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Principles Of Political Economy
Principles of Political Economy
By
By
John Stuart Mill
John Stuart Mill
Abridged, with Critical, Bibliographical,
Abridged, with critical bibliography,
and Explanatory Notes, and a Sketch
and Explanatory Notes, and a Sketch
of the History of Political Economy,
of the History of Political Economy,
By
By
J. Laurence Laughlin, Ph. D.
J. Laurence Laughlin, PhD
Assistant Professor of Political Economy in Harvard University
Assistant Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University
A Text-Book For Colleges.
A College Textbook.
New York:
NYC:
D. Appleton And Company,
D. Appleton & Company,
1, 3, and 5 Bond Street.
1, 3, and 5 Bond Street.
1885
1885
Contents
- Preface.
- Introductory.
- A Sketch Of The History Of Political Economy.
- Books For Consultation (From English, French, And German Authors).
- Preliminary Remarks.
- Book I. Production.
- Chapter I. Of The Requisites Of Production.
- § 1. The requisites of production.
- § 2. The Second Requisite of Production, Labor.
- § 3. Of Capital as a Requisite of Production.
- Chapter II. Of Unproductive Labor.
- § 1. Definition of Productive and Unproductive Labor.
- § 2. Productive and Unproductive Consumption.
- § 3. Distinction Between Labor for the Supply of Productive Consumption and Labor for the Supply of Unproductive Consumption.
- Chapter III. Of Capital.
- § 1. Capital is Wealth Appropriated to Reproductive Employment.
- § 2. More Capital Devoted to Production than Actually Employed in it.
- § 3. Examination of Cases Illustrative of the Idea of Capital.
- Chapter IV. Fundamental Propositions Respecting Capital.
- § 1. Industry is Limited by Capital.
- § 2. Increase of Capital gives Increased Employment to Labor, Without Assignable Bounds.
- § 3. Capital is the result of Saving, and all Capital is Consumed.
- § 4. Capital is kept up by Perpetual Reproduction, as shown by the Recovery of Countries from Devastation.
- § 5. Effects of Defraying Government Expenditure by Loans.
- § 6. Demand for Commodities is not Demand for Labor.
- Chapter V. On Circulating And Fixed Capital.
- § 1. Fixed and Circulating Capital.
- § 2. Increase of Fixed Capital, when, at the Expense of Circulating, might be Detrimental to the Laborers.
- § 3. —This seldom, if ever, occurs.
- Chapter VI. Of Causes Affecting The Efficiency Of Production.
- § 1. General Causes of Superior Productiveness.
- § 2. Combination and Division of Labor Increase Productiveness.
- § 3. Advantages of Division of Labor.
- § 4. Production on a Large and Production on a Small Scale.
- Chapter VII. Of The Law Of The Increase Of Labor.
- § 1. The Law of the Increase of Production Depends on those of Three Elements—Labor. Capital, and Land.
- § 2. The Law of Population.
- § 3. By what Checks the Increase of Population is Practically Limited.
- Chapter VIII. Of The Law Of The Increase Of Capital.
- § 1. Means for Saving in the Surplus above Necessaries.
- § 2. Motive for Saving in the Surplus above Necessaries.
- § 3. Examples of Deficiency in the Strength of this Desire.
- § 4. Examples of Excess of this Desire.
- Chapter IX. Of The Law Of The Increase Of Production From Land.
- § 1. The Law of Production from the Soil, a Law of Diminishing Return in Proportion to the Increased Application of Labor and Capital.
- § 2. Antagonist Principle to the Law of Diminishing Return; the Progress of Improvements in Production.
- § 3. —In Railways.
- § 4. —In Manufactures.
- § 5. Law Holds True of Mining.
- Chapter X. Consequences Of The Foregoing Laws.
- § 1. Remedies for Weakness of the Principle of Accumulation.
- § 2. Even where the Desire to Accumulate is Strong, Population must be Kept within the Limits of Population from Land.
- § 3. Necessity of Restraining Population not superseded by Free Trade in Food.
- § 4. —Nor by Emigration.
- Book II. Distribution.
- Chapter I. Of Property.
- § 1. Individual Property and its opponents.
- § 2. The case for Communism against private property presented.
- § 3. The Socialists who appeal to state-help.
- § 4. Of various minor schemes, Communistic and Socialistic.
- § 5. The Socialist objections to the present order of Society examined.
- § 6. Property in land different from property in Movables.
- Chapter II. Of Wages.
- § 1. Of Competition and Custom.
- § 2. The Wages-fund, and the Objections to it Considered.
- § 3. Examination of some popular Opinions respecting Wages.
- § 4. Certain rare Circumstances excepted, High Wages imply Restraints on Population.
- § 5. Due Restriction of Population the only Safeguard of a Laboring-Class.
- Chapter III. Of Remedies For Low Wages.
- § 1. A Legal or Customary Minimum of Wages, with a Guarantee of Employment.
- § 2. —Would Require as a Condition Legal Measures for Repression of Population.
- § 3. Allowances in Aid of Wages and the Standard of Living.
- § 4. Grounds for Expecting Improvement in Public Opinion on the Subject of Population.
- § 5. Twofold means of Elevating the Habits of the Laboring-People; by Education, and by Foreign and Home Colonization.
- Chapter IV. Of The Differences Of Wages In Different Employments.
- § 1. Differences of Wages Arising from Different Degrees of Attractiveness in Different Employments.
- § 2. Differences arising from Natural Monopolies.
- § 3. Effect on Wages of the Competition of Persons having other Means of Support.
- § 4. Wages of Women, why Lower than those of Men.
- § 5. Differences of Wages Arising from Laws, Combinations, or Customs.
- Chapter V. Of Profits.
- § 1. Profits include Interest and Risk; but, correctly speaking, do not include Wages of Superintendence.
- § 2. The Minimum of Profits; what produces Variations in the Amount of Profits.
- § 3. General Tendency of Profits to an Equality.
- § 4. The Cause of the Existence of any Profit; the Advances of Capitalists consist of Wages of Labor.
- § 5. The Rate of Profit depends on the Cost of Labor.
- Chapter VI. Of Rent.
- § 1. Rent the Effect of a Natural Monopoly.
- § 2. No Land can pay Rent except Land of such Quality or Situation as exists in less Quantity than the Demand.
- § 3. The Rent of Land is the Excess of its Return above the Return to the worst Land in Cultivation.
- § 4. —Or to the Capital employed in the least advantageous Circumstances.
- § 5. Opposing Views of the Law of Rent.
- § 6. Rent does not enter into the Cost of Production of Agricultural Produce.
- Book III. Exchange.
- Chapter I. Of Value.
- § 1. Definitions of Value in Use, Exchange Value, and Price.
- § 2. Conditions of Value: Utility, Difficulty of Attainment, and Transferableness.
- § 3. Commodities limited in Quantity by the law of Demand and Supply: General working of this Law.
- § 4. Miscellaneous Cases falling under this Law.
- § 5. Commodities which are Susceptible of Indefinite Multiplication without Increase of Cost. Law of their Value Cost of Production.
- § 6. The Value of these Commodities confirm, in the long run, to their Cost of Production through the operation of Demand and Supply.
- Chapter II. Ultimate Analysis Of Cost Of Production.
- § 1. Of Labor, the principal Element in Cost of Production.
- § 2. Wages affect Values, only if different in different employments; “non-competing groups.”
- § 3. Profits an element in Cost of Production.
- § 4. Cost of Production properly represented by sacrifice, or cost, to the Laborer as well as to the Capitalist; the relation of this conception to the Cost of Labor.
- § 5. When profits vary from Employment to Employment, or are spread over unequal lengths of Time, they affect Values accordingly.
- § 6. Occasional Elements in Cost of Production; taxes and ground-rent.
- Chapter III. Of Rent, In Its Relation To Value.
- § 1. Commodities which are susceptible of indefinite Multiplication, but not without increase of Cost. Law of their Value, Cost of Production in the most unfavorable existing circumstances.
- § 2. Such commodities, when Produced in circumstances more favorable, yield a Rent equal to the difference of Cost.
- § 3. Rent of Mines and Fisheries and ground-rent of Buildings, and cases of gain analogous to Rent.
- § 4. Resume of the laws of value of each of the three classes of commodities.
- Chapter IV. Of Money.
- § 1. The three functions of Money—a Common Denominator of Value, a Medium of Exchange, a “Standard of Value”.
- § 2. Gold and Silver, why fitted for those purposes.
- § 3. Money a mere contrivance for facilitating exchanges, which does not affect the laws of value.
- Chapter V. Of The Value Of Money, As Dependent On Demand And Supply.
- § 1. Value of Money, an ambiguous expression.
- § 2. The Value of Money depends on its quantity.
- § 3. —Together with the Rapidity of Circulation.
- § 4. Explanations and Limitations of this Principle.
- Chapter VI. Of The Value Of Money, As Dependent On Cost Of Production.
- § 1. The value of Money, in a state of Freedom, conforms to the value of the Bullion contained in it.
- § 2. —Which is determined by the cost of production.
- § 3. This law, how related to the principle laid down in the preceding chapter.
- Chapter VII. Of A Double Standard And Subsidiary Coins.
- § 1. Objections to a Double Standard.
- § 2. The use of the two metals as money, and the management of Subsidiary Coins.
- § 3. The experience of the United States with a double standard from 1792 to 1883.
- Chapter VIII. Of Credit, As A Substitute For Money.
- § 1. Credit not a creation but a Transfer of the means of Production.
- § 2. In what manner it assists Production.
- § 3. Function of Credit in economizing the use of Money.
- § 4. Bills of Exchange.
- § 5. Promissory Notes.
- § 6. Deposits and Checks.
- Chapter IX. Influence Of Credit On Prices.
- § 1. What acts on prices is Credit, in whatever shape given.
- § 2. Credit a purchasing Power, similar to Money.
- § 3. Great extensions and contractions of Credit. Phenomena of a commercial crisis analyzed.
- § 4. Influence of the different forms of Credit on Prices.
- § 5. On what the use of Credit depends.
- § 6. What is essential to the idea of Money?
- Chapter X. Of An Inconvertible Paper Currency.
- § 1. What determines the value of an inconvertible paper money?
- § 2. If regulated by the price of Bullion, as inconvertible Currency might be safe, but not Expedient.
- § 3. Examination of the doctrine that an inconvertible Current is safe, if representing actual Property.
- § 4. Experiments with paper Money in the United States.
- § 5. Examination of the gain arising from the increase and issue of paper Currency.
- § 6. Resume of the subject of money.
- Chapter XI. Of Excess Of Supply.
- § 1. The theory of a general Over-Supply of Commodities stated.
- § 2. The supply of commodities in general can not exceed the power of Purchase.
- § 3. There can never be a lack of Demand arising from lack of Desire to Consume.
- § 4. Origin and Explanation of the notion of general Over-Supply.
- Chapter XII. Of Some Peculiar Cases Of Value.
- § 1. Values of commodities which have a joint cost of production.
- § 2. Values of the different kinds of agricultural produce.
- Chapter XIII. Of International Trade.
- § 1. Cost of Production not a regulator of international values. Extension of the word “international.”
- § 2. Interchange of commodities between distance places determined by differences not in their absolute, but in the comparative, costs of production.
- § 3. The direct benefits of commerce consist in increased Efficiency of the productive powers of the World.
- § 4. —Not in a Vent for exports, nor in the gains of Merchants.
- § 5. Indirect benefits of Commerce, Economical and Moral; still greater than the Direct.
- Chapter XIV. Of International Values.
- § 1. The values of imported commodities depend on the Terms of international interchange.
- § 2. The values of foreign commodities depend, not upon Cost of Production, but upon Reciprocal Demand and Supply.
- § 3. —As illustrated by trade in cloth and linen between England and Germany.
- § 4. The conclusion states in the Equation of International Demand.
- § 5. The cost to a country of its imports depends not only on the ratio of exchange, but on the efficiency of its labor.
- Chapter XV. Of Money Considered As An Imported Commodity.
- § 1. Money imported on two modes; as a Commodity, and as a medium of Exchange.
- § 2. As a commodity, it obeys the same laws of Value as other imported Commodities.
- Chapter XVI. Of The Foreign Exchanges.
- § 1. Money passes from country to country as a Medium of Exchange, through the Exchanges.
- § 2. Distinction between Variations in the Exchanges which are self-adjusting and those which can only be rectified through Prices.
- Chapter XVII. Of The Distribution Of The Precious Metals Through The Commercial World.
- § 1. The substitution of money for barter makes no difference in exports and imports, nor in the Law of international Values.
- § 2. The preceding Theorem further illustrated.
- § 3. The precious metals, as money, are of the same Value, and distribute themselves according to the same Law, with the precious metals as a Commodity.
- § 4. International payments entering into the “financial account.”
- Chapter XVIII. Influence Of The Currency On The Exchanges And On Foreign Trade.
- § 1. Variations in the exchange, which originate in the Currency.
- § 2. Effect of a sudden increase of a metallic Currency, or of the sudden creation of Bank-Notes or other substitutes for Money.
- § 3. Effect of the increase of an inconvertible paper Currency. Real and nominal exchange.
- Chapter XIX. Of The Rate Of Interest.
- § 1. The Rate of Interest depends on the Demand and Supply of Loans.
- § 2. Circumstances which Determine the Permanent Demand and Supply of Loans.
- § 3. Circumstances which Determine the Fluctuations.
- § 4. The Rate of Interest not really Connected with the value of Money, but often confounded with it.
- § 5. The Rate of Interest determines the price of land and of Securities.
- Chapter XX. Of The Competition Of Different Countries In The Same Market.
- § 1. Causes which enable one Country to undersell another.
- § 2. High wages do not prevent one Country from underselling another.
- § 3. Low wages enable a Country to undersell another, when Peculiar to certain branches of Industry.
- § 4. —But not when common to All.
- § 5. Low profits as affecting the carrying Trade.
- Chapter XXI. Of Distribution, As Affected By Exchange.
- § 1. Exchange and money make no Difference in the law of Wages.
- § 2. In the law of Rent.
- § 3. —Nor in the law of Profits.
- Book IV. Influence Of The Progress Of Society On Production And Distribution.
- Chapter I. Influence Of The Progress Of Industry And Population On Values And Prices.
- § 1. Tendency of the progress of society toward increased Command over the powers of Nature; increased Security, and increased Capacity of Co-Operation.
- § 2. Tendency to a Decline of the Value and Cost of Production of all Commodities.
- § 3. —except the products of Agriculture and Mining, which have a tendency to Rise.
- § 4. —that tendency from time to time Counteracted by Improvements in Production.
- § 5. Effect of the Progress of Society in moderating fluctuations of Value.
- Chapter II. Influence Of The Progress Of Industry And Population On Rents, Profits, And Wages.
- § 1. Characteristic features of industrial Progress.
- § 2. First two cases, Population and Capital increasing, the arts of production stationary.
- § 3. The arts of production advancing, capital and population stationary.
- § 4. Theoretical results, if all three Elements progressive.
- § 5. Practical Results.
- Chapter III. Of The Tendency Of Profits To A Minimum.
- § 1. Different Theories as to the fall of Profits.
- § 2. What determines the minimum rate of Profit?
- § 3. In old and opulent countries, profits habitually near to the minimum.
- § 4. —prevented from reaching it by commercial revulsions.
- § 5. —by improvements in Production.
- § 6. —by the importation of cheap Necessaries and Implements.
- § 7. —by the emigration of Capital.
- Chapter IV. Consequences Of The Tendency Of Profits To A Minimum, And The Stationary State.
- § 1. Abstraction of Capital not necessarily a national loss.
- § 2. In opulent countries, the extension of machinery not detrimental but beneficial to Laborers.
- § 3. Stationary state of wealth and population dreaded by some writers, but not in itself undesirable.
- Chapter V. On The Possible Futurity Of The Laboring-Classes.
- § 1. The possibility of improvement while Laborers remain merely receivers of Wages.
- § 2.—through small holdings, by which the landlord's gain is shared.
- § 3. —through co-operation, by which the manager's wages are shared.
- § 4. Distributive Co-operation.
- § 5. Productive Co-Operation.
- § 6. Industrial Partnership.
- § 7. People's Banks.
- Book V. On The Influence Of Government.
- Chapter I. On The General Principles Of Taxation.
- § 1. Four fundamental rules of Taxation.
- § 2. Grounds of the principle of Equality of Taxation.
- § 3. Should the same percentage be levied on all amounts of Income?
- § 4. Should the same percentage be levied on Perpetual and on Terminable Incomes?
- § 5. The increase of the rent of land from natural causes a fit subject of peculiar Taxation.
- § 6. Taxes falling on Capital not necessarily objectionable.
- Chapter II. Of Direct Taxes.
- § 1. Direct taxes either on income or expenditure.
- § 2. Taxes on rent.
- § 3. —on profits.
- § 4. —on Wages.
- § 5. —on Income.
- § 6. A House-Tax.
- Chapter III. Of Taxes On Commodities, Or Indirect Taxes.
- § 1. A Tax on all commodities would fall on Profits.
- § 2. Taxes on particular commodities fall on the consumer.
- § 3. Peculiar effects of taxes on Necessaries.
- § 4. —how modified by the tendency of profits to a minimum.
- § 5. Effects of discriminating Duties.
- § 6. Effects produced on international Exchange by Duties on Exports and on Imports.
- Chapter IV. Comparison Between Direct And Indirect Taxation.
- § 1. Arguments for and against direct Taxation.
- § 2. What forms of indirect taxation are most eligible?
- § 3. Practical rules for indirect taxation.
- § 4. Taxation systems of the United States and other Countries.
- § 5. A Resume of the general principles of taxation.
- Chapter V. Of A National Debt.
- § 1. Is it desirable to defray extraordinary public expenses by loans?
- § 2. Not desirable to redeem a national Debt by a general Contribution.
- § 3. In what cases desirable to maintain a surplus revenue for the redemption of Debt.
- Chapter VI. Of An Interference Of Government Grounded On Erroneous Theories.
- § 1. The doctrine of Protection to Native Industry.
- § 2. —had its origin in the Mercantile System.
- § 3. —supported by pleas of national subsistence and national defense.
- § 4. —on the ground of encouraging young industries; colonial policy.
- § 5. —on the ground of high wages.
- § 6. —on the ground of creating a diversity of industries.
- § 7. —on the ground that it lowers prices.
- Appendix I. Bibliographies.
- Appendix II. Examination Questions.
- Footnotes
Preface.
An experience of five years with Mr. Mill's treatise in the class-room not only convinced me of the great usefulness of what still remains one of the most lucid and systematic books yet published which cover the whole range of the study, but I have also been convinced of the need of such additions as should give the results of later thinking, without militating against the general tenor of Mr. Mill's system; of such illustrations as should fit it better for American students, by turning their attention to the application of principles in the facts around us; of a bibliography which should make it easier to get at the writers of other schools who offer opposing views on controverted questions; and of some attempts to lighten those parts of his work in which Mr. Mill frightened away the reader by an appearance of too great abstractness, and to render them, if possible, more easy of comprehension to the student who first approaches Political Economy through this author. Believing, also, that the omission of much that should properly be classed under the head of Sociology, or Social Philosophy, would narrow the field to Political Economy alone, and aid, perhaps, in [pg iv] clearer ideas, I was led to reduce the two volumes into one, with, of course, the additional hope that the smaller book would tempt some readers who might hesitate to attack his larger work. In consonance with the above plan, I have abridged Mr. Mill's treatise, yet have always retained his own words; although it should be said that they are not always his consecutive words. Everything in the larger type on the page is taken literally from Mr. Mill, and, whenever it has been necessary to use a word to complete the sense, it has been always inserted in square brackets. All additional matter introduced by me has been printed in a smaller but distinctive type. The reader can see at a glance which part of the page is Mr. Mill's and which my own.
My five years of experience with Mr. Mill's treatise in the classroom not only convinced me of the significant usefulness of what remains one of the clearest and most methodical books published on the entire subject, but it also convinced me of the need for additions that would reflect the results of more recent thinking without undermining the overall framework of Mr. Mill's system. I found it necessary to include illustrations that would better suit American students by focusing their attention on how principles apply to the realities around us, and to provide a bibliography that would help readers access writers from other schools who present opposing views on debated issues. Additionally, I aimed to make those portions of his work less daunting, where Mr. Mill's abstractness might deter readers, and to make them, if possible, more accessible to students approaching Political Economy through this author for the first time. I also believed that leaving out many aspects that rightly belong to Sociology or Social Philosophy would limit the scope to Political Economy alone and could perhaps help in forming clearer ideas. Therefore, I decided to condense the two volumes into one, hoping that a smaller book would entice some readers who might hesitate to tackle the larger work. In line with this plan, I have abridged Mr. Mill's treatise, always using his own words; however, it should be noted that they are not always presented consecutively. Everything in larger type on the page is taken directly from Mr. Mill, and wherever it was necessary to insert a word for clarity, it has been included in square brackets. All additional content I introduced is printed in smaller but distinct type. This way, the reader can easily identify which parts of the page are from Mr. Mill and which are my contributions.
It has seemed necessary to make the most additions to the original treatise under the subjects of the Wages Question; of Wages of Superintendence; of Socialism; of Cost of Production; of Bimetallism; of the Paper Money experiments in this country; of International Values; of the Future of the Laboring-Classes (in which the chapter was entirely rewritten); and of Protection. The treatment of Land Tenures has not been entirely omitted, but it does not appear as a separate subject, because it has at present less value as an elementary study for American students. The chapters on Land Tenures, the English currency discussion, and much of Book V, on the Influence of Government, have been simply omitted. In one case I have changed the order of the chapters, by inserting Chap. XV of Book III, treating of a standard of value, under the chapter treating of money and its functions. In other respects, the same order has been followed as in the original work.
It has seemed necessary to add the most to the original treatise under the topics of the Wages Question; Wages of Supervision; Socialism; Cost of Production; Bimetallism; the Paper Money experiments in this country; International Values; the Future of the Laboring Classes (which was completely rewritten); and Protection. The discussion on Land Tenures hasn't been entirely left out, but it doesn't stand as a separate topic since it currently holds less significance as a basic study for American students. The chapters on Land Tenures, the English currency discussion, and much of Book V, on the Influence of Government, have been simply omitted. In one instance, I’ve changed the order of the chapters by inserting Chap. XV of Book III, which discusses a standard of value, under the chapter about money and its functions. Otherwise, the same order has been maintained as in the original work.
Wherever it has seemed possible, American illustrations have been inserted instead of English or Continental ones.
Wherever it has seemed possible, American illustrations have been included instead of English or Continental ones.
To interest the reader in home problems, twenty-four charts have been scattered throughout the volume, which bear upon our own conditions, with the expectation, also, that the different methods of graphic representation here presented would lead students to apply them to other questions. They are mainly such as I have employed in my class-room. The use and preparation of such charts ought to be encouraged. The earlier pages of the volume have been given up to a “Sketch of the History of Political Economy,” which aims to give the story of how we have arrived at our present knowledge of economic laws. The student who has completed Mill will then have a very considerable bibliography of the various schools and writers from which to select further reading, and to select this reading so that it may not fall wholly within the range of one class of writers. But, for the time that Mill is being first studied, I have added a list of the most important books for consultation. I have also collected, in Appendix I, some brief bibliographies on the Tariff, on Bimetallism, and on American Shipping, which may be of use to those who may not have the means of inquiring for authorities, and in Appendix II a number of questions and problems for the teacher's use.
To engage the reader with home issues, twenty-four charts have been included throughout the book that relate to our current situation, with the hope that the various ways of presenting data will inspire students to apply them to different topics. These charts are mostly the ones I’ve used in my classroom. The creation and use of such charts should be encouraged. The early pages of the book include a “Overview of the History of Political Economy,” which aims to tell the story of how we developed our current understanding of economic laws. Once students have finished reading Mill, they will have a substantial bibliography of various schools and writers to choose from for further reading, ensuring it doesn't solely focus on one type of writer. However, during the time Mill is first studied, I’ve included a list of the most important books for reference. In Appendix I, I’ve also gathered some brief bibliographies on the Tariff, Bimetallism, and American Shipping, which may be helpful for those who can’t easily find authoritative sources, and in Appendix II, there are several questions and problems for teachers to use.
In some cases I have omitted Mr. Mill's statement entirely, and put in its stead a simpler form of the same exposition which I believed would be more easily grasped by a student. Of such cases, the argument to show that Demand for Commodities is not Demand for Labor, the Doctrine of International Values, and the Effect of the Progress of Society on wages, profits, and rent, are examples. Whether I have succeeded or not, must be left for the experience of the teacher to determine. Many small figures and diagrams have been used throughout the text, in order [pg vi] to suggest the concrete means of getting a clear grasp of a principle.
In some cases, I've completely omitted Mr. Mill's statement and instead provided a simpler version of the same explanation that I thought would be easier for a student to understand. Examples of this include the argument showing that Demand for Commodities is not the same as Demand for Labor, the Doctrine of International Values, and the Impact of Societal Progress on wages, profits, and rent. Whether I've succeeded or not is something for the teacher's experience to determine. I've used many small figures and diagrams throughout the text to help suggest concrete ways to clearly understand a principle. [pg vi]
In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to several friends for assistance in the preparation of this volume, among whom are Professor Charles F. Dunbar, Dr. F. W. Taussig, Dr. A. B. Hart, and Mr. Edward Atkinson.
In conclusion, I want to express my gratitude to several friends for their help in preparing this volume, including Professor Charles F. Dunbar, Dr. F. W. Taussig, Dr. A. B. Hart, and Mr. Edward Atkinson.
J. Laurence Laughlin.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
September, 1884.
J. Laurence Laughlin.
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,
September 1884.


Intro.
An Overview of the History of Political Economy.
General Bibliography.—There is no satisfactory general history of political economy in English. Blanqui's “Histoire de l'économie politique en Europe” (Paris, 1837) is disproportioned and superficial, and he labors under the disadvantage of not understanding the English school of economists. He studies to give the history of economic facts, rather than of economic laws. The book has been translated into English (New York, 1880).
General BibliographyThere isn't a complete general history of political economy in English. Blanqui's __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“History of Political Economy in Europe”(Paris, 1837) lacks depth and is somewhat shallow, and he grapples with his incomplete understanding of the English school of economists. His goal is to present the history of economic events instead of the history of economic principles. The book has been translated into English (New York, 1880).
Villeneuve-Bargemont, in his “Histoire de l'économie politique” (Paris, 1841), aims to oppose a “Christian political economy” to the “English” political economy, and indulges in religious discussions.
Villeneuve-Bargemont, in his“Political Economy History”(Paris, 1841) aims to present a“Christian political economy”versus the“English”political economy and participates in discussions about religion.
Travers Twiss, “View of the Progress of Political Economy in Europe since the Sixteenth Century” (London, 1847), marked an advance by treating the subject in the last four centuries, and by separating the history of principles from the history of facts. It is brief, and only a sketch. Julius Kautz has published in German the best existing history, “Die geschichtliche Entwickelung der National-Oekonomie und ihrer Literatur” (Vienna, 1860). (See Cossa, “Guide to the Study of Political Economy,” page 80.) Cossa in his book has furnished a vast amount of information about writers, classified by epochs and countries, and a valuable discussion of the divisions of political economy by various writers, and its relation to other sciences. It is a very desirable little hand-book. McCulloch, in his “Introduction to the Wealth of Nations,” gives a brief sketch of the growth of economic doctrine. The editor begs to acknowledge his great indebtedness for information to his colleague, Professor Charles F. Dunbar, of Harvard University.
Travers Twiss,“A Look at the Development of Political Economy in Europe since the Sixteenth Century”(London, 1847) marked a major advancement by discussing the topic over the last four centuries and differentiating between the history of ideas and the history of events. It's brief and primarily a summary. Julius Kautz has published the best available history in German,“The Historical Development of National Economics and Its Literature”(Vienna, 1860). (See Cossa,"Guide to the Study of Political Economy,"page 80.) In his book, Cossa offers a lot of information about authors, sorted by time periods and countries, along with a helpful discussion on how various writers have categorized political economy and its relationship to other disciplines. It’s a really handy little guide. McCulloch, in his“Introduction to the Wealth of Nations,”provides a short summary of the evolution of economic ideas. The editor wants to extend his heartfelt thanks for the insights shared by his colleague, Professor Charles F. Dunbar, from Harvard University.
Systematic study for an understanding of the laws of political economy is to be found no farther back than the [pg 002] sixteenth century. The history of political economy is not the history of economic institutions, any more than the history of mathematics is the history of every object possessing length, breadth, and thickness. Economic history is the story of the gradual evolution in the thought of men of an understanding of the laws which to-day constitute the science we are studying. It is essentially modern.1
Systematic study to understand the laws of political economy goes back no further than the sixteenth century. The history of political economy isn’t about the history of economic institutions, just like the history of mathematics isn’t about every object that has length, width, and thickness. Economic history tells the story of how people’s understanding of the laws that now make up the science we’re studying has gradually evolved. It is fundamentally modern.
Aristotle2 and Xenophon had some comprehension of the theory of money, and Plato3 had defined its functions with some accuracy. The economic laws of the Romans were all summed up in the idea of enriching the metropolis at the expense of the dependencies. During the middle ages no systematic study was undertaken, and the nature of economic laws was not even suspected.
Aristotle2 and Xenophon understood the theory of money to some extent, while Plato3 accurately defined its functions. The economic principles of the Romans focused on enriching the capital city at the expense of its territories. In the middle ages, there was no systematic study of economics, and the concept of economic laws was largely unrecognized.
It is worth notice that the first glimmerings of political economy came to be seen through the discussions on money, and the extraordinary movements of gold and silver. About the time of Charles V, the young study was born, accompanied by the revival of learning, the Reformation, the discovery of America, and the great fall in the value of gold and silver. Modern society was just beginning, and had already brought manufactures into existence—woolens in England, silks in France, Genoa, and Florence; Venice had become the great commercial city of the world; the Hanseatic League was carrying goods from the Mediterranean to the Baltic; and the Jews of Lombardy had by that time brought into use the bill of exchange. While the supply of the precious metals had been tolerably constant hitherto, the steady increase of business brought about a fall of prices. From the middle of the fourteenth to the end of the fifteenth century [pg 003] the purchasing power of money increased in the ratio of four to ten. Then into this situation came the great influx of gold and silver from the New World. Prices rose unequally; the trading and manufacturing classes were flourishing, while others were depressed. In the sixteenth century the price of wheat tripled, but wages only doubled; the laboring-classes of England deteriorated, while others were enriched, producing profound social changes and the well-known flood of pauperism, together with the rise of the mercantile classes. Then new channels of trade were opened to the East and West. Of course, men saw but dimly the operation of these economic causes; although the books now began to hint at the right understanding of the movements and the true laws of money.
It's worth noting that the first hints of political economy emerged through discussions about money and the unusual fluctuations of gold and silver. Around the time of Charles V, this new study began, coinciding with the Renaissance, the Reformation, the discovery of America, and the significant drop in the value of gold and silver. Modern society was just starting to take shape, and had already led to the creation of industries—woolen goods in England, silks in France, Genoa, and Florence; Venice had become the leading commercial city in the world; the Hanseatic League was transporting goods from the Mediterranean to the Baltic; and by then, the Jews in Lombardy had introduced the bill of exchange. While the supply of precious metals had been relatively stable up until that point, the continual growth of business led to a decrease in prices. From the middle of the fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century, the purchasing power of money increased from four to ten. Then, the massive influx of gold and silver from the New World changed the situation. Prices rose unevenly; the trading and manufacturing classes thrived, while others faced hardship. In the sixteenth century, the price of wheat tripled, but wages only doubled; the laboring class in England suffered, while others became wealthy, leading to significant social changes and a notable increase in poverty, as well as the rise of the mercantile classes. New trade routes to the East and West were also established. Of course, people had only a vague understanding of these economic forces; although books began to suggest a better grasp of the movements and true principles of money.
Even before this time, however, Nicole Orêsme, Bishop of Lisieux (died 1382), had written intelligently on money;4 but, about 1526, the astronomer Copernicus gave a very good exposition of some of the functions of money. But he, as well as Latimer,5 while noticing the economic changes, gave no correct explanation. The Seigneur de Malestroit, a councilor of the King of France, however, by his errors drew out Jean Bodin6 to say that the rise of prices was due to the abundance of money brought from America. But he was in advance of his time, as well as William Stafford,7 the author of the first English treatise on money, which showed a perfect insight into the subject. Stafford distinctly grasped [pg 004] the idea that the high prices brought no loss to merchants, great gain to those who held long leases, and loss to those who did not buy and sell; that, in reality, commodities were exchanged when money was passed from hand to hand.
Even before this time, though, Nicole Orêsme, Bishop of Lisieux (died 1382), had written thoughtfully about money;4 but around 1526, the astronomer Copernicus offered a solid explanation of some functions of money. However, he, along with Latimer,5 while observing the economic changes, didn't provide a proper explanation. The Seigneur de Malestroit, a councilor to the King of France, made some mistakes that led Jean Bodin6 to state that the rise in prices was due to the influx of money from America. Yet he was ahead of his time, just like William Stafford,7 who wrote the first English treatise on money, demonstrating a deep understanding of the topic. Stafford clearly understood that high prices didn’t hurt merchants, benefited those with long leases, and harmed those who didn't buy and sell; in fact, commodities were exchanged when money changed hands.
Such was the situation8 which prefaced the first general system destined to be based on supposed economic considerations, wrongly understood, to be sure, but vigorously carried out. I refer to the well-known mercantile system which over-spread Europe.9 Spain, as the first receiver of American gold and silver, attributed to it abnormal power, and by heavy duties and prohibitions tried to keep the precious metals to herself. This led to a general belief in the tenets of the mercantile system, and its adoption by all Europe. 1. It was maintained that, where gold and silver abounded, there would be found no lack of the necessaries of life; 2. Therefore governments should do all in their power to secure an abundance of money. Noting that commerce and political power seemed to be in the hands of the states having the greatest quantity of money, men wished mainly to create such a relation of exports and imports of goods as would bring about an importation of money. The natural sequence of this was, the policy of creating a favorable “balance of trade” by increasing exports and diminishing imports, thus implying that the gain in international trade was not a mutual one. The error consisted in supposing that a nation could sell without buying, and in overlooking the instrumental character of money. The errors even went so far as to create prohibitory legislation, in the hope of shutting out imported goods and keeping the precious metals at home. The system [pg 005] spread over Europe, so that France (1544) and England (1552) forbade the export of specie. But, with the more peaceful conditions at the end of the sixteenth century, the expansion of commerce, the value of money became steadier, and prices advanced more slowly.
Such was the situation8 that set the stage for the first general system aimed at economic considerations, which were misunderstood but actively pursued. I’m talking about the well-known mercantile system that spread across Europe.9 Spain, being the first to receive American gold and silver, believed it conferred abnormal power and tried to keep the precious metals to itself through heavy taxes and restrictions. This led to a widespread belief in the principles of the mercantile system and its adoption throughout Europe. 1. It was argued that where gold and silver were abundant, the necessities of life would also be plentiful; 2. Therefore, governments should do everything possible to ensure a large supply of money. Observing that trade and political power seemed concentrated in states with the most money, people aimed primarily to establish a favorable relationship between exports and imports that would lead to an influx of money. The natural outcome of this was the policy of creating a favorable trade balance by boosting exports and cutting imports, suggesting that the benefits of international trade were not mutual. The mistake was in thinking that a nation could sell without buying and in ignoring the functional role of money. The misconceptions even led to laws intended to block imported goods and keep precious metals within the country. The system spread across Europe, prompting France (1544) and England (1552) to ban the export of coins. However, with more peaceful conditions by the end of the sixteenth century, trade expanded, the value of money stabilized, and prices increased more slowly.
Italian writers were among the first to discuss the laws of money intelligently,10 but a number of acute Englishmen enriched the literature of the subject,11 and it may be said that any modern study of political economy received its first definite impulse from England and France.
Italian writers were some of the first to thoughtfully discuss the principles of money, 10 but several sharp-minded English thinkers contributed significantly to the literature on the topic, 11 and it can be argued that any contemporary analysis of political economy got its initial boost from England and France.
The prohibition of the export of coin was embarrassing to the East India Company and to merchants; and Mun tried to show that freedom of exportation would increase the amount of gold and silver in a country, since the profits in foreign trade would bring back more than went out. It probably was not clear to them, however, that the export of bullion to the East was advantageous, because the commodities brought back in return were more valuable in England than the precious metals. The purpose of the mercantilists was to increase the amount of gold and silver in the country. Mun, with some penetration, had even pointed out that too much money was an evil; but in 1663 the English Parliament removed the restriction on the exportation of coin. The balance-of-trade heresy, that exports should always exceed [pg 006] imports (as if merchants would send out goods which, when paid for in commodities, should be returned in a form of less value than those sent out!), was the outcome of the mercantile system, and it has continued in the minds of many men to this day. The policy which aimed at securing a favorable balance of trade, and the plan of protecting home industries, had the same origin. If all consumable goods were produced at home, and none imported, that would increase exports, and bring more gold and silver into the country. As all the countries of Europe had adopted the mercantile theory after 1664, retaliatory and prohibitory tariffs were set up against each other by England, France, Holland, and Germany. Then, because it was seen that large sums were paid for carrying goods, in order that no coin should be required to pay foreigners in any branch of industry, navigation laws were enacted, which required goods to be imported only in ships belonging to the importing nation. These remnants of the mercantile system continue to this day in the shipping laws of this and other countries.12
The ban on exporting coins was a headache for the East India Company and merchants, and Mun tried to argue that allowing exports would actually increase the gold and silver in a country, as the profits from foreign trade would bring in more than what was sent out. However, they probably didn't realize that sending bullion to the East was beneficial because the goods brought back were worth more in England than the precious metals sent away. The goal of the mercantilists was to amass more gold and silver in the country. Mun insightfully mentioned that having too much money could be problematic; however, in 1663, the English Parliament lifted the ban on exporting coins. The misguided belief that exports should always outpace imports (as if merchants would send out goods that, when paid for with commodities, would come back in a less valuable form!) was a product of the mercantile system and continues to influence many people today. The strategy aimed at achieving a favorable trade balance and supporting domestic industries shared the same roots. If all consumer goods were produced locally and none were imported, it would boost exports and bring more gold and silver into the country. After 1664, when all European countries adopted mercantile theory, England, France, Holland, and Germany imposed retaliatory and prohibitory tariffs against each other. Then, realizing that substantial amounts were spent on transporting goods to avoid using coins to pay foreign industries, navigation laws were passed that required goods to be imported only on ships belonging to the importing nation. These vestiges of the mercantile system remain present today in the shipping laws of this and other countries.
A natural consequence of the navigation acts, and of the mercantile system, was the so-called colonial policy, by which the colonies were excluded from all trade except with the mother-country. A plantation like New England, which produced commodities in competition with England, was looked upon with disfavor for her enterprise; and all this because of the fallacy, at the foundation of the mercantile [pg 007] system, that the gain in international trade is not mutual, but that what one country gains another must lose.13
A natural outcome of the navigation acts and the mercantile system was the so-called colonial policy, which restricted the colonies from trading with anyone except the mother country. A colony like New England, which produced goods that competed with England, was viewed unfavorably for its ambition; and all of this stemmed from the misconception at the heart of the mercantile system that international trade benefits are not mutual, meaning that what one country gains, another must lose.13
An exposition of mercantilism would not be complete without a statement of the form it assumed in France under the guidance of Colbert,14 the great minister of Louis XIV, from 1661 to 1683. In order to create a favorable balance of trade, he devoted himself to fostering home productions, by attempts to abolish vexatious tolls and customs within the country, and by an extraordinary system of supervision in manufacturing establishments (which has been the stimulus to paternal government from which France has never since been able to free herself). Processes were borrowed from England, Germany, and Sweden, and new establishments for making tapestries and silk goods sprang up; even the sizes of fabrics were regulated by Colbert, and looms unsuitable for these sizes destroyed. In 1671 wool-dyers were given a code of detailed instructions as to the processes and materials that might be used. Long after, French industry felt the difficulty of struggling with stereotyped processes. His system, however, naturally resulted in a series of tariff measures (in 1664 and 1667). Moderate duties on the exportation of raw materials were first laid on, followed by heavy customs imposed on the importation of foreign goods. The shipment of coin was forbidden; but Colbert's criterion of prosperity was the favorable balance of trade. French agriculture was overlooked. The tariff of 1667 was based on the theory that foreigners must of necessity buy French wines, lace, and wheat; that the French could sell, but not buy; but the act of 1667 cut off the demand for French goods, and Portuguese [pg 008] wines came into the market. England and Holland retaliated and shut off the foreign markets from France. The wine and wheat growers of the latter country were ruined, and the rural population came to the verge of starvation. Colbert's last years were full of misfortune and disappointment; and a new illustration was given of the fallacy that the gain from international trade was not mutual.
An explanation of mercantilism wouldn’t be complete without discussing how it developed in France under Colbert, the influential minister of Louis XIV, from 1661 to 1683. To create a favorable trade balance, he focused on promoting domestic production by trying to eliminate annoying tolls and customs within the country, along with an extensive system of oversight in manufacturing (which became the basis for paternal governance in France that the country has struggled to escape). Techniques were borrowed from England, Germany, and Sweden, leading to the establishment of new tapestry and silk manufacturing. Colbert even regulated the sizes of fabrics and destroyed looms that didn’t meet those specifications. In 1671, wool-dyers received a detailed guide on the processes and materials they could use. Much later, French industry faced challenges due to the rigid processes established. His system, however, naturally led to a series of tariff measures in 1664 and 1667. Initially, moderate duties were imposed on exporting raw materials, followed by heavy tariffs on importing foreign goods. The shipment of coin was banned; Colbert believed that prosperity was based on a favorable trade balance. French agriculture was neglected. The 1667 tariff was based on the idea that foreigners had to buy French wines, lace, and wheat; the assumption was that the French could sell but not buy. However, the act of 1667 reduced the demand for French goods, leading to an influx of Portuguese wines. England and Holland retaliated by blocking French access to foreign markets. This devastated the wine and wheat producers in France, pushing the rural population close to starvation. Colbert’s final years were filled with misfortune and disappointment, serving as a new example of the false notion that the benefits of international trade are not mutual.
From this time, economic principles began to be better apprehended. It is to be noted that the first just observations arose from discussions upon money, and thence upon international trade. So far England has furnished the most acute writers: now France became the scene of a new movement. Marshal Vauban,15 the great soldier, and Boisguillebert16 both began to emphasize the truth that wealth really consists, not in money alone, but in an abundance of commodities; that countries which have plenty of gold and silver are not wealthier than others, and that money is only a medium of exchange. It was not, however, until 1750 that evidences of any real advance began to appear; for Law's famous scheme (1716-1720) only served as a drag upon the growth of economic truth. But in the middle of the eighteenth century an intellectual revival set in: the “Encyclopædia” was published, Montesquieu wrote his “l'Ésprit des Lois,” Rousseau was beginning to write, and Voltaire was at the height of his power. In this movement political economy had an important share, and there resulted the first school of Economists, termed the Physiocrats.
From this time on, economic principles started to be better understood. It’s important to note that the earliest accurate observations came from discussions about money, and then about international trade. Up to that point, England had produced the sharpest writers; now France became the center of a new movement. Marshal Vauban15, the great soldier, and Boisguillebert16 both began to highlight the reality that wealth isn’t just about money, but about having a lot of goods; that countries with plenty of gold and silver aren’t necessarily richer than others, and that money is just a means of exchange. However, it wasn’t until 1750 that signs of any real progress started to emerge; Law's famous scheme (1716-1720) only hindered the growth of economic understanding. But in the mid-eighteenth century, an intellectual revival began: the "Encyclopedia" was published, Montesquieu wrote his "The Spirit of the Laws," Rousseau was starting to write, and Voltaire was at the peak of his influence. In this movement, political economy played a significant role, leading to the emergence of the first school of Economists, known as the Physiocrats.
The founder and leader of this new body of economic thinkers was François Quesnay,17 a physician and favorite at [pg 009] the court of Louis XV. Passing by his ethical basis of a natural order of society, and natural rights of man, his main doctrine, in brief, was that the cultivation of the soil was the only source of wealth; that labor in other industries was sterile; and that freedom of trade was a necessary condition of healthy distribution. While known as the “Economists,” they were also called the “Physiocrats,”18 or the “Agricultural School.” Quesnay and his followers distinguished between the creation of wealth (which could only come from the soil) and the union of these materials, once created, by labor in other occupations. In the latter case the laborer did not, in their theory, produce wealth. A natural consequence of this view appeared in a rule of taxation, by which all the burdens of state expenditure were laid upon the landed proprietors alone, since they alone received a surplus of wealth (the famous net produit) above their sustenance and expenses of production. This position, of course, did not recognize the old mercantile theory that foreign commerce enriched a nation solely by increasing the quantity of money. To a physiocrat the wealth of a community was increased not by money, but by an abundant produce from its own soil. In fact, Quesnay argued that the right of property included the right to dispose of it freely at home or abroad, unrestricted by the state. This doctrine was formulated in the familiar expression, “Laissez faire, laissez passer.”19 Condorcet and Condillac favored the new ideas. The “Economists” became the fashion in France; and even included in their number Joseph II of Austria, the Kings of Spain, Poland, Sweden, Naples, Catharine [pg 010] of Russia, and the Margrave of Baden.20 Agriculture, therefore, received a great stimulus.
The founder and leader of this group of economic thinkers was François Quesnay, a physician and favorite at the court of Louis XV. Setting aside his ethical views about a natural social order and human rights, his main idea was quite simple: he believed that farming was the only source of wealth; that labor in other industries was unproductive; and that free trade was essential for healthy distribution. Known as the “Economists,” they were also referred to as the “Physiocrats” or the “Agricultural School.” Quesnay and his followers made a distinction between wealth creation (which they believed could only come from the land) and the transformation of these resources by labor in other fields. In their view, this latter type of labor did not actually generate wealth. A natural outcome of this perspective was a taxation rule that imposed all the financial burdens of state spending solely on landowners, who alone benefited from a surplus of wealth (the famous net produit) beyond their own needs and production costs. This viewpoint ignored the old mercantile theory that foreign trade enriched a nation just by increasing its money supply. For a physiocrat, a community's wealth was boosted not by money, but by a plentiful harvest from its own land. In fact, Quesnay argued that property rights included the freedom to sell it as one wishes, without state restrictions. This idea was encapsulated in the well-known phrase, “Laissez faire, laissez passer.” Condorcet and Condillac supported these new concepts. The “Economists” gained popularity in France, even drawing interest from figures like Joseph II of Austria, the Kings of Spain, Poland, Sweden, Naples, Catherine of Russia, and the Margrave of Baden. Consequently, agriculture received significant encouragement.
Quesnay had many vigorous supporters, of whom the most conspicuous was the Marquis de Mirabeau21 (father of him of the Revolution), and the culmination of their popularity was reached about 1764. A feeling that the true increase of wealth was not in a mere increase of money, but in the products of the soil, led them naturally into a reaction against mercantilism, but also made them dogmatic and overbearing in their one-sided system, which did not recognize that labor in all industries created wealth. As the mercantile system found a great minister in Colbert to carry those opinions into effect on a national scale, so the Physiocrats found in Turgot22 a minister, under Louis XVI, who gave them a national field in which to try the doctrines of the new school. Benevolently devoted to bettering the condition of the people while Intendant of Limoges (1751), he was made comptroller-general of the finances by Louis XVI in 1774. Turgot had the ability to separate political economy from politics, law, and ethics. His system of freeing industry from governmental interference resulted in abolishing many abuses, securing a freer movement of grain, and in lightening the taxation. But the rigidity of national prejudices [pg 011] was too strong to allow him success. He had little tact, and raised many difficulties in his way. The proposal to abolish the corvées (compulsory repair of roads by the peasants), and substitute a tax on land, brought his king into a costly struggle (1776), and attempts to undermine Turgot's power were successful. With his downfall ended the influence of the Economists. The last of them was Dupont de Nemours,23 who saw a temporary popularity of the Physiocrats in the early years of the French Revolution, when the Constituent Assembly threw the burden of taxes on land. But the fire blazed up fitfully for a moment, only to die away entirely.
Quesnay had many strong supporters, the most notable of whom was the Marquis de Mirabeau (father of the revolutionary figure). Their popularity peaked around 1764. They believed that true wealth came not just from money, but from agricultural products, which led to a backlash against mercantilism. However, this viewpoint also made them dogmatic and arrogant in their one-sided approach, ignoring the fact that all industries also created wealth. Just as the mercantile system had Colbert as a great minister to implement its ideas nationally, the Physiocrats had Turgot, under Louis XVI, who provided them a national platform to apply the new school's doctrines. He was genuinely committed to improving people's lives while serving as Intendant of Limoges (1751) and was appointed comptroller-general of finances by Louis XVI in 1774. Turgot understood how to separate political economy from politics, law, and ethics. His strategy to free industry from government interference led to the elimination of many abuses, promoted freer grain movement, and reduced taxes. However, national prejudices proved too strong for him to succeed. He lacked tact and created numerous obstacles for himself. His plan to abolish the *corvées* (forced road maintenance by peasants) and replace it with a land tax put his king in a costly conflict (1776), and efforts to undermine Turgot’s authority were successful. With his downfall, the influence of the Economists came to an end. The last of them was Dupont de Nemours, who witnessed a brief resurgence of the Physiocrats at the start of the French Revolution, when the Constituent Assembly shifted the tax burden onto land. But this revival was short-lived and quickly faded away completely.
All this, however, was the slow preparation for a newer and greater movement in political economy than had yet been known, and which laid the foundation of the modern study as it exists to-day. The previous discussions on money and the prominence given to agriculture and economic considerations by the Economists made possible the great achievements of Adam Smith and the English school. A reaction in England against the mercantile system produced a complete revolution in political economy. Vigorous protests against mercantilism had appeared long before,24 and the true functions of money had come to be rightly understood.25 More [pg 012] than that, many of the most important doctrines had been either discussed, or been given to the public in print. It is at least certain that hints of much that made so astonishing an effect in Adam Smith's “Wealth of Nations” (1776) had been given to the world before the latter was written. To what sources, among the minor writers, he was most indebted, it is hard to say. Two, at least, deserve considerable attention, David Hume and Richard Cantillon. The former published his “Economic Essays” in 1752, which contained what even now would be considered enlightened views on money, interest, balance of trade, commerce, and taxation; and a personal friendship existed between Hume and Adam Smith dating back as far as 1748, when the latter was lecturing in Edinburgh on rhetoric. The extent of Cantillon's acquirements and Adam Smith's possible indebtedness to him have been but lately recognized. In a recent study26 on Cantillon, the late Professor Jevons has pointed out that the former anticipated many of the doctrines later ascribed to Adam Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo. Certain it is that the author of the “Wealth of Nations” took the truth wherever he found it, received substantial suggestions from various sources, but, after having devoted himself in a peculiarly successful way to collecting facts, he wrought out of all he had gathered the first rounded system of political economy the world had yet known; which pointed out that labor was at the basis of production, not merely in agriculture, as the French school would have it, but in all industries; and which battered down all the defenses of the mediæval mercantile system. In a marked degree Adam Smith27 combined a logical precision and a [pg 013] power of generalizing results out of confused data with a practical and intuitive regard for facts which are absolutely necessary for great achievements in the science of political economy. At Glasgow (1751-1764) Adam Smith gave lectures on natural theology, ethical philosophy, jurisprudence, and political economy, believing that these subjects were complementary to each other.
All this, however, was the gradual buildup for a newer and more significant shift in political economy than had ever been seen before, which established the groundwork for the modern study as we know it today. The earlier debates on money and the focus on agriculture and economic issues by the Economists enabled the groundbreaking contributions of Adam Smith and the English school. A backlash in England against the mercantile system led to a complete transformation in political economy. Strong objections to mercantilism had emerged long before, and the true roles of money were finally understood. Furthermore, many of the key ideas had either been debated or published. It is certain that much of what had a remarkable impact in Adam Smith's “Wealth of Nations” (1776) had already been introduced to the public before it was written. It’s difficult to pinpoint exactly which lesser-known writers Smith drew from. At least two deserve notable mention: David Hume and Richard Cantillon. Hume published his “Economic Essays” in 1752, which included views on money, interest, balance of trade, commerce, and taxation that would still be considered insightful today; he and Adam Smith maintained a personal friendship that began in 1748, when Smith was lecturing on rhetoric in Edinburgh. Recently, scholars have begun to recognize the extent of Cantillon's knowledge and Adam Smith's possible reliance on him. In a recent study on Cantillon, the late Professor Jevons highlighted that Cantillon anticipated many principles later attributed to Adam Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo. It’s clear that the author of the “Wealth of Nations” gathered truthful insights from various sources and received significant ideas from many, but after successfully collecting facts, he developed the first comprehensive system of political economy the world had seen; this system argued that labor is the foundation of production, not just in agriculture, as the French school suggested, but across all industries, effectively dismantling the defenses of the medieval mercantile system. Adam Smith notably combined logical clarity with a remarkable ability to generalize from complex data, while also maintaining a practical and intuitive awareness of facts that are essential for significant advancements in political economy. While at Glasgow (1751-1764), Adam Smith lectured on natural theology, ethical philosophy, jurisprudence, and political economy, believing that these subjects complemented each other.
A connected and comprehensive grasp of principles was the great achievement of Adam Smith;28 for, although the “Wealth of Nations” was naturally not without faults, it has been the basis of all subsequent discussion and advance in political economy. In Books I and II his own system is elucidated, while Book IV contains his discussion of the Agricultural School and the attacks on the mercantile system. Seeing distinctly that labor was the basis of all production (not merely in agriculture), he shows (Books I and II) that the wealth of a country depends on the skill with which its labor is applied, and upon the proportion of productive to unproductive laborers. The gains from division of labor are explained, and money appears as a necessary instrument after society has reached such a division. He is then led to discuss prices (market price) and value; and, since from the price a distribution takes place among the factors of production, he is brought to wages, profit, and rent. The functions [pg 014] of capital are explained in general; the separation of fixed from circulating capital is made; and he discusses the influence of capital on the distribution of productive and unproductive labor; the accumulation of capital, money, paper money, and interest. He, therefore, gets a connected set of ideas on production, distribution, and exchange. On questions of production not much advance has been made since his day; and his rules of taxation are now classic. He attacked vigorously the balance-of-trade theory, and the unnatural diversion of industry in England by prohibitions, bounties, and the arbitrary colonial system. In brief, he held that a plan for the regulation of industry by the Government was indefensible, and that to direct private persons how to employ their capital was either hurtful or useless. He taught that a country will be more prosperous if its neighbors are prosperous, and that nations have no interest in injuring each other. It was, however, but human that his work should have been somewhat defective.29 A new period in the history of political [pg 015] economy, however, begins with Adam Smith. As Roscher says, he stands in the center of economic history.
A connected and comprehensive understanding of principles was the major achievement of Adam Smith;28 because, although the "Wealth of Nations" naturally had its faults, it has served as the foundation for all later discussions and advancements in political economy. In Books I and II, he explains his own system, while Book IV addresses the Agricultural School and critiques the mercantile system. He clearly sees that labor is the foundation of all production (not just in agriculture) and demonstrates (in Books I and II) that a country's wealth depends on how skillfully its labor is utilized and the ratio of productive to unproductive workers. He explains the benefits of division of labor and presents money as an essential tool once society reaches that stage. He then discusses prices (market price) and value, and since pricing leads to distribution among the factors of production, he covers wages, profit, and rent. He provides a general explanation of the functions of capital, differentiating between fixed and circulating capital, and discusses how capital impacts the distribution of productive and unproductive labor, as well as the accumulation of capital, money, paper money, and interest. As a result, he establishes a coherent set of ideas regarding production, distribution, and exchange. There hasn't been much progress in production issues since his time, and his taxation principles are now considered classic. He strongly criticized the balance-of-trade theory and the harmful diversion of industry in England caused by prohibitions, bounties, and the arbitrary colonial system. In short, he argued that a government plan to regulate industry was indefensible, and that directing individuals on how to use their capital was either harmful or pointless. He taught that a country is likely to be more prosperous if its neighbors are also prosperous, and that nations have no interest in harming each other. However, it was only human that his work would have some shortcomings.29 A new chapter in the history of political [pg 015] economy, however, begins with Adam Smith. As Roscher states, he occupies a central position in economic history.
New writers now appear who add gradually stone after stone to the good foundation already laid, and raise the edifice to fairer proportions. The first considerable addition comes from a contribution by a country clergyman, Thomas Robert Malthus,30 in his “Essay on the Principles of Population” (1798). Against the view of Pitt that “the man who had a large family was a benefactor to his country,” Malthus argued conclusively that “a perfectly happy and virtuous community, by physical law, is constrained to increase very rapidly.... By nature human food increases in a slow arithmetical ratio; man himself increases in a quick geometrical ratio, unless want and vice stop him.” In his second edition (1803), besides the positive check of vice and want, he gave more importance to the negative check of “self-restraint, moral and prudential.” The whole theory was crudely stated at first; and it raised the cry that such a doctrine was inconsistent with the belief in a benevolent Creator. In its essence, the law of population is simply that a tendency and ability exist in mankind to increase its numbers faster than subsistence, and that this result actually will happen unless checks retard it, or new means of getting subsistence [pg 016] arise. If an undue increase of population led to vice and misery, in Malthus's theory, he certainly is not to be charged with unchristian feelings if he urged a self-restraint by which that evil result should be avoided. Malthus's doctrines excited great discussion: Godwin says that by 1820 thirty or forty answers to the essay had been written; and they have continued to appear. The chief contributions have been by A. H. Everett, “New Ideas on Population” (1823), who believed that an increase of numbers increased productive power; by M. T. Sadler, “Law of Population” (1830), who taught that human fertility varied inversely with numbers, falling off with density of population; by Sir Archibald Alison, “Principles of Population” (1840), who reasoned inductively that the material improvement of the human race is a proof that man can produce more than he consumes, or that in the progress of society preventive checks necessarily arise; by W. R. Greg, “Enigmas of Life” (1873); and by Herbert Spencer, “Westminster Review” (April, 1852), and “Principles of Biology,” (part vi, ch. xii and xiii), who worked out a physiological check, in that with a mental development out of lower stages there comes an increased demand upon the nervous energy which causes a diminution of fertility. Since Darwin's studies it has been very generally admitted that it is the innate tendency of all organic life to increase until numbers press upon the limit of food-production; not that population has always done so in every country.31 Malthus's teachings resulted in the modern poor-house system, beginning with 1834 in England, and they corrected some of the abuses of indiscriminate charity.
New writers are now emerging who gradually add stone after stone to the solid foundation already established, and raise the structure to better heights. The first significant addition comes from a contribution by a country clergyman, Thomas Robert Malthus, in his "Essay on the Principles of Population" (1798). Challenging Pitt's view that “The man with a big family was a supporter of his country,” Malthus convincingly argued that "A perfectly happy and virtuous community, by natural law, is forced to grow very quickly... Naturally, human food increases at a slow arithmetic rate; while humans increase at a fast geometric rate, unless deprivation and moral decline hold them back." In his second edition (1803), he not only discussed the positive checks of vice and want but also placed more emphasis on the negative check of "self-control, ethical and cautious." At first, the entire theory was expressed in a crude manner, raising accusations that such a belief was incompatible with the idea of a benevolent Creator. Essentially, the law of population states that humans tend and have the ability to increase their numbers faster than the availability of resources, and this will happen unless certain checks slow it down or new means of acquiring resources [pg 016] emerge. If an excessive growth in population leads to vice and misery, Malthus cannot be blamed for advocating self-restraint to prevent these adverse outcomes. Malthus's ideas sparked extensive debate: Godwin notes that by 1820, thirty or forty responses to the essay had been written, and the discussion has continued. Key contributions have come from A. H. Everett, “Fresh Perspectives on Population” (1823), who argued that a growing population enhances productive capacity; M. T. Sadler, "Population Law" (1830), who proposed that human fertility decreases as population density increases; Sir Archibald Alison, "Population Principles" (1840), who logically deduced that the material advancement of humanity proves that people can produce more than they consume, or that as society evolves, preventive checks inevitably arise; W. R. Greg, “Life’s Mysteries” (1873); and Herbert Spencer, "Westminster Review" (April, 1852), and "Biology Principles," (part vi, ch. xii and xiii), who explored a physiological check — the notion that as mental development progresses from lower stages, there is an increased demand on nervous energy which leads to decreased fertility. Since Darwin's research, it has become widely accepted that all living organisms have an innate trend to multiply until their numbers approach the limits of food production; however, population growth has not consistently behaved this way in every country. Malthus's teachings led to the modern poorhouse system, starting in 1834 in England, and they helped to correct some of the abuses associated with indiscriminate charity.
While Adam Smith had formulated very correctly the laws of production, in his way Malthus was adding to the [pg 017] means by which a better knowledge of the principles of distribution was to be obtained; and the next advance, owing to the sharp discussions of the time on the corn laws, was, by a natural progress, to the law of diminishing returns and rent. An independent discovery of the law of rent is to be assigned to no less than four persons,32 but for the full perception of its truth and its connection with other principles of political economy the credit has been rightly given to David Ricardo,33 next to Adam Smith without question the greatest economist of the English school. Curiously enough, although Adam Smith was immersed in abstract speculations, his “homely sagacity” led him to the most practical results; but while Ricardo was an experienced and successful man of business, he it was, above all others, who established the abstract political economy, in the sense of a body of scientific laws to which concrete phenomena, in spite of temporary inconsistencies, must in the end conform. His work, therefore, supplemented that of Adam Smith; and there are very few doctrines fully worked out to-day of which hints have not been found in Ricardo's wonderfully compact statements. [pg 018] With no graces of exposition, his writings seem dry, but are notwithstanding mines of valuable suggestions.
While Adam Smith accurately established the laws of production, Malthus contributed to better understanding the principles of distribution. The ongoing debates about the corn laws led naturally to advancements regarding the law of diminishing returns and rent. The independent discovery of the law of rent is credited to no less than four individuals, but the full understanding of its truth and its connection to other political economy principles is rightly attributed to David Ricardo, who is, alongside Adam Smith, undoubtedly the greatest economist of the English school. Interestingly, even though Adam Smith was deeply involved in abstract theories, his "down-to-earth wisdom" led him to very practical outcomes. In contrast, even though Ricardo was a skilled and successful businessman, he was the one who primarily shaped abstract political economy as a set of scientific laws to which real-world events, despite temporary inconsistencies, must ultimately align. His work, therefore, complemented that of Adam Smith, and there are very few ideas fully developed today that don't contain hints found in Ricardo's remarkably concise statements. His writings might lack elegant presentation, making them seem dull, yet they are rich sources of valuable insights.
In the field of distribution and exchange Ricardo made great additions. Malthus and West had shown that rent was not an element in cost of production; but both Malthus and Ricardo seemed to have been familiar with the doctrine of rent long before the former published his book. Ricardo, however, saw into its connection with other parts of a system of distribution.34 The Malthusian doctrine of a pressure of population on subsistence naturally forced a recognition of the law of diminishing returns from land;35 then as soon as different qualities of land were simultaneously cultivated, the best necessarily gave larger returns than the poorest; and the idea that the payment of rent was made for a superior instrument, and in proportion to its superiority over the poorest instrument which society found necessary to use, resulted in the law of rent. Ricardo, moreover, carried out this principle as it affected wages, profits, values, and the fall of profits; but did not give sufficient importance to the operation of forces in the form of improvements acting in opposition to the tendency toward lessened returns. The theory of rent still holds its place, although it has met with no little opposition.36 A doctrine, quite as important in its effects on free [pg 019] exchange, was clearly established by Ricardo, under the name of the doctrine of “Comparative Cost,” which is the reason for the existence of any and all international trade.
In the area of distribution and exchange, Ricardo made significant contributions. Malthus and West had demonstrated that rent was not a part of production costs; however, both Malthus and Ricardo seemed to have understood the concept of rent long before Malthus published his book. Ricardo, nevertheless, recognized its connection with other aspects of a distribution system.34 The Malthusian idea of population pressure on subsistence inevitably led to the acknowledgment of the law of diminishing returns from land;35 and as soon as different types of land were farmed at the same time, the best land naturally yielded greater returns than the poorest. The notion that rent is paid for a superior resource, proportionate to its advantage over the least productive resource that society must utilize, gave rise to the law of rent. Furthermore, Ricardo applied this principle to wages, profits, values, and the decline of profits; but he did not adequately emphasize the impact of improvements that counteract the tendency toward decreased returns. The theory of rent remains relevant, despite facing considerable opposition.36 An equally important doctrine affecting free exchange was clearly formulated by Ricardo, known as the doctrine of "Comparative Cost," which explains the basis for all international trade.
The work of Adam Smith was soon known to other countries, apart from translations. A most lucid and attractive exposition was given to the French by J. B. Say, “Traité d'économie politique” (1803), followed, after lecturing in Paris from 1815-1830, by a more complete treatise,37 “Cours complète d'économie politique” (1828). While not contributing much that was new, Say did a great service by popularizing previous results in a happy and lively style, combined with good arrangement, and many illustrations. The theory that general demand and supply are identical is his most important contribution to the study. Although he translated Ricardo's book, he did not grasp the fact that rent did not enter into price. Say's work was later supplemented by an Italian, Pellegrino Rossi,38 who, in his “Cours d'économie politique” (1843-1851), naturalized the doctrines of Malthus and Ricardo on French soil. His work is of solid value, and he and Say have given rise to an active school of [pg 020] political economy in France. In Switzerland, Sismondi expounded Adam Smith's results in his “De la richesse commerciale” (1803), but was soon led into a new position, explained in his “Nouveaux principes d'économie politique” (1819). This has made him the earliest and most distinguished of the humanitarian economists. Seeing the sufferings caused by readjustments of industries after the peace, and the warehouses filled with unsold goods, he thought the excess of production over the power of consumption was permanent, and attacked division of labor, labor-saving machinery, and competition. Discoveries which would supersede labor he feared would continue, and the abolition of patents, together with the limitation of population,39 was urged. These arguments furnished excellent weapons to the socialistic agitators. Heinrich Storch40 aimed to spread the views of Adam Smith41 in Russia, by his “Cours d'économie politique” (1815). Without further developing the theory of political economy, he produced a book of exceptional merit by pointing out the application of the principles to Russia, particularly in regard to the effect of a progress of wealth on agriculture and manufactures; to the natural steps by which a new country changes from agriculture to a manufacturing régime; and to finance and currency, with an account of Russian depreciated paper since Catharine II.
The work of Adam Smith quickly gained recognition in other countries, even without translations. A very clear and engaging explanation was provided to the French by J. B. Say in his "Treatise on Political Economy" (1803), followed by a more comprehensive treatise after teaching in Paris from 1815-1830, "Complete course in political economy" (1828). While he didn't introduce many new ideas, Say greatly helped by making earlier findings accessible in an enjoyable and lively manner, with a well-organized structure and numerous illustrations. His most significant contribution to the field is the theory that general demand and supply are the same. Although he translated Ricardo's book, he failed to understand that rent doesn't factor into price. Say's work was later expanded upon by the Italian Pellegrino Rossi, “Political Economy Course” (1843-1851), who made Malthus and Ricardo's ideas more familiar in France. His work is highly valuable, and both he and Say contributed to the development of an active school of [pg 020] political economy in France. In Switzerland, Sismondi discussed Adam Smith's findings in his “From commercial wealth” (1803), but soon adopted a new perspective, as explained in his "New Principles of Political Economy" (1819). This made him the earliest and most notable of the humanitarian economists. Observing the hardships caused by shifts in industries after the peace, and warehouses filled with unsold goods, he believed that the surplus of production over consumption capacity was a permanent situation, and criticized the division of labor, labor-saving machines, and competition. He was concerned that innovations replacing labor would continue and advocated for the abolition of patents, along with population control. These points provided strong support for socialistic activists. Heinrich Storch aimed to disseminate Adam Smith's ideas in Russia through his "Political Economy Course" (1815). Without further developing the theory of political economy, he produced a highly valuable book by applying those principles to Russia, particularly regarding the impact of wealth growth on agriculture and manufacturing; the natural progression from an agricultural to a manufacturing diet; and financial matters and currency, including a discussion of Russian depreciated paper since Catherine II.
For the next advance, we must again look to England. Passing by McCulloch42 and Senior, a gifted writer, the legitimate successor of Ricardo is John Stuart Mill.43 His father, [pg 022] James Mill,44 introduced him into a circle of able men, of which Bentham was the ablest, although his father undoubtedly exercised the chief influence over his training. While yet but twenty-three, in his first book, “Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy” (1829-1830), he gained a high position as an economist. In one form or another, all his additions to the study are to be found here in a matured condition. The views on productive and unproductive consumption, profits, economic methods, and especially his very clever investigation on international values, were there presented. His “Logic” (1843) contains (Book VI) a careful statement of the relation of political economy to other sciences, and of the proper economic method to be adopted in investigations. Through his “Principles of Political Economy” (1848) he has exercised a remarkable influence upon men in all lands; not so much because of great originality, since, in truth, he only put Ricardo's principles in better and more attractive form, but chiefly by a method of systematic treatment more lucid and practical than had been hitherto reached, by improving vastly beyond the dry treatises of his predecessors (including Ricardo, who was concise and dull), by infusing a human element into his aims, and by illustrations and practical applications. Even yet, however, some parts of his book show the tendency to too great a fondness for abstract statement, induced probably by a dislike to slighting his reasons (due to his early training), and by the limits of his book, which obliged him to omit many possible illustrations. With a deep sympathy for the laboring-classes, he was [pg 023] tempted into the field of sociology in this book, although he saw distinctly that political economy was but one of the sciences, a knowledge of which was necessary to a legislator in reaching a decision upon social questions. Mill shows an advance beyond Ricardo in this treatise, by giving the study a more practical direction. Although it is usual to credit Mill with originating the laws of international values, yet they are but a development of Ricardo's doctrine of international trade, and Mill's discussions of the progress of society toward the stationary state were also hinted at, although obscurely, by Ricardo. In the volumes of Mr. Mill the subject is developed as symmetrically as a proof in geometry. While he held strongly to free trade,45 he gave little space to the subject in his book. All in all, his book yet remains the best systematic treatise in the English language, although much has been done since his day.46
For the next advancement, we need to again look to England. Skipping over McCulloch42 and Senior, a talented writer, the legitimate successor to Ricardo is John Stuart Mill.43 His father, [pg 022] James Mill,44 introduced him to a group of capable individuals, with Bentham being the most capable, although his father undoubtedly had the greatest influence on his education. By the age of twenty-three, in his first book, "Essays on Some Unresolved Issues in Political Economy" (1829-1830), he earned a prominent place as an economist. In one way or another, all his contributions to the field are found here in a developed state. His ideas on productive and unproductive consumption, profits, economic methods, and especially his insightful examination of international values were presented there. His "Logic" (1843) includes (Book VI) a thoughtful explanation of the relationship between political economy and other sciences, as well as the appropriate economic method to use in research. Through his "Political Economy Principles" (1848), he has had a significant impact on people worldwide; not so much because of original ideas, since he mainly presented Ricardo's principles in a clearer and more appealing way, but primarily through a systematic approach that was more clear and practical than previous efforts, greatly improving on the dry writings of his predecessors (including Ricardo, who was brief and dull) by adding a human element to his objectives, along with examples and practical applications. Even now, however, some sections of his book show a tendency to overly prefer abstract statements, likely stemming from a reluctance to overlook his reasoning (due to his early education) and the constraints of his book, which forced him to omit many potential examples. With a strong empathy for the working class, he was [pg 023] drawn into the area of sociology in this work, even though he clearly recognized that political economy was just one of the sciences necessary for a legislator to make informed decisions on social issues. Mill advances beyond Ricardo in this work by giving the study a more practical focus. While it's common to credit Mill with originating the laws of international values, they are really an extension of Ricardo's theory of international trade, and Mill's discussions on the progress of society toward the stationary state, although vaguely, were also suggested by Ricardo. In Mill's volumes, the subject is developed as systematically as a proof in geometry. Although he strongly supported free trade,45 he dedicated little space to it in his book. Overall, his book still stands as the best systematic treatise in the English language, even though much has been accomplished since his time.46
He who has improved upon previous conceptions, and been the only one to make any very important advance in the science since Mill's day, is J. E. Cairnes,47 in his “Leading Principles of [pg 024] Political Economy newly expounded” (1874). Scarcely any previous writer has equaled him in logical clearness, originality, insight into economic phenomena, and lucidity of style. He subjected value, supply and demand, cost of production, and international trade, to a rigid investigation, which has given us actual additions to our knowledge of the study. The wages-fund theory was re-examined, and was stated in a new form, although Mr. Mill had given it up. Cairnes undoubtedly has given it its best statement. His argument on free trade (Part III, chapter iv) is the ablest and strongest to be found in modern writers. This volume is, however, not a systematic treatise on all the principles of political economy; but no student can properly pass by these great additions for the right understanding of the science. His “Logical Method of Political Economy” (1875) is a clear and able statement of the process to be adopted in an economic investigation, and is a book of exceptional merit and usefulness, especially in view of the rising differences in the minds of economists as to method.
The person who has built on previous ideas and made the most significant advancement in the field since Mill's time is J. E. Cairnes, 47 in his "Key Principles of [pg 024] Political Economy Explained Anew" (1874). Few writers before him match his logical clarity, originality, understanding of economic phenomena, and clear writing style. He conducted a thorough investigation of value, supply and demand, cost of production, and international trade, which has genuinely enhanced our knowledge of the subject. The wages-fund theory was re-evaluated and presented in a new way, despite Mr. Mill having abandoned it. Cairnes certainly provided its best formulation. His argument on free trade (Part III, chapter iv) is the most articulate and compelling found among modern writers. This volume, however, isn't a comprehensive treatise on all political economy principles; nevertheless, no student can ignore these significant contributions to grasp the science properly. His “Logical Method of Political Economy” (1875) offers a clear and competent explanation of the approach to take in economic investigation and is a book of exceptional value and utility, especially given the increasing disagreements among economists regarding methodology.
A group of English writers of ability in this period have written in such a way as to win for them mention in connection with Cairnes and Mill. Professor W. Stanley Jevons48 [pg 025] put himself in opposition to the methods of the men just mentioned, and applied the mathematical process to political economy, but without reaching new results. His most serviceable work has been in the study of money, which appears in an excellent form, “The Money and Mechanism of Exchange” (1875), and in an investigation which showed a fall of the value of gold since the discoveries of 1849. In this latter he has furnished a model for any subsequent investigator. Like Professor Jevons, T. E. Cliffe Leslie49 opposed the older English school (the so-called “orthodox”), but in the different way of urging with great ability the use of the historical method, of which more will be said in speaking of later German writers.50 He also distinguished himself by a study of land tenures, in his “Land Systems and Industrial [pg 026] Economy of Ireland, England, and Continental Countries” (1870), which was a brilliant exposition of the advantages of small holdings.
A group of skilled English writers from this period have written in a way that earned them recognition alongside Cairnes and Mill. Professor W. Stanley Jevons48 [pg 025] opposed the methods of the previously mentioned individuals and applied mathematical processes to political economy, but he did not achieve new results. His most valuable work was in the study of money, which is presented excellently in “The Money and Mechanism of Exchange” (1875), along with an investigation that revealed a decline in the value of gold since the discoveries of 1849. In this latter work, he provided a model for future researchers. Like Professor Jevons, T. E. Cliffe Leslie49 opposed the older English school (the so-called "traditional"), but he did so by skillfully advocating for the use of the historical method, which will be elaborated on when discussing later German writers.50 He also distinguished himself with a study of land tenures in his "Land Systems and Industrial Economy of Ireland, England, and Continental Countries" (1870), which brilliantly presented the benefits of small holdings.
By far the ablest of the group, both by reason of his natural gifts and his training as a banker and financial editor, was Walter Bagehot.51 In his “Economic Studies” (1880) he has discussed with a remarkable economic insight the postulates of political economy, and the position of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus; in his “Lombard Street” (fourth edition, 1873), the money market is pictured with a vivid distinctness which implies the possession of rare qualities for financial writing; indeed, it is in this practical way also, as editor of the London “Economist,”52 that he made his great reputation.
By far the most capable of the group, thanks to his natural talents and his background as a banker and financial editor, was Walter Bagehot.51 In his "Economic Research" (1880), he offers remarkable economic insight into the foundations of political economy and the views of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus; in his "Lombard Street" (fourth edition, 1873), the money market is depicted with a clarity that shows he has unique skills for financial writing; indeed, it is also through this practical approach, as editor of the London “Economist”52 that he built his great reputation.
Of living English economists, Professor Henry Fawcett,53 in his “Manual of Political Economy” (1865; sixth edition, 1883), is a close follower of Mill, giving special care to co-operation, silver, nationalization of land, and trades-unions. He is an exponent of the strict wages-fund theory, and a vigorous free-trader. Professor J. E. Thorold Rogers, of Oxford, also holds aloof from the methods of the old school. [pg 027] His greatest contribution has been a “History of Agriculture and Prices in England,” from 1255 to 1793, in four volumes54 (1866-1882).
Of the living English economists, Professor Henry Fawcett, 53 in his "Political Economy Handbook" (1865; sixth edition, 1883), closely follows Mill, paying particular attention to co-operation, silver, land nationalization, and trade unions. He advocates for the strict wages-fund theory and is a strong proponent of free trade. Professor J. E. Thorold Rogers from Oxford also distances himself from the old-school methods. His most significant contribution has been a “History of Agriculture and Prices in England,” covering the years 1255 to 1793, in four volumes 54 (1866-1882).
Of all the writers55 since Cairnes, it may be said that, while adding to the data with which political economy has to do, and putting principles to the test of facts, they have made no actual addition to the existing body of principles; although questions of distribution and taxation are certainly not yet fully settled, as is seen by the wide differences of opinion expressed on subjects falling within these heads by writers of to-day.
Of all the writers since Cairnes, it's fair to say that, while they have contributed to the data relevant to political economy and tested principles against real-world facts, they haven't actually added any new principles to what already exists. However, issues of distribution and taxation are definitely still up for debate, as evidenced by the significant differences of opinion among today's writers on these topics.
It now remains to complete this sketch of the growth of political economy by a brief account of the writers on the Continent and in the United States, beginning with France. About the time of the founding of the London “Economist” (1844) and “The Statistical Journal” (1839) in England, there was established in Paris the “Journal des Économistes” (1842), which contains many valuable papers. On the whole, the most popular writer since J. B. Say has been Bastiat,56 who aspired to be the French Cobden. He especially urged [pg 028] a new57 view of value, which he defined as the relation established by an exchange of services; that nature's products are gratuitous, so that man can not exact anything except for a given service. Chiefly as a foe of protection, which he regarded as qualified socialism, he has won a reputation for popular and clever writing; and he was led to believe in a general harmony of interests between industrial classes; but in general he can not be said to have much influenced the course of French thought. On value, rent, and population, he is undoubtedly unsound. A writer of far greater depth than Bastiat, with uncommon industry and wide knowledge, was Michel Chevalier,58 easily the first among modern French economists. He has led in the discussion upon the fall of gold, protection, banking, and particularly upon money; an ardent free-trader, he had influence enough to induce France to enter into the commercial treaty of 1860 with England. One of the ablest writers on special topics is [pg 029] Levasseur,59 who has given us a history of the working-classes before and since the Revolution, and the best existing monograph on John Law. The most industrious and reliable of the recent writers is the well-known statistician, Maurice Block,60 while less profound economists were J. A. Blanqui61 and Wolowski.62 The latter devoted himself enthusiastically [pg 030] to banks of issue, and bimetallism. A small group gave themselves up chiefly to studies on agriculture and land-tenures—H. Passy,63 Laveleye, and Lavergne.64 The latter is by far the most important, as shown by his “L'économie rurale de la France depuis 1789” (1857), which gives a means of comparing recent French agriculture with that before the Revolution, as described in Arthur Young's “Travels in France” (1789). The best systematic treatise in French is the “Précis de la science économique” (1862), by Antoine-Élise Cherbuliez,65 a Genevan. The French were the first to produce an alphabetical encyclopædia of economics, [pg 031] by Coquelin and Guillaumin, entitled the “Dictionnaire de l'économie politique” (1851-1853, third edition, 1864). Courcelle-Seneuil,66 by his “Traité théorique et pratique d'économie politique” (second edition, 1867); and Baudrillart, by a good compendium. Joseph Garnier, Dunoyer,67 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu,68 Reybaud,69 De Parieu,70 Léon Say,71 Boiteau, and others, have done excellent work in France, and Walras72 in Switzerland.
It’s now time to finish this overview of the development of political economy with a brief account of the writers from Europe and the United States, starting with France. Around the time when the London Economist (1844) and “The Stats Journal” (1839) were founded in England, the “Economists' Journal” (1842) was established in Paris, which includes many valuable articles. Overall, the most prominent writer since J. B. Say has been Bastiat,56 who aimed to be the French Cobden. He notably advocated a new57 perspective on value, defining it as the relationship formed through the exchange of services; highlighting that nature's products are free, and therefore man can only demand something in return for a specific service. Primarily known as an opponent of protectionism, which he viewed as a form of qualified socialism, he gained a reputation for engaging and clever writing; he was also led to believe in a general harmony of interests among industrial classes; however, he cannot be said to have significantly influenced French thought overall. Regarding value, rent, and population, his views are undoubtedly flawed. A much deeper writer than Bastiat, with exceptional diligence and broad knowledge, was Michel Chevalier,58 easily the leading modern French economist. He was at the forefront of discussions about the decline of gold, protectionism, banking, and especially money; a passionate free-trader, he had enough influence to persuade France to enter into the 1860 commercial treaty with England. One of the most skilled writers on specific topics is [pg 029]Levasseur,59 who provided a history of the working classes before and after the Revolution, and the best existing monograph on John Law. The most diligent and trustworthy of recent writers is the well-known statistician, Maurice Block,60 while less profound economists included J. A. Blanqui61 and Wolowski.62 The latter enthusiastically focused on issuing banks and bimetallism. A small group concentrated primarily on agricultural studies and land use, including H. Passy,63 Laveleye, and Lavergne.64 The latter is by far the most significant, as shown by his "The rural economy of France since 1789" (1857), which allows for a comparison of modern French agriculture with that before the Revolution, as detailed in Arthur Young's "Traveling in France" (1789). The best systematic treatise in French is the "Overview of Economic Science" (1862), by Antoine-Élise Cherbuliez,65 a Genevan. The French were the first to create an alphabetical encyclopedia of economics, [pg 031] by Coquelin and Guillaumin, titled the “Dictionary of Political Economy” (1851-1853, third edition, 1864). Courcelle-Seneuil,66 with his "Theoretical and Practical Treatise on Political Economy" (second edition, 1867); and Baudrillart, with a good compendium. Joseph Garnier, Dunoyer,67 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu,68 Reybaud,69 De Parieu,70 Léon Say,71 Boiteau, and others have made excellent contributions in France, and Walras72 in Switzerland.
As Cobden had an influence on Bastiat, so both had an influence in Germany in creating what has been styled by opponents the “Manchester school,” led by Prince-Smith (died 1874). They have worked to secure complete liberty of [pg 032] commerce and industry, and include in their numbers many men of ability and learning. Yearly congresses have been organized for the purpose of disseminating liberal ideas, and an excellent review, the “Vierteljahrschrift für Volkswirthschaft, Politik, und Kulturgeschichte,”73 has been established. They have devoted themselves successfully to reforms of labor-laws, interest, workingmen's dwellings, the money system, and banking, and strive for the abolition of protective duties. Schulze-Delitzsch has acquired a deserved reputation for the creation of people's banks, and other forms of co-operation. The translator of Mill into German, Adolph Soetbeer,74 is the most eminent living authority on the production of the precious metals, and a vigorous monometallist. The school is represented in the “Handwörterbuch der Volkswirthschaftslehre” (1865) of Reutzsch. The other writers of this group are Von Böhmert,75 Faucher, Braun, Wolff, Michaelis, Emminghaus,76 Wirth,77 Hertzka, and Von Holtzendorf. The best known of the German protectionists is Friedrich List, the author of “Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie” (1841), whose doctrines are very similar to those of H. C. Carey in this country.78 An able writer on [pg 033] administrative functions and finance79 is Lorenz Stein, of Vienna.
As Cobden influenced Bastiat, both had an impact in Germany by creating what opponents have called the "Manchester school" led by Prince-Smith (died 1874). They worked to achieve complete freedom of [pg 032] commerce and industry, and their ranks include many capable and educated individuals. They have organized annual congresses aimed at spreading liberal ideas, and a notable review, the "Quarterly Journal for Economics, Politics, and Cultural History,"73 has been created. They have successfully focused on reforms related to labor laws, interest rates, housing for workers, the monetary system, and banking, and advocate for the elimination of protective duties. Schulze-Delitzsch has gained rightful recognition for establishing people's banks and other forms of cooperation. Adolph Soetbeer,74 the translator of Mill into German, is the most distinguished living expert on the production of precious metals and a strong proponent of monometallism. The school is represented in the "Dictionary of Economics" (1865) by Reutzsch. Other authors in this group include Von Böhmert,75 Faucher, Braun, Wolff, Michaelis, Emminghaus,76 Wirth,77 Hertzka, and Von Holtzendorf. The most recognized German protectionist is Friedrich List, the author of "The National System of Political Economy" (1841), whose theories closely resemble those of H. C. Carey in this country.78 A skilled writer on [pg 033] administrative functions and finance79 is Lorenz Stein, from Vienna.
But German economists are of interest, inasmuch as they have established a new school who urge the use of the historical method in political economy, and it is about the question of method that much of the interest of to-day centers. In 1814 Savigny introduced this method into jurisprudence, and about 1850 it was applied to political economy. The new school claim that the English “orthodox” writers begin by an a priori process, and by deductions reach conclusions which are possibly true of imaginary cases, but are not true of man as he really acts. They therefore assert that economic laws can only be truly discovered by induction, or a study of phenomena first, as the means of reaching a generalization. To them Bagehot80 answers that scientific bookkeeping, or collections of facts, in themselves give no results ending in scientific laws; for instance, since the facts of banking change and vary every day, no one can by induction alone reach any laws of banking; or, for example, the study of a panic from the concrete phenomena would be like trying to explain the bursting of a boiler without a theory of steam. More lately,81 since it seems that the new school claim that induction does not preclude deduction, and as the old school never intended to disconnect themselves from “comparing conclusions with external facts,” there is not such a cause of difference as has previously appeared. Doubtless the insistence upon the merits of induction will be fruitful of good to “orthodox” writers, in the more general resort to the collection of statistics and means of verification. It is suggestive also that the leaders of the new school in Germany [pg 034] and England have reached no different results by their new method, and in the main agree with the laws evolved by the old English school. The economist does not pretend that his assumptions are descriptions of economic conditions existing at a given time; he simply considers them as forces (often acting many on one point or occasion) to be inquired into separately, inasmuch as concrete phenomena are the resultants of several forces, not to be known until we know the separate operation of each of the conjoined forces.
But German economists are interesting because they've started a new school that advocates for the historical method in political economy, and a lot of today’s discussions focus on methods. In 1814, Savigny introduced this method in jurisprudence, and around 1850, it was applied to political economy. This new school argues that the English “orthodox” writers start with an a priori process and use deductions to reach conclusions that may be true for imaginary cases but don’t accurately reflect how real people act. They assert that economic laws can only be genuinely discovered through induction, or by first studying phenomena as a means of reaching generalizations. Bagehot responds that scientific bookkeeping, or collections of facts, don’t directly lead to scientific laws; for example, since the facts of banking change every day, no one can simply use induction to find laws of banking. Studying a panic from tangible phenomena would be like trying to explain a boiler explosion without understanding steam theory. More recently, since it appears the new school believes that induction doesn’t exclude deduction, and the old school never meant to separate themselves from “comparing conclusions with external facts,” there isn’t as much of a difference as previously suggested. Certainly, the emphasis on the value of induction will benefit “orthodox” writers by encouraging the broader collection of statistics and methods of verification. It’s also notable that the leaders of the new school in Germany and England have not arrived at different results using their new method and generally align with the laws proposed by the old English school. The economist doesn’t claim that his assumptions describe economic conditions at any specific time; instead, he views them as forces (often several acting at one point or moment) that need to be examined individually since concrete phenomena result from multiple forces that we can’t understand until we know how each of the combined forces operates.
The most prominent of the new school is Wilhelm Roscher,82 of Leipsic, who wrote a systematic treatise, “System der Volkswirthschaft” (1854, sixteenth edition, 1883), in the first division of which the notes contain a marvelous collection of facts and authorities. He agrees in results with Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill, but does not seem to have known much of Cairnes. This book, however, is only a first of four treatises eventually intended to include the political economy of (2) agriculture, (3) industry and commerce, [pg 035] and (4) the state and commune. The ablest contemporary of Roscher, who was probably the first to urge the historical method, is Karl Knies,83 in “Die politische Oekonomie vom Standpunkte der geschichtlichen Methode” (1853, second edition, 1881-1883). The third of the group who founded the historical school is Bruno Hildebrand,84 of Jena, author of “Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft” (1848).
The leading figure of the new school is Wilhelm Roscher, 82 of Leipsic, who wrote a systematic treatise, “System of Political Economy” (1854, sixteenth edition, 1883). The first part includes a fantastic collection of facts and references. He shares conclusions with Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill, but doesn't seem to have been familiar with Cairnes. This book is just the first of four treatises that were eventually meant to cover the political economy of (2) agriculture, (3) industry and commerce, [pg 035] and (4) the state and community. The most capable contemporary of Roscher, who likely was the first to advocate for the historical method, is Karl Knies, 83 in "The Political Economy from the Perspective of Historical Method" (1853, second edition, 1881-1883). The third member who founded the historical school is Bruno Hildebrand, 84 of Jena, author of "The National Economy of the Present and Future" (1848).
The German mind has always been familiar with the interference of the state, and a class of writers has arisen, not only advocating the inductive method, but strongly imbued with a belief in a close connection of the state with industry; and, inasmuch as the essence of modern socialism is a resort to state-help, this body of men, with Wagner at their head, has received the name of “Socialists85 of the Chair,” and now wield a wide influence in Germany. Of these writers,86 Wagner, Engel, Schmoller, Von Scheel, Brentano, Held, Schönberg, and Schäffle are the most prominent.
The German intellectual community has long been accustomed to government involvement, and a group of writers has emerged who not only support the inductive method but also strongly believe in a close connection between the government and industry. Since modern socialism essentially relies on government support, this group, led by Wagner, is known as “Socialists __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ of the Chair,” and they now hold significant influence in Germany. Among these writers, Wagner, Engel, Schmoller, Von Scheel, Brentano, Held, Schönberg, and Schäffle are the most notable.
The historical school has received the adhesion of Émile [pg 036] de Laveleye,87 in Belgium, and other economists in England and the United States. While Cliffe Leslie has been the most vigorous opponent of the methods of the old school, there have been many others of less distinction. Indeed, the period, the close of which is marked by J. R. McCulloch's book, was one in which the old school had seemingly come to an end of its progress, from too close an adhesion to deductions from assumed premises. Mill's great merit was that he began the movement to better adapt political economy to society as it actually existed; and the historical school will probably give a most desirable impetus to the same results, even though its exaggerated claims as to the true method88 can not possibly be admitted.
The historical school has gained support from Émile de Laveleye in Belgium and other economists in England and the United States. While Cliffe Leslie has been the strongest critic of the old school's methods, there have been many others with less prominence. In fact, the period, marked by J. R. McCulloch's book, was one where the old school seemed to have hit a wall in its progress due to its reliance on deductions from assumed premises. Mill's significant contribution was that he initiated the effort to align political economy more closely with the actual state of society; and the historical school is likely to provide a much-needed boost toward achieving similar outcomes, even if its exaggerated claims about the true method cannot be accepted.
Italian writers have not received hitherto the attention they deserve. After 1830, besides Rossi, who went to France, there was Romagnosi, who dealt more with the relations of economics to other studies; Cattanes, who turned to rural questions and free trade (combating the German, List); Scialoja, at the University of Turin; and Francesco Ferrara, also at Turin from 1849 to 1858. The latter was a follower of Bastiat and Carey, as regards value and rent, and at the same time was a radical believer in laissez-faire. Since the union of Italy there has been a new interest in economic study, as with us after our war. The most eminent living Italian economist is said to be Angelo Messedaglia, holding a chair at Padua since 1858. He has excelled in statistical and financial subjects, and is now engaged on a treatise on money, “Moneta,” of which one part has been issued (1882). Marco Minghetti and Fedele Lampertico stand above others, the former for a study of the connection of political economy [pg 038] with morals, and for his public career as a statesman; the latter for his studies on paper money and other subjects. Carlo Ferrais presented a good monograph on “Money and the Forced Currency” (1879); and Boccardo issued a library of selected works of the best economists, and a large Dictionary of Political Economy, “Dizionario universale di Economia Politica e di Commercio” (2 vols., second edition, 1875). Luigi Luzzati is a vigorous advocate of co-operation; and Elia Lattes has made a serious study of the early Venetian banks.
Italian writers haven't received the attention they deserve until now. After 1830, in addition to Rossi, who moved to France, there was Romagnosi, who focused more on the connections between economics and other fields; Cattanes, who addressed rural issues and free trade (challenging the German List); Scialoja, at the University of Turin; and Francesco Ferrara, also at Turin from 1849 to 1858. Ferrara was a follower of Bastiat and Carey regarding value and rent, and simultaneously a strong believer in hands-off. Since the unification of Italy, there has been a renewed interest in economic studies, similar to what we experienced after our war. The most prominent living Italian economist is said to be Angelo Messedaglia, who has held a position at Padua since 1858. He has excelled in statistical and financial topics and is currently working on a treatise on money, “Money,” of which one part has been published (1882). Marco Minghetti and Fedele Lampertico are notable figures, the former for his study on the relationship between political economy [pg 038] and ethics, as well as his career as a statesman; the latter for his research on paper money and other topics. Carlo Ferrais produced a solid monograph on "Money and the Enforced Currency" (1879); and Boccardo published a collection of selected works from the best economists, along with a comprehensive Dictionary of Political Economy, "Universal Dictionary of Political Economy and Commerce" (2 vols., second edition, 1875). Luigi Luzzati is a strong supporter of cooperation; and Elia Lattes has conducted a serious study of the early Venetian banks.
Political economy has gained little from American writers. Of our statesmen none have made any additions to the science, and only Hamilton and Gallatin can properly be called economists. Hamilton, in his famous “Report on Manufactures” (1791), shared in some of the erroneous conceptions of his day; but this paper, together with his reports on a national bank and the public credit, are evidences of a real economic power. Gallatin's “Memorial in Favor of Tariff Reform” (1832) is as able as Hamilton's report on manufactures, and a strong argument against protection. Both men made a reputation as practical financiers.
Political economy hasn't benefited much from American writers. Among our statesmen, none have contributed anything significant to the field, and only Hamilton and Gallatin can truly be considered economists. Hamilton, in his well-known “Manufacturing Report” (1791), shared some of the mistaken ideas of his time; however, this paper, along with his reports on a national bank and public credit, shows genuine economic insight. Gallatin's "Memorial in Support of Tariff Reform" (1832) is just as capable as Hamilton's report on manufactures and presents a strong case against protectionism. Both men earned a reputation as practical financial experts.
“With few exceptions, the works produced in the United States have been prepared as text-books89 by authors engaged in college instruction, and therefore chiefly interested in bringing principles previously worked out by others within the easy comprehension of undergraduate students.”90 Of these [pg 039] exceptions, Alexander H. Everett's “New Ideas on Population”91 (1822), forms a valuable part in the discussion which followed the appearance of Malthus's “Essay.” The writer, however, who has drawn most attention, at home and abroad, for a vigorous attack on the doctrines of Ricardo is Henry Charles Carey.92 Beginning with “The Rate of Wages” (1835), he developed a new theory of value (see “Principles of Political Economy,” 1837-1840), “which he defined as a measure of the resistance to be overcome in obtaining things required for use, or the measure of the power of nature over man. In simpler terms, value is measured by the cost of reproduction. The value of every article thus declines as the arts advance, while the general command of commodities constantly increases. This causes a constant fall in the value of accumulated capital as compared with the results of present labor, from which is inferred a tendency toward harmony rather than divergence of interests between capitalist and laborer.” This theory of value93 he applied to land, and even to man, in his desire to give it universality. He next claimed to have discovered a law of increasing production from land in his “Past, Present, and Future” (1848), which was diametrically opposed to Ricardo's law of diminishing returns. His proof was an historical one, that in fact the poorer, not the richer lands, were first taken into cultivation. This, however, did not explain the fact that different grades of [pg 040] land are simultaneously under cultivation, on which Ricardo's doctrine of rent is based. The constantly increasing production of land naturally led Carey to believe in the indefinite increase of population. He, however, was logically brought to accept the supposed law of an ultimate limit to numbers suggested by Herbert Spencer, based on a diminution of human fertility. He tried to identify physical and social laws, and fused his political economy in a system of “Social Science” (1853), and his “Unity of Law” (1872). From about 1845 he became a protectionist, and his writings were vigorously controversial. In his doctrines on money he is distinctly a mercantilist;94 but, by his earnest attacks on all that has been gained in the science up to his day, he has done a great service in stimulating inquiry and causing a better statement of results. While undoubtedly the best known of American writers, yet, because of a prolix style and an illogical habit of mind, he has had no extended influence on his countrymen.95
“Except for a few cases, the works created in the United States have been made as textbooks__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ by authors who teach in colleges, mainly aimed at simplifying principles developed by others for undergraduate students.”90 Among these exceptions, Alexander H. Everett's “Fresh Insights on Population”91 (1822) is an important contribution to the discussions that followed Malthus's "Essay." However, the writer who has gained the most attention, both in the U.S. and abroad, for a strong critique of Ricardo's ideas is Henry Charles Carey.92 Starting with “Wage Rates” (1835), he introduced a new theory of value (see "Principles of Political Economy," 1837-1840), He described it as a way to gauge the effort needed to get what we need or the extent of nature's influence on humans. In simple terms, value is determined by the cost of reproduction. Consequently, the value of each item decreases as technology progresses, while the overall availability of goods keeps rising. This results in a steady decline in the value of accumulated capital compared to the output of current labor, indicating a trend toward harmony rather than conflict between capitalists and laborers. He extended this theory of value93 to land, and even to people, aspiring to make it universal. He then claimed to have discovered a law of increasing production from land in his "Then, Now, and Next" (1848), which directly contradicted Ricardo's law of diminishing returns. His evidence was historical, showing that it was actually the poorer lands, not the richer ones, that were cultivated first. However, this did not clarify why different grades of [pg 040] land are cultivated simultaneously, which is the basis for Ricardo's rent theory. The steadily increasing production from land naturally led Carey to believe in unlimited population growth. Nevertheless, he eventually accepted the supposed law of a final population limit proposed by Herbert Spencer, which was based on a decrease in human fertility. He attempted to connect physical and social laws, integrating his political economy into a system of “Social Studies” (1853) and his "Rule of Law" (1872). From around 1845, he became a supporter of protectionism, and his writings were notably controversial. In his views on money, he distinctly aligns with mercantilism;94 however, through his passionate critiques of all that had been achieved in the field up to his time, he significantly stimulated inquiry and encouraged clearer presentations of findings. While he is undoubtedly the most well-known American writer, his lengthy style and illogical reasoning have limited his influence on his fellow countrymen.95
The effect of the civil war is now beginning to show itself in an unmistakable drift toward the investigation of economic questions, and there is a distinctly energetic tone which may bring new contributions from American writers. General Francis A. Walker,96 in his study on “The Wages Question” (1876), has combated the wages-fund theory, and [pg 041] proposed in its place a doctrine that wages are paid out of the product, and not out of accumulated capital. Professor W. G. Sumner97 is a vigorous writer in the school of Mill and Cairnes, and has done good work in the cause of sound money doctrines. Both General Walker and Professor Sumner hold to the method of economic investigation as expounded by Mr. Cairnes; although several younger economists show the influence of the German school. Professor A. L. Perry,98 of Williams College, adopted Bastiat's theory of value. He also accepts the wages-fund theory, rejects the law of Malthus, and, although believing in the law of diminishing returns from land, regards rent as the reward for a service rendered. Another writer, Henry George,99 has gained an abnormal prominence by a plausible book, “Progress and Poverty” (1880), which rejects the doctrine of Malthus, and argues that the increase of production of any kind augments the [pg 042] demand for land, and so raises its value. His conclusions lead him to advocate the nationalization of land. Although in opposition to almost all that political economy has yet produced, his writing has drawn to him very unusual notice. The increasing interest in social questions, and the general lack of economic training, which prevents a right estimate of his reasoning by people in general, sufficiently account for the wide attention he has received.
The impact of the civil war is starting to become clear, showing a clear shift towards exploring economic issues, and there’s an energetic vibe that could bring new insights from American writers. General Francis A. Walker, in his study on “The Pay Debate” (1876), challenged the wages-fund theory and suggested instead that wages come from production, not from saved capital. Professor W. G. Sumner is a strong advocate in the tradition of Mill and Cairnes, contributing significantly to the principles of sound money. Both General Walker and Professor Sumner follow the economic investigation methods described by Mr. Cairnes, although some younger economists are influenced by the German school. Professor A. L. Perry from Williams College has embraced Bastiat's theory of value. He supports the wages-fund theory, dismisses Malthus's law, and although he believes in the law of diminishing returns from land, he sees rent as payment for a service rendered. Another writer, Henry George, has gained significant attention with his compelling book, "Progress and Poverty" (1880), which rejects Malthus’s doctrine and argues that any increase in production raises the demand for land, thereby increasing its value. His conclusions lead him to propose the nationalization of land. Despite being contrary to nearly all established political economy, his writing has garnered a lot of attention. The growing interest in social issues, coupled with the general lack of economic education, which hinders most people's ability to properly evaluate his arguments, helps explain the considerable focus he has received.
Of late, however, new activity has been shown in the establishment of better facilities for the study of political economy in the principal seats of learning—Harvard, Yale, Cornell, Columbia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania: and a “Cyclopædia of Political Science” (1881-1884, three volumes) has been published by J. J. Lalor, after the example of the French dictionaries.
Recently, however, there has been a growing effort to improve the resources for studying political economy at major universities—Harvard, Yale, Cornell, Columbia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—and a “Encyclopedia of Political Science” (1881-1884, three volumes) has been published by J. J. Lalor, following the model of the French dictionaries.
Books for Reference (From English, French, and German Authors).
General Treatises forming a Parallel Course of Reading with Mill.
General treatises that accompany Mill's readings.
Professor Fawcett's “Manual of Political Economy” (London, sixth edition, 1883) is a brief statement of Mill's book, with additional matter on the precious metals, slavery, trades-unions, co-operation, local taxation, etc.
Professor Fawcett's “Political Economy Handbook” (London, sixth edition, 1883) is a concise summary of Mill's book, including extra information on precious metals, slavery, trade unions, cooperation, local taxation, and more.
Antoine-Élise Cherbuliez's “Précis de la science économique” (Paris, 1862, 2 vols.) follows the same arrangement as Mill, and is considered the best treatise on economic science in the French language. He is methodical, profound, and clear, and separates pure from applied political economy.
Antoine-Élise Cherbuliez's "Overview of Economic Science" (Paris, 1862, 2 vols.) follows the same layout as Mill and is viewed as the best text on economic science in French. He is organized, insightful, and straightforward, making a distinction between pure and applied political economy.
Other excellent books in French are: Courcelle-Seneuil's “Traité théorique et pratique d'économie politique” (1858), (Paris, second edition, 1867, 2 vols.), and a compendium by Henri Baudrillart, “Manuel d'économie politique” (third edition, 1872).
Other great books in French are: Courcelle-Seneuil's "Theoretical and Practical Treatise on Political Economy" (1858), (Paris, second edition, 1867, 2 vols.), and a summary by Henri Baudrillart, "Handbook of Economics" (third edition, 1872).
Roscher's “Principles of Political Economy” is a good example of the German historical method; its notes are crowded with facts; but the English translation (New York, 1878) is badly done. There is an excellent translation of it into French by Wolowski.
Roscher's "Political Economy Principles" is a solid example of the German historical method; its notes are filled with facts; however, the English translation (New York, 1878) is poorly executed. There's a great translation into French by Wolowski.
A desirable elementary work, “The Economics of Industry” (London, 1879), was prepared by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall.
A popular introductory book, "Industry Economics" (London, 1879), was created by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall.
Professor Jevons wrote a “Primer of Political Economy” (1878), which is a simple, bird's-eye view of the subject in a very narrow compass.
Professor Jevons wrote a "Introduction to Political Economy" (1878), which offers a straightforward overview of the topic in a very concise manner.
Important General Works.
Key General Works.
Adam Smith's “Wealth of Nations” (1776). The edition of McCulloch is perhaps more serviceable than that of J. E. T. Rogers.
Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" (1776). The McCulloch edition might be more useful than J. E. T. Rogers's.
Ricardo's “Principles of Political Economy and Taxation” (1817).
Ricardo's "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" (1817).
J. S. Mill's “Principles of Political Economy” (2 vols., 1848—sixth edition, 1865).
J. S. Mill's "Principles of Political Economy" (2 volumes, 1848—sixth edition, 1865).
Schönberg's “Handbuch der politischen Oekonomie” (1882). This is a large co-operative treatise by twenty-one writers from the historical school.
Schönberg's "Handbook of Political Economy" (1882). This is an extensive collaborative work by twenty-one authors from the historical school.
Cairnes's “Leading Principles of Political Economy” (1874); “Logical Method” (1875), lectures first delivered in Dublin in 1857.
Cairnes's "Key Principles of Political Economy" (1874); "Logical Approach" (1875), lectures first presented in Dublin in 1857.
Carey's “Social Science” (1877). This has been abridged in one volume by Kate McKean.
Carey's "Social Sciences" (1877). This has been condensed into one volume by Kate McKean.
F. A. Walker's “Political Economy” (1883). This author differs from other economists, particularly on wages and questions of distribution.
F. A. Walker's "Political Economy" (1883). This author has a distinct perspective compared to other economists, especially regarding wages and distribution issues.
H. George's “Progress and Poverty” (1879). In connection with this, read F. A. Walker's “Land and Rent” (1884).
H. George's "Progress and Poverty" (1879). In relation to this, check out F. A. Walker's "Land and Rent" (1884).
Treatises on Special Subjects.
Essays on Special Topics.
W. T. Thornton's “On Labor” (1869).
W. T. Thornton's “On Labor” (1869).
McLeod's “Theory and Practice of Banking” (second edition, 1875-1876).
McLeod's “Banking Theory and Practice” (2nd edition, 1875-1876).
M. Block's “Traité théorique et pratique de statistique” (1878).
M. Block's "Theoretical and Practical Guide to Statistics" (1878).
Goschen's “Theory of Foreign Exchanges” (eighth edition, 1875).
Goschen's “Foreign Exchange Theory” (8th edition, 1875).
J. Caird's “Landed Interest” (fourth edition, 1880), treating of English land and the food-supply.
J. Caird's "Ground Interest" (fourth edition, 1880), discussing English land and food supply.
W. G. Sumner's “History of American Currency” (1874).
W. G. Sumner's “History of U.S. Currency” (1874).
John Jay Knox's “United States Notes” (1884).
John Jay Knox's "United States Notes" (1884).
Jevons's “Money and the Mechanism of Exchange” (1875).
Jevons's "Money and the Exchange Process" (1875).
Tooke and Newmarch's “History of Prices” (1837-1856), in six volumes.
Tooke and Newmarch's “Price History” (1837-1856), in six volumes.
Leroy-Beaulieu's “Traité de la science des finances” (1883). This is an extended work, in two volumes, on taxation and finance; “Essai sur la répartition des richesses” (second edition, 1883).
Leroy-Beaulieu's "Treatise on the Science of Finance" (1883). This is a comprehensive work, in two volumes, on taxation and finance; "Essay on the Distribution of Wealth" (second edition, 1883).
F. A. Walker's “The Wages Question” (1876); “Money” (1878).
F. A. Walker's “The Wages Question” (1876); “Money” (1878).
L. Reybaud's “Études sur les réformateurs contemporains, ou socialistes modernes” (seventh edition, 1864).
L. Reybaud's "Research on Today’s Reformers, or Modern Socialists" (seventh edition, 1864).
Dictionaries.
Dictionaries.
McCulloch's “Commercial Dictionary” (new and enlarged edition, 1882).
McCulloch's "Business Dictionary" (new and expanded edition, 1882).
Lalor's “Cyclopædia of Political Science” (1881-84) is devoted to articles on political science, political economy, and American history.
Lalor's "Encyclopedia of Political Science" (1881-84) focuses on articles about political science, political economy, and American history.
Coquelin and Guillaumin's “Dictionnaire de l'économie politique” (1851-1853, third edition, 1864), in two large volumes.
Coquelin and Guillaumin's "Dictionary of Political Economy" (1851-1853, third edition, 1864), in two big volumes.
Reports and Statistics.
Reports and Stats.
The “Compendiums of the Census” for 1840, 1850, 1860, and 1870, are desirable. The volumes of the tenth census (1880) are of great value for all questions; as is also F. A. Walker's “Statistical Atlas” (1874).
The “Census Compendiums” for 1840, 1850, 1860, and 1870 are important. The volumes from the tenth census (1880) are very useful for all inquiries; so is F. A. Walker's "Statistical Atlas" (1874).
The United States Bureau of Statistics issues quarterly statements; and annually a report on “Commerce and Navigation,” and another on the “Internal Commerce of the United States.”
The United States Bureau of Statistics releases quarterly statements and annually publishes a report on “Commerce and Navigation” as well as another on the “Domestic Trade of the United States.”
The “Statistical Abstract” is an annual publication, by the same department, compact and useful. It dates only from 1878.
The "Stats Overview" is a useful and concise annual publication from the same department. It has only been around since 1878.
The Director of the Mint issues an annual report dealing with the precious metals and the circulation. Its tables are important.
The Director of the Mint releases an annual report about precious metals and currency circulation. Its tables are significant.
The Comptroller of the Currency (especially during the administration of J. J. Knox) has given important annual reports upon the banking systems of the United States.
The Comptroller of the Currency (especially during J. J. Knox's administration) has provided significant annual reports on the banking systems of the United States.
The reports of the Secretary of the Treasury deal with the general finances of the United States. These, with the two last mentioned, are bound together in the volume of “Finance Reports,” but often shorn of their tables.
The Secretary of the Treasury's reports cover the overall finances of the United States. These reports, along with the last two mentioned, are compiled in the volume of “Financial Reports,” but are often missing their tables.
There are valuable special reports to Congress of commissioners on the tariff, shipping, and other subjects, published by the Government.
There are important special reports to Congress from commissioners on the tariff, shipping, and other topics, published by the government.
The report on the “International Monetary Conference of 1878” contains a vast quantity of material on monetary questions.
The report on the “International Monetary Conference 1878” has a ton of information on money-related issues.
The British parliamentary documents contain several annual “Statistical Abstracts” of the greatest value, of which the one relating to other European states is peculiarly convenient and useful. These can always be purchased at given prices.
The British parliamentary documents include several yearly "Statistical Data" that are extremely valuable, particularly the one about other European countries, which is especially handy and useful. These can always be bought at set prices.
A. R. Spofford's “American Almanac” is an annual of great usefulness.
A. R. Spofford's "American Almanac" is a very useful annual publication.
Introductory Notes.
Writers on Political Economy profess to teach, or to investigate, the nature of Wealth, and the laws of its production and distribution; including, directly or remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of human beings, in respect to this universal object of human desire, is made prosperous or the reverse.
Writers on Political Economy claim to teach or study the nature of wealth and the laws of its production and distribution. This includes, either directly or indirectly, examining all the factors that affect the well-being of humanity or any society in relation to this universal object of human desire, whether it leads to prosperity or the opposite.
While the [Mercantile] system prevailed, it was assumed, either expressly or tacitly, in the whole policy of nations, [pg 048] that wealth consisted solely of money; or of the precious metals, which, when not already in the state of money, are capable of being directly converted into it. According to the doctrines then prevalent, whatever tended to heap up money or bullion in a country added to its wealth.
While the [Mercantile] system was in effect, it was believed, either openly or subtly, in the overall policies of nations, [pg 048] that wealth was defined only as money or precious metals, which could be turned into money if they weren't already. Based on the ideas of that time, anything that helped increase the amount of money or bullion in a country contributed to its wealth.
Whatever sent the precious metals out of a country impoverished it. If a country possessed no gold or silver mines, the only industry by which it could be enriched was foreign trade, being the only one which could bring in money. Any branch of trade which was supposed to send out more money than it brought in, however ample and valuable might be the returns in another shape, was looked upon as a losing trade. Exportation of goods was favored and encouraged (even by means extremely onerous to the real resources of the country), because, the exported goods being stipulated to be paid for in money, it was hoped that the returns would actually be made in gold and silver. Importation of anything, other than the precious metals, was regarded as a loss to the nation of the whole price of the things imported; unless they were brought in to be re-exported at a profit, or unless, being the materials or instruments of some industry practiced in the country itself, they gave the power of producing exportable articles at smaller cost, and thereby effecting a larger exportation. The commerce of the world was looked upon as a struggle among nations, which could draw to itself the largest share of the gold and silver in existence; and in this competition no nation could gain anything, except by making others lose as much, or, at the least, preventing them from gaining it.
Whatever caused the precious metals to leave a country made it poorer. If a country didn’t have any gold or silver mines, the only way it could get richer was through foreign trade, which was the only industry that could bring in money. Any type of trade that was thought to send out more money than it brought in, no matter how valuable the returns might be in different forms, was seen as a losing trade. Exporting goods was encouraged and supported (even at a high cost to the country’s actual resources) because the exported goods had to be paid for in cash, with the hope that the returns would actually come back in gold and silver. Bringing in anything other than precious metals was considered a loss to the nation equal to the full price of the imported items, unless they were brought in to be sold again at a profit, or if they were materials or tools for an industry practiced in the country that allowed for the production of exportable goods at a lower cost, thereby increasing exports. The world’s trade was viewed as a competition among nations, all trying to claim the largest share of the gold and silver available; and in this competition, no nation could gain anything without causing others to lose just as much, or at least stopping them from gaining any.
The Mercantile Theory could not fail to be seen in its true character when men began, even in an imperfect manner, [pg 049] to explore into the foundations of things. Money, as money, satisfies no want; its worth to any one consists in its being a convenient shape in which to receive his incomings of all sorts, which incomings he afterwards, at the times which suit him best, converts into the forms in which they can be useful to him. The difference between a country with money, and a country altogether without it, would be only one of convenience; a saving of time and trouble, like grinding by water instead of by hand, or (to use Adam Smith's illustration) like the benefit derived from roads; and to mistake money for wealth is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway, which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves.
The Mercantile Theory became clear when people started to explore the foundations of things, even if it was just in a basic way. Money, in and of itself, doesn't satisfy any needs; its value lies in being a convenient way to receive all kinds of income. People then convert that income into forms that are useful for them whenever it suits them. The difference between a country with money and one without it is mainly about convenience—a matter of saving time and effort, like using water power instead of doing everything by hand, or, as Adam Smith pointed out, the advantage of having roads. Mistaking money for wealth is like confusing the highway—the easiest route to your house or land—with the actual house and land themselves.
Money, being the instrument of an important public and private purpose, is rightly regarded as wealth; but everything else which serves any human purpose, and which nature does not afford gratuitously, is wealth also. To be wealthy is to have a large stock of useful articles, or the means of purchasing them. Everything forms, therefore, a part of wealth, which has a power of purchasing; for which anything useful or agreeable would be given in exchange. Things for which nothing could be obtained in exchange, however useful or necessary they may be, are not wealth in the sense in which the term is used in Political Economy. Air, for example, though the most absolute of necessaries, bears no price in the market, because it can be obtained gratuitously; to accumulate a stock of it would yield no profit or advantage to any one; and the laws of its production and distribution are the subject of a very different study from Political Economy. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which air would be a part of wealth. If it became customary to sojourn long in places where the air does not naturally penetrate, as in diving-bells sunk in the sea, a supply of air artificially furnished would, like water conveyed into houses, bear a price: and, if from any revolution in nature the atmosphere became too scanty for the consumption, [pg 050] or could be monopolized, air might acquire a very high marketable value. In such a case, the possession of it, beyond his own wants, would be, to its owner, wealth; and the general wealth of mankind might at first sight appear to be increased, by what would be so great a calamity to them. The error would lie in not considering that, however rich the possessor of air might become at the expense of the rest of the community, all persons else would be poorer by all that they were compelled to pay for what they had before obtained without payment.
Money, as an important tool for both public and private purposes, is rightly seen as wealth; but everything else that serves any human need and isn't freely provided by nature is also considered wealth. To be wealthy means to have a large supply of useful items or the means to buy them. Therefore, anything that has purchasing power—anything that can be exchanged for something useful or enjoyable—is part of wealth. However, things that can't be traded for anything—no matter how useful or essential they might be—are not considered wealth in the context of Political Economy. For example, air, despite being a basic necessity, has no market price because it's freely available; accumulating it wouldn't provide anyone with profit or benefit, and the principles behind its production and distribution are studied in a different field than Political Economy. It's conceivable to think of situations where air could be part of wealth. If people began spending long periods in places where air doesn't naturally flow, like in underwater diving suits, an artificially supplied air source could be priced similarly to water supplied to houses. If there were a natural change that made the atmosphere too thin for consumption or led to its monopolization, air might gain significant market value. In such cases, having air beyond what one needs could actually represent wealth for its owner, and the overall wealth of humanity might initially seem increased, despite being a dire situation for most. The mistake would be in not realizing that, no matter how wealthy someone became by exploiting air at the cost of others, everyone else would be poorer by the amount they had to pay for something they previously received for free.
Wealth, then, may be defined, all useful or agreeable things which possess exchangeable value; or, in other words, all useful or agreeable things except those which can be obtained, in the quantity desired, without labor or sacrifice.
Wealth can be defined as all useful or enjoyable things that have exchangeable value; in other words, all useful or enjoyable things except those that can be acquired, in the desired quantity, without effort or sacrifice.
Book I: Production.
Chapter I: The Essentials of Production.
§ 1. There are two requirements for production: labor and suitable natural resources.
Labor is either bodily or mental; or, to express the distinction more comprehensively, either muscular or nervous; and it is necessary to include in the idea, not solely the exertion itself, but all feelings of a disagreeable kind, all bodily inconvenience or mental annoyance, connected with the employment of one's thoughts, or muscles, or both, in a particular occupation.
Labor is either physical or mental; or, to put it more simply, either muscular or nervous. It's important to encompass not just the effort itself but also all unpleasant feelings, any physical discomfort, or mental irritation that come with using your thoughts, muscles, or both in a specific job.
Of the other requisite—appropriate natural objects—it is to be remarked that some objects exist or grow up spontaneously, of a kind suited to the supply of human wants. There are caves and hollow trees capable of affording shelter; fruits, roots, wild honey, and other natural products, on which human life can be supported; but even here a considerable quantity of labor is generally required, not for the purpose of creating, but of finding and appropriating them.
Of the other necessary aspect—suitable natural resources—it should be noted that some items occur or grow naturally, fitting to meet human needs. There are caves and hollow trees that can provide shelter; fruits, roots, wild honey, and other natural products that can sustain human life; but even in these cases, a significant amount of work is usually needed, not to create them, but to discover and gather them.
Of natural powers, some are unlimited, others limited in quantity. By an unlimited quantity is of course not meant literally, but practically unlimited: a quantity beyond the use which can in any, or at least in present circumstances, be made of it. Land is, in some newly settled countries, practically unlimited in quantity: there is more than can be used by the existing population of the country, or by any accession likely to be made to it for generations to come. But, even there, land favorably situated with regard to markets, or means of carriage, is generally limited in quantity: there is not so much of it as persons would gladly occupy and cultivate, or otherwise turn to use. In all old countries, land capable of cultivation, land at least of any tolerable fertility, must be ranked among agents limited in quantity. Coal, metallic ores, and other useful substances found in the earth, are still more limited than land.
Some natural resources are unlimited, while others are limited in quantity. By "unlimited quantity," we don't mean it literally, but rather that it feels practically unlimited: there's more than can be effectively used, at least under current conditions. In some newly settled areas, land is practically unlimited: there's more available than the current population can utilize or what any future growth could require for generations to come. However, even in those cases, land that is well-located in terms of markets or transportation is generally limited in quantity: there isn’t enough of it for everyone who would like to occupy, cultivate, or otherwise use it. In older countries, land suitable for cultivation, at least land that has decent fertility, is definitely limited. Resources like coal, metallic ores, and other useful materials found in the earth are even more limited than land.
For the present I shall only remark that, so long as the quantity of a natural agent is practically unlimited, it can not, unless susceptible of artificial monopoly, bear any value in the market, since no one will give anything for what can be obtained gratis. But as soon as a limitation becomes practically operative—as soon as there is not so much of the thing to be had as would be appropriated and used if it could be obtained for asking—the ownership or use of the natural agent acquires an exchangeable value.
For now, I’ll just note that as long as the supply of a natural resource is virtually unlimited, it won’t have any market value unless it can be artificially controlled, since no one will pay for something that can be obtained for free. However, once a limit becomes effective—when there isn’t enough of the resource available to be taken and used without cost—the ownership or use of that natural resource gains exchangeable value.
When more water-power is wanted in a particular district than there are falls of water to supply it, persons will give an equivalent for the use of a fall of water. When there is more land wanted for cultivation than a place possesses, or than it possesses of a certain quality and certain advantages of situation, land of that quality and situation may be sold for a price, or let for an annual rent.
When more water power is needed in a specific area than the available waterfalls can provide, people will pay for the use of a waterfall. Similarly, when there’s a greater demand for farmland than what an area has, or if the area lacks land of a certain quality and location, that quality land may be sold for a price or rented out for an annual fee.
§ 2. The Second Requirement of Production, Labor.
It is now our purpose to describe the second requisite of production, labor, and point out that it can be either direct or indirect. This division and subdivision can be seen from the classification given below. Under the head of indirect labor are to be arranged all the many employments subsidiary to the production of any one article, and which, as they furnish but a small part of labor for the one article (e.g., bread), are subsidiary to the production of a vast number of other articles; and hence we see the interdependence of one employment on another, which comes out so conspicuously at the time of a commercial depression.
Now, we want to explain the second key element of production, which is labor, and mention that it can be either direct or indirect. This distinction and further breakdown can be seen in the classification provided below. Indirect labor includes all the different jobs that support the production of a single item and, since they contribute only a small part of labor for that item (like bread), they actually support the production of many other items too. This shows the interdependence of different jobs, which becomes especially clear during a commercial downturn.
“We think it little to sit down to a table covered with articles from all quarters of the globe and from the remotest isles of the sea—with tea from China, coffee from Brazil, spices from the East, and sugar from the West Indies; knives from Sheffield, made with iron from Sweden and ivory from Africa; with silver from Mexico and cotton from South Carolina; all being lighted with oil brought from New Zealand or the Arctic Circle. Still less do we think of the great number of persons whose united agency is required to bring any one of these [pg 056] finished products to our homes—of the merchants, insurers, sailors, ship-builders, cordage and sail makers, astronomical-instrument makers, men of science, and others, before a pound of tea can appear in our market.”101
“We take for granted sitting down at a table filled with items from all over the world and the most remote islands—tea from China, coffee from Brazil, spices from the East, and sugar from the West Indies; knives from Sheffield made with iron from Sweden and ivory from Africa; silver from Mexico and cotton from South Carolina; all illuminated by oil from New Zealand or the Arctic Circle. Even less do we think about the countless people whose combined efforts are required to get just one of these finished products to our homes—the merchants, insurers, sailors, shipbuilders, rope and sail makers, makers of astronomical instruments, scientists, and many others, before a single pound of tea can arrive in our market.[pg 056]”101
The labor102 which terminates in the production of an article fitted for some human use is either employed directly about the thing, or in previous operations destined to facilitate, perhaps essential to the possibility of, the subsequent ones. In making bread, for example, the labor employed about the thing itself is that of the baker; but the labor of the miller, though employed directly in the production not of bread but of flour, is equally part of the aggregate sum of labor by which the bread is produced; as is also the labor of the sower, and of the reaper. Some may think that all these persons ought to be considered as employing their labor directly about the thing; the corn, the flour, and the bread being one substance in three different states. Without disputing about this question of mere language, there is still the plowman, who prepared the ground for the seed, and whose labor never came in contact with the substance in any of its states; and the plow-maker, whose share in the result was still more remote. We must add yet another kind of labor; that of transporting the produce from the place of its production to the place of its destined use: the labor of carrying the corn to market, and from market to the miller's, the flour from the miller's to the baker's, and the bread from the baker's to the place of its final consumption.
The labor that results in creating an item for human use is either directly involved with the item itself or in earlier tasks that help, or are essential, for the later ones. Take bread-making as an example; the baker's labor is directly related to the bread itself, but the miller’s work, while focused on producing flour rather than bread, is just as crucial to the overall process of making bread. The same goes for the sower and the reaper. Some might argue that all these individuals should be viewed as working directly on the item; after all, corn, flour, and bread are essentially the same substance in different forms. Without getting into a discussion about terminology, we also have the plowman, who prepared the soil for planting, and whose work didn’t directly interact with the substance in any of its forms, along with the plow-maker, whose contribution was even more indirect. Additionally, we need to consider another type of labor: transporting the produce from where it’s made to where it’s used. This includes hauling the corn to market, taking it from market to the mill, moving the flour from the mill to the bakery, and delivering the bread from the bakery to its final place of consumption.
§ 3. On Capital as a Requirement for Production.
The previous employment of labor is an indispensable condition to every productive operation, on any other than the very smallest scale. Except the labor of the hunter and fisher, there is scarcely any kind of labor to which the returns are immediate. Productive operations require to be continued a certain time before their fruits are obtained. Unless the laborer, before commencing his work, possesses a [pg 058] store of food, or can obtain access to the stores of some one else, in sufficient quantity to maintain him until the production is completed, he can undertake no labor but such as can be carried on at odd intervals, concurrently with the pursuit of his subsistence.
The previous use of labor is essential for every productive operation, except for the very smallest scale. Aside from the labor of hunters and fishermen, there's hardly any type of work that has immediate returns. Productive tasks need to be carried out for a certain period before the results are seen. Unless the worker has a supply of food before starting his job, or can access someone else's food stores in enough quantity to support him until the work is finished, he can only take on tasks that can be done in short bursts while also pursuing his means of staying alive.
He can not obtain food itself in any abundance; for every mode of so obtaining it requires that there be already food in store. Agriculture only brings forth food after the lapse of months; and, though the labors of the agriculturist are not necessarily continuous during the whole period, they must occupy a considerable part of it. Not only is agriculture impossible without food produced in advance, but there must be a very great quantity in advance to enable any considerable community to support itself wholly by agriculture. A country like England or the United States is only able to carry on the agriculture of the present year because that of past years has provided, in those countries or somewhere else, sufficient food to support their agricultural population until the next harvest. They are only enabled to produce so many other things besides food, because the food which was in store at the close of the last harvest suffices to maintain not only the agricultural laborers, but a large industrious population besides.
He can't obtain food in large amounts because every way of getting it requires that there is already some food on hand. Farming only produces food after several months, and even though a farmer's work isn't constant throughout that time, it does take up a significant portion of it. Not only is farming impossible without food produced in advance, but a substantial amount must be available to allow any large community to rely completely on agriculture. A country like England or the United States can only sustain its farming for the current year because food from previous years has provided enough resources, either within those countries or elsewhere, to support their agricultural population until the next harvest. They can produce many other goods beyond food because the supplies stored after the last harvest are enough to support not only the farm workers but also a large, productive population.
The claim to remuneration founded on the possession of food, available for the maintenance of laborers, is of another kind; remuneration for abstinence, not for labor. If a person has a store of food, he has it in his power to consume it himself in idleness, or in feeding others to attend on him, or to fight for him, or to sing or dance for him. If, instead of these things, he gives it to productive laborers to support [pg 059] them during their work, he can, and naturally will, claim a remuneration from the produce. He will not be content with simple repayment; if he receives merely that, he is only in the same situation as at first, and has derived no advantage from delaying to apply his savings to his own benefit or pleasure. He will look for some equivalent for this forbearance:103 he will expect his advance of food to come back to him with an increase, called, in the language of business, a profit; and the hope of this profit will generally have been a part of the inducement which made him accumulate a stock, by economizing in his own consumption; or, at any rate, which made him forego the application of it, when accumulated, to his personal ease or satisfaction.
The claim for payment based on holding food, which is available for supporting workers, is different; it’s payment for abstaining, not for actual work. If someone has food stored up, they can choose to eat it themselves while being idle, or use it to feed others who cater to them, fight for them, or entertain them with songs and dances. If, instead of these options, they provide it to productive workers to help them while they work, they can and will expect to receive payment from the produce. They won’t just settle for a simple repayment; if they receive only that, they find themselves in the same position as before, having gained nothing from postponing the use of their savings for their own enjoyment. They will look for something in return for this abstinence: they will expect their food advance to return to them with a profit, which in business terms means an increase; and the expectation of this profit is often what motivated them to save by cutting back on their own consumption, or at the very least, what made them decide not to use it for their own comfort or pleasure when they had accumulated it. [pg 059]
Chapter II. On Unproductive Work.
§ 1. Definition of Productive and Unproductive Labor.
Labor is indispensable to production, but has not always production for its effect. There is much labor, and of a high order of usefulness, of which production is not the object. Labor has accordingly been distinguished into Productive and Unproductive. Productive labor means labor productive of wealth. We are recalled, therefore, to the question touched upon in our [Preliminary Remarks], what Wealth is.
Labor is essential for production, but it doesn't always lead to production. There is a lot of valuable labor that doesn't aim at producing goods. Labor is therefore categorized into Productive and Unproductive. Productive labor refers to labor that creates wealth. This brings us back to the question mentioned in our [Preliminary Remarks], which is what Wealth actually is.
By Unproductive Labor, on the contrary, will be understood labor which does not terminate in the creation of material wealth. And all labor, according to our present definition, must be classed as unproductive, which terminates in a permanent benefit, however important, provided that an increase of material products forms no part of that benefit. The labor of saving a friend's life is not productive, unless the friend is a productive laborer, and produces more than he consumes.
By Unproductive Labor, we mean work that doesn’t result in the creation of material wealth. According to our current definition, any labor should be considered unproductive if it leads to a lasting benefit, no matter how significant, as long as increasing material goods is not part of that benefit. For example, saving a friend's life isn’t considered productive unless that friend contributes more through their work than they take in resources.
Unproductive may be as useful as productive labor; it may be more useful, even in point of permanent advantage; or its use may consist only in pleasurable sensation, which when gone leaves no trace; or it may not afford even this, but may be absolute waste. In any case, society or mankind grow no richer by it, but poorer. All material products consumed by any one while he produces nothing are so much subtracted, for the time, from the material products which society would otherwise have possessed.
Unproductive activities can be just as valuable as productive work; they might even be more beneficial in terms of lasting impact. They might provide only enjoyable experiences that don't leave a lasting impression, or they might not provide even that and could be just pure waste. In any case, society or humanity doesn't gain from this; instead, they become poorer. All the resources used by someone who isn't producing anything are essentially taken away, for that time, from what society could have otherwise benefited from.
To be wasted, however, is a liability not confined to unproductive labor. Productive labor may equally be waste, if more of it is expended than really conduces to production. If defect of skill in laborers, or of judgment in those who direct them, causes a misapplication of productive industry, labor is wasted. Productive labor may render a nation poorer, if the wealth it produces, that is, the increase it makes in the stock of useful or agreeable things, be of a kind not immediately wanted: as when a commodity is unsalable, because produced in a quantity beyond the present demand; or when speculators build docks and warehouses before there is any trade.
Being unproductive isn't the only way labor can be wasted. Even productive work can be wasteful if more effort is put in than is actually beneficial for production. If workers lack the necessary skills or if their supervisors make poor decisions, it can lead to a misallocation of productive work, resulting in wasted labor. Productive work can make a nation poorer if the wealth generated—meaning the increase in useful or enjoyable goods—doesn’t meet immediate needs. For example, a product might go unsold if it's made in larger quantities than what's currently needed, or if investors build docks and warehouses before there's any actual trade to support them.
§ 2. Productive and Unproductive Consumption.
The distinction of Productive and Unproductive is applicable to Consumption as well as to Labor. All the members of the community are not laborers, but all are consumers, and consume either unproductively or productively. Whoever contributes nothing directly or indirectly to production is an unproductive consumer. The only productive consumers are productive laborers; the labor of direction being of course included, as well as that of execution. But the consumption even of productive laborers is not all of it Productive Consumption. There is unproductive consumption by productive consumers. What they consume in keeping up or improving their health, strength, and capacities [pg 062] of work, or in rearing other productive laborers to succeed them, is Productive Consumption. But consumption on pleasures or luxuries, whether by the idle or by the industrious, since production is neither its object nor is in any way advanced by it, must be reckoned Unproductive: with a reservation, perhaps, of a certain quantum of enjoyment which may be classed among necessaries, since anything short of it would not be consistent with the greatest efficiency of labor. That alone is productive consumption which goes to maintain and increase the productive powers of the community; either those residing in its soil, in its materials, in the number and efficiency of its instruments of production, or in its people.
The distinction between Productive and Unproductive applies to both Consumption and Labor. Not everyone in the community is a laborer, but everyone is a consumer, and they consume either productively or unproductively. Anyone who contributes nothing directly or indirectly to production is an unproductive consumer. The only productive consumers are those who are productive laborers; this includes both the labor involved in directing and executing work. However, not all consumption by productive laborers is Productive Consumption. There is unproductive consumption by those who are productive. What they consume to maintain or improve their health, strength, and abilities to work, or to raise future productive laborers, counts as Productive Consumption. On the other hand, consumption for pleasure or luxury—whether by those who are idle or those who work—does not contribute to production nor advance it in any way, so it must be considered Unproductive, although a certain amount of enjoyment that can be deemed necessary may be an exception, as lacking this would hinder maximum labor efficiency. Productive consumption is what sustains and enhances the community's productive capabilities, whether found in its land, resources, the effectiveness of its production tools, or in its people.
I grant that no labor really tends to the enrichment of society, which is employed in producing things for the use of unproductive consumers. The tailor who makes a coat for a man who produces nothing is a productive laborer; but in a few weeks or months the coat is worn out, while the wearer has not produced anything to replace it, and the community is then no richer by the labor of the tailor than if the same sum had been paid for a stall at the opera. Nevertheless, society has been richer by the labor while the coat lasted. These things also [such as lace and pine-apples] are wealth until they have been consumed.
I acknowledge that no work truly benefits society if it goes towards creating items for people who don’t contribute anything productive. The tailor who makes a coat for someone who doesn’t produce anything is performing productive labor; however, after a few weeks or months, the coat wears out, and the wearer hasn’t produced anything to replace it. As a result, the community isn't any better off from the tailor's work than if the same amount had been spent on a seat at the opera. Still, society did benefit from the labor while the coat was being used. Items like lace and pineapples are considered wealth until they are consumed.
§ 3. Difference Between Labor for Productive Consumption and Labor for Unproductive Consumption.
We see, however, by this, that there is a distinction more important to the wealth of a community than even that between productive and unproductive labor; the distinction, namely, between labor for the supply of productive, and for the supply of unproductive, consumption; between labor employed in keeping up or in adding to the productive resources of the country, and that which is employed otherwise. Of the produce of the country, a part only is destined to be consumed productively; the remainder supplies the unproductive consumption of producers, and the entire consumption of the unproductive class. Suppose that the proportion of the annual produce applied to the first purpose amounts to half; then one half the productive laborers of the country [pg 063] are all that are employed in the operations on which the permanent wealth of the country depends. The other half are occupied from year to year and from generation to generation in producing things which are consumed and disappear without return; and whatever this half consume is as completely lost, as to any permanent effect on the national resources, as if it were consumed unproductively. Suppose that this second half of the laboring population ceased to work, and that the government maintained them in idleness for a whole year: the first half would suffice to produce, as they had done before, their own necessaries and the necessaries of the second half, and to keep the stock of materials and implements undiminished: the unproductive classes, indeed, would be either starved or obliged to produce their own subsistence, and the whole community would be reduced during a year to bare necessaries; but the sources of production would be unimpaired, and the next year there would not necessarily be a smaller produce than if no such interval of inactivity had occurred; while if the case had been reversed, if the first half of the laborers had suspended their accustomed occupations, and the second half had continued theirs, the country at the end of the twelvemonth would have been entirely impoverished. It would be a great error to regret the large proportion of the annual produce, which in an opulent country goes to supply unproductive consumption. That so great a surplus should be available for such purposes, and that it should be applied to them, can only be a subject of congratulation.
We see, however, that there’s a distinction that's even more crucial to a community's wealth than the one between productive and unproductive labor; specifically, the distinction between labor aimed at producing goods for productive consumption and labor aimed at producing goods for unproductive consumption. This involves labor used to maintain or increase the country’s productive resources, as opposed to labor that is used in other ways. Only a portion of the country’s output is intended for productive consumption; the rest goes toward the unproductive consumption of producers and the total consumption of the unproductive class. If we assume that half of the annual output is used for the first purpose, then only half of the productive workers are engaged in activities that support the country’s lasting wealth. The other half spend their time year after year and throughout generations producing items that are used up and gone without any return; whatever this half consumes is completely lost in terms of any lasting impact on national resources, just like if it were consumed without productivity. If this second half of the workforce stopped working and the government kept them idle for an entire year, the first half would still be able to produce their own needs and those of the second half, while also maintaining the supplies and tools without reduction. The unproductive classes would either starve or have to provide for their own needs, and the whole community would have to get by on just the basics for a year; but the sources of production would remain intact, and the following year wouldn’t necessarily see a decrease in output as a result of that pause in activity. On the other hand, if the first half of the workers took a break from their usual tasks while the second half continued, the country would end up completely impoverished after a year. It would be a serious mistake to lament the large share of annual output that, in a wealthy country, goes toward unproductive consumption. The fact that such a significant surplus is available for those purposes and that it is being used for them should be a cause for celebration.
This principle may be seen by the following classification:
This principle can be understood through the following classification:
(A) Idlers; or unproductive laborers—e.g., actors.
(B) Productive laborers—e.g., farmers.
(C) Producing wealth for productive consumption, one half
the annual produce.
(D) Producing wealth for unproductive consumption (A), one
half the annual produce.
(A) People who don't work or contribute—like actors.
(B) People who do work and contribute—like farmers.
(C) Creating wealth for useful consumption, half of the annual output.
(D) Creating wealth for non-useful consumption (A), half of the annual output.
Group D are productive laborers, and their own necessaries are productively consumed, but they are supplied by C, who keep themselves and D in existence. So long as C work, both C and D can go on producing. If D stopped working, they could be still subsisted as before by C; but A would be forced to produce for themselves. But, if C stopped working, D and C would be left without the necessaries of life, and would be obliged to cease their usual work. In this way it may be seen how much more important to the increase of material wealth C are than D, who labor “for the supply of unproductive consumption.” Of course, group D are desirable on other than economic grounds, because their labor represents what can be enjoyed beyond the necessities of life.
Group D are productive workers, and their personal essentials are used effectively, but they are provided for by Group C, who support both themselves and D. As long as C continues to work, both C and D can keep producing. If D stopped working, C could still support them as before, but A would have to provide for themselves. However, if C stopped working, both D and C would be left without the essentials of life and would have to stop their regular work. This shows how much more crucial Group C is to the increase of material wealth compared to D, who work "for the provision of non-essential goods." Naturally, Group D has value for reasons beyond economics, as their labor represents enjoyment beyond basic needs.
Chapter 3. Of Capital.
§ 1. Capital is wealth allocated for productive use.
It has been seen in the preceding chapters that besides the primary and universal requisites of production, labor and natural agents, there is another requisite without which no productive operations beyond the rude and scanty beginnings of primitive industry are possible—namely, a stock, previously accumulated, of the products of former labor. This accumulated stock of the produce of labor is termed Capital. What capital does for production is, to afford the shelter, protection, tools, and materials which the work requires, and to feed and otherwise maintain the laborers during the process. These are the services which present labor requires from past, and from the produce of past, labor. Whatever things are destined for this use—destined to supply productive labor with these various prerequisites—are Capital.
It has been explained in the preceding chapters that in addition to the essential and universal needs of production—labor and natural resources—there's another necessity without which no productive activities beyond the basic and limited beginnings of early industry can occur. This necessity is a previously accumulated stock of products from past labor. This accumulated stock is called Capital. Capital supports production by providing the shelter, protection, tools, and materials that work requires, as well as feeding and sustaining the laborers throughout the process. These are the resources that current labor needs from previous labor and its outcomes. Any items intended for this purpose—meant to supply productive labor with these various essentials—are considered Capital.
A manufacturer, for example, has one part of his capital in the form of buildings, fitted and destined for carrying on this branch of manufacture. Another part he has in the form of machinery. A third consists, if he be a spinner, of raw cotton, flax, or wool; if a weaver, of flaxen, woolen, silk, or cotton thread; and the like, according to the nature of the manufacture. Food and clothing for his operatives it is not the custom of the present age that he should directly provide; and few capitalists, except the producers of food or clothing, have any portion worth mentioning of their capital in that shape. Instead of this, each capitalist has money, which he pays to his work-people, and so enables them to supply themselves. What, then, is his capital? Precisely that part of his possessions, whatever it be, which he designs to employ in carrying on fresh production. It is of no consequence that a part, or even the whole of it, is in a form in which it can not directly supply the wants of laborers.
A manufacturer, for example, has part of his capital tied up in buildings that are set up and ready for this type of production. Another part he invests in machinery. A third part, if he’s a spinner, consists of raw materials like cotton, flax, or wool; if he’s a weaver, it’s threads made of flax, wool, silk, or cotton, depending on what he produces. It’s not common nowadays for him to directly provide food and clothing for his workers; in fact, very few capitalists, aside from those who produce food or clothing, have much of their capital in that form. Instead, each capitalist has money that he pays to his employees, allowing them to buy what they need. So, what is his capital? It’s exactly that part of his assets, whatever they are, that he plans to use for new production. It doesn’t matter if part, or even all, of it is in a form that can’t directly meet the needs of the workers.

Suppose, for instance, that the capitalist is a hardware manufacturer, and that his stock in trade, over and above his machinery, consists at present wholly in iron goods. Iron goods can not feed laborers. Nevertheless, by a mere change of the destination of the iron goods, he can cause laborers to be fed. Suppose that [the capitalist changed into wages what he had before spent] in buying plate and jewels; and, in order to render the effect perceptible, let us suppose that the change takes place on a considerable scale, and that a large sum is diverted from buying plate and jewels to employing productive laborers, whom we shall suppose to have been previously, like the Irish peasantry, only half employed and half fed. The laborers, on receiving their increased wages, will not lay them out in plate and jewels, but in food. There is not, however, additional food in the country; nor any unproductive laborers or animals, as in the former case, whose food is set free for productive purposes. Food will therefore be imported if possible; if not possible, the laborers will remain for a season on their short allowance: but the consequence of this change in the demand for commodities, occasioned by the change in the expenditure of capitalists from unproductive to productive, is that next year more food will be produced, and less plate and jewelry. So that again, without having had anything to do with the food of [pg 068] the laborers directly, the conversion by individuals of a portion of their property, no matter of what sort, from an unproductive destination to a productive, has had the effect of causing more food to be appropriated to the consumption of productive laborers. The distinction, then, between Capital and Not-capital, does not lie in the kind of commodities, but in the mind of the capitalist—in his will to employ them for one purpose rather than another; and all property, however ill adapted in itself for the use of laborers, is a part of capital, so soon as it, or the value to be received from it, is set apart for productive reinvestment.
Let's say a capitalist is a hardware manufacturer and his inventory, aside from his machinery, consists entirely of iron goods. Iron goods don’t feed workers. However, by simply changing the use of those iron goods, he can make it possible for workers to be fed. If the capitalist decides to use the money he previously spent on buying plates and jewelry to pay wages instead, and for the sake of clarity, let’s imagine this shift happens on a larger scale, diverting a significant amount of money from buying plates and jewelry to hiring productive workers—who have been barely employed and fed, like the Irish peasantry. When workers receive their higher wages, they won’t spend it on plates and jewelry; they will use it for food. However, there isn’t extra food available in the country, nor any unproductive laborers or animals, like before, whose food could be repurposed for productive use. Therefore, food will need to be imported if possible; if that’s not an option, the workers will have to make do with less food for a while. Nonetheless, the result of this shift in the demand for goods, caused by the change in how capitalists choose to spend their money, is that next year more food will be produced and less will be spent on plates and jewelry. Thus, without interacting directly with the food of the workers, the individual choice to shift some of their resources from unproductive uses to productive ones has led to more food being available for workers. The distinction between Capital and Non-capital comes down to the mindset of the capitalist—specifically, their willingness to use resources for one purpose over another. All property, no matter how poorly suited it may be for worker use, becomes capital as soon as it, or the potential value from it, is reserved for productive reinvestment.
§ 2. More Capital Dedicated to Production than Actually Used in It.
As whatever of the produce of the country is devoted to production is capital, so, conversely, the whole of the capital of the country is devoted to production. This second proposition, however, must be taken with some limitations and explanations. (1) A fund may be seeking for productive employment, and find none adapted to the inclinations of its possessor: it then is capital still, but unemployed capital. (2) Or the stock may consist of unsold goods, not susceptible of direct application to productive uses, and not, at the moment, marketable: these, until sold, are in the condition of unemployed capital.
As whatever goods a country produces are considered capital, the entire capital of the country is also directed toward production. However, this second statement needs some qualifications and clarifications. (1) A fund might be looking for productive opportunities but not find any suitable for its owner’s interests: in this case, it remains capital but is considered unemployed capital. (2) Alternatively, the stock might consist of unsold goods that cannot be directly used for production and are not sellable at the moment: these are, until sold, in the state of unemployed capital.
(3) [Or] suppose that the Government lays a tax on the production in one of its earlier stages, as, for instance, by taxing the material. The manufacturer has to advance the tax, before commencing the manufacture, and is therefore under a necessity of having a larger accumulated fund than is required for, or is actually employed in, the production which he carries on. He must have a larger capital to maintain the same quantity of productive labor; or (what is equivalent) with a given capital he maintains less labor. (4) For another example: a farmer may enter on his farm at such a time of the year that he may be required to pay one, two, or even [pg 069] three quarters' rent before obtaining any return from the produce. This, therefore, must be paid out of his capital.
(3) [Or] let’s say the Government imposes a tax on production at an earlier stage, like taxing the raw materials. The manufacturer has to pay the tax upfront before starting production, which means he needs a larger savings than what’s actually needed for the production he’s doing. He needs more capital to sustain the same amount of productive labor, or (which is the same thing) with a fixed amount of capital, he can employ less labor. (4) Another example: a farmer might start work on his farm at a time of year when he needs to pay one, two, or even three quarters' rent before making any profit from the crops. So, this has to come out of his capital.
(5) Finally, that large portion of the productive capital of a country which is employed in paying the wages and salaries of laborers, evidently is not, all of it, strictly and indispensably necessary for production. As much of it as exceeds the actual necessaries of life and health (an excess which in the case of skilled laborers is usually considerable) is not expended in supporting labor, but in remunerating it, and the laborers could wait for this part of their remuneration until the production is completed.
(5) Finally, a big part of a country's productive capital that goes towards paying the wages and salaries of workers isn't all strictly necessary for production. Any amount that goes beyond what's actually needed for basic living and health (which is often quite a lot for skilled workers) isn't spent on supporting labor but on compensating it. The workers could actually wait to receive this part of their pay until the production is done.
In truth, it is only after an abundant capital had already been accumulated that the practice of paying in advance any remuneration of labor beyond a bare subsistence could possibly have arisen: since whatever is so paid is not really applied to production, but to the unproductive consumption of productive laborers, indicating a fund for production sufficiently ample to admit of habitually diverting a part of it to a mere convenience.
In reality, it’s only after a significant amount of capital has been built up that the practice of paying workers any wages above basic survival needs could have started. This is because any money paid out isn’t actually going towards production; instead, it goes to the unproductive consumption of workers, showing that there’s enough production fund to regularly set aside some for mere comfort.
It will be observed that I have assumed that the laborers are always subsisted from capital:105 and this is obviously the fact, though the capital need not necessarily be furnished by a person called a capitalist.
It will be noted that I have assumed that workers are always supported by capital: 105 and this is clearly the case, though the capital doesn't have to come from someone identified as a capitalist.
The peasant does not subsist this year on the produce of this year's harvest, but on that of the last. The artisan is not living on the proceeds of the work he has in hand, but on those of work previously executed and disposed of. Each is supported by a small capital of his own, which he periodically replaces from the produce of his labor. The large capitalist is, in like manner, maintained from funds provided in advance.
The peasant isn't living off this year's harvest, but rather on what he harvested last year. The artisan isn't relying on the money from his current work, but from the profits of work he's finished and sold. Each one is supported by a small amount of capital they have, which they replenish periodically from their labor's output. Similarly, the large capitalist is sustained by funds that were provided upfront.
§ 3. Review of Examples that Illustrate the Concept of Capital.
That which is virtually capital to the individual is or is not capital to the nation, according as the fund which by the supposition he has not dissipated has or has not been dissipated by somebody else.
What is essential for an individual is either essential or not for the nation, depending on whether the resources they haven’t spent have been wasted by someone else.
(1.) For example, let property of the value of ten thousand pounds, belonging to A, be lent to B, a farmer or manufacturer, and employed profitably in B's occupation. It is as much capital as if it belonged to B. A is really a farmer or manufacturer, not personally, but in respect of his property. Capital worth ten thousand pounds is employed in production—in maintaining laborers and providing tools and materials—which capital belongs to A, while B takes the trouble of employing it, and receives for his remuneration the difference between the profit which it yields and the interest he pays to A. This is the simplest case.
(1.) For example, if A lends property worth ten thousand pounds to B, who is a farmer or manufacturer, and B uses it profitably in their business, it counts as capital just like if it belonged to B. A is effectively a farmer or manufacturer, not directly, but because of their property. The capital valued at ten thousand pounds is being used in production—paying workers and providing tools and materials—which belongs to A, while B manages it and earns the difference between the profit it generates and the interest they pay to A. This is the simplest case.
(2.) Suppose next that A's ten thousand pounds, instead of being lent to B, are lent on mortgage to C, a landed proprietor, by whom they are employed in improving the productive powers of his estate, by fencing, draining, road-making, or permanent manures. This is productive employment. The ten thousand pounds are sunk, but not [pg 071] dissipated. They yield a permanent return; the land now affords an increase of produce, sufficient in a few years, if the outlay has been judicious, to replace the amount, and in time to multiply it manifold. Here, then, is a value of ten thousand pounds, employed in increasing the produce of the country. This constitutes a capital, for which C, if he lets his land, receives the returns in the nominal form of increased rent; and the mortgage entitles A to receive from these returns, in the shape of interest, such annual sum as has been agreed on.
(2.) Now, let’s say that A's ten thousand pounds are lent not to B, but instead are given as a mortgage to C, a landowner. C uses the money to improve his estate’s productivity by building fences, draining land, constructing roads, or using permanent fertilizers. This is a productive investment. The ten thousand pounds are spent, but not wasted. They generate a lasting return; the land now provides a greater yield, which, if the investment was made wisely, will not only recover the initial amount in a few years but eventually increase it significantly. So, there's a value of ten thousand pounds being used to boost the country's output. This creates capital, which means that if C rents out his land, he gets returns in the form of higher rent; and the mortgage allows A to receive an agreed annual interest from these returns.
(3.) Suppose, however, that C, the borrowing landlord, is a spendthrift, who burdens his land not to increase his fortune but to squander it, expending the amount in equipages and entertainments. In a year or two it is dissipated, and without return. A is as rich as before; he has no longer his ten thousand pounds, but he has a lien on the land, which he could still sell for that amount. C, however, is ten thousand pounds poorer than formerly; and nobody is richer. It may be said that those are richer who have made profit out of the money while it was being spent. No doubt if C lost it by gaming, or was cheated of it by his servants, that is a mere transfer, not a destruction, and those who have gained the amount may employ it productively. But if C has received the fair value for his expenditure in articles of subsistence or luxury, which he has consumed on himself, or by means of his servants or guests, these articles have ceased to exist, and nothing has been produced to replace them: while if the same sum had been employed in farming or manufacturing, the consumption which would have taken place would have been more than balanced at the end of the year by new products, created by the labor of those who would in that case have been the consumers. By C's prodigality, that which would have been consumed with a return is consumed without return. C's tradesmen may have made a profit during the process; but, if the capital had been expended productively, an equivalent profit would have been made by builders, fencers, tool-makers, and the tradespeople [pg 072] who supply the consumption of the laboring-classes; while, at the expiration of the time (to say nothing of an increase), C would have had the ten thousand pounds or its value replaced to him, which now he has not. There is, therefore, on the general result, a difference, to the disadvantage of the community, of at least ten thousand pounds, being the amount of C's unproductive expenditure. To A, the difference is not material, since his income is secured to him, and while the security is good, and the market rate of interest the same, he can always sell the mortgage at its original value. To A, therefore, the lien of ten thousand pounds on C's estate is virtually a capital of that amount; but is it so in reference to the community? It is not. A had a capital of ten thousand pounds, but this has been extinguished—dissipated and destroyed by C's prodigality. A now receives his income, not from the produce of his capital, but from some other source of income belonging to C, probably from the rent of his land, that is, from payments made to him by farmers out of the produce of their capital.
(3.) Suppose, however, that C, the borrowing landlord, is a spendthrift who burdens his land not to grow his wealth but to waste it, spending the money on fancy cars and parties. After a year or two, it’s gone without any return. A is as wealthy as before; he no longer has his ten thousand pounds, but he has a lien on the land, which he could still sell for that same amount. C, however, is ten thousand pounds poorer than he was; and nobody is richer. It could be argued that those who profited while the money was being spent are better off. Of course, if C lost it through gambling, or was cheated by his employees, that’s just a transfer, not a loss, and those who gained the money can use it productively. But if C got fair value for what he spent on goods for himself or his guests, those goods are now gone, and nothing has been produced to replace them. If the same sum had been put into farming or manufacturing, the consumption that would have occurred would have been more than made up for by new products created by the labor of those who would have consumed in that case. Because of C's extravagance, what should have been consumed with a return is consumed without one. C’s suppliers may have made a profit during the transaction, but if the capital had been spent productively, builders, fence makers, tool manufacturers, and other tradespeople who cater to the needs of the laboring classes would have made an equivalent profit. Moreover, at the end of the period (not to mention any increase), C would have had his ten thousand pounds or its value replenished, which he now does not. Therefore, in terms of the overall result, the community suffers a loss of at least ten thousand pounds, which is the amount of C’s unproductive spending. For A, this difference is not significant because his income is secure, and as long as the security is good and the market interest rate remains the same, he can always sell the mortgage at its original value. Thus, for A, the lien of ten thousand pounds on C’s estate essentially acts as capital of that amount; but is it the same for the community? It is not. A had ten thousand pounds in capital, but this has been wiped out—wasted and destroyed by C’s extravagance. A now receives his income, not from the returns of his capital, but from some other source of income tied to C, likely from the rent of his land, which comes from payments made to him by farmers out of the produce of their capital.
(4.) Let us now vary the hypothesis still further, and suppose that the money is borrowed, not by a landlord, but by the state. A lends his capital to Government to carry on a war: he buys from the state what are called government securities; that is, obligations on the Government to pay a certain annual income. If the Government employed the money in making a railroad, this might be a productive employment, and A's property would still be used as capital; but since it is employed in war, that is, in the pay of officers and soldiers who produce nothing, and in destroying a quantity of gunpowder and bullets without return, the Government is in the situation of C, the spendthrift landlord, and A's ten thousand pounds are so much national capital which once existed, but exists no longer—virtually thrown into the sea, as wealth or production is concerned; though for other reasons the employment of it may have been justifiable. A's subsequent income is derived, not from the produce of his own capital, but from taxes drawn from the produce [pg 073] of the remaining capital of the community; to whom his capital is not yielding any return, to indemnify them for the payment; it is all lost and gone, and what he now possesses is a claim on the returns to other people's capital and industry.
(4.) Let’s change our assumption a bit and imagine that the money is borrowed, not by a landlord, but by the government. A lends his capital to the government to fund a war: he buys what are called government securities, which are essentially promises from the government to pay a certain annual income. If the government used the money to build a railroad, that could be a productive use, and A’s investment would still serve as capital; however, since it’s being used for war, specifically to pay officers and soldiers who don’t produce anything, and to waste a lot of gunpowder and bullets without any return, the government is in the same position as C, the reckless landlord. A’s ten thousand pounds are basically national capital that once existed but is now gone—virtually thrown into the sea in terms of wealth or production; though for other reasons, the use of the funds might have been justifiable. A's future income comes not from the returns on his own capital but from taxes collected from the output of the community’s remaining capital, which is providing no return to him to compensate for the payment; it’s all lost, and what he has now is just a claim on the returns from other people's capital and work.
The breach in the capital of the country was made when the Government spent A's money: whereby a value of ten thousand pounds was withdrawn or withheld from productive employment, placed in the fund for unproductive consumption, and destroyed without equivalent.
The breach in the capital of the country happened when the Government used A's money, resulting in ten thousand pounds being taken out of productive use, redirected to a fund for unproductive consumption, and ultimately wasted without any return.
Chapter IV. Basic Principles About Capital.
§ 1. Industry is Restricted by Capital.
The first of these propositions is, that industry is limited by capital. To employ labor in a manufacture is to invest capital in the manufacture. This implies that industry can not be employed to any greater extent than there is capital to invest. The proposition, indeed, must be assented to as soon as it is distinctly apprehended. The expression “applying capital” is of course metaphorical: what is really applied is labor; capital being an indispensable condition. The food of laborers and the materials of production have no productive power; but labor can not exert its productive power unless provided with them. There can be no more industry than is supplied with materials to work up and food to eat. Self-evident as the thing is, it is often forgotten that the people of a country are maintained and have their wants supplied, not by the produce of present labor, but of past.
The first of these points is that industry is limited by capital. To use labor in a manufacturing process means investing capital in that process. This means that the extent of industry cannot go beyond the amount of capital available for investment. This idea should be accepted as soon as it is clearly understood. The phrase “investing money” is, of course, metaphorical: what is actually being applied is labor, with capital being a necessary condition. The food for workers and the materials needed for production have no productive power on their own; however, labor cannot exercise its productive power without them. There can't be more industry than what is provided with materials to work with and food to consume. As obvious as this is, it's often overlooked that the people in a country are supported and have their needs met not by the results of current labor, but by the results of past labor.
They consume what has been produced, not what is about to be produced. Now, of what has been produced, a part only is allotted to the support of productive labor; and there will not and can not be more of that labor than the portion [pg 075] so allotted (which is the capital of the country) can feed, and provide with the materials and instruments of production.
They use what has already been produced, not what will be produced in the future. Of what has been produced, only a part goes to support productive labor; and there can't be more of that labor than the amount that the portion [pg 075] allocated can sustain and supply with the materials and tools for production.
Because industry is limited by capital, we are not, however, to infer that it always reaches that limit. There may not be as many laborers obtainable as the capital would maintain and employ. This has been known to occur in new colonies, where capital has sometimes perished uselessly for want of labor.
Because industry is restricted by capital, we shouldn't assume that it always hits that limit. There might not be enough workers available for the capital to support and employ. This has been seen in new colonies, where capital has occasionally gone to waste due to a lack of labor.
The unproductive consumption of productive laborers, the whole of which is now supplied by capital, might cease, or be postponed, until the produce came in; and additional productive laborers might be maintained with the amount.
The unproductive use of productive workers, all of which is currently funded by capital, could stop or be delayed until the output arrives; and more productive workers could be supported with that amount.
[Governments] can create capital. They may lay on taxes, and employ the amount productively. They may do what is nearly equivalent: they may lay taxes on income or expenditure, and apply the proceeds toward paying off the public debts. The fund-holder, when paid off, would still desire to draw an income from his property, most of which, therefore, would find its way into productive employment, while a great part of it would have been drawn from the fund for unproductive expenditure, since people do not wholly pay their taxes from what they would have saved, but partly, if not chiefly, from what they would have spent.
[Governments] can generate capital. They can impose taxes and use the funds wisely. They can do something similar: they can tax income or spending and use the money to reduce public debt. When the fund-holder is paid off, they would still want to earn income from their assets, most of which would likely be put to productive use, while a significant part would have been taken from the fund for non-productive spending, since people don’t typically pay their taxes solely from their savings, but rather mostly from what they would have otherwise spent.
§ 2. Increasing capital leads to more job opportunities for workers, with no set limits.
While, on the one hand, industry is limited by capital, so, on the other, every increase of capital gives, or is capable of giving, additional employment to industry; and this without assignable limit. I do not mean to deny that the capital, or part of it, may be so employed as not to support laborers, being fixed in machinery, buildings, improvement of land, and the like. In any large increase of capital a considerable portion will generally be thus employed, and will only co-operate with laborers, not maintain them.
While industry is constrained by capital, every increase in capital can provide additional job opportunities for industry, and this potential is limitless. I'm not saying that all capital, or even part of it, will necessarily support workers, as some may be tied up in machinery, buildings, land improvements, and similar investments. Typically, in any significant capital increase, a substantial portion will be allocated in this way and will only assist workers rather than sustain them.
What I do intend to assert is, that the portion which is destined to their maintenance may (supposing no alteration in anything else) be indefinitely increased, without creating an impossibility of finding the employment: in other words, that if there are human beings capable of work, and food to feed them, they may always be employed in producing something. It is very much opposed to common doctrines.106 There is not an opinion more general among mankind than this, that the unproductive expenditure of the rich is necessary to the employment of the poor.
What I want to say is that the amount set aside for their support can (assuming nothing else changes) be increased indefinitely without making it impossible to find work. In other words, if there are people who can work and enough food to feed them, they can always be employed in making something. This goes against popular beliefs. There’s no opinion more widespread among people than the idea that the spending of the wealthy is necessary for providing jobs for the poor.
Suppose that every capitalist came to be of opinion that, not being more meritorious than a well-conducted laborer, he ought not to fare better; and accordingly laid by, from conscientious motives, the surplus of his profits; unproductive expenditure is now reduced to its lowest limit: and it is asked, How is the increased capital to find employment? [pg 077] Who is to buy the goods which it will produce? There are no longer customers even for those which were produced before. The goods, therefore (it is said), will remain unsold; they will perish in the warehouses, until capital is brought down to what it was originally, or rather to as much less as the demand of the customers has lessened. But this is seeing only one half of the matter. In the case supposed, there would no longer be any demand for luxuries on the part of capitalists and land-owners. But, when these classes turn their income into capital, they do not thereby annihilate their power of consumption; they do but transfer it from themselves to the laborers to whom they give employment. Now, there are two possible suppositions in regard to the laborers: either there is, or there is not, an increase of their numbers proportional to the increase of capital. (1.) If there is, the case offers no difficulty. The production of necessaries for the new population takes the place of the production of luxuries for a portion of the old, and supplies exactly the amount of employment which has been lost. (2.) But suppose that there is no increase of population. The whole of what was previously expended in luxuries, by capitalists and landlords, is distributed among the existing laborers, in the form of additional wages. We will assume them to be already sufficiently supplied with necessaries.
Imagine if every capitalist believed that, since they aren't more deserving than a well-behaved worker, they shouldn't have a better life. As a result, they save their excess profits out of a sense of duty; unnecessary spending is now at its lowest point. We're left to wonder how the increased capital will find use. [pg 077] Who is going to buy the goods that will be produced? There are no customers even for the goods that were made before. So, it’s argued, the goods will just sit unsold; they will rot in warehouses until capital is reduced back to its original level, or even lower, based on how much demand from customers has dropped. But that only looks at part of the situation. In this scenario, there's no longer any demand for luxuries from capitalists and landowners. However, when these groups turn their income into capital, they don’t eliminate their ability to spend; they simply shift it from themselves to the laborers they employ. Now, there are two scenarios regarding the laborers: either their numbers increase in proportion to the increase in capital, or they don’t. (1.) If they do, there’s no problem. Producing necessities for the new population will replace the production of luxuries for some of the old population, providing exactly the amount of employment that was lost. (2.) But what if the population doesn’t increase? Then, everything that was previously spent on luxuries by capitalists and landlords is distributed among the existing laborers as higher wages. We’ll assume they already have enough basic needs met.
What follows? That the laborers become consumers of luxuries; and the capital previously employed in the production of luxuries is still able to employ itself in the same manner; the difference being, that the luxuries are shared among the community generally, instead of being confined to a few, supposing that the power of their labor were physically sufficient to produce all this amount of indulgences for their whole number. Thus the limit of wealth is never deficiency of consumers, but of producers and productive power. Every addition to capital gives to labor either additional employment or additional remuneration.
What comes next? That the workers become consumers of luxuries; and the capital that was previously used to make luxuries can still be used the same way; the only difference is that the luxuries are shared among the entire community instead of being limited to a few, assuming that their labor is physically enough to produce all this indulgence for everyone. Therefore, the limit of wealth is never the lack of consumers, but rather the lack of producers and productive capacity. Each increase in capital provides labor with either more jobs or higher pay.
That laborers should get more (a) by capitalists abstaining from unproductive expenditure than (b) by expenditure [pg 078] in articles unproductively consumed is a question difficult for many to comprehend, and needs all the elucidation possible. To start with, no one ever knew of a community all of whose wants were satisfied: in fact, civilization is constantly leading us into new fields of enjoyment, and results in a constant differentiation of new desires. To satisfy these wants is the spring to nearly all production and industry. There can, therefore, be no stop to production arising from lack of desire for commodities. “The limit of wealth is never deficiency of consumers,” but of productive power.
The idea that workers would benefit more __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__a) by capitalists reducing unnecessary expenses than (b) by spending[pg 078]Understanding the concept of wasted items can be difficult for many people and requires as much clarity as possible. First, no one has ever experienced a community where all needs are completely satisfied: in reality, society constantly encourages us to seek out new pleasures, resulting in a never-ending rise in new desires. Satisfying these needs is the main motivation behind nearly all production and industry. So, there will never be a stop in production because of a lack of desire for goods.“There’s never a lack of consumers when it comes to wealth,””but rather a limit to how much can be produced.
Now, in supposition (2) of the text, remember that the laborers are supposed not to be employed up to their full productive power. If all capitalists abstain from unproductive consumption, and devote that amount of wealth to production, then, since there can be no production without labor, the same number of laborers have offered to them in the aggregate a larger sum of articles for their exertions, which is equivalent to saying they receive additional wages.
In assumption (2) of the text, remember that the workers are believed to not be working at their full productive capacity. If all capitalists stop unnecessary spending and reinvest that wealth into production, then since production relies on labor, the same number of workers will together have access to more goods for their efforts, which basically means they will earn higher wages.
But some persons want to see the process in the concrete, and the same principle may be illustrated by a practical case. It is supposed that all laborers have the necessaries of life only, but none of the comforts, decencies, and luxuries. Let A be a farmer in New York, who can also weave carpets, and B a lumberman in Maine. A begins to want a better house, and B wishes a carpet, both having food, clothing, and shelter. One of the capitalists abstaining from unproductive consumption, as above, is X, who, knowing the two desires of A and B, presents himself as a middle-man (i.e., he gives a market for both men, as is found in every center of trade, as well as in a country store), furnishing A the tools, materials, etc., and giving him the promise of lumber if he will create the carpet, and promising B the carpet if he will likewise produce the additional lumber. To be more matter of fact, X buys the carpet of A, and sells it to B for the lumber. Thus two new articles have been created, and for their exertions A has received additional wages (either in the form of lumber, or of the money paid him for the carpet), and B has received additional wages (either in the form of a carpet, or the money paid him by X for the lumber). If A and B are regarded as typifying all the laborers, and X all the above capitalists, in the multiplicity of actual exchanges, it will be seen that A and B are creating new articles to satisfy their own demand, instead of meeting the demands of X. If their primary wants are already supplied, then they take their additional wages in the form of comforts and decencies. When Class X forego their consumption, but add that amount to capital, they do not give up their title to that capital, but they transfer the use of [pg 079] it, or their consuming power, to others for the time being. This question will be more fully discussed in § 6.
But some people want to see the process in practical terms, and the same principle can be demonstrated with an example. Imagine that all laborers have only the basics for survival, without any comforts, decencies, or luxuries. Let A be a farmer in New York who can also weave carpets, and let B be a lumberjack in Maine. A wants a nicer house, and B wants a carpet, both having food, clothing, and shelter. One of the capitalists who is not spending unproductively, as mentioned earlier, is X, who, understanding A and B's desires, acts as a middleman (in other words, he creates a market for both of them, similar to any trade center or country store). He supplies A with the tools and materials and promises him lumber if he'll make the carpet, and he promises B the carpet if he'll produce more lumber. To put it simply, X buys A's carpet and sells it to B for the lumber. In doing so, two new items have been created, and for their efforts, A has received additional payment (either in the form of lumber or money paid to him for the carpet), and B has received extra payment (either in the form of a carpet or the money X paid him for the lumber). If A and B represent all laborers, and X represents all the aforementioned capitalists in the various real exchanges, it becomes clear that A and B are creating new items to satisfy their own needs instead of merely meeting X's demands. If their basic needs are already met, they take their extra payment in the form of comforts and decencies. When Class X forgoes their consumption but adds that amount to capital, they do not lose their claim to that capital; instead, they temporarily transfer its use, or their purchasing power, to others. This topic will be discussed in more detail in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.§ 6.
§ 3. Capital comes from saving, and all capital is eventually used up.
A second fundamental theorem respecting capital relates to the source from which it is derived. It is the result of saving.
A second key principle regarding capital is about the source it comes from. It results from saving.
If all persons were to expend in personal indulgences all that they produce, and all the income that they receive from what is produced by others, capital could not increase. Some saving, therefore, there must have been, even in the simplest of all states of economical relations; people must have produced more than they used, or used less than they produced. Still more must they do so before they can employ other laborers, or increase their production beyond what can be accomplished by the work of their own hands. If it were said, for instance, that the only way to accelerate the increase of capital is by increase of saving, the idea would probably be suggested of greater abstinence and increased privation. But it is obvious that whatever increases the productive power of labor, creates an additional fund to make savings from, and enables capital to be enlarged, not only without additional privation, but concurrently with an increase of personal consumption. Nevertheless, there is here an increase of saving, in the scientific sense. Though there is more consumed, there is also more spared. There is a greater excess of production over consumption. To consume less than is produced is saving; and that is the process by which capital is increased; not necessarily by consuming less, absolutely.
If everyone spent all their earnings on personal pleasures, including everything they make and all the income they receive from what others produce, capital wouldn't be able to grow. So, some savings must have happened, even in the simplest economic systems; people must have produced more than they used or used less than they produced. They need to do even more if they want to hire additional workers or boost production beyond what they can achieve alone. If it were suggested that the only way to speed up capital growth is through increased savings, people might think of more self-denial and sacrifice. However, it’s clear that anything that boosts labor productivity creates more opportunities to save and allows capital to grow without requiring sacrifices, all while increasing personal consumption. Still, there is an increase in saving, in the scientific sense. While consumption goes up, so does the amount saved. There’s a greater surplus of production over consumption. To consume less than what’s produced constitutes saving, and that’s how capital increases—not necessarily by consuming less in absolute terms.
A fundamental theorem respecting capital, closely connected with the one last discussed, is, that although saved, [pg 080] and the result of saving, it is nevertheless consumed. The word saving does not imply that what is saved is not consumed, nor even necessarily that its consumption is deferred; but only that, if consumed immediately, it is not consumed by the person who saves it. If merely laid by for future use, it is said to be hoarded; and, while hoarded, is not consumed at all. But, if employed as capital, it is all consumed, though not by the capitalist. Part is exchanged for tools or machinery, which are worn out by use; part for seed or materials, which are destroyed as such by being sown or wrought up, and destroyed altogether by the consumption of the ultimate product. The remainder is paid in wages to productive laborers, who consume it for their daily wants; or if they in their turn save any part, this also is not, generally speaking, hoarded, but (through savings-banks, benefit clubs, or some other channel) re-employed as capital, and consumed. To the vulgar, it is not at all apparent that what is saved is consumed. To them, every one who saves appears in the light of a person who hoards. The person who expends his fortune in unproductive consumption is looked upon as diffusing benefits all around, and is an object of so much favor, that some portion of the same popularity attaches even to him who spends what does not belong to him; who not only destroys his own capital, if he ever had any, but, under pretense of borrowing, and on promise of repayment, possesses himself of capital belonging to others, and destroys that likewise.
A key principle about capital, closely related to the previous discussion, is that even though it is saved and results from saving, it is still consumed. The term "saving" doesn’t mean that what is saved isn’t consumed, or that its consumption is necessarily delayed; it simply means that if it is consumed right away, it’s not consumed by the person who saved it. If it's just put aside for later use, it’s considered hoarded; and while it’s hoarded, it isn’t consumed at all. However, if it’s used as capital, it’s completely consumed, though not by the person who invested it. Some of it is exchanged for tools or machinery, which wear out with use; some is spent on seeds or materials, which are made unusable when planted or processed, and ultimately destroyed when the final product is used up. The remainder is paid out as wages to workers, who use it to meet their daily needs; and if they save any part of it, that money typically isn’t hoarded but is instead put back into circulation as capital and consumed. To the average person, it’s not obvious that what is saved is still consumed. They see anyone saving as hoarding. On the other hand, someone who spends their wealth on things that don’t generate returns is viewed as spreading benefits all around and tends to be quite popular. In fact, even those who spend what isn’t theirs—destroying their own capital if they had any, and under the guise of borrowing, taking capital from others and wasting that as well—can also be seen in a favorable light.
This popular error comes from attending to a small portion only of the consequences that flow from the saving or the spending; all the effects of either, which are out of sight, being out of mind. There is, in the one case, a wearing out of tools, a destruction of material, and a quantity of food and clothing supplied to laborers, which they destroy by use; in the other case, there is a consumption, that is to say, a destruction, of wines, equipages, and furniture. Thus far, the consequence to the national wealth has been much the same; an equivalent quantity of it has been destroyed in [pg 081] both cases. But in the spending, this first stage is also the final stage; that particular amount of the produce of labor has disappeared, and there is nothing left; while, on the contrary, the saving person, during the whole time that the destruction was going on, has had laborers at work repairing it; who are ultimately found to have replaced, with an increase, the equivalent of what has been consumed.
This common mistake arises from focusing only on a small part of the results that come from saving or spending; all the effects of either, being unseen, are easily forgotten. In the case of saving, tools wear out, materials get used up, and laborers consume food and clothing that they eventually wear out. In the case of spending, there is a consumption, meaning a destruction, of wines, vehicles, and furniture. So far, the impact on national wealth has been mostly the same; an equivalent amount has been consumed in both cases. However, in spending, this initial stage is also the final stage; that specific amount of labor’s output has vanished, and nothing remains. In contrast, the saver has had laborers working to repair what was being consumed, and they ultimately manage to replace, with an increase, what was lost.
Almost all expenditure being carried on by means of money, the money comes to be looked upon as the main feature in the transaction; and since that does not perish, but only changes hands, people overlook the destruction which takes place in the case of unproductive expenditure. The money being merely transferred, they think the wealth also has only been handed over from the spendthrift to other people. But this is simply confounding money with wealth. The wealth which has been destroyed was not the money, but the wines, equipages, and furniture which the money purchased; and, these having been destroyed without return, society collectively is poorer by the amount. In proportion as any class is improvident or luxurious, the industry of the country takes the direction of producing luxuries for their use; while not only the employment for productive laborers is diminished, but the subsistence and instruments which are the means of such employment do actually exist in smaller quantity.
Almost all spending is done with money, so people tend to see money as the main aspect of transactions. Since money doesn’t disappear but just changes hands, they overlook the loss that happens with unproductive spending. They believe that since money is merely transferred, the wealth has simply shifted from one person to another. But this is mistakenly equating money with wealth. The wealth that has been wasted isn’t the money itself but the items like wine, vehicles, and furniture that the money bought; and since these items have been destroyed without being replaced, society is collectively poorer by that amount. As any group becomes more wasteful or indulgent, the industry of the country shifts to producing luxuries for their use; this not only reduces jobs for productive workers but also leads to a smaller supply of the means needed for such jobs.
§ 4. Capital is maintained through Perpetual Reproduction, as demonstrated by the Recovery of Countries from Destruction.
To return to our fundamental theorem. Everything which is produced is consumed—both what is saved and what is said to be spent—and the former quite as rapidly as the latter. All the ordinary forms of language tend to disguise this. When people talk of the ancient wealth of a country, of riches inherited from ancestors, and similar expressions, the idea suggested is, that the riches so transmitted were produced long ago, at the time when they are said to have been first acquired, and that no portion of the capital of the country was produced this year, except as much as may have been this year added to the total amount. The fact is far otherwise. The greater part, in value, of the [pg 082] wealth now existing [in the United States] has been produced by human hands within the last twelve months.
To return to our main theorem. Everything that gets produced is consumed—both what is saved and what is said to be spent—and the former just as quickly as the latter. All the typical ways of speaking tend to hide this. When people mention the ancient wealth of a country, talking about riches passed down from ancestors and similar phrases, the implication is that the wealth was created long ago, at the time it was first acquired, and that no part of the country's capital was generated this year, except for what might have been added to the total amount. The reality is quite different. Most of the value of the wealth currently existing [pg 082] in the United States has been produced by human hands within the last twelve months.
The land subsists, and the land is almost the only thing that subsists. Everything which is produced perishes, and most things very quickly. Most kinds of capital are not fitted by their nature to be long preserved. Westminster Abbey has lasted many centuries, with occasional repairs; some Grecian sculptures have existed above two thousand years; the Pyramids perhaps double or treble that time. But these were objects devoted to unproductive use. Capital is kept in existence from age to age not by preservation, but by perpetual reproduction; every part of it is used and destroyed, generally very soon after it is produced, but those who consume it are employed meanwhile in producing more. The growth of capital is similar to the growth of population. Every individual who is born, dies, but in each year the number born exceeds the number who die; the population, therefore, always increases, though not one person of those composing it was alive until a very recent date.
The land endures, and it's nearly the only thing that does. Everything that gets made eventually fades away, and most things do so pretty quickly. Most types of capital aren't naturally built to last long. Westminster Abbey has stood for many centuries, with some repairs along the way; certain Greek sculptures have existed for over two thousand years; the Pyramids might have lasted even twice or three times that. But these were objects meant for unproductive use. Capital survives from generation to generation not by being preserved, but by continuous reproduction; every part of it gets used and consumed, usually pretty soon after it's made, but those using it are busy creating more at the same time. The growth of capital resembles the growth of the population. Every person who is born eventually dies, but each year, more people are born than die; hence, the population keeps increasing, even though not one of them was alive until very recently.
This perpetual consumption and reproduction of capital afford the explanation of what has so often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover from a state of devastation. The possibility of a rapid repair of their disasters mainly depends on whether the country has been depopulated. If its effective population have not been extirpated at the time, and are not starved afterward, then, with the same skill and knowledge which they had before, with their land and its permanent improvements undestroyed, and the more durable buildings probably unimpaired, or only partially injured, they have nearly all the requisites for their [pg 083] former amount of production. If there is as much of food left to them, or of valuables to buy food, as enables them by any amount of privation to remain alive and in working condition, they will, in a short time, have raised as great a produce, and acquired collectively as great wealth and as great a capital, as before, by the mere continuance of that ordinary amount of exertion which they are accustomed to employ in their occupations. Nor does this evince any strength in the principle of saving, in the popular sense of the term, since what takes place is not intentional abstinence, but involuntary privation.
The constant cycle of consuming and reproducing capital explains why it’s often surprising how quickly countries bounce back from devastation. The speed of their recovery largely depends on whether the population has been wiped out. If the people are still around and not left starving, then, with the same skills and knowledge they had before, with their land and its lasting improvements intact, and with most of their durable buildings likely unharmed or only slightly damaged, they have nearly everything they need to return to their previous levels of production. If they have enough food or valuables to buy food, allowing them to endure any hardships just to stay alive and able to work, they will soon produce just as much and accumulate the same wealth and capital as before, simply by maintaining their usual level of effort in their jobs. This doesn’t show any strength in the idea of saving in the traditional sense because what happens isn’t a conscious decision to abstain, but rather an unavoidable situation of having less.

§ 5. Impact of Covering Government Expenses through Loans.
[An application of this truth has been made to the question of raising government supplies for war purposes.] Loans, being drawn from capital (in lieu of taxes, which would generally have been paid from income, and made up in part or altogether by increased economy), must, according to the principles we have laid down, tend to impoverish the country: yet the years in which expenditure of this sort has been on the greatest scale have often been years of great apparent prosperity: the wealth and resources of the country, instead of diminishing, have given every sign of [pg 084] rapid increase during the process, and of greatly expanded dimensions after its close.
[An application of this truth has been made to the question of raising government supplies for war purposes.] Loans, being drawn from capital (instead of taxes, which would typically be paid from income and compensated for in part or entirely by increasing savings), must, based on the principles we've established, end up hurting the country. Yet, the years when spending like this has been at its highest have often been years of significant apparent prosperity. The wealth and resources of the country, instead of shrinking, have shown clear signs of rapid growth during this period, and of much larger size after it ended.
We will suppose the most unfavorable case possible: that the whole amount borrowed and destroyed by the Government was abstracted by the lender from a productive employment in which it had actually been invested. The capital, therefore, of the country, is this year diminished by so much. But, unless the amount abstracted is something enormous, there is no reason in the nature of the case why next year the national capital should not be as great as ever. The loan can not have been taken from that portion of the capital of the country which consists of tools, machinery, and buildings. It must have been wholly drawn from the portion employed in paying laborers: and the laborers will suffer accordingly. But if none of them are starved, if their wages can bear such an amount of reduction, or if charity interposes between them and absolute destitution, there is no reason that their labor should produce less in the next year than in the year before. If they produce as much as usual, having been paid less by so many millions sterling, these millions are gained by their employers. The breach made in the capital of the country is thus instantly repaired, but repaired by the privations and often the real misery of the laboring-class.
Let’s consider the worst-case scenario: that the entire amount borrowed and wasted by the Government was taken from a productive investment. Therefore, the country's capital is reduced this year by that amount. However, unless the amount taken is massive, there’s no reason why the national capital shouldn’t return to its previous level next year. The loan could not have come from the part of the country’s capital that includes tools, machinery, and buildings. It must have been entirely taken from the funds used to pay workers, and the workers will feel the impact. But if none of them are starving, if their wages can handle such a cut, or if charity steps in to prevent them from complete poverty, there's no reason their productivity should be less next year compared to this year. If they produce as much as usual, even after being paid millions less, those millions are gained by their employers. The damage to the country’s capital is quickly fixed, but it’s done at the expense and often the real suffering of the working class.
This leads to the vexed question to which Dr. Chalmers has very particularly adverted: whether the funds required by a government for extraordinary unproductive expenditure are best raised by loans, the interest only being provided by taxes, or whether taxes should be at once laid on to the whole amount; which is called, in the financial vocabulary, raising the whole of the supplies within the year. Dr. Chalmers is strongly for the latter method. He says the common notion is that, in calling for the whole amount in one year, you require what is either impossible, or very inconvenient; that the people can not, without great hardship, pay the whole at once out of their yearly income; and that it is much better to require of them a small payment every year in the shape of interest, than so great a sacrifice once for all. To which his answer is, that the sacrifice is made equally in either case. Whatever is spent can not but be drawn from yearly income. The whole and every part of the wealth produced in the country forms, or helps to form, the yearly income of somebody. The privation which it is supposed must result from taking the amount in the shape of taxes is not avoided by taking it in a loan. The suffering is not averted, but only thrown upon the laboring-classes, the least able, and who least ought, to bear it: while all the inconveniences, physical, moral, and political, produced by maintaining taxes for the perpetual payment of the interest, are incurred in pure loss. Whenever capital is withdrawn from production, or from the fund destined for production, to be lent to the state and expended unproductively, that whole sum is withheld from the laboring-classes: the loan, therefore, is in truth paid off the same year; the whole of the sacrifice necessary for paying it off is actually made: only it is paid to the wrong persons, and therefore does not extinguish the claim; and paid by the very worst of taxes, a tax exclusively on the laboring-class. And, after having, in this most painful and unjust of ways, gone through [pg 086] the whole effort necessary for extinguishing the debt, the country remains charged with it, and with the payment of its interest in perpetuity.
This raises a complicated question that Dr. Chalmers has specifically addressed: Are the funds needed by a government for extraordinary unproductive spending better raised through loans, with only the interest covered by taxes, or should taxes be immediately applied to cover the entire amount? This approach of raising the full amount in one year is known in financial terms as raising the whole of the supplies within the year. Dr. Chalmers strongly supports the latter method. He argues that the common belief is that asking for the whole amount in one year is either impossible or very inconvenient; that people cannot, without significant hardship, pay the entire sum from their annual income at once; and that it’s much better to ask for small payments every year in the form of interest rather than a large sacrifice all at once. His counterargument is that the sacrifice is the same in either case. Whatever is spent must come from yearly income. The entire wealth produced in the country contributes to someone's annual income. The discomfort expected from taking the amount in taxes is not avoided by borrowing. The suffering isn't eliminated; it’s just shifted to the working class, who are the least able to bear it and should not have to. Meanwhile, all the drawbacks—physical, moral, and political—of maintaining taxes for ongoing interest payments result in pure loss. Whenever capital is taken away from production or from the resources meant for production to be lent to the government for unproductive expenses, that total amount is taken away from the working class. So the loan is essentially paid off in the same year; the entire sacrifice needed to pay it off is actually made, but it goes to the wrong people, meaning the debt claim isn't resolved. This is especially detrimental since it’s paid through a tax that falls solely on the working class. After enduring this unjust process to eliminate the debt, the country remains burdened with it and with the obligation to pay its interest indefinitely.
The United States, for example, borrows capital from A, with which it buys stores from B. If the loan all comes from within the country, A's capital is borrowed, when the United States should have taken that amount outright by taxation. When the money is borrowed of A, the laborers undergo the sacrifice, the title to the whole sum remains in A's hands, and the claim against the Government by A still exists; while, if the amount were taken by taxation, the title to the sum raised is in the state, and it is paid to the right person.
The United States, for instance, borrows money from A, which it uses to purchase goods from B. If the loan is sourced entirely from within the country, A's money is __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.lent, when the United States should have raised that amount directly through taxes. When the money is borrowed from A, the workers carry the burden, A still owns the full amount, and A keeps their claim against the Government; however, if the amount was collected through taxes, the ownership of the raised funds belongs to the state, and it’s distributed to the right people.
The experience of the United States during the civil war is an illustration of this principle. It is asserted that, as a matter of fact, the total expenses of the war were defrayed by the Northern States, during the four years of its continuance, out of surplus earnings; and yet at the close of the conflict a debt of $2,800,000,000 was saddled on the country.
The experience of the United States during the Civil War illustrates this principle. It's said that, in reality, the Northern States funded the total costs of the war over its four-year duration using surplus earnings; however, by the end of the conflict, the nation was left with a debt of $2,800,000,000.
The U.S. borrowed | $2.4 billion |
Revenue during that period | 1.7 billion |
Total cost of the war | $4.1 billion |
In reality we borrowed only about $1,500,000,000 instead of $2,400,000,000, since (1) the Government issued paper which depreciated, and yet received it at par in subscriptions for loans. Moreover, the total cost would have been much reduced had we issued no paper and (2) thereby not increased the prices of goods to the state, and (3) if no interest account had been created by borrowing. But could the country have raised the whole sum each year by taxation? In the first fiscal year after the war the United States paid in war taxes $650,000,000. At the beginning of the struggle, to June 30, 1862, the expenditure was $515,000,000, and by June 30, 1863, it had amounted to $1,098,000,000; so that $600,000,000 of taxes a year would have paid the war expenses, and left us free of debt at the close.
In reality, we only borrowed about $1.5 billion instead of $2.4 billion because (1) the government issued currency that lost value, yet we received it at full value in loan subscriptions. Plus, the total cost would have been much lower if we hadn't issued any currency and (2) therefore didn't raise prices on goods for the state, and (3) if we hadn’t created an interest account by borrowing. But could the country have raised the entire amount each year through taxes? In the first fiscal year after the war, the United States collected $650 million in war taxes. At the start of the conflict, up to June 30, 1862, expenditures were $515 million, and by June 30, 1863, they had risen to $1.098 billion; thus, $600 million a year in taxes would have covered war expenses and left us debt-free by the end.
A confirmatory experience is that of England during the Continental wars, 1793-1817:
A confirming example is England during the Continental wars, 1793-1817:
Total military spending | £1.06 billion |
Interest charges on the current debt | 235 million |
Total amount needed | £1.295 billion |
Revenue for that time | 1.145 billion |
Deficit | £150 million |
To provide for this deficit, the Government actually increased [pg 087] its debt by £600,000,000. A slight additional exertion would have provided £150,000,000 more of revenue, and saved £450,000,000 to the taxpayers.109
To tackle this shortfall, the Government actually increased[pg 087]its debt by £600,000,000. A little extra effort could have brought in an additional £150,000,000 in revenue, saving taxpayers £450,000,000.109
The practical state of the case, however, seldom exactly corresponds with this supposition. The loans of the less wealthy countries are made chiefly with foreign capital, which would not, perhaps, have been brought in to be invested on any less security than that of the Government: while those of rich and prosperous countries are generally made, not with funds withdrawn from productive employment, but with the new accumulations constantly making from income, and often with a part of them which, if not so taken, would have migrated to colonies, or sought other investments abroad.
The real situation, however, rarely matches this assumption. The loans from less wealthy countries are mainly funded by foreign capital, which likely wouldn’t have been invested without the government's backing. On the other hand, loans in rich and prosperous countries typically come not from pulling money out of productive use, but from new savings generated from income. Often, part of this money, if not used for loans, would have been sent to colonies or pursued other investments overseas.
§ 6. The demand for goods is not the same as the demand for labor.
Mr. Mill's statement of the theorem respecting capital, discussed in the argument that “demand for commodities is not demand for labor,” needs some simplification. For this purpose represent by the letters of the alphabet, A, B, C, ... X, Y, Z, the different kinds of commodities produced in the world which are exchanged against each other in the process of reaching the consumers. This exchange of commodities for each other, it need hardly be said, does not increase the number or quantity of commodities already in existence; since their production, as we have seen, requires labor and capital in connection with natural agents. Mere exchange does not alter the quantity of commodities produced.
Mr. Mill's explanation of the theorem on capital, discussed in the argument that __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“Demand for commodities isn’t the same as demand for labor.”It needs to be simplified. To do this, let's use the letters of the alphabet, A, B, C, ... X, Y, Z, to represent the different types of commodities produced globally that are traded for each other to reach consumers. It's obvious that this exchange of commodities doesn't increase the overall quantity of goods available; after all, their production, as we've seen, requires labor and capital along with natural resources. Just trading commodities doesn't change the amount produced.
To produce a plow, for example, the maker must have capital (in the form of subsistence, tools, and materials) of which some one has foregone the use by a process of saving in order that something else, in this case a plow, may be produced. This saving must be accomplished first to an amount sufficient to keep production going on from day to day. This capital is all consumed, but in a longer or shorter term (depending on the particular industrial operation) it is reproduced in new forms adapted to the existing wants of man. Moreover, without any new exertion of abstinence, this amount of capital may be again consumed and reproduced, and so go on forever, after once being saved (if never destroyed in the mean while, thereby passing out of the category not only of capital, but also of wealth). The total capital of the country, then, is not the sum [pg 088] of one year's capital added to that of another; but that of last year reproduced in a new form this year, plus a fractional increase arising from new savings. But, once saved, capital can go on constantly aiding in production forever. This plow when made is exchanged (if a plow is wanted, and the production is properly adjusted to meet desires) for such other products, food, means for repairing tools, etc., as give back to the plow-maker all the commodities consumed in its manufacture (with an increase, called profit).
To make a plow, for instance, the manufacturer needs capital (in the form of essentials, tools, and materials) that someone has saved up instead of using for something else, in this case, a plow. This saving must first accumulate to an amount sufficient to keep production going every day. This capital is fully utilized, but over time (depending on the specific industrial process), it is recreated in new forms that fit current human needs. Moreover, without any extra effort to save, this amount of capital can be consumed and reproduced again, continuing indefinitely, as long as it hasn’t been destroyed in the meantime, which would cause it to lose its status as both capital and wealth. The total capital in the country is not simply the sum of one year's capital plus another; it's last year's capital recreated in a new form this year, plus a bit of growth from new savings. Once saved, capital can continuously support production forever. When this plow is produced, it can be exchanged (if a plow is desired and production meets the demand) for other products, such as food, repair materials, etc., which return to the plow-maker all the resources used in its production (along with an increase, known as profit).[pg 088]
Returning to our illustration of the alphabet, it is evident that a certain amount of capital united with labor (constituting what may be called a productive engine) lies behind the production of A (such as the plow, for example), and to which its existence is due. The same is true of Z. Suppose that 5,000 of Z is produced, of which 4,000 is enough to reimburse the capital used up by labor in the operation, and that the owner of commodity Z spends the remaining 1,000 Z in exchange for 1,000 of commodity A. It is evident (no money being used as yet) that this exchange of goods is regulated entirely by the desires of the two parties to the transaction. No more goods are created simply by the exchange; the simple process of exchange does not keep the laborers engaged on A occupied. And yet the owner of Z had a demand for commodity A; his demand was worthless, except through the fact of his production, which gave him actual wealth, or purchasing power, in the form of Z. His demand for commodity A was not the thing which employed the laborers engaged in producing A, although the demand (if known beforehand) would cause them to produce A rather than some other article—that is, the demand of one quantity of wealth for a certain thing determines the direction taken by the owner of capital A. But, since the exchange is merely the form in which the demand manifests itself, it is clear that the demand does not add to production, and so of itself does not employ labor. Of course, if there were no desires, there would be no demand, and so no production and employment of labor. But we may conclude by formulating the proposition, that wealth (Z) offered for commodities (A) necessitates the use of other wealth (than Z) as capital to support the operation by which those commodities (A) are produced. It makes no difference to the existing employment of labor what want is supplied by the producers of A, whether it is velvet (intended for unproductive consumption) or plows (intended for productive consumption). Even if Z is no longer offered in exchange for A, and if then A is no longer to be made, the laborers formerly occupied in producing A—if warning is given of the coming change; if not, loss results—having the plant, can produce something else wanted by the owner of Z.
Returning to our example with the alphabet, it's clear that a certain amount of capital combined with labor (which we can refer to as a productive engine) is behind the creation of A (like a plow, for example), and this is what allows it to exist. The same applies to Z. Let’s say 5,000 of Z is produced, and 4,000 of that goes towards repaying the capital used for the labor involved, while the owner of Z spends the remaining 1,000 Z to get 1,000 of A. It’s evident (with no money involved yet) that this exchange of goods is entirely driven by the interests of both parties in the transaction. No additional goods are created just by the exchange; the simple act of swapping doesn’t keep the workers involved in A occupied. However, the owner of Z had a demand for A; his demand was worthless on its own, except for the fact that his production provided him with real wealth or purchasing power in the form of Z. His desire for A didn’t directly employ the workers making A, even though being aware of the demand beforehand would lead them to focus on producing A instead of something else—that is, the desire for one type of wealth to obtain something specific influences theguidancetaken by the owner of capital A. However, since the exchange is just how demand appears, it’s clear that demand doesn’t help in production and doesn’t employ labor on its own. Of course, if there were no wants, there would be no demand, and thus no production or employment of labor. But we can conclude by saying that wealth (Z) exchanged for commodities (A) requires the use of different wealth (not Z) as capital to support the process of producing those commodities (A). It doesn’t matter to current labor employment what need is being fulfilled by the producers of A, whether it’s velvet (for unproductive consumption) or plows (for productive consumption). Even if Z is no longer used to trade for A, and as a result A is no longer produced, the workers who were making A—if they are informed in advance about the upcoming change; otherwise, they’ll face loss—can use their facilities to create something else that the owner of Z wants.
Now into a community, as here pictured, all laborers supposed to be occupied, and all capital employed in producing A, B, C, ... X, Y, Z, imagine the coming of a shipwrecked crew. Instead of exchanging Z for A, as before, the owner of Z may offer his wealth to the crew to dance for him. The essential question is, Is more employment offered to labor by this action than the former exchange for A? That is, it is a question merely of distribution of wealth among the members of a community. The labor engaged on A is not thrown out of employment (if they have warning). There is no more wealth in existence, but it is differently distributed than before: the crew, instead of the former owner, now have 1,000 of Z. So far as the question of employment is concerned, it makes no difference on what terms the crew got it: they might have been hired to stand in a row and admire the owner of Z when he goes out. But yet it may naturally be assumed that the crew were employed productively. In this case, after they have consumed the wealth Z, they have brought into existence articles in the place of those they consumed. But, although this last operation is economically more desirable for the future growth of wealth, yet no more laborers for the time were employed than if the crew had merely danced. The advantages or disadvantages of productive consumption are not to be discussed here. It is intended, however, to establish the proposition that wealth paid out in wages, or advanced to producers, itself supports labor; that wealth offered directly to laborers in this way employs more labor than when merely offered in exchange for other goods, or, in other words, by a demand for commodities; that an increased demand for commodities does not involve an increased demand for labor, since this can only be created by capital. The essential difference is, that the owner of Z in one case, by exchanging goods for A, did not forego his consuming power; in the other case, by giving Z to the unemployed crew, he actually went through the process of saving by foregoing his personal consumption, and handing it over to the crew. If the crew use it unproductively, it is in the end the same as if the owner of Z had done it; but meanwhile the additional laborers were employed. If the crew be employed productively, then the saving once made will go on forever, as explained above, and the world will be the richer by the wealth this additional capital can create.
Imagine a community like the one described here, where all the workers are busy and all the resources are used to produce A, B, C, ... X, Y, Z. Now, think about the arrival of a shipwrecked crew. Instead of trading Z for A like before, the owner of Z might decide to pay the crew to work for him. The key question is: does this create more jobs for workers compared to the previous exchange for A? Essentially, it’s all about how wealth is shared among the community members. The labor focused on A won’t lose their jobs (if they are given notice). There isn’t any new wealth being created; it’s just been redistributed: the crew now possesses 1,000 of Z instead of the former owner. Regarding employment, it doesn’t matter how the crew obtained Z; they could have been hired to form a line and admire the owner of Z as he departs. Still, it’s fair to assume that the crew contributed productively. In this scenario, after they consume the wealth represented by Z, they create new items to replace what they used. However, even though this last action is better for future wealth growth, there weren’t more workers involved than if the crew had merely danced. The advantages and disadvantages of productive consumption aren’t the main focus here. The aim is to establish the idea thatWealth given as wages or provided to producers directly supports labor.Giving wealth directly to workers in this way creates more jobs than when it’s simply traded for other goods, or, in other words, driven by demand for products. A rise in demand for products doesn’t necessarily mean there’s a rise in demand for labor because that can only be generated by capital. The key difference is that in one scenario, the owner of Z, by exchanging goods for A, didn’t lose his ability to consume; whereas in the other scenario, by giving Z to the crew without jobs, he actually saved by sacrificing his own consumption and passing it to the crew. If the crew uses it unproductively, it ultimately has the same effect as if the owner of Z had used it; however, in the meantime, more workers were employed. If the crew is employed productively, the savings made will continuously provide benefits in the future, as explained above, and the world will be richer due to the wealth that this additional capital can generate.
It may now be objected that, if A is no longer in demand, the laborers in that industry will be thrown out of employment. Out of that employment certainly, but not out of every other. One thousand of Z was able to purchase certain results of labor and capital in industry A, when in the hands of its former owner; and now when in the hands of the crew it will [pg 090] control, as purchasing power, equivalent results of labor and capital. The crew may not want the same articles as the former owner of Z, but they will want the equivalents of 1,000 of Z in something, and that something will be produced now instead of A. The whole process may be represented by this diagram.
Some people might say that if A is no longer necessary, the workers in that industry will lose their jobs. They will indeed lose their jobs in that sector, but not everywhere else. One thousand of Z could purchase certain goods made by labor and capital in industry A when it was owned by the previous owner; now, with the current crew, it will have the same buying power for similar goods produced by labor and capital. The crew might not want the same products as the previous owner of Z, but they will want something worth 1,000 of Z, and that will now be produced in place of A. This entire process can be shown in this diagram.[pg 090]

1. Z is exchanged against A, and the crew remain unemployed.
1. Z is exchanged for A, and the crew is left unemployed.
2. Here the crew possess Z, and they themselves exchange Z for whatever A may produce in satisfaction of their wants, and the crew are then employed.
2. In this situation, the crew has Z, and they exchange Z for whatever A can create to satisfy their needs, after which the crew is hired.
It is possible that the intervention of money blinds some minds to a proper understanding of the operations described above. The supposition, as given, applies to a condition of barter, but is equally true if money is used.110 Imagine a display of all the industries of the world, A, B, C, ... X, Y, Z, presented within sight on one large field, and at the central spot the producer of gold and silver. When Z is produced, it is taken to the gold-counter, and exchanged for money; when A is produced, the same is done. Then the former money is given for A, and the latter for Z, so that in truth A is exchanged against Z through the medium of money, just as before money was considered. Now, it may be said by an objector, “If A is not wanted, after it is produced, and can not be sold, because the demand from Z has been withdrawn, then the capital used for A will not be returned, and the laborers in A will be thrown out of employment.” The answer is, of course, that the state of things here contemplated is a permanent and normal one wherein production is correctly adapted to human desires. If A is found not to be wanted, after the production of it, an industrial blunder has been committed, and wealth is wasted just as when burned up. It is ill-assorted production. The trouble is not in a lack of demand for what A may produce (of something else), but with the producers of A in not making that for which there were desires, from ignorance or lack of early information of the disposition of wealth Z. In practice, however, it will be found that most goods are made upon “orders,” and, except under peculiar circumstances, [pg 091] not actually produced unless a market is foreseen. Indeed, as every man knows, the most important function of a successful business man is the adaptation of production to the market, that is, to the desires of consumers.
It's possible that the influence of money stops some people from fully understanding the processes mentioned above. The assumption made here is based on a barter system, but it also applies when money is involved.110Picture a display of every industry in the world, A, B, C, ... X, Y, Z, arranged in a huge field, with the gold and silver producer at the center. When Z is produced, it's taken to the gold-counter and exchanged for cash; the same process occurs with A. The money from earlier is used to buy A, and the new money is used for Z, meaning A is essentially traded for Z using money, just like it was done before money existed. Now, someone might argue,“If A is no longer needed after it’s made and can't be sold because demand from Z has vanished, then the investment made in A won't be recouped, and the workers involved in A will be left jobless.”The response is that the situation described here is a common and ongoing one, where production matches human needs effectively. If A is deemed unwanted after it's produced, then an industrial error has happened, and resources are wasted just like when they are burned. This indicates poor production planning. The problem isn’t a lack of demand for what A could produce (or something else), but rather the producers of A failing to create what was truly desired due to ignorance or inadequate early information about the status of wealth Z. In reality, however, it usually turns out that most goods are made on"orders,"And, except in rare cases, they are not produced unless a market is expected. In fact, as everyone knows, the main job of a successful business person is to match production with the market, which means meeting consumers' needs.
One other form of this question needs brief mention. It is truly remarked that a large portion of industrial activity is engaged to-day, not in supplying productive consumption, such as food, shelter, and clothing, but in supplying the comforts and luxuries of low and high alike, or unproductive consumption; now, if there were not a demand for luxuries and comforts, many vast industries would cease to exist, and labor would be thrown out of employment. Is not a demand for such commodities, then, a cause of the present employment of labor? No, it is not. Luxuries and comforts are of course the objects of human wants; but a desire alone, without purchasing power, can not either buy or produce these commodities. To obtain a piano, one must produce goods, and this implies the possession of capital, by which to bring into existence goods, or purchasing power, to be offered for a piano. Nor is this sufficient. Even after a man, A, for example, offers purchasing power, he will not get a piano unless there exists an accumulation of unemployed capital, together with labor ready to manufacture the instrument. If capital were all previously occupied, no piano could be made, although A stood offering an equivalent in valuable goods. It may be said that A himself has the means. He has the wealth, and if he is willing to forego the use of this wealth, or, in other words, save it by devoting it to reproduction in the piano industry—that is, create the capital necessary for the purpose—then the piano can be made. But this shows again that, not a mere desire, but the existence of capital, is necessary to the production, and so to the employment of labor. An increased demand for commodities, therefore, does not give additional employment to labor, unless there be capital to support the labor.
There's another part of this question worth noting. It's been observed that a large portion of today’s industrial activity doesn't focus on producing essentials like food, shelter, and clothing, but rather on providing comforts and luxuries, which can be seen as unnecessary consumption. If there were no demand for luxuries and comforts, many big industries would close down, and workers would lose their jobs. So, can we say that the demand for these items is what drives current employment? No, it isn’t. Luxuries and comforts are definitely things that people want, but wanting something alone, without the financial means to afford it, can’t buy or create those goods. For example, to get a piano, one needs to produce something of value, which requires capital to create goods or purchasing power to buy a piano. But that's not all. Even if someone, say A, has purchasing power, he won’t be able to get a piano unless there’s already a supply of unused capital and available labor to build the instrument. If all capital were already in use, a piano couldn’t be made, even if A had valuable goods to trade. One might argue that A has the means. He has the wealth, and if he’s willing to forgo using it or, in other words, save it by investing it in the piano industry—that is, create the capital needed for this purpose—then a piano could be made. Yet, this shows again that it’s not just the desire, but the availability of capital, that is crucial for production and therefore for labor employment. So, an increase in demand for goods doesn’t create more job opportunities unless there is capital available to support that labor.
Some important corollaries result from this proposition: (a.) When a country by legislation creates a home demand for commodities, that does not of itself give additional employment to labor. If the goods had before been purchased abroad, under free discretion, then if produced at home they must require more capital and labor, or they would not have been brought from foreign countries. If produced at home, it would require, to purchase them, more of what was formerly sent abroad; or some must do without. The legislation can not, ipso facto, create capital, and only by an increase of capital can more employment result. It is possible, however, that legislation might cause a more effective use of existing capital; but that must be a question of fact, to be settled by circumstances [pg 092] in each particular case. It is not a thing to be governed by principles.
Some key conclusions can be drawn from this idea:a.When a country generates domestic demand for products through laws, it doesn’t necessarily create more jobs for workers. If those goods were previously imported without restrictions, making them locally would need more investment and labor; otherwise, they wouldn’t have been imported in the first place. If they are made locally, it would require more resources than what was previously imported, or some people will have to do without. Legislation cannot,by that very factGenerating capital and creating more jobs can only come from an increase in capital. However, it's possible that legislation could improve the use of existing capital; but that needs to be decided based on the specific circumstances of each case. It shouldn't be based on general principles.
(b.) It follows from the above proposition also that taxes levied on the rich, and paid by a saving from their consumption of luxuries, do not fall on the poor because of a lessened demand for commodities; since, as we have seen, that demand does not create or diminish the demand for labor. But, if the taxes levied on the rich are paid by savings from what the rich would have expended in wages, then if the Government spends the amount of revenue thus taken in the direct purchase of labor, as of soldiers and sailors, the tax does not fall on the laboring-class taken as a whole. When the Government takes that wealth which was formerly capital, burns it up, or dissipates it in war, it ceases to exist any longer as a means of again producing wealth, or of employing labor.
(b.This also means that taxes on wealthy individuals, which are covered by their savings from luxury spending, don't affect the poor by reducing demand for goods. As we've established, that demand doesn't impact the demand for labor. However, if taxes on the wealthy are funded by savings from what they would have paid in wages, and if the government uses that revenue directly to hire labor, like soldiers and sailors, the tax doesn't burden the working class as a whole. When the government takes wealth that was once capital and either spends it recklessly, like in war, it no longer exists as a way to produce wealth or provide employment.
Chapter V. On Circulating and Fixed Capital.
§ 1. Fixed and Circulating Capital.
Of the capital engaged in the production of any commodity, there is a part which, after being once used, exists no longer as capital; is no longer capable of rendering service to production, or at least not the same service, nor to the same sort of production. Such, for example, is the portion of capital which consists of materials. The tallow and alkali of which soap is made, once used in the manufacture, are destroyed as alkali and tallow. In the same division must be placed the portion of capital which is paid as the wages, or consumed as the subsistence, of laborers. That part of the capital of a cotton-spinner which he pays away to his work-people, once so paid, exists no longer as his capital, or as a cotton-spinner's capital. Capital which in this manner fulfills the whole of its office in the production in which it is engaged, by a single use, is called Circulating Capital. The term, which is not very appropriate, is derived from the circumstance that this portion of capital requires to be constantly renewed by the sale of the finished product, and when renewed is perpetually parted with in buying materials and paying wages; so that it does its work, not by being kept, but by changing hands.
Out of the capital used to produce any product, there’s a part that, after being used once, is no longer considered capital; it can't provide any further benefit to production, or at least not the same kind of benefit for the same type of production. For instance, the capital that consists of materials is like this. The tallow and alkali used to make soap are destroyed in the process and no longer exist as tallow and alkali. This also applies to the portion of capital that is paid as wages or used for the living expenses of workers. The money a cotton-spinner pays to their workers, once given, no longer exists as their capital or as a cotton-spinner's capital. Capital that fulfills its entire role in production with a single use is known as Circulating Capital. The term, which isn’t very fitting, comes from the fact that this part of capital needs to be continuously refreshed by selling the finished product, and when it's refreshed, it's constantly exchanged for buying materials and paying wages; thus, it performs its function not by being held onto, but by being passed around.
Another large portion of capital, however, consists in instruments of production, of a more or less permanent character; which produce their effect not by being parted with, but by being kept; and the efficacy of which is not exhausted by a single use. To this class belong buildings, [pg 094] machinery, and all or most things known by the name of implements or tools. The durability of some of these is considerable, and their function as productive instruments is prolonged through many repetitions of the productive operation. In this class must likewise be included capital sunk (as the expression is) in permanent improvements of land. So also the capital expended once for all, in the commencement of an undertaking, to prepare the way for subsequent operations: the expense of opening a mine, for example; of cutting canals, of making roads or docks. Other examples might be added, but these are sufficient. Capital which exists in any of these durable shapes, and the return to which is spread over a period of corresponding duration, is called Fixed Capital.
Another big chunk of capital, however, consists of production tools that are more or less permanent; they create value not by being sold off but by being utilized, and their usefulness doesn’t run out after just one use. This category includes buildings, [pg 094] machinery, and nearly everything referred to as implements or tools. Some of these have significant durability, and their role as productive tools extends through many uses. This category also includes capital invested (as the phrase goes) in lasting improvements to land. Additionally, the capital spent upfront to lay the groundwork for future tasks—like the cost of opening a mine, constructing canals, or building roads or docks—falls into this group. There are more examples, but these are enough. Capital that takes these durable forms, with returns spread out over a matching timeframe, is known as Fixed Capital.
Of fixed capital, some kinds require to be occasionally or periodically renewed. Such are all implements and buildings: they require, at intervals, partial renewal by means of repairs, and are at last entirely worn out. In other cases the capital does not, unless as a consequence of some unusual accident, require entire renewal. A dock or a canal, once made, does not require, like a machine, to be made again, unless purposely destroyed. The most permanent of all kinds of fixed capital is that employed in giving increased productiveness to a natural agent, such as land.
Some types of fixed capital need to be periodically renewed. This includes all tools and buildings; they require occasional repairs and eventually wear out completely. In other cases, capital doesn’t need to be completely renewed unless there’s some unusual incident. For example, a dock or a canal, once built, doesn’t need to be rebuilt like a machine does, unless it’s intentionally destroyed. The most durable form of fixed capital is the one used to increase the productivity of a natural resource, like land.
To return to the theoretical distinction between fixed and circulating capital. Since all wealth which is destined to be employed for reproduction comes within the designation of capital, there are parts of capital which do not agree with the definition of either species of it; for instance, the stock of finished goods which a manufacturer or dealer at any time possesses unsold in his warehouses. But this, though capital as to its destination, is not yet capital in actual exercise; it is not engaged in production, but has first to be sold or exchanged, that is, converted into an equivalent value of some other commodities, and therefore is not yet either fixed or circulating capital, but will become either one or the other, or be eventually divided between them.
To go back to the theoretical difference between fixed and circulating capital. Since all wealth meant for reproduction falls under the term capital, there are parts of capital that don't fit into either category; for example, the stock of finished goods that a manufacturer or dealer has unsold in their warehouses at any given time. While this is capital in terms of its purpose, it isn't capital actively at work; it isn't involved in production yet and needs to be sold or exchanged first, meaning it must be converted into equivalent value of other goods. Therefore, it isn't classified as either fixed or circulating capital at this stage, but it will eventually become one or the other, or possibly split between them.
§ 2. Increasing Fixed Capital, at the expense of Circulating Capital, can be harmful to the Workers.
There is a great difference between the effects of circulating and those of fixed capital, on the amount of the gross produce of the country. Circulating capital being destroyed as such, the result of a single use must be a reproduction equal to the whole amount of the circulating capital used, and a profit besides. This, however, is by no means necessary in the case of fixed capital. Since machinery, for example, is not wholly consumed by one use, it is not necessary that it should be wholly replaced from the product of that use. The machine answers the purpose of its owner if it brings in, during each interval of time, enough to cover the expense of repairs, and the deterioration in value which the machine has sustained during the same time, with a surplus sufficient to yield the ordinary profit on the entire value of the machine.
There is a significant difference between the effects of circulating capital and fixed capital on the total output of a country. Since circulating capital gets used up completely, each time it’s used, it must be replaced entirely by the total amount produced plus a profit. However, this isn’t the case for fixed capital. For instance, machinery isn’t fully consumed in one use, so it doesn't need to be entirely replaced from the product of that use. The machine serves its owner well if it generates enough income over time to cover repair costs and the depreciation in value it has experienced, along with extra earnings to provide a standard profit on its total value.
From this it follows that all increase of fixed capital, when taking place at the expense of circulating, must be, at least temporarily, prejudicial to the interests of the laborers. This is true, not of machinery alone, but of all improvements by which capital is sunk; that is, rendered permanently incapable of being applied to the maintenance and remuneration of labor.
From this, it follows that any increase in fixed capital, when it comes at the expense of circulating capital, must, at least for a time, harm the interests of workers. This is true not just for machinery, but for all improvements that involve capital being invested in ways that make it permanently unavailable for maintaining and paying workers.
The argument relied on by most of those who contend that machinery can never be injurious to the laboring-class is, that by cheapening production it creates such an increased demand for the commodity as enables, ere long, a greater number of persons than ever to find employment in producing it. The argument does not seem to me to have the weight commonly ascribed to it. The fact, though too broadly stated, is, no doubt, often true. The copyists who were thrown out of employment by the invention of printing [pg 096] were doubtless soon outnumbered by the compositors and pressmen who took their place; and the number of laboring persons now employed in the cotton manufacture is many times greater than were so occupied previously to the inventions of Hargreaves and Arkwright, which shows that, besides the enormous fixed capital now embarked in the manufacture, it also employs a far larger circulating capital than at any former time. But if this capital was drawn from other employments, if the funds which took the place of the capital sunk in costly machinery were supplied not by any additional saving consequent on the improvements, but by drafts on the general capital of the community, what better are the laboring-classes for the mere transfer?
The argument made by most people who believe that machinery can never harm the working class is that by lowering production costs, it creates a greater demand for the product, allowing more people than ever to find jobs in producing it. However, I don't think this argument carries the weight it's often given. The fact, although somewhat oversimplified, is, without a doubt, sometimes true. The copyists who lost their jobs because of the invention of printing were likely soon outnumbered by the typesetters and printers who took their place; and the number of workers now employed in cotton manufacturing is much greater than those who were employed before the inventions of Hargreaves and Arkwright. This shows that, in addition to the huge fixed capital now invested in manufacturing, it also uses a far larger circulating capital than at any previous time. But if this capital came from other jobs, if the funds replacing the capital lost in expensive machinery were not generated by any additional savings from the improvements but drawn from the overall capital of the community, what benefits do the working class gain from this mere transfer?
All attempts to make out that the laboring-classes as a collective body can not suffer temporarily by the introduction of machinery, or by the sinking of capital in permanent improvements, are, I conceive, necessarily fallacious.111 That they would suffer in the particular department of industry to which the change applies is generally admitted, and obvious to common sense; but it is often said that, though employment is withdrawn from labor in one department, an exactly equivalent employment is opened for it in others, because what the consumers save in the increased cheapness of one particular article enables them to augment their consumption of others, thereby increasing the demand for other kinds of labor. This is plausible, but, as was shown in the last chapter, involves a fallacy; demand for commodities being a totally different thing from demand [pg 097] for labor. It is true, the consumers have now additional means of buying other things; but this will not create the other things, unless there is capital to produce them, and the improvement has not set at liberty any capital, even if it has not absorbed some from other employments.
All attempts to claim that the working class as a group can't temporarily suffer from the introduction of machinery or from investments in permanent improvements are, in my opinion, fundamentally flawed.111 It’s generally accepted and obvious that they will suffer in the specific area of industry affected by the change; however, it's often argued that while jobs are lost in one area, equivalent jobs are created in others, since what consumers save from the lower price of one item allows them to spend more on other items, thereby increasing the demand for other types of labor. This argument seems reasonable, but as demonstrated in the last chapter, it is based on a misconception; the demand for goods is completely different from the demand for labor. It's true that consumers now have more money to buy other things, but this increased purchasing power won't create those other things unless there is capital available to produce them, and the improvement hasn't freed up any capital, even if it has drawn some away from other uses.
§ 3. —This rarely, if ever, happens.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that, as things are actually transacted, improvements in production are often, if ever, injurious, even temporarily, to the laboring-classes in the aggregate. They would be so if they took place suddenly to a great amount, because much of the capital sunk must necessarily in that case be provided from funds already employed as circulating capital. But improvements are always introduced very gradually, and are seldom or never made by withdrawing circulating capital from actual production, but are made by the employment of the annual increase. I doubt if there would be found a single example of a great increase of fixed capital, at a time and place where circulating capital was not rapidly increasing likewise.
However, I don't think that, in reality, improvements in production are usually harmful, even temporarily, to workers as a whole. They could be if they happened suddenly and on a large scale, because a lot of the invested capital would have to come from funds already being used as circulating capital. But improvements are always introduced very gradually and are rarely made by taking circulating capital away from current production; instead, they're achieved through the use of annual growth. I doubt there’s a single case of a significant increase in fixed capital occurring in a time and place where circulating capital wasn't also growing quickly.
In the United States, while the cost per yard of the manufactured goods has decreased, and so made accessible to poorer classes than before, the capital engaged in manufactures has increased so as to allow a vastly greater number of persons to be employed, as will be seen by the following comparison of 1860 with 1880 taken from the last census returns. (Compendium, 1880, pp. 928, 930.)
In the United States, even though the cost per yard of manufactured goods has decreased, making them more affordable for lower-income individuals than before, the investment in manufacturing has risen, enabling a significantly larger number of people to find jobs. This is illustrated by the comparison between 1860 and 1880 based on the latest census data. (Compendium, 1880, pp. 928, 930.)
Number of establishments. | Capital (Thousands). | Average number of hands employed. | Total amount paid in wages during the year. | |
1860 | 140,433 | $1,009,855 | 1,311,246 | $378,878,966 |
1880 | 253,852 | 2,790,272 | 2,732,595 | 947,953,795 |
“A hundred years ago, one person in every family of five or six must have been absolutely needed to spin and weave by [pg 098] hand the fabrics required for the scanty clothing of the people; now one person in two hundred or two hundred and fifty only need work in the factory to produce the cotton and woolen fabrics of the most amply clothed nation of the world.”112
“A hundred years ago, in every family of five or six, one person had to be fully committed to hand-spinning and weaving the fabrics needed for basic clothing; now, only one person in every two hundred or two hundred and fifty has to work in a factory to produce the cotton and wool fabrics for the most stylish nation in the world.[pg 098]”112
To these considerations must be added, that, even if improvements did for a time decrease the aggregate produce and the circulating capital of the community, they would not the less tend in the long run to augment both. This tendency of improvements in production to cause increased accumulation, and thereby ultimately to increase the gross produce, even if temporarily diminishing it, will assume a still more decided character if it should appear that there are assignable limits both to the accumulation of capital and to the increase of production from the land, which limits once attained, all further increase of produce must stop; but that improvements in production, whatever may be their other effects, tend to throw one or both of these limits farther off. Now, these are truths which will appear in the clearest light in a subsequent stage of our investigation. It will be seen that the quantity of capital which will, or even which can, be accumulated in any country, and the amount of gross produce which will, or even which can, be raised, bear a proportion to the state of the arts of production there existing; and that every improvement, even if for the time it diminish the circulating capital and the gross produce, ultimately makes room for a larger amount of both than could possibly have existed otherwise. It is this which is the conclusive answer to the objections against machinery; and the proof thence arising of the ultimate benefit to laborers of mechanical inventions, even in the existing state of society, will hereafter be seen to be conclusive.113
To these considerations, we should also add that even if improvements temporarily reduce the total production and circulating capital of the community, they will ultimately contribute to increasing both in the long run. This tendency for production improvements to lead to greater accumulation and, therefore, eventually increase overall production—even if they cause a temporary decline—will become more evident if it turns out that there are limits to capital accumulation and land production. Once these limits are reached, any further increase in production would stop; however, improvements in production, regardless of their other effects, push those limits further away. These truths will become clearer as we continue our investigation. It will be shown that the amount of capital that can be accumulated in any country and the total production that can be achieved are related to the levels of production technology in that country. Every improvement, even if it temporarily reduces circulating capital and overall production, ultimately allows for greater amounts of both than could have existed otherwise. This provides a definitive response to objections against machinery; and the proof of the eventual benefits of mechanical inventions to workers, even in the current state of society, will be seen to be conclusive.
Chapter VI. Factors Impacting Production Efficiency.
§ 1. General Reasons for Greater Productivity.
The most evident cause of superior productiveness is what are called natural advantages. These are various. Fertility of soil is one of the principal. The influence of climate [is another advantage, and] consists in lessening the physical requirements of the producers.
The most obvious reason for greater productivity is what we call natural advantages. These come in various forms. The fertility of the soil is one of the main factors. The influence of climate is another advantage, as it reduces the physical demands on the producers.
In spinning very fine cotton thread, England's natural climate gives in some parts of the country such advantages in proper moisture and electric conditions that the operation can be carried on out-of-doors; while in the United States it is generally necessary to create an artificial atmosphere. In ordinary spinning in our country more is accomplished when the wind is in one quarter than in another. The dry northwest wind in New England reduces the amount of product, while the dry northeast wind in England has a similar effect, and it is said has practically driven the cotton-spinners from Manchester to Oldham, where the climate is more equably moist. The full reasons for these facts are not yet ascertained.
When spinning very fine cotton thread, some areas of England have a natural climate that provides benefits due to optimal moisture and electrical conditions, allowing for outdoor work. In the United States, it’s generally required to create an artificial environment. In regular spinning here, the results can change based on the wind direction. The dry northwest wind in New England lowers production, while the dry northeast wind in England has a similar effect, reportedly pushing cotton-spinners from Manchester to Oldham, where the climate is more consistently humid. The complete reasons behind these observations are still not fully understood.
Experts in the woolen industry, also, explain that the quality and fiber of wool depend upon the soil and climate where the sheep are pastured. When Ohio sheep are transferred to Texas, in a few years their wool loses the distinctive quality it formerly possessed, and takes on a new character belonging to the breeds of Texas. The wool produced by one set of climatic conditions is quite different from that of another set, and is used by the manufacturers for different purposes.
Experts in the wool industry also explain that the quality and fiber of wool depend on the soil and climate where the sheep are raised. When Ohio sheep are moved to Texas, after a few years their wool loses its unique quality and develops new characteristics specific to Texas breeds. The wool produced in one set of climatic conditions is quite different from that produced in another, and manufacturers use them for different purposes.
In hot regions, mankind can exist in comfort with less perfect housing, less clothing; fuel, that absolute necessary of life in cold climates, they can almost dispense with, except for industrial uses. They also require less aliment. Among natural advantages, besides soil and climate, must be [pg 100] mentioned abundance of mineral productions, in convenient situations, and capable of being worked with moderate labor. Such are the coal-fields of Great Britain, which do so much to compensate its inhabitants for the disadvantages of climate; and the scarcely inferior resource possessed by this country and the United States, in a copious supply of an easily reduced iron-ore, at no great depth below the earth's surface, and in close proximity to coal-deposits available for working it. But perhaps a greater advantage than all these is a maritime situation, especially when accompanied with good natural harbors; and, next to it, great navigable rivers. These advantages consist indeed wholly in saving of cost of carriage. But few, who have not considered the subject, have any adequate notion how great an extent of economical advantage this comprises.
In hot regions, people can live comfortably with less advanced housing and clothing. They can almost do without fuel, which is essential for life in cold climates, except for industrial needs. They also need less food. Among the natural advantages, in addition to soil and climate, is the abundance of mineral resources located conveniently and requiring moderate effort to extract. This includes the coal fields of Great Britain, which significantly compensate its residents for the drawbacks of the climate, and the nearly equal benefit found in this country and the United States, with a plentiful supply of easily accessible iron ore just below the surface and close to coal deposits available for extraction. However, perhaps the greatest advantage of all is being near the sea, especially when there are good natural harbors; next would be having large navigable rivers. These benefits primarily come from reduced transportation costs. But very few who haven't thought about this topic truly understand how extensive these economic advantages are.
As the second of the [general] causes of superior productiveness, we may rank the greater energy of labor. By this is not to be understood occasional, but regular and habitual energy. The third element which determines the productiveness of the labor of a community is the skill and knowledge therein existing, whether it be the skill and knowledge of the laborers themselves or of those who direct their labor. That the productiveness of the labor of a people is limited by their knowledge of the arts of life is self-evident, and that any progress in those arts, any improved application of the objects or powers of nature to industrial uses, enables the same quantity and intensity of labor to raise a greater produce. One principal department of these improvements consists in the invention and use of tools and machinery.114
As the second major factor contributing to higher productivity, we can recognize the increased energy of labor. This doesn't refer to occasional bursts of effort but rather to consistent and habitual energy. The third aspect that influences a community's labor productivity is the skill and knowledge present, whether it's the workers' own expertise or that of the individuals managing their work. It's obvious that the productivity of a society's labor is constrained by their understanding of life's trades, and any advancements in those trades, along with better ways to utilize natural resources for industrial purposes, allow the same amount and intensity of labor to yield greater results. A key area of these improvements involves the invention and use of tools and machinery.114
The deficiency of practical good sense, which renders the majority of the laboring-class such bad calculators—which makes, for instance, their domestic economy so improvident, lax, and irregular—must disqualify them for any but a low grade of intelligent labor, and render their industry far less productive than with equal energy it otherwise might be. [pg 101] The moral qualities of the laborers are fully as important to the efficiency and worth of their labor as the intellectual. Independently of the effects of intemperance upon their bodily and mental faculties, and of flighty, unsteady habits upon the energy and continuity of their work (points so easily understood as not to require being insisted upon), it is well worthy of meditation how much of the aggregate effect of their labor depends on their trustworthiness.
The lack of practical common sense in most of the working class makes them poor at calculations, which leads to their domestic budget being careless, lax, and inconsistent. This must limit them to only low-skilled jobs and makes their work much less effective than it could be with the same amount of effort. [pg 101] The moral qualities of workers are just as crucial to the effectiveness and value of their labor as their intellectual abilities. Besides the impact of excessive drinking on their physical and mental health, and the effects of erratic, inconsistent habits on the energy and continuity of their work (points that are obvious enough not to need emphasis), it's worth reflecting on how much of the total impact of their labor relies on their reliability.
Among the secondary causes which determine the productiveness of productive agents, the most important is Security. By security I mean the completeness of the protection which society affords to its members.
Among the secondary causes that influence the productivity of productive agents, the most important is Security. By security, I mean the extent of protection that society provides to its members.
§ 2. Combining and Dividing Labor Boosts Productivity.
In the enumeration of the circumstances which promote the productiveness of labor, we have left one untouched, which is co-operation, or the combined action of numbers. Of this great aid to production, a single department, known by the name of Division of Labor, has engaged a large share of the attention of political economists; most deservedly, indeed, but to the exclusion of other cases and exemplifications of the same comprehensive law. In the lifting of heavy weights, for example, in the felling of trees, in the sawing of timber, in the gathering of much hay or corn during a short period of fine weather, in draining a large extent of land during the short season when such a work may be properly conducted, in the pulling of ropes on board ship, in the rowing of large boats, in some mining operations, in the erection of a scaffolding for building, and in the breaking of stones for the repair of a road, so that the whole of the road shall always be kept in good order: in all these simple operations, and thousands more, it is absolutely necessary that many persons should work together, at the same time, in the same place, and in the same way. [But] in the present state of society, the breeding and feeding of sheep is the occupation of one set of people; dressing the wool to prepare it for the spinner is that of another; spinning it into thread, of a third; weaving the thread into broadcloth, of a fourth; dyeing the cloth, of a fifth; making it into a coat, of a sixth; without [pg 102] counting the multitude of carriers, merchants, factors, and retailers put in requisition at the successive stages of this progress.
In discussing the factors that enhance labor productivity, we haven't mentioned one important aspect: cooperation, or the combined effort of multiple people. This significant contributor to production has garnered a lot of attention from political economists, particularly in relation to the Division of Labor. This focus is well-deserved, but it often overlooks other examples of this same broad principle. For instance, when lifting heavy objects, cutting down trees, sawing wood, gathering large amounts of hay or corn during a brief period of good weather, draining extensive land during the limited season suitable for such activities, pulling ropes on a ship, rowing large boats, participating in certain mining operations, building scaffolding, and breaking stones to keep roads in good condition—these simple tasks, along with countless others, require many people to work together simultaneously, in the same place, and in the same way. In today’s society, raising and feeding sheep is carried out by one group of people; processing wool for spinning is done by another; spinning it into thread is handled by yet another group; weaving the thread into broadcloth is done by another; dyeing the cloth is the responsibility of still another; making it into a coat is managed by yet another group; all this without even considering the numerous carriers, merchants, agents, and retailers involved at each stage of this process.
Without some separation of employments, very few things would be produced at all. Suppose a set of persons, or a number of families, all employed precisely in the same manner; each family settled on a piece of its own land, on which it grows by its labor the food required for its own sustenance, and, as there are no persons to buy any surplus produce where all are producers, each family has to produce within itself whatever other articles it consumes. In such circumstances, if the soil was tolerably fertile, and population did not tread too closely on the heels of subsistence, there would be, no doubt, some kind of domestic manufactures; clothing for the family might, perhaps, be spun and woven within it, by the labor, probably, of the women (a first step in the separation of employments); and a dwelling of some sort would be erected and kept in repair by their united labor. But beyond simple food (precarious, too, from the variations of the seasons), coarse clothing, and very imperfect lodging, it would be scarcely possible that the family should produce anything more.
Without some separation of tasks, very few things would ever get made. Imagine a group of people, or a bunch of families, all doing exactly the same work; each family lives on its own piece of land, where they grow the food they need to survive. Since no one is around to buy any extra produce when everyone is producing, each family has to make everything else it consumes by itself. In this situation, if the soil is reasonably fertile and the population isn't too far ahead of what the land can support, there would likely be some kind of simple domestic manufacturing. Families might spin and weave their own clothing, probably with the women doing most of the work (which represents the first step in separating tasks), and they would jointly build and maintain their home. But apart from basic food (which is unpredictable due to seasonal changes), rough clothing, and very basic shelter, it would be almost impossible for the family to produce anything else.
Suppose that a company of artificers, provided with tools, and with food sufficient to maintain them for a year, arrive in the country and establish themselves in the midst of the population. These new settlers occupy themselves in producing articles of use or ornament adapted to the taste of a simple people; and before their food is exhausted they have produced these in considerable quantity, and are ready to exchange them for more food. The economical position of the landed population is now most materially altered. They have an opportunity given them of acquiring comforts and luxuries. Things which, while they depended solely upon their own labor, they never could have obtained, because they could not have produced, are now accessible to them if they can succeed in producing an additional quantity of food and necessaries. They are thus incited to increase the productiveness [pg 103] of their industry. The new settlers constitute what is called a market for surplus agricultural produce; and their arrival has enriched the settlement, not only by the manufactured articles which they produce, but by the food which would not have been produced unless they had been there to consume it.
Imagine a group of skilled workers, equipped with tools and enough food to last a year, arriving in a new country and settling among the local people. These newcomers start creating useful and decorative items tailored to the tastes of a simple society. Before they run out of food, they manage to produce a significant amount and are ready to trade these goods for more food. The economic situation of the local population changes dramatically. They now have the chance to acquire comforts and luxuries that they could never have obtained on their own labor. By increasing their food production and basic necessities, they are encouraged to enhance their productivity. The new settlers create what is known as a marketplace for excess agricultural products, and their presence enriches the community, not only through the manufactured goods they create but also by generating additional food that wouldn’t have been produced without their demand.
There is no inconsistency between this doctrine and the proposition we before maintained,115 that a market for commodities does not constitute employment for labor. The labor of the agriculturists was already provided with employment; they are not indebted to the demand of the new-comers for being able to maintain themselves. What that demand does for them is to call their labor into increased vigor and efficiency; to stimulate them, by new motives, to new exertions.
There’s no conflict between this idea and what we stated earlier, 115 that a market for goods doesn’t create jobs for workers. Farmers already had employment; they don’t rely on the new demand to support themselves. What that demand does for them is boost their productivity and motivation, pushing them to put in more effort.
From these considerations it appears that a country will seldom have a productive agriculture unless it has a large town population, or, the only available substitute, a large export trade in agricultural produce to supply a population elsewhere. I use the phrase “town population” for shortness, to imply a population non-agricultural.
From these points, it seems that a country will rarely have productive agriculture unless it has a large urban population, or, as an alternative, a substantial export trade in agricultural goods to support a population elsewhere. I use the term "city population" for brevity, to imply a population that is not involved in agriculture.
It is found that the productive power of labor is increased by carrying the separation further and further; by breaking down more and more every process of industry into parts, so that each laborer shall confine himself to an ever smaller number of simple operations. And thus, in time, arise those remarkable cases of what is called the division of labor, with which all readers on subjects of this nature are familiar. Adam Smith's illustration from pin-making, though so well known, is so much to the point that I will venture once more to transcribe it: “The business of making a pin is divided into about eighteen distinct operations. One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business; [pg 104] to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper.... I have seen a small manufactory where ten men only were employed, and where some of them, consequently, performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upward of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upward of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day.”
The productive power of labor increases when the separation of tasks is pushed further and further; by breaking every industrial process down into smaller parts, so that each worker focuses on fewer and simpler tasks. Over time, this leads to the well-known phenomenon called the division of labor, which anyone familiar with these topics will recognize. Adam Smith's example from pin-making, although widely known, is so relevant that I will quote it again: Making a pin involves about eighteen different steps. One person draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, and a fifth shapes the top to hold the head; making the head itself includes two or three separate processes; attaching it is a distinct job; [pg 104] whitening the pins is another task; and even packaging them in paper is its own trade. I’ve seen a small factory where only ten men worked, and some of them had to do two or three different jobs. Even though they were quite poor and had limited machinery, when they put in the effort, they could produce around twelve pounds of pins in a day. A pound contains over four thousand average-sized pins. So, those ten workers could make more than forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, effectively producing one-tenth of forty-eight thousand pins, could be seen as making four thousand eight hundred pins daily. However, if they had all worked separately and independently, without being trained for this specific task, they certainly wouldn’t have even been able to make twenty pins each, and possibly not even one pin a day.
§ 3. Benefits of Division of Labor.
The causes of the increased efficiency given to labor by the division of employments are some of them too familiar to require specification; but it is worth while to attempt a complete enumeration of them. By Adam Smith they are reduced to three: “First, the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and, lastly, the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor, and enable one man to do the work of many.”
The reasons behind the increased efficiency in labor due to the division of tasks are so well-known that they hardly need to be detailed. Still, it's important to try to list them all. According to Adam Smith, there are three main reasons: “First, the improvement of skills in each individual worker; second, the time saved that is typically wasted when switching from one type of work to another; and finally, the invention of numerous machines that make work easier and faster, enabling one person to do the work of several.”
(1.) Of these, the increase of dexterity of the individual workman is the most obvious and universal. It does not follow that because a thing has been done oftener it will be done better. That depends on the intelligence of the workman, and on the degree in which his mind works along with his hands. But it will be done more easily. This is as true of mental operations as of bodily. Even a child, after much practice, sums up a column of figures with a rapidity which resembles intuition. The act of speaking any language, of [pg 105] reading fluently, of playing music at sight, are cases as remarkable as they are familiar. Among bodily acts, dancing, gymnastic exercises, ease and brilliancy of execution on a musical instrument, are examples of the rapidity and facility acquired by repetition. In simpler manual operations the effect is, of course, still sooner produced.
(1.) Among these, the increased skill of individual workers is the most noticeable and widespread. Just because something has been done more often doesn’t mean it will be done better. That depends on the worker's intelligence and how well their mind works with their hands. However, it will be done more easily. This applies to mental tasks just as much as to physical ones. Even a child, after practicing a lot, can quickly add up a column of numbers almost like it’s second nature. Speaking any language, reading fluently, and playing music at sight are just as impressive as they are common. For physical activities, dancing, gymnastic routines, and performing on a musical instrument with ease and flair are examples of the speed and skill gained through practice. In simpler manual tasks, the effect is achieved even more quickly.
(2.) The second advantage enumerated by Adam Smith as arising from the division of labor is one on which I can not help thinking that more stress is laid by him and others than it deserves. To do full justice to his opinion, I will quote his own exposition of it: “It is impossible to pass very quickly from one kind of work to another, that is carried on in a different place, and with quite different tools. A country weaver, who cultivates a small farm, must lose a good deal of time in passing from his loom to the field, and from the field to his loom. When the two trades can be carried on in the same workhouse, the loss of time is no doubt much less. It is even in this case, however, very considerable. A man commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of employment to another.” I am very far from implying that these considerations are of no weight; but I think there are counter-considerations which are overlooked. If one kind of muscular or mental labor is different from another, for that very reason it is to some extent a rest from that other; and if the greatest vigor is not at once obtained in the second occupation, neither could the first have been indefinitely prolonged without some relaxation of energy. It is a matter of common experience that a change of occupation will often afford relief where complete repose would otherwise be necessary, and that a person can work many more hours without fatigue at a succession of occupations, than if confined during the whole time to one.116 Different occupations employ different muscles, or different energies of the mind, some of which rest and are refreshed while [pg 106] others work. Bodily labor itself rests from mental, and conversely. The variety itself has an invigorating effect on what, for want of a more philosophical appellation, we must term the animal spirits—so important to the efficiency of all work not mechanical, and not unimportant even to that.
(2.) The second advantage that Adam Smith mentions as resulting from the division of labor is one that I think he and others emphasize more than it deserves. To give full credit to his view, I’ll quote his own explanation: “It’s hard to quickly switch from one type of work to another that’s done in a different place and with totally different tools. A weaver in the countryside, who runs a small farm, wastes a lot of time moving between his loom and the fields. When both jobs can be done in the same location, the lost time is definitely less. Still, even in this scenario, it’s still pretty substantial. People generally take their time when transitioning from one type of work to another.” I'm not suggesting that these points are insignificant; however, I believe there are counterpoints that aren’t considered. If one type of physical or mental work differs from another, that very difference provides some rest from the other. And while the second task may not immediately unleash the highest energy, the first task couldn’t be sustained indefinitely without some rejuvenation. It's widely recognized that changing tasks can often provide relief when complete rest would otherwise be necessary, allowing someone to work many more hours without fatigue by alternating between different types of jobs, rather than sticking to just one. 116 Different jobs use different muscles or mental energies, some of which rest and recharge while others are active. Physical work itself provides a break from mental work, and vice versa. This variety has an energizing effect on what, lacking a better philosophical term, we call the animal spirits—crucial for the effectiveness of all non-mechanical work, and still important for mechanical tasks as well.
(3.) The third advantage attributed by Adam Smith to the division of labor is, to a certain extent, real. Inventions tending to save labor in a particular operation are more likely to occur to any one in proportion as his thoughts are intensely directed to that occupation, and continually employed upon it.
(3.) The third benefit that Adam Smith associates with the division of labor is, to some degree, genuine. Innovations that aim to reduce effort in a specific task are more likely to come to someone as their focus is intensely directed at that job and they are constantly engaged in it.
(4.) The greatest advantage (next to the dexterity of the workmen) derived from the minute division of labor which takes place in modern manufacturing industry, is one not mentioned by Adam Smith, but to which attention has been drawn by Mr. Babbage: the more economical distribution of labor by classing the work-people according to their capacity. Different parts of the same series of operations require unequal degrees of skill and bodily strength; and those who have skill enough for the most difficult, or strength enough for the hardest parts of the labor, are made much more useful by being employed solely in them; the operations which everybody is capable of being left to those who are fit for no others.
(4.) The biggest benefit (after the skill of the workers) from the detailed division of labor in modern manufacturing is something Adam Smith didn’t mention, but that Mr. Babbage pointed out: the more efficient distribution of labor by organizing workers based on their abilities. Different stages of the same tasks require varying levels of skill and physical strength; those with enough skill for the most challenging tasks or enough strength for the toughest jobs are much more productive when focused solely on those tasks, while the simpler tasks can be handled by those who are suited for nothing else.
The division of labor, as all writers on the subject have remarked, is limited by the extent of the market. If, by the separation of pin-making into ten distinct employments, forty-eight thousand pins can be made in a day, this separation will only be advisable if the number of accessible consumers is such as to require, every day, something like forty-eight thousand pins. If there is only a demand for twenty-four thousand, the division of labor can only be advantageously carried to the extent which will every day produce that smaller number. The increase of the general riches of the world, when accompanied with freedom of commercial intercourse, improvements in navigation, and inland communication by roads, canals, or railways, tends to give increased productiveness to the labor of every nation in particular, by enabling each locality to supply with its special products so much larger a market that a great extension of the division of labor in their production is an ordinary consequence. The division of labor is also limited, in many cases, by the nature of the employment. Agriculture, for example, is not susceptible of so great a division of occupations as many branches of manufactures, because its different operations can not possibly be simultaneous.
The division of labor, as many writers have noted, is limited by how large the market is. If splitting pin-making into ten different jobs allows for the production of forty-eight thousand pins in a day, this division only makes sense if there are enough consumers to need about forty-eight thousand pins every day. If there's only a demand for twenty-four thousand, then the division of labor can only be effectively applied to produce that smaller amount daily. The overall growth in the world's wealth, when paired with free trade, advancements in navigation, and improved land communication through roads, canals, or railways, tends to make the labor of each nation more productive by enabling each area to provide its unique products to a much larger market, which usually leads to a significant increase in the division of labor in their production. The division of labor is also sometimes limited by the nature of the work itself. For instance, agriculture cannot be divided into as many specialized tasks as some manufacturing processes because its various operations cannot all happen at the same time.
§ 4. Large-Scale and Small-Scale Production.
Whenever it is essential to the greatest efficiency of labor that many laborers should combine, the scale of the enterprise must be such as to bring many laborers together, and the capital must be large enough to maintain them. Still more needful is this when the nature of the employment allows, and the extent of the possible market encourages, a considerable division of labor. The larger the enterprise the further the division of labor may be carried. This is one of the principal causes of large manufactories. Every increase of business would enable the whole to be carried on with a proportionally smaller amount of labor.
Whenever it's crucial for maximizing labor efficiency that many workers band together, the scale of the operation needs to be large enough to bring many workers in, and the capital must be sufficient to support them. This becomes even more important when the job allows for it and the potential market promotes a significant division of labor. The bigger the operation, the more extensive the division of labor can be. This is one of the main reasons for the existence of large factories. Every growth in business would allow the operation to be managed with a proportionally smaller amount of labor.
As a general rule, the expenses of a business do not increase by any means proportionally to the quantity of business. Let us take as an example a set of operations which we are accustomed to see carried on by one great establishment, that of the Post-Office. Suppose that the business, let us say only of the letter-post, instead of being centralized in a single concern, were divided among five or six competing companies. Each of these would be obliged to maintain almost as large an establishment as is now sufficient for the whole. Since each must arrange for receiving and delivering letters in all parts of the town, each must send letter-carriers into every street, and almost every alley, and this, too, as many times in the day as is now done by the Post-Office, if the service is to be as well performed. Each must have an office for receiving letters in every neighborhood, with all subsidiary arrangements for collecting the letters from the different offices and redistributing them. To this must be added the much greater number of superior officers [pg 109] who would be required to check and control the subordinates, implying not only a greater cost in salaries for such responsible officers, but the necessity, perhaps, of being satisfied in many instances with an inferior standard of qualification, and so failing in the object.
As a general rule, a business's expenses don’t increase in direct proportion to how much business it does. Take the Post Office as an example. If the letter delivery service were split among five or six competing companies instead of being run by a single organization, each one would need to operate nearly as large an operation as the Post Office does now. Each would have to arrange to receive and deliver letters throughout the entire town, sending letter carriers into every street and almost every alley as many times a day as the Post Office does now to maintain good service. Each company would need an office for receiving letters in every neighborhood, complete with all the additional facilities for collecting letters from different offices and redistributing them. Plus, there would be a significantly higher number of supervisors needed to oversee and manage the staff, which would not only increase salary costs for those responsible positions but might also lead to hiring people with lower qualifications in many cases, ultimately failing in their purpose. [pg 109]
Whether or not the advantages obtained by operating on a large scale preponderate in any particular case over the more watchful attention and greater regard to minor gains and losses usually found in small establishments, can be ascertained, in a state of free competition, by an unfailing test. Wherever there are large and small establishments in the same business, that one of the two which in existing circumstances carries on the production at greatest advantage will be able to undersell the other. The power of permanently underselling can only, generally speaking, be derived from increased effectiveness of labor; and this, when obtained by a more extended division of employment, or by a classification tending to a better economy of skill, always implies a greater produce from the same labor, and not merely the same produce from less labor; it increases not the surplus only, but the gross produce of industry. If an increased quantity of the particular article is not required, and part of the laborers in consequence lose their employment, the capital which maintained and employed them is also set at liberty, and the general produce of the country is increased by some other application of their labor.
Whether the benefits of operating on a large scale outweigh the closer attention and focus on small gains and losses typical of smaller businesses can be determined, in a system of free competition, by a reliable measure. Whenever large and small businesses are competing in the same sector, the one that can produce at the greatest advantage under the current circumstances will be able to offer lower prices than the other. The ability to consistently undersell usually comes from more effective labor; this efficiency, achieved through better division of tasks or a classification that enhances skill use, leads to greater output from the same amount of labor, not just the same output from less labor. It boosts not only the surplus but also the total output of the economy. If the demand for a certain product decreases and some workers lose their jobs as a result, the resources that supported those workers become available, and the overall production of the country increases through alternative uses of their labor.
A considerable part of the saving of labor effected by substituting the large system of production for the small, is the saving in the labor of the capitalists themselves. If a hundred producers with small capitals carry on separately the same business, the superintendence of each concern will probably require the whole attention of the person conducting it, sufficiently, at least, to hinder his time or thoughts from being disposable for anything else; while a single manufacturer possessing a capital equal to the sum of theirs, with ten or a dozen clerks, could conduct the whole of their amount of business, and have leisure, too, for other occupations.
A significant part of the labor savings achieved by switching from small-scale production to large-scale production is the reduction in the labor of the capitalists themselves. If a hundred producers with small capital run their businesses separately, managing each one will likely demand the full attention of its owner, making it hard for them to focus on anything else. In contrast, a single manufacturer with capital equal to the total of all their investments, along with ten or twelve clerks, could manage all of their business operations and still have time for other activities.
Production on a large scale is greatly promoted by the practice of forming a large capital by the combination of many small contributions; or, in other words, by the formation of stock companies. The advantages of the principle are important, [since] (1) many undertakings require an amount of capital beyond the means of the richest individual or private partnership. [Of course] the Government can alone be looked to for any of those works for which a great combination of means is requisite, because it can obtain those means by compulsory taxation, and is already accustomed to the conduct of large operations. For reasons, however, which are tolerably well known, government agency for the conduct of industrial operations is generally one of the least eligible of resources when any other is available. Of [the advantages referred to above] one of the most important is (2) that which relates to the intellectual and active qualifications of the directing head. The stimulus of individual interest is some security for exertion, but exertion is of little avail if the intelligence exerted is of an inferior order, which it must necessarily be in the majority of concerns carried on by the persons chiefly interested in them. Where the concern is large, and can afford a remuneration sufficient to attract a class of candidates superior to the common average, it is possible to select for the general management, and for all the skilled employments of a subordinate kind, persons of a degree of acquirement and cultivated intelligence which more than compensates for their inferior interest in the result. It must be further remarked that it is not a necessary consequence of joint-stock management that the persons employed, whether in superior or in subordinate offices, should be paid wholly by fixed salaries. In the case of the managers of joint-stock companies, and of the superintending and controlling officers in many private establishments, it is a common enough practice to connect their pecuniary interest with the interest of their employers, by giving them part of their remuneration in the form of a percentage on the profits.
Producing on a large scale is significantly supported by the practice of pooling together many small contributions to create a large capital, or in other words, by forming stock companies. The benefits of this approach are substantial, (1) as many ventures need more capital than the wealthiest individual or private partnership can provide. Naturally, the government can be relied upon for projects that require significant resources since it can gather funds through mandatory taxes and already has experience managing large operations. However, for reasons that are fairly well-known, using the government for industrial projects is usually one of the less desirable options when other alternatives are available. One of the key advantages mentioned above is (2) related to the skills and qualifications of the management. The motivation from individual interest provides some assurance of effort, but effort is not very useful if the intelligence applied is subpar, which is often the case for many projects run by those most invested in them. When the venture is large enough to offer competitive compensation, it's possible to select management and skilled subordinate roles from individuals with a higher level of education and intelligence that more than makes up for their lower personal stake in the outcomes. Moreover, it's important to note that it isn’t always necessary for joint-stock management to pay employees in all roles, whether senior or junior, entirely through fixed salaries. For managers of joint-stock companies and supervisory and controlling staff in many private entities, it's common practice to tie their financial interests to those of their employers by providing part of their compensation as a percentage of profits.
The possibility of substituting the large system of production for the small depends, of course, in the first place, on the extent of the market. The large system can only be advantageous when a large amount of business is to be done: it implies, therefore, either a populous and flourishing community, or a great opening for exportation.
The possibility of replacing the large production system with a smaller one depends, first and foremost, on the size of the market. The large system is only beneficial when there's a significant volume of business to be conducted; this means there either has to be a large, prosperous community or a substantial opportunity for exports.
In the countries in which there are the largest markets, the widest diffusion of commercial confidence and enterprise, the greatest annual increase of capital, and the greatest number of large capitals owned by individuals, there is a tendency to substitute more and more, in one branch of industry after another, large establishments for small ones. These are almost always able to undersell the smaller tradesmen, partly, it is understood, by means of division of labor, and the economy occasioned by limiting the employment of skilled agency to cases where skill is required; and partly, no doubt, by the saving of labor arising from the great scale of the transactions; as it costs no more time, and not much more exertion of mind, to make a large purchase, for example, than a small one, and very much less than to make a number of small ones. With a view merely to production, and to the greatest efficiency of labor, this change is wholly beneficial.
In the countries with the biggest markets, the most widespread commercial trust and entrepreneurship, the highest annual capital growth, and the most significant number of large capital holdings by individuals, there is a growing trend to replace smaller businesses with larger ones across different industries. These larger establishments can almost always offer lower prices than smaller retailers, partly due to division of labor and the efficiency that comes from using skilled workers only when necessary. Additionally, there's a significant labor saving that comes from the scale of transactions; for instance, making a large purchase takes about the same time and mental effort as a small one, and much less than making multiple small purchases. From the perspective of production and maximizing labor efficiency, this shift is entirely beneficial.
Chapter VII. On the Law of the Increase of Labor.
§ 1. The Law of Increasing Production Relies on Three Elements—Labor, Capital, and Land.
Production is not a fixed but an increasing thing. When not kept back by bad institutions, or a low state of the arts of life, the produce of industry has usually tended to increase; stimulated not only by the desire of the producers to augment their means of consumption, but by the increasing number of the consumers.
Production is not static; it tends to grow over time. When it's not restricted by poor institutions or a lack of advancements in living standards, the output of industry generally increases. This growth is driven not only by producers wanting to improve their consumption but also by the rising number of consumers.
We have seen that the essential requisites of production are three—labor, capital, and natural agents; the term capital including all external and physical requisites which are products of labor, the term natural agents all those which are not. The increase of production, therefore, depends on the properties of these elements. It is a result of the increase either of the elements themselves, or of their productiveness. We proceed to consider the three elements successively, with reference to this effect; or, in other words, the law of the increase of production, viewed in respect of its dependence, first on Labor, secondly on Capital, and lastly on Land.
We have identified that the key requirements for production are three—labor, capital, and natural resources; the term capital includes all the external and physical resources that are products of labor, while natural resources refer to those that aren’t. Therefore, the growth of production depends on the characteristics of these elements. It results from either an increase in the elements themselves or an increase in their productivity. We will now examine the three elements one by one concerning this effect; in other words, we will explore the law of increased production in relation to its dependence, first on Labor, second on Capital, and finally on Land.
§ 2. The Law of Population.
The increase of labor is the increase of mankind; of population. The power of multiplication inherent in all organic life may be regarded as infinite. There are many species of vegetables of which a single plant will produce in one year the germs of a thousand; if only two come to maturity, in fourteen years the two will have multiplied to sixteen thousand and more. It is but a moderate case of fecundity in animals to be capable of quadrupling their numbers in a single year; if they only do as much in half a century, [pg 113] ten thousand will have swelled within two centuries to upward to two millions and a half. The capacity of increase is necessarily in a geometrical progression: the numerical ratio alone is different.
The growth of labor reflects the growth of humanity and the population. The power to reproduce inherent in all living things can be seen as limitless. Many types of plants can produce thousands of seeds in just one year; if only two seeds mature, in fourteen years those two can multiply to over sixteen thousand. It's not unusual for animals to be able to increase their numbers fourfold in a year; if they manage to do just that over half a century, ten thousand could grow to over two and a half million in two centuries. The potential for growth follows a geometric progression, although the exact numerical ratio may vary.
To this property of organized beings, the human species forms no exception. Its power of increase is indefinite, and the actual multiplication would be extraordinarily rapid, if the power were exercised to the utmost. It never is exercised to the utmost, and yet, in the most favorable circumstances known to exist, which are those of a fertile region colonized from an industrious and civilized community, population has continued, for several generations, independently of fresh immigration, to double itself in not much more than twenty years.
To this characteristic of organized beings, humans are no exception. Our potential for growth is limitless, and the actual increase would be incredibly fast if we fully utilized that potential. However, it’s never fully realized, and yet, under the most favorable conditions—like in a fertile area settled by a hardworking and civilized community—population has managed to double itself every twenty years or so for several generations without needing new immigration.
Years. | Population. | Food. |
25 | 11 mills | x |
25 | 22 million | 2x |
25 | 44 mills | 3x |
25 | 88 mills | 4x |
25 | 176 million | 5x |
By this table it will be seen that if population can double itself in twenty-five years, and if food can only be increased by as much as x (the subsistence of eleven millions) by additional application of another equal quantity of labor on the same land in each period, then at the end of one hundred years there would be the disproportion of one hundred and seventy-six millions of people, with subsistence for only fifty-five millions. Of course, this is prevented either by checking population to the amount of the subsistence; by sending off the surplus population; or by bringing in food from new lands.
This table indicates that if the population can double in twenty-five years, and if food production can only increase by as much as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,x(which supports eleven million people) by adding an equal amount of labor on the same land in each period, then after one hundred years, there would be a difference of one hundred seventy-six million people, with enough food for only fifty-five million. Naturally, this imbalance is resolved by either limiting the population to fit the available food, moving the excess population, or importing food from new lands.
In the United States to 1860 population has doubled itself about every twenty years, while in France there is practically no increase of population. It is stated that the white population of the United States between 1790 and 1840 increased 400.4 per cent, deducting immigration. The extraordinary advance of population with us, where subsistence is easily attainable, is to be seen in the chart on the next page (No. III), which shows the striking rapidity of increase in the United States when compared with the older countries of Europe. The steady demand for land can be seen by the gradual westward movement of the center of population, as seen in chart No. IV (p. 116), and by the rapid settlement of the distant parts of our country, as shown by the two charts (frontispieces), which represent to the eye by heavier colors the areas of the more densely settled districts in 1830 and in 1880.
In the United States up to 1860, the population roughly doubled every twenty years, whereas in France, there was almost no population growth. Reports indicate that the white population in the United States grew by 400.4 percent between 1790 and 1840, not counting immigration. This significant population increase in a place where it's easy to make a living is shown in the chart on the next page (No. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).III), which shows the quick growth in the United States compared to the older nations of Europe. The consistent demand for land is reflected in the gradual movement of the population center to the west, illustrated in chart No. IV (p. 116), and by the rapid settlement of the more distant areas of our country, represented by the two charts (frontispieces) that clearly depict the more densely populated regions in 1830 and 1880 using darker colors.

§ 3. How Population Growth is Actually Limited.
The obstacle to a just understanding of the subject arises from too confused a notion of the causes which, at most times and places, keep the actual increase of mankind so far behind the capacity.
The barrier to a fair understanding of the topic comes from a too unclear idea of the reasons that, in most situations and locations, hold back the actual growth of humanity compared to its potential.
The conduct of human creatures is more or less influenced by foresight of consequences, and by some impulses superior to mere animal instincts; and they do not, therefore, propagate like swine, but are capable, though in very unequal degrees, of being withheld by prudence, or by the social affections, from giving existence to beings born only to misery and premature death.
Human behavior is influenced to varying degrees by the anticipation of outcomes and by impulses that go beyond basic animal instincts. As a result, people don't reproduce like pigs; instead, they have the capacity—though to varying extents—to exercise caution or rely on social bonds to avoid bringing into the world beings destined for suffering and early death.
In proportion as mankind rise above the condition of the beast, population is restrained by the fear of want, rather than by want itself. Even where there is no question of starvation, many are similarly acted upon by the apprehension of losing what have come to be regarded as the decencies of their situation in life. Among the middle classes, in many individual instances, there is an additional restraint exercised from the desire of doing more than maintaining their circumstances—of improving them; but such a desire is rarely found, or rarely has that effect, in the laboring-classes. If they can bring up a family as they were themselves brought up, even the prudent among them are usually satisfied. Too often they do not think even of that, but rely on fortune, or on the resources to be found in legal or voluntary charity.
As humanity rises above the level of animals, population growth is limited more by the fear of lacking resources than by actual scarcity. Even when starvation isn’t an issue, many are influenced by the fear of losing what they consider the basic comforts of their lifestyle. Among the middle class, there are often additional constraints driven by the ambition to improve their situation rather than just maintain it; however, this desire is not as common or impactful among the working class. If they can raise a family in the same way they were raised, even the more responsible among them tend to feel content. Too often, they don’t even consider that and instead depend on luck or the help available through legal or voluntary charity.

(1.) In a very backward state of society, like that of Europe in the middle ages, and many parts of Asia at present, population is kept down by actual starvation. The starvation does not take place in ordinary years, but in seasons of scarcity, which in those states of society are much more frequent and more extreme than Europe is now accustomed to. (2.) In a more improved state, few, even among the poorest of the people, are limited to actual necessaries, and to a bare sufficiency of those: and the increase is kept within bounds, not by excess of deaths, but by limitation of births.124 The limitation is brought about in various ways. In some countries, it is the result of prudent or conscientious self-restraint. There is a condition to which the laboring-people are habituated; they perceive that, by having too numerous families, they must sink below that condition, or fail to transmit it to their children; and this they do not choose to submit to.
(1.) In a very underdeveloped society, like Europe during the Middle Ages or many parts of Asia today, the population is kept in check by actual starvation. This starvation doesn’t happen in normal years, but rather during times of scarcity, which are much more common and severe in those types of societies than what Europe is used to now. (2.) In a more advanced society, few, even among the poorest, are limited to just the essentials, and even those are barely enough. The population growth is controlled not by a high death rate, but by limiting births.124 The limitation happens in various ways. In some countries, it comes from responsible or conscious self-restraint. The working-class people adapt to a certain standard of living; they realize that having too many children means they will fall below that standard or be unable to pass it on to their kids, and they choose not to accept that.
There are other cases in which the prudence and forethought, which perhaps might not be exercised by the people [pg 118] themselves, are exercised by the state for their benefit; marriage not being permitted until the contracting parties can show that they have the prospect of a comfortable support. There are places, again, in which the restraining cause seems to be not so much individual prudence, as some general and perhaps even accidental habit of the country. In the rural districts of England, during the last century, the growth of population was very effectually repressed by the difficulty of obtaining a cottage to live in. It was the custom for unmarried laborers to lodge and board with their employers; it was the custom for married laborers to have a cottage: and the rule of the English poor-laws, by which a parish was charged with the support of its unemployed poor, rendered land-owners averse to promote marriage. About the end of the century, the great demand for men in war and manufactures made it be thought a patriotic thing to encourage population: and about the same time the growing inclination of farmers to live like rich people, favored as it was by a long period of high prices, made them desirous of keeping inferiors at a greater distance, and, pecuniary motives arising from abuses of the poor-laws being superadded, they gradually drove their laborers into cottages, which the landowners now no longer refused permission to build.
There are other situations where the caution and planning that people might not apply themselves are taken care of by the state for their benefit; marriage is not allowed until both parties can prove they have a good chance of a stable living. There are also cases where the restriction seems less about personal caution and more about a general habit of the region, which may even be accidental. In rural England during the last century, population growth was effectively limited by the challenge of finding a cottage to live in. Unmarried laborers typically boarded and lodged with their employers, while married laborers were expected to have a cottage. The English poor laws, which required a parish to support its unemployed poor, made landowners hesitant to encourage marriage. Towards the end of the century, the significant demand for labor due to war and industries sparked the idea that it was patriotic to encourage population growth. Around the same time, farmers' increasing desire to live like the wealthy—boosted by a long period of high prices—led them to want to keep their workers at a distance. Combined with financial incentives stemming from abuses of the poor laws, this gradually pushed landowners to allow their laborers to live in cottages, which they previously had refused to permit.
It is but rarely that improvements in the condition of the laboring-classes do anything more than give a temporary margin, speedily filled up by an increase of their numbers. Unless, either by their general improvement in intellectual and moral culture, or at least by raising their habitual standard of comfortable living, they can be taught to make a better use of favorable circumstances, nothing permanent can be done for them; the most promising schemes end only in having a more numerous but not a happier people. There is no doubt that [the standard] is gradually, though slowly, rising in the more advanced countries of Western Europe.125 [pg 119] Subsistence and employment in England have never increased more rapidly than in the last forty years, but every census since 1821 showed a smaller proportional increase of population than that of the period preceding; and the produce of French agriculture and industry is increasing in a progressive ratio, while the population exhibits, in every quinquennial census, a smaller proportion of births to the population.
Improvements in the living conditions of the working class rarely do more than provide a temporary boost, quickly offset by an increase in their numbers. Unless they can be educated to improve their intellectual and moral standards, or at least raise their usual level of comfort, they won't be able to take full advantage of favorable situations. As a result, no lasting change can be made for them; the most promising initiatives often just lead to a larger population that isn't any happier. There's no doubt that [the standard] is gradually, albeit slowly, rising in the more advanced countries of Western Europe.125 [pg 119] Subsistence and employment in England have never increased more rapidly than in the last forty years, yet every census since 1821 has shown a smaller proportional increase in population than in the earlier period. Meanwhile, French agriculture and industry are growing progressively, while each five-year census shows a decreasing ratio of births to the population.
Chapter VIII. On the Law of Capital Growth.
§ 1. Ways to Save from the Excess Beyond Essentials.
The requisites of production being labor, capital, and land, it has been seen from the preceding chapter that the impediments to the increase of production do not arise from the first of these elements. But production has other requisites, and, of these, the one which we shall next consider is Capital. There can not be more people in any country, or in the world, than can be supported from the produce of past labor until that of present labor comes in [although it is not to be supposed that capital consists wholly of food]. We have next, therefore, to inquire into the conditions of the increase of capital: the causes by which the rapidity of its increase is determined, and the necessary limitations of that increase.
The essentials of production are labor, capital, and land. As discussed in the previous chapter, the obstacles to increasing production do not come from the first of these elements. However, production has other requirements, and the next one we'll look at is capital. A country, or the world as a whole, can't have more people than can be supported by what has already been produced until the current labor starts to produce [though it shouldn't be assumed that capital is purely about food]. So, we now need to examine the conditions for increasing capital: the factors that influence the speed of its growth and the necessary limits on that growth.
Since all capital is the product of saving, that is, of abstinence from present consumption for the sake of a future good, the increase of capital must depend upon two things—the amount of the fund from which saving can be made, and the strength of the dispositions which prompt to it.
Since all capital comes from saving, which is the act of forgoing current consumption for future benefits, the growth of capital relies on two main factors—the size of the fund available for saving and the strength of the motivations that encourage it.
(1.) The fund from which saving can be made is the surplus of the produce of labor, after supplying the necessaries of life to all concerned in the production (including those employed in replacing the materials, and keeping the fixed capital in repair). More than this surplus can not be saved under any circumstances. As much as this, though it never is saved, always might be. This surplus is the fund from which the enjoyments, as distinguished from the necessaries of the producers, are provided; it is the fund from which all are subsisted who are not themselves engaged in production, and from which all additions are made to capital. The capital of the employer forms the revenue of the laborers, and, if this exceeds the necessaries of life, it gives them a surplus which they may either expend in enjoyments or save.
(1.) The money available for saving comes from the extra output of labor after all essential needs for everyone involved in production have been met (including those who help replace materials and maintain fixed capital). No more than this surplus can be saved under any circumstances. Though it never gets fully saved, there’s always potential for it to be. This surplus provides the benefits beyond the necessities for the producers; it supports everyone who isn’t directly involved in production and funds all increases in capital. The employer's capital becomes the income for the workers, and if this exceeds their basic needs, it gives them a surplus that they can either spend on luxuries or save.
The greater the produce of labor after supporting the laborers, the more there is which can be saved. The same thing also partly contributes to determine how much will be saved. A part of the motive to saving consists in the prospect of deriving an income from savings; in the fact that capital, employed in production, is capable of not only reproducing itself but yielding an increase. The greater the profit that can be made from capital, the stronger is the motive to its accumulation.
The more output that labor produces after taking care of the workers, the more can be saved. This also influences how much will be saved. One of the reasons for saving is the potential to earn income from those savings; the fact that capital used in production can not only sustain itself but also generate more. The higher the profit from capital, the stronger the incentive to accumulate it.
§ 2. Reason for Saving in the Surplus Beyond Essentials.
But the disposition to save does not wholly depend on the external inducement to it; on the amount of profit to be made from savings. With the same pecuniary inducement, the inclination is very different, in different persons, and in different communities.
But the tendency to save isn’t entirely based on outside incentives; it’s not just about how much profit you can make from saving. Even with the same financial motivation, people's willingness to save varies significantly among individuals and communities.
(2.) All accumulation involves the sacrifice of a present, for the sake of a future good.
(2.) All accumulation requires giving up something in the present for the benefit of a future outcome.
In weighing the future against the present, the uncertainty of all things future is a leading element; and that uncertainty is of very different degrees. “All circumstances,” therefore, “increasing the probability of the provision we make for futurity being enjoyed by ourselves or others, tend” justly and reasonably “to give strength to the effective desire of accumulation. Thus a healthy climate or occupation, by increasing the probability of life, has a tendency to add to this desire. When engaged in safe occupations and living in healthy countries, men are much more apt to be frugal, than in unhealthy or hazardous occupations and in climates pernicious to human life. Sailors and soldiers are prodigals. In the West Indies, New Orleans, the East Indies, the expenditure of the inhabitants is profuse. The same people, coming to reside in the healthy parts of Europe, and not getting into the vortex of extravagant fashion, live economically. War and pestilence have always waste and luxury among the other evils that follow in their train. For similar reasons, whatever gives security to the affairs of the community is favorable to the strength of this principle. In this respect the general prevalence of law and [pg 123] order and the prospect of the continuance of peace and tranquillity have considerable influence.”128
When comparing the future to the present, the uncertainty of what’s to come is a major factor, and that uncertainty varies in degrees. "All situations," therefore, "that make it more likely for us or others to enjoy what we plan for in the future tend" to reasonably "boost the genuine desire to save. A positive environment or job can increase the chances of living longer, which strengthens this desire. When people have stable jobs and reside in healthy areas, they are far more likely to be frugal than in dangerous jobs or unhealthy conditions. Sailors and soldiers often spend freely. In regions like the West Indies, New Orleans, and the East Indies, locals frequently spend extravagantly. However, those same individuals, when they relocate to healthier parts of Europe and avoid the lure of lavish trends, typically live more economically. War and disease have always caused waste and luxury, among other problems they bring. For similar reasons, anything that provides stability to a community's situation upholds this idea. In this context, the widespread presence of law and [pg 123] order, coupled with the expectation of lasting peace and stability, has a major impact."128
The more perfect the security, the greater will be the effective strength of the desire of accumulation. Where property is less safe, or the vicissitudes ruinous to fortunes are more frequent and severe, fewer persons will save at all, and, of those who do, many will require the inducement of a higher rate of profit on capital to make them prefer a doubtful future to the temptation of present enjoyment.
The better the security, the stronger the desire to accumulate wealth will be. When property is less secure or when economic downturns that can wipe out fortunes are more common and severe, fewer people will save at all. Among those who do save, many will need the incentive of a higher return on investment to choose an uncertain future over the lure of immediate pleasure.
In the circumstances, for example, of a hunting tribe, “man may be said to be necessarily improvident, and regardless of futurity, because, in this state, the future presents nothing which can be with certainty either foreseen or governed.... Besides a want of the motives exciting to provide for the needs of futurity through means of the abilities of the present, there is a want of the habits of perception [pg 124] and action, leading to a constant connection in the mind of those distant points, and of the series of events serving to unite them. Even, therefore, if motives be awakened capable of producing the exertion necessary to effect this connection, there remains the task of training the mind to think and act so as to establish it.”
In a hunting tribe, for instance, A person can be viewed as inherently shortsighted and indifferent to the future, because, in this context, the future presents nothing that can be reliably expected or controlled. Along with having no motivation to prepare for future needs using current abilities, there’s also a lack of habits that aid in recognizing and pursuing those distant goals, as well as understanding the sequence of events that links them. Thus, even if the right motivations emerge to encourage the effort needed to create this connection, there’s still the hurdle of conditioning the mind to think and act in a way that makes it happen.
§ 3. Examples of Weakness in this Desire.
For instance: “Upon the banks of the St. Lawrence there are several little Indian villages. The cleared land is rarely, I may almost say never, cultivated, nor are any inroads made in the forest for such a purpose. The soil is, nevertheless, fertile, and, were it not, manure lies in heaps by their houses. Were every family to inclose half an acre of ground, till it, and plant it in potatoes and maize, it would yield a sufficiency to support them one half the year. They suffer, too, every now and then, extreme want, insomuch that, joined to occasional intemperance, it is rapidly reducing their numbers. This, to us, so strange apathy proceeds not, in any great degree, from repugnance to labor; on the contrary, they apply very diligently to it when its reward is immediate. It is evidently not the necessary labor that is the obstacle to more extended culture, but the distant return from that labor. I am assured, indeed, that among some of the more remote tribes, the labor thus expended much exceeds that given by the whites. On the Indian, succeeding years are too distant to make sufficient impression; though, to obtain what labor may bring about in the course of a few months, he toils even more assiduously than the white man.”
For example: Along the banks of the St. Lawrence, there are several small Indigenous villages. The cleared land is rarely farmed, and there’s no effort to clear the forest for farming. The soil is rich, and even if it weren't, there are heaps of manure near their homes. If every family enclosed half an acre, tended to it, and planted potatoes and corn, they’d have enough food to last them for half the year. They also face periods of extreme poverty, which, combined with occasional drinking, is quickly decreasing their population. This seeming apathy isn’t mainly because they dislike work; in fact, they work very hard when the rewards are immediate. The problem isn’t the necessary labor that would enable more farming, but rather the delayed rewards from that labor. I’ve heard that among some of the more isolated tribes, the effort they put in far exceeds that of white people. For the Indigenous people, the future seems too distant to matter much, although they work even harder than white people for immediate gains that can be achieved in just a few months.
This view of things is confirmed by the experience of the Jesuits, in their interesting efforts to civilize the Indians of Paraguay. The real difficulty was the improvidence of the people; their inability to think for the future; and the necessity accordingly of the most unremitting and minute superintendence on the part of their instructors. “Thus at first, if these gave up to them the care of the oxen with which they plowed, their indolent thoughtlessness would probably leave them at evening still yoked to the implement. Worse than this, instances occurred where they cut them up [pg 125] for supper, thinking, when reprehended, that they sufficiently excused themselves by saying they were hungry.”
This perspective is supported by the experiences of the Jesuits in their notable attempts to civilize the Indigenous people of Paraguay. The main challenge was the people's lack of foresight; their failure to think ahead necessitated constant and careful supervision from their teachers. “For example, at first, if they allowed these people to take care of the oxen used for plowing, their lazy negligence would probably lead to the animals being left still harnessed to the plow by evening. Even more troubling, there were instances where they killed the oxen for dinner, thinking that when reprimanded, they could justify their actions by saying they were hungry.”
As an example intermediate, in the strength of the effective desire of accumulation, between the state of things thus depicted and that of modern Europe, the case of the Chinese deserves attention. “Durability is one of the chief qualities, marking a high degree of the effective desire of accumulation. The testimony of travelers ascribes to the instruments formed by the Chinese a very inferior durability to similar instruments constructed by Europeans. The houses, we are told, unless of the higher ranks, are in general of unburnt bricks, of clay, or of hurdles plastered with earth; the roofs, of reeds fastened to laths. A greater degree of strength in the effective desire of accumulation would cause them to be constructed of materials requiring a greater present expenditure, but being far more durable. From the same cause, much land, that in other countries would be cultivated, lies waste. All travelers take notice of large tracts of lands, chiefly swamps, which continue in a state of nature. To bring a swamp into tillage is generally a process to complete which requires several years. It must be previously drained, the surface long exposed to the sun, and many operations performed, before it can be made capable of bearing a crop. Though yielding, probably, a very considerable return for the labor bestowed on it, that return is not made until a long time has elapsed. The cultivation of such land implies a greater strength of the effective desire of accumulation than exists in the empire. The amount of self-denial would seem to be small. It is their great deficiency in forethought and frugality in this respect which is the cause of the scarcities and famines that frequently occur.”
As an example of an intermediate situation in the strength of the effective desire to accumulate, when comparing this situation to that of modern Europe, the case of China deserves attention. Durability is one of the main qualities reflecting a strong desire to accumulate wealth. Travelers note that tools made by the Chinese are much less durable than similar tools made by Europeans. Most houses, except for those of the upper class, are typically built from unburnt bricks, clay, or hurdles covered with earth; the roofs are made of reeds attached to wooden laths. A greater desire to accumulate would lead to using materials that require more initial investment but are much more durable. For the same reason, much farmland that could be cultivated in other countries remains unused. Travelers observe large areas of land, mainly swamps, that remain in their natural state. Transforming a swamp into farmland usually takes several years. It must be drained, exposed to the sun for a long time, and undergo several processes before it can support crops. Although it could likely yield significant returns for the effort invested, those returns don't come until long after. Cultivating such land requires a stronger desire to accumulate than what is present in the empire. The level of self-denial seems quite low. Their significant lack of foresight and frugality in this area results in the shortages and famines that often occur.
That it is defect of providence, not defect of industry, that limits production among the Chinese, is still more obvious than in the case of the semi-agriculturized Indians. “Where the returns are quick, where the instruments formed require but little time to bring the events for which they were formed to an issue,” it is well known that “the great [pg 126] progress which has been made in the knowledge of the arts suited to the nature of the country and the wants of its inhabitants” makes industry energetic and effective. “What marks the readiness with which labor is forced to form the most difficult materials into instruments, where these instruments soon bring to an issue the events for which they are formed, is the frequent occurrence, on many of their lakes and rivers, of structures resembling the floating gardens of the Peruvians, rafts covered with vegetable soil and cultivated. Labor in this way draws from the materials on which it acts very speedy returns. Nothing can exceed the luxuriance of vegetation when the quickening powers of a genial sun are ministered to by a rich soil and abundant moisture. It is otherwise, as we have seen, in cases where the return, though copious, is distant. European travelers are surprised at meeting these little floating farms by the side of swamps which only require draining to render them tillable.”
It's even clearer that the limits on production among the Chinese come from a lack of resources, not a lack of effort, compared to the semi-agricultural Indians. "Where returns happen quickly, and the tools created require little time to deliver the intended results," it’s well known that "the significant [pg 126] progress that has been achieved in understanding the arts that fit the characteristics of the country and the needs of its people" makes work energetic and effective. "What shows how easily labor can transform tough materials into tools, where those tools quickly achieve their intended results, is the common sight of structures similar to the floating gardens of the Peruvians on many of their lakes and rivers—rafts covered with soil that can be farmed. This kind of labor provides quick returns from the materials used. The abundance of vegetation thrives best when it's supported by warm sunlight, fertile soil, and ample moisture. It’s a different situation, as we've observed, when the returns, although abundant, take longer to yield. European travelers are often astonished to see these small floating farms next to swamps that just need draining to become cultivable.”
When a country has carried production as far as in the existing state of knowledge it can be carried with an amount of return corresponding to the average strength of the effective desire of accumulation in that country, it has reached what is called the stationary state; the state in which no further addition will be made to capital, unless there takes place either some improvement in the arts of production, or an increase in the strength of the desire to accumulate. In the stationary state, though capital does not on the whole increase, some persons grow richer and others poorer. Those whose degree of providence is below the usual standard become impoverished, their capital perishes, and makes room for the savings of those whose effective desire of accumulation exceeds the average. These become the natural purchasers of the lands, manufactories, and other instruments of production owned by their less provident countrymen.
When a country has pushed production as far as it can go with the current knowledge available, achieving a level of return that matches the average desire to save in that country, it has reached what’s known as the stationary state. This is the point where no new capital will be added unless there's either an improvement in production methods or an increase in the desire to save. In the stationary state, while overall capital doesn't really grow, some people get richer and others get poorer. Those who are less careful with their finances tend to become poorer, their capital dwindles, and this creates opportunities for those whose desire to save is stronger than average. These individuals naturally buy up the land, factories, and other production resources owned by their less careful compatriots.
In China, if that country has really attained, as it is supposed to have done, the stationary state, accumulation has stopped when the returns to capital are still as high as is indicated by a rate of interest legally twelve per cent, and practically [pg 127] varying (it is said) between eighteen and thirty-six. It is to be presumed, therefore, that no greater amount of capital than the country already possesses can find employment at this high rate of profit, and that any lower rate does not hold out to a Chinese sufficient temptation to induce him to abstain from present enjoyment. What a contrast with Holland, where, during the most flourishing period of its history, the government was able habitually to borrow at two per cent, and private individuals, on good security, at three!
In China, if the country has truly reached, as believed, a stationary state, capital accumulation has stopped even when returns on capital remain high, indicated by a legal interest rate of twelve percent and practically varying between eighteen and thirty-six. Therefore, it can be assumed that there isn't any more capital available for investment at this high profit rate, and that lower rates don't provide enough incentive for a Chinese person to forgo immediate enjoyment. This is in stark contrast to Holland, where, during its most prosperous times, the government could consistently borrow at two percent, and private individuals could borrow at three percent with good security!
§ 4. Examples of Excessive Desire.
In [the United States and] the more prosperous countries of Europe, there are to be found abundance of prodigals: still, in a very numerous portion of the community, the professional, manufacturing, and trading classes, being those who, generally speaking, unite more of the means with more of the motives for saving than any other class, the spirit of accumulation is so strong that the signs of rapidly increasing wealth meet every eye: and the great amount of capital seeking investment excites astonishment, whenever peculiar circumstances turning much of it into some one channel, such as railway construction or foreign speculative adventure, bring the largeness of the total amount into evidence.
In the United States and the more prosperous countries of Europe, there are plenty of spendthrifts. However, in a large part of the community, particularly among the professional, manufacturing, and trading classes—who generally have both the means and the motivation to save—the urge to accumulate wealth is so strong that signs of rapidly growing riches are evident to everyone. The significant amount of capital looking for investment is surprising, especially when specific circumstances channel a large portion of it into one area, like railway construction or foreign speculative ventures, highlighting the sheer scale of the total amount.
There are many circumstances which, in England, give a peculiar force to the accumulating propensity. The long exemption of the country from the ravages of war and the far earlier period than elsewhere at which property was secure from military violence or arbitrary spoliation have produced a long-standing and hereditary confidence in the safety of funds when trusted out of the owner's hands, which in most other countries is of much more recent origin, and less firmly established.
There are many factors in England that make the tendency to accumulate wealth particularly strong. The country's long history of being free from the destruction of war and the much earlier time when property was protected from military violence or random theft have built a deep-rooted and inherited trust in the safety of money when it's handed over to others. In most other countries, this trust is of a much more recent origin and is not as firmly established.
The geographical causes which have made industry rather than war the natural source of power and importance to Great Britain [and the United States] have turned an unusual proportion of the most enterprising and energetic characters into the direction of manufactures and commerce; into supplying their wants and gratifying their ambition by producing and saving, rather than by appropriating what has been produced and saved. Much also depended on the better political institutions of this country, which, by the scope they have allowed to individual freedom of action, have encouraged personal activity and self-reliance, while, by the liberty they confer of association and combination, they facilitate industrial enterprise on a large scale. The same institutions, in another of their aspects, give a most direct and potent stimulus to the desire of acquiring wealth. The earlier decline of feudalism [in England] having removed or much weakened invidious distinctions between the originally trading classes and those who had been accustomed to despise them, and a polity having grown up which made wealth the real source of political influence, its acquisition was invested with a factitious value independent of its intrinsic utility. And, inasmuch as to be rich without industry has always hitherto constituted a step in the social scale above those who are rich by means of industry, it becomes the object of ambition to save not merely as much as will afford a large income while in business, but enough to retire from business and live in affluence on realized gains.
The geographical factors that have made industry, rather than war, the main source of power and significance for Great Britain and the United States have led many of the most ambitious and energetic individuals to focus on manufacturing and commerce. They meet their needs and fulfill their ambitions by producing and saving rather than by taking what has already been produced and saved. A lot also relied on the better political systems in this country, which, by allowing individual freedom of action, have encouraged personal initiative and self-reliance. Additionally, the freedom to associate and collaborate has made it easier to undertake large-scale industrial ventures. These same institutions, viewed in another light, provide a strong incentive to seek wealth. The earlier decline of feudalism in England diminished or greatly weakened the negative distinctions between originally trading classes and those who once looked down on them. A new system developed, making wealth the true source of political power, giving its acquisition a perceived value beyond its practical usefulness. Since being rich without working has always ranked above being wealthy through hard work, the goal is to save not just enough for a substantial income while running a business, but also enough to retire comfortably and enjoy the wealth accumulated over time.
In [the United States,] England, and Holland, then, for a long time past, and now in most other countries in Europe, the second requisite of increased production, increase of capital, shows no tendency to become deficient. So far as that element is concerned, production is susceptible of an increase without any assignable bounds. The limitation to production, not consisting in any necessary limit to the increase of the other two elements, labor and capital, must turn upon the properties of the only element which is inherently, and in itself, limited in quantity. It must depend on the properties of land.
In the United States, England, and Holland, for a long time now, and in most other European countries, the need for increased production, specifically the increase of capital, shows no signs of running low. As far as that factor is concerned, production can increase without any clear limits. The limits to production, which don’t stem from any necessary restrictions on the growth of the other two factors, labor and capital, must come from the characteristics of the one element that is inherently and intrinsically limited in quantity. It must rely on the characteristics of land.
Chapter IX. On the Law of Increasing Production from Land.
§ 1. The Law of Soil Production: A Law of Diminishing Returns Related to Increased Labor and Capital Investment.
Land differs from the other elements of production, labor, and capital, in not being susceptible of indefinite increase. Its extent is limited, and the extent of the more productive kinds of it more limited still. It is also evident that the quantity of produce capable of being raised on any given piece of land is not indefinite. This limited quantity of land and limited productiveness of it are the real limits to the increase of production.
Land is different from other production factors like labor and capital because it can't be increased indefinitely. There's a limit to how much land is available, and even more so to the most productive types of land. It's also clear that the amount of produce that can be grown on a specific piece of land isn't limitless. This finite amount of land and its limited productivity are the actual boundaries for increasing production.
The limitation to production from the properties of the soil is not like the obstacle opposed by a wall, which stands immovable in one particular spot, and offers no hindrance to motion short of stopping it entirely. We may rather compare it to a highly elastic and extensible band, which is hardly ever so violently stretched that it could not possibly be stretched any more, yet the pressure of which is felt long before the final limit is reached, and felt more severely the nearer that limit is approached.
The limitations on production from the qualities of the soil aren’t like a wall that stands firm in one place and only completely halts progress. It's more like a highly elastic and stretchable band that is rarely stretched to its absolute limit. However, you can feel the pressure long before you hit that limit, and it becomes much more intense as you get closer to it.
After a certain, and not very advanced, stage in the progress of agriculture—as soon, in fact, as mankind have applied themselves to cultivation with any energy, and have brought to it any tolerable tools—from that time it is the law of production from the land, that in any given state of agricultural skill and knowledge, by increasing the labor, the produce is not increased in an equal degree; doubling the labor does not double the produce; or, to express the same thing in other words, every increase of produce is obtained [pg 131] by a more than proportional increase in the application of labor to the land. This general law of agricultural industry is the most important proposition in political economy. Were the law different, nearly all the phenomena of the production and distribution of wealth would be other than they are.
After a certain, and not very advanced, stage in the development of agriculture—specifically, as soon as people have committed to farming with some effort and have acquired decent tools—from that point on, it’s the rule in land production that at any level of agricultural skill and knowledge, increasing the labor doesn’t lead to an equal increase in output; if you double the labor, you don't get double the output. To put it another way, every increase in output comes from a more than proportional increase in the amount of labor put into the land. This overall principle of agriculture is the most significant statement in political economy. If this principle were different, almost all the aspects of wealth production and distribution would look completely different.
When, for the purpose of raising an increase of produce, recourse is had to inferior land, it is evident that, so far, the produce does not increase in the same proportion with the labor. The very meaning of inferior land is land which with equal labor returns a smaller amount of produce. Land may be inferior either in fertility or in situation. The one requires a greater proportional amount of labor for growing the produce, the other for carrying it to market. If the land A yields a thousand quarters of wheat to a given outlay in wages, manure, etc., and, in order to raise another thousand, recourse must be had to the land B, which is either less fertile or more distant from the market, the two thousand quarters will cost more than twice as much labor as the original thousand, and the produce of agriculture will be increased in a less ratio than the labor employed in procuring it.
When trying to increase production by using less productive land, it’s clear that the increase in output doesn’t match the amount of labor put in. Inferior land is defined as land that produces less output for the same amount of labor. Land can be inferior either in its fertility or its location. Fertile land needs more labor to grow the crops, while less accessible land requires more effort to transport the goods to market. If land A produces a thousand bushels of wheat for a certain amount spent on wages and fertilizer, and to produce another thousand you have to use land B, which is either less fertile or further from the market, then those two thousand bushels will require more than double the labor of the first thousand, resulting in agricultural production increasing at a slower rate than the labor used to achieve it.
Instead of cultivating the land B, it would be possible, by higher cultivation, to make the land A produce more. It might be plowed or harrowed twice instead of once, or three times instead of twice; it might be dug instead of being plowed; after plowing, it might be gone over with a hoe instead of a harrow, and the soil more completely pulverized; it might be oftener or more thoroughly weeded; [pg 132] the implements used might be of higher finish, or more elaborate construction; a greater quantity or more expensive kinds of manure might be applied, or, when applied, they might be more carefully mixed and incorporated with the soil.
Instead of farming land B, it could be possible to get more yield from land A through better farming techniques. It could be plowed or harrowed twice instead of just once, or three times instead of twice; it could be dug instead of just being plowed; after plowing, it could be worked with a hoe instead of a harrow, making the soil finer; it could be weeded more often or more thoroughly; [pg 132] the tools used could be of higher quality or more advanced design; and a larger amount or more expensive types of fertilizer could be used, or they could be more carefully mixed into the soil when applied.
Inferior lands, or lands at a greater distance from the market, of course yield an inferior return, and an increasing demand can not be supplied from them unless at an augmentation of cost, and therefore of price. If the additional demand could continue to be supplied from the superior lands, by applying additional labor and capital, at no greater proportional cost than that at which they yield the quantity first demanded of them, the owners or farmers of those lands could undersell all others, and engross the whole market. Lands of a lower degree of fertility or in a more remote situation might indeed be cultivated by their proprietors, for the sake of subsistence or independence; but it never could be the interest of any one to farm them for profit. That a profit can be made from them, sufficient to attract capital to such an investment, is a proof that cultivation on the more eligible lands has reached a point beyond which any greater application of labor and capital would yield, at the best, no greater return than can be obtained at the same expense from less fertile or less favorably situated lands.
Inferior lands, or those farther away from the market, obviously provide a lower return. An increase in demand cannot be met with these lands without raising costs and, consequently, prices. If the extra demand could continue to be satisfied by the more productive lands, by using more labor and capital without increasing costs proportionately from what they originally provided, the owners or farmers of those lands could underprice everyone else and take over the entire market. Lands that are less fertile or located farther away might be farmed by their owners for survival or independence, but it would never be in anyone's best interest to farm them for profit. If a profit can be made that attracts investment in such lands, it's a sign that farming on the better lands has reached a limit where any further investment of labor and capital would yield, at best, no better return than could be obtained at the same cost from less fertile or less advantageous lands.
“It is long,” says a late traveler in the United States,130 “before an English eye becomes reconciled to the lightness of the crops and the careless farming (as we should call it) which is apparent. One forgets that, where land is so plentiful and labor so dear as it is here, a totally different principle must be pursued from that which prevails in populous countries, and that the consequence will of course be a want of tidiness, as it were, and finish, about everything which requires labor.” Of the two causes mentioned, the plentifulness of land seems to me the true explanation, rather than the dearness of labor; for, however dear labor may be, when food is wanted, labor will always be applied to producing it in preference to anything else. But this labor is more effective for its end by being applied to fresh soil than if it were employed in bringing the soil already occupied into higher cultivation.
"It’s been a while," says a recent traveler in the United States, 130 "Before someone from England gets used to the ease of farming and the relaxed approach to agriculture (as we would say) that's clear. People often forget that when there's so much land and labor is costly, a totally different approach is needed than what's used in densely populated countries, and this will naturally result in a lack of neatness and polish in everything that needs labor." Of the two reasons mentioned, the abundance of land seems to be the true explanation, rather than the high cost of labor; because, no matter how expensive labor may be, when food is needed, it will always be focused on producing it instead of anything else. But this labor is more effective for its purpose when applied to fresh soil rather than trying to improve the productivity of already cultivated land.
Only when no soils remain to be broken up, but such as either from distance or inferior quality require a considerable rise of price to render their cultivation profitable, can it become advantageous to apply the high farming of Europe to any American lands; except, perhaps, in the immediate vicinity of towns, where saving in cost of carriage may compensate for great inferiority in the return from the soil itself.
Only when there are no more unplowed soils left, except those that are either too far away or of poor quality, requiring a significant price increase to make farming them worthwhile, can it be beneficial to use European high farming techniques on any American lands; except maybe near towns, where savings on shipping costs might balance out the lower quality of the soil.
The principle which has now been stated must be received, no doubt, with certain explanations and limitations. Even after the land is so highly cultivated that the mere application of additional labor, or of an additional amount of ordinary dressing, would yield no return proportioned to the expense, it may still happen that the application of a much greater additional labor and capital to improving the soil itself, by draining or permanent manures, would be as liberally remunerated by the produce as any portion of the labor and capital already employed. It would sometimes be much more amply remunerated. This could not be, if capital always sought and found the most advantageous employment.
The principle that has just been stated should definitely be received with certain explanations and limitations. Even when the land is so well-cultivated that simply adding more labor or regular fertilizers wouldn’t yield a return that matches the expense, it’s still possible that investing a lot more labor and resources into improving the soil itself—through drainage or permanent fertilizers—could generate returns just as good as any of the labor and resources already used. In some cases, it could even be much more profitable. This wouldn’t be the case if capital always aimed for and found the most advantageous use.
§ 2. Opposing Principle to the Law of Diminishing Returns; the Advancement of Production Improvements.
That the produce of land increases, cæteris paribus, in a diminishing ratio to the increase in the labor employed, is, as we have said (allowing for occasional and temporary exceptions), the universal law of agricultural industry. This principle, however, has been denied. So much so, indeed, that (it is affirmed) the worst land now in cultivation produces as much food per acre, and even as much to a given amount of labor, as our ancestors contrived to extract from the richest soils in England.
That the yield from land grows, ceteris paribus, in a decreasing ratio to the increase in labor used, is, as we mentioned (with occasional and temporary exceptions), the universal law of farming. However, this principle has been contested. In fact, it's claimed that the worst land currently being farmed produces as much food per acre, and even as much for a certain amount of labor, as our ancestors managed to get from the richest soils in England.
This, however, does not prove that the law of which we have been speaking does not exist, but only that there is some antagonizing principle at work, capable for a time of making head against the law. Such an agency there is, in habitual antagonism to the law of diminishing return from land; and to the consideration of this we shall now proceed. It is no other than the progress of civilization. The most obvious [part of it] is the progress of agricultural knowledge, skill, and invention. Improved processes of agriculture are of two kinds: (1) some enable the land to yield a greater absolute produce, without an equivalent increase of labor; (2) others have not the power of increasing the produce, but have that of diminishing the labor and expense by which it is obtained. (1.) Among the first are to be reckoned the disuse of fallows, by means of the rotation of crops; and the introduction of new articles of cultivation capable of entering advantageously into the rotation. The change made in agriculture toward the close of the last century, by the introduction of turnip-husbandry, is spoken of as amounting to a revolution. Next in order comes the introduction of new articles of food, containing a greater amount of sustenance, like the potato, or more productive species or varieties of the same plant, such as the Swedish turnip. In the same class of improvements must be placed a better knowledge of the properties of manures, and of the most effectual modes of applying them; the introduction of new and more powerful fertilizing agents, such as guano, and the conversion to the same purpose of substances previously wasted; inventions like subsoil-plowing or tile-draining, by which the produce of some kinds of lands is so greatly multiplied; improvements in the breed or feeding of [pg 136] laboring cattle; augmented stock, of the animals which consume and convert into human food what would otherwise be wasted; and the like. (2.) The other sort of improvements, those which diminish labor, but without increasing the capacity of the land to produce, are such as the improved construction of tools; the introduction of new instruments which spare manual labor, as the winnowing and thrashing machines. These improvements do not add to the productiveness of the land, but they are equally calculated with the former to counteract the tendency in the cost of production of agricultural produce, to rise with the progress of population and demand.
This, however, doesn’t prove that the law we’ve been talking about doesn’t exist; it only shows that there’s some opposing force at play that can temporarily resist the law. That opposing force is nothing other than the advancement of civilization. The most obvious aspect of it is the growth of agricultural knowledge, skills, and innovations. There are two types of improved agricultural processes: (1) some allow the land to produce more without a corresponding increase in labor; (2) others don’t increase production but reduce the labor and costs involved in obtaining it. (1.) Among the first type are practices like abandoning fallow periods through crop rotation and introducing new crops that fit well into the rotation. The shift in agriculture towards the end of the last century, due to the implementation of turnip cultivation, is considered revolutionary. Following that, new food sources that provide more sustenance, like the potato, or more productive varieties of the same plant, such as the Swedish turnip, came into play. Improvements like better knowledge of manure properties and effective application methods, the use of new fertilizing agents like guano, and repurposing previously wasted materials are also in this category. Innovations like subsoil plowing or tile drainage significantly increase yields on certain types of land. Better breeding and feeding practices for labor animals, as well as an increase in livestock that convert otherwise wasted resources into human food, also fall under this category. (2.) The second type of improvements reduces labor without boosting the land’s production capacity, including better tool designs and new machines that save manual labor, like winnowing and threshing machines. While these improvements don’t increase land productivity, they also help counteract the tendency for production costs in agriculture to rise as the population and demand grow.
§ 3. —In Railways.
Analogous in effect to this second class of agricultural improvements are improved means of communication. Good roads are equivalent to good tools. It is of no consequence whether the economy of labor takes place in extracting the produce from the soil, or in conveying it to the place where it is to be consumed.
Similar to the impact of this second category of agricultural improvements, better communication methods also play a vital role. Well-maintained roads are like high-quality tools. It doesn't matter if the efficiency in labor happens during the harvesting of crops from the land or while transporting them to where they will be consumed.
Chart V.
Chart V.
Cost of 20 Barrels of Flour, 10 Beef, 10 Pork, 100 Bushels Wheat, 100 Corn, 100 Oats, 100 Pounds Butter, 100 Lard, and 100 Fleece Wool, in New York City, at the Average of each Year, Compiled by Months, in Gold; Compared Graphically with the Decrease in the Charge per Ton per Mile, on all the Railroads of the State of New York, during the Same Period.
The cost of 20 barrels of flour, 10 beef, 10 pork, 100 bushels of wheat, 100 corn, 100 oats, 100 pounds of butter, 100 lard, and 100 fleece wool in New York City was averaged annually, compiled by month, in gold; and it was compared graphically with the decrease in the charge per ton per mile on all the railroads in the State of New York during the same time period.
Year. | Price in gold of basic farm products. (Dollars) | Charge for transporting one ton for one mile. (Cents) | Reduction in railroad costs per ton. (Cents) | Decrease in profits for railroads transporting one ton. (Cents) |
1870 | 776.02 | 1.7016 | 1.1471 | .5545 |
1871 | 735.33 | 1.7005 | 1.450 | .5555 |
1872 | 675.92 | 1.6645 | 1490 | .5155 |
1873 | 662.50 | 1.6000 | 1.0864 | .5136 |
1874 | 748.54 | 1.4480 | .9730 | .4750 |
1875 | 696.40 | 1.3039 | .9587 | .3452 |
1876 | 651.74 | 1.1604 | .8561 | .3043 |
1877 | 751.95 | 1.0590 | .7740 | .2850 |
1878 | 569.81 | .9994 | .6900 | .3094 |
1879 | 568.34 | .8082 | .5847 | .2295 |
1880 | 631.32 | .9220 | .6030 | .3190 |
1881 | 703.10 | .8390 | .5880 | .2510 |
1882 | 776.12 | .8170 | .6010 | .2160 |
1883 | 662.11 | .8990 | .6490 | .2500 |
In 1855 the charge per ton per mile was 3.27 cents, as compared with 0.89 in 1883.
In 1855, the price was 3.27 cents per ton per mile, while in 1883 it was 0.89.
Tons moved 1 meter in 1883 by the railroads of New York. | 9.29 billion |
At a rate of 1855, it would cost | $303.66 million |
Actual cost in 1883 | 83,464,919 |
Saving to the Government | $220 million |
The explanation of this reduced cost is given by Mr. Edward Atkinson135 as (1) the competition of water-ways, (2) the competition of one railway with another, and (3) the competition of other countries, which forces our railways to try to lay our staple products down in foreign markets at a price which will warrant continued shipment. Besides these reasons, much ought also (4) to be assigned to the progress of inventions and the reduced cost of steel and all appliances necessary to the railways.
Mr. Edward Atkinson attributes this lower cost to (1) competition from waterways, (2) competition among various railways, and (3) competition from other countries, which forces our railways to price our key products for foreign markets in a way that guarantees consistent shipments. Besides these factors, (4) we should also recognize the progress of inventions and the reduced costs of steel and all the equipment required for railways.
The large importance of the railways shows itself in an influence on general business prosperity, and as a place for large investments of a rapidly growing capital. The building of railways, however, has been going on, at some times with greater speed than at others. Instead of 33,908 miles of railways at the close of our war, we have now (1884) over 120,000 miles. How the additional mileage has been built year by year, with two distinct eras of increased building—one from 1869 to 1873, and another from 1879 to 1884—may be seen by the shorter lines of the subjoined chart, No. VI.
The important role of railways is clear in how they affect overall business success and serve as a site for significant investments of rapidly growing capital. Railway construction has happened at different speeds over time. Instead of having 33,908 miles of railways at the end of our war, we now (1884) have over 120,000 miles. The additional mileage built each year, including two specific periods of increased construction—one from 1869 to 1873 and another from 1879 to 1884—can be seen in the shorter lines of the chart below, No. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.VI.
That speculation has been excited at different times by the opening up of our Western country, there can be no doubt. And if a comparison be made with Chart No. XVII (Book IV, Chap. III), which gives the total grain-crops of the United States, it will be seen that since 1879, although our population has increased from 12-½ per cent to 14 per cent, our grain-crops only 5 per cent, yet our railway mileage has increased 40 per cent.
It's obvious that speculation has been triggered at different times by the growth of our western territories. If we compare this to Chart No. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,XVIIPlease provide the text you would like me to modernize.Book 4, Ch. 3The chart showing the total grain crops in the United States reveals that since 1879, our population has grown from 12.5% to 14%, while our grain crops have only increased by 5%. On the other hand, our railway mileage has increased by 40%.
The extent to which the United States has carried railway-building, as compared with European countries, although we have a very much greater area, is distinctly shown by Chart No. VII. This application of one form of improvement to oppose the law of diminishing returns in the United States has produced extraordinary results, especially when we consider that we are probably not yet using all our best lands, or, in other words, that we have not yet felt the law of diminishing returns in some large districts.
The level to which the United States has developed railways, in comparison to European countries, is clearly shown in Chart No. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.VIIThis implementation of a specific improvement to combat the law of diminishing returns in the United States has produced impressive results, especially given that we may not be fully using all our best lands; in other words, we haven't yet faced the law of diminishing returns in several large areas.
Chart VI.
Chart 6.
Miles of Railroad in Operation on the 1st January in each Year, and the Miles added in the Year Ensuing.
The total miles of railroad in operation on January 1st each year, along with the miles added in the subsequent year.
Year. | Miles of Railroad. | Miles added. |
1865 | 33,908 | 1,177 |
1866 | 35,085 | 1,716 |
1867 | 36,801 | 2,449 |
1868 | 39,250 | 2,979 |
1869 | 42,229 | 4,615 |
1870 | 46,844 | 6,070 |
1871 | 52,914 | 7,379 |
1872 | 60,293 | 5,878 |
1873 | 66,171 | 4,107 |
1874 | 70,278 | 2,105 |
1875 | 72,383 | 1,713 |
1876 | 74,096 | 2,712 |
1877 | 76,808 | 2,281 |
1878 | 79,089 | 2,687 |
1879 | 81,776 | 4,721 |
1880 | 86,497 | 7,048 |
1881 | 93,545 | 9,789 |
1882 | 103,334 | 11,591 |
1883 | 114,925 | 6,618 |
Railways and canals are virtually a diminution of the cost of production of all things sent to market by them; and literally so of all those the appliances and aids for producing which they serve to transmit. By their means land can be [pg 140] cultivated, which would not otherwise have remunerated the cultivators without a rise of price. Improvements in navigation have, with respect to food or materials brought from beyond sea, a corresponding effect.
Railways and canals basically reduce the cost of producing everything they transport to market; and they definitely do so for all the tools and supports used in production that they help move. Because of them, land can be farmed that wouldn’t have been profitable for farmers without a price increase. Advances in navigation have a similar impact on food or materials brought in from overseas.
§ 4. —In Manufacturing.
From similar considerations, it appears that many purely mechanical improvements, which have, apparently, at least, no peculiar connection with agriculture, nevertheless enable a given amount of food to be obtained with a smaller expenditure of labor. A great improvement in the process of smelting iron would tend to cheapen agricultural implements, diminish the cost of railroads, of wagons and carts, ships, and perhaps buildings, and many other things to which iron is not at present applied, because it is too costly; and would thence diminish the cost of production of food. The same effect would follow from an improvement in those processes of what may be termed manufacture, to which the material of food is subjected after it is separated from the ground. The first application of wind or water power to grind corn tended to cheapen bread as much as a very important discovery in agriculture would have done; and any great improvement in the construction of corn-mills would have, in proportion, a similar influence.
From similar considerations, it seems that many purely mechanical improvements, which don’t seem directly connected to agriculture, still allow for a certain amount of food to be produced with less labor. Significant advancements in the process of smelting iron would help reduce the costs of agricultural tools, railroads, wagons, carts, ships, and potentially buildings, as well as other things that currently can’t use iron due to its high cost; this would consequently lower the cost of food production. The same outcome would result from improvements in the processes involved in the manufacturing of food after it's harvested from the ground. The initial use of wind or water power to grind grain led to cheaper bread, just as a major discovery in agriculture would have, and any substantial improvement in the design of grain mills would similarly impact costs.
Those manufacturing improvements which can not be made instrumental to facilitate, in any of its stages, the actual production of food, and therefore do not help to counteract or retard the diminution of the proportional return to labor from the soil, have, however, another effect, which is practically equivalent. What they do not prevent, they yet, in some degree, compensate for.136
Those manufacturing improvements that can't be used to help at any stage of actual food production, and therefore don’t help slow down the decrease in the proportional return to labor from the land, have another effect that is almost equivalent. What they can’t stop, they somewhat make up for. 136
Chart VII.
Chart 7.
Ratio of Miles of Railroad to the Areas of States and Countries—United States and Europe. The relative proportion is 1 Mile Railroad to 4 Square Miles of Area.
Ratio of Miles of Railroad to the Areas of States and Countries—United States and Europe. The relative proportion is 1 Mile of Railroad to 4 Square Miles of Area.
No. | Name. | Rank in Size. | Relative. |
1 | Massachusetts | 67 | 98 |
2 | Belgium | 62 | 96 |
3 | England and Wales | 29 | 88 |
4 | New Jersey | 62 | 81 |
5 | Connecticut | 68 | 80 |
6 | Rhode Island | 71 | 65 |
7 | Ohio | 44 | 60 |
8 | Illinois | 32 | 59 |
9 | Pennsylvania | 40 | 55 |
10 | Delaware | 69 | 53 |
11 | Indiana | 50 | 52 |
12 | New Hampshire | 65 | 45 |
13 | Switzerland | 59 | 44 |
14 | New York | 39 | 41 |
15 | Iowa | 33 | 39 |
16 | German Empire | 4 | 38 |
17 | Scotland | 52 | 37 |
18 | Maryland | 63 | 36 |
19 | Vermont | 64 | 35 |
20 | Ireland | 51 | 29 |
21 | Michigan | 31 | 28 |
22 | France | 5 | 27 |
23 | Denmark | 60 | 26 |
24 | Netherlands | 57 | 25 |
25 | Missouri | 26 | 24 |
26 | Wisconsin | 34 | 23 |
27 | Austrian Empire | 3 | 21 |
28 | Virginia | 45 | 19 |
29 | Italy | 13 | 18 |
30 | Georgia | 30 | 17 |
31 | Kansas | 22 | 16 |
32 | Kentucky | 46 | 15 |
33 | South Carolina | 49 | 14 |
34 | Tennessee | 42 | 14 |
35 | Minnesota | 21 | 13 |
36 | Alabama | 36 | 13 |
37 | West Virginia | 55 | 12 |
38 | Roumania | 41 | 12 |
39 | North Carolina | 37 | 12 |
40 | Maine | 48 | 12 |
41 | Nebraska | 23 | 10 |
42 | Mississippi | 38 | 9 |
43 | Spain | 6 | 9 |
44 | Portugal | 47 | 9 |
45 | Sweden | 7 | 9 |
46 | Arkansas | 35 | 8 |
47 | Louisiana | 43 | 8 |
48 | Colorado | 16 | 8 |
49 | California | 8 | 7 |
50 | Turkey | 27 | 7 |
51 | Texas | 2 | 7 |
52 | Utah | 20 | 6 |
53 | Florida | 28 | 6 |
54 | Dakota | 7 | 6 |
55 | Russia in Europe | 1 | 5 |
56 | Nevada | 15 | 5 |
57 | Norway | 11 | 5 |
58 | Oregon | 18 | 4 |
59 | Bulgaria | 54 | 4 |
60 | New Mexico | 12 | 3 |
61 | Wyoming | 17 | 2 |
62 | Indian Territory | 25 | 2 |
63 | Washington | 24 | 1 |
64 | Arizona | 14 | 1 |
65 | Idaho | 19 | 1 |
66 | Greece | 58 | 0 |
67 | Montana | 10 | 0 |
68 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 53 | 0 |
69 | Servia | 56 | 0 |
70 | Eastern Roumelia | 61 | 0 |
71 | Monteblack | 70 | 0 |
72 | Andorra | 72 | 0 |
(The United States have substantially one mile of railway to each 540 inhabitants. Europe has one mile to each 3,000 inhabitants, if Russia be included; about one mile to each 2,540, exclusive of Russia.)
(The United States has about one mile of railway for every 540 people. Europe has one mile for every 3,000 people, including Russia; or about one mile for every 2,540 people, not counting Russia.)
The materials of manufactures being all drawn from the land, and many of them from agriculture, which supplies in particular the entire material of clothing, the general law of production from the land, the law of diminishing return, must in the last resort be applicable to manufacturing as well as to agricultural history. As population increases, and [pg 142] the power of the land to yield increased produce is strained harder and harder, any additional supply of material, as well as of food, must be obtained by a more than proportionally increasing expenditure of labor. But the cost of the material forming generally a very small portion of the entire cost of the manufacture, the agricultural labor concerned in the production of manufactured goods is but a small fraction of the whole labor worked up in the commodity.
The raw materials for manufacturing come from the land, with many sourced from agriculture, which primarily provides all the material for clothing. Therefore, the general principle of production from the land, known as the law of diminishing returns, applies to manufacturing just as it does to agriculture. As the population grows and the land's ability to produce more is pushed to its limits, any extra supply of materials, along with food, will require a disproportionately higher amount of labor. However, since the cost of materials typically represents a very small part of the total manufacturing cost, the agricultural labor involved in producing manufactured goods accounts for only a tiny fraction of the overall labor that goes into the final product.
Mr. Babbage137 gives an interesting illustration of this principle. Bar-iron of the value of £1 became worth, when manufactured into—
Mr. Babbage137provides a compelling example of this principle. Bar iron worth £1 increased in value when it was transformed into—
£ | |
Slit iron, for nails | 1.10 |
Raw steel | 1.42 |
Horseshoes | 2.55 |
Regular gun barrels | 9.10 |
Saw blades | 14.28 |
Best scissors | 446.94 |
Pocket knife blades | 657.14 |
Steel sword handles, polished | 972.82 |
It can not, however, be said of such manufactures as coarse cotton cloth, wherein the increased cost of raw cotton causes an immediate effect upon the price of the cloth, that the cost of the materials forms but a small portion of the cost of the manufacture.138
However, it can't be said that for products like rough cotton fabric, where the increasing cost of raw cotton directly affects the fabric's price, the cost of materials accounts for only a small portion of the total manufacturing cost.138
All the labor [not engaged in preparing materials] tends constantly and strongly toward diminution, as the amount of production increases. Manufactures are vastly more susceptible than agriculture of mechanical improvements and contrivances for saving labor. In manufactures, accordingly, the causes tending to increase the productiveness of industry preponderate greatly over the one cause which tends to diminish it; and the increase of production, called forth by the progress of society, takes place, not at an increasing, but at a continually diminishing proportional cost. This fact has manifested itself in the progressive fall of the prices and values of almost every kind of manufactured goods during two centuries past; a fall accelerated by the mechanical inventions of the last seventy or eighty years, and susceptible [pg 143] of being prolonged and extended beyond any limit which it would be safe to specify. The benefit might even extend to the poorest class. The increased cheapness of clothing and lodging might make up to them for the augmented cost of their food.
All the labor that isn’t involved in preparing materials tends to constantly and significantly decrease as production rises. Manufacturing is much more open to mechanical improvements and innovations that save labor compared to agriculture. In manufacturing, the factors that boost industrial productivity greatly outweigh those that reduce it; as a result, the increase in production driven by societal progress happens not at an increasing cost but at a continuously decreasing proportional cost. This fact has been evident in the ongoing drop in prices and values of nearly all types of manufactured goods over the past two centuries—a decline accelerated by mechanical inventions in the last seventy or eighty years, and likely to continue beyond any safe limit we could specify. The benefits could even reach the poorest class. The increased affordability of clothing and housing might compensate for the rising cost of their food.
There is, thus, no possible improvement in the arts of production which does not in one or another mode exercise an antagonistic influence to the law of diminishing return to agricultural labor. Nor is it only industrial improvements which have this effect. Improvements in government, and almost every kind of moral and social advancement, operate in the same manner. We may say the same of improvements in education. The intelligence of the workman is a most important element in the productiveness of labor. The carefulness, economy, and general trustworthiness of laborers are as important as their intelligence. Friendly relations and a community of interest and feeling between laborers and employers are eminently so. In the rich and idle classes, increased mental energy, more solid instruction, and stronger feelings of conscience, public spirit, or philanthropy, would qualify them to originate and promote the most valuable improvements, both in the economical resources of their country and in its institutions and customs.
There’s no way to improve production methods without somehow counteracting the law of diminishing returns in agricultural labor. It's not just industrial advancements that have this effect; improvements in government and almost every kind of moral and social progress do as well. The same goes for advancements in education. The worker's intelligence is a crucial factor in how productive labor can be. The carefulness, efficiency, and overall reliability of workers are just as important as their intelligence. Positive relationships and shared interests and feelings between workers and employers are essential, too. For the wealthy and idle classes, increased mental energy, better education, and stronger senses of conscience, public spirit, or philanthropy would enable them to create and encourage the most valuable improvements, both in the economic resources of their country and in its institutions and customs.
§ 5. The Law Applies to Mining.
We must observe that what we have said of agriculture is true, with little variation, of the other occupations which it represents; of all the arts which extract materials from the globe. Mining industry, for example, usually yields an increase of produce at a more than proportional increase of expense.
We should note that what we've said about agriculture is mostly true for other jobs that involve pulling resources from the earth. For instance, the mining industry often produces more output, but it also incurs costs that rise even more than the increase in production.
It does worse, for even its customary annual produce requires to be extracted by a greater and greater expenditure of labor and capital. As a mine does not reproduce the coal or ore taken from it, not only are all mines at last exhausted, but even when they as yet show no signs of exhaustion they must be worked at a continually increasing cost; shafts must be sunk deeper, galleries driven farther, greater power applied to keep them clear of water; the produce must be [pg 144] lifted from a greater depth, or conveyed a greater distance. The law of diminishing return applies therefore to mining in a still more unqualified sense than to agriculture; but the antagonizing agency, that of improvements in production, also applies in a still greater degree. Mining operations are more susceptible of mechanical improvements than agricultural: the first great application of the steam-engine was to mining; and there are unlimited possibilities of improvement in the chemical processes by which the metals are extracted. There is another contingency, of no unfrequent occurrence, which avails to counterbalance the progress of all existing mines toward exhaustion: this is, the discovery of new ones, equal or superior in richness.
It gets worse, because even the usual annual output needs to be extracted with increasing amounts of labor and capital. Just like a mine doesn't regenerate the coal or ore taken from it, all mines eventually run dry. Moreover, even when they show no signs of running out, they have to be worked at ever-increasing costs; shafts have to be dug deeper, tunnels have to be extended further, and more power is needed to keep them clear of water. The output has to be taken from greater depths or transported longer distances. The law of diminishing returns applies to mining even more than it does to agriculture. However, the opposing factor—improvements in production—also has a greater impact. Mining operations are more open to mechanical advancements than agriculture is: the first significant use of the steam engine was in mining, and there are endless possibilities for improvement in the chemical methods used to extract metals. There’s also the chance of discovering new mines, which are often found to be equal to or richer than existing ones, that can offset the depletion of current mines.
To resume: all natural agents which are limited in quantity are not only limited in their ultimate productive power, but, long before that power is stretched to the utmost, they yield to any additional demands on progressively harder terms. This law may, however, be suspended, or temporarily controlled, by whatever adds to the general power of mankind over nature, and especially by any extension of their knowledge, and their consequent command, of the properties and powers of natural agents.
To sum up: all natural resources that are finite not only have a limit to their ultimate ability to produce, but well before they reach that limit, they respond to any extra demands on increasingly tougher conditions. However, this rule can be overridden or temporarily managed by anything that enhances humanity's overall ability to control nature, especially through an increase in knowledge and a resulting mastery over the properties and capabilities of natural resources.
Chapter X. Effects of the Previous Laws.
§ 1. Solutions for Weakness in the Principle of Accumulation.
From the preceding exposition it appears that the limit to the increase of production is twofold: from deficiency of capital, or of land. Production comes to a pause, either because the effective desire of accumulation is not sufficient to give rise to any further increase of capital, or because, however disposed the possessors of surplus income may be to save a portion of it, the limited land at the disposal of the community does not permit additional capital to be employed with such a return as would be an equivalent to them for their abstinence.
From the earlier discussion, it seems that the limit to increasing production comes from two main sources: a lack of capital or a lack of land. Production stops either because the actual desire to accumulate isn’t strong enough to lead to more capital, or because, no matter how willing those with excess income are to save, the limited land available to the community doesn’t allow for additional capital to be used in a way that would compensate them for their restraint.
In countries where the principle of accumulation is as weak as it is in the various nations of Asia, the desideratum economically considered is an increase of industry, and of the effective desire of accumulation. The means are, first, a better government: more complete security of property; moderate taxes, and freedom from arbitrary exaction under the name of taxes; a more permanent and more advantageous tenure of land, securing to the cultivator as far as possible the undivided benefits of the industry, skill, and economy he may exert. Secondly, improvement of the public intelligence. Thirdly, the introduction of foreign arts, which raise the returns derivable from additional capital to a rate corresponding to the low strength of the desire of accumulation.
In countries where the concept of accumulation is as weak as it is in various Asian nations, the main economic goal is to boost industry and the actual desire to accumulate wealth. To achieve this, we need, first, better governance: more reliable property rights, reasonable taxes, and protection from arbitrary charges disguised as taxes; a more stable and favorable land tenure system that ensures the farmer gets as much benefit as possible from their hard work, skills, and efficiency. Secondly, we need to improve public knowledge and understanding. Thirdly, we should introduce foreign techniques that can increase returns from additional investment to a level that matches the current low desire to accumulate.
§ 2. Even when the desire to accumulate is strong, the population must be kept within the limits of resources available from the land.
But there are other countries, and England [and the United States are] at the head of them, in which neither the spirit of industry nor the effective desire of accumulation need any encouragement. In these countries there would never be any deficiency of capital, if its increase were never checked or brought to a stand by too great a diminution of its returns. It is the tendency of the returns to a progressive diminution which causes the increase of production to be often attended with a deterioration in the condition of the producers; and this tendency, which would in time put an end to increase of production altogether, is a result of the necessary and inherent conditions of production from the land.
But there are other countries, with England and the United States leading the way, where neither the spirit of hard work nor the genuine desire to accumulate wealth need any encouragement. In these countries, there would never be a shortage of capital if its growth was not hindered or halted by a significant drop in its returns. It is the tendency for returns to gradually decrease that often leads to an improvement in production being accompanied by a decline in the situation of the producers; and this tendency, which would eventually stop production growth altogether, is a result of the essential and inherent conditions of farming.
In all countries which have passed beyond a very early stage in the progress of agriculture, every increase in the demand for food, occasioned by increased population, will always, unless there is a simultaneous improvement in production, diminish the share which on a fair division would fall to each individual. An increased production, in default of unoccupied tracts of fertile land, or of fresh improvements tending to cheapen commodities, can never be obtained but by increasing the labor in more than the same proportion. The population must either work harder or eat less, or obtain their usual food by sacrificing a part of their other customary comforts. Whenever this necessity is postponed, it is because the improvements which facilitate production continue progressive; because the contrivances of mankind for making their labor more effective keep up an [pg 147] equal struggle with Nature, and extort fresh resources from her reluctant powers as fast as human necessities occupy and engross the old.
In all countries that have moved beyond an early stage in agricultural development, any increase in the demand for food due to a growing population will always, unless there’s a simultaneous boost in production, reduce the amount that each person would get in a fair distribution. Increased production, without available fertile land or new advancements that lower costs, can only be achieved by increasing labor more than proportionately. The population must either work harder, eat less, or trade off some of their usual comforts to maintain their food supply. Whenever this need is delayed, it’s because the improvements that aid production keep progressing; the ways people find to make their work more effective maintain a balanced competition with Nature, extracting new resources from her reluctant capabilities as quickly as human needs fill and consume the old ones.
From this results the important corollary, that the necessity of restraining population is not, as many persons believe, peculiar to a condition of great inequality of property. A greater number of people can not, in any given state of civilization, be collectively so well provided for as a smaller. The niggardliness of nature,140 not the injustice of society, is the cause of the penalty attached to over-population. An unjust distribution of wealth does not even aggravate the evil, but, at most, causes it to be somewhat earlier felt. It is in vain to say that all mouths which the increase of mankind calls into existence bring with them hands. The new mouths require as much food as the old ones, and the hands do not produce as much.
From this follows the important conclusion that the need to control population is not, as many people think, specific to a situation of extreme wealth inequality. A larger number of people cannot, in any given stage of civilization, be collectively better provided for than a smaller group. The scarcity of resources, not the unfairness of society, is the reason for the consequences of overpopulation. An unfair distribution of wealth does not even make the problem worse, but at most, makes it felt a little sooner. It's useless to claim that every mouth that the growth of humanity creates comes with hands. The new mouths need as much food as the existing ones, and the hands do not produce as much.
After a degree of density has been attained, sufficient to allow the principal benefits of combination of labor, all further increase tends in itself to mischief, so far as regards the average condition of the people; but the progress of improvement has a counteracting operation, and allows of increased numbers without any deterioration, and even consistently with a higher average of comfort. Improvement must here be understood in a wide sense, including not only new industrial inventions, or an extended use of those already known, but improvements in institutions, education, opinions, and human affairs generally, provided they tend, as almost all improvements do, to give new motives or new facilities to production.
Once a certain level of density is reached that allows for the main benefits of teamwork, any additional growth tends to cause problems for the average well-being of the population. However, advancements in improvement can counteract this, enabling a larger population without a decline in conditions and even supporting a higher standard of comfort. Here, improvement should be understood broadly, including not just new industrial innovations or a greater application of existing ones, but also enhancements in institutions, education, beliefs, and societal matters in general, as long as they, like most improvements, provide new incentives or opportunities for production.
The increase in the population of the United States has been enormous, as already seen, but the increase of production has been still greater, owing to the fertility of our land, to improvements in the arts, and to our great genius for invention, as may be seen by the following table (amounts in the second [pg 148] column are given in millions).141 The steady increase of the valuation of our wealth goes on faster than the increase of population, so that it manifests itself in a larger average wealth to each inhabitant.
The U.S. population has grown significantly, as previously mentioned, but production has increased even more, thanks to the fertility of our land, advances in technology, and our exceptional ability to invent, as shown in the following table (amounts in the second[pg 148]column is in millions).141Our wealth is growing faster than the population, leading to a higher average wealth per person.
Years. | Valuation. | Percent increase. | Population. | Percentage increase. | Per capita valuation. |
1800 | $1,742 | .. | 5.3 million | Got it! Please provide the short phrases you would like me to modernize. | $328 |
1810 | 2,382 | 37 | 7,239,881 | 36 | 329 |
1820 | 3,734 | 57 | 9.6 million | 33 | 386 |
1830 | 4,328 | 16 | 12,866,020 | 34 | 336 |
1840 | 6,124 | 41 | 17,069,453 | 33 | 359 |
1850 | 8,800 | 44 | 23,191,876 | 36 | 379 |
1860 | 16,160 | 84 | 31.4 million | 35 | 514 |
1870 | 30,068 | 86 | 38,558,371 | 23 | 780 |
1880 | 40,000 | 33 | 50,155,783 | 30 | 798 |
If the productive powers of the country increase as rapidly as advancing numbers call for an augmentation of produce, it is not necessary to obtain that augmentation by the cultivation of soils more sterile than the worst already under culture, or by applying additional labor to the old soils at a diminished advantage; or at all events this loss of power is compensated by the increased efficiency with which, in the progress of improvement, labor is employed in manufactures. In one way or the other, the increased population is provided for, and all are as well off as before. But if the growth of human power over nature is suspended or slackened, and population does not slacken its increase; if, with only the existing command over natural agencies, those agencies are called upon for an increased produce; this greater produce will not be afforded to the increased population, without either demanding on the average a greater effort from each, or on the average reducing each to a smaller ration out of the aggregate produce.
If the country’s ability to produce more grows as quickly as the rising population needs more goods, we don’t have to increase production by farming poorer land than what we already use or by putting more labor into the old fields with less benefit; or in any case, this loss of productivity is balanced out by the greater efficiency with which labor is used in manufacturing as improvements take place. In one way or another, the growing population is taken care of, and everyone is just as well off as before. But if the growth of human control over nature slows down or stops while the population continues to rise; if, relying only on the current ability to access natural resources, we push those resources for more output, this increased output won’t be possible for the larger population without either requiring more average effort from each person or reducing everyone’s share of the total output.
Ever since the great mechanical inventions of Watt, Arkwright, and their contemporaries, the return to labor has probably increased as fast as the population; and would [pg 149] even have outstripped it, if that very augmentation of return had not called forth an additional portion of the inherent power of multiplication in the human species. During the twenty or thirty years last elapsed, so rapid has been the extension of improved processes of agriculture [in England], that even the land yields a greater produce in proportion to the labor employed; the average price of corn had become decidedly lower, even before the repeal of the corn laws had so materially lightened, for the time being, the pressure of population upon production. But though improvement may during a certain space of time keep up with, or even surpass, the actual increase of population, it assuredly never comes up to the rate of increase of which population is capable: and nothing could have prevented a general deterioration in the condition of the human race, were it not that population has in fact been restrained. Had it been restrained still more, and the same improvements taken place, there would have been a larger dividend than there now is, for the nation or the species at large. The new ground wrung from nature by the improvements would not have been all tied up in the support of mere numbers. Though the gross produce would not have been so great, there would have been a greater produce per head of the population.
Ever since the major mechanical inventions by Watt, Arkwright, and their peers, the return on labor has likely increased as quickly as the population; and it might have surpassed it, if this very increase in returns hadn’t triggered an additional part of the natural ability to multiply in humans. Over the past twenty to thirty years, the rapid expansion of improved agricultural processes in England has led to greater yields from the land relative to the labor put in. The average price of grain dropped significantly, even before the repeal of the corn laws eased the pressure of population on production for a time. However, while improvements might keep pace with, or even exceed, the actual growth of population for a certain period, they definitely never match the rate at which population can grow. Nothing could have stopped a general decline in the human condition if population hadn’t actually been limited. If it had been limited even more, along with the same improvements, there would have been a larger share for the nation or the species as a whole. The new resources gained through these improvements wouldn’t have been entirely consumed just to support more people. Even though the total output might not have been as high, there would have been a greater output per person in the population.
§ 3. The Need to Control Population is Not Overruled by Free Trade in Food.
When the growth of numbers outstrips the progress of improvement, and a country is driven to obtain the means of subsistence on terms more and more unfavorable, by the inability of its land to meet additional demands except on more onerous conditions, there are two expedients, by which it may hope to mitigate that disagreeable necessity, even though no change should take place in the habits of the people with respect to their rate of increase. One of these expedients is the importation of food from abroad. The other is emigration.
When the population grows faster than improvements are made, and a country has to secure its means of living under increasingly unfavorable conditions because its land can't meet growing demands without tougher terms, there are two ways it might ease that unpleasant situation, even if people's habits about having more kids don't change. One option is to import food from other countries. The other is to encourage emigration.
The admission of cheaper food from a foreign country is equivalent to an agricultural invention by which food could be raised at a similarly diminished cost at home. It equally increases the productive power of labor. The return was [pg 150] before, so much food for so much labor employed in the growth of food: the return is now, a greater quantity of food for the same labor employed in producing cottons or hardware, or some other commodity to be given in exchange for food. The one improvement, like the other, throws back the decline of the productive power of labor by a certain distance: but in the one case, as in the other, it immediately resumes its course; the tide which has receded, instantly begins to readvance. It might seem, indeed, that, when a country draws its supply of food from so wide a surface as the whole habitable globe, so little impression can be produced on that great expanse by any increase of mouths in one small corner of it that the inhabitants of the country may double and treble their numbers without feeling the effect in any increased tension of the springs of production, or any enhancement of the price of food throughout the world. But in this calculation several things are overlooked.
The import of cheaper food from abroad is like an agricultural breakthrough that allows food to be produced at a lower cost at home. It also boosts the productivity of labor. Previously, the return was a fixed amount of food for a certain amount of labor involved in food production; now, the return is a greater quantity of food for the same amount of labor spent producing goods like cotton or hardware, or other items exchanged for food. Both improvements push back the decline in labor productivity for a while, but eventually, they both resume their trend; the tide that has receded quickly begins to advance again. It might seem that when a country sources its food from such a vast area like the entire habitable world, any growth in population in a small part won't significantly impact that great expanse. People in the country might double or triple their numbers without experiencing any strain on production or an increase in global food prices. However, this analysis overlooks several factors.
In the first place, the foreign regions from which corn can be imported do not comprise the whole globe, but those parts of it almost alone which are in the immediate neighborhood of coasts or navigable rivers; and of such there is not, in the productive regions of the earth, so great a multitude as to suffice during an indefinite time for a rapidly growing demand, without an increasing strain on the productive powers of the soil.
First of all, the foreign regions where corn can be imported don’t include the entire world, but mostly areas that are close to coastlines or navigable rivers. There aren’t that many of these productive regions on Earth that can meet an ever-increasing demand for a long time without putting more pressure on the soil’s ability to produce.
In the next place, even if the supply were drawn from the whole instead of a small part of the surface of the exporting countries, the quantity of food would still be limited, which could be obtained from them without an increase of the proportional cost. The countries which export food may be divided into two classes: those in which the effective desire of accumulation is strong, and those in which it is weak. In Australia and the United States of America, the effective desire of accumulation is strong; capital increases fast, and the production of food might be very rapidly extended. But in such countries population [pg 151] also increases with extraordinary rapidity. Their agriculture has to provide for their own expanding numbers, as well as for those of the importing countries. They must, therefore, from the nature of the case, be rapidly driven, if not to less fertile, at least what is equivalent, to remoter and less accessible lands, and to modes of cultivation like those of old countries, less productive in proportion to the labor and expense.
Next, even if the supply came from the entire surface of the exporting countries rather than just a small part, the amount of food we could get from them would still be limited without increasing the proportional cost. The countries that export food can be divided into two categories: those where the desire to accumulate wealth is strong, and those where it is weak. In Australia and the United States, the desire to accumulate wealth is strong; capital grows quickly, and food production could be expanded rapidly. However, in these countries, the population also increases at an extraordinary rate. Their agriculture must support not only their own growing numbers but also those of the importing countries. Therefore, they are inevitably forced to cultivate less fertile land or, at the very least, land that is farther away and harder to access, using farming methods similar to those in older countries, which are less productive in relation to the labor and costs involved.
But the countries which have at the same time cheap food and great industrial prosperity are few, being only those in which the arts of civilized life have been transferred full-grown to a rich and uncultivated soil. Among old countries, those which are able to export food, are able only because their industry is in a very backward state, because capital, and hence population, have never increased sufficiently to make food rise to a higher price. Such countries are Russia, Poland, and Hungary.
But the countries that have both affordable food and strong industrial growth are few. They are mainly those where the advantages of civilized life have been fully established in a rich but undeveloped area. Among older nations, those that can export food do so mainly because their industry is quite underdeveloped. This is because capital and, therefore, population have never grown enough to drive food prices up. Such countries include Russia, Poland, and Hungary.
The law, therefore, of diminishing return to industry, whenever population makes a more rapid progress than improvement, is not solely applicable to countries which are fed from their own soil, but in substance applies quite as much to those which are willing to draw their food from any accessible quarter that can afford it cheapest.
The law of diminishing returns in industry, when the population grows faster than improvements, doesn't just apply to countries that produce their own food. It also equally applies to those that choose to get their food from any available source that offers it at a lower cost.
§ 4. —Not by Emigration.
Besides the importation of corn, there is another resource which can be invoked by a nation whose increasing numbers press hard, not against their capital, but against the productive capacity of their land: I mean Emigration, especially in the form of Colonization. Of this remedy the efficacy as far as it goes is real, since it consists in seeking elsewhere those unoccupied tracts of fertile land which, if they existed at home, would enable the demand of an increasing [pg 152] population to be met without any falling off in the productiveness of labor. Accordingly, when the region to be colonized is near at hand, and the habits and tastes of the people sufficiently migratory, this remedy is completely effectual. The migration from the older parts of the American Confederation to the new Territories, which is to all intents and purposes colonization, is what enables population to go on unchecked throughout the Union without having yet diminished the return to industry, or increased the difficulty of earning a subsistence.
In addition to importing corn, there's another option that a nation facing a growing population can utilize: Emigration, specifically through Colonization. This solution is effective because it involves finding unoccupied, fertile land elsewhere. If such land were available at home, it could accommodate the demands of a rising population without reducing labor productivity. Thus, when the area to be colonized is nearby and the people's habits and desires are suitable for migration, this approach works very well. The movement from the older parts of the American Confederation to the new Territories, which essentially amounts to colonization, allows the population to continue growing throughout the Union without negatively impacting industrial returns or making it harder to earn a living.
There is no probability that even under the most enlightened arrangements (in older countries) a permanent stream of emigration could be kept up, sufficient to take off, as in America, all that portion of the annual increase (when proceeding at its greatest rapidity) which, being in excess of the progress made during the same short period in the arts of life, tends to render living more difficult for every averagely situated individual in the community. And, unless this can be done, emigration can not, even in an economical point of view, dispense with the necessity of checks to population.
There is no chance that even with the most advanced systems in older countries, a steady flow of emigration could be sustained, like in America, to absorb all the extra population growth (even at its fastest rate) that exceeds the improvements in living standards during the same short period, which generally makes life harder for an average person in the community. And, unless this is possible, emigration cannot, from an economic perspective, eliminate the need for population control measures.
The influence of immigration to the United States from European countries, in lessening the tension in the relation between food and numbers, is one of the most marked events in this century. The United States has received about one fourth of its total population in 1880 from abroad since the foundation of the republic, as will be seen by this table:
The impact of immigration to the United States from European countries, in reducing the tension between food supply and population growth, is one of the most significant events of this century. The United States has welcomed about one-fourth of its total population in 1880 from overseas since the founding of the republic, as shown in this table:
Total Immigration Into The United States.
Total Immigration Into The United States.
Periods. | Numbers. |
From 1789-1820 | 250,000143 |
1820-1830 | 151,824 |
1831-1840 | 599,125 |
1841-1850 | 1,713,251 |
1851-1860 | 2,598,214 |
1861-1870 | 2,491,451 |
1871-1880 | 2,812,191 |
1881-1883 | 2,061,745 |
Total | 12,677,801 |
Of this number, 5,333,991 came from the British Isles, of which 3,367,624 were Irish.
Of this total, 5,333,991 came from the British Isles, including 3,367,624 who were Irish.
There came 3,860,624 Germans, 593,021 Scandinavians, and 334,064 French. (See United States “Statistical Abstract,” 1878, 1880, 1883.)
There were 3,860,624 Germans, 593,021 Scandinavians, and 334,064 French people. (See United States "Statistical Overview," 1878, 1880, 1883.)
The causes operating on this movement of men—a movement unequaled in history—are undoubtedly economic. Like the migration of the early Teutonic races from the Baltic to Southern Europe, it is due to the pressure of numbers on subsistence.
The factors driving this movement of people—a movement unmatched in history—are definitely economic. Similar to the migration of the early Teutonic races from the Baltic to Southern Europe, it results from the pressure of population on resources.
A still more interesting study is that of the causes which attempt to explain the direction of this stream after it has reached our shores. It is a definite fact that the old slave States have hitherto received practically none of this vast foreign immigration.144 The actual distribution of the foreign born in the United States is to be seen in a most interesting way by aid of the colored map, Chart No. VIII, giving the different densities of foreign-born population in different parts of the Union. It seems almost certain that the general belief hitherto in the insecurity of life and property in the old slave States has worked against the material prosperity of that section.
A more intriguing study is the reasons that try to explain the movement of this stream once it reaches our shores. It's a clear fact that the former slave states have so far received almost none of this huge foreign immigration. The actual distribution of foreign-born residents in the United States can be seen in a fascinating way through the colored map, Chart No. VIII, which shows the varying densities of foreign-born populations across different parts of the country. It appears almost certain that the widespread belief in the instability of life and property in the former slave states has hindered the economic growth of that region.
The different ages of the native- and foreign-born inhabitants of the United States may be seen from the accompanying diagrams145 comparing the aggregate population of the United States with the foreign-born. This may profitably be compared with a similar diagram relating to the Chinese in the United States (Book II, Chap. III, § 3).
The various ages of native and foreign-born residents of the United States can be observed in the accompanying diagrams145 that compare the total population of the United States with that of foreign-born individuals. This can be effectively compared to a similar diagram concerning the Chinese population in the United States (Book II, Chap. III, § 3).
Aggregate: 1870. The figures give the number of thousands of each sex.
Aggregate: 1870. The numbers represent the thousands of each gender.
Decade of Life. | Males. | Females. |
1 | 136 | 132 |
2 | 115 | 114 |
3 | 87 | 90 |
4 | 62 | 63 |
5 | 47 | 44 |
6 | 31 | 27 |
7 | 17 | 15 |
8 | 7 | 7 |
9 | 2 | 2 |
Foreign: 1870.
Foreign: 1870.
Decade of Life. | Males. | Females. |
1 | 24 | 23 |
2 | 48 | 49 |
3 | 128 | 114 |
4 | 134 | 113 |
5 | 107 | 84 |
6 | 60 | 44 |
7 | 27 | 23 |
8 | 9 | 9 |
9 | 2 | 2 |
Book II. Distribution.
Chapter 1. About Property.
§ 1. Individual Property and its opponents.
The laws and conditions of the Production of Wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them. It is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They can place them at the disposal of whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms. The Distribution of Wealth depends on the laws and customs of society. The rules by which it is determined are what the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community make them, and are very different in different ages and countries; and might be still more different, if mankind so chose. We have here to consider, not the causes, but the consequences, of the rules according to which wealth may be distributed. Those, at least, are as little arbitrary, and have as much the character of physical laws, as the laws of production.
The laws and conditions of Wealth Production are like physical truths. There’s nothing optional or arbitrary about them. The same isn’t true for Wealth Distribution. That is entirely a matter of human choice. Once wealth exists, people, either individually or collectively, can do whatever they want with it. They can decide who gets it and under what terms. Wealth Distribution relies on the laws and customs of society. The criteria for how it’s determined are shaped by the opinions and feelings of the dominant part of the community, and they vary widely across different times and places; they could be even more varied if humanity chose to change them. Here, we need to focus on the consequences of the rules that dictate how wealth may be distributed, which are just as fixed and physical in nature as the laws of production.
We proceed, then, to the consideration of the different modes of distributing the produce of land and labor, which have been adopted in practice, or may be conceived in theory. Among these, our attention is first claimed by that primary and fundamental institution, on which, unless in [pg 156] some exceptional and very limited cases, the economical arrangements of society have always rested, though in its secondary features it has varied, and is liable to vary. I mean, of course, the institution of individual property.
We will now look at the different ways of distributing the products of land and labor that have been used in practice or can be imagined in theory. First, we need to focus on the primary and essential institution that, except for some rare and very specific cases, has always been the foundation of society's economic arrangements, even though it can vary in its detailed aspects. I am, of course, referring to the institution of individual property.
Private property, as an institution, did not owe its origin to any of those considerations of utility which plead for the maintenance of it when established. Enough is known of rude ages, both from history and from analogous states of society in our own time, to show that tribunals (which always precede laws) were originally established, not to determine rights, but to repress violence and terminate quarrels. With this object chiefly in view, they naturally enough gave legal effect to first occupancy, by treating as the aggressor the person who first commenced violence, by turning, or attempting to turn, another out of possession.
Private property, as an institution, didn't originate from the practical reasons that support its existence today. We know from history and similar social conditions in our current times that courts (which always come before laws) were initially created not to define rights but to prevent violence and settle disputes. With this main goal in mind, they naturally recognized the rights of the first occupant, seeing as the aggressor the person who was the first to commit violence by trying to remove someone from their possession.
In considering the institution of property as a question in social philosophy, we must leave out of consideration its actual origin in any of the existing nations of Europe. We may suppose a community unhampered by any previous possession; a body of colonists, occupying for the first time an uninhabited country. (1.) If private property were adopted, we must presume that it would be accompanied by none of the initial inequalities and injustice which obstruct the beneficial operation of the principle in old society. Every full-grown man or woman, we must suppose, would be secured in the unfettered use and disposal of his or her bodily and mental faculties; and the instruments of production, the land and tools, would be divided fairly among them, so that all might start, in respect to outward appliances, on equal terms. It is possible also to conceive that, in this original apportionment, compensation might be made for the injuries of nature, and the balance redressed by assigning to the less robust members of the community advantages in the distribution, sufficient to put them on a par with the rest. But the division, once made, would not again be interfered with; individuals would be left to their own exertions and to the [pg 157] ordinary chances for making an advantageous use of what was assigned to them. (2.) If individual property, on the contrary, were excluded, the plan which must be adopted would be to hold the land and all instruments of production as the joint property of the community, and to carry on the operations of industry on the common account. The direction of the labor of the community would devolve upon a magistrate or magistrates, whom we may suppose elected by the suffrages of the community, and whom we must assume to be voluntarily obeyed by them. The division of the produce would in like manner be a public act. The principle might either be that of complete equality, or of apportionment to the necessities or deserts of individuals, in whatever manner might be conformable to the ideas of justice or policy prevailing in the community.
When thinking about property as a topic in social philosophy, we should ignore its actual origins in current European nations. Let's imagine a community free from any prior ownership—like a group of settlers arriving in an uninhabited land for the first time. (1.) If they decided to adopt private property, we would assume it wouldn’t come with the initial inequalities and injustices that hinder its positive impact in older societies. Every adult man or woman would be guaranteed the unrestricted use and control of their physical and mental abilities, and the resources for production, including land and tools, would be fairly distributed among them, allowing everyone to start on equal footing regarding external resources. It’s also conceivable that, during this initial allocation, adjustments could be made for natural disadvantages, giving those less able sufficient advantages in distribution to level the playing field. However, once the division was made, it wouldn’t be altered again; individuals would rely on their own efforts and the usual opportunities to use what was given to them effectively. (2.) On the other hand, if individual property were not allowed, the alternative would involve treating land and all means of production as shared property of the community, operating industries collectively. The management of the community’s labor would fall to a magistrate or magistrates, elected by the community and assumed to be willingly followed. The distribution of the goods produced would also be a public decision. The guiding principle could be total equality or distributed based on individual needs or merits, whatever aligns with the community's notions of justice or policy.
The assailants of the principle of individual property may be divided into two classes: (1) those whose scheme implies absolute equality in the distribution of the physical means of life and enjoyment, and (2) those who admit inequality, but grounded on some principle, or supposed principle, of justice or general expediency, and not, like so many of the existing social inequalities, dependent on accident alone. The characteristic name for this [first] economical system is Communism, a word of Continental origin, only of late introduced into this country. The word Socialism, which originated among the English Communists, and was assumed by them as a name to designate their own doctrine, is now, on the Continent, employed in a larger sense; not necessarily implying Communism, or the entire abolition of private property, but applied to any system which requires that the land and the instruments of production should be the property, not of individuals, but of communities, or associations, or of the government.
The critics of individual property can be categorized into two groups: (1) those whose plan suggests complete equality in the distribution of the resources needed for life and enjoyment, and (2) those who acknowledge inequality but base it on some principle, or presumed principle, of fairness or general benefit, rather than, like many existing social inequalities, relying on chance alone. The defining term for this [first] economic system is Communism, a word that has its roots in Europe and has only recently been introduced in this country. The term Socialism, which originated with English Communists and was adopted by them to label their own beliefs, is now used in a broader context in Europe; it doesn't necessarily imply Communism or the total abolition of private property, but refers to any system where land and means of production are owned not by individuals but by communities, groups, or the government.
§ 2. The argument for Communism against private property is presented.
The objection ordinarily made to a system of community of property and equal distribution of the produce, that each person would be incessantly occupied in evading his fair share of the work, points, undoubtedly, to a real difficulty. But those who urge this objection forget to how great an extent the same difficulty exists under the system on which nine tenths of the business of society is now conducted. And though the “master's eye,” when the master is vigilant and intelligent, is of proverbial value, it must be remembered that, in a Socialist farm or manufactory, each laborer would be under the eye, not of one master, but of the whole community. If Communistic labor might be less vigorous than that of a peasant proprietor, or a workman laboring on his own account, it would probably be more energetic than that of a laborer for hire, who has no personal interest in the matter at all.
The common objection to a system of shared property and equal distribution of resources is that everyone would constantly try to avoid doing their fair share of the work. This points to a genuine issue. However, those who raise this objection overlook how significantly that same issue exists under the current system that runs nine-tenths of society's business. While having a "master's eye" is said to be invaluable when the master is attentive and knowledgeable, it's important to note that in a Socialist farm or factory, every worker would be watched not by a single master, but by the entire community. Even if Communistic labor might be less vigorous than that of a peasant owner or a worker who is self-employed, it would likely be more energetic than that of a hired laborer who has no personal stake in the work at all.
Another of the objections to Communism is that if every member of the community were assured of subsistence for himself and any number of children, on the sole condition of willingness to work, prudential restraint on the multiplication of mankind would be at an end, and population would start forward at a rate which would reduce the community through successive stages of increasing discomfort to actual starvation. But Communism is precisely the state of things in which opinion might be expected to declare itself with greatest intensity against this kind of selfish intemperance. An augmentation of numbers which diminished the comfort or increased the toil of the mass would then cause (which now it does not) immediate and unmistakable inconvenience to every individual in the association; inconvenience which could not then be imputed to the avarice of employers, or the unjust privileges of the rich.
Another objection to Communism is that if every member of the community was guaranteed a basic living for themselves and any number of children, as long as they were willing to work, people would stop being cautious about having more kids, leading to a population boom. This could result in the community suffering through various levels of discomfort, eventually reaching starvation. However, Communism is exactly the kind of system where people would likely speak out most strongly against this kind of selfish behavior. An increase in population that made life harder or added more work for everyone would then create obvious and immediate issues for every individual in the community; issues that couldn’t be blamed on greedy employers or the unfair advantages of the wealthy.
A more real difficulty is that of fairly apportioning the labor of the community among its members. There are many kinds of work, and by what standard are they to be measured one against another? Who is to judge how much cotton-spinning, or distributing goods from the stores, or brick-laying, or chimney-sweeping, is equivalent to so much plowing? Besides, even in the same kind of work, nominal equality of labor would be so great a real inequality that the feeling of justice would revolt against its being enforced. All persons are not equally fit for all labor; and the same quantity of labor is an unequal burden on the weak and the strong, the hardy and the delicate, the quick and the slow, the dull and the intelligent.146
A more significant challenge is fairly dividing the community's work among its members. There are many types of jobs, and by what standard can they be compared to one another? Who decides how much cotton-spinning, delivering goods from stores, laying bricks, or cleaning chimneys is equal to a certain amount of plowing? Moreover, even within the same type of work, a nominal equality of labor would be such a substantial real inequality that the sense of fairness would rebel against enforcing it. Not everyone is equally suited for every job; the same amount of work is an unequal burden on the weak and the strong, the tough and the delicate, the fast and the slow, the dull and the smart. 146
If, therefore, the choice were to be made between Communism with all its chances and the present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices, all the difficulties, great or small, of Communism, would be but as dust in the balance. But, to make the comparison applicable, we must compare Communism at its best with the régime of individual property, not as it is, but as it might be made. The laws of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the justification of private property rests. They have made property of things which never ought to be property, and absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist. Private property, in every defense made of it, is supposed to mean the guarantee to individuals of the fruits of their own labor and abstinence. The guarantee to them of the fruits of the labor and abstinence of others, transmitted to them without any merit or exertion of their own, is not of the essence of the institution, but a mere incidental consequence, which, when it reaches a certain height, does not promote, but conflicts with the ends which render private property legitimate. To judge of the final destination of the institution of property, we must suppose everything [pg 160] rectified which causes the institution to work in a manner opposed to that equitable principle, of proportion between remuneration and exertion, on which, in every vindication of it that will bear the light, it is assumed to be grounded. We must also suppose two conditions realized, without which neither Communism nor any other laws or institutions could make the condition of the mass of mankind other than degraded and miserable. One of these conditions is, universal education; the other, a due limitation of the numbers of the community. With these, there could be no poverty, even under the present social institutions: and, these being supposed, the question of socialism is not, as generally stated by Socialists, a question of flying to the sole refuge against the evils which now bear down humanity, but a mere question of comparative advantages, which futurity must determine. We are too ignorant either of what individual agency in its best form, or socialism in its best form, can accomplish, to be qualified to decide which of the two will be the ultimate form of human society.
If we had to choose between Communism, with all its possibilities, and our current society, with all its suffering and injustices, all the challenges of Communism would be minor in comparison. However, to make a fair comparison, we need to look at Communism at its best against the system of private property not as it currently exists, but as it could be. The laws surrounding property have never fully aligned with the principles that justify private ownership. They have allowed ownership of things that should never belong to anyone and have created absolute ownership where only shared ownership should exist. Private property, as defended, is meant to guarantee individuals the rewards of their own work and sacrifices. However, receiving the rewards from the effort of others, without any effort or merit of their own, is not essential to this system but merely a byproduct that, when it becomes excessive, actually contradicts the goals that justify private property. To truly assess the future of property, we must correct everything that causes it to operate contrary to the fair principle of balance between reward and effort, which is assumed to be the basis of any valid defense of it. We also need to assume two conditions are met; without these, neither Communism nor any other laws or institutions can raise the general condition of humanity above degradation and misery. One of these conditions is universal education, and the other is a sensible limitation on population growth. With these in place, poverty would not exist, even within the current social systems. Therefore, given these assumptions, the question of socialism is not about fleeing to the only solution for the current troubles facing humanity, as Socialists often suggest, but rather about comparing the advantages of different systems, which the future will determine. We are too uninformed about what the best forms of individual achievement or socialism can truly accomplish to decide which will ultimately shape human society.
If a conjecture may be hazarded, the decision will probably depend mainly on one consideration, viz., which of the two systems is consistent with the greatest amount of human liberty and spontaneity. It is yet to be ascertained whether the communistic scheme would be consistent with that multiform development of human nature, those manifold unlikenesses, that diversity of tastes and talents, and variety of intellectual points of view, which not only form a great part of the interest of human life, but, by bringing intellects into stimulating collision and by presenting to each innumerable notions that he would not have conceived of himself, are the mainspring of mental and moral progression.
If we can make a guess, the decision will likely come down to one main consideration: which of the two systems allows for the most human freedom and spontaneity. It still needs to be determined whether the communist model would support the diverse development of human nature, with its many differences, varied tastes and talents, and a range of intellectual perspectives. These aspects not only make human life more interesting but also drive mental and moral progress by encouraging stimulating interactions between ideas, presenting individuals with countless concepts they wouldn’t have thought of on their own.
§ 3. The Socialists who seek assistance from the state.
For general purposes, a clearer understanding of the various schemes may be gained by observing that (1) one class of socialists intend to include the state itself within their plan, and (2) another class aim to form separate communities inside the state, and under its protection.
For general purposes, a clearer understanding of the different schemes can be gained by noting that (1) one group of socialists intends to include the state in their vision, and (2) another group seeks to establish independent communities within the state, under its protection.
Of this first system there are no present examples; but the object of most of the socialistic organizations in the United [pg 161] States and Europe is to strive for the assumption by the state of the production and distribution of wealth.147 At present the most active Socialists are to be found in Germany. The origin of this influence, however, is to be traced to France.148 Louis Blanc,149 in his “Organisation du Travail,” considers property the great scourge of society. The Government, he asserts, should regulate production; raise money to be appropriated without interest for creating state workshops, in which the workmen should elect their own overseers, and all receive the same wages; and the sums needed should be raised from the abolition of collateral inheritance. The important practical part of his scheme was that the great state workshops, aided by the Government, would make private competition in those industries impossible, and thus bring about the change from the private to the socialistic system.
There are no current examples of this first system; however, most socialist organizations in the United States and Europe aim for the government to control the production and distribution of wealth.[pg 161]Currently, the most active Socialists are in Germany. However, the origin of this influence can be traced back to France.148Louis Blanc149in his“Work Organization”He sees property as the biggest curse of society. He argues that the government should regulate production, raise interest-free funds to create government-run workshops where workers can select their own supervisors, and ensure everyone receives equal pay. The required funds would be generated by getting rid of inheritance rights. A key practical element of his plan is that the large government-funded workshops would make private competition in those areas unfeasible, resulting in a transition from a private to a socialist system.
The founder of modern German socialism was Karl Marx,150 and almost the only Socialist who pretended to economic knowledge. He aimed his attack on the present social system against the question of value, by asserting that the amount of labor necessary for the production of an article is the sole measure of its exchange value. It follows from this that the [pg 162] right of property in the article vests wholly in the laborer, while the capitalist, if he claims a share of the product, is nothing less than a robber. No just system, he avers, can properly exist so long as the rate of wages is fixed by free contract between the employer and laborer; therefore the only remedy is the nationalization of all the elements of production, land, tools, materials, and all existing appliances, which involves, of course, the destruction of the institution of private property. An obvious weakness in this scheme is the provision that the Government should determine what goods are to be produced, and that every one is bound to perform that work which is assigned by the state. In this there is no choice of work, and the tyranny of one master would be supplanted by the tyranny of a greater multiplex master in the officers of Government. Moreover, it can not be admitted that exchange value is determined by the quantity of labor alone. Every one knows that the result of ten days' labor of a skilled watch-maker does not exchange for the result of ten days' labor of an unskilled hodman. Of two men making shoes, one may produce a good the other a poor article, although both may work the same length of time; so that their exchange value ought not to be determined by the mere quantity of labor expended. Above all, Marx would extend the equality of wages for the same time to the manager and superintendent also. In other words, he proposes to take away all the incentives to the acquirement or exercise of superior and signal ability in every work of life, the result of which would inevitably lead to a deadening extension of mediocrity.
The founder of modern German socialism was Karl Marx,150He was nearly the only socialist who claimed to have expertise in economics. He challenged the current social system by focusing on the concept of value, arguing that the amount of labor required to produce an item is the only measure of its exchange value. This means that the laborer has full ownership of the product, and if the capitalist claims any part of it, they are essentially stealing. He argues that no fair system can exist as long as wages are set through free agreements between employers and workers; thus, the only solution is to nationalize all means of production, including land, tools, materials, and all existing equipment, which would naturally lead to the abolition of private property. A significant flaw in this plan is the requirement that the government must decide what goods are produced and that everyone must do the work assigned by the state. This eliminates choice in employment, and the oppression of one ruler would simply be replaced by the oppression of a larger collective ruler in government officials. Moreover, it’s unacceptable to claim that exchange value is determined solely by the amount of labor. It's well-known that the work of a skilled watchmaker over ten days cannot be equated to the output of an unskilled laborer over the same period. Among two shoemakers, one may produce a high-quality shoe while the other makes a poor one, even if they both work the same number of hours; therefore, their exchange value should not be based solely on the quantity of labor. Most importantly, Marx would also equalize wages between managers and supervisors. In other words, he proposes eliminating all incentives to develop or use superior skills in any job, which would inevitably lead to a widespread decline into mediocrity.
This system gained an undue attention because it was made the instrument of a socialist propaganda under the leadership of Ferdinand Lassalle.151 This active leader, in 1863, founded the German “Workingmen's Union,” a year earlier than the “International152 Association.” In 1869 Liebknecht and his friends established the “Social Democratic Workingmen's Party,” which after some difficulties absorbed the followers of Lassalle in a congress at Gotha in 1875, and form the [pg 163] present Socialist party in Germany. Their programme,153 as announced at Gotha, is as follows:
This system gained a lot of attention because it was used as a tool for socialist propaganda directed by Ferdinand Lassalle.151This proactive leader established the German __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“Workers' Union,”In 1863, one year before the“Global152 Association.”In 1869, Liebknecht and his team established the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“Social Democratic Workers' Party,”which, after facing some challenges, gathered the followers of Lassalle at a congress in Gotha in 1875, creating the[pg 163]current Socialist party in Germany. Their program, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,153as presented at Gotha, is as follows:
I. Labor is the source of all riches and of all culture. As general profitable labor can only be done by the human society, the whole product of labor belongs to society—i.e., to all its members—who have the same duties and the same right to work, each according to his reasonable wants.
I. Work is the basis of all wealth and culture. Because productive work can only be done by society as a whole, the total output of labor belongs to society—meaning all its members—who share the same responsibilities and the same right to work, each according to their reasonable needs.
In the present society the means of work are the monopoly of the class of capitalists. The class of workingmen thus become dependent on them, and consequently are given over to all degrees of misery and servitude.
In today's society, the tools for work are owned by the capitalist class. As a result, the working class becomes reliant on them and, as a consequence, experiences different levels of struggle and servitude.
In order to emancipate labor it is requisite that the means of work be transformed into the common property of society, that all production be regulated by associations, and that the entire product of labor be turned over to society and justly distributed for the benefit of all.
To liberate labor, we must make the tools and resources of work shared assets for everyone, ensure that production is organized by groups, and fairly redistribute the total output of labor to society for the benefit of all.
None but the working-class itself can emancipate labor, as in relation to it all other classes are only a reactionary mass.
Only the working class can liberate labor, as all other classes are merely a reactionary group by comparison.
II. Led by these principles, the German Social Workingmen's party, by all legal means, strives for a free state and society, the breaking down of the iron laws of wages by abolishing the system of hired workingmen, by abolishing exploitation in every shape, and doing away with all social and political inequality.
II. Following these principles, the German Social Workingmen's party aims to establish a free state and society through legal means. They want to break down the strict wage system by getting rid of the concept of hired workers, abolishing exploitation in all its forms, and addressing all social and political inequalities.
The German Social Workingmen's party, although first working within its national confines, is fully conscious of the international character of the general workingmen's movement, and is resolved to fulfill all duties which it imposes on each workingman in order to realize the fraternity of all men.
The German Social Workingmen's party, initially centered on national interests, understands the global scope of the workers' movement and is dedicated to meeting all the responsibilities it assigns to every worker to achieve universal brotherhood.
The German Social Workingmen's party, for the purpose of preparing the way, and for the solution of the social problem, demands the creation of social productive associations, to be supported by the state government, and under the control of the working-people. The productive associations are to be founded in such numbers that the social organization of the whole production can be effected by them.
The German Social Workingmen's Party seeks to lead the way in addressing social issues by promoting the formation of socially productive associations. These should have government support and be run by the workers themselves. There should be enough productive associations created to ensure that the entire production process can be organized socially through them.
The German Social Workingmen's party requires as the basis of state government:
The German Social Workingmen's Party demands the following as the basis for government:
1. Universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, which, beginning with the twentieth year, obliges all citizens to vote in all State, county, and town elections. Election-day must be a Sunday or a holiday.
1. Universal, equal, direct, and private voting, starting at age twenty, requires all citizens to take part in all state, county, and local elections. Election day must be on a Sunday or a holiday.
2. Direct legislation by the people; decision as to war and peace by the people.
2. Laws created directly by the people; decisions about war and peace made by the people.
3. General capability of bearing arms; popular defense in place of standing armies.
3. General ability to carry weapons; community defense instead of having a permanent military.
4. Abolition of all exceptional laws, especially those relating to the press, public meetings, and associations—in short, of all laws which hinder the free expression of ideas and thought.
4. Eliminate all exceptional laws, especially those related to the press, public gatherings, and organizations—in other words, all laws that hinder free expression of ideas and thoughts.
5. Gratuitous administration of justice by the people.
5. Community-provided unpaid administration of justice.
6. General and equal, popular and gratuitous education by the Government in all classes and institutes of learning; general duty to attend school; religion to be declared a private affair.
6. The government provides universal and equal education in all types of schools and educational institutions; everyone has a general responsibility to attend school; religion is seen as a private matter.
The German Social Workingmen's party insists on realizing in the present state of society:
The German Social Workers' Party is dedicated to accomplishing this in today's society:
1. The largest possible extension of political rights and freedom in conformity to the above six demands.
1. The widest possible expansion of political rights and freedoms based on the six demands stated above.
2. A single progressive income-tax for State, counties, and towns, instead of those which are imposed at present, and in place of indirect taxes, which unequally burden the people.
2. A unified progressive income tax for the state, counties, and towns, replacing the current systems and eliminating indirect taxes that unfairly burden citizens.
3. Unlimited right of combination.
Unlimited right to combine.
4. A normal working-day corresponding with the wants of society; prohibition of Sunday labor.
4. A standard workday that fulfills the needs of society; no work permitted on Sundays.
5. Prohibition of children's work and of women's work, so far as it injures their health and morality.
5. Prohibition of child labor and women's work if it harms their health and morals.
6. Protective laws for the life and health of workingmen; sanitary control of their dwellings; superintendence of mines, factories, industry, and home work by officers chosen by the workingmen; an effectual law guaranteeing the responsibility of employers.
6. Laws to safeguard the lives and health of workers; health regulations for their homes; monitoring of mines, factories, industries, and home-based work by officials chosen by the workers; a robust law ensuring employer responsibility.
7. Regulation of prison-work.
7. Prison work regulations.
8. Unrestricted self-government of all banks established for the mutual assistance of workingmen.
8. Full self-governance for all banks established to support working individuals.
The above scheme also represents very well the character of the Socialist agitators in the United States, who are themselves chiefly foreigners, and have foreign conceptions of socialism. On this form of socialism it is interesting to have Mr. Mill's later opinions154 in his own words.
The scheme above effectively captures the nature of the Socialist activists in the United States, who are mostly foreigners with outside views on socialism. Regarding this type of socialism, it's worth reflecting on Mr. Mill's later opinions.154in his own words.
“Among those who call themselves Socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, (1) those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such [pg 165] self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic Socialists generally. The other class (2) who are more a product of the Continent than of Great Britain, and may be called the revolutionary Socialists, propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general Government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working-classes, or somebody in their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit. The aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realized under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification, must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand, and a recklessness of people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to.”
Among those who consider themselves Socialists, we can identify two types of people. First, (1) there are those whose visions for a new social order, replacing private property and individual competition with different motivations, are focused on community levels, like a village or town, and would be implemented nationwide by replicating these self-sufficient units. This group includes systems proposed by Owen, Fourier, and generally more thoughtful and philosophical Socialists. The second group (2), which is more influenced by Continent ideas than those from Great Britain, can be referred to as revolutionary Socialists. They advocate for a much more ambitious plan: managing all of the country’s productive resources through a central authority, specifically the general Government. To achieve this, some openly argue that the working classes, or representatives acting on their behalf, should take control of all the country’s property and manage it for everyone’s benefit. The aim here is to completely replace the old system with the new in one go, sacrificing the benefits gained under the current system, along with its considerable potential for improvement, for an unprepared leap into the most extreme form of reshaping all aspects of social life without the driving force that has consistently powered social operations. It must be acknowledged that those willing to take this risk based solely on their personal beliefs, which have yet to be validated by any practical testing, must possess a calm confidence in their own judgment along with a disregard for the suffering of others that even Robespierre and St. Just, who are typically seen as the epitome of these traits, could hardly match.
§ 4. Of various minor plans, Communistic and Socialistic.
[Of the schemes to be tried within a state], the two elaborate forms of non-communistic Socialism known as Saint-Simonism and Fourierism are totally free from the objections usually urged against Communism. The Saint-Simonian155 scheme does not contemplate an equal, but an [pg 166] unequal division of the produce; it does not propose that all should be occupied alike, but differently, according to their vocation or capacity; the function of each being assigned, like grades in a regiment, by the choice of the directing authority, and the remuneration being by salary, proportioned to the importance, in the eyes of that authority, of the function itself, and the merits of the person who fulfills it. But to suppose that one or a few human beings, howsoever selected, could, by whatever machinery of subordinate agency, be qualified to adapt each person's work to his capacity, and proportion each person's remuneration to his merits, is a supposition almost too chimerical to be reasoned against.156
[Of the schemes to be tried within a state], the two detailed forms of non-communistic Socialism known as Saint-Simonism and Fourierism are completely free from the usual criticisms against Communism. The Saint-Simonian scheme does not aim for an equal, but rather an unequal distribution of resources; it doesn't suggest that everyone should work the same, but instead, differently, based on their vocation or abilities. Each person's role is assigned, like ranks in a military unit, by the decisions of the governing authority, with pay being determined by the significance, in the view of that authority, of the role itself and the individual's qualifications for it. However, to believe that one or a few individuals, no matter how they are chosen, could somehow be equipped to match each person's work to their abilities and adjust each person's pay according to their qualifications is a notion that is almost too unrealistic to argue against.
The most skillfully combined, and with the greatest foresight of objections, of all the forms of Socialism is that commonly known as Fourierism.157 This system does not contemplate the abolition of private property, nor even of inheritance: on the contrary, it avowedly takes into consideration, as an element in the distribution of the produce, capital as well as labor. It proposes that the operations of industry should be carried on by associations of about two thousand members, combining their labor on a district of about a square league in extent, under the guidance of chiefs selected by themselves (the “phalanstery”). In the distribution a certain minimum is first assigned for the subsistence of every member of the community, whether capable or not of labor. The remainder of the produce is shared in certain proportions, to be determined beforehand, among the three elements, Labor, Capital, and Talent. [pg 167] The capital of the community may be owned in unequal shares by different members, who would in that case receive, as in any other joint-stock company, proportional dividends. The claim of each person on the share of the produce apportioned to talent is estimated by the grade or rank which the individual occupies in the several groups of laborers to which he or she belongs, these grades being in all cases conferred by the choice of his or her companions. The remuneration, when received, would not of necessity be expended or enjoyed in common; there would be separate ménages for all who preferred them, and no other community of living is contemplated than that all the members of the association should reside in the same pile of buildings; for saving of labor and expense, not only in building, but in every branch of domestic economy; and in order that, the whole buying and selling operations of the community being performed by a single agent, the enormous portion of the produce of industry now carried off by the profits of mere distributors might be reduced to the smallest amount possible.
The most skillfully combined and well-thought-out version of Socialism is what we commonly call Fourierism. This system doesn’t propose the elimination of private property or inheritance; instead, it acknowledges both capital and labor as important factors in producing and distributing goods. It suggests that industry should be run by groups of about two thousand members, who combine their efforts within a region of about a square league, led by leaders they choose themselves (the “phalanstery”). At first, a basic minimum is set aside to ensure every community member can meet their needs, regardless of their ability to work. The rest of the produce is divided among three categories: Labor, Capital, and Talent, based on specific ratios determined in advance. The community's capital can be owned in unequal shares by different members, who would then receive dividends similar to a joint-stock company. Each person’s claim on the portion of the produce related to talent is based on their rank within the various labor groups they are part of, with these ranks assigned by their peers. When it comes to payment, it doesn’t have to be spent or enjoyed collectively; there can be separate living arrangements for those who prefer them. The only communal living expected is that all members reside in the same set of buildings. This arrangement is meant to save on labor and costs, not just in construction but in all areas of household management. Additionally, since all buying and selling for the community would be handled by a single agent, the large portion of industrial output currently lost to the profits of distributors could be minimized.
Fourierism was tried in West Virginia by American disciples, and it was advocated by Horace Greeley. A modified form appeared in the famous community at Brook Farm (near Dedham, Massachusetts), which drew there George Ripley, Margaret Fuller, and even George William Curtis and Nathaniel Hawthorne.
Fourierism was tried out in West Virginia by American supporters and was promoted by Horace Greeley. A modified version appeared in the well-known community at Brook Farm (near Dedham, Massachusetts), which drew in George Ripley, Margaret Fuller, George William Curtis, and Nathaniel Hawthorne.
There have been many smaller communities established in the United States, but it can not be said that they have been successful from the point of view either of numbers or material prosperity. The followers of Rapp, or the Harmonists, in Pennsylvania and Indiana; the Owenites,158 in Indiana; the community of Zoar, in Ohio; the Inspirationists, in New York [pg 168] and Iowa; the Perfectionists, at Oneida and Wallingford—are all evidently suffering from the difficulties due to the absence of family life, from the increasing spirit of personal independence which carries away the younger members of the organizations,159 and the want of that executive ability which distinguishes the successful manager in private enterprises.
Numerous smaller communities have been formed in the United States, but it's fair to say they haven't been successful in terms of population or wealth. The followers of Rapp, known as the Harmonists, in Pennsylvania and Indiana; the Owenites,158in Indiana; the community of Zoar in Ohio; the Inspirationists in New York[pg 168]and Iowa; the Perfectionists, at Oneida and Wallingford—are all clearly facing challenges due to the absence of family life and the increasing desire for personal independence that draws younger members away from the groups,159and the absence of the management skills that are crucial for success in private enterprises.
§ 5. An analysis of the Socialist criticisms of the current social order.
“The attacks160 on the present social order are vigorous and earnest, but open to the charge of exaggeration.
The criticisms of the current social system are valid and heartfelt, but they can be called out for being overstated.
“In the first place, it is unhappily true that the wages of ordinary labor, in all the countries of Europe, are wretchedly insufficient to supply the physical and moral necessities of the population in any tolerable measure. But when it is further alleged that even this insufficient remuneration has a tendency to diminish; that there is, in the words of M. Louis Blanc, une baisse continue des salaires; the assertion is in opposition to all accurate information, and to many notorious facts. It has yet to be proved that there is any country in the civilized world where the ordinary wages of labor, estimated either in money or in articles of consumption, are declining; while in many they are, on the whole, on the increase; and an increase which is becoming, not slower, but more rapid. There are, occasionally, branches of industry which are being gradually superseded by something else, and in those, until production accommodates itself to demand, wages are depressed.
First of all, it’s unfortunately true that the wages of regular workers in all European countries are terribly inadequate to meet the physical and moral needs of the population in any decent way. However, when it is further claimed that even these insufficient wages are declining; that there is, in the words of M. Louis Blanc, une baisse continue des salaires; this claim contradicts all reliable information and many well-known facts. It still needs to be proven that there is any country in the civilized world where the typical wages of labor, measured either in money or in goods, are falling; while in many places, they are generally increasing; and this increase is not slowing down but speeding up. There are occasionally sectors of industry that are being gradually replaced by others, and during that time, until production adjusts to demand, wages are lowered.
“M. Louis Blanc appears to have fallen into the same error which was at first committed by Malthus and his followers, that of supposing because population has a greater power of [pg 169] increase than subsistence, its pressure upon subsistence must be always growing more severe. It is a great point gained for truth when it comes to be seen that the tendency to over-population is a fact which Communism, as well as the existing order of society, would have to deal with. However this may be, experience shows that in the existing state of society the pressure of population on subsistence, which is the principal cause of low wages, though a great, is not an increasing evil; on the contrary, the progress of all that is called civilization has a tendency to diminish it, partly by the more rapid increase of the means of employing and maintaining labor, partly by the increased facilities opened to labor for transporting itself to new countries and unoccupied fields of employment, and partly by a general improvement in the intelligence and prudence of the population. It is, of course, open to discussion what form of society has the greatest power of dealing successfully with the pressure of population on subsistence, and on this question there is much to be said for Socialism; but it has no just claim to be considered as the sole means of preventing the general and growing degradation of the mass of mankind through the peculiar tendency of poverty to produce over-population.
M. Louis Blanc appears to have made the same mistake that Malthus and his followers initially made, which is believing that since population can grow faster than the means of survival, its effect on resources must always become worse. It’s a significant advancement for truth when we acknowledge that the risk of overpopulation is an issue that both Communism and our current social structure need to tackle. Nonetheless, experience demonstrates that in today’s society, the impact of population on resources—which is the main reason for low wages—is considerable but not increasing; in fact, advancements in what we refer to as civilization tend to alleviate this pressure. This happens partly because of the faster development of ways to create and support jobs, partly due to better opportunities for workers to move to new countries and unfilled job markets, and partly because of an overall increase in the intelligence and prudence of the population. Naturally, there’s room for discussion about which type of society is best at handling the pressure of population on resources, and there is significant support for Socialism in this debate; however, it doesn’t have a legitimate claim to be viewed as the only solution for addressing the overall and worsening decline of the masses due to poverty’s unique tendency to result in overpopulation.
“Next, it must be observed that Socialists generally, and even the most enlightened of them, have a very imperfect and one-sided notion of the operation of competition. They see half its effects, and overlook the other half. They forget that competition is a cause of high prices and values as well as of low; that the buyers of labor and of commodities compete with one another as well as the sellers; and that, if it is competition which keeps the prices of labor and commodities as low as they are, it is competition which keeps them from falling still lower. To meet this consideration, Socialists are reduced to affirm that, when the richest competitor has got rid of all his rivals, he commands the market and can demand any price he pleases. But in the ordinary branches of industry no one rich competitor has it in his power to drive [pg 170] out all the smaller ones. Some businesses show a tendency to pass out of the hands of small producers or dealers into a smaller number of larger ones; but the cases in which this happens are those in which the possession of a larger capital permits the adoption of more powerful machinery, more efficient by more expensive processes, or a better organized and more economical mode of carrying on business, and this enables the large dealer legitimately and permanently to supply the commodity cheaper than can be done on the small scale; to the great advantage of the consumers, and therefore of the laboring-classes, and diminishing, pro tanto, that waste of the resources of the community so much complained of by Socialists, the unnecessary multiplication of mere distributors, and of the various other classes whom Fourier calls the parasites of industry.
Next, it’s important to note that Socialists, even the most knowledgeable among them, have a limited and biased understanding of how competition operates. They recognize some effects but overlook others. They forget that competition can lead to both high and low prices and values; that buyers of labor and goods compete against each other just like sellers do; and that while competition helps keep prices of labor and goods low, it also prevents them from falling even lower. To counter this perspective, Socialists argue that when the richest competitor eliminates all rivals, they control the market and can set any price they want. However, in typical industries, no single wealthy competitor can push all the smaller ones out. Some industries may shift from smaller producers or sellers to a smaller number of larger ones, but this mainly happens when having more capital allows for better machinery, more efficient but costly processes, or a more organized and cost-effective way of doing business. In this way, larger sellers can legitimately and consistently offer products at a lower price than smaller operations, benefiting consumers, including the working class, while minimizing, pro tanto, the waste of community resources that Socialists often criticize—specifically, the unnecessary proliferation of mere distributors and the various other groups that Fourier refers to as the parasites of industry.
“Another point on which there is much misapprehension on the part of Socialists, as well as of trades-unionists and other partisans of labor against capital, relates to the proportion in which the produce of the country is really shared and the amount of what is actually diverted from those who produce it, to enrich other persons. When, for instance, a capitalist invests £20,000 in his business, and draws from it an income of (suppose) £2,000 a year, the common impression is as if he were the beneficial owner both of the £20,000 and of the £2,000, while the laborers own nothing but their wages. The truth, however, is that he only obtains the £2,000 on condition of applying no part of the £20,000 to his own use. He has the legal control over it, and might squander it if he chose, but if he did he would not have the £2,000 a year also. For all personal purposes they have the capital and he has but the profits, which it only yields to him on condition that the capital itself is employed in satisfying not his own wants, but those of laborers. Even of his own share a small part only belongs to him as the owner of capital. The portion of the produce which falls to capital merely as capital is measured by the interest of money, since that is all that the owner of capital obtains [pg 171] when he contributes to production nothing except the capital itself.
Another misunderstanding among Socialists, union members, and other labor supporters about capital involves how the nation’s output is actually distributed and how much is taken from those who create it, benefiting others instead. For instance, when a capitalist invests £20,000 in their business and earns (let's say) £2,000 a year, it’s commonly thought that they fully own both the £20,000 and the £2,000, while workers only receive their wages. The truth is, they only earn the £2,000 if they don’t use any of the £20,000 for personal use. They have legal control over it and could squander it if they chose to, but doing that would mean missing out on the £2,000 a year. For personal needs, the workers have the capital, while the capitalist only gets the profits, which are available only if the capital is used to meet the workers' needs, not their own. Even from their share, only a small portion truly belongs to them as the owners of the capital. The part of the output that goes to capital simply as capital is determined by the interest on money, since that’s all the capital owner receives when they contribute nothing to production except the capital itself.
“The result of our review of the various difficulties of Socialism has led us to the conclusion that the various schemes for managing the productive resources of the country by public instead of private agency have a case for a trial, and some of them may eventually establish their claims to preference over the existing order of things, but that they are at present workable only by the élite of mankind, and have yet to prove their power of training mankind at large to the state of improvement which they presuppose.”
"Our evaluation of the issues with Socialism has led us to believe that various approaches to managing the country's productive resources through public instead of private means deserve a chance, and some might actually be more effective than the current system. However, at this time, they can only be successfully carried out by the elite of society, and they still need to prove their ability to uplift the general population to the level of progress they claim."
§ 6. Ownership of land is different from ownership of movable property.
It is next to be considered what is included in the idea of private property and by what considerations the application of the principle should be bounded.
It is now important to examine what is meant by private property and what factors should limit the application of this principle.
The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced by their own exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from those who produced it. The foundation of the whole is, the right of producers to what they themselves have produced. Nothing is implied in property but the right of each to his (or her) own faculties, to what he can produce by them, and to whatever he can get for them in a fair market: together with his right to give this to any other person if he chooses, and the right of that other to receive and enjoy it.
The concept of property, when stripped down to its basic elements, involves recognizing that each person has the right to exclusively control what they have created through their own efforts, or what they have received as a gift or through fair agreement, without coercion or deceit, from those who created it. The foundation of this idea is the right of creators to what they have produced themselves. Property only implies the right of each individual to their own abilities, to what they can create with them, and to whatever they can obtain for their efforts in a fair market. This includes the right to give these creations to anyone else if they want to, and the right for that other person to receive and enjoy them.
It follows, therefore, that although the right of bequest, or gift after death, forms part of the idea of private property, the right of inheritance, as distinguished from bequest, does not. That the property of persons who have made no disposition of it during their lifetime should pass first to their children, and, failing them, to the nearest relations, may be a proper arrangement or not, but is no consequence of the principle of private property. I see no reason why collateral inheritance should exist at all. Mr. Bentham long ago proposed, and other high authorities have agreed in the opinion, that, if there are no heirs either in the descending or in the [pg 172] ascending line, the property, in case of intestacy, should escheat to the state. The parent owes to society to endeavor to make the child a good and valuable member of it, and owes to the children to provide, so far as depends on him, such education, and such appliances and means, as will enable them to start with a fair chance of achieving by their own exertions a successful life. To this every child has a claim; and I can not admit that as a child he has a claim to more.
It follows that, while the right to bequeath or gift property after death is part of the concept of private property, the right of inheritance, unlike bequest, is not. The idea that property belonging to those who haven't decided its fate during their lifetime should first go to their children, and if there are no children, to the closest relatives, might be a reasonable arrangement or not, but it isn't a necessary result of private property principles. I see no reason why collateral inheritance should exist at all. Mr. Bentham suggested long ago, and many respected thinkers have supported this view, that if there are no heirs in either the direct or indirect line, the property should go to the state in cases of intestacy. Parents owe it to society to try to raise their children as good, valuable members and owe it to their children to provide them with an education and resources that give them a fair shot at a successful life through their own efforts. Every child has a right to this, and I cannot agree that they have a right to anything more.
The essential principle of property being to assure to all persons what they have produced by their labor and accumulated by their abstinence, this principle can not apply to what is not the produce of labor, the raw material of the earth. If the land derived its productive power wholly from nature, and not at all from industry, or if there were any means of discriminating what is derived from each source, it not only would not be necessary, but it would be the height of injustice, to let the gift of nature be engrossed by individuals. [But] the use of the land in agriculture must indeed, for the time being, be of necessity exclusive; the same person who has plowed and sown must be permitted to reap.
The main principle of property is to guarantee that everyone gets to keep what they’ve created through their work and saved through their restraint. This principle doesn’t apply to things that aren’t produced by labor, like the raw materials from the earth. If the land’s ability to produce came entirely from nature and not at all from human effort, or if there was a way to tell what came from each source, it wouldn’t just be unnecessary, but highly unfair, to let the gifts of nature be controlled by individuals. However, the use of land for farming must, for the time being, be exclusive; the same person who has plowed and planted should be allowed to harvest.
But though land is not the produce of industry, most of its valuable qualities are so. Labor is not only requisite for using, but almost equally so for fashioning, the instrument. Considerable labor is often required at the commencement, to clear the land for cultivation. In many cases, even when cleared, its productiveness is wholly the effect of labor and art. One of the barrenest soils in the world, composed of the material of the Goodwin Sands, the Pays de Waes in Flanders, has been so fertilized by industry as to have become one of the most productive in Europe. Cultivation also requires buildings and fences, which are wholly the produce of labor. The fruits of this industry can not be reaped in a short period. The labor and outlay are immediate, the benefit is spread over many years, perhaps over all future time. A holder will not incur this labor and outlay when strangers and not himself will be benefited by it. If he [pg 173] undertakes such improvements, he must have a sufficient period before him in which to profit by them; and he is in no way so sure of having always a sufficient period as when his tenure is perpetual.
But even though land isn’t a result of human effort, most of its valuable qualities definitely are. Labor isn’t just necessary for using land, but almost equally important for shaping the tools needed for that. A significant amount of work is often needed at the start to clear the land for farming. In many situations, even after the land has been cleared, its productivity is entirely due to labor and skill. One of the least fertile soils in the world, made up of material from the Goodwin Sands, the Pays de Waes in Flanders, has been so enriched by industry that it’s become one of the most productive areas in Europe. Farming also needs buildings and fences, which come solely from human effort. The rewards of this hard work can’t be gained quickly. The labor and investment are immediate, but the benefits are spread out over many years, maybe even indefinitely. A landowner won’t make this investment and effort if it’s strangers who will benefit and not him. If he decides to make such improvements, he needs to have enough time ahead of him to gain from them; and he can feel much more confident about having that time when he has permanent ownership.
These are the reasons which form the justification, in an economical point of view, of property in land. It is seen that they are only valid in so far as the proprietor of land is its improver. Whenever, in any country, the proprietor, generally speaking, ceases to be the improver, political economy has nothing to say in defense of landed property, as there established.
These are the reasons that justify land ownership from an economic perspective. It's clear that these reasons only hold true as long as the landowner actively improves the land. Whenever, in any country, the landowner stops being the one who enhances the land, political economy has no argument to defend land ownership in that context.
When the “sacredness of property” is talked of, it should always be remembered that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency. When private property in land is not expedient, it is unjust. The reverse is the case with property in movables, and in all things the product of labor: over these, the owner's power both of use and of exclusion should be absolute, except where positive evil to others would result from it; but, in the case of land, no exclusive right should be permitted in any individual which can not be shown to be productive of positive good. To be allowed any exclusive right at all, over a portion of the common inheritance, while there are others who have no portion, is already a privilege. No quantity of movable goods which a person can acquire by his labor prevents others from acquiring the like by the same means; but, from the very nature of the case, whoever owns land keeps others out of the enjoyment of it. When land is not intended to be cultivated, no good reason can in general be given for its being private property at all. Even in the case of cultivated land, a man whom, though only one among millions, the law permits to hold thousands of acres as his single share, is not entitled to think that all this is given to him to use and abuse, and deal with as if it concerned nobody but himself. [pg 174] The rents or profits which he can obtain from it are at his sole disposal; but with regard to the land, in everything which he does with it, and in everything which he abstains from doing, he is morally bound, and should, whenever the case admits, be legally compelled to make his interest and pleasure consistent with the public good.
When we talk about the “value of property”, it's important to remember that this sacredness doesn't apply equally to land. No one created the land; it's the original inheritance of all humanity. How we use land is primarily a question of what benefits society as a whole. When private ownership of land doesn't serve the public interest, it becomes unjust. This is different from personal property and goods produced by labor: for those, the owner should have complete rights to use and exclude others unless their actions would cause harm to others. However, with land, no individual should have exclusive rights that can't be shown to benefit the public. Having any exclusive right over a part of this shared inheritance while others have none is already a privilege. A person can acquire as many movable goods as they can through their labor without stopping others from doing the same, but anyone who owns land excludes others from using it. If land is not going to be cultivated, there’s generally no good reason for it to be privately owned at all. Even with farmland, a person, even though just one among many, might hold thousands of acres as their share, but they shouldn’t think that this land is theirs to use and misuse as if it only affects them. [pg 174] The rents or profits they get from it are theirs to manage; however, regarding the land itself, in everything they do or choose not to do, they are morally expected, and when possible, legally required to align their interests and enjoyment with the public good.
Chapter 2. Wages.
§ 1. About Competition and Tradition.
Political economists generally, and English political economists above others, have been accustomed to lay almost exclusive stress upon the first of [two] agencies [competition and custom]; to exaggerate the effect of competition, and to take into little account the other and conflicting principle. They are apt to express themselves as if they thought that competition actually does, in all cases, whatever it can be shown to be the tendency of competition to do. This is partly intelligible, if we consider that only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension to the character of a science. So far as rents, profits, wages, prices, are determined by competition, laws may be assigned for them. Assume competition to be their exclusive regulator, and principles of broad generality and scientific precision may be laid down, according to which they will be regulated. The political economist justly deems this his proper business: and, as an abstract or hypothetical science, political economy can not be required to do, and indeed can not do, anything more. But it would be a great misconception of the actual course of human affairs to suppose that competition exercises in fact this unlimited sway. I am not speaking of monopolies, either natural or artificial, or of any interferences of authority with the liberty of production or exchange. Such disturbing causes have always been allowed for by political economists. I speak of cases in which there is nothing to restrain competition; no hindrance [pg 176] to it either in the nature of the case or in artificial obstacles; yet in which the result is not determined by competition, but by custom or usage; competition either not taking place at all, or producing its effect in quite a different manner from that which is ordinarily assumed to be natural to it.
Political economists, particularly English political economists, have typically focused almost exclusively on the first of two factors: competition and custom. They tend to overemphasize the impact of competition while giving little regard to the opposing principle. They often communicate as if they believe that competition always acts in accordance with its known tendencies. This can be somewhat understood since political economy only claims scientific status through the concept of competition. When rents, profits, wages, and prices are determined by competition, we can establish laws for them. If we assume competition is the sole regulator, we can set forth broad and scientifically precise principles to explain how they are regulated. Political economists rightly view this as their core focus, and as a theoretical science, political economy can’t be expected to achieve anything more. However, it greatly misrepresents real-world dynamics to think competition truly has such unlimited power. I'm not referring to monopolies, whether natural or man-made, or to any governmental controls on the freedom of production or trade. Such disruptive factors have always been acknowledged by political economists. I'm speaking of situations where there are no barriers to competition, whether natural or artificial, yet the outcomes are not dictated by competition but rather by custom or established practices; competition may either not occur at all or produce results that differ significantly from what is typically considered natural.
Competition, in fact, has only become in any considerable degree the governing principle of contracts, at a comparatively modern period. The further we look back into history, the more we see all transactions and engagements under the influence of fixed customs. The relations, more especially between the land-owner and the cultivator, and the payments made by the latter to the former, are, in all states of society but the most modern, determined by the usage of the country. The custom of the country is the universal rule; nobody thinks of raising or lowering rents, or of letting land, on other than the customary conditions. Competition, as a regulator of rent, has no existence.
Competition has really only become a major factor in contracts in recent times. The further we go back in history, the more we see that all transactions and agreements were guided by established customs. The relationships, especially between landowners and farmers, and the payments made by farmers to landowners, are determined by local customs in all societies except the most modern ones. These customs serve as the standard rule; no one considers changing rents or leasing land outside of the usual terms. Competition as a factor in setting rent simply didn’t exist.
Prices, whenever there was no monopoly, came earlier under the influence of competition, and are much more universally subject to it, than rents. The wholesale trade, in the great articles of commerce, is really under the dominion of competition. But retail price, the price paid by the actual consumer, seems to feel very slowly and imperfectly the effect of competition; and, when competition does exist, [pg 177] it often, instead of lowering prices, merely divides the gains of the high price among a greater number of dealers. The influence of competition is making itself felt more and more through the principal branches of retail trade in the large towns.
Prices, when there isn't a monopoly, are influenced by competition much quicker and more broadly than rents are. The wholesale market for major goods is definitely driven by competition. However, retail prices, the prices that consumers actually pay, seem to respond to competition very slowly and incompletely. Even when competition is present, instead of lowering prices, it often just spreads the profits from high prices among more sellers. The impact of competition is becoming more noticeable across key areas of retail trade in large cities.
All professional remuneration is regulated by custom. The fees of physicians, surgeons, and barristers, the charges of attorneys, are nearly invariable. Not certainly for want of abundant competition in those professions, but because the competition operates by diminishing each competitor's chance of fees, not by lowering the fees themselves.
All professional pay is managed by tradition. The rates for doctors, surgeons, and lawyers, as well as the fees charged by attorneys, are almost always the same. This is not necessarily due to a lack of competition in these fields, but because the competition reduces each person's chance of getting paid, rather than lowering the fees themselves.
These observations must be received as a general correction to be applied whenever relevant, whether expressly mentioned or not, to the conclusions contained in the subsequent portions of this treatise. Our reasonings must, in general, proceed as if the known and natural effects of competition were actually produced by it, in all cases in which it is not restrained by some positive obstacle. Where competition, though free to exist, does not exist, or where it exists, but has its natural consequences overruled by any other agency, the conclusions will fail more or less of being applicable. To escape error, we ought, in applying the conclusions of political economy to the actual affairs of life, to consider not only what will happen supposing the maximum of competition, but how far the result will be affected if competition falls short of the maximum.
These observations should be taken as a general guideline to apply whenever relevant, whether explicitly stated or not, to the conclusions found in the later sections of this work. Our reasoning should generally assume that the known and natural effects of competition are actually created by it, in all cases where it isn't hindered by a significant barrier. Where competition, although allowed, does not take place, or where it does occur but its natural outcomes are overridden by other factors, the conclusions will be less applicable. To avoid mistakes, when applying the conclusions of political economy to real-life situations, we need to consider not just what would happen if competition were at its highest level, but also how much the outcome will change if competition is below that level.
§ 2. The Wages Fund and the Objections to It Examined.
Under the head of Wages are to be considered, first, the causes which determine or influence the wages of labor generally, and secondly, the differences that exist between the wages of different employments. It is convenient to keep these two classes of considerations separate; and in discussing the law of wages, to proceed in the first instance as if there were no other kind of labor than common unskilled labor, of the average degree of hardness and disagreeableness.
Under the topic of Wages, we should first look at the factors that determine or affect labor wages in general, and second, the variations that exist among the wages of different jobs. It's helpful to keep these two categories of considerations separate; and when discussing the law of wages, we should initially treat it as if there were only one type of labor: common unskilled labor that is of average difficulty and unpleasantness.
Wages, then, depend mainly upon the demand and supply of labor; or, as it is often expressed, on the proportion between population and capital. By population is here meant the number only of the laboring-class, or rather of those who work for hire; and by capital, only circulating capital, and not even the whole of that, but the part which is expended in the direct purchase of labor. To this, however, must be added all funds which, without forming a part of capital, are paid in exchange for labor, such as the wages of soldiers, domestic servants, and all other unproductive laborers. There is unfortunately no mode of expressing, by one familiar term, the aggregate of what may be called the wages-fund of a country: and, as the wages of productive labor form nearly the whole of that fund, it is usual to overlook the smaller and less important part, and to say that wages depend on population and capital. It will be convenient to employ this expression, remembering, however, to consider it as elliptical, and not as a literal statement of the entire truth.
Wages depend mainly on the demand and supply of labor, or, as it’s often put, on the balance between population and capital. Here, population refers specifically to the number of working-class individuals, or those who work for pay; and capital refers only to circulating capital, specifically the portion used directly for hiring labor. Additionally, we must consider all funds that, while not part of capital, are paid for labor, such as the wages of soldiers, domestic workers, and other unproductive laborers. Unfortunately, there isn’t a single term that captures the totality of what could be called a country’s wages fund, and since the wages of productive labor make up nearly all of that fund, people often overlook the smaller, less significant part and say wages depend on population and capital. It’ll be useful to use this phrase, but keep in mind that it's shorthand and doesn’t fully represent the whole truth.
With these limitations of the terms, wages not only depend upon the relative amount of capital and population, but can not, under the rule of competition, be affected by anything else. Wages (meaning, of course, the general rate) can not rise, but by an increase of the aggregate funds employed in hiring laborers, or a diminution in the number of the competitors for hire; nor fall, except either by a diminution of the funds devoted to paying labor, or by an increase in the number of laborers to be paid.
With these limits in mind, wages depend not only on the relative amount of capital and population, but also cannot be influenced by anything else under competitive conditions. Wages (which refers to the overall rate) can only rise if there’s an increase in the total funds used to hire workers or a decrease in the number of people competing for jobs; similarly, wages can only fall if there’s a reduction in the funds available for paying workers or an increase in the number of workers needing pay.

This is the simple statement of the well-known Wages-Fund Theory, which has given rise to no little animated discussion. Few economists now assent to this doctrine when stated as above, and without changes. The first attack on this explanation of the rate of wages came from what is now a very scarce pamphlet, written by F. D. Longe, entitled “A Refutation of the Wage-Fund Theory of Modern Political Economy” (1866). Because laborers do not really compete with each other, he [pg 179] regarded the idea of average wages as absurd as the idea of an average price of ships and cloth; he declared that there was no predetermined wages-fund necessarily expended on labor; and that “demand for commodities” determined the amount of wealth devoted to paying wages (p. 46). While the so-called wages-fund limits the total amount which the laborers can receive, the employer would try to get his workmen at as much less than that amount as possible, so that the aggregate fund would have no bearing on the actual amount paid in wages. The quantity of work to be done, he asserts, determines the quantity of labor to be employed. About the same time (but unknown to Mr. Longe), W. T. Thornton was studying the same subject, and attracted considerable attention by his publication, “On Labor” (1868), which in Book II, Chap. I, contained an extended argument to show that demand and supply (i.e., the proportion between wages-fund and laborers) did not regulate wages, and denied the existence of a predetermined wages-fund fixed in amount. His attack, however, assumes a very different conception of an economic law from that which we think right to insist upon. The character of mankind being what it is, it will be for their interest to invest so much and no more in labor, and we must believe that in this sense there is a predetermination of wealth to be paid in wages. In order to make good investments, a certain amount must, if capitalists follow their best interests, go to the payment of labor.162 Mr. Thornton's argument attracted the more attention because Mr. Mill163 admitted that Mr. Thornton had induced him to abandon his Wages-Fund Theory. The subject was, however, taken up, re-examined by Mr. Cairnes,164 and stated in a truer form. (1.) The total wealth of a country (circle A in the diagram) is the outside limit of its capital. How much capital will be saved out of this depends upon the effective desire of accumulation in the community (as set forth in Book I, Chap. VIII). The size of circle B within circle A, therefore, depends on the character of the people. The wages-fund, then, depends ultimately on the extent of A, and proximately on the extent of B. It can never [pg 180] be larger than B. So far, at least, its amount is “predetermined” in the economic sense by general laws regarding the accumulation of capital and the expectation of profit. Circle B contracts and expands under influences which have nothing to do with the immediate bargains between capitalists and laborers. (2.) Another influence now comes in to affect the amount of capital actually paid as wages, one also governed by general causes outside the reach of laborer or capitalist, that is, the state of the arts of production. In production, the particular conditions of each industry will determine how much capital is to be set apart for raw material, how much for machinery, buildings, and all forms of fixed capital, and how many laborers will be assigned to a given machine for a given amount of material. With some kinds of hand-made goods the largest share of capital goes to wages, a less amount for materials, and a very small proportion for machinery and tools. In many branches of agriculture and small farming this holds true. The converse, however, is true in many manufactures, where machinery is largely used. No two industries will maintain the same proportion between the three elements. The nature of the industry, therefore, will determine whether a greater or a less share of capital will be spent in wages. It is needless to say that this condition of things is not one to be changed at the demand of either of the two parties to production, Labor and Capital; it responds only to the advance of mechanical science or general intelligence. It is impossible, then, to escape the conclusion that general causes restrict the amount which will, under any normal investment, go to the payment of wages. Only within the limits set by these forces can any further expansion or contraction take place. (3.) Within these limits, of course, minor changes may take place, so that the fund can not be said to be “fixed” or “absolutely predetermined”; but these changes must take place within such narrow limits that they do not much affect the practical side of the question. How these changes act, may be seen in a part of the following illustration of the above principles:
This is a clear explanation of the well-known Wages-Fund Theory, which has led to a lot of lively debate. Few economists today support this principle as it stands, without any changes. The first challenge to this perspective on wage rates came from a now rare pamphlet by F. D. Longe, titled“A Rebuttal of the Wage-Fund Theory in Contemporary Political Economy”(1866). He argued that workers don’t really compete with each other, calling the idea of average wages as silly as the notion of an average price for ships and fabric. He stated that there isn’t a fixed wages fund that has to be allocated to labor, and that the“demand for goods”determines how much wealth is set aside for wages (p. 46). While the so-called wages-fund restricts the overall amount that workerscanearn, employers will aim to pay their workers the lowest amount possible, which means the overall fund doesn't affect the actual wages that are paid out. He argues that the amount of work needed determines how much labor is required. At the same time (but unbeknownst to Mr. Longe), W. T. Thornton was investigating the same topic and received considerable attention with his publication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“On Labor”In 1868, Book II, Chapter I, presented a detailed argument showing that demand and supply (i.e., the link between the wages-fund and workers) do not determine wages. He challenged the idea of a fixed wages-fund. However, his critique is based on a different understanding of economic law than what we consider important. Given human nature, it’s in people's best interest to invest a specific amount—and not more—into labor, and we have to accept that, in this way, there is a predetermined amount of wealth intended for wages. To make successful investments, a portion must go towards paying workers, assuming capitalists act in their own best interest.162Mr. Thornton's argument received more attention because Mr. Mill163acknowledged that Mr. Thornton had convinced him to give up his Wages-Fund Theory. However, Mr. Cairnes later revisited and reassessed the topic,164who presented it more accurately. (1.) The total wealth of a country (circle A in the diagram) represents the maximum amount of its capital. The amount of capital saved from this depends on the community's true desire to accumulate (as discussed in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).Book 1, Chapter 8The size of circle B inside circle A depends on the characteristics of the people. Therefore, the wages fund ultimately relies on the size of A and is closely tied to the size of B. It can never be larger than B. So far, at least, its amount is“predetermined”In economic terms, general laws govern capital accumulation and profit expectations. Circle B grows and shrinks due to factors unrelated to the immediate negotiations between capitalists and workers. (2.) Another important factor that affects the actual capital paid as wages is the state of production technologies, which is also influenced by general causes beyond the control of workers or capitalists. Specific conditions in each industry determine how much capital is allocated for raw materials, machinery, buildings, and other fixed assets, as well as how many workers are assigned to a particular machine for a certain amount of material. In some types of handcrafted goods, the largest portion of capital goes toward wages, with less allocated for raw materials and only a small amount for machinery and tools. This is also true in many areas of agriculture and small-scale farming. On the other hand, this principle doesn't apply in many manufacturing sectors where machinery is a major factor. No two industries will maintain the same ratio between these three elements. Therefore, the nature of the industry will determine whether a larger or smaller share of capital is spent on wages. It's clear that this situation cannot be changed by demands from either side of production, whether Labor or Capital; it is solely influenced by advancements in mechanical technology or general intelligence. As a result, it's impossible to ignore the conclusion that general factors limit the portion allocated to wage payments in any typical investment situation. Expansion or contraction can only occur within the parameters set by these forces. (3.) Within these limits, minor fluctuations can happen, making it inaccurate to claim that the fund is“fixed”or“totally predetermined”; but these fluctuations happen within such small ranges that they don’t meaningfully affect the practical aspects of the issue. We can illustrate how these changes work with the following example based on the principles mentioned above:
Suppose a cotton-mill established in one of the valleys of Vermont, for the management of which the owner has $140,000 of capital. Of this, $100,000 is given for buildings, machinery, and plant. If he turns over his remaining capital ($40,000) each month, we will suppose that $28,000 spent in raw materials will keep five hundred men occupied at a monthly expenditure of $12,000. The present state of cotton-manufacture itself settles the relation between a given quantity of raw cotton and a certain amount of machinery. A fixed amount of cotton, no more, no less, can be spun by each spindle and woven by each loom; and the nature of the process determines [pg 181] the number of laborers to each machine. This proportion is something which an owner must obey, if he expects to compete with other manufacturers: the relationship is fixed for, not by, him. Now, each of the five hundred laborers being supposed to receive on an average $1.00 a day, imagine an influx of a body of French Canadians who offer to work, on an average, for eighty cents a day.165 The five hundred men will now receive but $9,600 monthly instead of $12,000, as before, as a wages-fund; the monthly payment for wages now is nearly seven per cent, while formerly it was nearly nine per cent of the total capital invested ($140,000). Thus it will be seen that the wages-fund can change with a change in the supply of labor: but the point to be noticed is that it is a change in the subdivision, $12,000, of the total $140,000. That is, this alteration can take place only within the limits set by the nature of the industry. Now, if this $2,400 (i.e., $12,000 less $9,600) saved out of the wages-fund were to be reinvested, it must necessarily be divided between raw materials, fixed capital, and wages in the existing relations, that is, only seven per cent of the new $2,400 would be added to the wages-fund. It is worth while calling attention to this, if for no other reason than to show that in this way a change can be readily made in the wages-fund by natural movements; and that no one can be so absurd as to say that it is absolutely fixed in amount. But it certainly is “predetermined” in the economic sense, in that any reinvestments, as well as former funds, must necessarily be distributed according to the above general principles, independent of the “higgling” in the labor market. The following is Mr. Cairnes's statement of the amount and “predetermination” of the wages-fund:
Imagine a cotton mill located in one of Vermont's valleys, with a total capital of $140,000 for its operation. Out of this, $100,000 is dedicated to buildings, machinery, and equipment. If the owner rotates the remaining capital of $40,000 every month, let’s assume that spending $28,000 on raw materials will keep five hundred workers employed, with a monthly payout of $12,000. The current state of cotton manufacturing determines the relationship between a specific amount of raw cotton and a certain quantity of machinery. Each spindle can process a set amount of cotton, and each loom can weave a fixed quantity; the nature of this process defines how many workers are needed for each machine. This ratio is something the owner must follow to remain competitive with other manufacturers: it is established for him, not by him. Now, if each of the five hundred workers is assumed to earn an average of $1.00 a day, consider an influx of French Canadians who are willing to work for about eighty cents a day on average.165The five hundred workers will now collectively receive about $9,600 per month instead of the previous $12,000 as a wages fund. The monthly wage payment will now be nearly seven percent of the total capital invested ($140,000), compared to nearly nine percent before. This indicates that the wages fund can change with fluctuations in the labor supply. However, it’s important to note that this is a modification of the $12,000 share of the total $140,000. This change can only happen within the limits set by the nature of the industry. If the saved $2,400 (i.e., $12,000 minus $9,600) from the wages fund were to be reinvested, it would need to be divided among raw materials, fixed capital, and wages based on current relations; only seven percent of the new $2,400 would be added to the wages fund. This point is important, not just to show that the wages fund can change due to natural fluctuations, but also to clarify that it isn’t completely fixed in amount. However, it certainly is“preordained”In economic terms, any reinvestments, along with current funds, must be allocated based on these general principles, regardless of the“bargaining”in the job market. Below is Mr. Cairnes’s statement about the amount and“predetermination”of the wage fund:
“I believe that, in the existing state of the national wealth, the character of Englishmen being what it is, a certain prospect of profit will ‘determine’ a certain proportion of this wealth to productive investment; that the amount thus ‘determined’ will increase as the field for investment is extended, and that it will not increase beyond what this field can find employment for at that rate of profit which satisfies English commercial expectation. Further, I believe that, investment thus taking place, the form which it shall assume will be ‘determined’ by the nature of the national industries—‘determined,’ not under acts of Parliament, or in virtue of any physical law, but through the influence of the investor's interests; while this, the form of the investment, will again ‘determine’ the proportion of the whole capital which shall be paid as [pg 182] wages to laborers.”166 In this excellent and masterly conception, the doctrine of a wages-fund is not open to the objections usually urged against it. Indeed, with the exception of Professor Fawcett, scarcely any economist believes in an absolutely fixed wages-fund. In this sense, then, and in view of the above explanation, it will be understood what is meant by saying that wages depend upon the proportion of the wages-fund to the number of the wage-receivers.167
“I think that given the current level of national wealth and the character of the English people, there will be some expectation of profit that will ‘determine’ a certain portion of that wealth for productive investment. The amount that gets ‘determined’ will increase as investment opportunities rise, and it won't go beyond what those opportunities can profitably support according to English commercial expectations. Additionally, I believe that how this investment takes shape will be ‘determined’ by the nature of the national industries—‘determined,’ not by legislation or any physical laws, but by the interests of the investors. This form of investment will then ‘determine’ the portion of total capital that will be allocated as [pg 182] wages for workers.”166In this clever and well-thought-out idea, the concept of a wages-fund doesn't face the usual criticisms it typically encounters. In fact, besides Professor Fawcett, very few economists believe in a completely fixed wages-fund. With the explanation provided, it will be clear what is meant by stating that wages are determined by the ratio of the wages-fund to the number of wage-receivers.167
In applying these principles to the question of strikes, it is evident enough that if they result in an actual expansion of the whole circle B, by forcing saving from unproductive expenditure, a real addition, of some extent, may be made to the wages-fund; but only by increasing the total capital. If, however, they attempt to increase one of the elements of capital, the wages-fund, without also adding to the other elements, fixed capital and materials, in the proportion fixed by the nature of the industry, they will destroy all possibility of continuing that production in the normal way, and the capitalist must withdraw from the enterprise.
When we apply these principles to strikes, it's obvious that if they result in a meaningful expansion of the whole circle B by reducing unproductive spending, there can be a real increase, to some extent, in the wages fund, but this can only occur if the total capital is increased. However, if they attempt to increase one part of the capital—the wages fund—without also raising the other parts, like fixed capital and materials, in a way that aligns with the industry’s needs, they will undermine any possibility of maintaining normal production, and the capitalist will have to pull out of the business.
Francis A. Walker168 has also offered a solution of this problem in his “Wages Question” (1876), in which he holds that “wages are, in a philosophical view of the subject, paid out of the product of present industry, and hence that production furnishes the true measure of wages” (p. 128). “It is the prospect of a profit in production which determines the employer to hire laborers; it is the anticipated value of the product which determines how much he can pay him” (p. 144). No doubt wages can be (and often are) paid out of the current product; but what amount? What is the principle of distribution? Wherever the incoming product is a moral certainty (and, unless this is true, in no case could wages be paid out of the future product), saving is as effective upon it as upon the actual accumulations of the past; and the amount of the coming product which will be saved and used as capital is determined by the same principles which govern the saving of past products. An increase of circle A by a larger production makes possible an increase of circle B, but whether it will be enlarged [pg 183] or not depends on the principle of accumulation. The larger the total production of wealth, the greater the possible wages, all must admit; but it does not seem clear that General Walker has given us a solution of the real question at issue. The larger the house you build, the larger the rooms may be; but it does not follow that the rooms will be necessarily large—as any inmate of a summer hotel will testify.
Francis A. Walker168has also offered a solution to this issue in his"Wages Issue"(1876), where he contends that“wages are, from a philosophical perspective, derived from the output of today's industry, indicating that production is the real basis for wages”(p. 128). “Employers hire workers based on the expected profits from production; the anticipated value of the product determines how much they can pay them” (p. 144). Certainly, wages can be (and often are) paid from current output; but what amount? What is the underlying principle for distribution? Whenever the incoming product is morally certain (and without this certainty, wages could never be paid from future products), saving impacts it just as much as it does the actual accumulations of the past; and the portion of the future product that will be saved and used as capital follows the same principles that govern the saving of past products. An increase in circle A through larger production leads to an increase in circle B, but whether it actually grows depends on the principle of accumulation. The more overall wealth is produced, the greater the potential wages will be, everyone must agree; yet it doesn’t seem clear that General Walker has provided us a solution to the real issue at hand. The bigger the house you build, the larger the rooms can be; but that doesn’t necessarily mean the rooms will actually be large—as anyone who has stayed in a summer hotel can confirm.
§ 3. A Look at Some Common Beliefs About Wages.
There are, however, some facts in apparent contradiction to this [the Wages-Fund] doctrine, which it is incumbent on us to consider and explain.
There are, however, some facts that seem to contradict this [the Wages-Fund] doctrine, which we need to examine and clarify.
1. For instance, it is a common saying that wages are high when trade is good. The demand for labor in any particular employment is more pressing, and higher wages are paid, when there is a brisk demand for the commodity produced; and the contrary when there is what is called a stagnation: then work-people are dismissed, and those who are retained must submit to a reduction of wages; though in these cases there is neither more nor less capital than before. This is true; and is one of those complications in the concrete phenomena which obscure and disguise the operation of general causes; but it is not really inconsistent with the principles laid down. Capital which the owner does not employ in purchasing labor, but keeps idle in his hands, is the same thing to the laborers, for the time being, as if it did not exist. All capital is, from the variations of trade, occasionally in this state. A manufacturer, finding a slack demand for his commodity, forbears to employ laborers in increasing a stock which he finds it difficult to dispose of; or if he goes on until all his capital is locked up in unsold goods, then at least he must of necessity pause until he can get paid for some of them. But no one expects either of these states to be permanent; if he did, he would at the first opportunity remove his capital to some other occupation, in which it would still continue to employ labor. The capital remains unemployed for a time, during which the labor market is overstocked, and wages fall. Afterward the demand revives, and perhaps becomes unusually brisk, enabling the manufacturer to sell his commodity [pg 184] even faster than he can produce it; his whole capital is then brought into complete efficiency, and, if he is able, he borrows capital in addition, which would otherwise have gone into some other employment. These, however, are but temporary fluctuations: the capital now lying idle will next year be in active employment, that which is this year unable to keep up with the demand will in its turn be locked up in crowded warehouses; and wages in these several departments will ebb and flow accordingly: but nothing can permanently alter general wages, except an increase or a diminution of capital itself (always meaning by the term, the funds of all sorts, destined for the payment of labor) compared with the quantity of labor offering itself to be hired.
1. For example, people often say that wages are high when business is good. The need for workers in any given job is greater, and higher wages are paid, when there’s strong demand for the products being made; the opposite happens when there’s a slowdown: then workers are laid off, and those who keep their jobs have to agree to lower wages; yet, in these situations, there’s no change in the amount of capital available. This is true and represents one of those complexities in real-world situations that masks how general causes work, but it doesn’t contradict the principles that have been established. Capital that the owner doesn’t invest in hiring workers, but instead keeps idle, is effectively nonexistent for laborers at that moment. All capital occasionally finds itself in this idle state due to market changes. A manufacturer, noticing a decrease in demand for their product, will hold off on hiring workers to increase stock that’s hard to sell; or if they continue until all their capital is tied up in unsold goods, they’ll have to stop until they can sell some of it. However, no one expects these situations to last forever; if they did, they would move their capital to another field where it could still generate work. The capital remains unused for a while, during which the job market gets crowded, and wages drop. Eventually, demand picks up again, possibly becoming quite strong, allowing the manufacturer to sell their product faster than they can make it; at this point, all of their capital is fully utilized, and if they can, they will borrow additional capital that would otherwise have gone to another venture. These are just temporary ups and downs: the capital that's lying idle now will be actively used next year, and what is unable to meet demand this year will, in turn, be stuck in overfilled warehouses; wages in these various sectors will rise and fall accordingly. However, nothing can permanently change overall wages except for an increase or decrease in capital itself (always referring to the funds of all kinds, allocated for paying labor) in relation to the amount of labor available for hire.
2. Again, it is another common notion that high prices make high wages; because the producers and dealers, being better off, can afford to pay more to their laborers. I have already said that a brisk demand, which causes temporary high prices, causes also temporary high wages. But high prices, in themselves, can only raise wages if the dealers, receiving more, are induced to save more, and make an addition to their capital, or at least to their purchases of labor. Wages will probably be temporarily higher in the employment in which prices have risen, and somewhat lower in other employments: in which case, while the first half of the phenomenon excites notice, the other is generally overlooked, or, if observed, is not ascribed to the cause which really produced it. Nor will the partial rise of wages last long: for, though the dealers in that one employment gain more, it does not follow that there is room to employ a greater amount of savings in their own business: their increasing capital will probably flow over into other employments, and there counterbalance the diminution previously made in the demand for labor by the diminished savings of other classes.
2. There’s a common belief that high prices lead to high wages because producers and sellers, being better off, can pay their workers more. I’ve mentioned that a strong demand, which causes temporary high prices, also leads to temporary high wages. But high prices alone can only increase wages if the sellers, earning more, are encouraged to save more and increase their capital or at least their hiring of workers. Wages are likely to be higher temporarily in the jobs where prices have gone up, and somewhat lower in other jobs: in this case, while the increase in wages in one area grabs attention, the decrease in others is often overlooked or, if noticed, not connected to its actual cause. Furthermore, this temporary rise in wages won’t last long: even though sellers in that one area benefit, it doesn’t mean there’s room to invest more in their business. Their growing capital will likely spill over into other sectors, balancing out the decrease in labor demand caused by reduced savings from other groups.
A clear distinction must be made between real wages and money wages; the former is of importance to the laborer as being his real receipts. The quantity of commodities satisfying [pg 185] his desires which the laborer receives for his exertion constitutes his real wages. The mere amount of money he receives for his exertions, irrespective of what the money will exchange for, forms his money wages. Since the functions of money have not yet been explained, it is difficult to discuss the relation between prices and money wages here. But, as the total value of the products in a certain industry is the sum out of which both money wages and profits are paid, this total will rise or fall (efficiency of labor remaining the same) with the price of the particular article. If the price rises, profits will be greater than elsewhere, and more capital will be invested in that one business; that is, the capital will be a demand for more labor, and, until equalization is accomplished in all trades between wages and profits, money wages will be higher in some trades than in others.169
It's important to differentiate between real wages and money wages; the former is significant to the worker because it reflects their actual earnings. Real wages are made up of the amount of goods that meet the worker's needs in exchange for their efforts. Money wages, on the other hand, refer to the total amount of money they receive for their work, regardless of what that money can purchase. Since we haven't covered the functions of money yet, it's difficult to analyze the connection between prices and money wages at this point. However, since the total value of products in a specific industry is the budget from which both money wages and profits are paid, this total will rise or fall (assuming labor efficiency remains constant) based on the price of a particular item. If the price increases, profits in that industry will also increase, leading to more capital flowing into that business; this means that capital will create a demand for more labor, and until wages and profits are balanced across all industries, money wages will generally be higher in some sectors than in others.169
When reference is had to the connection between real wages and prices, the question is a different one. General high prices would not change general real wages. But if high prices cause higher money wages in particular branches of trade, then, because the movement is not general, there will accrue, to those receiving more money, the means to buy more of real wages. And, as in practice, changes in prices which arise from an increased demand are partial, and not general, it often happens that high prices produce high real wages (not general high wages) in some, not in all employments. (For a further study of this relation between prices and wages the reader is advised to recall this discussion in connection with that in a later part of the volume, Book III, Chaps. XX and XXI.)
When discussing the connection between real wages and prices, the situation is different. Generally, high prices wouldn’t alter overallreal wagesHowever, if high prices lead to higher pay in certain sectors, then since this change isn’t widespread, those who earn more will be able to buy more of what counts as real wages. In practice, price changes driven by increased demand tend to be specific rather than universal, so it’s common for high prices to result in high real wages (not overall high wages) in some jobs but not in others. (For a deeper look at this relationship between prices and wages, the reader should refer back to this discussion in connection with that in a later section of the book, Book III, Chaps. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.)XXandXXI.)
3. Another opinion often maintained is, that wages (meaning of course money wages) vary with the price of food; rising when it rises, and falling when it falls. This opinion is, I conceive, only partially true; and, in so far as true, in no way affects the dependence of wages on the proportion between capital and labor: since the price of food, when it affects wages at all, affects them through that law. Dear or cheap food caused by variety of seasons does not affect wages (unless they are artificially adjusted to it by law or charity): or rather, it has some tendency to affect them in the contrary way to that supposed; since in times of scarcity people generally compete more violently for employment, and lower the labor market against themselves. But dearness [pg 186] or cheapness of food, when of a permanent character, and capable of being calculated on beforehand, may affect wages. (1.) In the first place, if the laborers have, as is often the case, no more than enough to keep them in working condition and enable them barely to support the ordinary number of children, it follows that, if food grows permanently dearer without a rise of wages, a greater number of the children will prematurely die; and thus wages will ultimately be higher, but only because the number of people will be smaller, than if food had remained cheap. (2.) But, secondly, even though wages were high enough to admit of food's becoming more costly without depriving the laborers and their families of necessaries; though they could bear, physically speaking, to be worse off, perhaps they would not consent to be so. They might have habits of comfort which were to them as necessaries, and sooner than forego which, they would put an additional restraint on their power of multiplication; so that wages would rise, not by increase of deaths but by diminution of births. In these cases, then, wages do adapt themselves to the price of food, though after an interval of almost a generation.170 If wages were previously so high that they could bear reduction, to which the obstacle was a high standard of comfort habitual among the laborers, a rise of the price of food, or any other disadvantageous change in their circumstances, may operate in two ways: (a) it may correct itself by a rise of wages, brought about through a gradual effect on the prudential check to population; or (b) it may permanently lower the standard of living of the class, in case their previous habits in respect of population prove stronger than their previous habits in respect of comfort. In that case the injury done to them will be permanent, and their deteriorated condition will become a new minimum, tending to perpetuate [pg 187] itself as the more ample minimum did before. It is to be feared that, of the two modes in which the cause may operate, the last (b) is the most frequent, or at all events sufficiently so to render all propositions, ascribing a self-repairing quality to the calamities which befall the laboring-classes, practically of no validity.
3. Another common opinion is that wages (meaning money wages) change with food prices; they rise when food prices rise and fall when they fall. I believe this is only partially true and, to the extent that it is true, does not affect the dependence of wages on the balance between capital and labor: since food prices, when they affect wages at all, do so through that balance. Expensive or cheap food caused by seasonal variations doesn't influence wages (unless they are artificially adjusted by law or charity): in fact, it tends to affect them in the opposite way from what is assumed; during times of scarcity, people typically compete more fiercely for jobs, pushing wages down. However, if food prices are permanently high or low and can be anticipated, they may impact wages. (1.) First, if workers often only earn enough to stay healthy and barely support their usual number of children, then if food becomes permanently more expensive without wages rising, more children will die prematurely; consequently, wages will eventually be higher, but only because there will be fewer people than if food had remained cheap. (2.) Secondly, even if wages were sufficiently high to allow for food to become more expensive without depriving workers and their families of necessities, even though they could physically handle being worse off, they might not agree to it. They might have comfort habits that feel essential to them, and rather than give those up, they would impose additional restrictions on their family size; thus, wages would rise, not through increased deaths but through fewer births. In these cases, wages do adjust to food prices, but only after nearly a generation. If wages were previously so high that they could tolerate a reduction, and the obstacle was a high standard of living among the workers, then a rise in food prices, or any other negative change in their situation, can have two effects: (a) it might correct itself with a rise in wages resulting from a gradual impact on population control; or (b) it might permanently lower the living standards of the class, if their prior habits regarding population prove stronger than their previous comfort habits. In that case, the damage inflicted on them would be permanent, and their worsened situation would establish a new baseline that tends to perpetuate itself, just as the more generous minimum did before. Unfortunately, of the two ways the cause might operate, the second (b) is the more common, or at least frequent enough to make any claims that suggest laboring-class hardships have a self-correcting nature practically invalid.
The converse case occurs when, by improvements in agriculture, the repeal of corn laws, or other such causes, the necessaries of the laborers are cheapened, and they are enabled with the same [money] wages to command greater comforts than before. Wages will not fall immediately: it is even possible that they may rise; but they will fall at last, so as to leave the laborers no better off than before, unless during this interval of prosperity the standard of comfort regarded as indispensable by the class is permanently raised. Unfortunately this salutary effect is by no means to be counted upon: it is a much more difficult thing to raise, than to lower, the scale of living which the laborers will consider as more indispensable than marrying and having a family. According to all experience, a great increase invariably takes place in the number of marriages in seasons of cheap food and full employment.
The opposite situation happens when improvements in agriculture, the repeal of corn laws, or similar factors make the essentials for workers more affordable, allowing them to enjoy greater comforts with the same wages. Wages won’t drop right away; it’s even possible they could rise. However, eventually, wages will decrease, leaving workers no better off than before, unless the accepted standard of comfort for this group is permanently raised during this period of prosperity. Unfortunately, we can’t rely on this positive effect: it’s much harder to elevate the living standards that workers view as essential compared to lowering them, even more so than the desire to marry and start a family. Based on all previous experience, there’s always a significant increase in marriages during times of cheap food and full employment.
This is to be seen by some brief statistics of marriages in Vermont and Massachusetts.
This can be shown with some quick stats about marriages in Vermont and Massachusetts.
Year. | Vermont | Massachusetts |
1860 | 2,179 | 12,404 |
1861 | 2,188 | 10,972 |
1862 | 1,962 | 11,014 |
1863 | 2,007 | 10,873 |
1864 | 1,804 | 12,513 |
1865 | 2,569 | 13,052 |
1866 | 3,001 | 14,428 |
1867 | 2,857 | 14,451 |
In Vermont, while the average number of marriages was reached in 1860 and 1861, it fell off on the breaking out of the war; rose in 1863, under the fair progress of the Northern arms; again fell off in 1864, during the period of discouragement; and since 1865 has kept a steadily higher average. In manufacturing Massachusetts the number fell earlier than in agricultural Vermont, at the beginning of the difficulties.
In Vermont, the average number of marriages was steady in 1860 and 1861, but it fell when the war began; it rose again in 1863 as the Northern forces gained ground; then it dropped once more in 1864 during a period of discouragement; and since 1865, it has kept a consistently higher average. In manufacturing-focused Massachusetts, the number of marriages declined earlier than in agricultural Vermont, right at the beginning of the troubles.
July 1856 to January 1857. | 6,418 |
Jan. to July 1857 | 5,803 |
July 1857 to January 1858. | 5,936 |
Jan. to July 1858 | 4,917 |
July 1858 to January 1859. | 5,610 |
To produce permanent advantage, the temporary cause operating upon them must be sufficient to make a great change in their condition—a change such as will be felt for many years, notwithstanding any stimulus which it may give during one generation to the increase of people. When, indeed, the improvement is of this signal character, and a generation grows up which has always been used to an improved scale of comfort, the habits of this new generation in respect to population become formed upon a higher minimum, and the improvement in their condition becomes permanent.
To create a lasting advantage, the temporary cause affecting them must be strong enough to bring about a significant change in their situation—a change that will be felt for many years, despite any boost it may give to population growth during one generation. When this improvement is so remarkable, and a generation grows up accustomed to a higher level of comfort, the habits of this new generation regarding population are shaped by a higher standard, making the improvement in their situation permanent.
§ 4. Except for certain rare circumstances, high wages indicate limits on population.
Wages depend, then, on the proportion between the number of the laboring population and the capital or other funds devoted to the purchase of labor; we will say, for shortness, the capital. If wages are higher at one time or place than at another, if the subsistence and comfort of the class of hired laborers are more ample, it is for no other reason than because capital bears a greater proportion to population. It is not the absolute amount of accumulation or of production that is of importance to the laboring-class; it is not the amount even of the funds destined for distribution among the laborers; it is the proportion between those funds and the numbers among whom they are shared. The condition of the class can be bettered in no other way than by altering that proportion to their advantage: and every scheme for their benefit which does not proceed on this as its foundation is, for all permanent purposes, a delusion.
Wages depend on the ratio between the number of workers and the capital or funds allocated to hiring labor; for simplicity, we’ll call it capital. When wages are higher at a certain time or place, or when the living standards of hired workers are better, it’s simply because there’s more capital relative to the population. What matters for the working class isn’t the total amount of wealth or production, nor is it the total funds set aside for the workers; it’s the ratio of those funds to the number of people sharing them. The condition of the working class can only improve by changing that ratio in their favor: any plan for their benefit that doesn’t start from this principle is ultimately misleading.
In countries like North America and the Australian colonies, where the knowledge and arts of civilized life and a high effective desire of accumulation coexist with a boundless extent of unoccupied land, the growth of capital easily keeps pace with the utmost possible increase of population, and is chiefly retarded by the impracticability of obtaining laborers enough. All, therefore, who can possibly be born can find employment without overstocking the market: every [pg 189] laboring family enjoys in abundance the necessaries, many of the comforts, and some of the luxuries of life; and, unless in case of individual misconduct, or actual inability to work, poverty does not, and dependence need not, exist. [In England] so gigantic has been the progress of the cotton manufacture since the inventions of Watt and Arkwright, that the capital engaged in it has probably quadrupled in the time which population requires for doubling. While, therefore, it has attracted from other employments nearly all the hands which geographical circumstances and the habits or inclinations of the people rendered available; and while the demand it created for infant labor has enlisted the immediate pecuniary interest of the operatives in favor of promoting, instead of restraining, the increase of population; nevertheless wages in the great seats of the manufacture are still so high that the collective earnings of a family amount, on an average of years, to a very satisfactory sum; and there is as yet no sign of decrease, while the effect has also been felt in raising the general standard of agricultural wages in the counties adjoining.
In places like North America and the Australian colonies, where the knowledge and arts of civilized life come together with a strong desire for wealth alongside vast areas of unused land, capital grows easily at the same pace as the population. It's mostly slowed down by the challenge of finding enough workers. Thus, everyone who is born can find a job without flooding the market: each laboring family has plenty of basic needs, many comforts, and some luxuries; and unless due to individual missteps or genuine inability to work, poverty doesn’t have to exist, and dependence isn’t necessary. In England, the cotton industry has seen such explosive growth since the inventions of Watt and Arkwright that the capital invested in it has likely quadrupled in the time it takes for the population to double. While it has drawn in nearly all available workers from other jobs due to geographic factors and the people’s habits or preferences, and while the demand for child labor has made it financially beneficial for workers to encourage rather than limit population growth, wages in the main manufacturing areas remain high enough that a family’s total income averages out to a very satisfactory amount; and there's still no indication of a decrease, with a positive effect also observed in raising the general agricultural wages in nearby counties.
But those circumstances of a country, or of an occupation, in which population can with impunity increase at its utmost rate, are rare and transitory. Very few are the countries presenting the needful union of conditions. Either the industrial arts are backward and stationary, and capital therefore increases slowly, or, the effective desire of accumulation being low, the increase soon reaches its limit; or, even though both these elements are at their highest known degree, the increase of capital is checked, because there is not fresh land to be resorted to of as good quality as that already occupied. Though capital should for a time double itself simultaneously with population, if all this capital and population are to find employment on the same land, they can not, without an unexampled succession of agricultural inventions, continue doubling the produce; therefore, if wages do not fall, profits must; and, when profits fall, increase of capital is slackened.
But the situations in a country or an industry where the population can grow at full speed without any consequences are rare and temporary. Only a few countries have the necessary combination of conditions. Either the industrial sector is underdeveloped and stagnant, leading to slow capital growth, or the desire to accumulate wealth is low, causing growth to hit its ceiling quickly. Even if both of these factors are at their peak, capital growth can still be limited if there isn't new land available that is as good as the land currently in use. Even if capital and population were to double at the same time, if they have to operate on the same land, they can’t continue to double their output without unprecedented agricultural innovations. Therefore, if wages don’t decrease, profits must; and when profits drop, capital growth slows down.
Except, therefore, in the very peculiar cases which I have [pg 190] just noticed, of which the only one of any practical importance is that of a new colony, or a country in circumstances equivalent to it, it is impossible that population should increase at its utmost rate without lowering wages. In no old country does population increase at anything like its utmost rate; in most, at a very moderate rate: in some countries, not at all. These facts are only to be accounted for in two ways. Either the whole number of births which nature admits of, and which happen in some circumstances, do not take place; or, if they do, a large proportion of those who are born, die. The retardation of increase results either from mortality or prudence; from Mr. Malthus's positive, or from his preventive check: and one or the other of these must and does exist, and very powerfully too, in all old societies. Wherever population is not kept down by the prudence either of individuals or of the state, it is kept down by starvation or disease.
Except in the very unique cases I've just mentioned, where the only one of any practical significance is that of a new colony or a country in similar circumstances, it's impossible for the population to grow at its maximum rate without wages dropping. In no established country does the population grow anywhere close to its maximum rate; most grow at a very moderate pace, and in some, not at all. These facts can be explained in two ways: either the total number of births that nature allows, which can happen in certain circumstances, doesn't occur, or if they do happen, a large number of those who are born die. The slowdown in population growth comes either from high mortality rates or from cautious decision-making; from Mr. Malthus's positive check or his preventive check. One of these factors must and does exist, and quite strongly, in all established societies. Wherever the population isn't controlled by the caution of individuals or the state, it's managed by starvation or disease.
§ 5. Proper Control of Population is the Only Protection for the Working Class.
Where a laboring-class who have no property but their daily wages, and no hope of acquiring it, refrain from over-rapid multiplication, the cause, I believe, has always hitherto been, either actual legal restraint, or a custom of some sort which, without intention on their part, insensibly molds their conduct, or affords immediate inducements not to marry. It is not generally known in how many countries of Europe direct legal obstacles are opposed to improvident marriages.
Where a working class that has no property except for their daily wages and no hope of gaining any, holds back from having too many children, I believe the reason has always been either actual legal restrictions or some kind of custom that, without their intention, subtly influences their behavior or provides immediate reasons not to marry. It's not widely known how many countries in Europe have direct legal barriers against irresponsible marriages.
Where there is no general law restrictive of marriage, there are often customs equivalent to it. When the guilds or trade corporations of the middle ages were in vigor, their by-laws or regulations were conceived with a very vigilant eye to the advantage which the trade derived from limiting competition; and they made it very effectually the interest of artisans not to marry until after passing through the two stages of apprentice and journeyman, and attaining the rank of master.
Where there’s no general law restricting marriage, there are often customs that serve a similar purpose. When the guilds or trade organizations of the Middle Ages were strong, their rules were designed with a sharp focus on benefiting the trade by limiting competition. They made it very much in the interest of craftsmen not to marry until they had completed the two levels of apprentice and journeyman and achieved the status of master.
Unhappily, sentimentality rather than common sense usually presides over the discussions of these subjects. Discussions [pg 191] on the condition of the laborers, lamentations over its wretchedness, denunciations of all who are supposed to be indifferent to it, projects of one kind or another for improving it, were in no country and in no time of the world so rife as in the present generation; but there is a tacit agreement to ignore totally the law of wages, or to dismiss it in a parenthesis, with such terms as “hard-hearted Malthusianism”; as if it were not a thousand times more hard-hearted to tell human beings that they may, than that they may not, call into existence swarms of creatures who are sure to be miserable, and most likely to be depraved!
Unfortunately, emotions rather than common sense usually dominate discussions on these topics. Conversations about the situation of workers, complaints about its misery, accusations against anyone thought to be indifferent to it, and various proposals to improve it are more common today than ever before; yet there’s an unspoken agreement to completely ignore the law of wages, or to mention it only in passing, using phrases like “hard-hearted Malthusianism”; as if it were not far more cruel to suggest that people can bring into existence countless beings who are guaranteed to suffer, and are likely to be corrupt!
I ask, then, is it true or not, that if their numbers were fewer they would obtain higher wages? This is the question, and no other: and it is idle to divert attention from it, by attacking any incidental position of Malthus or some other writer, and pretending that to refute that is to disprove the principle of population. Some, for instance, have achieved an easy victory over a passing remark of Mr. Malthus, hazarded chiefly by way of illustration, that the increase of food may perhaps be assumed to take place in an arithmetical ratio, while population increases in a geometrical: when every candid reader knows that Mr. Malthus laid no stress on this unlucky attempt to give numerical precision to things which do not admit of it, and every person capable of reasoning must see that it is wholly superfluous to his argument. Others have attached immense importance to a correction which more recent political economists have made in the mere language of the earlier followers of Mr. Malthus. Several writers had said that it is the tendency of population to increase faster than the means of subsistence. The assertion was true in the sense in which they meant it, namely, that population would in most circumstances increase faster than the means of subsistence, if it were not checked either by mortality or by prudence. But inasmuch as these checks act with unequal force at different times and places, it was possible to interpret the language of these writers as if they had meant that population is usually [pg 192] gaining ground upon subsistence, and the poverty of the people becoming greater. Under this interpretation of their meaning, it was urged that the reverse is the truth: that as civilization advances, the prudential check tends to become stronger, and population to slacken its rate of increase, relatively to subsistence; and that it is an error to maintain that population, in any improving community, tends to increase faster than, or even so fast as, subsistence.171 The word tendency172 is here used in a totally different sense from that of the writers who affirmed the proposition; but waiving the verbal question, is it not allowed, on both sides, that in old countries population presses too closely upon the means of subsistence?
I ask, then, is it true or not that if their numbers were fewer, they would earn higher wages? That's the question, and nothing else. It's pointless to shift the focus away from it by attacking some incidental point made by Malthus or another writer, pretending that disproving that is the same as disproving the principle of population. For instance, some have easily dismissed a passing remark from Mr. Malthus, mainly made as an example, that the increase in food might be assumed to happen in an arithmetic ratio, while population grows in a geometric one. Every honest reader knows that Mr. Malthus didn’t put much weight on this unfortunate attempt to give numerical accuracy to things that don’t allow for it, and anyone capable of reasoning can see it’s completely unnecessary to his argument. Others have placed great importance on a correction that more recent political economists have made in the wording used by earlier followers of Mr. Malthus. Several writers stated that population tends to speed up than the means of subsistence. That assertion was true in the sense they intended it, meaning that population would, in most circumstances, grow faster than the means of subsistence if it weren’t limited by either death rates or careful planning. But since these checks act with varying strength at different times and places, one could interpret these writers' language as suggesting that population is usually [pg 192] gaining on subsistence, leading to increased poverty among the people. With this interpretation, it was argued that the opposite is true: as civilization progresses, the checks from prudence tend to become stronger, and population growth slows down relative to subsistence. It's a mistake to say that population, in any improving community, tends to grow faster than, or even as fast as, subsistence. 171 The word tendency 172 is used here in a completely different way than by the writers who made that claim; but setting aside the wording issue, isn’t it accepted on both sides that in older countries, population is pressing too closely against the means of subsistence?
Chapter III: Remedies for Low Wages.
§ 1. A legal or customary minimum wage, along with a guarantee of employment.
The simplest expedient which can be imagined for keeping the wages of labor up to the desirable point would be to fix them by law; and this is virtually the object aimed at in a variety of plans which have at different times been, or still are, current, for remodeling the relation between laborers and employers. No one, probably, ever suggested that wages should be absolutely fixed, since the interests of all concerned often require that they should be variable; but some have proposed to fix a minimum of wages, leaving the variations above that point to be adjusted by competition. Another plan, which has found many advocates among the leaders of the operatives, is that councils should be formed, which in England have been called local boards of trade, in France “conseils de prud'hommes,” and other names; consisting of delegates from the work-people and from the employers, who, meeting in conference, should agree upon a rate of wages, and promulgate it from authority, to be binding generally on employers and workmen; the ground of decision being, not the state of the labor market, but natural equity; to provide that the workmen shall have reasonable wages, and the capitalist reasonable profits.
The easiest way to keep wages at a desirable level would be to set them by law; this is essentially what various plans have aimed for at different times in restructuring the relationship between workers and employers. No one has probably ever suggested that wages should be fixed at a single number since the needs of everyone involved often mean they should be flexible; however, some have proposed establishing a minimum wage, allowing any increases above that to be determined by competition. Another idea, which has gained support among worker leaders, is to create councils—known in England as local boards of trade, in France as "labor court advice," and called other names—composed of representatives from both workers and employers. These councils would meet to agree on a wage rate, which would be announced and enforced as binding for both employers and workers, based not on the current labor market but on natural fairness; ensuring that workers receive fair wages and that capitalists earn reasonable profits.
Others again (but these are rather philanthropists interesting themselves for the laboring-classes, than the laboring people themselves) are shy of admitting the interference of authority in contracts for labor: they fear that if law intervened, it would intervene rashly and ignorantly; they are convinced that two parties, with opposite interests, attempting to adjust those interests by negotiation through their representatives on principles of equity, when no rule could be laid down to determine what was equitable, would merely exasperate their differences instead of healing them; but what it is useless to attempt by the legal sanction, these persons desire to compass by the moral. Every employer, they think, ought to give sufficient wages; and if he does it not willingly, should be compelled to it by general opinion; the test of sufficient wages being their own feelings, or what they suppose to be those of the public. This is, I think, a fair representation of a considerable body of existing opinion on the subject.
Others, however (though they are more philanthropists concerned with the working class than the workers themselves), are hesitant to accept government involvement in labor contracts: they worry that if the law steps in, it would do so carelessly and without understanding; they believe that two parties with opposing interests trying to resolve those issues through negotiations with their representatives based on fairness—when there's no clear guideline on what fairness is—would only intensify their disagreements instead of resolving them. What they feel is pointless to pursue through legal means, these individuals want to achieve through moral pressure. They believe every employer should give fair wages, and if they don't do so willingly, they should be forced to by public opinion; the measure of fair wages being based on their own feelings or what they think the public feels. I believe this is a fair representation of a significant segment of current opinion on the issue.
I desire to confine my remarks to the principle involved in all these suggestions, without taking into account practical difficulties, serious as these must at once be seen to be. I shall suppose that by one or other of these contrivances wages could be kept above the point to which they would be brought by competition. This is as much as to say, above the highest rate which can be afforded by the existing capital [pg 195] consistently with employing all the laborers. For it is a mistake to suppose that competition merely keeps down wages. It is equally the means by which they are kept up. When there are any laborers unemployed, these, unless maintained by charity, become competitors for hire, and wages fall; but when all who were out of work have found employment, wages will not, under the freest system of competition, fall lower. There are strange notions afloat concerning the nature of competition. Some people seem to imagine that its effect is something indefinite; that the competition of sellers may lower prices, and the competition of laborers may lower wages, down to zero, or some unassignable minimum. Nothing can be more unfounded. Goods can only be lowered in price by competition to the point which calls forth buyers sufficient to take them off; and wages can only be lowered by competition until room is made to admit all the laborers to a share in the distribution of the wages-fund. If they fell below this point, a portion of capital would remain unemployed for want of laborers; a counter-competition would commence on the side of capitalists, and wages would rise.
I want to focus my comments on the principle behind all these suggestions, without getting into the practical challenges, which are obviously significant. I will assume that through one of these methods, wages could be kept above the level that competition would normally bring them to. This means that wage levels could be maintained above the highest rate that current capital can support while also employing all laborers. It’s a common misconception to think that competition only drives wages down. In fact, it’s also a way to keep them up. When there are unemployed laborers, unless they are supported by charity, they compete for jobs, and wages decrease. However, once all the unemployed have found work, wages won’t drop any lower, even in a highly competitive environment. There are some odd ideas floating around about what competition really means. Some people seem to think its effect is vague; that sellers competing can reduce prices and that laborers competing can drive wages down to zero or some undefined minimum. This could not be more incorrect. Prices can only fall due to competition to a level that attracts enough buyers to purchase them. Similarly, wages can only decrease through competition until there is space for all laborers to share in the wages pool. If wages were to fall below this level, some capital would remain unused due to a lack of laborers; this would lead to increased competition among capitalists, causing wages to rise.
Since, therefore, the rate of wages which results from competition distributes the whole wages-fund among the whole laboring population, if law or opinion succeeds in fixing wages above this rate, some laborers are kept out of employment; and as it is not the intention of the philanthropists that these should starve, they must be provided for [pg 196] by a forced increase of the wages-fund—by a compulsory saving. It is nothing to fix a minimum of wages unless there be a provision that work, or wages at least, be found for all who apply for it. This, accordingly, is always part of the scheme, and is consistent with the ideas of more people than would approve of either a legal or a moral minimum of wages. Popular sentiment looks upon it as the duty of the rich, or of the state, to find employment for all the poor. If the moral influence of opinion does not induce the rich to spare from their consumption enough to set all the poor at work at “reasonable wages,” it is supposed to be incumbent on the state to lay on taxes for the purpose, either by local rates or votes of public money. The proportion between labor and the wages-fund would thus be modified to the advantage of the laborers, not by restriction of population, but by an increase of capital.
Since the competitive wage rate distributes the total wage fund among all workers, if laws or opinions manage to set wages above this rate, some workers will be unable to find jobs. And since philanthropists don't intend for these individuals to starve, they need to be supported by a forced increase in the wage fund—through mandatory savings. Setting a minimum wage means nothing unless there’s a plan to ensure that work or at least wages are available for everyone who seeks it. This is always a part of the approach and aligns with the beliefs of more people than would support either a legal or a moral minimum wage. Public opinion tends to view it as the responsibility of the wealthy or the government to provide jobs for all the poor. If the moral pressure of public opinion doesn’t compel the wealthy to reduce their consumption enough to employ all the poor at “reasonable wages,” it is assumed that the government should impose taxes for this purpose, either through local levies or public funding. This way, the ratio of labor to the wage fund would be adjusted in favor of workers, not by limiting population, but by increasing capital.
§ 2. —Would Require Legal Measures to Control the Population as a Condition.
If this claim on society could be limited to the existing generation; if nothing more were necessary than a compulsory accumulation, sufficient to provide permanent employment at ample wages for the existing numbers of the people; such a proposition would have no more strenuous supporter than myself. Society mainly consists of those who live by bodily labor; and if society, that is, if the laborers, lend their physical force to protect individuals in the enjoyment of superfluities, they are entitled to do so, and have always done so, with the reservation of a power to tax those superfluities for purposes of public utility; among which purposes the subsistence of the people is the foremost. Since no one is responsible for having been born, no pecuniary sacrifice is too great to be made by those who have more than enough, for the purpose of securing enough to all persons already in existence.
If this claim on society could be limited to the current generation; if all that was needed was a mandatory accumulation that could provide permanent jobs with good wages for the people alive today; I would be its strongest supporter. Society mostly consists of people who work with their bodies; and if society, meaning the workers, lend their physical strength to help individuals enjoy their excesses, they have the right to do so, and have always done so, while having the power to tax those excesses for public purposes; among which the well-being of the people is the top priority. Since no one is at fault for being born, no financial sacrifice is too significant to be made by those who have more than enough to ensure that everyone currently alive has enough to live on.
But it is another thing altogether when those who have produced and accumulated are called upon to abstain from consuming until they have given food and clothing, not only to all who now exist, but to all whom these or their descendants may think fit to call into existence. Such an obligation [pg 197] acknowledged and acted upon, would suspend all checks, both positive and preventive; there would be nothing to hinder population from starting forward at its rapidest rate; and as the natural increase of capital would, at the best, not be more rapid than before, taxation, to make up the growing deficiency, must advance with the same gigantic strides. But let them work ever so efficiently, the increasing population could not, as we have so often shown, increase the produce proportionally; the surplus, after all were fed, would bear a less and less proportion to the whole produce and to the population: and the increase of people going on in a constant ratio, while the increase of produce went on in a diminishing ratio, the surplus would in time be wholly absorbed; taxation for the support of the poor would engross the whole income of the country; the payers and the receivers would be melted down into one mass.
But it's a completely different story when those who have produced and accumulated are expected to refrain from consuming until they've provided food and clothing not just to everyone alive now, but to everyone who might ever be born in the future. Accepting and acting on such a responsibility would eliminate all checks, both positive and preventive; there would be nothing to stop the population from growing at the fastest possible rate. Since the natural increase of capital wouldn't be any quicker than it was before, taxes would have to rise to cover the growing shortfall. No matter how efficiently they worked, as we've often pointed out, the growing population couldn't increase the total output proportionally; the surplus, once everyone was fed, would make up a smaller and smaller part of the overall output and the population. With the population increasing at a steady rate while output grew at a decreasing rate, the surplus would eventually be completely consumed; tax revenues for supporting the poor would take up the entire income of the country, merging the taxpayers and recipients into one group.
It would be possible for the state to guarantee employment at ample wages to all who are born. But if it does this, it is bound in self-protection, and for the sake of every purpose for which government exists, to provide that no person shall be born without its consent. To give profusely to the people, whether under the name of charity or of employment, without placing them under such influences that prudential motives shall act powerfully upon them, is to lavish the means of benefiting mankind without attaining the object. But remove the regulation of their wages from their own control; guarantee to them a certain payment, either by law or by the feeding of the community; and no amount of comfort that you can give them will make either them or their descendants look to their own self-restraint as the proper means for preserving them in that state.
The state could guarantee jobs with good pay for everyone born. But if it does this, it must, for its own protection and for all the reasons governments exist, ensure that no one is born without its approval. Giving generously to the people, whether it's called charity or employment, without putting them in situations where practical motivations strongly influence their decisions, is wasting resources to help humanity without achieving the goal. If you take control of their wages away from them; if you guarantee them a certain income, either by law or from community support; then no amount of comfort you provide will encourage them or their future generations to see self-discipline as the right way to maintain that comfort.
The famous poor-laws of Elizabeth, enacted in 1601, were at first intended to relieve the destitute poor, sick, aged, and impotent, but in their administration a share was given to all who begged it. Employers, of course, found it cheaper to hire labor partly paid for by the parish, and the independent farm-laborer who would not go on the parish found his own wages lowered by this kind of competition. This continued a crying [pg 198] evil until it reached the proportions described by May: “As the cost of pauperism, thus encouraged, was increasing, the poorer rate-payers were themselves reduced to poverty. The soil was ill-cultivated by pauper labor, and its rental consumed by parish rates. In a period of fifty years, the poor-rates were quadrupled, and had reached, in 1833, the enormous amount of £8,600,000. In many parishes they were approaching the annual value of the land itself.”173 The old poor-laws were repealed, and there went into effect in 1834 the workhouse system, which, while not denying subsistence to all those born, required that the giving of aid should be made as disagreeable as possible, in order to stimulate among the poor a feeling of repugnance to all aid from the community. This is also the general idea of poor-relief in the United States.
The famous poor laws of Elizabeth, established in 1601, were originally intended to assist the needy, sick, elderly, and disabled. However, in reality, they provided benefits to anyone who __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.askedFor employers, it became more cost-effective to hire workers partially funded by the parish, which lowered wages for independent farm workers who declined parish support. This problem persisted and became serious, reaching the extent described by May:“As the cost of supporting the poor went up, the burden fell on the poorer taxpayers, driving them deeper into poverty. The land was poorly managed by those depending on assistance, and the rental income was eaten up by parish taxes. In just fifty years, poor rates increased fourfold, hitting an incredible £8,600,000 in 1833. In many parishes, these rates were almost equal to the annual value of the land itself.”173The outdated poor laws were repealed, and in 1834, the workhouse system was implemented. This system ensured that everyone received at least basic support while making access to aid as unpleasant as possible to discourage dependence on community assistance. This attitude towards welfare is also evident in the United States.
The cultivation of the principle of self-help in each laborer is certainly the right object at which to aim. In the United States voluntary charitable organizations have associated together, in some cities, in order to scrutinize all cases of poverty through a number of visitors in each district, who advise and counsel the unfortunate, but never give money. This system has been very successful, and, by basing its operations on the principle of self-help, has given the best proof of its right to an increasing influence.
Promoting the idea of self-help among all workers is definitely a worthwhile goal. In the United States, voluntary charity organizations have joined forces in some cities to tackle poverty by engaging various volunteers in each area who offer advice and support to those in need, without handing out cash. This method has been very effective, and by emphasizing self-help, it has demonstrated a significant increase in its impact.
§ 3. Wage Support and Living Standards.
Next to the attempts to regulate wages, and provide artificially that all who are willing to work shall receive an adequate price for their labor, we have to consider another class of popular remedies, which do not profess to interfere with freedom of contract; which leave wages to be fixed by the competition of the market, but, when they are considered insufficient, endeavor by some subsidiary resource to make up to the laborers for the insufficiency. Of this nature was the allowance system. The principle of this scheme being avowedly that of adapting the means of every family to its necessities, it was a natural consequence that more should be given to the married than to the single, and to those who had large families than to those who had not: in fact, an allowance was usually granted for every child. It is obvious that this is merely another mode of fixing a minimum of wages.
Alongside efforts to regulate pay and ensure that everyone willing to work receives fair compensation for their labor, we also need to look at another set of popular solutions. These solutions don’t claim to interfere with the freedom to contract; they allow wages to be determined by market competition but, when wages are deemed insufficient, aim to provide some additional support to workers. One example of this is the allowance system. The principle behind this system is explicitly about matching each family's resources to their needs. Naturally, this meant that married individuals received more than single people, and those with larger families received more than those with fewer children; in fact, an allowance was typically given for each child. It's clear that this is just another way of establishing a minimum wage.
There is a rate of wages, either the lowest on which the [pg 199] people can, or the lowest on which they will consent, to live. We will suppose this to be seven shillings a week. Shocked at the wretchedness of this pittance, the parish authorities humanely make it up to ten. But the laborers are accustomed to seven, and though they would gladly have more, will live on that (as the fact proves) rather than restrain the instinct of multiplication. Their habits will not be altered for the better by giving them parish pay. Receiving three shillings from the parish, they will be as well off as before, though they should increase sufficiently to bring down wages to four shillings. They will accordingly people down to that point; or, perhaps, without waiting for an increase of numbers, there are unemployed laborers enough in the workhouse to produce the effect at once. It is well known that the allowance system did practically operate in the mode described, and that under its influence wages sank to a lower rate than had been known in England before.
There’s a minimum wage, either the least amount people can live on or the least they’ll agree to accept. Let's say this is seven shillings a week. Shocked by how miserable this amount is, the local authorities kindly raise it to ten. However, the workers are used to seven, and even though they would happily take more, they'll manage on that (as shown by the facts) rather than control their natural tendency to have larger families. Giving them assistance from the parish won’t improve their habits. If they receive three shillings from the local authority, they'll feel just as secure as before, even if that causes wages to drop to four shillings. They'll adjust their numbers down to that level; or, without waiting for that increase, there are already enough jobless laborers in the workhouse to make this happen immediately. It’s well known that the allowance system essentially worked as described, causing wages to fall to a level not seen in England before.
The operation of a low standard upon the wages of those in the community who have a higher one, has been seen in the United States to a certain extent by the landing on our shores of Chinese laborers, who maintain a decidedly lower standard of living than either their American or Irish competitors. If they come in such numbers as to retain their lower standard by forming a group by themselves, and are thereby not assimilated into the body of laborers who have a higher standard of comfort, they can, to the extent of their ability to do work, drive other laborers out of employment. This, moreover, is exactly what was done by the Irish, who drove Americans out of the mills of New England, and who are now being driven out, probably, by the French Canadians, with a standard lower than the Irish. The Chinese come here now without their families, as may be seen by the accompanying diagram, in which the shaded side represents the males on the left, and the unshaded the females on the right, of the perpendicular line.
The effect of a lower wage standard on those in the community with a higher one can be observed in the United States, especially with the influx of Chinese laborers who live at a much lower standard than their American or Irish counterparts. If they come in such numbers that they keep their lower standard by forming their own group and do not integrate into the larger workforce that has a higher standard of living, they can, based on their work capacity, drive other workers out of jobs. This is exactly what the Irish did, pushing Americans out of the mills in New England, and they are now likely being displaced by French Canadians, who have a lower standard than the Irish. The Chinese come here without their families, as shown in the accompanying diagram, where the shaded side represents the males on the left and the unshaded side represents the females on the right of the vertical line.
Ten years. | Men. | Women. |
1 | 6 | 4 |
2 | 106 | 12 |
3 | 351 | 37 |
4 | 283 | 15 |
5 | 139 | 3 |
6 | 32 | 1 |
7 | 10 | 0 |
8 | 1 | 0 |
9 | 0 | 0 |
The horizontal lines show the ages, the largest number being about thirty years of age. It will be noted how many come in the prime of life, and how few children and females there are.
The horizontal lines show the ages, with the highest number around thirty. It's clear how many people are in their prime and how few children and women are represented.
It need hardly be said that the economic side of a question is here discussed, which requires for its solution many ethical and political considerations besides.
It's important to recognize that the economic side of this issue is being discussed, which also involves many ethical and political factors for its resolution.
§ 4. Reasons to Expect Improved Public Opinion on the Issue of Population.
By what means, then, is poverty to be contended against? How is the evil of low wages to be remedied? If the expedients usually recommended for the purpose are not adapted to it, can no others be thought of? Is the problem incapable of solution? Can political economy do nothing, but only object to everything, and demonstrate that nothing can be done? Those who think it hopeless that the laboring-classes should be induced to practice a sufficient degree of prudence in regard to the increase of their families, because they have hitherto stopped short of that point, show an inability to estimate the ordinary principles of human action. Nothing more would probably be necessary to secure that result, than an opinion generally diffused that it was desirable.
By what means, then, can we fight poverty? How can we fix the issue of low wages? If the usual suggestions for this purpose aren't suitable, can't we think of other options? Is the problem unsolvable? Can economic theory do nothing but criticize everything and prove that nothing can be done? Those who believe it's hopeless for the working class to learn to manage their families better, simply because they haven't done so in the past, fail to understand the basic principles of human behavior. All it might take to achieve that change is a widespread belief that it's something worth striving for.
But let us try to imagine what would happen if the idea became general among the laboring-class that the competition of too great numbers was the principal cause of their poverty. We are often told that the most thorough perception of the dependence of wages on population will not influence the conduct of a laboring-man, because it is not the children he himself can have that will produce any effect in generally depressing the labor market. True, and it is also true that one soldier's running away will not lose the battle; accordingly, it is not that consideration which keeps each soldier in his rank: it is the disgrace which naturally and inevitably attends on conduct by any one individual which, if pursued by a majority, everybody can see would be fatal. Men are seldom found to brave the general opinion of their class, unless supported either by some principle higher than regard for opinion, or by some strong body of opinion elsewhere.
But let's try to picture what would happen if the working class widely believed that the competition from too many people was the main reason for their poverty. People often say that even if workers fully understand how wages depend on population, it won't change how they act, because it’s not the children they have personally that will affect the overall decline in the job market. That’s true, but just like one soldier running away won’t cost the battle; it’s not that thought that keeps each soldier in line. Instead, it’s the shame that naturally follows any individual’s bad behavior, which, if adopted by most, would clearly lead to disaster. Men rarely challenge the prevailing opinion of their class unless they are driven by a principle that outweighs their concern for that opinion, or unless they have strong support from another viewpoint.
If the opinion were once generally established among the [pg 201] laboring-class that their welfare required a due regulation of the numbers of families, the respectable and well-conducted of the body would conform to the prescription, and only those would exempt themselves from it who were in the habit of making light of social obligations generally; and there would be then an evident justification for converting the moral obligation against bringing children into the world, who are a burden to the community, into a legal one; just as in many other cases of the progress of opinion, the law ends by enforcing against recalcitrant minorities obligations which, to be useful, must be general, and which, from a sense of their utility, a large majority have voluntarily consented to take upon themselves.
If it became widely accepted among the laboring class that their well-being depended on managing the number of families, the responsible and reputable members of that group would follow the guidelines, and only those who generally disregard social responsibilities would opt out. This would create a clear reason to turn the moral obligation of not bringing kids into the world—who are a burden on society—into a legal one. Just like in many other instances where public opinion evolves, the law eventually enforces on resistant minorities obligations that, to be effective, need to be universal, and which a large majority have willingly agreed to uphold due to their perceived benefits.
The dependence of wages on the number of the competitors for employment is so far from hard of comprehension, or unintelligible to the laboring-classes, that by great bodies of them it is already recognized and habitually acted on. It is familiar to all trades-unions: every successful combination to keep up wages owes its success to contrivances for restricting the number of competitors; all skilled trades are anxious to keep down their own numbers, and many impose, or endeavor to impose, as a condition upon employers, that they shall not take more than a prescribed number of apprentices. There is, of course, a great difference between limiting their numbers by excluding other people, and doing the same thing by a restraint imposed on themselves; but the one as much as the other shows a clear perception of the relation between their numbers and their remuneration. The principle is understood in its application to any one employment, but not to the general mass of employment. For this there are several reasons: first, the operation of causes is more easily and distinctly seen in the more circumscribed field; secondly, skilled artisans are a more intelligent class than ordinary manual laborers; and the habit of concert, and of passing in review their general condition as a trade, keeps up a better understanding of their collective interests; thirdly and lastly, they are the most [pg 202] provident, because they are the best off, and have the most to preserve.
The way wages depend on the number of people competing for jobs is not hard to understand, even for the working class, and many of them recognize this and act accordingly. All trade unions are aware of this: every successful effort to maintain wages relies on strategies to limit the number of competitors. Skilled trades are eager to keep their numbers low, and many set conditions with employers that restrict the number of apprentices they can take on. Of course, there's a big difference between limiting their numbers by excluding others and doing it by self-imposed restrictions; however, both show a clear understanding of the connection between their numbers and their pay. This principle is recognized in specific jobs but not across the board in all jobs. There are several reasons for this: first, it's easier to see the effects of causes in a smaller field; second, skilled workers tend to be more knowledgeable than regular manual laborers, and the habit of working together and reviewing their overall situation as a trade helps them understand their common interests better; third and finally, they are the most forward-thinking because they are better off and have more to protect.
§ 5. Two ways to improve the habits of working people: through education and by supporting both foreign and domestic colonization.
For the purpose, therefore, of altering the habits of the laboring people, there is need of a twofold action, directed simultaneously upon their intelligence and their poverty. An effective national education of the children of the laboring-class is the first thing needful; and, coincidently with this, a system of measures which shall (as the Revolution did in France) extinguish extreme poverty for one whole generation. Without entering into disputable points, it may be asserted without scruple that the aim of all intellectual training for the mass of the people should be to cultivate common sense; to qualify them for forming a sound practical judgment of the circumstances by which they are surrounded. [But] education is not compatible with extreme poverty. It is impossible effectually to teach an indigent population. Toward effecting this object there are two resources available, without wrong to any one, without any of the liabilities of mischief attendant on voluntary or legal charity, and not only without weakening, but on the contrary strengthening, every incentive to industry, and every motive to forethought.
To change the habits of working people, we need to take two simultaneous actions that target both their intelligence and their poverty. The first step is to provide effective national education for children from working-class families. Alongside this, we need a system of measures that will eliminate extreme poverty for an entire generation, similar to what the Revolution did in France. Without getting into debatable points, it's clear that the goal of educating the general public should be to develop common sense, enabling them to make sound practical judgments about their circumstances. However, education isn't possible in the face of extreme poverty. It’s difficult to effectively teach people who are struggling financially. To achieve this goal, there are two resources we can utilize that won't harm anyone, will avoid the pitfalls of voluntary or legal charity, and will not only preserve but actually enhance the motivation to work hard and plan for the future.
The first is a great national measure of colonization. I mean, a grant of public money, sufficient to remove at once, and establish in the colonies, a considerable fraction of the youthful agricultural population. It has been shown by others that colonization on an adequate scale might be so conducted as to cost the country nothing, or nothing that would not be certainly repaid; and that the funds required, even by way of advance, would not be drawn from the capital employed in maintaining labor, but from that surplus which can not find employment at such profit as constitutes an adequate remuneration for the abstinence of the possessor, and which is therefore sent abroad for investment, or wasted at home in reckless speculations.
The first is a major national plan for colonization. I’m talking about using public funds to quickly relocate and settle a significant portion of the young farming population in the colonies. Others have shown that a large-scale colonization effort could be managed in a way that wouldn’t cost the country anything, or at least not more than what would be definitely returned; and that the initial funds needed wouldn’t come from the capital used to support labor, but rather from surplus money that can’t find a profitable investment that adequately compensates for the owner’s lack of use. This surplus is often sent abroad for investment or wasted at home in reckless ventures.
The second resource would be to devote all common land, hereafter brought into cultivation, to raising a class of [pg 203] small proprietors. What I would propose is, that common land should be divided into sections of five acres or thereabout, to be conferred in absolute property on individuals of the laboring-class who would reclaim and bring them into cultivation by their own labor.
The second resource would be to dedicate all common land, which will be cultivated in the future, to creating a class of small property owners. What I suggest is that common land should be divided into sections of about five acres, to be granted as complete ownership to individuals from the working class who would reclaim and cultivate it through their own efforts.
The preference should be given to such laborers, and there are many of them, as had saved enough to maintain them until their first crop was got in, or whose character was such as to induce some responsible person to advance to them the requisite amount on their personal security. The tools, the manure, and in some cases the subsistence also, might be supplied by the parish, or by the state; interest for the advance, at the rate yielded by the public funds, being laid on as a perpetual quitrent, with power to the peasant to redeem it at any time for a moderate number of years' purchase. These little landed estates might, if it were thought necessary, be indivisible by law; though, if the plan worked in the manner designed, I should not apprehend any objectionable degree of subdivision. In case of intestacy, and in default of amicable arrangement among the heirs, they might be bought by government at their value, and re-granted to some other laborer who could give security for the price. The desire to possess one of these small properties would probably become, as on the Continent, an inducement to prudence and economy pervading the whole laboring population; and that great desideratum among a people of hired laborers would be provided, an intermediate class between them and their employers; affording them the double advantage of an object for their hopes, and, as there would be good reason to anticipate, an example for their imitation.
Laborers who have saved enough to support themselves until their first crop is harvested, or whose character is strong enough to persuade someone trustworthy to lend them the necessary amount based on their personal security, should be prioritized. The parish or the state might provide tools, fertilizer, and sometimes even food, with interest on the loan set at the rate offered by public funds. This would be treated as a perpetual quitrent, giving the peasant the option to pay it off at any time for a reasonable number of years' purchase. These small land estates could be legally indivisible if necessary; although, if the plan is carried out as intended, I wouldn’t expect any significant unwanted division. In case of someone dying without a will, and if the heirs can't come to a friendly agreement, the government could buy the property at its value and reassign it to another laborer willing to provide security for the price. The desire to own one of these small properties would likely encourage sensible and economical behavior throughout the entire working population, creating that important middle class between laborers and their employers. This would provide both a goal for their aspirations and, as we could reasonably expect, a role model to follow.
It would, however, be of little avail that either or both of these measures of relief should be adopted, unless on such a scale as would enable the whole body of hired laborers remaining on the soil to obtain not merely employment, but a large addition to the present wages—such an addition as would enable them to live and bring up their children in a degree of comfort and independence to which they have hitherto been strangers.
It wouldn't really help if either or both of these relief measures were implemented unless they were done on such a scale that all the hired workers still on the land could not only find jobs but also receive a significant increase in their current wages—an increase that would allow them to live comfortably and raise their children with a level of independence that they have not experienced before.
Chapter IV. The Differences in Wages Across Different Jobs.
§ 1. Wage Differences Due to Varying Levels of Attractiveness in Different Jobs.
In treating of wages, we have hitherto confined ourselves to the causes which operate on them generally, and en masse; the laws which govern the remuneration of ordinary or average labor, without reference to the existence of different kinds of work which are habitually paid at different rates, depending in some degree on different laws. We will now take into consideration these differences, and examine in what manner they affect or are affected by the conclusions already established.
In discussing wages, we've previously focused on the general factors that influence them, looking at the laws that determine the pay for typical or average labor, without considering the various types of work that are usually compensated at different rates, which are somewhat influenced by different rules. Now, we will consider these differences and explore how they impact or are impacted by the conclusions we've already reached.
The differences, says [Adam Smith], arise partly “from certain circumstances in the employments themselves, which either really, or at least in the imaginations of men, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in others.” These circumstances he considers to be: “First, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly, the small or great trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them; and, fifthly, the probability or improbability of success in them.”
The differences, according to [Adam Smith], come partly from "Certain aspects of the jobs themselves that, whether genuinely or just in people's perception, make up for a small pay increase in some cases and balance out a large pay increase in others." He identifies these factors as: “First, how enjoyable or unenjoyable the jobs are; second, how easy and cheap or how hard and expensive it is to learn them; third, whether the work is consistent or inconsistent; fourth, the amount of trust required in those who do the work; and fifth, the chances of success in those jobs.”
(1.) “The wages of labor vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honorableness or dishonorableness of the employment. A journeyman blacksmith, though an artificer, seldom earns so much in twelve hours as a collier, who is only a laborer, does in eight. His work [pg 206] is not quite so dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in daylight and above ground. Honor makes a great part of the reward of all honorable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered,” their recompense is, in his opinion, below the average. “Disgrace has the contrary effect. The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business; but it is in most places more profitable than the greater part of common trades. The most detestable of all employments, that of the public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade whatever.”
(1.) “The pay for a job depends on how easy or hard it is, how clean or dirty it is, and whether the job is viewed as respectable. A skilled journeyman blacksmith often makes less in twelve hours than a coal miner, who is just a laborer, makes in eight. The blacksmith's job isn't as dirty, involves less risk, and is done during the day and above ground. Having a good reputation is a big part of the reward for all respectable jobs. When you look at financial benefits overall,” he believes their compensation is below average. “Dishonor has the opposite effect. Being a butcher is tough and unpleasant; however, in many places, it pays more than most regular jobs. The most despised job, that of the public executioner, is, in comparison to the amount of work involved, better paid than any typical job.”
(2.) “Employment is much more constant,” continues Adam Smith, “in some trades than in others. In the greater part of manufactures, a journeyman may be pretty sure of employment almost every day in the year that he is able to work. A mason or brick-layer, on the contrary, can work neither in hard frost nor in foul weather, and his employment at all other times depends upon the occasional calls of his customers. He is liable, in consequence, to be frequently without any. What he earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain him while he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion.”
(2.) “Jobs are way more stable,” continues Adam Smith, “in some trades more than in others. In most manufacturing jobs, a worker can expect to have work almost every day of the year that they are available. A mason or bricklayer, however, cannot work in freezing conditions or bad weather, and their employment during other times depends on the unpredictable demands of their clients. As a result, they often find themselves without work. What they earn while working, therefore, needs to not only support them during their downtime but also provide some compensation for those anxious and hopeless moments that come from the uncertainty of such an unstable situation.”
“When (1) the inconstancy of the employment is combined with (2) the hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises the wages of the most common labor above those of the most skillful artificers. A collier working by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly about double, and in many parts of Scotland about three times, the wages of common labor. His high wages arise altogether from the hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of his work. His employment may, upon most occasions, be as constant as he pleases. The coal-heavers in London exercise a trade which in hardship, dirtiness, and disagreeableness almost equals that of colliers; and from the unavoidable irregularity in the arrivals of coal-ships, the [pg 207] employment of the greater part of them is necessarily very inconstant. If colliers, therefore, commonly earn double and triple the wages of common labor, it ought not to seem unreasonable that coal-heavers should sometimes earn four or five times those wages. In the inquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was found that, at the rate at which they were then paid, they could earn about four times the wages of common labor in London.”
“When (1) the inconsistency of the job is combined with (2) the difficulty, unpleasantness, and messiness of the work, it can sometimes lead to pay for basic labor exceeding that of skilled craftsmen. A coal miner paid by the piece is believed to earn about double in Newcastle, and in many areas of Scotland, roughly three times the wages of regular laborers. His high wages stem entirely from the difficulty, unpleasantness, and messiness of his job. For the most part, his work can be as steady as he chooses. The coal heavers in London have tasks that are almost as hard, dirty, and unpleasant as those of miners, and due to the unavoidable irregularity in the arrival of coal ships, their work is often very inconsistent. Therefore, if miners typically earn double or triple the wages of common labor, it’s not unreasonable that coal heavers sometimes make four or five times those wages. In a recent inquiry into their situation, it was found that, at the rates they were paid then, they could earn about four times the wages of common labor in London.”
These inequalities of remuneration, which are supposed to compensate for the disagreeable circumstances of particular employments, would, under certain conditions, be natural consequences of perfectly free competition: and as between employments of about the same grade, and filled by nearly the same description of people, they are, no doubt, for the most part, realized in practice.
These pay disparities, which are meant to make up for the unpleasant aspects of certain jobs, could, under certain conditions, be a natural outcome of completely free competition. And when comparing jobs of similar levels, staffed by nearly the same types of people, they are mostly seen in practice.
But it is altogether a false view of the state of facts to present this as the relation which generally exists between agreeable and disagreeable employments. The really exhausting and the really repulsive labors, instead of being better paid than others, are almost invariably paid the worst of all, because performed by those who have no choice. If the laborers in the aggregate, instead of exceeding, fell short of the amount of employment, work which was generally disliked would not be undertaken, except for more than ordinary wages. But when the supply of labor so far exceeds the demand that to find employment at all is an uncertainty, and to be offered it on any terms a favor, the case is totally the reverse. Partly from this cause, and partly from the natural and artificial monopolies, which will be spoken of presently, the inequalities of wages are generally in an opposite direction to the equitable principle of compensation, erroneously represented by Adam Smith as the general law of the remuneration of labor.
But it's entirely misleading to suggest that this is the usual relationship between enjoyable and unpleasant jobs. The truly exhausting and genuinely unpleasant tasks are, contrary to what one might think, usually the least paid because they are done by people who have no choice. If workers collectively fell short of the demand for work, jobs that were typically disliked wouldn’t be taken unless the pay was significantly higher. However, when the supply of labor far exceeds the demand to the point where finding any job is uncertain, and being offered one at all is a privilege, the situation flips entirely. This, along with the natural and artificial monopolies that will be discussed shortly, leads to wage inequalities that generally contradict the fair compensation principle that Adam Smith incorrectly claimed was the standard for labor remuneration.
(3.) One of the points best illustrated by Adam Smith is the influence exercised on the remuneration of an employment by the uncertainty of success in it. If the chances are great of total failure, the reward in case of success must be [pg 208] sufficient to make up, in the general estimation, for those adverse chances. Put your son apprentice to a shoemaker, there is little doubt of his learning to make a pair of shoes; but send him to study the law, it is at least twenty to one if ever he makes such proficiency as will enable him to live by the business. In a perfectly fair lottery, those who draw the prizes ought to gain all that is lost by those who draw the blanks. In a profession where twenty fail for one that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have been gained by the unsuccessful twenty. How extravagant soever the fees of counselors-at-law may sometimes appear, their real retribution is never equal to this.
(3.) One of the key points Adam Smith illustrates is how the uncertainty of success in a job affects the pay for that job. If the chances of total failure are high, the reward for success must be enough to offset those negative odds in the eyes of the public. If you train your son to be a shoemaker, there’s little doubt he’ll learn to make a pair of shoes; but if you send him to study law, there’s only about a one in twenty chance he’ll become skilled enough to make a living at it. In a completely fair lottery, those who win prizes should receive everything that is lost by those who draw blanks. In a profession where twenty fail for every one that succeeds, that one person should earn all that the twenty could have earned. No matter how expensive legal fees might sometimes seem, the actual compensation for lawyers is never equal to this.
§ 2. Differences from Natural Monopolies.
The preceding are cases in which inequality of remuneration is necessary to produce equality of attractiveness, and are examples of the equalizing effect of free competition. The following are cases of real inequality, and arise from a different principle.
The previous examples show instances where unequal pay is needed to create equality of appeal, highlighting the equalizing effect of free competition. The following examples demonstrate actual inequality and stem from a different principle.
(4.) “The wages of labor vary according to the small or great trust which must be reposed in the workmen. The wages of goldsmiths and jewelers are everywhere superior to those of many other workmen, not only of equal but of much superior ingenuity, on account of the precious materials with which they are intrusted.” The superiority of reward is not here the consequence of competition, but of its absence: not a compensation for disadvantages inherent in the employment, but an extra advantage; a kind of monopoly price, the effect not of a legal, but of what has been termed a natural monopoly. If all laborers were trustworthy, it would not be necessary to give extra pay to working goldsmiths on account of the trust. The degree of integrity required being supposed to be uncommon, those who can make it appear that they possess it are able to take advantage of the peculiarity, and obtain higher pay in proportion to its rarity.
(4.) "The pay for work varies based on the level of trust in the workers. Goldsmiths and jewelers typically earn higher wages than many other workers, not just those with similar skills but even those who are more skilled, due to the valuable materials they work with." The higher wages here are not due to competition but rather its absence: they aren’t compensating for the downsides of the job but rather offer an additional benefit; it's like a monopoly price, resulting not from legal restrictions but what’s referred to as a natural monopoly. If all workers were trustworthy, there wouldn’t be a need to offer extra pay to goldsmiths due to the trust required. Because the level of integrity needed is assumed to be rare, those who can demonstrate that they have it can leverage this unusual quality to negotiate higher wages based on its scarcity.
(5.) Some employments require a much longer time to learn, and a much more expensive course of instruction, than others; and to this extent there is, as explained by Adam Smith, an inherent reason for their being more highly remunerated. Wages, consequently, must yield, over and above the ordinary amount, an annuity sufficient to repay these sums, with the common rate of profit, within the number of years [the laborer] can expect to live and be in working condition.
(5.) Some jobs take a lot longer to learn and require a more expensive education than others; this is why, as Adam Smith explained, they tend to pay more. Wages, therefore, need to include an extra amount that covers these costs, along with the usual profit rate, over the number of years that the worker can expect to live and be able to work.
But, independently of these or any other artificial monopolies, there is a natural monopoly in favor of skilled laborers against the unskilled, which makes the difference of reward exceed, sometimes in a manifold proportion, what is sufficient merely to equalize their advantages. But the fact that a course of instruction is required, of even a low degree of costliness, or that the laborer must be maintained for a considerable time from other sources, suffices everywhere to exclude the great body of the laboring people from the possibility of any such competition. Until lately, all employments which required even the humble education of reading and writing could be recruited only from a select class, the majority having had no opportunity of acquiring those attainments.
But, aside from these or any other artificial monopolies, there is a natural monopoly favoring skilled workers over unskilled ones, which causes the difference in pay to sometimes be much greater than what is needed to level the playing field. However, the requirement of even a relatively low-cost education or the need for laborers to be supported for a significant time by other means keeps most working people from being able to compete. Until recently, all jobs that required even the basic skills of reading and writing could only be filled by a select group, as most people did not have the chance to learn those skills.
The changes, however, now so rapidly taking place in usages and ideas, are undermining all these distinctions; the habits or disabilities which chained people to their hereditary condition are fast wearing away, and every class is exposed to increased and increasing competition from at least the class immediately below it. The general relaxation of conventional barriers, and the increased facilities of education which already are, and will be in a much greater degree, brought within the reach of all, tend to produce, among many excellent effects, one which is the reverse: they tend to bring down the wages of skilled labor.
The changes happening so quickly in practices and ideas are breaking down all these distinctions. The habits or limitations that kept people tied to their social status are quickly fading, and every class is facing more competition from the one directly below it. The overall easing of traditional barriers, along with the growing access to education, which is already available to many and will be even more so in the future, leads to many positive effects, but one negative outcome: they tend to lower the wages of skilled workers.
§ 3. Impact on Wages from Competition with Individuals Having Other Sources of Income.
A modifying circumstance still remains to be noticed, which interferes to some extent with the operation of the principles thus far brought to view. While it is true, as a general rule, that the earnings of skilled labor, and especially of any labor which requires school education, are at a monopoly rate, from the impossibility, to the mass of the people, of obtaining that education, it is also true that the policy of nations, or the bounty of individuals, formerly did much to counteract the effect of this limitation of competition, by offering eleemosynary instruction to a much larger class of persons than could have obtained the same advantages by paying their price.
One more thing needs to be addressed that affects how the principles we've discussed work. Generally, it's true that skilled labor earnings, especially for jobs requiring formal education, are at a monopoly rate because most people can't access that education. However, it's also true that government policies and individual generosity have historically helped offset this lack of competition by providing free education to a much broader group of people than could have afforded it otherwise.
[Adam Smith has pointed out that] “whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it has always been rather to lower them than to raise them. But the law has upon many occasions attempted to raise the wages of curates, and, for the dignity of the Church, to oblige the rectors of parishes to give them more than the wretched maintenance which they themselves might be willing to accept of. And in both cases the law seems to have been equally ineffectual, and has never been either able to raise [pg 211] the wages of curates or to sink those of laborers to the degree that was intended, because it has never been able to hinder either the one from being willing to accept of less than the legal allowance, on account of the indigence of their situation and the multitude of their competitors, or the other from receiving more, on account of the contrary competition of those who expected to derive either profit or pleasure from employing them.”
[Adam Smith has pointed out that] Whenever the law has tried to regulate workers’ wages, it has ended up lowering them instead of raising them. However, the law has often attempted to increase the wages of curates and, for the dignity of the Church, to require parish rectors to pay them more than the meager support they might be willing to accept. In both situations, the law appears to have been equally ineffective and has never managed to raise the wages of curates or lower those of laborers to the desired level. This is because it has never been able to stop either group from accepting less than the legal minimum due to their desperate situations and the number of competitors, or from earning more because of the conflicting interests of those who stood to gain either profit or pleasure from employing them.
Although the highest pecuniary prizes of successful authorship are incomparably greater than at any former period, yet on any rational calculation of the chances, in the existing competition, scarcely any writer can hope to gain a living by books, and to do so by magazines and reviews becomes daily more difficult. It is only the more troublesome and disagreeable kinds of literary labor, and those which confer no personal celebrity, such as most of those connected with newspapers, or with the smaller periodicals, on which an educated person can now rely for subsistence. Of these, the remuneration is, on the whole, decidedly high; because, though exposed to the competition of what used to be called “poor scholars” (persons who have received a learned education from some public or private charity), they are exempt from that of amateurs, those who have other means of support being seldom candidates for such employments.
Although the highest monetary rewards for successful authorship are significantly greater than at any previous time, almost no writer today can realistically expect to make a living from books, and earning a living from magazines and reviews is becoming increasingly difficult. Only the more challenging and less appealing types of literary work, which do not bring personal fame, like many roles associated with newspapers or smaller periodicals, can now provide a reliable source of income for an educated person. Overall, the pay for these positions is quite decent because, while they face competition from what were once called “poor scholars” (individuals who have received a scholarly education through some form of public or private charity), they are not competing with amateurs, as those who have other means of support rarely seek out these jobs.
When an occupation is carried on chiefly by persons who derive the main portion of their subsistence from other sources, its remuneration may be lower almost to any extent than the wages of equally severe labor in other employments. The principal example of the kind is domestic manufactures. When spinning and knitting were carried on in every cottage, by families deriving their principal support from agriculture, the price at which their produce was sold (which constituted the remuneration of their labor) was often so low that there would have been required great perfection of machinery to undersell it. The amount of the remuneration in such a case depends chiefly upon whether the quantity of the commodity produced by this description of labor [pg 212] suffices to supply the whole of the demand. If it does not, and there is consequently a necessity for some laborers who devote themselves entirely to the employment, the price of the article must be sufficient to pay those laborers at the ordinary rate, and to reward, therefore, very handsomely the domestic producers. But if the demand is so limited that the domestic manufacture can do more than satisfy it, the price is naturally kept down to the lowest rate at which peasant families think it worth while to continue the production. Thus far, as to the remuneration of the subsidiary employment; but the effect to the laborers of having this additional resource is almost certain to be (unless peculiar counteracting causes intervene) a proportional diminution of the wages of their main occupation.
When a job is primarily done by people who get most of their income from other sources, the pay can be much lower than the wages for similar hard work in other jobs. A key example of this is home-based manufacturing. When spinning and knitting were done in every home by families who primarily relied on farming for their income, the prices for their products (which represented their labor's pay) were often so low that it would take very advanced machines to beat those prices. In this situation, the pay mainly depends on whether the total amount produced by this kind of work meets the entire demand. If it doesn’t and some workers are needed to focus solely on this work, then the prices must be high enough to pay those workers at the regular rate, allowing the home producers to earn a good profit as well. However, if demand is so low that home manufacturing can produce more than what is needed, the price naturally stays at the lowest point that families think is worth continuing production. This covers the pay for the side job; however, having this extra income source usually leads to a decrease in wages for their main job unless specific factors counteract this trend.
For the same reason it is found that, cæteris paribus, those trades are generally the worst paid in which the wife and children of the artisan aid in the work. The income which the habits of the class demand, and down to which they are almost sure to multiply, is made up in those trades by the earnings of the whole family, while in others the same income must be obtained by the labor of the man alone. It is even probable that their collective earnings will amount to a smaller sum than those of the man alone in other trades, because the prudential restraint on marriage is unusually weak when the only consequence immediately felt is an improvement of circumstances, the joint earnings of the two going further in their domestic economy after marriage than before.
For the same reason, it turns out that, ceteris paribus, the jobs where the artisan’s wife and children help are usually the worst paid. The income required by their lifestyle, which they seem to multiply to meet, comes from the whole family's earnings in these jobs, while in other jobs, the same income has to be earned solely by the man’s labor. It’s even likely that their combined earnings will be less than what the man would earn alone in other jobs, because the usual caution against marriage is less strict when the only immediate outcome is an improvement in their situation, with their joint earnings going further in their household budget after marriage than they did before.
This statement seems to be borne out by the statistics of wages176 both in England and the United States. In our cotton-mills, where women do certain kinds of work equally well with men, the wages of the men are lower than in outside employments into which women can not enter.
This statement seems to be backed by wage statistics.176in both England and the United States. In our cotton mills, where women do certain jobs just as well as men, the men's wages are lower than in other jobs that women can't reach.
Blacksmiths, per week: $16.74
Family of four: Drawers-in, cotton-mill—man, per week: $5.50
Family of four: Drawers-in, cotton-mill—woman, per week: $5.50
Family of four: Tenders, two boys: $4.50
Total: $15.50
Blacksmiths, weekly: $16.74
Family of four: Cotton mill workers—man, weekly: $5.50
Family of four: Cotton mill workers—woman, weekly: $5.50
Family of four: Helpers, two boys: $4.50
Total: $15.50
In this case the family of four all together receive only about the same as the wages of the single blacksmith alone.
In this case, the whole family of four makes about the same amount as the salary of the single blacksmith on his own.
§ 4. Women's Wages: Why They Are Lower than Men's.
Where men and women work at the same employment, if it be one for which they are equally fitted in point of physical power, they are not always unequally paid. Women in factories sometimes earn as much as men; and so they do in hand-loom weaving, which, being paid by the piece, brings their efficiency to a sure test. When the efficiency is equal, but the pay unequal, the only explanation that can be given is custom. But the principal question relates to the peculiar employments of women. The remuneration of these is always, I believe, greatly below that of employments of equal skill and equal disagreeableness carried on by men. In some of these cases the explanation is evidently that already given: as in the case of domestic servants, whose wages, speaking generally, are not determined by competition, but are greatly in excess of the market value of the labor, and in this excess, as in almost all things which are regulated by custom, the male sex obtains by far the largest share. In the occupations in which employers take full advantage of competition, the low wages of women, as compared with the ordinary earnings of men, are a proof that the employments are overstocked: that although so much smaller a number of women than of men support themselves by wages, the occupations which law and usage make accessible to them are comparatively so few that the field of their employment is still more overcrowded.
Where men and women work in the same job and are equally suited in terms of physical strength, they aren't always paid unequally. Women in factories sometimes earn as much as men, and the same goes for hand-loom weaving, which is paid by the piece and puts their efficiency to a clear test. When their efficiency is equal but their pay isn’t, the only reason that can be given is tradition. However, the main issue concerns the specific jobs available to women. I'm convinced that the pay for these jobs is usually much lower than for jobs requiring equal skill and unpleasantness that men do. In some cases, the explanation is clear, like with domestic workers, whose wages are generally not determined by competition but are much higher than the market value of their labor; in this case, as in almost everything determined by custom, men get the biggest share. In jobs where employers fully exploit competition, the low wages for women, compared to the typical earnings of men, indicate that these jobs are oversaturated. Even though fewer women than men earn their living through wages, the jobs that laws and customs make available to them are relatively scarce, resulting in an even more crowded job market for them.
It must be observed that, as matters now stand, a sufficient degree of overcrowding may depress the wages of women to a much lower minimum than those of men. The wages, at least of single women, must be equal to their support, but need not be more than equal to it; the minimum, in their case, is the pittance absolutely requisite for the sustenance of one human being. Now the lowest point to which the most superabundant competition can permanently depress the wages of a man is always somewhat more than this. Where the wife of a laboring-man does not by general custom contribute to his earnings, the man's wages must be at least sufficient to support himself, a wife, and a number of children adequate to keep up the population, since, if it were less, the population would not be kept up.
It's important to note that, as things stand now, a significant level of overcrowding can push women's wages down to a much lower minimum compared to men's. The wages of single women should at least match their basic living costs, but they don’t have to exceed them; the minimum for them is just enough to sustain one person. Conversely, the lowest wages that intense competition can consistently force down for a man is always a bit higher than this. When a laborer’s wife typically doesn’t contribute to the family income, the man's wages must be enough to support himself, his wife, and a sufficient number of children to maintain the population, because if they weren’t, the population wouldn’t continue to grow.
§ 5. Wage Differences Caused by Laws, Unions, or Customs.
Thus far we have, throughout this discussion, proceeded on the supposition that competition is free, so far as regards human interference; being limited only by natural causes, or by the unintended effect of general social circumstances. But law or custom may interfere to limit competition. If apprentice laws, or the regulations of corporate bodies, make the access to a particular employment slow, costly, or difficult, the wages of that employment may be kept much above their natural proportion to the wages of common labor. In some trades, however, and to some extent, the combinations of workmen produce a similar effect. Those combinations always fail to uphold wages at an artificial rate unless they also limit the number of competitors. Putting aside the atrocities sometimes committed by workmen in the way of personal outrage or intimidation, which can not be too rigidly repressed, if the present state of the general habits of the people were to remain forever unimproved, these partial combinations, in so far as they do succeed in keeping up the wages of any trade by limiting its numbers, might be looked upon as simply intrenching round a particular spot against the inroads of over-population, and making the wages of the class depend upon their own rate of [pg 215] increase, instead of depending on that of a more reckless and improvident class than themselves.
So far in this discussion, we’ve assumed that competition is free from human interference, only limited by natural factors or unintended social conditions. However, laws or customs can interfere with competition. If apprenticeship laws or corporate regulations make it slow, expensive, or difficult to access certain jobs, the wages for those jobs may stay much higher than what’s typical compared to general labor. In some industries, worker unions can create a similar situation. However, these unions usually can’t keep wages artificially high unless they also limit the number of competitors. Aside from the extreme actions sometimes taken by workers, such as personal violence or intimidation—which must be strictly controlled—if the overall habits of people never improve, these partial unions, to the extent that they can maintain wages in a specific trade by restricting numbers, might just be seen as defending a particular area against overpopulation and allowing that class's wages to depend on their own growth rate instead of being influenced by a more careless and unprepared group than themselves.
To conclude this subject, I must repeat an observation already made, that there are kinds of labor of which the wages are fixed by custom, and not by competition. Such are the fees or charges of professional persons—of physicians, surgeons, barristers, and even attorneys.
To wrap up this topic, I need to reiterate what I've already mentioned: there are types of work where pay is determined by tradition rather than competition. This includes the fees charged by professionals like doctors, surgeons, lawyers, and even solicitors.
Chapter 5. About Profits.
§ 1. Profits consist of Interest and Risk; however, to be precise, they do not include Wages of Superintendence.
Having treated of the laborer's share of the produce, we next proceed to the share of the capitalist; the profits of capital or stock; the gains of the person who advances the expenses of production—who, from funds in his possession, pays the wages of the laborers, or supports them during the work; who supplies the requisite buildings, materials, and tools or machinery; and to whom, by the usual terms of the contract, the produce belongs, to be disposed of at his pleasure. After indemnifying him for his outlay, there commonly remains a surplus, which is his profit; the net income from his capital [and skill]; the amount which he can afford to expend in necessaries or pleasures, or from which by further saving he can add to his wealth.
After discussing the laborer's share of the produce, we now turn to the share of the capitalist; the profits from capital or investment; the earnings of the person who covers the costs of production—who, using their resources, pays the workers' wages or supports them during the job; who provides the necessary buildings, materials, and tools or machinery; and to whom, based on the usual terms of the contract, the produce belongs and can be sold as they wish. After reimbursing them for their expenses, there is usually a surplus left, which is their profit; the net income from their capital [and skill]; the amount they can spend on essentials or pleasures, or from which, by saving more, they can increase their wealth.
As the wages of the laborer are the remuneration of labor, so [a part of] the profits of the capitalist are properly, according to Mr. Senior's well-chosen expression, the remuneration of abstinence. They are what he gains by forbearing to consume his capital for his own uses, and allowing it to be consumed by productive laborers for their uses. For this forbearance he requires a recompense.
As the wages of a worker are the payment for their labor, a portion of a capitalist's profits is rightly seen, as Mr. Senior aptly puts it, as the payment for restraint. These profits come from the capitalist choosing not to spend their capital for personal use and instead letting it be used by workers for productive purposes. For this self-restraint, they expect to receive compensation.
Of the gains, however, which the possession of a capital enables a person to make, (1) a part only is properly an equivalent for the use of the capital itself; namely, as much as a solvent person would be willing to pay for the loan of it. This, which as everybody knows is called interest, is all that a person is enabled to get by merely abstaining from the [pg 217] immediate consumption of his capital, and allowing it to be used for productive purposes by others. The remuneration which is obtained in any country for mere abstinence is measured by the current rate of interest on the best security; such security as precludes any appreciable chance of losing the principal. What a person expects to gain, who superintends the employment of his own capital, is always more, and generally much more, than this. The rate of profit greatly exceeds the rate of interest. (2.) The surplus is partly compensation for risk. By lending his capital on unexceptionable security he runs little or no risk. But if he embarks in business on his own account, he always exposes his capital to some, and in many cases to very great, danger of partial or total loss. For this danger he must be compensated, otherwise he will not incur it. (3.) He must likewise be remunerated for the devotion of his time and labor. The control of the operations of industry usually belongs to the person who supplies the whole or the greatest part of the funds by which they are carried on, and who, according to the ordinary arrangement, is either alone interested, or is the person most interested (at least directly), in the result. To exercise this control with efficiency, if the concern is large and complicated, requires great assiduity, and often no ordinary skill. This assiduity and skill must be remunerated.
Of the benefits that having capital allows a person to achieve, (1) only a portion is truly equivalent to the use of the capital itself; specifically, the amount a reliable person would be willing to pay to borrow it. This, as everyone knows, is called interest, and it's all a person can earn by simply refraining from consuming their capital immediately and letting it be used for productive purposes by others. The compensation one receives in any country for just holding back is reflected in the current interest rate on the best investments; these investments are those that virtually eliminate any significant risk of losing the principal. What a person hopes to earn by overseeing the use of their own capital is always greater, and often much greater, than this. The profit rate greatly surpasses the interest rate. (2.) The extra amount is partly to cover risk. By lending their capital with strong security, they face little to no risk. But if they start a business themselves, they always put their capital at some level of risk, and often at a very high risk of partial or complete loss. For this risk, they need to be compensated; otherwise, they won’t take it. (3.) They must also be compensated for the time and effort they devote. The management of industrial operations usually falls to the person who provides most or all of the funding needed to carry them out, and who, under normal circumstances, is either solely invested or is the person most invested (at least directly) in the outcome. Effectively managing this control, especially if the business is large and complex, requires significant dedication and often considerable skill. This dedication and skill must be compensated.
The gross profits from capital, the gains returned to those who supply the funds for production, must suffice for these three purposes; and the three parts into which profit may be considered as resolving itself may be described respectively as interest, insurance, and wages of superintendence.
The total profits from investments, the earnings given to those who provide the money for production, need to cover these three purposes; and the three components into which profit can be broken down are interest, insurance, and management wages.
§ 2. The Minimum of Profits; what causes Changes in Profit Levels.
The lowest rate of profit that can permanently exist is that which is barely adequate, at the given place and time, to afford an equivalent for the abstinence, risk, and exertion implied in the employment of capital. From the gross profit has first to be deducted as much as will form a fund sufficient on the average to cover all losses incident to the employment. Next, it must afford such an equivalent to the owner of the capital for forbearing to consume it as is then and there a sufficient motive to him to persist in his abstinence. How much will be required to form this equivalent depends [pg 219] on the comparative value placed, in the given society, upon the present and the future (in the words formerly used): on the strength of the effective desire of accumulation. Further, after covering all losses, and remunerating the owner for forbearing to consume, there must be something left to recompense the labor and skill of the person who devotes his time to the business.
The lowest profit rate that can consistently exist is the one that just barely compensates for the sacrifice, risk, and effort involved in using capital at a specific time and place. From the total profit, you first need to subtract enough to create a fund that, on average, covers all the losses that come with investing. Next, it should provide enough compensation to the capital owner for delaying consumption, to motivate them to continue that delay. The amount needed for this compensation depends on how society values the present versus the future—essentially, on how strong the desire to accumulate wealth is. Additionally, after covering all losses and compensating the owner for not consuming, there must be remaining profit to reward the labor and skill of the person dedicating their time to the business. [pg 219]
Such, then, is the minimum of profits: but that minimum is exceedingly variable, and at some times and places extremely low, on account of the great variableness of two out of its three elements. That the rate of necessary remuneration for abstinence, or in other words the effective desire of accumulation, differs widely in different states of society and civilization, has been seen in a former chapter. There is a still wider difference in the element which consists in compensation for risk.
Such is the minimum profit: but that minimum is highly variable and can be extremely low at certain times and places, due to the great variability of two out of its three elements. The necessary rate of return for saving, or in other words, the actual desire to accumulate wealth, varies greatly across different societies and levels of civilization, as discussed in an earlier chapter. There is an even greater difference in the element that accounts for compensation for risk.
The remuneration of capital in different employments, much more than the remuneration of labor, varies according to the circumstances which render one employment more attractive or more repulsive than another. The profits, for example, of retail trade, in proportion to the capital employed, exceed those of wholesale dealers or manufacturers, for this reason among others, that there is less consideration attached to the employment. The greatest, however, of these differences, is that caused by difference of risk. The profits of a gunpowder-manufacturer must be considerably greater than the average, to make up for the peculiar risks to which he and his property are constantly exposed. When, however, as in the case of marine adventure, the peculiar risks are capable of being, and commonly are, commuted for a fixed payment, the premium of insurance takes its regular place among the charges of production, and the compensation which the owner of the ship or cargo receives for that payment does not appear in the estimate of his profits, but is included in the replacement of his capital.
The returns on capital in different jobs vary much more than the returns on labor, depending on what makes one job more appealing or less appealing than another. For instance, the profits from retail trade, relative to the capital invested, are higher than those of wholesalers or manufacturers, partly because retail has less prestige. However, the biggest difference comes from the level of risk involved. A gunpowder manufacturer needs to earn significantly higher profits than average to compensate for the unique risks he and his property face daily. In cases like maritime ventures, where specific risks can be exchanged for a fixed payment, insurance premiums become a standard part of production costs, and the compensation received by the ship or cargo owner for that payment isn’t counted in their profit estimate; instead, it’s factored into the recovery of their capital.
The portion, too, of the gross profit, which forms the remuneration for the labor and skill of the dealer or producer, is very different in different employments. This is the explanation always given of the extraordinary rate of apothecaries' profit. There are cases, again, in which a considerable amount of labor and skill is required to conduct a business necessarily of limited extent. In such cases a higher than common rate of profit is necessary to yield only the common rate of remuneration.
The share of the overall profit that pays for the work and expertise of the dealer or producer varies widely across different jobs. This is the usual explanation for the high profit margins seen in pharmacies. There are also instances where a significant amount of effort and skill is needed to run a business that naturally has a limited scope. In these situations, a higher than usual profit margin is necessary just to provide a standard level of compensation.
All the natural monopolies (meaning thereby those which are created by circumstances, and not by law) which produce or aggravate the disparities in the remuneration of different kinds of labor, operate similarly between different employments of capital.
All natural monopolies (meaning those created by circumstances, not by law) that produce or worsen the differences in pay for different types of labor act in the same way between various uses of capital.
§ 3. General Trend of Profits Toward Equality.
After due allowance is made for these various causes of inequality, namely, difference in the risk or agreeableness of different employments, and natural or artificial monopolies [which give greater or less wages of superintendence], [pg 221] the rate of profit on capital in all employments tends to an equality. That portion of profit which is properly interest, and which forms the real remuneration for abstinence, is strictly the same at the same time and place, whatever be the employment. The rate of interest, on equally good security, does not vary according to the destination of the principal, though it does vary from time to time very much, according to the circumstances of the market.
After taking into account the various reasons for inequality, such as differences in the risks or enjoyment of different jobs, and natural or artificial monopolies [which affect wages of supervision], [pg 221] the profit rate on capital across all jobs tends to equalize. The portion of profit that represents interest, and which serves as the actual reward for forgoing consumption, is essentially the same at the same time and place, regardless of the job. The interest rate, on equally good security, doesn't change based on what the principal is used for, although it can fluctuate significantly over time due to market conditions.
It is far otherwise with gross profit, which, though (as will presently be seen) it does not vary much from employment to employment, varies very greatly from individual to individual, and can scarcely be in any two cases the same. It depends on the knowledge, talents, economy, and energy of the capitalist himself, or of the agents whom he employs; on the accidents of personal connection; and even on chance. Hardly any two dealers in the same trade, even if their commodities are equally good and equally cheap, carry on their business at the same expense, or turn over their capital in the same time. That equal capitals give equal profits, as a general maxim of trade, would be as false as that equal age or size gives equal bodily strength, or that equal reading or experience gives equal knowledge. The effect depends as much upon twenty other things as upon the single cause specified. On an average (whatever may be the occasional fluctuations) the various employments of capital are on such a footing as to hold out, not equal profits, but equal expectations of profit, to persons of average abilities and advantages. By equal, I mean after making compensation for any inferiority in the agreeableness or safety of an employment. If the case were not so; if there were, evidently, and to common experience, more favorable chances of pecuniary success in one business than in others, more persons would engage their capital in the business. If, on the contrary, a business is not considered thriving; if the chances of profit in it are thought to be inferior to those in other employments; capital gradually leaves it, or at least new capital is not attracted to it; and by this change in the distribution of [pg 222] capital between the less profitable and the more profitable employments, a sort of balance is restored.
Gross profit works very differently. While it generally doesn’t change much between jobs, it can vary significantly from person to person, and it’s unlikely to be the same in any two situations. It depends on the knowledge, skills, frugality, and drive of the capitalist or the agents they hire; on personal connections; and even on luck. Hardly any two people in the same trade, even if their products are equally good and cheap, run their businesses at the same cost or recycle their capital in the same timeframe. The idea that equal amounts of capital yield equal profits is as misleading as saying that equal age or size results in equal physical strength, or that equal reading or experience equals equal knowledge. The outcome relies on many factors beyond just the one mentioned. On average (regardless of any occasional ups and downs), different ways of using capital offer similar, not identical, profit expectations to people with average skills and advantages. By equal, I mean after considering any drawbacks in the attractiveness or safety of a job. If this weren't true; if there were clearly better chances for financial success in one business compared to others, more people would invest their capital there. Conversely, if a business doesn’t seem prosperous; if profit chances are viewed as lower than those in other jobs; capital gradually exits, or at least new capital isn't attracted to it, and this change in how capital is distributed between less and more profitable jobs helps restore some balance.

This equalizing process, commonly described as the transfer of capital from one employment to another, is not necessarily the onerous, slow, and almost impracticable operation which it is very often represented to be. In the first place, it does not always imply the actual removal of capital already embarked in an employment. In a rapidly progressive state of capital, the adjustment often takes place by means of the new accumulations of each year, which direct themselves in preference toward the more thriving trades. Even when a real transfer of capital is necessary, it is by no means implied that any of those who are engaged in the unprofitable employment relinquish business and break up their establishments. The numerous and multifarious channels of credit through which, in commercial nations, unemployed capital diffuses itself over the field of employment, flowing over in greater abundance to the lower levels, are the means by which the equalization is accomplished. The process consists in a limitation by one class of dealers or producers and an extension by the other of that portion of their business which is carried on with borrowed capital.
This equalizing process, often referred to as the transfer of capital from one job to another, isn't as burdensome, slow, and nearly impossible as it's frequently portrayed. First of all, it doesn’t always mean the actual removal of capital already invested in a job. In a rapidly growing economy, the adjustment often happens through the new accumulations each year, which tend to flow towards more successful industries. Even when a genuine transfer of capital is necessary, it doesn’t mean that those involved in unprofitable sectors have to shut down their businesses. The many different channels of credit in commercial nations allow unused capital to spread across various opportunities, flowing more generously to lower levels. This process involves one group of businesses or producers limiting their operations while another group expands the part of their business that relies on borrowed capital.
In the case of an altogether declining trade, in which it is necessary that the production should be, not occasionally varied, but greatly and permanently diminished, or perhaps stopped altogether, the process of extricating the capital is, no doubt, tardy and difficult, and almost always attended with considerable loss; much of the capital fixed in machinery, buildings, permanent works, etc., being either not applicable to any other purpose, or only applicable after expensive alterations; and time being seldom given for effecting the change in the mode in which it would be effected with least loss, namely, by not replacing the fixed capital as it wears out. There is besides, in totally changing the destination of a capital, so great a sacrifice of established connection, and of acquired skill and experience, that people are always very slow in resolving upon it, and hardly ever do so until long after a change of fortune has become hopeless.
In a situation where trade is consistently declining, it’s necessary for production to be not just sometimes reduced, but significantly and permanently cut back, or possibly even halted completely. The process of pulling out capital is undoubtedly slow and challenging, often leading to considerable losses. A lot of capital tied up in machinery, buildings, and other permanent structures is either unusable for anything else or requires costly modifications to repurpose. Additionally, there’s rarely enough time to make this transition in a way that minimizes losses, which would involve not replacing fixed capital as it wears out. Moreover, completely shifting the focus of capital entails a tremendous loss of established connections, along with developed skills and experience, leading people to be very hesitant to make such changes. They usually only do so long after it becomes clear that the situation is beyond saving.
In general, then, although profits are very different to different individuals, and to the same individual in different years, there can not be much diversity at the same time and place in the average profits of different employments (other than the standing differences necessary to compensate for difference of attractiveness), except for short periods, or when some great permanent revulsion has overtaken a particular trade. It is true that, to persons with the same amount of original means, there is more chance of making a large fortune in some employments than in others. But it would be found that in those same employments bankruptcies also are more frequent, and that the chance of greater success is balanced by a greater probability of complete failure.
In general, while profits vary greatly among different individuals and for the same person across different years, there isn’t a lot of variation in the average profits of different jobs at the same time and place (aside from the usual differences needed to account for varying levels of appeal), except for brief periods or when a major, lasting shift affects a specific industry. It's true that individuals with the same initial resources have a better chance of making a significant fortune in some jobs than others. However, it’s also the case that bankruptcies tend to be more common in those same fields, meaning the potential for greater success comes with an increased risk of complete failure.
§ 4. The Reason for Any Profit's Existence; the Investments of Capitalists are Made Up of Labor Wages.
The preceding remarks have, I hope, sufficiently elucidated what is meant by the common phrase, “the ordinary rate of profit,” and the sense in which, and the limitations under which, this ordinary rate has a real existence. It now remains to consider what causes determine its amount.
The previous comments have, I hope, clearly explained what is meant by the common phrase, “the standard profit rate,” and the way it exists, along with the limitations it has. Now, we need to examine the factors that determine its amount.
The cause of profit is, that labor produces more than is required for its support; the reason why capital yields a profit is, because food, clothing, materials, and tools last longer than the time which is required to produce them; so that if a capitalist supplies a party of laborers with these things, on condition of receiving all they produce, they will, in addition to reproducing their own necessaries and instruments, have a portion of their time remaining, to work for the capitalist. We thus see that profit arises, not from the incident of exchange, but from the productive power of labor; and the general profit of the country is always what the productive power of labor makes it, whether any exchange takes place or not. I proceed, in expansion of the considerations thus briefly indicated, to exhibit more minutely the mode in which the rate of profit is determined.
The reason for profit is that labor creates more than what's needed for its survival. Capital earns a profit because essentials like food, clothing, materials, and tools last longer than it takes to produce them. So, if a capitalist provides a group of workers with these essentials in exchange for all they produce, the workers will not only recreate what they need but also have extra time to work for the capitalist. This shows that profit comes not from the act of exchanging goods but from the ability of labor to produce. The overall profit of a country is always determined by its labor productivity, regardless of whether any exchanges happen. I will now elaborate on these points to explain how the rate of profit is determined.
I assume, throughout, the state of things which, where the laborers and capitalists are separate classes, prevails, with few exceptions, universally; namely, that the capitalist advances the whole expenses, including the entire remuneration of the laborer. That he should do so is not a matter of inherent necessity; the laborer might wait until the production is complete for all that part of his wages which exceeds mere necessaries, and even for the whole, if he has funds in hand sufficient for his temporary support. But in the latter case the laborer is to that extent really a capitalist, investing capital in the concern, by supplying a portion of the funds necessary for carrying it on; and even in the former case he may be looked upon in the same light, since, contributing his labor at less than the market price, he may be regarded as lending the difference to his employer, and receiving it back with interest (on whatever principle computed) from the proceeds of the enterprise.
I assume that, generally speaking, the situation in which workers and capitalists are separate classes is almost universally the case, with few exceptions. This means that the capitalist covers all expenses, including the full payment for the worker. This isn't something that has to happen; the worker could wait until production is finished to receive all of his wages beyond just the necessities, and even the entire amount if he has enough savings to support himself temporarily. However, in that situation, the worker is partially acting as a capitalist by investing in the business by providing some of the funds needed to keep it running. Even in the first scenario, he can be seen in the same way, since by offering his labor for less than the market rate, he is essentially lending the difference to his employer and will get it back with interest (however that is calculated) from the profits of the venture.
The capitalist, then, may be assumed to make all the advances and receive all the produce. His profit consists of the excess of the produce above the advances; his rate of profit is the ratio which that excess bears to the amount advanced.
The capitalist can be seen as providing all the resources and collecting all the output. His profit comes from the amount of output that exceeds the resources provided; his rating of profit is the ratio of that excess to the total amount invested.
But what do the advances consist of? It is, for the present, necessary to suppose that the capitalist does not pay any rent; has not to purchase the use of any appropriated natural agent. The nature of rent, however, we have not yet taken into consideration; and it will hereafter appear that no practical error, on the question we are now examining, is produced by disregarding it.
But what do the advances involve? For now, we need to assume that the capitalist isn't paying any rent and doesn't have to buy the use of any claimed natural resource. However, we haven't yet looked at what rent actually is, and it will become clear later that ignoring it does not lead to any practical mistakes regarding the issue we are currently discussing.
If, then, leaving rent out of the question, we inquire in what it is that the advances of the capitalist, for purposes of production, consist, we shall find that they consist of wages of labor.
If we set aside rent for a moment and look into what the capitalists' investments in production actually consist of, we'll see that they mainly consist of wages for labor.
A large portion of the expenditure of every capitalist consists in the direct payment of wages. What does not consist of this is composed of materials and implements, including buildings. But materials and implements are produced by labor; and as our supposed capitalist is not meant to represent a single employment, but to be a type of the productive industry of the whole country, we may suppose that he makes his own tools and raises his own materials. He does this by means of previous advances, which, again, consist wholly of wages. If we suppose him to buy the materials and tools instead of producing them, the case is not altered: he then repays to a previous producer the wages which that previous producer has paid. It is true he repays it to him with a profit; and, if he had produced the things himself, he himself must have had that profit on this part of his outlay [pg 226] as well as on every other part. The fact, however, remains, that in the whole process of production, beginning with the materials and tools and ending with the finished product, all the advances have consisted of nothing but wages, except that certain of the capitalists concerned have, for the sake of general convenience, had their share of profit paid to them before the operation was completed.
A significant part of every capitalist's expenses comes from directly paying wages. What isn’t wages includes materials and tools, like buildings. But these materials and tools are produced by labor; since our hypothetical capitalist is not meant to represent just one job, but to symbolize the productive industry of the entire country, we can assume he makes his own tools and gathers his own materials. He does this through previous investments, which again are entirely made up of wages. If we assume he buys the materials and tools instead of producing them, the situation doesn’t change: he is just reimbursing a prior producer for the wages that producer has already paid. It's true that he pays them back with a profit; if he had made the items himself, he would also need to account for that profit on his expenses. However, the key point remains that throughout the entire production process—starting from the materials and tools and ending with the finished product—all expenses have consisted solely of wages, except that some of the involved capitalists have, for convenience's sake, received their share of profits before the process was finished. [pg 226]
§ 5. The Rate of Profit is influenced by Labor Costs.
It thus appears that the two elements on which, and which alone, the gains of the capitalists depend, are, first, the magnitude of the produce, in other words, the productive power of labor; and secondly, the proportion of that produce obtained by the laborers themselves; the ratio which the remuneration of the laborers bears to the amount they produce.
It seems that the two factors on which the capitalists' profits depend are, first, the size of the output, in other words, the productivity of labor; and second, the share of that output received by the workers themselves; the ratio of workers' pay to the amount they produce.
We thus arrive at the conclusion of Ricardo and others, that the rate of profits depends upon wages; rising as wages fall, and falling as wages rise. In adopting, however, this doctrine, I must insist upon making a most necessary alteration in its wording. Instead of saying that profits depend on wages, let us say (what Ricardo really meant) that they depend on the cost of labor.
We therefore come to the conclusion of Ricardo and others that the rate of profit depends on wages; it increases as wages decrease and decreases as wages increase. However, in accepting this theory, I must emphasize a crucial change in how we express it. Instead of saying that profits depend on wages, let's say (which is what Ricardo really meant) that they depend on the labor costs.
Wages and the cost of labor; what labor brings in to the laborer and what it costs to the capitalist are ideas quite distinct, and which it is of the utmost importance to keep so. For this purpose it is essential not to designate them, as is almost always done, by the same name. Wages, in public discussions, both oral and printed, being looked upon from the same point of view of the payers, much oftener than from that of the receivers, nothing is more common than to say that wages are high or low, meaning only that the cost of labor [to the capitalist] is high or low. The reverse of this would be oftener the truth: the cost of labor is frequently at its highest where wages are lowest. This may arise from two causes. (1.) In the first place, the labor, though cheap, may be inefficient.
Wages and the cost of labor—what labor earns for the worker and what it costs the capitalist—are two very different ideas, and it's crucial to keep them separate. To do this, it's important not to call them by the same name, as is often the case. In public discussions, both spoken and written, wages are usually viewed from the perspective of those who pay, much more than from the perspective of those who receive. It’s very common to say that wages are high or low, which really only reflects the cost of labor to the capitalist. The opposite is often true: the cost of labor can be at its highest when wages are at their lowest. This can happen for two reasons. (1.) First, the labor, while cheap, may not be very effective.
(2.) The other cause which renders wages and the cost of labor no real criteria of one another is the varying costliness of the articles which the laborer consumes. If these are cheap, wages, in the sense which is of importance to the laborer, may be high, and yet the cost of labor may be low; if dear, the laborer may be wretchedly off, though his labor may cost much to the capitalist. This last is the condition of a country over-peopled in relation to its land; in which, food being dear, the poorness of the laborer's real reward does not prevent labor from costing much to the purchaser, and low wages and low profits coexist. The opposite case is exemplified in the United States of America. The laborer there enjoys a greater abundance of comforts than in any other country of the world, except some of the newest colonies; but owing to the cheap price at which these comforts can be obtained (combined with the great efficiency of the labor), the cost of labor to the capitalist is considerably lower than in Europe. It must be so, since the rate of profit is higher; as indicated by the rate of interest, which is six per cent at New York when it is three or three and a quarter per cent in London.
(2.) Another reason why wages and the cost of labor aren't reliable indicators of each other is the varying cost of the goods that laborers consume. If these goods are inexpensive, wages, in a way that matters to the laborer, can be high, while the cost of labor may be low; if they are expensive, the laborer may be struggling, even if their labor costs a lot to the business owner. This situation often occurs in a country that has too many people for the amount of land available; in such cases, when food is expensive, the low real earnings of the laborer don't stop labor from being costly for the buyer, leading to low wages and low profits at the same time. A contrasting example can be seen in the United States. There, laborers enjoy more comforts than in any other country, except for a few of the newest colonies; however, because these comforts are available at such low prices (along with the high efficiency of labor), the cost of labor for the business owner is significantly lower than in Europe. This is necessary, as the profit margin is higher; as shown by interest rates, which are six percent in New York compared to three or three and a quarter percent in London.
The cost of labor, then, is, in the language of mathematics, a function of three variables: (1) the efficiency of labor; (2) the wages of labor (meaning thereby the real reward [or real wages] of the laborer); and (3) the greater or less cost179 [pg 229] at which the articles composing that real reward can be produced or purchased. It is plain that the cost of labor to the capitalist must be influenced by each of these three circumstances, and by no others. These, therefore, are also the circumstances which determine the rate of profit; and it can not be in any way affected except through one or other of them.
The cost of labor is, in mathematical terms, a function of three factors: (1) the efficiency of labor; (2) the wages of labor (which refers to the actual rewards or real wages of the worker); and (3) the higher or lower cost at which the goods that make up that real reward can be produced or bought. It's clear that the cost of labor for the capitalist is affected by each of these three factors and no others. Therefore, these are also the factors that determine the profit rate, and it can't be influenced in any way except through one of them. [pg 229]
The efficiency of labor, in this connection, is highly important in its practical aspects, and as affecting the labor question, because as a function of cost of labor, that is, as an element affecting the quantity of things advanced to the laborers in comparison with the quantity of things returned to the employer, it includes the whole influence of machinery, labor-saving devices, and the results of invention. The quantity of produce depends, for a given advance, on the kind of machinery, the speed with which it is run, and on the general state of the arts and industrial inventions. The extent to which the productive capacity of a single laborer has been increased in the United States has been almost incredible. Instead of weaving cloth by hand, as was done a hundred years ago, “one operative in Lowell, working one year, can produce the cotton fabric needed for the year's supply of 1,500 to 1,800 Chinese.” Moreover, there is no question as to the fact that no nation in the world compares with ours in the power to invent, construct, and manage the most ingenious and complicated machinery. The inventive faculty belongs to every class in our country; and, in studying cost of labor, it must be well borne in mind that the efficiency of American labor, particularly as combined with mechanical appliances, is one of the great causes of our enormous production. The result of this, for instance, has been that, without lowering profits, although the price of cloth has been greatly reduced, employers have been able to raise the wages of operatives, and shorten their hours of labor, because machinery has so vastly increased the production for a given outlay. As one of a few facts showing this tendency in the last fifty years, note the following table, taken from the books of the Namquit cotton-mill in Bristol, Rhode Island:
the use of machines has transformed the process. Now, workers can operate machines that weave fabric much more quickly and efficiently. This shift not only reduces the time needed to produce fabric but also significantly lowers labor costs. The impact of this technological advancement is crucial to understanding labor dynamics and overall productivity. The type of machinery used, its operational speed, and the current level of technological and industrial innovation all play essential roles in determining how much product is generated for a specific investment. In the United States, the rise in productivity per worker has been remarkable.“a worker in Lowell who works for a year can produce enough cotton fabric for a whole year's supply for 1,500 to 1,800 people in China.”It's clear that no other country compares to ours in inventing, building, and operating the most advanced and sophisticated machinery. The ability to innovate is found in every class in our nation, and when looking at labor costs, it's important to keep in mind that the efficiency of American workers—especially when paired with mechanical tools—is a key factor in our high levels of production. This efficiency has allowed employers to increase worker wages and shorten their working hours without hurting profits, even with a significant decline in cloth prices due to a massive rise in production for the same investment. For example, take a look at the following table from the records of the Namquit cotton-mill in Bristol, Rhode Island, which illustrates this trend over the past fifty years:
Type of Work. | 1841. | 1884. |
Cardroom assistance, per week | $3.28 | $5.40 |
Card strippers per week | 4.98 | 6:00 |
Weavers, weekly | 4.75 | 6:00 |
Carding room supervisor, per week | 7:00 | 13.50 |
The hours per week have decreased in the same time from 84 to 66, while the product of the mill in pounds has increased 25 per cent. It may be unnecessary, perhaps, to say that these figures represent the current wages in [pg 230] other mills at the same periods; and that these facts can be sustained by the records of other mills.
The hours worked per week have decreased from 84 to 66, while the mill's output in pounds has risen by 25 percent. It may not be necessary to point out that these figures represent the current wages in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.[pg 230]other mills during the same time period; and that these facts can be supported by the records of other mills.
In its economic effect we must also consider, under efficiency, the whole question of natural advantages of soil, climate, and natural resources. Laborers of the same skill, paid the same real wages, of the same cost, will produce a vastly greater amount of wheat in Dakota than in Vermont or England. This is the chief reason why profits are so high in the United States. In many industries we have very marked natural advantages, which permits a high reward to labor, and yet yields a high profit to the capitalist. This applies not merely to agriculture, but to all the extractive industries, such as the production of petroleum, wood, copper, etc.
When looking at the economic impact, we need to consider the broader issue of natural advantages related to soil, climate, and resources in terms of efficiency. Workers with the same skills, earning the same real wages and facing the same costs, will produce much more wheat in Dakota than in Vermont or England. This is the primary reason why profits are so high in the United States. Many industries benefit from significant natural advantages, which allow for higher wages for workers while still generating substantial profits for investors. This applies not only to agriculture but also to all extractive industries, including oil, timber, copper, and more.
In short, the whole matter of ease and difficulty of production, of high or low cost of production, taking it in the sense of great or little sacrifice (compare carefully Book III, Chap. II, § 4), comes in under the element of efficiency, in cost of labor. The reader can not be too strongly urged to connect different parts of the economic system together. And the questions of Cost of Labor and Cost of Production are of paramount importance to a proper understanding of political economy.
In short, the question of how easy or hard it is to create something, and whether it is expensive or inexpensive, should be viewed in light of the level of sacrifice required (see carefully __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).Book III, Chapter II, Section 4This relates to the idea of efficiency, especially in terms of labor costs. Readers need to make strong connections between the various parts of the economic system. The issues of Labor Costs and Production Costs are essential for a clear understanding of political economy.
If labor generally became more efficient, without being more highly rewarded; if, without its becoming less efficient, its remuneration fell, no increase taking place in the cost of the articles composing that remuneration; or if those articles became less costly, without the laborers obtaining more of them; in any one of these three cases, profits would rise. If, on the contrary, labor became less efficient (as it might do from diminished bodily vigor in the people, destruction of fixed capital, or deteriorated education); or if the laborer obtained a higher remuneration, without any increased cheapness in the things composing it; or if, without his obtaining more, that which he did obtain became more costly; profits, in all these cases, would suffer a diminution. And there is no other combination of circumstances in which the general rate of profit of a country, in all employments indifferently, can either fall or rise.
If labor generally became more efficient without higher pay; if the pay decreased, but the cost of the things that make up that pay didn’t go up; or if those things became cheaper without workers getting more of them; in any of these three situations, profits would increase. Conversely, if labor became less efficient (which could happen due to reduced physical strength in the workforce, loss of fixed capital, or poorer education); or if workers received higher pay without any decrease in the prices of what that pay covers; or if what they got didn’t increase but became more expensive; profits would decrease in all these cases. There’s no other combination of circumstances where the overall profit rate in a country, across all jobs, can increase or decrease.
The connection of profit with the three constituents of cost of labor may probably be better seen by aid of the following illustration; it being premised that as yet money is not used, [pg 231] and that the laborers are paid in the articles which their money wages would have bought had money been used. For simplicity we will suppose that all articles of the laborer's consumption are represented by corn. Imagine a large woolen-mill employing 500 men, and paying them in corn; and suppose that one yard of woolen cloth exchanges for one bushel of corn in the open market. In the beginning, with a given condition of efficiency, suppose that each man produces on an average 1,200 yards of cloth, for which he is paid 1,000 bushels of corn:
The connection between profit and the three parts of labor costs can be made clearer with this example, assuming that money hasn’t been introduced yet.[pg 231]and that workers get paid in goods equivalent to what their wages would have bought if cash had been used. To make it straightforward, let’s say that all items consumed by the workers are represented by corn. Imagine a big woolen mill that employs 500 men and pays them in corn; assume that one yard of woolen cloth sells for one bushel of corn in the market. At first, with a certain level of efficiency, let’s say each man produces an average of 1,200 yards of cloth, for which he receives 1,000 bushels of corn:
500 men, each producing 1,200 yards, give a total product of 600,000 yards.
500 men, each paid 1,000 bushels, cause an outlay of 500,000 yards.
Profit: 100,000 yards.
500 men, each making 1,200 yards, lead to a total output of 600,000 yards.
500 men, each earning 1,000 bushels, result in a spending of 500,000 yards.
Profit: 100,000 units.
(1.) Now suppose a change increasing the efficiency of labor to such an extent that each laborer produces 1,300 instead of 1,200 yards, then the account will stand, if the other elements remain unchanged:
(1.) Now picture a change that increases labor efficiency so much that each worker produces 1,300 yards instead of 1,200. In that case, the account will appear like this, assuming all other factors remain constant:
500 men, each producing 1,300 yards, give a total product of 650,000 yards.
500 men, each paid 1,000 bushels, cause an outlay of 500,000 yards.
Profit: 150,000 yards.
500 men, each producing 1,300 yards, generate a total of 650,000 yards.
500 men, each paid with 1,000 bushels, result in an expense of 500,000 yards.
Profit: 150,000 units.
(2.) If efficiency and the cost of producing food remain the same as at first, suppose a change to occur which raises the quantity of corn each laborer receives from 1,000 to 1,100, or, as it is called, increases his real wages—then the account will be:
(2.) If the efficiency and cost of producing food remain the same as before, imagine a change occurs that boosts the amount of corn each worker receives from 1,000 to 1,100, which we call an increase in their real wages—then the account will be:
500 men, each producing 1,200 yards, give a total product of 600,000 yards.
500 men, each paid 1,100 bushels, cause an outlay of 550,000 yards.
Profit: 50,000 yards.
500 men, each creating 1,200 yards, generate a total of 600,000 yards.
500 men, each earning 1,100 bushels, have a total cost of 550,000 yards.
Profit: 50,000 units.
(3.) If efficiency and real wages remain the same, suppose such an increase in the cost to the employers of obtaining corn that they are obliged to give one and one tenth yard of their goods for one bushel of corn (1,000 bushels of corn costing them 1,100 yards of cloth), then the statement will read:
(3.) If efficiency and real wages remain unchanged, let’s say there’s a rise in the cost for employers to acquire corn that requires them to pay one and one-tenth yards of their products for one bushel of corn (with 1,000 bushels of corn costing them 1,100 yards of cloth), then the statement will say:
500 men, each producing 1,200 yards, give a total product of 600,000 yards.
500 men, each paid 1,000 bushels, cause an outlay of 550,000 yards.
Profit: 50,000 yards.
500 men, each working 1,200 yards, produce a total of 600,000 yards.
500 men, each earning 1,000 bushels, leads to a cost of 550,000 yards.
Profit: 50,000 yards.
Chapter 6. About Rent.
§ 1. Rent from the Impact of a Natural Monopoly.
The requisites of production being labor, capital, and natural agents, the only person, besides the laborer and the capitalist, whose consent is necessary to production, and who can claim a share of the produce as the price of that consent, is the person who, by the arrangements of society, possesses exclusive power over some natural agent. The land is the principal of the natural agents which are capable of being appropriated, and the consideration paid for its use is called rent. Landed proprietors are the only class, of any numbers or importance, who have a claim to a share in the distribution of the produce, through their ownership of something which neither they nor any one else have produced. If there be any other cases of a similar nature, they will be easily understood, when the nature and laws of rent are comprehended.
The essentials of production are labor, capital, and natural resources. The only person, besides the worker and the capitalist, whose agreement is needed for production and who can receive a portion of the output as compensation for that agreement is the individual who, according to societal arrangements, has exclusive control over a natural resource. Land is the main natural resource that can be owned, and the payment made for its use is called rent. Landowners are the only significant group that has a claim to a share of the output due to owning something that neither they nor anyone else has created. If there are any other similar situations, they will be easy to understand once the nature and principles of rent are grasped.
It is at once evident that rent is the effect of a monopoly. The reason why land-owners are able to require rent for their land is, that it is a commodity which many want, and which no one can obtain but from them. If all the land of the country belonged to one person, he could fix the rent at his pleasure. This case, however, is nowhere known to exist; and the only remaining supposition is that of free competition; the land-owners being supposed to be, as in fact they are, too numerous to combine.
It's clear that rent comes from a monopoly. The reason landowners can charge rent for their land is that it's a resource many people want, and no one can get it except from them. If all the land in the country belonged to one person, they could set the rent however they wanted. However, this situation doesn't actually happen; the only other possibility is free competition, with landowners being too many to join forces.
§ 2. No land can generate rent unless it is of such quality or location that it is in less supply than the demand.
A thing which is limited in quantity, even though its possessors do not act in concert, is still a monopolized article. But even when monopolized, a thing which is the gift of nature, and requires no labor or outlay as the condition of its existence, will, if there be competition among the holders of it, command a price only if it exist in less quantity than the demand.
A thing that is limited in quantity, even if its owners don’t work together, is still considered a monopolized item. However, even when it’s monopolized, something that is a natural gift and doesn’t require any effort or cost to exist will only have a price if there’s competition among its owners and it’s available in less quantity than what people want.
If the whole land of a country were required for cultivation, all of it might yield a rent. But in no country of any extent do the wants of the population require that all the land, which is capable of cultivation, should be cultivated. The food and other agricultural produce which the people need, and which they are willing and able to pay for at a price which remunerates the grower, may always be obtained without cultivating all the land; sometimes without cultivating more than a small part of it; the more fertile lands, or those in the more convenient situations, being of course preferred. There is always, therefore, some land which can not, in existing circumstances, pay any rent; and no land ever pays rent unless, in point of fertility or situation, it belongs to those superior kinds which exist in less quantity [pg 234] than the demand—which can not be made to yield all the produce required for the community, unless on terms still less advantageous than the resort to less favored soils. (1.) The worst land which can be cultivated as a means of subsistence is that which will just replace the seed and the food of the laborers employed on it, together with what Dr. Chalmers calls their secondaries; that is, the laborers required for supplying them with tools, and with the remaining necessaries of life. Whether any given land is capable of doing more than this is not a question of political economy, but of physical fact. The supposition leaves nothing for profits, nor anything for the laborers except necessaries: the land, therefore, can only be cultivated by the laborers themselves, or else at a pecuniary loss; and, a fortiori, can not in any contingency afford a rent. (2.) The worst land which can be cultivated as an investment for capital is that which, after replacing the seed, not only feeds the agricultural laborers and their secondaries, but affords them the current rate of wages, which may extend to much more than mere necessaries, and leaves, for those who have advanced the wages of these two classes of laborers, a surplus equal to the profit they could have expected from any other employment of their capital. (3.) Whether any given land can do more than this is not merely a physical question, but depends partly on the market value of agricultural produce. What the land can do for the laborers and for the capitalist, beyond feeding all whom it directly or indirectly employs, of course depends upon what the remainder of the produce can be sold for. The higher the market value of produce, the lower are the soils to which cultivation can descend, consistently with affording to the capital employed the ordinary rate of profit.
If all the land in a country were needed for farming, then all of it could bring in some rent. However, in any large country, the needs of the population don’t require that all the land capable of being farmed be used for farming. The food and other agricultural products that people need and are willing to pay for at a price that rewards the grower can always be obtained without farming all the land; sometimes it’s enough to farm only a small part of it, with the more fertile lands or those in better locations naturally being preferred. Consequently, there’s always some land that, under current conditions, cannot pay any rent; and no land pays rent unless it is more fertile or better located than other types that are in shorter supply than the demand — it cannot be made to produce all the food needed for the community without conditions that are less favorable than using inferior soils. (1.) The least productive land that can still support people is just enough to cover the cost of seeds and food for the workers on it, along with what Dr. Chalmers refers to as their secondary needs; this includes the labor required to provide them with tools and other essentials for living. Whether a particular piece of land can do more than this isn't a matter of political economy but one of physical reality. This scenario leaves nothing for profits and only the basics for the laborers: hence, the land can only be farmed by the laborers themselves or it will incur a financial loss, and, a fortiori, under no circumstances can it generate a rent. (2.) The least productive land that can be used as an investment for capital is the type that, after paying for the seeds, feeds not only the agricultural laborers and their secondary needs but also provides them with the standard wage rate, which can significantly exceed mere necessities, while leaving a surplus for those who covered the wages of these workers that equals the profit they could have earned from any other investment of their capital. (3.) Whether any particular land can do more than this isn't just a physical issue, but also relates to the market value of agricultural products. What the land can provide for both the laborers and the capitalists, beyond feeding everyone it directly or indirectly employs, certainly depends on what the rest of the produce can sell for. The higher the market value of products, the lower the quality of soil that can be farmed while still providing the capital invested with the usual profit rate.
As, however, differences of fertility slide into one another by insensible gradations; and differences of accessibility, that is, of distance from markets do the same; and since there is land so barren that it could not pay for its cultivation at any price; it is evident that, whatever the [pg 235] price may be, there must in any extensive region be some land which at that price will just pay the wages of the cultivators, and yield to the capital employed the ordinary profit, and no more. Until, therefore, the price rises higher, or until some improvement raises that particular land to a higher place in the scale of fertility, it can not pay any rent. It is evident, however, that the community needs the produce of this quality of land; since, if the lands more fertile or better situated than it could have sufficed to supply the wants of society, the price would not have risen so high as to render its cultivation profitable. This land, therefore, will be cultivated; and we may lay it down as a principle that, so long as any of the land of a country which is fit for cultivation, and not withheld from it by legal or other factitious obstacles, is not cultivated, the worst land in actual cultivation (in point of fertility and situation together) pays no rent.
As differences in fertility blend into each other through subtle transitions, and as differences in accessibility, meaning distance from markets, do the same, it's clear that there's land so barren that it couldn't cover the cost of its cultivation at any price. Therefore, regardless of the price, there must be some land in any large area that will just cover the wages of the workers and provide the usual profit on the capital used, but nothing more. Until the price goes up further, or until some improvement upgrades that particular land to a higher level of fertility, it cannot generate any rent. However, it's clear that the community needs the produce from this type of land; if the more fertile or better-situated lands could meet society's needs, the price wouldn't have increased enough to make its cultivation worthwhile. This land, then, will be farmed, and we can establish a principle that as long as there is any cultivable land in a country that isn't kept from being cultivated by legal or other artificial barriers, the least productive land currently being farmed (considering both fertility and location) does not earn any rent.
§ 3. The rent of land is the difference between its yield and the yield from the least productive land in use.
If, then, of the land in cultivation, the part which yields least return to the labor and capital employed on it gives only the ordinary profit of capital, without leaving anything for rent, a standard [i.e., the “margin of cultivation”] is afforded for estimating the amount of rent which will be yielded by all other land. Any land yields just as much more than the ordinary profits of stock as it yields more than what is returned by the worst land in cultivation. The surplus is what the farmer can afford to pay as rent to the landlord; and since, if he did not so pay it, he would receive more than the ordinary rate of profit, the competition of other capitalists, that competition which equalizes the profits of different capitals, will enable the landlord to appropriate it. The rent, therefore, which any land will yield, is the excess of its produce, beyond what would be returned to the same capital if employed on the worst land in cultivation.
If the part of the land being farmed that produces the least return for the labor and capital invested only gives the standard profit for capital and nothing for rent, a benchmark [i.e., the “cultivation margin”] is established for estimating the amount of rent that other land will generate. Each piece of land provides profits beyond the standard returns of capital in proportion to how much better it performs compared to the least productive land. The extra earnings are what the farmer can pay as rent to the landlord; and if he didn’t pay this rent, he would receive more than the typical profit rate, allowing competition among other investors, which equalizes the profits from different investments, to enable the landlord to claim it. Therefore, the rent that any land can generate is the difference between its output and what would be earned using the same amount of capital on the least productive land being farmed.
It has been denied that there can be any land in cultivation which pays no rent, because landlords (it is contended) would not allow their land to be occupied without payment. [pg 236] Inferior land, however, does not usually occupy, without interruption, many square miles of ground; it is dispersed here and there, with patches of better land intermixed, and the same person who rents the better land obtains along with it the inferior soils which alternate with it. He pays a rent, nominally for the whole farm, but calculated on the produce of those parts alone (however small a portion of the whole) which are capable of returning more than the common rate of profit. It is thus scientifically true that the remaining parts pay no rent.
It's been argued that there can't be any farmland in use that doesn’t pay rent because landlords supposedly wouldn’t let their land be used without compensation. [pg 236] However, inferior land typically doesn’t cover vast areas continuously; it’s scattered with patches of better land mixed in. The same person who leases the better land also gets the inferior soils that alternate with it. They pay rent for the entire farm, but it’s based on the yield of those parts that can generate more than the average profit rate, no matter how small that portion is. Therefore, it’s technically accurate that the remaining parts do not yield any rent.
§ 4. —Or to the capital used in the least favorable circumstances.
Let us, however, suppose that there were a validity in this objection, which can by no means be conceded to it; that, when the demand of the community had forced up food to such a price as would remunerate the expense of producing it from a certain quality of soil, it happened nevertheless [pg 237] that all the soil of that quality was withheld from cultivation, the increase of produce, which the wants of society required, would for the time be obtained wholly (as it always is partially), not by an extension of cultivation, but by an increased application of labor and capital to land already cultivated.
Let’s assume, for a moment, that there’s some truth to this objection, which I don’t agree with; that when the community's demand drives food prices up to a level that covers the costs of producing it from a certain type of soil, if all that type of soil is kept from being farmed, the extra produce that society needs would, at least for now, be gained entirely (as it usually is only partially) not by expanding farming, but by putting more labor and investment into the land that's already being farmed. [pg 237]
Now we have already seen that this increased application of capital, other things being unaltered, is always attended with a smaller proportional return. The rise of price enables measures to be taken for increasing the produce, which could not have been taken with profit at the previous price. The farmer uses more expensive manures, or manures land which he formerly left to nature; or procures lime or marl from a distance, as a dressing for the soil; or pulverizes or weeds it more thoroughly; or drains, irrigates, or subsoils portions of it, which at former prices would not have paid the cost of the operation; and so forth. The farmer or improver will only consider whether the outlay he makes for the purpose will be returned to him with the ordinary profit, and not whether any surplus will remain for rent. Even, therefore, if it were the fact that there is never any land taken into cultivation, for which rent, and that too of an amount worth taking into consideration, was not paid, it would be true, nevertheless, that there is always some agricultural capital which pays no rent, because it returns nothing beyond the ordinary rate of profit: this capital being the portion of capital last applied—that to which the last addition to the produce was due; or (to express the essentials of the case in one phrase) that which is applied in the least favorable circumstances. But the same amount of demand and the same price, which enable this least productive portion of capital barely to replace itself with the ordinary profit, enable every other portion to yield a surplus proportioned to the advantage it possesses. And this surplus it is which competition enables the landlord to appropriate.
Now we’ve already seen that when more capital is invested, while everything else stays the same, the proportional return is always smaller. The increase in price allows for measures to be taken to boost production that wouldn’t have been profitable at the previous price. The farmer uses more expensive fertilizers, cultivates land he previously left untouched, brings in lime or marl from afar as soil treatment, or works the land more thoroughly by tilling or weeding it; he may also drain, irrigate, or improve sections of land that wouldn’t have justified the costs at the earlier prices, and so on. The farmer or investor will only think about whether the money spent will yield the standard profit, not if any extra will be left for rent. Therefore, even if it were true that no land is cultivated for which rent—worthy of consideration—was paid, it would still be true that some agricultural capital does not generate rent because it only returns the standard profit: this capital refers to the last capital invested, which caused the last increase in production; or to put it in simpler terms, it’s what’s used in the least favorable conditions. However, the same level of demand and the same price that allow this least productive portion of capital to barely recover its costs with standard profit also enable all other portions to generate a surplus based on their advantages. And this surplus is what competition allows the landlord to capture.
The rent of all land is measured by the excess of the return to the whole capital employed on it above what is necessary to replace the capital with the ordinary rate of profit, or, in other words, above what the same capital would yield if it were all employed in as disadvantageous circumstances as the least productive portion of it: whether that least productive portion of capital is rendered so by being employed on the worst soil, or by being expended in extorting more produce from land which already yielded as much as it could be made to part with on easier terms.
The rental value of all land is determined by how much more the total return from it exceeds what is needed to replace the capital at a normal profit rate. In simpler terms, it’s the difference between what the capital would earn if invested in the least productive conditions and what it actually makes. This least productive capital could be less effective because it’s used on the poorest quality land or because it’s used to extract more output from land that is already producing at its maximum capacity with minimal effort.
It will be true that the farmer requires the ordinary rate of profit on the whole of his capital; that whatever it returns to him beyond this he is obliged to pay to the landlord, but will not consent to pay more; that there is a portion of capital applied to agriculture in such circumstances of productiveness as to yield only the ordinary profits; and that the difference between the produce of this and of any other capital of similar amount is the measure of the tribute which that other capital can and will pay, under the name of rent, to the landlord. This constitutes a law of rent, as near the [pg 239] truth as such a law can possibly be; though of course modified or disturbed, in individual cases, by pending contracts, individual miscalculations, the influence of habit, and even the particular feelings and dispositions of the persons concerned.
The farmer does need to earn the typical profit rate on all of his capital; anything beyond that goes to the landlord, and he won’t agree to pay more. Some of the capital used in farming operates under such productive conditions that it only generates the normal profits. The difference between the output from this capital and any other capital of the same amount is what that other capital can and will pay in rent to the landlord. This forms a law of rent that is as close to the truth as such a law can be, though it can be affected in individual cases by existing contracts, personal mistakes, habits, and even the specific feelings and attitudes of those involved.
The law of rent, in the economic sense, operates in the United States as truly as elsewhere, although there is no separate class of landlords here. With us, almost all land is owned by the cultivator; so that two functions, those of the landlord and farmer, are both united in one person. Although one payment is made, it is still just as distinctly made up of two parts, one of which is a payment to the owner for the superior quality of his soil, and the other a payment (to the same person, if the owner is the cultivator) of profit on the farmer's working capital. Land which in the United States will only return enough to pay a profit on this capital can not pay any rent. And land which can pay more than a profit on this working capital, returns that excess as rent, even if the farmer is also the owner and landlord. The principle which regulates the amount of that excess—which is the essential point—is the principle which determines the amount of economic rent, and it holds true in the United States or Finland, provided only that different grades of land are called into cultivation. The governing principle is the same, no matter whether a payment is made to one man as profit and to another as rent, or whether the two payments are made to the same man in two capacities. It has been urged that the law of rent does not hold in the United States, because “the price of grain and other agricultural produce has not risen in proportion to the increase of our numbers, as it ought to have done if Ricardo's theory were true, but has fallen, since 1830, though since that time our population has been more than tripled.”181 This overlooks the fact that we have not even yet taken up all our best agricultural lands, so that for some products the law of diminishing productiveness has not yet shown itself. The reason is, that the extension of our railway system has only of late years brought the really good grain-lands into cultivation. The fact that there has been no rise in agricultural products is due to the enormous extent of marvelously fertile grain-lands in the West, and to the cheapness of transportation from those districts to the seaboard.
The law of rent, in economic terms, functions in the United States just like it does anywhere else, even though we don't have a distinct class of landlords here. Most land is owned by those who farm it, meaning the roles of landlord and farmer are often combined in one person. Even though there's only one payment, it still has two components: one is a payment to the landowner for the higher quality of their soil, and the other is a payment (to the same person if they are both the owner and the farmer) for the profit on the farmer's working capital. Land that can only generate enough to cover the profit on that capital cannot pay rent. On the other hand, land that produces more than just a profit on working capital provides that surplus as rent, even if the farmer is both the landowner and landlord. The key principle that determines the amount of that surplus—the main issue—is what defines economic rent, and it applies in both the United States and Finland, as long as different quality land is being farmed. The governing principle remains consistent, whether the payment is given to one person as profit and to another as rent, or if both payments are made to the same person in different roles. Some have argued that the law of rent doesn’t apply in the United States because __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“The price of grain and other agricultural products hasn't risen in line with our population growth as it should have if Ricardo's theory were correct. Instead, it has decreased since 1830, even though our population has more than tripled during that time.”181This overlooks the reality that we still haven't fully used all of our prime agricultural land, meaning that for certain products, the law of diminishing returns isn’t obvious yet. This is because the expansion of our railway system has only recently opened up the high-quality grain lands for farming. The stagnation in agricultural products is due to the vast amounts of exceptionally fertile grain land in the West and the low transportation costs from those regions to the coast.
For a general understanding of the law of rent the following table will show how, under constant increase of population (represented by four different advances of population, in the [pg 240] first column), first the best and then the poorer lands are brought into cultivation. We will suppose (1) that the most fertile land, A, at first pays no rent; then (2), when more food is wanted than land A can supply, it will be profitable to till land B, but which, as yet, pays no rent. But if eighteen bushels are a sufficient return to a given amount of labor and capital, then when an equal amount of labor and capital engaged on A returns twenty-four bushels, six of that are beyond the ordinary profit, and form the rent on land A, and so on; C will next be the line of comparison, and then D; as the poorer soils are cultivated, the rent of A increases:
To understand how rent works, the table below shows how a continuous increase in population (illustrated by four different population growth scenarios in the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__) affects it.[pg 240]In the first column, we first use the best land and then move on to the less productive land. We can assume (1) that the most fertile land, A, doesn't initially generate any rent; then (2), as the demand for food surpasses what land A can produce, it becomes reasonable to farm land B, which also currently doesn’t pay any rent. If eighteen bushels is a good return for a specific amount of labor and resources, then when the same amount of labor and resources on A yields twenty-four bushels, six bushels are above the usual profit and represent the rent for land A. This process continues with land C and then D; as we start using poorer soils, the rent for land A increases:
Population Increase. | A | B | C | D | ||||
24 bushels | 18 bushels | 12 bushels | 6 bushels | |||||
Total product | Rent in Bushels | Total product | Rent in Bushels | Total product | Rent in Bushels | Total product | Rent in Bushels | |
I. | 24 | 0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
II. | 24 | 6 | 18 | 0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
III. | 24 | 12 | 18 | 6 | 12 | 0 | .. | .. |
IV. | 24 | 18 | 18 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
§ 5. Different Perspectives on the Law of Rent.
Under the name of rent, many payments are commonly included, which are not a remuneration for the original powers of the land itself, but for capital expended on it. The buildings are as distinct a thing from the farm as the stock or the timber on it; and what is paid for them can no more be called rent of land than a payment for cattle would be, if it were the custom that the landlord should stock the farm for the tenant. The buildings, like the cattle, are not land, but capital, regularly consumed and reproduced; and all payments made in consideration for them are properly interest.
Many payments are often included under the term rent that aren't actually payment for the land itself but rather for the money spent on it. The buildings are as separate from the land as the livestock or timber on it; what you pay for them shouldn't be considered rent for the land any more than payment for livestock would be if it were customary for the landlord to stock the farm for the tenant. The buildings, like the livestock, are not land but capital, regularly used and replaced; and all payments made for them are really interest.
But with regard to capital actually sunk in improvements, and not requiring periodical renewal, but spent once for all in giving the land a permanent increase of productiveness, it appears to me that the return made to such capital loses altogether the character of profits, and is governed by the principles of rent. It is true that a landlord will not expend capital in improving his estate unless he expects from the improvement an increase of income surpassing the interest [pg 241] of his outlay. Prospectively, this increase of income may be regarded as profit; but, when the expense has been incurred and the improvement made, the rent of the improved land is governed by the same rules as that of the unimproved.
But when it comes to capital that has already been invested in improvements, which doesn't need regular renewal and is spent once to permanently boost the land's productivity, I believe the returns on that capital stop being considered profits and instead follow the principles of rent. It's true that a landlord won't invest in improving their land unless they expect the improvement to create an income that exceeds the interest on their investment. Initially, this increased income can be seen as profit; however, once the expense is paid and the improvement is complete, the rent for the upgraded land is determined by the same factors as that of the unimproved land.
In a work entitled “The Past, the Present, and the Future,” Mr. Carey takes [a] ground of objection to the Ricardo theory of rent, namely, that in point of historical fact the lands first brought under cultivation are not the most fertile, but the barren lands. “We find the settler invariably occupying the high and thin lands requiring little clearing and no drainage. With the growth of population and wealth, other soils yielding a larger return to labor are always brought into activity, with a constantly increasing return to the labor expended upon them.”
In a work titled "The Past, the Present, and the Future," Mr. Carey raises an objection to the Ricardo theory of rent, arguing that historically, the first lands to be cultivated are not the most fertile, but rather the less productive lands. “We see that settlers typically settle in the higher, less fertile land that needs little clearing and no drainage. As the population and wealth increase, other soils that provide better yields for the labor are slowly used, resulting in consistently higher returns on the labor invested in them.”
In whatever order the lands come into cultivation, those [pg 242] which when cultivated yield the least return, in proportion to the labor required for their culture, will always regulate the price of agricultural produce; and all other lands will pay a rent simply equivalent to the excess of their produce over this minimum. Whatever unguarded expressions may have been occasionally used in describing the law of rent, these two propositions are all that was ever intended by it. If, indeed, Mr. Carey could show that the return to labor from the land, agricultural skill and science being supposed the same, is not a diminishing return, he would overthrow a principle much more fundamental than any law of rent. But in this he has wholly failed.
No matter which lands are cultivated first, those that yield the least return compared to the effort needed to farm them will always set the price for agricultural products. All other lands will pay a rent that's just the difference between their output and this minimum. Regardless of any careless terms that might have been used in discussing the law of rent, these two points are all that was ever meant by it. If Mr. Carey could demonstrate that the return on labor from the land, assuming agricultural skill and knowledge are the same, doesn't diminish, he would challenge a principle that's much more fundamental than any rent law. But he has completely failed to do so.
Others, again, allege as an objection against Ricardo, that if all land were of equal fertility it might still yield a rent. But Ricardo says precisely the same. It is also distinctly a portion of Ricardo's doctrine that, even apart from differences of situation, the land of a country supposed to be of uniform fertility would, all of it, on a certain supposition, pay rent, namely, if the demand of the community required [pg 243] that it should all be cultivated, and cultivated beyond the point at which a further application of capital begins to be attended with a smaller proportional return.
Others argue against Ricardo by stating that even if all land were equally fertile, it could still generate rent. However, Ricardo actually agrees with this point. It's also a key part of Ricardo's theory that even without differences in location, land in a country that is uniformly fertile would, under certain conditions, produce rent. This would happen if the community's demand required that all the land be cultivated, extending cultivation beyond the point where additional capital leads to a smaller proportional return.
This is simply the question, before discussed, whether, if only one class of land were cultivated, some agricultural capital would pay rent or not. It all depends on the fact whether population—and so the demand for food—has increased to the point where it calls out a recognition of the diminishing productiveness of the soil. In that case different capitals would be invested, so that there would be different returns to the same amount of capital; and the prior or more advantageous investments of capital on the land would yield more than the ordinary rate of profit, which could be claimed as rent.
This is basically the question we talked about before: if only one type of land is farmed, would any agricultural investment actually cover the rent or not? It really depends on whether the population—and therefore the demand for food—has increased to the point where it shows the declining productivity of the soil. If that’s true, different investments would take place, resulting in various returns on the same amount of capital; and earlier or more advantageous investments in the land would generate more than the typical profit rate, which could be seen as rent.
A. L. Perry184 admits the law of diminishing returns, but holds that, “as land is capital, and as every form of capital may be loaned or rented, and thus become fruitful in the hands of another, the rent of land does not differ essentially in its nature from the rent of buildings in cities, or from the interest of money.” Henry George admits Ricardo's law of rent to its full extent, but very curiously says: “Irrespective of the increase of population, the effect of improvements in methods of production and exchange is to increase rent.... The effect of labor-saving improvements will be to increase the production of wealth. Now, for the production of wealth, two things are required, labor and land. Therefore, the effect of labor-saving improvements will be to extend the demand for land, and, wherever the limit of the quality of land in use is reached, to bring into cultivation lands of less natural productiveness, or to extend cultivation on the same lands to a point of lower natural productiveness. And thus, while the primary effect of labor-saving improvements is to increase the power of labor, the secondary effect is to extend cultivation, and, where this lowers the margin of cultivation, to increase rent.”185 Francis Bowen186 rejects Ricardo's law, and says, “Rent depends, not on the increase, but on the distribution, of the population”—asserting that the existence of large cities and towns determines the amount of rent paid by neighboring land.187
A. L. Perry184acknowledges the law of diminishing returns, but believes that,“Since land is a type of capital and all capital can be loaned or rented to generate productivity in someone else's hands, the rent for land is essentially the same as the rent for buildings in cities or the interest on money.”Henry George fully embraces Ricardo's law of rent, but interestingly notes:“No matter how much the population grows, better production and exchange methods increase rent.... Innovations that save labor enhance wealth production. Two key components for generating wealth are labor and land. Therefore, the effects of labor-saving advancements will broadly increase the demand for land, and when the quality of usable land reaches its limit, they will result in cultivating less productive lands or increasing cultivation on the same lands, even if that means operating at a lower level of natural productivity. So, while the main effect of labor-saving advancements is to improve the efficiency of labor, the secondary effect is to expand cultivation, and when this decreases the margin of cultivation, it will raise rent.”185Francis Bowen186disputes Ricardo's law, which says,“Rent is influenced not by how many people there are, but by how those people are spread out”—arguing that the existence of large cities and towns affects the rent for nearby land.187
§ 6. Rent is not included in the Cost of Production of Agricultural Produce.
Rent does not really form any part of the expenses of [agricultural] production, or of the advances of the capitalist. The grounds on which this assertion was made are now apparent. It is true that all tenant-farmers, and many other classes of producers, pay rent. But we have now seen that whoever cultivates land, paying a rent for it, gets in return for his rent an instrument of superior power to other instruments of the same kind for which no rent is paid. The superiority of the instrument is in exact proportion to the rent paid for it. If a few persons had steam-engines of superior power to all others in existence, but limited by physical laws to a number short of the demand, the rent which a manufacturer would be willing to pay for one of these steam-engines could not be looked upon as an addition to his outlay, because by the use of it he would save in his other expenses the equivalent of what it cost him: without it he could not do the same quantity of work, unless at an additional expense equal to the rent. The same thing is true of land. The real expenses of production are those incurred on the worst land, or by the capital employed in the least favorable circumstances. This land or capital pays, as we have seen, no rent, but the expenses to which it is subject cause all other land or agricultural capital to be subjected to an equivalent expense in the form of rent. Whoever does pay rent gets back its full value in extra advantages, and the rent which he pays does not place him in a worse position than, but only in the same position as, his fellow-producer who pays no rent, but whose instrument is one of inferior efficiency.
Rent doesn't actually contribute to the expenses of agricultural production or the investments made by capitalists. The reasons behind this claim are now clear. It's true that all tenant farmers and many other types of producers pay rent. However, we've seen that anyone who cultivates land and pays rent for it receives, in exchange, a tool that is more effective than similar tools for which no rent is paid. The effectiveness of this tool is directly related to the rent paid for it. For example, if a few individuals had steam engines that were far more powerful than any others available, but their number was limited due to physical constraints, the rent a manufacturer would be willing to pay for one of these superior steam engines shouldn't be viewed as an added cost. This is because, by using it, the manufacturer would save on other expenses equivalent to the rent: without it, he couldn't achieve the same output without incurring extra costs equal to the rent. The same principle applies to land. The actual production costs come from using the least productive land or capital in less favorable conditions. This land or capital doesn't pay rent, but the costs associated with it force all other land or agricultural capital to bear a similar cost in the form of rent. Anyone who pays rent receives the full value back in additional benefits, and the rent they pay doesn’t put them at a disadvantage compared to their fellow producer who pays no rent but has less efficient tools.
Book III. Trade.
Chapter 1: Value.
§ 1. Definitions of Value in Use, Exchange Value, and Price.
It is evident that, of the two great departments of Political Economy, the production of wealth and its distribution, the consideration of Value has to do with the latter alone; and with that only so far as competition, and not usage or custom, is the distributing agency.
It’s clear that, between the two major areas of Political Economy—wealth production and its distribution—the concept of Value relates only to the latter; and only when competition, rather than usage or custom, is the means of distribution.
The use of a thing, in political economy, means its capacity to satisfy a desire, or serve a purpose. Diamonds have this capacity in a high degree, and, unless they had it, would not bear any price. Value in use, or, as Mr. De Quincey calls it, teleologic value, is the extreme limit of value in exchange. The exchange value of a thing may fall short, to any amount, of its value in use; but that it can ever exceed the value in use implies a contradiction; it supposes that persons will give, to possess a thing, more than the utmost value which they themselves put upon it, as a means of gratifying their inclinations.
The use of an item in political economy refers to its ability to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose. Diamonds have this ability to a great extent, and if they didn’t, they wouldn’t have any value. Use value, or as Mr. De Quincey puts it, goal-oriented value, represents the highest limit of exchange value. The exchange value of an item can be lower than its use value by any amount; however, if it were to exceed its use value, it would be contradictory. This would mean that people would pay more for something than the maximum value they assign to it as a way to satisfy their desires.
The word Value, when used without adjunct, always means, in political economy, value in exchange.
The term "Value," when used alone, always refers to exchange value in political economy.
Exchange value requires to be distinguished from Price. Writers have employed Price to express the value of a thing in relation to money—the quantity of money for which it will exchange. By the price of a thing, therefore, we shall [pg 250] henceforth understand its value in money; by the value, or exchange value of a thing, its general power of purchasing; the command which its possession gives over purchasable commodities in general. What is meant by command over commodities in general? The same thing exchanges for a greater quantity of some commodities, and for a very small quantity of others. A coat may exchange for less bread this year than last, if the harvest has been bad, but for more glass or iron, if a tax has been taken off those commodities, or an improvement made in their manufacture. Has the value of the coat, under these circumstances, fallen or risen? It is impossible to say: all that can be said is, that it has fallen in relation to one thing, and risen in respect to another. Suppose, for example, that an invention has been made in machinery, by which broadcloth could be woven at half the former cost. The effect of this would be to lower the value of a coat, and, if lowered by this cause, it would be lowered not in relation to bread only or to glass only, but to all purchasable things, except such as happened to be affected at the very time by a similar depressing cause. Those [changes] which originate in the commodities with which we compare it affect its value in relation to those commodities; but those which originate in itself affect its value in relation to all commodities.
Exchange value needs to be distinguished from Price. Writers have used Price to represent the value of something in relation to money—the amount of money it can be exchanged for. So from now on, when we talk about the price of something, we mean its value in money; and when we talk about value, or exchange value, we mean its overall purchasing power—the control that owning it gives over what can be bought in general. What do we mean by control over commodities in general? The same item can be exchanged for a greater quantity of some goods and for a very small quantity of others. A coat might buy less bread this year compared to last if the harvest was poor, but it could buy more glass or iron if a tax on those items was lifted or if they were improved in production. Has the value of the coat gone down or up in these situations? It's hard to say: all we can say is that it has decreased in relation to one item and increased in relation to another. For example, if a new machine was invented that made it possible to weave broadcloth at half the previous cost, this would lower the value of a coat. If that happens, its value would decrease not just in relation to bread or glass, but across all things that can be bought, except for those affected at the same time by a similar drop in value. Changes arising from the goods we compare it to affect its value in relation to those items; but changes that originate within itself affect its value in relation to all goods.
There is such a thing as a general rise of prices. All commodities may rise in their money price. But there can not be a general rise of values. It is a contradiction in terms. A can only rise in value by exchanging for a greater quantity of B and C; in which case these must exchange for a smaller quantity of A. All things can not rise relatively to one another. If one half of the commodities in the market rise in exchange value, the very terms imply a fall of the other half; and, reciprocally, the fall implies a rise. Things which are exchanged for one another can no more all fall, or all rise, than a dozen runners can each outrun all the rest, or a hundred trees all overtop one another. A general rise or a general fall of prices is merely tantamount to an alteration [pg 251] in the value of money, and is a matter of complete indifference, save in so far as it affects existing contracts for receiving and paying fixed pecuniary amounts.
There is such a thing as a general increase in prices. All goods can go up in their money price. But there can't be a general increase in values. It's a contradiction. A can only increase in value by being exchanged for a larger quantity of B and C; in that case, these must be exchanged for a smaller quantity of A. Not all things can rise relative to each other. If half of the goods in the market increase in exchange value, it means the other half must fall; and vice versa, a fall implies a rise. Things that are exchanged for each other can’t all fall or all rise, just like a dozen runners can’t all outrun each other, or a hundred trees can’t all be taller than each one. A general increase or decrease in prices just means a change in the value of money, and it doesn’t really matter, except as it affects existing contracts for paying and receiving fixed amounts of money.
Before commencing the inquiry into the laws of value and price, I have one further observation to make. I must give warning, once for all, that the cases I contemplate are those in which values and prices are determined by competition alone. In so far only as they are thus determined, can they be reduced to any assignable law. The buyers must be supposed as studious to buy cheap as the sellers to sell dear.
Before starting the investigation into the laws of value and price, I have one more point to make. I need to clarify that the cases I'm considering are those where values and prices are determined solely by competition. Only to the extent that they are determined in this way can they be distilled into any identifiable law. Buyers must be thought of as eager to buy cheaply just as sellers are keen to sell at a high price.
§ 2. Conditions of Value: Usefulness, Difficulty of Attaining, and Transferability.
That a thing may have any value in exchange, two conditions are necessary. 1. It must be of some use; that is (as already explained), it must conduce to some purpose, satisfy some desire. No one will pay a price, or part with anything which serves some of his purposes, to obtain a thing which serves none of them. 2. But, secondly, the thing must not only have some utility, there must also be some difficulty in its attainment.
For something to have value in exchange, two conditions are necessary. 1. It must be useful; in other words, it needs to contribute to some goal or fulfill some desire. No one is going to pay for or give up something that meets their needs just to get something that doesn’t help them at all. 2. Additionally, the item must not only be useful, but there should also be some difficulty in obtaining it.
The difficulty of attainment which determines value is not always the same kind of difficulty: (1.) It sometimes consists in an absolute limitation of the supply. There are things of which it is physically impossible to increase the quantity beyond certain narrow limits. Such are those wines which can be grown only in peculiar circumstances of soil, climate, and exposure. Such also are ancient sculptures; pictures by the old masters; rare books or coins, or other articles of antiquarian curiosity. Among such may also be reckoned houses and building-ground, in a town of definite extent.
The difficulty of achieving something that determines its value isn't always the same type of difficulty: (1.) Sometimes it comes from a complete limitation of the supply. There are things for which it's physically impossible to increase the quantity beyond certain narrow limits. This includes wines that can only be produced under specific conditions of soil, climate, and exposure. It also applies to ancient sculptures, paintings by old masters, rare books or coins, and other items of historical interest. This can also include houses and plots of land in a town with set boundaries.

(2.) But there is another category (embracing the majority of all things that are bought and sold), in which the obstacle to attainment consists only in the labor and expense requisite to produce the commodity. Without a certain labor and expense it can not be had; but, when any one is willing to incur these, there needs be no limit to the multiplication of the product. If there were laborers enough and machinery enough, cottons, woolens, or linens might be produced by thousands of yards for every single yard now manufactured.
(2.) But there’s another category (covering most things that are bought and sold) where the only barrier to obtaining those items is the work and cost needed to create them. Without a certain amount of work and expense, they can’t be obtained; however, as long as someone is willing to invest in these, there’s no limit to how much of the product can be made. If there were enough workers and machinery, thousands of yards of cotton, wool, or linen could be produced for every single yard currently made.

(3.) There is a third case, intermediate between the two preceding, and rather more complex, which I shall at present merely indicate, but the importance of which in political economy is extremely great. There are commodities which can be multiplied to an indefinite extent by labor and expenditure, but not by a fixed amount of labor and expenditure. Only a limited quantity can be produced at a given cost; if more is wanted, it must be produced at a greater cost. To this class, as has been often repeated, agricultural produce belongs, and generally all the rude produce of the earth; and this peculiarity is a source of very important consequences; one of which is the necessity of a limit to population; and another, the payment of rent.
(3.) There's a third situation, which is in between the two previous ones and is somewhat more complicated. I’ll just point it out for now, but its significance in political economy is really important. There are goods that can be produced indefinitely through labor and investment, but not with a fixed amount of labor and investment. Only a certain quantity can be produced at a specific cost; if more is needed, it has to be produced at a higher cost. This category, as has often been mentioned, includes agricultural products and generally all the raw produce from the earth. This unique aspect leads to very significant consequences, one of which is the need for a limit on population; another is the payment of rent.

§ 3. Commodities Limited in Quantity by the Law of Demand and Supply: Overview of How This Law Works.
These being the three classes, in one or other of which all things that are bought and sold must take their place, we shall consider them in their order. And first, of things absolutely limited in quantity, such as ancient sculptures or pictures.
These are the three categories in which everything bought and sold must fit, so we'll look at them in order. First, we’ll discuss things that have a definite quantity, like ancient sculptures or paintings.
Of such things it is commonly said that their value depends on their scarcity; others say that the value depends on the demand and supply. But this statement requires much explanation. The supply of a commodity is an intelligible expression: it means the quantity offered for sale; the quantity that is to be had, at a given time and place, by those who wish to purchase it. But what is meant by the demand? Not the mere desire for the commodity. A beggar [pg 255] may desire a diamond; but his desire, however great, will have no influence on the price. Writers have therefore given a more limited sense to demand, and have defined it, the wish to possess, combined with the power of purchasing.207 To distinguish demand in this technical sense from the demand which is synonymous with desire, they call the former effectual demand.
People often say that the value of things hinges on how rare they are; others argue that it relies on supply and demand. However, this statement needs further clarification. The supply of a commodity is a clear term: it refers to the amount available for sale; the quantity that can be acquired at a specific time and place by those who want to buy it. But what do we mean by demand? It’s not just a simple wish for the commodity. A beggar might want a diamond; however, his desire, no matter how strong, won’t impact the price. Therefore, writers have given a more specific definition to demand, describing it as the desire to own something combined with the ability to buy it. To differentiate this technical sense of demand from the general notion of desire, they refer to the former as effective demand.
General supply consists in the commodities offered in exchange for other commodities; general demand likewise, if no money exists, consists in the commodities offered as purchasing power in exchange for other commodities. That is, one can not increase the demand for certain things without increasing the supply of some articles which will be received in exchange for the desired commodities. Demand is based upon the production of articles having exchange value, in its economic sense; and the measure of this demand is necessarily the quantity of commodities offered in exchange for the desired goods. General demand and supply are thus reciprocal to each other. But as soon as money, or general purchasing power, is introduced, Mr. Cairnes208 defines “demand as the desire for commodities or services, seeking its end by an offer of general purchasing power; and supply, as the desire for general purchasing power, seeking its end by an offer of specific commodities or services.” But many persons find a difficulty because they insist upon separating the idea of supply from that of demand, owing to the fact that producers seem to be a distinct class in the community, different from consumers. That they are in reality the same persons can be easily explained by the following statement: “A certain number of people, A, B, C, D, E, F, etc., are engaged in industrial occupations—A produces for B, C, D, E, F; B for A, C, D, E, F; C for A, B, D, E, F, and so on. In each case the producer and the consumers are distinct, and hence, by a very natural fallacy, it is concluded that the whole body of consumers is distinct from the whole body of producers, whereas they consist of precisely the same persons.”
General supply refers to the goods traded for other goods, while general demand, when money isn't involved, means the goods provided as purchasing power in exchange for other goods. In other words, you can't boost the demand for certain items without also increasing the supply of other items that people will accept in return for the desired goods. Demand depends on the production of items with economic exchange value, and the measure of this demand is the amount of goods offered in exchange for the wanted items. General demand and supply are therefore linked. However, once money or general purchasing power comes into play, Mr. Cairnes208defines“Demand refers to the desire for goods or services, fulfilled by providing overall purchasing power; while supply refers to the desire for overall purchasing power, fulfilled by offering specific goods or services.”However, many people find this concept challenging because they insist on seeing supply and demand as two separate things, thinking that producers belong to a different group in society than consumers. The truth is that they are often the same people, as explained by the following statement:“A number of people, A, B, C, D, E, F, etc., are involved in industrial jobs—A makes products for B, C, D, E, F; B makes products for A, C, D, E, F; C makes products for A, B, D, E, F, and so on. In each case, the producer and the consumers are different, which leads to a common misunderstanding that the entire group of consumers is separate from the entire group of producers, even though they are actually the same people.”
But in regard to demand and supply of particular commodities (not general demand and supply), the increase of the demand [pg 256] is not necessarily followed by an increased supply, or vice versa. Out of the total production (which constitutes general demand) a varying amount, sometimes more, sometimes less, may be directed by the desires of men to the purchase of some given thing. This should be borne in mind, in connection with the future discussion of over-production. The identity of general demand with general supply shows there can be no general over-production: but so long as there exists the possibility that the demand for a particular commodity may diminish without a corresponding effect being thereby produced on the supply of that commodity, by a necessary connection, we see that there may be over-production of particular commodities; that is, a production in excess of the demand.
But when we talk about the demand and supply of specific goods (not overall demand and supply), an increase in demand[pg 256]doesn't automatically result in a greater supply, orand vice versaFrom the total production, which represents overall demand, a varying amount—sometimes more, sometimes less—can be influenced by people's preferences towards the purchase of a specific item. This is important to remember when we talk about over-production later. The alignment of general demand with general supply indicates that there can't be any overall over-production. However, as long as there is a possibility that the demand for a specific product could drop without a corresponding decrease in its supply, we can see that over-production can occur for specific commodities, meaning producing more than what is actually demanded.
The proper mathematical analogy [between demand and supply] is that of an equation. If unequal at any moment, competition equalizes them, and the manner in which this is done is by an adjustment of the value. If the demand increases, the value rises; if the demand diminishes, the value falls; again, if the supply falls off, the value rises; and falls, if the supply is increased. The rise or the fall continues until the demand and supply are again equal to one another: and the value which a commodity will bring in any market is no other than the value which, in that market, gives a demand just sufficient to carry off the existing or expected supply.
The right mathematical analogy [between demand and supply] is that of an equation. If they are not equal at any point, competition brings them into balance, and this happens through a change in value. When demand goes up, value increases; when demand goes down, value decreases; similarly, if supply goes down, value increases; and it decreases if supply goes up. This increase or decrease keeps happening until demand and supply are balanced again: the value a commodity can fetch in any market is simply the value that, in that market, creates just enough demand to match the current or anticipated supply.
Mr. Cairnes209 finally defined market value as the price “which is sufficient, and no more than sufficient, to carry the existing supply over, with such a surplus as circumstances may render advisable, to meet the new supplies forthcoming,” which is nothing more than a paraphrase of the words “existing or expected supply” just used by Mr. Mill. It seems unnecessary, therefore, that Mr. Cairnes should have added: “According to Mr. Mill, the actual market price is the price which equalizes supply and demand in a given market; as I view the case, the ‘proper market price’ is the price which equalizes supply and demand, not as existing in the particular market, but in the larger sense which I have assigned to the terms. To this price the actual market price will, according to my view, approximate, in proportion to the intelligence and knowledge of the dealers.”
Mr. Cairnes209 finally defined market value as the price "That is sufficient, and only sufficient, to maintain the current supply, along with some extra as needed, to manage the incoming new supplies." which is essentially a rephrasing of the terms “available or anticipated supply” that Mr. Mill just used. It seems unnecessary, then, for Mr. Cairnes to add: According to Mr. Mill, the actual market price is the price that balances supply and demand in a specific market. From my point of view, the ‘proper market price’ is the price that balances supply and demand, not just as it exists in that specific market, but in the broader context I’ve defined for these terms. I believe the actual market price will come close to this price, depending on the knowledge and understanding of the sellers.
Adam Smith, who introduced the expression “effectual demand,” employed it to denote the demand of those who are willing and able to give for the commodity what he calls its natural price—that is, the price which will enable it to be permanently produced and brought to market.210
Adam Smith, who coined the term “effective demand” used it to refer to the demand from people who are willing and able to pay the commodity's natural price—that is, the price that allows it to be sustainably produced and sold. 210
This, then, is the Law of Value, with respect to all commodities not susceptible of being multiplied at pleasure.
This is the Law of Value, concerning all commodities that can't be easily produced in unlimited amounts.
§ 4. Other Cases Covered by this Law.
There are but few commodities which are naturally and necessarily limited in supply. But any commodity whatever may be artificially so. The monopolist can fix the value as high as he pleases, short of what the consumer either could not or would not pay; but he can only do so by limiting the supply. Monopoly value, therefore, does not depend on any peculiar principle, but is a mere variety of the ordinary case of demand and supply.
There are only a few goods that are naturally and necessarily in limited supply. However, any good can be artificially restricted. The monopolist can set the price as high as they want, as long as it's below what the consumer either can't afford or isn't willing to pay; but they can only do this by limiting the supply. Therefore, monopoly value doesn't rely on any special principle, but is simply a variation of the usual situation of demand and supply.
Again, though there are few commodities which are at all times and forever unsusceptible of increase of supply, any commodity whatever may be temporarily so; and with some commodities this is habitually the case. Agricultural produce, for example, can not be increased in quantity before the next harvest; the quantity of corn already existing in the world is all that can be had for sometimes a year to come. During that interval, corn is practically assimilated to things of which the quantity can not be increased. In the case of most commodities, it requires a certain time to increase their quantity; and if the demand increases, then, until a corresponding supply can be brought forward, that is, until the supply can accommodate itself to the demand, the value will so rise as to accommodate the demand to the supply.
Once again, while there are very few goods that are always unable to have their supply increased, any good can be temporarily limited in supply; and with some goods, this is often the case. For instance, agricultural products cannot be increased in quantity until the next harvest; the amount of grain that currently exists in the world is all that can be available for a year or sometimes longer. During that time, grain is essentially treated like goods whose quantity cannot be increased. For most goods, it takes time to boost their quantity; and if demand goes up, then until a matching supply can be created—meaning until the supply can meet the demand—the price will rise to adjust the demand to the available supply.
There is another case the exact converse of this. There are some articles of which the supply may be indefinitely increased, but can not be rapidly diminished. There are things so durable that the quantity in existence is at all times very great in comparison with the annual produce. Gold [pg 258] and the more durable metals are things of this sort, and also houses. The supply of such things might be at once diminished by destroying them; but to do this could only be the interest of the possessor if he had a monopoly of the article, and could repay himself for the destruction of a part by the increased value of the remainder. The value, therefore, of such things may continue for a long time so low, either from excess of supply or falling off in the demand, as to put a complete stop to further production; the diminution of supply by wearing out being so slow a process that a long time is requisite, even under a total suspension of production, to restore the original value. During that interval the value will be regulated solely by supply and demand, and will rise very gradually as the existing stock wears out, until there is again a remunerating value, and production resumes its course.
There's another situation that's the exact opposite of this. There are some goods where the supply can be increased indefinitely, but cannot be quickly decreased. Some items are so durable that the amount available is always large compared to the annual production. Gold [pg 258] and other durable metals, as well as houses, fall into this category. The supply of these items could be reduced by destroying them, but this would only make sense for the owner if they had a monopoly on the item and could make up for the loss of part of it through the increased value of what remains. Therefore, the value of these goods may stay low for a long time, either due to an oversupply or decreased demand, which can completely halt further production; the reduction in supply from wear and tear is such a slow process that it takes a long time, even with production completely stopped, to restore the original value. During this time, the value will be determined solely by supply and demand and will rise very gradually as the existing stock decreases, until there is once again a profitable value, and production restarts.
Finally, there are commodities of which, though capable of being increased or diminished to a great and even an unlimited extent, the value never depends upon anything but demand and supply. This is the case, in particular, with the commodity Labor, of the value of which we have treated copiously in the preceding book; and there are many cases besides in which we shall find it necessary to call in this [pg 259] principle to solve difficult questions of exchange value. This will be particularly exemplified when we treat of International Values; that is, of the terms of interchange between things produced in different countries, or, to speak more generally, in distant places.
Finally, there are goods that can be increased or decreased significantly, even to an unlimited extent, but their value only relies on demand and supply. This is especially true for Labor, the value of which we discussed in detail in the previous book; there are also many other instances where we will need to apply this [pg 259] principle to address challenging questions of exchange value. This will be particularly evident when we discuss International Values; that is, the terms of exchange between products made in different countries, or, to put it more broadly, in distant locations.
§ 5. Goods that can be produced endlessly without any increase in cost. Their value is determined by the cost of production.
When the production of a commodity is the effect of labor and expenditure, whether the commodity is susceptible of unlimited multiplication or not, there is a minimum value which is the essential condition of its being permanently produced. The value at any particular time is the result of supply and demand, and is always that which is necessary to create a market for the existing supply. But unless that value is sufficient to repay the Cost of Production, and to afford, besides, the ordinary expectation of profit, the commodity will not continue to be produced. Capitalists will not go on permanently producing at a loss. When such profit is evidently not to be had, if people do not actually withdraw their capital, they at least abstain from replacing it when consumed. The cost of production, together with the ordinary profit, may, therefore, be called the necessary price or value of all things made by labor and capital. Nobody willingly produces in the prospect of loss.
When a product is created through labor and investment, whether it can be produced endlessly or not, there’s a minimum value that's crucial for its ongoing production. The value at any given moment is determined by supply and demand, and it’s always what’s needed to create a market for the available supply. However, if that value isn’t enough to cover the costs of production and provide a standard profit expectation, the product won't keep being made. Investors won’t keep producing if they’re losing money. When it’s clear that profit isn’t available, even if people don't pull out their investments, they at least won’t reinvest once it’s used up. Therefore, the cost of production combined with the normal profit can be regarded as the essential price or value of all goods created by labor and capital. No one willingly produces with the hope of losing money.
When a commodity is not only made by labor and capital, but can be made by them in indefinite quantity, this Necessary Value, the minimum with which the producers will be content, is also, if competition is free and active, the maximum which they can expect. If the value of a commodity is such that it repays the cost of production not only with the customary but with a higher rate of profit, capital rushes to share in this extra gain, and, by increasing the supply of the article, reduces its value. This is not a mere supposition or surmise, but a fact familiar to those conversant with commercial operations. Whenever a new line of business presents itself, offering a hope of unusual profits, and whenever any established trade or manufacture is believed to be yielding a greater profit than customary, there is sure to be in a short time so large a production or importation of [pg 260] the commodity as not only destroys the extra profit, but generally goes beyond the mark, and sinks the value as much too low as it had before been raised too high, until the over-supply is corrected by a total or partial suspension of further production. As already intimated,212 these variations in the quantity produced do not presuppose or require that any person should change his employment. Those whose business is thriving, increase their produce by availing themselves more largely of their credit, while those who are not making the ordinary profit, restrict their operations, and (in manufacturing phrase) work short time. In this mode is surely and speedily effected the equalization, not of profits, perhaps, but of the expectations of profit, in different occupations.
When a product is not only created by labor and capital but can be produced in unlimited amounts, this Necessary Value, which is the minimum that producers will accept, is also, if competition is strong and active, the maximum they can expect. If the value of a product is such that it covers the production costs with not just the usual but a higher profit margin, capital rushes in to take part in these extra gains, and by increasing the supply of the product, it lowers its value. This isn't just a theory or guess; it's a well-known fact for those familiar with business activities. Whenever a new business opportunity comes up that seems to promise high profits, or when an existing industry is thought to be earning more than usual, there will soon be a surge of production or importation of that product, which not only eliminates the extra profit but often overshoots so much that it reduces the value even lower than where it was increased before, until the oversupply is balanced out by completely or partially stopping further production. As already mentioned, these fluctuations in production levels don't require anyone to change their job. Those whose businesses are doing well increase their output by making better use of credit, while those who aren't making normal profits limit their operations and (as the manufacturing term goes) work shorter hours. This method effectively and quickly balances out expectations of profit across different fields.
As a general rule, then, things tend to exchange for one another at such values as will enable each producer to be repaid the cost of production with the ordinary profit; in other words, such as will give to all producers the same rate of profit on their outlay. But in order that the profit may be equal where the outlay, that is, the cost of production, is equal, things must on the average exchange for one another in the ratio of their cost of production; things of which the cost of production is the same, must be of the same value.
As a general rule, things usually trade at values that allow each producer to cover their production costs along with a normal profit; in other words, values that provide all producers with the same profit rate on their investment. However, to ensure that profits are equal when the costs of production are the same, things must, on average, exchange at a ratio reflecting their production costs; items with the same production cost must have the same value.
Adam Smith and Ricardo have called that value of a thing which is proportional to its cost of production, its Natural Value (or its Natural Price). They meant by this, the point about which the value oscillates, and to which it always tends to return; the center value, toward which, as Adam Smith expresses it, the market value of a thing is constantly gravitating; and any deviation from which is but a temporary irregularity which, the moment it exists, sets forces in motion tending to correct it. On an average of years sufficient to enable the oscillations on one side of the central line to be compensated by those on the other, the market value agrees with the natural value; but it very seldom coincides exactly with it at any particular time. The sea everywhere tends to a level, but it never is at an exact level; its surface is always ruffled by waves, and often agitated by storms. It is enough that no point, at least in the open sea, is permanently higher than another. Each place is alternately elevated and depressed; but the ocean preserves its level.
Adam Smith and Ricardo referred to the value of a thing that corresponds to its production cost as its Natural Value (or Natural Price). They meant this as the point around which value fluctuates and to which it always aims to return; the central value toward which, as Adam Smith puts it, the market value of a thing is consistently drawn. Any deviation from this is just a temporary irregularity that, as soon as it occurs, triggers forces that work to correct it. Over a sufficient average of years to allow the fluctuations on one side of the central line to balance out those on the other, the market value aligns with the natural value; however, it rarely matches it exactly at any given moment. The sea everywhere aims for a level, but it’s never at an exact level; its surface is constantly disturbed by waves and often stirred by storms. It’s enough that no place, at least in the open sea, remains permanently higher than another. Each spot is alternately raised and lowered, but the ocean maintains its level.
§ 6. The value of these commodities ultimately aligns with their production costs due to the influence of supply and demand.
The latent influence by which the values of things are made to conform in the long run to the cost of production is the variation that would otherwise take place in the supply of the commodity. The supply would be increased if the thing continued to sell above the ratio of its cost of production, and would be diminished if it fell below that ratio.
The hidden force that causes the value of things to match their production costs over time is the change that would otherwise happen in the supply of the product. The supply would increase if the item kept selling for more than its production cost, and it would decrease if it dropped below that cost.
There is no need that there should be any actual alteration of supply; and when there is, the alteration, if permanent, is not the cause but the consequence of the alteration in value. If, indeed, the supply could not be increased, no diminution in the cost of production would lower the value; but there is by no means any necessity that it should. The mere possibility often suffices; the dealers are aware of what would happen, and their mutual competition makes them anticipate the result by lowering the price.
There’s no need for any actual change in supply; and when there is, if the change is permanent, it’s not the cause but rather the result of the change in value. If the supply could not be increased, a decrease in production costs wouldn’t lower the value; however, it’s not necessary that it should. Often, just the possibility is enough; sellers know what will happen, and their competition leads them to anticipate the outcome by lowering the price.
It is, therefore, strictly correct to say that the value of things which can be increased in quantity at pleasure does not depend (except accidentally, and during the time necessary for production to adjust itself) upon demand and supply; on the contrary, demand and supply depend upon it. There is a demand for a certain quantity of the commodity at its natural or cost value, and to that the supply in the long run endeavors to conform.
It is, therefore, accurate to say that the value of things that can be increased in quantity at will does not rely (except by chance, and during the time it takes for production to adapt) on supply and demand; rather, supply and demand are influenced by it. There is a demand for a certain amount of the product at its natural or cost value, and the supply aims to match that in the long run.
When at any time it fails of so conforming, it is either from miscalculation, or from a change in some of the elements of the problem; either in the natural value, that is, in the cost of production, or in the demand, from an alteration in public taste, or in the number or wealth of the consumers. If a value different from the natural value be necessary to make the demand equal to the supply, the market value will deviate from the natural value; but only for a time, for the permanent tendency of supply is to conform itself to the demand which is found by experience to exist for the commodity when selling at its natural value. If the supply is either more or less than this, it is so accidentally, and affords either more or less than the ordinary rate of profit, which, under free and active competition, can not long continue to be the case.
When it fails to align at any point, it’s either due to miscalculation or a change in some aspects of the problem; either in the natural value, meaning the cost of production, or in demand, due to shifts in public taste or changes in the number or wealth of consumers. If a value different from the natural value is needed to balance demand and supply, the market value will temporarily shift away from the natural value. However, this will only last for a short time, as the long-term trend of supply is to adjust to the demand that experience shows exists for the product when it’s priced at its natural value. If the supply is either more or less than this, it’s only a temporary situation and results in either higher or lower than the usual rate of profit, which, under free and active competition, cannot persist for long.
To recapitulate: demand and supply govern the value of all things which can not be indefinitely increased; except that even for them, when produced by industry, there is a minimum value, determined by the cost of production. But in all things which admit of indefinite multiplication, demand and supply only determine the perturbations of value during a period which can not exceed the length of time necessary for altering the supply. While thus ruling the oscillations of value, they themselves obey a superior force, which makes value gravitate toward Cost of Production, and which would settle it and keep it there, if fresh disturbing influences were not continually arising to make it again deviate.
To sum up: supply and demand control the value of everything that can't be increased indefinitely; however, even for those, when produced through work, there's a minimum value set by production costs. In the case of things that can be produced endlessly, supply and demand only influence temporary changes in value for a period that doesn't last longer than it takes to change the supply. While managing the fluctuations in value, supply and demand are influenced by a greater force that pulls value toward the cost of production, which would stabilize it there if new disruptive factors didn’t keep causing it to shift again.
Chapter II. Final Analysis of Production Costs.
§ 1. Labor, the main factor in production costs.
The component elements of Cost of Production have been set forth in the First Part of this inquiry.214 The principal of them, and so much the principal as to be nearly the sole, was found to be Labor. What the production of a thing costs to its producer, or its series of producers, is the labor expended in producing it. If we consider as the producer the capitalist who makes the advances, the word Labor may be replaced by the word Wages: what the produce costs to him, is the wages which he has had to pay. At the first glance, indeed, this seems to be only a part of his outlay, since he has not only paid wages to laborers, but has likewise provided them with tools, materials, and perhaps buildings. These tools, materials, and buildings, however, were produced by labor and capital; and their value, like that of the article to the production of which they are subservient, depends on cost of production, which again is resolvable into labor. The cost of production of broadcloth does not wholly consist in the wages of weavers; which alone are directly paid by the cloth-manufacturer. It consists also of the wages of spinners and wool-combers, and, it may be added, of shepherds, all of which the clothier has paid for in the price of yarn. It consists, too, of the wages of builders and brick-makers, which he has reimbursed in the contract price of erecting his factory. It partly consists of the wages of machine-makers, iron-founders, and miners. And to these must be added the wages of the carriers who transported any of [pg 265] the means and appliances of the production to the place where they were to be used, and the product itself to the place where it is to be sold.
The basic elements of the Cost of Production have been outlined in the First Part of this inquiry.214 The main one, almost the only one, is Labor. What it costs to produce something for its producer, or the series of producers, is the labor put into making it. If we think of the capitalist making the investments as the producer, we can substitute the word Labor with Wages: what the product costs him are the wages he has to pay. At first glance, this seems to be just a part of his expenses, since he has not only paid wages to workers, but has also provided them with tools, materials, and possibly buildings. However, these tools, materials, and buildings were made by labor and capital; their value, like that of the item they help produce, is based on the cost of production, which ultimately breaks down to labor. The cost of producing broadcloth doesn’t solely consist of the wages of the weavers; those are just directly paid by the cloth manufacturer. It also includes the wages of spinners, wool combers, and even shepherds, all of which the clothier has covered when paying for yarn. Additionally, it includes the wages of builders and brick makers, which he has reimbursed in the contract price for building his factory. It partly comprises the wages of machine makers, iron founders, and miners. And we must also include the wages of the carriers who transported any of the means and tools of production to where they were needed, and the final product to where it will be sold.
The value of commodities, therefore, depends principally (we shall presently see whether it depends solely) on the quantity of labor required for their production, including in the idea of production that of conveyance to the market. But since the cost of production to the capitalist is not labor but wages, and since wages may be either greater or less, the quantity of labor being the same, it would seem that the value of the product can not be determined solely by the quantity of labor, but by the quantity together with the remuneration, and that values must partly depend on wages.
The value of commodities, then, mainly depends (we’ll see soon if it depends entirely) on the amount of labor required for their production, which includes getting them to market. However, since the cost of production for the capitalist isn’t just labor but also wages, and since wages can vary, even when the labor amount is the same, it seems like the value of the product can't be determined only by the amount of labor. Instead, it also depends on the pay, meaning that value has to be partially influenced by wages.
Now the relation of one thing to another can not be altered by any cause which affects them both alike. A rise or fall of general wages is a fact which affects all commodities in the same manner, and therefore affords no reason why they should exchange for each other in one rather than in another proportion. Though there is no such thing as a general rise of values, there is such a thing as a general rise of prices. As soon as we form distinctly the idea of values, we see that high or low wages can have nothing to do with them; but that high wages make high prices, is a popular and widely spread opinion. The whole amount of error involved in this proposition can only be seen thoroughly when we come to the theory of money; at present we need only say that if it be true, there can be no such thing as a real rise of wages; for if wages could not rise without a proportional rise of the price of everything, they could not, for any substantial purpose, rise at all. It must be remembered, too, that general high prices, even supposing them to exist, can be of no use to a producer or dealer, considered as such; for, if they increase his money returns, they increase in the same degree [pg 266] all his expenses. There is no mode in which capitalists can compensate themselves for a high cost of labor, through any action on values or prices. It can not be prevented from taking its effect in low profits. If the laborers really get more, that is, get the produce of more labor, a smaller percentage must remain for profit.
Now, the relationship between one thing and another can’t be changed by any cause that affects both of them in the same way. An increase or decrease in general wages impacts all commodities in the same way, so it doesn’t provide any reason for them to exchange in one proportion over another. Although there’s no such thing as a general rise in values, a general rise in prices does exist. Once we clearly understand the concept of values, we realize that high or low wages have no bearing on them. However, the idea that high wages lead to high prices is a common and widely held belief. The full extent of the error in this belief becomes clear when we examine the theory of money; for now, we simply need to acknowledge that if this statement were true, there could be no actual rise in wages. If wages could only increase alongside a proportional rise in the price of everything, they wouldn’t realistically be able to rise at all. It’s also important to remember that general high prices, even if they do exist, are not beneficial to a producer or dealer in and of themselves. If high prices increase their monetary returns, they also increase their expenses by the same amount. There’s no way for capitalists to offset high labor costs through any changes in values or prices. This inevitably leads to lower profits. If workers genuinely earn more, meaning they derive the output of more work, then a smaller percentage must be left as profit.
§ 2. Wages influence values only when they vary across different jobs;“non-competing groups.”
Although, however, general wages, whether high or low, do not affect values, yet if wages are higher in one employment than another, or if they rise or fall permanently in one employment without doing so in others, these inequalities do really operate upon values. Things, for example, which are made by skilled labor, exchange for the produce of a much greater quantity of unskilled labor, for no reason but because the labor is more highly paid. We have before remarked that the difficulty of passing from one class of employments to a class greatly superior has hitherto caused the wages of all those classes of laborers who are separated from one another by any very marked barrier to depend more than might be supposed upon the increase of the population of each class considered separately, and that the inequalities in the remuneration of labor are much greater than could exist if the competition of the laboring people generally could be brought practically to bear on each particular employment. It follows from this that wages in different employments do not rise or fall simultaneously, but are, for short and sometimes even for long periods, nearly independent of one another. All such disparities evidently alter the relative cost of production of different commodities, and will therefore be completely represented in their natural or average value.
Although overall wages, whether high or low, don't affect values, when wages are higher in one job compared to another, or if they rise or fall in one job without doing so in others, these disparities do impact values. For instance, products made by skilled labor typically trade for the output of a much larger amount of unskilled labor, solely because the skilled labor is paid more. We've noted before that the challenge of moving from one type of job to a significantly better one has led to the wages of various groups of workers, who are separated by a noticeable gap, depending more than expected on the growth of each group’s population. As a result, the wage differences among workers are much greater than what would exist if competition among workers could effectively influence each specific job. Thus, wages in different jobs do not go up or down at the same time, but instead, they often remain nearly independent of each other for short and sometimes even long periods. All these differences clearly change the relative cost of production for various goods and will therefore be fully reflected in their natural or average value.
Wages do enter into value. The relative wages of the labor necessary for producing different commodities affect their value just as much as the relative quantities of labor. [pg 267] It is true, the absolute wages paid have no effect upon values; but neither has the absolute quantity of labor. If that were to vary simultaneously and equally in all commodities, values would not be affected. If, for instance, the general efficiency of all labor were increased, so that all things without exception could be produced in the same quantity as before with a smaller amount of labor, no trace of this general diminution of cost of production would show itself in the values of commodities.
Wages play a role in determining value. The relative pay for the labor required to produce different goods significantly impact their value, just like the relative amounts of labor do. [pg 267] It's true that the absolute wages paid don't affect values; the same goes for the absolute amount of labor. If the quantity of labor were to change at the same time and to the same extent across all goods, values wouldn’t be impacted. For example, if the overall efficiency of all labor improved, allowing everything to be produced just as before but using less labor, there would be no evidence of this overall reduction in production costs reflected in the values of commodities.
§ 3. Profits as a part of the Cost of Production.
Thus far of labor or wages as an element in cost of production. But in our analysis, in the First Book, of the requisites of production, we found that there is another necessary element in it besides labor. There is also capital; and this being the result of abstinence, the produce, or its value, must be sufficient to remunerate, not only all the labor required, but the abstinence of all the persons by whom the remuneration of the different classes of laborers was advanced. The return from abstinence is Profit. And profit, we have also seen, is not exclusively the surplus remaining to the capitalist after he has been compensated for his outlay, but forms, in most cases, no unimportant part of the outlay itself. The flax-spinner, part of whose expenses consists of the purchase of flax and of machinery, has had to pay, in their price, not only the wages of the labor by which the flax was grown and the machinery made, but the profits of the grower, the flax-dresser, the miner, the iron-founder, and the machine-maker. All these profits, together with those of the spinner himself, were again advanced by the weaver, in the price of his material—linen yarn; and along with them the profits of a fresh set of machine-makers, and of the miners and iron-workers who supplied them with their metallic material. All these advances form part of the cost of production of linen. Profits, therefore, as well as wages, enter into the cost of production which determines the value of the produce.
So far, we’ve talked about labor or wages as a part of production costs. However, in our discussion in the First Book about what’s needed for production, we discovered there’s another essential component besides labor. There’s also capital, which results from saving. The output, or its value, has to be enough to pay not just for all the labor involved but also for the sacrifices made by everyone who helped pay the various types of workers. The return from saving is profit. And we’ve seen that profit isn’t just the extra that remains for the capitalist after covering their expenses; in many cases, it’s a significant part of the expenses themselves. The flax-spinner’s expenses include buying flax and machinery, so they’ve paid not only for the wages of the workers who grew the flax and made the machinery but also for the profits of the grower, the flax-dresser, the miner, the iron-founder, and the machine-maker. All these profits, along with those of the spinner themselves, were then passed on to the weaver in the price of their material—linen yarn—along with the profits of another set of machine-makers and the miners and iron-workers who supplied them with their metal materials. All these costs contribute to the production cost of linen. Therefore, profits, just like wages, play a role in the cost of production that determines the value of the output.
§ 4. The cost of production is accurately depicted as the sacrifice or cost incurred by both the laborer and the capitalist; this idea is related to the cost of labor.
In discussing Cost of Labor (supra, pp. 225, 226), Mr. Mill found that the advances of the immediate producer consisted [pg 268] not only of wages, but also of tools, materials, etc., in the price of which he was including the profits of an auxiliary capitalist who advanced the capital for making these tools, etc. But, then, if a line of division were to be passed down through all these advances, separating wages from profits, he urged that, if all the capitalists (auxiliary and immediate both) were one, all the advances of the capitalist might be considered as wages. Profits did not form a part of the outlay to the capitalists in the former analysis. And this seems correct enough. Now, however, he suggests that the outlay of the immediate producers should include the profit of the auxiliary capitalist. More than this, Mr. Mill now includes in cost to the capitalist the profit of the immediate capitalist. For example, in his illustration of the manufacture of linen, he includes not merely the profit of the auxiliary capital engaged in spinning and weaving, but the profit of the immediate and last capitalist, the linen-manufacturer, also. This includes in the cost of producing an article a profit not realized until after the commodity is produced.
When talking about the Cost of Labor (supra, pp.225,226Mr. Mill found that what the immediate producer offers includes __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.[pg 268]not just wages, but also tools, materials, and so on. In the price, he included the profits of an additional capitalist who provided the capital for these tools, etc. However, if there were to be a separation through all these advances, distinguishing wages from profits, he argued that if all the capitalists (both auxiliary and immediate) were treated as one entity, all the advances from the capitalists could be seen as wages. Profits did not count as part of the costs to the capitalists in the earlier analysis. This seems reasonable. Now, though, he suggests that the costs for the immediate producers should also cover the profit of the auxiliary capitalist. Furthermore, Mr. Mill now counts the profit of the immediate capitalist in the costs to the capitalist. For example, in his case of linen manufacturing, he includes not only the profit from the auxiliary capital involved in spinning and weaving, but also the profit from the immediate and final capitalist, the linen manufacturer. This means that the cost of producing an item includes a profit that isn't realized until after the product is made.
It is now time to give a more correct idea of cost of production. Every one admits, for example, that the “cost of production” of wheat is less in the United States than in England. If, for instance, three men with a capital of one hundred dollars may on a plot of ground, A, in the United States produce one hundred bushels of wheat, it will happen that the same men and capital will only produce sixty bushels on ground, B, in England.
It's time to clarify production costs. Everyone agrees, for instance, that the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“cost of production”The amount of wheat produced is lower in the United States than in England. For example, if three people have a total of one hundred dollars and can produce one hundred bushels of wheat on land A in the United States, they would only produce sixty bushels on land B in England with the same resources and investment.

In ordinary language, then, we say that the cost of production is greater in England than in the United States, because the same labor and capital here produce one hundred bushels for sixty in England; or, what amounts to the same thing, that less labor and capital could produce sixty bushels in the United States than sixty bushels in England. If we suppose that one fourth of the crop is profit, and three fourths is assigned to wages in both countries, then in the United States the one hundred dollars of capital receives twenty-five bushels of profit, while in England it receives only fifteen; and the three men receive as wages in the United States twenty-five bushels each, while in England they receive only fifteen bushels each. The first important induction to be made is that where cost of production [pg 269] is low, wages and profits are high. The high productiveness of extractive industries in the United States is the reason why wages and profits are higher here than in older countries.
In simple terms, production costs are higher in England than in the United States because the same amount of labor and capital here produces one hundred bushels versus sixty in England. In other words, it takes less labor and capital to produce sixty bushels in the United States than it does in England. If we assume that one-fourth of the crop is profit and three-fourths go to wages in both countries, then in the United States, one hundred dollars of capital results in twenty-five bushels of profit, while in England it only yields fifteen. The three workers in the United States each earn twenty-five bushels in wages, while in England, they earn only fifteen bushels each. The main point is that where production costs are low, wages and profits are high. The high productivity of extractive industries in the United States is why wages and profits are greater here than in older countries.[pg 269]
Now the second important question is, Is cost of production made up of wages and profits, and is it true that the cost rises with a rise of wages and profits? Certainly not. Wages and profits are both higher in the United States than in England, but no one is so absurd as to say that the cost of production of wheat (as above explained) is higher here than there. It is exactly because cost of production of wheat is lower in the United States that wages and profits measured in wheat are higher here than in England. Therefore, it can not be granted, as Mr. Mill expounds the doctrine, that cost of production is made up of wages and profits. When we speak of an increased cost of production of a given article, we mean that its production requires more labor and capital than before; and of a decrease in cost of production, that it requires less labor and capital than before; meaning by “more labor” that a given quality of labor is exerted for a longer or shorter time, and by “more capital” that a greater or less quantity of wealth abstained from is employed for a longer or shorter time; or, in other words, that laborers and capitalists undergo more or less sacrifice in exertion and abstinence, respectively, to attain a given result. This is the contribution to cost of production made by Mr. Cairnes, and briefly defined as follows: “In the case of labor, the cost of producing a given commodity will be represented by the number of average laborers employed in its production—regard at the same time being had to the severity of the work and the degree of risk it involves—multiplied by the duration of their labors. In that of abstinence, the principle is analogous; the sacrifice will be measured by the quantity of wealth abstained from, taken in connection with the risk incurred, and multiplied by the duration of the abstinence.”216
Now the second important question is, is the cost of production made up of wages and profits, and is it true that costs go up when wages and profits rise? Absolutely not. Wages and profits are both higher in the United States than in England, but no one is foolish enough to say that the cost of producing wheat (as explained above) is higher here than there. It's exactly because the cost of producing wheat is lower in the United States that wages and profits, when measured in wheat, are higher here than in England. Therefore, we cannot agree with Mr. Mill’s explanation that the cost of production consists solely of wages and profits. When we talk about an increased cost of production for a specific item, we mean that its production requires more labor and capital than before; and when we refer to a decrease in cost of production, it means it requires less labor and capital than before, where __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“more work”means that a specific quality of work is performed for a longer or shorter duration, and“more funding”means that a larger or smaller amount of savings is used for a longer or shorter time; in other words, that workers and investors experience more or less sacrifice in effort and discipline, respectively, to achieve a specific outcome. This is the contribution to the cost of production made by Mr. Cairnes, which can be briefly defined as follows:“When it comes to labor, the cost of producing a particular good is defined by the number of average workers involved in its production—factoring in the effort required and the risks taken—multiplied by how long they work. For abstaining, the concept is similar; the cost is determined by the amount of wealth set aside, taking into account the risk involved, and multiplied by the length of time of the abstinence.”216
This view of cost of production takes into consideration, in the act of production, what Mr. Mill does not include, the cost, or real sacrifice, to the laborer as well as to the capitalist. It may, then, be well to state the relations of cost of production, taken in this better sense, to value.
This view on production costs considers, in the production process, what Mr. Mill misses: the costs, or real sacrifices, that both the worker and the capitalist encounter. It may be useful, then, to clarify the connection between production costs, understood in this broader sense, and value.
Within competing groups, where there is free choice for labor and capital to select the most remunerative occupations, the hardest and most disagreeable employments will be best paid, and the wages and profits will be in proportion to the sacrifice involved in each case. If so, the amount paid in wages and profits represents the sacrifices in each case. [pg 270] Now, the aggregate product of an industry is the source from which is drawn its wages and profits: the aggregate wages and profits, therefore, must vary with the value of the total product. If the total value depart from the sum hitherto sufficient to pay the given wages and profits, then some will be paid proportionally less than their sacrifice. The value of a commodity, therefore, within the competing group, must conform to the costs of production. If, for example (a), the value at any time were such as not to give the laborer the usual equivalent for his sacrifice, he would change his employment to another within the group where he could get it; if (b) the share of the capitalist were at any time insufficient to give him the usual reward for his abstinence, he would change the investment of his capital. Therefore, within such limits as allow a free competition of labor and capital, value must conform itself to cost of production.
In competitive environments, where workers and capital can select the most rewarding positions, the hardest and least enjoyable jobs will offer the highest pay. Wages and profits will mirror the sacrifices required in each scenario. Thus, the amounts paid in wages and profits reflect the sacrifices made.[pg 270]Now, the total output of an industry is what pays for its wages and profits: the total wages and profits must, therefore, change with the overall output value. If the total value is not enough to cover the current wages and profits, then some people will be paid less than their contributions. Therefore, the value of a good, within the competing group, must match the production costs. For example (a), if at any time the value does not give the worker the typical return for his effort, he will move on to a different job in the group where he can get it; if (bIf a capitalist's share at any point isn't enough to provide a standard return on their investment, they'll relocate their capital to another opportunity. So, as long as there is free competition among labor and capital, value has to match the cost of production.
Not so, however, with the products of non-competing industrial groups. As shown by Mr. Mill, labor does not pass freely from one employment to another; and it must be said that capital does not either, although vastly more ready to move than labor. In a large and thinly settled country capital does not move freely over the whole area of industry; if it did, different rates of profit would not prevail, as we all know they do, in the United States. Now, as before stated, the total value of the commodities resulting from the exertions of each group of producers is the source from which wages and profits are drawn. The aggregate wages and profits in each industry will vary with the value of the aggregate products. But this total value depends upon what it will exchange for of the products of other groups; that is, this value depends on the reciprocal demand of one group for the commodities of the other groups, as compared with the demand of the other groups for its products. For example, although cost of production is low in group A, if the demand from outside groups were to be strong, the exchange value of A's products would rise, and A would get more of other goods in exchange; that is, the total produce is large, but a second increment, arising from a higher exchange value, is to be shared among A's laborers and capitalists. A few years ago, about 1878-1879, the value of wheat in the United States rose because of the increased demand from Europe, where the harvests had been unusually deficient. There had been no falling off in the productiveness of the farming industry of the United States to cause the increased price; but the relative demand of other industrial groups for wheat, the product of the farming industry, raised the exchange value of wheat, and so increased the industrial rewards of those engaged as laborers and capitalists in farming. So [pg 271] it is to be concluded that since there is no free movement of labor and capital between non-competing groups, wages and profits may constantly remain at rates which are not in correspondence with the actual sacrifice, or cost, to labor and capital in different groups; hence, their products do not exchange for each other in proportion to their costs of production. Reciprocal demand is the law of their value.
That's not true, though, for products from non-competing industrial groups. As Mr. Mill pointed out, labor doesn't easily move from one job to another; and it's also important to note that capital doesn't either, even though it's generally more willing to shift than labor. In a large and sparsely populated country, capital doesn't flow freely across all areas of industry; if it did, we wouldn't see the different profit rates that are well-known in the United States. As mentioned earlier, the total value of the goods produced by each group of producers is the source of wages and profits. The combined wages and profits in each industry will vary based on the total product value. But this total value relies on what it can be traded for against the products of other groups; in other words, this value is affected by how much one group wants goods from other groups versus how much the other groups want its products. For example, even if production costs are low in group A, if there's strong demand from outside groups, the exchange value of A's products would rise, and A would receive more goods in return. In that case, the total output is important, but any extra gain from a higher exchange value would be shared among A's workers and capitalists. A few years ago, around 1878-1879, the value of wheat in the United States increased due to higher demand from Europe, where harvests had been unusually bad. The price increase wasn't caused by a decline in the productivity of the American farming industry; rather, it was the relative demand from other industrial groups for wheat, which is produced by the farming industry, that raised the exchange value of wheat, thereby increasing the industrial earnings for those working as laborers and capitalists in agriculture. So[pg 271]We can conclude that because there's no free movement of labor and capital between non-competing groups, wages and profits may consistently stay at levels that don’t reflect the actual sacrifices or costs to labor and capital in different groups; therefore, their products do not exchange with each other in proportion to their production costs. Reciprocal demand is the principle that determines their value.
It will be said, at once, that the foregoing conception of cost of production is entirely opposed to the language of practical men of affairs. They constantly speak of higher or lower wages as increasing their cost of production, or as affecting their ability to compete with foreigners. So universal a usage implies a foundation of truth which demands attention. Wages do represent cost to the capitalist, that is, the chief part of the outlay he makes in order to get a given return; but we have already seen this, and, in the language of Political Economy, termed it “cost of labor” to the capitalist. When the business world use the phrase cost of production, they use it in the sense of cost of labor, as hitherto explained. When they are obliged by strikers to pay more wages, they say that it increases their “cost of production,” meaning the cost to them of getting their product, and that it affects their profits. This, then, will show that there is no objection to be urged, in its true sense, against the phrase cost of production, arising from its misuse in the common language of business.
It's obvious from the start that the old notion of production costs is in direct conflict with how businesspeople talk. They frequently mention higher or lower wages as factors that either raise their production costs or affect their ability to compete with foreign firms. This common discussion implies an important truth that should be recognized. Wages are indeed a cost for the capitalist, making them a major part of the expenses needed to achieve a desired return. We've previously acknowledged this, referring to it in economic terms as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“labor cost”When the business community discusses production costs, they're referring to labor costs, as mentioned earlier. When striking workers force them to pay higher wages, they argue that it increases their“production cost,”They mention the expense of getting their product, stating it affects their profits. This shows that there really isn’t a valid objection to the term "cost of production" when used correctly, even though it’s often misused in everyday business discussions.
The real connection between the proper conception of cost of production and cost of labor is, however, worth attention. It touches cost of labor through that one of its elements called “efficiency of labor.” The more productive an industry is, the higher its wages and profits may be, and it is exactly at this point that more attention should be given to the relations of labor and capital. If productiveness can be increased, higher wages as well as higher profits are possible. The proper understanding of the idea that where cost of production is low wages and profits are high, throws a flood of light on many industrial questions in the United States. In the connection in which it stands, as I have shown, to cost of labor, it means that if commodities can be produced at a less sacrifice to labor and capital by the use of machinery and new processes, higher wages are consistent with a lower price of the given product. It explains the fact that, owing to skill or natural resources, labor, although paid much higher rates, can produce articles cheaper than laborers who are less highly paid. Mr. Brassey217 has pointed out that English wages are higher than on the Continent; and yet England, through low cost of production, [pg 272] owing to skill, natural resources, etc., can produce so much more of commodities for a given outlay that (while keeping her usual rate of profit) she can generally undersell her competitors who employ cheaper labor. The same observations apply to the United States; but the question of foreign competition will be further discussed (Book III, Chap. XX) after we have studied international trade and values.
It's important to recognize the actual link between understanding production costs and labor costs. This connection relates to labor costs through one of its components known as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“work efficiency.”The more productive an industry is, the more it can pay in wages and profits, which is why we need to focus on the relationship between labor and capital. If we can increase productivity, we can achieve both higher wages and greater profits. Recognizing that lower production costs lead to higher wages and profits helps explain many industrial issues in the United States. This means that when products can be made with less effort from labor and capital thanks to machinery and new methods, higher wages can match with lower product prices. It explains why, due to skill or natural resources, workers can produce goods more cheaply even when they earn higher wages compared to those who earn less. Mr. Brassey217has noted that wages in England are higher than those in Europe; however, England, due to its low production costs and factors like skilled labor and natural resources, can produce significantly more goods for the same investment, allowing it to generally undercut competitors who rely on cheaper labor while maintaining regular profit margins. The same applies to the United States; however, the issue of foreign competition will be discussed further (Book 3, Chapter 20) after we look into international trade and values.
“And here it may be well to state precisely what is to be understood by a ‘fluctuation of the market,’ as distinguished from those changes of normal price which we have been considering. Normal price, as we have seen, is governed, according to the circumstances of the case [as to whether there is free industrial competition or not], by one or other of two causes—cost of production and reciprocal demand. A change in normal price, therefore, is a change which is the consequence of an alteration in one or other of these conditions. So long as the determining condition—be it cost of production or reciprocal demand—remains constant, the normal price must be considered as remaining constant; but, the normal price remaining constant, the market price (which, as we have seen, depends on the opinion of dealers respecting the state of supply and demand in relation to the particular article) may undergo a change—may deviate, that is to say, either upward or downward from the normal level. Such changes of price, occurring while the permanent conditions of production remain unaffected, can only be temporary, calling into action, as they do, forces which at once tend to restore the normal state of things: they may therefore be properly described as ‘fluctuations of the market.’ ”218
“Now, it’s important to clarify what we mean by a ‘market fluctuation,’ in contrast to the usual price changes we've been discussing. Normal prices, as we’ve noted, are affected by the circumstances, whether there's free industrial competition or not, driven by either one of two factors—cost of production or reciprocal demand. A change in normal price happens due to a shift in one of these factors. As long as the determining factor—either cost of production or reciprocal demand—remains stable, the normal price will also stay the same; however, while the normal price remains constant, the market price (which, as we’ve mentioned, is influenced by what dealers think about the supply and demand for that specific item) can fluctuate—either rise or fall compared to the normal level. These price changes occur while the underlying production conditions are consistent and can only be temporary, as they trigger forces that will quickly work to return things to the normal state: they can thus be accurately described as ‘market fluctuations.’ ”218
§ 5. When profits differ from job to job or are distributed over different lengths of time, they impact values accordingly.
Value, however, being purely relative, can not depend upon absolute profits, no more than upon absolute wages, but upon relative profits only. High general profits can not, any more than high general wages, be a cause of high values, because high general values are an absurdity and a contradiction. In so far as profits enter into the cost of production of all things, they can not affect the value of any. It is only by entering in a greater degree into the cost of production of some things than of others, that they can have any influence on value.
Value, however, is purely relative and cannot rely on absolute profits, just like it can't depend on absolute wages, but only on relative profits. High overall profits cannot, any more than high overall wages, lead to high values, because high overall values are nonsensical and contradictory. Since profits are part of the production costs of all goods, they do not affect the value of any specific item. They can only influence value if they make up a larger portion of the production costs for some items compared to others.
Profits, however, may enter more largely into the conditions of production of one commodity than of another, even [pg 273] though there be no difference in the rate of profit between the two employments. The one commodity may be called upon to yield a profit during a longer period of time than the other. The example by which this case is usually illustrated is that of wine. Suppose a quantity of wine and a quantity of cloth, made by equal amounts of labor, and that labor paid at the same rate. The cloth does not improve by keeping; the wine does. Suppose that, to attain the desired quality, the wine requires to be kept five years. The producer or dealer will not keep it, unless at the end of five years he can sell it for as much more than the cloth as amounts to five years' profit, accumulated at compound interest. The wine and the cloth were made by the same original outlay. Here, then, is a case in which the natural values, relatively to one another, of two commodities, do not conform to their cost of production alone, but to their cost of production plus something else—unless, indeed, for the sake of generality in the expression, we include the profit which the wine-merchant foregoes during the five years, in the cost of production of the wine, looking upon it as a kind of additional outlay, over and above his other advances, for which outlay he must be indemnified at last.
Profits can vary significantly in how they affect the production conditions of one commodity compared to another, even when the profit rates for the two are the same. One commodity might need to generate a profit over a longer period than the other. A common example to illustrate this is wine. Imagine we have a quantity of wine and an equal amount of cloth, both produced with the same amount of labor paid at the same rate. The cloth doesn't improve over time, but the wine does. If making the wine requires aging it for five years to reach the desired quality, the producer or seller won't hold onto it unless they can sell it for enough more than the cloth to cover five years' profit accumulated with compound interest. Both the wine and cloth were produced with the same initial investment. In this scenario, the relative natural values of the two commodities don't just reflect their production costs, but also consider additional factors—unless, for simplicity, we include the profit the wine seller gives up during the five years as part of the wine's production cost, treating it as an extra expense that he needs to be compensated for eventually.
All commodities made by machinery are assimilated, at least approximately, to the wine in the preceding example. In comparison with things made wholly by immediate labor, profits enter more largely into their cost of production. Suppose two commodities, A and B, each requiring a year for its production, by means of a capital which we will on [pg 274] this occasion denote by money, and suppose it to be £1,000. A is made wholly by immediate labor, the whole £1,000 being expended directly in wages. B is made by means of labor which cost £500 and a machine which cost £500, and the machine is worn out by one year's use. The two commodities will be of exactly the same value, which, if computed in money, and if profits are 20 per cent per annum, will be £1,200. But of this £1,200, in the case of A, only £200, or one sixth, is profit; while in the case of B there is not only the £200, but as much of £500 (the price of the machine) as consisted of the profits of the machine-maker; which, if we suppose the machine also to have taken a year for its production, is again one sixth. So that in the case of A only one sixth of the entire return is profit, while in B the element of profit comprises not only a sixth of the whole, but an additional sixth of a large part.
All goods produced by machines are somewhat similar to the wine in the earlier example. Compared to items made entirely by direct labor, profits play a bigger role in their production costs. Let’s say we have two products, A and B, each taking a year to produce with a capital we'll refer to as money, specifically £1,000. Product A is made completely with direct labor, spending the entire £1,000 on wages. Product B involves labor costing £500 and a machine that costs £500, which gets worn out after a year of use. Both products will have exactly the same value, which, when calculated in money and assuming profits are 20 percent per year, equals £1,200. However, in the case of A, only £200, or one-sixth, is profit; whereas for B, there’s not only the £200 but also a portion of the £500 (the machine's price) that represents the profits of the machine-maker. If we assume the machine took a year to produce as well, that’s another one-sixth. Thus, for A, only one-sixth of the total return is profit, while for B, profit accounts for not just one-sixth of the whole but an extra sixth from a significant portion.
From the unequal proportion in which, in different employments, profits enter into the advances of the capitalist, and therefore into the returns required by him, two consequences follow in regard to value. (1). One is, that commodities do not exchange in the ratio simply of the quantities of labor required to produce them; not even if we allow for the unequal rates at which different kinds of labor are permanently remunerated.
From the unequal way profits are divided in different jobs, they affect the advances of the capitalist, which impacts the returns he expects. (1) One consequence is that commodities don't trade based solely on the amount of labor needed to produce them; not even if we consider the different pay rates for various types of labor.
(2.) A second consequence is, that every rise or fall of general profits will have an effect on values. Not, indeed, by raising or lowering them generally (which, as we have so often said, is a contradiction and an impossibility), but by altering the proportion in which the values of things are affected by the unequal lengths of time for which profit is due. When two things, though made by equal labor, are of unequal value because the one is called upon to yield profit for a greater number of years or months than the other, this difference of value will be greater when profits are greater, and less when they are less. The wine which has to yield five years' profit more than the cloth will surpass it in value much more if profits are forty per cent than if they are only twenty.
(2.) A second consequence is that any increase or decrease in overall profits will impact values. Not by raising or lowering them across the board (which, as we've mentioned many times, is a contradiction and impossible), but by changing how the values of things are influenced by the unequal time periods for which profit is expected. When two items are produced with equal effort but have different values because one needs to generate profit over a longer span of years or months than the other, this difference in value will be greater when profits are high and smaller when they're low. The wine that needs to generate five years' worth of profit more than the cloth will be significantly more valuable if profits are at forty percent compared to only twenty percent.
It follows from this that even a general rise of wages, when it involves a real increase in the cost of labor, does in some degree influence values. It does not affect them in the manner vulgarly supposed, by raising them universally; but an increase in the cost of labor lowers profits, and therefore lowers in natural values the things into which profits enter in a greater proportion than the average, and raises those into which they enter in a less proportion than the average. All commodities in the production of which machinery bears a large part, especially if the machinery is very durable, are lowered in their relative value when profits fall; or, what is equivalent, other things are raised in value relatively to them. This truth is sometimes expressed in a phraseology more plausible than sound, by saying that a rise of wages raises the value of things made by labor in comparison with those made by machinery. But things made by machinery, just as much as any other things, are made by labor—namely, the labor which made the machinery itself—the only difference being that profits enter somewhat more largely into the production of things for which machinery is used, though the principal item of the outlay is still labor.
It follows that even a general increase in wages, when it represents a real rise in labor costs, does influence values to some extent. It doesn't affect them in the way many people think, by universally raising them; rather, an increase in labor costs reduces profits, and therefore lowers the natural values of items where profits are a larger part of the equation compared to the average, while raising those where profits account for a lesser proportion than average. All products that rely heavily on machinery, especially durable machinery, see their relative value drop when profits decline; or, in other words, other items rise in value relative to them. This reality is sometimes expressed in a way that sounds better than it actually is, by stating that a rise in wages increases the value of goods produced by labor compared to those made by machinery. However, items manufactured with machinery are just as much the result of labor—specifically, the labor that created the machinery itself—the main difference being that profits are a slightly larger part of the production costs for items that use machinery, although labor remains the principal expense.
§ 6. Occasional Factors in Production Costs: taxes and ground rent.
Cost of Production consists of several elements, some of which are constant and universal, others occasional. The universal elements of cost of production are the wages of the labor, and the profits of the capital. The occasional elements are taxes, and any extra cost occasioned by a scarcity value of some of the requisites. Besides the natural and necessary elements in cost of production—labor and profits—there are others which are artificial and casual, as, for instance, a tax. The taxes on hops and malt are as much a part of the cost of production of those articles as the wages of the laborers. The expenses which the law imposes, as well as those which the nature of things imposes, must be reimbursed with the ordinary profit from the value of the produce, or the things will not continue to be produced. But the influence of taxation on value is subject to the same conditions as the influence of wages and of profits. It is not [pg 276] general taxation, but differential taxation, that produces the effect. If all productions were taxed so as to take an equal percentage from all profits, relative values would be in no way disturbed. If only a few commodities were taxed, their value would rise; and if only a few were left untaxed, their value would fall.
The cost of production includes several factors, some of which are constant and universal, while others are occasional. The universal factors are the wages for labor and the profits from capital. The occasional factors include taxes and any additional expenses caused by the scarcity of certain necessary resources. In addition to the essential elements of cost of production—labor and profits—there are also artificial and casual factors, like taxes. The taxes on hops and malt are just as much a part of their production cost as the wages of the workers. The expenses mandated by law, along with those that are inherent to the production process, must be covered by the usual profit from the value of the goods; otherwise, production will not continue. However, the effect of taxation on value is governed by the same principles as those affecting wages and profits. It's not overall taxation that's impactful, but rather differential taxation. If all products were taxed at the same percentage of profits, relative values would remain unchanged. If only a few goods were taxed, their value would increase; if only a few were left untaxed, their value would decrease.
But the case in which scarcity value chiefly operates in adding to cost of production is the case of natural agents. These, when unappropriated, and to be had for the taking, do not enter into the cost of production, save to the extent of the labor which may be necessary to fit them for use. Even when appropriated, they do not (as we have already seen) bear a value from the mere fact of the appropriation, but only from scarcity—that is, from limitation of supply. But it is equally certain that they often do bear a scarcity value.
But the situation where scarcity value mainly affects the cost of production is with natural resources. When these resources are unclaimed and available for anyone to take, they don’t contribute to production costs beyond the labor needed to prepare them for use. Even when they are claimed, as we’ve already noted, they don’t hold value simply because they’ve been claimed, but only due to scarcity—meaning there's a limited supply. However, it's also clear that they often do have a scarcity value.
No one can deny that rent sometimes enters into cost of production [of other than agricultural products]. If I buy or rent a piece of ground, and build a cloth-manufactory on it, the ground-rent forms legitimately a part of my expenses of production, which must be repaid by the product. And since all factories are built on ground, and most of them in places where ground is peculiarly valuable, the rent paid for it must, on the average, be compensated in the values of all things made in factories. In what sense it is true that rent does not enter into the cost of production or affect the value of agricultural produce will be shown in the succeeding chapter.
No one can argue that rent sometimes factors into the cost of production [for non-agricultural products]. If I buy or rent a piece of land and build a factory for making cloth, the rent for that land is legitimately part of my production costs, which must be covered by the products I create. Since all factories are built on land, and most of them in locations where land is especially valuable, the rent paid for it must, on average, be reflected in the prices of all the goods produced in factories. The way in which rent doesn’t enter into the cost of production or influence the value of farming products will be explained in the next chapter.
Chapter III. Rent and Its Relationship to Value.
§ 1. Commodities that can be produced indefinitely, but with an increase in cost. Their value is determined by the cost of production under the most unfavorable existing conditions.
We have investigated the laws which determine the value of two classes of commodities—the small class which, being limited to a definite quantity, have their value entirely determined by demand and supply, save that their cost of production (if they have any) constitutes a minimum below which they can not permanently fall; and the large class, which can be multiplied ad libitum by labor and capital, and of which the cost of production fixes the maximum as well as the minimum at which they can permanently exchange [if there be free competition]. But there is still a third kind of commodities to be considered—those which have, not one, but several costs of production; which can always be increased in quantity by labor and capital, but not by the same amount of labor and capital; of which so much may be produced at a given cost, but a further quantity not without a greater cost. These commodities form an intermediate class, partaking of the character of both the others. The principal of them is agricultural produce. We have already made abundant reference to the fundamental truth that in agriculture, the state of the art being given, doubling the labor does not double the produce; that, if an increased quantity of produce is required, the additional supply is obtained at a greater cost than the first. Where a hundred quarters of corn are all that is at present required from the lands of a given village, if the growth of population made it necessary to raise a hundred more, either by breaking up worse land now uncultivated, or by a more elaborate cultivation of the land already under the plow, the additional hundred, or some part of them, at least, might cost double or treble as much per quarter as the former supply.
We have looked into the principles that determine the value of two categories of goods—the small category that, due to its limited quantity, has its value entirely dictated by supply and demand, although its production cost (if there is one) sets a minimum value that it cannot fall below; and the larger category, which can be increased endlessly by labor and capital, where both production costs establish a maximum and a minimum price at which they can be traded permanently, assuming there is free competition. However, there is also a third category to consider—those that have not just one but multiple production costs; these can always be increased in quantity by labor and capital, but not by the same amount of labor and capital; a certain amount can be produced at a given cost, but producing more requires a higher cost. These goods represent an intermediate category, having characteristics of both previous types. The primary example is agricultural produce. We have previously highlighted the important fact that in agriculture, given the current state of technology, doubling the labor does not lead to double the output; if more produce is needed, the additional supply comes at a higher cost than the initial one. For instance, if a village currently requires a hundred quarters of corn from its fields, and population growth necessitates raising another hundred, this could involve turning over less productive, currently uncultivated land, or intensifying the cultivation of land already in use. The additional hundred, or at least a portion of it, could end up costing double or triple per quarter compared to the original supply.
If the first hundred quarters were all raised at the same expense (only the best land being cultivated), and if that expense would be remunerated with the ordinary profit by a price of 20s. the quarter, the natural price of wheat, so long as no more than that quantity was required, would be 20s.; and it could only rise above or fall below that price from vicissitudes of seasons, or other casual variations in supply. But if the population of the district advanced, a time would arrive when more than a hundred quarters would be necessary to feed it. We must suppose that there is no access to any foreign supply. By the hypothesis, no more than a hundred quarters can be produced in the district, unless by either bringing worse land into cultivation, or altering the system of culture to a more expensive one. Neither of these things will be done without a rise in price. This rise of price will gradually be brought about by the increasing demand. So long as the price has risen, but not risen enough to repay with the ordinary profit the cost of producing an additional quantity, the increased value of the limited supply partakes of the nature of a scarcity value. Suppose that it will not answer to cultivate the second best land, or land of the second degree of remoteness, for a less return than 25s. the quarter; and that this price is also necessary to remunerate the expensive operations by which an increased produce might be raised from land of the first quality. If so, the price will rise, through the increased demand, until it reaches 25s. That will now be the natural price; being the price without which the quantity, for which society has a demand at that price, will not be produced. At that price, however, society can go on for some time longer; could go on perhaps forever, if population did not increase. The price, having attained that point, will not again permanently recede (though it may fall temporarily from accidental abundance); nor will it advance further, so long as society can obtain the supply it requires without a second increase of the cost of production.
If the first hundred quarters were all produced at the same cost (only the best land being used), and if that cost would bring in the usual profit at a price of 20s. per quarter, the natural price of wheat, as long as that quantity was sufficient, would be 20s.; and it could only go up or down from that price due to seasonal changes or other random fluctuations in supply. However, if the population in the area grew, there would come a time when more than a hundred quarters would be needed to feed everyone. We have to assume that there is no access to any outside supply. Under this assumption, no more than a hundred quarters can be produced locally unless either less desirable land is used or the growing methods are changed to a more expensive approach. Neither of these options will happen without an increase in price. This price increase will gradually occur due to the rising demand. As long as the price has risen, but not enough to cover the usual profit from producing additional quantities, the increased value of the limited supply will resemble a scarcity value. Suppose it isn't feasible to cultivate the second-best land, or land that's a bit further away, for less than 25s. per quarter; and that this price is also required to cover the costly processes needed to produce more from the best quality land. If that's the case, the price will rise, due to the increased demand, until it reaches 25s.. That will now be the natural price; it's the price below which the quantity society demands at that price won't be produced. At that price, though, society can continue for a while longer; it could last possibly forever if the population didn't grow. Once the price hits that point, it won't permanently go back down (even if it may temporarily drop due to unexpected abundance); nor will it go up further, as long as society can get the supply it needs without another increase in production costs.
In the case supposed, different portions of the supply of [pg 279] corn have different costs of production. Though the twenty, or fifty, or one hundred and fifty quarters additional have been produced at a cost proportional to 25s., the original hundred quarters per annum are still produced at a cost only proportional to 20s. This is self-evident, if the original and the additional supply are produced on different qualities of land. It is equally true if they are produced on the same land. Suppose that land of the best quality, which produced one hundred quarters at 20s., has been made to produce one hundred and fifty by an expensive process, which it would not answer to undertake without a price of 25s. The cost which requires 25s. is incurred for the sake of fifty quarters alone: the first hundred might have continued forever to be produced at the original cost, and with the benefit, on that quantity, of the whole rise of price caused by the increased demand: no one, therefore, will incur the additional expense for the sake of the additional fifty, unless they alone will pay for the whole of it. The fifty, therefore, will be produced at their natural price, proportioned to the cost of their production; while the other hundred will now bring in 5s. a quarter more than their natural price—than the price corresponding to, and sufficing to remunerate, their lower cost of production.
In the given situation, different sections of the corn supply have varying production costs. Although the additional twenty, fifty, or one hundred and fifty quarters were produced at a cost of 25s., the original hundred quarters produced each year still cost only 20s.. This is clear if the original and additional supplies come from different types of land. It’s also true if they come from the same land. Imagine the best quality land, which produced one hundred quarters at 20s., has been used to produce one hundred and fifty quarters through an expensive process that wouldn’t be worth it unless the price is 25s.. The cost of 25s. is only justified for the additional fifty quarters: the first hundred could continue to be produced at the original cost, benefiting from the entire price increase due to higher demand. Therefore, no one will take on the extra cost for just those additional fifty quarters unless they can fully cover it. Consequently, the fifty quarters will be produced at their natural price, aligned with their production cost, while the original hundred will now earn 5s. more than their natural price—the price that corresponds to and adequately compensates for their lower production cost.
If the production of any, even the smallest, portion of the supply requires as a necessary condition a certain price, that price will be obtained for all the rest. We are not able to buy one loaf cheaper than another because the corn from which it was made, being grown on a richer soil, has cost less to the grower. The value, therefore, of an article (meaning its natural, which is the same with its average value) is determined by the cost of that portion of the supply which is produced and brought to market at the greatest expense. This is the Law of Value of the third of the three classes into which all commodities are divided.
If producing any part of the supply, even the tiniest bit, requires a specific price, that price will apply to all the rest. We can't buy one loaf for less than another just because the corn it was made from, grown in richer soil, cost less to the farmer. Therefore, the value of an item (which is the same as its average value) is determined by the cost of the portion of the supply that's produced and brought to market at the highest expense. This is the Law of Value of the third class into which all commodities are divided.
§ 2. Such goods, when produced in more favorable conditions, generate a rent that is equal to the difference in cost.
If the portion of produce raised in the most unfavorable circumstances obtains a value proportioned to its cost of production; all the portions raised in more favorable circumstances, [pg 280] selling as they must do at the same value, obtain a value more than proportioned to their cost of production.
The owners, however, of those portions of the produce enjoy a privilege; they obtain a value which yields them more than the ordinary profit. The advantage depends on the possession of a natural agent of peculiar quality, as, for instance, of more fertile land than that which determines the general value of the commodity; and when this natural agent is not owned by themselves, the person who does own it is able to exact from them, in the form of rent, the whole extra gain derived from its use. We are thus brought by another road to the Law of Rent, investigated in the concluding chapter of the Second Book. Rent, we again see, is the difference between the unequal returns to different parts of the capital employed on the soil. Whatever surplus any portion of agricultural capital produces, beyond what is produced by the same amount of capital on the worst soil, or under the most expensive mode of cultivation, which the existing demands of society compel a recourse to, that surplus will naturally be paid as rent from that capital, to the owner of the land on which it is employed.
The owners of certain parts of the produce have a privilege; they receive a value that gives them more than the typical profit. This advantage comes from having access to a natural resource of unique quality, like land that is more fertile than the average land that determines the general value of the commodity. If they do not own this resource, the person who does own it can charge them rent for the full extra profit gained from its use. This leads us to the Law of Rent, which is discussed in the last chapter of the Second Book. Once again, we see that rent is the difference between the varying returns on different portions of the capital used on the land. Any extra yield that a part of agricultural capital generates, over what the same amount of capital would produce on the least productive land or under the most costly method of farming that society currently requires, will naturally be paid as rent to the owner of the land used.
The discussion of rent is here followed wholly from the point of view of value, while before (Book II, Chap. VI) the law of rent was reached through a limitation of the quantity of land due to the influence of population. In the former case the rent and produce were stated in bushels. By introducing price now (as the convenient symbol of value), instead of the separate increased demands of population in our illustration than used (p. 240), it will be seen how the same operation, looking at it solely in respect to value, brings us to the same law:
The conversation about rent is now completely focused on value, whereas before (Book 2, Chap. 6) the law of rent was influenced by the limited amount of land available because of population pressure. In the earlier case, rent and production were measured in bushels. Now, by introducing price (as the practical symbol of value), instead of the individual increased demands of the population from our previous example (p.240), it will be clear that the same operation, when considered only in terms of value, brings us to the same law:
Price per Bushel. | A | B | C | D | |||
24 bushels | 18 bushels | 12 bushels | 6 bushels | ||||
Total value of product. | Rent. | Total value of product. | Rent. | Total value of product. | Rent. | Total value of product. | |
$1.00 | $24.00 | $0.00 | .... | .... | .... | .... | .... |
$1.33 | $32.00 | $8.00 | $24.00 | $0.00 | .... | .... | .... |
$2.00 | $48.00 | $24.00 | $36.00 | $12.00 | $24.00 | $0.00 | .... |
$4.00 | $96.00 | $72.00 | $72.00 | $48.00 | $48.00 | $24.00 | $24.00 |
It was long thought by political economists, among the rest even by Adam Smith, that the produce of land is always at a monopoly value, because (they said), in addition to the ordinary rate of profit, it always yields something further for rent. This we now see to be erroneous. A thing can not be at a monopoly value when its supply can be increased to an indefinite extent if we are only willing to incur the cost. As long as there is any land fit for cultivation, which at the existing price can not be profitably cultivated at all, there must be some land a little better, which will yield the ordinary profit, but allow nothing for rent: and that land, if within the boundary of a farm, will be cultivated by the farmer; if not so, probably by the proprietor, or by some other person on sufferance. Some such land at least, under cultivation, there can scarcely fail to be.
It has long been believed by political economists, including Adam Smith, that the produce of land always has a monopoly value because, they argued, it not only provides the normal profit rate but also generates extra income for rent. We now see this as incorrect. Something can't have a monopoly value if its supply can be increased indefinitely as long as we’re willing to cover the costs. As long as there is any land suitable for farming that can’t be profitably cultivated at the current price, there will be some land that is slightly better, which will provide normal profit but leave nothing for rent. That land, if it's within the boundaries of a farm, will be cultivated by the farmer; if not, it’s likely to be cultivated by the owner or someone else under permission. There will likely always be some of this land in cultivation.
Rent, therefore, forms no part of the cost of production which determines the value of agricultural produce. The land or the capital most unfavorably circumstanced among those actually employed, pays no rent, and that land or capital determines the cost of production which regulates the value of the whole produce. Thus rent is, as we have already seen, no cause of value, but the price of the privilege which the inequality of the returns to different portions of agricultural produce confers on all except the least favored portion.
Rent, therefore, is not a factor in the cost of production that determines the value of agricultural products. The land or capital that's in the worst situation among those actually used incurs no rent, and that land or capital sets the cost of production that controls the value of all produce. So, as we've already noted, rent is not a cause of value; instead, it’s the price of the benefit that the unequal returns from different parts of agricultural production provide to everyone except the least favored part.
Rent, in short, merely equalizes the profits of different farming capitals, by enabling the landlord to appropriate all extra gains occasioned by superiority of natural advantages. If all landlords were unanimously to forego their rent, they would but transfer it to the farmers, without benefiting the consumer; for the existing price of corn would still be an indispensable condition of the production of part of the existing supply, and if a part obtained that price the whole would obtain it. Rent, therefore, unless artificially increased by restrictive laws, is no burden on the consumer: it does not raise the price of corn, and is no otherwise a detriment to the public than inasmuch as if the [pg 282] state had retained it, or imposed an equivalent in the shape of a land-tax, it would then have been a fund applicable to general instead of private advantage.
Rent, in simple terms, just balances the profits from different farming investments by allowing the landlord to take all the extra earnings that come from natural advantages. If all landlords decided to give up their rent, it would just go to the farmers without helping the consumer; the current price of grain would still be necessary for producing part of the available supply, and if some farmers got that price, then all would. Therefore, rent, unless artificially increased by restrictive laws, isn't a burden on the consumer: it doesn't raise the price of grain and doesn't harm the public any more than if the government had kept it or imposed a similar land tax, which could then have been used for the benefit of everyone instead of just private profit.
§ 3. Rent from Mines and Fisheries, ground rent from Buildings, and situations that generate income similar to Rent.
Agricultural productions are not the only commodities which have several different costs of production at once, and which, in consequence of that difference, and in proportion to it, afford a rent. Mines are also an instance. Almost all kinds of raw material extracted from the interior of the earth—metals, coals, precious stones, etc.—are obtained from mines differing considerably in fertility—that is, yielding very different quantities of the product to the same quantity of labor and capital. There are, perhaps, cases in which it is impossible to extract from a particular vein, in a given time, more than a certain quantity of ore, because there is only a limited surface of the vein exposed, on which more than a certain number of laborers can not be simultaneously employed. But this is not true of all mines. In collieries, for example, some other cause of limitation must be sought for. In some instances the owners limit the quantity raised, in order not too rapidly to exhaust the mine; in others there are said to be combinations of owners, to keep up a monopoly price by limiting the production. Whatever be the causes, it is a fact that mines of different degrees of richness are in operation, and since the value of the produce must be proportional to the cost of production at the worst mine (fertility and situation taken together), it is more than proportional to that of the best. All mines superior in produce to the worst actually worked will yield, therefore, a rent equal to the excess. They may yield more; and the worst mine may itself yield a rent. Mines being comparatively few, their qualities do not graduate gently into one another, as the qualities of land do; and the demand may be such as to keep the value of the produce considerably above the cost of production at the worst mine now worked, without [pg 283] being sufficient to bring into operation a still worse. During the interval, the produce is really at a scarcity value.
Agricultural products aren’t the only commodities with varying production costs that lead to rent. Mines are another example. Almost all types of raw materials taken from deep within the earth—like metals, coal, precious stones, etc.—come from mines that differ greatly in productivity, meaning they produce very different amounts with the same level of labor and capital. In some cases, a specific vein of ore can only yield a certain amount in a given time, limited by the exposed surface area that can support a certain number of workers at once. But that doesn’t apply to all mines. For example, in coal mines, there are other limitations. Sometimes, the owners restrict how much they mine so they don’t deplete the resource too quickly; in other cases, there are alliances among owners to keep prices high by limiting output. Regardless of the reasons, it’s true that there are mines with varying levels of richness in operation, and because the value of the output depends on the production cost of the least productive mine (considering both quality and location), it will be significantly higher for the more productive ones. Therefore, all mines that produce more than the least productive ones will generate rent equal to their surplus. They could produce even more, and the least productive mine may also provide some rent. Since there are relatively few mines, their qualities don’t transition smoothly like land does; the demand may keep the value of the output well above the production cost of the least productive mine currently in use, without being enough to justify opening an even less productive one. During this time, the output is essentially valued as scarce.
Fisheries are another example. Fisheries in the open sea are not appropriated, but fisheries in lakes or rivers almost always are so, and likewise oyster-beds or other particular fishing-grounds on coasts. We may take salmon-fisheries as an example of the whole class. Some rivers are far more productive in salmon than others. None, however, without being exhausted, can supply more than a very limited demand. All others, therefore, will, if appropriated, afford a rent equal to the value of their superiority.
Fisheries are another example. Open sea fisheries aren’t owned by anyone, but those in lakes or rivers usually are, just like oyster beds or specific fishing areas along coasts. We can look at salmon fisheries as a representative example of this entire category. Some rivers produce a lot more salmon than others. However, none can meet an unlimited demand without running out. Therefore, all others, if owned, will generate a rent equal to the value of their advantage.
Both in the case of mines and of fisheries, the natural order of events is liable to be interrupted by the opening of a new mine, or a new fishery, of superior quality to some of those already in use. In this case, when things have permanently adjusted themselves, the result will be that the scale of qualities which supply the market will have been cut short at the lower end, while a new insertion will have been made in the scale at some point higher up; and the worst mine or fishery in use—the one which regulates the rents of the superior qualities and the value of the commodity—will be a mine or fishery of better quality than that by which they were previously regulated.
Both in the case of mines and fisheries, the natural order of events can be disrupted by the opening of a new mine or fishery that is of higher quality than some that are already in operation. When everything eventually settles, the result will be that the range of qualities supplying the market will have been shortened at the lower end, while a new quality will have been added further up the scale. The least favorable mine or fishery still in use—the one that determines the rents of the higher-quality options and the value of the product—will now be one of better quality than what was used to regulate them before.
The ground-rent of a building, and the rent of a garden or park attached to it, will not be less than the rent which the same land would afford in agriculture, but may be greater than this to an indefinite amount; the surplus being either in consideration of beauty or of convenience, the convenience often consisting in superior facilities for pecuniary gain. Sites of remarkable beauty are generally limited in supply, and therefore, if in great demand, are at a scarcity value. Sites superior only in convenience are governed as to their value by the ordinary principles of rent. The ground-rent of a house in a small village is but little higher than the rent of a similar patch of ground in the open fields.
The ground rent for a building, along with the rent for an attached garden or park, won't be less than what the same land would earn through farming, but it can exceed that amount significantly. The extra value usually comes from the property's beauty or convenience, with convenience often linked to better opportunities for making money. Beautiful locations are usually in short supply, so when demand is high, they hold a higher value. On the other hand, sites that are only more convenient are valued according to standard rental principles. For example, the ground rent for a house in a small village is only slightly higher than the rent for a similar piece of land in the countryside.
Suppose the various kinds of land to be represented by the alphabet; that those below O pay no agricultural rent, and that [pg 284] all lands increase in fertility and situation as we approach the beginning of the alphabet, but which, as far up as K, are used in agriculture; that higher than K all are more profitably used for building purposes, viz.:
Imagine that different types of land are represented by letters of the alphabet; those below O don’t pay any agricultural rent, and that[pg 284]all land becomes more fertile and better situated as we move towards the beginning of the alphabet. Up to K, all the land is used for farming; beyond K, all land is more profitably used for construction purposes, specifically:
A, B, C, ... | K, L, M, N, O, | ... X, Y, Z.
A, B, C, ... | K, L, M, N, O, | ... X, Y, Z.
Now it will happen that land is chosen for building purposes irrespective of its fertility for agricultural purposes. It will not be true, as some may think, that no land will be used for building until it will pay a ground-rent greater than the greatest agricultural rent paid by any piece of land. It is not true, for example, if N be selected for a building-lot, that it must pay a ground-rent as high as the agricultural rent of K, the most fertile land cultivated in agriculture. It must pay a ground-rent higher only than it itself would pay, if cultivated. It is only necessary that it pay more than the same (not better) land would pay as rent if used only in agriculture.
Now, land is selected for construction without regard to how good it is for farming. It's not true, as some might think, that no land will be developed until it can bring in a ground rent higher than the highest agricultural rent for any piece of land. For example, if N is chosen as a construction site, it doesn't have to pay a ground rent as high as the agricultural rent of K, the most fertile farmland. It just needs to cover a ground rent that is higher than what it would earn if it were farmed. It only needs to pay more than what the same (not better) land would make as rent if it were used exclusively for agriculture.
The rents of wharfage, dock, and harbor room, water-power, and many other privileges, may be analyzed on similar principles. Take the case, for example, of a patent or exclusive privilege for the use of a process by which the cost of production is lessened. If the value of the product continues to be regulated by what it costs to those who are obliged to persist in the old process, the patentee will make an extra profit equal to the advantage which his process possesses over theirs. This extra profit is essentially similar to rent, and sometimes even assumes the form of it, the patentee allowing to other producers the use of his privilege in consideration of an annual payment.
The fees for wharfage, dock and harbor space, water power, and various other privileges can be examined similarly. Take, for instance, a patent or exclusive right to use a process that reduces production costs. If the value of the product continues to be determined by the expenses of those who have to stick with the traditional method, the patent holder will earn an additional profit equal to the benefits his process has over theirs. This extra profit is essentially like rent and can sometimes even take on that form, with the patent holder allowing other producers to use his privilege for an annual fee.
The extra gains which any producer or dealer obtains through superior talents for business, or superior business arrangements, are very much of a similar kind. If all his competitors had the same advantages, and used them, the benefit would be transferred to their customers through the diminished value of the article; he only retains it for himself because he is able to bring his commodity to market at a lower cost, while its value is determined by a higher.219
The additional profits that a producer or dealer makes from better business skills or smarter business strategies are pretty much the same. If all his competitors had the same advantages and used them, the benefit would go to their customers through a lower price for the product; he keeps it for himself because he can sell his goods at a lower cost while their value is set by a higher one.219
§ 4.Resumeof the value laws for each of the three classes of goods.
A general résumé of the laws of value, where a free movement of labor and capital exists, may now be briefly made in the following form:
A general resume of the laws of value, where there is free movement of labor and capital, can now be summarized briefly in the following way:
Exchange value has three conditions, viz.:
1. Utility, or ability to satisfy a desire (U).
2. Difficulty of attainment (D), according to which there are three classes of
commodities.
3. Transferableness.
Exchange value has three conditions:
1. Utility, or the ability to satisfy a desire (U).
2. Difficulty of attainment (D), which divides commodities into three classes.
3. Transferability.
Of the second condition, there are three classes:
1. Those limited in supply—e.g., ancient pictures or monopolized articles.
2. Those whose supply is capable of indefinite increase by the use of
labor and capital.
3. Those whose supply is gained at a gradually increasing cost, under the law
of diminishing returns.
Of the second condition, there are three categories:
1. Those that are limited in supply—e.g., ancient artworks or monopolized items.
2. Those whose supply can be infinitely increased through labor and capital.
3. Those whose supply comes at an increasingly higher cost due to the law of diminishing returns.
Of those limited in supply, their value is regulated by Demand and Supply. The only limit is U.
Of the things that are in limited supply, their value is determined by supply and demand. The only limit is U.
Of those whose supply is capable of indefinite increase, their normal and permanent value is regulated by Cost of Production, and their temporary or market value is regulated by Demand and Supply, oscillating around Cost of Production (which consists of the amount of labor and abstinence required).
Of those whose supply can keep increasing indefinitely, their normal and permanent value is determined by the Cost of Production, while their temporary or market value is influenced by Demand and Supply, fluctuating around the Cost of Production (which is based on the amount of labor and sacrifice involved).
Of those whose supply is gained at a gradually increasing cost, their normal value is regulated by the Cost of Production of that portion of the whole amount of the whole amount needed, which is brought to market at the greatest expense, and their market value is regulated by Demand and Supply (as in class 2).
Of those whose supply is obtained at a gradually increasing cost, their normal value is determined by the production cost of the part of the total amount needed that is brought to market at the highest expense, and their market value is regulated by demand and supply (as in class 2).
If there be no free competition between industries, then the value of those commodities which has been said, in the above classification, to depend on cost of production, will be governed by the law of Reciprocal Demand.
If there's no free competition between industries, then the value of the commodities mentioned in the classification above, which depends on production costs, will be determined by the law of Reciprocal Demand.
Chapter 4. About Money.
§ 1. The three functions of Money—a Common Measure of Value, a Medium of Exchange, a“Value Standard”.
Having proceeded thus far in ascertaining the general laws of Value, without introducing the idea of Money (except occasionally for illustration), it is time that we should now superadd that idea, and consider in what manner the principles of the mutual interchange of commodities are affected by the use of what is termed a Medium of Exchange.
Having made progress in understanding the general laws of Value without bringing in the concept of Money (except sometimes for illustration), it's time to add that idea and examine how the principles of the mutual exchange of goods are influenced by the use of something called a Medium of Exchange.
As Professor Jevons220 has pointed out, money performs three distinct services, capable of being separated by the mind, and worthy of separate definition and explanation:
As Prof. Jevons220It's important to recognize that money has three distinct functions that the mind can identify, and each one deserves its own definition and explanation:
1. A Common Measure, or Common Denominator, of Value.
1. A standard measure or common denominator of value.
2. A Medium of Exchange.
2. A Means of Exchange.
3. A Standard of Value.
3. A Standard of Value.
F. A. Walker,221 however, says: “Money is the medium of exchange. Whatever performs this function, does this work, is money, no matter what it is made of.... That which does the money-work is the money-thing.”
F. A. Walker,221but, says:“Money is what we use for trade. Anything that serves this purpose and performs this function is considered money, no matter what it’s made of.... What fulfills the role of money is the money item.”
(1.) [If we had no money] the first and most obvious [inconvenience] would be the want of a common measure for values of different sorts. If a tailor had only coats, and wanted to buy bread or a horse, it would be very troublesome to ascertain how much bread he ought to obtain for a coat, or how many coats he should give for a horse. The calculation must be recommenced on different data every time he bartered his coats for a different kind of article, and there could be no current price or regular quotations of value. As it is much easier to compare different lengths by expressing [pg 287] them in a common language of feet and inches, so it is much easier to compare values by means of a common language of [dollars and cents].
(1.) [If we had no money] the first and most obvious [inconvenience] would be the lack of a standard for values of different types. If a tailor had only coats and wanted to buy bread or a horse, it would be really difficult to figure out how much bread he should get for a coat or how many coats he should trade for a horse. Every time he exchanged his coats for a different item, he would have to start the calculations over with new information, and there wouldn’t be any standard prices or consistent value quotes. Just as it's much easier to compare different lengths by using a common unit like feet and inches, it’s also much easier to compare values using a common currency like [dollars and cents].
The need of a common denominator of values (an excellent term, introduced by Storch), to whose terms the values of all other commodities may be reduced, and so compared, is as great as that the inhabitants of the different States of the United States should have a common language as a means by which ideas could be communicated to the whole nation. A man may have a horse, whose value he wishes to compare in some common term with the value of his house, although he might not wish to sell either. A valuation by the State for taxation could not exist but for this common denominator, or register, of value.
The need for a common standard of value (a great term introduced by Storch) to which the values of all other goods can be simplified and compared is just as important as people from different states in the United States having a shared language to communicate ideas across the country. A person might own a horse and want to compare its value to that of their house, even if they aren't planning to sell either. A valuation by the state for taxation wouldn't be possible without this common standard or record of value.
(2.) The second function is that of a medium of exchange. The distinction between this function and the common denominator of value is that the latter measures value, the former transfers value. The man owning the horse, after having measured its value by comparison with a given thing, may now wish to exchange it for other things. This discloses the need of another quality in money.
(2.) The second function is as a medium of exchange. The difference between this function and the common measure of value is that the latter evaluates value, while the former facilitates the transfer of value. A person who owns a horse, after figuring out its value by comparing it to something else, might now want to trade it for other items. This underscores the need for an additional feature in money.
The inconveniences of barter are so great that, without some more commodious means of effecting exchanges, the division of employments could hardly have been carried to any considerable extent. A tailor, who had nothing but coats, might starve before he could find any person having bread to sell who wanted a coat: besides, he would not want as much bread at a time as would be worth a coat, and the coat could not be divided. Every person, therefore, would at all times hasten to dispose of his commodity in exchange for anything which, though it might not be fitted to his own immediate wants, was in great and general demand, and easily divisible, so that he might be sure of being able to purchase with it whatever was offered for sale. The thing which people would select to keep by them for making purchases must be one which, besides being divisible and generally desired, does not deteriorate by keeping. This reduces the choice to a small number of articles.
The problems with bartering are so significant that, without some better way to make trades, the division of labor probably wouldn't have developed much at all. A tailor with only coats could end up starving before he found someone selling bread who also wanted a coat: plus, he wouldn’t want enough bread at once to equal the value of a coat, and he couldn’t split the coat. So, everyone would always be eager to trade their goods for something that, even if it didn’t meet their immediate needs, was widely wanted and easy to divide, ensuring they could buy whatever was for sale. The item people would choose to keep for making purchases has to be something that, in addition to being divisible and in high demand, doesn’t spoil over time. This narrows the options down to just a few items.
This need is well explained by the following facts furnished by Professor Jevons: “Some years since, Mademoiselle Zélie, [pg 288] a singer of the Théâtre Lyrique at Paris, made a professional tour round the world, and gave a concert in the Society Islands. In exchange for an air from ‘Norma’ and a few other songs, she was to receive a third part of the receipts. When counted, her share was found to consist of three pigs, twenty-three turkeys, forty-four chickens, five thousand cocoanuts, besides considerable quantities of bananas, lemons, and oranges. In the Society Islands, however, pieces of money were very scarce; and, as mademoiselle could not consume any considerable portion of the receipts herself, it became necessary in the mean time to feed the pigs and poultry with the fruit.”222
This need is clearly illustrated by the following points made by Professor Jevons:“A few years ago, Mademoiselle Zélie,[pg 288] a singer from the Théâtre Lyrique in Paris, went on a world tour and held a concert in the Society Islands. In return for a song from ‘Norma’ and a few other songs, she was supposed to receive a third of the earnings. When calculated, her share turned out to be three pigs, twenty-three turkeys, forty-four chickens, five thousand coconuts, along with large quantities of bananas, lemons, and oranges. However, in the Society Islands, money was very scarce; and since Mademoiselle couldn't eat a significant portion of the earnings herself, she had to feed the pigs and poultry with the fruit.”222
(3.) The third function desired of money is what is usually termed a “standard of value.” It is, perhaps, better expressed by F. A. Walker223 as a “standard of deferred payments.” Its existence is due to the desire to have a means of comparing the purchasing power of a commodity at one time with its purchasing power at another distant time; that is, that for long contracts, exchanges may be in unchanged ratios at the beginning and at the end of the contracts. There is no distinction between this function and the first, except one arising from the introduction of time. At the same time and place, the “standard of value” is given in the common denominator of value.
(3.) The third role that money is generally expected to serve is commonly referred to as a"standard of value."It may be better described by F. A. Walker.223as a“standard for deferred payments.”Its importance lies in the necessity to compare the purchasing power of a commodity at one moment with its purchasing power at a later time; that is, for long-term contracts, exchanges can maintain the same ratios at the beginning and end of the agreements. There is no difference between this function and the first one, except for the factor oftime. At the same time and location, the“value standard”is represented by the shared value denominator.
A Measure of Value,224 in the ordinary sense of the word measure, would mean something by comparison with which we may ascertain what is the value of any other thing. When we consider, further, that value itself is relative, and that two things are necessary to constitute it, independently of the third thing which is to measure it, we may define a Measure of Value to be something, by comparing with which any two other things, we may infer their value in relation to one another.
A Measure of Value,224 in the typical sense of the word measure, refers to something we use to determine the value of anything else by comparison. When we also take into account that value is relative and that two things are needed to establish it, aside from the third thing that serves as the measure, we can define a Measure of Value as something we can compare with two other things in order to understand their value in relation to each other.
In this sense, any commodity will serve as a measure of value at a given time and place; since we can always infer the proportion in which things exchange for one another, when we know the proportion in which each exchanges for any third thing. To serve as a convenient measure of value is one of the functions of the commodity selected as a medium [pg 289] of exchange. It is in that commodity that the values of all other things are habitually estimated.
In this way, any product can act as a measure of value at a specific time and place; since we can always figure out how things relate to each other by knowing how each one compares to a third item. One of the roles of the commodity chosen as a medium of exchange is to conveniently measure value. It's in that commodity that we usually assess the values of everything else. [pg 289]
But the desideratum sought by political economists is not a measure of the value of things at the same time and place, but a measure of the value of the same thing at different times and places: something by comparison with which it may be known whether any given thing is of greater or less value now than a century ago, or in this country than in America or China. To enable the money price of a thing at two different periods to measure the quantity of things in general which it will exchange for, the same sum of money must correspond at both periods to the same quantity of things in general—that is, money must always have the same exchange value, the same general purchasing power. Now, not only is this not true of money, or of any other commodity, but we can not even suppose any state of circumstances in which it would be true.
But what political economists are really looking for isn't just a way to measure the value of things at the same time and place; it's about measuring the value of the same item at different times and places. This allows us to see whether something is worth more or less now compared to a century ago, or here compared to America or China. For the money price of an item at two different times to accurately reflect the quantity of things it can be traded for, the same amount of money must represent the same quantity of goods in both periods. This means that money needs to always have the same exchange value and general purchasing power. However, not only is this not the case for money or any other commodity, but we can't even imagine a situation where it would be true.
It being very clear that money, or the precious metals, do not themselves remain absolutely stable in value for long periods, the only way in which a “standard of value” can be properly established is by the proposed “multiple standard of value,” stated as follows:
It's obvious that money, or precious metals, don’t remain completely stable in value over long periods. The only way to accurately establish a __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"market value"is via the proposed“multiple standards of value,”outlined as follows:
“A number of articles in general use—corn, beef, potatoes, wool, cotton, silk, tea, sugar, coffee, indigo, timber, iron, coal, and others—shall be taken, in a definite quantity of each, so many pounds, or bushels, or cords, or yards, to form a standard required. The value of these articles, in the quantities specified, and all of standard quality, shall be ascertained monthly or weekly by Government, and the total sum [in money] which would then purchase this bill of goods shall be, thereupon, officially promulgated. Persons may then, if they choose, make their contracts for future payments in terms of this multiple or tabular standard.”225 A, who had borrowed $1,000 of B in 1870 for ten years, would make note of the total money value of all these articles composing the multiple standard, which we will suppose is $125 in 1870. Consequently, A would promise to pay B eight multiple units in ten years (that is, eight times $125, or $1,000). But, if other things change in value relatively [pg 290] to money during these ten years, the same sum of money—$1,000—in 1880 will not return to B the same just amount of purchasing power which he parted with in 1870. Now, if, in 1880, when his note falls due, the government list is examined, and it is found that commodities in general have fallen in value relatively to gold, the multiple unit will not amount to as much gold as it did in 1870; perhaps each unit may be rated only at $100. In that case, A is obliged to pay back but eight multiple units, which costs him only $800 in money, while B receives from A the same amount of purchasing power over other commodities which he loaned to him. B had no just claim to ten units, since the fall of all commodities relatively to gold was not due to his exertions. On the other hand, if, between 1870 and 1880, prices had risen, mutatis mutandis, the eight units would have cost A more than $1,000 in gold; but he would have been justly obliged to return the same amount of purchasing power to B which he received from him.
“A range of commonly used goods—corn, beef, potatoes, wool, cotton, silk, tea, sugar, coffee, indigo, timber, iron, coal, and others—will be listed in specific quantities, measured in pounds, bushels, cords, or yards, to establish a required standard. The government will set the value of these goods in the specified quantities, all meeting standard quality, either weekly or monthly. The total amount of money needed to purchase this set of goods will then be officially published. Individuals can choose to base their future payment contracts on this standard unit or table.”225If A borrowed $1,000 from B in 1870 for ten years, he would consider the total value of all goods that make up the standard, which we can assume is $125 in 1870. So, A would agree to pay B eight standard units in ten years (which totals eight times $125, or $1,000). However, if the values of other goods change in relation to money over those ten years, the same amount of money—$1,000—in 1880 will not have the same purchasing power that B had when he lent it in 1870. If, in 1880, when A's note is due, they check the government list and find that commodities have decreased in value compared to gold, the standard unit will not be worth as much gold as it was in 1870; maybe each unit is only valued at $100. In that case, A only needs to repay eight standard units, which would only cost him $800 in cash, while B receives from A the same purchasing power over other goods that he originally lent. B would not have a legitimate claim for ten units since the decrease in the value of all commodities compared to gold was not due to his actions. On the other hand, if prices had increased between 1870 and 1880,with necessary changesA would need to pay over $1,000 in gold for the eight units; however, he would rightfully be obligated to return the same purchasing power to B that he received.
§ 2. Why Gold and Silver Are Suitable for Those Purposes.
By a tacit concurrence, almost all nations, at a very early period, fixed upon certain metals, and especially gold and silver, to serve this purpose. No other substances unite the necessary qualities in so great a degree, with so many subordinate advantages. These were the things which it most pleased every one to possess, and which there was most certainty of finding others willing to receive in exchange for any kind of produce. They were among the most imperishable of all substances. They were also portable, and, containing great value in small bulk, were easily hid; a consideration of much importance in an age of insecurity. Jewels are inferior to gold and silver in the quality of divisibility; and are of very various qualities, not to be accurately discriminated without great trouble. Gold and silver are eminently divisible, and, when pure, always of the same quality; and their purity may be ascertained and certified by a public authority.
Almost all countries, from a very early time, agreed on certain metals, especially gold and silver, to fulfill this role. No other materials combine the necessary qualities to such a degree, along with so many additional benefits. These were the items that everyone wanted to have, and there was a high certainty of finding others willing to exchange them for any type of goods. They were among the most durable of all materials. They were also portable, and since they hold significant value in a small size, they could be easily hidden—a very important factor in a time of insecurity. Gems are less effective than gold and silver because they don't divide as easily and come in various qualities that are hard to distinguish without considerable effort. Gold and silver are highly divisible and, when pure, always have the same quality, and their purity can be verified and certified by a public authority.
Jevons226 has more fully stated the requisites for a perfect money as—
Jevons226 more clearly outlined the requirements for perfect money as—
1. Value. | |
2. Portability. | |
3. Indestructibility. | |
4. Homogeneity. | |
5. Divisibility. | |
6. Stability of value. | |
7. Cognizability. |
Accordingly, though furs have been employed as money in some countries, cattle in others, in Chinese Tartary cubes of tea closely pressed together, the shells called cowries on the coast of Western Africa, and in Abyssinia at this day blocks of rock-salt, gold and silver have been generally preferred by nations which were able to obtain them, either by industry, commerce, or conquest. To the qualities which originally recommended them, another came to be added, the importance of which only unfolded itself by degrees. Of all commodities, they are among the least influenced by any of the causes which produce fluctuations of value. No commodity is quite free from such fluctuations. Gold and silver have sustained, since the beginning of history, one great permanent alteration of value, from the discovery of the American mines.
Accordingly, while furs have been used as money in some countries, cattle in others, and in Chinese Tartary, tightly packed cubes of tea, the shells known as cowries along the coast of Western Africa, and currently in Abyssinia, blocks of rock salt, gold and silver have generally been favored by nations that could acquire them through work, trade, or conquest. Along with the qualities that initially made them attractive, another factor emerged gradually over time. Among all commodities, gold and silver are among the least affected by the factors that cause fluctuations in value. No commodity is completely immune to such fluctuations. Since the beginning of recorded history, gold and silver have experienced one significant, lasting change in value due to the discovery of the American mines.
In the present age the opening of new sources of supply, so abundant as the Ural Mountains, California, and Australia, may be the commencement of another period of decline, on the limits of which it would be useless at present to speculate. But, on the whole, no commodities are so little exposed to causes of variation. They fluctuate less than almost any other things in their cost of production. And, from their durability, the total quantity in existence is at all times so great in proportion to the annual supply, that the effect on value even of a change in the cost of production is not sudden: a very long time being required to diminish materially the quantity in existence, and even to increase it very greatly not being a rapid process. Gold and silver, therefore, are more fit than any other commodity to be the subject of engagements for receiving or paying a given quantity at some distant period.
In today's world, the discovery of new supply sources, as abundant as the Ural Mountains, California, and Australia, could mark the start of another decline. It's pointless to speculate on where that might lead us right now. Overall, though, no commodities are as stable against fluctuations. They change in cost less than almost anything else. Because they last a long time, the total amount available is always large compared to the annual supply, so even a change in production costs doesn't quickly impact their value. It takes a long time to significantly reduce the amount in circulation, and increasing it substantially is also a slow process. Therefore, gold and silver are better suited than any other commodity for agreements to receive or pay a specific amount at a future date.
When gold and silver had become virtually a medium of exchange, by becoming the things for which people generally sold, and with which they generally bought, whatever they had to sell or to buy, the contrivance of coining obviously suggested itself. By this process the metal was divided into convenient portions, of any degree of smallness, and bearing a recognized proportion to one another; and the trouble was saved of weighing and assaying at every change of possessors—an inconvenience which, on the occasion of small purchases, would soon have become insupportable. Governments found it their interest to take the operation into their own hands, and to interdict all coining by private persons.
When gold and silver became almost a standard form of money, used by people to sell and buy various goods, the idea of coining naturally emerged. This process involved dividing the metal into manageable sizes that reflected a known value relative to each other, eliminating the hassle of weighing and testing each time ownership changed hands—an inconvenience that would quickly become unbearable for small purchases. Governments realized it was in their best interest to take control of this operation and prohibited private individuals from coining money.
§ 3. Money is just a tool to make exchanges easier and does not change the laws of value.
It must be evident, however, that the mere introduction of a particular mode of exchanging things for one another, by first exchanging a thing for money, and then exchanging the money for something else, makes no difference in the essential character of transactions. It is not with money that things are really purchased. Nobody's income (except that of the gold or silver miner) is derived from the precious metals. The [dollars or cents] which a person receives weekly or yearly are not what constitutes his income; they are a sort of tickets or orders which he can present for payment at any shop he pleases, and which entitle him to receive a certain value of any commodity that he makes choice of. The farmer pays his laborers and his landlord in these tickets, as the most convenient plan for himself and them; [pg 293] but their real income is their share of his corn, cattle, and hay, and it makes no essential difference whether he distributes it to them directly, or sells it for them and gives them the price. There can not, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money; except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and labor. It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it; and, like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets out of order.
It should be clear, though, that just introducing a specific way of exchanging items for each other—first by trading something for money and then using that money to buy something else—doesn't change the fundamental nature of transactions. Money itself isn't what truly buys things. The only people whose income comes from precious metals are miners. The [dollars or cents] someone earns weekly or yearly aren't actually their income; they're more like tickets or vouchers that can be used to get goods at any store, allowing them to receive a certain value of whatever they choose. The farmer pays his workers and landlord with these vouchers because it's the easiest option for everyone involved; [pg 293] but their true income is their share of his crops, livestock, and hay. It doesn't matter whether he gives it to them directly or sells it and hands them the money. In short, money is, by itself, one of the least significant things in the economy of society—except for its role as a tool that saves time and effort. It’s a system that allows tasks to be completed faster and more conveniently than they could be done otherwise; just like many types of machinery, it only has a distinct and independent impact when it breaks down.
The introduction of money does not interfere with the operation of any of the Laws of Value laid down in the preceding chapters. The reasons which make the temporary or market value of things depend on the demand and supply, and their average and permanent values upon their cost of production, are as applicable to a money system as to a system of barter. Things which by barter would exchange for one another will, if sold for money, sell for an equal amount of it, and so will exchange for one another still, though the process of exchanging them will consist of two operations instead of only one. The relations of commodities to one another remain unaltered by money; the only new relation introduced is their relation to money itself; how much or how little money they will exchange for; in other words, how the Exchange Value of money itself is determined. Money is a commodity, and its value is determined like that of other commodities, temporarily by demand and supply, permanently and on the average by cost of production.
The introduction of money doesn’t change how any of the Laws of Value discussed in the previous chapters work. The reasons that make the temporary or market value of things depend on supply and demand, and their average and long-term values depend on production costs, apply to a money system just as they do to a barter system. Things that would trade for one another in barter will, when sold for money, sell for an equal amount of it, and will still be able to exchange for each other, though the exchange process will involve two steps instead of one. The relationships between commodities remain unchanged by money; the only new relationship introduced is with money itself—how much or how little money they will sell for; in other words, how the Exchange Value of money itself is determined. Money is a commodity, and its value is determined like that of other commodities, temporarily by supply and demand, and permanently and on average by production costs.
Chapter V. The Value of Money, Based on Supply and Demand.
§ 1. The Value of Money is a vague term.
The Value of Money is to appearance an expression as precise, as free from possibility of misunderstanding, as any in science. The value of a thing is what it will exchange for; the value of money is what money will exchange for, the purchasing power of money. If prices are low, money will buy much of other things, and is of high value; if prices are high, it will buy little of other things, and is of low value. The value of money is inversely as general prices; falling as they rise, and rising as they fall. When one person lends to another, as well as when he pays wages or rent to another, what he transfers is not the mere money, but a right to a certain value of the produce of the country, to be selected at pleasure; the lender having first bought this right, by giving for it a portion of his capital. What he really lends is so much capital; the money is the mere instrument of transfer. But the capital usually passes from the lender to the receiver through the means either of money, or of an order to receive money, and at any rate it is in money that the capital is computed and estimated. Hence, borrowing capital is universally called borrowing money; the loan market is called the money market; those who have their capital disposable for investment on loan are called the moneyed class; and the equivalent given for the use of capital, or, in other words, interest, is not only called the interest of money, but, by a grosser perversion of terms, the value of money.
The value of money is supposed to be as clear and unambiguous as any term in science. The value of something is what it can be exchanged for; the value of money is what money can be exchanged for, which is its purchasing power. When prices are low, money can buy a lot of other things, making it highly valuable; when prices are high, it can buy little else, making it less valuable. The value of money moves in the opposite direction of general prices: it decreases as prices rise and increases as prices fall. When one person lends to another, or when they pay wages or rent to someone, what is being transferred isn’t just money, but a right to a certain value of the country's goods, which can be chosen freely. The lender has initially acquired this right by exchanging part of their capital for it. Essentially, what is being lent is capital; money is just the tool for transfer. However, capital usually moves from the lender to the borrower through money or a request for money, and it’s in terms of money that capital is calculated and valued. Thus, borrowing capital is commonly referred to as borrowing money; the loan market is known as the money market; those who have available capital for investment loans are called the moneyed class; and the fee paid for using capital, or interest, is not only referred to as the interest of money but, in a more confusing twist, the value of money.
§ 2. The value of money depends on how much of it there is.
The supply of a commodity means the quantity offered for sale. But it is not usual to speak of offering money for sale. People are not usually said to buy or sell money. This, however, is merely an accident of language. In point of fact, money is bought and sold like other things, whenever other things are bought and sold for money. Whoever sells corn, or tallow, or cotton, buys money. Whoever buys bread, or wine, or clothes, sells money to the dealer in those articles. The money with which people are offering to buy, is money offered for sale. The supply of money, then, is the quantity of it which people are wanting to lay out; that is, all the money they have in their possession, except what they are hoarding, or at least keeping by them as a reserve for future contingencies. The supply of money, in short, is all the money in circulation at the time.
The supply of a commodity refers to the amount that is available for sale. However, it’s not common to talk about selling money. People don’t typically say they buy or sell money. This is just a quirk of language. In reality, money is bought and sold like other things whenever other goods are bought and sold for money. Anyone selling corn, tallow, or cotton is actually buying money. Anyone buying bread, wine, or clothes is selling money to the retailer of those items. The money that people are offering to buy with is actually money being offered for sale. So, the supply of money is the amount that people want to spend; in other words, all the money they have, except what they’re saving or keeping as a backup for future needs. In short, the supply of money is all the money currently in circulation.
The demand for money, again, consists of all the goods offered for sale. Every seller of goods is a buyer of money, and the goods he brings with him constitute his demand. The demand for money differs from the demand for other things in this, that it is limited only by the means of the purchaser.
The demand for money, once again, includes all the goods available for sale. Every seller of goods is also a buyer of money, and the goods they bring represent their demand. The demand for money is different from the demand for other things in that it is only limited by the buyer's financial resources.
As the whole of the goods in the market compose the demand for money, so the whole of the money constitutes the demand for goods. The money and the goods are seeking each other for the purpose of being exchanged. They are reciprocally supply and demand to one another. It is indifferent whether, in characterizing the phenomena, we speak of the demand and supply of goods, or the supply and the demand of money. They are equivalent expressions.
As all the goods in the market make up the demand for money, all the money represents the demand for goods. Money and goods are looking for each other to be exchanged. They are each other's supply and demand. It doesn't matter if we talk about the demand and supply of goods or the supply and demand of money; they mean the same thing.
Supposing the money in the hands of individuals to be increased, the wants and inclinations of the community collectively in respect to consumption remaining exactly the same, the increase of demand would reach all things equally, and there would be a universal rise of prices. Let us rather suppose, therefore, that to every pound, or shilling, or penny in the possession of any one, another pound, shilling, or penny were suddenly added. There would be an increased money demand, and consequently an increased money value, or price, for things of all sorts. This increased value would do no good to any one; would make no difference, except that of having to reckon [dollars and cents] in higher numbers. It would be an increase of values only as estimated in money, a thing only wanted to buy other things with; and would not enable any one to buy more of them than before. Prices would have risen in a certain ratio, and the value of money would have fallen in the same ratio.
If we assume that the amount of money individuals have increases, while everyone's wants and needs regarding consumption stay the same, the overall increase in demand would affect everything equally, leading to a general rise in prices. Instead, let's imagine that for every pound, shilling, or penny someone has, another one is suddenly added. This would create a higher demand for money and, as a result, a higher monetary value or price for all sorts of goods. However, this increase in value wouldn’t benefit anyone; it would only change the way we calculate [dollars and cents] to larger amounts. It would just be an increase in values measured in money, which is only needed to purchase other goods; it wouldn't allow anyone to buy more than they could before. Prices would increase at a certain rate, and the value of money would decrease at the same rate.
It is to be remarked that this ratio would be precisely that in which the quantity of money had been increased. If the whole money in circulation was doubled, prices would be doubled. If it was only increased one fourth, prices would rise one fourth. There would be one fourth more money, all of which would be used to purchase goods of some description. When there had been time for the increased supply of money to reach all markets, or (according to the conventional metaphor) to permeate all the channels of circulation, all prices would have risen one fourth. But the general rise of price is independent of this diffusing and equalizing process. Even if some prices were raised more, and others less, [pg 297] the average rise would be one fourth. This is a necessary consequence of the fact that a fourth more money would have been given for only the same quantity of goods. General prices, therefore, would in any case be a fourth higher.
It's important to note that this ratio would reflect exactly how much the amount of money had been increased. If the total money in circulation was doubled, prices would also double. If it was increased by just a quarter, prices would rise by a quarter. There would be a quarter more money, all of which would be used to buy various goods. Once enough time has passed for the increased money supply to reach all markets, or (to use the familiar metaphor) to flow through all the channels of circulation, all prices would have increased by a quarter. However, the overall price increase is independent of this spreading and balancing process. Even if some prices rise more than others, and some less, the average increase would still be a quarter. This is a necessary result of the fact that a quarter more money would have been paid for the same amount of goods. General prices would, in any case, be a quarter higher.
So that the value of money, other things being the same, varies inversely as its quantity; every increase of quantity lowering the value, and every diminution raising it, in a ratio exactly equivalent. This, it must be observed, is a property peculiar to money. We did not find it to be true of commodities generally, that every diminution of supply raised the value exactly in proportion to the deficiency, or that every increase lowered it in the precise ratio of the excess. Some things are usually affected in a greater ratio than that of the excess or deficiency, others usually in a less; because, in ordinary cases of demand, the desire, being for the thing itself, may be stronger or weaker; and the amount of what people are willing to expend on it, being in any case a limited quantity, may be affected in very unequal degrees by difficulty or facility of attainment. But in the case of money, which is desired as the means of universal purchase, the demand consists of everything which people have to sell; and the only limit to what they are willing to give, is the limit set by their having nothing more to offer. The whole of the goods being in any case exchanged for the whole of the money which comes into the market to be laid out, they will sell for less or more of it, exactly according as less or more is brought.
The value of money, assuming everything else is constant, changes inversely with its quantity; every increase in quantity decreases its value, and every decrease increases it, in an exactly equivalent ratio. This is a unique characteristic of money. We don’t see this hold true for commodities in general; a decrease in supply doesn’t always raise the value in direct proportion to the shortage, nor does an increase always lower it in the same exact ratio as the surplus. Some items are usually impacted more than the ratio of the excess or shortage, while others are affected less. This is because, in typical cases of demand, the desire for the item itself can vary in strength, and the amount people are willing to spend is always limited, which can be influenced unevenly by how easy or difficult it is to obtain. However, with money, which is desired as a means of universal purchasing, the demand includes everything people want to sell; the only limit on what they are willing to give is when they run out of things to offer. All goods are ultimately exchanged for the total amount of money available in the market; they will sell for less or more depending on whether less or more money is present.
§ 3. —Along with the Speed of Circulation.
It might be supposed that there is always in circulation in a country a quantity of money equal in value to the whole of the goods then and there on sale. But this would be a complete misapprehension. The money laid out is equal in value to the goods it purchases; but the quantity of money laid out is not the same thing with the quantity in circulation. As the money passes from hand to hand, the same piece of money is laid out many times before all the things on sale at one time are purchased and finally removed from the market; and each pound or dollar must be counted [pg 298] for as many pounds or dollars as the number of times it changes hands in order to effect this object.
It might be assumed that there’s always a certain amount of money in a country that matches the total value of all the goods available for sale. But that’s a complete misunderstanding. The money spent equals the value of the goods it buys; however, the amount of money spent isn’t the same as the amount that’s actually in circulation. As money exchanges hands, the same piece of money gets used multiple times before all the items for sale are bought and taken off the market. Each pound or dollar has to be counted for as many pounds or dollars as the number of times it changes hands to achieve this. [pg 298]
If we assume the quantity of goods on sale, and the number of times those goods are resold, to be fixed quantities, the value of money will depend upon its quantity, together with the average number of times that each piece changes hands in the process. The whole of the goods sold (counting each resale of the same goods as so much added to the goods) have been exchanged for the whole of the money, multiplied by the number of purchases made on the average by each piece. Consequently, the amount of goods and of transactions being the same, the value of money is inversely as its quantity multiplied by what is called the rapidity of circulation. And the quantity of money in circulation is equal to the money value of all the goods sold, divided by the number which expresses the rapidity of circulation.
If we consider the amount of goods available for sale and how often those goods are resold as fixed amounts, the value of money will depend on its quantity and the average number of times each piece of money changes hands during transactions. All the goods sold (counting each resale of the same item) have been traded for the total amount of money, multiplied by the average number of purchases made per piece of money. Therefore, if the amount of goods and transactions stays the same, the value of money is inversely related to its quantity multiplied by what's known as the speed of circulation. The amount of money in circulation equals the monetary value of all the goods sold, divided by the number that represents the speed of circulation.
This may be expressed in mathematical language, where V is the value of money, Q is the quantity in circulation, and R the number expressing the rapidity of circulation, as follows:
This can be explained using mathematical terms, where V is the value of money, Q is the amount in circulation, and R represents the rate of circulation, as follows:
V = 1 / (Q × R).
V = 1 / (Q × R).
The phrase, rapidity of circulation, requires some comment. It must not be understood to mean the number of purchases made by each piece of money in a given time. Time is not the thing to be considered. The state of society may be such that each piece of money hardly performs more than one purchase in a year; but if this arises from the small number of transactions—from the small amount of business done, the want of activity in traffic, or because what traffic there is mostly takes place by barter—it constitutes no reason why prices should be lower, or the value of money higher. The essential point is, not how often the same money changes hands in a given time, but how often it changes hands in order to perform a given amount of traffic. We must compare the number of purchases made by the money in a given time, not with the time itself, but with the goods sold in that same time. If each piece of [pg 299] money changes hands on an average ten times while goods are sold to the value of a million sterling, it is evident that the money required to circulate those goods is £100,000. And, conversely, if the money in circulation is £100,000, and each piece changes hands, by the purchase of goods, ten times in a month, the sales of goods for money which take place every month must amount, on the average, to £1,000,000. [The essential point to be considered is] the average number of purchases made by each piece in order to affect a given pecuniary amount of transactions.
The term "rapidity of circulation" needs some clarification. It shouldn't be interpreted as the number of purchases each piece of money makes in a specific time frame. Time isn’t the main factor to consider. Society might be in a situation where each piece of money is used for less than one purchase a year; however, if that's due to a low number of transactions, little business activity, or if most transactions are done through barter, it doesn't justify lower prices or a higher value of money. The key factor is not how often the same money changes hands in a given time, but how often it changes hands to facilitate a certain amount of transactions. We need to compare the number of purchases made by the money in a specific time to the value of the goods sold in that same period. If each piece of money changes hands about ten times while goods worth a million pounds are sold, it's clear that £100,000 is needed to circulate those goods. Similarly, if the amount of money in circulation is £100,000, and each piece changes hands through purchases ten times in a month, then the total sales of goods for money each month must average to £1,000,000. The crucial point to consider is the average number of purchases made by each piece to achieve a specific monetary value of transactions.
§ 4. Clarifications and Limitations of this Principle.
The proposition which we have laid down respecting the dependence of general prices upon the quantity of money in circulation must be understood as applying only to a state of things in which money—that is, gold or silver—is the exclusive instrument of exchange, and actually passes from hand to hand at every purchase, credit in any of its shapes being unknown. When credit comes into play as a means of purchasing, distinct from money in hand, we shall hereafter find that the connection between prices and the amount of the circulating medium is much less direct and intimate, and that such connection as does exist no longer admits of so simple a mode of expression. That an increase of the quantity of money raises prices, and a diminution lowers them, is the most elementary proposition in the theory of [pg 300] currency, and without it we should have no key to any of the others. In any state of things, however, except the simple and primitive one which we have supposed, the proposition is only true, other things being the same.
The idea we've presented about how general prices depend on the amount of money in circulation should only be seen as applicable in a situation where money—meaning gold or silver—is the only means of exchange, actually changing hands with every purchase, and where credit in any form is not involved. Once credit starts to play a role in transactions, separate from cash in hand, we will find that the link between prices and the amount of circulating money becomes much less straightforward and direct, and any existing connection isn't as easily expressed. The basic principle that increasing the amount of money raises prices, and decreasing it lowers them, is the simplest concept in the theory of [pg 300] currency, and without it, we wouldn't have a basis for any of the other concepts. However, in any scenario other than the simple and basic one we've described, this principle is only true if all other factors remain constant.
It is habitually assumed that whenever there is a greater amount of money in the country, or in existence, a rise of prices must necessarily follow. But this is by no means an inevitable consequence. In no commodity is it the quantity in existence, but the quantity offered for sale, that determines the value. Whatever may be the quantity of money in the country, only that part of it will affect prices which goes into the market of commodities, and is there actually exchanged against goods. Whatever increases the amount of this portion of the money in the country tends to raise prices.
It's commonly believed that whenever there's more money in the country or in circulation, prices are sure to go up. However, this isn't always the case. In any product, it's not the total amount available but the amount actually for sale that determines its value. Regardless of how much money exists in the country, only the portion that enters the market and is exchanged for goods actually influences prices. Any increase in this part of the money supply tends to raise prices.
It frequently happens that money to a considerable amount is brought into the country, is there actually invested as capital, and again flows out, without having ever once acted upon the markets of commodities, but only upon the market of securities, or, as it is commonly though improperly called, the money market.
It often happens that a significant amount of money is brought into the country, invested as capital, and then flows out again, without ever impacting the commodity markets, but only affecting the securities market, or what is often improperly referred to as the money market.
A foreigner landing in the country with a treasure might very probably prefer to invest his fortune at interest; which we shall suppose him to do in the most obvious way by becoming a competitor for a portion of the stock, railway debentures, mercantile bills, mortgages, etc., which are at all times in the hands of the public. By doing this he would raise the prices of those different securities, or in other words would lower the rate of interest; and since this would disturb the relation previously existing between the rate of interest on capital in the country itself and that in [pg 301] foreign countries, it would probably induce some of those who had floating capital seeking employment to send it abroad for foreign investment, rather than buy securities at home at the advanced price. As much money might thus go out as had previously come in, while the prices of commodities would have shown no trace of its temporary presence. This is a case highly deserving of attention; and it is a fact now beginning to be recognized that the passage of the precious metals from country to country is determined much more than was formerly supposed by the state of the loan market in different countries, and much less by the state of prices.
A foreigner arriving in the country with a treasure might likely choose to invest his wealth for interest. Let's assume he does this by competing for a share of the stocks, railway bonds, commercial bills, mortgages, etc., which are always available to the public. By doing so, he would drive up the prices of these various securities, effectively lowering the interest rate; and since this would disrupt the existing relationship between the interest rates on capital in the country and those in foreign countries, it would probably lead some people with extra capital looking for investment to send it abroad instead of buying local securities at the higher price. As much money could flow out as had previously come in, while the prices of goods would show no sign of its temporary presence. This situation is very noteworthy; and it's increasingly recognized that the movement of precious metals between countries is influenced much more by the status of the loan market in different nations than by the prices themselves.
If there be, at any time, an increase in the number of money transactions, a thing continually liable to happen from differences in the activity of speculation, and even in the time of year (since certain kinds of business are transacted only at particular seasons), an increase of the currency which is only proportional to this increase of transactions, and is of no longer duration, has no tendency to raise prices.
If there’s ever an increase in the number of money transactions, which can happen often due to changes in speculation and even the time of year (since certain businesses operate only during specific seasons), an increase in currency that matches this rise in transactions and is short-lived doesn't lead to higher prices.
Chapter VI. The Value of Money Based on Production Costs.
§ 1. The value of money, in a state of freedom, aligns with the value of the bullion it contains.
But money, no more than commodities in general, has its value definitely determined by demand and supply. The ultimate regulator of its value is Cost of Production.
But money, like any other product, has its value clearly defined by supply and demand. The main factor that determines its value is the cost of production.
We are supposing, of course, that things are left to themselves. Governments have not always left things to themselves. It was, until lately, the policy of all governments to interdict the exportation and the melting of money; while, by encouraging the exportation and impeding the importation of other things, they endeavored to have a stream of money constantly flowing in. By this course they gratified two prejudices: they drew, or thought that they drew, more money into the country, which they believed to be tantamount to more wealth; and they gave, or thought that they gave, to all producers and dealers, high prices, which, though no real advantage, people are always inclined to suppose to be one.
We are assuming, of course, that things are allowed to run their course. Governments haven't always taken a hands-off approach. Until recently, it was the policy of all governments to ban the export and melting of money; meanwhile, by promoting the export of other goods and restricting imports, they tried to maintain a steady flow of money coming in. This approach satisfied two biases: they believed they were bringing more money into the country, which they thought meant more wealth; and they provided, or thought they provided, producers and sellers with high prices, which, although not a real benefit, people tend to think it is.
We are, however, to suppose a state, not of artificial regulation, but of freedom. In that state, and assuming no charge to be made for coinage, the value of money will conform to the value of the bullion of which it is made. A pound-weight of gold or silver in coin, and the same weight in an ingot, will precisely exchange for one another. On the supposition of freedom, the metal can not be worth more in the state of bullion than of coin; for as it can be melted without any loss of time, and with hardly any expense, this would of course be done until the quantity in circulation was so much diminished [pg 303] as to equalize its value with that of the same weight in bullion. It may be thought, however, that the coin, though it can not be of less, may be, and being a manufactured article will naturally be, of greater value than the bullion contained in it, on the same principle on which linen cloth is of more value than an equal weight of linen yarn. This would be true, were it not that Government, in this country and in some others, coins money gratis for any one who furnishes the metal. If Government, however, throws the expense of coinage, as is reasonable, upon the holder, by making a charge to cover the expense (which is done by giving back rather less in coin than has been received in bullion, and is called levying a seigniorage), the coin will rise, to the extent of the seigniorage, above the value of the bullion. If the mint kept back one per cent, to pay the expense of coinage, it would be against the interest of the holders of bullion to have it coined, until the coin was more valuable than the bullion by at least that fraction. The coin, therefore, would be kept one per cent higher in value, which could only be by keeping it one per cent less in quantity, than if its coinage were gratuitous.
We should imagine a situation not controlled by artificial rules, but one of true freedom. In such a situation, if we assume there are no fees for coinage, the value of money will directly reflect the value of the precious metal it's made from. A pound of gold or silver in coin form will exchange exactly for the same weight in raw form. In a free market, the metal cannot be worth more as bullion than as coin; since it can be melted down quickly and cheaply, people will naturally do this until the amount in circulation is reduced enough to match its value with that of the same weight in raw metal. However, one might think that the coin, while it can't be worth less, might actually be worth more than the bullion it contains, similar to how linen fabric is more valuable than the same weight of linen thread. This could be true if it weren't for the fact that the government in this country and others mints coins for free for anyone who supplies the metal. If the government assigns the cost of minting to the owner by charging a fee (which happens when they give back slightly less in coins than was received in bullion, known as levying a seigniorage), the coin will be valued above the bullion by the amount of the seigniorage. For instance, if the mint kept back one percent to cover minting costs, it would not be in the holders' best interest to have their bullion coined until the coins were worth at least that much more than the bullion. Therefore, the coin would hold a value one percent higher, which could only happen by keeping the supply one percent lower, compared to a situation where coinage was free.
§ 2. —Which is determined by production costs.
The value of money, then, conforms permanently, and in a state of freedom almost immediately, to the value of the metal of which it is made; with the addition, or not, of the expenses of coinage, according as those expenses are borne by the individual or by the state.
The value of money, therefore, consistently aligns, and in a state of freedom almost instantly, with the value of the metal it's made from; including, or excluding, the costs of minting, depending on whether those costs are covered by the individual or by the government.
To the majority of civilized countries gold and silver are [pg 304] foreign products: and the circumstances which govern the values of foreign products present some questions which we are not yet ready to examine. For the present, therefore, we must suppose the country which is the subject of our inquiries to be supplied with gold and silver by its own mines [as in the case of the United States], reserving for future consideration how far our conclusions require modification to adapt them to the more usual case.
For most developed countries, gold and silver are foreign products. The factors that determine the values of these foreign products raise questions we aren't ready to explore yet. For now, we need to assume that the country we are examining has access to gold and silver from its own mines [like the United States], and we’ll consider later how our conclusions might need to be adjusted to fit the more common scenario. [pg 304]
Of the three classes into which commodities are divided—those absolutely limited in supply, those which may be had in unlimited quantity at a given cost of production, and those which may be had in unlimited quantity, but at an increasing cost of production—the precious metals, being the produce of mines, belong to the third class. Their natural value, therefore, is in the long run proportional to their cost of production in the most unfavorable existing circumstances, that is, at the worst mine which it is necessary to work in order to obtain the required supply. A pound weight of gold will, in the gold-producing countries, ultimately tend to exchange for as much of every other commodity as is produced at a cost equal to its own; meaning by its own cost the cost in labor and expense at the least productive sources of supply which the then existing demand makes it necessary to work. The average value of gold is made to conform to its natural value in the same manner as the values of other things are made to conform to their natural value. Suppose that it were selling above its natural value; that is, above the value which is an equivalent for the labor and expense of mining, and for the risks attending a branch of industry in which nine out of ten experiments have usually been failures. A part of the mass of floating capital which is on the lookout for investment would take the direction of mining enterprise; the supply would thus be increased, and the value would fall. If, on the contrary, it were selling below its natural value, miners would not be obtaining the ordinary profit; they would slacken their works; if the depreciation was great, some of the inferior mines would [pg 305] perhaps stop working altogether: and a falling off in the annual supply, preventing the annual wear and tear from being completely compensated, would by degrees reduce the quantity, and restore the value.
Of the three categories that commodities fall into—those that are strictly limited in supply, those that can be produced in unlimited amounts at a fixed production cost, and those that can be produced in unlimited amounts but at a rising production cost—precious metals, being mined materials, belong to the third category. Their natural value, therefore, tends to align with their production cost under the worst-case scenarios, meaning at the least efficient mine necessary to meet the demand. A pound of gold will ultimately exchange for an amount of every other commodity produced at a cost equal to its own; by its own cost, we mean the labor and expenses from the least productive sources that are being worked due to current demand. The average value of gold adjusts to its natural value in the same way that the values of other goods align with their natural value. If it were selling for more than its natural value—meaning above the cost that represents the labor and expenses of mining, along with the risks associated with an industry where nine out of ten attempts usually fail—then some of the floating capital seeking investment would shift towards mining ventures; this would increase supply and consequently lower the value. Conversely, if it were selling for less than its natural value, miners wouldn't be achieving normal profits; they would reduce their operations. If the depreciation were significant, some of the less profitable mines might even shut down completely, leading to a decrease in the annual supply, which would prevent the replacement of annual depletion and gradually reduce the quantity while restoring the value.
When examined more closely, the following are the details of the process: If gold is above its natural or cost value—the coin, as we have seen, conforming in its value to the bullion—money will be of high value, and the prices of all things, labor included, will be low. These low prices will lower the expenses of all producers; but, as their returns will also be lowered, no advantage will be obtained by any producer, except the producer of gold; whose returns from his mine, not depending on price, will be the same as before, and, his expenses being less, he will obtain extra profits, and will be stimulated to increase his production. E converso, if the metal is below its natural value; since this is as much as to say that prices are high, and the money expenses of all producers unusually great; for this, however, all other producers will be compensated by increased money returns; the miner alone will extract from his mine no more metal than before, while his expenses will be greater: his profits, therefore, being diminished or annihilated, he will diminish his production, if not abandon his employment.
When looked at more closely, here are the details of the process: If gold is worth more than its natural or cost value—the coin, as we've seen, matching its value to the bullion—money will have a high value, and the prices of everything, including labor, will be low. These low prices will reduce the costs for all producers; however, since their returns will also decrease, no producer will gain an advantage, except for the gold producer; whose earnings from the mine, not tied to price, will remain the same as before, and with lower expenses, he will make extra profits and be encouraged to boost his production. And conversely, if the metal is worth less than its natural value; this means that prices are high, and the money costs for all producers are unusually high; for this, though, all other producers will benefit from increased money returns; the miner will extract no more metal from his mine than before, while his costs will be higher: thus, his profits will decrease or vanish, leading him to reduce his production or possibly give up his job.
In this manner it is that the value of money is made to conform to the cost of production of the metal of which it is made. It may be well, however, to repeat (what has been said before) that the adjustment takes a long time to effect, in the case of a commodity so generally desired and at the same time so durable as the precious metals. Being so largely used, not only as money but for plate and ornament, there is at all times a very large quantity of these metals in existence: while they are so slowly worn out that a comparatively small annual production is sufficient to keep up the supply, and to make any addition to it which may be required by the increase of goods to be circulated, or by the increased demand for gold and silver articles by wealthy consumers. Even if this small annual supply were stopped entirely, [pg 306] it would require many years to reduce the quantity so much as to make any very material difference in prices. The quantity may be increased much more rapidly than it can be diminished; but the increase must be very great before it can make itself much felt over such a mass of the precious metals as exists in the whole commercial world. And hence the effects of all changes in the conditions of production of the precious metals are at first, and continue to be for many years, questions of quantity only, with little reference to cost of production. More especially is this the case when, as at the present time, many new sources of supply have been simultaneously opened, most of them practicable by labor alone, without any capital in advance beyond a pickaxe and a week's food, and when the operations are as yet wholly experimental, the comparative permanent productiveness of the different sources being entirely unascertained.
In this way, the value of money is adjusted to match the production cost of the metal it's made from. It's important to remember that this adjustment takes a long time, especially for commodities that are both highly desirable and durable, like precious metals. Since these metals are widely used not just as money, but also for decorative plates and jewelry, there is always a large amount of them available. They wear out so slowly that a relatively small annual production is enough to maintain the supply and meet any increases in demand caused by the rise in goods to be traded or by wealthy consumers wanting more gold and silver items. Even if that small annual supply stopped completely, it would take many years to deplete the quantity enough to significantly impact prices. The quantity can be increased much faster than it can be reduced, but the increase needs to be substantial before it affects the overall stock of precious metals available in the global market. Therefore, the effects of any changes in the conditions for producing precious metals initially revolve primarily around quantity, with little influence from production costs. This is especially true now, as many new sources of supply have been opened, most requiring only basic labor with no capital investment beyond a pickaxe and a week’s food, and when these operations are still largely experimental, with the lasting productivity of each source yet to be determined.
For the facts in regard to the production of the precious metals, see the investigation by Dr. Adolf Soetbeer,230 from which Chart IX has been taken. It is worthy of careful study. The figures in each period, at the top of the respective spaces, give the average annual production during those years. The last period has been added by me from figures taken from the reports of the Director of the United States Mint. Other accessible sources, for the production of the precious metals, are the tables in the appendices to the Report of the Committee to the House of Commons on the “Depreciation of Silver” (1876); the French official Procès-Verbaux of the International Monetary Conference of 1881, which give Soetbeer's figures to a later date than his publication above mentioned; the various papers in the British parliamentary documents; and the reports of the director of our mint. Since 1850 more gold has been produced than in the whole period preceding, from 1492 to 1850. Previous to 1849 the annual average product of gold, out of the total product of both gold and silver, was thirty-six per cent; for the twenty-six years ending in 1875, it has been seventy and one half per cent. The result has been a rise in gold prices certainly down to 1862,231 as shown by the following chart. [pg 308] It will be observed how much higher the prices rose during the depression after 1858 than it was during a period of similar conditions after 1848. The result, it may be said, was predicted by Chevalier.232
For information about producing precious metals, check out Dr. Adolf Soetbeer’s research, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.230from which Chart IX is based. It’s definitely worth a detailed review. The numbers at the top of each section represent the average annual production for those years. I’ve included the most recent period using data from the reports of the Director of the United States Mint. Other available sources for precious metal production include the tables in the appendices of the Report of the Committee to the House of Commons on the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“Depreciation of Silver”(1876); the official French minutes from the International Monetary Conference of 1881, which include Soetbeer’s figures updated beyond his earlier publication; various documents from British parliamentary records; and reports from our mint’s director. Since 1850, more gold has been produced than during the entire period from 1492 to 1850. Before 1849, the average annual gold production, out of the total of both gold and silver, was thirty-six percent; in the twenty-six years leading up to 1875, it increased to seventy and a half percent. This caused gold prices to rise until 1862,231as shown in the chart below.[pg 308]You can see how much higher prices rose during the downturn after 1858 compared to a similar situation after 1848. This outcome was somewhat predicted by Chevalier.232
Chart IX.
Chart 9.
Chart showing the Production of the Precious Metals, according to Value, from 1493 to 1879.
Chart displaying the Production of Precious Metals, by Value, from 1493 to 1879.
Years. | Silver. | Gold. | Total. |
1493-1520 | $2,115,000 | $4,045,500 | $6,160,500 |
1521-1544 | 4,059,000 | 4,994,000 | 9,053,000 |
1545-1560 | 14,022,000 | 5,935,500 | 19,957,500 |
1561-1580 | 13,477,500 | 4,770,750 | 18,248,250 |
1581-1600 | 18,850,500 | 5,147,500 | 23,998,000 |
1601-1620 | 19,030,500 | 5,942,750 | 24,973,250 |
1621-1640 | 17,712,000 | 5,789,250 | 23,501,250 |
1641-1660 | 16,483,500 | 6,117,000 | 22,600,500 |
1661-1680 | 15,165,000 | 6,458,750 | 21,623,750 |
1681-1700 | 15,385,500 | 7,508,500 | 22,894,000 |
1701-1720 | 16,002,000 | 8,942,000 | 24,944,000 |
1721-1740 | 19,404,000 | 13,308,250 | 32,712,250 |
1741-1760 | 23,991,500 | 17,165,500 | 41,157,000 |
1761-1780 | 29,373,250 | 14,441,750 | 43,815,000 |
1781-1800 | 39,557,750 | 12,408,500 | 51,966,250 |
1801-1810 | 40,236,750 | 12,400,000 | 52,636,750 |
1811-1820 | 24,334,750 | 7,983,000 | 32,317,750 |
1821-1830 | 20,725,250 | 9,915,750 | 30,641,000 |
1831-1840 | 26,840,250 | 14,151,500 | 40,991,750 |
1841-1850 | 35,118,750 | 38,194,250 | 73,313,000 |
1851-1855 | 39,875,250 | 137,766,750 | 177,642,000 |
1856-1860 | 40,724,500 | 143,725,250 | 184,449,750 |
1861-1865 | 49,551,750 | 129,123,250 | 178,675,000 |
1866-1870 | 60,258,750 | 133,850,000 | 194,108,750 |
1871-1875 | 88,624,000 | 119,045,750 | 207,669,750 |
1876-1879 | 110,575,000 | 119,710,000 | 230,285,000 |

The fall of prices from 1873 to 1879, owing to the commercial panic in the former year, however, is regarded, somewhat unjustly, in my opinion, as an evidence of an appreciation of gold. Mr. Giffen's paper in the “Statistical Journal,” vol. xlii, is the basis on which Mr. Goschen founded an argument in the “Journal of the Institute of Bankers” (London), May, 1883, and which attracted considerable attention. On the other side, see Bourne, “Statistical Journal,” vol. xlii. The claim that the value of gold has risen seems particularly hasty, especially when we consider that after the panics of 1857 and 1866 the value of money rose, for reasons not affecting gold, respectively fifteen and twenty-five per cent.
The drop in prices from 1873 to 1879, caused by the commercial panic in 1873, is often seen, somewhat unfairly in my view, as evidence of a rise in the value of gold. Mr. Giffen's paper in the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“Statistical Journal,”vol. xlii was the basis for Mr. Goschen’s argument in the“Journal of the Institute of Bankers”(London), May 1883, which gained a lot of attention. On the other side, see Bourne,“Statistical Journal,”vol. xlii. The claim that the value of gold has gone up seems quite hasty, especially since after the panics of 1857 and 1866, the value of money increased by fifteen and twenty-five percent, respectively, for reasons unrelated to gold.
The very thing for which the precious metals are most recommended for use as the materials of money—their durability—is also the very thing which has, for all practical purposes, excepted them from the law of cost of production, and caused [pg 309] their value to depend practically upon the law of demand and supply. Their durability is the reason of the vast accumulations in existence, and this it is which makes the annual product very small in relation to the whole existing supply, and so prevents its value from conforming, except after a long term of years, to the cost of production of the annual supply.
The main reason precious metals are often recommended as money is their __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__durability—is also the reason that, for all intents and purposes, has exempted them from the law of production costs and resulted in[pg 309]Their value mainly depends on the law of supply and demand. Because they are durable, there are large quantities available, which means that the annual production is quite small compared to the total supply. This, in turn, prevents their value from matching, except over many years, the cost of producing the annual supply.
§ 3. This law is connected to the principle established in the previous chapter.
Since, however, the value of money really conforms, like that of other things, though more slowly, to its cost of production, some political economists have objected altogether to the statement that the value of money depends on its quantity combined with the rapidity of circulation, which, they think, is assuming a law for money that does not exist for any other commodity, when the truth is that it is governed by the very same laws. To this we may answer, in the first place, that the statement in question assumes no peculiar law. It is simply the law of demand and supply, which is acknowledged to be applicable to all commodities, and which, in the case of money, as of most other things, is controlled, but not set aside, by the law of cost of production, since cost of production would have no effect on value if it could have none on supply. But, secondly, there really is, in one respect, a closer connection between the value of money and its quantity than between the values of other things and their quantity. The value of other things conforms to the changes in the cost of production, without requiring, as a condition, that there should be any actual alteration of the supply: the potential alteration is sufficient; and, if there even be an actual alteration, it is but a temporary one, except in so far as the altered value may make a difference in the demand, and so require an increase or diminution of supply, as a consequence, not a cause, of the alteration in value. Now, this is also true of gold and silver, considered as articles of expenditure for ornament and luxury; but it is not true of money. If the permanent cost of production of gold were reduced one fourth, it might happen that there would not be more of it bought for plate, gilding, or jewelry, than before; and if so, though the value would fall, the quantity extracted from the mines for these [pg 310] purposes would be no greater than previously. Not so with the portion used as money: that portion could not fall in value one fourth unless actually increased one fourth; for, at prices one fourth higher, one fourth more money would be required to make the accustomed purchases; and, if this were not forthcoming, some of the commodities would be without purchasers, and prices could not be kept up. Alterations, therefore, in the cost of production of the precious metals do not act upon the value of money except just in proportion as they increase or diminish its quantity; which can not be said of any other commodity. It would, therefore, I conceive, be an error, both scientifically and practically, to discard the proposition which asserts a connection between the value of money and its quantity.
However, since the value of money, like other things, although more slowly, aligns with its cost of production, some economists have entirely disagreed with the idea that the value of money is determined by its quantity and the speed of circulation. They believe this suggests a rule for money that doesn’t apply to any other good, while the reality is it follows the same laws. First, we can respond that the statement in question does not imply a unique law. It is simply the law of supply and demand, which is recognized as relevant to all goods and is influenced, but not negated, by the cost of production. After all, if production cost had no effect on supply, it wouldn't affect value either. Secondly, there is, in one way, a more direct link between the value of money and its quantity than there is for other items and their quantities. The value of other goods adjusts to changes in production costs without needing an actual change in supply; a potential change is enough. Even if there is an actual change, it is usually temporary, unless the change in value impacts demand, which then requires an adjustment in supply as a result, not a cause, of the value change. This is also true for gold and silver when viewed as luxury items, but not for money. If the permanent production cost of gold were reduced by a quarter, it might turn out that no more would be bought for use in plates, gilding, or jewelry than before; in that case, even though the value would drop, the amount mined for these uses wouldn’t increase. However, the same isn't true for the portion used as money: that part couldn’t drop in value by a quarter unless its amount actually rose by a quarter. At prices a quarter higher, an additional quarter of money would be needed to maintain normal purchasing levels; if this extra amount wasn’t available, some goods would go unsold, and prices couldn't be sustained. Therefore, changes in the production costs of precious metals only affect the value of money in proportion to the changes in its quantity, which can’t be said for any other good. Thus, I believe it would be a mistake, both scientifically and practically, to reject the idea that there is a connection between the value of money and its quantity.
It is evident, however, that the cost of production, in the long run, regulates the quantity; and that every country (temporary fluctuation excepted) will possess, and have in [pg 311] circulation, just that quantity of money which will perform all the exchanges required of it, consistently with maintaining a value conformable to its cost of production. The prices of things will, on the average, be such that money will exchange for its own cost in all other goods: and, precisely because the quantity can not be prevented from affecting the value, the quantity itself will (by a sort of self-acting machinery) be kept at the amount consistent with that standard of prices—at the amount necessary for performing, at those prices, all the business required of it.
It’s clear that, in the long run, production costs determine the quantity of goods; and every country (aside from temporary fluctuations) will have, and will be using, just the right amount of money needed to handle all necessary transactions while maintaining a value that aligns with its production costs. On average, prices will be set so that money corresponds to its production cost when exchanged for other goods. Because the total quantity will inevitably influence value, it will be automatically adjusted to match that price standard—ensuring there’s enough to facilitate all transactions at those prices.
Chapter VII. On a Double Standard and Subsidiary Coins.
§ 1. Concerns about a Double Standard.
Though the qualities necessary to fit any commodity for being used as money are rarely united in any considerable perfection, there are two commodities which possess them in an eminent and nearly an equal degree—the two precious metals, as they are called—gold and silver. Some nations have accordingly attempted to compose their circulating medium of these two metals indiscriminately.
Though the qualities needed for any item to be used as money are rarely found together in a significant way, there are two items that have them in a notable and almost equal measure—the two precious metals, known as gold and silver. As a result, some nations have tried to create their currency using these two metals interchangeably.
There is an obvious convenience in making use of the more costly metal for larger payments, and the cheaper one for smaller; and the only question relates to the mode in which this can best be done. The mode most frequently adopted has been to establish between the two metals a fixed proportion [to decide by law, for example, that sixteen grains of silver should be equivalent to one grain of gold]; and it being left free to every one who has a [dollar] to pay, either to pay it in the one metal or in the other.
It's clearly more convenient to use the more expensive metal for bigger payments and the cheaper one for smaller ones; the only real question is how to do this most effectively. The most common approach has been to set a fixed ratio between the two metals [for instance, deciding by law that sixteen grains of silver equals one grain of gold]; and it is left up to anyone who has a [dollar] to choose whether to pay in one metal or the other.
If [their] natural or cost values always continued to bear the same ratio to one another, the arrangement would be unobjectionable. This, however, is far from being the fact. Gold and silver, though the least variable in value of all commodities, are not invariable, and do not always vary simultaneously. Silver, for example, was lowered in permanent value more than gold by the discovery of the American mines; and those small variations of value which take place occasionally do not affect both metals alike. Suppose such a variation to take place—the value of the two metals relatively to one another no longer agreeing with their rated [pg 313] proportion—one or other of them will now be rated below its bullion value, and there will be a profit to be made by melting it.
If their natural or cost values always stayed in the same ratio, the situation would be acceptable. However, that's definitely not the case. Gold and silver, while the least variable in value among all commodities, are not constant and don’t always change in sync. For instance, silver lost permanent value more than gold due to the discovery of the American mines, and those small fluctuations in value that occur now and then don’t impact both metals equally. Imagine such a fluctuation happens—the value of the two metals no longer aligns with their rated proportion—one of them will now be valued lower than its bullion value, creating a profit opportunity by melting it.
Suppose, for example, that gold rises in value relatively to silver, so that the quantity of gold in a sovereign is now worth more than the quantity of silver in twenty shillings. Two consequences will ensue. No debtor will any longer find it his interest to pay in gold. He will always pay in silver, because twenty shillings are a legal tender for a debt of one pound, and he can procure silver convertible into twenty shillings for less gold than that contained in a sovereign. The other consequence will be that, unless a sovereign can be sold for more than twenty shillings, all the sovereigns will be melted, since as bullion they will purchase a greater number of shillings than they exchange for as coin. The converse of all this would happen if silver, instead of gold, were the metal which had risen in comparative value. A sovereign would not now be worth so much as twenty shillings, and whoever had a pound to pay would prefer paying it by a sovereign; while the silver coins would be collected for the purpose of being melted, and sold as bullion for gold at their real value—that is, above the legal valuation. The money of the community, therefore, would never really consist of both metals, but of the one only which, at the particular time, best suited the interest of debtors; and the standard of the currency would be constantly liable to change from the one metal to the other, at a loss, on each change, of the expense of coinage on the metal which fell out of use.
Imagine that gold becomes more valuable compared to silver, so much so that the amount of gold in a sovereign is now worth more than the amount of silver in twenty shillings. Two things will happen. No debtor will want to pay in gold anymore; they will always use silver instead, because twenty shillings is legal tender for a one-pound debt, and they can get silver convertible into twenty shillings for less gold than what’s in a sovereign. The other thing that will happen is that unless a sovereign can be sold for more than twenty shillings, all the sovereigns will be melted down since as bullion they will buy more shillings than they can be exchanged for as coins. The opposite would occur if silver, rather than gold, became the more valuable metal. A sovereign would be worth less than twenty shillings, and anyone who owed a pound would prefer to pay it with a sovereign; meanwhile, the silver coins would be gathered to be melted down and sold as bullion for gold at their true value—that is, higher than their legal worth. Thus, the community's money would never truly consist of both metals but instead just the one that best served the interests of debtors at that time; and the standard of the currency would constantly shift from one metal to the other, leading to a loss each time due to the cost of minting the metal that was no longer in use.
It appears, therefore, that the value of money is liable to more frequent fluctuations when both metals are a legal tender at a fixed valuation than when the exclusive standard of the currency is either gold or silver. Instead of being only affected by variations in the cost of production of one metal, it is subject to derangement from those of two. The particular kind of variation to which a currency is rendered more liable by having two legal standards is a fall of value, or what is commonly called a depreciation, since practically that one of the two metals will always be the standard of which the real has fallen below the rated value. If the tendency of the metals be to rise in value, all payments will be made in the one which has risen least; and, if to fall, then in that which has fallen most.
It seems that the value of money is more prone to frequent changes when both metals are legal tender at a fixed price compared to when only gold or silver is used as the standard currency. Instead of being influenced solely by the production costs of one metal, it's affected by the fluctuations of both. The particular type of change that a currency is more vulnerable to when it has two legal standards is a drop in value, commonly known as depreciation, since one of the two metals will usually be the one whose actual value has fallen below its set price. If the value of the metals tends to increase, all payments will be made using the one that has increased the least; and if the value tends to decrease, then payments will be made using the one that has decreased the most.
While liable to “more frequent fluctuations,” prices do not follow the extreme fluctuations of both metals, as some suppose, and as is shown by the following diagram.236 A represents the line of the value of gold, and B of silver, relatively to some third commodity represented by the horizontal line. Superposing these curves, C would show the line of extreme variations, while since prices would follow the metal which falls in [pg 315] value, D would show the actual course of variations. While the fluctuations are more frequent in D, they are less extreme than in C.
Although subject to“more frequent changes,”prices do not match theextremefluctuations in both metals, as some believe, illustrated in the following diagram.236A shows the value line for gold, while B shows it for silver, compared to another commodity represented by the horizontal line. By overlaying these curves, C would display the line ofextremevariations, while prices would follow the metal thatdropsin[pg 315]Value D shows the actual trend of changes. Although the fluctuations in D occur more often, they are less drastic compared to C.

§ 2. The use of the two metals as currency, and the handling of Subsidiary Coins.
The plan of a double standard is still occasionally brought forward by here and there a writer or orator as a great improvement in currency.
The idea of a double standard is still sometimes proposed by a few writers or speakers as a major upgrade in currency.
It is probable that, with most of its adherents, its chief merit is its tendency to a sort of depreciation, there being at all times abundance of supporters for any mode, either open or covert, of lowering the standard. [But] the advantage without the disadvantages of a double standard seems to be best obtained by those nations with whom one only of the two metals is a legal tender, but the other also is coined, and allowed to pass for whatever value the market assigns to it.
It's likely that, for most of its supporters, its main benefit is its inclination towards a kind of devaluation, as there are always plenty of backers for any method, whether open or subtle, of lowering the standard. However, the benefit of having a double standard without its drawbacks seems to be best achieved by those countries where only one of the two metals is legal tender, while the other is also minted and allowed to circulate at whatever value the market gives it.
When this plan is adopted, it is naturally the more costly metal which is left to be bought and sold as an article of commerce. But nations which, like England, adopt the more costly of the two as their standard, resort to a different expedient for retaining them both in circulation, namely (1), to make silver a legal tender, but only for small payments. In England no one can be compelled to receive silver in payment for a larger amount than forty shillings. With this regulation there is necessarily combined another, namely (2), that silver coin should be rated, in comparison with gold, somewhat above its intrinsic value; that there should not [pg 316] be, in twenty shillings, as much silver as is worth a sovereign; for, if there were, a very slight turn of the market in its favor would make it worth more than a sovereign, and it would be profitable to melt the silver coin. The overvaluation of the silver coin creates an inducement to buy silver and send it to the mint to be coined, since it is given back at a higher value than properly belongs to it; this, however, has been guarded against (3) by limiting the quantity of the silver coinage, which is not left, like that of gold, to the discretion of individuals, but is determined by the Government, and restricted to the amount supposed to be required for small payments. The only precaution necessary is, not to put so high a valuation upon the silver as to hold out a strong temptation to private coining.
When this plan is put into action, it’s naturally the more expensive metal that remains available for trading as a commodity. However, nations like England, which choose the pricier option as their standard, take a different approach to keep both metals in circulation. They (1) make silver a legal tender, but only for smaller transactions. In England, no one can be forced to accept silver for amounts greater than forty shillings. This rule goes hand in hand with another, (2) where silver coins are valued slightly more than their actual worth in comparison to gold; in twenty shillings, there shouldn’t be as much silver as the value of a sovereign. If that were the case, even a slight shift in the market could make it worth more than a sovereign, leading to a profit from melting down the silver coin. The higher valuation of the silver coin encourages people to buy silver and take it to the mint for coining, as they receive it back at a value that is greater than its true worth. However, this has been addressed (3) by limiting the amount of silver coinage, which isn’t left to individuals' discretion like gold, but is instead set by the Government and restricted to what is believed to be needed for small payments. The only necessary precaution is to avoid valuing the silver too highly to prevent a strong temptation for private coining.
§ 3. The United States' experience with a double standard from 1792 to 1883.
The experience of the United States with a double standard, extending as it does from 1792 to 1873 without a break, and from 1878 to the present time, is a most valuable source of instruction in regard to the practical working of bimetallism. While we have nominally had a double standard, in reality we have either had one alone, or been in a transition from one to the other standard; and the history of our coinage strikingly illustrates the truth that the natural values of the two metals, in spite of all legislation, so vary relatively to each other that a constant ratio can not be maintained for any length of time; and that “the poor money drives out the good,” according to Gresham's statement. For clearness, the period may be divided, in accordance with the changes of legislation, into four divisions:
The U.S. experience with a double standard, which has continued from 1792 to 1873 without a break, and from 1878 to the present, offers an important lesson in how bimetallism works in reality. While we have officially maintained a double standard, in practice, we've typically had only one standard or have been shifting between the two. The history of our currency clearly shows that the natural values of the two metals vary in relation to each other despite all laws, making it impossible to keep a consistent ratio for any long time; and that“bad money pushes out good money,”according to Gresham's law. To clarify, this period can be split into four segments based on changes in legislation:
I. 1792-1834. Transition from gold to silver.
I. 1792-1834. Transition from gold to silver.
II. 1834-1853. Transition from silver to gold.
II. 1834-1853. Transition from silver to gold.
III. 1853-1878. Single gold currency (except 1862-1879, the paper period).
III. 1853-1878. Gold was the only currency in use (except for 1862-1879, which was the paper money period).
IV. 1878-1884. Transition from gold to silver.
IV. 1878-1884. Transition from gold to silver.
I. With the establishment of the mint, Hamilton agreed upon the use of both gold and silver in our money, at a ratio of 15 to 1: that is, that the amount of pure silver in a dollar should be fifteen times the weight of gold in a dollar. So, while the various Spanish dollars then in circulation in the United States seemed to contain on the average about 371-¼ grains of pure silver, and since Hamilton believed the relative market value of gold and silver to be about 1 to 15, he put 1/15 of 371-¼ grains, or 24-¾ grains of pure gold, into the gold dollar. It was the best possible example of the bimetallic [pg 317] system to be found, and the mint ratio was intended to conform to the market ratio. If this conformity could have been maintained, there would have been no disturbance. But a cause was already in operation affecting the supply of one of the metals—silver—wholly independent of legislation, and without correspondingly affecting gold.
I. When the mint was created, Hamilton decided to use both gold and silver in our currency at a ratio of 15 to 1. This meant that the amount of pure silver in a dollar should be fifteen times the weight of gold in a dollar. At that time, the Spanish dollars that were in circulation in the United States contained, on average, about 371-¼ grains of pure silver. Since Hamilton believed the market value of gold and silver was roughly 1 to 15, he included 1/15 of 371-¼ grains, or 24-¾ grains of pure gold, in the gold dollar. This was the best example of the bimetallic system, and the mint ratio was intended to align with the market ratio. If this alignment had been upheld, there wouldn't have been any problems. However, a factor was already affecting the supply of one metal—silver—independently of any laws, without equally impacting gold.[pg 317]
Two periods of production of silver, in which the production of silver was great relatively to gold, stand out prominently in the history of that metal. (1) One was the enormous yield from the mines of the New World, continuing from 1545 to about 1640, and (2) the only other period of great production at all comparable with it (that is, as regards the production of silver relatively to gold) was that lasting from 1780 to 1820, due to the richness of the Mexican silver-mines. The first period of ninety-five years was longer than the second, which was only forty years; yet while about forty-seven times as much silver as gold was produced on an average during the first period, the average annual amount of silver produced relatively to gold was probably a little greater from 1780 to 1820. The effect of the first period in lowering the relation of silver to gold is well recognized in the history of the precious metals (see Chart X for the fall in the value of silver relatively to gold); that the effect of the second period on the value of silver has not been greater than was actually caused—it has not been small—is explicable only by the laws of the value of money. If you let the same amount of water into a small reservoir which you let into a large one, the level of the former will be raised more than the level of the latter. The great production of the first period was added to a very small existing stock of silver; that of the second period was added to a stock increased by the great previous production just mentioned. The smallness of the annual product relatively to the total quantity existing in the world requires some time, even for a production of silver forty-seven times greater than the gold production, to take its effect on the value of the total silver stock in existence. The effect of this process was beginning to be felt soon after the United States decided on a double standard. For this reason the value of silver was declining about 1800, and, although the annual silver product fell off seriously after 1820, the value of silver continued to decline even after that time, because the increased production, dating back to 1780, was just beginning to make itself felt. Thus we have the phenomenon—which seems very difficult for some persons to understand—of a falling off in the annual production of silver, accompanied by a decrease in its value relatively to gold.
Two important periods of silver production stand out in the history of this metal, where silver output was much higher than gold. (1) The first was the substantial yield from the New World mines, which lasted from 1545 to around 1640, and (2) the only other high production period similar to that was from 1780 to 1820, fueled by the rich Mexican silver mines. The first period lasted ninety-five years, longer than the second, which lasted only forty years. However, during the first period, approximately forty-seven times more silver than gold was produced on average, whereas from 1780 to 1820, the annual average of silver production compared to gold was likely even higher. The impact of the first period on reducing the silver-to-gold ratio is well-documented in the history of precious metals (see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).Chart XThe decline in silver's value compared to gold happened for several reasons. The impact of the second period on silver's value, while significant, didn't exceed the actual decline and can only be understood through the principles that determine the value of money. When you pour the same amount of water into a small reservoir as you do into a large one, the water level in the small reservoir rises more. During the first period, high production added to a very small existing amount of silver, while production in the second period was added to a supply that had already increased due to the earlier output. Since the annual silver production is relatively small compared to the total silver available worldwide, even a production rate that was forty-seven times higher than that of gold takes time to influence the overall value of the existing silver supply. This effect started to be noticeable soon after the United States adopted a double standard. Therefore, around 1800, silver's value was declining, and although annual silver production sharply dropped after 1820, its value continued to decrease afterward because the increased output from 1780 was just starting to take effect. This creates a confusing situation for some, as they see a decline in annual silver production alongside a fall in its value compared to gold.
This diminishing value of silver began to affect the coinage of the United States as early as 1811, and by 1820 the [pg 319] disappearance of gold was everywhere commented upon. The process by which this result is produced is a simple one, and is adopted as soon as a margin of profit is seen arising from a divergence between the mint and market ratios. In 1820 the market ratio of gold to silver was 1 to 15.7—that is, the amount of gold in a dollar (24-¾ grains) would exchange for 15.7 times as many grains of silver in the market, in the form of bullion; while at the mint, in the form of coin, it would exchange for only 15 times as many grains of silver. A broker having 1,000 gold dollars could buy with them in the market silver bullion enough (1,000 × 15.7 grains) to have coined, when presented at the mint, 1,000 dollars in silver pieces, and yet have left over as a profit by the operation 700 grains of silver. So long as this can be done, silver (the cheapest money) will be presented at the mint, and gold (the dearest money) will become an article of merchandise too valuable to be used as money when the cheaper silver is legally as good. The best money, therefore, disappears from circulation, as it did in the United States before 1820, owing to the fall in the value of silver. It is to be said, that it has been seriously urged by some writers that silver did not fall, but that gold rose, in value, owing to the demand of England for resumption in 1819.237 Chronology kills this view; for the change in the value of silver began too early to have been due to English measures, even if conclusive reasons have not been given above why silver should naturally have fallen in value.
The decreasing value of silver started affecting U.S. coinage as early as 1811, and by 1820, the lack of gold was a common topic of discussion. The process behind this is simple and begins as soon as there’s a profit margin between the mint and market ratios. In 1820, the market ratio of gold to silver was 1 to 15.7—meaning the amount of gold in a dollar (24-¾ grains) could be traded for 15.7 times that amount in silver grains on the market, as bullion; whereas at the mint, in coin form, it would only be exchanged for 15 times that amount in silver grains. A broker with 1,000 gold dollars could buy enough silver bullion in the market (1,000 × 15.7 grains) to mint $1,000 in silver coins, while still having 700 grains of silver left as profit from the deal. As long as this scenario exists, silver (the cheaper currency) will go to the mint, and gold (the more expensive currency) will become a commodity too valuable to be spent as money when the less expensive silver is legally accepted as equivalent. As a result, the best currency leaves circulation, as happened in the U.S. before 1820, due to the decline in silver's value. It's also important to mention that some writers believe silver didn't actually fall but rather that gold increased in value because of England's demand for resumption in 1819.237Evidence from the timeline disproves this claim; the drop in silver's value started too soon to be linked to English policies, even though strong reasons haven't been given above for why silver would have naturally lost value.

II. The change in the relative values of gold and silver finally forced the United States to change their mint ratio in 1834. Two courses were open to us: (1) either to increase the quantity of silver in the dollar until the dollar of silver was intrinsically worth the gold in the gold dollar; or (2) debase the gold dollar-piece until it was reduced in value proportionate to the depreciation of silver since 1792. The latter expedient, without any seeming regard to the effect on contracts and the integrity of our monetary standard, was adopted: 6.589 per cent was taken out of the gold dollar, leaving it containing 23.22 grains of pure gold; and as the silver dollar remained unchanged (371-¼ grains) the mint ratio established was 1 to 15.988, or, as commonly stated, 1 to 16. Did this correspond with the market ratio then existing? No. Having seen the former steady fall in silver, and believing that it would continue, Congress hoped to anticipate any further fall by making the mint ratio of gold to silver a little larger than the market ratio. This was done by establishing the mint ratio of 1 to 15.988, while the market ratio in 1834 was 1 to 15.73. Here, [pg 320] again, appeared the difficulty arising from the attempt to balance a ratio on a movable fulcrum. It will be seen that the act of 1834 set at work forces for another change in the coinage—forces of a similar kind, but working in exactly the opposite direction to those previous to 1834. A dollar of gold coin would now exchange for more grains of silver at the mint (15.98) than it would in the form of bullion in the market (15.73). Therefore it would be more profitable to put gold into coin than exchange it as bullion. Gold was sent to the mint, while silver began to be withdrawn from circulation, silver now being more valuable as bullion than as coin. By 1840 a silver dollar was worth 102 cents in gold.238 This movement, which was displacing silver with gold, received a surprising and unexpected impetus by the gold discoveries of California and Australia in 1849, before mentioned, and made gold less valuable relatively to silver, by lowering the value of gold. Here, again, was another natural cause, independent of legislation, and not to be foreseen, altering the value of one of the precious metals, and in exactly the opposite direction from that in the previous period, when silver was lowered by the increase from the Mexican mines. In 1853 a silver dollar was worth 104 cents in gold (i.e., of a gold dollar containing 23.22 grains); but, some years before, all silver dollars had disappeared from use, and only gold was in circulation. For a large part of this period we had in reality a single standard of gold, the other metal not being able to stay in the currency.
II. The change in the values of gold and silver eventually forced the United States to adjust their mint ratio in 1834. We had two choices: (1) either increase the amount of silver in the dollar until the silver dollar equaled the gold dollar in value, or (2) reduce the gold dollar to match the decrease in silver's value since 1792. The second option, which ignored the effects on contracts and the stability of our currency, was chosen: 6.589 percent was deducted from the gold dollar, leaving it with 23.22 grains of pure gold; since the silver dollar remained the same at 371-¼ grains, the mint ratio was set at 1 to 15.988, or more commonly, 1 to 16. Did this align with the current market ratio? No. Noticing silver's steady decline and believing it would continue, Congress sought to stay ahead of any further drop by setting the mint ratio of gold to silver slightly higher than the market ratio. This resulted in a mint ratio of 1 to 15.988, while the market ratio in 1834 was 1 to 15.73. Once again, there was the challenge of trying to balance a ratio on an unstable base. The 1834 act initiated forces for another currency change—forces similar in nature but working in the opposite direction to those before 1834. A gold dollar would now exchange for more grains of silver at the mint (15.98) than it would as bullion in the market (15.73). As a result, it became more profitable to mint gold into coins rather than sell it as bullion. Gold was sent to the mint while silver began to be withdrawn from circulation, as silver was now worth more as bullion than as coin. By 1840, a silver dollar was valued at 102 cents in gold.238This trend of replacing silver with gold got an unexpected boost from the gold discoveries in California and Australia in 1849, which, as mentioned earlier, made gold less valuable compared to silver by lowering gold’s worth. There was also another natural factor, independent of laws and unpredictable, that changed the value of one of the precious metals, moving in the opposite direction from when silver's value had fallen due to increases from the Mexican mines. In 1853, a silver dollar was worth 104 cents in gold (meaning a gold dollar containing 23.22 grains); however, several years earlier, all silver dollars had been taken out of circulation, leaving only gold in use. For a significant portion of this time, we effectively had a single gold standard, with the other metal unable to stay in circulation.
III. After our previous experience, the impossibility of retaining both metals in the coinage together, on equal terms, now came to be generally recognized, and was accepted by Congress in the legislation of 1853. This act made no further changes intended to adapt the mint to the market ratios, but remained satisfied with the gold circulation. But hitherto no regard had been paid to the principles on which a subsidiary coinage is based, as explained by Mr. Mill in the last section (§ 2). The act of 1853, while acquiescing in the single gold standard, had for its purpose the readjustment of the subsidiary coins, which, together with silver dollar-pieces, had all gone out of circulation. Before this, two halves, four quarters, or ten dimes contained the same quantity of pure silver as the dollar-piece (371-¼ grains); therefore, when it became profitable to withdraw the dollar-pieces and substitute gold, it gave exactly the same profit to withdraw two halves or four quarters in silver. For this reason all the subsidiary silver had gone out of circulation, and there was no “small change” in the country. The legislation of 1853 rectified this error: (1) [pg 321] by reducing the quantity of pure silver in a dollar's worth of subsidiary coin to 345.6 grains. By making so much less an amount of silver equal to a dollar of small coins, it was more valuable in that shape than as bullion, and there was no reason for melting it, or withdrawing it (since even if gold and silver changed considerably in their relative values, 345.6 grains of silver could not easily rise sufficiently to become equal in value to a gold dollar, when 371-¼ grains were worth only 104 cents of the gold dollar); (2) this over-valuation of silver in subsidiary coin would cause a great flow of silver to the mint, since silver would be more valuable in subsidiary coin than as bullion; but this was prevented by the provision (section 4 of the act of 1853) that the amount or the small coinage should be limited according to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury; and, (3) in order that the overvalued small coinage might not be used for purposes other than for effecting change, its legal-tender power was restricted to payments not exceeding five dollars. This system, a single gold standard for large, and silver for small, payments, continued without question, and with great convenience, until the days of the war, when paper money (1862-1879) drove out (by its cheapness, again) both gold and silver. Paper was far cheaper than the cheapest of the two metals.
III. After our previous experience, it became generally accepted that it was impossible to keep both metals in the coinage on equal footing, which Congress acknowledged in the legislation of 1853. This act did not make any further changes to align the mint with market ratios but was satisfied with the circulation of gold. Until then, the principles underlying subsidiary coinage had not been considered, as Mr. Mill explained in the previous section (§ 2The 1853 act, while adopting the single gold standard, aimed to adjust the subsidiary coins because both the subsidiary coins and silver dollar coins had fallen out of circulation. Before this, two half-dollars, four quarters, or ten dimes contained the same amount of pure silver as a dollar coin (371-¼ grains). As a result, when it became more lucrative to take out the dollar coins and replace them with gold, it was equally profitable to remove two half-dollars or four quarters in silver. This explains why all the subsidiary silver coins disappeared from circulation, leaving no“small change”available in the country. The 1853 legislation addressed this issue: (1)[pg 321]by reducing the amount of pure silver in a dollar's worth of small coins to 345.6 grains. By lowering the silver amount that equaled a dollar in these coins, they became more valuable than as bullion, removing any reason to melt them down or take them out of circulation (since even if gold and silver values changed a lot, 345.6 grains of silver wouldn’t likely increase enough to match a gold dollar, especially when 371-¼ grains were valued at only 104 cents of the gold dollar); (2) this inflated value of silver in coins would result in a significant increase of silver to the mint, as silver would be worth more as small coins than as bullion; however, this was prevented by the rule (section 4 of the act of 1853) that limited the amount of small coinage at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury; and, (3) to limit the use of the overvalued small coins for anything other than making change, their legal-tender status was restricted to payments of five dollars or less. This system, featuring a single gold standard for large transactions and silver for small payments, remained effective and convenient until the war years, when paper money (1862-1879) replaced both gold and silver due to its lower value, as paper was much cheaper than either metal.

The mere fact that the silver dollar-piece had not circulated since even long before 1853 led the authorities to drop out the provisions for the coinage of silver dollars and in 1873 remove it from the list of legal coins (at the ratio of 1 to 15.98, [pg 322] the obsolete ratio fixed as far back as 1834). This is what is known as the “demonetization” of silver. It had no effect on the circulation of silver dollars, since none were in use, and had not been for more than twenty-five years. There had been no desire up to this time to use silver, since it was more expensive than gold; indeed, it is somewhat humiliating to our sense of national honor to reflect that it was not until silver fell so surprisingly in value (in 1876) that the agitation for its use in the coinage arose. When a silver dollar was worth 104 cents, no one wanted it as a means of liquidating debts; when it came to be worth 86 cents, it was capable of serving debtors even better than the then appreciating greenbacks. Thus, while from 1853 (and even before) we had legally two standards, of both gold and silver, but really only one, that of gold, from 1873 to 1878 we had both legally and really only one standard, that of gold.
The fact that the silver dollar hadn’t been in circulation since well before 1853 prompted the authorities to get rid of the rules for minting silver dollars and, in 1873, to take it off the list of legal coins (at the ratio of 1 to 15.98,[pg 322]the outdated ratio established way back in 1834). This is referred to as the“demonetization”of silver. It didn't affect the circulation of silver dollars, as none were in use, and hadn't been for over twenty-five years. Until then, there was no interest in using silver because it was pricier than gold; it's somewhat embarrassing to note that it wasn't until silver unexpectedly dropped in value (in 1876) that people started calling for its use in coins. When a silver dollar was worth 104 cents, nobody wanted it for settling debts; but when it dropped to 86 cents, it became a more appealing option for debtors compared to the then-rising greenbacks. So, while from 1853 (and even earlier) we had two legal standards, of both gold and silver, in practice we had only one—gold. From 1873 to 1878, we had both legally and practically just one standard: gold.
It might be here added, that I have spoken of the silver dollar as containing 371-¼ grains of pure silver. Of course, alloy is mixed with the pure silver, sufficient, in 1792, to make the original dollar weigh 416 grains in all, its “standard” weight. In 1837 the amount of alloy was changed from 1/12 to 1/10 of the standard weight, which (as the 371-¼ grains of pure silver were unchanged) gave the total weight of the dollar as 412-½ grains, whence the familiar name assigned to this piece. In 1873, moreover, the mint was permitted to put its stamp and devices—to what was not money at all, but a “coined ingot”—on 378 grains of pure silver (420 grains, standard), known as the “trade-dollar.” It was intended by this means to make United States silver more serviceable in the Asiatic trade. Oriental nations care almost exclusively for silver in payments. The Mexican silver dollar contained 377-¼ grains of pure silver; the Japanese yen, 374-4/10; and the United States dollar, 371-¼. By making the “trade-dollar” slightly heavier than any coin used in the Eastern world, it would give our silver a new market; and the United States Government was simply asked to certify to the fineness and weight by coining it, provided the owners of silver paid the expenses of coinage. Inadvertently the trade-dollar was included in the list of coins in the act of 1873 which were legal tender for payments of five dollars, but, when this was discovered, it was repealed in 1876. So that the trade-dollar was not a legal coin, in any sense (although it contained more silver than the 412-½-grains dollar). They ceased to be coined in 1878, to which time there had been made $35,959,360.
It’s important to note that I’ve discussed the silver dollar, which contains 371-¼ grains of pure silver. Of course, there was an alloy mixed in with the pure silver, which meant that in 1792, the original dollar had a total weight of 416 grains.“standard”weight. In 1837, the proportion of alloy changed from 1/12 to 1/10 of the standard weight, which (since the 371-¼ grains of pure silver stayed the same) resulted in a total weight of 412-½ grains for the dollar, leading to the famous name given to this coin. In 1873, the mint was permitted to imprint its designs on items that were not considered money at all, but a“bullion”—378 grains of pure silver (420 grains, standard), referred to as the“trade dollar.”This was meant to make United States silver more valuable in Asian trade. Eastern countries mainly prefer silver for transactions. The Mexican silver dollar contained 377-¼ grains of pure silver; the Japanese yen had 374-4/10; and the United States dollar had 371-¼. By adjusting the“trade dollar”A bit heavier than any coin used in the East, it would create a new market for our silver. The United States Government was simply asked to certify the quality and weight by coining it, as long as the silver owners covered the coinage costs. Unintentionally, the trade dollar was added to the list of coins in the 1873 act that were legal tender for payments of five dollars, but when this was discovered, it was repealed in 1876. Therefore, the trade dollar wasn’t a legal coin in any meaningful way (even though it contained more silver than the 412-½-grains dollar). Minting stopped in 1878, and by that time, $35,959,360 had been produced.
IV. In February, 1878, an indiscreet and unreasonable movement induced Congress to authorize the recoinage of the silver dollar-piece at the obsolete ratio of 1834 (1 to 15.98), while the [pg 323] market ratio was 1 to 17.87. So extraordinary a reversal of all sound principles and such blindness to our previous experience could be explained only by a desire to force this country to use a silver coinage only, and had its origin with the owners of silver-mines, aided by the desires of debtors for a cheap unit in which to absolve themselves from their indebtedness. There was no pretense of setting up a double standard about it; for it was evident to the most ignorant that so great a disproportion between the mint and market ratios must inevitably lead to the disappearance of gold entirely. This would happen, if owners could bring their silver freely, in any amounts, to the mint for coinage (“Free Coinage”), and so exchange silver against gold coin for the purpose of withdrawing gold, since gold would exchange for less as coin than as bullion. This immediate result was prevented by a provision in the law, which prevented the “free coinage” of silver, and required the Government itself to buy silver and coin at least $2,000,000 in silver each month. This retarded, but will not ultimately prevent, the change from the present gold to a single silver standard. At the rate of $24,000,000 a year, it is only a question of time when the Treasury will be obliged to pay out, for its regular disbursements on the public debt, silver in such amounts as will drive gold out of circulation. In February, 1884, it was feared that this was already at hand, and was practically reached in the August following. Unless a repeal of the law is reached very soon, the uncomfortable spectacle will be seen of a gradual disarrangement of prices, and consequently of trade, arising from a change of the standard.
IV. In February 1878, a reckless and irrational movement prompted Congress to approve the recoinage of the silver dollar at the outdated ratio of 1834 (1 to 15.98), while the market ratio was 1 to 17.87. This major shift from sound principles and neglect of our past experiences can only be understood as an attempt to force the country to adopt a silver-only currency, influenced by silver mine owners and debtors looking for a cheaper way to settle their debts. There was no pretense of creating a double standard; it was obvious to everyone that such a significant difference between the mint and market ratios would inevitably lead to the complete disappearance of gold. This would occur if owners could freely bring their silver in any amount to the mint for coinage.“Free Coinage”) and traded silver for gold coins to withdraw gold, since gold would be valued less as a coin than as bullion. This immediate outcome was hindered by a provision in the law that prevented the“free coinage”The government was required to buy silver and mint at least $2,000,000 in silver each month. This has delayed, but will not ultimately prevent, the transition from the current gold standard to a solely silver standard. At a rate of $24,000,000 a year, it’s only a matter of time before the Treasury has to pay out silver in such large amounts for its regular payments on public debt that gold will be pushed out of circulation. By February 1884, there were concerns that this was already starting to happen, and by the following August, it was practically a reality. Unless the law is repealed very soon, we will see a troubling gradual disruption of prices and trade due to this change in standards.
In order that the alternate movements of silver and gold to the mint for coinage may be seen, there is appended a statement of the coinage239 during the above periods, which well shows the effects of Gresham's law.
To show the back-and-forth movements of silver and gold to the mint for coin production, a statement of the coinage __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__239During these times, it clearly shows the effects of Gresham's law.
Ratio in the mint and in the market. | . | Gold coins. | Silver dollars minted. |
1:15 (silver down in market) | 1792-1834 | $11,825,890 | $36.3 million |
1:15.98 (gold declining in market) | 1834-1853 | 224,965,730 | 42,936,294 |
1:15.98 (gold down in market) | 1853-1873 | 544,864,921 | 5,538,948 |
Gold standard. | 1873-1878 | 166,253,816 | I'm sorry, but there doesn't appear to be a phrase present for me to modernize. Please provide one for me to assist you with. |
1:15.98 (silver lower, but no free coinage) | 1878-1883 | 354,019,865 | 147,255,899 |
It may, perhaps, be asked why the silver dollar of 412-½ grains, being worth intrinsically only from 86 to 89 cents, does not depreciate to that value. The Government buys the silver, owns the coin, and holds all that it can not induce the public to receive voluntarily; so that but a part of the total coinage is out of the Treasury. And most of the coins issued are returned for deposit and silver certificates received in return. There being no free coinage, and no greater amount in circulation than satisfies the demand for change, instead of small bills, the dollar-pieces will circulate at their full value, on the principle of subsidiary coin, even though overvalued. And the silver certificates practically go through a process of constant redemption by being received for customs dues equally with gold. When they become too great in quantity to be needed for such purposes, then we may look for the depreciation with good reason.240
One might ask why the silver dollar, which weighs 412-½ grains and is only worth about 86 to 89 cents, doesn't actually drop to that value. The government buys the silver, owns the coins, and keeps what it can't get people to accept voluntarily; as a result, only a portion of the total coins are outside the Treasury. Most of the coins issued are returned for deposit in exchange for silver certificates. Since there’s no free coinage and no more coins in circulation than necessary for making change instead of using small bills, the dollar coins can circulate at their full value, acting as subsidiary coins even if they’re overvalued. Silver certificates effectively go through a constant redemption process as they are accepted for customs duties along with gold. If they start to become too common for those uses, we can reasonably expect depreciation to occur.240
There are, then, the following kinds of legal tender in the United States in 1884: (1) Gold coins (if not below tolerance); (2) the silver dollar of 412-½ grains; (3) United States notes (except for customs and interest on the public debt); (4) subsidiary silver coinage, to the amount of five dollars; and (5) minor coins, to the amount of twenty-five cents.
In the United States in 1884, the following types of legal tender are recognized: (1) Gold coins (as long as they meet the acceptable weight); (2) the silver dollar weighing 412.5 grains; (3) United States notes (not including customs payments and interest on the national debt); (4) subsidiary silver coins, totaling up to five dollars; and (5) small coins, totaling up to twenty-five cents.
The question of a double standard has provoked no little vehement discussion and has called forth a considerable literature since the fall of silver in 1876. A body of opinion exists, best represented in this country by F. A. Walker and S. D. Horton, that the relative values of gold and silver may be kept unchanged, in spite of all natural causes, by the force of law, which, provided that enough countries join in the plan, shall fix the ratio of exchange in the coinage for all great commercial countries, and by this means keep the coinage ratio equivalent to the bullion ratio. The difficulty with this scheme, even if it were wholly sufficient, has thus far been in the obstacles to international agreement. After several international monetary conferences, in 1867, 1878, and 1881, the project seems now to have been practically abandoned by all except the most sanguine. (For a fuller list of authorities on bimetallism, see Appendix I.)
The issue of a double standard has ignited heated discussions and has resulted in a substantial amount of writing since the decline of silver in 1876. One perspective, most notably represented in this country by F. A. Walker and S. D. Horton, suggests that the relative values of gold and silver can be kept at a constant level, regardless of natural factors, through legislation. If enough countries agree to this plan, it would create a fixed exchange ratio in coinage for all major trading nations, thus aligning the coinage ratio with the bullion ratio. The challenge with this approach, even if it were entirely achievable, has been the obstacles to reaching international agreement. After a series of international monetary conferences in 1867, 1878, and 1881, it seems that this initiative has now been largely overlooked by all but the most hopeful. (For a fuller list of authorities on bimetallism, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__)Appendix 1.)
Chapter VIII. On Credit as a Substitute for Money.
§ 1. Credit is not a creation but a transfer of the means of production.
Credit has a great, but not, as many people seem to suppose, a magical power; it can not make something out of nothing. How often is an extension of credit talked of as equivalent to a creation of capital, or as if credit actually were capital! It seems strange that there should be any need to point out that, credit being only permission to use the capital of another person, the means of production can not be increased by it, but only transferred. If the borrower's means of production and of employing labor are increased by the credit given him, the lender's are as much diminished. The same sum can not be used as capital both by the owner and also by the person to whom it is lent; it can not supply its entire value in wages, tools, and materials, to two sets of laborers at once. It is true that the capital which A has borrowed from B, and makes use of in his business, still forms a part of the wealth of B for other purposes; he can enter into arrangements in reliance on it, and can borrow, when needful, an equivalent sum on the security of it; so that to a superficial eye it might seem as if both B and A had the use of it at once. But the smallest consideration will show that, when B has parted with his capital to A, the use of it as capital rests with A alone, and that B has no other service from it than in so far as his ultimate claim upon it serves him to obtain the use of another capital from a third person, C.
Credit has significant power, but it’s not the magical force that many people think it is; it can't create something from nothing. How often is credit described as if it equals the creation of capital, or as if credit itself is capital! It seems odd to have to point out that credit is merely permission to use someone else's capital, meaning it can’t increase the means of production but only transfer them. If the borrower’s means of production and ability to employ labor increase due to the credit, the lender’s means decrease just as much. The same amount of capital can't be used by both the owner and the borrower at the same time; it can't provide full value in wages, tools, and materials to two different groups of workers simultaneously. It’s true that the capital A borrows from B and uses in his business still counts as part of B's wealth for other purposes; B can rely on it for arrangements and can borrow an equivalent amount based on it, so at first glance, it may seem like both B and A have access to it at the same time. However, a closer look reveals that when B gives his capital to A, only A has the actual use of it as capital, and B only benefits from it to the extent that his claim on it allows him to access capital from someone else, C.
§ 2. How it supports Production.
But, though credit is never anything more than a transfer of capital from hand to hand, it is generally, and [pg 326] naturally, a transfer to hands more competent to employ the capital efficiently in production. If there were no such thing as credit, or if, from general insecurity and want of confidence, it were scantily practiced, many persons who possess more or less of capital, but who from their occupations, or for want of the necessary skill and knowledge, can not personally superintend its employment, would derive no benefit from it: their funds would either lie idle, or would be, perhaps, wasted and annihilated in unskillful attempts to make them yield a profit. All this capital is now lent at interest, and made available for production. Capital thus circumstanced forms a large portion of the productive resources of any commercial country, and is naturally attracted to those producers or traders who, being in the greatest business, have the means of employing it to most advantage, because such are both the most desirous to obtain it and able to give the best security. Although, therefore, the productive funds of the country are not increased by credit, they are called into a more complete state of productive activity. As the confidence on which credit is grounded extends itself, means are developed by which even the smallest portions of capital, the sums which each person keeps by him to meet contingencies, are made available for productive uses. The principal instruments for this purpose are banks of deposit. Where these do not exist, a prudent person must keep a sufficient sum unemployed in his own possession to meet every demand which he has even a slight reason for thinking himself liable to. When the practice, however, has grown up of keeping this reserve not in his own custody, but with a banker, many small sums, previously lying idle, become aggregated in the banker's hands; and the banker, being taught by experience what proportion of the amount is likely to be wanted in a given time, and knowing that, if one depositor happens to require more than the average, another will require less, is able to lend the remainder, that is, the far greater part, to producers and dealers: thereby adding the amount, not indeed to the capital in existence, [pg 327] but to that in employment, and making a corresponding addition to the aggregate production of the community.
But although credit is just a transfer of capital from one person to another, it usually goes to those who can use it more effectively for production. If credit didn't exist, or if it was rarely used due to insecurity and lack of trust, many people who have some amount of capital but can't personally oversee its use would gain no benefit from it. Their funds would either sit unused or would be wasted on unsuccessful attempts to generate profit. Now, all this capital is lent out at interest and made available for production. This capital is a significant part of the productive resources of any commercial country and is naturally drawn to those producers or traders who are the most productive and can use it most advantageously, as they are both eager to obtain it and can provide the best security. So while credit doesn't increase the overall productive funds in the country, it does bring those funds into a more active state of production. As trust in credit grows, even the smallest amounts of capital that people keep on hand for emergencies can be put to productive use. Banks of deposit primarily facilitate this. Without them, a careful person must keep enough cash on hand to cover any potential needs. However, once the norm becomes storing this reserve with a banker instead of keeping it at home, many small, idle sums are pooled together in the bank's possession. The banker learns from experience how much money is typically needed at a given time and knows that if one customer needs more than usual, another will need less. This allows the banker to lend out the remaining amount, which is usually much more, to producers and traders, effectively increasing the amount of capital in use, not the total capital available, and contributing to the overall production of the community.
While credit is thus indispensable for rendering the whole capital of the country productive, it is also a means by which the industrial talent of the country is turned to better account for purposes of production. Many a person who has either no capital of his own, or very little, but who has qualifications for business which are known and appreciated by some possessors of capital, is enabled to obtain either advances in money, or, more frequently, goods on credit, by which his industrial capacities are made instrumental to the increase of the public wealth.
While credit is essential for making the country's total capital productive, it’s also a way to help the country’s industrial talent be used more effectively for production. Many individuals who either have no capital or very little but possess valuable business skills recognized by some capital owners can obtain either cash advances or, more often, goods on credit. This allows their industrial abilities to contribute to increasing public wealth.
Such are, in the most general point of view, the uses of credit to the productive resources of the world. But these considerations only apply to the credit given to the industrious classes—to producers and dealers. Credit given by dealers to unproductive consumers is never an addition, but always a detriment, to the sources of public wealth. It makes over in temporary use, not the capital of the unproductive classes to the productive, but that of the productive to the unproductive.
Such are, in the broadest sense, the benefits of credit to the world's productive resources. However, these points only relate to the credit extended to working people—producers and vendors. Credit extended by vendors to non-productive consumers is never a benefit; it always harms the sources of public wealth. It temporarily shifts, not the capital of the non-productive classes to the productive, but rather that of the productive to the non-productive.
§ 3. The Role of Credit in Saving Money.
But a more intricate portion of the theory of Credit is its influence on prices; the chief cause of most of the mercantile phenomena which perplex observers. In a state of commerce in which much credit is habitually given, general prices at any moment depend much more upon the state of credit than upon the quantity of money. For credit, though it is not productive power, is purchasing power; and a person who, having credit, avails himself of it in the purchase of goods, creates just as much demand for the goods, and tends quite as much to raise their price, as if he made an equal amount of purchases with ready money.
But a more complex part of the theory of credit is its impact on prices; it's the main reason behind most business phenomena that confuse observers. In a market where a lot of credit is regularly extended, Overall prices at any given moment are influenced much more by the state of credit than by the amount of money.. Because credit, while it isn’t productive power, is still purchasing power; and someone who uses their credit to buy goods creates just as much demand for those goods and has just as much effect on raising their price as if they made the same purchases with cash.
The credit which we are now called upon to consider, as a distinct purchasing power, independent of money, is of course not credit in its simplest form, that of money lent by one person to another, and paid directly into his hands; for, when the borrower expends this in purchases, he makes the [pg 328] purchases with money, not credit, and exerts no purchasing power over and above that conferred by the money. The forms of credit which create purchasing power are those in which no money passes at the time, and very often none passes at all, the transaction being included with a mass of other transactions in an account, and nothing paid but a balance. This takes place in a variety of ways, which we shall proceed to examine, beginning, as is our custom, with the simplest.
The credit we're about to discuss is a separate type of purchasing power that operates independently of cash. This isn’t credit in its most basic form, where one person loans money directly to another; because when the borrower uses that money to make purchases, they’re using cash, not credit, and don’t have any extra purchasing power beyond what the cash provides. The types of credit that create purchasing power are those where no money changes hands at the time, and often none may ever change hands at all. Instead, the transaction gets grouped with many others in an account, with only a balance being settled. This happens in various ways, which we’ll begin to explore, starting with the simplest as is our practice.
First: Suppose A and B to be two dealers, who have transactions with each other both as buyers and as sellers. A buys from B on credit. B does the like with respect to A. At the end of the year, the sum of A's debts to B is set against the sum of B's debts to A, and it is ascertained to which side a balance is due. This balance, which may be less than the amount of many of the transactions singly, and is necessarily less than the sum of the transactions, is all that is paid in money; and perhaps even this is not paid, but carried over in an account current to the next year. A single payment of a hundred pounds may in this manner suffice to liquidate a long series of transactions, some of them to the value of thousands.
First: Imagine A and B as two dealers who buy and sell from each other. A buys on credit from B, and B does the same with A. At the end of the year, A's total debts to B are set against B's total debts to A to determine who owes what. This balance, which may be smaller than the individual amounts of many transactions and is definitely less than the total of all transactions combined, is all that gets settled in cash; and maybe even this amount isn't paid but rolled over into the next year's accounts. A single payment of a hundred pounds could cover a long list of transactions, some worth thousands.
But, secondly: The debts of A to B may be paid without the intervention of money, even though there be no reciprocal debts of B to A. A may satisfy B by making over to him a debt due to himself from a third person, C. This is conveniently done by means of a written instrument, called a bill of exchange, which is, in fact, a transferable order by a creditor upon his debtor, and when accepted by the debtor, that is, authenticated by his signature, becomes an acknowledgment of debt.
But, secondly: A's debts to B can be settled without using money, even if B doesn't owe anything to A. A can pay B by transferring a debt that C owes A to B. This is typically done through a written document called a bill of exchange, which is essentially a transferable order from a creditor to their debtor. When the debtor accepts it by signing, it serves as an acknowledgment of the debt.
§ 4. Exchange Bills.
Bills of exchange were first introduced to save the expense and risk of transporting the precious metals from place to place.
Bills of exchange were first created to reduce the cost and risk of moving precious metals from one location to another.
The trade between New York and Liverpool affords a constant illustration of the uses of a bill of exchange. Suppose that A in New York ships a cargo of wheat, worth $100,000, or [pg 329] £20,000, to B in Liverpool; also suppose that C in Liverpool (independently of the negotiations of A and B) ships, about the same time, a cargo of steel rails to D in New York, also worth £20,000. Without the use of bills of exchange, B would have been obliged to send £20,000 in gold across the Atlantic, and so would D, at the risk of loss to both. By the device of bills of exchange the goods are really bartered against each other, and all transmission of money saved.
The trade between New York and Liverpool is a great example of how a bill of exchange works. Imagine that A in New York ships a cargo of wheat worth $100,000, or £20,000, to B in Liverpool. At the same time, C in Liverpool sends a cargo of steel rails to D in New York, also worth £20,000, without any connection to A and B's negotiations. Without bills of exchange, B would have had to send £20,000 in gold across the Atlantic, and D would have had to do the same, risking losses for both. With bills of exchange, the goods are effectively traded against each other, saving the need for any money to change hands.

A has money due to him in Liverpool, and he sells his claim to this money to any one who wants to make a payment in Liverpool. Going to his banker (the middle-man between exporters and importers and the one who deals in such bills) he finds there D, inquiring for some one who has a claim to money in Liverpool, since D owes C in Liverpool for his cargo of steel rails. A makes out a paper title to the £20,000 which B owes him (i.e., a bill of exchange) and by selling it to D gets immediately his £20,000 there in New York. The form in which this is done is as follows:
A has money owed to him in Liverpool, and he sells his claim to that money to anyone who wants to make a payment in Liverpool. When he goes to his banker (the middleman between exporters and importers who deals in such bills), he finds D, who is looking for someone with a claim to money in Liverpool because D owes C in Liverpool for his shipment of steel rails. A prepares a paper title for the £20,000 that B owes him (that is, a bill of exchange) and sells it to D, getting his £20,000 right there in New York. The process is as follows:
New York, January 1, 1884.
New York, January 1, 1884.
At sight [or sixty days after date] of this first bill of exchange (second and third unpaid), pay to the order of D [the importer of steel rails] £20,000, value received, and charge the same to the account of
Upon presentation [or sixty days after the date] of this first bill of exchange (with the second and third unpaid), pay to the order of D [the importer of steel rails] £20,000, for value received, and charge it to the account of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
[Signed] A [exporter of wheat].
To B [buyer of wheat],
Liverpool, Eng.
[Signed] A [grain exporter].
To B [wheat buyer],
Liverpool, UK.
D has now paid $100,000, or £20,000, to A for a title to money across the Atlantic in Liverpool, and with this title he can pay his debt to C for the rails. D indorses the bill of exchange, as follows:
D has now paid $100,000, or £20,000, to A for a title to money across the Atlantic in Liverpool, and with this title, he can pay his debt to C for the rails. D endorses the bill of exchange as follows:
Pay to the order of C [the seller of steel rails], Liverpool, value in account. D [importer of steel rails].
Pay C [the seller of steel rails] in Liverpool the amount owed. D [importer of steel rails].
To B [the buyer of wheat].
To B [the person buying wheat].
By this means D transfers his title to the £20,000 to C, sends the bill across by mail (“first” in one steamer, “second” in another, to insure certain transmission) to C, who then calls upon B to pay him the £20,000 instead of B sending it across the Atlantic to A; and all four persons have made their payments the more safely by the use of this convenient device. This is the simplest form of the transaction, and it does not change the principle on which it is based, when, as is the case, a banker buys the bills of A, and sells the bills to D—since A typifies all exporters and D all importers.
By this method, D transfers his title to the £20,000 to C, sends the bill through the mail ("first" in one steamer, "second" in another, to ensure reliable delivery) to C, who then asks B to pay him the £20,000 instead of B sending it across the Atlantic to A; and all four parties have completed their transactions more securely using this convenient approach. This is the simplest version of the transaction, and the underlying principle remains unchanged when, as is often the case, a banker purchases A's bills and sells them to D—since A represents all exporters and D represents all importers.
Bills of exchange having been found convenient as means of paying debts at distant places without the expense of transporting the precious metals, their use was afterward greatly extended from another motive. It is usual in every trade to give a certain length of credit for goods bought: three months, six months, a year, even two years, according to the convenience or custom of the particular trade. A dealer who has sold goods, for which he is to be paid in six months, but who desires to receive payment sooner, draws a bill on his debtor payable in six months, and gets the bill discounted by a banker or other money-lender, that is, transfers the bill to him, receiving the amount, minus interest for the time it has still to run. It has become one of the chief functions of bills of exchange to serve as a means by which a debt due from one person can thus be made available for obtaining credit from another.
Bills of exchange have become a convenient way to pay debts in faraway places without the cost of transporting valuable metals, and their use expanded for another reason. In every trade, it's common to offer a certain period of credit for purchased goods: three months, six months, a year, or even two years, depending on what's typical in that trade. A vendor who sells goods with payment due in six months but wants to get paid sooner can draw a bill on their customer payable in six months and have the bill discounted by a bank or another lender. This means they transfer the bill to the lender, receiving the amount minus interest for the time remaining. One of the main purposes of bills of exchange is to allow a debt owed by one person to be used for obtaining credit from another.
The notes given in consequence of a real sale of goods can not be considered as on that account certainly representing any actual property. Suppose that A sells £100 worth of goods to B at six months' credit, and takes a bill at six months for it; and that B, within a month after, sells the same goods, at a like credit, to C, taking a like bill; and again, that C, after another month, sells them to D, taking a like bill, and so on. There may then, at the end of six months, be six bills of £100 each existing at the same time, and every one of these may possibly have been discounted. [pg 331] Of all these bills, then, only one represents any actual property.
The notes issued from a legitimate sale of goods can't be seen as definitely representing any actual property. For example, if A sells £100 worth of goods to B with a six-month credit term and receives a bill due in six months; then, within a month, B sells the same goods on similar credit terms to C, also taking a bill; then C sells them to D with the same arrangement after another month, and so on. At the end of six months, there could be six £100 bills in existence at the same time, and each of these might have been discounted. Of all these bills, only one actually represents any real property. [pg 331]
The extent of a man's actual sales forms some limit to the amount of his real notes; and, as it is highly desirable in commerce that credit should be dealt out to all persons in some sort of regular and due proportion, the measure of a man's actual sales, certified by the appearance of his bills drawn in virtue of those sales, is some rule in the case, though a very imperfect one in many respects. When a bill drawn upon one person is paid to another (or even to the same person) in discharge of a debt or a pecuniary claim, it does something for which, if the bill did not exist, money would be required: it performs the functions of currency. This is a use to which bills of exchange are often applied.
The amount a person actually sells sets a limit on how much credit they can have. Since it's important in business for credit to be distributed fairly, the measure of someone's actual sales, proven by the bills they've drawn from those sales, serves as a guideline, even though it's not perfect in many ways. When a bill drawn on one person is paid to another (or even back to the original person) to settle a debt or financial obligation, it's doing something that would otherwise require cash if the bill didn’t exist: it acts as a form of currency. This is a common use of bills of exchange.
Many bills, both domestic and foreign, are at last presented for payment quite covered with indorsements, each of which represents either a fresh discounting, or a pecuniary transaction in which the bill has performed the functions of money.
Many bills, both local and international, are finally presented for payment, completely covered with endorsements, each representing either a new discount or a financial transaction in which the bill has acted like money.
§ 5. Promissory Notes.
A third form in which credit is employed as a substitute for currency is that of promissory notes.
A third way credit is used as a replacement for currency is through promissory notes.
The difference between a bill of exchange and a promissory note is, that the former is an order for the payment of money, while the latter is a promise to pay money. In a note the promissor is primarily liable; in a bill the drawer becomes liable only after an ineffectual resort to the drawee.
The difference between a bill of exchange and a promissory note is that a bill is an order to pay money, whereas a promissory note is a promise to pay money. In a promissory note, the person making the promise is mainly responsible; in a bill of exchange, the person who created it is responsible only after they've tried and failed to collect from the person who is meant to pay.
In the United States a Western merchant who buys $1,000 worth of cotton goods, for instance, of a Boston commission-house on credit, customarily gives his note for the amount, and this note is put upon the market, or presented at a bank for discount. This plan, however, puts all risk upon the one who discounted the note. In the United States such promissory notes are the forms of credit most used between merchants and buyers. The custom, however, is quite different in England and Germany (and generally, it is stated, on the Continent), where bills of exchange are employed in cases where we use a promissory note. A house in London sells $1,000 worth of cotton goods to A, in Carlisle, on a credit of sixty days, draws a bill of exchange on A, which is a demand upon A to pay in a given time (e.g., sixty days), and if “accepted” by him is a legal obligation. The London house takes this bill (perhaps adding its own [pg 332] firm name as indorsers to the paper), and presents it for discount at a London bank. This now explains why it is that, when a particular industry is prosperous and many goods are sold, there is more “paper” offered for discount at the banks (cf. p. 222), and why capital flows readily in that direction.
In the United States, a Western merchant who purchases $1,000 worth of cotton goods from a Boston commission house on credit usually provides a promissory note for that amount, which is then either placed on the market or taken to a bank for discounting. However, this approach places all the risk on the party that discounted the note. In the U.S., promissory notes are the most common form of credit used between merchants and buyers. This method, however, is quite different in England and Germany (and generally in other parts of the Continent), where bills of exchange are used instead of promissory notes. For example, a London company sells $1,000 worth of cotton goods to A in Carlisle with a sixty-day credit term, draws a bill of exchange on A, which requests A to pay within a set time (e.g., sixty days), and if“accepted”by A, it becomes a legal obligation. The London company then takes this bill (possibly adding its own firm name as endorsers to the document) and presents it for discounting at a London bank. This explains why, when a specific industry is doing well and many goods are sold, there is more“paper”available for discount at the banks (see p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__)222), and why capital moves easily in that direction.
It is chiefly in the latter form [promissory notes] that it has become, in commercial countries, an express occupation to issue such substitutes for money. Dealers in money wish to lend, not their capital merely, but their credit, and not only such portion of their credit as consists of funds actually deposited with them, but their power of obtaining credit from the public generally, so far as they think they can safely employ it. This is done in a very convenient manner by lending their own promissory notes payable to bearer on demand—the borrower being willing to accept these as so much money, because the credit of the lender makes other people willingly receive them on the same footing, in purchases or other payments. These notes, therefore, perform all the functions of currency, and render an equivalent amount of money, which was previously in circulation, unnecessary. As, however, being payable on demand, they may be at any time returned on the issuer, and money demanded for them, he must, on pain of bankruptcy, keep by him as much money as will enable him to meet any claims of that sort which can be expected to occur within the time necessary for providing himself with more; and prudence also requires that he should not attempt to issue notes beyond the amount which experience shows can remain in circulation without being presented for payment.
It’s mainly in the latter form [promissory notes] that it has become a common practice in commercial countries to issue such substitutes for cash. Money dealers want to lend not just their capital, but also their credit—not only the portion of their credit that comes from actual funds they have, but their ability to obtain credit from the public at large, as much as they feel they can safely use. They do this conveniently by lending their own promissory notes, which are payable on demand to the bearer—the borrower is willing to accept these as money because the lender's credit makes others willing to accept them in the same way for purchases or other payments. Therefore, these notes serve all the functions of currency, making an equivalent amount of cash previously in circulation unnecessary. However, since they are payable on demand, they can be returned to the issuer at any time, and cash demanded for them, so the issuer must keep enough cash on hand to cover any claims that can be expected within the time it would take to get more. Additionally, common sense dictates that he should not try to issue notes beyond the amount that experience shows can stay in circulation without being presented for payment.
The convenience of this mode of (as it were) coining credit having once been discovered, governments have availed themselves of the same expedient, and have issued their own promissory notes in payment of their expenses; a resource the more useful, because it is the only mode in which they are able to borrow money without paying interest.
The convenience of this way of essentially creating credit, once discovered, led governments to use the same method and issue their own promissory notes to cover their expenses; a resource that is particularly useful, as it’s the only way they can borrow money without having to pay interest.
§ 6. Deposits and Checks.
A fourth mode of making credit answer the purposes of money, by which, when carried far enough, money [pg 333] may be very completely superseded, consists in making payments by checks. The custom of keeping the spare cash reserved for immediate use, or against contingent demands, in the hands of a banker, and making all payments, except small ones, by orders on bankers, is in this country spreading to a continually larger portion of the public. If the person making the payment and the person receiving it keep their money with the same banker, the payment takes place without any intervention of money, by the mere transfer of its amount in the banker's books from the credit of the payer to that of the receiver. If all persons in [New York] kept their cash at the same banker's, and made all their payments by means of checks, no money would be required or used for any transactions beginning and terminating in [New York]. This ideal limit is almost attained, in fact, so far as regards transactions between [wholesale] dealers. It is chiefly in the retail transactions between dealers and consumers, and in the payment of wages, that money or bank-notes now pass, and then only when the amounts are small. As for the merchants and larger dealers, they habitually make all payments in the course of their business by checks. They do not, however, all deal with the same banker, and, when A gives a check to B, B usually pays it not into the same but into some other bank. But the convenience of business has given birth to an arrangement which makes all the banking-houses of [a] city, for certain purposes, virtually one establishment. A banker does not send the checks which are paid into his banking-house to the banks on which they are drawn, and demand money for them. There is a building called the Clearing-House, to which every [member of the association] sends, each afternoon, all the checks on other bankers which he has received during the day, and they are there exchanged for the checks on him which have come into the hands of other bankers, the balances only being paid in money; or even these not in money, but in checks.
A fourth way to use credit like money, to the extent that money might be completely replaced, is by making payments through checks. The practice of keeping extra cash available for immediate needs or unexpected expenses with a banker, while making most payments, except for small ones, by issuing orders to banks, is becoming more common among the public in this country. If both the person making the payment and the person receiving it have their funds with the same bank, the payment occurs without the exchange of physical money, just by transferring the amount in the bank's records from the payer's account to the receiver's. If everyone in [New York] kept their money in the same bank and paid through checks, there would be no need for cash in any transactions that start and end in [New York]. This ideal state is nearly achieved, especially in transactions among [wholesale] traders. Money or banknotes mainly circulate in retail transactions between sellers and consumers, and typically only when the amounts are small. However, merchants and larger dealers usually make all their business payments with checks. They don’t all use the same bank, so when A writes a check to B, B often deposits it into a different bank. Nonetheless, to simplify business, an arrangement has been created that essentially makes all the banks in [a] city function as one for certain purposes. A banker doesn’t send the checks deposited at his bank to the banks they are drawn on to collect money. Instead, there is a place called the Clearing-House, where each member sends all checks received from other banks every afternoon, and they exchange these for checks on themselves that have been deposited by other banks, with only the balances being settled in cash; or sometimes even those are settled with checks.
A clearing-house is simply a circular railing containing as many openings as there are banks in the association; a clerk [pg 334] from each bank presents, in the form of a bundle of checks, at his opening, all the claims of his bank against all others, and notes the total amount; a clerk inside takes the checks, distributes each check to the clerk of the bank against whom it is drawn, and all that are left at his opening constitute the total demands of all the other banks against itself; and this sum total is set off against the given bank's demands upon the others. The difference, for or against the bank, as the case may be, may then be settled by a check.241
A clearing house is basically a circular rail with openings for each bank in the association. A clerk from each bank presents a bundle of checks at their opening, which represents all the claims their bank has against the others, and notes the total amount. A clerk inside collects the checks, hands each one to the clerk of the bank it’s drawn against, and all the checks that remain at their opening represent the total claims of all the other banks against that bank. This total is then balanced against the claims that bank has on the others. The difference, whether it’s in favor of or against the bank, can then be settled with a check.[pg 334]
The total amount of exchanges made through the New York Clearing-House in 1883 was $40,293,165,258 (or about twenty-five times the total of our national debt in that year), and the balances paid in money were only 3.9 per cent of the exchanges.242 For valuable explanations on this subject, consult Jevons, “Money and the Mechanism of Exchange,” Chapters XIX-XXIII. The explanation of the functions of a bank, Chapter XX, is very good.
In 1883, the total value of transactions processed through the New York Clearing House was $40,293,165,258 (roughly twenty-five times the national debt at that time), and the cash balances paid represented only 3.9 percent of the transactions.242For valuable insights on this topic, check out Jevons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“Money and the Exchange Process,”Chapters XIX-XXIII. The explanation of a bank's functions in Chapter XX is especially well done.
Chapter 9. The Impact of Credit on Prices.
§ 1. Credit, in any form, affects prices.
Having now formed a general idea of the modes in which credit is made available as a substitute for money, we have to consider in what manner the use of these substitutes affects the value of money, or, what is equivalent, the prices of commodities. It is hardly necessary to say that the permanent value of money—the natural and average prices of commodities—are not in question here. These are determined by the cost of producing or of obtaining the precious metals. An ounce of gold or silver will in the long run exchange for as much of every other commodity as can be produced or imported at the same cost with itself. And an order, or note of hand, or bill payable at sight, for an ounce of gold, while the credit of the giver is unimpaired, is worth neither more nor less than the gold itself.
Having now formed a general understanding of how credit can be used as a substitute for money, we need to look at how using these substitutes impacts the value of money, or, in other words, the prices of goods. It's not necessary to mention that the long-term value of money—the natural and average prices of goods—isn't what we're discussing here. These values are determined by the cost of producing or obtaining precious metals. An ounce of gold or silver will, over time, trade for the same amount of any other item that can be produced or imported at the same cost as itself. And a promise, a note, or a bill payable on demand for an ounce of gold, as long as the issuer's credit is intact, is worth exactly the same as the gold itself.
It is not, however, with ultimate or average, but with immediate and temporary prices that we are now concerned. These, as we have seen, may deviate very widely from the standard of cost of production. Among other causes of fluctuation, one we have found to be the quantity of money in circulation. Other things being the same, an increase of the money in circulation raises prices; a diminution lowers them. If more money is thrown into circulation than the quantity which can circulate at a value conformable to its cost of production, the value of money, so long as the excess lasts, will remain below the standard of cost of production, and general prices will be sustained above the natural rate.
It is not with ultimate or average prices that we are concerned, but rather with immediate and temporary prices. As we've seen, these can vary significantly from the standard cost of production. One of the factors causing fluctuations is the amount of money in circulation. When everything else is equal, an increase in the money supply raises prices, while a decrease lowers them. If more money is introduced into circulation than what can circulate at a value that aligns with its cost of production, the value of money, as long as the surplus exists, will stay below the standard cost of production, and overall prices will remain above the natural rate.
But we have now found that there are other things, such [pg 336] as bank-notes, bills of exchange, and checks, which circulate as money, and perform all the functions of it, and the question arises, Do these various substitutes operate on prices in the same manner as money itself? I apprehend that bank-notes, bills, or checks, as such, do not act on prices at all. What does act on prices is Credit, in whatever shape given, and whether it gives rise to any transferable instruments capable of passing into circulation or not.
But we've now discovered that there are other things, such as bank notes, bills of exchange, and checks, that circulate like money and fulfill all its functions. This raises the question: do these various substitutes affect prices in the same way that money does? I believe that bank notes, bills, or checks, in themselves, do not influence prices at all. What actually affects prices is Credit, in whatever form it takes, whether or not it results in transferable instruments that can circulate.
§ 2. Credit is a purchasing power, similar to money.
Money acts upon prices in no other way than by being tendered in exchange for commodities. The demand which influences the prices of commodities consists of the money offered for them. Money not in circulation has no effect on prices.
Money affects prices only by being offered in exchange for goods. The demand that influences the prices of goods comes from the money that people are willing to pay for them. Money that isn't in circulation has no impact on prices.
In the case, however, of payment by checks, the purchases are, at any rate, made, though not with the money in the buyer's possession, yet with money to which he has a right. But he may make purchases with money which he only expects to have, or even only pretends to expect. He may obtain goods in return for his acceptances payable at a future time, or on his note of hand, or on a simple book-credit—that is, on a mere promise to pay. All these purchases have exactly the same effect on price as if they were made with ready money. The amount of purchasing power which a person can exercise is composed of all the money in his possession or due to him, and of all his credit. For exercising the whole of this power he finds a sufficient motive only under peculiar circumstances, but he always possesses it; and the portion of it which he at any time does exercise is the measure of the effect which he produces on price.
In the case of paying with checks, purchases are still made even if the buyer doesn’t physically have the money on hand but has a right to it. A buyer can make purchases with money they expect to have or even claim to expect. They can get goods in exchange for notes that are payable in the future, or on a promissory note, or just based on a simple account credit—that is, a mere promise to pay. All these purchases affect prices just like if they were made with cash. The total purchasing power available to a person includes all the cash they have or are owed, plus any credit they have. A person may have sufficient motivation to use their full purchasing power only in specific situations, but they always have that power; and the amount they do use at any time is what measures their impact on price.
Suppose that, in the expectation that some commodity will rise in price, he determines not only to invest in it all his ready money, but to take up on credit, from the producers or importers, as much of it as their opinion of his resources will enable him to obtain. Every one must see that by thus acting he produces a greater effect on price than if he limited his purchases to the money he has actually [pg 337] in hand. He creates a demand for the article to the full amount of his money and credit taken together, and raises the price proportionally to both. And this effect is produced, though none of the written instruments called substitutes for currency may be called into existence; though the transaction may give rise to no bill of exchange, nor to the issue of a single bank-note. The buyer, instead of taking a mere book-credit, might have given a bill for the amount, or might have paid for the goods with bank-notes borrowed for that purpose from a banker, thus making the purchase not on his own credit with the seller, but on the banker's credit with the seller, and his own with the banker. Had he done so, he would have produced as great an effect on price as by a simple purchase to the same amount on a book-credit, but no greater effect. The credit itself, not the form and mode in which it is given, is the operating cause.
Imagine that, anticipating a price increase for a certain product, he decides to invest all his available cash and also borrow on credit from producers or importers, as much as they believe he can handle. It's clear that by doing this, he has a larger impact on the price than if he only bought what he could afford with his own cash. He creates demand for the product equal to the total of his money and credit combined, which raises the price in proportion to both. This effect happens even if no written agreements, known as substitutes for currency, are created; the transaction doesn't have to result in any bills of exchange or banknotes being issued. Instead of just using a book credit, the buyer could have issued a bill for the total amount, or paid for the goods with banknotes obtained through a loan from a banker, which would make the purchase reliant on the banker's credit with the seller, rather than just his own credit with the seller. If he had done that, he would have had the same effect on the price as making a straightforward purchase for the same amount using book credit, but no greater impact. It's the credit itself, not how it’s given, that drives the effect.
§ 3. Significant increases and decreases in credit. Analyzing the effects of a commercial crisis.
The inclination of the mercantile public to increase their demand for commodities by making use of all or much of their credit as a purchasing power depends on their expectation of profit. When there is a general impression that the price of some commodity is likely to rise from an extra demand, a short crop, obstructions to importation, or any other cause, there is a disposition among dealers to increase their stocks in order to profit by the expected rise. This disposition tends in itself to produce the effect which it looks forward to—a rise of price; and, if the rise is considerable and progressive, other speculators are attracted, who, so long as the price has not begun to fall, are willing to believe that it will continue rising. These, by further purchases, produce a further advance, and thus a rise of price, for which there were originally some rational grounds, is often heightened by merely speculative purchases, until it greatly exceeds what the original grounds will justify. After a time this begins to be perceived, the price ceases to rise, and the holders, thinking it time to realize their gains, are anxious to sell. Then the price begins to decline, the holders rush into the market to avoid a still greater loss, and, [pg 338] few being willing to buy in a falling market, the price falls much more suddenly than it rose. Those who have bought at a higher price than reasonable calculation justified, and who have been overtaken by the revulsion before they had realized, are losers in proportion to the greatness of the fall and to the quantity of the commodity which they hold, or have bound themselves to pay for.
The tendency of the business public to increase their demand for goods by using all or most of their credit as buying power relies on their expectation of profit. When there's a general belief that the price of a certain commodity is likely to rise due to extra demand, a poor harvest, import restrictions, or any other reason, dealers tend to stock up to take advantage of the anticipated increase. This behavior itself can lead to the outcome they expect—a price increase; and if the rise is significant and continuous, it attracts other speculators who, as long as prices haven't started to drop, are eager to believe that they will keep going up. Their further purchases drive the price up even more, and thus a price increase that originally had some logical basis can be inflated by mere speculative buying until it far exceeds what the initial rationale could support. Eventually, this becomes apparent, the price levels off, and the holders, wanting to cash in on their profits, become eager to sell. Consequently, the price starts to drop, and the holders rush into the market to prevent even larger losses. With few buyers in a declining market, the price falls much more rapidly than it rose. Those who bought at a higher price than what was justified by reasonable calculations and were caught by the downturn before they could sell end up losing in proportion to the size of the decline and the amount of the commodity they hold or have committed to buy.
This is the ideal extreme case of what is called a commercial crisis. There is said to be a commercial crisis when a great number of merchants and traders at once either have, or apprehend that they shall have, a difficulty in meeting their engagements. The most usual cause of this general embarrassment is the recoil of prices after they have been raised by a spirit of speculation, intense in degree, and extending to many commodities. When, after such a rise, the reaction comes and prices begin to fall, though at first perhaps only through the desire of the holders to realize, speculative purchases cease; but, were this all, prices would only fall to the level from which they rose, or to that which is justified by the state of the consumption and of the supply. They fall, however, much lower; for as, when prices were rising, and everybody apparently making a fortune, it was easy to obtain almost any amount of credit, so now, when everybody seems to be losing, and many fail entirely, it is with difficulty that firms of known solidity can obtain even the credit to which they are accustomed, and which it is the greatest inconvenience to them to be without, because all dealers have engagements to fulfill, and, nobody feeling sure that the portion of his means which he has intrusted to others will be available in time, no one likes to part with ready money, or to postpone his claim to it. To these rational considerations there is superadded, in extreme cases, a panic as unreasoning as the previous over-confidence; money is borrowed for short periods at almost any rate of interest, and sales of goods for immediate payment are made at almost any sacrifice. Thus general prices, during a commercial revulsion, fall as much below the usual level as [pg 339] during the previous period of speculation they have risen above it; the fall, as well as the rise, originating not in anything affecting money, but in the state of credit.
This is the perfect example of what we call a commercial crisis. A commercial crisis occurs when a large number of businesses and traders suddenly find themselves having, or fearing they will have, trouble meeting their obligations. The most common reason for this widespread trouble is the drop in prices after they have been inflated by intense speculation that extends to many goods. When this inflation peaks and prices start to drop, it might begin with sellers wanting to cash in, and speculative buying stops. However, if that were all that happened, prices would only fall back to where they started or to a level that reflects the current state of demand and supply. Instead, prices drop much lower; when prices were rising, it was easy to get almost any amount of credit, but now, with many people losing money and some going bankrupt, even well-established firms struggle to get the credit they usually rely on, which is particularly inconvenient since all dealers have commitments to meet. Everyone is uncertain about whether they can access the funds they’ve entrusted to others, so no one wants to spend cash or delay their claims on it. On top of these logical concerns, in extreme cases, a panic sets in that is just as irrational as the earlier overconfidence. Money is borrowed for short terms at almost any interest rate, and goods are sold for immediate payment at significant losses. As a result, general prices during a commercial downturn fall as much below the usual level as they rose above it during the previous speculative period; both the fall and the rise stem not from anything related to money itself, but from the state of credit.
Professor Jevons seriously advanced a theory that, inasmuch as the harvests of the world were the causes of good or bad trade, and that their deficiency would regularly be followed by commercial distress, then a periodic cause of bad harvests, if found, would explain the constant recurrence of commercial crises. This cause he claimed to have found in the sun-spots, which periodically deprive the crops of that source of growth which is usually furnished by the sun when no spots appear.243 It has not received general acceptance.
Professor Jevons proposed a serious theory that because global harvests affect trade positively or negatively, and poor harvests usually lead to economic issues, pinpointing a consistent cause of bad harvests could help explain the frequent financial crises. He claimed that this cause was related to sunspots, which intermittently block the sunlight that crops need for growth when no spots are present.243It hasn’t been widely accepted.
In the United States financial disasters have occurred in 1814, 1819, 1825, 1837-1839, 1857, and 1873. Those of 1837 and 1873 seem to have been the most serious in their effects; but this field, so far as scientific study is concerned, has not been fully worked, and much remains to be learned about these crises in the United States. The crisis of 1873 was due to excessive railway-building. It was testified244 concerning the New York banks in 1873 that “their capital needed for legitimate purposes was practically lent out on certain iron rails, railroad-ties, bridges, and rolling-stock, called railroads, many of them laid down in places where these materials were practically useless.”
In the United States, financial disasters occurred in 1814, 1819, 1825, 1837-1839, 1857, and 1873. The crises of 1837 and 1873 appeared to have the most significant effects; however, this topic hasn’t been deeply researched scientifically, and there’s still much to discover about these crises in the U.S. The crisis of 1873 was triggered by excessive railway construction. It was reported244concerning the New York banks in 1873 that“the capital they needed for legitimate purposes was mostly invested in specific iron rails, railroad ties, bridges, and train cars, called railroads, many of which were constructed in places where these materials were pretty much useless.”
Under the effects due to swift communication by steam, but especially to the electric telegraph, modern credit is a very different thing from what it was fifty years ago. Now, a shock on the Bourse at Vienna is felt the same day at Paris, London, and New York. A commercial crisis in one great money-center is felt at every other point in the world which has business connections with it. Moreover, as Cherbuliez245 says: “A country is more subject to crises the more advanced is its economical development. There are certain maladies which attack only grown-up persons who have reached a certain degree of vigor and maturity.”
Thanks to quick communication via steam and especially the electric telegraph, modern credit is much different from what it was fifty years ago. Now, a shock in the stock market in Vienna is felt the same day in Paris, London, and New York. A financial crisis in one major financial hub impacts every other place in the world connected to it. Furthermore, as Cherbuliez245says:“A country is more likely to face crises the more developed its economy is. There are specific issues that only impact adults who have attained a certain degree of strength and maturity.”
§ 4. Impact of Different Types of Credit on Prices.
It does not, indeed, follow that credit will be more used because it can be. When the state of trade holds out no particular temptation to make large purchases on credit, dealers will use only a small portion of the credit-power, and it will depend only on convenience whether the portion [pg 340] which they use will be taken in one form or in another. One single exertion of the credit-power in the form of (1) book-credit, is only the foundation of a single purchase; but, if (2) a bill is drawn, that same portion of credit may serve for as many purchases as the number of times the bill changes hands; while (3) every bank-note issued renders the credit of the banker a purchasing power to that amount in the hands of all the successive holders, without impairing any power they may possess of effecting purchases on their own credit. Credit, in short, has exactly the same purchasing power with money; and as money tells upon prices not simply in proportion to its amount, but to its amount multiplied by the number of times it changes hands, so also does credit; and credit transferable from hand to hand is in that proportion more potent than credit which only performs one purchase.
It doesn’t necessarily mean that credit will be used more just because it can be. When the state of trade doesn’t encourage making large purchases on credit, sellers will use only a small portion of their credit capacity, and it will depend on convenience whether what they use takes one form or another. A single use of credit, like (1) book credit, is just the basis for one purchase; however, if (2) a bill is drawn, the same amount of credit can facilitate multiple purchases, depending on how many times the bill changes hands. Additionally, (3) every banknote issued gives the banker's credit a purchasing power equal to that amount in the hands of all the subsequent holders, without diminishing their ability to make purchases on their own credit. In short, credit has the same purchasing power as money; and just like money affects prices not only based on its amount but also on how many times it changes hands, so does credit; and credit that can be transferred from person to person is significantly more powerful than credit that is only used for a single purchase.
There is a form of credit transactions (4) by checks on bankers, and transfers in a banker's books, which is exactly parallel in every respect to bank-notes, giving equal facilities to an extension of credit, and capable of acting on prices quite as powerfully. A bank, instead of lending its notes to a merchant or dealer, might open an account with him, and credit the account with the sum it had agreed to advance, on an understanding that he should not draw out that sum in any other mode than by drawing checks against it in favor of those to whom he had occasion to make payments. These checks might possibly even pass from hand to hand like bank-notes; more commonly, however, the receiver would pay them into the hands of his own banker, and when he wanted the money would draw a fresh check against it; and hence an objector may urge that as the original check would very soon be presented for payment, when it must be paid either in notes or in coin, notes or coin to an equal amount must be provided as the ultimate means of liquidation. It is not so, however. The person to whom the check is transferred may perhaps deal with the same banker, and the check may return to the very bank on which it was drawn.
There’s a type of credit transaction (4) involving checks on bankers and transfers recorded in a banker's accounts that is exactly like banknotes, offering the same opportunities for extending credit and influencing prices just as strongly. Instead of lending notes to a merchant or dealer, a bank could open an account for them and deposit the amount they agreed to lend, on the condition that the merchant would only withdraw that amount by writing checks to pay others. These checks might even circulate like banknotes; however, more often than not, the recipient would deposit them into their own bank and, when they needed cash, would write a new check against that amount. An objector might argue that since the original check would soon be presented for payment, it must be cashed in either notes or coins, and therefore, there must be an equivalent amount of notes or coins available for settlement. However, that’s not the case. The person receiving the check might be dealing with the same bank, and the check could end up back at the very bank it was drawn on.
This is very often the case in country districts; if so, no payment will be called for, but a simple transfer in the banker's books will settle the transaction. If the check is paid into a different bank, it will not be presented for payment, but liquidated by set-off against other checks; and, in a state of circumstances favorable to a general extension of banking credits, a banker who has granted more credit, and has therefore more checks drawn on him, will also have more checks on other bankers paid to him, and will only have to provide notes or cash for the payment of balances; for which purpose the ordinary reserve of prudent bankers, one third of their liabilities, will abundantly suffice.
This is often the case in rural areas; if that's true, no payment will be required, and a simple transfer in the bank's records will complete the transaction. If the check is deposited in a different bank, it won't be presented for payment but will be settled by offsetting it against other checks. In a situation where there's a favorable environment for expanding banking credits, a banker who has issued more credit and therefore has more checks written against them will also receive more checks from other banks. They will only need to provide notes or cash for managing the balances. For this, the typical reserve maintained by careful bankers, which is one-third of their liabilities, will be more than enough.
§ 5. What the Use of Credit Depends On.
The credit given to any one by those with whom he deals does not depend on the quantity of bank-notes or coin in circulation at the time, but on their opinion of his solvency. If any consideration of a more general character enters into their calculation, it is only in a time of pressure on the loan market, when they are not certain of being themselves able to obtain the credit on which they have been accustomed to rely; and even then, what they look to is the general state of the loan market, and not (preconceived theory apart) the amount of bank-notes. So far, as to the willingness to give credit. And the willingness of a dealer to use his credit depends on his expectations of gain, that is, on his opinion of the probable future price of his commodity; an opinion grounded either on the rise or fall already going on, or on his prospective judgment respecting the supply and the rate of consumption. When a dealer extends his purchases beyond his immediate means of payment, engaging to pay at a specified time, he does so in the expectation either that the transaction will have terminated favorably before that time arrives, or that he shall then be in possession of sufficient funds from the proceeds of his other transactions. The fulfillment of these expectations depends upon prices, but not specially upon the amount of bank-notes. It is obvious, however, that prices do not depend on money, but on purchases. Money left with a banker, and not drawn [pg 342] against, or drawn against for other purposes than buying commodities, has no effect on prices, any more than credit which is not used. Credit which is used to purchase commodities affects prices in the same manner as money. Money and credit are thus exactly on a par in their effect on prices.
The trust that people have in someone they do business with doesn't rely on the amount of cash or coins available at that moment, but on their assessment of that person's financial stability. If they consider broader factors, it's usually during a tight lending period when they're unsure if they can get the credit they usually depend on; even then, they focus on the overall health of the lending market, not just the quantity of cash. This covers their willingness to expand credit. A seller's willingness to use their credit relies on their expectations of profit, which are based on their beliefs about future prices of their goods; these beliefs could be informed by current price trends or their outlook on supply and consumption rates. When a seller makes purchases beyond their immediate financial means, agreeing to pay at a later date, they do so hoping that either the deal will turn out well before that date, or that they’ll have enough funds from other transactions by then. The realization of these expectations depends on prices, but not specifically on the amount of cash available. It’s clear, though, that prices aren't determined by money alone, but by the volume of purchases. Money that’s kept in the bank and not withdrawn for buying goods doesn't impact prices, just like unused credit doesn't. However, credit that is used to buy goods influences prices in the same way that money does. Therefore, money and credit have an equal effect on prices.
§ 6. What is essential to the concept of Money?
There has been a great amount of discussion and argument on the question whether several of these forms of credit, and in particular whether bank-notes, ought to be considered as money. It seems to be an essential part of the idea of money that it be legal tender. An inconvertible paper which is legal tender is universally admitted to be money; in the French language the phrase papier-monnaie actually means inconvertibility, convertible notes being merely billets à porteur. An instrument which would be deprived of all value by the insolvency of a corporation can not be money in any sense in which money is opposed to credit. It either is not money, or it is money and credit too.
There has been a lot of discussion and debate about whether several types of credit, especially banknotes, should be considered money. It's essential to understand that money is supposed to be legal tender. An inconvertible paper that is legal tender is generally accepted as money; in French, the term paper money actually means inconvertibility, while convertible notes are simply bearer bonds. An instrument that loses all value if a corporation becomes insolvent cannot be considered money in the same way that money is distinct from credit. It either isn’t money, or it is both money and credit.
Chapter X. On a Non-Convertible Paper Currency.
§ 1. What factors determine the value of paper money that can't be exchanged for something else?
After experience had shown that pieces of paper, of no intrinsic value, by merely bearing upon them the written profession of being equivalent to a certain number of francs, dollars, or pounds, could be made to circulate as such, and to produce all the benefit to the issuers which could have been produced by the coins which they purported to represent, governments began to think that it would be a happy device if they could appropriate to themselves this benefit, free from the condition to which individuals issuing such paper substitutes for money were subject, of giving, when required, for the sign, the thing signified. They determined to try whether they could not emancipate themselves from this unpleasant obligation, and make a piece of paper issued by them pass for a pound, by merely calling it a pound, and consenting to receive it in payment of the taxes.
After experience showed that pieces of paper, which have no real value, could circulate and be used just like a certain amount of francs, dollars, or pounds simply by stating that they were equivalent to those amounts, governments started to think it would be a great idea if they could take advantage of this benefit. They wanted to do this without the requirement that individuals had when they issued such paper money, which was to provide the actual value behind the note when asked. They decided to see if they could free themselves from this inconvenient obligation and make a piece of paper issued by them be accepted as a pound just by calling it a pound and agreeing to accept it as payment for taxes.
In the case supposed, the functions of money are performed by a thing which derives its power of performing them solely from convention; but convention is quite sufficient to confer the power; since nothing more is needful to make a person accept anything as money, and even at any arbitrary value, than the persuasion that it will be taken from him on the same terms by others. The only question is, what determines the value of such a currency, since it can not be, as in the case of gold and silver (or paper exchangeable for them at pleasure), the cost of production.
In the hypothetical situation, the roles of money are carried out by something that gains its ability to do so purely through agreement; however, this agreement is enough to give it that ability. All that’s required for someone to accept anything as money, even at any made-up value, is the belief that others will also accept it under the same conditions. The only thing to consider is what establishes the value of such a currency, since it can't be, like with gold and silver (or paper that can be exchanged for gold and silver whenever desired), the cost of production.
We have seen, however, that even in the case of metallic currency, the immediate agency in determining its value is its quantity. If the quantity, instead of depending on the ordinary mercantile motives of profit and loss, could be arbitrarily fixed by authority, the value would depend on the fiat of that authority, not on cost of production. The quantity of a paper currency not convertible into the metals at the option of the holder can be arbitrarily fixed, especially if the issuer is the sovereign power of the state. The value, therefore, of such a currency is entirely arbitrary.
We have observed, however, that even in the case of metallic currency, its value is primarily determined by its quantity. If the amount, rather than being influenced by the usual business motivations of profit and loss, could be set arbitrarily by an authority, then its value would rely on that authority's decree, not on production costs. The amount of a paper currency that cannot be exchanged for metals at the holder's discretion can be set arbitrarily, especially if the issuer is the sovereign power of the state. Therefore, the value of this kind of currency is completely arbitrary.
The value of paper money is, of course, primarily and mainly dependent on the quantity issued. The general level of value depends on the quantity; but we also find that deviations from this general level, in the direction of further depreciation than could be due to quantity alone, is caused by any event which shakes the confidence of any one that he may get the existing value for his paper. The “convention” by which real value (the essential idea of money) was associated with this paper in the minds of all is thereby broken. Fiat money—that is, a piece of paper, not containing a promise to pay a dollar, but a simple declaration that this is a dollar—therefore, separates the paper from any connection with value. And yet we see that fiat money has some, although a fluctuating, value at certain times: if the State receives it for taxes, if it is a legal acquittal of obligations, then, to that extent, a certain quantity of it is given a value equal to the wealth represented by the taxes, or the debts. Jevons remarks on this point247 that, if “the quantity of notes issued was kept within such moderate limits that any one wishing to realize the metallic value of the notes could find some one wanting to pay taxes, and therefore willing to give coin for notes,” stability of value might be secured. If there is more in circulation than performs these functions, it will depreciate in the proportion of the quantity to the extent of the uses assigned to it; so that the relation of quantity to uses is the only thing which can give value to fiat money, but beyond a certain point in the issues other forces than mere quantity begin to affect the value. Although the paper is not even a promise to pay value, the form of expression on its face, or the term used as its designation, generally tends, under the force of convention and habit, to give a popular value to paper.
The value of paper money mainly relies on how much of it is in circulation. The overall value level is determined by the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.amount; however, we also see that any significant drop in value beyond what’s caused by the quantity itself comes from events that shake people's confidence in receiving its current value for their paper. The“convention”The connection between real value (the core concept of money) and this paper in everyone's mind is now disrupted.Moneymoney—essentially a piece of paper that doesn't guarantee a dollar but only asserts that this represents a dollar—thus separates the paper from any actual value connection. Still, we notice thatmoneyMoney can sometimes fluctuate in value: if the government accepts it for taxes or it acts as a legal way to settle debts, then, to that extent, a certain amount of it gains value equal to the wealth represented by those taxes or debts. Jevons observes that, if“the number of notes issued was kept at a reasonable level, ensuring that anyone who wanted to exchange notes for their metal value could find someone willing to pay taxes and therefore trade coins for notes,”the stability of value can be maintained. If there is more money in circulation than necessary for these purposes, it will decrease in value accordingly to theamountin relation to its designated purposes; therefore, the connection between quantity and uses is the only factor that can determine value formoneyMoney, but beyond a certain amount in circulation, other factors beyond just quantity begin to affect its value. While the paper isn't even a guarantee to pay value, the wording on it or the term used tends, through convention and habit, to give the paper a widely accepted value.
Although the State may not promise to pay a dollar, yet, wherever such paper money carries any purchasing power with it (which has very seldom happened, and then only for short periods), it will be found that there is a vague popular understanding that the State intends, at some time or other, to redeem the notes with value in coin to some amount. In the early cases of irredeemable money in our colonies, the income of taxes, or similar resources, were promised as a means of redemption. To some—although a slight—extent, the idea of value was associated with such paper. The actual quantity issued did not measure the depreciation. The paper did depreciate with increased issues. But only in so far as the increased issues proved to the community that there was less and less possibility of ever receiving value for them did they depreciate. In other words, we come to the familiar experience, known to many, of a paper money depending for its value on the opinions of men in the country. This was partially true, even of our own greenbacks, which were not fiat money, but promises to pay (although not then redeemable), as may be seen by the movement of the line in Chart XII (p. 359), which represents the fluctuations of our paper money during the civil war. The upward movement of the line, which indicates the premium on gold during our late war, of course represents correspondingly the depreciation of the paper. Every victory or defeat of the Union arms raised or lowered the premium on gold; it was the register of the opinion of the people as to the value to be associated with the paper. The second and third resorts to issues of greenbacks were regarded as confessions of financial distress; it was this which produced the effect on their value. It was not only the quantity but also that which caused the issue of the quantity. It is, of course, clear that the value of a paper money like the greenbacks, which were the promises to pay of a rich country, would bear a definite relation to the actual quantity issued; and this is to be seen by the generally higher level of the line on the chart, showing a steadily diminishing purchasing power as the issues increased. But the thing which weighed largely in people's minds was the possibility of ultimate redemption; and the premium on gold was practically a register of the “betting” on this possibility. In 1878, when Secretary Sherman's reserve was seen to be increasing to an effective amount, and when it became evident that he would have the means (i.e., the value represented by all the paper that was likely to be presented) to resume on the day set, January 1, 1879, the premium gradually faded away. The general shifting of the level to a lower stage in this later period was not due to any decrease in the quantity outstanding, because the contraction had been stopped in 1868, and that consequent on the resumption act in May, 1878.
Although the government doesn’t guarantee a specific amount, whenever paper money has any purchasing power—which is uncommon and usually lasts only a short time—there's a general belief that the government intends to redeem the notes for some value in coins at some point. In the early days of non-redeemable money in our colonies, tax revenue or similar resources were promised as a way to support the currency. To some extent, people connected this paper with value. The amount issued didn’t dictate its depreciation. The paper did lose value as more was issued, but this only happened as the community realized that their chances of getting value in exchange were diminishing. In other words, we see the familiar idea that paper money depends on people's perceptions. This was somewhat true even for our greenbacks, which weren’t strictly fiat money but rather promises to pay (though not redeemable at the time), as seen inChart 12(p.359This chart shows the changes in our paper money during the Civil War. The rising line represents the premium on gold at that time, indicating the decline in the value of paper money. Each Union victory or defeat affected the premium on gold, reflecting public opinion about the value of the paper. The second and third issues of greenbacks were viewed as signs of financial difficulties, influencing how much they were valued. It wasn’t just the amount issued that mattered, but also the reasons behind the issuance. Clearly, the value of a paper currency like greenbacks, supported by a prosperous nation, would be directly related to the amount issued, as demonstrated by the generally higher line on the chart, which illustrates a steady decline in purchasing power as the amounts increased. However, what worried people most was the possibility of future redemption; the gold premium acted as a measure of this “bet” on that chance. In 1878, when Secretary Sherman’s reserves started to rise significantly, and it became evident he would have the necessary means (i.e., the value of all the paper likely to be presented) to resume on the planned date, January 1, 1879, the premium slowly decreased. The overall decline in this later period wasn't due to a reduction in the amount of currency in circulation since the contraction had halted in 1868, after the resumption act in May 1878.
Suppose that, in a country of which the currency is wholly metallic, a paper currency is suddenly issued, to the amount of half the metallic circulation; not by a banking establishment, or in the form of loans, but by the Government, in payment of salaries and purchase of commodities. The currency being suddenly increased by one half, all prices will rise, and, among the rest, the prices of all things made of gold and silver. An ounce of manufactured gold will become more valuable than an ounce of gold coin, by more than that customary difference which compensates for the value of the workmanship; and it will be profitable to melt the coin for the purpose of being manufactured, until as much has been taken from the currency by the subtraction of gold as had been added to it by the issue of paper. Then prices will relapse to what they were at first, and there will be nothing changed, except that a paper currency has been substituted for half of the metallic currency which existed before. Suppose, now, a second emission of paper; the same series of effects will be renewed; and so on, until the whole of the metallic money has disappeared [see Chart No. XIV, Chap. XV, for the exportation of gold from the United States after the issue of our paper money in 1862]: that is, if paper be issued of as low a denomination as the lowest coin; if not, as much will remain as convenience requires for the smaller payments. The addition made to the quantity of gold and silver disposable for ornamental purposes will somewhat reduce, for a time, the value of the article; and as long as this is the case, even though paper has been issued to the original amount of the metallic circulation, as much coin will remain in circulation along with it as will keep the value of the currency down to the reduced value of the metallic material; but the value having fallen below the cost of production, a stoppage or diminution of the supply from the mines will enable the surplus to be carried off by the ordinary agents of destruction, after which the metals and the currency will recover their natural value. We are here supposing, as we [pg 348] have supposed throughout, that the country has mines of its own, and no commercial intercourse with other countries; for, in a country having foreign trade, the coin which is rendered superfluous by an issue of paper is carried off by a much prompter method.
Imagine that in a country where the currency is entirely made of metal, a paper currency is suddenly introduced that amounts to half the metallic circulation—not by banks or loans, but directly by the government, as payment for salaries and to buy goods. With the sudden increase of currency by fifty percent, all prices will rise, including the prices of items made from gold and silver. An ounce of crafted gold will be worth more than an ounce of gold coins, exceeding the usual difference meant to account for the craftsmanship. It will become profitable to melt down coins for manufacturing purposes until enough gold has been removed from circulation to match the amount of paper money issued. At that point, prices will return to their original levels, leaving nothing changed except that paper currency has replaced half of the previously existing metallic currency. Now, if a second round of paper currency is issued, the same effects will repeat, and this will continue until all metallic money has disappeared [see Chart No. XIV, Chap. XV, for the exportation of gold from the United States after the issue of our paper money in 1862]: that is, if the paper is issued in denominations as low as the smallest coins; if not, as much currency will stay in circulation as is needed for smaller transactions. The extra gold and silver made available for decorative purposes will temporarily lower the value of these items; as long as this occurs, even if paper has been issued equal to the original amount of metallic currency, a portion of the coins will remain in circulation to keep the currency's value aligned with the decreased worth of the metals. However, as the value drops below production costs, a reduction in mine output will lead to the excess being removed through normal destruction pathways, after which both the metals and the currency will regain their intrinsic value. We are assuming throughout that the country has its own mines and no trade with other countries; in a country with foreign trade, the excess coins made unnecessary by the paper currency will be removed much more swiftly.
Up to this point the effects of a paper currency are substantially the same, whether it is convertible into specie or not. It is when the metals have been completely superseded and driven from circulation that the difference between convertible and inconvertible paper begins to be operative. When the gold or silver has all gone from circulation, and an equal amount of paper has taken its place, suppose that a still further issue is superadded. The same series of phenomena recommences: prices rise, among the rest the prices of gold and silver articles, and it becomes an object, as before, to procure coin, in order to convert it into bullion. There is no longer any coin in circulation; but, if the paper currency is convertible, coin may still be obtained from the issuers in exchange for notes. All additional notes, therefore, which are attempted to be forced into circulation [pg 349] after the metals have been completely superseded, will return upon the issuers in exchange for coin; and they will not be able to maintain in circulation such a quantity of convertible paper as to sink its value below the metal which it represents. It is not so, however, with an inconvertible currency. To the increase of that (if permitted by law) there is no check. The issuers may add to it indefinitely, lowering its value and raising prices in proportion; they may, in other words, depreciate the currency without limit.
Up to now, the effects of a paper currency are basically the same, whether it can be exchanged for gold and silver or not. The difference between convertible and non-convertible paper really comes into play when metals are completely replaced and removed from circulation. When all the gold or silver is out of circulation and an equal amount of paper takes its place, imagine that more paper is issued. The same pattern starts again: prices go up, including the prices of gold and silver items, and it becomes a goal, as before, to get coins to turn into bullion. There’s no coin circulating anymore; but if the paper currency is convertible, you can still get coins from the issuers in exchange for notes. So, any extra notes that are forced into circulation after metals have disappeared will come back to the issuers in exchange for coins; and they won’t be able to keep such a large amount of convertible paper in circulation that its value falls below the metal it represents. This isn’t the case with a non-convertible currency. If allowed by law, there’s no limit to how much can be added. The issuers can keep increasing it, lowering its value and raising prices correspondingly; in other words, they can depreciate the currency without restriction.
Such a power, in whomsoever vested, is an intolerable evil. All variations in the value of the circulating medium are mischievous: they disturb existing contracts and expectations, and the liability to such changes renders every pecuniary engagement of long date entirely precarious. The person who buys for himself, or gives to another, an annuity of one [hundred dollars], does not know whether it will be equivalent to [two hundred or to fifty dollars] a few years hence. Great as this evil would be if it depended only on accident, it is still greater when placed at the arbitrary disposal of an individual or a body of individuals, who may have any kind or degree of interest to be served by an artificial fluctuation in fortunes, and who have at any rate a strong interest in issuing as much as possible, each issue being in itself a source of profit—not to add, that the issuers may have, and, in the case of a government paper, always have, a direct interest in lowering the value of the currency, because it is the medium in which their own debts are computed.
Such a power, no matter who holds it, is an unbearable problem. Any changes in the value of money in circulation are harmful: they disrupt existing contracts and expectations, and the risk of these changes makes any long-term financial commitments completely uncertain. When someone buys or gives an annuity of one hundred dollars, they have no way of knowing if that will equate to two hundred or fifty dollars a few years later. This issue would be serious enough if it were just a matter of chance, but it's even worse when it lies in the arbitrary control of an individual or a group that may have their own interests to benefit from artificial fluctuations in wealth. They have a strong incentive to issue as much currency as possible, with each issuance generating profit. Moreover, these issuers may have, and in the case of government-issued money, always do have, a direct incentive to decrease the value of the currency because it is the measure used to calculate their own debts.
§ 2. If it is regulated by the price of bullion, then inconvertible currency might be secure, but it wouldn’t be practical.
In order that the value of the currency may be secure from being altered by design, and may be as little as possible liable to fluctuation from accident, the articles least liable of all known commodities to vary in their value, the precious metals, have been made in all civilized countries the standard of value for the circulating medium; and no paper currency ought to exist of which the value can not be made to conform to theirs. Nor has this fundamental maxim ever been entirely lost sight of, even by the governments which have most abused the power of creating inconvertible paper. If they have not (as they generally have) professed an intention of paying in specie at some indefinite future time, they have at least, by giving to their paper issues the names of their coins, made a virtual, though generally a false, profession of intending to keep them at a value corresponding to that of the coins. This is not impracticable, even with an inconvertible paper. There is not, indeed, the self-acting check which convertibility brings with it. But there is a clear and unequivocal indication by which to judge whether the currency is depreciated, and to what extent. That indication is the price of the precious metals. When holders of paper can not demand coin to be converted into bullion, and when there is none left in circulation, bullion rises and falls in price like other things; and if it is above the mint price—if an ounce of gold, which would be coined into the equivalent of [$18.60], is sold for [$20 or $25] in paper—the value of the currency has sunk just that much below what the value of a metallic currency would be. If, therefore, the issue of inconvertible paper were subjected to [pg 351] strict rules, one rule being that, whenever bullion rose above the mint price, the issues should be contracted until the market price of bullion and the mint price were again in accordance, such a currency would not be subject to any of the evils usually deemed inherent in an inconvertible paper.
To ensure that the value of the currency stays stable and is not easily changed intentionally or accidentally, the most stable commodities known—precious metals—have become the standard for value in all developed nations. There shouldn’t be any paper currency whose value can’t be aligned with theirs. Even the governments that have most misused the power to create non-convertible paper have not entirely ignored this fundamental principle. If they haven’t claimed an intention to eventually pay in actual coins, they have at least called their paper money by the names of their coins, which is a virtual, though often false, promise to maintain a value that matches the coins. This is achievable, even with non-convertible paper. While it lacks the automatic checks that convertibility provides, there is a clear way to assess whether the currency has depreciated and to what extent. That measure is the price of precious metals. When paper holders can't exchange their currency for coins converted to bullion, and there’s none left in circulation, bullion's price fluctuates like other goods. If it's priced above the mint rate—meaning an ounce of gold that should be worth [$18.60] is sold for [$20 or $25] in paper—the currency’s value has fallen just that much below the value of a metal-based currency. Thus, if the issuance of non-convertible paper were governed by strict rules, with one rule being that whenever bullion priced above the mint value, the paper issues should be reduced until the market price of bullion aligned with the mint price, such a currency would avoid problems that are typically seen as inherent to non-convertible paper.
But, also, such a system of currency would have no advantages sufficient to recommend it to adoption. An inconvertible currency, regulated by the price of bullion, would conform exactly, in all its variations, to a convertible one; and the only advantage gained would be that of exemption from the necessity of keeping any reserve of the precious metals, which is not a very important consideration, especially as a government, so long as its good faith is not suspected, need not keep so large a reserve as private issuers, being not so liable to great and sudden demands, since there never can be any real doubt of its solvency.
But such a currency system wouldn't have any advantages great enough to recommend its adoption. An inconvertible currency, determined by the price of bullion, would behave exactly like a convertible one in all its changes; the only benefit would be the removal of the requirement to maintain a reserve of precious metals, which isn’t a significant concern, especially since a government, as long as its integrity is not questioned, doesn't need to keep as large a reserve as private issuers. This is because it’s not as prone to sudden and large demands, as there can never really be any doubt about its ability to pay its debts.
Against this small advantage is to be set, in the first place, the possibility of fraudulent tampering with the price of bullion for the sake of acting on the currency, in the manner of the fictitious sales of corn, to influence the averages, so much and so justly complained of while the corn laws were in force. But a still stronger consideration is the importance of adhering to a simple principle, intelligible to the most untaught capacity. Everybody can understand convertibility; every one sees that what can be at any moment exchanged for five [dollars] is worth five [dollars]. Regulation by the price of bullion is a more complex idea, and does not recommend itself through the same familiar associations. There would be nothing like the same confidence, by the public generally, in an inconvertible currency so regulated, as in a convertible one: and the most instructed person might reasonably doubt whether such a rule would be [pg 352] as likely to be inflexibly adhered to. The grounds of the rule not being so well understood by the public, opinion would probably not enforce it with as much rigidity, and, in any circumstances of difficulty, would be likely to turn against it; while to the Government itself a suspension of convertibility would appear a much stronger and more extreme measure than a relaxation of what might possibly be considered a somewhat artificial rule. There is therefore a great preponderance of reasons in favor of a convertible, in preference to even the best regulated inconvertible, currency. The temptation to over-issue, in certain financial emergencies, is so strong, that nothing is admissible which can tend, in however slight a degree, to weaken the barriers that restrain it.
We need to consider the downside to this small advantage, especially the chance of cheating with the price of bullion to manipulate the currency, similar to the fake sales of corn that aimed to affect the averages, which caused so much frustration while the corn laws were in place. An even more important point is the value of sticking to a straightforward principle that everyone, regardless of their knowledge level, can grasp. Anyone can understand convertibility; it's clear that something that can be exchanged at any moment for five dollars is worth five dollars. Using the price of bullion for regulation is a more complicated concept and doesn't have the same familiar associations. People generally wouldn't have the same trust in a currency that isn't convertible and is regulated this way as they would in a convertible one. Even well-informed individuals might reasonably question whether such a rule would be consistently followed. Since the public doesn't fully understand the reasons behind the rule, their opinion might not uphold it as strictly, and in challenging situations, they could easily turn against it. For the Government, suspending convertibility would seem like a much more serious and drastic step than relaxing something that could be seen as an artificial rule. Therefore, there are many more reasons supporting a convertible currency compared to even the best-regulated inconvertible one. The temptation to issue too much currency during certain financial crises is very strong, so we shouldn't allow anything that could weaken the barriers preventing it, even in a small way.
§ 3. Evaluation of the idea that an inconvertible currency is secure when it reflects real assets.
Projectors every now and then start up, with plans for curing all the economical evils of society by means of an unlimited issue of inconvertible paper. There is, in truth, a great charm in the idea. To be able to pay off the national debt, defray the expenses of government without taxation, and, in fine, to make the fortunes of the whole community, is a brilliant prospect, when once a man is capable of believing that printing a few characters on bits of paper will do it. The philosopher's stone could not be expected to do more.248
Projectors occasionally have new ideas, proposing to solve all the economic problems in society by just printing unlimited amounts of non-convertible money. Honestly, there's a certain appeal to this idea. The thought of eliminating the national debt, covering government expenses without taxes, and ultimately making everyone wealthy is an exciting prospect once someone believes that printing a few letters on pieces of paper can make it happen. The philosopher's stone couldn't promise more. 248
As these projects, however often slain, always resuscitate, it is not superfluous to examine one or two of the fallacies [pg 353] by which the schemers impose upon themselves. One of the commonest is, that a paper currency can not be issued in excess so long as every note issued represents property, or has a foundation of actual property to rest on. These phrases, of representing and resting, seldom convey any distinct or well-defined idea; when they do, their meaning is no more than this—that the issuers of the paper must have property, either of their own, or intrusted to them, to the value of all the notes they issue, though for what purpose does not very clearly appear; for, if the property can not be claimed in exchange for the notes, it is difficult to divine in what manner its mere existence can serve to uphold their value. I presume, however, it is intended as a guarantee that the holders would be finally reimbursed, in case any untoward event should cause the whole concern to be wound up. On this theory there have been many schemes for “coining the whole land of the country into money” and the like.
As these projects, no matter how often they fail, always come back to life, it’s worth looking at one or two of the misconceptions they have that trick them. One of the most common is the belief that paper currency can be issued without limit as long as every note issued represents actual property or has a foundation in real assets. These terms—representing and resting—rarely convey any clear or specific meaning; when they do, it only means that the issuers of the paper need to have property, whether it belongs to them or is entrusted to them, that is worth as much as all the notes they issue, although the exact purpose of this isn’t very clear; because if the property can’t be exchanged for the notes, it’s hard to see how its mere existence can help maintain their value. However, I assume it’s meant as a promise that the holders would eventually get reimbursed if something unfortunate happens that forces the whole operation to shut down. Based on this idea, there have been many schemes for “turning the whole country’s land into cash” and similar proposals.
In so far as this notion has any connection at all with reason, it seems to originate in confounding two entirely distinct evils, to which a paper currency is liable. One is, the insolvency of the issuers; which, if the paper is grounded on their credit—if it makes any promise of payment in cash, either on demand or at any future time—of course deprives the paper of any value which it derives from the promise. To this evil paper credit is equally liable, however moderately used; and against it, a proviso that all issues should be “founded on property,” as for instance that notes should only be issued on the security of some valuable thing, expressly pledged for their redemption, would really be efficacious as a precaution. But the theory takes no account of another evil, which is incident to the notes of the most solvent firm, company, or government; that of being depreciated in value from being issued in excessive quantity. The assignats, during the French Revolution, were an example of a currency grounded on these principles. The assignats “represented” an immense amount of highly valuable property, [pg 354] namely, the lands of the crown, the church, the monasteries, and the emigrants; amounting possibly to half the territory of France. They were, in fact, orders or assignments on this mass of land. The revolutionary government had the idea of “coining” these lands into money; but, to do them justice, they did not originally contemplate the immense multiplication of issues to which they were eventually driven by the failure of all other financial resources. They imagined that the assignats would come rapidly back to the issuers in exchange for land, and that they should be able to reissue them continually until the lands were all disposed of, without having at any time more than a very moderate quantity in circulation. Their hope was frustrated: the land did not sell so quickly as they expected; buyers were not inclined to invest their money in possessions which were likely to be resumed without compensation if the revolution succumbed; the bits of paper which represented land, becoming prodigiously multiplied, could no more keep up their value than the land itself would have done if it had all been brought to market at once; and the result was that it at last required an assignat of five hundred francs to pay for a cup of coffee.
As far as this idea is connected to reason, it seems to stem from confusing two completely different problems that a paper currency can face. One is the insolvency of the issuers; if the currency is based on their credit—if it promises cash payment either on demand or at some future time—it obviously loses any value it has because of that promise. This issue also affects paper credit, even if it’s used cautiously; and to address it, a rule that all issues should be "based on assets," such as issuing notes only against some valuable asset pledged for their redemption, would effectively serve as a precaution. However, the theory overlooks another issue that can affect the notes of even the most solvent firm, company, or government: the risk of depreciation due to being issued in excessive quantities. The assignats during the French Revolution are an example of a currency based on these principles. The assignats “represented” a vast amount of highly valuable property, [pg 354] specifically, the lands of the crown, the church, the monasteries, and those of emigrants; potentially covering half the territory of France. Essentially, they were orders or claims on this large expanse of land. The revolutionary government thought of "turning" these lands into money; but to their credit, they didn’t initially plan for the vast multiplication of issues they ended up having to resort to due to the failure of all other financial resources. They believed that the assignats would quickly return to the issuers in exchange for land, and that they would be able to reissue them continuously until all the lands were sold, without ever having more than a modest quantity in circulation at any one time. Their hopes were dashed: the land didn’t sell as quickly as they had anticipated; buyers were reluctant to invest in properties that could be reclaimed without compensation if the revolution failed; the pieces of paper representing land, becoming incredibly abundant, could no longer maintain their value than the land itself would have if it had all been offered for sale at once; as a result, it eventually took an assignat of five hundred francs to buy a cup of coffee.
The example of the assignats has been said not to be conclusive, because an assignat only represented land in general, but not a definite quantity of land. To have prevented their depreciation, the proper course, it is affirmed, would have been to have made a valuation of all the confiscated property at its metallic value, and to have issued assignats up to, but not beyond, that limit; giving to the holders a right to demand any piece of land, at its registered valuation, in exchange for assignats to the same amount. There can be no question about the superiority of this plan over the one actually adopted. Had this course been followed, the assignats could never have been depreciated to the inordinate degree they were; for—as they would have retained all their purchasing power in relation to land, however much they might have fallen in respect to other things—before they had lost [pg 355] very much of their market value, they would probably have been brought in to be exchanged for land. It must be remembered, however, that their not being depreciated would presuppose that no greater number of them continued in circulation than would have circulated if they had been convertible into cash. However convenient, therefore, in a time of revolution, this currency convertible into land on demand might have been, as a contrivance for selling rapidly a great quantity of land with the least possible sacrifice, it is difficult to see what advantage it would have, as the permanent system of a country, over a currency convertible into coin; while it is not at all difficult to see what would be its disadvantages, since land is far more variable in value than gold and silver; and besides, land, to most persons, being rather an incumbrance than a desirable possession, except to be converted into money, people would submit to a much greater depreciation before demanding land, than they will before demanding gold or silver.249
The example of the assignats has been said not to be conclusive because an assignat only represented land in general, not a specific amount of land. To prevent their depreciation, it’s suggested that the right approach would have been to evaluate all the confiscated property at its metal value and issue assignats up to, but not exceeding, that limit; giving holders the right to exchange any piece of land at its registered value for assignats of the same amount. There’s no question that this plan was better than the one that was actually implemented. If this had been followed, the assignats would never have depreciated as drastically as they did; because they would have maintained their purchasing power in relation to land, no matter how much they fell in value compared to other things—before losing much of their market value, they likely would have been exchanged for land. However, it should be noted that their stability would mean that no more of them were in circulation than would have circulated if they were convertible into cash. Therefore, while this land-convertible currency might have been useful during a revolution for quickly selling a large amount of land with minimal loss, it’s hard to see how it would be advantageous as a permanent system for a country compared to a currency that could be exchanged for coins; and it’s easy to see its downsides, since land has a much more volatile value than gold and silver. Moreover, for most people, land is more of a burden than a desirable asset, unless it’s being turned into cash, so they would tolerate a much larger depreciation before asking for land compared to asking for gold or silver.
§ 4. Experiments with Paper Money in the United States.
The experience of the colonies before our Revolution is rich in warning examples of the over-issue of inconvertible paper money. Those of Rhode Island250 and the Province [pg 356] of Massachusetts251 are the most conspicuous, perhaps, because we have better knowledge of them, but other colonies suffered in as great a degree. The experience of the latter illustrates as well as any, perhaps, not only the general theory of inconvertible paper, but the device of supporting the paper by paying interest upon the notes. Although the issues since 1690 had depreciated, in 1702 £10,000 more notes were issued, because, as it was said, there was a scarcity of money. It is always noticeable that the more issues of paper money there are made, the more there is a cry of scarcity, much like the thirst of a hard drinker after the first exhilaration has passed off. On the new issues five per cent interest was paid, and even excises and imposts were set aside as security for their payment. The year 1709 saw a new expedition to Canada, and saw also the broken promises of the province, when £20,000 more notes were put out; the collection of the taxes with which to pay the notes was deferred in 1707 for two years; in 1709 deferred for four years; in 1710 for five years; in 1711 for six years. By 1712 they had depreciated thirty per cent, when the charm of legal tender was thrown around them, but to no purpose. The idea of value was not associated with them in people's minds, and they put no faith in promises. The usual result took place. People divided politically on the money question, and parties began to agitate for banks which should issue notes based on real estate, or for loans from the state to private persons at interest to be paid annually. Such facts show the train of evils following the first innocent departure from the maintenance of a currency equivalent to coin. The people forgot, or did not know, the nature of money, or the offices it performed. They did not understand that creating paper money did not create wealth. This experiment closed only in 1750 (March 31st), when the province had courage enough to resume specie payments. The effect was to transfer the West India trade from paper-issuing colonies to Massachusetts, and to produce a steady prosperity in her business interests.
The experiences of the colonies before our Revolution serve as strong warnings about the risks of issuing too much unconvertible paper money. Those in Rhode Island250and the Province[pg 356]of Massachusetts251are the most significant, likely because we have more information about them, but other colonies faced similar levels of hardship. Their experiences illustrate, perhaps better than any other, not only the general theory of unconvertible paper but also the approach of backing the paper by paying interest on the notes. Even though the notes had lost value since 1690, in 1702, another £10,000 worth of notes were issued, supposedly due to a lack of money. It's interesting to note that the more paper money is issued, the louder the claims of scarcity become, similar to an alcoholic's craving after the initial high fades. On the new notes, five percent interest was paid, and even taxes were set aside as security for their payment. The year 1709 saw a new military campaign in Canada, along with the broken promises of the province, leading to the issuance of an additional £20,000 in notes; the tax collection needed to pay these notes was postponed in 1707 for two years, in 1709 for four years, in 1710 for five years, and in 1711 for six years. By 1712, the notes had lost thirty percent of their value, and even though they were declared legal tender, it made no difference. People did not see any real value in them and lost trust in the promises made. The usual consequences followed. People became politically divided over the money issue, and factions began to advocate for banks that would issue notes backed by real estate or for state loans to individuals with interest payable annually. These events highlight the chain of problems that arose from the initial innocent deviation from maintaining a currency equivalent to coin. The public forgot or were unaware of the true nature of money and its functions. They didn’t understand that creating paper money did not create wealth. This experiment ended only on March 31, 1750, when the province finally had the resolve to resume payments in specie. The result shifted West India trade from colonies issuing paper to Massachusetts, leading to steady prosperity in its business activities.

The issue of paper money as a means of making a forced loan from the people, when there seem to be no other means of getting funds, has been fully illustrated in our country by the Continental currency issued during our Revolution. It is not, however, considered that this is also accompanied by a process by which every debtor takes “a forced contribution from his creditor.” Congress had no power to tax, and the separate [pg 358] States would not do it; and this has been considered as the excuse for making issues of that well-known paper money, which has given rise to the familiar by-word for absence of value, “not worth a Continental.” Without going into details,252 in one year, 1779, Congress issued $140,000,000, worth in coin only $7,000,000. They, however, bravely declared that paper had not depreciated, but that the price of coin had gone up! Legal attempts were made to repress the premium on silver; but resolutions do not create wealth as fast as money can be printed. The depreciation went on more rapidly than the issues (see Chart No. XI, in which the black line represents the amounts of issues, and the broken line the depreciation of paper, starting at 100); and, finally, March 18, 1780, Congress decided to admit a depreciation, and resumed in silver at the rate of one dollar in silver for forty in paper.
The problem of using paper money to compel loans from the people, especially when there seem to be no other ways to raise funds, has been clearly demonstrated in our country through the Continental currency issued during our Revolution. However, it's important to point out that this comes with a process where each debtor effectively takes __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“a coerced payment from his lender.”Congress didn’t have the authority to tax, and the individual States wouldn't do it either. This is often seen as the reason for the introduction of that infamous paper money, which led to the well-known saying about its lack of value.“not worth a dime.”Without getting into details,252In 1779, Congress issued $140,000,000, which was only worth $7,000,000 in coins. They confidently stated that paper currency hadn't lost value; instead, the price of coins had gone up! Legal efforts were made to control the premium on silver, but resolutions don't generate wealth as quickly as money can be printed. The depreciation kept happening faster than the money was being printed (see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).Chart No. 11, where the solid line represents the total issues, and the dashed line shows the depreciation of paper, starting at 100); and, ultimately, on March 18, 1780, Congress chose to recognize the depreciation and resumed transactions in silver at the rate of one dollar in silver for every forty in paper.
The question of government issues253 of paper money again came up in the United States in 1862, during the civil war, and part of our present currency is the result of the policy then adopted. The first step—the one that generally costs—however, was taken July 17, 1861, when the Treasury issued $50,000,000 of “demand notes,” not bearing interest. These notes, however, were not made legal tender. They could be used in payment of salaries and other dues from the United States. It may be well to state that the Treasury balanced the arguments for and against the issues of paper at the beginning of the experiment, and we can see how these views were realized as we go along. In favor of paper issues it was urged that we could borrow a large amount without interest, as in the case of the Continental currency; that there would be no expense beyond the coin necessary for keeping the paper at par; and that the country would gain a uniform currency. On the other hand, it was seen that there might be temptations to issue without provisions for redemption; that even if a fund were kept, a disturbance of the money market would precipitate a demand for coin, and all upon this single fund; and, lastly, that there were all the dangers of over-issue. Secretary Chase254 then decided [pg 359] against paper issues. Government bonds, however, did not sell, and the attempt of the banks toward the end of 1861 to carry $150,000,000 of bonds brought on a suspension of specie payments, December 31, 1861. Without any taxation policy, the country drifted along, until in a spasm of dread at seeing an empty Treasury, Congress passed the legal-tender act (February 25, 1862), issuing $150,000,000 of paper in the form of promises to pay. A committee of bankers showed that the issue could have been avoided by selling bonds at their market price; but Congress would not sell them below par. No necessity for the issues of paper need have arrived. In four months another issue of $150,000,000 was authorized (July 11, 1862); and a third issue of a like amount (March 3, 1863), in all $450,000,000. The depreciation took place (see Chart No. XII), for, as Secretary Chase anticipated, no provision was made for redemption. They were made legal tender, but this “essential idea” did not preserve their value; nor did the provision that they be received for taxes (except customs), avail for this purpose.
The topic of government and paper money resurfaced in the United States in 1862, during the Civil War, and some of our current currency origins trace back to the policy established then. The first major action took place on July 17, 1861, when the Treasury issued $50,000,000 in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“demand notes,”which did not earn interest. However, these notes were not considered legal tender. They could be used to pay salaries and other debts owed by the United States. It's important to note that the Treasury evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of issuing paper money at the beginning of this experiment, and we can see how those views evolved over time. Supporters of paper money argued that it would allow for borrowing a significant amount without interest, similar to the Continental currency; that there would be no costs beyond the coins necessary to maintain parity; and that it would create a uniform currency for the country. On the other hand, there were concerns about the temptation to issue money without adequate backing; that even if a reserve was maintained, disruptions in the money market could lead to a rush for coins against that reserve; and finally, the risks of over-issuing. Secretary Chase254Then they decided not to issue paper money. However, government bonds didn't sell well. By the end of 1861, when the banks attempted to take on $150,000,000 worth of bonds, it resulted in a suspension of gold payments on December 31, 1861. Without a tax policy, the country continued until, in a panic over a depleted Treasury, Congress passed the Legal Tender Act on February 25, 1862, issuing $150,000,000 in paper as promises to pay. A committee of bankers demonstrated that this could have been avoided by selling the bonds at their market price, but Congress refused to sell them for less than par. There was no reason for paper money issues to have arisen. Within four months, another $150,000,000 was authorized (July 11, 1862), followed by a third issue of the same amount (March 3, 1863), totaling $450,000,000. The depreciation occurred (see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).Chart No. 12), as Secretary Chase predicted, because no arrangements were made for redemption. They were stated as legal tender, but this“key concept”did not retain their value, and the requirement that they be accepted for taxes (except customs) did not resolve this issue either.
The effects of the depreciation were as evil as can well be imagined. (1) The expenses of the Government were increased by the rise in prices, so that (2) our national debt became hundreds of millions larger than it need have been; (3) a vicious speculation in gold began, leading to the unsettling of legitimate trade and to greater variations in prices; (4) the existence of depreciated paper later gave rise to all the dishonest schemes for paying the coin obligations of the United States in cheap issues, to the ruin of its credit and honor; and (5) it has practically become a settled part of our circulation, and a possible source of danger.
The effect of the depreciation was as terrible as one could expect. (1) The government's costs increased because of rising prices, so (2) our national debt grew by hundreds of millions more than it should have; (3) a harmful speculation in gold began, disrupting legitimate trade and causing even greater price fluctuations; (4) the existence of devalued paper later led to various dishonest schemes to settle U.S. coin obligations with worthless issues, harming its credit and reputation; and (5) it has almost become a permanent part of our currency, creating a potential risk.
Of the whole $450,000,000, $50,000,000 were set aside as a reserve for temporary deposits; but in July, 1864, $431,000,000 were in circulation. At this time (June 30, 1864) Congress, retaining distinctly the feeling that the issue of paper was but a temporary measure, forbade any further issues. Secretary McCulloch, immediately on the close of the war, began to contract, and, by a resolution of the lower branch in Congress (December 18, 1865), a cordial concurrence in the measures for contraction was manifested. Of course, the return from the path of inflated credit and high prices was painful, and Congress began to feel the pressure of its constituents. Had they not yielded, much of the severity of the crisis of 1873 might have been avoided; but (April 12, 1866) they forbade any greater contraction than $4,000,000 a month. Here was a lack of courage not foreseen by Secretary Chase. This was again shown (February 4, 1868) by a law which absolutely forbade the Secretary to further reduce the currency, which now stood [pg 360] at $356,000,000. This marks an important change in the attitude of the Government, as compared with 1862. After the panic of 1873, the paper evil produced its usual effect in the cry for more money, and, as in the Province of Massachusetts in 1712, parties divided on the question of inflation or contraction. A bill to expand the Government issues to $400,000,000 (and the national-bank notes also to $400,000,000) actually passed both Houses of Congress, and we were fortunately saved from it only by the veto of President Grant (April 22, 1874). This was another landmark in the history of our paper money. Secretary Richardson, however, had already, without authority, reissued $26,000,000 of the $44,000,000 withdrawn by Secretary McCulloch, and the amount outstanding was thus $382,000,000. A compromise measure was passed (June 20, 1874), which retained this amount in the circulation.
Out of the total $450,000,000, $50,000,000 was set aside for temporary deposits. By July 1864, $431,000,000 was in circulation. At this point (June 30, 1864), Congress, believing that issuing paper currency was just a temporary fix, banned any further issuances. Secretary McCulloch began to cut the money supply right after the war ended, and on December 18, 1865, the House of Representatives showed strong support for efforts to reduce it. Naturally, the return from inflated credit and high prices was tough, and Congress started to feel pressure from their constituents. If they hadn’t given in, a lot of the intensity of the crisis in 1873 could have been avoided; however, on April 12, 1866, they limited reductions to no more than $4,000,000 a month. This showed a lack of determination that Secretary Chase didn’t expect. This became evident again on February 4, 1868, when a law completely prohibited the Secretary from reducing the currency further, which was then at $356,000,000. This was a significant change in the Government's position compared to 1862. After the panic of 1873, the usual demand for more money arose, and, similar to what happened in Massachusetts in 1712, factions formed around the issues of inflation or contraction. A bill aimed at increasing Government currency to $400,000,000 (along with national bank notes also to $400,000,000) passed both Houses of Congress, but we were fortunately spared from it by President Grant’s veto on April 22, 1874. This marked another crucial moment in the history of our paper money. However, Secretary Richardson had already reissued $26,000,000 of the $44,000,000 that Secretary McCulloch had withdrawn, raising the outstanding amount to $382,000,000. A compromise measure was passed on June 20, 1874, which kept this amount in circulation.
When the resumption act was passed (January 14, 1875), the provision that, for every $100 of new national-bank notes issued, $80 of United States notes should be retired, resulted in a contraction of the latter from $382,000,000 to $346,000,000. The reason of this was, that there was no provision for the increase of United States notes when national banks withdrew their own issues; and after the crisis many banks naturally did so. The culmination of the policy of Congress came in a law (May 31, 1878) which absolutely forbade all further retirement of United States notes, and we are now left at the present time with an inelastic limit of $346,000,000. Finally, in 1877 and 1878, Secretary Sherman, aided by a most fortunate state of foreign trade, began to accumulate gold in order to carry out the provisions of the resumption act, which required him to resume specie payments on January 1, 1879. He successfully collected $133,000,000 of gold, and on December 17, 1878, the premium on gold disappeared, and resumption was accomplished quietly on the day appointed, without a jar to business.
When the resumption act was passed on January 14, 1875, the rule that for every $100 of new national bank notes issued, $80 of United States notes had to be retired, led to a drop in the latter from $382,000,000 to $346,000,000. This occurred because there was no plan to increase United States notes when national banks reduced their own issues; after the crisis, many banks understandably did just that. The peak of Congress's policy came with a law on May 31, 1878, that completely banned any further retirement of United States notes, leaving us with a fixed limit of $346,000,000. Finally, in 1877 and 1878, Secretary Sherman, taking advantage of a favorable state of foreign trade, began to stockpile gold to meet the requirements of the resumption act, which required him to resume specie payments on January 1, 1879. He successfully accumulated $133,000,000 in gold, and on December 17, 1878, the premium on gold vanished, allowing for a smooth resumption on the scheduled date, without disrupting business.
But it is a significant fact that even after all the evils inflicted on our country by over-issues, in spite of the temptation to misuse paper money if it is in any way permitted, in spite of all the warnings of history, there seems to be a dangerous acquiescence in the presence of government paper money in our currency. It is an open pitfall, tempting to evils whenever sudden emergencies arise. It ought not to be allowed to remain any longer.
However, it’s important to recognize that even after all the damage caused to our country by printing too much money, despite the lure to misuse paper currency if permitted, and despite all the historical warnings, there seems to be a concerning acceptance of government-issued paper money in our economy. It poses a clear risk, tempting us toward wrongdoing whenever unforeseen circumstances arise. This shouldn’t be allowed to persist.
§ 5. Review of the profits from the increase and issuance of paper currency.
Another of the fallacies from which the advocates of an inconvertible currency derive support is the notion that an increase of the currency quickens industry. Mr. Attwood maintained that a rise of prices produced by an increase [pg 361] of paper currency stimulates every producer to his utmost exertions, and brings all the capital and labor of the country into complete employment; and that this has invariably happened in all periods of rising prices, when the rise was on a sufficiently great scale. I presume, however, that the inducement which, according to Mr. Attwood, excited this unusual ardor in all persons engaged in production must have been the expectation of getting more of commodities generally, more real wealth, in exchange for the produce of their labor, and not merely more pieces of paper. This expectation, however, must have been, by the very terms of the supposition, disappointed, since, all prices being supposed to rise equally, no one was really better paid for his goods than before. It calculates on finding the whole world persisting forever in the belief that more pieces of paper are more riches, and never discovering that, with all their paper, they can not buy more of anything than they could before. At the periods which Mr. Attwood mistook for times of prosperity, and which were simply (as all periods of high prices, under a convertible currency, must be) times of speculation, the speculators did not think they were growing rich because the high prices would last, but because they would not last, and because whoever contrived to realize while they did last would find himself, after the recoil, in possession of a greater number of [dollars], without their having become of less value.
Another misconception that supporters of an inconvertible currency rely on is the idea that increasing the currency boosts industry. Mr. Attwood argued that a rise in prices caused by more paper currency pushes every producer to work as hard as possible and employs all the capital and labor in the country effectively; this has always been true during periods of rising prices, as long as the increases were significant enough. However, I believe the motivation that, according to Mr. Attwood, drove this unusual enthusiasm in everyone involved in production must have been the expectation of getting more goods in general, more real wealth, in exchange for what they produced, not just more pieces of paper. But this expectation must have been, by the very nature of the assumption, disappointed since, with all prices rising equally, no one was actually better compensated for their goods than before. It assumes that the entire world would continue to believe that having more pieces of paper equates to more wealth, without ever realizing that, despite all their paper, they cannot buy more of anything than they could before. During the times Mr. Attwood mistook for periods of prosperity, which were merely (as all times of high prices under a convertible currency must be) times of speculation, the speculators didn't think they were becoming wealthy because the high prices would last, but because they wouldn't last. They believed that whoever managed to cash in while the prices were high would end up, after the downturn, with a greater number of [dollars], without those dollars losing their value.
Hume's version of the doctrine differed in a slight degree from Mr. Attwood's. He thought that all commodities would not rise in price simultaneously, and that some persons therefore would obtain a real gain, by getting more money for what they had to sell, while the things which they wished to buy might not yet have risen. And those who would reap this gain would always be (he seems to think) the first comers. It seems obvious, however, that, for every person who thus gains more than usual, there is necessarily some other person who gains less. The loser, if things took place as Hume supposes, would be the seller of the commodities [pg 362] which are slowest to rise; who, by the supposition, parts with his goods at the old prices, to purchasers who have already benefited by the new. This seller has obtained for his commodity only the accustomed quantity of money, while there are already some things of which that money will no longer purchase as much as before. If, therefore, he knows what is going on, he will raise his price, and then the buyer will not have the gain, which is supposed to stimulate his industry. But if, on the contrary, the seller does not know the state of the case, and only discovers it when he finds, in laying his money out, that it does not go so far, he then obtains less than the ordinary remuneration for his labor and capital; and, if the other dealer's industry is encouraged, it should seem that his must, from the opposite cause, be impaired.
Hume's take on the doctrine was slightly different from Mr. Attwood's. He believed that not all commodities would increase in price at the same time, so some people would actually gain by selling their goods for more money while the things they wanted to buy hadn’t increased in price yet. He suggested that those who would benefit from this would often be the ones who act first. However, it's clear that for every person who gains more than usual, there has to be someone else who gains less. The one losing out, if things happen as Hume thinks, would be the seller of the commodities that take the longest to rise in price. This seller would sell his goods at the previous prices to buyers who have already benefited from the new prices. He would get only the usual amount of money for his commodity while some items that money can buy would now be less than before. So, if he knows what’s happening, he would raise his price, and then the buyer wouldn’t have the gain that’s supposed to boost his work. But if the seller doesn’t realize the situation and only finds out when he sees that his money doesn’t stretch as far, he ends up getting less than normal for his labor and investment. If other dealers' work is boosted, then it seems like his must suffer for the opposite reason.
An issue of notes is a manifest gain to the issuers, who, until the notes are returned for payment, obtain the use of them as if they were a real capital; and, so long as the notes are no permanent addition to the currency, but merely supersede gold or silver to the same amount, the gain of the issuer is a loss to no one; it is obtained by saving to the community the expense of the more costly material. But, if there is no gold or silver to be superseded—if the notes are added to the currency, instead of being substituted for the metallic part of it—all holders of currency lose, by the depreciation of its value, the exact equivalent of what the issuer gains. A tax is virtually levied on them for his benefit.
Issuing notes is a clear advantage for the issuers, who, until the notes are returned for payment, get to use them as if they were real capital. As long as the notes don’t permanently increase the currency supply but simply replace an equal amount of gold or silver, the issuer's gain doesn't result in anyone else's loss; it saves the community the cost of the more expensive material. However, if there’s no gold or silver to replace—if the notes add to the currency instead of replacing the metallic part—then all currency holders lose value equivalent to what the issuer gains. Essentially, a tax is imposed on them for the issuer's benefit.
But besides the benefit reaped by the issuers, or by others through them, at the expense of the public generally, there is another unjust gain obtained by a larger class—namely, by those who are under fixed pecuniary obligations. All such persons are freed, by a depreciation of the currency, from a portion of the burden of their debts or other engagements; in other words, part of the property of their creditors is gratuitously transferred to them. On a superficial view it may be imagined that this is an advantage to industry; since the productive classes are great borrowers, and generally owe [pg 363] larger debts to the unproductive (if we include among the latter all persons not actually in business) than the unproductive classes owe to them, especially if the national debt be included. It is only thus that a general rise of prices can be a source of benefit to producers and dealers, by diminishing the pressure of their fixed burdens. And this might be accounted an advantage, if integrity and good faith were of no importance to the world, and to industry and commerce in particular.
But aside from the benefits gained by the issuers, or by others through them, at the expense of the public as a whole, there's another unfair advantage gained by a larger group—specifically, those who have fixed financial obligations. All these individuals are relieved, through currency depreciation, from part of the burden of their debts or other commitments; in other words, a portion of their creditors' property is unfairly transferred to them. At first glance, it might seem like this is beneficial for industry since the productive classes tend to be big borrowers and usually owe more to the unproductive (if we consider all individuals not actively in business as unproductive) than the unproductive classes owe to them, especially if we include the national debt. This is how a general rise in prices can benefit producers and sellers by easing the strain of their fixed obligations. And this could be seen as an advantage if integrity and good faith didn’t matter to the world, especially to industry and commerce.
§ 6.Resumeabout money.
Of these substitutes for money, (1) Use of credit depends not on quality of coin and notes, and (2) Various kinds of credit.
Of these alternatives to money, (1) using credit doesn't depend on the quality of coins and bills, and (2) there are various types of credit.
Of those various kinds of credit, there are (1) Book credits, (2) Bills of exchange, (3) Promissory notes, and (4) checks processed via clearing-house.
Among the various types of credit, there are (1) book credits, (2) bills of exchange, (3) promissory notes, and (4) checks processed through a clearinghouse.
Of the promissory notes, they are of either (1) Individuals, (2) Banks (Coin Banks or Land Banks, etc.), or (3) Governments.
Promissory notes can be categorized as (1) Individuals, (2) Banks (such as Coin Banks or Land Banks, etc.), or (3) Governments.
Of Government notes, there are (1) Convertible or (2) Inconvertible.
There are two types of government notes: (1) Convertible and (2) Inconvertible.
Chapter XI. On Excess of Supply.
§ 1. Explanation of the theory of general over-supply of goods.
After the elementary exposition of the theory of money contained in the last few chapters, we shall return to a question in the general theory of Value which could not be satisfactorily discussed until the nature and operations of Money were in some measure understood, because the errors against which we have to contend mainly originate in a misunderstanding of those operations.
After the basic explanation of the theory of money in the last few chapters, we will go back to a question in the general theory of Value that couldn't be discussed properly until we had a better understanding of the nature and functions of Money. This is important because the mistakes we have to address mostly come from a misunderstanding of those functions.
Because the phenomenon of over-supply and consequent inconvenience or loss to the producer or dealer may exist in the case of any one commodity whatever, many persons, including some distinguished political economists,255 have thought that it may exist with regard to all commodities; that there may be a general over-production of wealth; a supply of commodities in the aggregate surpassing the demand; and a consequent depressed condition of all classes of producers.
Because over-supply and the resulting inconvenience or loss to the producer or dealer can happen with any commodity, many people, including some well-known economists, have believed that this could be true for all commodities; that there could be a general over-production of wealth; a total supply of goods exceeding demand; and a resulting downturn affecting all classes of producers.
The doctrine appears to me to involve so much inconsistency in its very conception that I feel considerable difficulty in giving any statement of it which shall be at once clear and satisfactory to its supporters. They agree in maintaining that there may be, and sometimes is, an excess of productions in general beyond the demand for them; that when this happens, purchasers can not be found at prices which will repay the cost of production with a profit; that there ensues a general depression of prices or values (they are seldom [pg 366] accurate in discriminating between the two), so that producers, the more they produce, find themselves the poorer instead of richer; and Dr. Chalmers accordingly inculcates on capitalists the practice of a moral restraint in reference to the pursuit of gain, while Sismondi deprecates machinery and the various inventions which increase productive power. They both maintain that accumulation of capital may proceed too fast, not merely for the moral but for the material interest of those who produce and accumulate; and they enjoin the rich to guard against this evil by an ample unproductive consumption.
The doctrine seems to me to have so much inconsistency in its very idea that I struggle to provide any explanation of it that would be clear and satisfying for its supporters. They agree that there can be, and sometimes is, an oversupply of goods beyond what is needed; that when this happens, buyers can't be found at prices that will cover production costs and yield a profit; that this leads to a general decline in prices or values (they are rarely precise in distinguishing between the two), so that producers, the more they produce, end up poorer instead of richer; and Dr. Chalmers therefore urges capitalists to exercise moral restraint in the pursuit of profit, while Sismondi criticizes machinery and various inventions that boost production power. They both argue that the accumulation of capital can happen too quickly, not just for moral reasons but also for the material well-being of those who produce and accumulate; and they advise the wealthy to protect against this issue by engaging in substantial unproductive consumption.
§ 2. The supply of goods in general cannot exceed the purchasing power.
When these writers speak of the supply of commodities as outrunning the demand, it is not clear which of the two elements of demand they have in view—the desire to possess, or the means of purchase; whether their meaning is that there are, in such cases, more consumable products in existence than the public desires to consume, or merely more than it is able to pay for. In this uncertainty, it is necessary to examine both suppositions.
When these writers talk about the supply of goods exceeding the demand, it's not clear which aspect of demand they're referring to—the desire to own or the financial ability to buy. They might mean that there are more products available than people want to use, or just that there are more than they can afford. Given this uncertainty, it's important to look into both possibilities.
First, let us suppose that the quantity of commodities produced is not greater than the community would be glad to consume; is it, in that case, possible that there should be a deficiency of demand for all commodities for want of the means of payment? Those who think so can not have considered what it is which constitutes the means of payment for commodities. It is simply commodities. Each person's means of paying for the productions of other people consists of those which he himself possesses. All sellers are inevitably and ex vi termini buyers. Could we suddenly double the productive powers of the country, we should double the supply of commodities in every market; but we should, by the same stroke, double the purchasing power.
First, let’s assume that the amount of goods produced isn't greater than what the community wants to consume; could there be a lack of demand for all goods because of a shortage of payment means? Those who believe that haven't thought about what actually constitutes the means of payment for goods. It’s simply other goods. Each person's ability to pay for the products of others consists of what they already have. All sellers are inevitably and by definition buyers. If we could suddenly double the country’s production capacity, we would double the supply of goods in every market; but at the same time, we would also double the purchasing power.
Everybody would bring a double demand as well as supply; everybody would be able to buy twice as much, because every one would have twice as much to offer in exchange. It is probable, indeed, that there would now be a superfluity of certain things. Although the community would willingly double its aggregate consumption, it may already have as much as it desires of some commodities, and it may prefer to do more than double its consumption of others, or to exercise its increased purchasing power on some new thing. If so, the supply will adapt itself accordingly, and the values of things will continue to conform to their cost of production. At any rate, it is a sheer absurdity that all things should fall in value, and that all producers should, in consequence, be insufficiently remunerated. If values remain the same, what becomes of prices is immaterial, since the remuneration of producers does not depend on how much money, but on how much of consumable articles, they obtain for their goods. Besides, money is a commodity; and, if all commodities are supposed to be doubled in quantity, we must suppose money to be doubled too, and then prices would no more fall than values would.
Everyone would bring double the demand and supply; everyone could buy twice as much because everyone would have twice as much to offer in exchange. It’s likely, in fact, that there would now be a surplus of certain items. Although the community would gladly double its overall consumption, it may already have as much as it wants of some goods, and it might prefer to more than double its consumption of others, or to spend its increased purchasing power on something new. If that’s the case, the supply will adjust accordingly, and the values of goods will continue to match their production costs. In any case, it’s completely absurd for all things to lose value, and for all producers to be underpaid as a result. If values stay the same, what happens to prices doesn’t matter, since producers’ pay doesn’t depend on how much money they get, but on how many consumable goods they receive for their products. Moreover, money is a commodity; and if all commodities are assumed to be doubled in quantity, we have to assume money is doubled too, and then prices wouldn’t fall anymore than values would.
§ 3. There will never be a shortage of Demand due to a lack of Desire to Consume.
A general over-supply, or excess of all commodities above the demand, so far as demand consists in means of payment, is thus shown to be an impossibility. But it may, perhaps, be supposed that it is not the ability to purchase, but the desire to possess, that falls short, and that the general produce of industry may be greater than the community desires to consume—the part, at least, of the community which has an equivalent to give.
A general oversupply, or excess of all goods beyond what is needed, as far as demand is defined by purchasing power, is shown to be impossible. However, it might be considered that it's not the ability to buy that is lacking, but rather the desire to own, and that the overall production from industry could be greater than what the community wants to consume—at least for those members of the community who have something of equal value to exchange.
This is much the most plausible form of the doctrine, and does not, like that which we first examined, involve a contradiction. There may easily be a greater quantity of any particular commodity than is desired by those who have the ability to purchase, and it is abstractedly conceivable that this might be the case with all commodities. The error is in not perceiving that, though all who have an equivalent to give might be fully provided with every consumable [pg 368] article which they desire, the fact that they go on adding to the production proves that this is not actually the case. Assume the most favorable hypothesis for the purpose, that of a limited community, every member of which possesses as much of necessaries and of all known luxuries as he desires, and, since it is not conceivable that persons whose wants were completely satisfied would labor and economize to obtain what they did not desire, suppose that a foreigner arrives and produces an additional quantity of something of which there was already enough. Here, it will be said, is over-production. True, I reply; over-production of that particular article. The community wanted no more of that, but it wanted something. The old inhabitants, indeed, wanted nothing; but did not the foreigner himself want something? When he produced the superfluous article, was he laboring without a motive? He has produced—but the wrong thing instead of the right. He wanted, perhaps, food, and has produced watches, with which everybody was sufficiently supplied. The new-comer brought with him into the country a demand for commodities equal to all that he could produce by his industry, and it was his business to see that the supply he brought should be suitable to that demand. If he could not produce something capable of exciting a new want or desire in the community, for the satisfaction of which some one would grow more food and give it to him in exchange, he had the alternative of growing food for himself, either on fresh land, if there was any unoccupied, or as a tenant, or partner, or servant of some former occupier, willing to be partially relieved from labor. He has produced a thing not wanted, instead of what was wanted, and he himself, perhaps, is not the kind of producer who is wanted—but there is no over-production; production is not excessive, but merely ill-assorted. We saw before that whoever brings additional commodities to the market brings an additional power of purchase; we now see that he brings also an additional desire to consume, since if he had not that desire he would not have troubled himself to produce. [pg 369] Neither of the elements of demand, therefore, can be wanting when there is an additional supply, though it is perfectly possible that the demand may be for one thing, and the supply may, unfortunately, consist of another.
This is by far the most reasonable version of the idea, and unlike the first one we looked at, it doesn't create a contradiction. It's easy to imagine that there could be more of a specific product than what people who can buy it want, and it's theoretically possible that this could apply to all products. The mistake is in not realizing that, even if everyone with something to trade could have all the consumables they desire, the ongoing production shows that this isn't actually true. Let's assume the best-case scenario: a small community where every member has as much of the necessities and all the luxuries they want. Since it's hard to picture people whose needs are completely met working and saving to get things they don't want, picture someone from outside the community arriving and making more of something that's already abundant. Here, it could be said, is overproduction. That's true, I would say; there is overproduction of that specific item. The community didn't want more of that, but it still wanted something. The original residents might not have wanted anything, but didn't the newcomer want something? When this person produced the extra item, was he working without a purpose? He created something—but the wrong thing instead of what was needed. Maybe he wanted food but ended up making watches, which everyone already had enough of. The newcomer brought with him a demand for goods equal to everything he could produce through his efforts, and it was his responsibility to ensure that the supply he introduced was suitable for that demand. If he couldn't create something that sparked a new want or desire in the community, prompting someone to grow more food in exchange for it, his other option was to grow food for himself, either on new land if any was available or as a tenant, partner, or worker for a previous owner willing to lessen their workload. He made something that wasn't needed instead of what was needed, and perhaps he's not the kind of producer that's in demand—but there is no overproduction; production isn't excessive, just poorly matched. We noted earlier that anyone who brings extra goods to the market also brings additional purchasing power; now we see that they also bring an added desire to consume, since if they didn't have that desire, they wouldn't have bothered to produce. So, neither element of demand can be absent when there is extra supply, though it’s entirely possible that demand is for one thing, while supply unfortunately consists of another.
§ 4. Origin and Explanation of the Concept of General Over-Supply.
I have already described the state of the markets for commodities which accompanies what is termed a commercial crisis. At such times there is really an excess of all commodities above the money demand: in other words, there is an under-supply of money. From the sudden annihilation of a great mass of credit, every one dislikes to part with ready money, and many are anxious to procure it at any sacrifice. Almost everybody, therefore, is a seller, and there are scarcely any buyers: so that there may really be, though only while the crisis lasts, an extreme depression of general prices, from what may be indiscriminately called a glut of commodities or a dearth of money. But it is a great error to suppose, with Sismondi, that a commercial crisis is the effect of a general excess of production. It is simply the consequence of an excess of speculative purchases. It is not a gradual advent of low prices, but a sudden recoil from prices extravagantly high: its immediate cause is a contraction of credit, and the remedy is, not a diminution of supply, but the restoration of confidence. It is also evident that this temporary derangement of markets is an evil only [pg 370] because it is temporary. The fall being solely of money prices, if prices did not rise again no dealer would lose, since the smaller price would be worth as much to him as the larger price was before. In no matter does this phenomenon answer to the description which these celebrated economists have given of the evil of over-production. That permanent decline in the circumstances of producers, for want of markets, which those writers contemplate, is a conception to which the nature of a commercial crisis gives no support.
I’ve already talked about the state of the commodity markets that comes with what we call a commercial crisis. During these times, there’s really too much of everything compared to the demand for money; in other words, there’s not enough money circulating. After a sudden loss of a large amount of credit, everyone is hesitant to spend cash, and many are willing to do anything to get it. Almost everyone ends up being a seller, and there are hardly any buyers, which can lead to a significant drop in overall prices, due to what might be broadly referred to as a surplus of goods or a shortage of money. But it’s a big mistake to think, like Sismondi, that a commercial crisis is caused by an overall excess in production. It's really the result of too many speculative purchases. It isn’t a slow decline in prices but a quick crash from prices that were excessively high; its immediate cause is a tightening of credit, and the solution isn’t reducing supply but rebuilding confidence. It’s also clear that this temporary disruption in the markets is harmful only because it’s temporary. The drop in prices is just about money prices; if they didn’t go back up, no seller would actually lose, since the lower price would be worth just as much to them as the higher price was before. This situation doesn’t match the description that those famous economists provided about the problem of over-production. The lasting decline in producers' circumstances due to a lack of markets, which those writers talk about, isn’t something that aligns with what happens in a commercial crisis.
The other phenomenon from which the notion of a general excess of wealth and superfluity of accumulation seems to derive countenance is one of a more permanent nature, namely, the fall of profits and interest which naturally takes place with the progress of population and production. The cause of this decline of profit is the increased cost of maintaining labor, which results from an increase of population and of the demand for food, outstripping the advance of agricultural improvement. This important feature in the economical progress of nations will receive full consideration and discussion in the succeeding book.256 It is obviously a totally different thing from a want of market for commodities, though often confounded with it in the complaints of the producing and trading classes. The true interpretation of the modern or present state of industrial economy is, that there is hardly any amount of business which may not be done, if people will be content to do it on small profits; and this all active and intelligent persons in business perfectly well know: but even those who comply with the necessities of their time grumble at what they comply with, and wish that there were less capital,257 or, as they express it, less competition, in order that there might be greater profits. Low profits, however, are a different thing from deficiency [pg 371] of demand, and the production and accumulation which merely reduce profits can not be called excess of supply or of production. What the phenomenon really is, and its effects and necessary limits, will be seen when we treat of that express subject.
The other phenomenon that seems to support the idea of a general excess of wealth and unnecessary accumulation is more long-lasting in nature—specifically, the decline in profits and interest rates that naturally occurs as population and production grow. The reason for this drop in profit is the rising cost of maintaining labor, which results from increasing population and demand for food, surpassing the progress in agricultural improvements. This significant aspect of the economic development of nations will be thoroughly examined in the next book.256 It's clearly a completely different issue from a lack of market for goods, although it's often confused with that in the complaints from producers and traders. The real understanding of the current state of industrial economy is that nearly any amount of business can be done if people are willing to accept lower profits; and all active and smart individuals in business are well aware of this. However, even those who adapt to the current conditions still complain about what they have to accept and wish there was less capital,257 or, as they put it, less competition, so that they could enjoy higher profits. Low profits, though, are different from a lack of demand, and production and accumulation that simply lower profits cannot be deemed excess supply or production. The true nature of the phenomenon, along with its effects and necessary limits, will become clear when we discuss that specific topic.
Chapter 12. On Certain Unique Cases of Value.
§ 1. The value of goods that share a common production cost.
The general laws of value, in all the more important cases of the interchange of commodities in the same country, have now been investigated. We examined, first, the case of monopoly, in which the value is determined by either a natural or an artificial limitation of quantity, that is, by demand and supply: secondly, the case of free competition, when the article can be produced in indefinite quantity at the same cost; in which case the permanent value is determined by the cost of production, and only the fluctuations by supply and demand: thirdly, a mixed case, that of the articles which can be produced in indefinite quantity, but not at the same cost; in which case the permanent value is determined by the greatest cost which it is necessary to incur in order to obtain the required supply: and, lastly, we have found that money itself is a commodity of the third class; that its value, in a state of freedom, is governed by the same laws as the values of other commodities of its class; and that prices, therefore, follow the same laws as values.
The general laws of value regarding the exchange of goods within a country have now been studied. We first looked at the case of monopoly, where value is determined by a natural or artificial limitation of quantity, specifically by demand and supply. Next, we examined free competition, where a product can be produced in unlimited quantities at the same cost; in this situation, the lasting value is determined by production costs, while only short-term fluctuations are influenced by supply and demand. Third, we explored a mixed case involving items that can be produced in unlimited amounts but not at the same cost; here, the lasting value is determined by the highest cost necessary to obtain the desired supply. Finally, we found that money itself is a commodity of the third type; its value, in a free market, is governed by the same laws as the values of other commodities in its category, meaning that prices follow the same principles as values.
From this it appears that demand and supply govern the fluctuations of values and prices in all cases, and the permanent values and prices of all things of which the supply is determined by any agency other than that of free competition: but that, under the régime of competition, things are, on the average, exchanged for each other at such values, and sold at such prices, as afford equal expectation of advantage to all classes of producers; which can only be when things [pg 373] exchange for one another in the ratio of their cost of production.
From this, it seems that demand and supply control the changes in values and prices in every situation, as well as the stable values and prices of things where the supply is influenced by factors other than free competition. However, under the diet of competition, items are, on average, traded for each other at values, and sold at prices, that provide equal opportunities for profit to all types of producers; which can only happen when items [pg 373] exchange for one another in the ratio of their production costs.
It sometimes happens [however] that two different commodities have what may be termed a joint cost of production. They are both products of the same operation, or set of operations, and the outlay is incurred for the sake of both together, not part for one and part for the other. The same outlay would have to be incurred for either of the two, if the other were not wanted or used at all. There are not a few instances of commodities thus associated in their production. For example, coke and coal-gas are both produced from the same material, and by the same operation. In a more partial sense, mutton and wool are an example; beef, hides, and tallow; calves and dairy produce; chickens and eggs. Cost of production can have nothing to do with deciding the value of the associated commodities relatively to each other. It only decides their joint value. Cost of production does not determine their prices, but the sum of their prices. A principle is wanting to apportion the expenses of production between the two.
It sometimes happens that two different products have what we can call a joint cost of production. They both come from the same process or set of processes, and the expenses are incurred for both together, not split between them. The same expenses would need to be paid for either one, even if the other wasn’t needed or used at all. There are plenty of examples of products linked in their production. For instance, coke and coal gas are both made from the same material and through the same process. In a more limited sense, mutton and wool are an example; beef, hides, and tallow; calves and dairy products; chickens and eggs. The cost of production doesn’t help determine the value of these related products in comparison to each other. It only establishes their combined value. Cost of production doesn't set their prices, but the total of their prices. We need a principle to divide the production costs between the two.
Since cost of production here fails us, we must revert to a law of value anterior to cost of production, and more fundamental, the law of demand and supply. The law is, that the demand for a commodity varies with its value, and that the value adjusts itself so that the demand shall be equal to the supply. This supplies the principle of repartition which we are in quest of.
Since the cost of production here is inadequate, we need to return to a principle of value that comes before cost of production and is more fundamental: the law of demand and supply. This law states that the demand for a commodity changes with its value, and that value adjusts itself so that demand matches supply. This provides the principle of distribution we are looking for.
Suppose that a certain quantity of gas is produced and sold at a certain price, and that the residuum of coke is offered at a price which, together with that of the gas, repays the expenses with the ordinary rate of profit. Suppose, too, that, at the price put upon the gas and coke respectively, the whole of the gas finds an easy market, without [pg 374] either surplus or deficiency, but that purchasers can not be found for all the coke corresponding to it. The coke will be offered at a lower price in order to force a market. But this lower price, together with the price of the gas, will not be remunerating; the manufacture, as a whole, will not pay its expenses with the ordinary profit, and will not, on these terms, continue to be carried on. The gas, therefore, must be sold at a higher price, to make up for the deficiency on the coke. The demand consequently contracting, the production will be somewhat reduced; and prices will become stationary when, by the joint effect of the rise of gas and the fall of coke, so much less of the first is sold, and so much more of the second, that there is now a market for all the coke which results from the existing extent of the gas-manufacture.
Imagine a situation where a certain amount of gas is produced and sold at a specific price, and the leftover coke is sold at a price that, along with the gas, covers the costs and gives a normal profit. Also, assume that at the prices set for gas and coke, all the gas sells easily, without any surplus or shortage, but not all the coke is sold. The coke will be priced lower to stimulate sales. However, this lower price, combined with the gas price, won't cover expenses adequately, and as a result, the overall production won’t be sustainable with a normal profit, so it won’t continue under these conditions. Therefore, the gas must be sold at a higher price to compensate for the losses on the coke. As demand decreases, production will be slightly reduced, and prices will stabilize when the combined effect of the gas price increase and the coke price decrease results in less gas being sold and more coke being sold, creating a market for all the coke produced from the current gas manufacturing level.
Or suppose the reverse case; that more coke is wanted at the present prices than can be supplied by the operations required by the existing demand for gas. Coke, being now in deficiency, will rise in price. The whole operation will yield more than the usual rate of profit, and additional capital will be attracted to the manufacture. The unsatisfied demand for coke will be supplied; but this can not be done without increasing the supply of gas too; and, as the existing demand was fully supplied already, an increased quantity can only find a market by lowering the price. Equilibrium will be attained when the demand for each article fits so well with the demand for the other, that the quantity required of each is exactly as much as is generated in producing the quantity required of the other.
Or imagine the opposite scenario: more coke is needed at the current prices than can be provided by the processes that meet the existing demand for gas. Since there’s a shortfall in coke, its price will increase. This entire situation will lead to higher-than-normal profits, attracting more investment into coke production. The unmet demand for coke will be fulfilled; however, this can't happen without also increasing the gas supply. Since the current demand for gas was already fully met, the only way to sell the extra gas is by lowering the price. Balance will be achieved when the demand for each product aligns perfectly with the demand for the other, so that the quantity needed of each matches exactly the amount produced to meet the quantity of the other.
When, therefore, two or more commodities have a joint cost of production, their natural values relatively to each other are those which will create a demand for each, in the ratio of the quantities in which they are sent forth by the productive process.
When two or more products have a shared production cost, their natural values compared to each other are those that will generate demand for each, in proportion to the quantities in which they are produced.
§ 2. Values of various types of agricultural products.
Another case of value which merits attention is that of the different kinds of agricultural produce. The case would present nothing peculiar, if different agricultural products [pg 375] were either grown indiscriminately and with equal advantage on the same soils, or wholly on different soils. The difficulty arises from two things: first, that most soils are fitter for one kind of produce than another, without being absolutely unfit for any; and, secondly, the rotation of crops.
Another important case to consider is the various types of agricultural produce. This wouldn't seem unusual if different agricultural products were either grown equally well on the same soils or entirely on different soils. The challenge stems from two factors: first, that most soils are better suited for one type of produce than another, even if they're not completely unsuitable for any; and second, the practice of rotating crops.
For simplicity, we will confine our supposition to two kinds of agricultural produce; for instance, wheat and oats. If all soils were equally adapted for wheat and for oats, both would be grown indiscriminately on all soils, and their relative cost of production, being the same everywhere, would govern their relative value. If the same labor which grows three quarters of wheat on any given soil would always grow on that soil five quarters of oats, the three and the five quarters would be of the same value. The fact is, that both wheat and oats can be grown on almost any soil which is capable of producing either.
To keep things simple, let’s only consider two types of crops: wheat and oats. If all types of soil were equally suitable for growing both wheat and oats, then both would be planted anywhere without distinction, and their production costs would be the same everywhere, which would determine their value. If the same amount of labor that produces three quarters of wheat on a specific piece of land could always produce five quarters of oats on that land, then the three and five quarters would have the same value. The reality is that wheat and oats can be grown on nearly any soil that can support either crop.
It is evident that each grain will be cultivated in preference on the soils which are better adapted for it than for the other; and, if the demand is supplied from these alone, the values of the two grains will have no reference to one another. But when the demand for both is such as to require that each should be grown not only on the soils peculiarly fitted for it, but on the medium soils which, without being specifically adapted to either, are about equally suited for both, the cost of production on those medium soils will determine the relative value of the two grains; while the rent of the soils specifically adapted to each will be regulated by their productive power, considered with reference to that one [grain] alone to which they are peculiarly applicable. Thus far the question presents no difficulty, to any one to whom the general principles of value are familiar.
It’s clear that each type of grain will be grown in the soils that are best suited for it rather than for the other. If the demand is met using only those soils, the values of the two grains won’t be connected. However, when the demand for both grains is such that each needs to be cultivated not just on the soils specifically suited for it, but also on average soils that aren’t specially adapted to either but are equally suitable for both, the production costs on those average soils will set the relative value of the two grains. Meanwhile, the rent of the soils specifically suited for each grain will be determined by their productivity, focusing on the one grain they are best designed for. Up to this point, the issue poses no challenge for anyone familiar with the basic principles of value.

It may happen, however, that the demand for one of the two, as for example wheat, may so outstrip the demand for the other, as not only to occupy the soils specially suited for wheat, but to engross entirely those equally suitable to both, and even encroach upon those which are better adapted to oats. To create an inducement for this unequal apportionment of the cultivation, wheat must be relatively dearer, and oats cheaper, than according to the cost of their production on the medium land. Their relative value must be in proportion to the cost on that quality of land, whatever it may be, on which the comparative demand for the two grains requires that both of them should be grown. If, from the state of the demand, the two cultivations meet on land more favorable to one than to the other, that one will be cheaper and the other dearer, in relation to each other and to things in general, than if the proportional demand were as we at first supposed.
It may happen, however, that the demand for one of the two, like wheat, could greatly exceed the demand for the other. This could not only take over the land particularly suited for wheat but also entirely dominate the land that is suitable for both, and even spill over into areas better suited for oats. To encourage this uneven distribution of cultivation, wheat must be relatively more expensive, and oats cheaper, than what would be expected based on their production costs on average land. Their relative value must be aligned with the cost on whatever quality of land is needed to grow both grains based on their comparative demand. If the demand situation pushes both crops onto land that's more suited for one than the other, then that one crop will be cheaper, and the other will be more expensive compared to each other and to other things in general, than if the proportional demand were as we initially assumed.
Here, then, we obtain a fresh illustration, in a somewhat different manner, of the operation of demand, not as an occasional disturber of value, but as a permanent regulator of it, conjoined with, or supplementary to, cost of production.
Here, we get a new example, in a slightly different way, of how demand works, not just as a temporary disruptor of value, but as a constant regulator of it, alongside or in addition to production costs.
Chapter 13. International Trade.
§ 1. Production costs are not a regulator of international values. Expansion of the term“international.”
Some things it is physically impossible to produce, except in particular circumstances of heat, soil, water, or atmosphere. But there are many things which, though they could be produced at home without difficulty, and in any quantity, are yet imported from a distance. The explanation which would be popularly given of this would be, that it is cheaper to import than to produce them: and this is the true reason. But this reason itself requires that a reason be given for it. Of two things produced in the same place, if one is cheaper than the other, the reason is that it can be produced with less labor and capital, or, in a word, at less cost. Is this also the reason as between things produced in different places? Are things never imported but from places where they can be produced with less labor (or less of the other element of cost, time) than in the place to which they are brought? Does the law, that permanent value is proportioned to cost of production, hold good between commodities produced in distant places, as it does between those produced in adjacent places?
Some things are physically impossible to produce except under specific conditions of heat, soil, water, or atmosphere. However, there are many items that, despite being easy to produce at home and in any quantity, are still imported from far away. The common explanation for this is that it’s cheaper to import them than to make them locally, which is indeed the real reason. But this explanation itself raises another question. When comparing two items made in the same location, if one is cheaper, it’s because it can be produced with less labor and resources, or simply at a lower cost. Does this also apply to items produced in different locations? Are things only imported from places where they can be made with less labor (or less of the other cost element, time) than in the destination area? Does the principle that lasting value is related to production cost also apply to goods produced in distant locations, just like it does for those made nearby?
We shall find that it does not. A thing may sometimes be sold cheapest, by being produced in some other place than that at which it can be produced with the smallest amount of labor and abstinence.
We will see that it doesn’t. Sometimes, an item can be sold for less when it’s produced somewhere else instead of where it can be made with the least amount of effort and sacrifice.
This could not happen between adjacent places. If the north bank of the Thames possessed an advantage over the south bank in the production of shoes, no shoes would be produced on the south side; the shoemakers would remove themselves and their capitals to the north bank, or would have established themselves there originally; for, being competitors [pg 378] in the same market with those on the north side, they could not compensate themselves for their disadvantage at the expense of the consumer; the amount of it would fall entirely on their profits; and they would not long content themselves with a smaller profit, when, by simply crossing a river, they could increase it. But between distant places, and especially between different countries, profits may continue different; because persons do not usually remove themselves or their capitals to a distant place without a very strong motive. If capital removed to remote parts of the world as readily, and for as small an inducement, as it moves to another quarter of the same town—if people would transport their manufactories to America or China whenever they could save a small percentage in their expenses by it—profits would be alike (or equivalent) all over the world, and all things would be produced in the places where the same labor and capital would produce them in greatest quantity and of best quality. A tendency may, even now, be observed toward such a state of things: capital is becoming more and more cosmopolitan; there is so much greater similarity of manners and institutions than formerly, and so much less alienation of feeling, among the more civilized countries, that both population and capital now move from one of those countries to another on much less temptation than heretofore. But there are still extraordinary differences, both of wages and of profits, between different parts of the world.
This couldn't happen between nearby places. If the north bank of the Thames had an advantage over the south bank in making shoes, no shoes would be made on the south side. The shoemakers would move themselves and their resources to the north bank, or they would have set up their businesses there from the start. Being competitors in the same market as those on the north side, they couldn't make up for their disadvantage at the consumer's expense; the impact would entirely fall on their profits. They wouldn't stay satisfied with a smaller profit when they could simply cross a river to increase it. However, between distant places, especially different countries, profits can remain different because people usually don't move themselves or their resources to far-off locations without a strong incentive. If capital could easily move to far corners of the world for small reasons, just as it moves to another area of the same town—if people would shift their factories to America or China every time they could save a little on expenses—profits would be similar everywhere, and all goods would be produced in places where the same labor and capital could create them in the largest quantities and best quality. We can see a trend toward that situation now: capital is becoming more global; there's much more similarity in customs and institutions than before, and less feeling of separation among more developed countries, so both people and capital now move from one of those countries to another with much less incentive than in the past. Still, there are remarkable differences in both wages and profits across different parts of the world.
Between all distant places, therefore, in some degree, but especially between different countries (whether under the same supreme government or not), there may exist great inequalities in the return to labor and capital, without causing them to move from one place to the other in such quantity as to level those inequalities. The capital belonging to a country will, to a great extent, remain in the country, even if there be no mode of employing it in which it would not be more productive elsewhere. Yet even a country thus circumstanced might, and probably would, carry on trade with [pg 379] other countries. It would export articles of some sort, even to places which could make them with less labor than itself; because those countries, supposing them to have an advantage over it in all productions, would have a greater advantage in some things than in others, and would find it their interest to import the articles in which their advantage was smallest, that they might employ more of their labor and capital on those in which it was greatest.
Between all distant places, there can be significant differences in the returns on labor and capital, especially between different countries (whether they are governed by the same authority or not), without causing a large movement of these resources to equalize those differences. The capital of a country will largely stay within that country, even if there are more productive opportunities elsewhere. However, a country in this situation might still engage in trade with other countries. It would export certain goods, even to places that could produce them more efficiently, because those countries, assuming they excel in all types of production, would still find it beneficial to import items where their advantage is less significant, allowing them to allocate more of their labor and capital to areas where their advantage is greater.
§ 2. The exchange of goods between distant locations is determined by differences in their comparative, not absolute, production costs.
As I have said elsewhere260 after Ricardo (the thinker who has done most toward clearing up this subject),261 “it is not a difference in the absolute cost of production which determines the interchange, but a difference in the comparative cost. It may be to our advantage to procure iron from Sweden in exchange for cottons, even although the mines of England as well as her manufactories should be more productive than those of Sweden; for if we have an advantage of one half in cottons, and only an advantage of a quarter in iron, and could sell our cottons to Sweden at the price which Sweden must pay for them if she produced them herself, we should obtain our iron with an advantage [over Sweden] of one half, as well as our cottons. We may often, by trading with foreigners, obtain their commodities at a smaller expense of labor and capital than they cost to the foreigners themselves. The bargain is still advantageous to the foreigner, because the commodity which he receives in exchange, though it has cost us less, would have cost him more.”
As I have mentioned before260 after Ricardo (the thinker who has contributed the most to clarifying this topic),261 "It’s not the difference in the absolute cost of production that impacts trade, but the difference in the comparative cost. It could be advantageous for us to get iron from Sweden in exchange for cotton, even if England’s mines and factories are more efficient than Sweden’s. If we have a 50% advantage in cotton and only a 25% advantage in iron, and we sell our cotton to Sweden at the price they would pay if they produced it themselves, we would get our iron at a 50% advantage compared to Sweden, just like we do with our cotton. By trading with other countries, we can often obtain their goods for less labor and capital than it costs them to produce. The arrangement is still beneficial for the foreigner because the item they receive in exchange, even though it costs us less, would have cost them more."
This may be illustrated as follows:
This can be demonstrated like this:
Articles interchanged. | England. | Sweden. |
Cotton. | 10 days' labor produces x yds. | 15 days' labor produces x yds. |
Iron. | 12 days' labor produces y cwts. | 15 days' labor produces y cwts. |
Here England has the advantage over Sweden in both cotton and iron, since she can produce x yards of cotton in ten days' labor to fifteen days in Sweden, and y cwts. of iron in twelve days' labor to fifteen days in Sweden. The ship which takes x yards of cotton to Sweden, and there exchanges it, as may be done, for y cwts. of iron, brings back to England that which cost Sweden fifteen days' labor, while the cotton with [pg 381] which the iron was bought cost England only ten days' labor. So that England also got her iron at an advantage over Sweden of one half of ten days' labor; and yet England had an absolute advantage over Sweden in iron of a less amount (i.e., of one fourth of twelve days' labor). It is to be distinctly understood that by difference in comparative cost we mean a difference in the comparative cost of producing two or more articles in the same country, and not the difference of cost of the same article in the different trading countries. In this example, for instance, it is the difference in the comparative costs in England of both cotton and iron (not the different costs of cotton in England and Sweden) which gives the reason for the existence of the foreign trade.
Here, England outperforms Sweden in both cotton and iron, as it can producexyards of cotton in ten days of work, compared to fifteen days in Sweden, andyhundredweights of iron in twelve days of work compared to fifteen days in Sweden. The ship that carriesxyards of cotton to Sweden, where it can be traded foryhundredweights of iron, brings back to England what took Sweden fifteen days of work, while the cotton that bought the iron only cost England ten days of work. So, England effectively got its iron at a five-day labor advantage over Sweden, but it also had a total advantage over Sweden in iron of a smaller amount (i.e., three days of work). It's important to clearly understand that by the difference incost comparisonwe refer to the difference in the comparative cost of producing two or more items within thesame country, instead of the price variation of the same item in different trading countries. In this example, it's the difference in the comparative costs in England for both cotton and iron (not the differing prices of cotton in England and Sweden) that accounts for the existence of foreign trade.
To illustrate the cases in which interchange of commodities will not, and those in which it will, take place between two countries, the supposition may be made that the United States has an advantage over England in the production both of iron and of corn. It may first be supposed that the advantage is of equal amount in both commodities; the iron and the corn, each of which required 100 days' labor in the United States, requiring each 150 days' labor in England. It would follow that the iron of 150 days' labor in England, if sent to the United States, would be equal to the iron of 100 days' labor in the United States; if exchanged for corn, therefore, it would exchange for the corn of only 100 days' labor. But the corn of 100 days' labor in the United States was supposed to be the same quantity with that of 150 days' labor in England. With 150 days' labor in iron, therefore, England would only get as much corn in the United States as she could raise with 150 days' labor at home; and she would, in importing it, have the cost of carriage besides. In these circumstances no exchange would take place. In this case the comparative costs of the two articles in England and in the United States were supposed to be the same, though the absolute costs were different; on which supposition we see that there would be no labor saved to either country by confining its industry to one of the two productions and importing the other.
To show the situations where trade of goods will not and will happen between two countries, let’s assume that the United States has an edge over England in making both iron and corn. First, let’s say that the advantage is the same for both goods; producing iron and corn each takes 100 days of labor in the United States, while each takes 150 days of labor in England. This means that the iron produced in England in 150 days would equal the iron produced in the U.S. in 100 days. If this iron were swapped for corn, it would only trade for the corn that requires 100 days of labor. However, the corn produced in 100 days in the U.S. is the same amount as that which takes 150 days to produce in England. Thus, with 150 days' labor in iron, England would only get as much corn in the U.S. as it could grow with 150 days of labor at home, plus it would have to pay for shipping costs. Under these conditions, no trade would occur. In this scenario, while the relative costs of both goods were assumed to be the same in England and the U.S., their absolute costs differed; this means that neither country would save any labor by focusing on just one of the two products and importing the other.
It is otherwise when the comparative and not merely [pg 382] the absolute costs of the two articles are different in the two countries. If, while the iron produced with 100 days' labor in the United States was produced with 150 days' labor in England, the corn which was produced in the United States with 100 days' labor could not be produced in England with less than 200 days' labor, an adequate motive to exchange would immediately arise. With a quantity of iron which England produced with 150 days' labor, she would be able to purchase as much corn in the United States as was there produced with 100 days' labor; but the quantity which was there produced with 100 days' labor would be as great as the quantity produced in England with 200 days' labor. By importing corn, therefore, from the United States, and paying for it with iron, England would obtain for 150 days' labor what would otherwise cost her 200, being a saving of 50 days' labor on each repetition of the transaction; and not merely a saving to England, but a saving absolutely; for it is not obtained at the expense of the United States, who, with corn that cost her 100 days' labor, has purchased iron which, if produced at home, would have cost her the same. The United States, therefore, on this supposition, loses nothing; but also she derives no advantage from the trade, the imported iron costing her as much as if it were made at home. To enable the United States to gain anything by the interchange, something must be abated from the gain of England: the corn produced in the United States by 100 days' labor must be able to purchase from England more iron than the United States could produce by that amount of labor; more, therefore, than England could produce by 150 days' labor, England thus obtaining the corn which would have cost her 200 days at a cost exceeding 150, though short of 200. England, therefore, no longer gains the whole of the labor which is saved to the two jointly by trading with one another.262
It’s different when the relative, not just the absolute, costs of the two goods vary between the two countries. If iron produced in the United States takes 100 days of labor while the same amount in England takes 150 days, and corn produced in the United States takes 100 days but would require at least 200 days in England, an incentive to trade would quickly appear. With the amount of iron England generates in 150 days of labor, it could buy as much corn in the United States as is produced in 100 days. That quantity of corn in the U.S. would be equivalent to what would take 200 days to produce in England. By importing corn from the United States and paying for it with iron, England would be able to get for 150 days of labor what would typically cost her 200, saving 50 days of labor each time they make that exchange; and this isn't just a benefit for England, but a net gain overall, since it's not at the expense of the United States, which, by selling corn that costs 100 days of labor, buys iron that would have cost the same if produced domestically. Therefore, under this scenario, the United States doesn’t lose anything; however, it also doesn’t gain from the trade, as the imported iron costs as much as if it was made at home. For the United States to benefit from this exchange, England would have to forfeit some of its gain: the corn produced in the U.S. with 100 days of labor must be able to buy more iron from England than the U.S. could create in that same time, specifically more than what England could produce in 150 days. Consequently, England would be acquiring corn, which would cost her 200 days of labor, at a cost higher than 150 days, but less than 200. Thus, England doesn’t fully capture all the labor savings that result from both countries trading with each other.
The case in which both England and the United States would gain from the trade may be thus briefly shown:
Here's a brief overview of how both England and the United States would gain from the trade:
Articles swapped. | U.S. | England. |
Corn. | 100 days of work producesxbus. | 200 days of work producesxbus. |
Iron. | 125 days of work producesytons. | 150 days of work producesylots. |
The ship which carries x bushels of corn from the United States to England can there exchange it for at least y tons of iron (costing England 150 days' labor, since x bushels in England would cost 200 days' labor), and bring it home, gaining for the United States the difference between the 100 days' labor in corn, paid for the y tons of iron, and the 125 days which the iron would have cost here if produced at home. In this case the United States has an advantage over England in both corn and iron, but still an international trade will spring up, because the United States will derive a gain owing to the less cost of corn as compared with the cost of iron. Our comparative advantage is in corn. England, also, by sending to the United States y tons of iron, gets in return for it x bushels of corn. To produce the corn herself would have cost her 200 days' labor, but she bought that corn by only 150 days' labor spent on iron. England's comparative advantage is in iron. Then both countries will gain.
The ship that transportsxbushels of corn from the United States to England can be traded there for at leastylots of iron (which costs England 150 days' labor, sincexBushels would require 200 days' labor in England, and if we bring it back, it would provide the United States with the difference from the 100 days' labor invested in corn.ya lot of iron, and the 125 days it would take to produce that iron at home. In this situation, the United States has an edge over England in both corn and iron, but international trade will still emerge because the United States will benefit from the lower price of corn compared to the price of iron. Ourcomparative analysisThe advantage lies in corn. England, by sending __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ytons of iron to the United States, receivesxbushels of corn in return. Producing the corn herself would have taken her 200 days of work, but she obtained that corn by spending only 150 days of work on iron. England'scomparativeThe advantage lies in iron. So, both countries will gain benefits.
Mr. Bowen263 gives an instance of international trade where one country has the advantage in both of the commodities entering into the exchange: “The inhabitants of Barbadoes, favored by their tropical climate and fertile soil, can raise provisions cheaper than we can in the United States. And yet Barbadoes buys nearly all her provisions from this country. Why is this so? Because, though Barbadoes has the advantage over us in the ability to raise provisions cheaply, she has a still greater advantage over us in her power to produce sugar and molasses. If she has an advantage of one fourth in raising provisions, she has an advantage of one half in regard to products exclusively tropical; and it is better for her to employ all her labor and capital in that branch of production in which her advantage is greatest. She can thus, by trading with us, obtain our breadstuffs and meat at a smaller expense of labor and capital than they cost ourselves. If, for instance, a barrel of flour costs ten days' labor in the United States and only eight days' labor in Barbadoes, the people of Barbadoes can still profitably buy the flour from this [pg 384] country, if they can pay for it with sugar which cost them only six days' labor; and the people of this country can profitably sell them the flour, or buy from them the sugar, provided the sugar, if raised in the United States, would cost eleven days' labor.... The United States receive sugar, which would have cost them eleven days' labor, by paying for it with flour which costs them but ten days. Barbadoes receives flour, which would have cost her eight days' labor, by paying for it with sugar which costs her but six days. If Barbadoes produced both commodities with greater facility, but greater in precisely the same degree, there would be no motive for interchange.”
Mr. Bowen263provides an example of international trade where one country has an advantage in both goods involved in the exchange:“People in Barbados, thanks to their tropical climate and fertile soil, can produce food more cheaply than we can in the U.S. Yet, Barbados purchases most of its food from here. Why? Because while they can grow food at a lower cost, they have an even greater advantage in producing sugar and molasses. If they have a 25% advantage in food production, they have a 50% advantage in tropical products. It's smarter for them to focus all their labor and resources on what they do best. By trading with us, they can get our grains and meat at a lower cost in terms of labor and resources than it would take us to produce them. For instance, if making a barrel of flour takes ten days of labor in the U.S. but only eight days in Barbados, they can still profitably buy flour from us if they pay for it with sugar that costs them only six days of labor. And we can profitably sell them the flour or buy their sugar, as long as producing sugar here takes us eleven days of labor… The U.S. obtains sugar, which would have required eleven days of labor, by trading flour that costs just ten days to make. Barbados gets flour, which would have taken eight days of labor, by paying with sugar that takes only six days. If Barbados could produce both items more easily, but to the same extent, there wouldn’t be any reason for trade.”
It may be said, however, that in practice no business-man considers the question of “comparative cost” in making shipments of goods abroad; that all he thinks of is whether the price here, for example, is less than it is in London. And yet the very fact that the prices are less here implies that gold is of high value relatively to the given commodity; while in London, if money is to be sent back in payment, and if prices are high there, that implies that gold is there of less comparative value than commodities, and consequently that gold is the cheapest article to send to the United States. The doctrine, then, is as true of gold, or the precious metals, as it is of other commodities.264 It may be stated in the following language of Mr. Cairnes: “The proximate condition determining international exchange is the state of comparative prices in the exchanging countries as regards the commodities which form the subject of the trade. But comparative prices within the limits of each country are determined by two distinct principles—within the range of effective industrial competition, by cost of production; outside that range, by reciprocal demand.”265
It can be said, however, that in reality, no businessman thinks about the question of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“comparative cost”When sending goods overseas, he only considers whether the price here is lower than in London. However, the lower prices here indicate that gold holds a higher value compared to the specific commodity; in contrast, if money is sent as payment to London and prices are high, it suggests that gold has less value compared to the commodities, meaning that gold is the least expensive item to send to the United States. This principle applies to gold or precious metals just like it does for other commodities.264It can be stated in the following words of Mr. Cairnes:“The current factor influencing international trade is the relative prices of goods in the countries involved. However, in each country, relative prices are determined by two different principles—within the zone of effective industrial competition, they are driven by production costs; outside that zone, they are influenced by mutual demand.”265
§ 3. The direct benefits of commerce include the increased efficiency of the world's productive capabilities.
From this exposition we perceive in what consists the benefit of international exchange, or, in other words, foreign commerce. Setting aside its enabling countries to obtain commodities which they could not themselves produce at all, its advantage consists in a more efficient employment of the productive forces of the world. If two countries which traded together attempted, as far as was physically possible, to produce for themselves what they now import from one another, the labor and capital of the two countries [pg 385] would not be so productive, the two together would not obtain from their industry so great a quantity of commodities, as when each employs itself in producing, both for itself and for the other, the things in which its labor is relatively most efficient. The addition thus made to the produce of the two combined constitutes the advantage of the trade. It is possible that one of the two countries may be altogether inferior to the other in productive capacities, and that its labor and capital could be employed to greatest advantage by being removed bodily to the other. The labor and capital which have been sunk in rendering Holland habitable would have produced a much greater return if transported to America or Ireland. The produce of the whole world would be greater, or the labor less, than it is, if everything were produced where there is the greatest absolute facility for its production. But nations do not, at least in modern times, emigrate en masse; and, while the labor and capital of a country remain in the country, they are most beneficially employed in producing, for foreign markets as well as for its own, the things in which it lies under the least disadvantage, if there be none in which it possesses an advantage.
From this explanation, we understand the benefits of international trade, or in other words, foreign commerce. Beyond allowing countries to access goods that they can't produce themselves, the main advantage lies in a more efficient use of the world’s productive forces. If two nations that trade with each other tried, as much as physically possible, to produce everything they now import from one another, their combined labor and capital would not be as productive. Together, they would not generate as many goods as when each country focuses on producing the things in which it has a relative efficiency. The increase in total output from both nations together represents the benefit of trade. It’s possible that one of the countries might be completely less capable than the other in terms of production, and moving its labor and capital to the more productive country could yield better results. The resources invested in making the Netherlands habitable would likely have generated much greater returns if they had been allocated to America or Ireland. The overall production globally could be higher, or the amount of labor needed could be less, if everything were produced where it could be done most easily. However, in modern times, countries do not emigrate en masse; and while the labor and capital of a nation remain within its borders, they are best utilized in producing for both foreign markets and domestic needs in areas where they face the least disadvantages, if not advantages.
The fundamental ground on which all trade, or all exchange of commodities, rests, is division of labor, or separation of employments. Beyond the ordinary gain from division of labor, arising from increased dexterity, there exist gains arising from the development of “the special capacities or resources possessed by particular individuals or localities.” International exchanges call out chiefly the special advantages offered by particular localities for the prosecution of particular industries.
The fundamental basis for all trade or exchange of goods is the division of labor, or the separation of tasks. In addition to the typical advantages from division of labor, which come from enhanced skills, there are further benefits that arise from the development of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“the distinct skills or resources of particular people or regions.”International trade mainly emphasizes the specific advantages that someareasprovide for executing specific industries.
“The only case, indeed, in which personal aptitudes go for much in the commerce of nations is where the nations concerned occupy different grades in the scale of civilization.... The most striking example which the world has ever seen of a foreign trade determined by the peculiar personal qualities of those engaged in ministering to it is that which was furnished by the Southern States of the American Union previous to the abolition of slavery. The effect of that institution was to give a very distinct industrial character to the laboring population of those States which unfitted them for all but a very limited number of occupations, but gave them a certain special fitness for these. Almost the entire industry of the country was consequently [pg 386] turned to the production of two or three crude commodities, in raising which the industry of slaves was found to be effective; and these were used, through an exchange with foreign countries, as the means of supplying the inhabitants with all other requisites.... In the main, however, it would seem that this cause [personal aptitudes] does not go for very much in international commerce.”266
“The only time that personal skills have a significant role in international trade is when the countries involved are at different levels of development.... A prime example of foreign trade influenced by the unique personal qualities of those involved is found in the Southern States of the United States before slavery was abolished. The effects of slavery created a distinct industrial profile for the labor force in those states, confining them to only a few types of work, but making them particularly effective in those roles. Consequently, most of the country’s industry focused on producing two or three raw materials, where slave labor was especially efficient; these materials were traded with other countries to provide residents with everything else they needed.... Overall, though, it seems that this factor [personal skills] doesn’t have a major influence in international trade.[pg 386]”266
In brief, then, international trade is but an extension of the principle of division of labor; and the gains to increased productiveness, arising from the latter, are exactly the same as those from the former.
In summary, international trade is simply an expansion of the principle of labor division, and the productivity benefits that result from it are the same as those from the original concept.
§ 4. —Not through a channel for exports, nor in the profits of merchants.
According to the doctrine now stated, the only direct advantage of foreign commerce consists in the imports. A country obtains things which it either could not have produced at all, or which it must have produced at a greater expense of capital and labor than the cost of the things which it exports to pay for them. It thus obtains a more ample supply of the commodities it wants, for the same labor and capital; or the same supply, for less labor and capital, leaving the surplus disposable to produce other things. The vulgar theory disregards this benefit and deems the advantage of commerce to reside in the exports: as if not what a country obtains, but what it parts with, by its foreign trade, was supposed to constitute the gain to it. An extended market for its produce—an abundant consumption for its goods—a vent for its surplus—are the phrases by which it has been customary to designate the uses and recommendations of commerce with foreign countries. This notion is intelligible, when we consider that the authors and leaders of opinion on mercantile questions have always hitherto been the selling class. It is in truth a surviving relic of the Mercantile Theory, according to which, money being the only wealth, selling, or, in other words, exchanging goods for money, was (to countries without mines of their own) the only way of growing rich—and importation of goods, that is to say, parting with money, was so much subtracted from the benefit.
According to the theory stated here, the main benefit of foreign trade comes from imports. A country acquires items that it either can't produce at all, or would have to produce at a much higher cost in terms of capital and labor than what it exports to pay for those items. This way, it gets a larger supply of the goods it needs for the same amount of labor and capital; or the same quantity for less labor and capital, allowing the extra resources to be used for producing other things. The common view ignores this advantage and believes that the benefits of trade come from exports—suggesting that what matters is not what a country gains, but what it loses through foreign trade. Phrases like "a broader market for its products," "high demand for its goods," and "a way to sell its surplus" are often used to highlight the benefits of international trade. This idea makes sense when we realize that those who have shaped opinions on trade issues have primarily been sellers. In reality, it’s a leftover belief from the Mercantile Theory, which claimed that money is the only form of wealth. For countries without their own mines, selling, or exchanging goods for money, was seen as the only way to become wealthy, while importing goods—essentially spending money—was viewed as a loss of value.
The notion that money alone is wealth has been long defunct, but it has left many of its progeny behind it. Adam Smith's theory of the benefit of foreign trade was, that it afforded an outlet for the surplus produce of a country, and enabled a portion of the capital of the country to replace itself with a profit. The expression, surplus produce, seems to imply that a country is under some kind of necessity of producing the corn or cloth which it exports; so that the portion which it does not itself consume, if not wanted and consumed elsewhere, would either be produced in sheer waste, or, if it were not produced, the corresponding portion of capital would remain idle, and the mass of productions in the country would be diminished by so much. Either of these suppositions would be entirely erroneous. The country produces an exportable article in excess of its own wants from no inherent necessity, but as the cheapest mode of supplying itself with other things. If prevented from exporting this surplus, it would cease to produce it, and would no longer import anything, being unable to give an equivalent; but the labor and capital which had been employed in producing with a view to exportation would find employment in producing those desirable objects which were previously brought from abroad; or, if some of them could not be produced, in producing substitutes for them. These articles would, of course, be produced at a greater cost than that of the things with which they had previously been purchased from foreign countries. But the value and price of the articles would rise in proportion; and the capital would just as much be replaced, with the ordinary profit, from the returns, as it was when employed in producing for the foreign market. The only losers (after the temporary inconvenience of the change) would be the consumers of the heretofore imported articles, who would be obliged either to do without them, consuming in lieu of them something which they did not like as well, or to pay a higher price for them than before.
The idea that money alone equals wealth has been outdated for a long time, but it has left many implications behind. Adam Smith's theory on the advantages of foreign trade suggested that it provided a way for a country to sell surplus goods and allowed some of the country's capital to be reinvested for profit. The term "surplus produce" implies that a country has to produce the grain or textiles it exports; otherwise, any goods not consumed locally would either be wasted or, if not produced, lead to idle capital and a decrease in overall production. However, both assumptions are entirely wrong. A country produces exportable goods beyond its needs not out of obligation but because it’s the most cost-effective way to obtain other goods. If it couldn’t export this surplus, it would stop producing it and wouldn’t import anything, as it wouldn’t have anything to exchange; instead, the labor and capital previously used for export production would shift to making things that were once imported. If some of those items couldn't be made, substitutes would be created instead. These goods would naturally cost more than those previously purchased from abroad. But the value and price of these items would increase accordingly, and the capital would still be recovered, along with normal profits, just as it was when producing for foreign markets. The only losers (after the temporary upset of the transition) would be the consumers of the previously imported goods, who would have to either do without them and settle for something they liked less or pay a higher price for them than before.
If it be said that the capital now employed in foreign [pg 388] trade could not find employment in supplying the home market, I might reply that this is the fallacy of general over-production, discussed in a former chapter; but the thing is in this particular case too evident to require an appeal to any general theory. We not only see that the capital of the merchant would find employment, but we see what employment. There would be employment created, equal to that which would be taken away. Exportation ceasing, importation to an equal value would cease also, and all that part of the income of the country which had been expended in imported commodities would be ready to expend itself on the same things produced at home, or on others instead of them. Commerce is virtually a mode of cheapening production; and in all such cases the consumer is the person ultimately benefited; the dealer, in the end, is sure to get his profit, whether the buyer obtains much or little for his money.
If someone argues that the capital currently used in foreign trade couldn't find a purpose in supplying the domestic market, I would point out that this idea stems from the misconception of general over-production, which we discussed in a previous chapter. However, in this particular situation, it's clear enough that we don't need to rely on any broad theory. We can see that the merchant's capital would indeed find a purpose, and we can see exactly what that purpose would be. Employment created would be equal to the employment lost. If exports stop, imports of equal value would stop as well, and all the income spent on imported goods would instead be spent on similar products made locally or on different ones. Commerce essentially acts as a way to reduce production costs; in all these cases, the consumer ultimately benefits the most. The dealer will always make a profit, regardless of whether the buyer gets a lot or a little for their money.
§ 5. Indirect benefits of commerce, both economic and moral, are even greater than the direct ones.
Such, then, is the direct economical advantage of foreign trade. But there are, besides, indirect effects, which must be counted as benefits of a high order. (1) One is, the [pg 389] tendency of every extension of the market to improve the processes of production. A country which produces for a larger market than its own can introduce a more extended division of labor, can make greater use of machinery, and is more likely to make inventions and improvements in the processes of production. Whatever causes a greater quantity of anything to be produced in the same place tends to the general increase of the productive powers of the world.267 There is (2) another consideration, principally applicable to an early stage of industrial advancement. The opening of a foreign trade, by making them acquainted with new objects, or tempting them by the easier acquisition of things which they had not previously thought attainable, sometimes works a sort of industrial revolution in a country whose resources were previously undeveloped for want of energy and ambition in the people; inducing those who were satisfied with scanty comforts and little work to work harder for the gratification of their new tastes, and even to save, and accumulate capital, for the still more complete satisfaction of those tastes at a future time.
So, that's the direct economic benefit of foreign trade. But there are also indirect effects that should be considered as significant advantages. (1) One is that every expansion of the market tends to improve production processes. A country that produces for a larger market than its own can implement a more extensive division of labor, utilize machinery more effectively, and is more likely to create inventions and enhancements in production methods. Anything that leads to a greater amount of something being produced in the same location contributes to the overall increase of the world's productive capabilities.267 There's (2) another factor, mostly relevant at the early stages of industrial development. The opening of foreign trade, by exposing people to new possibilities or making it easier to acquire things they previously viewed as unattainable, can sometimes trigger an industrial revolution in a country where resources were underutilized due to a lack of energy and ambition among the population. This encourages those who were content with minimal comforts and little work to strive harder for the satisfaction of their new desires and even to save and accumulate capital for even greater fulfillment of those desires in the future.
But (3) the economical advantages of commerce are surpassed in importance by those of its effects which are intellectual and moral. It is hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of human improvement, of placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar. Commerce is now, what war once was, the principal source of this contact. Such communication has always been, and is peculiarly in the present age, one of the primary sources of progress. Finally, (4) commerce first taught nations to see with goodwill the wealth and prosperity of one another. Before, the patriot, unless sufficiently advanced in culture to feel the world his country, wished all countries weak, poor, and ill-governed but his own: he now sees in their wealth and [pg 390] progress a direct source of wealth and progress to his own country. It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to it. And it may be said without exaggeration that the great extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race.
But (3) the economic benefits of trade are overshadowed by its intellectual and moral effects. It's hard to overstate the value, especially considering the current low level of human development, of connecting people with those who are different from them and exposing them to unfamiliar ways of thinking and acting. Trade today serves as the main avenue for this interaction, much like war used to. Such communication has always been a key driver of progress, particularly in our current age. Finally, (4) trade was the first to show nations the value of each other's wealth and prosperity. In the past, a patriot, unless they were culturally advanced enough to see the world as their homeland, wanted other countries to be weak, poor, and poorly governed, unlike their own. Now, they recognize that the wealth and progress of others can directly benefit their own country. Trade is quickly making war obsolete by strengthening and multiplying personal interests that oppose it. It can be said without exaggeration that the vast scale and rapid growth of international trade is the main guarantee of global peace and the enduring foundation for the continuous advancement of human ideas, institutions, and character.
Chapter 14. On International Values.
§ 1. The prices of imported goods depend on the terms of international trade.
The values of commodities produced at the same place, or in places sufficiently adjacent for capital to move freely between them—let us say, for simplicity, of commodities produced in the same country—depend (temporary fluctuations apart) upon their cost of production. But the value of a commodity brought from a distant place, especially from a foreign country, does not depend on its cost of production in the place from whence it comes. On what, then, does it depend? The value of a thing in any place depends on the cost of its acquisition in that place; which, in the case of an imported article, means the cost of production of the thing which is exported to pay for it.
The values of goods made in the same location, or in nearby places where capital can move easily between them—let's say, for simplicity, goods produced in the same country—depend (apart from temporary fluctuations) on their production costs. However, the value of a product brought from a distant location, especially from another country, doesn’t rely on its production costs where it comes from. So, what does it depend on? The value of something in any location depends on the cost of acquiring it there; in the case of an imported item, this means the production cost of the item that is exported to pay for it.
If, then, the United States imports wine from Spain, giving for every pipe of wine a bale of cloth, the exchange value of a pipe of wine in the United States will not depend upon what the production of the wine may have cost in Spain, but upon what the production of the cloth has cost in the United States. Though the wine may have cost in Spain the equivalent of only ten days' labor, yet, if the cloth costs in the United States twenty days' labor, the wine, when brought to the United States, will exchange for the produce of twenty days' American labor, plus the cost of carriage, including the usual profit on the importer's capital during the time it is locked up and withheld from other employment.268
If the United States imports wine from Spain, trading one pipe of wine for a bale of cloth, the exchange value of a pipe of wine in the U.S. won't be determined by the production costs of the wine in Spain, but by the production costs of the cloth in the U.S. Even if the wine only cost the equivalent of ten days' labor in Spain, if the cloth costs twenty days' labor in the U.S., the wine, when it arrives in the U.S., will trade for the equivalent of twenty days' American labor, plus the shipping costs and the usual profit on the importer's investment while it's tied up and unavailable for other uses.268
The value, then, in any country, of a foreign commodity, [pg 392] depends on the quantity of home produce which must be given to the foreign country in exchange for it. In other words, the values of foreign commodities depend on the terms of international exchange. What, then, do these depend upon? What is it which, in the case supposed, causes a pipe of wine from Spain to be exchanged with the United States for exactly that quantity of cloth? We have seen that it is not their cost of production. If the cloth and the wine were both made in Spain, they would exchange at their cost of production in Spain; if they were both made in the United States, they would [possibly] exchange at their cost of production in the United States: but all the cloth being made in the United States, and all the wine in Spain, they are in circumstances to which we have already determined that the law of cost of production is not applicable. We must accordingly, as we have done before in a similar embarrassment, fall back upon an antecedent law, that of supply and demand; and in this we shall again find the solution of our difficulty.
The value of a foreign product in any country depends on how much local goods must be exchanged for it. In other words, the value of foreign products is tied to the terms of international trade. So, what influences these terms? What determines why a pipe of wine from Spain is traded with the United States for a specific amount of cloth? We've established that it isn't based on the cost of production. If the cloth and wine were both produced in Spain, they would trade at their production costs in Spain; if both were made in the United States, they would likely trade at their production costs there as well. However, since all the cloth is made in the U.S. and all the wine in Spain, we're in a situation where the law of production cost doesn't apply. Thus, as we have done before in similar situations, we need to rely on an underlying principle: supply and demand; and through this, we will find the answer to our question.
§ 2. The prices of foreign goods are determined not by the cost of production, but by mutual demand and supply.
It has been previously explained that the conditions called. “international” are those, either within a nation, or those existing between two separate nations, which are such as to prevent the free movement of labor and capital from one group of industries to another, or from one locality to another distant one. Even if woolen cloth could be made cheaper in England than in the United States, we know that neither capital nor labor would easily leave the United States for England, although it might go from Rhode Island to Massachusetts under similar inducements. If shoes can be made with less advantage in Providence than in Lynn, the shoe industry will come to Lynn; but it does not follow that the English shoe industry would come to Lynn, even if the advantages of the latter were greater than those in England. If there be no obstacle to the free movement of labor and capital between places or occupations, and if some place or occupation can produce at a less cost than another place or occupation, then there will be a migration of the instruments of production. Since there is no free movement of labor and capital between one country and another, then two countries stand in the same relation as that of two “non-competing groups” within the same country, as before explained. When this fact is once fully grasped, the [pg 393] subject of international values becomes very simple. It does not differ from the question of those domestic values for which we found269 that the dependence on cost of production would not hold, but that their values were governed by reciprocal demand and supply.
It has been explained before that the conditions are called.“international”are those, whether within a country or between two different countries, that restrict the free movement of labor and capital from one industry to another, or from one location to a faraway one. Even if woolen cloth can be made more cheaply in England than in the United States, we know that labor and capital wouldn’t easily move from the United States to England, although they might shift from Rhode Island to Massachusetts under similar incentives. If shoes can be produced more efficiently in Lynn than in Providence, the shoe industry will move to Lynn; however, that doesn’t mean the English shoe industry would relocate to Lynn, even if the benefits were greater than those in England. If there are no barriers to the free movement of labor and capital between locations or jobs, and if one location or job can produce at a lower cost than another, then there will be a transfer of production resources. Since there is no free movement of labor and capital between countries, the relationship between two countries is similar to that of two __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"non-competing groups"within the same country, as discussed earlier. Once this idea is fully grasped, the topic of international values becomes quite simple. It is no different from the issue of domestic values, where we found269that reliance on production costs would not be valid, but that their values were set by mutual demand and supply.
Attention should be drawn to the real nature of the present inquiry. It is not here a question as to what causes international trade between two countries: that has been treated in the preceding chapter, and has been found to be a difference in the comparative cost. The question now is one of exchange value, that is, for how much of other commodities a given commodity will exchange. The reasons for the trade are supposed to exist; but we now want to know what the law is which determines the proportions of the exchange. Why does one article exchange for more or less of another? Not, as we have seen, because one costs more or less to produce than the other.
It's crucial to grasp the true essence of this inquiry. We're not examining what leads to international __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.tradebetween two countries: this was discussed in the previous chapter and identified as a difference in comparative cost. The current question is abouttrade value—specifically, how much of one good can be traded for another. We’re assuming the reasons for the trade are established, but now we want to understand the rules that determine the exchange ratios. Why does one item trade for more or less than another? As we’ve observed, it’s not just because one costs more or less to produce than the other.
In the trade between the United States and England in iron and corn, formerly referred to (p. 383), it was seen that a 100 days' labor of corn buys from England iron which would have cost the United States 125 days' labor. England sends 150 days' labor of iron and buys from the United States corn which would have cost her 200 days' labor. But what rule fixes the proportions between 100 and 125 for the United States, and between 150 and 200 for England, at which the exchanges will take place? The trade increases the productiveness of both countries, but in what ratio will the two countries share this gain? The answer is, briefly, in the ratio set by reciprocal demand and supply, that is, the relative strength, as compared with each other, of the demands of the two countries respectively for iron and corn. This, however, may be capable of explanation in a simple form.
In the trade between the United States and England concerning iron and corn, as previously mentioned (p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__),383), it was noted that 100 days of work used for buying corn results in iron from England that would have cost the United States 125 days of work. England sends iron worth 150 days of work and buys corn from the United States that would have cost her 200 days of work. But what defines the ratios between 100 and 125 for the United States, and between 150 and 200 for England, where the trades take place? The exchange improves the productivity of both nations, but how will they share this advantage? The brief answer is, inthe ratio established by mutual demand and supply, which shows how strong each country's demand is for iron and corn. This can be explained easily, though.
A has spades, and B has oats, to dispose of; and each wishes to get the article belonging to the other. Will A give one spade for one bushel of oats, or for two? Will B give two bushels of oats for one spade? That depends upon how strong a desire A has for oats; the intensity of his demand may induce him to give two spades for one bushel. But the exchange also depends upon B. If he has no great need for spades, and A has a strong desire for oats, B will get more spades for oats than otherwise, possibly two spades for one bushel of oats; that is, oats will have a larger exchange value. If, on the other hand, A cares less for oats than B does for spades, then the exchange will result in an increased value of spades relatively to oats. When two commodities exchange against each other, their exchange values will depend entirely upon the relative intensity of the demand [pg 394] on each side for the other commodity. And this simple form of the statement of reciprocal demand and supply is also the law of international values.
A has spades, and B has oats to trade; each wants what the other has. Will A trade one spade for one bushel of oats, or for two? Will B trade two bushels of oats for one spade? That depends on how badly A wants the oats; if he really wants them, he might give two spades for one bushel. But the trade also relies on B. If B doesn't need spades much and A really wants oats, B will get more spades for his oats, possibly two spades for one bushel; in this case, oats will have a higher exchange value. On the other hand, if A is less interested in oats than B is in spades, then spades will become more valuable compared to oats in the trade. When two goods are exchanged, their relative values depend entirely on how strong the demand is for each good by the other party. This simple explanation of reciprocal demand and supply also applies to international values.[pg 394]
If instead of spades and oats we substitute iron and corn, and let the trade be between England and the United States, the quantity of corn required to buy a given quantity of iron will depend upon the relative demands of England for corn and of the United States for iron. Something may cut off England's demand for our breadstuffs, and they will then have a less exchange value relatively to iron (if we keep up our demand), and their prices will fall. But if, on the other hand, England has poor harvests, and consequently a great demand for corn, and if our demand for iron is not excessive at the same time, then our breadstuffs will rise in value. And this was precisely what happened from 1877 to 1879. Now, in the above illustration of corn and iron, how can we know whether or not x bushels of corn (the produce of 100 days' labor in the United States) will exchange for exactly y tons of English iron? That, again, will depend upon the reciprocal demands of the two countries for corn and iron respectively. Moreover, it will have been already observed that the ratio of exchange is not capable of being ascertained exactly, since it varies with changing conditions, namely, the desires of the people of the two countries, together with their means of purchase.
If we swap spades and oats for iron and corn, and set up trade between England and the United States, the amount of corn needed to buy a certain amount of iron will depend on how much England wants corn compared to how much the U.S. wants iron. If something limits England’s demand for our grains, their exchange value compared to iron (assuming we keep our demand stable) will go down, leading to lower prices. On the other hand, if England has poor harvests and therefore a high demand for corn, while our demand for iron isn't overly high at the same time, then the value of our grains will rise. This is exactly what occurred from 1877 to 1879. Now, in this scenario with corn and iron, how can we know ifxbushels of corn (the outcome of 100 days of work in the United States) will trade for exactlyyA lot of English iron? That will again depend on the mutual needs for corn and iron from both countries. Moreover, it's already been pointed out that the exchange ratio can't be precisely determined, as it varies with changing conditions, including the wants of the people in both countries and their purchasing power.
But yet these variations are capable of ascertainment as regards their extreme limits. The reciprocal demand can not carry the exchange value in either country beyond the line set by the cost of production of the article. For instance, an urgent need in England for corn (if the United States has a light demand for English iron) can not carry the ratio of exchange to a point such that England will offer so much more than 150 days' labor in iron for x bushels of American corn that it will go beyond 200 days' labor in iron. It will be seen at once, then, if that were the case, that England would produce the corn herself; and that she would then have no gain whatever from the trade. The ratio of exchange will thus be limited by the reciprocal demand on one side to the cost of production (200 days' labor) of English corn. On the other hand, if the supposition were reversed, and the United States had a great demand for iron, but England had little need for our corn, then we would not offer more than 125 days' labor of corn for y tons of iron, because for that expenditure of labor we could produce the iron ourselves.
However, these variations can still be assessed in terms of their extreme limits. The reciprocal demand cannot push the exchange value in either country past the line set by the production cost of the goods. For instance, a high demand in England for corn (if the United States only has a slight interest in English iron) cannot raise the exchange ratio to a point where England offers significantly more than 150 days' labor in iron for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.xbushels of American corn, which is more than 200 days' worth of labor in iron. If that were the case, England would just grow the corn themselves, which would eliminate any advantage from the trade. Thus, the exchange ratio is constrained by one side's demand in relation to the production cost (200 days of labor) for English corn. On the other hand, if we reversed the scenario, with the United States having a high demand for iron and England showing little interest in our corn, we wouldn't offer more than 125 days' labor of corn forya lot of iron, since we could produce the iron ourselves with that level of effort.
In the above examples we have considered the case of a trade in corn and iron only. If corn were to typify all our goods wanted by England, and iron all English goods wanted by the United States, the conclusions would be exactly the [pg 395] same. The ratios of a myriad of things, each governed by its particular reciprocal demand, exchanging against each other, give a general result by which the goods sent out exchange against the goods brought back at such rates as are fixed by the reciprocal demands acting on all the goods. Goods are payments for goods; the ratio of exchange depends on reciprocal demand and supply. If we now add more countries to the example, we simply increase the number of persons (although in different countries) wanting our goods, as set off against our demands for the goods of this greater number of persons. If France, Germany, and England all want our corn, we must have some demand for the goods of France, Germany, and England also; and the same law of reciprocal demand gives the ratio of interchange. That this explanation is consistent with the facts is to be seen when we notice how eagerly the exporters of American staples watch the conditions which increase or diminish the foreign demand for these commodities, looking at them as the causes which directly affect their exchange value, or price.
In the examples above, we've only looked at trade in corn and iron. If corn represents all the goods we need from England, and iron represents all the goods from England that the United States wants, the conclusions would still be the same. The ratios of various items, each shaped by its specific reciprocal demand, trade against each other, leading to a general outcome where the goods we export are exchanged for the goods we import at rates determined by the reciprocal demands affecting all products. Goods act as payment for goods; the exchange rate hinges on reciprocal demand and supply. If we add more countries into the equation, we simply increase the number of people (even from different countries) who want our products, along with our need for goods from this larger group. If France, Germany, and England all want our corn, we need to have some demand for goods from France, Germany, and England as well; and the same principle of reciprocal demand determines the exchange rate. We can see this explanation is valid when we look at how closely exporters of American staple goods track the factors that increase or decrease foreign demand for these products, seeing them as the reasons that directly affect their exchange value or price.[pg 395]
When cost of carriage is added, it will increase the price of corn to England and of iron to the United States. But, as every one knows, an increase of price affects the demand; and, as the demand on each side is affected, a new ratio of exchange will finally be reached consistent with the strength of desires on each side. Who, therefore, will pay the most of the cost of carriage England or the United States? That will, again, depend on whether England has the greatest relative demand for American goods, as compared with the demand of the United States for English goods.
When shipping costs are added, it will raise the price of corn in England and iron in the United States. But, as everyone knows, an increase in price impacts demand; and since demand on both sides is influenced, a new exchange rate will eventually be established that reflects the strength of preferences on each side. So, who will bear the most of the shipping costs, England or the United States? That will depend on whether England has a higher relative demand for American goods compared to the U.S. demand for English goods.
No absolute rule, therefore, can be laid down for the division of the cost, no more than for the division of the advantage; and it does not follow that, in whatever ratio the one is divided, the other will be divided in the same. It is impossible to say, if the cost of carriage could be annihilated, whether the producing or the importing country would be most benefited. This would depend on the play of international demand.
No absolute rule can be established for dividing costs, just like there isn't one for dividing advantages; it doesn't mean that if one is split in a certain way, the other will be split the same. It's impossible to determine if, by eliminating carriage costs, the producing or importing country would benefit more. This would depend on the dynamics of international demand.
Cost of carriage has one effect more. But for it, every commodity would (if trade be supposed free) be either regularly imported or regularly exported. A country would make nothing for itself which it did not also make for other countries. But in consequence of cost of carriage there are many things, especially bulky articles, which every, or almost [pg 396] every, country produces within itself. After exporting the things in which it can employ itself most advantageously, and importing those in which it is under the greatest disadvantage, there are many lying between, of which the relative cost of production in that and in other countries differs so little that the cost of carriage would absorb more than the whole saving in cost of production which would be obtained by importing one and exporting another. This is the case with numerous commodities of common consumption, including the coarser qualities of many articles of food and manufacture, of which the finer kinds are the subject of extensive international traffic.
The cost of shipping has another effect. Without it, every product would (assuming free trade) be either regularly imported or exported. A country would only produce things for itself that it also supplies to other countries. However, due to shipping costs, there are many items, especially bulky ones, that almost every country produces for itself. After exporting the goods it can produce most efficiently and importing those it struggles to produce, there are many items where the relative production costs in that country and others differ so little that shipping costs would exceed any savings from production by importing one item and exporting another. This is true for many everyday goods, including the coarser types of various food and manufacturing products, while the finer types are often traded internationally.
§ 3. —As shown by the trade in fabric and linen between England and Germany.
“Suppose that ten yards of broadcloth cost in England as much labor as fifteen yards of linen, and in Germany as much as twenty.” This supposition then being made, it would be the interest of England to import linen from Germany, and of Germany to import cloth from England. “When each country produced both commodities for itself, ten yards of cloth exchanged for fifteen yards of linen in England, and for twenty in Germany. They will now exchange for the same number of yards of linen in both. For what number? If for fifteen yards, England will be just as she was, and Germany will gain all. If for twenty yards, Germany will be as before, and England will derive the whole of the benefit. If for any number intermediate between fifteen and twenty, the advantage will be shared between the two countries. If, for example, ten yards of cloth exchange for eighteen of linen, England will gain an advantage of three yards on every fifteen, Germany will save two out of every twenty. The problem is, what are the causes which determine the proportion in which the cloth of England and the linen of Germany will exchange for each other? Let us suppose, then, that by the effect of what Adam Smith [pg 397] calls the higgling of the market, ten yards of cloth, in both countries, exchange for seventeen yards of linen.
“Let’s say that making ten yards of broadcloth in England requires the same amount of labor as making fifteen yards of linen, and in Germany, it takes as much labor as making twenty yards.” With this assumption, it would make sense for England to import linen from Germany and for Germany to import cloth from England. "When each country made both goods themselves, ten yards of cloth traded for fifteen yards of linen in England and for twenty in Germany. Now, they will trade for the same amount of linen in both countries. For how much? If it’s for fifteen yards, England stays the same, and Germany gets all the benefits. If it’s for twenty yards, Germany remains unchanged, and England gets all the benefits. If it’s for any amount between fifteen and twenty, the benefit will be shared between the two countries. For instance, if ten yards of cloth trade for eighteen yards of linen, England gains three yards for every fifteen, while Germany saves two out of every twenty. The question is, what factors determine the exchange rate between British cloth and German linen? Let’s assume that, due to what Adam Smith [pg 397] refers to as the higgling of the market, ten yards of cloth in both countries trade for seventeen yards of linen."
“The demand for a commodity, that is, the quantity of it which can find a purchaser, varies, as we have before remarked, according to the price. In Germany the price of ten yards of cloth is now seventeen yards of linen, or whatever quantity of money is equivalent in Germany to seventeen yards of linen. Now, that being the price, there is some particular number of yards of cloth, which will be in demand, or will find purchasers, at that price. There is some given quantity of cloth, more than which could not be disposed of at that price; less than which, at that price, would not fully satisfy the demand. Let us suppose this quantity to be 1,000 times ten yards.
The demand for a product, which refers to how much can actually be sold, varies with its price. In Germany, the price of ten yards of cloth is currently equal to seventeen yards of linen, or whatever that amount of money is in Germany. At this price, there is a specific number of yards of cloth that people will want or that will sell. There’s a maximum amount of cloth that could be sold at this price; going over that amount wouldn’t sell any more, while less than that amount wouldn’t satisfy the demand at that price. Let's say this quantity is 1,000 times ten yards.
“Let us now turn our attention to England. There the price of seventeen yards of linen is ten yards of cloth, or whatever quantity of money is equivalent in England to ten yards of cloth. There is some particular number of yards of linen which, at that price, will exactly satisfy the demand, and no more. Let us suppose that this number is 1,000 times seventeen yards.
"Now, let's focus on England. There, the cost of seventeen yards of linen is the same as ten yards of cloth, or whatever amount of money equals ten yards of cloth in England. There's a specific number of yards of linen that will perfectly meet the demand without exceeding it. Let's assume this number is 1,000 times seventeen yards."
“As seventeen yards of linen are to ten yards of cloth, so are 1,000 times seventeen yards to 1,000 times ten yards. At the existing exchange value, the linen which England requires will exactly pay for the quantity of cloth which, on the same terms of interchange, Germany requires. The demand on each side is precisely sufficient to carry off the supply on the other. The conditions required by the principle of demand and supply are fulfilled, and the two commodities will continue to be interchanged, as we supposed them to be, in the ratio of seventeen yards of linen for ten yards of cloth.
“Just like seventeen yards of linen corresponds to ten yards of cloth, 1,000 times seventeen yards corresponds to 1,000 times ten yards. At the current exchange rate, the amount of linen that England needs will perfectly match the amount of cloth that Germany needs under the same exchange terms. The demand on both sides is just enough to absorb the supply on the other side. The conditions established by the principle of demand and supply are fulfilled, and the two goods will continue to be exchanged, just as we anticipated, at the rate of seventeen yards of linen for ten yards of cloth."
“But our suppositions might have been different. Suppose that, at the assumed rate of interchange, England had been disposed to consume no greater quantity of linen than 800 times seventeen yards; it is evident that, at the rate supposed, this would not have sufficed to pay for the 1,000 times [pg 398] ten yards of cloth which we have supposed Germany to require at the assumed value. Germany would be able to procure no more than 800 times ten yards at that price. To procure the remaining 200, which she would have no means of doing but by bidding higher for them, she would offer more than seventeen yards of linen in exchange for ten yards of cloth; let us suppose her to offer eighteen. At this price, perhaps, England would be inclined to purchase a greater quantity of linen. She would consume, possibly, at that price, 900 times eighteen yards. On the other hand, cloth having risen in price, the demand of Germany for it would probably have diminished. If, instead of 1,000 times ten yards, she is now contented with 900 times ten yards, these will exactly pay for the 900 times eighteen yards of linen which England is willing to take at the altered price; the demand on each side will again exactly suffice to take off the corresponding supply; and ten yards for eighteen will be the rate at which, in both countries, cloth will exchange for linen.
“But our assumptions could have been different. Imagine that, at the expected rate of trade, England only wanted to consume 800 times seventeen yards of linen; clearly, at that rate, it wouldn’t be enough to cover the 1,000 times [pg 398] ten yards of cloth we estimated Germany would need at the assumed value. Germany could only receive 800 times ten yards at that price. To get the remaining 200, which she could only obtain by raising her offer, she would need to give more than seventeen yards of linen for ten yards of cloth; let’s say she offers eighteen. At this new price, England might be willing to buy more linen. She could possibly purchase 900 times eighteen yards. However, since cloth has become more expensive, Germany's demand for it would likely decrease. If instead of needing 1,000 times ten yards, she is now satisfied with 900 times ten yards, these will perfectly match the 900 times eighteen yards of linen that England is prepared to accept at the new price; the demand on both sides will again exactly meet the corresponding supply, and ten yards for eighteen will be the rate at which, in both countries, cloth will exchange for linen.”
“The converse of all this would have happened if, instead of 800 times seventeen yards, we had supposed that England, at the rate of ten for seventeen, would have taken 1,200 times seventeen yards of linen. In this case, it is England whose demand is not fully supplied; it is England who, by bidding for more linen, will alter the rate of interchange to her own disadvantage; and ten yards of cloth will fall, in both countries, below the value of seventeen yards of linen. By this fall of cloth, or, what is the same thing, this rise of linen, the demand of Germany for cloth will increase, and the demand of England for linen will diminish, till the rate of interchange has so adjusted itself that the cloth and the linen will exactly pay for one another; and, when once this point is attained, values will remain without further alteration.”
The opposite of all this would occur if, instead of 800 times seventeen yards, we assumed that England, at the rate of ten for seventeen, would have bought 1,200 times seventeen yards of linen. In this case, it's England that faces unmet demand; it's England that, by trying to buy more linen, will shift the exchange rate to its disadvantage; and ten yards of cloth will drop in value in both countries, below the value of seventeen yards of linen. As cloth loses value, or similarly, as linen gains value, Germany's demand for cloth will increase while England's demand for linen will decrease, until the exchange rate adjusts so that cloth and linen have the same value; and once this balance is achieved, values will stay the same.
§ 4. The conclusion is presented in the Equation of International Demand.
“It may be considered, therefore, as established, that when two countries trade together in two commodities, the exchange value of these commodities relatively to each other will adjust itself to the inclinations and circumstances of the consumers on both sides, in such manner that the quantities [pg 399] required by each country, of the articles which it imports from its neighbor, shall be exactly sufficient to pay for one another. As the inclinations and circumstances of consumers can not be reduced to any rule, so neither can the proportions in which the two commodities will be interchanged. We know that the limits within which the variation is confined are the ratio between their costs of production in the one country and the ratio between their costs of production in the other. Ten yards of cloth can not exchange for more than twenty yards of linen, nor for less than fifteen. But they may exchange for any intermediate number. The ratios, therefore, in which the advantage of the trade may be divided between the two nations are various. The circumstances on which the proportionate share of each country more remotely depends admit only of a very general indication.”
It’s clear that when two countries trade different goods, the exchange value of these goods in relation to one another will change based on the preferences and circumstances of consumers in both countries. This change will make sure that the amounts each country needs from the other are just enough to cover the cost of those imports. Since consumer preferences and situations aren’t strictly defined, the ratio at which the two goods are traded also cannot be fixed. The limits for this variation are determined by the production costs of the goods in each country. For instance, ten yards of cloth can’t be traded for more than twenty yards of linen or for less than fifteen. However, they can be traded for any amount in between. Thus, the way the benefits of the trade are shared between the two nations can vary, and the factors that influence each country's share are based on very general concepts.
If, therefore, it be asked what country draws to itself the greatest share of the advantage of any trade it carries on, the answer is, the country for whose productions there is in other countries the greatest demand, and a demand the most susceptible of increase from additional cheapness. In so far as the productions of any country possess this property, the country obtains all foreign commodities at less cost. It gets its imports cheaper, the greater the intensity of the demand in foreign countries for its exports. It also gets its imports cheaper, the less the extent and intensity of its own demand for them. The market is cheapest to those whose demand is small. A country which desires few foreign productions, and only a limited quantity of them, while its own commodities are in great request in foreign countries, will obtain its limited imports at extremely small cost, that is, in exchange for the produce of a very small quantity of its labor and capital.
If someone asks which country benefits the most from any trade it engages in, the answer is the country whose products have the highest demand in other nations, especially demand that can easily grow with lower prices. As long as the products of any country have this characteristic, that country can acquire all foreign goods for less. The more intense the demand abroad for its exports, the cheaper its imports will be. Additionally, the less a country demands these imports, the cheaper they become. The market is most affordable for those with a smaller demand. A country that wants only a few foreign products and in limited quantities, while its own goods are highly sought after in other countries, will be able to acquire these limited imports at a very low cost, essentially trading for them with a small amount of its labor and capital.
The law which we have now illustrated may be appropriately named the Equation of International Demand. It may be concisely stated as follows: The produce of a country exchanges for the produce of other countries at such values as are required in order that the whole of her exports may [pg 400] exactly pay for the whole of her imports. This law of International Values is but an extension of the more general law of Value, which we called the Equation of Supply and Demand.270 We have seen that the value of a commodity always so adjusts itself as to bring the demand to the exact level of the supply. But all trade, either between nations or individuals, is an interchange of commodities, in which the things that they respectively have to sell constitute also their means of purchase: the supply brought by the one constitutes his demand for what is brought by the other. So that supply and demand are but another expression for reciprocal demand; and to say that value will adjust itself so as to equalize demand with supply, is, in fact, to say that it will adjust itself so as to equalize the demand on one side with the demand on the other.
The law we've just discussed can be aptly called the Equation of International Demand. It can be summarized like this: A country's exports are traded for the exports of other countries at values that ensure all its exports will exactly cover all its imports. This law of International Values is simply an extension of the broader law of Value, referred to as the Equation of Supply and Demand. We’ve observed that the value of a commodity always adjusts to balance demand with supply. However, trade, whether between nations or individuals, involves the exchange of goods, where what each party has to sell also acts as their means of purchasing. The supply provided by one party represents their demand for what the other party offers. Therefore, supply and demand are just different ways of expressing reciprocal demand; saying that value will adjust to balance demand with supply essentially means it will adjust to equalize the demand on one side with the demand on the other.

§ 5. The cost of a country’s imports depends not just on the exchange rate, but also on how efficient its labor is.
We now pass to another essential part of the theory of the subject. There are two senses in which a country obtains commodities cheaper by foreign trade: in the sense of value and in the sense of cost: (1.) It gets them cheaper in the first sense, by their falling in value relatively to other things; the same quantity of them exchanging, in the country, for a smaller quantity than before of the other produce of the country. To revert to our original figures [of the trade with Germany in cloth and linen]: in England, all consumers of linen obtained, after the trade was opened, seventeen or some greater number of yards for the same quantity of all other things for which they before obtained only fifteen. The degree of cheapness, in this sense of the term, depends on the laws of International Demand, so copiously illustrated in the preceding sections. (2.) But, in the other sense, that of cost, a country gets a commodity cheaper when it obtains a greater quantity of the commodity with the same expenditure of labor and capital. In this sense of the term, cheapness in a great measure depends upon a cause of a different nature: a country gets its imports cheaper, in proportion to the general productiveness of its domestic industry; to the general efficiency of its labor. The labor of one country may be, as a whole, much more efficient than that of another: all or most of the commodities capable of being produced in both may be produced in one at less absolute cost than in the other; which, as we have seen, will not necessarily prevent the two countries from exchanging commodities. The things which the more favored country will import from others are, of course, those in which it is least superior; but, by importing them, it acquires, even in those commodities, the same advantage which it possesses in the articles it gives in exchange for them. What her imports cost to her is a function of two variables: (1) the quantity of her own commodities which she gives for them, and (2) the cost of those commodities. Of these, the last alone depends on the efficiency of her labor; the first depends on the law of international values; that is, on the [pg 403] intensity and extensibility of the foreign demand for her commodities, compared with her demand for foreign commodities.
We now move on to another crucial part of the theory of the subject. A country can obtain goods more cheaply through foreign trade in two ways: in terms of value and in terms of cost. (1.) It gets goods cheaper in the first sense when their value falls relative to other items; the same quantity of goods is exchanged in the country for a smaller quantity of other goods than before. Referring back to our original example [of the trade with Germany in cloth and linen]: in England, after the trade opened, all linen consumers were able to get seventeen or more yards for the same amount of everything else that previously cost them only fifteen. The degree of cheapness in this sense depends on the laws of International Demand, which we discussed in the previous sections. (2.) In the other sense, regarding cost, a country enjoys cheaper commodities when it can obtain more of a good with the same amount of labor and capital. In this sense, cheapness relies on a different factor: a country gets its imports cheaper in relation to the overall productivity of its domestic industry and the general efficiency of its labor. The labor in one country can be significantly more efficient overall than in another: all or most commodities that both can produce might come at a lower absolute cost in one country than in the other; however, this doesn’t necessarily stop the two countries from trading goods. The items the more advantaged country will import from others are those where it has the least advantage; nevertheless, by importing them, it gains the same benefits in those items as it does in the products it exchanges. The cost of its imports is determined by two factors: (1) the quantity of its own goods it trades for them, and (2) the cost of those goods. The latter depends solely on the efficiency of its labor; the former is influenced by international value laws—that is, by the intensity and extent of foreign demand for its goods compared to its demand for foreign goods.
The great productiveness of any industry in our country has thus two results: (1) it gives a larger total out of which labor and capital at home can receive greater rewards; and (2) the commodities being cheaper in comparison than other commodities not so easily produced, furnish the very articles which are most likely to be sent abroad, in accordance with the doctrine of comparative cost. In the United States, those things in the production of which labor and capital are most efficient, and so earn the largest rewards, are precisely the articles entering most largely into our foreign trade. That is, we get foreign articles cheaper precisely because these exports cost us less in labor and capital. These, of course, since we inhabit a country whose natural resources are not yet fully worked, are largely the products of the extractive industries, as may be seen by the following table of the value of goods entering to the greatest extent into our foreign export trade in 1883:
The high productivity of any industry in our country leads to two main results: (1) it creates a larger total from which local labor and capital can earn higher returns; and (2) the cheaper goods, compared to those that are more difficult to produce, provide the items that are most likely to be exported, following the principle of comparative cost. In the United States, the products that use labor and capital most efficiently, and therefore generate the highest returns, are the ones that make up a large share of our foreign trade. This means we can get foreign goods for less because these exports are cheaper for us in terms of labor and capital. These exports primarily come from the extractive industries, as we live in a country with many natural resources still mostly untapped, as demonstrated in the following table showing the value of goods that most significantly contributed to our foreign export trade in 1883:
Cotton fiber | $247 million |
Baked goods | 208 million, 40 thousand, 850 |
Supplies and animals | 118,177,555 |
Mineral oils | 40,555,492 |
Wood | 26,793,708 |
Cigarettes | 22,095,229 |
These six classes of commodities are arranged in the order in which they enter into our export trade, and are the six which come first and highest in the list.
These six types of goods are listed in the order they are involved in our export trade, and they are the first ones on the list.
Chapter 15. Money Viewed as an Imported Commodity.
§ 1. Money is brought in through two methods: as a commodity and as a medium of exchange.
The degree of progress which we have now made in the theory of foreign trade puts it in our power to supply what was previously deficient in our view of the theory of money; and this, when completed, will in its turn enable us to conclude the subject of foreign trade.
The level of progress we’ve made in foreign trade theory allows us to fill in the gaps we had in our understanding of money theory; and once we complete this, it will, in turn, help us wrap up the topic of foreign trade.
Money, or the material of which it is composed, is, in Great Britain, and in most other countries, a foreign commodity. Its value and distribution must therefore be regulated, not by the law of value which obtains in adjacent places, but by that which is applicable to imported commodities—the law of international values.
Money, or what it’s made of, is, in Great Britain and most other countries, a foreign good. Its value and distribution need to be governed, not by the local laws of value, but by the rules that apply to imported goods—the law of international values.
In the discussion into which we are now about to enter, I shall use the terms money and the precious metals indiscriminately. This may be done without leading to any error; it having been shown that the value of money, when it consists of the precious metals, or of a paper currency convertible into them on demand, is entirely governed by the value of the metals themselves: from which it never permanently differs, except by the expense of coinage, when this is paid by the individual and not by the state.
In the discussion we're about to have, I'll use the terms money and precious metals interchangeably. This can be done without causing any confusion since it's been proven that the value of money—whether it consists of precious metals or a paper currency that can be exchanged for them on demand—is completely determined by the value of the metals themselves. The value only varies from this, except for the cost of minting coins when that cost is covered by the individual and not the government.
Money is brought into a country in two different ways. It is imported (chiefly in the form of bullion) like any other merchandise, as being an advantageous article of commerce. It is also imported in its other character of a medium of exchange, to pay some debt due to the country, either for goods exported or on any other account. The existence of these two distinct modes in which money flows into a country, [pg 405] while other commodities are habitually introduced only in the first of these modes, occasions somewhat more of complexity and obscurity than exists in the case of other commodities, and for this reason only is any special and minute exposition necessary.
Money comes into a country in two main ways. It's imported (mainly as gold or silver) just like any other product, considered as a valuable item for trade. It’s also brought in as a medium of exchange to settle debts owed to the country, either for exported goods or for other reasons. The presence of these two different methods for money entering a country, while other goods usually come in only through the first method, adds a bit more complexity and confusion compared to other commodities, and this is why a detailed explanation is important. [pg 405]
§ 2. As a product, it follows the same principles of value as other imported goods.
In so far as the precious metals are imported in the ordinary way of commerce, their value must depend on the same causes, and conform to the same laws, as the value of any other foreign production. It is in this mode chiefly that gold and silver diffuse themselves from the mining countries into all other parts of the commercial world. They are the staple commodities of those countries, or at least are among their great articles of regular export; and are shipped on speculation, in the same manner as other exportable commodities. The quantity, therefore, which a country (say England) will give of its own produce, for a certain quantity of bullion, will depend, if we suppose only two countries and two commodities, upon the demand in England for bullion, compared with the demand in the mining country (which we will call the United States272) for what England has to give.
As long as precious metals are imported through regular trade, their value must depend on the same factors and follow the same rules as the value of any other foreign goods. This is mainly how gold and silver spread from the mining countries to other parts of the global market. They are the main commodities of those countries or at least among their key exports, and are shipped based on market speculation, just like other exportable goods. Therefore, the amount a country (let’s say England) will exchange of its own products for a specific amount of bullion will depend, if we consider only two countries and two goods, on the demand in England for bullion compared to the demand in the mining country (which we will call the United States272) for what England has to offer.
The bullion required by England must exactly pay for the cottons or other English commodities required by the United States. If, however, we substitute for this simplicity the degree of complication which really exists, the equation of international demand must be established not between the bullion wanted in England and the cottons or broadcloth wanted in the United States, but between the whole of the imports of England and the whole of her exports. The demand in foreign countries for English products must be brought into equilibrium with the demand in England for the products of foreign countries; and all foreign commodities, bullion among the rest, must be exchanged against English products in such proportions as will, by the effect they produce on the demand, establish this equilibrium.
The gold required by England needs to exactly cover the cost of the cotton or other English goods that the United States wants. However, if we replace this straightforward relationship with the actual complexity that exists, we must establish the international demand equation not just between the gold needed in England and the cotton or wool needed in the United States, but between all of England's imports and exports. The demand from foreign countries for English products must match the demand in England for products from abroad; and all foreign goods, including gold, must be exchanged for English products in amounts that will balance demand and achieve this equilibrium.
There is nothing in the peculiar nature or uses of the [pg 406] precious metals which should make them an exception to the general principles of demand. So far as they are wanted for purposes of luxury or the arts, the demand increases with the cheapness, in the same irregular way as the demand for any other commodity. So far as they are required for money, the demand increases with the cheapness in a perfectly regular way, the quantity needed being always in inverse proportion to the value. This is the only real difference, in respect to demand, between money and other things.
There’s nothing about the unique nature or uses of the precious metals that makes them different from general demand principles. When they’re desired for luxury or artistic purposes, the demand rises as they become cheaper, just like any other product. When they’re needed as money, demand goes up as they get cheaper in a straightforward way, with the amount needed always being inversely related to their value. This is the only true difference regarding demand between money and other items.
Money, then, if imported solely as a merchandise, will, like other imported commodities, be of lowest value in the countries for whose exports there is the greatest foreign demand, and which have themselves the least demand for foreign commodities. To these two circumstances it is, however, necessary to add two others, which produce their effect through cost of carriage. The cost of obtaining bullion is compounded of two elements; the goods given to purchase it and the expense of transport; of which last, the bullion countries will bear a part (though an uncertain part) in the adjustment of international values. The expense of transport is partly that of carrying the goods to the bullion countries, and partly that of bringing back the bullion; both these items are influenced by the distance from the mines; and the former is also much affected by the bulkiness of the goods. Countries whose exportable produce consists of the finer manufactures obtain bullion, as well as all other foreign articles, cæteris paribus, at less expense than countries which export nothing but bulky raw produce.
Money, if imported just as a commodity, will, like other imported goods, have the lowest value in countries where there is the highest foreign demand for exports and the least demand for foreign products. However, we need to consider two more factors that impact this situation through shipping costs. The cost of obtaining bullion consists of two parts: the goods given in exchange for it and the shipping expenses. The bullion-exporting countries will bear some of the shipping costs (though the exact amount is uncertain) when it comes to balancing international values. The shipping cost involves transporting goods to the bullion-exporting countries and bringing the bullion back; both of these costs are affected by the distance from the mines, and the first is also greatly influenced by the size of the goods. Countries that export finer manufactured products obtain bullion, along with other foreign items, ceteris paribus, at a lower cost than countries that only export bulky raw materials.
To be quite accurate, therefore, we must say: The countries whose exportable productions (1) are most in demand abroad, and (2) contain greatest value in smallest bulk, (3) which are nearest to the mines, and (4) which have least demand for foreign productions, are those in which money will be of lowest value, or, in other words, in which prices will habitually range the highest. If we are speaking not of the value of money, but of its cost (that is, the quantity of the country's labor which must be expended to obtain it), [pg 407] we must add (5) to these four conditions of cheapness a fifth condition, namely, “whose productive industry is the most efficient.” This last, however, does not at all affect the value of money, estimated in commodities; it affects the general abundance and facility with which all things, money and commodities together, can be obtained.273
To be precise, we should say: The countries whose exportable goods (1) are most sought after abroad, (2) have the highest value for the least weight, (3) are closest to the resource mines, and (4) have the least need for imported goods, are those where money has the lowest value, or in other words, where prices are generally higher. If we are not discussing the value of money, but rather its cost (that is, the amount of the country's labor needed to obtain it), [pg 407] we must add (5) to these four conditions of affordability a fifth condition, which is "which production industry is the most efficient." This last factor, however, does not impact the value of money when measured against commodities; it influences the overall abundance and ease with which all things, including money and goods, can be acquired.273

From the preceding considerations, it appears that those are greatly in error who contend that the value of money, in countries where it is an imported commodity, must be entirely regulated by its value in the countries which produce it; and can not be raised or lowered in any permanent manner unless some change has taken place in the cost of production at the mines. On the contrary, any circumstance which disturbs the equation of international demand with respect to a particular country not only may, but must, affect the value of money in that country—its value at the mines remaining the same. The opening of a new branch of export trade from England; an increase in the foreign demand for English products, either by the natural course of events or by the abrogation of duties; a check to the demand in England for foreign commodities, by the laying on of import duties in England or of export duties elsewhere; these and all other events of similar tendency would [pg 409] make the imports of England (bullion and other things taken together) no longer an equivalent for the exports; and the countries which take her exports would be obliged to offer their commodities, and bullion among the rest, on cheaper terms, in order to re-establish the equation of demand; and thus England would obtain money cheaper, and would acquire a generally higher range of prices. A country which, from any of the causes mentioned, gets money cheaper, obtains all its other imports cheaper likewise.
Based on the previous points, it seems that those who argue that the value of money in countries where it is imported should be completely determined by its value in the countries that produce it are mistaken. They believe it can't be permanently changed unless there's been a change in production costs at the mines. However, any situation that disrupts the balance of international demand for a specific country can and will affect the value of money in that country, even if its value at the mines stays the same. For example, the opening of a new export trade route from England, an increase in foreign demand for English goods—whether through natural market shifts or the removal of tariffs—or a decrease in demand in England for foreign goods due to new import taxes in England or export duties elsewhere, all these factors would make England's imports (including bullion and other goods) no longer equivalent to its exports. Consequently, the countries receiving England's exports would need to offer their goods, including bullion, at lower prices to restore the balance of demand; thus, England would acquire money at a cheaper rate and experience generally higher prices. A country that, for any of these reasons, gets money at a lower cost will also obtain all other imports for less.
It is by no means necessary that the increased demand for English commodities, which enables England to supply herself with bullion at a cheaper rate, should be a demand in the mining countries. England might export nothing whatever to those countries, and yet might be the country which obtained bullion from them on the lowest terms, provided there were a sufficient intensity of demand in other foreign countries for English goods, which would be paid for circuitously, with gold and silver from the mining countries. The whole of its exports are what a country exchanges against the whole of its imports, and not its exports and imports to and from any one country.
It's not essential that the rising demand for English goods, which allows England to get bullion at a lower cost, also exists in the mining countries. England might not export anything to those countries and still obtain bullion from them at the best prices, as long as there is strong demand in other foreign markets for English products, which would be indirectly paid for with gold and silver from the mining countries. A country's total exports represent what it exchanges for its total imports, rather than just its exports and imports with a specific country.
Chapter 16: About Foreign Exchanges.
§ 1. Money moves from one country to another as a Medium of Exchange, through the Exchanges.
We have thus far considered the precious metals as a commodity, imported like other commodities in the common course of trade, and have examined what are the circumstances which would in that case determine their value. But those metals are also imported in another character, that which belongs to them as a medium of exchange; not as an article of commerce, to be sold for money, but as themselves money, to pay a debt, or effect a transfer of property.
We have so far looked at precious metals as commodities, imported like other goods in regular trade, and we’ve discussed the factors that would determine their value in that context. However, these metals are also imported in another way, as a medium of exchange; not as a product to be sold for cash, but as money itself to pay off a debt or facilitate a transfer of property.
Money is sent from one country to another for various purposes: the most usual purpose, however, is that of payment for goods. To show in what circumstances money actually passes from country to country for this or any of the other purposes mentioned, it is necessary briefly to state the nature of the mechanism by which international trade is carried on, when it takes place not by barter but through the medium of money.
Money is transferred between countries for different reasons: the most common reason is to pay for goods. To explain the situations where money moves from one country to another for this or other mentioned purposes, it’s important to briefly outline how international trade works, especially when it’s done with money instead of barter.
In practice, the exports and imports of a country not only are not exchanged directly against each other, but often do not even pass through the same hands. Each is separately bought and paid for with money. We have seen, however, that, even in the same country, money does not actually pass from hand to hand each time that purchases are made with it, and still less does this happen between different countries. The habitual mode of paying and receiving payment for commodities, between country and country, is by bills of exchange.
In reality, a country’s exports and imports aren’t directly traded with each other, and they often don’t even go through the same people. Each is purchased and paid for separately with money. However, we've noticed that even within the same country, money doesn’t actually change hands every time a purchase is made, and that’s even less common between different countries. The usual way of paying and receiving payment for goods between countries is through bills of exchange.
A merchant in the United States, A, has exported American [pg 411] commodities, consigning them to his correspondent, B, in England. Another merchant in England, C, has exported English commodities, suppose of equivalent value, to a merchant, D, in the United States. It is evidently unnecessary that B in England should send money to A in the United States, and that D in the United States should send an equal sum of money to C in England. The one debt may be applied to the payment of the other, and the double cost and risk of carriage be thus saved. A draws a bill on B for the amount which B owes to him: D, having an equal amount to pay in England, buys this bill from A, and sends it to C, who, at the expiration of the number of days which the bill has to run, presents it to B for payment. Thus the debt due from England to the United States, and the debt due from the United States to England, are both paid without sending an ounce of gold or silver from one country to the other.274
A merchant in the United States, A, has exported American [pg 411] goods, sending them to his contact, B, in England. Another merchant in England, C, has exported British goods, let’s say of equivalent value, to a merchant, D, in the United States. Clearly, it’s unnecessary for B in England to send money to A in the United States, and for D in the United States to send the same amount of money to C in England. One debt can offset the other, saving both the costs and risks of shipping. A writes a bill on B for the amount that B owes him: D, having the same amount to pay in England, buys this bill from A and sends it to C, who, after the number of days the bill has to run, presents it to B for payment. In this way, the debt from England to the United States, and the debt from the United States to England, are both settled without transferring any gold or silver between countries.274

This implies (if we exclude for the present any other international payments than those occurring in the course of commerce) that the exports and imports exactly pay for one another, or, in other words, that the equation of international demand is established. When such is the fact, the international transactions are liquidated without the passage of any money from one country to the other. But, if there is a greater sum due from the United States to England than is due from England to the United States, or vice versa, the debts can not be simply written off against one another. After the one has been applied, as far as it will go, toward covering the other, the balance must be transmitted in the precious metals. In point of fact, the merchant who has the amount to pay will even then pay for it by a bill. When a person has a remittance to make to a foreign country, he does [pg 412] not himself search for some one who has money to receive from that country, and ask him for a bill of exchange. In this, as in other branches of business, there is a class of middle-men or brokers, who bring buyers and sellers together, or stand between them, buying bills from those who have money to receive, and selling bills to those who have money to pay. When a customer comes to a broker for a bill on Paris or Amsterdam, the broker sells to him perhaps the bill he may himself have bought that morning from a merchant, perhaps a bill on his own correspondent in the foreign city; and, to enable his correspondent to pay, when due, all the bills he has granted, he remits to him all those which he has bought and has not resold. In this manner these brokers take upon themselves the whole settlement of the pecuniary transactions between distant places, being remunerated by a small commission or percentage on the amount of each bill which they either sell or buy. Now, if the brokers find that they are asked for bills, on the one part, to a greater amount than bills are offered to them on the other, they do not on this account refuse to give them; but since, in that case, they have no means of enabling the correspondents on whom their bills are drawn to pay them when due, except by transmitting part of the amount in gold or silver, they require from those to whom they sell bills an additional price, sufficient to cover the freight and insurance of the gold and silver, with a profit sufficient to compensate them for their trouble and for the temporary occupation of a portion of their capital. This premium (as it is called) the buyers are willing to pay, because they must otherwise go to the expense of remitting the precious metals themselves, and it is done cheaper by those who make doing it a part of their especial business. But, though only some of those who have a debt to pay would have actually to remit money, all will be obliged, by each other's competition, to pay the premium; and the brokers are for the same reason obliged to pay it to those whose bills they buy. The reverse of all this happens, if, on the comparison of exports and imports, the country, [pg 413] instead of having a balance to pay, has a balance to receive. The brokers find more bills offered to them than are sufficient to cover those which they are required to grant. Bills on foreign countries consequently fall to a discount; and the competition among the brokers, which is exceedingly active, prevents them from retaining this discount as a profit for themselves, and obliges them to give the benefit of it to those who buy the bills for purposes of remittance.
This means (if we ignore any other international payments besides those made during trade) that exports and imports balance each other out, or in other words, international demand is equal. When this is the case, international transactions settle without any money changing hands between countries. However, if the amount owed from the United States to England is greater than what is owed from England to the United States, or vice versa, the debts can't simply offset each other. After one debt covers as much of the other as possible, the remaining balance must be paid in precious metals. In reality, the merchant who owes will still pay through a bill. When someone needs to send money to a foreign country, they don’t look for someone who has money to collect from that country and ask for a bill of exchange. Instead, there are middlemen or brokers in this and other businesses who connect buyers and sellers, buying bills from those expecting money and selling bills to those needing to pay. When a customer approaches a broker for a bill on Paris or Amsterdam, the broker might sell them a bill they bought that morning from a merchant or a bill from their own contact in the foreign city; to ensure their contact can pay all the bills they’ve issued, they send them all the bills they’ve purchased but haven’t sold yet. In this way, these brokers handle all financial transactions between distant locations, earning a small commission or percentage on each bill they either sell or buy. If the brokers find they are receiving requests for more bills than are being offered, they won’t refuse to issue them; however, since they can only enable their contacts to pay the bills by sending some funds in gold or silver, they charge those buying bills an extra fee to cover the shipping and insurance of the precious metals, along with a profit to compensate for their effort and for temporarily using part of their capital. Buyers are willing to pay this extra fee, as otherwise they would incur the cost of sending the metals themselves, which is cheaper when handled by those who specialize in it. Although not all who owe money would actually need to send funds, all will ultimately have to pay the extra fee due to competition, and for the same reason, brokers must pay it to those from whom they buy bills. The reverse happens when a country has a balance to receive rather than to pay when comparing exports and imports. In that scenario, brokers see more bills available than are needed to cover those they must issue. Consequently, bills on foreign countries drop in value; and the fierce competition among brokers prevents them from keeping this discount as profit and forces them to pass the benefits on to those buying bills for remittance.
When the United States had the same number of dollars to pay to England which England had to pay to her, one set of merchants in the United States would want bills, and another set would have bills to dispose of, for the very same number of dollars; and consequently a bill on England for $1,000 would sell for exactly $1,000, or, in the phraseology of merchants, the exchange would be at par. As England also, on this supposition, would have an equal number of dollars to pay and to receive, bills on the United States would be at par in England, whenever bills on England were at par in the United States.
When the United States had the same amount of dollars to pay to England as England had to pay to the U.S., one group of merchants in the U.S. would want to buy bills, while another group would have bills they wanted to sell, all for the same amount of dollars. As a result, a bill from England for $1,000 would sell for exactly $1,000, or, as merchants would say, the exchange would be at par. Since England would also have an equal amount of dollars to pay and receive, bills on the United States would be at par in England whenever bills on England were at par in the United States.
If, however, the United States had a larger sum to pay to England than to receive from her, there would be persons requiring bills on England for a greater number of dollars than there were bills drawn by persons to whom money was due. A bill on England for $1,000 would then sell for more than $1,000, and bills would be said to be at a premium. The premium, however, could not exceed the cost and risk of making the remittance in gold, together with a trifling profit; because, if it did, the debtor would send the gold itself, in preference to buying the bill.
If the United States owed England more than it was set to receive, some people would need bills on England for more dollars than there were bills issued by those expecting payment. In that case, a bill on England for $1,000 would sell for more than $1,000, meaning bills would be at a premium. However, the premium couldn't go beyond the cost and risk of sending the money in gold, plus a small profit; otherwise, the debtor would just send the gold directly instead of buying the bill.
If, on the contrary, the United States had more money to receive from England than to pay, there would be bills offered for a greater number of dollars than were wanted for remittance, and the price of bills would fall below par: a bill for $1,000 might be bought for somewhat less than $1,000, and bills would be said to be at a discount.
If, on the other hand, the United States had more money to receive from England than to pay out, there would be bills available for more dollars than needed for transfer, and the price of those bills would drop below their face value: a bill for $1,000 could be bought for slightly less than $1,000, and those bills would be considered to be at a discount.
When the United States has more to pay than to receive, England has more to receive than to pay, and vice versa. [pg 414] When, therefore, in the United States, bills on England bear a premium, then, in England, bills on the United States are at a discount; and, when bills on England are at a discount in the United States, bills on the United States are at a premium in England. If they are at par in either country, they are so, as we have already seen, in both.275
When the United States has to pay more than it receives, England has to receive more than it pays, and . [pg 414] So, when bills on England have a premium in the United States, then bills on the United States are at a discount in England; and when bills on England are at a discount in the United States, bills on the United States are at a premium in England. If they are equal in either country, they are equal, as we've already noted, in both.275
Thus do matters stand between countries, or places which have the same currency. So much of barbarism, however, still remains in the transactions of the most civilized nations, that almost all independent countries choose to assert their nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neighbors, a peculiar currency of their own. To our present purpose this makes no other difference than that, instead of speaking of equal sums of money, we have to speak of equivalent sums. By equivalent sums, when both currencies are composed of the same metal, are meant sums which contain exactly the same quantity of the metal, in weight and fineness.
This is how things are between countries, or places that share the same currency. However, a lot of backward thinking still exists in the dealings of even the most advanced nations, so nearly all independent countries prefer to express their national identity by having their own unique currency, even if it creates challenges for themselves and their neighbors. For our current discussion, this only means that instead of referring to equal amounts of money, we need to refer to equal amounts. By equivalent amounts, when both currencies are made of the same metal, we mean amounts that contain the exact same quantity of the metal in weight and purity.
The quantity of gold in the English pound is equivalent to $4.8666+ of our gold coins. If the bills offered are about equal to those wanted, a claim to a pound in England will sell for $4.86. If many are wanted, and but few to be had, their price will go up, of course; but it can not go more than a small fraction beyond $4.90, since about 3-¼ cents is sufficient to cover the brokerage, insurance, and freight per pound sterling in a shipment of gold to London. Therefore, in order to get money to a creditor in London, no one will pay more for a pound in the form of a bill than he will be obliged to pay for sending it across in the form of bullion. Bills of exchange, then, can not rise in price beyond the point ($4.90 +) since, rather than pay a higher sum for a bill, gold will be sent. This point is called the “shipping-point” of gold. When the exchanges are at $4.90, it will be found that gold is going abroad. On the other hand, when the supply of bills is greater than the demand, their price will fall. A man having a bill on London to sell—i.e., a claim to a pound in London—will not sell it at a price here lower than $4.86, by more than the expense of bringing the gold itself across. Since this expense is about 3-¼ cents, bills can not fall below about $4.83. When exchange is at that price, it will be [pg 415] found that gold is coming to the United States from England. This price is the “shipping-point” for imports of gold. This, of course, applies to sight-bills only.
The amount of gold in the English pound is worth $4.8666+ in our gold coins. If the available bills are roughly equal to the desired amount, a claim to a pound in England will sell for $4.86. If there's high demand and limited availability, the price will naturally go up; however, it can't rise significantly above $4.90 because about 3-¼ cents covers the brokerage, insurance, and freight costs per pound sterling when shipping gold to London. Therefore, to pay a creditor in London, no one is willing to spend more on a pound in the form of a bill than they would to send it as gold. So, bills of exchange cannot be priced higher than around $4.90+, since people would choose to send gold instead of paying extra for a bill. This limit is known as the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“shipping location”for gold. When exchanges reach $4.90, it shows that gold is being exported. On the other hand, if there are more bills than demand, their price will decrease. Someone trying to sell a bill in London—a claim to a pound in London—won't sell it here for less than $4.86 minus the cost of transporting the gold. Since this cost is about 3-¼ cents, bills can't drop below approximately $4.83. When the exchange rate is at this level, it will be[pg 415]noted that gold is coming into the United States from England. This price represents the“shipping point”for gold imports. This only applies to sight bills.
Formerly, we computed exchange on a scale of percentages, the real par being about 109. This was given up after the war.
Before, we calculated exchange rates using percentages, with the actual par being about 109. This practice was dropped after the war.
When bills on foreign countries are at a premium, it is customary to say that the exchanges are against the country, or unfavorable to it. In order to understand these phrases, we must take notice of what “the exchange,” in the language of merchants, really means. It means the power which the money of the country has of purchasing the money of other countries. Supposing $4.86 to be the exact par of exchange, then when it requires more than $1,000 to buy a bill of £205, $1,000 of American money are worth less than their real equivalent of English money: and this is called an exchange unfavorable to the United States. The only persons in the United States, however, to whom it is really unfavorable are those who have money to pay in England, for they come into the bill market as buyers, and have to pay a premium; but to those who have money to receive in England the same state of things is favorable; for they come as sellers and receive the premium. The premium, however, indicates that a balance is due by the United States, which must be eventually liquidated in the precious metals; and since, according to the old theory, the benefit of a trade consisted in bringing money into the country, this prejudice introduced the practice of calling the exchange favorable when it indicated a balance to receive, and unfavorable when it indicated one to pay; and the phrases in turn tended to maintain the prejudice.
When foreign exchange rates are high, we usually say that the exchange is against the country or unfavorable to it. To understand these terms, we need to recognize what "the trade," means in business terms. It refers to how much the money in a country can buy in other countries' currencies. If $4.86 is the exact exchange rate, then if it takes more than $1,000 to buy a bill for £205, it means that $1,000 of American money is worth less than the equivalent amount in British money; this is referred to as an unfavorable exchange for the United States. However, the only people truly affected negatively in the U.S. are those who need to pay money in England, as they enter the bill market as buyers and must pay a premium. On the other hand, those who have money to receive from England benefit from this situation because they enter as sellers and gain that premium. Nevertheless, the premium shows that the U.S. owes a balance that eventually needs to be settled in precious metals. According to the old view, the advantage of trade was seen as bringing money into the country, which led to the bias of calling the exchange favorable when it indicated money to be received and unfavorable when it suggested a payment due; these phrases further reinforced that bias.
§ 2. Difference between self-adjusting variations in exchanges and those that can only be corrected through prices.
It might be supposed at first sight that when the exchange is unfavorable, or, in other words, when bills are at a premium, the premium must always amount to a full equivalent for the cost of transmitting money. But a small excess of imports above exports, or any other small amount of debt to be paid to foreign countries, does not usually affect the exchanges to the full extent of the cost and risk of transporting bullion. The length of credit allowed generally permits, on the part of some of the debtors, a postponement [pg 416] of payment, and in the mean time the balance may turn the other way, and restore the equality of debts and credits without any actual transmission of the metals. And this is the more likely to happen, as there is a self-adjusting power in the variations of the exchange itself. Bills are at a premium because a greater money value has been imported than exported. But the premium is itself an extra profit to those who export. Besides the price they obtain for their goods, they draw for the amount and gain the premium. It is, on the other hand, a diminution of profit to those who import. Besides the price of the goods, they have to pay a premium for remittance. So that what is called an unfavorable exchange is an encouragement to export, and a discouragement to import. And if the balance due is of small amount, and is the consequence of some merely casual disturbance in the ordinary course of trade, it is soon liquidated in commodities, and the account adjusted by means of bills, without the transmission of any bullion. Not so, however, when the excess of imports above exports, which has made the exchange unfavorable, arises from a permanent cause. In that case, what disturbed the equilibrium must have been the state of prices, and it can only be restored by acting on prices. It is impossible that prices should be such as to invite to an excess of imports, and yet that the exports should be kept permanently up to the imports by the extra profit on exportation derived from the premium on bills; for, if the exports were kept up to the imports, bills would not be at a premium, and the extra profit would not exist. It is through the prices of commodities that the correction must be administered.
At first glance, it might seem that when the exchange rate is unfavorable, meaning bills are at a premium, that premium should always cover the full cost of sending money. However, a slight increase in imports over exports, or any minor debt owed to foreign countries, typically doesn’t affect the exchange rate to the extent of the costs and risks of transporting gold. The length of credit usually allows some debtors to delay payment, and during that time, the balance may shift back, restoring the equality of debts and credits without needing to actually send any metals. This is even more likely because there’s a self-adjusting mechanism in the exchange rate itself. Bills are at a premium because more money value has been imported than exported. This premium becomes extra profit for exporters. In addition to the price they receive for their products, they also get the premium. On the flip side, it reduces the profit for importers. Along with paying the price for goods, they must also pay a premium for sending money. Therefore, what’s called an unfavorable exchange actually encourages exports and discourages imports. If the outstanding balance is small and results from a temporary disruption in regular trade, it’s soon settled through goods, and the account gets adjusted with bills, without the need to send any gold. However, when a persistent imbalance exists, where imports exceed exports, caused by a fundamental issue, restoring balance must address prices. It's not possible for prices to entice excessive imports while exports stay high due to the extra profit from the premium on bills; if exports matched imports, bills wouldn’t have a premium, and that extra profit wouldn’t exist. The correction has to come through the prices of commodities.
Disturbances, therefore, of the equilibrium of imports and exports, and consequent disturbances of the exchange, may be considered as of two classes: the one casual or accidental, which, if not on too large a scale, correct themselves through the premium on bills, without any transmission of the precious metals; the other arising from the general state of prices, which can not be corrected without the subtraction [pg 417] of actual money from the circulation of one of the countries, or an annihilation of credit equivalent to it.
Disturbances in the balance of imports and exports, and the resulting issues with exchange rates, can be categorized into two types: the first is random or accidental, which, if they aren't too significant, tend to self-correct through the increased cost of bills, without needing to move physical gold or silver; the second comes from the overall price levels, which cannot be corrected without removing actual money from the circulation of one of the countries, or a destruction of credit that is equivalent to that amount. [pg 417]
It remains to observe that the exchanges do not depend on the balance of debts and credits with each country separately, but with all countries taken together. The United States may owe a balance of payments to England; but it does not follow that the exchange with England will be against the United States, and that bills on England will be at a premium; because a balance may be due to the United States from Holland or Hamburg, and she may pay her debts to England with bills on those places; which is technically called arbitration of exchange. There is some little additional expense, partly commission and partly loss of interest in settling debts in this circuitous manner, and to the extent of that small difference the exchange with one country may vary apart from that with others.
It’s important to note that exchanges are not determined by the balance of debts and credits with each individual country, but rather with all countries combined. The United States may have a balance of payments owed to England; however, that doesn’t mean the exchange rate with England will be unfavorable for the United States, nor that bills on England will be at a premium. This is because the U.S. could have a balance owed to it from Holland or Hamburg, allowing it to settle its debts to England using bills from those locations, which is known as arbitration of exchange. There are some minor additional costs involved, mainly commission and loss of interest from settling debts this indirect way, and this small difference can cause the exchange rate with one country to fluctuate independently of others.
A common use of bills of exchange is that by which, when three countries are concerned, two of them may strike a balance through the third, if both countries have dealings with that third country. New York merchants may buy of China, but China may not be buying of New York, although both may have dealings with London.
A common way bills of exchange are used is when three countries are involved, allowing two of them to settle their accounts through the third, as long as both countries trade with that third one. New York merchants might buy from China, but China might not be buying from New York, even though both have trade relations with London.

A, we will suppose, is a buyer of £1,000 worth of tea from F, in Hong-Kong; B is an exporter of wheat (£1,000) to C in London; D has sent £1,000 worth of cotton goods to E in Hong-Kong. A can now pay F through London without the transmission of coin. A buys B's claim on C for £1,000, and sends it to F. E wishes to pay D in London for the cotton goods he bought of him; therefore, he buys from F for £1,000 the claim he now holds (i.e., a bill of exchange on London) against C for £1,000. E sends it to D, and, when D collects it from C, the whole circle of exchanges is completed without the transmission of the precious metals.
Let’s say A is buying £1,000 worth of tea from F in Hong Kong; B is exporting £1,000 worth of wheat to C in London; and D has sent £1,000 worth of cotton goods to E in Hong Kong. A can now pay F through London without transferring any physical cash. A buys B's claim on C for £1,000 and sends it to F. E wants to pay D in London for the cotton goods he bought from him, so he purchases F’s claim (a bill of exchange on London) against C for £1,000. E sends it to D, and when D cashes it from C, the entire cycle of exchanges is completed without moving any precious metals.
Chapter 17. The Distribution of Precious Metals in the Commercial World.
§ 1. The replacement of money with barter doesn't change exports and imports or the Law of international Values.
Having now examined the mechanism by which the commercial transactions between nations are actually conducted, we have next to inquire whether this mode of conducting them makes any difference in the conclusions respecting international values, which we previously arrived at on the hypothesis of barter.
Having now looked into how trade between countries actually happens, we need to ask whether this way of doing things changes our previous conclusions about international values, which we came to based on the assumption of barter.
The nearest analogy would lead us to presume the negative. We did not find that the intervention of money and its substitutes made any difference in the law of value as applied to adjacent places. Things which would have been equal in value if the mode of exchange had been by barter are worth equal sums of money. The introduction of money is a mere addition of one more commodity, of which the value is regulated by the same laws as that of all other commodities. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if we find that international values also are determined by the same causes under a money and bill system as they would be under a system of barter, and that money has little to do in the matter, except to furnish a convenient mode of comparing values.
The closest comparison would suggest a negative outcome. We discovered that the use of money and its alternatives didn't change the law of value in nearby locations. Things that would have been valued equally if traded through barter are worth the same amount of money. The introduction of money is just an addition of another commodity, with its value determined by the same principles as all other goods. So, we shouldn’t be surprised to find that international values are also influenced by the same factors under a money and bill system as they would be under a barter system, and that money plays a minimal role, primarily serving as a convenient way to compare values.
All interchange is, in substance and effect, barter; whoever sells commodities for money, and with that money buys other goods, really buys those goods with his own commodities. And so of nations: their trade is a mere exchange of exports for imports; and, whether money is employed or not, things are only in their permanent state when the exports and imports exactly pay for each other. When this is the [pg 419] case, equal sums of money are due from each country to the other, the debts are settled by bills, and there is no balance to be paid in the precious metals. The trade is in a state like that which is called in mechanics a condition of stable equilibrium.
All exchange is essentially barter; when someone sells goods for money and then uses that money to buy other products, they are effectively purchasing those products with their own goods. The same goes for countries: their trade is simply an exchange of exports for imports; whether or not money is involved, things are only balanced when exports and imports match each other's value. When this happens, equal amounts of money are owed from each country to the other, the debts are settled through bills, and there’s no need to pay off with precious metals. The trade is in a state similar to what mechanics describe as stable equilibrium.
But the process by which things are brought back to this state when they happen to deviate from it is, at least outwardly, not the same in a barter system and in a money system. Under the first, the country which wants more imports than its exports will pay for must offer its exports at a cheaper rate, as the sole means of creating a demand for them sufficient to re-establish the equilibrium. When money is used, the country seems to do a thing totally different. She takes the additional imports at the same price as before, and, as she exports no equivalent, the balance of payments turns against her; the exchange becomes unfavorable, and the difference has to be paid in money. This is, in appearance, a very distinct operation from the former. Let us see if it differs in its essence, or only in its mechanism.
But the way things are brought back to this state when they go off track is, at least on the surface, different in a barter system than in a money system. In a barter system, a country that wants to buy more imports than it sells must offer its exports at a lower price to create enough demand to restore balance. With money, the country seems to handle it differently. It accepts the extra imports at the same price as before, and since it doesn't export anything equivalent, the balance of payments shifts against it; the exchange rate worsens, and the difference has to be covered in cash. This appears to be quite different from the previous method. Let's see if it differs in its core concept or just in how it works.
Let the country which has the balance to pay be the United States,276 and the country which receives it, England. By this transmission of the precious metals, the quantity of the currency is diminished in the United States, and increased in England. This I am at liberty to assume. We are now supposing that there is an excess of imports over exports, arising from the fact that the equation of international demand is not yet established: that there is at the ordinary prices a permanent demand in the United States for more English goods than the American goods required in England at the ordinary prices will pay for. When this is the case, if a change were not made in the prices, there would be a perpetually renewed balance to be paid in money. The imports require to be permanently diminished, or the exports to be increased, which can only be accomplished through [pg 420] prices; and hence, even if the balances are at first paid from hoards, or by the exportation of bullion, they will reach the circulation at last, for, until they do, nothing can stop the drain.
Let the country that has the balance to pay be the United States, and the country that receives it, England. This transfer of precious metals decreases the currency supply in the United States and increases it in England. I can assume this. We are assuming that there is an excess of imports over exports because the international demand hasn’t yet balanced out: at normal prices, there is a consistent demand in the United States for more English goods than the American goods that are needed in England can cover at those normal prices. When this situation occurs, if prices don’t change, a balance will continuously need to be paid in cash. Imports need to be permanently reduced, or exports need to be boosted, which can only happen through pricing adjustments; therefore, even if the balances are initially covered by reserves or by exporting bullion, they will eventually enter circulation, because until they do, nothing can stop the outflow.
When, therefore, the state of prices is such that the equation of international demand can not establish itself, the country requiring more imports than can be paid for by the exports, it is a sign that the country has more of the precious metals, or their substitutes, in circulation, than can permanently circulate, and must necessarily part with some of them before the balance can be restored. The currency is accordingly contracted: prices fall, and, among the rest, the prices of exportable articles; for which, accordingly, there arises, in foreign countries, a greater demand: while imported commodities have possibly risen in price, from the influx of money into foreign countries, and at all events have not participated in the general fall. But, until the increased cheapness of American goods induces foreign countries to take a greater pecuniary value, or until the increased dearness (positive or comparative) of foreign goods makes the United States take a less pecuniary value, the exports of the United States will be no nearer to paying for the imports than before, and the stream of the precious metals which had begun to flow out of the United States will still flow on. This efflux will continue until the fall of prices in the United States brings within reach of the foreign market some commodity which the United States did not previously send thither; or, until the reduced price of the things which she did send has forced a demand abroad for a sufficient quantity to pay for the imports, aided perhaps by a reduction of the American demand for foreign goods, through their enhanced price, either positive or comparative.
When the price levels are such that international demand can’t balance out, and the country needs more imports than it can pay for with exports, it signals that the country has more precious metals, or their substitutes, in circulation than can be sustained. As a result, it must sell off some of these assets before achieving balance. This leads to a contraction of currency: prices drop, including the prices of exportable goods, which then triggers a higher demand from foreign markets. Meanwhile, imported goods may have risen in price due to the influx of money into other countries, and they certainly won't drop along with the general price decline. However, unless the cheaper American goods encourage foreign countries to accept them for a higher monetary value, or the increased cost of foreign goods leads the United States to accept them for less, the exports from the United States will remain incapable of covering the cost of imports, and the outflow of precious metals from the U.S. will continue. This outflow will persist until falling prices in the U.S. make some commodities that weren’t previously exported attractive to the foreign market, or until the decreased prices of goods already sent abroad generate enough demand to cover the imports, potentially supported by a reduction in American demand for foreign goods due to their higher prices, whether absolutely or comparatively.
Now, this is the very process which took place on our original supposition of barter. Not only, therefore, does the trade between nations tend to the same equilibrium between exports and imports, whether money is employed or not, but the means by which this equilibrium is established are essentially [pg 421] the same. The country whose exports are not sufficient to pay for her imports offers them on cheaper terms, until she succeeds in forcing the necessary demand: in other words, the equation of international demand, under a money system as well as under a barter system, is the law of international trade. Every country exports and imports the very same things, and in the very same quantity, under the one system as under the other. In a barter system, the trade gravitates to the point at which the sum of the imports exactly exchanges for the sum of the exports: in a money system, it gravitates to the point at which the sum of the imports and the sum of the exports exchange for the same quantity of money. And, since things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, the exports and imports which are equal in money price would, if money were not used, precisely exchange for one another.277
Now, this is exactly what happens in our initial assumption of barter. So, the trade between countries tends to balance out exports and imports, whether or not money is used, and the way this balance is achieved is basically the same. The country that doesn't export enough to cover its imports starts offering them at lower prices until it creates the necessary demand. In other words, the balance of international demand works the same way in both a money system and a barter system; that’s the principle of international trade. Every country exports and imports the same items in the same quantities, whether under one system or the other. In a barter system, trade settles where the total value of imports equals the total value of exports; in a money system, it settles where the total value of imports and exports equals the same amount of money. And, since things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other, exports and imports that have the same money value would, without money, exchange for each other exactly. [pg 421]
§ 2. A further explanation of the previous theorem.
Let us proceed to [examine] to what extent the benefit of an improvement in the production of an exportable article is participated in by the countries importing it.
Let’s look at how much the countries that import a product benefit from improvements in its production.
The improvement may either consist in the cheapening of some article which was already a staple production of the country, or in the establishment of some new branch of industry, or of some process rendering an article exportable which had not till then been exported at all. It will be convenient to begin with the case of a new export, as being somewhat the simpler of the two.
The improvement could either be in reducing the cost of an item that is already a key product of the country or in starting a new industry or in creating a process that makes a product exportable that wasn’t exported before. It’s easier to start with the case of a new export, as it’s somewhat simpler than the other option.
The first effect is that the article falls in price, and a demand arises for it abroad. This new exportation disturbs the balance, turns the exchanges, money flows into the country (which we shall suppose to be the United States), and continues to flow until prices rise. This higher range of prices will somewhat check the demand in foreign countries for the new article of export; and will diminish the demand which existed abroad for the other things which the United States was in the habit of exporting. The exports will thus be diminished; while at the same time the American public, [pg 424] having more money, will have a greater power of purchasing foreign commodities. If they make use of this increased power of purchase, there will be an increase of imports; and by this, and the check to exportation, the equilibrium of imports and exports will be restored. The result to foreign countries will be, that they have to pay dearer than before for their other imports, and obtain the new commodity cheaper than before, but not so much cheaper as the United States herself does. I say this, being well aware that the article would be actually at the very same price (cost of carriage excepted) in the United States and in other countries. The cheapness, however, of the article is not measured solely by the money-price, but by that price compared with the money-incomes of the consumers. The price is the same to the American and to the foreign consumers; but the former pay that price from money-incomes which have been increased by the new distribution of the precious metals; while the latter have had their money-incomes probably diminished by the same cause. The trade, therefore, has not imparted to the foreign consumer the whole, but only a portion, of the benefit which the American consumer has derived from the improvement; while the United States has also benefited in the prices of foreign commodities. Thus, then, any industrial improvement which leads to the opening of a new branch of export trade benefits a country not only by the cheapness of the article in which the improvement has taken place, but by a general cheapening of all imported products.
The first effect is that the price of the article drops, leading to increased demand for it abroad. This new export activity disrupts the balance, shifts the exchange rates, and money flows into the country (let’s assume it’s the United States) until prices rise again. This increase in prices will somewhat reduce foreign demand for the new export and will also lessen the demand for other products that the United States typically exported. As a result, exports will decrease, while at the same time, the American public, having more money, will be able to buy more foreign goods. If they take advantage of this increased purchasing power, imports will rise; thus, with the reduction in exports, the balance between imports and exports will be restored. The consequence for foreign countries will be that they end up paying more than before for their other imports while getting the new product at a lower price than before, but not as low as what the United States pays. I mention this knowing that the article would actually be sold at the same price (excluding shipping costs) in the United States and in other countries. However, the affordability of the article isn’t just about its money price; it’s about that price in relation to the money incomes of the consumers. The price is the same for both American and foreign consumers, but the former can afford that price thanks to increased money incomes from the new distribution of precious metals, while the latter likely see their money incomes reduced for the same reason. Therefore, the trade has not given the foreign consumer all the benefits that the American consumer has received from the improvement; meanwhile, the United States has also gained from the lower prices of foreign goods. Thus, any industrial improvement that opens up a new export trade benefits a country not only through the lower price of the improved article but also through an overall reduction in the cost of all imported products.
Let us now change the hypothesis, and suppose that the improvement, instead of creating a new export from the United States, cheapens an existing one. Let the commodity in which there is an improvement be [cotton] cloth. The first effect of the improvement is that its price falls, and there is an increased demand for it in the foreign market. But this demand is of uncertain amount. Suppose the foreign consumers to increase their purchases in the exact ratio of the cheapness, or, in other words, to lay out in cloth the [pg 425] same sum of money as before; the same aggregate payment as before will be due from foreign countries to the United States; the equilibrium of exports and imports will remain undisturbed, and foreigners will obtain the full advantage of the increased cheapness of cloth. But if the foreign demand for cloth is of such a character as to increase in a greater ratio than the cheapness, a larger sum than formerly will be due to the United States for cloth, and when paid will raise American prices, the price of cloth included; this rise, however, will affect only the foreign purchaser, American incomes being raised in a corresponding proportion; and the foreign consumer will thus derive a less advantage than the United States from the improvement. If, on the contrary, the cheapening of cloth does not extend the foreign demand for it in a proportional degree, a less sum of debts than before will be due to the United States for cloth, while there will be the usual sum of debts due from the United States to foreign countries; the balance of trade will turn against the United States, money will be exported, prices (that of cloth included) will fall, and cloth will eventually be cheapened to the foreign purchaser in a still greater ratio than the improvement has cheapened it to the United States. These are the very conclusions which [would be] deduced on the hypothesis of barter.278
Let’s change the assumption and imagine that the improvement, instead of creating a new export from the United States, lowers the cost of an existing one. Let’s say the product that sees the improvement is cotton cloth. The first result of this improvement is that its price drops, leading to an increase in demand for it in the foreign market. However, this demand is uncertain. If foreign buyers increase their purchases in direct proportion to the price drop, or in other words, spend the same amount on cloth as before, then the total payment owed from foreign countries to the United States will remain unchanged, and the balance of exports and imports will stay stable, allowing foreigners to fully benefit from the cheaper cloth. On the other hand, if the foreign demand for cloth increases at a rate greater than the price drop, a larger amount than before will be owed to the United States for cloth, and when this is paid, it will raise American prices, including the price of cloth; however, this price increase will only impact foreign buyers, while American incomes will rise correspondingly. This means that the foreign consumer will gain less benefit from the improvement than the United States will. Conversely, if the price drop of cloth does not lead to a proportionate increase in foreign demand, a smaller amount will be owed to the United States for cloth compared to before, while the usual debts owed from the United States to foreign countries will remain the same. This would cause the balance of trade to turn against the United States, money will be sent abroad, prices (including that of cloth) will drop, and eventually, cloth will be even cheaper for foreign buyers than it was for the United States due to the improvement. These are the same conclusions that would be drawn from the assumption of barter.
The result of the preceding discussion can not be better summed up than in the words of Ricardo.279 “Gold and silver having been chosen for the general medium of circulation, they are, by the competition of commerce, distributed in such proportions among the different countries of the world as to accommodate themselves to the natural traffic which would take place if no such metals existed, and the trade between countries were purely a trade of barter.” Of this principle, so fertile in consequences, previous to which the theory of foreign trade was an unintelligible chaos, Mr. [pg 426] Ricardo, though he did not pursue it into its ramifications, was the real originator.
The outcome of the earlier discussion can be best summarized by Ricardo's words. 279 "Gold and silver have been chosen as the primary means of exchange and are distributed among various countries based on market competition, allowing them to match the natural trade flow that would happen if these metals weren't available and countries relied solely on bartering." This principle, which has far-reaching implications, turned foreign trade from an incomprehensible mess into a coherent theory. Mr. [pg 426] Ricardo, while he didn't delve into all its details, was the true pioneer behind this idea.
§ 3. Precious metals used as money hold the same value and distribute themselves according to the same rules as precious metals as a commodity.
It is now necessary to inquire in what manner this law of the distribution of the precious metals by means of the exchanges affects the exchange value of money itself; and how it tallies with the law by which we found that the value of money is regulated when imported as a mere article of merchandise.
It is now important to explore how this law regarding the distribution of precious metals through exchanges impacts the exchange value of money itself, and how it aligns with the law that determines the value of money when it is imported simply as a commodity.
The causes which bring money into or carry it out of a country (1) through the exchanges, to restore the equilibrium of trade, and which thereby raise its value in some countries and lower it in others, are the very same causes on which the local value of money would depend, if it were never imported except (2) as a merchandise, and never except directly from the mines. When the value of money in a country is permanently lowered (1) [as a medium of exchange] by an influx of it through the balance of trade, the cause, if it is not diminished cost of production, must be one of those causes which compel a new adjustment, more favorable to the country, of the equation of international demand—namely, either an increased demand abroad for her commodities, or [pg 427] a diminished demand on her part for those of foreign countries. Now, an increased foreign demand for the commodities of a country, or a diminished demand in the country for imported commodities, are the very causes which, on the general principles of trade, enable a country to purchase all imports, and consequently (2) the precious metals, at a lower value. There is, therefore, no contradiction, but the most perfect accordance, in the results of the two different modes [(1) as a medium of exchange; and (2) as merchandise] in which the precious metals may be obtained. When money [as a medium of exchange] flows from country to country in consequence of changes in the international demand for commodities, and by so doing alters its own local value, it merely realizes, by a more rapid process, the effect which would otherwise take place more slowly by an alteration in the relative breadth of the streams by which the precious metals [as merchandise] flow into different regions of the earth from the mining countries. As, therefore, we before saw that the use of money as a medium of exchange does not in the least alter the law on which the values of other things, either in the same country or internationally, depend, so neither does it alter the law of the value of the precious metals itself; and there is in the whole doctrine of international values, as now laid down, a unity and harmony which are a strong collateral presumption of truth.
The factors that bring money into or take it out of a country (1) through exchanges, to balance trade, and thus increase its value in some countries while decreasing it in others, are the same factors on which the local value of money would rely if it were only imported (2) as a commodity, and only directly from the mines. When the value of money in a country is consistently decreased (1) [as a medium of exchange] due to an influx from trade balances, the cause, unless it's a reduced production cost, must be one of those factors that necessitate a new adjustment, more beneficial to the country, in the equation of international demand—specifically, either a greater demand overseas for its products or a reduced demand within the country for foreign goods. An increase in foreign demand for a country’s products, or a decrease in the country's demand for imported goods, are precisely the reasons that, based on general trade principles, allow a country to buy all imports, and thus (2) precious metals, at a lower value. There is, therefore, no contradiction, but rather a complete alignment, in the outcomes of the two different ways [(1) as a medium of exchange; and (2) as merchandise] in which precious metals can be obtained. When money [as a medium of exchange] moves from one country to another due to shifts in international demand for goods, and in doing so changes its own local value, it simply accelerates the effect that would otherwise occur more slowly through changes in the relative flows of precious metals [as merchandise] moving from mining countries into different regions of the world. Thus, as we previously noted, the use of money as a medium of exchange doesn’t alter the law governing the values of other items, either domestically or internationally, nor does it change the law of the precious metals' value itself; and the whole theory of international values, as presented now, demonstrates a unity and harmony that strongly supports its validity.
§ 4. International payments involved in the“financial account.”
Before closing this discussion, it is fitting to point out in what manner and degree the preceding conclusions are affected by the existence of international payments not originating in commerce, and for which no equivalent in either money or commodities is expected or received—such as a tribute, or remittances, or interest to foreign creditors, or a government expenditure abroad.
Before wrapping up this discussion, it’s important to highlight how the previous conclusions are influenced by international payments that aren’t tied to trade, for which no equivalent in money or goods is anticipated or received—like tributes, remittances, interest to foreign creditors, or government spending abroad.
To begin with the case of barter. The supposed annual remittances being made in commodities, and being exports for which there is to be no return, it is no longer requisite that the imports and exports should pay for one another; on the contrary, there must be an annual excess of exports over [pg 428] imports, equal to the value of the remittance. If, before the country became liable to the annual payment, foreign commerce was in its natural state of equilibrium, it will now be necessary, for the purpose of effecting the remittances, that foreign countries should be induced to take a greater quantity of exports than before, which can only be done by offering those exports on cheaper terms, or, in other words, by paying dearer for foreign commodities. The international values will so adjust themselves that, either by greater exports or smaller imports, or both, the requisite excess on the side of exports will be brought about, and this excess will become the permanent state. The result is, that a country which makes regular payments to foreign countries, besides losing what it pays, loses also something more, by the less advantageous terms on which it is forced to exchange its productions for foreign commodities.
To start with barter, the supposed annual payments made in goods are exports with no return, so it’s no longer necessary for imports and exports to balance each other out. Instead, there needs to be a yearly surplus of exports over imports that matches the value of the payment. If, before the country had to make these annual payments, foreign trade was balanced, now it will require foreign countries to buy more exports than they did before. This can only happen by offering those exports at lower prices, which means paying more for foreign goods. The international values will adjust so that either through increased exports, reduced imports, or a combination of both, the necessary surplus in exports will be achieved, and this surplus will become a permanent condition. As a result, a country that regularly sends payments abroad not only loses what it pays but also suffers further losses due to the less favorable terms it has to accept when trading its goods for foreign ones.
The same results follow on the supposition of money. Commerce being supposed to be in a state of equilibrium when the obligatory remittances begin, the first remittance is necessarily made in money. This lowers prices in the remitting country, and raises them in the receiving. The natural effect is, that more commodities are exported than before, and fewer imported, and that, on the score of commerce alone, a balance of money will be constantly due from the receiving to the paying country. When the debt thus annually due to the tributary country becomes equal to the annual tribute or other regular payment due from it, no further transmission of money takes place; the equilibrium of exports and imports will no longer exist, but that of payments will; the exchange will be at par, the two debts will be set off against one another, and the tribute or remittance will be virtually paid in goods. The result to the interests of the two countries will be as already pointed out—the paying country will give a higher price for all that it buys from the receiving country, while the latter, besides receiving the tribute, obtains the exportable produce of the tributary country at a lower price.
The same results apply when considering money. Commerce is assumed to be balanced when the required payments start, so the first payment is always made in money. This causes prices to drop in the sending country and rise in the receiving one. The natural outcome is that more goods are exported than before, and fewer are imported, creating a constant monetary balance that is owed from the receiving country to the sending country based solely on trade. When the debt that is owed each year to the sending country equals the annual tribute or other regular payments it owes, no more money is transferred; the balance of trade no longer exists, but the balance of payments does. The exchange will be equal, the two debts will cancel each other out, and the tribute or payment will effectively be settled with goods. The impact on both countries will be as noted earlier—the paying country will pay a higher price for everything it buys from the receiving country, while the receiving country, in addition to receiving the tribute, will get the exportable goods from the paying country at a lower price.
Chapter 18. The Impact of Currency on Exchange Rates and International Trade.
§ 1. Fluctuations in the exchange that come from the Currency.
In our inquiry into the laws of international trade, we commenced with the principles which determine international exchanges and international values on the hypothesis of barter. We next showed that the introduction of money, as a medium of exchange, makes no difference in the laws of exchanges and of values between country and country, no more than between individual and individual: since the precious metals, under the influence of those same laws, distribute themselves in such proportions among the different countries of the world as to allow the very same exchanges to go on, and at the same values, as would be the case under a system of barter. We lastly considered how the value of money itself is affected by those alterations in the state of trade which arise from alterations either in the demand and supply of commodities or in their cost of production. It remains to consider the alterations in the state of trade which originate not in commodities but in money.
In our exploration of international trade laws, we started with the principles that govern international exchanges and values based on the idea of barter. We then demonstrated that introducing money as a medium of exchange doesn’t change the laws of exchanges and values between countries or individuals. This is because precious metals, influenced by the same laws, distribute themselves among different countries in such a way that the same exchanges occur at the same values as they would in a barter system. Finally, we looked at how the value of money itself is influenced by changes in trade conditions that result from shifts in the demand and supply of goods or their production costs. Now, we need to look at the changes in trade that come from factors related to money rather than commodities.
Gold and silver may vary like other things, though they are not so likely to vary as other things in their cost of production. The demand for them in foreign countries may also vary. It may increase by augmented employment of the metals for purposes of art and ornament, or because the increase of production and of transactions has created a greater amount of business to be done by the circulating medium. It may diminish, for the opposite reasons; or, [pg 431] from the extension of the economizing expedients by which the use of metallic money is partially dispensed with. These changes act upon the trade between other countries and the mining countries, and upon the value of the precious metals, according to the general laws of the value of imported commodities: which have been set forth in the previous chapters with sufficient fullness.
Gold and silver can fluctuate like other items, though they're not as likely to change in production costs. The demand for them in other countries can also shift. It can rise as more of these metals are used for art and decoration, or because increased production and transactions have led to more business needing a circulating medium. It can drop for the opposite reasons, or due to the adoption of cost-saving measures that reduce the need for physical money. These changes impact trade between other countries and mining nations, as well as the value of precious metals, following the general principles of imported goods' value, which have been detailed in previous chapters.
What I propose to examine in the present chapter is not those circumstances affecting money which alter the permanent conditions of its value, but the effects produced on international trade by casual or temporary variations in the value of money, which have no connection with any causes affecting its permanent value.
What I plan to explore in this chapter isn’t the factors that change money’s long-term value, but rather the impact that random or short-term fluctuations in money’s value have on international trade, which aren't linked to any elements affecting its lasting value.
§ 2. Impact of a sudden rise in metallic currency or the sudden introduction of banknotes or other money substitutes.
Let us suppose in any country a circulating medium purely metallic, and a sudden casual increase made to it; for example, by bringing into circulation hoards of treasure, which had been concealed in a previous period of foreign invasion or internal disorder. The natural effect would be a rise of prices. This would check exports and encourage imports; the imports would exceed the exports, the exchanges would become unfavorable, and a newly acquired stock of money would diffuse itself over all countries with which the supposed country carried on trade, and from them, progressively, through all parts of the commercial world. The money which thus overflowed would spread itself to an equal depth over all commercial countries. For it would go on flowing until the exports and imports again balanced one another; and this (as no change is supposed in the permanent circumstances of international demand) could only be when the money had diffused itself so equally that prices had risen in the same ratio in all countries, so that the alteration of price would be for all practical purposes ineffective, and the exports and imports, though at a higher money valuation, would be exactly the same as they were originally. This diminished value of money throughout the world (at least if the diminution was considerable) would cause a suspension, or at least a diminution, of the annual supply from [pg 432] the mines, since the metal would no longer command a value equivalent to its highest cost of production. The annual waste would, therefore, not be fully made up, and the usual causes of destruction would gradually reduce the aggregate quantity of the precious metals to its former amount; after which their production would recommence on its former scale. The discovery of the treasure would thus produce only temporary effects; namely, a brief disturbance of international trade until the treasure had disseminated itself through the world, and then a temporary depression in the value of the metal below that which corresponds to the cost of producing or of obtaining it; which depression would gradually be corrected by a temporarily diminished production in the producing countries and importation in the importing countries.
Let's assume that in any country there's a fully metallic currency, and suddenly, a significant increase occurs; for instance, by bringing hidden treasure into circulation that had been stored away during a previous period of foreign invasion or internal chaos. The immediate result would be a rise in prices. This would reduce exports and boost imports; imports would surpass exports, leading to unfavorable exchange rates, and the newly acquired money would spread to all the countries that trade with the supposed country, gradually reaching all parts of the commercial world. The overflowing money would distribute evenly across all commercial nations. It would continue to flow until exports and imports were balanced again; and since no change is assumed in the enduring conditions of international demand, this balance could only be achieved when the money had spread so evenly that prices rose uniformly in all countries, making the change in price practically ineffective, with exports and imports, now valued higher, being precisely the same as they were originally. This reduction in the value of money worldwide (especially if it was significant) would lead to a slowdown or at least a decrease in the annual output from the mines, as the metal would no longer fetch a price equivalent to its highest production cost. Consequently, the annual depletion would not be fully replenished, and usual destruction factors would gradually decrease the total quantity of precious metals back to its previous level; after which production would restart at its former rate. Thus, the discovery of the treasure would only result in temporary effects, specifically, a short disruption in international trade until the treasure had circulated globally, followed by a temporary drop in the metal's value below that corresponding to its production costs, a decline that would be slowly corrected by a temporary reduction in production in the producing countries and in imports in the importing nations.
The same effects which would thus arise from the discovery of a treasure accompany the process by which bank-notes, or any of the other substitutes for money, take the place of the precious metals. Suppose282 that the United States possessed a currency, wholly metallic, of $200,000,000, and that suddenly $200,000,000 of bank-notes were sent into circulation. If these were issued by bankers, they would be employed in loans, or in the purchase of securities, and would therefore create a sudden fall in the rate of interest, which would probably send a great part of the $200,000,000 of gold out of the country as capital, to seek a higher rate of interest elsewhere, before there had been time for any action on prices. But we will suppose that the notes are not issued by bankers, or money-lenders of any kind, but by manufacturers, in the payment of wages and the purchase of materials, or by the Government [as, e.g., greenbacks] in its ordinary expenses, so that the whole amount would be rapidly carried into the markets for commodities. The following would be the natural order of consequences: All prices would rise greatly. Exportation would almost cease; importation would be prodigiously [pg 433] stimulated. A great balance of payments would become due, the exchanges would turn against the United States, to the full extent of the cost of exporting money; and the surplus coin would pour itself rapidly forth, over the various countries of the world, in the order of their proximity, geographically and commercially, to the United States.
The same effects that would happen from discovering treasure also occur when bank-notes or other forms of money replace precious metals. Suppose that the United States had a completely metallic currency of $200,000,000, and suddenly $200,000,000 in bank-notes were put into circulation. If these were issued by banks, they would be used for loans or buying securities, causing a sharp drop in interest rates. This would likely lead a significant portion of the $200,000,000 in gold to leave the country in search of higher interest rates elsewhere before prices could react. However, let’s assume that the notes are not issued by banks or money-lenders but by manufacturers, to pay wages and buy materials, or by the Government (like greenbacks) for its regular expenses. In this case, the entire amount would quickly enter the markets for goods. The natural consequences would be: all prices would rise significantly. Exports would nearly stop; imports would skyrocket. A large balance of payments would be owed, and the exchanges would turn against the United States to the full extent of the cost of exporting money. The excess coins would quickly flow out to various countries around the world, in order of their geographical and commercial closeness to the United States.
The efflux would continue until the currencies of all countries had come to a level; by which I do not mean, until money became of the same value everywhere, but until the differences were only those which existed before, and which corresponded to permanent differences in the cost of obtaining it. When the rise of prices had extended itself in an equal degree to all countries, exports and imports would everywhere revert to what they were at first, would balance one another, and the exchanges would return to par. If such a sum of money as $200,000,000, when spread over the whole surface of the commercial world, were sufficient to raise the general level in a perceptible degree, the effect would be of no long duration. No alteration having occurred in the general conditions under which the metals were procured, either in the world at large or in any part of it, the reduced value would no longer be remunerating, and the supply from the mines would cease partially or wholly, until the $200,000,000 were absorbed.283
The outflow would continue until the currencies of all countries reached a uniform level; I don’t mean that money would be of the same value everywhere, but rather that the differences would revert to those that existed before, which corresponded to lasting differences in the cost of acquiring it. Once price increases had spread evenly across all countries, exports and imports would return to their original levels, balancing each other out, and exchange rates would stabilize. If a sum of $200,000,000, when distributed across the entire global market, was enough to raise the general level noticeably, that effect wouldn't last long. Since no changes had occurred in the overall conditions under which metals were obtained, either globally or in any specific area, the reduced value would no longer be rewarding, causing the supply from mines to decrease partially or completely until the $200,000,000 was absorbed.283
Effects of another kind, however, will have been produced: $200,000,000, which formerly existed in the unproductive [pg 434] form of metallic money, have been converted into what is, or is capable of becoming, productive capital. This gain is at first made by the United States at the expense of other countries, who have taken her superfluity of this costly and unproductive article off her hands, giving for it an equivalent value in other commodities. By degrees the loss is made up to those countries by diminished influx from the mines, and finally the world has gained a virtual addition of $200,000,000 to its productive resources. Adam Smith's illustration, though so well known, deserves for its extreme aptness to be once more repeated. He compares the substitution of paper in the room of the precious metals to the construction of a highway through the air, by which the ground now occupied by roads would become available for agriculture. As in that case a portion of the soil, so in this a part of the accumulated wealth of the country, would be relieved from a function in which it was only employed in rendering other soils and capitals productive, and would itself become applicable to production; the office it previously fulfilled being equally well discharged by a medium which costs nothing.
However, different effects will have occurred: $200,000,000, which used to exist as unproductive metallic money, have been turned into what is or can become productive capital. This initial benefit goes to the United States at the expense of other countries, which have taken her excess of this expensive and unproductive asset off her hands, providing an equivalent value in other goods. Over time, the loss for those countries is compensated by a reduced influx from the mines, and ultimately, the world gains a virtual addition of $200,000,000 to its productive resources. Adam Smith's example, although well-known, is worth repeating because of its clarity. He compares the replacement of precious metals with paper money to building a highway in the air, which would free up land currently used for roads for agricultural purposes. Just as land would be liberated in that case, a portion of the nation’s accumulated wealth would be freed from a role that only served to make other lands and assets productive and would instead be directed towards production; the function it previously served could be just as well managed by a medium that costs nothing.
The value saved to the community by thus dispensing with metallic money is a clear gain to those who provide the substitute. They have the use of $200,000,000 of circulating medium which have cost them only the expense of an engraver's plate. If they employ this accession to their fortunes as productive capital, the produce of the country is increased and the community benefited, as much as by any other capital of equal amount. Whether it is so employed or not depends, in some degree, upon the mode of issuing it. If issued by the Government, and employed in paying off debt, it would probably become productive capital. The Government, however, may prefer employing this extraordinary resource in its ordinary expenses; may squander it uselessly, or make it a mere temporary substitute for taxation to an equivalent amount; in which last case the amount is saved by the tax-payers at large, who either add it to their [pg 435] capital or spend it as income. When [a part of the] paper currency is supplied, as in our own country, by banking companies, the amount is almost wholly turned into productive capital; for the issuers, being at all times liable to be called upon to refund the value, are under the strongest inducements not to squander it, and the only cases in which it is not forthcoming are cases of fraud or mismanagement. A banker's profession being that of a money-lender, his issue of notes is a simple extension of his ordinary occupation. He lends the amount to farmers, manufacturers, or dealers, who employ it in their several businesses. So employed, it yields, like any other capital, wages of labor, and profits of stock. The profit is shared between the banker, who receives interest, and a succession of borrowers, mostly for short periods, who, after paying the interest, gain a profit in addition, or a convenience equivalent to profit. The capital itself in the long run becomes entirely wages, and, when replaced by the sale of the produce, becomes wages again; thus affording a perpetual fund, of the value of $200,000,000, for the maintenance of productive labor, and increasing the annual produce of the country by all that can be produced through the means of a capital of that value. To this gain must be added a further saving to the country, of the annual supply of the precious metals necessary for repairing the wear and tear, and other waste, of a metallic currency.
The money saved for the community by not using metal coins is a clear benefit to those who provide the alternative. They have access to $200,000,000 in circulating money that cost them only the price of an engraver's plate. If they invest this extra wealth as productive capital, the country’s output increases and the community benefits as much as it would from any other capital of similar size. Whether or not it’s used this way depends partly on how it’s issued. If issued by the Government and used to pay off debt, it would likely become productive capital. However, the Government might prefer to use this unique resource for its regular expenses; it could waste it or use it as a temporary replacement for taxes of the same amount; in this last case, the taxpayers save that amount, which they can either add to their capital or spend as income. When paper currency is provided, as in our own country, by banks, most of it is turned into productive capital; since the issuers are always required to repay the value, they are strongly motivated not to waste it, and the only situations where it isn’t available are due to fraud or mismanagement. A banker’s job as a money-lender means their issuance of notes is simply an extension of their regular work. They lend the amount to farmers, manufacturers, or traders, who use it in their respective businesses. When used this way, it generates wages for labor and profits from stock. The profit is shared between the banker, who earns interest, and a series of borrowers, mostly for short terms, who, after paying interest, either gain a profit or receive a benefit equivalent to profit. Over time, the capital itself turns entirely into wages, and when replaced by the sale of the output, it becomes wages again; this creates a continuous fund worth $200,000,000 for supporting productive labor and increasing the country’s annual output through the means provided by capital of that value. Additionally, this benefit includes the annual savings for the country from not needing the precious metals necessary for maintaining and replacing a metallic currency.
The substitution, therefore, of paper for the precious metals should always be carried as far as is consistent with safety, no greater amount of metallic currency being retained than is necessary to maintain, both in fact and in public belief, the convertibility of the paper.
The replacement of paper for precious metals should always go as far as it can while still being safe, keeping only as much metallic currency as needed to ensure both the actual and public perception of the paper's convertibility.
But since gold wanted for exportation is almost invariably drawn from the reserves of the banks, and is never likely to be taken directly from the circulation while the banks remain solvent, the only advantage which can be obtained from retaining partially a metallic currency for daily purposes is, that the banks may occasionally replenish their reserves from it.
But since gold needed for export is usually taken from the banks' reserves and is unlikely to be withdrawn directly from circulation as long as the banks are solvent, the only benefit of keeping a partial metallic currency for everyday transactions is that the banks can sometimes replenish their reserves from it.
§ 3. Impact of Increasing Inconvertible Paper Currency. Real and Nominal Exchange.
When metallic money had been entirely superseded and expelled from circulation, by the substitution of an equal amount of bank-notes, any attempt to keep a still further quantity of paper in circulation must, if the notes are convertible [into gold], be a complete failure.
When metallic money had been completely replaced and removed from circulation by an equal amount of banknotes, any effort to keep even more paper money in circulation must, if the notes can be exchanged for gold, be a total failure.
[A] new issue would again set in motion the same train of consequences by which the gold coin had already been expelled. The metals would, as before, be required for exportation, and would be for that purpose demanded from the banks, to the full extent of the superfluous notes, which thus could not possibly be retained in circulation. If, indeed, the notes were inconvertible, there would be no such obstacle to the increase in their quantity. An inconvertible paper acts in the same way as a convertible, while there remains any coin for it to supersede; the difference begins to manifest itself when all the coin is driven from circulation (except what may be retained for the convenience of small change), and the issues still go on increasing. When the paper begins to exceed in quantity the metallic currency which it superseded, prices of course rise; things which were worth $25 in metallic money become worth $30 in inconvertible paper, or more, as the case may be. But this rise of price will not, as in the cases before examined, stimulate import and discourage export. The imports and exports are determined by the metallic prices of things, not by the paper prices; and it is only when the paper is exchangeable at pleasure for the metals that paper prices and metallic prices must correspond.
A new issue would once again trigger the same chain of outcomes that led to the expulsion of gold coins. As before, metals would be necessary for export, and banks would be called upon to provide them to match the excess notes, which could not remain in circulation. If the notes were non-convertible, there wouldn’t be a barrier to increasing their quantity. Non-convertible paper functions like convertible paper as long as there is any coin for it to replace; the distinction becomes clear when all the coins are removed from circulation (except for what’s kept for small change), and the issuance of paper continues to grow. As the amount of paper starts to surpass the amount of metallic currency it replaced, prices will naturally rise; items that were valued at $25 in metal money will become worth $30 in non-convertible paper, or more, depending on the situation. However, this price increase won’t, as in previous cases, encourage imports and discourage exports. Imports and exports are determined by the metallic prices of goods, not by paper prices; only when the paper can be freely exchanged for metals do paper prices and metallic prices need to align.
Let us suppose that the United States is the country which has the depreciated paper. Suppose that some American production could be bought, while the currency was still metallic, for $25, and sold in England for $27.50, the difference covering the expense and risk, and affording a profit to the merchant. On account of the depreciation, this commodity will now cost in the United States $30, and can not be sold in England for more than $27.50, and yet it will be exported as before. Why? Because the $27.50 which the exporter can get for it in England is not depreciated paper, but gold or silver; and since in the United States bullion has risen in the same proportion with other things—if the merchant brings the gold or silver to the United States, he can sell his $27.50 [in coin] for $33 [in paper], and obtain as before 10 per cent for profit and expenses.
Let’s say the United States is the country with the devalued currency. Imagine that some American-made product could be bought, while the currency was still backed by metal, for $25, and sold in England for $27.50, with the difference covering costs and risks, plus making a profit for the seller. Because of the devaluation, this product will now cost $30 in the United States, and it can’t be sold in England for more than $27.50, yet it will still be exported as before. Why? Because the $27.50 the exporter will receive in England is not devalued currency, but gold or silver; and since bullion prices in the United States have risen in the same way as everything else—if the merchant brings the gold or silver back to the United States, he can sell his $27.50 [in coin] for $33 [in paper], allowing him to still make a 10 percent profit after costs.
It thus appears that a depreciation of the currency does not affect the foreign trade of the country: this is carried on precisely as if the currency maintained its value. But, though the trade is not affected, the exchanges are. When the imports and exports are in equilibrium, the exchange, in a metallic currency, would be at par; a bill on England for the equivalent of $25 would be worth $25. But $25, or the quantity of gold contained in them, having come to be worth in the United States $30, it follows that a bill on England for $25 will be worth $30. When, therefore, the real exchange is at par, there will be a nominal exchange against the country of as much per cent as the amount of the depreciation. If the currency is depreciated 10, 15, or 20 per cent, then in whatever way the real exchange, arising from the variations of international debts and credits, may vary, the quoted exchange will always differ 10, 15, or 20 per cent from it. However high this nominal premium may be, it has no tendency to send gold out of the country for the purpose of drawing a bill against it and profiting by the premium; because the gold so sent must be procured, not from the banks and at par, as in the case of a convertible currency, but in the market, at an advance of price equal [pg 438] to the premium. In such cases, instead of saying that the exchange is unfavorable, it would be a more correct representation to say that the par has altered, since there is now required a larger quantity of American currency to be equivalent to the same quantity of foreign. The exchanges, however, continue to be computed according to the metallic par. The quoted exchanges, therefore, when there is a depreciated currency, are compounded of two elements or factors: (1) the real exchange, which follows the variations of international payments, and (2) the nominal exchange, which varies with the depreciation of the currency, but which, while there is any depreciation at all, must always be unfavorable. Since the amount of depreciation is exactly measured by the degree in which the market price of bullion exceeds the mint valuation, we have a sure criterion to determine what portion of the quoted exchange, being referable to depreciation, may be struck off as nominal, the result so corrected expressing the real exchange.
It seems that a decline in currency value doesn't impact the country's foreign trade; it continues just as if the currency retained its value. However, while trade remains steady, the exchanges do change. When imports and exports are balanced, the exchange with a metallic currency would be at par; a bill on England for $25 would equal $25. But if $25, or the amount of gold in it, is now worth $30 in the United States, it indicates that a bill on England for $25 will actually be worth $30. Therefore, when the genuine exchange is at par, there will be a official exchange against the country that reflects the percentage of depreciation. If the currency has depreciated by 10, 15, or 20 percent, no matter how much the real exchange varies due to international debts and credits, the quoted exchange will always differ by that same percentage. Regardless of how high this nominal premium is, it won't encourage sending gold out of the country to draw a bill against it and profit from the premium, because the gold must be sourced not from the banks and at par like in a convertible currency situation, but from the market at a price increase equal to the premium. In these situations, instead of claiming that the exchange is unfavorable, it would be more accurate to say that the par has changed, as now a larger quantity of American currency is needed to match the same amount of foreign currency. However, exchanges are still calculated based on the metallic par. Thus, when there’s a depreciated currency, quoted exchanges consist of two components: (1) the real exchange, which tracks variations in international payments, and (2) the nominal exchange, which fluctuates with currency depreciation, always remaining unfavorable as long as there’s any depreciation. The extent of depreciation is clearly indicated by how much the market price of bullion exceeds the mint valuation, allowing us to determine what part of the quoted exchange attributed to depreciation can be deducted as nominal, with the corrected result reflecting the real exchange.
The same disturbance of the exchanges and of international trade which is produced by an increased issue of convertible bank-notes is in like manner produced by those extensions of credit which, as was so fully shown in a preceding chapter, have the same effect on prices as an increase of the currency. Whenever circumstances have given such an impulse to the spirit of speculation as to occasion a great increase of purchases on credit, money prices rise, just as much as they would have risen if each person who so buys on credit had bought with money. All the effects, therefore, must be similar. As a consequence of high prices, exportation is checked and importation stimulated; though in fact the increase of importation seldom waits for the rise of prices which is the consequence of speculation, inasmuch as some of the great articles of import are usually among the things in which speculative overtrading first shows itself. There is, therefore, in such periods, usually a great excess of imports over exports; and, when the time comes at which these must be paid for, the exchanges become unfavorable and gold flows out of the [pg 439] country. This efflux of gold takes effect on prices [by withdrawing gold from the reserves of the banks, and so by stopping loans and the use of credit, or purchasing power]: its effect is to make them recoil downward. The recoil once begun, generally becomes a total rout, and the unusual extension of credit is rapidly exchanged for an unusual contraction of it. Accordingly, when credit has been imprudently stretched, and the speculative spirit carried to excess, the turn of the exchanges and consequent pressure on the banks to obtain gold for exportation are generally the proximate cause of the catastrophe.
The same disruption in trading and international commerce caused by issuing more convertible banknotes is similarly caused by the extensions of credit which, as discussed in a previous chapter, affect prices just like increasing the money supply. When situations encourage speculation, leading to a significant rise in purchases made on credit, prices rise just as they would have if everyone buying on credit had used cash instead. Therefore, the effects must be alike. As a result of rising prices, exports decline while imports increase; however, the rise in imports often doesn’t wait for the price hike that follows speculation since many major imports are typically among the first areas where speculative overtrading occurs. Consequently, during these times, there is usually a significant excess of imports over exports. When the time comes to settle these transactions, the exchanges turn unfavorable, leading to gold flowing out of the [pg 439] country. This outflow of gold affects prices by reducing the reserves of the banks, thereby limiting loans and credit or purchasing power, which causes prices to drop. Once this downward trend starts, it often leads to a complete collapse, and an unusual increase in credit quickly turns into an unusual decrease. Therefore, when credit has been excessively extended and speculation has gone too far, the shift in exchanges and the resulting pressure on banks to secure gold for export is usually the immediate cause of the crisis.
Chapter 19. On the Rate of Interest.
§ 1. The interest rate is determined by the demand and supply of loans.
The two topics of Currency and Loans, though in themselves distinct, are so intimately blended in the phenomena of what is called the money market, that it is impossible to understand the one without the other, and in many minds the two subjects are mixed up in the most inextricable confusion.
The two topics of Currency and Loans, although distinct, are so closely intertwined in what we refer to as the money market that it's impossible to understand one without the other. In many people's minds, the two subjects are often confused in the most complicated way.
In the preceding book285 we defined the relation in which interest stands to profit. We found that the gross profit of capital might be distinguished into three parts, which are respectively the remuneration for risk, for trouble, and for the capital itself, and may be termed insurance, wages of superintendence, and interest. After making compensation for risk, that is, after covering the average losses to which capital is exposed either by the general circumstances of society or by the hazards of the particular employment, there remains a surplus, which partly goes to repay the owner of the capital for his abstinence, and partly the employer of it for his time and trouble. How much goes to the one and how much to the other is shown by the amount of the remuneration which, when the two functions are separated, the owner of capital can obtain from the employer for its use. This is evidently a question of demand and supply. Nor have demand and supply any different meaning or effect in this case from what they have in all others. The rate of interest will be such as to equalize the demand for loans with the supply [pg 441] of them. It will be such that, exactly as much as some people are desirous to borrow at that rate, others shall be willing to lend. If there is more offered than demanded, interest will fall; if more is demanded than offered, it will rise; and in both cases, to the point at which the equation of supply and demand is re-established.
In the previous book285, we defined the relationship between interest and profit. We found that the gross profit of capital can be broken down into three parts: compensation for risk, for effort, and for the capital itself. These are referred to as insurance, wages of supervision, and interest. After accounting for risk—meaning after covering the average losses that capital faces due to societal conditions or the specific uncertainties of a particular investment—there is a surplus. This surplus partly compensates the capital owner for forgoing the use of their money and partly goes to the employer for their time and effort. The division of this surplus between the two parties is determined by the amount of compensation the capital owner can negotiate with the employer for its use. This is obviously a matter of supply and demand, which operate the same way here as they do in any other context. The interest rate will adjust to balance the demand for loans with the available supply. It will be set at a level where the desire to borrow matches the willingness to lend. If there are more loans available than people want, interest rates will drop; if demand exceeds supply, rates will increase; and in both scenarios, they will adjust until supply and demand are balanced again.
The desire to borrow and the willingness to lend are more or less influenced by every circumstance which affects the state or prospects of industry or commerce, either generally or in any of their branches. The rate of interest, therefore, on good security, which alone we have here to consider (for interest in which considerations of risk bear a part may swell to any amount), is seldom, in the great centers of money transactions, precisely the same for two days together; as is shown by the never-ceasing variations in the quoted prices of the funds and other negotiable securities. Nevertheless, there must be, as in other cases of value, some rate which (in the language of Adam Smith and Ricardo) may be called the natural rate; some rate about which the market rate oscillates, and to which it always tends to return. This rate partly depends on the amount of accumulation going on in the hands of persons who can not themselves attend to the employment of their savings, and partly on the comparative taste existing in the community for the active pursuits of industry, or for the leisure, ease, and independence of an annuitant.
The desire to borrow and the willingness to lend are influenced by various factors that affect the state or outlook of industry or commerce, both in general and in specific sectors. The interest rate, therefore, on good security—which is what we're focusing on here (since interest rates involving risk can vary widely)—rarely stays the same for two consecutive days in major financial centers, as evidenced by the constant changes in the quoted prices of stocks and other tradable securities. However, there must exist, like in other areas of value, a rate that can be called the natural rate (as described by Adam Smith and Ricardo); a rate around which the market rate fluctuates and to which it always tends to revert. This rate depends partly on how much accumulation is happening among people who can’t actively manage their savings and partly on the community’s preferences for engaging in active industry versus enjoying leisure, comfort, and the independence of receiving an annuity.
§ 2. Factors that Determine the Long-Term Demand and Supply of Loans.
In [ordinary] circumstances, the more thriving producers and traders have their capital fully employed, and many are able to transact business to a considerably greater extent than they have capital for. These are naturally borrowers: and the amount which they desire to borrow, and can give security for, constitutes the demand for loans on account of productive employment. To these must be added the loans required by Government, and by land-owners, or other unproductive consumers who have good security to give. This constitutes the mass of loans for which there is an habitual demand.
In typical situations, the more successful producers and traders have their capital fully utilized, and many are able to conduct business on a much larger scale than their available capital. These individuals are naturally borrowers: the amount they wish to borrow and can secure represents the demand for loans for productive use. Additionally, this includes loans needed by the government and by landowners or other unproductive consumers who can offer good collateral. This forms the bulk of loans that consistently have demand.
Now, it is conceivable that there might exist, in the hands of persons disinclined or disqualified for engaging personally in business, (1) a mass of capital equal to, and even exceeding, this demand. In that case there would be an habitual excess of competition on the part of lenders, and the rate of interest would bear a low proportion to the rate of profit. Interest would be forced down to the point which would either tempt borrowers to take a greater amount of loans than they had a reasonable expectation of being able to employ in their business, or would so discourage a portion of the lenders as to make them either forbear to accumulate or endeavor to increase their income by engaging in business on their own account, and incurring the risks, if not the labors, of industrial employment.
Now, it's possible that there are people who are not inclined or qualified to engage personally in business who hold a large amount of capital, equal to or even greater than this demand. In that case, there would be a continuous oversupply of competition among lenders, and the interest rate would be much lower compared to the profit rate. Interest would be driven down to a level that would either entice borrowers to take out more loans than they could reasonably expect to use in their business or would discourage some lenders from accumulating that capital, pushing them to either stop saving or try to boost their income by starting their own businesses and taking on the associated risks or demands of industrial work.
(2.) On the other hand, the capital owned by persons who prefer lending it at interest, or whose avocations prevent them from personally superintending its employment, may be short of the habitual demand for loans. It may be in great part absorbed by the investments afforded by the public debt and by mortgages, and the remainder may not be sufficient to supply the wants of commerce. If so, the rate of interest will be raised so high as in some way to re-establish the equilibrium. When there is only a small difference between interest and profit, many borrowers may no longer be willing to increase their responsibilities and involve their credit for so small a remuneration: or some, who would otherwise have engaged in business, may prefer leisure, and become lenders instead of borrowers: or others, under the inducement of high interest and easy investment for their capital, may retire from business earlier, and with smaller fortunes, than they otherwise would have done.
(2.) On the other hand, the money owned by people who prefer to lend it for interest, or whose jobs prevent them from supervising how it’s used, may fall short of the usual demand for loans. It might be largely taken up by investments in government bonds and mortgages, leaving not enough to meet the needs of commerce. If that happens, the interest rate will go up high enough to restore balance. When the gap between interest and profit is small, many borrowers might be less willing to take on more debt for such a small reward: some who might have started a business may choose to relax instead and become lenders rather than borrowers; or others, tempted by high interest and easy ways to invest their money, might leave business earlier and with smaller fortunes than they would have otherwise.
Or, lastly, instead of [capital] being afforded by persons not in business, the affording it may itself become a business. A portion of the capital employed in trade may be supplied by a class of professional money-lenders. These money-lenders, however, must have more than a mere interest; they must have the ordinary rate of profit on their capital, risk and all other circumstances being allowed for. [For] it can never answer, to any one who borrows for the purposes of his business, to pay a full profit for capital from which he will only derive a full profit: and money-lending, as an employment, for the regular supply of trade, can not, therefore, be carried on except by persons who, in addition to their own capital, can lend their credit, or, in other words, the capital of other people. A bank which lends its notes lends capital which it borrows from the community, and for which it pays no interest.
Or, finally, instead of capital being provided by people who aren't in business, providing it could become a business itself. Some of the capital used in trade might come from a group of professional money-lenders. However, these money-lenders need to have more than just a basic interest; they must earn the standard rate of profit on their capital, considering the risks and all other factors. It doesn't make sense for anyone borrowing for their business to pay a full profit for capital that will only yield a full profit. Therefore, money-lending as a profession for the regular supply of trade can only be done by those who, besides their own capital, can also lend their credit—or, in simple terms, the capital of other people. A bank that lends its notes is providing capital that it borrows from the community and does not pay interest on.
A bank of deposit lends capital which it collects from the community in small parcels, sometimes without paying any interest, and, if it does pay interest, it still pays much less than it receives; for the depositors, who in any other way could mostly obtain for such small balances no interest worth taking any trouble for, are glad to receive even a little. Having this subsidiary resource, bankers are enabled to obtain, by lending at interest, the ordinary rate of profit on their own capital. The disposable capital deposited in banks, together with the funds belonging to those who, either from necessity or preference, live upon the interest of their property, constitute the general loan fund of the country; and [pg 444] the amount of this aggregate fund, when set against the habitual demands of producers and dealers, and those of the Government and of unproductive consumers, determines the permanent or average rate of interest, which must always be such as to adjust these two amounts to one another.286 But, while the whole of this mass of lent capital takes effect upon the permanent rate of interest, the fluctuations depend almost entirely upon the portion which is in the hands of bankers; for it is that portion almost exclusively which, being lent for short times only, is continually in the market seeking an investment. The capital of those who live on the interest of their own fortunes has generally sought and found some fixed investment, such as the public funds, mortgages, or the bonds of public companies, which investment, except under peculiar temptations or necessities, is not changed.
A bank accepts deposits and lends out that capital, which it gathers from the community in small amounts. Sometimes it does this without paying any interest, and even when it does pay interest, it's usually much less than what it charges for loans. For depositors, who typically wouldn't earn interest on such small amounts through other means, receiving even a small return is welcome. With this additional resource, banks can earn the usual profit margin on their own capital by lending at interest. The total capital available in banks, combined with the funds of those who either need or prefer to live off the interest from their assets, makes up the country's general loan fund. The total amount of this fund, compared to the consistent needs of producers, sellers, the government, and consumers who don't produce, sets the average or permanent interest rate, which must always align these two amounts. However, while all this lent capital impacts the permanent interest rate, the fluctuations mainly depend on the portion held by bankers, as this portion is typically lent out for short periods and is constantly looking for investment opportunities. The capital of individuals living off their own investments usually finds stable placements, such as government bonds, mortgages, or public company stocks, and tends not to change except in special circumstances or out of necessity.
§ 3. Factors That Determine Fluctuations.
Fluctuations in the rate of interest arise from variations either in the demand for loans or in the supply. The supply is liable to variation, though less so than the demand. The willingness to lend is greater than usual at the commencement of a period of speculation, and much less than usual during the revulsion which follows. In speculative times, money-lenders as well as other people are inclined to extend their business by stretching their credit; they lend more than usual (just as other classes of dealers and producers employ more than usual) of capital which does not belong to them. Accordingly, these are the times when the rate of interest is low; though for this too (as we shall immediately see) there are other causes. During the revulsion, on the contrary, interest always rises inordinately, because, while there is a most pressing need on the part of many persons to borrow, there is a general disinclination to lend.287
Fluctuations in interest rates happen because of changes in either the demand for loans or the supply. The supply can vary, but not as much as the demand. Lenders are usually more willing to lend at the start of a speculative period and much less willing during the downturn that follows. During speculative times, moneylenders and others are likely to expand their business by taking on more credit; they lend more than usual (just like other types of dealers and producers use more than usual) of capital that isn’t theirs. This is why interest rates are low during these periods; however, there are other reasons for this too (as we’ll see shortly). In contrast, during a downturn, interest rates always rise sharply because, while many people urgently need to borrow, there’s a widespread reluctance to lend. 287
This disinclination, when at its extreme point, is called a panic. It occurs when a succession of unexpected failures has created in the mercantile, and sometimes also in the non-mercantile public, a general distrust in each other's solvency; disposing every one not only to refuse fresh credit, except on very onerous terms, but to call in, if possible, all credit which he has already given. Deposits are withdrawn from banks; notes are returned on the issuers in exchange for specie; bankers raise their rate of discount, and withhold their customary advances; merchants refuse to renew mercantile bills. At such times the most calamitous consequences were formerly experienced from the attempt of the law to prevent more than a certain limited rate of interest from being given or taken. Persons who could not borrow at five per cent had to pay, not six or seven, but ten or fifteen per cent, to compensate the lender for risking the penalties of the law; or had to sell securities or goods for ready money at a still greater sacrifice.
This reluctance, when it reaches its peak, is referred to as a panic. It happens when a series of unexpected failures leads the business community, and sometimes the general public, to lose trust in each other's ability to pay debts. As a result, everyone becomes inclined not only to deny new credit, except under very harsh conditions, but also to demand repayment of any credit they've already extended. People start withdrawing their deposits from banks; promissory notes are returned to the issuers in exchange for cash; banks increase their interest rates and hold back on their usual loans; and merchants refuse to extend loans on commercial bills. During such times, there were serious negative consequences in the past from the law trying to limit how much interest could be charged or paid. Individuals who couldn’t borrow at five percent often had to pay not six or seven, but ten or fifteen percent to compensate lenders for the risks they were taking by breaking the law. They also had to sell off securities or goods for immediate cash at even bigger losses.
Except at such periods, the amount of capital disposable on loan is subject to little other variation than that which arises from the gradual process of accumulation; which process, [pg 446] however, in the great commercial countries, is sufficiently rapid to account for the almost periodical recurrence of these fits of speculation; since, when a few years have elapsed without a crisis, and no new and tempting channel for investment has been opened in the mean time, there is always found to have occurred in those few years so large an increase of capital seeking investment as to have lowered considerably the rate of interest, whether indicated by the prices of securities or by the rate of discount on bills; and this diminution of interest tempts the possessors to incur hazards in hopes of a more considerable return.
Except during those times, the amount of capital available for loans doesn’t change much other than through the slow process of accumulation. However, in major commercial countries, this process is quick enough to explain the almost periodic bursts of speculation. When a few years pass without a crisis and no new, attractive investment opportunities arise, there tends to be a significant increase in the amount of capital looking for investment during those years. This surge has typically reduced interest rates considerably, whether reflected in security prices or the discount rates on bills. This drop in interest pushes investors to take risks in hopes of bigger returns.
The demand for loans varies much more largely than the supply, and embraces longer cycles of years in its aberrations. A time of war, for example, is a period of unusual draughts on the loan market. The Government, at such times, generally incurs new loans, and, as these usually succeed each other rapidly as long as the war lasts, the general rate of interest is kept higher in war than in peace, without reference to the rate of profit, and productive industry is stinted of its usual supplies.
The demand for loans fluctuates a lot more than the supply and goes through longer cycles of change over the years. For instance, during wartime, there’s a significant increase in the need for loans. The government usually takes on new loans during these times, and since these loans tend to happen one after another as long as the war continues, the overall interest rate is higher during wartime than in peacetime, regardless of the profit rate, which limits the usual resources available for productive industries.
Nor does the influence of these loans altogether cease when the Government ceases to contract others; for those already contracted continue to afford an investment for a greatly increased amount of the disposable capital of the country, which, if the national debt were paid off, would be added to the mass of capital seeking investment, and (independently of temporary disturbance) could not but, to some extent, permanently lower the rate of interest.
Nor does the impact of these loans completely stop when the government stops taking on new ones; the existing loans still represent a significant investment for a much larger portion of the country's available capital. If the national debt were paid off, that capital would enter the pool of investable funds, and, aside from any short-term disruptions, it would likely lead to a lasting decrease in interest rates.
The same effect on interest which is produced by government loans for war expenditure is produced by the sudden opening of any new and generally attractive mode of permanent investment. The only instance of the kind in recent history, on a scale comparable to that of the war loans, is the absorption of capital in the construction of railways. This capital must have been principally drawn from the deposits in banks, or from savings which would have gone into deposit, and which were destined to be ultimately employed in buying securities from persons who would have employed the purchase-money in discounts or other loans at interest: in either case, it was a draft on the general loan fund. It is, in fact, evident that, unless savings were made expressly to be employed in railway adventure, the amount thus employed must have been derived either from the actual capital of persons in business or from capital which would have been lent to persons in business.
The same impact on interest that government loans for war spending create is also caused by the sudden emergence of any new and generally appealing way to invest permanently. The only comparable recent example, on a scale similar to war loans, is the investment of capital in railway construction. This capital likely came mainly from bank deposits or from savings that would have been deposited, which were intended to be used to buy securities from people who would have spent that money on discounts or other interest-bearing loans: in either case, it was a draw on the overall loan fund. In fact, it's clear that unless savings were specifically set aside for railway ventures, the funds used must have come either from the actual capital of business people or from capital that would have been lent to business people.
§ 4. The interest rate isn't actually related to the value of money, but it's often confused with it.
From the preceding considerations it would be seen, even if it were not otherwise evident, how great an error it is to imagine that the rate of interest bears any necessary relation to the quantity or value of the money in circulation. An increase of the currency has in itself no effect, and is incapable of having any effect, on the rate of interest. A paper currency issued by Government in the payment of its ordinary expenses, in however great excess it may be issued, affects the rate of interest in no manner whatever. It diminishes, indeed, the power of money to buy commodities, but not the power of money to buy money. If a hundred dollars will buy a perpetual annuity of four dollars a year, a [pg 448] depreciation which makes the hundred dollars worth only half as much as before has precisely the same effect on the four dollars, and therefore can not alter the relation between the two. Unless, indeed, it is known and reckoned upon that the depreciation will only be temporary; for people certainly might be willing to lend the depreciated currency on cheaper terms if they expected to be repaid in money of full value.
From the previous discussion, it’s clear—if it wasn’t obvious already—that it's a huge mistake to think that the interest rate is necessarily related to the amount or value of money circulating. An increase in currency doesn’t impact the interest rate at all. A paper currency issued by the government to cover its regular expenses, no matter how much is issued beyond what’s needed, has no effect on the interest rate. It does reduce the purchasing power of money for buying goods, but it doesn’t affect the ability of money to buy more money. If a hundred dollars can buy a perpetual annuity of four dollars a year, a depreciation that makes that hundred dollars worth only half as much as before will have the same effect on the four dollars, so it won’t change the relationship between the two. Unless, of course, it’s understood that the depreciation will only be temporary; people might be willing to lend the devalued currency at lower rates if they expect to be repaid in money with full value.
In considering the effect produced by the proceedings of banks in encouraging the excesses of speculation, an immense effect is usually attributed to their issues of notes, but until of late hardly any attention was paid to the management of their deposits, though nothing is more certain than that their imprudent extensions of credit take place more frequently by means of their deposits than of their issues. Says Mr. Tooke: “Supposing all the deposits received by a banker to be in coin, is he not, just as much as the issuing banker, exposed to the importunity of customers, whom it may be impolitic to refuse, for loans or discounts, or to be tempted by a high interest; and may he not be induced to encroach so much upon his deposits as to leave him, under not improbable circumstances, unable to meet the demands of his depositors?”
When looking at how banks influence speculation, a lot of focus is usually placed on the money they print, but until recently, not much thought was given to how they manage their deposits. However, it’s clear that reckless credit expansions happen more often through their deposits than their note issues. Mr. Tooke states: “If we assume that all the deposits a banker receives are in cash, isn’t he, just like the banker who issues notes, under pressure from customers? It might not be smart to refuse them loans or discounts, or to resist the lure of high interest rates; and could he end up using so much of his deposits that he can’t meet the demands of his depositors in certain likely situations?”
§ 5. The interest rate determines the price of land and securities.
Before quitting the general subject of this chapter, I will make the obvious remark that the rate of interest determines the value and price of all those salable articles which are desired and bought, not for themselves, but for [pg 449] the income which they are capable of yielding. The public funds, shares in joint-stock companies, and all descriptions of securities, are at a high price in proportion as the rate of interest is low. They are sold at the price which will give the market rate of interest on the purchase-money, with allowance for all differences in the risk incurred, or in any circumstance of convenience.
Before wrapping up the main topic of this chapter, I’ll point out the obvious fact that the interest rate influences the value and price of all those sellable items that are sought after and purchased not for their own sake, but for the income they can produce. Public funds, shares in joint-stock companies, and all kinds of securities are priced higher when the interest rate is lower. They are sold at a price that will yield the market rate of interest on the investment, taking into account any differences in risk or other factors that could affect convenience. [pg 449]
The price of land, mines, and all other fixed sources of income, depends in like manner on the rate of interest. Land usually sells at a higher price, in proportion to the income afforded by it, than the public funds, not only because it is thought, even in [England], to be somewhat more secure, but because ideas of power and dignity are associated with its possession. But these differences are constant, or nearly so; and, in the variations of price, land follows, cæteris paribus, the permanent (though, of course, not the daily) variations of the rate of interest. When interest is low, land will naturally be dear; when interest is high, land will be cheap.
The price of land, mines, and all other stable sources of income depends similarly on the interest rate. Land generally sells for a higher price relative to the income it generates compared to government bonds, not just because it's considered somewhat safer even in [England], but also because owning land is associated with power and status. However, these differences remain fairly consistent; in price fluctuations, land typically moves in line with the long-term (though not daily) changes in interest rates. When interest is low, land will naturally be expensive; when interest is high, land will be cheaper.
A lot of land, which fifty years ago gave an annual return of $100, if ten per cent was then the common rate of interest, would sell for $1,000. If the return from the land remains the same ($100) to-day, and if the usual rate of interest is now five per cent, the same piece of land, therefore, would sell for $2,000, since $100 is five per cent of $2,000.
A lot of land that, fifty years ago, produced an annual return of $100 would sell for $1,000 if ten percent was the standard interest rate. If the return from the land remains the same ($100) today, and the typical interest rate is now five percent, that same piece of land would sell for $2,000, because $100 is five percent of $2,000.
The price of a bond, it may be said, also varies with the time it has to run. At the same rate of interest, a bond running for a long term of years is better for an investment than one for a short term. The lumberman, who looks at two trees of equal diameter at the base, estimates the total value of each according to the height of the tree. Then, again, a bond running for a short term may be worth less than one for a long term, even though the first bears a higher rate of interest. That is, to resume the illustration, one tree, not rising very high, although larger at the bottom, may not contain so many square feet as another, with perhaps a less diameter at the bottom, but which stretches much higher up into the air.
The price of a bond changes depending on how much time is left until it matures. With the same interest rate, a long-term bond is a better investment compared to a short-term bond. The lumberjack, who examines two trees withthe same sizeat the base, evaluates the total worth of each based on theheightof the tree. Also, a short-term bond might be worth less than a long-term bond, even if the former has a higher interest rate. Continuing with the analogy, one tree, while beingthickerat the base, it might not have as much volume as another tree that has asmallerThe base has a diameter, but it extends much higher into the sky.
Chapter XX. On the Competition of Different Countries in the Same Market.
§ 1. Reasons that allow one country to sell at lower prices than another.
In the phraseology of the Mercantile System, there is no word of more frequent recurrence or more perilous import than the word underselling. To undersell other countries—not to be undersold by other countries—were spoken of, and are still very often spoken of, almost as if they were the sole purposes for which production and commodities exist.
In the language of the Mercantile System, no word appears more often or carries more risk than the word selling for less. To undersell other countries—not to be undersold by other countries—was discussed, and is still often discussed, almost as if it were the only reason for production and goods to exist.
One country (A) can only undersell another (B) in a given market, to the extent of entirely expelling her from it, on two conditions: (1) In the first place, she (A) must have a greater advantage than the second country (B) in the production of the article exported by both; meaning by a greater advantage (as has been already so fully explained) not absolutely, [pg 451] but in comparison with other commodities; and (2) in the second place, such must be her (A's) relation with the customer-country in respect to the demand for each other's products, and such the consequent state of international values, as to give away to the customer-country more than the whole advantage possessed by the rival country (B); otherwise the rival will still be able to hold her ground in the market.
One country (A) can only undercut another (B) in a specific market to the point of completely pushing them out, under two conditions: (1) First, country A must have a greater advantage in producing the exported product than country B, meaning that this advantage isn’t absolute but is significant when compared to other goods; and (2) Secondly, A’s relationship with the customer country regarding the demand for each other’s products, along with the resulting international values, must allow A to concede more to the customer country than the total advantage that rival country B has; otherwise, B will still be able to maintain its position in the market.
It thus appears that the alarm of being permanently undersold may be taken much too easily; may be taken when the thing really to be anticipated is not the loss of the trade, but the minor inconvenience of carrying it on at a diminished advantage; an inconvenience chiefly falling on the consumers of foreign commodities, and not on the producers or sellers of the exported article. It is no sufficient ground of apprehension to the [American] producers, to find that some other country can sell [wheat] in foreign markets, at some particular time, a trifle cheaper than they can themselves afford to do in the existing state of prices in [the United States]. Suppose them to be temporarily unsold, and their exports diminished; the imports will exceed the exports, there will be a new distribution of the precious metals, prices will fall, and, as all the money expenses of the [American] producers will be diminished, they will be able (if the case falls short of that stated in the preceding paragraph) again to compete with their rivals.
It seems that the fear of being permanently undersold may be overstated; what we should really expect is not the loss of business, but the small hassle of operating at a reduced advantage. This hassle mainly affects consumers of foreign goods, not the producers or sellers of the exported items. It's not a huge concern for American producers to see that another country can sell wheat in international markets slightly cheaper at certain times than they can under current U.S. prices. Even if they end up with unsold stock and lower exports, imports will surpass exports, leading to a redistribution of precious metals, prices will drop, and since all the expenses for American producers will decrease, they’ll be able to compete once again with their rivals.
The loss which [the United States] will incur will not fall upon the exporters, but upon those who consume imported commodities; who, with money incomes reduced in amount, will have to pay the same or even an increased price for all things produced in foreign countries.
The loss that [the United States] will face won’t be felt by the exporters, but by those who buy imported goods; who, with lower income, will have to pay the same or even higher prices for everything made in other countries.
§ 2. High wages don’t stop one country from selling for less than another.
According to the preceding doctrine, a country can not be undersold in any commodity, unless the rival country [pg 453] has a stronger inducement than itself for devoting its labor and capital to the production of the commodity; arising from the fact that by doing so it occasions a greater saving of labor and capital, to be shared between itself and its customers—a greater increase of the aggregate produce of the world. The underselling, therefore, though a loss to the undersold country, is an advantage to the world at large; the substituted commerce being one which economizes more of the labor and capital of mankind, and adds more to their collective wealth, than the commerce superseded by it. The advantage, of course, consists in being able to produce the commodity of better quality, or with less labor (compared with other things); or perhaps not with less labor, but in less time; with a less prolonged detention of the capital employed. This may arise from greater natural advantages (such as soil, climate, richness of mines); superior capability, either natural or acquired, in the laborers; better division of labor, and better tools, or machinery. But there is no place left in this theory for the case of lower wages. This, however, in the theories commonly current, is a favorite cause of underselling. We continually hear of the disadvantage under which the [American] producer labors, both in foreign markets and even in his own, through the lower wages paid by his foreign rivals. These lower wages, we are told, enable, or are always on the point of enabling, them to sell at lower prices, and to dislodge the [American] manufacturer from all markets in which he is not artificially protected.
According to the previous theory, a country can’t be undersold in any product unless the competing country has a stronger reason to invest its labor and capital in producing that product. This happens because it leads to a greater saving of labor and capital, benefiting both itself and its customers, and increasing the overall production of the world. Therefore, while underselling is a loss for the country that is undersold, it’s an advantage for the global economy; the new trade saves more labor and capital and boosts collective wealth compared to the trade it replaces. The benefit usually comes from being able to produce a better quality product or doing it with less labor (in relation to other products); or maybe not with less labor, but in less time, reducing the time the capital is tied up. This can come from better natural resources (like soil, climate, and minerals), higher skills (whether innate or learned) among workers, improved division of labor, and better tools or machinery. However, this theory doesn’t account for the role of lower wages. Yet, in commonly accepted theories, lower wages are often cited as a major reason for underselling. We often hear about the disadvantages American producers face in both foreign and domestic markets due to the lower wages their foreign competitors pay. These lower wages supposedly allow them to sell at lower prices, pushing American manufacturers out of markets unless they are somehow protected.
It will be remembered that, as we have before seen, international trade, in actual practice, depends on comparative prices within the same country (even though the exporter may not consciously make a comparison). We send wheat abroad, because it is low in price relatively to certain manufactured goods; that is, we send the wheat, but we do not send the manufactured goods. But, so far, this is considering only the comparative prices in the same country. Yet we shall fail to realize in actual practice the application of the above principles, when we use the terms prices and money, if we do not admit that there is in the matter of underselling a comparison, also, between the absolute price of the goods in one country and the absolute [pg 454] price of the same goods in the competing country. For example, wheat is not shipped to England unless the price is lower here than there. If India or Morocco were to send wheat into the English market in close competition with the United States, and the price were to fall in London, it would mean that, if we continued our shipments of wheat to England, we must part with our wheat at a less advantage in the international exchange. In the illustration already used, we must, for example, offer more than seventeen bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron. The fall in the price of wheat, without any change in that of iron, implies the necessity of offering a greater quantity of wheat for the same quantity of iron, perhaps nineteen or twenty bushels for ten cwts. of iron. If the price went so low as to require twenty-one bushels to pay for ten cwts. of iron, then we should be entirely undersold; and the price here as compared with the price in London would be an indication of the fact. So that the comparison of prices here with prices abroad is merely a register of the terms at which our international exchanges are performed; but not the cause of the existence of the international trade. If the price falls so low in a foreign market that we can not sell wheat there, it simply means that we have reached in the exchange ratios the limit of our comparative advantages in wheat and iron; so that we are obliged to offer twenty or more bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron.
It's important to remember that, as we've seen before, international trade really relies on price differences within the same country, even if exporters don't consciously think about it that way. We export wheat because it's cheaper compared to certain manufactured goods; we ship the wheat but not the manufactured goods. However, this only takes into account the price differences within a single country. We won't completely grasp the practical implications of these ideas about prices and money if we don't recognize that there's also a comparison between the actual prices of goods in one country and the actual prices of the same goods in a competing country. For instance, wheat won’t be exported to England unless the price is lower here than there. If countries like India or Morocco start sending wheat to the English market to compete with the United States, and the price drops in London, it means that if we continue to export our wheat to England, we have to sell it under less favorable terms in international trade. Referring back to the earlier example, we would need to offer more than seventeen bushels of wheat for ten hundredweight (cwts.) of iron. If the price of wheat decreases without a change in the price of iron, we would need to provide a larger quantity of wheat for the same amount of iron, possibly nineteen or twenty bushels for ten cwts. of iron. If the price fell so low that it took twenty-one bushels to cover the cost of ten cwts. of iron, we would be completely undersold, and that price difference compared to London would show that. Therefore, comparing prices here with prices abroad is really just a way to assess how our international trade functions; it doesn’t create international trade. If prices become so low in a foreign market that we can't sell wheat there, it simply means we've reached the limit of our comparative advantages in wheat and iron in terms of exchange ratios; thus, we have to offer twenty or more bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron.[pg 454]
But in all this it must be noted that this price must include the return to capital also, and that it must be equal to the usual reward for capital in other competing industries, that is, the ordinary rate of profit. In exporting wheat from the United States the capital engaged will insist on getting the rate of profit to be found in other occupations to which the capital can go, in the United States. Now, the price, if it stands for the value (which is supposed to be governed by cost of production in this case), is the sum out of which wages and profits are paid. If the price were to fall in the foreign market, then there might not be the means with which to pay the usual rate of wages and the usual rate of profit also. Then we should probably hear of complaints by the shippers that there is no profit in the exportation of wheat, and of a falling off in the trade. In other words, as the capitalist is the one who manages the operation, and is the one first affected, the diminution of advantage in foreign trade arising from competition, generally shows itself first in lessened profits. The price, then, is the means by which we determine whether a certain article gives us that comparative advantage which will insure a gain from international trade.
It's important to recognize that this price must also take into account a return on capital, which should match the standard profit rate found in other competing industries. When exporting wheat from the United States, the capital involved expects to earn a profit rate similar to what it could achieve in other sectors in the U.S. The price, which is assumed to be influenced by production costs in this scenario, represents the total amount from which wages and profits are derived. If the price in the foreign market decreases, there may not be enough revenue to cover the customary wages and profit rates. This could result in exporters complaining about low profits from wheat exports and a decrease in trade. Essentially, since the capitalist runs the operation and is the first to experience the effects, reduced benefits in foreign trade due to competition usually manifest first as lower profits. Therefore, the price is our measure of whether a specific product provides the comparative advantage necessary to benefit from international trade.
An exportable article whose price in this country is low—since [pg 455] it is for this reason selected as an export—is one whose cost is low. If the cost be low, it means that the industry is very productive; that the same capital and labor produce more for their exertion in this than in other industries. And yet it is precisely in the most productive industries that higher wages and profits can be, and are, paid. Although each article is sold at a low price, the great quantity produced makes the total sum, or value, out of which the industrial rewards, profits, and wages, are paid, large. That is, the price may be very low (lower, also, in direct comparison with prices abroad) and yet pay the rate of wages and profits current in this country. Consequently, although wages and profits may be very high (relatively to older countries) in those industries of the United States whose productiveness is great, yet the very fact of this low cost, and consequently this low price (where competition is effective), is that which fits the commodity for exportation. We are, therefore, inevitably led to a position in which we see that high wages and low prices naturally go together in an exportable commodity. In practice, certainly, the high wages do not, by raising the price, prevent us, by comparing our price with English prices, from sending goods abroad—because we send goods abroad from our most productive employments. As an illustration of this principle, it is found that the leading exports of the United States, in 1883, were cotton, breadstuffs, provisions, tobacco, mineral oils, and wood.
An exportable article that's priced cheaply in this country—because[pg 455]It's chosen for export for this reason: it has a low cost. If the cost is low, it indicates that the industry is very productive; the same amount of capital and labor produces more output here than in other sectors. However, it's in the most productive industries where higher wages and profits can and do arise. Even though each item is sold at a low price, the large quantity produced results in considerable total value from which industrial rewards, profits, and wages are paid. This means that the price can be quite low (even lower compared to prices abroad) and still offer the wage and profit rates typical in this country. Therefore, while wages and profits may be relatively high (compared to older countries) in the highly productive industries of the United States, it's the low cost—and thus low price (where competition is strong)—that makes the product suitable for export. This leads us to understand that high wages and low prices can naturally exist together in an exportable commodity. In practice, the high wages don’t stop us from competing internationally, as we export goods from our most productive sectors—despite the lower prices. For example, the main exports of the United States in 1883 were cotton, grains, food products, tobacco, mineral oils, and timber.
But, since a direct comparison is in practice made between prices here and prices in England (for example), in order to determine whether the trade can be a profitable one, we constantly hear it said that we can not send goods abroad because our labor is so dear. It need scarcely be observed that we do not hear this from those engaged in any of the extractive industries just mentioned as furnishing large exports, which are admittedly very productive; it is generally heard in regard to certain kinds of manufactured goods. The difficulty arises not with regard to articles in which we have the greatest advantage in productiveness, but those in which we have a less advantage. If the majority of occupations are so productive as to assure a generally high reward to labor and capital throughout the country, these less advantageously situated industries—not being so productive as others (either from lack of skill or good management, or high cost of machinery and materials, or peculiarities of climate, or heavy taxation)—can not pay the usual high reward to labor, and at the same time get for the capitalist the same high reward he can everywhere else receive at home. For, at a price low enough to warrant an exportation, the quantity made by a given amount of labor and [pg 456] capital does not yield a total value so great as is given in the majority of other occupations to the same amount of labor and capital, and out of which the usual high wages and profits can be paid. The less productiveness of an industry, compared with other industries in the same country, then, is the real cause which prevents it from competing with foreign countries consistently with receiving the ordinary rate of profit. It is the high rate of profits as well as the high rate of wages common in the country which prevents selling abroad. It is absurd to say that it is only high wages: it is just as much high profits. Of course, if the less productive industries wish to compete with England, and if they pay—as we know they must—the high rate of wages due to the general productiveness of our country's industries, they must submit to less profits for the pleasure of having that particular desire. It is not possible that we should produce everything equally well here; nor is it possible that England should produce everything equally well. If we wish to send any goods at all to England, we must receive some goods from her. In order to get the gain arising from our productiveness, we must earnestly wish that England should have some commodity also in which she has a comparative advantage, in order that any trade whatever may exist. It is not, however, worth while, in my opinion, to go on in this discussion to consider the position of those who would shut us off from any and all foreign trade.
Since we often compare prices here with those in England to see if trade can be profitable, we often hear that we can't export goods because our labor costs are too high. It's important to note that this view usually doesn’t come from people in the extractive industries, which are known for their large exports and high productivity; instead, it’s typically brought up in relation to certain manufactured goods. The issue doesn’t arise from areas where we have the highest productivity, but rather from those with lower productivity. If most jobs are productive enough to ensure a generally high return for labor and capital across the board, the less competitive industries—due to factors like a lack of skills, poor management, high machinery and material costs, unique climate challenges, or heavy taxes—struggle to offer the usual high returns for labor while also providing capitalists with the same high returns they could get elsewhere. At prices low enough to justify exporting, the output generated by a certain amount of labor and capital doesn’t yield as much total value as most other jobs, which can support the typical high wages and profits. Therefore, the lower productivity of an industry compared to others in the same country is the main reason it can’t compete with foreign countries while still achieving the standard profit rate. It’s both the high profit margins and the high wages typical in our country that make it hard to sell abroad. It’s absurd to claim it's just about high wages; high profits are equally significant. If the less productive industries want to compete with England and pay the high wages that reflect the overall productivity of our industries, they must be willing to accept lower profits to achieve that goal. It’s unrealistic to expect that we can produce everything equally well here, just as it’s unrealistic for England to do the same. If we want to export any goods to England, we need to import some from them. To take advantage of our productivity, we should genuinely hope that England has a product where it holds a comparative advantage, allowing for trade to happen. However, in my opinion, it’s not worth continuing this discussion by considering the views of those who would prefer to cut us off from all foreign trade.
Our present high wages should be a cause for congratulation, because they are due to the generally high productiveness of our resources, or, in other words, due to low cost; and it is to be hoped that they may long continue high. We do not seem to be in imminent danger of not having goods which we can export in quantities which will buy for us all we may wish to import from abroad. (See Chart No. XIII, and note the vast increase of exports at the same time that wages are known to be higher in this country than abroad.) So long as wages continue high, we may possibly be unwilling to see gratified that false and ignorant desire which leads some people to think that we ought to produce, equally well with any competitor in the world, everything that is made. If, as was pointed out under the discussion on cost of labor,289 we must necessarily connect with efficiency of labor all natural advantages under which labor works, it is easy to see that high wages are entirely consistent with low prices; and that high wages do not prevent us to-day from having an hitherto unequaled export trade. Even if all wages and all profits were lower, it would, however, affect all industries alike, and some would still be more productive relatively [pg 457] to others, and the same inequality would remain. If, however, we learn to use our materials better, use machinery with more effect on the quantity produced, adapt our industries to our climate, get the raw products more cheaply, free ourselves from excessive and unreasonable taxation, it would be difficult to say what commodities we might not be able eventually to manufacture in competition with the rest of the world. For we have scarcely ever, as a country, had the advantage of such conditions to aid us in our foreign trade.
Our current high wages are worth celebrating because they come from the overall high productivity of our resources, or in simpler terms, low costs; and we hope they stay high for a long time. It doesn’t seem like we’re in any immediate danger of running out of goods to export in enough quantities to buy everything we want to import from other countries. (See Chart __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__)No. 13, and notice the significant rise in exports while wages here are known to be higher than in other places.) As long as wages remain high, we might be less tempted to give in to the mistaken and uninformed belief that we should be able to produce everything just as well as any global competitor. If, as mentioned in the discussion on labor costs,289We have to connect labor efficiency with all the natural advantages that affect labor. It’s clear that high wages can exist alongside low prices, and high wages don’t prevent us from having an unmatched export trade today. Even if all wages and profits were lower, it would still affect all industries equally, and some would remain relatively more productive than others, keeping the same inequality. However, if we learn to use our resources more effectively, operate machinery more efficiently to boost production, adjust our industries to fit our climate, obtain raw materials at lower costs, and get rid of excessive and unreasonable taxes, it would be hard to predict what goods we couldn’t ultimately produce competitively with the rest of the world. As a country, we’ve rarely had such favorable conditions to support our foreign trade.
Mr. Mill now goes on to consider the suggestive fact that wages are higher in England than on the Continent, and yet that the English have no difficulty in underselling their Continental rivals.
Mr. Mill now explores the interesting fact that wages in England are higher than in Europe, yet the English have no difficulty undercutting their competitors on the continent.
Before examining this opinion on grounds of principle, it is worth while to bestow a moment's consideration upon it as a question of fact. Is it true that the wages of manufacturing labor are lower in foreign countries than in England, in any sense in which low wages are an advantage to the capitalist? The artisan of Ghent or Lyons may earn less wages in a day, but does he not do less work? Degrees of efficiency considered, does his labor cost less to his employer? Though wages may be lower on the Continent, is not the Cost of Labor, which is the real element in the competition, very nearly the same? That it is so seems the opinion of competent judges, and is confirmed by the very little difference in the rate of profit between England and the Continental countries. But, if so, the opinion is absurd that English producers can be undersold by their Continental rivals from this cause. It is only in America that the supposition is prima facie admissible. In America wages are much higher than in England, if we mean by wages the daily earnings of a laborer; but the productive power of American labor is so great—its efficiency, combined with the favorable circumstances in which it is exerted, makes it worth so much to the purchaser—that the Cost of Labor is lower in America than in England; as is proved by the fact that the general rate of profits and of interest is very much higher.
Before looking at this opinion based on principle, it's important to take a moment to consider it as a factual question. Is it true that manufacturing labor wages are lower in foreign countries than in England, in any way that benefits the capitalist? A worker in Ghent or Lyons might earn less in a day, but does he not do less work? When considering efficiency levels, does his labor actually cost less to his employer? Even if wages are lower on the Continent, is the Cost of Labor—the key factor in competition—not very similar? This seems to be the view of knowledgeable judges and is supported by the minimal difference in profit rates between England and Continental countries. If that's the case, it doesn't make sense to claim that English producers can be undersold by their Continental competitors for this reason. The only place where that assumption might hold is in America. In America, wages are much higher than in England, if we define wages as the daily earnings of a laborer; however, the productivity of American labor is so high—its efficiency, along with the favorable conditions in which it operates, makes it so valuable to buyers—that the Cost of Labor is actually lower in America than in England. This is evidenced by the fact that the overall rates of profit and interest are significantly higher.
§ 3. Low wages allow a country to sell its products cheaper than another, especially in specific industries.
But is it true that low wages, even in the sense of low Cost of Labor, enable a country to sell cheaper in the [pg 458] foreign market? I mean, of course, low wages which are common to the whole productive industry of the country.
But is it really true that low wages, even when considering low labor costs, allow a country to sell for less in the foreign market? I mean low wages that are widespread across the entire productive industry of the country.
If wages, in any of the departments of industry which supply exports, are kept, artificially or by some accidental cause, below the general rate of wages in the country, this is a real advantage in the foreign market. It lessens the comparative cost of production of those articles in relation to others, and has the same effect as if their production required so much less labor. Take, for instance, the case of the United States in respect to certain commodities. In that country tobacco and cotton, two great articles of export, are produced by slave-labor, while food and manufactures generally are produced by free laborers, who either work on their own account or are paid by wages. In spite of the inferior efficiency of slave-labor, there can be no reasonable doubt that, in a country where the wages of free labor are so high, the work executed by slaves is a better bargain to the capitalist. To whatever extent it is so, this smaller cost of labor, being not general, but limited to those employments, is just as much a cause of cheapness in the products, both in the home and in the foreign market, as if they had been made by a less quantity of labor. If the slaves in the Southern States were emancipated, and their wages rose to the general level of the earnings of free labor in America, that country might be obliged to erase some of the slave-grown articles from the catalogue of its exports, and would certainly be unable to sell any of them in the foreign market at the present price. Their cheapness is partly an artificial cheapness, which may be compared to that produced by a bounty on production or on exportation; or, considering the means by which it is obtained, an apter comparison would be with the cheapness of stolen goods.
If wages in any of the industries that provide exports are kept, either artificially or due to some random factor, below the average wage rate in the country, this creates a real advantage in the foreign market. It reduces the comparative analysis cost of producing those goods compared to others, having the same effect as if their production required significantly less labor. For example, consider the United States regarding certain products. In that country, tobacco and cotton—two major export items—are produced using slave labor, whereas food and most manufactured goods are produced by free workers, who either work for themselves or are paid wages. Despite the lower efficiency of slave labor, it’s reasonable to conclude that in a country where free labor wages are so high, the work done by slaves turns out to be a better deal for capitalists. To whatever degree this is true, the lower labor cost, which is not widespread but confined to specific jobs, contributes to the lower prices of the products, both domestically and in the foreign market, just as if they had been made with less labor. If the slaves in the Southern States were freed and their wages rose to match the general earnings of free workers in America, that country might need to remove some of the slave-produced items from its export list and would definitely struggle to sell any of them abroad at current prices. Their low prices are partly due to an artificial reduction, akin to that created by a production or export bounty; or, considering how this low price is achieved, a more fitting comparison would be to the cheapness of stolen goods.

An advantage of a similar economical, though of a very different moral character, is that possessed by domestic manufactures; fabrics produced in the leisure hours of families partially occupied in other pursuits, who, not depending for subsistence on the produce of the manufacture, can afford to sell it at any price, however low, for which they think it worth while to take the trouble of producing. The workman of Zürich is to-day a manufacturer, to-morrow again an agriculturist, and changes his occupations with the seasons in a continual round. Manufacturing industry and tillage advance hand in hand, in inseparable alliance, and in this union of the two occupations the secret may be found why the simple and unlearned Swiss manufacturer can always go on competing and increasing in prosperity in the face of those extensive establishments fitted out with great economic and (what is still more important) intellectual resources.
One benefit of a similar economical approach, although with a very different moral aspect, is seen in domestic manufacturing. Fabrics are made during the free time of families who are also engaged in other activities. Since they don’t rely solely on the income from their manufacturing, they can sell their goods at any price they choose, even if it’s low, as long as it’s worth their effort. The worker in Zürich might be a manufacturer today and a farmer tomorrow, shifting jobs with the seasons in a never-ending cycle. Manufacturing and farming grow together in a close partnership, and it is in this combination of roles that we find the reason why the simple, uneducated Swiss manufacturer can consistently compete and thrive, even against large operations equipped with significant financial and (even more importantly) intellectual resources.
In the case of these domestic manufactures, the comparative cost of production, on which the interchange between countries depends, is much lower than in proportion to the quantity of labor employed. The work-people, looking to the earnings of their loom for a part only, if for any part, of their actual maintenance, can afford to work for a less remuneration than the lowest rate of wages which can permanently exist in the employments by which the laborer has to support the whole expense of a family. Working, as they do, not for an employer but for themselves, they may be said to carry on the manufacture at no cost at all, except the small expense of a loom and of the material; and the limit of possible cheapness is not the necessity of living by their trade, but that of earning enough by the work to make that social employment of their leisure hours not disagreeable.
In the case of these local productions, the relative cost of making goods, which affects trade between countries, is much lower compared to the amount of labor involved. The workers, relying on the income from their looms for only part of their actual living expenses, can afford to work for less pay than the minimum wage needed for someone to fully support a family. Since they are working for themselves rather than for an employer, they can be considered to operate their manufacturing with almost no cost, aside from the minor expense of a loom and the materials. The potential for lower prices isn't limited by the need to earn a living from their trade, but by the need to make enough from their work to keep the social aspect of their free time enjoyable.
§ 4. —But not when it's common to everyone.
These two cases, of slave-labor and of domestic [pg 461] manufactures, exemplify the conditions under which low wages enable a country to sell its commodities cheaper in foreign markets, and consequently to undersell its rivals, or to avoid being undersold by them. But no such advantage is conferred by low wages when common to all branches of industry. General low wages never caused any country to undersell its rivals, nor did general high wages ever hinder it from doing so.
These two cases, of slave labor and domestic [pg 461] manufacturing, illustrate how low wages allow a country to sell its products cheaper in international markets, enabling it to beat its competitors or keep from being undercut by them. However, low wages don’t provide any advantage when they are widespread across all industries. Overall low wages have never helped a country undercut its rivals, nor have overall high wages ever stopped it from doing so.
To demonstrate this, we must turn to an elementary principle which was discussed in a former chapter.290 General low wages do not cause low prices, nor high wages high prices, within the country itself. General prices are not raised by a rise of wages, any more than they would be raised by an increase of the quantity of labor required in all production. Expenses which affect all commodities equally have no influence on prices. If the maker of broadcloth or cutlery, and nobody else, had to pay higher wages, the price of his commodity would rise, just as it would if he had to employ more labor; because otherwise he would gain less profit than other producers, and nobody would engage in the employment. But if everybody has to pay higher wages, or everybody to employ more labor, the loss must be submitted to; as it affects everybody alike, no one can hope to get rid of it by a change of employment; each, therefore, resigns himself to a diminution of profits, and prices remain as they were. In like manner, general low wages, or a general increase in the productiveness of labor, does not make prices low, but profits high. If wages fall (meaning here by wages the cost of labor), why, on that account, should the producer lower his price? He will be forced, it may be said, by the competition of other capitalists who will crowd into his employment. But other capitalists are also paying lower wages, and by entering into competition with him they would gain nothing but what they are gaining already. The rate, then, at which labor is paid, as well as the quantity [pg 462] of it which is employed, affects neither the value nor the price of the commodity produced, except in so far as it is peculiar to that commodity, and not common to commodities generally.
To show this, we should refer back to a basic principle discussed in a previous chapter.290 In general, low wages don’t lead to low prices, nor do high wages lead to high prices within the country itself. A rise in wages doesn’t raise prices any more than an increase in the amount of labor needed for all production would. Costs that affect all goods equally don’t influence prices. If only the producer of broadcloth or cutlery had to pay higher wages, the price of their product would increase, just like it would if they had to hire more labor; otherwise, they'd earn less profit compared to other producers, and no one would want to stay in that business. However, if everyone has to pay higher wages or hire more labor, the loss has to be accepted because it impacts everyone the same way, and no one can escape it by changing jobs; everyone then adjusts to reduced profits, and prices stay the same. Similarly, general low wages or a general increase in labor productivity doesn’t make prices low, but it does lead to higher profits. If wages drop (and here we mean the cost of labor), why should the producer lower their price because of that? It might be said that they would be pressured by competition from other capitalists entering the field. But those other capitalists are also paying lower wages, and by competing with him, they wouldn’t gain anything beyond what they already have. So, the rate at which labor is paid, as well as how much labor is employed, affects neither the value nor the price of the produced goods, except in cases that are unique to that specific commodity and not applicable to commodities in general.
Since low wages are not a cause of low prices in the country itself, so neither do they cause it to offer its commodities in foreign markets at a lower price. It is quite true that, if the cost of labor is lower in America than in England, America could sell her cottons to Cuba at a lower price than England, and still gain as high a profit as the English manufacturer. But it is not with the profit of the English manufacturer that the American cotton-spinner will make his comparison; it is with the profits of other American capitalists. These enjoy, in common with himself, the benefit of a low cost of labor, and have accordingly a high rate of profit. This high profit the cotton-spinner must also have: he will not content himself with the English profit. It is true he may go on for a time at that lower rate, rather than change his employment; and a trade may be carried on, sometimes for a long period, at a much lower profit than that for which it would have been originally engaged in. Countries which have a low cost of labor and high profits do not for that reason undersell others, but they do oppose a [pg 463] more obstinate resistance to being undersold, because the producers can often submit to a diminution of profit without being unable to live, and even to thrive, by their business. But this is all which their advantage does for them; and in this resistance they will not long persevere when a change of times which may give them equal profits with the rest of their countrymen has become manifestly hopeless.
Since low wages don't cause low prices in the country, they also don’t lead to selling goods in foreign markets at lower prices. It’s true that if labor costs are lower in America than in England, America could sell its cotton to Cuba at a lower price than England while still making as much profit as the English manufacturers. However, the American cotton-spinner will compare his profits with other American capitalists, not with the profits of English manufacturers. These other capitalists also benefit from low labor costs and therefore have high profit margins. The cotton-spinner also needs to achieve that high profit; he won’t settle for the English profit. It’s true he might continue for a while at that lower rate rather than switch jobs, and a trade might go on for a long time at a much lower profit than it was initially set up for. Countries with low labor costs and high profits don’t necessarily undersell others, but they do put up a stronger resistance against being undersold, because producers can often take a hit in profits without being unable to survive, and even thrive, in their business. But that’s all their advantage does for them; they won’t hold out for long in this resistance when it becomes clear that changes in the times that could give them equal profits with the rest of their fellow countrymen are manifestly hopeless.
§ 5. Low profits and their impact on the carrying trade.
It is worth while also to notice a third class of small, but in this case mostly independent communities, which have supported and enriched themselves almost without any productions of their own (except ships and marine equipments), by a mere carrying-trade, and commerce of entrepot; by buying the produce of one country, to sell it at a profit in another. Such were Venice and the Hanse Towns.
It’s also important to point out a third group of small, mostly independent communities that have managed to thrive and grow mostly without producing anything themselves (apart from ships and marine equipment). They relied on carrying trade and entrepot commerce, buying goods from one country and selling them for a profit in another. Examples of these are Venice and the Hanse Towns.
When the Venetians became the agents of the general commerce of Southern Europe, they had scarcely any competitors: the thing would not have been done at all without them, and there was really no limit to their profits except the limit to what the ignorant feudal nobility could and would give for the unknown luxuries then first presented to their sight. At a later period competition arose, and the profit of this operation, like that of others, became amenable to natural laws. The carrying-trade was taken up by Holland, a country with productions of its own and a large accumulated capital. The other nations of Europe also had now capital to spare, and were capable of conducting their foreign trade for themselves: but Holland, having, from the variety of circumstances, a lower rate of profit at home, could afford to carry for other countries at a smaller advance on the original cost of the goods than would have been required by their own capitalists; and Holland, therefore, engrossed the greatest part of the carrying-trade of all those countries which did not keep it to themselves by navigation laws,292 constructed, like those of England, for the express purpose.
When the Venetians became the main players in the general trade of Southern Europe, they had almost no competition: this would not have happened without them, and their profits had no real limit aside from what the clueless feudal nobility could and would pay for the exotic luxuries that were just being introduced to them. Later on, competition emerged, and the profits from this trade, like others, became subject to market forces. The shipping trade was taken over by Holland, a country with its own products and substantial accumulated wealth. Other European nations also had capital available and could manage their foreign trade themselves: however, Holland, due to various factors, had a lower profit margin at home, which allowed them to ship goods for other countries at a smaller markup than would have been feasible for their own capitalists. As a result, Holland dominated the shipping trade for those countries that didn't reserve it for themselves through navigation laws, 292 constructed, like those of England, for that specific purpose.
Chapter 21. About Distribution, Influenced by Exchange.
§ 1. Exchange and money do not affect the law of wages.
The division of the produce among the three classes, laborers, capitalists, and landlords, when considered without any reference to exchange, appeared to depend on certain general laws. It is fit that we should now consider whether these same laws still operate, when the distribution takes place through the complex mechanism of exchange and money; or whether the properties of the mechanism interfere with and modify the presiding principles.
The way the produce is split among the three groups—workers, capitalists, and landowners—seems to rely on some general rules when looked at without considering trade. Now, we should examine if these same rules still apply when the distribution happens through the complex system of trade and money, or if the characteristics of this system affect and change the governing principles.
The primary division of the produce of human exertion and frugality is, as we have seen, into three shares—wages, profits, and rents; and these shares are portioned out, to the persons entitled to them, in the form of money and by a process of exchange; or, rather, the capitalist, with whom in the usual arrangements of society the produce remains, pays in money, to the other two sharers, the market value of their labor and land. If we examine on what the pecuniary value of labor and the pecuniary value of the use of land depend, we shall find that it is on the very same causes by which we found that wages and rent would be regulated if there were no money and no exchange of commodities.
The main division of the results of human effort and savings is, as we've seen, into three parts—wages, profits, and rents; and these parts are distributed, to those entitled to them, in the form of money through a process of exchange. In normal societal arrangements, the capitalist, who usually holds the produce, pays the other two parties the market value of their labor and land in money. If we look into what determines the monetary value of labor and the monetary value of land use, we will find that it relies on the same factors that would govern wages and rent if there were no money or commodity exchanges.
It is evident, in the first place, that the law of wages is not affected by the existence or non-existence of exchange or money. Wages depend on the ratio between population and capital [taking into account the nature of a country's industries]; and would do so if all the capital in the world were the property of one association, or if the capitalists among [pg 466] whom it is shared maintained each an establishment for the production of every article consumed in the community, exchange of commodities having no existence. As the ratio between capital and population, everywhere but in new colonies, depends on the strength of the checks by which the too rapid increase of population is restrained, it may be said, popularly speaking, that wages depend on the checks to population; that, when the check is not death by starvation or disease, wages depend on the prudence of the laboring people; and that wages in any country are habitually at the lowest rate to which in that country the laborer will suffer them to be depressed rather than put a restraint upon multiplication.
It's clear, first of all, that the law of wages isn't influenced by whether or not exchange or money exists. Wages rely on the balance between population and capital [considering the nature of a country's industries]; this would hold true even if all the capital in the world were owned by one group, or if the capitalists sharing it each operated a business that produced every item consumed in the community, with no exchange of goods occurring. Since the balance between capital and population, except in new colonies, is determined by the effectiveness of measures that prevent the population from growing too quickly, we can generally say that wages depend on these population checks; specifically, when the check isn’t death from starvation or disease, wages depend on the foresight of the working class; and that wages in any country tend to be at the lowest rate that workers will tolerate rather than limit their reproduction.
What is here meant, however, by wages, is the laborer's real scale of comfort; the quantity he obtains of the things which nature or habit has made necessary or agreeable to him: wages in the sense in which they are of importance to the receiver. In the sense in which they are of importance to the payer, they do not depend exclusively on such simple principles. Wages in the first sense, the wages on which the laborer's comfort depends, we will call real wages, or wages in kind. Wages in the second sense we may be permitted to call, for the present, money wages; assuming, as it is allowable to do, that money remains for the time an invariable standard, no alteration taking place in the conditions under which the circulating medium itself is produced or obtained. If money itself undergoes no variation in cost, the money price of labor is an exact measure of the cost of labor, and may be made use of as a convenient symbol to express it [if the efficiency of labor also be supposed to remain the same].
What is meant here by wages is the real level of comfort for the laborer; the amount of goods that nature or habit has made necessary or enjoyable for him: wages in the sense that matter to the recipient. From the payer's perspective, wages don't solely rely on such straightforward principles. The first kind of wages, which are essential for the laborer's comfort, will be referred to as real wages or wages in kind. The second kind of wages we can call, for now, money wages; assuming, as is reasonable, that money remains a stable standard, without any changes occurring in the conditions under which the currency itself is produced or obtained. If the cost of money itself doesn't fluctuate, then the money price of labor accurately reflects the cost of labor and can serve as a useful symbol to represent it [assuming the efficiency of labor also stays the same].
The money wages of labor are a compound result of two elements: first, real wages, or wages in kind, or, in other words, the quantity which the laborer obtains of the ordinary articles of consumption; and, secondly, the money prices of those articles. In all old countries—all countries in which the increase of population is in any degree checked by the [pg 467] difficulty of obtaining subsistence—the habitual money price of labor is that which will just enable the laborers, one with another, to purchase the commodities without which they either can not or will not keep up the population at its customary rate of increase. Their standard of comfort being given (and by the standard of comfort in a laboring class is meant that rather than forego which they will abstain from multiplication), money wages depend on the money price, and therefore on the cost of production, of the various articles which the laborers habitually consume: because, if their wages can not procure them a given quantity of these, their increase will slacken and their wages rise. Of these articles, food and other agricultural produce are so much the principal as to leave little influence to anything else.
The money wages of labor come from two main factors: first, real wages, or wages in kind, which refer to the quantity of regular goods a laborer can get; and second, the money prices of those goods. In older countries—where the population growth is somewhat limited by the difficulty of getting enough to eat—the usual money price of labor is just enough for workers to buy the necessities they need to maintain the usual population growth rate. Their level of comfort, which determines their willingness to have more children, is essential; money wages rely on the money price and thus the production cost of the various items that laborers typically consume. If their wages can't buy a certain amount of these items, their population growth will slow down, and their wages will increase. Among these items, food and other agricultural products are so important that they overshadow everything else.
It is at this point that we are enabled to invoke the aid of the principles which have been laid down in this Third Part. The cost of production of food and agricultural produce has been analyzed in a preceding chapter. It depends on the productiveness of the least fertile land, or of the least productively employed portion of capital, which the necessities of society have as yet put in requisition for agricultural purposes. The cost of production of the food grown in these least advantageous circumstances determines, as we have seen, the exchange value and money price of the whole. In any given state, therefore, of the laborers' habits, their money wages depend on the productiveness of the least fertile land, or least productive agricultural capital: on the point which cultivation has reached in its downward progress—in its encroachments on the barren lands, and its gradually increased strain upon the powers of the more fertile. Now, the force which urges cultivation in this downward course is the increase of people; while the counter-force, which checks the descent, is the improvement of agricultural science and practice, enabling the same soil to yield to the same labor more ample returns. The costliness of the most costly part of the produce of cultivation is an exact expression of the state, at any given moment, of the race which population [pg 468] and agricultural skill are always running against each other.
At this point, we can call on the principles laid out in this Third Part. The cost of producing food and agricultural products was analyzed in a previous chapter. It depends on the productivity of the least fertile land or the least effectively used capital that society has required for agricultural use. The cost of producing food in these least favorable conditions determines, as we have seen, the exchange value and money price of everything. Therefore, in any given situation regarding the habits of workers, their money wages depend on the productivity of the least fertile land or the least effective agricultural capital: on how far cultivation has advanced in its encroachment on barren lands and its increasing demands on the capabilities of more fertile areas. The force driving cultivation to expand into less favorable areas is population growth, while the counter-force that limits this expansion is the advancement of agricultural science and practices, which allow the same land to yield greater returns from the same labor. The expense of the most costly portion of cultivated produce accurately reflects the state of the struggle between population and agricultural skill at any moment.
§ 2. Regarding the law of Rent.
The degree of productiveness of this extreme margin is an index to the existing state of the distribution of the produce among the three classes, of laborers, capitalists, and landlords. When the demand of an increasing population for more food can not be satisfied without extending cultivation to less fertile land, or incurring additional outlay, with a less proportional return, on land already in cultivation, it is a necessary condition of this increase of agricultural produce that the value and price of that produce must first rise. The price of food will always on the average be such that the worst land, and the least productive installment of the capital employed on the better lands, shall just replace the expenses with the ordinary profit. If the least favored land and capital just do thus much, all other land and capital will yield an extra profit, equal to the proceeds of the extra produce due to their superior productiveness; and this extra profit becomes, by competition, the prize of the landlords. Exchange [pg 469] and money, therefore, make no difference in the law of rent: it is the same as we originally293 found it. Rent is the extra return made to agricultural capital when employed with peculiar advantages; the exact equivalent of what those advantages enable the producers to economize in the cost of production: the value and price of the produce being regulated by the cost of production to those producers who have no advantages; by the return to that portion of agricultural capital the circumstances of which are the least favorable.
The level of productivity at this extreme margin shows the current state of how produce is distributed among the three classes: laborers, capitalists, and landlords. When a growing population's demand for more food can't be met without farming less fertile land or spending more on land that's already in use, it's essential for the increase in agricultural output that the value and price of that produce first go up. The average price of food will always be such that the least productive land and the lowest yielding part of the capital used on better lands will just cover the costs plus normal profit. If the least favorable land and capital do just enough to achieve this, all other land and capital will bring in extra profits, equal to the additional output from their greater productivity; and this extra profit becomes the prize for landlords through competition. Therefore, exchange and money don’t change the law of rent: it remains as we originally found it. Rent is the extra return made to agricultural capital when used with special advantages; it’s the precise equivalent of what those advantages help producers save in production costs: the value and price of the produce being determined by the production costs faced by those producers without advantages; by the returns to that portion of agricultural capital in the least favorable circumstances.
§ 3. —Nor in the law of Profits.
Wages and rent being thus regulated by the same principles when paid in money, as they would be if apportioned in kind, it follows that Profits are so likewise. For the surplus, after replacing wages and paying rent, constitutes Profits.
Wages and rent are regulated by the same principles when paid in money as they would be if given in kind, so it follows that Profits are likewise determined. The surplus, after covering wages and paying rent, makes up Profits.
We found, in the last chapter of the Second Book, that the advances of the capitalist, when analyzed to their ultimate elements, consist either in the purchase or maintenance of labor, or in the profits of former capitalists; and that, therefore, profits in the last resort depend upon the Cost of Labor, falling as that rises, and rising as it falls. Let us endeavor to trace more minutely the operation of this law.
We discovered in the last chapter of the Second Book that the gains of capitalists, when broken down to their basic components, are either from buying or maintaining labor or from the profits of previous capitalists. So, ultimately, profits depend on the Cost of Labor, decreasing as it increases and increasing as it decreases. Let’s try to examine the details of how this law works.
There are two modes in which the Cost of Labor, which is correctly represented (money being supposed invariable as well as efficiency) by the money wages of the laborer, may be increased. The laborer may obtain greater comforts; wages in kind—real wages—may rise. Or the progress of population may force down cultivation to inferior soils and more costly processes; thus raising the cost of production, the value, and the price, of the chief articles of the laborer's consumption. On either of these suppositions the rate of profit will fall.
There are two ways the Cost of Labor, which is accurately represented (assuming money and efficiency remain unchanged) by the worker's wages, can increase. The worker might gain access to more comforts; wages in kind—actual wages—could go up. Alternatively, population growth might push farming onto poorer lands and more expensive methods, which would raise the cost of production, the value, and the price of the main items the worker consumes. In either case, the profit rate will decline.
If the laborer obtains more abundant commodities only by reason of their greater cheapness, if he obtains a greater quantity, but not on the whole a greater cost, real wages will be increased, but not money wages, and there will be [pg 470] nothing to affect the rate of profit. But, if he obtains a greater quantity of commodities of which the cost of production is not lowered, he obtains a greater cost; his money wages are higher. The expense of these increased money wages falls wholly on the capitalist. There are no conceivable means by which he can shake it off. It may be said—it used formerly to be said—that he will get rid of it by raising his price. But this opinion we have already, and more than once, fully refuted.294
If the worker gets more products just because they are cheaper, and if he ends up with more items but not an overall higher cost, then real wages will go up, but money wages won’t, and this won’t change the profit rate at all. However, if he ends up with more products and the production cost doesn't drop, then his costs increase, and his money wages go up. The burden of these higher money wages falls entirely on the capitalist. There’s no way for him to avoid it. It used to be said that he could offset this by raising his prices. But we have already thoroughly disproven this idea multiple times.
The doctrine, indeed, that a rise of wages causes an equivalent rise of prices, is, as we formerly observed, self-contradictory: for, if it did so, it would not be a rise of wages; the laborer would get no more of any commodity than he had before, let his money wages rise ever so much; a rise of real wages would be an impossibility. This being equally contrary to reason and to fact, it is evident that a rise of money wages does not raise prices; that high wages are not a cause of high prices. A rise of general wages falls on profits. There is no possible alternative.
The idea that an increase in wages leads to a corresponding increase in prices is, as we mentioned before, inherently contradictory. If that were the case, an increase in wages wouldn't actually mean more for workers; they wouldn't be able to buy more of any goods than they did before, no matter how much their wages went up. Therefore, true real wage increases would be impossible. Since this is clearly against logic and facts, it's clear that higher money wages do not increase prices; in fact, high wages are not the reason for high prices. Instead, when wages generally rise, it affects profits. There are no other options.
Having disposed of the case in which the increase of money wages, and of the Cost of Labor, arises from the laborer's obtaining more ample wages in kind, let us now suppose it to arise from the increased cost of production of the things which he consumes, owing to an increase of population unaccompanied by an equivalent increase of agricultural skill. The augmented supply required by the population would not be obtained, unless the price of food rose sufficiently to remunerate the farmer for the increased cost of production. The farmer, however, in this case sustains a twofold disadvantage. He has to carry on his cultivation under less favorable conditions of productiveness than before. For this, as it is a disadvantage belonging to him only as a farmer, and not shared by other employers, he will, on the general principles of value, be compensated by a rise of the price of his commodity; indeed, until this rise has taken [pg 471] place, he will not bring to market the required increase of produce. But this very rise of price involves him in another necessity, for which he is not compensated. He must pay higher money wages to his laborers [if they retain the same quantity of real wages]. This necessity, being common to him with all other capitalists, forms no ground for a rise of price. The price will rise, until it has placed him in as good a situation, in respect of profits, as other employers of labor; it will rise so as to indemnify him for the increased labor which he must now employ in order to produce a given quantity of food; but the increased wages of that labor are a burden common to all, and for which no one can be indemnified. It will be paid wholly from profits.
Having dealt with the situation where the rise in money wages and the cost of labor comes from workers receiving higher wages in kind, let’s now consider if it comes from an increase in the production costs of the things they consume, due to population growth that isn’t matched by an equivalent rise in agricultural skills. The additional supply needed for the growing population wouldn’t be achieved unless food prices increased enough to compensate farmers for the higher production costs. However, in this situation, the farmer faces a double disadvantage. He has to farm under less favorable conditions than before. Since this disadvantage is unique to him as a farmer, and not shared by other employers, he will be compensated by an increase in the price of his goods. In fact, until this price increase happens, he won’t bring the extra produce to market. But this rise in price creates another challenge for him that he isn’t compensated for. He’ll have to pay higher money wages to his workers if they want to maintain the same amount of real wages. This challenge, which all other capitalists also face, doesn’t justify a price increase. Prices will go up only to ensure that he has similar profit conditions as other employers, increasing to cover the greater labor he must now use to produce a certain amount of food. However, the higher wages for that labor are a shared burden, and there’s no way for anyone to be compensated for it. It will all come out of profits.
Thus we see that increased wages, when common to all descriptions of productive laborers, and when really representing a greater Cost of Labor, are always and necessarily at the expense of profits. And by reversing the cases, we should find in like manner that diminished wages, when representing a really diminished Cost of Labor, are equivalent to a rise of profits. But the opposition of pecuniary interest thus indicated between the class of capitalists and that of laborers is to a great extent only apparent. Real wages are a very different thing from the Cost of Labor, and are generally highest at the times and places where, from the easy terms on which the land yields all the produce as yet required from it, the value and price of food being low, the cost of labor to the employer, notwithstanding its ample remuneration, is comparatively cheap, and the rate of profit consequently high, as at present in the United States. We thus obtain a full confirmation of our original theorem that Profits depend on the Cost of Labor: or, to express the meaning with still greater accuracy, the rate of profit and the cost of labor vary inversely as one another, and are joint effects of the same agencies or causes.
So, we can see that when wages increase for all types of productive workers and truly reflect a higher Cost of Labor, it always comes at the expense of profits. Conversely, if wages decrease and genuinely indicate a lower Cost of Labor, it leads to a rise in profits. However, the conflict of financial interests between capitalists and laborers is mostly just an illusion. Actual wages are quite different from the Cost of Labor and are usually highest at times and places where the land produces food easily, leading to low food prices. In such situations, even though labor is fairly compensated, it remains relatively inexpensive for employers, resulting in higher profit rates, as we see now in the United States. This supports our original idea that Profits are linked to the Cost of Labor: more precisely, the rate of profit and the Cost of Labor move inversely to each other and are influenced by the same factors.
Book IV. The Impact of Social Progress on Production and Distribution.
Chapter I. The Impact of Industrial and Population Growth on Values and Prices.
§ 1. The trend of societal progress is towards greater control over the forces of nature, enhanced security, and improved capacity for cooperation.
In the leading countries of the world, and in all others as they come within the influence of those leading countries, there is at least one progressive movement which continues with little interruption from year to year and from generation to generation—a progress in wealth; an advancement in what is called material prosperity. All the nations which we are accustomed to call civilized increase gradually in production and in population: and there is no reason to doubt that not only these nations will for some time continue so to increase, but that most of the other nations of the world, including some not yet founded, will successively enter upon the same career. It will, therefore, be our first object to examine the nature and consequences of this progressive change, the elements which constitute it, and the effects it produces on the various economical facts of which we have been tracing the laws, and especially on wages, profits, rents, values, and prices.
In the leading countries of the world, as well as in others influenced by them, there’s at least one ongoing progressive movement that continues with little interruption from year to year and generation to generation—a growth in wealth; an increase in what we call material prosperity. All the nations we consider civilized gradually see an increase in production and population. There’s no reason to believe that not only these nations will continue to grow for some time, but that most of the other nations in the world, including some that don’t exist yet, will eventually follow the same path. Therefore, our first goal will be to examine the nature and consequences of this progressive change, the elements that make it up, and the effects it has on the various economic factors we’ve been studying, especially on wages, profits, rents, values, and prices.
Of the features which characterize this progressive economical movement of civilized nations, that which first excites attention, through its intimate connection with the phenomena of Production, is the perpetual, and, so far as human foresight can extend (1), the unlimited, growth of man's [pg 476] power over nature. Our knowledge of the properties and laws of physical objects shows no sign of approaching its ultimate boundaries: it is advancing more rapidly, and in a greater number of directions at once, than in any previous age or generation, and affording such frequent glimpses of unexplored fields beyond as to justify the belief that our acquaintance with nature is still almost in its infancy.
One of the key features of the progressive economic movement of modern nations that grabs attention, due to its close link with the phenomena of Production, is the ongoing, and as far as human foresight can reach, unlimited growth of humanity's power over nature. Our understanding of the properties and laws of physical objects shows no sign of nearing its ultimate limits: it's advancing faster and in more directions than ever before, offering frequent glimpses of unexplored areas, supporting the belief that our knowledge of nature is still very much in its infancy.
Another change, which has always hitherto characterized, and will assuredly continue to characterize, the progress of civilized society, is (2) a continual increase of the security of person and property. Of this increased security, one of the most unfailing effects is a great increase both of production and of accumulation. Industry and frugality can not exist where there is not a preponderant probability that those who labor and spare will be permitted to enjoy.
Another change that has always defined, and will definitely continue to define, the progress of civilized society is a constant increase in the security of individuals and their property. One of the most reliable outcomes of this increased security is a significant rise in both production and accumulation. People can't work hard and save if they don't have a strong chance of being able to enjoy the fruits of their labor.
One of the changes which most infallibly attend the progress of modern society is, (3) an improvement in the business capacities of the general mass of mankind. I do not mean that the practical sagacity of an individual human being is greater than formerly. What is lost in the separate efficiency of each is far more than made up by the greater capacity of united action. Works of all sorts, impracticable to the savage or the half-civilized, are daily accomplished by civilized nations, not by any greatness of faculties in the actual agents, but through the fact that each is able to rely with certainty on the others for the portion of the work which they respectively undertake. The peculiar characteristic, in short, of civilized beings, is the capacity of co-operation; and this, like other faculties, tends to improve by practice, and becomes capable of assuming a constantly wider sphere of action.
One of the changes that definitely comes with the advancement of modern society is an improvement in the business abilities of the general population. I'm not saying that the practical wisdom of any individual is greater than it used to be. What’s lost in individual effectiveness is far outweighed by the increased ability for collective action. Tasks that would be impossible for the primitive or semi-civilized are accomplished daily by civilized nations, not because of any exceptional skills in the individuals involved, but because each person can reliably depend on others for the part of the work they take on. The key feature, in short, of civilized people is their ability to collaborate; and this, like other skills, tends to improve with practice and can expand into a wider range of activities.
[This progress affords] space and scope for an indefinite increase of capital and production, and for the increase of population which is its ordinary accompaniment. That the growth of population will overpass the increase of production, there is not much reason to apprehend. It is, however, quite possible that there might be a great progress in industrial [pg 477] improvement, and in the signs of what is commonly called national prosperity; a great increase of aggregate wealth, and even, in some respects, a better distribution of it; that not only the rich might grow richer, but many of the poor might grow rich, that the intermediate classes might become more numerous and powerful, and the means of enjoyable existence be more and more largely diffused, while yet the great class at the base of the whole might increase in numbers only, and not in comfort nor in cultivation. We must, therefore, in considering the effects of the progress of industry, admit as a supposition, however greatly we deprecate as a fact, an increase of population as long-continued, as indefinite, and possibly even as rapid, as the increase of production and accumulation.
This progress allows for unlimited growth in capital and production, as well as the increase in population that usually comes with it. There's not much reason to worry that population growth will outpace production increases. However, it's quite possible that there could be significant advancements in industrial improvement and what we typically refer to as national prosperity; a large rise in overall wealth, and in some ways, a better distribution of it. Not only might the rich get richer, but many of the poor could become wealthy as well, the middle class could grow larger and more powerful, and the means for a better quality of life could be distributed more broadly. Yet, the large lower class might only see an increase in numbers without any improvement in comfort or education. Therefore, when we think about the effects of industrial progress, we must consider the possibility—however much we might disapprove of it as a reality—of a long-lasting, indefinite, and potentially rapid increase in population alongside the growth of production and accumulation.
§ 2. Trend of Decreasing Value and Production Costs of All Goods.
The changes which the progress of industry causes or presupposes in the circumstances of production are necessarily attended with changes in the values of commodities.
The changes brought about by the advancement of industry in the conditions of production inevitably lead to shifts in the values of goods.
The permanent values of all things which are neither under a natural nor under an artificial monopoly depend, as we have seen, on their cost of production. (1.) But the increasing power which mankind are constantly acquiring over nature increases more and more the efficiency of human exertion, or, in other words, diminishes cost of production. All inventions by which a greater quantity of any commodity can be produced with the same labor, or the same quantity with less labor, or which abridge the process, so that the capital employed needs not be advanced for so long a time, lessen the cost of production of the commodity. As, however, value is relative, if inventions and improvements in production were made in all commodities, and all in the same degree, there would be no alteration in values.
The lasting values of all things that are not under a natural or artificial monopoly depend, as we've seen, on their production costs. (1.) However, the growing ability of humanity to harness nature continuously boosts the efficiency of human effort, which, in turn, lowers production costs. Any innovations that allow a greater quantity of a commodity to be produced with the same amount of labor, or the same quantity with less labor, or that speed up the process so that the capital invested doesn't need to be tied up for as long, reduce the production costs of that commodity. Yet, since value is relative, if innovations and improvements in production occurred across all commodities and at the same rate, there would be no change in values.
As for prices, in these circumstances they would be affected or not, according as the improvements in production did or did not extend to the precious metals. If the materials of money were an exception to the general diminution of cost of production, the values of all other things would fall in relation to money—that is, there would be a fall of general [pg 478] prices throughout the world. But if money, like other things, and in the same degree as other things, were obtained in greater abundance and cheapness, prices would be no more affected than values would.
Regarding prices, they would either be impacted or not, depending on whether improvements in production applied to precious metals. If the materials used for money were excluded from the overall decrease in production costs, the value of everything else would decrease in comparison to money—that is, there would be a general drop in prices worldwide. However, if money was produced more abundantly and cheaply, like other goods, prices wouldn’t be affected any more than values would. [pg 478]
As regards the precious metals, it is to be said that since 1850 there has been a vast increase in their amount, and probably in greater proportion than the need arising from increased transactions. This is certainly true of silver; and it is admitted to be true of gold as late as about 1865. It has been asserted by Mr. Goschen that since then, especially since 1873, gold has not existed in a quantity that would permit it to keep its former proportions to commodities, and that it had appreciated. An appreciation, of course, would show itself in lower gold prices. On the other hand, gold has, as I think, not appreciated. Prices, even in the collapse of credit after the panic of 1873 down to 1879, were not quite so low as in 1845-1850, as is seen by the following table taken from the London “Economist”—2,200 indicating the price of a given number of articles in 1845-1850, as the basis of the table with which the prices of other years are compared:
When it comes to precious metals, it's important to note that since 1850, their total amount has grown significantly, likely beyond what's necessary due to increased transaction volumes. This is definitely true for silver, and it's believed to apply to gold until around 1865. Mr. Goschen has stated that since then, especially from 1873 onward, there hasn't been enough gold to keep its previous ratio to commodities, indicating that its value has increased. Typically, an increase in value would appear as lower gold prices. However, I think that gold hasn't actually appreciated. Prices, even during the credit crash after the panic of 1873 through to 1879, were not as low as those from 1845-1850, as shown by the following table from the London __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“Economist”—2,200 representing the price of a specific number of items between 1845 and 1850, used as a reference point for comparing prices in other years:
Year. | Index numbers. |
1845-1850 | 2,200 |
July 1, 1857 | 2,996 |
January 1, 1858 | 2,612 |
1865 | 3,575 |
1866 | 3,564 |
1867 | 3,024 |
1868 | 2,682 |
1869 | 2,666 |
1870 | 2,689 |
1871 | 2,590 |
1872 | 2,835 |
1873 | 2,947 |
1874 (Recession) | 2,891 |
1875 (Recession) | 2,778 |
1876 (Recession) | 2,711 |
1877 (Recession) | 2,723 |
1878 (Recession) | 2,529 |
1879 (Recession) | 2,202 |
1880 | 2,538 |
1881 | 2,376 |
1882 | 2,435 |
1883 | 2,343 |
But the progress of society, particularly in the direction of improved and cheapened processes of manufacturing, has vastly lowered the cost of a great number of articles of common consumption. The process has been already seen in the diminished charge for railway transportation (see Chart No. V). Moreover, the years of a depression are exactly those in which there is always a forced economy, and generally form a period in which cheapening goes on at its best. Hence, if prices have had a tendency to fall, owing to the lowered cost of production consequent on improvements—and if they are not, as a rule, lower than in 1850—it shows that they are still supported by the high tide of the great gold production of this century. And [pg 479] even the access to more fertile land in the world has acted to prevent an increase in the prices of agricultural products such as would offset the fall of manufactured goods. That is, the fact that prices have not fallen as much as might be expected, indicates that the gold has prevented the lower costs due to the progress of industry from being fully seen.
However, the progress of society, particularly in better and cheaper manufacturing methods, has greatly lowered the prices of many everyday products. You can already see this trend in the decreased expenses for railway transport (see Chart __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).No. V). Also, during economic downturns, there is often a forced economy, which usually leads to the best times for price reductions. So, if prices have been declining due to lower production costs from advancements—and if they aren't usually lower than they were in 1850—it indicates that they are still supported by the booming gold production of this century. And[pg 479]The availability of more fertile land around the world has helped keep agricultural prices from rising, which would offset the decline in manufactured goods. In other words, the fact that prices haven't dropped as much as anticipated suggests that gold has prevented the complete benefits of lower costs from industrial advancements.
Improvements in production are not the only circumstance accompanying the progress of industry, which tends to diminish the cost of producing, or at least of obtaining, commodities. (2.) Another circumstance is the increase of intercourse between different parts of the world. As commerce extends, and the ignorant attempts to restrain it by tariffs become obsolete, commodities tend more and more to be produced in the places in which their production can be carried on at the least expense of labor and capital to mankind. (3.) Much will also depend on the increasing migration of labor and capital to unoccupied parts of the earth, of which the soil, climate, and situation are found, by the ample means of exploration now possessed, to promise not only a large return to industry, but great facilities of producing commodities suited to the markets of old countries. Much as the collective industry of the earth is likely to be increased in efficiency by the extension of science and of the industrial arts, a still more active source of increased cheapness of production will be found, probably, for some time to come, in the gradually unfolding consequences of Free Trade, and in the increasing scale on which Emigration and Colonization will be carried on.
Improvements in production aren’t the only factor driving industrial progress that tends to lower the cost of producing or at least obtaining goods. (2.) Another factor is the growing exchange between different parts of the world. As commerce expands, the old attempts to control it through tariffs are becoming outdated, leading to goods being produced more and more in places where they can be made at the lowest cost in labor and capital. (3.) A lot will also depend on the increasing movement of labor and capital to unoccupied areas of the earth, which, through extensive exploration, are found to offer not just a high return on industry but also great advantages in producing goods suited to the markets of established countries. While the overall efficiency of global industry is likely to improve through advancements in science and industrial techniques, a more significant source of reduced production costs will probably be found, at least for the foreseeable future, in the gradual unfolding effects of Free Trade and the growing scale of Emigration and Colonization efforts.
From the causes now enumerated, unless counteracted by others, the progress of things enables a country to obtain, at less and less of real cost, not only its own productions but those of foreign countries. Indeed, whatever diminishes the cost of its own productions, when of an exportable character, enables it, as we have already seen, to obtain its imports at less real cost.
From the causes listed above, unless counteracted by other factors, the development of things allows a country to acquire not only its own products but also those from foreign countries at a lower real cost. In fact, anything that reduces the cost of its own exportable products enables it, as we have already observed, to obtain its imports at a lower real cost.
§ 3. —except for the products of agriculture and mining, which tend to increase in value.
Are no causes of an opposite character, brought into operation by the same progress, sufficient in some cases not only to neutralize but to overcome the former, and convert [pg 480] the descending movement of cost of production into an ascending movement? We are already aware that there are such causes, and that, in the case of the most important classes of commodities, food, and materials, there is a tendency diametrically opposite to that of which we have been speaking. The cost of production of these commodities tends to increase.
Are there no opposing factors, influenced by the same progress, that in some instances can not only neutralize but also surpass the previous ones, turning the decrease in production costs into an increase? We already know that such factors exist, and that for the major classes of goods, like food and materials, there is a tendency that goes in the exact opposite direction than what we’ve been discussing. The cost of production for these goods tends to rise.
This is not a property inherent in the commodities themselves. If population were stationary, and the produce of the earth never needed to be augmented in quantity, there would be no cause for greater cost of production.295 The only products of industry which, if population did not increase, would be liable to a real increase of cost of production, are those which, depending on a material which is not renewed, are either wholly or partially exhaustible, such as coal, and most if not all metals; for even iron, the most abundant as well as most useful of metallic products, which forms an ingredient of most minerals and of almost all rocks, is susceptible of exhaustion so far as regards its richest and most tractable ores.
This quality isn't inherent to the commodities themselves. If the population were stable, and the earth's produce never needed to increase, there wouldn't be any reason for higher production costs. The only industrial products that would likely face a real increase in production costs, if the population didn't grow, are those that rely on a material that isn't renewable and are either completely or partially exhaustible, like coal and most, if not all, metals. Even iron, which is the most abundant and useful of metallic products and is a component of most minerals and nearly all rocks, can be depleted, especially concerning its richest and easiest to access ores.
When, however, population increases, as it has never yet failed to do, then comes into effect that fundamental law of production from the soil on which we have so frequently had occasion to expatiate, the law that increased labor, in any given state of agricultural skill, is attended with a less than proportional increase of produce. The cost of production of the fruits of the earth increases, cæteris paribus, with every increase of the demand.
When the population grows, which it always has, the fundamental law of agriculture that we've talked about before comes into play: more labor, under the same farming techniques, results in a smaller increase in yields than you’d expect. The cost of producing food goes up, ceteris paribus, with every rise in demand.
Mr. Cairnes has made some essential contributions to the discussion of changes of value arising from the progress of society:296 “When a colony establishes itself in a new country, the course of its industrial development naturally follows the character of the opportunities offered to industrial enterprise [pg 481] by the environment. These will, of course, vary a good deal, according to the part of the world in which the new society happens to be placed; but, speaking broadly, they will be such as to draw the bulk of the industrial activity of the new people into some one or more of those branches of industry which have been conveniently designated ‘extractive.’ Agriculture, pastoral and mining pursuits, and the cutting of lumber, are among the principal of such industries.” To these pursuits apply “that law of Political Economy, or, more properly, of physical nature, which Mr. Mill has rightly characterized as the most important proposition in economic science—the law, as he phrased it, of ‘diminishing productiveness.’ It may be thus briefly stated: In any given state of the arts of production, the returns to human industry employed upon natural agents will, up to a certain point, be the maximum which those natural agents, cultivated with the degree of skill brought to bear upon them, are capable of yielding; but, after this point has been passed, though an increased application of labor and capital will obtain an increased return, it will not obtain a proportionally increased return; on the contrary, every further increase of outlay—always assuming that the skill employed in applying it continues the same as before—will be attended with a return constantly diminishing.... What I am now concerned to show is the manner in which, with the progress of society, the law in question affects the course of normal297 values in all commodities coming under its influence.
Mr. Cairnes has made significant contributions to the conversation about the changes in value that come from social progress:296 “When a colony establishes itself in a new country, its industrial growth typically aligns with the business opportunities available in that environment. These opportunities can differ greatly depending on the region of the world where the new society is situated; however, they generally steer most of the new population's industrial activities towards one or more sectors of industry that have been conveniently labeled ‘extractive.’ Key industries include agriculture, animal husbandry, mining, and lumber production.”These activities are regulated by“the law of Political Economy, or more accurately, of physical nature, which Mr. Mill rightly identified as the key principle in economic science—the law, as he called it, of ‘diminishing returns.’ This can be summarized as follows: In any established set of production techniques, the returns from human labor applied to natural resources will, up to a certain point, achieve the maximum output that those resources, skillfully cultivated, can yield; however, once this point is surpassed, while increasing the amount of labor and capital invested may result in higher returns, those returns will not rise proportionally; instead, any additional investment—assuming that skill levels stay the same—will consistently lead to diminishing returns.... What I want to show now is how, as society advances, this law affects the trend of normal297values in all commodities impacted by it.
“The class of commodities in the production of which the facilities possessed by new communities, as compared with old, attain their greatest height, are those of which timber and meat may be taken as the type, and comprises such articles as wool, game, furs, hides, horns, pitch, resin, etc. The circumstance which most powerfully affects the course of values in the products of extractive industry, and in the commodities just referred to among the rest, is the degree in which they admit of being transported from place to place—that is to say, their portableness—depending, as it does, partly on their durability and partly on their bulk.” It is found that, taking timber and meat as a type—one possessing portableness in a vastly greater degree than the other—in the early settlement of a new country, the portable article, like timber, at once rises in price “to a level lower than that prevailing in old countries only by the cost of transport”; on the other hand, perishable articles like meat are “confined for a market, if not to the immediate [pg 482] locality where it is produced, at least to the bordering countries; and, being raised in new countries at very low cost, their value during the early stages of their growth is necessarily low. But, as population advances, and agriculture encroaches on the natural pasture-lands originally available for the rearing of cattle, still more as it becomes necessary to cultivate land for the purpose of pasture, the cost of meat constantly rises.” As population increases there will be an increased demand for dairy-products, eggs, small fruits, fresh vegetables, milk, etc., and thereby it becomes more profitable to employ land near populous centers for such perishable products than for the products of large farming. Almost every one, who knows the high prices of butter, eggs, and vegetables in large cities as compared with their prices in country districts, is familiar with the phenomena which illustrate this principle. Moreover, as a denser population settles on our Western prairies, now given over to ranches and vast pasturing-grounds for cattle—since cattle in general require a large extent of land—the cost of meat will rise. The prices of perishable articles, therefore, will rise without any limit except that set by increasing numbers, and can not be kept down by the force of competition from other distant places, as is the case with such easily transportable things as timber and wool. What has been said of the transportableness of meat, however, is to be modified somewhat by the introduction of improved processes of transporting meat in refrigerator-cars; but there still exist commodities of which meat was only taken as a type.
“The types of products that gain the most from resources in new communities, as opposed to older ones, are mainly timber and meat. This includes items like wool, game, furs, hides, horns, pitch, resin, and more. The main factor affecting the pricing of products from the extractive industry—and the products listed above—is how easy they are to transport. This transportability, or portableness, relies on their durability and bulk.”Timber is much more portable than meat, especially during the early days of settling a new area, which causes timber prices to quickly rise to a level only slightly lower than that in older countries, considering transportation costs.“to a level lower than what exists in older countries only by the cost of transport”In contrast, perishable items like meat can only be sold in the area where they’re produced or nearby; because they can be raised cheaply in new locations, their initial value is usually low. However, as the population increases and farming starts to take over the natural grazing lands that were originally used for cattle, and as more land is utilized for pasture, the price of meat gradually rises.”As the population grows, the demand for dairy products, eggs, small fruits, fresh vegetables, and milk will also rise, making it more profitable to use land near urban areas for these perishable goods rather than for extensive farming. Most people notice the high prices of butter, eggs, and vegetables in big cities compared to rural areas, which highlights this point. Moreover, as more people settle in our Western prairies—currently used for ranching and extensive cattle grazing, since cattle typically require large areas—the cost of meat is likely to increase. As a result, the prices of perishable goods will rise without limits, except for what population growth dictates, and they won’t stay low due to competition from distant sources, unlike goods that are easy to transport, such as timber and wool. While advancements in refrigerated transportation have made it easier to ship meat, other commodities similar to meat still face similar challenges.
No tendency of a like kind exists with respect to manufactured articles. The tendency is in the contrary direction. The larger the scale on which manufacturing operations are carried on, the more cheaply they can in general be performed. As manufactures, however, depend for their materials either upon agriculture, or mining, or the spontaneous produce of the earth, manufacturing industry is subject, in respect of one of its essentials, to the same law as agriculture. But the crude material generally forms so small a portion of the total cost that any tendency which may exist to a progressive increase in that single item is much overbalanced by the diminution continually taking place in all the other elements; to which diminution it is impossible at present to assign any limit.
No similar trend exists for manufactured goods. Instead, the trend goes the other way. The larger the manufacturing operations are, the cheaper they can generally be done. However, since manufacturing relies on materials from agriculture, mining, or natural resources, it is subject, in terms of one of its essentials, to the same rules as agriculture. But the raw materials typically make up such a small part of the overall cost that any tendency for a gradual increase in that one element is greatly outweighed by the constant decrease happening in all other costs; and it’s currently impossible to define a limit for that decrease.
It follows that the exchange values of manufactured articles, [pg 483] compared with the products of agriculture and of mines, have, as population and industry advance, a certain and decided tendency to fall. Money being a product of mines, it may also be laid down as a rule that manufactured articles tend, as society advances, to fall in money price. The industrial history of modern nations, especially during the last hundred years, fully bears out this assertion.
As a result, the exchange values of manufactured goods, [pg 483] compared to agricultural products and minerals, tend to decrease as population and industry grow. Since money is derived from minerals, it's also true that manufactured goods tend to decrease in price as society progresses. The industrial history of modern nations, especially over the last hundred years, strongly supports this claim.
In regard to manufactures, as opposed to raw products, it is to be remarked “that, as the course of price in the field of raw products is, on the whole, upward, so in that of manufactured goods the course is, not less strikingly, in the opposite direction. The reasons of this are exceedingly plain. In the first place, division of labor—the first and most powerful of all cheapeners of production, but for which there is in extractive industry but very limited scope—finds in manufacturing industry an almost unbounded range for its application; and, secondly, it is in manufacturing industry also that machinery, the other great cheapener of production, admits of being employed on the largest scale, and has, in fact, been employed with the most signal success. It follows at once from these facts, taken in connection with the further fact that industrial invention does not take place per saltum, but gradually—one invention ever treading on the heels of another—and that its advance seems to be subject to no limitation; it follows, I say, from these considerations, that that portion of the cost of manufactured goods which properly belongs to the manufacturing process must, with the progress of society, undergo constant diminution.... In all the great branches of manufacturing industry the portion of the cost incurred in the manufacturing process bears in general a large proportion to that represented by the raw material, while the influence of industrial invention, in reducing this portion of the cost, is, as every one knows, great and unremitting in its action.”
When it comes to manufactured products, rather than raw materials, it’s important to note __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“While prices for raw materials generally go up, manufactured goods tend to go in the opposite direction. The reasons for this are quite clear. First, division of labor—the main and most effective method to lower production costs, which has limited use in extractive industries—offers nearly limitless possibilities in manufacturing. Secondly, in manufacturing, machinery, another significant way to cut costs, can be implemented on a large scale and has been used very successfully. Therefore, it’s evident from these observations, especially considering that industrial innovation doesn't occur all at once per saltum, but happens gradually—with one invention leading to another—and that its progress appears limitless; it follows that the cost of manufactured goods related to the manufacturing process must keep decreasing as society progresses.... In all major manufacturing areas, the costs associated with the manufacturing process usually represent a significant share compared to raw material costs, and the effect of industrial innovation in reducing this cost is, as everyone understands, substantial and ongoing.”
As has been said, “the two great cheapeners of production are division of labor and machinery, and the degree in which these admit of being applied to manufacture is mainly dependent upon the scale on which the manufacturing process is carried on. Those manufactures, therefore, that are produced upon a large scale are the sort of manufactures in which we may expect the greatest reduction in cost; in which, therefore, the fall in price, with the progress of society, will be most marked. But the manufactures which are produced upon the largest scale are those for which there exists the largest demand—that is to say, are those which enter most extensively into the consumption of the great mass of people. They are [pg 484] also, I may add, those in which a fall in price is apt to stimulate a great increase of demand. All the common kinds of clothing, furniture, and utensils fall within the scope of this remark; and it is in these, rather than in the commodities consumed exclusively or mainly by the richer classes, that we should, accordingly, expect to find the greatest marvels of cheapening.” But the articles of common consumption are those in which “the amount of manufacture bestowed upon them bears a smaller proportion to the raw material than is the case with the more elaborate manufactures. Such coarser manufactures, therefore, would feel the effects of the advancing cost of the raw material more sensibly than the refined sorts. Nevertheless, it can not be supposed to compensate the advantages due to the causes I have pointed out which fall to the share of the commoner sorts. It is in this class of goods that the most remarkable reductions in price have been accomplished in the past, and it is in them, probably, that we shall witness in the future the greatest results of the same kind.”
As stated,“The two main factors that reduce production costs are dividing labor and using machinery, and how effectively these can be utilized in manufacturing primarily depends on the scale of the production process. Therefore, products made on a large scale are the ones where we can expect the biggest cost reductions; consequently, the drop in price will be most noticeable as society advances. However, the products produced on the largest scale are also the ones that have the highest demand—that is, they are the goods most widely consumed by the general population. They are [pg 484] also, I should add, the ones for which a price decrease is likely to result in a significant increase in demand. All common types of clothing, furniture, and household items fall into this category; therefore, we would expect to see the most significant price reductions in these products rather than in those primarily consumed by wealthier individuals.”But everyday items are those that“the amount spent on manufacturing these items is a smaller percentage compared to the raw materials compared to more complex products. Because of this, these simpler goods will be more impacted by rising raw material costs than the more sophisticated goods. However, this does not negate the benefits that I’ve mentioned which favor the more common products. It is within this category that we have seen the most significant price drops in the past, and we are likely to see the most substantial future developments of the same nature.”
§ 4. —that tendency is occasionally countered by improvements in production.
Whether agricultural produce increases in absolute as well as comparative cost of production depends on the conflict of the two antagonist agencies—increase of population and improvement in agricultural skill. In some, perhaps in most, states of society (looking at the whole surface of the earth), both agricultural skill and population are either stationary, or increase very slowly, and the cost of production of food, therefore, is nearly stationary. In a society which is advancing in wealth, population generally increases faster than agricultural skill, and food consequently tends to become more costly; but there are times when a strong impulse sets in toward agricultural improvement. Such an impulse has shown itself in Great Britain during the last fifteen or twenty years [before 1847]. In England and Scotland agricultural skill has of late increased considerably faster than population, insomuch that food and other agricultural produce, notwithstanding the increase of people, can be grown at less cost than they were thirty years ago; and the abolition of the Corn Laws has given an additional stimulus to the spirit of improvement. In some other countries, and particularly in France, the improvement of agriculture gains ground still more decidedly upon population, because though [pg 485] agriculture, except in a few provinces, advances slowly, population advances still more slowly, and even with increasing slowness, its growth being kept down, not by poverty, which is diminishing, but by prudence.
Whether the cost of agricultural produce rises in both absolute and comparative terms depends on the tension between two opposing forces: population growth and advancements in agricultural skills. In many societies (considering the whole world), both agricultural expertise and population are either stable or growing very slowly, so the cost of food production remains fairly constant. In a society that is becoming wealthier, the population usually grows faster than agricultural improvements, which leads to higher food prices; however, there are times when a strong push for agricultural development occurs. This drive has been evident in Great Britain over the past fifteen to twenty years [before 1847]. In England and Scotland, agricultural skills have recently improved significantly faster than the population, allowing food and other agricultural products to be produced at a lower cost than thirty years ago, despite the population increase; the removal of the Corn Laws has further encouraged this spirit of progress. In some other countries, especially France, agricultural advancements are even outpacing population growth more clearly, because while agriculture, except in a few areas, progresses slowly, population growth is even slower and is constrained, not by increasing poverty (which is actually declining), but by careful planning.
§ 5. Impact of Societal Progress on Reducing Value Fluctuations.
Thus far, of the effect of the progress of society on the permanent or average values and prices of commodities. It remains to be considered in what manner the same progress affects their fluctuations. Concerning the answer to this question there can be no doubt. It tends in a very high degree to diminish them.
Thus far, we've looked at how societal progress impacts the average values and prices of goods. Now, we need to consider how this progress affects their fluctuations. There's no doubt about the answer to this question. It significantly tends to reduce them.
In poor and backward societies, as in the East, and in Europe during the middle ages, extraordinary differences in the price of the same commodity might exist in places not very distant from each other, because the want of roads and canals, the imperfection of marine navigation, and the insecurity of communications generally, prevented things from being transported from the places where they were cheap to those where they were dear. The things most liable to fluctuations in value, those directly influenced by the seasons, and especially food, were seldom carried to any great distances. In most years, accordingly, there was, in some part or other of any large country, a real dearth; while a deficiency at all considerable, extending to the whole world, is [now] a thing almost unknown. In modern times, therefore, there is only dearth, where there formerly would have been famine, and sufficiency everywhere when anciently there would have been scarcity in some places and superfluity in others.
In poor and underdeveloped societies, like in the East and in Europe during the Middle Ages, there could be huge differences in the price of the same goods in places that weren’t far apart. This was because the lack of roads and canals, the limitations of sea travel, and the general insecurity of communication made it hard to move things from areas where they were cheap to places where they were expensive. Items that were most affected by changes in value, especially food, were rarely transported over long distances. As a result, in most years, some part of a large country experienced real shortages, while a significant global shortage is almost unheard of today. In modern times, we only see shortages where there would have once been famines, and there is plenty everywhere when there used to be scarcity in some areas and excess in others.
The same change has taken place with respect to all other articles of commerce. The safety and cheapness of communications, which enable a deficiency in one place to be supplied from the surplus of another, at a moderate or even a [pg 486] small advance on the ordinary price, render the fluctuations of prices much less extreme than formerly. This effect is much promoted by the existence of large capitals, belonging to what are called speculative merchants, whose business it is to buy goods in order to resell them at a profit. These dealers naturally buying things when they are cheapest, and storing them up to be brought again into the market when the price has become unusually high, the tendency of their operations is to equalize price, or at least to moderate its inequalities. The prices of things are neither so much depressed at one time, nor so much raised at another, as they would be if speculative dealers did not exist.
The same change has happened with all other goods in trade. The safety and affordability of communication allow for shortages in one area to be met by surpluses in another, with just a small increase over the regular price, making price fluctuations much less drastic than before. This effect is further boosted by the presence of large funds owned by so-called speculative merchants, whose job is to buy goods to sell them later at a profit. These traders naturally purchase items when prices are low and store them to sell when prices are unusually high, which helps to stabilize prices, or at least reduce their extremes. Prices are neither as low at one time nor as high at another as they would be without these speculative dealers.
It appears, then, that the fluctuations of values and prices arising from variations of supply, or from alterations in real (as distinguished from speculative) demand, may be expected to become more moderate as society advances. With regard to those which arise from miscalculation, and especially from the alternations of undue expansion and excessive contraction of credit, which occupy so conspicuous a place among commercial phenomena, the same thing can not be affirmed with equal confidence. Such vicissitudes, beginning with irrational speculation and ending with a commercial crisis, have not hitherto become either less frequent or less violent with the growth of capital and extension of industry. Rather they may be said to have become more so, in consequence, as is often said, of increased competition, but, as I prefer to say, of a lower rate of profits and interest, which makes capitalists dissatisfied with the ordinary course of safe mercantile gains. The connection of this low rate of profit with the advance of population and accumulation is one of the points to be illustrated in the ensuing chapters.
It seems that the ups and downs of values and prices, which come from changes in supply or shifts in real (as opposed to speculative) demand, are likely to become more stable as society progresses. However, the same cannot be confidently said for fluctuations that result from miscalculations, especially those caused by the extremes of excessive credit expansion and severe contraction, which play a significant role in commercial events. These disruptions, starting with irrational speculation and leading to a market crisis, have not become less frequent or less intense with the growth of capital and the expansion of industry. In fact, they may have become more pronounced, often attributed to increased competition, but I would argue it's due to a lower rate of profits and interest, which leaves capitalists dissatisfied with the usual path of safe business gains. The link between this low profit rate and the growth of population and accumulation is one of the topics to be examined in the following chapters.
Mr. Cairnes also adds some investigations as to the fluctuations of value: “Hitherto I have examined the derivative laws of value in so far only as they are exemplified in the movements of normal prices. It will be interesting now to consider whether it is possible to discover in the movements of market prices any corresponding phenomena.
Mr. Cairnes also includes some research on the changes in value:“Up to now, I've only examined the basic laws of value as they relate to changes in normal prices. Now, it will be interesting to see if we can find similar patterns in the changes of market prices.
“Taking manufactures first, it is evident at once that, as regards conditions of protection, the circumstances of the case are such as to secure, in general, (1.) great rapidity and great certainty in bringing commodities to market. A deal table may be made in a few hours, a piece of cloth in a few weeks, and a moderate-sized house in a month or little more. Tables, cloth, and houses may be produced with certainty in any quantity required. It results from this that it is scarcely possible that, under ordinary circumstances, the selling price of a product of manufacture should for any long time much exceed its normal price. (2.) The nature of manufactures is, in general, such as to fit them admirably for distant transport. Any considerable elevation of price, therefore, is pretty certain to attract supplies from remote sources. (3.) Further, considered in their relation to human needs, I think it may be said of manufactured goods, that either the need for them is not very urgent, or, where it happens to be so, substitutes ... may easily be found. From all these circumstances it results that an advance in the price ... either attracts supplies, or deters purchasers, ... preventing any great departure from the usual terms of the market.
“When we examine manufactured goods first, it’s evident that, in terms of protection conditions, the situation typically guarantees (1.) speed and reliability in getting products to market. A table can be made in a few hours, a piece of cloth in a few weeks, and a moderately sized house in about a month. Tables, cloth, and houses can be produced reliably in whatever quantity is needed. Because of this, it’s nearly impossible for the selling price of a manufactured product to remain significantly above its usual price for an extended period. (2.) The features of manufactured goods usually make them very appropriate for long-distance shipping. So, if prices increase significantly, it’s likely that supplies will come in from far away. (3.) Furthermore, when we consider manufactured goods in relation to human needs, we can say that either the demand for them isn’t very urgent, or when it is, alternatives can often be found easily. All these factors mean that a price increase either brings in more supplies or discourages buyers, which helps maintain stable market prices.
“Turning now to the products of agricultural, pastoral, or, more generally, ‘extractive’ industry, we find the circumstances under which this class of goods is brought to market in all respects extremely different from those which we have just examined, and such as to permit a much wider margin of deviation for the market from the normal price. Here the period of production is longer, the result of the process much more uncertain, the commodity at once more perishable and less portable, and human requirements in relation to it are mostly of a more urgent kind: (1.) The shortest period within which additions can be made to the supply of food and raw material of the vegetable kind is in general a year, and, if the commodity be of animal origin, the minimum is considerably larger. (2.) Again, the farmer may decide upon the breadth of ground to be devoted to a particular crop, or upon the number of cattle he will maintain; but the actual returns will vary according to the season, and may prove far in excess or far in defect of his calculations. These circumstances all present obstacles to the adjustment of supply and demand, and consequently tend to produce frequent and extensive deviations of the market [pg 488] from the normal price. Nor are the other conditions of the case such as to neutralize the influence of such disturbing agencies. (3.) The nature, indeed, of some of the principal agricultural products fits them sufficiently well for distant transport, and so far tends to correct fluctuations of price. But, on the other hand, (4.) the relation of these products to human wants is such as greatly to enhance that tendency to violent fluctuation incident to the conditions of their production. More especially is this the case with the commodity, whatever it may be, which forms the staple food of a people. For observe the peculiar nature of human requirements with reference to such a commodity. They are of this kind, that, given the number of a population, the quantity of the staple food required is nearly a fixed quantity, and this almost irrespective of price. Except among the poorest, increased cheapness will not stimulate a larger consumption; while, on the other hand, all, at any cost within the range of their means, will obtain their usual supply. The consequence is that, when even a moderate deficiency or excess occurs in the supply of the staple food of a people, in the one case (a), the competition of consumers for their usual quantum of food rapidly forces up the price far out of proportion to the diminution in the supply; in the other (b), no one being inclined to increase his usual consumption, the competition of sellers, in their eagerness to find a market for the superfluous portion of the supply, is equally powerful to depress it.”
“Now, looking at products from agriculture, livestock, or more broadly, the ‘extractive’ industries, we can see that the way these goods are brought to market is quite different from what we've just discussed, leading to much larger fluctuations in market prices. The production period is longer, the outcomes are more unpredictable, the products tend to be more perishable and less portable, and the human needs related to them are often more immediate: (1.) Generally, the shortest time to increase the supply of food and vegetable raw materials is about a year; for animal-based products, it takes much longer. (2.) Furthermore, while a farmer can decide how much land to use for a crop or how many animals to raise, the actual yield will change depending on the season and may be much higher or lower than expected. These factors make it difficult to balance supply and demand, resulting in frequent and significant changes in market prices. [pg 488]Additionally, other conditions do not lessen the effects of these disturbances. (3.) Some major agricultural products can indeed be transported over long distances, which helps stabilize prices to some extent. However, (4.) the connection of these products to human needs significantly increases the volatility of their production. This is particularly true for staple foods. Consider how human needs for such a commodity operate. The amount of staple food required is nearly fixed based on the population size, regardless of price. Except for the poorest, lower prices typically don't lead to increased consumption, while everyone within their budget will buy their usual supply. The outcome is that when there’s a moderate shortage or surplus of a staple food, in the first scenario (a), the competition among consumers for their typical amount of food quickly drives the price up disproportionately compared to the reduced supply; conversely (b), since nobody wants to increase their regular consumption, the competition among sellers to find a market for the excess supply similarly pushes prices down.”
Chapter II. The Impact of Industrial and Population Growth on Rents, Profits, and Wages.
§ 1. Key features of industrial progress.
Continuing the inquiry into the nature of the economical changes taking place in a society which is in a state of industrial progress, we shall next consider what is the effect of that progress on the distribution of the produce among the various classes who share in it. We may confine our attention to the system of distribution which is the most complex, and which virtually includes all others—that in which the produce of manufactures is shared between two classes, laborers and capitalists, and the produce of agriculture among three, laborers, capitalists, and landlords.
Continuing our investigation into the economic changes happening in a society experiencing industrial progress, we will next look at how that progress affects the distribution of resources among the different classes involved. We'll focus on the distribution system that is the most complex and essentially encompasses all others—where the output from manufacturing is divided between two groups, workers and capitalists, and the output from agriculture is divided among three groups: workers, capitalists, and landowners.
The characteristic features of what is commonly meant by industrial progress resolve themselves mainly into three, increase of capital, increase of population, and improvements in production; understanding the last expression, in its widest sense, to include the process of procuring commodities from a distance, as well as that of producing them. It will be convenient to set out by considering each of the three causes, as operating separately; after which we can suppose them combined in any manner we think fit.298
The main aspects of what is typically meant by industrial progress can be broken down into three key elements: an increase in capital, a rise in population, and advancements in production. The term "production" is used here broadly to encompass both the process of obtaining goods from afar and the process of creating them. It makes sense to start by examining each of these three factors individually, after which we can consider how they might work together in various ways.298
§ 2. In the first two scenarios, the population and capital are increasing while the methods of production remain unchanged.
For the sake of clearness we will form two general groups of these causes:
To clarify, we will organize these causes into two main categories:
A. The Influence of Population and Capital (Improvements remaining stationary).
A.The Effect of Population and WealthPlease provide the text you would like me to modernize.When upgrades remain unchanged).
B. The Influence of Improvements (Population and Capital remaining stationary).
B.The Effects of ProgressIt seems you've submitted an incomplete request. Please provide the text or phrases you would like me to modernize.Population and Capital remaining unchanged).
We will first take up A, and under this division make for convenience two separate suppositions:
First, we'll discuss A, and to make things easier, we'll create two separate assumptions in this category:
I. The first is that, while Population is advancing, Capital is stationary. By this means we can study separately the operation of one of the factors of societary progress, Population, and see its influence on rents, profits, and wages. There being only the same given quantity of wealth in the form of capital to be now distributed among more laborers (1), real wages must fall; whereupon, if the same capital purchases more labor, and obtains more produce (2), profits rise. Now, if the laborers were so well off before as to suffer the reduction of wages to take place not in their food, but in their other comforts, then, if each laborer uses as much food as before, and if, as by the supposition, there are more laborers, an increased quantity of food will be required from the soil. This supply can be produced only at a greater cost, and, as inferior soils are called into cultivation (3), rents will rise. This last action (3), however, will have an influence on the rise of profits (2). For it was only by a reduction of real wages that profits rose; but if the cost of food, that is, the real wages, have since risen, then one of the elements entering into cost of labor has risen, and in so far will offset the fall of real wages; so that profits will not gain so much as if rents had not risen. The result of this first supposition, then, is, that the landlord is the chief gainer:
I. The first point is that while the population is increasing, the amount of capital stays the same. This allows us to look at how one factor of social progress, population, influences rents, profits, and wages. With the same amount of capital now shared among more workers (1), real wages have to go down; therefore, if the same capital hires more labor and produces more (2), profits will go up. Now, if workers were doing well enough before that a drop in wages affects their other comforts rather than their food, then if each worker consumes the same amount of food as before, and with more workers, a larger food supply will be needed from the land. This food supply can only be produced at a higher cost, and as less fertile lands are farmed (3), rents will increase. However, this last factor (3) will also affect the rise in profits (2). Profits increased mainly due to lower real wages; but if the cost of food, or real wages, has now gone up, then one of the components affecting labor costs has increased, which will balance out the drop in real wages; thus, profits won’t rise as much as they would have if rents hadn’t gone up. The result of this first assumption, then, is that the landlord comes out as the main beneficiary:
I. (1.) Wages fall.
(2.) Profits rise (less if rents rise).
(3.) Rents rise.
I. (1.) Salaries decline.
(2.) Profits rise (but less so if rents increase).
Rents increase.
II. We will now take up the second supposition under A, that while Capital is advancing Population remains stationary. Then, of course (1), wages will rise; and, as there is no improvement to cheapen the cost of their real wages, there will be an increase in cost of labor to the capitalist, and (2) profits will fall. If, now, the laborers, being better off, demand more food, the new food would cost more, as the margin of cultivation was pushed down, and (3) rents would inevitably rise. But not only have the laborers received more real wages, but since that change the cost, as just described, of these real wages has increased. Therefore (2), profits would fall still more than by the rise of real wages. In this supposition, consequently, while the laborer gains, so does the landlord:
II. Now, let's discuss the second assumption under A, which is that while Capital is growing, the Population stays the same. In this situation, (1) wages will increase; and since there's no progress to reduce the actual cost of these wages, the cost of labor for the capitalist will go up, and (2) profits will fall. If the laborers, feeling more comfortable financially, demand more food, the price of that food will rise because the ability to cultivate more has decreased, and (3) rents will inevitably go up. Not only have the laborers received higher real wages, but the cost of those wages has also increased as mentioned. Therefore, (2) profits would drop even more than just from the increase in real wages. In this scenario, while the laborers benefit, so does the landlord:
II. (1.) Wages rise.
(2.) Profits fall (more if rents rise).
(3.) Rents rise.
Wages increase.
(2.) Profits decrease (more if rents increase).
Rents are increasing.
A. It is easy for us now to take into our view the total effects under A, and see what the combined action of I and [pg 491] II would be. That is, if both Capital and Population (improvements remaining stationary) increase, what will be the effect on Wages, Profits, and Rent? Of course, we must suppose that Capital and Population just keep pace with each other; and in that case (1) real wages remain the same, each laborer receiving the same quantity and same quality of commodities as before. Hence, if each laborer receives the same quantity as before, and there are many more laborers, there will be an increased demand put upon the soil for food, poorer soils will be cultivated, and the cost of the products will rise. So (3) rents rise. But if each laborer receives the same quantity of real wages as before, and the cost of them has risen, as just explained, an increased cost of labor will result which must come out of profits. (2) Profits will fall. So that the results of A upon distribution, taken separately from B, are that the owner of capital loses; but the owner of land again gains.
A. It’s now easy for us to look at the overall effects under A and see what the combined impact of I and II would be. Specifically, if both Capital and Population increase (assuming improvements remain the same), what will be the effects on Wages, Profits, and Rent? Of course, we have to assume that Capital and Population grow at the same rate; in this case (1) real wages remain unchanged, with each worker receiving the same amount and quality of goods as before. So, if each worker gets the same amount as before and there are many more workers, there will be a higher demand for food from the land, leading to the use of poorer soils, and the cost of products will rise. Thus, (3) rents will increase. However, if each worker receives the same quantity of real wages as before, and the cost of those wages has gone up, as previously explained, the increased labor costs will cut into profits. (2) Profits will decrease. Therefore, the outcomes of A on distribution, viewed separately from B, suggest that the owner of capital loses, but the owner of land gains.
A. (1.) Wages the same.
(2.) Profits fall.
(3.) Rents rise.
A. (1.) Wages remain unchanged.
Profits are down.
Rents increase.
§ 3. As production techniques improve, both capital and population remain stable.
Now, let us go back to our first general group of causes, B—an advance in the arts of production (while capital and population remain stationary). We can now study by themselves the effect of improvements on wages, profits, and rent. The general effects arising from the extended introduction of machinery into agriculture and manufactures, the lowered cost of transportation by steam, have been to lessen the value of articles consumed chiefly by the laboring-classes. For the sake of clearness, imagine that the improvement comes suddenly. The first effect will be to lower the value and price of articles entering into the real wages of the laborers; and, if those consist mostly of food, there will be a rise in the margin of cultivation and a fall in rents (3). It has been previously shown299 that improvements retard, or put back, the law of diminishing returns from land (or in manufactures compensate for it), and so lower rents. The poorest soil cultivated is now of a better grade than before, and the produce is yielded at a less cost and value; so that the land with which the best grades are compared, to determine the rent, is not separated from the best grades by so wide a gap. It would at first blush seem, then, that the interests of the landlord were antagonistic to improvements, since they lower rents; but, in practice, it is not so, as we shall soon see.
Now, let's go back to our first main group of causes, B—improvements in production methods (with capital and population remaining constant). We can now look at how these advancements affect wages, profits, and rent. Overall, the introduction of machinery into agriculture and manufacturing, along with lower transportation costs due to steam, has decreased the value of goods that are mostly used by the working class. To clarify, imagine that these improvements occur all at once. The immediate result will be a drop in the value and price of goods that make up the real wages of workers; if these goods mainly consist of food, this will lead to an increase in cultivation margins and a decrease in rents (3). It has been previously shown299Improvements slow down or counteract the law of diminishing returns in agriculture (or balance it in manufacturing), which in turn lowers rents. The least productive land being farmed now has better quality than it did before, and the output is achieved at a lower cost and value. Therefore, the land that is used as a reference for determining rents is not that different from the higher quality grades. At first glance, it might appear that landlords' interests conflict with improvements because they lower rents; however, this is not actually true, as we will soon explain.
We have seen that improvements cheapen the price of articles [pg 492] entering into the real wages of the laborer. Having had a given sum as money wages before the change, then, when the sudden change of improvements came, it lowered prices to the laborer, and the same money wages bought more (1) real wages. If nothing more happened, we could see that improvements raised real wages—without lowering (2) profits (because cost of labor remains the same, since the lowered cost of the articles consumed was exactly in proportion to the increase of real wages). And, if the laborers chose to retain this higher standard, this would be the situation. Sadly enough, however, in practice they are apt to be satisfied with the old standard; and the amount of real wages to give the old standard of living can be had now for less money wages. While only the same number, without any increase, can live at the new (higher) standard, a larger number can live at the old (lower) standard. In short, the obstacles to an increase of population will be removed by the possession of higher money wages. After a generation, it is very probable that a larger number of laborers will be in existence living at the same (or possibly a slightly higher) standard of real wages, and money wages will have fallen.
We've noticed that advancements reduce the prices of goods.[pg 492]that contribute to the real wages of workers. If workers had a certain amount in money wages before the change, then when these sudden advancements happened, prices fell for the workers, and the same money wages bought more (1) real wages. If nothing else changed, we would see that advancements increased real wages—without reducing (2) profits (because the cost of labor stays the same, as the lower cost of the goods consumed was exactly equal to the increase in real wages). If the workers chose to maintain this higher standard, that would be the outcome. Unfortunately, in reality, they often settle for the old standard; and the amount of real wages needed to keep the old standard of living can now be achieved with less money wages. While only the same number, without any increase, can live at the new (higher) standard, a larger number can live at the old (lower) standard. In short, the barriers to population growth will be removed by having higher money wages. After a generation, it’s likely that more workers will exist living at the same (or possibly a slightly higher) standard of real wages, and money wages will have decreased.
Now we can understand better than before what would be the practical result of the causes under B. (3.) Rent has fallen; money wages have fallen (even if (2) real wages have not); and, since real wages have not fallen in the proportion that their cost has been reduced, (2) profits will have risen. The general result of the causes under B alone, acting as just described, will then be:
Now we can better understand the practical outcome of the factors in B. (3.). Rent has gone down; money wages have fallen (even if (2) real wages haven't); and since real wages haven't decreased as much as their costs have been reduced, (2) profits will have increased. The overall result of the factors in B alone, acting as described, will then be:
B. (1.) Real wages remain the same; money wages less.
(2.) Profits rise.
(3.) Rents fall.
B. (1.) Real wages remain constant; nominal wages decline.
Profits are up.
Rents decrease.
§ 4. Theoretical results, if all three elements are progressive.
We have considered, on the one hand, under A, the manner in which the distribution of the produce into rent, profits, and wages is affected by the ordinary increase of Population and Capital; and on the other, under B, how it is affected by improvements in production, and more especially in agriculture, as follows:
We have examined, on one side, under A, how the distribution of produce among rent, profits, and wages is affected by the regular growth of population and capital; and on the other side, under B, how it is influenced by improvements in production, especially in agriculture, as detailed below:
A. (1.) Wages the same. B. (1.) Real wages the same, money wages less.
A. (2.) Profits fall. B. (2.) Profits rise.
A. (3.) Rents rise. B. (3.) Rents fall.
A. (1.) Wages stay the same. B. (1.) Real wages stay the same, but nominal wages go down.
A. (2.) Profits go down. B. (2.) Profits go up.
A. (3.) Rent goes up. B. (3.) Rent goes down.
The effects are clearly contrasted. Under A, we see a tendency to a rise of rents (3), an increased cost of labor, and a fall of profits (2); under B, a fall of rents (3), a diminished cost of labor, and a rise of profits (2). We have, therefore, analyzed [pg 493] the forces belonging to the progress of industry, and found two distinct and antagonistic forces, working against each other. If, at any period, improvements (B) advance faster than population and capital (A), rent and money wages will tend downward and profits upward. If, on the other hand, population advances faster than improvements (B) either the laborers will submit to a reduction in the quantity or quality of their food, or, if not, rent and money wages will progressively rise, and profits will fall.
The effects are clearly different. In situation A, we see rents increasing (3), higher labor costs, and decreasing profits (2); in situation B, rents decrease (3), labor costs go down, and profits increase (2). Therefore, we have analyzed[pg 493]The forces driving industrial progress reveal two distinct and opposing influences in conflict with each other. When improvements (B) outpace the growth of population and capital (A), rents and wages will decrease while profits rise. On the other hand, if the population grows faster than improvements (B), workers will either have to accept a decline in the quantity or quality of their food, or, if they refuse to do so, rents and wages will continually increase, leading to a decline in profits.
§ 5. Practical Outcomes.
The reason why agricultural improvement seldom lowers rent is, that it seldom cheapens food, but only prevents it from growing dearer; and seldom, if ever, throws land out of cultivation, but only enables worse and worse land to be taken in for the supply of an increasing demand. What is sometimes called the natural state of a country which is but half cultivated, namely, that the land is highly productive, and food obtained in great abundance by little labor, is only true of unoccupied countries colonized by a civilized people. In the United States the worst land in cultivation is of a high quality (except sometimes in the immediate vicinity of markets or means of conveyance, where a bad quality is compensated by a good situation); and even if no further improvements were made in agriculture or locomotion, cultivation would have many steps yet to descend, before the increase of population and capital would be brought to a stand; but in Europe five hundred years ago, though so thinly peopled in comparison to the present population, it is probable that the worst land under the plow was, from the rude state of agriculture, quite as unproductive as the worst land now cultivated, and that cultivation had approached as near to the ultimate limit of profitable tillage in those times as in the [pg 494] present. What the agricultural improvements since made have really done is, by increasing the capacity of production of land in general, to enable tillage to extend downward to a much worse natural quality of land than the worst which at that time would have admitted of cultivation by a capitalist for profit; thus rendering a much greater increase of capital and population possible, and removing always a little and a little further off the barrier which restrains them; population meanwhile always pressing so hard against the barrier that there is never any visible margin left for it to seize, every inch of ground made vacant for it by improvement being at once filled up by its advancing columns. Agricultural improvement may thus be considered to be not so much a counter-force conflicting with increase of population as a partial relaxation of the bonds which confine that increase.
The reason agricultural improvements rarely reduce rent is that they seldom make food cheaper; instead, they only stop it from getting more expensive. They usually don’t take land out of production but allow lower-quality land to be used to meet rising demand. The idea of a country being in a natural state of half cultivation—where land is very productive and food can be gathered easily with little effort—only applies to unoccupied regions that have been settled by a more advanced society. In the United States, even the poorest cultivated land is quite good (unless it's near markets or transport routes, where poor quality can be offset by a better location). Even without further advancements in farming or transportation, cultivation has a long way to go before population and capital growth hit a limit. However, in Europe five hundred years ago, despite having a lower population compared to today, it’s likely that the worst land being farmed was as unproductive as the worst land we see cultivated now, and that farming then was already nearing its profitable limit just like it is now. The agricultural improvements made since then have increased the overall productivity of land, allowing farming to expand to land types that would have been considered too poor for profitable cultivation at that time. This has enabled a much greater growth of capital and population, constantly pushing the barrier that limits them a little further away. Meanwhile, population always pushes hard against that barrier, leaving little room for it to expand; every inch of land freed up by improvements is immediately filled by this advancing population. Therefore, agricultural improvement can be seen as not so much a force opposing population growth but as a partial loosening of the constraints that limit that growth.
If a great agricultural improvement were suddenly introduced, it might throw back rent for a considerable space, leaving it to regain its lost ground by the progress of population and capital, and afterward to go on further. But taking place, as such improvement always does, very gradually, it causes no retrograde movement of either rent or cultivation; it merely enables the one to go on rising, and the other extending, long after they must otherwise have stopped.
If a significant agricultural improvement were introduced all at once, it could lower rent for a while, allowing it to recover as the population and capital grow, and then continue to increase further. However, since such improvements typically happen gradually, they don’t cause any backward movement in rent or cultivation; they simply allow rent to keep rising and cultivation to expand long after they would have otherwise plateaued.
Inasmuch as, in point of fact, B never gets the start of A, but follows along with A, the general result will be that which we found true under A—a rise of rents (3), and increased cost of labor to the capitalist, arising from an increased cost of laborers' subsistence and a fall of profits (2). The effect of a more rapid advance of improvements, at any one time, will temporarily better the condition of the laborers and also raise profits; but, if it is followed immediately by an increase of population, the land-owners will reap the benefits of the improvement in the rise of rent. The final result, then, is as follows:
Since B never really surpasses A but instead keeps pace with A, the overall outcome will still mirror what we see with A—higher rents (3) and increased labor costs for capitalists because of the rising living expenses for workers and a decrease in profits (2). If improvements happen more rapidly at any point, it will temporarily enhance workers' conditions and increase profits; however, if this is soon followed by a population surge, landowners will profit from the rising rents due to those improvements. Therefore, the final result is as follows:
(1.) Real wages, probably higher.
(2.) Profits fall.
(3.) Rents rise.
(1.) Real wages are probably higher.
Profits drop.
Rents are increasing.
It is possible that a different combination from the above may sometimes occur in the causes which underlie the progress of society: (1.) There may be a period in which capital is increasing more rapidly than population, and when there seems to be an era of industrial improvements also. Then both wages and profits will be high, and it will be a period of general satisfaction. (2.) If capital goes on increasing, but improvements are few, wages will rise; but profits must suffer a fall. In this country, where population has not yet increased so as to press seriously against subsistence, and where capital increases with incredible swiftness, these cases are often exemplified. The extraordinary resources of the newer States have permitted an unlimited increase of population, and capital has found no difficulty in finding an investment. But yet those States which have been burdened with the disabilities of the old slave régime are far behind the others. The changes in the rank of the States, in respect of population, at each decade, as seen in Chart No. XVI, are suggestive.
There are various combinations of factors that influence the progress of society: (1.) There could be a time when capital is growing faster than the population, coinciding with a period of industrial advancements. During this time, both wages and profits will be high, resulting in widespread satisfaction. (2.) If capital keeps growing but improvements are limited, wages will rise, but profits will fall. In this country, where the population hasn't surged to the point of greatly challenging subsistence, and where capital is rapidly increasing, these situations frequently occur. The abundant resources of the newer states have allowed for unlimited population growth, and capital has easily found places to invest. However, those states that have dealt with the legacies of the old slave régime are falling behind. The changes in the rankings of the states based on population every decade, as illustrated in Chart No. XVI, are significant.

Chapter III: The Tendency of Profits Toward a Minimum.
§ 1. Various Theories about the Decline of Profits.
The tendency of profits to fall as society advances, which has been brought to notice in the preceding chapter, was early recognized by writers on industry and commerce; but, the laws which govern profits not being then understood, the phenomenon was ascribed to a wrong cause. Adam Smith considered profits to be determined by what he called the competition of capital. In Adam Smith's opinion, the manner in which the competition of capital lowers profits is by lowering prices; that being usually the mode in which an increased investment of capital in any particular trade lowers the profits of that trade. But, if this was his meaning, he overlooked the circumstance that the fall of price, which, if confined to one commodity, really does lower the profits of the producer, ceases to have that effect as soon as it extends to all commodities; because, when all things have fallen, nothing has really fallen, except nominally; and, even computed in money, the expenses of every producer have diminished as much as his returns. Unless, indeed, labor be the one commodity which has not fallen in money price, when all other things have: if so, what has really taken place is a rise of wages; and it is that, and not the fall of prices, which has lowered the profits of capital. There is another thing which escaped the notice of Adam Smith; that the supposed universal fall of prices, through increased competition of capitals, is a thing which can not take place. Prices are not determined by the competition of the sellers only, but also by that of the buyers; by demand as well as supply. The demand which affects money prices consists of all the money in the [pg 498] hands of the community destined to be laid out in commodities; and, as long as the proportion of this to the commodities is not diminished, there is no fall of general prices. Now, howsoever capital may increase, and give rise to an increased production of commodities, a full share of the capital will be drawn to the business of producing or importing money, and the quantity of money will be augmented in an equal ratio with the quantity of commodities. For, if this were not the case, and if money, therefore, were, as the theory supposes, perpetually acquiring increased purchasing power, those who produced or imported it would obtain constantly increasing profits; and this could not happen without attracting labor and capital to that occupation from other employments. If a general fall of prices and increased value of money were really to occur, it could only be as a consequence of increased cost of production, from the gradual exhaustion of the mines.
The tendency for profits to decline as society progresses, which was discussed in the previous chapter, was recognized early on by writers in industry and commerce. However, since the laws governing profits were not understood at that time, this phenomenon was attributed to the wrong cause. Adam Smith believed that profits were determined by what he termed the competition of capital. In his view, the way this competition reduces profits is by lowering prices; typically, an increase in capital investment in a particular trade decreases that trade's profits. But if that was his intent, he missed the fact that a price drop, if limited to one commodity, does reduce the producer's profits, but once it affects all commodities, it no longer has that effect. When every price falls, nothing has truly decreased except nominally; and even when adjusted for money, all producers' costs decrease just as much as their returns. Unless, of course, labor remains the only commodity whose money price hasn't decreased along with everything else; if that’s the case, what has actually happened is a rise in wages, which is what has reduced capital profits—not the price drop itself. Another point Adam Smith overlooked is that a supposed universal price drop, due to increased competition among capital, is not possible. Prices are influenced not only by the competition among sellers but also by buyers; demand and supply both play a role. The demand affecting money prices consists of all the money in the community that’s meant to be spent on commodities; as long as the ratio of this money to the commodities remains constant, there won't be a general drop in prices. Regardless of how much capital increases and results in more commodities being produced, a significant portion of that capital will always go toward generating or importing money, which means the amount of money will grow in proportion to the amount of commodities. If this weren't true, and if money were, as the theory suggests, constantly gaining purchasing power, those who produced or imported it would be gaining continuously rising profits, which would inevitably draw labor and capital away from other jobs into this one. A true general price drop and rise in money value could only happen as a result of increased production costs from the gradual depletion of mines.
It is not tenable, therefore, in theory, that the increase of capital produces, or tends to produce, a general decline of money prices. Neither is it true that any general decline of prices, as capital increased, has manifested itself in fact. The only things observed to fall in price with the progress of society are those in which there have been improvements in production, greater than have taken place in the production of the precious metals; as, for example, all spun and woven fabrics. Other things, again, instead of falling, have risen in price, because their cost of production, compared with that of gold and silver, has increased. Among these are all kinds of food, comparison being made with a much earlier period of history. The doctrine, therefore, that competition of capital lowers profits by lowering prices, is incorrect in fact, as well as unsound in principle.
It's not realistic, then, to say that an increase in capital causes or tends to cause a general drop in money prices. It's also not true that any widespread drop in prices has actually happened as capital has increased. The only things that have been seen to decrease in price as society progresses are those where improvements in production have outpaced those in the production of precious metals, like all spun and woven fabrics. On the other hand, some items have actually increased in price because their production costs have gone up compared to gold and silver. This includes all types of food when compared to much earlier periods in history. So, the idea that capital competition lowers profits by lowering prices is wrong both in practice and in theory.
Mr. Wakefield, in his Commentary on Adam Smith, and his important writings on Colonization, takes a much clearer view of the subject, and arrives, through a substantially correct series of deductions, at practical conclusions which appear to me just and important. Mr. Wakefield's explanation of the fall of profits is briefly this: Production is limited not [pg 499] solely by the quantity of capital and of labor, but also by the extent of the “field of employment.” The field of employment for capital is twofold: the land of the country, and the capacity of foreign markets to take its manufactured commodities. On a limited extent of land, only a limited quantity of capital can find employment at a profit. As the quantity of capital approaches this limit, profit falls; when the limit is attained, profit is annihilated, and can only be restored through an extension of the field of employment, either by the acquisition of fertile land, or by opening new markets in foreign countries, from which food and materials can be purchased with the products of domestic capital.300
Mr. Wakefield, in his Commentary on Adam Smith and his significant writings on Colonization, offers a much clearer perspective on the subject. He arrives at practical conclusions through a mostly accurate set of deductions that I find fair and important. Mr. Wakefield's explanation for the drop in profits is simply this: Production isn't only limited by the amount of capital and labor available, but also by the size of the “field of employment.” The field of employment for capital has two dimensions: the land in the country and the ability of foreign markets to absorb its manufactured goods. On a limited area of land, only a certain amount of capital can be profitably employed. As the amount of capital nears this limit, profits decrease; once the limit is reached, profits vanish and can only be regained by expanding the field of employment, either by acquiring fertile land or by opening new markets in foreign countries, from which food and materials can be obtained with the products of domestic capital.300
§ 2. What factors determine the minimum profit rate?
There is at every time and place some particular rate of profit which is the lowest that will induce the people of that country and time to accumulate savings, and to employ those savings productively. This minimum rate of profit varies according to circumstances. It depends on two elements: One is the strength of the effective desire of accumulation; the comparative estimate, made by the people of that place and era, of future interests when weighed against present. This element chiefly affects the inclination to save. The other element, which affects not so much the willingness to save as the disposition to employ savings productively, is the degree of security of capital engaged in industrial operations. In employing any funds which a person may possess as capital on his own account, or in lending it to others to be so employed, there is always some additional risk over and above that incurred by keeping it idle in his own custody. This extra risk is great in proportion as the general state of society is insecure: it may be equivalent to twenty, thirty, or fifty per cent, or to no more than one or two; something however, it must always be; and for this the expectation of profit must be sufficient to compensate.
At any given time and place, there is a specific minimum rate of profit that will motivate people in that country and time to save money and invest those savings productively. This minimum profit rate changes depending on the circumstances. It relies on two factors: One is the strength of the desire to save; the other is how people at that time view future benefits compared to immediate ones. This factor mainly influences the tendency to save. The second factor, which impacts not just the willingness to save but also the likelihood of using savings productively, is the level of security for capital used in business ventures. When a person uses their funds as capital, either for themselves or by lending to others, there is always some extra risk compared to just keeping the money idle. This additional risk increases with the overall insecurity in society and could range from twenty, thirty, or fifty percent to just one or two percent; regardless, some risk will always be present, and the expected profit must be enough to make up for it.
There would be adequate motives for a certain amount of saving, even if capital yielded no profit. There would be an inducement to lay by in good times a provision for bad; to reserve something for sickness and infirmity, or as a means of leisure and independence in the latter part of life, or a help to children in the outset of it. Savings, however, which have only these ends in view, have not much tendency to increase the amount of capital permanently in existence. The savings by which an addition is made to the national capital usually emanate from the desire of persons to improve what is termed their condition in life, or to make a provision for children or others, independent of their exertions. Now, to the strength of these inclinations it makes a very material difference how much of the desired object can be effected by a given amount and duration of self-denial; which again depends on the rate of profit. And there is in every country some rate of profit below which persons in general will not find sufficient motive to save for the mere purpose of growing richer, or of leaving others better off than themselves. Any accumulation, therefore, by which the general capital is increased, requires as its necessary condition a certain rate of profit—a rate which an average person will deem to be an equivalent for abstinence, with the addition of a sufficient insurance against risk.
There are good reasons to save money, even if it doesn’t earn any interest. People might want to set aside funds during good times to prepare for tough times, to have something saved for illness and old age, to enjoy leisure, or to help their children start out in life. However, savings aimed strictly at these goals don’t do much to permanently boost the overall capital. The savings that actually contribute to increasing national capital generally come from people wanting to improve their living conditions or provide for their children or others without relying on their own effort. The effectiveness of these motivations really depends on how much can be achieved through a certain level and length of self-restraint, which is in turn influenced by the rate of profit. In every country, there is a profit rate below which people will not feel motivated enough to save just to get richer or to ensure others are better off than they are. Therefore, for the general capital to increase, it’s necessary to have a certain profit rate—a rate that the average person views as a fair trade-off for their restraint, along with enough protection against risks.
I have already observed that this minimum rate of profit, less than which is not consistent with the further increase of capital, is lower in some states of society than in others; and I may add that the kind of social progress characteristic of our present civilization tends to diminish it: (1.) In the first place, one of the acknowledged effects of that progress is an increase of general security. Destruction by wars and spoliation by private or public violence are less and less to be apprehended. The risks attending the investment of savings in productive employment require, therefore, a smaller rate of profit to compensate for them than was required a century ago, and will hereafter require less than at present. (2.) In the second place, it is also one of the consequences of [pg 501] civilization that mankind become less the slaves of the moment, and more habituated to carry their desires and purposes forward into a distant future. This increase of providence is a natural result of the increased assurance with which futurity can be looked forward to; and is, besides, favored by most of the influences which an industrial life exercises over the passions and inclinations of human nature. In proportion as life has fewer vicissitudes, as habits become more fixed, and great prizes are less and less to be hoped for by any other means than long perseverance, mankind become more willing to sacrifice present indulgence for future objects. But, though the minimum rate of profit is liable to vary, and though to specify exactly what it is would at any given time be impossible, such a minimum always exists; and, whether it be high or low, when once it is reached, no further increase of capital can for the present take place. The country has then attained what is known to political economists under the name of the stationary state.
I’ve noticed that the minimum profit rate, below which capital can’t grow, is lower in some societies than in others. Additionally, the type of social progress we see in today’s civilization tends to reduce this minimum. (1.) First, one of the recognized effects of progress is an increase in overall security. Destruction from wars and violence, whether from private individuals or the government, is becoming less of a concern. Therefore, the risks associated with investing savings in productive activities require a lower profit rate to offset them than they did a century ago, and this rate will likely continue to decrease. (2.) Second, another outcome of civilization is that people are becoming less tied to immediate desires and more used to planning for the long-term. This shift toward being more proactive about the future is a natural result of the increased confidence we have looking ahead, and is also supported by the various influences that an industrial lifestyle has on human passions and inclinations. As life becomes more stable, habits become more ingrained, and significant rewards are less likely to come from anything other than sustained effort, people grow more willing to give up immediate pleasures for future goals. However, while the minimum profit rate can change and pinpointing it at any given time is practically impossible, it always exists; and once this minimum is reached, no further increase in capital can happen for the present. At this point, the country has reached what political economists refer to as the stationary state.
§ 3. In wealthy and established countries, profits usually hover around the minimum.
We now arrive at the fundamental proposition which this chapter is intended to inculcate. When a country has long possessed a large production, and a large net income to make savings from, and when, therefore, the means have long existed of making a great annual addition to capital (the country not having, like America, a large reserve of fertile land still unused), it is one of the characteristics of such a country that the rate of profit is habitually within, as it were, a hand's breadth of the minimum, and the country, therefore, on the very verge of the stationary state. My meaning is, that it would require but a short time to reduce profits to the minimum, if capital continued to increase at its present rate, and no circumstances having a tendency to raise the rate of profit occurred in the mean time.
We now come to the main idea that this chapter aims to convey. When a country has consistently produced a lot and has a significant net income to save from, and when there are already established means for making substantial annual increases to capital (unlike America, which still has a lot of unused fertile land), one characteristic of such a country is that the rate of profit tends to be close to the minimum. This means the country is on the brink of a stable state. What I mean is that it wouldn’t take long to bring profits down to the minimum if capital keeps increasing at the current rate, and no factors arise that would increase the rate of profit in the meantime.
In England, the ordinary rate of interest on government securities, in which the risk is next to nothing, may be estimated at a little more than three per cent: in all other investments, therefore, the interest or profit calculated upon (exclusively of what is properly a remuneration for talent [pg 502] or exertion) must be as much more than this amount as is equivalent to the degree of risk to which the capital is thought to be exposed. Let us suppose that in England even so small a net profit as one per cent, exclusive of insurance against risk, would constitute a sufficient inducement to save, but that less than this would not be a sufficient inducement. I now say that the mere continuance of the present annual increase of capital, if no circumstance occurred to counteract its effect, would suffice in a small number of years to reduce the rate of net profit to one per cent.
In England, the typical interest rate on government bonds, where the risk is minimal, is just over three percent. Therefore, for all other investments, the interest or profit must be significantly higher than this rate to account for the risk that the capital is exposed to. Let's assume that in England, even a small net profit of one percent, not counting any insurance against risk, would be enough to encourage saving, but anything less wouldn’t be motivating. I now propose that simply maintaining the current annual growth of capital, without any factors to counterbalance this, would be enough in just a few years to bring the net profit rate down to one percent.
To fulfill the conditions of the hypothesis, we must suppose an entire cessation of the exportation of capital for foreign investment. We must suppose the entire savings of the community to be annually invested in really productive employment within the country itself, and no new channels opened by industrial inventions, or by a more extensive substitution of the best-known processes for inferior ones.
To meet the conditions of the hypothesis, we need to assume a complete halt in the export of capital for foreign investment. We have to assume that all the savings of the community are invested every year in truly productive uses within the country, with no new opportunities created by industrial innovations or by replacing less effective methods with better-known ones.
The difficulty in finding remunerative employment every year for so much new capital would not consist in any want of a market. If the new capital were duly shared among many varieties of employment, it would raise up a demand for its own produce, and there would be no cause why any part of that produce should remain longer on hand than formerly. What would really be, not merely difficult, but impossible, would be to employ this capital without submitting to a rapid reduction of the rate of profit.
The challenge of finding profitable jobs each year for all this new capital isn't about lacking a market. If the new capital was distributed properly across different types of jobs, it would create a demand for its own products, and there would be no reason for any part of that production to stay unsold longer than before. What would truly be not just difficult, but impossible, is to use this capital without facing a quick drop in profit rates.
As capital increased, population either would also increase, or it would not. If it did not, wages would rise, and a greater capital would be distributed in wages among the same number of laborers. There being no more labor than before, and no improvements to render the labor more efficient, there would not be any increase of the produce; and, as the capital, however largely increased, would only obtain the same gross return, the whole savings of each year would be exactly so much subtracted from the profits of the next and of every following year.
As capital grew, the population would either increase or it wouldn't. If it didn’t, wages would go up, and more capital would be shared in wages among the same number of workers. Since there wouldn’t be more labor than before, and there wouldn’t be any improvements to make the labor more productive, there wouldn’t be any increase in output. And since the capital, no matter how much it increased, would only generate the same total return, all the savings from each year would be exactly what got taken away from the profits of the next year and every year after that.

It is hardly necessary to say that in such circumstances profits would very soon fall to the point at which further increase of capital would cease. An augmentation of capital, much more rapid than that of population, must soon reach its extreme limit, unless accompanied by increased efficiency of labor (through inventions and discoveries, or improved mental and physical education), or unless some of the idle people, or of the unproductive laborers, became productive.
It's almost unnecessary to mention that in these situations profits would quickly drop to a level where any further increase in capital would stop. A rise in capital, which outpaces population growth significantly, will soon hit its maximum limit unless it's supported by greater labor efficiency (through inventions, discoveries, or better mental and physical education), or unless some of the idle individuals or unproductive workers start contributing productively.
If population did increase with the increase of capital and in proportion to it, the fall of profits would still be inevitable. Increased population implies increased demand for agricultural produce. In the absence of industrial improvements, this demand can only be supplied at an increased cost of production, either by cultivating worse land, or by a more elaborate and costly cultivation of the land already under tillage. The cost of the laborer's subsistence is therefore increased, and, unless the laborer submits to a deterioration of his condition, profits must fall. In an old country like England, if, in addition to supposing all improvement in domestic agriculture suspended, we suppose that there is no increased production in foreign countries for the English market, the fall of profits would be very rapid. If both these avenues to an increased supply of food were [pg 504] closed, and population continued to increase, as it is said to do, at the rate of a thousand a day, all waste land which admits of cultivation in the existing state of knowledge would soon be cultivated, and the cost of production and price of food would be so increased that, if the laborers received the increased money wages necessary to compensate for their increased expenses, profits would very soon reach the minimum. The fall of profits would be retarded if money wages did not rise, or rose in a less degree; but the margin which can be gained by a deterioration of the laborers' condition is a very narrow one: in general, they can not bear much reduction; when they can, they have also a higher standard of necessary requirements, and will not. On the whole, therefore, we may assume that in such a country as England, if the present annual amount of savings were to continue, without any of the counteracting circumstances which now keep in check the natural influence of those savings in reducing profit, the rate of profit would speedily attain the minimum, and all further accumulation of capital would for the present cease.
If the population were to increase along with capital and in proportion to it, a drop in profits would still be unavoidable. A growing population means a higher demand for agricultural products. Without improvements in industry, this demand can only be met at a greater cost of production, either by farming poorer land or by using more complex and expensive cultivation methods on the land that's already being farmed. This increases the cost of living for laborers, and unless they accept a decline in their living conditions, profits must decrease. In a long-established country like England, if we assume all advancements in domestic agriculture are halted and that there won’t be any additional food production from foreign countries for the English market, profits would decline rapidly. If these two sources of increased food supply were to be closed off and the population kept rising, supposedly by a thousand people a day, all of the uncultivated land that could be farmed with the current knowledge would quickly be used, and the costs of production and food prices would rise so much that if the laborers received the extra wages needed to cover their increasing expenses, profits would soon reach their lowest point. The fall in profits would slow down if wages didn’t increase or if they grew at a slower rate; however, the potential for profits to be maintained by worsening the laborers' conditions is quite limited: generally, they can't tolerate much of a cut; when they can, they also tend to have a higher standard of essential needs, and will not accept less. Overall, we can assume that in a country like England, if the current annual savings continue without any opposing factors that currently prevent the natural effects of those savings from lowering profits, the profit rate would quickly hit the minimum, and any further accumulation of capital would come to a halt for now.
§ 4. —unable to reach it due to economic downturns.
What, then, are these counteracting circumstances which, in the existing state of things, maintain a tolerably equal struggle against the downward tendency of profits, and prevent the great annual savings which take place in this country from depressing the rate of profit much nearer to that lowest point to which it is always tending, and which, left to itself, it would so promptly attain? The resisting agencies are of several kinds.
What, then, are these opposing factors that, in the current situation, keep a pretty balanced fight against the decline in profits and stop the large annual savings that happen in this country from pushing the profit rate down closer to that lowest point it always aims for, and which it would quickly reach if left alone? The forces holding it back come in various forms.
First among them is the waste of capital in periods of overtrading and rash speculation, and in the commercial revulsions [pg 505] by which such times are always followed. Mines are opened, railways or bridges made, and many other works of uncertain profit commenced, and in these enterprises much capital is sunk which yields either no return, or none adequate to the outlay. Factories are built and machinery erected beyond what the market requires, or can keep in employment. Even if they are kept in employment, the capital is no less sunk; it has been converted from circulating into fixed capital, and has ceased to have any influence on wages or profits. Besides this, there is a great unproductive consumption of capital during the stagnation which follows a period of general overtrading. Establishments are shut up, or kept working without any profit. Such are the effects of a commercial revulsion; and that such revulsions are almost periodical is a consequence of the very tendency of profits which we are considering. By the time a few years have passed over without a crisis, so much additional capital has been accumulated that it is no longer possible to invest it at the accustomed profit; all public securities rise to a high price, the rate of interest on the best mercantile security falls very low, and the complaint is general among persons in business that no money is to be made. But the diminished scale of all safe gains inclines persons to give a ready ear to any projects which hold out, though at the risk of loss, the hope of a higher rate of profit; and speculations ensue, which, with the subsequent revulsions, destroy, or transfer to foreigners, a considerable amount of capital, produce a temporary rise of interest and profit, make room for fresh accumulations, and the same round is recommenced.
First among them is the waste of capital during times of excessive trading and reckless speculation, followed by commercial downturns. Mines are opened, railways or bridges are built, and many other uncertain ventures start, which tie up a lot of capital that either brings no return or only insufficient returns on the investment. Factories are constructed and machinery is set up beyond what the market needs or can utilize. Even if they are in use, the capital is still sunk; it has shifted from being circulating to fixed capital, losing its ability to impact wages or profits. Additionally, there is a significant waste of capital during the stagnation that follows a period of widespread overtrading. Businesses close down or continue operating without making a profit. These are the effects of a commercial downturn, and the fact that these downturns seem almost periodic is a result of the profit tendencies we're discussing. After a few years without a crisis, so much extra capital builds up that it can no longer be invested at the usual profit; all public securities become highly priced, and interest rates on the best commercial securities drop very low, leading business people to commonly complain that there's no money to be made. However, the reduced potential for safe gains makes people more willing to listen to any projects that offer, albeit with the risk of loss, the chance of higher profits. This leads to speculation, which, along with the subsequent downturns, either destroys or transfers a significant amount of capital to foreigners, creates a temporary spike in interest and profit, allows for new capital accumulation, and the cycle begins again.
This, doubtless, is one considerable cause which arrests profits in their descent to the minimum, by sweeping away from time to time a part of the accumulated mass by which they are forced down. But this is not, as might be inferred from the language of some writers, the principal cause. If it were, the capital of the country would not increase; but in England it does increase greatly and rapidly. This is shown by the increasing productiveness of almost all taxes, [pg 506] by the continual growth of all the signs of national wealth, and by the rapid increase of population, while the condition of the laborers certainly is not on the whole declining.301
This is definitely one major reason that slows down profits as they drop to their lowest point, by occasionally reducing a part of the accumulated amount that pushes them down. However, this is not, as some writers might suggest, the main reason. If it were, the country’s capital wouldn’t be growing; yet in England, it is growing significantly and quickly. This is evident from the increasing returns from almost all taxes, the steady rise in indicators of national wealth, and the rapid growth of the population, even though the overall situation for laborers is not deteriorating. [pg 506]
§ 5. —through improvements in production.
This brings us to the second of the counter-agencies, namely, improvements in production. These evidently have the effect of extending what Mr. Wakefield terms the field of employment, that is, they enable a greater amount of capital to be accumulated and employed without depressing the rate of profit; provided always that they do not raise, to a proportional extent, the habits and requirements of the laborer. If the laboring-class gain the full advantage of the increased cheapness, in other words, if money wages do not fall, profits are not raised, nor their fall retarded. But, if the laborers people up to the improvement in their condition, and so relapse to their previous state, profits will rise. All inventions which cheapen any of the things consumed by the laborers, unless their requirements are raised in an equivalent degree, in time lower money wages, and, by doing so, enable a greater capital to be accumulated and employed, before profits fall back to what they were previously.
This brings us to the second countermeasure, which is improvements in production. These clearly help to expand what Mr. Wakefield calls the field of employment, meaning they allow for more capital to be accumulated and used without lowering the profit rate; as long as they don’t increase the habits and needs of workers proportionately. If the working class fully benefits from the lower costs—meaning money wages don’t decrease—profits won’t increase, nor will their decline be slowed down. However, if workers adjust their lifestyle to the improvements and revert to their previous conditions, profits will rise. Any innovations that reduce the cost of goods consumed by workers, unless their needs also increase at a similar rate, will eventually lower money wages. By doing this, they allow for more capital to be accumulated and utilized before profits fall back to their previous level.
Improvements which only affect things consumed exclusively by the richer classes do not operate precisely in the same manner. The cheapening of lace or velvet has no effect in diminishing the cost of labor; and no mode can be pointed out in which it can raise the rate of profit, so as to make room for a larger capital before the minimum is attained. It, however, produces an effect which is virtually equivalent; it lowers, or tends to lower, the minimum itself. In the first place, increased cheapness of articles of consumption promotes the inclination to save, by affording to all consumers a surplus which they may lay by, consistently with their accustomed manner of living. In the next place, whatever [pg 507] enables people to live equally well on a smaller income inclines them to lay by capital for a lower rate of profit. If people can live on an independence of [$1,000] a year in the same manner as they formerly could on one of [$2,000], some persons will be induced to save in hopes of the one, who would have been deterred by the more remote prospect of the other. All improvements, therefore, in the production of almost any commodity tend in some degree to widen the interval which has to be passed before arriving at the stationary state.
Improvements that only benefit the wealthy don’t work quite the same way. Lowering the price of lace or velvet doesn’t reduce labor costs; there’s no way to show how it can increase profit rates enough to allow for a larger capital before reaching the minimum level. However, it creates an effect that is nearly the same: it lowers, or tends to lower, that minimum itself. First, making consumption items cheaper encourages people to save by giving all consumers a surplus they can set aside without changing their usual way of living. Next, anything that allows people to live just as well on a smaller income makes them more likely to save capital at a lower profit rate. If someone can live comfortably on $1,000 a year the same way they used to on $2,000, then some people will be motivated to save when they might have previously hesitated due to the longer-term outlook of the higher amount. Thus, all improvements in the production of nearly any commodity help to extend the time it takes to reach a stationary state.
§ 6. —through the importation of affordable necessities and tools.
Equivalent in effect to improvements in production is the acquisition of any new power of obtaining cheap commodities from foreign countries. If necessaries are cheapened, whether they are so by improvements at home or importation from abroad, is exactly the same thing to wages and profits. Unless the laborer obtains and, by an improvement of his habitual standard, keeps the whole benefit, the cost of labor is lowered and the rate of profit raised. As long as food can continue to be imported for an increasing population without any diminution of cheapness, so long the declension of profits through the increase of population and capital is arrested, and accumulation may go on without making the rate of profit draw nearer to the minimum. And on this ground it is believed by some that the repeal of the corn laws has opened to [England] a long era of rapid increase of capital with an undiminished rate of profit.
The effects of advancements in production are similar to gaining new ways to obtain cheap goods from other countries. If essentials become cheaper, whether through improvements at home or imports, it has the same impact on wages and profits. If workers don’t benefit entirely from this improvement in their usual standard of living, then labor costs go down and profit rates go up. As long as food can continue to be imported for a growing population without losing its affordability, the decline in profits due to population and capital growth can be halted, allowing accumulation to continue without profits getting closer to the minimum. For this reason, some believe that the repeal of the corn laws has opened up a long period of rapid capital growth in [England] without a decrease in profit rates.
Before inquiring whether this expectation is reasonable, one remark must be made, which is much at variance with commonly received notions. Foreign trade does not necessarily increase the field of employment for capital. When foreign trade makes room for more capital at the same profit, it is by enabling the necessaries of life, or the habitual articles of the laborer's consumption, to be obtained at smaller cost. It may do this in two ways: by the importation either of those commodities themselves, or of the means and appliances for producing them. Cheap iron has, in a certain measure, the same effect on profits and the cost of [pg 508] labor as cheap corn, because cheap iron makes cheap tools for agriculture and cheap machinery for clothing. But a foreign trade, which neither directly nor by any indirect consequence increases the cheapness of anything consumed by the laborers, does not, any more than an invention or discovery in the like case, tend to raise profits or retard their fall; it merely substitutes the production of goods for foreign markets in the room of the home production of luxuries, leaving the employment for capital neither greater nor less than before.
Before questioning whether this expectation is reasonable, one important point must be made, which contrasts sharply with widely accepted beliefs. Foreign trade does not automatically expand the area of employment for capital. When foreign trade allows for more capital at the same profit, it does so by making essential goods or the everyday items that workers consume more affordable. It can achieve this in two ways: by importing either those goods directly or by bringing in the means and tools needed to produce them. Affordable iron has a similar impact on profits and labor costs as inexpensive grain does, because cheap iron leads to cheaper agricultural tools and more affordable machinery for clothing. However, foreign trade that neither directly nor indirectly reduces the cost of anything that workers consume does not, just like a similar invention or discovery, boost profits or slow their decline; it simply replaces the production of goods for international markets instead of local production of luxury items, leaving the employment for capital unchanged.
It must, of course, be supposed that, with the increase of capital, population also increases; for, if it did not, the consequent rise of wages would bring down profits, in spite of any cheapness of food. Suppose, then, that the population of Great Britain goes on increasing at its present rate, and demands every year a supply of imported food considerably beyond that of the year preceding. This annual increase in the food demanded from the exporting countries can only be obtained either by great improvements in their agriculture, or by the application of a great additional capital to the growth of food. The former is likely to be a very slow process, from the rudeness and ignorance of the agricultural classes in the food-exporting countries of Europe, while the British colonies and the United States are already in possession of most of the improvements yet made, so far as suitable to their circumstances. There remains, as a resource, the extension of cultivation. And on this it is to be remarked that the capital by which any such extension can take place is mostly still to be created. In Poland, Russia, Hungary, Spain, the increase of capital is extremely slow. In America it is rapid, but not more rapid than the population. The principal fund at present available for supplying this country with a yearly increasing importation of food is that portion of the annual savings of America which has heretofore been applied to increasing the manufacturing establishments of the United States, and which free trade in corn may possibly divert from that purpose to growing food for our market. This limited source of supply, unless great improvements take place in agriculture, [pg 509] can not be expected to keep pace with the growing demand of so rapidly increasing a population as that of Great Britain; and, if our population and capital continue to increase with their present rapidity, the only mode in which food can continue to be supplied cheaply to the one is by sending the other abroad to produce it.
It has to be assumed that as capital increases, the population also grows; because if it doesn’t, the resulting rise in wages would lower profits, regardless of how cheap food is. So, let’s say the population of Great Britain keeps increasing at its current rate and demands a supply of imported food each year that is significantly higher than the previous year. This annual growth in food demand from exporting countries can only happen through major improvements in their agriculture or by investing a lot more capital into food production. The former is likely to be a slow process due to the rough conditions and lack of knowledge among the agricultural workforce in the food-exporting countries of Europe, while British colonies and the United States already have most of the advancements that suit their needs. The alternative is expanding cultivation. It’s important to note that the capital needed for this expansion is mostly still to be generated. In Poland, Russia, Hungary, and Spain, capital growth is extremely slow. In America, it is fast, but not faster than the population growth. Currently, the main source available to provide this country with a continuously increasing amount of food imports is the portion of America’s annual savings that has been used to expand manufacturing facilities in the United States, which free trade in corn may redirect toward food production for our market. This limited supply source, unless there are significant advancements in agriculture, [pg 509] cannot be expected to keep up with the rising demand of such a rapidly growing population like that of Great Britain; and if both our population and capital continue to grow at their current pace, the only way to keep food inexpensive for one is to send the other abroad to produce it.
Chart XVII. Grain-Crops of the United States.
Chart XVII. Grain Crops in the United States.
Year. | Bushels. |
1865 | 1,127,499,187 |
1866 | 1,343,027,868 |
1867 | 1,329,729,400 |
1868 | 1,450,789,000 |
1869 | 1,491,412,100 |
1870 | 1,629,027,600 |
1871 | 1,528,776,100 |
1872 | 1,664,331,600 |
1873 | 1,538,892,891 |
1874 | 1,455,180,200 |
1875 | 2,032,235,300 |
1876 | 1,962,821,600 |
1877 | 2,178,934,646 |
1878 | 2,302,254,950 |
1879 | 2,434,884,541 |
1880 | 2,448,079,181 |
1881 | 2,699,394,496 |
1882 | 2,699,394,496 |
1883 | 2,623,319,089 |
§ 7. —through the emigration of capital.
This brings us to the last of the counter-forces which check the downward tendency of profits in a country whose capital increases faster than that of its neighbors, and whose profits are therefore nearer to the minimum. This is, the perpetual overflow of capital into colonies or foreign countries, to seek higher profits than can be obtained at home. I believe this to have been for many years one of the principal causes by which the decline of profits in England has been arrested. It has a twofold operation: In the first place, it does what a fire, or an inundation, or a commercial crisis would have done—it carries off a part of the increase of capital from which the reduction of profits proceeds; secondly, the capital so carried off is not lost, but is chiefly employed either in founding colonies, which become large exporters of cheap agricultural produce, or in extending and perhaps improving the agriculture of older communities.
This brings us to the final counter-force that prevents profits from declining in a country where capital is growing faster than in its neighbors, and where profits are therefore closer to the minimum. This is the continual outflow of capital to colonies or foreign countries in search of better profits than what can be earned at home. I believe this has been for many years one of the main reasons why profit declines in England have been halted. It works in two ways: First, it acts like a fire, flood, or economic crisis would—it removes part of the increase in capital that leads to reduced profits; secondly, the capital that is removed isn’t wasted but is mostly used to establish colonies that export cheap agricultural products or to enhance and possibly improve the agriculture of established communities.
In countries which are further advanced in industry and population, and have therefore a lower rate of profit, than others, there is always, long before the actual minimum is reached, a practical minimum, viz., when profits have fallen so much below what they are elsewhere that, were they to fall lower, all further accumulations would go abroad. As long as there are old countries where capital increases very rapidly, and new countries where profit is still high, profits in the old countries will not sink to the rate which would put a stop to accumulation: the fall is stopped at the point which sends capital abroad.
In countries that are more advanced in industry and population, and therefore have a lower rate of profit compared to others, there is always a practical minimum that comes into play long before the actual minimum is hit. This practical minimum occurs when profits drop so much below those in other places that if they were to drop any lower, all further investments would go overseas. As long as there are established countries where capital grows very quickly and new regions where profits are still high, profits in the established countries won’t fall to a level that would halt accumulation; the decline stops at the point where it drives capital abroad.
Chapter IV. The Effects of the Tendency of Profits to Diminish, and the Steady State.
§ 1. The abstraction of capital isn't necessarily a loss for the nation.
The theory of the effect of accumulation on profits must greatly abate, or rather, altogether destroy, in countries where profits are low, the immense importance which used to be attached by political economists to the effects which an event or a measure of government might have in adding to or subtracting from the capital of the country. We have now seen that the lowness of profits is a proof that the spirit of accumulation is so active, and that the increase of capital has proceeded at so rapid a rate, as to outstrip the two counter-agencies, improvements in production and increased supply of cheap necessaries from abroad. A sudden abstraction of capital, unless of inordinate amount, [would not] have any real effect in impoverishing the country. After a few months or years, there would exist in the country just as much capital as if none had been taken away. The abstraction, by raising profits and interest, would give a fresh stimulus to the accumulative principle, which would speedily fill up the vacuum. Probably, indeed, the only effect that would ensue would be that for some time afterward less capital would be exported, and less thrown away in hazardous speculation.
The theory about how accumulation affects profits needs to be reduced or even completely disregarded in countries where profits are low. This is because political economists used to place immense importance on how an event or government action could add to or take away from a country's capital. We have now realized that low profits actually demonstrate that the accumulation process is very active, and that capital has been growing so quickly that it has outpaced two opposing factors: improvements in production and an increased supply of cheap necessities from abroad. A sudden withdrawal of capital, unless it is an exceptionally large amount, wouldn’t significantly impoverish the country. After a few months or years, the country would have about the same amount of capital as if none had been taken out. This withdrawal, by boosting profits and interest, would create a new incentive for accumulation, quickly filling the void. In fact, the only likely outcome would be that for a while afterward, less capital would be exported and less would be wasted on risky investments.
In the first place, then, this view of things greatly weakens, in a wealthy and industrious country, the force of the economical argument against the expenditure of public money for really valuable, even though industriously unproductive, purposes. In poor countries, the capital of the country requires the legislator's sedulous care; he is bound [pg 512] to be most cautious of encroaching upon it, and should favor to the utmost its accumulation at home, and its introduction from abroad. But in rich, populous, and highly cultivated countries, it is not capital which is the deficient element, but fertile land; and what the legislator should desire and promote, is not a greater aggregate saving, but a greater return to savings, either by improved cultivation, or by access to the produce of more fertile lands in other parts of the globe.
First of all, this perspective significantly undermines, in a wealthy and industrious country, the strength of the economic argument against spending public money on truly valuable purposes, even if they don't produce immediate results. In poorer countries, the nation's capital needs the legislator's careful attention; they must be very cautious not to encroach on it and should encourage its accumulation domestically and its import from abroad. However, in rich, populous, and highly developed countries, it's not capital that is lacking, but fertile land. What legislators should aim for and encourage is not simply more saving, but a better return on those savings, either through improved farming methods or by gaining access to the produce from more fertile lands elsewhere in the world.
The same considerations enable us to throw aside as unworthy of regard one of the common arguments against emigration as a means of relief for the laboring-class. Emigration, it is said, can do no good to the laborers, if, in order to defray the cost, as much must be taken away from the capital of the country as from its population. If one tenth of the laboring people of England were transferred to the colonies, and along with them one tenth of the circulating capital of the country, either wages, or profits, or both, would be greatly benefited, by the diminished pressure of capital and population upon the fertility of the land. The landlords alone would sustain some loss of income; and even they, only if colonization went to the length of actually diminishing capital and population, but not if it merely carried off the annual increase.
The same points allow us to dismiss as unworthy one of the common arguments against emigration as a solution for the working class. It's claimed that emigration won’t help laborers if the costs are covered by taking away as much from the country’s capital as from its population. If ten percent of the working people in England were moved to the colonies, along with ten percent of the country’s circulating capital, either wages, profits, or both would benefit significantly from the reduced pressure of capital and population on the land’s productivity. Only the landlords would experience some loss of income; and even then, that would only happen if colonization actually lowered both capital and population, not just removed the annual increase.
§ 2. In wealthy countries, the growth of machinery is not harmful but advantageous to workers.
From the same principles we are now able to arrive at a final conclusion respecting the effects which machinery, and generally the sinking of capital for a productive purpose, produce upon the immediate and ultimate interests of the laboring-class. The characteristic property of this class of industrial improvements is the conversion of circulating capital into fixed: and it was shown in the first book303 that, in a country where capital accumulates slowly, the introduction of machinery, permanent improvements of land, and the like, might be, for the time, extremely injurious; since the capital so employed might be directly taken from the [pg 513] wages fund, the subsistence of the people and the employment for labor curtailed, and the gross annual produce of the country actually diminished. But in a country of great annual savings and low profits no such effects need be apprehended. It merely draws off at one orifice what was already flowing out at another; or, if not, the greater vacant space left in the reservoir does but cause a greater quantity to flow in. Accordingly, in spite of the mischievous derangements of the money market which have been occasioned by the great sums in process of being sunk in railways, I can not agree with those who apprehend any mischief, from this source, to the productive resources of the country. Not on the absurd ground (which to any one acquainted with the elements of the subject needs no confutation) that railway expenditure is a mere transfer of capital from hand to hand, by which nothing is lost or destroyed. This is true of what is spent in the purchase of the land; a portion too of what is paid to agents, counsels, engineers, and surveyors, is saved by those who receive it, and becomes capital again: but what is laid out in the bona fide construction of the railway itself is lost and gone; when once expended, it is incapable of ever being paid in wages or applied to the maintenance of laborers again; as a matter of account, the result is, that so much food and clothing and tools have been consumed, and the country has got a railway instead.
From the same principles, we can now come to a final conclusion about the effects that machinery and the general investment of capital for productive purposes have on both the immediate and long-term interests of the working class. The main characteristic of these industrial improvements is the conversion of circulating capital into fixed capital. As explained in the first book303, in a country where capital accumulates slowly, introducing machinery, permanent land improvements, and similar investments might temporarily be very harmful. This is because the capital invested could be directly taken from the wages fund, reducing the people's livelihood and job opportunities, and actually decreasing the overall annual production of the country. However, in a country with significant annual savings and low profits, we don't need to worry about such negative effects. It simply redirects what was already flowing out elsewhere; or, if not, the larger void left in the reservoir will just cause an increased inflow. Therefore, despite the harmful disruptions in the money market caused by the large amounts being invested in railways, I cannot agree with those who fear any damage to the country's productive resources from this source. Not for the ridiculous reason (which anyone familiar with the topic knows doesn't need to be argued against) that railway spending is just a transfer of capital from one place to another, where nothing is lost or destroyed. This holds true for the money spent on purchasing land; part of the payments made to agents, legal advisors, engineers, and surveyors is saved by those who receive it and becomes capital again. But what is spent on the actual construction of the railway itself is lost and gone; once it's spent, it can never be converted back into wages or used to support laborers. In accounting terms, this means that so much food, clothing, and tools have been used up, and in exchange, the country has gained a railway.
It already appears, from these considerations, that the conversion of circulating capital into fixed, whether by railways, or manufactories, or ships, or machinery, or canals, or mines, or works of drainage and irrigation, is not likely, in any rich country, to diminish the gross produce or the amount of employment for labor. There is hardly any increase of fixed capital which does not enable the country to contain eventually a larger circulating capital than it otherwise could possess and employ within its own limits; for there is hardly any creation of fixed capital which, when it proves successful, does not cheapen the articles on which wages are habitually expended.
It already seems clear from these points that turning circulating capital into fixed capital—whether through railways, factories, ships, machinery, canals, mines, or drainage and irrigation works—is unlikely to reduce the total output or the amount of jobs available for workers in any wealthy country. There’s hardly any increase in fixed capital that doesn’t eventually allow the country to support a larger amount of circulating capital than it would otherwise be able to within its own borders; for almost every creation of fixed capital, when it succeeds, leads to lower costs for the goods on which wages are typically spent.
§ 3. Some writers fear a stable state of wealth and population, but it isn't necessarily a bad thing.
Toward what ultimate point is society tending by its industrial progress? When the progress ceases, in what condition are we to expect that it will leave mankind?
Toward what final goal is society headed with its industrial progress? When progress stops, what state should we expect it to leave humanity in?
It must always have been seen, more or less distinctly, by political economists, that the increase of wealth is not boundless; that at the end of what they term the progressive state lies the stationary state, that all progress in wealth is but a postponement of this, and that each step in advance is an approach to it. We have now been led to recognize that this ultimate goal is at all times near enough to be fully in view; that we are always on the verge of it, and that, if we have not reached it long ago, it is because the goal itself flies before us. The richest and most prosperous countries would very soon attain the stationary state, if no further improvements were made in the productive arts, and if there were a suspension of the overflow of capital from those countries into the uncultivated or ill-cultivated regions of the earth. Adam Smith always assumes that the condition of the mass of the people, though it may not be positively distressed, must be pinched and stinted in a stationary condition of wealth, and can only be satisfactory in a progressive state. The doctrine that, to however distant a time incessant struggling may put off our doom, the progress of society must “end in shallows and in miseries,” far from being, as many people still believe, a wicked invention of Mr. Malthus, was either expressly or tacitly affirmed by his most distinguished predecessors, and can only be successfully combated on his principles.
Political economists have always recognized, in one way or another, that the increase of wealth isn’t limitless; that at the end of what they call the progressive state lies the stationary state, meaning that any progress in wealth is just delaying this outcome, and that each step forward is a step closer to it. We now understand that this ultimate goal is always near enough to see clearly; we are constantly on the brink of it, and if we haven’t already reached it, it’s because the goal itself keeps slipping away from us. The richest and most prosperous countries would quickly reach the stationary state if no further advancements were made in productive techniques, and if there was a halt in the flow of capital from those countries to underdeveloped or poorly developed areas of the world. Adam Smith always assumed that while the general population may not be in outright distress, their condition must still be constrained and limited in a stationary state of wealth, and it can only be truly satisfying in a progressive state. The idea that, no matter how far off constant struggles may delay our downfall, the progress of society must “end in shallows and in miseries,” is not merely a malevolent notion created by Mr. Malthus, as many people still think; it was either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged by his most notable predecessors, and can only be effectively challenged using his principles.
Even in a progressive state of capital, in old countries, a conscientious or prudential restraint on population is indispensable, to prevent the increase of numbers from outstripping [pg 515] the increase of capital, and the condition of the classes who are at the bottom of society from being deteriorated. Where there is not, in the people, or in some very large proportion of them, a resolute resistance to this deterioration—a determination to preserve an established standard of comfort—the condition of the poorest class sinks, even in a progressive state, to the lowest point which they will consent to endure. The same determination would be equally effectual to keep up their condition in the stationary state, and would be quite as likely to exist.
Even in advanced capitalist countries, it's essential to have some responsible limits on population growth to make sure that the increase in population doesn’t surpass the growth of capital, preventing the situation of the lower classes in society from worsening. If a significant portion of the population doesn't strongly oppose this decline and is determined to maintain a certain standard of living, the situation for the poorest people will drop to the lowest level they are willing to accept, even in a progressive environment. That same determination would also help maintain their situation in a stable state, and it would be just as likely to be present.
I can not, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested toward it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition.
I can't, therefore, view the fixed state of capital and wealth with the same unshakeable dislike that is commonly shown by traditional political economists. I tend to think it would be, overall, a significant improvement over our current situation.
It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still an important object; in those most advanced, what is economically needed is a better distribution, of which one indispensable means is a stricter restraint on population. On the other hand, we may suppose this better distribution of property attained, by the joint effect of the prudence and frugality of individuals, and of a system of legislation favoring equality of fortunes, so far as is consistent with the just claim of the individual to the fruits, whether great or small, of his or her own industry. We may suppose, for instance (according to the suggestion thrown out in a former chapter304), a limitation of the sum which any one person may acquire by gift or inheritance, to the amount sufficient to constitute a moderate independence. Under this twofold influence, society would exhibit these leading features: a well-paid and affluent body of laborers; no enormous fortunes, except what were earned and accumulated during a single lifetime; but a much larger body of persons than at present, not only exempt from the coarser toils, but with sufficient [pg 516] leisure, both physical and mental, from mechanical details, to cultivate freely the graces of life, and afford examples of them to the classes less favorably circumstanced for their growth. This condition of society, so greatly preferable to the present, is not only perfectly compatible with the stationary state, but, it would seem, more naturally allied with that state than with any other.
It’s only in the developing countries of the world that increasing production is still a key goal; in the most advanced countries, what's needed economically is better distribution, which requires stricter control on population growth. On the flip side, we can imagine this improved distribution of wealth achieved through both individuals being prudent and frugal, and a legal system promoting equal opportunities, as far as it aligns with each person's rightful claim to the rewards, big or small, of their own hard work. For instance, we might imagine (as suggested in a previous chapter304) a limit on the amount any one person can receive through gifts or inheritance, set at a level enough for a modest independence. With these two influences combined, society would show these main characteristics: a well-paid and prosperous workforce; no vast fortunes, except those earned and saved in one lifetime; but a much larger number of people than currently, not only free from the hardest labor, but with enough physical and mental leisure to escape mechanical routines, allowing them to freely develop the finer aspects of life and provide examples of those to others less fortunate in their opportunities for growth. This ideal state of society, far better than the current one, would not only be fully compatible with a stationary economy but seems, in fact, to be more naturally aligned with that condition than with any other.
There is room in the world, no doubt, and even in old countries, for a great increase of population, supposing the arts of life to go on improving, and capital to increase. But even if innocuous, I confess I see very little reason for desiring it. The density of population necessary to enable mankind to obtain, in the greatest degree, all the advantages both of co-operation and of social intercourse, has, in all the most populous countries, been attained. If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger but not a better or a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compels them to it.
There’s definitely room in the world, even in older countries, for a significant increase in population if the ways of life continue to improve and capital grows. However, even if it’s harmless, I honestly don’t see much reason to want it. The level of population density necessary for people to get the most benefits from cooperation and social interaction has already been reached in the most populated countries. If the earth has to lose a lot of its charm due to the unlimited growth of wealth and population, just to support a larger but not necessarily better or happier population, I truly hope, for future generations, that they will choose to remain at a stable level long before it becomes a necessity.
It is scarcely necessary to remark that a stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state of human improvement. Even the industrial arts might be as earnestly and as successfully cultivated, with this sole difference, that instead of serving no purpose but the increase of wealth, industrial improvements would produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging labor. Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being. They have enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment, and an increased number of manufacturers and others to make fortunes. They have increased the comforts of the middle classes.
It's hardly necessary to say that a stable state of capital and population doesn't mean a stable situation for human progress. Even the industrial arts could be developed just as passionately and successfully, with one key difference: instead of only increasing wealth, these industrial improvements would actually reduce the amount of labor needed. So far, it's debatable whether all the mechanical inventions created have actually eased the daily grind for anyone. They've allowed more people to endure the same life of hard work and confinement, and they've helped more manufacturers and others get rich. They've also boosted the comforts of the middle class.
The statement that inventions have not “lightened the day's toil of any human being” has been persistently misquoted [pg 517] by many persons and has been taken out of its connection. Mr. Mill distinctly holds that the laborer's lot could have been improved had there been any limitation of population; that it is the constant growth of population as society progresses which destroys the gains afforded to the laboring-classes by improvements. But it is quite certain that the material facts of Mr. Mill's statement are no longer true. In the United States wages have risen, with an additional gain in lower prices; and Mr. Giffen shows the same progress in England. Moreover, travelers on the Continent speak of a similar movement already noticeable there. Mr. Giffen's statement in his comparison305 with fifty years ago, is as follows:
The assertion that inventions have not“lightened the day’s work of any person”has been repeatedly misquoted[pg 517]by many people and has been taken out of context. Mr. Mill clearly states that the laborer's situation could have improved if there had been some control over population; that it is the ongoing growth of population as society advances which undermines the benefits offered to the working class by advancements. However, it's clear that the material facts of Mr. Mill's statement are no longer accurate. In the United States, wages have increased, along with a corresponding drop in prices; and Mr. Giffen shows the same progress in England. Furthermore, travelers in Europe report a similar trend already visible there. Mr. Giffen's statement in his comparison305fifty years ago is as follows:
“While the money wages have increased as we have seen, the hours of labor have diminished. It is difficult to estimate what the extent of this diminution has been, but collecting one or two scattered notices I should be inclined to say very nearly 20 per cent. There has been at least this reduction in the textile, engineering, and house-building trades. The workman gets from 50 to 100 per cent more money for 20 per cent less work; in round figures he has gained from 70 to 120 per cent in fifty years in money return. It is just possible, of course, that the workman may do as much, or nearly as much, in the shorter period as he did in his longer hours. Still, there is the positive gain in his being less time at his task, which many of the classes still tugging lengthily day by day at the oar would appreciate.”
“While wages have increased, work hours have decreased. It’s hard to say exactly how much they’ve gone down, but based on a few reports, I’d estimate it’s around 20 percent. This reduction has happened in the textile, engineering, and construction industries. Workers are making 50 to 100 percent more money for 20 percent less work; overall, they’ve experienced a 70 to 120 percent increase in earnings over the past fifty years. It’s possible that workers might accomplish as much, or nearly as much, in the shorter hours as they did in the longer shifts. Still, the clear benefit is that they spend less time at work, which many people who still work long hours would definitely appreciate.”
Chapter V. On The Potential Future of the Working Class.
§ 1. The potential for progress while workers continue to be just recipients of wages.
There has probably never been a time when more attention has been called to the material and social conditions of the working-classes than in the last few years. The great increase of literature and the extension of the newspaper has brought to every reader, even where public and private charities have not sent eye-witnesses into direct contact with distress, a more explicit knowledge of the working-classes than ever before. The revelation of existing poverty and misery is, often wrongly, taken to be a proof of the increasing degradation of the working-men, and the cause has been ascribed to the grasping cruelty of capitalists. Instances of injustice arising from the relations of employers and employed will occur so long as human nature remains imperfect. But the world hopes that some other relation than that of master and workman may be evolved in which not only many admitted wrongs may be avoided, but also new forces may be applied to raise the laborer out of his dependence on other classes in the community.
There’s probably never been a time when the material and social conditions of the working class have received more attention than in recent years. The significant rise in literature and the expansion of newspapers have provided every reader, even where public and private charities haven't shared firsthand accounts of struggle, a clearer understanding of the working class than ever before. The spotlight on current poverty and suffering is often wrongly interpreted as proof that workers' conditions are getting worse, with blame directed at the greedy cruelty of capitalists. Injustices from the employer-employee relationship will continue as long as human nature is flawed. However, there is hope that a different dynamic can develop beyond that of master and worker, one that not only prevents many known injustices but also fosters new ways to empower workers and lessen their dependence on other social classes.
We are, at present, living under a régime of private property and competition. But certainly the progress of the laborer is not that which can excite enthusiastic hopes for the future, so long as he remains a mere receiver of wages. The progress of industrial improvements has resulted, says Mr. Cairnes, in “a temporary improvement of the laborer's condition, followed by an increase of population and an enlarged demand for the cheapened commodity.... Laborers' commodities, however, are for the most part commodities of raw produce, or in which the raw material constitutes the chief element of the value (clothing is, in truth, the only important exception); and of all such commodities it is the well-known law that an augmentation of quantity can only be obtained, other things being the same, at an increasing proportional cost. Thus, it has happened that the gain in productiveness obtained by improved processes has, after a generation, to a great extent been lost—lost, [pg 519] that is to say, for any benefit that can be derived from it in favor of wages and profits.... The large addition to the wealth of the country has gone neither to profits nor to wages, nor yet to the public at large [as consumers], but to swell a fund ever growing even while its proprietors sleep—the rent-roll of the owners of the soil.... The aggregate return from the land has immensely increased; but the cost of the costliest portion of the produce, which is that which determines the price of the whole, remains pretty nearly as it was. Profits, therefore, have not risen at all, and the real remuneration of the laborer, taking the whole field of labor, in but a slight degree—at all events in a degree very far from commensurate with the general progress of industry.”306
Right now, we are living under a __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.dietof private property and competition. However, the laborer's progress doesn't inspire much hope for the future as long as he only remains a wage earner. According to Mr. Cairnes, the advancements in industry have led to“A temporary improvement in workers' conditions led to a population increase and a greater demand for cheaper goods.... Most products made by laborers are either raw materials or items heavily reliant on raw materials for their value (with clothing being a major exception); and for these goods, it's well known that increasing quantity, all else being equal, comes at a higher proportional cost. Thus, the productivity gains from better methods have largely diminished after a generation—meaning, [pg 519] any benefits seen in terms of wages and profits.... The significant rise in national wealth hasn’t translated into increased profits, wages, or even benefits for consumers; instead, it has created a growing fund that continues to expand even while its owners do nothing—the rental income for landowners.... The overall return from land has greatly increased; however, the cost of the most expensive part of the product, which influences prices everywhere, remains almost unchanged. As a result, profits have not increased at all, and the real earnings of workers, when looking at the entire labor market, have only improved slightly—far from matching the overall advancement of industry.”306
Under these conditions, it seems that the only hope of an improvement for the laboring-classes lies in the limitation of population—or at least in an increase of numbers less than the increase of capital and improvements. It is possible, however, that Mr. Cairnes, with many others, has failed to recognize the full extent of the improvement which is taking place in the wages of the laborer under the existing social order. Although we hear much of the wrongs of the working-men—and they no doubt exist—yet it is unquestionable that their condition has vastly improved within the last fifty years; largely, in my opinion, because improvements have outstripped population, and because wide areas of fertile land in new and peaceful countries have drawn off the surplus population in the older countries, and because the available spots in the newer countries like the United States have not yet been covered over with a population sufficiently dense to keep real wages anything below a relatively high standard. The facts to substantiate this opinion, so far as regards Great Britain, are to be found in a recent investigation307 by Mr. Giffen, the statistician of the English Board of Trade. For a very considerable reduction in hours of daily labor, the workman now receives wages on an average about 70 per cent higher than fifty years ago, as may be seen by the following table:
Given the situation, it looks like the only way for the working class to improve their circumstances is by managing population growth, or at least making sure it increases more slowly than capital and advancements. However, it seems that Mr. Cairnes and others may not fully recognize the significant improvements in laborers' wages under the current social system. While we often hear about the difficulties workers face—and they are real—it's clear that their conditions have greatly improved over the last fifty years. I believe this is mostly because advancements have outpaced population growth and because large areas of fertile land in new, peaceful countries have attracted excess population from older countries. Moreover, the land available in newer countries like the United States hasn't yet reached a population density that's high enough to push real wages below a relatively good standard. Evidence supporting this view regarding Great Britain can be found in a recent investigation.307by Mr. Giffen, the statistician for the English Board of Trade. Due to a significant reduction in daily working hours, today’s workers earn on average about 70 percent more than they did fifty years ago, as illustrated in the following table:
Occupation. | Place. | Wages fifty years ago, per week. | Wages, present time, per week. | Increase or decrease, amount, per cent. |
Carpenters | Manchester | 24 0 | 34 0 | 10 0 (+) 42 |
Glasgow | 14 0 | 26 0 | 12 0 (+) 85 | |
Bricklayers | Manchester308 | 24 0 | 36 0 | 12 0 (+) 50 |
Glasgow | 15 0 | 27 0 | 12 0 (+) 80 | |
Masons | Manchester309 | 24 0 | 29 10 | 5 10 (+) 24 |
Glasgow | 14 0 | 23 8 | 9 8 (+) 69 | |
Miners | Staffordshire | 2 8310 | 4 0311 | 1 4 (+) 50 |
Pattern-weavers | Huddersfield | 16 0 | 25 0 | 9 0 (+) 55 |
Wool-scourers | " | 17 0 | 22 0 | 5 0 (+) 30 |
Mule-spinners | " | 25 6 | 30 0 | 4 6 (+) 20 |
Weavers | " | 12 0 | 26 0 | 14 0 (+) 115 |
Warpers and beamers | " | 17 0 | 27 0 | 10 0 (+) 58 |
Winders and reelers | " | 6 0 | 11 0 | 5 0 (+) 83 |
Weavers (men) | Bradford | 8 3 | 20 6 | 12 3 (+) 150 |
Reeling and warping | " | 7 9 | 15 6 | 7 9 (+) 100 |
Spinning (children) | " | 4 5 | 11 6 | 7 1 (+) 160 |
With increased wages, prices are not much higher than fifty years ago. But the clearest evidence as to their bettered material condition is to be found in the following table, which shows the amount of food consumed per head by the total population of Great Britain:
With higher wages, prices are not significantly different from what they were fifty years ago. However, the best evidence of their improved living conditions can be seen in the table below, which shows the amount of food consumed per person by the entire population of Great Britain:
Articles. | 1840. | 1881. |
Bacon and ham, pounds. | 0.01 | 13.93 |
Butter, lbs. | 1.05 | 6.36 |
Cheese, lbs. | 0.92 | 5.77 |
Currants and raisins, pounds. | 1.45 | 4.34 |
No eggs. | 3.63 | 21.65 |
Potatoes, lbs. | 0.01 | 12.5 |
Rice, lbs. | 0.90 | 16:32 |
Cocoa, lbs. | 0.08 | 0.31 |
Coffee, currency. | 1.08 | 0.89 |
Corn, wheat, and flour, pounds. | 42.47 | 216.92 |
Brown sugar, Pounds. | 15.20 | 58.92 |
Refined sugar, lbs. | Nil. | 8.44 |
Tea, money. | 1.22 | 4.58 |
Tobacco, Pounds. | 0.86 | 1.41 |
Wine, gallons. | 0.25 | 0.45 |
Alcohol, Gallons. | 0.97 | 1.08 |
Malt, Bushels. | 1.59 | 1.91312 |
The question then at once arises, whether capital has been shown by the statistics to have gained accordingly, or whether there has been a proportionally less increase than in wages. [pg 521] Says Mr. Giffen: “If the return to capital had doubled, as the wages of the working-classes appear to have doubled, the aggregate income of the capitalist classes returned to the income-tax would now be £800,000,000 instead of £400,000,000.... The capitalist, as such, gets a low interest for his money, and the aggregate returns to capital is not a third part of the aggregate income of the country, which may be put at not less than £1,200,000,000.” It is found, moreover—as a suggestion that property is more generally diffused—that while there were 25,368 estates entered to probate in 1838, of an average value of £2,160 each, there were 55,359 estates in 1882 of an average value of £2,500 each.
The question that comes up is: do statistics indicate that capital has increased as well, or has it risen less than wages?[pg 521]Mr. Giffen says:“If the return on capital had doubled, like the way wages for the working class appear to have doubled, the total income reported by the capitalist class for income tax would now be £800,000,000 instead of £400,000,000.... Generally, capitalists receive low interest on their investments, and the total returns on capital don't even account for a third of the country's total income, which is estimated to be at least £1,200,000,000.”It's been noted that property ownership is becoming more common. In 1838, there were 25,368 estates probated, with an average value of £2,160 each. By 1882, this number increased to 55,359 estates, with an average value of £2,500 each.
But yet the vast increase of wealth made possible by improvements and the growth of capital would have bettered the condition of all still more had population been somewhat more limited. As it is, the material gain has been large in spite of an increase in the population from 16,500,000 in 1831 to nearly 30,000,000 in 1881. In other words, the landlords have been great gainers, while the laborers have intercepted much more than Mr. Cairnes supposed.
However, the substantial increase in wealth due to advancements and capital growth could have made things better for everyone if the population had been more controlled. As it is, the material benefits have been significant, even with the population growing from 16,500,000 in 1831 to nearly 30,000,000 in 1881. In other words, the landlords have gained a lot, while the laborers have received much more than Mr. Cairnes thought.
There are at hand some very striking data relating to the United States which point in the same direction as those of Mr. Giffen. Charts No. XIX and XX show vividly how far the increased productiveness of an industry, arising from greater skill and greater efficiency of labor in the connection of improved machinery, has enabled manufacturers to steadily lower the price of their goods, and yet increase the wages paid to their operatives. What was true of these two cotton-mills was true of others within New England; for the rate of wages paid by these mills was the rate current in the country in 1830 and in 1884. While each spindle and loom has become vastly more effective, we see by Chart No. XIX that the average production of each operative constantly increased from 4,321 yards per year in 1830, to 28,032 yards in 1884; and this it was which made possible the corresponding increase in the rate of wages from $164 in 1830, to $290 in 1884. The sum of $290 a year as an average for each operative, is a stipend too small to cause any general satisfaction; but he must be gloomy indeed who does not see that $290 is a cheerful possession as compared with $164. There is, then, abundant ground for believing that in the past fifty years the condition of the working-classes in the United States has been materially improved. The diminishing proportion of the price which goes to the capital is a significant fact, and illustrates the tendency of profits to fall with the increase of capital.313 The same truth seems to be [pg 522] seen in the table given in a previous chapter,314 where the wages have been increased, but the hours have fallen per day from thirteen to eleven since 1840.
There is some really striking data related to the United States that backs up Mr. Giffen's findings. Charts No. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__19andXXclearly show how the increased productivity of an industry, due to better skills and efficiency of labor along with improved machinery, has enabled manufacturers to continuously lower their prices while also raising the wages they pay their workers. What was true for these two cotton mills was also the case for others in New England; the wage rates offered by these mills were comparable to those in the country in 1830 and 1884. While each spindle and loom has become much more efficient, we can see from Chart No. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__19The average output per worker increased from 4,321 yards per year in 1830 to 28,032 yards in 1884; this rise allowed for wages to also increase from $164 in 1830 to $290 in 1884. Although $290 a year per worker is still a modest amount, it would take a very pessimistic viewpoint to deny that $290 is a significant improvement over $164. Thus, there's strong evidence suggesting that over the past fifty years, the condition of the working class in the United States has improved greatly. The decreasing share of profits going to capital is an important fact that shows the trend of profits declining as capital increases.313This same truth is also shown in the table from a previous chapter,314where wages have gone up, but daily hours have dropped from thirteen to eleven since 1840.
§ 2.—through small holdings, which allow for shared gains between the landlord and the tenants.
So far we have considered the chances for improvement in an industrial order in which the present separation of capitalists from laborers is maintained. But this does not take into account that future time when cultivation in the United States shall be forced down upon inferior land, and no more remains to be occupied, and when capital may no longer increase as fast as population. What must be the ultimate outlook for wages-receivers? Or, more practically, what is the outlook now for those who are wages-receivers, and for whom a more equitable distribution of the product seems desirable? How can they escape the thralldom of dependence on the accumulations of others?
So far, we’ve explored opportunities for improvement in an industrial system that keeps capitalists and workers apart. However, this doesn’t take into account a future where farming in the United States will need to transition to less productive land, leaving no additional land to use, and where capital may not grow as quickly as the population. What will the long-term outlook be for wage earners? More specifically, what does the current situation look like for those who earn wages and want a fairer distribution of resources? How can they become less dependent on the wealth of others?
In this connection, and of primary importance, is the avenue opened to all holders of small properties to share in the increase which goes to owners of land. It has been seen that owners of the soil constantly gain from the inevitable tendencies of industrial progress. If one large owner gains, why should not the increment be the same if ten owners held the property instead of one? The more the land is subdivided, the more the vast increase arising from rent will be shared by a larger number. This, in my opinion, is the strongest reason for the encouragement of small holdings in every country. The greater the extension of small properties among the working-class, the more will they gain a share of that part of the product which goes to the owner of land by the persistent increase of population. If, then, the gain arising from improvements is largely passed to the credit of land-owners, as Mr. Cairnes believes, it should be absolutely necessary to spread among the working-classes the doctrine that if they own their own homes, and buy the land they live on, to that extent will they “grow rich while they sleep,” independently of their other exertions. Land worth $500 to-day when bought by the savings of a laborer, besides the self-respect315 it gives him, will increase in value with the [pg 523] density of population, and become worth $600 or more without other sacrifice of his.
In this context, it's crucial to recognize the opportunity available to all small property owners to benefit from the growth that landowners experience. It's been noted that landowners continually gain from the inevitable trends in industrial progress. If one large landowner makes a profit, why shouldn't the increase be similar if ten people owned the property instead of one? The more the land is divided, the more the significant increase from rent will be shared among a larger number of people. In my view, this is the strongest argument for promoting small holdings in every country. The more small properties are distributed among the working class, the more they will receive a share of the benefits that go to landowners due to ongoing population growth. If the benefits from improvements are mostly attributed to landowners, as Mr. Cairnes suggests, then it's essential to convey to the working class that if they own their own homes and purchase the land they live on, they will“get rich while they sleep,”regardless of their other efforts. Land valued at $500 today, when bought with a laborer’s savings, along with the self-respect315it gives him, will appreciate in value with the[pg 523]the population density, and become valued at $600 or more without any extra effort from him.
§ 3. —through collaboration, where the manager's salary is distributed.
It will be found, however, that, of the various industrial rewards, profits tend to diminish, meaning by “profits” only the interest and insurance given for abstinence and risk in the use of capital; but that the manager's wages (wages of superintendence) are larger than is commonly supposed in relation to other industrial rewards, owing to the position of monopoly practically held by such executive ability as is competent to successfully manage large business interests. To the laborer this large payment to the manager seems to be paid for the possession of capital. This we now know to be wrong. The manager's wages are payments of exactly the same nature as any laborer's wages. It makes no difference whether wages are paid for manual or mental labor. The payment to capital, purely as such, known as interest (with insurance for risk), is unmistakably decreasing, even in the United States. And yet we see men gain by industrial operations enormous rewards; but these returns are in their essence solely manager's wages. For in many instances, as hitherto discussed, we have seen that the manager is not the owner of the capital he employs. To what does this lead us? Inevitably to the conclusion that the laborer, if he would become something more than a receiver of wages, in the ordinary sense, must himself move up in the scale of laborers until he reaches the skill and power also to command manager's wages. The importance of this principle to the working-man can not be exaggerated, and there flows from it important consequences to the whole social condition of the lower classes. It leads us directly to the means by which the lower classes may raise themselves to a higher position—the actual details of which, of course, are difficult, but, as they are not included in political economy, they must be left to sociology—and forms the essential basis of hope for any proper extension of productive co-operation. In short, co-operation owes its existence to the possibility of dividing the manager's wages, to a greater or less degree, among the so-called wages-receivers, or the “laboring-class.” And it is from this point of view that co-operation is seen more truly and fitly than in any other way. For it is to be said that in some of its forms co-operation gives the most promising economic results as regards the condition of the laborer which have yet been reached in the long discussion upon the relations of labor and capital.
It turns out that, in various industries, profits tend to decline. By "profits," we refer specifically to the interest and insurance paid for taking risks with capital. However, manager salaries are larger than most people realize relative to other industrial earnings, due to the monopolistic power that those skilled in managing large businesses possess. To workers, this high pay for managers seems like compensation for owning capital. We now understand that this view is incorrect. Manager salaries are just like any worker's wages. It doesn't matter whether the pay is for physical or mental work. The return on capital, simply as capital, known as interest (including insurance for risk), is clearly decreasing, even in the United States. Yet, we see individuals earning substantial rewards from industrial operations; these profits are essentially just manager wages. In many cases, as previously mentioned, the manager does not own the capital they use. What does this mean? It leads us to the conclusion that if a worker wants to become more than just a typical wage earner, they must work their way up until they acquire the skills and authority to earn manager wages as well. The importance of this principle for the working class cannot be overstated, and it has significant implications for the social conditions of the lower classes. It directly indicates how lower classes can improve their circumstances—although the specifics are complex and, since they do not fall under political economy, they must be examined in sociology. This forms the foundational basis of hope for any meaningful growth of productive cooperation. In summary, cooperation exists because some of the manager's wages can, to a certain extent, be shared among those usually seen as wage earners, or the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“working-class.”Seeing cooperation this way uncovers its true and significant nature. Some types of cooperation actually lead to the best economic outcomes for workers, based on the extensive discussions about the relationship between labor and capital.
§ 4. Collaborative Distribution.
It will be my object, then, to describe the chief forms in which the co-operative principle has manifested itself. These may be said, in general, to be four: (1) distributive co-operation, by which goods already produced are bought and sold to [pg 524] members without the aid of retail dealers; (2) productive co-operation, by which associations are formed for producing and manufacturing goods for the market; (3) partial productive co-operation in the form of industrial partnerships between laborers and employers, without dispensing with the latter; and (4) co-operative, or People's, banks. There are, of course, many other forms in which the principle of co-operation has been applied; but these four are probably the most characteristic.
My aim is to outline the main ways the co-operative principle has manifested itself. Generally, there are four main forms: (1) distributive co-operation, where goods that have already been produced are bought and sold to members without involving retail dealers; (2) productive co-operation, where groups are formed to produce and manufacture goods for the market; (3) partial productive co-operation, which involves industrial partnerships between workers and employers, without replacing the latter; and (4) co-operative, or People's, banks. Of course, there are many other ways the co-operative principle has been implemented, but these four are likely the most distinctive.
Distributive co-operation is at once the simplest and the most successful form, not merely because it requires less for capital than any other for its inception, but also because it calls for less business and executive capacity. The number of persons capable of managing a small retail store is vastly greater than the class fit to assume control of the very complex duties involved in the care of wholesale houses—or, at all events, of mills and factories. Distributive co-operation has its origin in the fact that the expenses of a middle-man between the producer and consumer may be entirely dispensed with, and in the fact that more capital had collected in the business of distribution than could economically be so employed. Its educating power on the men concerned in teaching them to save, in showing the need of business methods, and in instilling the elements of industrial management, is of no little importance. It is, therefore, the best gateway to any further or more difficult co-operative experiments—such experiments as can be attempted only after the proper capital is saved, and the necessary executive capacity is discovered, or developed by training. In England co-operation began its history in distributive stores, and has finally led to such a stimulus of self-help in the laborer, that now co-operative gymnasiums, libraries, gardens, and other results have proved the wisdom of calling upon the laborers for their own exertions. Under the system which separates employers and the employed, high wages are not found to be the only boon which the receivers could wish; for it is sometimes found that the best-paid workmen are the most unwise and intemperate.316 For the most ignorant and unskilled of the workmen in the lowest strata the object would seem to be to give not merely more wages, but give more in such a way as might excite new and better motives, a desire as well as a possibility of improvement. Self-help must be stimulated, not deadened by stifling dependence on a class of superiors, or on the state. The extraordinary growth of co-operation is one of the most cheering signs of modern times. Distributive co-operation originated in Rochdale, in England, about 1844, with a few laborers desirous of saving themselves from the high prices paid for poor provisions. By uniting, they purchased [pg 525] tea by the chest, sugar by the hogshead, which they sold to each member at market prices. They were surprised to find a large profit by the operation, which they divided proportionally to the capital subscribed. Others soon joined them; they took a store-room, and in 1882 there were 10,894 members, with a share capital of $1,576,215, and with realized profits in that year of $162,885. They have erected expensive steam flour-mills, and the society occupies eighteen branch establishments in Rochdale. Libraries containing more than 15,000 volumes, and classes in science, language, and the technical arts, attended by 500 students, have been maintained. The extension of the Rochdale store led to the necessity of a wholesale establishment of their own. It is now a large institution with branches in London and Newcastle. “It owns manufactories in London, Manchester, Newcastle, Leicester, Durham, and Crumpsall; and it has depots in Cork, Limerick, Kilmallock, Waterford, Tipperary, Tralee, and Armagh, for the purchase of butter, potatoes, and eggs. It has buyers in New York and Copenhagen, and it owns two steamships. It has a banking department with a turn-over of more than £12,000,000 annually.”317
Distributive cooperation is the simplest and most effective form, not only because it requires less startup capital than other methods, but also because it needs less business and management expertise. Many more people can run a small retail store than those who are qualified to manage the complexities of wholesale operations—or at least mills and factories. Distributive cooperation came from the idea that the costs associated with a middleman between the producer and the consumer can be completely eliminated, along with the realization that there’s more capital in the distribution sector than can be used efficiently. The educational benefits for participants, such as learning how to save, understanding the importance of business practices, and being introduced to the basics of industrial management, are significant. Therefore, it provides an excellent foundation for any further or more challenging cooperative efforts—projects that can only be undertaken once sufficient capital has been saved and necessary management skills have been developed through training. In England, cooperation began with distributive stores, eventually leading to such a rise in self-help among workers that now there are cooperative gyms, libraries, gardens, and other initiatives that demonstrate the wisdom of encouraging workers to depend on their own efforts. In a system that separates employers from employees, high wages aren’t the only thing workers want; often, the best-paid workers are also the most reckless and unwise. 316 For the least educated and unskilled workers at the bottom, the goal should be to not only provide better wages but also to inspire new and improved motivations, creating both desire and opportunity for growth. Self-help should be encouraged, not hindered by reliance on a higher class or the government. The remarkable rise of cooperation is one of the most encouraging signs of our time. Distributive cooperation began in Rochdale, England, around 1844, when a group of workers aimed to avoid the high prices of low-quality goods. By coming together, they purchased tea in bulk and sugar by the barrel, which they sold to each member at market prices. They were amazed to find they made a significant profit from their efforts, which they shared according to how much each contributed. Others quickly joined; they rented a storage space, and by 1882, there were 10,894 members with a share capital of $1,576,215, realizing a profit of $162,885 that year. They constructed expensive steam flour mills, and the society now has eighteen branches in Rochdale. They have maintained libraries with over 15,000 volumes and offered classes in science, languages, and technical skills, attended by 500 students. The growth of the Rochdale store made it necessary to establish their own wholesale branch. It has developed into a major organization with branches in London and Newcastle.“It owns factories in London, Manchester, Newcastle, Leicester, Durham, and Crumpsall, and it has distribution centers in Cork, Limerick, Kilmallock, Waterford, Tipperary, Tralee, and Armagh for buying butter, potatoes, and eggs. It has buyers in New York and Copenhagen, and it operates two steamships. It has a banking division with an annual turnover of more than £12,000,000.” 317
The following figures for England and Wales tell their own story as to the progress of co-operation:318
The statistics for England and Wales clearly show the advancements in collaboration:318
1862. | 1881. | |
Member count | 90,000 | 525k |
Capital: Share Now | 428,000 | 5.88 million |
Capital: Credit | 55k | 1.27 million |
Sales | 2.33 million | 20.9 million |
Net income | 165,000 | 1.6 million |
Several persons each subscribe a sum to make up the share capital of a store, and a person is selected to take charge of the purchase and care of the goods. The advantages of the plan are: (1) A division among the co-operators of all the net profits of the retail trade; (2) a saving in advertisements, since members are always purchasers without solicitation; (3) no loss by bad debts, since only cash sales are permitted; and (4) security against fraud as to the character of the goods, because there is no inducement to make gains by adulterations. It is often found that the capital is turned over ten times in the course of a year; while the cost of management in the wholesale Rochdale stores does not amount to one per cent on the returns.
A group of people each puts in money to create the share capital for a store, and one person is selected to manage the purchases and oversee the goods. The advantages of this plan are: (1) a sharing of all net profits from the retail business among the members; (2) savings on advertising, as members are always buyers without needing extra motivation; (3) no losses from bad debts since only cash transactions are permitted; and (4) protection against fraud regarding the quality of goods, as there's no incentive to profit from tampering. It's often noted that the capital is circulated ten times in a year, while the management costs in the wholesale Rochdale stores are less than one percent of the returns.
The arrangement of obligations in due order of their priority, which has been recommended by Mr. Holyoake,319 is as follows: of funds in the store, payment should be made, (1) of the expenses of management; (2) of interest due on all loans; (3) of an amount equivalent to ten per cent of the value of the fixed stock to cover the annual depreciation from wear and tear; (4) of dividends on the subscribed capital of the members;320 (5) of such a sum as may be necessary for an extension of the business; (6) of two and a half per cent of the remaining profit, after all the above items are provided for, for educational purposes; (7) of the residue, and that only, among all the persons employed, and members of the store, in proportion to the amount of their wages, or of their respective purchases during the quarter.321 The payment of dividends to customers on their purchases seems now to be considered an essential element of success.
The order of obligations according to their priority, as suggested by Mr. Holyoake,319is as follows: funds in the store should be allocated for payment in this order: (1) management expenses; (2) interest owed on all loans; (3) an amount equal to ten percent of the fixed stock's value to cover annual wear and tear depreciation; (4) dividends on the members' subscribed capital;320(5) any amount needed for business growth; (6) two and a half percent of the leftover profit, after accounting for all the above items, for educational purposes; (7) the rest will be shared only among employees and store members, based on their salaries or their purchases during the quarter.321Rewarding customers with dividends based on their purchases is now seen as essential for success.
§ 5. Productive Collaboration.
Productive co-operation presents many serious difficulties, the chief of which is the need of managing ability. Some one in the association must know the wholesale markets well, the expectation of crops connected with his materials used, the proper time to buy; he must know the processes of the special production thoroughly, the best machinery, the best adaptation of labor to the given end; he must know the whims of purchasers, and be ready to change his products accordingly—in short, a man eminently fitted for success in his own factory is essential to the profitable management of one belonging to a body of co-operators. It has been already seen how large a variation in profit is due to manager's wages; and it is very often only his skill, prudence, and experience that make the difference between a failure and a success in business. Unless co-operators are willing to pay as large a sum for the services of a good manager as he could get in his own [pg 527] establishment, they can not secure the talent which will make their venture succeed.322
Working together effectively comes with many significant challenges, with the main one being the need for strong management skills. Someone in the organization needs to have a solid understanding of the wholesale markets, anticipate crop yields related to the materials used, and know the right time to make purchases. They should be knowledgeable about the specific production processes, the best machinery, and how to use labor effectively for the desired outcome. They also need to understand buyer preferences and be ready to adjust their products accordingly—in short, having a highly qualified person for success in their own factory is crucial for the profitable management of a cooperative enterprise. It has already been shown how much profit can vary due to the wages of the manager; often, it is their skill, judgment, and experience that make the difference between failure and success in business. Unless cooperators are willing to pay as much for a good manager as they could earn in their own company, they won't be able to attract the talent that will lead to their success.322
In France the national workshops of Louis Blanc, established in 1848, were a failure. Nowhere has it been more clearly seen that state help has been disastrous than in France, where the Constituent Assembly voted 3,000,000 francs for co-operative experiments, all of which failed. Curiously enough, distributive co-operation has not succeeded in France, because, owing to a wide-spread dislike of the wages system, workmen will try nothing less than productive schemes. And their success in this has been no greater than might be expected, when inexperience is put to a task beyond its powers.323
In France, the national workshops established by Louis Blanc in 1848 ended in failure. It's evident that government support has been a disaster, especially in France, where the Constituent Assembly allocated 3,000,000 francs for cooperative projects, none of which succeeded. Notably, distributive cooperation has failed in France because workers, due to a strong dislike for the wage system, refuse to consider anything less than productive schemes. Their performance in this area has been as poor as expected, given that inexperience is faced with tasks that exceed its abilities.323
In Great Britain and the United States there have been some successful experiments in production; and Mr. Holyoake324 holds that, although workmen certainly do begrudge the manager's salary, productive associations are possible when managed by a board of elected directors. He urges, moreover, that, as in distributive co-operation, if profits are shared with customers, there will be insured both popularity and continuity of custom without the cost of advertising, and such expenses as those of travelers and commissions. The plan of actual operations upon which successes have been reached in England seems to be briefly this: (1) To save capital, chiefly through co-operative associations; (2) to purchase or lease premises; (3) to engage managers, accountants, and officers at the ordinary salaries which such men can command in the market according to their ability; (4) to borrow capital on the credit of the association; (5) to pay upon capital subscribed by members the same rate of interest as that upon borrowed capital; (6) to regard as profit only that which remains after making payment for rent, materials, wages, all business outlays, and interest on capital; and (7) to divide the profits according to the salaries of all officers, wages of workmen, and purchases of customers. Those mills and factories which have sprung out of the extension of distributive associations, as at Rochdale, seem, and naturally so, to have been most successful. They have gradually trained themselves somewhat for the work, and their customers were beforehand secured. That is, where the difficulties of the manager's function have been lessened, they have a better chance of success. And yet it must be said that productive associations will gain largely from the efficiency of the labor when working for its own interest; and this is an important consideration to be urged in favor of such associations.
In Great Britain and the United States, there have been some successful experiments in production, and Mr. Holyoake324believes that, even though employees often envy the manager's salary, productive associations can succeed under a board of elected directors. He also notes that, similar to cooperative distribution, sharing profits with customers can create both popularity and steady business without needing advertising or additional costs like travel and commissions. The successful approach seen in England can be summarized as follows: (1) Save capital mainly through cooperative associations; (2) Buy or lease facilities; (3) Hire managers, accountants, and officers at competitive market salaries for their skills; (4) Borrow capital based on the association's credit; (5) Pay members the same interest rate on their invested capital as that on borrowed funds; (6) Consider only what’s left after covering rent, materials, wages, all business expenses, and interest on capital as profit; and (7) Distribute profits based on the salaries of all officers, wages of workers, and purchases made by customers. The mills and factories that have emerged from the growth of distribution associations, like those in Rochdale, are understandably among the most successful. They have slowly prepared for the work, and their customers were already secured. In other words, where the challenges of management have been minimized, there’s a better chance of achieving success. Still, it’s important to highlight that productive associations greatly benefit from workers being more efficient when they are working for their own interests; this is a key argument supporting such associations.
The Sun Mill,325 at Oldham, England, was established for spinning cotton in 1861 by the exertions of some co-operative bodies. Beginning with a share capital of $250,000, and a loan capital of a like amount, it set 80,000 spindles in operation. In 1874 they had a share capital of $375,000 (all subscribed except $1,000), and an equal amount of loan capital, while the whole plant was estimated as worth $615,000. Two and a half per cent per annum has been set apart for the depreciation in the value of the mill, and seven and a half per cent for the machinery; so that in the first ten years a total sum of $160,000 was set aside for depreciation of the property. The profits have varied from two to forty per cent; and, while only five per cent interest was paid on the loan capital, large dividends were made on the share capital. During the last few years the Sun Mill has on an average realized a profit of 12-½ per cent, although it is known that the cotton trade has suffered during this time from a serious depression.
The Sun Mill,325In Oldham, England, operations began in 1861 for spinning cotton due to the efforts of several cooperative groups. It started with a share capital of $250,000 and an equal amount in loans, using 80,000 spindles. By 1874, the share capital increased to $375,000 (with almost all of it subscribed except for $1,000), along with the same amount in loans, while the total value of the plant was $615,000. They set aside 2.5% per year for the mill's depreciation and 7.5% for the machinery, totaling $160,000 reserved for property depreciation over the first ten years. Profits ranged from 2% to 40%, and although only 5% interest was paid on the loan capital, significant dividends were given to shareholders. In recent years, Sun Mill has averaged a profit of 12.5%, even though it's acknowledged that the cotton industry faced a major downturn during this time.
Many experiments, however, have proved failures; and sometimes, when they are successful (as in the case of the Hatters' Association in Newark, New Jersey326), the workmen have no desire to share their benefits with others, and practically form a corporation by themselves. The mere fact that they do sometimes succeed is an important thing. Then, too, they have an opportunity of securing by salaries that executive ability in the community which exists separate from the possession of capital. And in these days, in large corporations, the manager is not necessarily (although he often is) a large owner of capital. The last annual report of the Co-operative Congress (1882) shows the existence in England and Scotland of productive associations for the manufacture of cloth, flannel, fustian, hosiery, quilts, worsted, nails, watches, linen, and silk, as well as those for engineering, printing, and quarrying; and these were but a few of them.327
Many experiments, however, have turned out to be failures; and sometimes, when they are successful (like the Hatters' Association in Newark, New Jersey)326The workers aren't interested in sharing their benefits with others, effectively creating their own corporation. The fact that they occasionally succeed is important. They also have the opportunity to gain leadership skills within the community that don't depend on owning capital, as salaries allow for this development. Nowadays, in large corporations, a manager is not always (though often is) a major capital owner. The most recent annual report from the Co-operative Congress (1882) points out the presence of productive associations in England and Scotland that manufacture cloth, flannel, fustian, hosiery, quilts, worsted, nails, watches, linen, and silk, along with industries like engineering, printing, and quarrying; these are just a few examples.327
In the United States there have been some successes as well as failures. In January, 1872, a number of machinists and other working-men organized in the town of Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, a Co-operative Foundry Association for the manufacture of stoves, hollow-ware, and fine castings. On a small capital of only $4,000 they have steadily prospered, paid the market rate of wages, and also paid annual dividends, over and above all expenses and interest on the plant, of from twelve to fifteen per cent. In 1867 thirty workmen started a co-operative foundry in Somerset, Massachusetts, with a capital of about $14,000. [pg 529] In the years 1874-1875 the company spent $5,400 for new flasks and patterns, and yet showed a net gain of $11,914. In 1876 it had a capital of $30,000, and a surplus fund of $28,924.328
In the United States, there have been both successes and failures. In January 1872, several machinists and other workers formed a Co-operative Foundry Association in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, to produce stoves, hollow-ware, and high-quality castings. With just $4,000 in capital, they thrived, offered competitive wages, and distributed annual dividends of twelve to fifteen percent after covering all expenses and interest on the facility. In 1867, thirty workers launched a co-operative foundry in Somerset, Massachusetts, with around $14,000 in capital.[pg 529]In 1874-1875, the company invested $5,400 in new flasks and patterns, but still reported a net profit of $11,914. By 1876, it had a capital of $30,000 and a surplus fund of $28,924.328
§ 6. Business Partnership.
The difficulties of productive co-operation arising from the need of skilled management, together with the existing unsatisfactory relation between employers and laborers when wholly separate from each other, have led to a most promising plan of industrial partnership by which the manager retains the control of the business operations, but shares his profits with the workmen. The gain through increased efficiency, greater economy, and superior workmanship, recoups the manager for the voluntary subtraction from his share, and yet the laborers receive an additional share; but more than this, it educates the laborer in industrial methods, discloses the difficulties of management, and stimulates him to saving habits and greater regularity of work. This system is particularly adapted to reaching those laborers who would not themselves rise to the demands of productive co-operation.
The challenges of effective teamwork due to the need for skilled management, combined with the poor relationship between employers and employees when they operate independently, have led to an innovative plan for industrial partnership. In this plan, the manager still oversees business operations but shares profits with the employees. The gains from improved efficiency, better cost management, and higher quality work offset the manager's reduced share, while the employees get an additional portion too. More importantly, this approach educates employees about industrial processes, highlights the complexities of management, and promotes better saving habits and consistency in their work. This system is particularly suitable for those workers who may struggle to meet the demands of productive teamwork on their own.
The principle was tried on one of the Belgian railways. “Ninety-five kilogrammes of coke were consumed for every league of distance run, but this was known to be more than necessary; but how to remedy the evil was the problem. A bonus of 3-½d. on every hectolitre of coke saved on this average of ninety-five to the league was offered to the men concerned, and this trifling bonus worked the miracle. The work was done equally well, or better, with forty-eight kilogrammes of coke instead of ninety-five; just one half, or nearly, saved by careful work, at an expense of probably less than one tenth of the saving.”329
The principle was tested on a Belgian train line.“Ninety-five kilograms of coke were required for every league of distance traveled, but it was obvious that this amount was excessive; the challenge was finding a solution. A bonus of 3-½d. for each hectolitre of coke saved from the average of ninety-five to the league was offered to the workers, and this small incentive led to impressive results. The work was completed just as effectively, or even better, with only forty-eight kilograms of coke instead of ninety-five; that’s nearly half saved through careful effort, at a cost likely less than one-tenth of the savings.”329
The experiment which has attracted most attention in the past has been that of the Messrs. Briggs, at their collieries in Yorkshire, England.330 The relations between the owners and the laborers were as bad as they could well be. “All coal-masters is devils, and Briggs is the prince of devils,” ran the talk of the miners, when they did not choose to send letters threatening to shoot the owners. In 1865 Messrs. Briggs tried the plan of an industrial partnership with their men, purely from business considerations. Seventy per cent of the cost of raising coal consisted of wages, and fully fifteen per cent of materials which were habitually wasted. The whole property [pg 530] was valued, and divided into shares of $50 each, of which the owners retained two thirds, together with the control of the business. The remaining one third of the shares was offered to the employés. If any subscriber was too poor to pay $50 for a share, the subsequent dividends and payments were to be applied to purchasing the share. After reserving a fair allowance for expenses, like the redemption of capital, whenever the remaining profits exceeded ten per cent on the capital, that excess was to be divided into two equal parts, one of which was to be distributed among all persons employed by the company in proportion to their wages, and the other was to be retained by the capital. In previous years but once had they made ten per cent profit on their capital, and twice only five per cent. In the first year after the new system came into operation, the total profits were fourteen per cent, and the four per cent of excess was divided, two to the laborers' bonus, and two to the capital, so that capital received twelve per cent. In the second year the profits were sixteen per cent, in the third year seventeen per cent; the first year the work-people received in addition to their wages $9,000, in the second $13,500, in the third $15,750. The moral effect was striking. Work was done regularly, forbearance was exercised, habits improved, and the faces of the men were set toward improvement in life. The scheme worked successfully for years, but was finally ended by the pressure of the outside trades-unions, who compelled the workmen to give up the arrangement.
The experiment that grabbed the most attention in the past was conducted by the Briggs family at their coal mines in Yorkshire, England.330The relationship between the owners and the workers was as terrible as it could get.“All coal bosses are terrible, and Briggs is the worst of them all,”was what the miners said when they weren't writing letters threatening to shoot the owners. In 1865, the Briggs family decided to try an industrial partnership with their workers purely for business reasons. Seventy percent of the cost of mining coal was wages, and about fifteen percent was materials that were often wasted. The entire property was valued and divided into shares of $50 each, with the owners keeping two-thirds along with control of the business. The remaining one-third of the shares was offered to the employees. If any worker couldn't afford the $50 for a share, the dividends and payments would go toward buying the share. After setting aside a reasonable amount for expenses, such as capital repayment, any profits exceeding ten percent on the capital were to be split evenly—half distributed among all employees based on their wages, and the other half kept by the capital. In previous years, they had only once made a ten percent profit on their capital, and twice only five percent. In the first year after the new system was implemented, total profits reached fourteen percent, and the four percent excess was split equally, giving two to the workers' bonus and two to the capital, meaning capital received twelve percent. In the second year, profits were sixteen percent, and in the third year, seventeen percent; in the first year, the workers received an additional $9,000 on top of their wages, $13,500 in the second, and $15,750 in the third. The moral impact was significant. Work was done regularly, patience was shown, habits improved, and the workers were focused on bettering their lives. The scheme was successful for many years but eventually ended due to pressure from outside trade unions that forced the workers to abandon the agreement.
A similar experiment was tried by the Messrs. Brewster, carriage-manufacturers, of New York. They offered to their workmen ten per cent of their profits, before any allowance was made for interest on the capital invested, or before any payment was made for the services of the firm as managers. In one year as much as $11,000 was divided among the laborers. Again, as in the case of the Briggs colliery, the experiment was brought to an end by an unreasoning submission to the pressure of outside workmen during a strike.331
A similar experiment was tried by the Brewster brothers, who made carriages in New York. They promised their workers ten percent of their profits, before any deductions for interest on the invested capital or payments for the firm's management services. In one year, $11,000 was shared among the laborers. However, similar to what happened at the Briggs colliery, the experiment ended because of unreasonable pressure from outside workers during a strike.331
But, all in all, industrial partnership332 offers a great field for [pg 531] that kind of improvement which is worth more than a mere increase of wages, and seems to make it possible to reach the heavy weight of sluggishness among the lower and more hopeless strata of society. And it is possible that it will stir in them the powers which may afterward find employment in the harder problems of productive co-operation.333
Overall, industry partnerships332offer a great opportunity for[pg 531]improvements that offer more value than simply higher wages, and they appear to address the deep-seated laziness present in the lower and more discouraged segments of society. This could potentially awaken their potential, which might later be used to tackle the more complex challenges of productive cooperation.333
§ 7. Community Banks.
In Germany the struggle between the two theories—self-help and state-help—was fought out by Schultze-Delitsch—that is, Schultze of Delitsch, a town in Saxony—and Lasalle, and the victory given to the former. Schultze-Delitsch, as a consequence, was successful in directing the co-operative principle in Germany to giving workmen credit in purchasing tools, etc., when he had no security but his character. This form of co-operation works to give the energetic and industrious workmen a lever by which, through the possession of credit, they can raise themselves to the position of small capitalists, and thus widen the field of possible improvement. While the former schemes of co-operation described above have given the wages-receivers a share of the unearned increment from land, and tend to give them a share of the manager's wages, the plan of Schultze was to assist them to gain a share in the advantages belonging to the possession of capital. The capital was to be accumulated by their own exertions, and, in his scheme depended on the principle of self-help. The following is the plan of banks adopted:
In Germany, the conflict between two approaches—self-help and state-help—was led by Schultze-Delitsch, often called Schultze after his hometown in Saxony, and Lasalle, with Schultze ultimately prevailing. As a result, Schultze-Delitsch successfully implemented the co-operative principle in Germany to provide workers with credit for buying tools and other essentials, relying solely on his character as collateral. This kind of cooperation enables hardworking and ambitious workers to acquire the resources needed to improve their status to that of small capitalists, thus broadening their opportunities for advancement. Whereas earlier cooperative schemes allowed wage earners to benefit from unearned income from land and aimed to give them a share of managers' wages, Schultze focused on helping them earn a stake in the profits that come from owning capital. This capital was to be built through their own efforts and was founded on the principle of self-help. The following is the banking plan that was adopted:
“Every member is obliged to make a certain weekly payment into the common stock. As soon as it reaches a certain sum he is allowed to raise a loan exceeding his share in the inverse ratio of the amount of his deposit. For instance, after he has deposited one dollar, he is allowed to borrow five or six; but, if he had deposited twenty dollars, he is allowed only to borrow thirty. The security he is compelled to offer is his own and that of two other members of the association, who become jointly and severally liable. He may have no assets whatever beyond the amount of his deposits, nor may his guarantors; the bank relies simply on the character of the three, and the two securities rely on the character of their principal; and the remarkable fact is, that the security has been found sufficient, that the interest of the men in the institutions and the fear of the opinion of their fellows has produced a display of honesty and punctuality such as perhaps is not to be found in the history of any other banking institutions. Such is the confidence inspired by these institutions that they hold on deposit, or as loans from third parties, an amount exceeding by more than three fourths the total amount of their own capital. The [pg 533] monthly contributions of the members may be as low as ten cents, but the amount which each member is allowed to have in some banks is not more than seven or eight dollars, in none more than three hundred dollars. He has a right to borrow to the full amount of his deposit without giving security; if he desires to borrow a larger sum, he must furnish security in the manner we have described. The liability of the members is unlimited. The plan of limiting the liability to the amount of the capital deposited was tried at first, but it inspired no confidence, and the enterprise did not succeed till every member was made generally liable. Each member, on entering, is obliged to pay a small fee, which goes toward forming or maintaining a reserve fund, apart from the active capital. The profits are derived from the interest paid by borrowers, which amounts to from eight to ten per cent, which may not sound very large in our ears, but in Germany is very high. Not over five per cent is paid on capital borrowed from outsiders. All profits are distributed in dividends among the members of the association, in the proportion of the amount of their deposits—after the payment of the expenses of management, of course—and the apportionment of a certain percentage to the reserve-fund. Every member, as we have said, has a right to borrow to the extent of his deposit without security; but then, if he seeks to borrow more, whether he shall obtain any loan, and, if so, how large a one, is decided by the board of management, who are guided in making their decision just as all bank officers are—by a consideration of the circumstances of the bank as well as those of the borrower. All the affairs of the association are discussed and decided in the last resort by a general assembly composed of all the members.”334 The main part of the capital loaned by the banks is obtained from outside sources on the credit of the associations. In 1865 there were 961 of these institutions in Germany; in 1877 there were 1,827, with over 1,000,000 members, owning $40,000,000 of capital, with $100,000,000 more on loan, and doing a business of $550,000,000.335
“Every member needs to make a weekly contribution to the common fund. Once their contributions reach a certain amount, they can take out a loan that exceeds their share, based on the inverse ratio of their deposit. For example, if they deposit one dollar, they can borrow five or six; but if they deposit twenty dollars, they can only borrow thirty. The collateral they need to provide includes their own and that of two other group members, who become jointly responsible. They cannot have any assets beyond their deposits, nor can their guarantors; the bank relies solely on the character of these three individuals. Remarkably, this security has proven sufficient, as the members' commitment to the institution and their concern for how peers view them have led to honesty and punctuality likely unmatched in other banking institutions. These institutions inspire such confidence that they manage deposits or loans from outside parties exceeding three times their own capital. The [pg 533] monthly contributions can be as low as ten cents, but the maximum each member is allowed in some banks is about seven or eight dollars, and no more than three hundred dollars in total. Members can borrow up to the full amount of their deposit without providing collateral; for larger loans, they must offer security as described earlier. Members have unlimited liability. Initially, the plan to limit liability to the amount deposited did not inspire confidence, so the system only worked once every member was made fully liable. Each member must pay a small fee upon joining, which helps create or maintain a reserve fund separate from the active capital. Profits come from the interest paid by borrowers, which ranges from eight to ten percent—seemingly modest to us, but considered high in Germany. Outside borrowed capital pays no more than five percent. All profits are shared as dividends among the members in proportion to their deposits, after covering management expenses and allocating a portion to the reserve fund. As noted, every member has the right to borrow up to their deposit amount without collateral. However, if they want to borrow more, the management board decides whether and how much they can borrow, taking into account both the bank's situation and the borrower's circumstances. Ultimately, the general assembly made up of all members discusses and decides all matters of the association.”334Most of the capital lent by banks comes from external sources based on the associations' credit. In 1865, there were 961 of these institutions in Germany; by 1877, that number had grown to 1,827, with over 1,000,000 members, holding $40,000,000 in capital, $100,000,000 more in loans, and handling business worth $550,000,000.335
Book V. On the Influence of Government.
Chapter I. On the General Principles of Taxation.
§ 1. Four basic rules of taxation.
One of the most disputed questions, both in political science and in practical statesmanship at this particular period, relates to the proper limits of the functions and agency of governments.
One of the most debated questions in political science and practical governance right now is about the appropriate limits of government functions and authority.
We shall first consider the economical effects arising from the manner in which governments perform their necessary and acknowledged functions.
We will first look at the economic effects that come from the way governments carry out their essential and recognized functions.
We shall then pass to certain governmental interferences of what I have termed the optional kind (i.e., overstepping the boundaries of the universally acknowledged functions) which have heretofore taken place, and in some cases still take place, under the influence of false general theories.
We will then move on to some government actions that I refer to as optional (i.e., going beyond the limits of the widely accepted functions) that have happened in the past, and in some cases still happen, due to misguided general theories.
The first of these divisions is of an extremely miscellaneous character: since the necessary functions of government, and those which are so manifestly expedient that they have never or very rarely been objected to, are too various to be brought under any very simple classification. We commence, [under] the first head, with the theory of Taxation.
The first of these divisions is quite varied: the essential functions of government, along with those that are clearly beneficial and have hardly ever faced opposition, are too diverse to fit into any straightforward classification. We start, [under] the first head, with the theory of Taxation.
The qualities desirable, economically speaking, in a system of taxation, have been embodied by Adam Smith in four maxims or principles, which, having been generally concurred in by subsequent writers, may be said to have become [pg 538] classical, and this chapter can not be better commenced than by quoting them:336
The qualities that are desirable from an economic standpoint in a tax system have been summarized by Adam Smith in four maxims or principles. These principles have been widely agreed upon by later authors and can be considered classical. This chapter can start best by quoting them:336
“1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities: that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. In the observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation.
1. Citizens of every state should support the government according to their individual abilities, meaning in relation to the income they earn under the protection of the state. How closely this principle is followed or disregarded determines the fairness or unfairness of taxation.
“2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty.
"2. The tax that each person must pay should be clear and not arbitrary. The due date, payment method, and amount owed should be obvious to both the taxpayer and others. The certainty of what each person has to pay is so important in taxation that, based on my observations from all countries, a significant amount of inequality appears to be much less harmful than even a small degree of uncertainty."
“3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient to him. He pays them little by little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty, too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconvenience from such taxes.
“3. Every tax should be collected at a time or in a way that is most convenient for the person paying it. Taxes on luxury items are ultimately paid by the consumer, typically in a way that works well for them. They pay gradually as they buy these items. Because they have the choice to buy or not, it’s their own responsibility if they ever face significant inconvenience from these taxes.”
“4. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury in the four following ways: First, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon [pg 539] the people.” Secondly, it may divert a portion of the labor and capital of the community from a more to a less productive employment. “Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have derived from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling. Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression”: to which may be added that the restrictive regulations to which trades and manufactures are often subjected, to prevent evasion of a tax, are not only in themselves troublesome and expensive, but often oppose insuperable obstacles to making improvements in the processes.
“4. Every tax should be structured to take as little money as possible from the people, except for what it adds to the state’s public treasury. A tax can end up taking more from the people than it contributes to the public treasury in four main ways: First, collecting it may require a lot of officials whose salaries can use up a large portion of the tax revenue, and their benefits may impose an extra burden on the people.” Secondly, it can divert labor and resources from more productive activities to less productive ones. "Third, the fines and penalties imposed on those who unsuccessfully try to evade the tax can often ruin them, eliminating the potential benefits the community could have gained from their investments. A poorly designed tax creates a strong incentive for smuggling. Fourth, subjecting people to frequent visits and invasive inspections by tax collectors can cause them a lot of unnecessary hassle, frustration, and oppression.": Additionally, the restrictive regulations that businesses and industries often face to prevent tax evasion are not only burdensome and costly but can also create significant obstacles to improving processes.
§ 2. Reasons for the principle of Equality of Taxation.
The first of the four points, equality of taxation, requires to be more fully examined, being a thing often imperfectly understood, and on which many false notions have become to a certain degree accredited, through the absence of any definite principles of judgment in the popular mind.
The first of the four points, equality of taxation, needs to be looked at more closely, as it is often misunderstood, and many misconceptions have gained some acceptance due to a lack of clear principles in the public's understanding.
For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? For the reason that it ought to be so in all affairs of government. A government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their claims on it. If any one bears less than his fair share of the burden, some other person must suffer more than his share. Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics, means equality of sacrifice. It means apportioning the contribution of each person toward the expenses of government, so that he shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment than every other person experiences from his. There are persons, however, who regard the taxes paid by each member of the community as an equivalent for value received, in the shape of service to himself; and they prefer to rest the justice of making each contribute in proportion to his means upon the ground that he who has [pg 540] twice as much property to be protected receives, on an accurate calculation, twice as much protection, and ought, on the principles of bargain and sale, to pay twice as much for it. Since, however, the assumption that government exists solely for the protection of property is not one to be deliberately adhered to, some consistent adherents of the quid pro quo principle go on to observe that protection being required for persons as well as property, and everybody's person receiving the same amount of protection, a poll-tax of a fixed sum per head is a proper equivalent for this part of the benefits of government, while the remaining part, protection to property, should be paid for in proportion to property. But, in the first place, it is not admissible that the protection of persons and that of property are the sole purposes of government. In the second place, the practice of setting definite values on things essentially indefinite, and making them a ground of practical conclusions, is peculiarly fertile in the false views of social questions. It can not be admitted that to be protected in the ownership of ten times as much property is to be ten times as much protected. If we wanted to estimate the degrees of benefit which different persons derive from the protection of government, we should have to consider who would suffer most if that protection were withdrawn: to which question, if any answer could be made, it must be, that those would suffer most who were weakest in mind or body, either by nature or by position.
Why should equality be the standard in taxation? Because it should apply to all aspects of government. A government shouldn't favor individuals or groups based on their status. If someone pays less than their fair share, then another person has to bear a heavier burden. Therefore, equality in taxation, as a political principle, means equality in sacrifice. It involves distributing each person's contribution toward government expenses so that no one feels more or less burdened by their share than anyone else does by theirs. However, some people see the taxes paid by each community member as a return for the value received in terms of services rendered to them. They argue that it’s fair for each person to contribute according to their means, on the basis that someone with twice as much property to protect gets, by logical calculation, twice as much protection and should thus pay twice as much for it. However, the idea that government exists solely to protect property is a narrow view. Some loyal proponents of the exchange principle point out that since protection is needed for both people and property, and everyone receives the same level of personal protection, a flat tax per person is a fair way to cover this aspect of government benefits, while the protection of property should be paid based on one's property value. But first, it's not acceptable to say that protecting individuals and protecting property are the only goals of government. Second, trying to assign specific values to things that are essentially flexible and then using them as a basis for concrete conclusions often leads to misunderstanding social issues. It's unreasonable to claim that being protected in the ownership of ten times as much property means being ten times as protected. If we were to assess the varying benefits individuals receive from government protection, we would need to determine who would suffer the most if that protection were taken away. In response to that question, it must be said that those who would suffer the most are the ones weakest in body or mind, whether by nature or circumstance.
§ 3. Should the same percentage be applied to all amounts of income?
Setting out, then, from the maxim that equal sacrifices ought to be demanded from all, we have next to inquire whether this is in fact done, by making each contribute the same percentage on his pecuniary means. Many persons maintain the negative, saying that a tenth part taken from a small income is a heavier burden than the same fraction deducted from one much larger; and on this is grounded the very popular scheme of what is called a graduated property-tax, viz., an income-tax in which the percentage rises with the amount of the income.
Starting from the principle that everyone should make equal sacrifices, we now need to examine whether this actually happens by having each person contribute the same percentage of their financial resources. Many people argue against this, claiming that taking ten percent from a small income is a heavier burden than taking the same percentage from a much larger income. This belief supports the widely accepted idea of a graduated property tax, which is an income tax where the percentage increases with the amount of income.
On the best consideration I am able to give to this question, [pg 541] it appears to me that the portion of truth which the doctrine contains arises principally from the difference between a tax which can be saved from luxuries and one which trenches, in ever so small a degree, upon the necessaries of life. To take a thousand a year from the possessor of ten thousand would not deprive him of anything really conducive either to the support or to the comfort of existence; and, if such would be the effect of taking five pounds from one whose income is fifty, the sacrifice required from the last is not only greater than, but entirely incommensurable with, that imposed upon the first. The mode of adjusting these inequalities of pressure which seems to be the most equitable is that recommended by Bentham, of leaving a certain minimum of income, sufficient to provide the necessaries of life, untaxed. Suppose [$250] a year to be sufficient to provide the number of persons ordinarily supported from a single income with the requisites of life and health, and with protection against habitual bodily suffering, but not with any indulgence. This then should be made the minimum, and incomes exceeding it should pay taxes not upon their whole amount, but upon the surplus. If the tax be ten per cent, an income of [$300] should be considered as a net income of [$50], and charged with [$5] a year, while an income of [$5,000] should be charged as one of [$4,750]. An income not exceeding [$250] should not be taxed at all, either directly or by taxes on necessaries; for, as by supposition this is the smallest income which labor ought to be able to command, the government ought not to be a party to making it smaller.
After considering this question carefully, [pg 541] it seems to me that the truth in this doctrine mainly comes from the difference between a tax that targets luxuries and one that affects, even slightly, the essentials of life. Taking a thousand a year from someone with ten thousand wouldn’t really deprive them of anything important for their survival or comfort. On the other hand, if taking five pounds from someone earning fifty means a bigger sacrifice for them compared to the first person, the burden on them is not just greater; it's completely disproportionate. The fairest way to address these inequalities, as Bentham suggests, is to leave a certain minimum income, enough to cover the essentials of life, untaxed. Let’s say [$250] a year is enough to provide for an average household's needs for life and health without any luxuries. This should be the minimum, and anyone earning above it should only pay taxes on the amount over that. If the tax rate is ten percent, an income of [$300] would be treated as a net income of [$50], incurring a tax of [$5] a year, while someone earning [$5,000] would have a taxable income of [$4,750]. Any income not exceeding [$250] should be completely tax-exempt, whether directly or through taxes on necessities; since this is assumed to be the minimum that a person should earn from labor, the government shouldn't contribute to making it any smaller.
Both in England and on the Continent a graduated property-tax (l'impôt progressif) has been advocated, on the avowed ground that the state should use the instrument of taxation as a means of mitigating the inequalities of wealth. I am as desirous as any one that means should be taken to diminish those inequalities, but not so as to relieve the prodigal at the expense of the prudent. To tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the smaller is to lay a tax on industry and economy; to impose a penalty on people for [pg 542] having worked harder and saved more than their neighbors. It is not the fortunes which are earned, but those which are unearned, that it is for the public good to place under limitation. With respect to the large fortunes acquired by gift or inheritance, the power of bequeathing is one of those privileges of property which are fit subjects for regulation on grounds of general expediency; and I have already suggested,337 as the most eligible mode of restraining the accumulation of large fortunes in the hands of those who have not earned them by exertion, a limitation of the amount which any one person should be permitted to acquire by gift, bequest, or inheritance. I conceive that inheritances and legacies, exceeding a certain amount, are highly proper subjects for taxation; and that the revenue from them should be as great as it can be made without giving rise to evasions, by donation inter vivos or concealment of property, such as it would be impossible adequately to check. The principle of graduation (as it is called), that is, of levying a larger percentage on a larger sum, though its application to general taxation would be in my opinion objectionable, seems to me both just and expedient as applied to legacy and inheritance duties.
Both in England and on the Continent, a graduated property tax (progressive tax) has been promoted, with the clear intention that the state should use taxation to reduce wealth inequalities. I want to see steps taken to lessen those inequalities just as much as anyone else, but not in a way that rewards the reckless at the cost of the responsible. Taxing higher incomes at a greater percentage than lower ones penalizes hard work and saving; it punishes those who have worked harder and saved more than others. It’s the fortunes that are unearned, not those earned, that should be limited for the public good. Regarding the large fortunes gained through gifts or inheritance, the ability to leave money to others is one of those property privileges that should be regulated for the greater good. I’ve already suggested, 337, that the best way to limit the concentration of large fortunes in the hands of those who didn’t earn them is to cap the amount any one person can receive through gifts, bequests, or inheritances. I believe that inheritances and legacies over a certain amount are very appropriate subjects for taxation, and the revenue from them should be maximized as much as possible without encouraging evasion through gifts while alive or hiding property, which would be difficult to monitor effectively. The principle of graduation (as it is called), which means charging a higher percentage on larger sums, would be objectionable if applied to general taxation, but seems just and practical when it comes to duties on legacies and inheritances.
The objection to a graduated property-tax applies in an aggravated degree to the proposition of an exclusive tax on what is called “realized property,” that is, property not forming a part of any capital engaged in business, or rather in business under the superintendence of the owner; as land, the public funds, money lent on mortgage, and shares in stock companies. Except the proposal of applying a sponge to the national debt, no such palpable violation of common honesty has found sufficient support in this country, during the present generation, to be regarded as within the domain of discussion. It has not the palliation of a graduated property-tax, that of laying the burden on those best able to bear it; for “realized property” includes the far larger portion of [pg 543] the provision made for those who are unable to work, and consists, in great part, of extremely small fractions. I can hardly conceive a more shameless pretension than that the major part of the property of the country, that of merchants, manufacturers, farmers, and shopkeepers, should be exempted from its share of taxation; that these classes should only begin to pay their proportion after retiring from business, and if they never retire should be excused from it altogether. But even this does not give an adequate idea of the injustice of the proposition. The burden thus exclusively thrown on the owners of the smaller portion of the wealth of the community would not even be a burden on that class of persons in perpetual succession, but would fall exclusively on those who happened to compose it when the tax was laid on. As land and those particular securities would thenceforth yield a smaller net income, relatively to the general interest of capital and to the profits of trade, the balance would rectify itself by a permanent depreciation of those kinds of property. Future buyers would acquire land and securities at a reduction of price, equivalent to the peculiar tax, which tax they would, therefore, escape from paying; while the original possessors would remain burdened with it even after parting with the property, since they would have sold their land or securities at a loss of value equivalent to the fee-simple of the tax. Its imposition would thus be tantamount to the confiscation for public uses of a percentage of their property equal to the percentage laid on their income by the tax.
The objection to a graduated property tax is even stronger when it comes to the idea of a special tax on what’s called "real estate" which means property that isn’t part of any capital tied up in business, or rather, in business overseen by the owner; like land, public funds, money lent on mortgage, and shares in stock companies. Aside from the proposal to erase the national debt, no such clear violation of common honesty has found enough support in this country in recent generations to be considered a topic of discussion. It doesn't have the justification of a graduated property tax, which places the burden on those who can most afford it; because “real estate” includes a much larger portion of the provisions made for those who can’t work, and mainly consists of very small amounts. I can hardly imagine a more outrageous claim than that the majority of the country's property, owned by merchants, manufacturers, farmers, and shopkeepers, should be exempt from its share of taxes; that these groups should only start paying their part after stepping away from business, and if they never retire, should be completely excused from it. But even this doesn’t capture the full injustice of the proposal. The burden would be placed solely on the owners of the smaller portion of the community's wealth and wouldn’t even affect a specific class of people over time, but would only weigh on those who happened to own it when the tax was imposed. As land and those specific securities would then produce a smaller net income compared to the overall interest of capital and the profits of trade, the balance would adjust itself through a permanent decline in the value of those types of property. Future buyers would acquire land and securities at a price reduction equal to the special tax, effectively avoiding responsibility for it; while original owners would remain burdened by it even after selling the property, since they would have sold their land or securities at a value loss equal to the tax they would owe. Imposing this tax would essentially be like confiscating a portion of their property for public use, equal to the percentage of their income that the tax imposes.
§ 4. Should the same percentage be applied to Perpetual and Terminable Incomes?
Whether the profits of trade may not rightfully be taxed at a lower rate than incomes derived from interest or rent is part of the more comprehensive question whether life-incomes should be subjected to the same rate of taxation as perpetual incomes; whether salaries, for example, or annuities, or the gains of professions, should pay the same percentage as the income from inheritable property.
Whether the profits from trade can justifiably be taxed at a lower rate than incomes from interest or rent is part of the broader question of whether life incomes should be taxed at the same rate as perpetual incomes; for instance, whether salaries, annuities, or earnings from professions should be taxed at the same percentage as income from inherited property.
The existing tax [in England] treats all kinds of incomes exactly alike,339 taking its [fivepence] in the pound as well from the person whose income dies with him as from the landholder, stockholder, or mortgagee, who can transmit his fortune undiminished to his descendants. This is a visible injustice; yet it does not arithmetically violate the rule that taxation ought to be in proportion to means. When it is said that a temporary income ought to be taxed less than a permanent one, the reply is irresistible that it is taxed less: for the income which lasts only ten years pays the tax only ten years, while that which lasts forever pays forever. The claim in favor of terminable incomes does not rest on grounds of arithmetic, but of human wants and feelings. It is not because the temporary annuitant has smaller means, but because he has greater necessities, that he ought to be assessed at a lower rate.
The current tax system in England treats all types of income the same, taking its fivepence for every pound from everyone, whether it's from someone whose income ends when they die or from a landowner, stockholder, or mortgagee who can pass down their wealth intact to their heirs. This is a clear injustice; however, it doesn't technically go against the idea that taxation should be relative to one's means. When people argue that temporary income should be taxed at a lower rate than permanent income, the counterargument is clear: it is already taxed less. The income that lasts only ten years is taxed for only those ten years, while income that lasts indefinitely is taxed indefinitely. The argument for lower taxes on temporary income isn’t based on math but rather on human needs and emotions. It’s not that the person receiving temporary income has fewer resources, but rather that they have greater needs, which is why they should be taxed at a lower rate.
In spite of the nominal equality of income, A, an annuitant of £1,000 a year, can not so well afford to pay £100 out of it as B, who derives the same annual sum from heritable property; A having usually a demand on his income which [pg 545] B has not, namely, to provide by saving for children or others; to which, in the case of salaries or professional gains, must generally be added a provision for his own later years; while B may expend his whole income without injury to his old age, and still have it all to bestow on others after his death. If A, in order to meet these exigencies, must lay by £300 of his income, to take £100 from him as income-tax is to take £100 from £700, since it must be retrenched from that part only of his means which he can afford to spend on his own consumption. Were he to throw it ratably on what he spends and on what he saves, abating £70 from his consumption and £30 from his annual saving, then indeed his immediate sacrifice would be proportionally the same as B's; but then his children or his old age would be worse provided for in consequence of the tax. The capital sum which would be accumulated for them would be one tenth less, and on the reduced income afforded by this reduced capital they would be a second time charged with income-tax; while B's heirs would only be charged once.
Despite the seeming equality of income, A, who receives £1,000 a year as an annuitant, can't afford to pay £100 of it as easily as B, who gets the same annual amount from inherited property. A usually has obligations on his income that B doesn’t, such as saving for children or others; in the case of salaries or professional earnings, he often has to think about providing for his own future as well. In contrast, B can spend his entire income without risking his financial stability in old age and can still pass it all on to others after he dies. If A must save £300 of his income to meet these needs, taking £100 as income tax effectively reduces his usable income to £700, since it only comes out of what he can spend on himself. If he spread the tax evenly across what he spends and saves, cutting £70 from his consumption and £30 from his annual savings, his immediate sacrifice would be proportionate to B's; however, this would leave his children or his own future less secure because of the tax. The total amount saved for them would be reduced by one-tenth, and on that diminished income from the smaller capital, they would again face income tax, while B's heirs would only pay it once.
The principle, therefore, of equality of taxation, interpreted in its only just sense, equality of sacrifice, requires that a person who has no means of providing for old age, or for those in whom he is interested, except by saving from income, should have the tax remitted on all that part of his income which is really and bona fide applied to that purpose.
The principle of equal taxation, understood in its rightful context as equal sacrifice, demands that a person who has no way of preparing for retirement or supporting those they care about except by saving from their income should have the tax waived on the portion of their income that is genuinely and genuine used for that purpose.
If, indeed, reliance could be placed on the conscience of the contributors, or sufficient security taken for the correctness of their statements by collateral precautions, the proper mode of assessing an income-tax would be to tax only the part of income devoted to expenditure, exempting that which is saved. For when saved and invested (and all savings, speaking generally, are invested) it thenceforth pays income-tax on the interest or profit which it brings, notwithstanding that it has already been taxed on the principal. Unless, therefore, savings are exempted from income-tax, the contributors are twice taxed on what they save, and only [pg 546] once on what they spend. To tax the sum invested, and afterward tax also the proceeds of the investment, is to tax the same portion of the contributor's means twice over.
If we can really trust the honesty of the contributors, or if we take enough precautions to ensure their statements are correct, the best way to assess an income tax would be to tax only the portion of income that is spent, while excluding what is saved. Because when savings are put away and invested (and generally, all savings are invested), they then generate income that is taxed on the interest or profit it earns, even though the principal amount was already taxed. So, unless savings are exempt from income tax, contributors end up being taxed twice on what they save and only once on what they spend. Taxing the amount invested and then also taxing the income from that investment means the same part of the contributor's finances is taxed twice.
No income-tax is really just from which savings are not exempted; and no income-tax ought to be voted without that provision, if the form of the returns and the nature of the evidence required could be so arranged as to prevent the exemption from being taken fraudulent advantage of, by saving with one hand and getting into debt with the other, or by spending in the following year what had been passed tax-free as saving in the year preceding. But, if no plan can be devised for the exemption of actual savings, sufficiently free from liability to fraud, it is necessary, as the next thing in point of justice, to take into account, in assessing the tax, what the different classes of contributors ought to save. In fixing the proportion between the two rates, there must inevitably be something arbitrary; perhaps a deduction of one fourth in favor of life-incomes would be as little objectionable as any which could be made.
No income tax is truly valid unless savings are exempt; and no income tax should be approved without that provision, if the way returns are filed and the nature of the evidence required can be set up to prevent people from taking advantage of the exemption fraudulently, by saving on one hand while going into debt on the other, or by spending in the following year what was claimed as tax-free savings in the previous year. However, if no plan can be devised to exempt actual savings that is sufficiently protected against fraud, it is necessary, as a matter of fairness, to consider, when assessing the tax, what different groups of contributors *ought* to save. When determining the ratio between the two rates, there will inevitably be some level of arbitrariness; perhaps a deduction of one-fourth in favor of life incomes would be as reasonable as any that could be suggested.
Of the net profits of persons in business, a part, as before observed, may be considered as interest on capital, and of a perpetual character, and the remaining part as remuneration for the skill and labor of superintendence. The surplus beyond interest depends on the life of the individual, and even on his continuance in business, and is entitled to the full amount of exemption allowed to terminable incomes.
Of the net profits of people in business, part of it, as mentioned earlier, can be seen as interest on capital, which is ongoing, while the rest is compensation for the skill and effort of management. The surplus beyond the interest relies on the person's lifespan and their continued involvement in the business, and it qualifies for the full amount of exemption permitted for temporary incomes.
§ 5. The rise in land rent due to natural factors is a suitable topic for special taxation.
Suppose that there is a kind of income which constantly tends to increase, without any exertion or sacrifice on the part of the owners: those owners constituting a class in the community, whom the natural course of things progressively enriches, consistently with complete passiveness on their own part. In such a case it would be no violation of the principles on which private property is grounded, if the state should appropriate this increase of wealth, or part of it, as it arises. This would not properly be taking anything from anybody; it would merely be applying an accession of wealth, created by circumstances, to the benefit of society, instead of [pg 547] allowing it to become an unearned appendage to the riches of a particular class.
Imagine a type of income that keeps growing without any effort or sacrifice from the owners: these owners make up a group in society that naturally gains wealth over time while doing nothing. In this situation, it wouldn't go against the principles of private property if the state decided to take this increase in wealth, or a portion of it, as it happens. This wouldn't be considered stealing from anyone; it would simply be using wealth generated by circumstances for the good of society, rather than letting it become an unearned addition to the wealth of a specific group.
Now, this is actually the case with rent. The ordinary progress of a society which increases in wealth is at all times tending to augment the incomes of landlords; to give them both a greater amount and a greater proportion of the wealth of the community, independently of any trouble or outlay incurred by themselves. They grow richer, as it were, in their sleep, without working, risking, or economizing. What claim have they, on the general principle of social justice, to this accession of riches? In what would they have been wronged if society had, from the beginning, reserved the right of taxing the spontaneous increase of rent, to the highest amount required by financial exigencies? The only admissible mode of proceeding would be by a general measure. The first step should be a valuation of all the land in the country. The present value of all land should be exempt from the tax; but after an interval had elapsed, during which society had increased in population and capital, a rough estimate might be made of the spontaneous increase which had accrued to rent since the valuation was made. Of this the average price of produce would be some criterion: if that had risen, it would be certain that rent had increased, and (as already shown) even in a greater ratio than the rise of price. On this and other data, an approximate estimate might be made how much value had been added to the land of the country by natural causes; and in laying on a general land-tax, which for fear of miscalculation should be considerably within the amount thus indicated, there would be an assurance of not touching any increase of income which might be the result of capital expended or industry exerted by the proprietor.
Now, this is actually the situation with rent. The normal development of a society that becomes wealthier constantly leads to increased incomes for landlords, giving them a larger share of the community's wealth without any effort or investment on their part. They essentially get richer while they sleep, without having to work, take risks, or save money. What justification do they have, based on the general principle of social justice, for this increase in wealth? How would they have been wronged if society had, from the start, kept the right to tax the natural increase in rent, to the maximum amount needed for financial needs? The only acceptable way to handle this would be through a general measure. The first step should be to assess the value of all the land in the country. The current value of all land should be free from the tax; but after some time has passed, during which society has grown in population and capital, a rough estimate could be made of the natural increase in rent since the initial valuation. The average price of produce could serve as an indicator: if that has gone up, it would show that rent has increased, and (as already mentioned) even more than the rise in price. Based on this and other information, a rough estimate could be made of how much value has been added to the land of the country due to natural causes; and when imposing a general land tax, which should be set significantly lower than that estimated amount to avoid miscalculations, there would be assurance that no increase in income resulting from capital investment or effort by the owner would be affected.
With reference to such a tax, perhaps a safer criterion than either a rise of rents or a rise of the price of corn, would be a general rise in the price of land. It would be easy to keep the tax within the amount which would reduce the market value of land below the original valuation; and [pg 548] up to that point, whatever the amount of the tax might be, no injustice would be done to the proprietors.
Regarding such a tax, a safer guideline than either an increase in rents or a rise in corn prices might be a general increase in land prices. It would be straightforward to keep the tax below the level that would decrease the market value of land below the original valuation; and [pg 548] up to that point, regardless of the tax amount, no unfairness would occur to the owners.
§ 6. Taxes on Capital are not necessarily problematic.
In addition to the preceding rules, another general rule of taxation is sometimes laid down—namely, that it should fall on income and not on capital.
In addition to the previous rules, another general tax rule is often stated—specifically, that it should be based on income and not on capital.
To provide that taxation shall fall entirely on income, and not at all on capital, is beyond the power of any system of fiscal arrangements. There is no tax which is not partly paid from what would otherwise have been saved; no tax, the amount of which, if remitted, would be wholly employed in increased expenditure, and no part whatever laid by as an addition to capital. All taxes, therefore, are in some sense partly paid out of capital; and in a poor country it is impossible to impose any tax which will not impede the increase of the national wealth. But, in a country where capital abounds and the spirit of accumulation is strong, this effect of taxation is scarcely felt. To take from capital by taxation what emigration would remove, or a commercial crisis destroy, is only to do what either of those causes would have done—namely, to make a clear space for further saving.
Taxation can’t just target income without affecting capital at all; that's beyond any financial system's control. Every tax is partially paid from what could have been saved. No tax amount, if eliminated, would solely go to increased spending without any part being set aside for capital growth. So, all taxes are in some way drawn from capital. In a poor country, imposing any tax will hinder the growth of national wealth. However, in a capital-rich country with a strong saving culture, the impact of taxation is barely noticeable. Taking from capital through taxes what emigration would take away, or what a market crash would ruin, simply clears the way for more savings.
I can not, therefore, attach any importance, in a wealthy country, to the objection made against taxes on legacies and inheritances, that they are taxes on capital. It is perfectly true that they are so. As Ricardo observes, if £100 are taken [pg 549] from any one in a tax on houses or on wine, he will probably save it, or a part of it, by living in a cheaper house, consuming less wine, or retrenching from some other of his expenses; but, if the same sum be taken from him because he has received a legacy of £1,000, he considers the legacy as only £900, and feels no more inducement than at any other time (probably feels rather less inducement) to economize in his expenditure. The tax, therefore, is wholly paid out of capital; and there are countries in which this would be a serious objection. But, in the first place, the argument can not apply to any country which has a national debt and devotes any portion of revenue to paying it off, since the produce of the tax, thus applied, still remains capital, and is merely transferred from the tax-payer to the fund-holder. But the objection is never applicable in a country which increases rapidly in wealth.
I can't, therefore, find any real significance, in a wealthy country, to the argument against taxes on legacies and inheritances, that they are taxes on capital. It's completely true that they are. As Ricardo points out, if £100 is taken from someone in a tax on houses or wine, they will likely save it, or part of it, by living in a cheaper house, drinking less wine, or cutting back on other expenses. However, if the same amount is taken from them because they've received a legacy of £1,000, they perceive the legacy as only £900 and feel no more motivation than usual (probably even less motivation) to cut back on their spending. Therefore, the tax is entirely paid from capital; and there are countries where this would be a serious concern. But, first of all, the argument doesn’t apply to any country that has a national debt and uses part of its revenue to pay it off, since the money from the tax, when used this way, still counts as capital, just transferred from the taxpayer to the bondholder. Moreover, this objection is never relevant in a country that's rapidly increasing in wealth.
Chapter 2. Direct Taxes.
§ 1. Direct taxes on either income or spending.
Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is demanded from the very persons who, it is intended or desired, should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another: such as the excise or customs. The producer or importer of a commodity is called upon to pay tax on it, not with the intention to levy a peculiar contribution upon him, but to tax through him the consumers of the commodity, from whom it is supposed that he will recover the amount by means of an advance in price.
Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one that is collected from the individuals who are expected to pay it. Indirect taxes are those collected from one person with the expectation that they will pass the cost on to someone else, such as excise or customs duties. The producer or importer of a product is required to pay the tax, not with the intention of placing a specific burden on them, but to tax the consumers of the product through them, assuming they will recoup the amount by raising the price.
Direct taxes are either on income or on expenditure. Most taxes on expenditure are indirect, but some are direct, being imposed, not on the producer or seller of an article, but immediately on the consumer. A house-tax, for example, is a direct tax on expenditure, if levied, as it usually is, on the occupier of the house. If levied on the builder or owner, it would be an indirect tax. A window-tax is a direct tax on expenditure; so are the taxes on horses and carriages.
Direct taxes are based on income or spending. Most spending taxes are indirect, but some are direct, meaning they are charged right to the consumer rather than the producer or seller of a product. For instance, a house tax is a direct tax on spending if it's charged to the person living in the house, which is usually the case. If it's charged to the builder or owner, it would be an indirect tax. A window tax is a direct tax on spending, as are the taxes on horses and carriages.
The sources of income are rent, profits, and wages. This includes every sort of income, except gift or plunder. Taxes may be laid on any one of the three kinds of income, or a uniform tax on all of them. We will consider these in their order.
The sources of income are rent, profits, and wages. This includes all types of income, except for gifts or stolen goods. Taxes can be imposed on any of these three types of income, or a flat tax can be applied to all of them. We will look at these in order.
§ 2. Rent taxes.
A tax on rent falls wholly on the landlord. There [pg 551] are no means by which he can shift the burden upon any one else. It does not affect the value or price of agricultural produce, for this is determined by the cost of production in the most unfavorable circumstances, and in those circumstances, as we have so often demonstrated, no rent is paid.
A tax on rent is completely shouldered by the landlord. There are no ways for them to pass the burden onto anyone else. It doesn't impact the value or price of agricultural products, since that is governed by production costs under the toughest conditions, and in those situations, as we've shown many times, no rent is collected.
This, however, is, in strict exactness, only true of the rent which is the result either of natural causes, or of improvements made by tenants. When the landlord makes improvements which increase the productive power of his land, he is remunerated for them by an extra payment from the tenant; and this payment, which to the landlord is properly a profit on capital, is blended and confounded with rent. A tax on rent, if extending to this portion of it, would discourage landlords from making improvements; but whatever hinders improvements from being made in the manner in which people prefer to make them, will often prevent them from being made at all; and on this account a tax on rent would be inexpedient unless some means could be devised of excluding from its operation that portion of the nominal rent which may be regarded as landlord's profit.
This is only true for the rent that comes from natural causes or improvements made by tenants. When a landlord makes improvements that boost the productivity of their land, they receive extra payment from the tenant as compensation. For the landlord, this extra payment is basically a profit on their investment, but it gets mixed up with rent. A tax on rent that includes this type of payment would discourage landlords from making improvements; however, anything that prevents improvements from happening the way people want them to can often stop them completely. For this reason, a tax on rent would not be a good idea unless there’s a way to exclude the part of the nominal rent that can be seen as the landlord's profit.
§ 3. —about profits.
A tax on profits, like a tax on rent, must, at least in its immediate operation, fall wholly on the payer. All profits being alike affected, no relief can be obtained by a change of employment. If a tax were laid on the profits of any one branch of productive employment, the tax would be virtually an increase of the cost of production, and the value and price of the article would rise accordingly; by which the tax would be thrown upon the consumers of the commodity, and would not affect profits. But a general and equal tax on all profits would not affect general prices, and would fall, at least in the first instance, on capitalists alone.
A profit tax, similar to a rent tax, must, at least initially, be fully shouldered by the person paying it. Since all profits are similarly impacted, changing jobs won't provide any relief. If a tax were imposed on the profits of a specific type of productive work, that tax would effectively increase production costs, leading to a corresponding rise in the value and price of the product; therefore, the tax burden would shift to the consumers of that product, without affecting profits. However, a general and equal tax on all profits wouldn't influence overall prices and would primarily impact capitalists at least in the beginning.
There is, however, an ulterior effect, which, in a rich and prosperous country, requires to be taken into account. It may operate in two different ways: (1.) The curtailment of profit, and the consequent increased difficulty in making a fortune or obtaining a subsistence by the employment of capital, may act as a stimulus to inventions, and to the use [pg 552] of them when made. If improvements in production are much accelerated, and if these improvements cheapen, directly or indirectly, any of the things habitually consumed by the laborer, profits may rise, and rise sufficiently to make up for all that is taken from them by the tax. In that case the tax will have been realized without loss to any one, the produce of the country being increased by an equal, or what would in that case be a far greater, amount. The tax, however, must even in this case be considered as paid from profits, because the receivers of profits are those who would be benefited if it were taken off.
However, there is another effect that needs to be considered in a wealthy and prosperous country. It can occur in two different ways: (1) The reduction of profit and the resulting difficulty in getting rich or making a living by investing capital can encourage inventions and their adoption when created. If advancements in production speed up significantly, and if these advancements lower the cost—either directly or indirectly—of items that laborers commonly consume, profits may increase enough to offset what is lost to the tax. In that case, the tax would be paid without any loss to anyone, as the country's output would increase by the same amount, or even more. Still, even in this scenario, the tax should be viewed as being taken from profits, as those who receive profits are the ones who would benefit if it were eliminated.
But (2.) though the artificial abstraction of a portion of profits would have a real tendency to accelerate improvements in production, no considerable improvements might actually result, or only of such a kind as not to raise general profits at all, or not to raise them so much as the tax had diminished them. If so, the rate of profit would be brought closer to that practical minimum to which it is constantly approaching. At its first imposition the tax falls wholly on profits; but the amount of increase of capital, which the tax prevents, would, if it had been allowed to continue, have tended to reduce profits to the same level; and at every period of ten or twenty years there will be found less difference between profits as they are and profits as they would in that case have been, until at last there is no difference, and the tax is thrown either upon the laborer or upon the landlord. The real effect of a tax on profits is to make the country possess at any given period a smaller capital and a smaller aggregate production, and to make the stationary state be attained earlier, and with a smaller sum of national wealth.
But (2.) even though artificially cutting a portion of profits would likely speed up production improvements, it might not actually lead to significant enhancements or might only improve things in ways that don’t boost overall profits or don’t boost them as much as the tax has lowered them. If that's the case, the profit rate would get closer to the practical minimum it’s always nearing. When the tax is first imposed, it completely targets profits; however, the lack of capital growth caused by the tax would, if allowed to continue, have aimed to reduce profits to the same level. Over every ten or twenty years, the difference between actual profits and the profits that would have occurred in that case will shrink, until eventually there’s no difference at all, and the tax is shifted either to the worker or the landlord. The real impact of a tax on profits is that it results in the country having less capital and overall production at any given time, causing it to reach a stationary state sooner, but with a smaller total of national wealth.
Even in countries which do not accumulate so fast as to be always within a short interval of the stationary state, it seems impossible that, if capital is accumulating at all, its accumulation should not be in some degree retarded by the abstraction of a portion of its profit; and, unless the effect in stimulating improvements be a full counterbalance, it is [pg 553] inevitable that a part of the burden will be thrown off the capitalist, upon the laborer or the landlord. One or other of these is always the loser by a diminished rate of accumulation. If population continues to increase as before, the laborer suffers; if not, cultivation is checked in its advance, and the landlords lose the accession of rent which would have accrued to them. The only countries in which a tax on profits seems likely to be permanently a burden on capitalists exclusively are those in which capital is stationary, because there is no new accumulation. In such countries the tax might not prevent the old capital from being kept up through habit, or from unwillingness to submit to impoverishment, and so the capitalists might continue to bear the whole of the tax.
Even in countries that don't grow fast enough to always be close to the stationary state, it seems unavoidable that if capital is growing at all, its growth will be somewhat hindered by taking away a portion of its profit. Unless the positive effects of encouraging improvements completely offset this, it’s inevitable that part of the burden will fall from the capitalist onto the laborer or the landlord. One of these groups will always lose out because of a lower rate of accumulation. If the population keeps increasing as before, the laborer will suffer; if it doesn’t, agricultural development will slow down, and landlords will miss out on potential rent increases. The only places where a tax on profits is likely to consistently burden only the capitalists are those where capital is stagnant, as there is no new accumulation. In such places, the tax might not stop the existing capital from being maintained out of habit or reluctance to face declining wealth, so the capitalists could continue to absorb the entire tax.
§ 4. —on Pay.
We now turn to Taxes on Wages. The incidence of these is very different, according as the wages taxed as those of ordinary unskilled labor, or are the remuneration of such skilled or privileged employments, whether manual or intellectual, as are taken out of the sphere of competition by a natural or conferred monopoly.
We now turn to Taxes on Wages. The impact of these taxes is quite different, depending on whether the wages are those of regular unskilled labor or the pay for skilled or privileged jobs, whether they're manual or intellectual, that are removed from competitive pressure by a natural or granted monopoly.
I have already remarked that, in the present low state of popular education, all the higher grades of mental or educated labor are at a monopoly price, exceeding the wages of common workmen in a degree very far beyond that which is due to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required in qualifying for the employment. Any tax levied on these gains, which still leaves them above (or not below) their just proportion, falls on those who pay it; they have no means of relieving themselves at the expense of any other class. The same thing is true of ordinary wages, in cases like that of the United States, or of a new colony, where, capital increasing as rapidly as population can increase, wages are kept up by the increase of capital, and not by the adherence of the laborers to a fixed standard of comforts. In such a case, some deterioration of their condition, whether by a tax or otherwise, might possibly take place without checking the increase of population. The tax would in that case fall on the laborers [pg 554] themselves, and would reduce them prematurely to that lower state to which, on the same supposition with regard to their habits, they would in any case have been reduced ultimately, by the inevitable diminution in the rate of increase of capital, through the occupation of all the fertile land.
I've already pointed out that, given the current low level of popular education, all higher levels of skilled or educated work command high wages, far exceeding what common workers earn, much more than what would seem fair based on the costs, effort, and time needed to qualify for those jobs. Any tax imposed on these earnings, as long as it keeps them above (or not below) a fair amount, is borne by those who earn it; they can’t pass the burden on to other classes. The same is true for regular wages, in situations like that of the United States or a new colony, where capital grows as quickly as the population, and wages are sustained by the growth of capital rather than by laborers sticking to a fixed standard of living. In such cases, some decline in their situation, whether due to taxes or other reasons, could happen without stopping population growth. In that scenario, the tax would ultimately fall on the laborers themselves and would prematurely force them down to a lower standard of living that, under the same assumptions about their habits, they would eventually reach anyway due to the inevitable slowdown in the growth of capital from using up all the fertile land. [pg 554]
Some will object that, even in this case, a tax on wages can not be detrimental to the laborers, since the money raised by it, being expended in the country, comes back to the laborers again through the demand for labor. Without, however, reverting to general principles, we may rely on an obvious reductio ad absurdum. If to take money from the laborers and spend it in commodities is giving it back to the laborers, then, to take money from other classes, and spend it in the same manner, must be giving it to the laborers; consequently, the more a government takes in taxes, the greater will be the demand for labor, and the more opulent the condition of the laborers—a proposition the absurdity of which no one can fail to see.
Some people will argue that, even in this situation, a tax on wages can't harm the workers, since the money collected from it, when spent in the country, returns to the workers through an increased demand for labor. However, without going back to general principles, we can rely on a clear reductio ad absurdum. If taking money from the workers and spending it on goods means giving it back to them, then taking money from other classes and spending it in the same way must mean giving it to the workers too; therefore, the more a government collects in taxes, the greater the demand for labor will be, and the wealthier the workers will become—a claim that is clearly absurd and easy for anyone to recognize.
In the condition of most communities, wages are regulated by the habitual standard of living to which the laborers adhere, and on less than which they will not multiply. Where there exists such a standard, a tax on wages will indeed for a time be borne by the laborers themselves; but, unless this temporary depression has the effect of lowering the standard itself, the increase of population will receive a check, which will raise wages, and restore the laborers to their previous condition. On whom, in this case, will the tax fall? A rise of wages occasioned by a tax must, like any other increase of the cost of labor, be defrayed from profits. To attempt to tax day-laborers, in an old country, is merely to impose an extra tax upon all employers of common labor; unless the tax has the much worse effect of permanently lowering the standard of comfortable subsistence in the minds of the poorest class.
In most communities, wages are determined by the typical standard of living that workers maintain, and they won’t have children if they can’t meet that standard. When such a standard exists, a tax on wages will initially be covered by the workers themselves; however, unless this temporary setback lowers the standard, population growth will slow down, leading to higher wages and returning workers to their earlier situation. In this case, who bears the tax? An increase in wages due to a tax must, like any other rise in labor costs, come from profits. Trying to tax day laborers in an old country is just adding an extra burden on all employers of low-wage workers, unless the tax has the far worse effect of permanently reducing what the poorest class considers a decent living.
We find in the preceding considerations an additional argument for the opinion, already expressed, that direct taxation should stop short of the class of incomes which do not [pg 555] exceed what is necessary for healthful existence. These very small incomes are mostly derived from manual labor; and, as we now see, any tax imposed on these, either permanently degrades the habits of the laboring-class, or falls on profits, and burdens capitalists with an indirect tax, in addition to their share of the direct taxes; which is doubly objectionable, both as a violation of the fundamental rule of equality, and for the reasons which, as already shown, render a peculiar tax on profits detrimental to the public wealth, and consequently to the means which society possesses of paying any taxes whatever.
We find in the previous discussions an additional argument for the viewpoint, already stated, that direct taxation should avoid the income classes that don’t exceed what is needed for a healthy life. These very low incomes mostly come from manual labor; and, as we can see, any tax placed on these either permanently lowers the standards of the working class or affects profits, adding an extra burden on capitalists with an indirect tax, on top of their share of direct taxes. This is doubly concerning, both because it violates the basic principle of equality and for the reasons already outlined, which show that a specific tax on profits harms public wealth and, therefore, the resources society has to pay any taxes at all.
§ 5. —on Income.
We now pass, from taxes on the separate kinds of income, to a tax attempted to be assessed fairly upon all kinds; in other words, an Income-Tax. The discussion of the conditions necessary for making this tax consistent with justice has been anticipated in the last chapter. We shall suppose, therefore, that these conditions are complied with. They are, first, that incomes below a certain amount should be altogether untaxed. This minimum should not be higher than the amount which suffices for the necessaries of the existing population. The second condition is, that incomes above the limit should be taxed only in proportion to the surplus by which they exceed the limit. Thirdly, that all sums saved from income and invested should be exempt from the tax; or, if this be found impracticable, that life-incomes and incomes from business and professions should be less heavily taxed than inheritable incomes.
We now move from taxing individual types of income to a tax that aims to fairly assess all types; in other words, an Income Tax. The previous chapter discussed the necessary conditions for making this tax fair. So, we'll assume that these conditions are met. First, incomes below a certain level should not be taxed at all. This minimum should not exceed what is necessary for the basic needs of the current population. The second condition is that incomes above this level should be taxed only on the amount that exceeds it. Third, all amounts saved from income and invested should be exempt from the tax; or, if that's not feasible, then earnings from life incomes and businesses should be taxed at a lower rate than inheritable incomes.
An income-tax, fairly assessed on these principles, would be, in point of justice, the least exceptionable of all taxes. The objection to it, in the present state of public morality, is the impossibility of ascertaining the real incomes of the contributors. Notwithstanding, too, what is called the inquisitorial nature of the tax, no amount of inquisitorial power which would be tolerated by a people the most disposed to submit to it could enable the revenue officers to assess the tax from actual knowledge of the circumstances of contributors. Rents, salaries, annuities, and all fixed incomes, [pg 556] can be exactly ascertained. But the variable gains of professions, and still more the profits of business, which the person interested can not always himself exactly ascertain, can still less be estimated with any approach to fairness by a tax-collector. The main reliance must be placed, and always has been placed, on the returns made by the person himself. The tax, therefore, on whatever principles of equality it may be imposed, is in practice unequal in one of the worst ways, falling heaviest on the most conscientious.
An income tax, fairly assessed based on these principles, would be the least objectionable of all taxes in terms of justice. The main issue with it, given the current state of public morality, is the difficulty of determining the actual incomes of taxpayers. Also, despite what some call the intrusive nature of the tax, no level of scrutiny that the most cooperative citizens would accept could allow tax officials to assess the tax based on a thorough understanding of each taxpayer’s situation. Fixed incomes, like rents, salaries, annuities, and others, can be accurately determined. However, the fluctuating earnings from professions, and even more so the profits from businesses, which individuals may not always accurately gauge themselves, can be even harder for tax collectors to evaluate fairly. Ultimately, the system must rely, and has always relied, on the self-reported earnings of the individuals. Therefore, regardless of how the tax might be designed to be equitable, it is practically unequal in one of the worst possible ways, disproportionately impacting those who are most honest.
It is to be feared, therefore, that the fairness which belongs to the principle of an income-tax can not be made to attach to it in practice. This consideration would lead us to concur in the opinion which, until of late, has usually prevailed—that direct taxes on income should be reserved as an extraordinary resource for great national emergencies, in which the necessity of a large additional revenue overrules all objections.
It is concerning, therefore, that the fairness associated with the principle of an income tax may not be achievable in practice. This thought would lead us to agree with the view that, until recently, has commonly been held—that direct taxes on income should be saved as a special resource for major national emergencies, when the need for significant extra revenue outweighs all objections.
The difficulties of a fair income-tax have elicited a proposition for a direct tax of so much per cent, not on income but on expenditure; the aggregate amount of each person's expenditure being ascertained as the amount of income now is, from statements furnished by the contributors themselves. The only security would still be the veracity of individuals, and there is no reason for supposing that their statements would be more trustworthy on the subject of their expenses than on that of their revenues. The taxes on expenditure at present in force, either in this or in other countries, fall only on particular kinds of expenditure, and differ no otherwise from taxes on commodities than in being paid directly by the person who consumes or uses the article, instead of being advanced by the producer or seller, and reimbursed in the price. The taxes on horses and carriages, on dogs, on servants, are of this nature. They evidently fall on the persons from whom they are levied—those who use the commodity taxed. A tax of a similar description, and more important, is a house-tax, which must be considered at somewhat greater length.
The challenges of a fair income tax have led to a suggestion for a direct tax based on a percentage of spending, rather than income. The total amount of each person's spending would be calculated just like income is now, using statements provided by the individuals themselves. The only guarantee would still rely on people being honest, and there's no reason to believe that their reports about their expenses would be more reliable than those concerning their earnings. Current expenditure taxes in place, whether in this country or others, only target specific types of spending and differ from commodity taxes only in that they are paid directly by the individual who consumes or uses the item, instead of being advanced by the producer or seller and added to the price. Taxes on horses and carriages, dogs, and servants fall into this category. They are clearly imposed on the individuals being taxed—those who utilize the taxed commodity. A similar type of tax, which is more significant, is a house tax, and it needs to be examined in a bit more detail.
§ 6. A Property Tax.
The rent of a house consists of two parts, the ground-rent, and what Adam Smith calls the building-rent. The first is determined by the ordinary principles of rent. It is the remuneration given for the use of the portion of land occupied by the house and its appurtenances; and varies from a mere equivalent for the rent which the ground would afford in agriculture to the monopoly rents paid for advantageous situations in populous thoroughfares. The rent of the house itself, as distinguished from the ground, is the equivalent given for the labor and capital expended on the building. The fact of its being received in quarterly or half-yearly payments makes no difference in the principles by which it is regulated. It comprises the ordinary profit on the builder's capital, and an annuity, sufficient at the current rate of interest, after paying for all repairs chargeable on the proprietor, to replace the original capital by the time the house is worn out, or by the expiration of the usual term of a building-lease.
The rent for a house has two components: the ground rent and what Adam Smith refers to as the building rent. The first part is determined by the usual principles of rent. It’s the payment made for using the piece of land where the house and its amenities sit; it can vary from a simple equivalent for what the land would generate in agriculture to higher rents for prime locations in busy areas. The rent for the house itself, separate from the ground, is the payment for the labor and capital invested in building it. The fact that it’s paid quarterly or biannually doesn’t change the principles that govern it. It includes the typical profit on the builder's investment and an annuity that, at the current interest rate, is enough—after accounting for all repairs needed by the owner—to replace the original investment by the time the house is no longer usable or when the standard lease term expires.
A tax of so much per cent on the gross rent falls on both those portions alike. The more highly a house is rented, the more it pays to the tax, whether the quality of the situation or that of the house itself is the cause. The incidence, however, of these two portions of the tax must be considered separately.
A tax of a certain percentage on the gross rent applies to both parts equally. The higher the rent of a house, the more it contributes to the tax, regardless of whether it's due to the location or the house's quality. However, the impact of these two parts of the tax needs to be looked at separately.
As much of it as is a tax on building-rent must ultimately fall on the consumer, in other words, the occupier. For, as the profits of building are already not above the ordinary rate, they would, if the tax fell on the owner and not on the occupier, become lower than the profits of untaxed employments, and houses would not be built. It is probable, however, that for some time after the tax was first imposed, a great part of it would fall, not on the renter, but on the owner of the house. A large proportion of the consumers either could not afford, or would not choose, to pay their former rent with the tax in addition, but would content themselves with a lower scale of accommodation. Houses, therefore, would be for a time in excess of the demand. The [pg 558] consequence of such excess, in the case of most other articles, would be an almost immediate diminution of the supply; but so durable a commodity as houses does not rapidly diminish in amount. New buildings, indeed, of the class for which the demand had decreased, would cease to be erected, except for special reasons; but in the mean time the temporary superfluity would lower rents, and the consumers would obtain, perhaps, nearly the same accommodation as formerly, for the same aggregate payment, rent and tax together. By degrees, however, as the existing houses wore out, or as increase of population demanded a greater supply, rents would again rise; until it became profitable to recommence building, which would not be until the tax was wholly transferred to the occupier. In the end, therefore, the occupier bears that portion of a tax on rent which falls on the payment made for the house itself, exclusively of the ground it stands on.
As much of the tax on building rent ultimately impacts the consumer, meaning the person living there. Since profits from building aren't above the normal rate, if the tax burden fell on the owner instead of the tenant, profits would dip below those of untaxed jobs, and homes wouldn’t get built. However, it's likely that for a while after the tax is first introduced, much of the cost would hit the homeowner rather than the renter. A significant number of consumers either wouldn't be able to pay their old rent plus the new tax or simply wouldn't want to, so they would settle for lower-quality housing. As a result, there would be an oversupply of houses for a time. In most cases, such excess would lead to an almost immediate drop in supply for other goods, but since houses are durable, they don't quickly disappear. New constructions of the types that were in lower demand would stop, except for specific reasons. However, during this time, the surplus would drive down rents, allowing consumers to get nearly the same living conditions as before for the same total payment, including rent and tax. Gradually, as existing houses aged or as population growth increased demand, rents would rise again until it became profitable to start building again, which wouldn't happen until the tax was fully passed on to the renter. Ultimately, the renter ends up bearing the portion of the tax on rent that applies to the payment for the house itself, excluding the land it’s on.
The case is partly different with the portion which is a tax on ground-rent. As taxes on rent, properly so called, fall on the landlord, a tax on ground-rent, one would suppose, must fall on the ground-landlord, at least after the expiration of the building-lease. It will not, however, fall wholly on the landlord, unless with the tax on ground-rent there is combined an equivalent tax on agricultural rent. The lowest rent of land let for building is very little above the rent which the same ground would yield in agriculture: since it is reasonable to suppose that land, unless in case of exceptional circumstances, is let or sold for building as soon as it is decidedly worth more for that purpose than for cultivation. If, therefore, a tax were laid on ground-rents without being also laid on agricultural rents, it would, unless of trifling amount, reduce the return from the lowest ground-rents below the ordinary return from land, and would check further building quite as effectually as if it were a tax on building-rents, until either the increased demand of a growing population, or a diminution of supply by the ordinary causes of destruction, had raised the rent by a full equivalent [pg 559] for the tax. But whatever raises the lowest ground-rents raises all others, since each exceeds the lowest by the market value of its peculiar advantages. If, therefore, the tax on ground-rents were a fixed sum per square foot, the more valuable situations paying no more than those least in request, this fixed payment would ultimately fall on the occupier. Suppose the lowest ground-rent to be $50 per acre, and the highest $5,000, a tax of $5 per acre on ground-rents would ultimately raise the former to $55, and the latter consequently to $5,005, since the difference of value between the two situations would be exactly what it was before: the annual $5, therefore, would be paid by the occupier. But a tax on ground-rent is supposed to be a portion of a house-tax which is not a fixed payment, but a percentage on the rent. The cheapest site, therefore, being supposed as before to pay $5, the dearest would pay $500, of which only the $5 could be thrown upon the occupier, since the rent would still be only raised to $5,005. Consequently, $495 of the $500 levied from the expensive site would fall on the ground-landlord.341 A house-tax thus requires to be considered in a double aspect, as a tax on all occupiers of houses, and a tax on ground-rents.
The situation is somewhat different with the part that is a tax on ground rent. Since taxes on rent, strictly speaking, fall on the landlord, a tax on ground rent would presumably fall on the landowner, at least after the building lease ends. However, it won't completely fall on the landlord unless there’s an equivalent tax on agricultural rent put in place. The lowest rent for land rented for building is only slightly above what the same land would earn from agriculture. This is because it makes sense to think that land is rented or sold for building as soon as it’s clearly worth more for that purpose than for farming, unless there are exceptional circumstances. Therefore, if a tax were imposed on ground rents without also imposing it on agricultural rents, it would, unless it were a minimal amount, lower the returns from the lowest ground rents below the normal returns from land, effectively hindering further building just as much as if it were a tax on building rents, until either the demand from a growing population increases or a reduction in supply from ordinary causes of wear and tear raises the rent by a full amount equal to the tax. But anything that raises the lowest ground rents will raise all other rents, since each one is higher than the lowest by the market value of its specific advantages. So, if the tax on ground rents were a fixed amount per square foot, the more valuable locations would pay no more than the least desirable ones, and this fixed payment would ultimately fall on the occupant. For example, if the lowest ground rent is $50 per acre and the highest is $5,000, a tax of $5 per acre on ground rents would eventually increase the former to $55 and the latter to $5,005, since the difference in value between the two would remain the same. Thus, the annual $5 would be paid by the occupant. However, a tax on ground rent is expected to be part of a house tax, which is not a fixed payment, but a percentage of the rent. Assuming the cheapest site still pays $5, the most expensive would pay $500, of which only $5 could be passed on to the occupant since the rent would only rise to $5,005. As a result, $495 of the $500 collected from the expensive site would be borne by the landowner. A house tax, therefore, needs to be viewed from two perspectives, as a tax on all occupants of houses and as a tax on ground rents.
In the vast majority of houses the ground-rent forms but a small proportion of the annual payment made for the house, and nearly all the tax falls on the occupier. It is only in exceptional cases, like that of the favorite situations in large towns, that the predominant element in the rent of the house is the ground-rent; and, among the very few kinds of income which are fit subjects for peculiar taxation, these ground-rents hold the principal place, being the most gigantic example extant of enormous accessions of riches acquired rapidly, and in many cases unexpectedly, by a few families, from the mere accident of their possessing certain tracts of land without their having themselves aided in the acquisition by the smallest exertion, outlay, or risk. So far, therefore, as a house-tax falls on the ground-landlord, it is liable to no valid objection.
In most homes, the ground rent makes up just a small part of the total annual payment for the house, with nearly all taxes being paid by the tenant. It's only in rare cases, like prime locations in big cities, that ground rent is the main factor in how much rent is charged. Among the few types of income that can be specifically taxed, ground rents are the most significant, representing a massive example of wealth that has been quickly and often unexpectedly gained by a few families simply because they own certain pieces of land, without having to put in any effort, money, or risk themselves. Therefore, as far as a house tax falls on the ground landlord, there are no valid objections to it.
In so far as it falls on the occupier, if justly proportioned to the value of the house, it is one of the fairest and most unobjectionable of all taxes. No part of a person's expenditure is a better criterion of his means, or bears, on the whole, more nearly the same proportion to them. The equality of this tax can only be seriously questioned on two grounds. The first is, that a miser may escape it. This objection applies to all taxes on expenditure; nothing but a direct tax on income can reach a miser. The second objection is, that a person may require a larger and more expensive house, not from having greater means, but from having a larger family. Of this, however, he is not entitled to complain, since having a large family is at a person's own choice; and, so far as concerns the public interest, is a thing rather to be discouraged than promoted.342
As far as it falls on the homeowner, if it's fairly based on the value of the house, it's one of the fairest and least objectionable taxes. No part of a person's spending is a better indicator of their financial situation, or is more closely related to it overall. The fairness of this tax can only be seriously challenged on two grounds. The first is that a miser might avoid it. This concern applies to all taxes on spending; only a direct tax on income can really affect a miser. The second concern is that someone might need a bigger and more expensive house not because they have more money, but because they have a larger family. However, they can't really complain about this, since having a large family is a personal choice; and in terms of public interest, it's something that should be discouraged rather than encouraged.342
A valuation should be made of the house, not at what it would sell for, but at what would be the cost of rebuilding it, and this valuation might be periodically corrected by an allowance for what it had lost in value by time, or gained by repairs and improvements. The amount of the amended valuation would form a principal sum, the interest of which, at the current price of the public funds, would form the annual value at which the building should be assessed to the tax.
A valuation of the house should be based on the cost to rebuild it, not what it would sell for, and this valuation could be updated over time to reflect any decrease in value due to aging or increases from repairs and improvements. The adjusted valuation would create a principal amount, and the interest on that amount, based on current public fund rates, would determine the annual value for tax assessment purposes.
As incomes below a certain amount ought to be exempt from income-tax, so ought houses below a certain value from house-tax, on the universal principle of sparing from all taxation the absolute necessaries of healthful existence. In order that the occupiers of lodgings, as well as of houses, might benefit, as in justice they ought, by this exemption, it might be optional with the owners to have every portion of a house which is occupied by a separate tenant valued and assessed separately.
As incomes below a certain level should be exempt from income tax, so should homes below a certain value be exempt from property tax, based on the universal idea of protecting the essential needs for a healthy life from all taxation. To ensure that both renters and homeowners can fairly benefit from this exemption, homeowners should have the option to have each part of a house that has a separate tenant valued and assessed individually.
Chapter III. On Taxes for Goods, or Indirect Taxes.
§ 1. A tax on all goods would impact profits.
By taxes on commodities are commonly meant those which are levied either on the producers, or on the carriers or dealers who intervene between them and the final purchasers for consumption; the phrase being, by custom, confined to indirect taxes—those which are advanced by one person, to be, as is expected and intended, reimbursed by another.
By taxes on goods, people usually mean those that are imposed either on the producers or on the carriers or sellers who come between them and the final buyers for consumption; the term is typically limited to indirect taxes—those paid by one person, with the expectation that another will eventually reimburse them.
Taxes on commodities are either on production within the country, or on importation into it, or on conveyance or sale within it, and are classed respectively as excise, customs, or tolls and transit duties. To whichever class they belong, and at whatever stage in the progress of the community they may be imposed, they are equivalent to an increase of the cost of production; using that term in its most enlarged sense, which includes the cost of transport and distribution, or, in common phrase, of bringing the commodity to market.
Taxes on goods are either on production within the country, on imports, or on transportation or sale within the country, and are classified as excise, customs, or tolls and transit duties. No matter which category they fall into or at what stage in the community's development they are applied, they effectively raise the cost of production; using that term broadly to include transport and distribution costs, or, as commonly stated, the cost of getting the goods to market.
When the cost of production is increased artificially by a tax, the effect is the same as when it is increased by natural causes. If only one or a few commodities are affected, their value and price rise, so as to compensate the producer or dealer for the peculiar burden; but if there were a tax on all commodities, exactly proportioned to their value, no such compensation would be obtained; there would neither be a general rise of values, which is an absurdity, nor of prices, which depend on causes entirely different. There would, however, as Mr. McCulloch has pointed out, be a disturbance [pg 563] of values, some falling, others rising, owing to a circumstance, the effect of which on values and prices we formerly discussed—the different durability of the capital employed in different occupations. The gross produce of industry consists of two parts; one portion serving to replace the capital consumed, while the other portion is profit. Now, equal capital in two branches of production must have equal expectations of profit; but if a greater portion of the one than of the other is fixed capital, or if that fixed capital is more durable, there will be a less consumption of capital in the year, and less will be required to replace it, so that the profit, if absolutely the same, will form a greater proportion of the annual returns. To derive from a capital of $1,000 a profit of $100, the one producer may have to sell produce to the value of $1,100, the other only to the value of $500. If on these two branches of industry a tax be imposed of five per cent ad valorem, the last will be charged only with $25, the first with $55; leaving to the one $75 profit, to the other only $45. To equalize, therefore, their expectation of profit, the one commodity must rise in price, or the other must fall, or both.343 Commodities made chiefly by immediate labor must rise in value, as compared with those which are chiefly made by machinery. It is unnecessary to prosecute this branch of the inquiry any further.
When production costs go up due to a tax, it's the same effect as if they increased for other reasons. If just a few products are affected, their value and price go up to offset the extra burden on the producer or dealer. However, if there's a tax on all products based on their value, there wouldn't be any compensation like that; there wouldn't be a general rise in values, which is unreasonable, or prices, which stem from completely different factors. As Mr. McCulloch mentioned, there would be a disruption in values, with some going down and others going up, due to the varying durability of the capital used in different industries, which we discussed previously. The total output of an industry comprises two parts: one part replaces consumed capital, while the other is profit. Now, equal capital in two different production areas should yield equal profit expectations; however, if one has more fixed capital or if that capital is more durable, less capital will be consumed in the year, requiring less to replace it, so the profit, if it's the same, will take a larger share of the yearly returns. For example, to generate $100 profit from $1,000 capital, one producer might need to sell products worth $1,100, while another only needs to sell $500 worth. If a tax of five percent ad valorem is imposed on both, the second will be taxed only $25, while the first will be taxed $55; leaving the first with $75 profit and the second with only $45. To balance their profit expectations, either the price of one product must increase, or the price of the other must decrease, or both. Commodities produced mainly by immediate labor will need to increase in value compared to those primarily produced by machinery. There’s no need to delve further into this line of inquiry.
§ 2. Taxes on specific goods are ultimately paid by the consumer.
A tax on any one commodity, whether laid on its production, its importation, its carriage from place to place, or its sale, and whether the tax be a fixed sum of money for a given quantity of the commodity, or an ad valorem duty, will, as a general rule, raise the value and price of the commodity by at least the amount of the tax. There are few cases in which it does not raise them by more than that amount. In the first place, there are few taxes on production on account of which it is not found or deemed necessary to impose restrictive regulations on the manufacturers or dealers, in order to check evasions of the tax. These [pg 564] regulations are always sources of trouble and annoyance, and generally of expense, for all of which, being peculiar disadvantages, the producers or dealers must have compensation in the price of their commodity. These restrictions also frequently interfere with the processes of manufacture, requiring the producer to carry on his operations in the way most convenient to the revenue, though not the cheapest or most efficient for purposes of production. Any regulations whatever, enforced by law, make it difficult for the producer to adopt new and improved processes. Further, the necessity of advancing the tax obliges producers and dealers to carry on their business with larger capitals than would otherwise be necessary, on the whole of which they must receive the ordinary rate of profit, though a part only is employed in defraying the real expenses of production or importation. The price of the article must be such as to afford a profit on more than its natural value, instead of a profit on only its natural value. Neither ought it to be forgotten that whatever renders a larger capital necessary in any trade or business limits the competition in that business, and, by giving something like a monopoly to a few dealers, may enable them either to keep up the price beyond what would afford the ordinary rate of profit, or to obtain the ordinary rate of profit with a less degree of exertion for improving and cheapening their commodity. In these several modes, taxes on commodities often cost to the consumer, through the increased price of the article, much more than they bring into the treasury of the state. There is still another consideration: the higher price necessitated by the tax almost always checks the demand for the commodity; and, since there are many improvements in production which, to make them practicable, require a certain extent of demand, such improvements are obstructed, and many of them prevented altogether. It is a well-known fact that the branches of production in which fewest improvements are made are those with which the revenue-officer interferes; and that nothing, in general, gives a greater impulse to improvements [pg 565] in the production of a commodity than taking off a tax which narrowed the market for it.
A tax on any single product, whether it's placed on its production, import, transportation, or sale, and whether the tax is a set amount for a specific quantity or an value-based duty, will generally increase the product's value and price by at least the amount of the tax. In fact, there are few instances where it doesn't raise them by more than that. First, there are usually few production taxes that don't require the imposition of restrictive regulations on manufacturers or sellers to prevent tax evasion. These [pg 564] regulations can be a source of hassle and expense, and because they are unique disadvantages, producers or sellers need to be compensated through higher prices for their products. These restrictions can also disrupt manufacturing processes, forcing producers to conduct their operations in ways that benefit revenue collection rather than being the cheapest or most efficient for production. Any regulations imposed by law make it hard for producers to adopt newer, better methods. Additionally, the requirement to prepay the tax forces producers and sellers to operate with larger amounts of capital than would normally be needed, for which they expect to earn the usual profit, even though only a portion of that capital is used to cover the actual costs of production or import. Thus, the price of the item has to provide a profit that exceeds its natural value instead of just matching it. Furthermore, it shouldn't be overlooked that anything requiring larger capital in any industry limits competition in that sector, potentially granting something like a monopoly to a select few dealers. This can allow them to charge prices that are higher than what would typically allow for an ordinary profit or allow them to earn the usual profit with less effort in improving and reducing the cost of their product. In these various ways, taxes on products often cost consumers significantly more through increased pricing than what is collected by the government. There's also another important factor: the higher price caused by the tax usually reduces demand for the product; and since many production advancements require a certain level of demand to be feasible, these improvements can be hindered, with some completely prevented. It's well known that the areas of production where the fewest advancements are made are those where revenue officials are involved, and that nothing generally stimulates improvements in production more than removing a tax that has limited the market for it. [pg 565]
§ 3. Unique effects of taxes on necessities.
Such are the effects of taxes on commodities, considered generally; but, as there are some commodities (those composing the necessaries of the laborer) of which the values have an influence on the distribution of wealth among different classes of the community, it is requisite to trace the effects of taxes on those particular articles somewhat further. If a tax be laid, say on corn, and the price rises in proportion to the tax, the rise of price may operate in two ways: First, it may lower the condition of the laboring-classes; temporarily, indeed, it can scarcely fail to do so. If it diminishes their consumption of the produce of the earth, or makes them resort to a food which the soil produces more abundantly, and therefore more cheaply, it to that extent contributes to throw back agriculture upon more fertile lands or less costly processes, and to lower the value and price of corn; which therefore ultimately settles at a price, increased not by the whole amount of the tax, but by only a part of its amount. Secondly, however, it may happen that the dearness of the taxed food does not lower the habitual standard of the laborer's requirements, but that wages, on the contrary, through an action on population, rise, in shorter or longer periods, so as to compensate the laborers for their portion of the tax, the compensation being of course at the expense of profits. Taxes on necessaries must thus have one of two effects: either they lower the condition of the laboring-classes, or they exact from the owners of capital, in addition to the amount due to the state on their own necessaries, the amount due on those consumed by the laborers. In the last case, the tax on necessaries, like a tax on wages, is equivalent to a peculiar tax on profits; which is, like all other partial taxation, unjust, and is specially prejudicial to the increase of the national wealth.
These are the effects of taxes on goods in general; however, since some goods (the essentials for workers) affect how wealth is distributed among different classes in society, it’s important to look more closely at the impact of taxes on those specific items. If a tax is placed on corn, for example, and the price increases as a result, this price hike can have two effects: First, it may worsen the situation for workers; at least temporarily, it likely will. If it reduces their consumption of basic food or forces them to switch to cheaper, more abundant alternatives, this can push agriculture back to more productive lands or cheaper methods, ultimately lowering the value and price of corn. Therefore, the final price will probably be higher not by the full amount of the tax, but only by a portion of it. On the other hand, it’s also possible that the increased price of taxed food doesn’t lower the standard of living for workers. In fact, wages might rise over time due to population dynamics, helping to offset the tax burden for workers, although this increase in wages comes at the cost of profits. Thus, taxes on essentials will have one of two outcomes: they either harm the situation of laborers, or they require capital owners to pay not only their own tax burden on essentials but also the tax burden for what workers consume. In the latter scenario, the tax on essentials, much like a tax on wages, acts as a special tax on profits, which, like any form of targeted taxation, is unfair and particularly harmful to the growth of national wealth.
It remains to speak of the effect on rent. Assuming (what is usually the fact) that the consumption of food is not diminished, the same cultivation as before will be necessary [pg 566] to supply the wants of the community; the margin of cultivation, to use Dr. Chalmers's expression, remains where it was; and the same land or capital, which, as the least productive, already regulated the value and price of the whole produce, will continue to regulate them. The effect which a tax on agricultural produce will have on rent depends on its affecting or not affecting the difference between the return to this least productive land or capital and the returns to other lands and capitals. Now, this depends on the manner in which the tax is imposed. If it is an ad valorem tax, or, what is the same thing, a fixed proportion of the produce, such as tithe for example, it evidently lowers corn-rents. For it takes more corn from the better lands than from the worse, and exactly in the degree in which they are better, land of twice the productiveness paying twice as much to the tithe. Whatever takes more from the greater of two quantities than from the less, diminishes the difference between them. The imposition of a tithe on corn would take a tithe also from corn-rent: for, if we reduce a series of numbers by a tenth each, the differences between them are reduced one tenth.
It’s important to discuss the impact on rent. Assuming (which is usually the case) that food consumption doesn’t decrease, the same level of farming will be needed to meet the community's needs; the cultivation limit, to use Dr. Chalmers's term, stays the same. The same land or capital, which is the least productive and already determines the value and price of all produce, will keep regulating them. The effect that a tax on agricultural produce will have on rent depends on whether it changes the difference between the returns from this least productive land or capital and the returns from other lands and capitals. This, in turn, depends on how the tax is applied. If it is an value-based tax, or a fixed percentage of the produce, like a tithe for instance, it clearly reduces corn rents. This is because it takes more corn from the more productive lands than from the less productive ones, exactly in proportion to their productivity—lands that are twice as productive will pay twice as much in tithe. Anything that takes more from the larger of two values than from the smaller one reduces the difference between them. Imposing a tithe on corn would also affect corn rent; if we deduct a tenth from a series of numbers, the differences between them are reduced by a tenth as well.
For example, let there be five qualities of land, which severally yield, on the same extent of ground and with the same expenditure, 100, 90, 80, 70, and 60 bushels of wheat, the last of these being the lowest quality which the demand for food renders it necessary to cultivate. The rent of these lands will be as follows:
For example, let's consider five types of land that produce, on the same area and with the same amount of effort, 100, 90, 80, 70, and 60 bushels of wheat, with the last type being the lowest quality that needs to be farmed due to food demand. The rent for these lands will be as follows:
The land producing 100 bushels will yield a rent of 100-60, or 40 bushels.
That producing 90 bushels, a rent of 90-60, or 30 bushels.
That producing 80 bushels, a rent of 80-60, or 20 bushels.
That producing 70 bushels, a rent of 70-60, or 10 bushels.
That producing 60 bushels, will yield no rent.
The land that yields 100 bushels will generate a rent of 100-60, or 40 bushels.
The land that yields 90 bushels will generate a rent of 90-60, or 30 bushels.
The land that yields 80 bushels will generate a rent of 80-60, or 20 bushels.
The land that yields 70 bushels will generate a rent of 70-60, or 10 bushels.
The land that yields 60 bushels will not produce any rent.
Now let a tithe be imposed, which takes from these five pieces of land 10, 9, 8, 7, and 6 bushels respectively, the fifth quality still being the one which regulates the price, but returning to the farmer, after payment of tithe, no more than 54 bushels:
Now let's impose a tithe that takes 10, 9, 8, 7, and 6 bushels from these five pieces of land, respectively. The fifth quality still determines the price, but after paying the tithe, the farmer ends up with no more than 54 bushels:
The land producing 100 bushels reduced to 90 will yield a rent of 90-54, or 36
bushels.
That producing 90 bushels reduced to 81, a rent of 81-54, or 27 bushels.
That producing 80 bushels reduced to 72, a rent of 72-54, or 18 bushels.
That producing 70 bushels reduced to 63, a rent of 63-54, or 9 bushels.
The land that produces 100 bushels, reduced to 90, will yield a rent of 90-54, or 36 bushels.
The land producing 90 bushels, reduced to 81, will yield a rent of 81-54, or 27 bushels.
The land producing 80 bushels, reduced to 72, will result in a rent of 72-54, or 18 bushels.
The land producing 70 bushels, reduced to 63, will generate a rent of 63-54, or 9 bushels.
and that producing 60 bushels, reduced to 54, will yield, as before, no rent. So that the rent of the first quality of land has lost four bushels; of the second, three; of the third, two; and of the fourth, one: that is, each has lost exactly one tenth. A tax, therefore, of a fixed proportion of the produce lowers, in the same proportion, corn-rent.
and that producing 60 bushels, reduced to 54, will yield, as before, no rent. So the rent for the first quality of land has dropped by four bushels; for the second, three; for the third, two; and for the fourth, one: that is, each has lost exactly one-tenth. A tax, therefore, of a fixed proportion of the produce decreases corn-rent by the same proportion.
But it is only corn-rent that is lowered, and not rent estimated in money, or in any other commodity. For, in the same proportion as corn-rent is reduced in quantity, the corn composing it is raised in value. Under the tithe, 54 bushels will be worth in the market what 60 were before; and nine tenths will in all cases sell for as much as the whole ten tenths previously sold for. The landlords will therefore be compensated in value and price for what they lose in quantity, and will suffer only so far as they consume their rent in kind, or, after receiving it in money, expend it in agricultural produce; that is, they only suffer as consumers of agricultural produce, and in common with all the other consumers. Considered as landlords, they have the same income as before; the tithe, therefore, falls on the consumer, and not on the landlord.
But it’s only the corn rent that goes down, not the rent measured in money or any other goods. As the quantity of corn rent decreases, the value of the corn itself goes up. With the tithe, 54 bushels will sell for what 60 used to sell for in the market; and nine-tenths will sell for the same amount that the whole ten-tenths used to sell for. Landlords will be compensated in value and price for what they lose in quantity, and they’ll only lose out if they consume their rent in kind or, after getting it in cash, spend it on agricultural products; in other words, they only suffer as consumers of agricultural goods, just like all the other consumers. As landlords, they have the same income as before; therefore, the tithe falls on the consumer, not on the landlord.
The same effect would be produced on rent if the tax, instead of being a fixed proportion of the produce, were a fixed sum per quarter or per bushel. A tax which takes a shilling for every bushel takes more shillings from one field than from another, just in proportion as it produces more bushels; and operates exactly like tithe, except that tithe is not only the same proportion on all lands, but is also the same proportion at all times, while a fixed sum of money per bushel will amount to a greater or less proportion, according as corn is cheap or dear.
The same effect on rent would occur if the tax, instead of being a fixed percentage of the yield, were a fixed amount per quarter or per bushel. A tax that takes a shilling for each bushel takes more shillings from one field than another, depending on how many bushels it produces; it works just like a tithe, except that a tithe is always the same percentage on all lands and remains consistent over time, while a fixed dollar amount per bushel will represent a higher or lower percentage based on whether corn is cheap or expensive.
There are other modes of taxing agriculture, which would affect rent differently. A tax proportioned to the rent would [pg 568] fall wholly on the rent, and would not at all raise the price of corn, which is regulated by the portion of the produce that pays no rent. A fixed tax of so much per cultivated acre, without distinction of value, would have effects directly the reverse. Taking no more from the best qualities of land than from the worst, it would leave the differences the same as before, and consequently the same corn-rents, and the landlords would profit to the full extent of the rise of price. To put the thing in another manner: the price must rise sufficiently to enable the worst land to pay the tax, thus enabling all lands which produce more than the worst to pay not only the tax, but also an increased rent to the landlords. These, however, are not so much taxes on the produce of land as taxes on the land itself. Taxes on the produce, properly so called, whether fixed or ad valorem, do not affect rent, but fall on the consumer, profits, however, generally bearing either the whole or the greatest part of the portion which is levied on the consumption of the laboring-classes.
There are other ways to tax agriculture that would have different effects on rent. A tax based on the rent would completely impact the rent and wouldn’t raise the price of corn at all, since that price is determined by the portion of the crop that doesn’t pay any rent. In contrast, a fixed tax per cultivated acre, without regard to its value, would have completely opposite effects. By taking the same amount from both the best and worst quality land, it would keep the differences unchanged and maintain the same corn-rents, meaning landlords would benefit fully from the price increase. To put it another way: the price must increase enough for the least productive land to cover the tax, which would allow all land that produces more than the least productive to not only pay the tax but also pay an increased rent to the landlords. However, these taxes target the land itself rather than the output from the land. Taxes on the actual produce, whether fixed or based on value, don’t impact rent but are passed on to the consumer, with profits generally absorbing either all or most of the tax imposed on the spending of the working-class.
§ 4. —how influenced by the tendency of profits to reach a minimum.
The preceding is, I apprehend, a correct statement of the manner in which taxes on agricultural produce operate when first laid on. When, however, they are of old standing, their effect may be different. Now, the effect of accumulation, when attended by its usual accompaniment, an increase of population, is to increase the value and price of food, to raise rent, and to lower profits; that is, to do precisely what is done by a tax on agricultural produce, except that this does not raise rent. The tax, therefore, merely anticipates the rise of price and fall of profits which would have taken place ultimately through the mere progress of accumulation, while it at the same time prevents, or at least retards, that progress. If the rate of profit was such that the effect of the tithe reduces it to the practical minimum, after a lapse of time which would have admitted of a rise of one tenth from the natural progress of wealth, the consumer will be paying no more than he would have paid if the tithe had never existed; he will have ceased to pay any portion of it, and the person who will really pay it is the landlord, [pg 569] whom it deprives of the increase of rent which would by that time have accrued to him. At every successive point in this interval of time, less of the burden will rest on the consumer, and more of it on the landlord; and, in the ultimate result, the minimum of profits will be reached with a smaller capital and population and a lower rental than if the course of things had not been disturbed by the imposition of the tax. If, on the other hand, the tithe or other tax on agricultural produce does not reduce profits to the minimum, but to something above the minimum, accumulation will not be stopped, but only slackened; and, if population also increases, the twofold increase will continue to produce its effects—a rise of the price of corn and an increase of rent. These consequences, however, will not take place with the same rapidity as if the higher rate of profit had continued. At the end of twenty years the country will have a smaller population and capital than, but for the tax, it would by that time have had; the landlords will have a smaller rent, and the price of corn, having increased less rapidly than it would otherwise have done, will not be so much as a tenth higher than what, if there had been no tax, it would by that time have become. A part of the tax, therefore, will already have ceased to fall on the consumer and devolved upon the landlord, and the proportion will become greater and greater by lapse of time.
I believe the previous statement is an accurate description of how taxes on agricultural products work when they are first imposed. However, when these taxes have been in place for a long time, their impact may change. The effect of accumulation, along with the usual increase in population, tends to raise the value and price of food, increase rent, and lower profits. This means it does exactly what a tax on agricultural products does, except that it doesn’t increase rent. So, the tax simply anticipates the price rise and profit decrease that would eventually happen due to natural accumulation, while also hindering that progress. If the profit rate were such that the tax reduced it to a practical minimum, after enough time for a rise of one-tenth due to natural wealth growth, the consumer would end up paying no more than if the tax hadn’t existed. Eventually, they would stop paying any part of it, and the one who truly pays it is the landlord, who loses the rent increase that would have accumulated by that time. At every point in this timeframe, less of the burden will be on the consumer and more on the landlord. Ultimately, the minimum profits will be reached with a lower capital, smaller population, and reduced rent compared to a scenario without the tax interruption. Conversely, if the tax doesn’t lower profits to the minimum but just above it, accumulation will not stop but slow down, and if the population also grows, the combined increases will still lead to higher corn prices and more rent. However, these changes will occur more slowly than if the higher profit rate had stayed in effect. After twenty years, the country will have a smaller population and capital than it would have without the tax; landlords will collect less rent, and corn prices will not rise as rapidly, being less than one-tenth higher than they would be without the tax. Therefore, part of the tax will have already shifted from the consumer to the landlord, and this shift will grow larger over time.
But though tithes and other taxes on agricultural produce, when of long standing, either do not raise the price of food and lower profits at all, or, if at all, not in proportion to the tax, yet the abrogation of such taxes, when they exist, does not the less diminish price, and, in general, raise the rate of profit. The abolition of a tithe takes one tenth from the cost of production, and consequently from the price, of all agricultural produce; and, unless it permanently raises the laborer's requirements, it lowers the cost of labor and raises profits. Rent, estimated in money or in commodities, generally remains as before; estimated in agricultural produce, it is raised. The country adds as much, by the repeal of a tithe, to the margin which intervenes between it and the stationary [pg 570] state as was cut off from that margin by the tithe when first imposed. Accumulation is greatly accelerated, and, if population also increases, the price of corn immediately begins to recover itself and rent to rise, thus gradually transferring the benefit of the remission from the consumer to the landlord.
But even though long-standing tithes and other taxes on agricultural products usually don’t raise food prices or lower profits much, if at all, the removal of such taxes does reduce prices and generally increases profit margins. Getting rid of a tithe cuts one-tenth off the production cost, and consequently the price, of all agricultural products; unless it permanently raises what laborers need to earn, this lowers labor costs and increases profits. Rent, whether calculated in money or goods, typically stays the same; but when measured in agricultural products, it goes up. The country gains as much from the elimination of a tithe to the difference that existed between it and a stable state as what was deducted from that difference when the tithe was first introduced. Accumulation speeds up significantly, and if the population grows as well, the price of grain starts to recover quickly and rents begin to increase, slowly shifting the advantage of the tax removal from consumers to landlords.
§ 5. Impact of Discriminatory Duties.
We have hitherto inquired into the effects of taxes on commodities, on the assumption that they are levied impartially on every mode in which the commodity can be produced or brought to market. Another class of considerations is opened, if we suppose that this impartiality is not maintained, and that the tax is imposed, not on the commodity, but on some particular mode of obtaining it.
We have so far looked into how taxes affect goods, assuming that they are applied fairly to every way the goods can be produced or sold. Another set of considerations arises if we assume that this fairness is not upheld, and that the tax is placed not on the good itself, but on a specific method of acquiring it.
Suppose that a commodity is capable of being made by two different processes—as a manufactured commodity may be produced either by hand or by steam-power—sugar may be made either from the sugar-cane or from beet-root, cattle fattened either on hay and green crops or on oil-cake and the refuse of breweries. It is the interest of the community that, of the two methods, producers should adopt that which produces the best article at the lowest price. This being also the interest of the producers, unless protected against competition, and shielded from the penalties of indolence, the process most advantageous to the community is that which, if not interfered with by Government, they ultimately find it to their advantage to adopt. Suppose, however, that a tax is laid on one of the processes, and no tax at all, or one of smaller amount, on the other. If the taxed process is the one which the producers would not have adopted, the measure is simply nugatory. But if the tax falls, as it is of course intended to do, upon the one which they would have adopted, it creates an artificial motive for preferring the untaxed process, though the inferior of the two. If, therefore, it has any effect at all, it causes the commodity to be produced of worse quality, or at a greater expense of labor; it causes so much of the labor of the community to be wasted, and the capital employed in supporting and remunerating [pg 571] that labor to be expended as uselessly as if it were spent in hiring men to dig holes and fill them up again. This waste of labor and capital constitutes an addition to the cost of production of the commodity, which raises its value and price in a corresponding ratio, and thus the owners of the capital are indemnified. The loss falls on the consumers; though the capital of the country is also eventually diminished, by the diminution of their means of saving, and, in some degree, of their inducements to save.
Suppose a product can be made using two different methods—just like a product can be produced either by hand or with steam power—sugar can be derived from either sugar cane or beetroot, and livestock can be fed either with hay and fresh crops or with oil cake and brewery leftovers. It's in the community's best interest for producers to choose the method that creates the best product at the lowest cost. This is also in the producers' interest; unless they're protected from competition and shielded from the consequences of laziness, the process that benefits the community the most is the one they will ultimately find advantageous if the government doesn't interfere. However, if a tax is imposed on one method and either no tax or a smaller tax on the other, and if the taxed method is one that the producers wouldn't have chosen anyway, the tax becomes irrelevant. But if the tax is applied to the method they would have chosen, it creates an artificial incentive to prefer the untaxed method, even if it's the inferior option. Therefore, if it has any effect, it results in a product of lower quality or at a higher labor cost; it leads to wasted labor within the community, and the capital used to support and pay for that labor is spent as wastefully as if it were used to hire people to dig holes and fill them back in. This waste of labor and capital adds extra costs to producing the product, raising its value and price proportionately, thereby compensating the capital owners. The burden falls on consumers, and over time, the country’s capital is also decreased due to a reduction in their saving capacity and their motivation to save.
The kind of tax, therefore, which comes under the general denomination of a discriminating duty, transgresses the rule that taxes should take as little as possible from the taxpayer beyond what they bring into the treasury of the state. A discriminating duty makes the consumer pay two distinct taxes, only one of which is paid to the Government, and that frequently the less onerous of the two. If a tax were laid on sugar produced from the cane, leaving the sugar from beet-root untaxed, then in so far as cane-sugar continued to be used, the tax on it would be paid to the treasury, and might be as unobjectionable as most other taxes; but if cane-sugar, having previously been cheaper than beet-root sugar, was now dearer, and beet-root sugar was to any considerable amount substituted for it, and fields laid out and manufactories established in consequence, the Government would gain no revenue from the beet-root sugar, while the consumers of it would pay a real tax. They would pay for beet-root sugar more than they had previously paid for cane-sugar, and the difference would go to indemnify producers for a portion of the labor of the country actually thrown away, in producing by the labor of (say) three hundred men what could be obtained by the other process with the labor of two hundred.
The type of tax referred to as a discriminating duty goes against the principle that taxes should take as little as possible from the taxpayer beyond what's necessary for the government’s budget. A discriminating duty forces consumers to pay two different taxes, only one of which goes to the government, and that one is often the lighter burden. For example, if a tax is imposed on sugar from cane while sugar from beet is untaxed, as long as cane sugar is still being consumed, the tax on it would go to the treasury and might be as reasonable as most other taxes. However, if cane sugar, which was previously cheaper, becomes more expensive and beet sugar is used instead, leading to the establishment of fields and factories, the government wouldn’t earn any revenue from beet sugar, but consumers would still face a real tax. They would end up paying more for beet sugar than they did for cane sugar, and the difference would cover part of the expenses incurred by producers who were producing with three hundred men what could have been done with just two hundred.
One of the commonest cases of discriminating duties is that of a tax on the importation of a commodity capable of being produced at home, unaccompanied by an equivalent tax on the home production. A commodity is never permanently imported, unless it can be obtained from abroad at a smaller cost of labor and capital, on the whole, than is necessary for producing it. If, therefore, by a duty on the importation, it is rendered cheaper to produce the article than to import it, an extra quantity of labor and capital is expended, without any extra result. The labor is useless, and the capital is spent in paying people for laboriously doing nothing. All custom duties which operate as an encouragement to the home production of the taxed article are thus an eminently wasteful mode of raising a revenue.
One of the most common examples of unfair tax duties is a tax on imported goods that could be made locally, without a similar tax on local production. A good is rarely imported permanently unless it can be acquired from abroad at a lower total cost of labor and resources than what it would take to produce it here. Therefore, if an import tax makes it cheaper to create the item than to import it, more labor and resources are wasted without achieving any extra output. The labor is pointless, and the capital is spent paying people to do nothing productive. All tariffs that encourage local production of the taxed item are, therefore, an incredibly inefficient way to generate revenue.
This character belongs in a peculiar degree to custom duties on the produce of land, unless countervailed by excise duties on the home production. Such taxes bring less into the public treasury, compared with what they take from the consumers, than any other imposts to which civilized nations are usually subject. If the wheat produced in a country is twenty millions of quarters, and the consumption twenty-one millions, a million being annually imported, and if on this [pg 573] million a duty is laid which raises the price ten shillings per quarter, the price which is raised is not that of the million only, but of the whole twenty-one millions. Taking the most favorable but extremely improbable supposition, that the importation is not at all checked, nor the home production enlarged, the state gains a revenue of only half a million, while the consumers are taxed ten millions and a half, the ten millions being a contribution to the home growers, who are forced by competition to resign it all to the landlords. The consumer thus pays to the owners of land an additional tax, equal to twenty times that which he pays to the state. Let us now suppose that the tax really checks importation. Suppose importation stopped altogether in ordinary years; it being found that the million of quarters can be obtained, by a more elaborate cultivation, or by breaking up inferior land, at a less advance than ten shillings upon the previous price—say, for instance, five shillings a quarter. The revenue now obtains nothing, except from the extraordinary imports which may happen to take place in a season of scarcity. But the consumers pay every year a tax of five shillings on the whole twenty-one millions of quarters, amounting to £5,250,000 sterling. Of this the odd £250,000 goes to compensate the growers of the last million of quarters for the labor and capital wasted under the compulsion of the law. The remaining £5,000,000 go to enrich the landlords as before.
This situation relates mainly to customs duties on agricultural products, unless offset by excise duties on domestic production. These taxes bring in less revenue for the government compared to what they extract from consumers than any other taxes that civilized nations usually face. If a country produces twenty million quarters of wheat and consumes twenty-one million, importing one million annually, and there's a duty that raises the price by ten shillings per quarter, the price increase affects not just the one million but the entire twenty-one million. Even under the most favorable but highly unlikely scenario where imports remain unaffected and domestic production doesn't increase, the government collects only half a million in revenue, while consumers end up paying an additional ten and a half million—in which ten million goes to local growers who are forced by competition to pass it all on to the landlords. As a result, the consumer is effectively taxed twenty times more for the landowners than for the government. Now, let’s assume the tax actually reduces imports. If imports completely stop in a typical year and it turns out that the million quarters can be sourced through more intensive farming or by cultivating less productive land with only a five-shilling increase in price, the government won’t collect anything except from any exceptional imports that might occur during a shortage. However, consumers will still pay an annual tax of five shillings on all twenty-one million quarters, totaling £5,250,000. Of this amount, £250,000 compensates the growers of the last million for the labor and resources wasted due to legal requirements, while the remaining £5,000,000 continues to enrich the landlords.
Such is the operation of what are technically termed corn laws, when first laid on; and such continues to be their operation so long as they have any effect at all in raising the price of corn. The difference between a country without corn laws and a country which has long had corn laws is not so much that the last has a higher price or a larger rental, but that it has the same price and the same rental with a smaller aggregate capital and a smaller population. The imposition of corn laws raises rents, but retards that progress of accumulation which would in no long period have raised them fully as much. The repeal of corn laws tends to lower rents, but it unchains a force which, in a progressive state of [pg 574] capital and population, restores and even increases the former amount.
This is how corn laws work when they are first introduced, and this continues to be their effect as long as they raise corn prices. The difference between a country without corn laws and one that has had them for a long time isn’t so much that the latter has higher prices or rentals, but that it has the same prices and rentals with less total capital and a smaller population. The imposition of corn laws raises rents but slows down the accumulation of wealth that would have eventually raised them as much. Repealing corn laws tends to lower rents, but it unleashes a force that, in a growing economy with increasing capital and population, brings back and even boosts the previous levels.
What we have said of duties on importation generally is equally applicable to discriminating duties which favor importation from one place, or in one particular manner, in contradistinction to others; such as the preference given to the produce of a colony, or of a country with which there is a commercial treaty; or the higher duties formerly imposed by our navigation laws on goods imported in other than British shipping. Whatever else may be alleged in favor of such distinctions, whenever they are not nugatory, they are economically wasteful. They induce a resort to a more costly mode of obtaining a commodity in lieu of one less costly, and thus cause a portion of the labor which the country employs in providing itself with foreign commodities to be sacrificed without return.
What we've discussed about import duties generally also applies to discriminatory duties that favor imports from specific places or methods over others. This includes preferences for goods from a colony or a country with which we have a trade agreement, as well as the higher duties that our navigation laws used to impose on goods imported through non-British shipping. Regardless of the arguments made in favor of these distinctions, they are economically wasteful when they are not insignificant. They force us to use a more expensive way to obtain a product instead of a cheaper one, leading to a part of the labor that the country uses to get foreign goods being wasted without any benefit.
§ 6. Impact of Export and Import Taxes on International Trade.
There is one more point, relating to the operation of taxes on commodities conveyed from one country to another, which requires notice: the influences which they exert on international exchanges. Every tax on a commodity tends to raise its price, and consequently to lessen the demand for it in the market in which it is sold. All taxes on international trade tend, therefore, to produce a disturbance, and a readjustment of what we have termed the equation of international demand.
There’s one more thing to mention regarding the impact of taxes on goods that are moved from one country to another: the effect they have on international trade. Any tax on a product generally increases its price, which then reduces its demand in the market where it’s sold. Therefore, all taxes on international trade tend to disrupt and require a realignment of what we call the balance of international demand.
Taxes on foreign trade are of two kinds—taxes on imports and on exports. On the first aspect of the matter it would seem that both these taxes are paid by the consumers of the commodity; that taxes on exports consequently fall entirely on foreigners, taxes on imports wholly on the home consumer. The true state of the case, however, is much more complicated.
Taxes on foreign trade come in two types—import taxes and export taxes. Regarding imports, it appears that these taxes are paid by consumers of the goods; thus, export taxes fully impact foreigners, while import taxes are completely borne by domestic consumers. However, the actual situation is much more complex.
“By taxing exports we may, in certain circumstances, produce a division of the advantage of the trade more favorable to ourselves. In some cases we may draw into our coffers, at the expense of foreigners, not only the whole tax, but more than the tax; in other cases we should gain exactly [pg 575] the tax; in others, less than the tax. In this last case a part of the tax is borne by ourselves; possibly the whole, possibly even, as we shall show, more than the whole.”
"By taxing exports, we can sometimes create a distribution of trade benefits that works better for us. In some cases, we might collect not just the full tax but even more, while in other instances we would receive exactly the tax; and in some situations, we would end up getting less than the tax. In this last case, some of the tax burden would fall on us; it could be the entire tax or, as we will show, even more than the entire tax."
Reverting to the supposititious case employed of a trade between England and the United States in iron and corn, suppose that the United States taxes her export of corn, the tax not being supposed high enough to induce England to produce corn for herself. The price at which corn can be sold in England is augmented by the tax. This will probably diminish the quantity consumed. It may diminish it so much that, even at the increased price, there will not be required so great a money value as before. Or it may not diminish it at all, or so little that, in consequence of the higher price, a greater money value will be purchased than before. In this last case, the United States will gain, at the expense of England, not only the whole amount of the duty, but more; for, the money value of her exports to England being increased, while her imports remain the same, money will flow into the United States from England. The price of corn will rise in the United States, and consequently in England; but the price of iron will fall in England, and consequently in the United States. We shall export less corn and import more iron, till the equilibrium is restored. It thus appears (what is at first sight somewhat remarkable) that, by taxing her exports, the United States would, in some conceivable circumstances, not only gain from her foreign customers the whole amount of the tax, but would also get her imports cheaper. She would get them cheaper in two ways, for she would obtain them for less money, and would have more money to purchase them with. England, on the other hand, would suffer doubly: she would have to pay for her corn a price increased not only by the duty, but by the influx of money into the United States, while the same change in the distribution of the circulating medium would leave her less money to purchase it with.344
Returning to the hypothetical scenario of trade between England and the United States concerning iron and corn, let's say that the United States imposes a tax on its corn exports, but the tax isn't high enough to make England grow its own corn. The tax raises the price of corn in England, likely leading to a decrease in consumption. It could drop to the point where, even with the higher price, the overall money spent on corn is less than before. Alternatively, the consumption may not decrease much at all—so much so that the higher price results in a greater total expenditure than previously. In this latter case, the United States would benefit at England's expense, collecting not just the full tax amount but even more. Since the value of U.S. exports to England would increase while import values remain constant, more money would flow into the U.S. from England. The price of corn would rise in the U.S. and thus in England too, while the price of iron would decline in England and consequently in the U.S. We'd export less corn and import more iron until balance is restored. This shows (which may initially seem surprising) that by taxing its exports, the United States could, under certain conditions, not only reclaim the entire tax from foreign customers but also obtain its imports at a lower cost. It would secure cheaper imports in two ways: by spending less money and having more money available to make those purchases. Conversely, England would face a double burden: it would pay higher prices for its corn due to the tax and the increase of money flowing into the United States, while the shift in currency distribution would leave England with less money to spend on it. 344
This, however, is only one of three possible cases. If, after the imposition of the duty, England requires so diminished a quantity of corn that its total value is exactly the same as before, the balance of trade would be undisturbed; the United States will gain the duty, England will lose it, and nothing more. If, again, the imposition of the duty occasions such a falling off in the demand that England requires a less pecuniary value than before, our exports will no longer pay for our imports; money must pass from the United States into England; and England's share of the advantage of the trade will be increased. By the change in the distribution of money, corn will fall in the United States, and therefore it will, of course, fall in England. Thus England will not pay the whole of the tax. From the same cause, iron will rise in England, and consequently in the United States. When this alteration of prices has so adjusted the demand that the corn and the iron again pay for one another, the result is that England has paid only a part of the tax, and the remainder of what has been received into our treasury has come indirectly out of the pockets of our own consumers of iron, who pay a higher price for that imported commodity in consequence of the tax on our exports, while at the same time they, in consequence of the efflux of money and the fall of prices, have smaller money incomes wherewith to pay for the iron at that advanced price.
This is just one of three possible scenarios. If, after the duty is imposed, England needs so much less corn that its total value stays exactly the same as before, the balance of trade remains unchanged; the United States will collect the duty, England will lose out, and that’s it. If, on the other hand, the duty causes a significant drop in demand so that England requires less value than before, our exports won’t cover our imports; money will flow from the United States to England; and England will benefit more from the trade. As money is redistributed, corn prices will drop in the United States, and naturally, they will also fall in England. Therefore, England won’t shoulder the entire tax burden. Meanwhile, iron prices will increase in England and also in the United States. Once the price changes adjust demand so that corn and iron can again cover each other’s costs, it turns out that England has only paid part of the tax, and the rest collected in our treasury has indirectly come from our own iron consumers, who end up paying a higher price for that imported product because of the tax on our exports, while simultaneously having lower money incomes due to the outflow of cash and the decrease in prices, making it harder for them to afford the iron at the increased price.
It is not an impossible supposition that by taxing our exports we might not only gain nothing from the foreigner, the tax being paid out of our own pockets, but might even compel our own people to pay a second tax to the foreigner. Suppose, as before, that the demand of England for corn falls off so much on the imposition of the duty that she requires a smaller money value than before, but that the case is so different with iron in the United States that when the price rises the demand either does not fall off at all, or so little that the money value required is greater than before. The first effect of laying on the duty is, as before, that the corn exported will no longer pay for the iron imported.
It's not impossible to think that by taxing our exports, we might not only gain nothing from foreign countries, since the tax would come out of our own pockets, but we could even force our own people to pay a second tax to the foreigner. Let's say, as before, that England's demand for corn drops so much after the duty is imposed that she needs less money than before. However, the situation is different with iron in the United States; when the price goes up, the demand either doesn't decrease at all, or it decreases so little that the total money value required is actually greater than before. The first effect of imposing the duty is, as mentioned earlier, that the corn we export will no longer cover the cost of the iron we import.
Money will therefore flow out of the United States into England. One effect is to raise the price of iron in England, and consequently in the United States. But this, by the supposition, instead of stopping the efflux of money, only makes it greater; because, the higher the price, the greater the money value of the iron consumed. The balance, therefore, can only be restored by the other effect, which is going on at the same time, namely, the fall of corn in the American and consequently in the English market. Even when corn has fallen so low that its price with the duty is only equal to what its price without the duty was at first, it is not a necessary consequence that the fall will stop; for the same amount of exportation as before will not now suffice to pay the increased money value of the imports; and although the English consumers have now not only corn at the old price, but likewise increased money incomes, it is not certain that they will be inclined to employ the increase of their incomes in increasing their purchases of corn. The price of corn, therefore, must perhaps fall, to restore the equilibrium, more than the whole amount of the duty; England may be enabled to import corn at a lower price when it is taxed than when it was untaxed; and this gain she will acquire at the expense of the American consumers of iron, who, in addition, will be the real payers of the whole of what is received at their own custom-house under the name of duties on the export of corn.
Money will flow out of the United States and into England. One result is that the price of iron in England, and consequently in the United States, will rise. However, this, as supposed, does not stop the outflow of money; it actually increases it because the higher price raises the money value of the iron consumed. The balance can only be restored by another effect happening simultaneously, which is the drop in corn prices in both the American and English markets. Even when corn prices drop so low that, including duties, they only equal the initial price without duties, it doesn't necessarily mean that the decrease will stop. The same volume of exports as before won’t be enough to cover the increased money value of imports. Although English consumers now have corn at the old price and higher incomes, it's uncertain they will choose to use their increased incomes to buy more corn. Thus, the price of corn may need to drop further than the total duty amount to restore balance. England might be able to import corn at a lower price even when taxed than when it was untaxed, gaining at the expense of American iron consumers, who will ultimately bear the full cost reflected in their own customs fees under the name of duties on corn exports.
In general, however, there could be little doubt that a country which imposed such taxes would succeed in making foreign countries contribute something to its revenue; but, unless the taxed article be one for which their demand is extremely urgent, they will seldom pay the whole of the amount which the tax brings in.345
In general, though, it’s pretty clear that a country that imposed such taxes would manage to get foreign countries to contribute to its revenue; however, unless the taxed item is something they desperately need, they usually won’t pay the full amount brought in by the tax.345
Thus far of duties on exports. We now proceed to the more ordinary case of duties on imports: “We have had an example of a tax on exports, that is, on foreigners, falling in part on ourselves. We shall therefore not be surprised if we find a tax on imports, that is, on ourselves, partly falling upon foreigners.
Thus far about duties on exports. Now, let's move on to the more common situation of duties on imports: "We’ve seen an example of a tax on exports, which is a tax on foreigners that also affects us. So, we shouldn’t be surprised if we see a tax on imports, which is a tax on us that also impacts foreigners."
“Instead of taxing the corn which we export, suppose that we tax the iron which we import. The duty which we are now supposing must not be what is termed a protecting duty, that is, a duty sufficiently high to induce us to produce the article at home. If it had this effect, it would destroy entirely the trade both in corn and in iron, and both countries would lose the whole of the advantage which they previously gained by exchanging those commodities with one another. We suppose a duty which might diminish the consumption of the article, but which would not prevent us from continuing to import, as before, whatever iron we did consume.
"Instead of taxing the corn we export, what if we taxed the iron we import? The duty we’re discussing shouldn’t be a protective tariff, meaning it shouldn’t be so high that it encourages local production of the item. If it did have that effect, it would damage the trade in both corn and iron, and both countries would lose all the benefits they originally gained from trading these goods. We’re proposing a duty that might decrease our consumption of the product, but that wouldn’t prevent us from continuing to import as much iron as we still use."
“The equilibrium of trade would be disturbed if the imposition of the tax diminished, in the slightest degree, the quantity of iron consumed. For, as the tax is levied at our own custom-house, the English exporter only receives the same price as formerly, though the American consumer pays a higher one. If, therefore, there be any diminution of the quantity bought, although a larger sum of money may be actually laid out in the article, a smaller one will be due from the United States to England: this sum will no longer be an equivalent for the sum due from England to the United States for corn, the balance therefore must be paid in money. Prices will fall in England and rise in the United States; iron will fall in the English market; corn will rise in the American. The English will pay a higher price for corn, [pg 579] and will have smaller money incomes to buy it with; while the Americans will obtain iron cheaper, that is, its price will exceed what it previously was by less than the amount of the duty, while their means of purchasing it will be increased by the increase of their money incomes.
The balance of trade would be disrupted if the tax caused even a slight drop in iron consumption. Since the tax is applied at customs, the English exporter will still get the same price as before, even though the American consumer will pay more. So, if there’s any reduction in the quantity bought, even if more money is actually spent on the product, the amount the United States owes to England will be smaller: this will no longer match what England owes to the United States for corn, so the difference needs to be paid in cash. Prices in England will go down while they go up in the United States; iron will become cheaper in the English market, and corn will become more expensive in America. The English will end up paying a higher price for corn, [pg 579] and will have less money to buy it; meanwhile, the Americans will get iron at a lower price, which will lead to an increase in its cost, but by less than the tax amount, while their purchasing power will grow due to higher incomes.
“If the imposition of the tax does not diminish the demand, it will leave the trade exactly as it was before. We shall import as much, and export as much; the whole of the tax will be paid out of our own pockets.
“If the tax doesn’t lower demand, trade will stay the same. We’ll import and export the same amounts; the whole tax will come out of our own pockets."
“But the imposition of a tax on a commodity almost always diminishes the demand more or less; and it can never, or scarcely ever, increase the demand. It may, therefore, be laid down as a principle that a tax on imported commodities, when it really operates as a tax, and not as a prohibition either total or partial, almost always falls in part upon the foreigners who consume our goods; and that this is a mode in which a nation may appropriate to itself, at the expense of foreigners, a larger share than would otherwise belong to it of the increase in the general productiveness of the labor and capital of the world, which results from the interchange of commodities among nations.”
"However, placing a tax on a product almost always lowers demand to some degree, and it hardly ever increases demand. So, it can be considered a principle that a tax on imported goods, when it truly functions as a tax and not as a total or partial ban, generally puts some burden on the foreigners who purchase our products. This is a way for a country to take, at the expense of foreigners, a bigger share of the overall benefits from the increased productivity of labor and capital worldwide that results from trade between nations."
Those are, therefore, in the right who maintain that taxes on imports are partly paid by foreigners; but they are mistaken when they say that it is by the foreign producer. It is not on the person from whom we buy, but on all those who buy from us, that a portion of our custom duties spontaneously falls. It is the foreign consumer of our exported commodities who is obliged to pay a higher price for them because we maintain revenue duties on foreign goods.
Those who argue that taxes on imports are partly paid by foreigners are correct; however, they're wrong when they claim that the burden falls on the foreign producer. It’s not the seller we buy from who bears this cost, but rather everyone who buys from us. It's the foreign consumer of our exported goods who ends up paying a higher price because we impose revenue duties on foreign products.
There are but two cases in which duties on commodities can in any degree, or in any manner, fall on the producer. One is, when the article is a strict monopoly, and at a scarcity price. The price in this case being only limited by the desires of the buyer—the sum obtained for the restricted supply being the utmost which the buyers would consent to give rather than go without it—if the treasury intercepts a part of this, the price can not be further raised to compensate for the tax, [pg 580] and it must be paid from the monopoly profits. A tax on rare and high-priced wines will fall wholly on the growers, or rather, on the owners of the vineyards. The second case, in which the producer sometimes bears a portion of the tax, is more important: the case of duties on the produce of land or of mines. These might be so high as to diminish materially the demand for the produce, and compel the abandonment of some of the inferior qualities of land or mines. Supposing this to be the effect, the consumers, both in the country itself and in those which dealt with it, would obtain the produce at smaller cost; and a part only, instead of the whole, of the duty would fall on the purchaser, who would be indemnified chiefly at the expense of the land-owners or mine-owners in the producing country.
Duties on goods can only affect the producer in two situations. One situation is when the item is a strict monopoly and priced high due to scarcity. In this case, the price is only limited by how much the buyer wants it—the amount gained from this limited supply is the most the buyers would pay rather than do without it. If the government takes a portion of this profit, the price can't go up any further to cover the tax, and it must come out of the monopoly profits. A tax on rare and expensive wines will be entirely paid by the growers, or more accurately, the vineyard owners. The second situation, where the producer sometimes absorbs part of the tax, is more significant: it involves duties on agricultural or mining products. These taxes might be so high that they would significantly reduce the demand for the products and lead to the abandonment of some lower-quality land or mines. If this happens, consumers—both locally and in trading countries—would get the products at a lower cost; only part of the tax, rather than the whole, would be passed on to them. Meanwhile, the landowners or mine-owners in the producing country would primarily bear the cost. [pg 580]
Duties on importation may, then, be divided “into two classes: (1) those which have the effect of encouraging some particular branch of domestic industry [protective duties], (2) and those which have not [revenue duties]. The former are purely mischievous, both to the country imposing them and to those with whom it trades. They prevent a saving of labor and capital, which, if permitted to be made, would be divided in some proportion or other between the importing country and the countries which buy what that country does or might export.
Duties on imports can be classified into two categories: (1) those that encourage specific sectors of domestic industry [protective duties], and (2) those that do not [revenue duties]. The first type is purely harmful, both to the country that imposes them and to its trading partners. They hinder savings in labor and capital, which, if allowed, would be shared in some way between the importing country and the countries that purchase what that country produces or might export.
“The other class of duties are those which do not encourage one mode of procuring an article at the expense of another, but allow interchange to take place just as if the duty did not exist, and to produce the saving of labor which constitutes the motive to international as to all other commerce. Of this kind are duties on the importation of any commodity which could not by any possibility be produced at home, and duties not sufficiently high to counterbalance the difference of expense between the production of the article at home and its importation. Of the money which is brought into the treasury of any country by taxes of this last description, a part only is paid by the people of that country; the remainder by the foreign consumers of their goods.
The other type of duties are those that don’t prioritize one way of getting a product over another, but instead enable trade to occur as if the duty didn’t exist, resulting in labor savings that stimulate international and all other commerce. This includes duties on imported goods that cannot be produced locally and duties that aren’t high enough to make domestic production more cost-effective than importing the item. Of the money collected from these types of taxes in a country’s treasury, only a part is paid by the citizens of that country; the rest comes from foreign buyers of their products.
“Nevertheless, this latter kind of taxes are in principle as ineligible as the former, though not precisely on the same ground. A protecting duty can never be a cause of gain, but always and necessarily of loss, to the country imposing it, just so far as it is efficacious to its end. A non-protecting duty, on the contrary, would in most cases be a source of gain to the country imposing it, in so far as throwing part of the weight of its taxes upon other people is a gain; but it would be a means which it could seldom be advisable to adopt, being so easily counteracted by a precisely similar proceeding on the other side.
Still, this kind of tax is basically just as unacceptable as the last one, though not for the same reasons. A protective tariff can never lead to a benefit, only and always a loss for the country that implements it, as long as it effectively serves its purpose. A non-protective tax, on the other hand, would typically benefit the country that imposes it, since shifting part of the tax burden onto others is seen as advantageous; however, it's a strategy that is rarely smart to adopt, as it can easily be countered by a similar action from the other side.
“If the United States, in the case already supposed, sought to obtain for herself more than her natural share of the advantage of the trade with England, by imposing a duty upon iron, England would only have to impose a duty upon corn sufficient to diminish the demand for that article about as much as the demand for iron had been diminished in the United States by the tax. Things would then be as before, and each country would pay its own tax—unless, indeed, the sum of the two duties exceeded the entire advantage of the trade, for in that case the trade and its advantage would cease entirely.
"If the United States, in this hypothetical situation, tried to get more than its fair share from trade with England by imposing a tax on iron, England would simply need to impose a tax on corn that would lower its demand for that product by about the same amount that the demand for iron was reduced in the United States because of the tax. Things would then go back to how they were, and each country would pay its own tax—unless, of course, the total of the two taxes was greater than the overall benefit of the trade, in which case the trade and its benefits would completely come to an end."
“There would be no advantage, therefore, in imposing duties of this kind with a view to gain by them in the manner which has been pointed out. But, when any part of the revenue is derived from taxes on commodities, these may often be as little objectionable as the rest. It is evident, too, that considerations of reciprocity, which are quite unessential when the matter in debate is a protecting duty, are of material importance when the repeal of duties of this other description is discussed. A country can not be expected to renounce the power of taxing foreigners unless foreigners will in return practice toward itself the same forbearance. The only mode in which a country can save itself from being a loser by the revenue duties imposed by other countries on its commodities is, to impose corresponding revenue duties on theirs. Only it must take care that [pg 582] those duties be not so high as to exceed all that remains of the advantage of the trade, and put an end to importation altogether, causing the article to be either produced at home, or imported from another and a dearer market.”
There wouldn’t be any advantage in imposing these types of duties to profit from them as mentioned. However, when some of the revenue comes from taxes on goods, those can sometimes be just as acceptable as others. It’s also clear that considerations of reciprocity, which aren’t really necessary when discussing a protective duty, become quite important when talking about eliminating duties of this other type. A country can’t be expected to give up the power to tax foreigners unless those foreigners agree to show the same restraint towards it. The only way a country can avoid being negatively affected by the revenue duties that other countries impose on its goods is to apply similar revenue duties on theirs. But it must ensure that these duties aren’t so high that they eliminate any remaining benefits of trade entirely, leading to a situation where the product must either be produced domestically or imported from a different, more expensive market.
Chapter IV. Comparison Between Direct and Indirect Taxation.
§ 1. Reasons for and against direct taxation.
Are direct or indirect taxes the most eligible? A man dislikes not so much the payment as the act of paying. He dislikes seeing the face of the tax-collector, and being subjected to his peremptory demand. Perhaps, too, the money which he is required to pay directly out of his pocket is the only taxation which he is quite sure that he pays at all. That a tax of two shillings per pound on tea, or of three shillings per bottle on wine, raises the price of each pound of tea and bottle of wine which he consumes, by that and more than that amount, can not, indeed, be denied; it is the fact, and is intended to be so, and he himself, at times, is perfectly aware of it; but it makes hardly any impression on his practical feelings and associations, serving to illustrate the distinction between what is merely known to be true and what is felt to be so. The unpopularity of direct taxation, contrasted with the easy manner in which the public consent to let themselves be fleeced in the prices of commodities, has generated in many friends of improvement a directly opposite mode of thinking to the foregoing. They contend that the very reason which makes direct taxation disagreeable makes it preferable. Under it every one knows how much he really pays; and, if he votes for a war, or any other expensive national luxury, he does so with his eyes open to what it costs him. If all taxes were direct, taxation would be much more perceived than at present, and there would be a security, which now there is not, for economy in the public expenditure.
Are direct or indirect taxes more appropriate? A person doesn’t dislike payment itself as much as the experience of paying. They dislike facing the tax collector and dealing with their demanding attitude. Perhaps the money taken directly out of their pocket is the only tax they’re completely aware of paying. It's undeniable that a tax of two shillings per pound on tea, or three shillings per bottle on wine, increases the price of each pound of tea and bottle of wine they buy by that amount or more; this is a fact, and they know it, but it hardly affects their practical feelings and associations. This highlights the difference between what is simply known to be true and what is actually felt. The unpopularity of direct taxation, in contrast to how easily the public allows themselves to be overcharged in the prices of goods, has led many advocates for improvement to think the opposite. They argue that the very reasons making direct taxation unpleasant also make it preferable. With direct taxation, everyone knows exactly how much they really pay; and if they support a war or any other costly national luxury, they do so fully aware of what it costs them. If all taxes were direct, people would be much more aware of taxation than they are now, and there would be a guarantee, which is currently lacking, for more economical public spending.
Although this argument is not without force, its weight is likely to be constantly diminishing. The real incidence of indirect taxation is every day more generally understood and more familiarly recognized. The mere distinction between paying money directly to the tax-collector and contributing the same sum through the intervention of the tea-dealer or the wine-merchant no longer makes the whole difference between dislike or opposition and passive acquiescence.
Although this argument has some validity, its impact is likely to keep fading. More and more people are coming to understand and recognize the true effects of indirect taxation. The simple difference between paying money directly to the tax collector and contributing the same amount through the tea dealer or the wine merchant no longer creates a significant divide between dislike or opposition and passive acceptance.
If our present revenue [of $400,000,000 in 1883] were all raised by direct taxes, an extreme dissatisfaction would certainly arise at having to pay so much; but while men's minds are so little guided by reason, as such a change of feeling from so irrelevant a cause would imply, so great an aversion to taxation might not be an unqualified good. Of the [$400,000,000] in question, nearly [$60,000,000] are pledged, under the most binding obligations, to those whose property has been borrowed and spent by the state; and, while this debt remains unredeemed, a greatly increased impatience of taxation would involve no little danger of a breach of faith. That part, indeed, of the public expenditure which is devoted to the maintenance of civil and military establishments [$206,000,000] (that is, all except the interest of the national debt), affords, in many of its details, ample scope for retrenchment. If so great an addition were made to the public dislike of taxation as might be the consequence of confining it to the direct form, the classes who profit by the misapplication of public money might probably succeed in saving that by which they profit, at the expense of that which would only be useful to the public.
If our current revenue [of $400,000,000 in 1883] came entirely from direct taxes, there would definitely be strong discontent over having to pay so much. However, since people's thinking is often not guided by reason, such a drastic shift in feelings from such an unrelated cause could mean that a strong dislike for taxes might not be entirely beneficial. Of the [$400,000,000] in question, nearly [$60,000,000] are committed, under strict obligations, to those whose assets the government has borrowed and used; and as long as this debt remains unpaid, growing impatience with taxes could pose a significant risk of breaking trust. In fact, the portion of public spending dedicated to maintaining civil and military services [$206,000,000] (which is everything except the interest on the national debt) offers plenty of opportunities for cuts in various areas. If there were a significant increase in public resentment towards taxes due to limiting them to direct forms, those who benefit from the misuse of public funds might be able to protect their interests at the expense of what would actually benefit the public.
There is, however, a frequent plea in support of indirect taxation, which must be altogether rejected as grounded on a fallacy. We are often told that taxes on commodities are less burdensome than other taxes, because the contributor can escape from them by ceasing to use the taxed commodity. He certainly can, if that be his object, deprive the Government of the money; but he does so by a sacrifice of his own [pg 585] indulgences, which (if he chose to undergo it) would equally make up to him for the same amount taken from him by direct taxation. Suppose a tax laid on wine, sufficient to add [$25] to the price of the quantity of wine which he consumes in a year. He has only (we are told) to diminish his consumption of wine by [$25], and he escapes the burden. True, but if the [$25], instead of being laid on wine, had been taken from him by an income-tax, he could, by expending [$25] less in wine, equally save the amount of the tax, so that the difference between the two cases is really illusory. If the Government takes from the contributor [$25] a year, whether in one way or another, exactly that amount must be retrenched from his consumption to leave him as well off as before; and in either way the same amount of sacrifice, neither more nor less, is imposed on him.
There’s a common argument in favor of indirect taxation that should be completely dismissed because it’s based on a misconception. People often say that taxes on goods are less burdensome than other taxes, since individuals can avoid them by simply not using the taxed item. While it’s true that they can forgo the tax, they do so by giving up something they enjoy, which, if they were willing to do without, would make up for the same amount lost through direct taxation. For instance, imagine a tax on wine that raises the price by $25 for the amount they drink in a year. The reasoning goes that they can just cut back on their wine consumption by $25 to avoid the tax burden. This is true, but if the $25 had been deducted from their income instead, they could also save that amount by spending $25 less on wine, meaning the difference between these situations is just an illusion. If the government takes $25 from someone each year, no matter how it’s done, that same amount has to be cut from their spending for them to feel as financially secure as before; in either scenario, they face the same sacrifice, no more, no less.
On the other hand, it is some advantage on the side of indirect taxes that what they exact from the contributor is taken at a time and in a manner likely to be convenient to him. It is paid at a time when he has at any rate a payment to make; it causes, therefore, no additional trouble, nor (unless the tax be on necessaries) any inconvenience but what is inseparable from the payment of the amount. He can also, except in the case of very perishable articles, select his own time for laying in a stock of the commodity, and consequently for payment of the tax. The producer or dealer who advances these taxes is, indeed, sometimes subjected to inconvenience; but, in the case of imported goods, this inconvenience is reduced to a minimum by what is called the Warehousing System, under which, instead of paying the duty at the time of importation, he is only required to do so when he takes out the goods for consumption, which is seldom done until he has either actually found, or has the prospect of immediately finding, a purchaser.
On the flip side, one benefit of indirect taxes is that they are collected from contributors in a way that is usually convenient for them. They pay at a time when they have a transaction to make, so it doesn’t create extra hassle, and unless the tax is on essential goods, it doesn’t cause much inconvenience beyond the payment itself. They can also, except in the case of very perishable items, choose when to stock up on the product, which means they can decide when to pay the tax. The producer or seller who pays these taxes might sometimes face some inconvenience; however, for imported goods, this inconvenience is minimized by what's known as the Warehousing System. With this system, instead of paying the duty when the goods are imported, they only need to pay when they take the goods out for sale, which usually happens when they have either found a buyer or are about to find one.
The strongest objection, however, to raising the whole or the greater part of a large revenue by direct taxes, is the impossibility of assessing them fairly without a conscientious co-operation on the part of the contributors, not to be hoped [pg 586] for in the present low state of public morality. In the case of an income-tax, we have already seen that, unless it be found practicable to exempt savings altogether from the tax, the burden can not be apportioned with any tolerable approach to fairness upon those whose incomes are derived from business or professions; and this is in fact admitted by most of the advocates of direct taxation who, I am afraid, generally get over the difficulty by leaving those classes untaxed, and confining their projected income-tax to “realized property,” in which form it certainly has the merit of being a very easy form of plunder. But enough has been said in condemnation of this expedient. We have seen, however, that a house-tax is a form of direct taxation not liable to the same objections as an income-tax, and indeed liable to as few objections of any kind as perhaps any of our indirect taxes. But it would be impossible to raise, by a house-tax alone, the greatest part of the revenue, without producing a very objectionable overcrowding of the population, through the strong motive which all persons would have to avoid the tax by restricting their house accommodation.
The main issue with raising most or all of a large revenue through direct taxes is that it's impossible to assess them fairly without honest cooperation from contributors, which isn't realistic given the current low level of public morality. In the case of an income tax, we've already seen that unless it's possible to completely exempt savings from the tax, the burden can't be distributed fairly among those whose incomes come from businesses or professions. Most advocates of direct taxation tend to sidestep this problem by leaving those groups untaxed and limiting their proposed income tax to “realized property,” which certainly simplifies the process of taking money from people. But we’ve discussed the faults in this approach. That said, a house tax is a form of direct taxation that doesn't face the same criticisms as an income tax and is perhaps as free from any significant objections as some of our indirect taxes. However, it would be impossible to generate a significant amount of revenue through a house tax alone without causing the undesirable issue of overcrowding, as everyone would be motivated to limit their housing to avoid the tax.
A certain amount of revenue may, as we have seen, be obtained without injustice by a peculiar tax on rent. Besides (1) the land-tax,346 and (2) an equivalent for the revenue derived from stamp duties on the conveyance of land, some further taxation might, I have contended, at some future period be imposed, (3) to enable the state to participate in the progressive increase of the incomes of landlords from natural causes. (4) Legacies and inheritances, we have also seen, ought to be subjected to taxation sufficient to yield a considerable revenue. With these taxes, and (5) a house-tax of suitable amount, we should, I think, have reached the prudent limits of direct taxation. The remainder of the revenue would have to be provided by taxes on consumption, [pg 587] and the question is, which of these are the least objectionable.
A certain amount of revenue can, as we’ve seen, be generated fairly through a specific tax on rent. Besides (1) the land tax, 346 and (2) a substitute for the revenue collected from stamp duties on land transfers, I have suggested that, at some point in the future, additional taxes could be imposed (3) to allow the state to share in the growing incomes of landlords from natural sources. (4) We have also noted that legacies and inheritances should be taxed enough to produce significant revenue. With these taxes, and (5) a reasonable house tax, we should, in my opinion, have reached the practical limits of direct taxation. The rest of the revenue would need to be covered by consumption taxes, [pg 587] and the question is which of these are the least objectionable.
§ 2. Which types of indirect taxes are the most suitable?
There are some forms of indirect taxation which must be peremptorily excluded. (1.) Taxes on commodities, for revenue purposes, must not operate as protecting duties, but must be levied impartially on every mode in which the articles can be obtained, whether produced in the country itself, or imported. (2.) An exclusion must also be put upon all taxes on the necessaries of life, or on the materials or instruments employed in producing those necessaries. Such taxes are always liable to encroach on what should be left untaxed, the incomes barely sufficient for healthful existence; and on the most favorable supposition, namely, that wages rise to compensate the laborers for the tax, it operates as a peculiar tax on profits, which is at once unjust and detrimental to national wealth.347 What remain are taxes on luxuries. And these have some properties which strongly recommend them. In the first place, they can never, by any possibility, touch those whose whole income is expended on necessaries; while they do reach those by whom what is required for necessaries is expended on indulgences. In the next place, they operate in some cases as a useful, and the only useful, kind of sumptuary law. A great portion of the expense of the higher and middle classes in most countries is not incurred for the sake of the pleasure afforded by the things on which the money is spent, but from regard to opinion, and an idea that certain expenses are expected from them, as an appendage of station; and I can not but think that expenditure of this sort is a most desirable subject of [pg 588] taxation. When a thing is bought, not for its use but for its costliness, cheapness is no recommendation.
There are certain types of indirect taxes that must be strictly excluded. (1.) Taxes on goods, meant for revenue, should not act as protective tariffs; they must be applied equally to all ways in which these goods can be obtained, whether they are produced domestically or imported. (2.) Additionally, all taxes on life essentials or on the materials and tools used to produce these essentials must also be excluded. Such taxes tend to infringe upon what should remain untaxed—the minimal incomes needed for a healthy life. Even with the best scenario, where wages increase to offset the tax burden for laborers, these taxes effectively become a distinct tax on profits, which is both unfair and harmful to national wealth. What remains are taxes on luxuries. These have several characteristics that make them particularly appealing. Firstly, they will never affect those whose entire income goes toward necessities; instead, they impact those who choose to spend extra on luxuries. Secondly, they can serve as a beneficial, and often the only effective, form of sumptuary law. A significant portion of the spending by the upper and middle classes in most countries isn't driven by the enjoyment of the items purchased, but rather by societal expectations and the notion that certain expenditures are obligatory as part of their social status. I believe that this type of spending should be a prime target for taxation. When something is bought for its expense rather than its utility, affordability holds no allure. [pg 588]
§ 3. Practical Guidelines for Indirect Taxation.
In order to reduce as much as possible the inconveniences, and increase the advantages, incident to taxes on commodities, the following are the practical rules which suggest themselves: 1. To raise as large a revenue as conveniently may be, from those classes of luxuries which have most connection with vanity, and least with positive enjoyment; such as the more costly qualities of all kinds of personal equipment and ornament. But with regard to horses and carriages, as there are many persons to whom, from health or constitution, these are not so much luxuries as necessaries, the tax paid by those who have but one riding-horse, or but one carriage, especially of the cheaper descriptions, should be low; while taxation should rise very rapidly with the number of horses and carriages, and with their costliness. 2. Whenever possible, to demand the tax, not from the producer, but directly from the consumer, since, when levied on the producer, it raises the price always by more, and often by much more, than the mere amount of the tax. 3. But as the only indirect taxes which yield a large revenue are those which fall on articles of universal or very general consumption, and as it is therefore necessary to have some taxes on real luxuries, that is, on things which afford pleasure in themselves, and are valued on that account rather than for their cost, these taxes should, if possible, be so adjusted as to fall with the same proportional weight on small, on moderate, and on large incomes. This is not an easy matter; since the things which are the subjects of the more productive taxes are in proportion more largely consumed by the poorer members of the community than by the rich. Tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, fermented drinks, can hardly be so taxed that the poor shall not bear more than their due share of the burden. Something might be done by making the duty on the superior qualities, which are used by the richer consumers, much higher in proportion to the value; but in some cases the difficulty of at all adjusting the duty to the value, [pg 589] so as to prevent evasion, is said, with what truth I know not, to be insuperable; so that it is thought necessary to levy the same fixed duty on all the qualities alike. 4. As far as is consistent with the preceding rules, taxation should rather be concentrated on a few articles than diffused over many, in order that the expenses of collection may be smaller, and that as few employments as possible may be burdensomely and vexatiously interfered with. 5. Among luxuries of general consumption, taxation should by preference attach itself to stimulants, because these, though in themselves as legitimate indulgences as any others, are more liable than most others to be used in excess, so that the check to consumption, naturally arising from taxation, is on the whole better applied to them than to other things. 6. As far as other considerations permit, taxation should be confined to imported articles, since these can be taxed with a less degree of vexatious interference, and with fewer incidental bad effects, than when a tax is levied on the field or on the workshop. Custom duties are, cæteris paribus, much less objectionable than excise: but they must be laid only on things which either can not, or at least will not, be produced in the country itself; or else their production there must be prohibited (as in England is the case with tobacco), or subjected to an excise duty of equivalent amount. 7. No tax ought to be kept so high as to furnish a motive to its evasion, too strong to be counteracted by ordinary means of prevention; and especially no commodity should be taxed so highly as to raise up a class of lawless characters—smugglers, illicit distillers, and the like.
To minimize inconveniences and maximize benefits related to taxes on goods, here are some practical guidelines: 1. Generate as much revenue as reasonably possible from luxury items strongly associated with vanity and less with real enjoyment, like expensive personal gear and accessories. However, regarding horses and carriages, many people need them for health reasons, so the tax for those who own just one riding horse or one affordable carriage should be low. Conversely, taxes should increase significantly with the number of horses and carriages owned and their expense. 2. Whenever possible, collect the tax not from the producer but directly from the consumer, since taxing the producer tends to raise prices by more than just the tax amount. 3. The only indirect taxes that produce significant revenue are those on widely consumed items. Therefore, we need some taxes on true luxuries, which are enjoyable for their own sake, valued for pleasure rather than cost. These taxes should, if feasible, be structured to impact small, medium, and large incomes equally. This is challenging since the items subject to more profitable taxes are consumed more by lower-income individuals than by the wealthy. It's difficult to tax items like tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, and alcohol without placing a heavier burden on the poor. Raising the duty on higher-quality items consumed by wealthier individuals in proportion to their value could help, but it's often said that it's nearly impossible to adjust the duty accurately without allowing evasion, leading to fixed duties across all qualities. 4. As much as the above rules allow, taxes should focus on a few items rather than spreading them too thinly over many, to reduce collection costs and minimize disruptive impacts on various jobs. 5. Among popular luxury items, taxes should primarily target stimulants, as these, while valid indulgences, are more often overused, making taxation a more effective way to curtail their consumption compared to other goods. 6. Whenever possible, taxes should focus on imported items, as these tend to cause less interference and fewer negative consequences than taxing domestic production. Customs duties are generally less problematic than excise taxes, but they should only apply to items that can’t or won’t be produced domestically, or where production is either banned (like tobacco in England) or subject to an equivalent excise duty. 7. No tax should be set high enough to encourage evasion that normal prevention methods can't overcome, and especially no commodity should be taxed so much that it creates a group of lawless individuals—like smugglers and illegal distillers.
The experience of the United States is pregnant with lessons in this direction. During the war we imposed an internal-revenue tax on distilled spirits of so large an amount that it not only produced less revenue than a smaller tax would have done, but it created gigantic frauds, public corruption, and infinite devices to escape the payment. The following table will show how the production, as indicated by the tax, fell off when the tax was excessive. It forced evasions by distillers. It has been found by various experiences that with a less rate the revenue is largely increased.
The history of the United States offers many lessons in this regard. During the war, we implemented a high internal revenue tax on distilled spirits that ended up generating less income than a lower tax would have, plus it prompted widespread fraud, public corruption, and numerous attempts to dodge payment. The table below will demonstrate how production, as reflected by the tax, dropped when the tax rate was too high. It pushed distillers to find ways to circumvent it. Different experiences have shown that with a lower rate, revenue can actually increase significantly.
Year. | Income. | Production indicated by the tax (gallons). | Tax amount. |
1862-1863 | $3.2 million | 16 million | July 1862, 20 cents per gallon. |
1867-1868 | 14.2 million | 7 million | Jan. 1865, $2 a gallon. |
1868-1869 | 34.2 million | 16 million | July 1868, 50 cents per gallon. |
1869-1870 | 39.2 million | 18 million |
The actual amount reached by taxation is very much less than that known to be actually used by from ten to fifteen millions of gallons, or nearly one half the product. The openness of the frauds can be judged by the fact that proof spirits were “openly sold in the market, and even quoted in price-currents, at from five to fifteen cents less per gallon than the rate of tax and the average cost of manufacture.”348
The actual amount collected from taxes is much lower than what's being used, by about ten to fifteen million gallons, which is almost half of the total production. The fraud becomes obvious when you notice that proof spirits were __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“openly sold in the market, and even listed in price updates, for five to fifteen cents less per gallon than the tax rate and the average manufacturing cost.”348
In what manner the finer articles of manufacture, consumed by the rich, might most advantageously be taxed, I must leave to be decided by those who have the requisite practical knowledge. The difficulty would be, to effect it without an inadmissible degree of interference with production. In countries which, like the United States, import the principal part of the finer manufactures which they consume, there is little difficulty in the matter; and, even where nothing is imported but the raw material, that may be taxed, especially the qualities of it which are exclusively employed for the fabrics used by the richer class of consumers. Thus, in England a high custom duty on raw silk would be consistent with principle; and it might perhaps be practicable to tax the finer qualities of cotton or linen yarn, whether spun in the country itself or imported.
I have to leave it to those with the right practical experience to decide how best to tax the luxury goods consumed by the wealthy. The challenge is to implement this without excessively interfering with production. In countries like the United States that rely on importing most of the luxury goods they consume, this isn’t much of an issue; even when only raw materials are imported, those can be taxed, particularly the types that are specifically used for products favored by wealthier consumers. For example, in England, a high customs duty on raw silk would align with the principles involved; it might also be feasible to tax the higher-quality cotton or linen yarn, whether produced domestically or imported.
§ 4. Tax Systems in the United States and Other Countries.
It will now well repay study to examine Chart No. XXI, which shows in what manner the United States have raised their revenues, and to consider how far the right rules of taxation have been followed.
It's important to take a close look at Chart.No. 21, which shows how the United States has generated its revenue and prompts reflection on how closely the correct principles of taxation have been followed.
I. For means of comparison, I shall give the last annual budget of the United States in order to make clear from what sources the country derives its revenues:
I. To make a comparison, I will share the most recent annual budget of the United States to explain the sources of revenue for the country:
Chart XXI.
Chart 21.
United States Budget, Year Ending June 30, 1883.
United States Budget for the Year Ending June 30, 1883.
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
Receipts: | |
Traditions | $214.70 |
Tax department | 144.7 |
Income tax | .1 |
Public land sale | 7.9 |
Miscellaneous | 30.8 |
Net regular revenue | $398.20 |
Spending: | |
Department of Defense | $48.9 |
Navy Secretary's Office | 15.3 |
Indians | 7.3 |
Retirement funds | 66.0 |
Miscellaneous Items | 68.7 |
Net regular expenses | $206.20 |
Interest on government debt | 59.2 |
Total | $265.40 |
This leaves a surplus of $132,839,444 above all expenditures, and our problem is now where to reduce taxation. The annual interest charge is lessening with the payment of the public debt, having fallen from its highest figure of $143,781,591 in 1867, to $59,160,131 in 1883.349 Our national taxation is practically all indirect, that of internal taxation being chiefly levied on tobacco and distilled spirits, and our customs falling on almost all articles which can be imported, materials as well as manufactures.
This results in a surplus of $132,839,444 after covering all expenses, and our current challenge is to find ways to reduce taxes. The yearly interest expense is going down as we pay off the national debt, which has fallen from a high of $143,781,591 in 1867 to $59,160,131 in 1883.349Most of our national taxes are indirect; internal taxes primarily target tobacco and distilled spirits, while customs duties apply to nearly all imported goods, including raw materials and manufactured items.
In the United States direct taxation on real and personal property is very generally levied for State, county, and municipal purposes. In fact, nearly all the perceptible taxation is the property tax, and, inasmuch as the State and county tax is very light, the burden is almost always owing to municipal and town expenditures. People do not seem to be aware of the enormous national burden, because the taxes are indirect, and only increase the prices of commodities. Other countries, it will be seen, make a greater use of direct taxation than the United States. In fact, the comparison of the ways by which different countries collect their revenues may naturally show us where we may gain by their experience.
In the United States, direct taxes on real estate and personal property are typically imposed for the needs of state, county, and local governments. In fact, most significant taxes come from property taxes, and since state and county taxes are relatively low, the majority of the burden usually falls on local and town expenditures. People often don't notice the substantial national burden because these taxes are indirect and simply increase the prices of goods. Other countries, as we’ll see, depend more on direct taxation than the United States does. In fact, comparing how different countries gather their revenues can help us understand where we can learn from their experiences.
II. The English system is especially interesting, because, after having had an extended scheme of customs duties, they abandoned it, and raised their revenue, some on imported articles, [pg 592] it is true (generally on those which could not be produced in England), but by the income-tax, and other forms.350
II. The English system is particularly noteworthy because, after implementing a complete customs duty system, they eliminated it and increased their revenue partly from imported goods—especially those that couldn't be produced in England—but also through income tax and other means.[pg 592] 350
In 1842 Sir Robert Peel found 1,200 articles subject to customs-duties. He began (1) by removing all prohibitions; (2) by reducing duties on raw materials to 5 per cent or less; (3) by limiting the rates on partially manufactured goods to 12 per cent; and (4) those on wholly manufactured goods to 20 per cent. Now customs-duties are levied only on beer, cards, chiccory, chocolate, cocoa, coffee, dried fruit, plate, spirits, tea, tobacco, and wine. The following budget gives the sources of revenue for Great Britain:351
In 1842, Sir Robert Peel identified 1,200 items that were subject to customs duties. He started by (1) removing all prohibitions; (2) reducing duties on raw materials to 5 percent or less; (3) limiting the rates on partially manufactured goods to 12 percent; and (4) keeping the rates on fully manufactured goods at 20 percent. Currently, customs duties are only applied to beer, playing cards, chicory, chocolate, cocoa, coffee, dried fruit, plate, spirits, tea, tobacco, and wine. The following budget details the sources of revenue for Great Britain:351
Budget Of Great Britain, 1883.
Budget of Great Britain, 1883.
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
Receipts: | |
Traditions | $98.40 |
Excise taxes (like those on tobacco and alcohol) | 134.9 |
Postage stamps | 58.5 |
Property tax | 5.2 |
House chores | 8.9 |
Income tax | 60.9 |
Post Office | 36.5 |
Text message | 8.6 |
Crown land | 2.0 |
Interest (on loans, Suez Canal, etc.) | 6.1 |
Miscellaneous Items | 26.4 |
Total | $446.40 |
Expenses: | |
Interest on national debt | $148.40 |
Military branches, etc. | 157.1 |
Cost of revenue teams | 45.1 |
Infrastructure projects | 9.1 |
Public agencies, pay, etc. | 12.5 |
Law and justice | 35.7 |
Education, science, and art | 22.9 |
Colonial and diplomatic | 3.4 |
Government funding | 2.0 |
Retirement funds | 2.0 |
Miscellaneous | 6.8 |
Total expenses | $445 |
From this it will be seen that in the land, income, and house taxes, Great Britain raises by direct taxation about $75,000,000, and in customs and excise, by indirect taxation, about $233,000,000.
This indicates that in land, income, and house taxes, Great Britain gathers about $75,000,000 from direct taxation, and through customs and excise, raises around $233,000,000 from indirect taxation.
III. The following is the system adopted by Germany (Prussia):
III. Here's the system that Germany (Prussia) uses:
German Budget, 1881-1882.
German Budget, 1881-1882.
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
Receipts: | |
(1.) Income from property related to domains and forests | $11.70 |
From mines and saltworks | 2.5 |
From trains | 22.5 |
Miscellaneous | 5.0 |
$41.7 | |
National Lottery | 1.0 |
Justice Department | $12.70 |
Ports and bridges | .5 |
13.2 | |
Direct taxes | $35.50 |
Indirect taxes (for Prussia) | 12.3 |
Total sales receipts | $103.60 |
Expenses: | |
Public funding | 3.0 |
Debt | 25.0 |
Various ministries, schools, etc. | 49.5 |
Retirement plans | 4.0 |
Miscellaneous | 19.5 |
Total expenses352 | $101.00 |
The Prussian direct taxes include (1) a land-tax, (2) a house-tax, (3) an income-tax, (4) a class-tax, (5) a trade-tax, and (6) miscellaneous taxes.
The PrussianstraightforwardTaxes include (1) a land tax, (2) a property tax, (3) an income tax, (4) a class tax, (5) a business tax, and (6) various other taxes.
IV. How the French supply themselves may be seen by the following statement:353
IV. You can understand how the French meet their needs from the following statement:353
French Budget, 1881.
French Budget, 1881.
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
[In millions and tenths of millions.]
Proof of Purchase: | |
Income taxes | $75.90 |
Like taxes | 4.7 |
Registry, stamps, etc. | 135.1 |
Woodlands | 7.6 |
Customs (and salt tax $3.5) | 65.4 |
Indirect taxes (including tobacco products) | 209.7 |
Post office and telegraph | 27.2 |
Miscellaneous | 29.8 |
Total revenue | $555.40 |
Spending: | |
Public debt, etc. | $249.00 |
Ministry functions | 243.7 |
Administrative expenses, costs associated with revenue collection, etc. | 58.5 |
Random | 3.5 |
Total expenses | $554.70 |
The direct taxes are (1) on property; (2) one nearly like our poll-tax together with a species of income-tax; (3) a tax on doors and windows; and (4) one on licenses.
The direct taxes include (1) property tax; (2) a tax similar to our poll tax alongside a type of income tax; (3) a tax on doors and windows; and (4) a tax on licenses.
§ 5. AResumeof the basic principles of taxation.
After the manner of our classification and résumé of the subject of value and money, it may be convenient to here insert a recapitulation of the various principles under the treatment of taxation.354
After our classification and resume of the topic of value and money, it might be useful to include a summary of the different principles regarding taxation. 354
Comparison Between Direct And Indirect Taxation.
Comparison Between Direct And Indirect Taxation.
Adam Smith's “Canons of Taxation.”—A tax should be: I. Equal (in amount of sacrifice entailed). II. Certain. III. Timely. IV. All for the state.
Adam Smith's "Taxation Guidelines."—A tax should be: I. Equal (in terms of the sacrifice involved). II. Sure. III. On time. IV. For the good of the state.
A Tax is either:
Direct.
Indirect (on commodities.)
A tax is either:
Direct.
Indirect (on goods).
Direct taxes are:
On Income.
On Expenditure.
Direct taxes are:
On Income.
On Spending.
Taxes on Income are:
General.
Special.
Income Taxes are:
General.
Special.
General income taxes. The best of taxes, if people were all honest. As it is, it falls most heavily on the conscientious. Should be reserved for emergency. All savings and a fixed amount in all incomes should be exempt.
General income taxes. The best type of tax, if everyone were honest. Unfortunately, it mainly impacts those who do the right thing. It should only be used for emergencies. All savings account and a set amount from all incomes should be exempt.
Special taxes are on:
Rent.
Wages.
Profits.
Special taxes apply to:
Rent.
Wages.
Profits.
Taxes on Rent. Agricultural rent is meant. It falls entirely on the landlord, and, if not balanced by taxes on other classes, is unjust. May be blended with a tax on profits, if on rent due to landlord's improvements.
Taxes on Rent. This refers to agricultural rent. It is fully borne by the landlord and, unless offset by taxes on other groups, is unfair. It may be combined with a tax on profits if it's a result of improvements made by the landlord.
Taxes on Wages are:
On Skilled.
On Unskilled.
Taxes on Wages are:
For Skilled Workers.
For Unskilled Workers.
Skilled wages are at a monopoly price, and taxes on them are paid by the laborers, so long as wages are not reduced below their just proportion.
Skilled wages are set at a monopoly price, and the laborers pay taxes on them, as long as wages aren't lowered below their fair share.
Unskilled wages. (1) Population diminished by it. Paid by profits. (2) Population left stationary. Shared between profits and wages. (3) Population increasing in spite of it. Falls entirely on wages.
Unskilled wages. (1) Population declined because of it. Paid from profits. (2) Population stayed steady. Shared between profits and wages. (3) Population growing despite it. Falls completely on wages.
Taxes on Profits. May possible stimulate production, and is then a good all round, contributing to the state, and leaving no one any poorer. If not, if profits are really diminished by the tax, capital may be diminished also. This (a) may, or (b) may not diminish population. If (a), then the margin of cultivation ceases to be extended, and part of the tax, pro tanto, falls on the landlords. If (b), then wages fall, and part of the tax falls on the laborer. Total result is a nearer approach to the stationary state.
Taxes on profits can potentially boost production, making it beneficial overall by supporting the government while not leaving anyone worse off. However, if profits actually decrease due to the tax, then capital could decrease as well. This (a) might, or (b) might not lead to a drop in population. If (a) happens, then the areas available for farming stop expanding, and part of the tax, pro tanto, is passed on to the landlords. If (b) happens, then wages drop, and part of the tax impacts the workers. The end result is a move closer to a stable state.
Taxes on Expenditure are open to the same objections as the general income-tax.
They may be:
Assessed taxes.
House-tax.
Taxes on spending face the same criticisms as the general income tax. They may include:
Assessed taxes.
Property tax.
Assessed taxes, such as on servants, dogs, etc. These are rigidly direct.
Assessed taxes, like those on servants, dogs, and so on. These are strictly straightforward.
House-taxes are:
On building-rent.
On ground-rent.
House taxes are:
On building rent.
On land rent.
House-taxes on building-rent are paid by occupier. This tax is indirect.
House taxes on rent are paid by the tenant. This tax is indirect.
House-taxes on ground-rent are (1.) with, or (2.) without an equivalent tax on agricultural rent. (1.) Are paid by ground landlord wholly, and therefore direct. (2.) Are part by occupier, and therefore indirect.
House taxes on ground rent are (1.) with, or (2.) without a corresponding tax on agricultural rent. (1.) Are fully paid by the ground landlord, making it direct. (2.) Are partly paid by the occupant, making it indirect.
Indirect taxes are:
Excise,
Customs, or
Tolls.
Indirect taxes include:
Excise,
Customs, or
Tolls.
Indirect taxes may be on (1.) Long or (2.) Short investments of capital.
Indirect taxes can be applied to (1.) long-term or (2.) short-term capital investments.
Indirect taxes on Long investments are always unadvisable, in view of Canon IV.
Indirect taxes on long-term investments are always not recommended, considering Canon IV.
Indirect taxes on Short investments are subject to the laws of indirect taxation. 1. Tax vanities rather than positive enjoyments (e.g., liveries rather than servants). 2. The consumer and not the producer should pay the tax collector (Canon IV). That is, collect the tax as near the actual consumer as possible. 3. Taxes on real enjoyments to be kept as equal as possible for large and small means. 4. Tax as few articles as possible. England taxes only a very small number of imports. The United States taxes nearly everything imported. 5. Tax stimulants freely. The United States collect $91,000,000 from spirits and liquors, and $42,000,000 from tobacco (1883). 6. Tax imports of commodities not made at home, or whose home production is under an excise (internal revenue) duty equal to the customs tax. 7. Keep the rate of tax low, in order to get most revenue.
Indirect taxes on short investments follow the rules of indirect taxation. 1. Tax luxuries rather than basic necessities (e.g., uniforms instead of staff). 2. The consumer, not the producer, should pay the tax collector (Canon IV). In other words, collect the tax as close to the actual consumer as possible. 3. Taxes on real benefits should be made as equal as possible for both wealthy and less wealthy individuals. 4. Tax as few items as you can. England only taxes a very small number of imports. The United States taxes nearly everything that comes in. 5. Tax addictive substances heavily. The United States collected $91,000,000 from alcohol and $42,000,000 from tobacco in 1883. 6. Tax imports of goods that aren't produced locally, or where domestic production is subject to an excise (internal revenue) duty equal to the customs tax. 7. Keep the tax rate low to maximize revenue.
Chapter V. About a National Debt.
§ 1. Is it advisable to cover exceptional public expenses with loans?
The question must now be considered, how far it is right or expedient to raise money for the purposes of government, not by laying on taxes to the amount required, but by taking a portion of the capital of the country in the form of a loan, and charging the public revenue with only the interest.
The question now to be considered is how appropriate or practical it is to raise money for government purposes, not by imposing taxes equal to what is needed, but by borrowing a portion of the country's capital and only charging public revenue with the interest.
This question has already been touched upon in the First Book.355 We remarked, that if the capital taken in loans is abstracted from funds either engaged in production, or destined to be employed in it, their diversion from that purpose is equivalent to taking the amount from the wages of the laboring-classes. Borrowing, in this case, is not a substitute for raising the supplies within the year. A government which borrows does actually take the amount within the year, and that too by a tax exclusively on the laboring-classes, than which it could have done nothing worse, if it had supplied its wants by avowed taxation; and in that case the transaction, and its evils, would have ended with the emergency; while, by the circuitous mode adopted, the value exacted from the laborers is gained, not by the state, but by the employers of labor, the state remaining charged with the debt besides, and with its interest in perpetuity. The system of public loans, in such circumstances, may be pronounced the very worst which, in the present state of civilization, [pg 597] is still included in the catalogue of financial expedients.
This question has already been addressed in the First Book.355 We noted that if the capital taken in loans is taken away from funds either being used in production or meant to be used for it, redirecting those funds is like taking money from the wages of working-class people. In this situation, borrowing does not replace gathering the necessary funds within the year. A government that borrows actually takes that amount within the year, and it does so through taxes that solely burden the working class, which is even worse than if it had met its needs through outright taxation. In that case, the issue and its negative impacts would have ended with the immediate need; however, through this indirect method, the value extracted from laborers does not benefit the state, but instead goes to employers of labor, while the state is left with the debt—and its ongoing interest—indefinitely. In such circumstances, the system of public loans can be considered the absolute worst option available in today’s financial practices. [pg 597]
We, however, remarked that there are other circumstances in which loans are not chargeable with these pernicious consequences: namely, first, when what is borrowed is foreign capital, the overflowings of the general accumulation of the world; or, secondly, when it is capital which either would not have been saved at all, unless this mode of investment had been open to it, or, after being saved, would have been wasted in unproductive enterprises, or sent to seek employment in foreign countries. When the progress of accumulation has reduced profits either to the ultimate or to the practical minimum—to the rate less than which would either put a stop to the increase of capital, or send the whole of the new accumulations abroad—government may annually intercept these new accumulations, without trenching on the employment or wages of the laboring-classes in the country itself, or perhaps in any other country. To this extent, therefore, the loan system may be carried, without being liable to the utter and peremptory condemnation which is due to it when it overpasses this limit. What is wanted is an index to determine whether, in any given series of years, as during the last great war, for example, the limit has been exceeded or not.
We noted, however, that there are other situations where loans don’t lead to these harmful effects: first, when the borrowed money comes from foreign capital, which is the surplus from the world’s overall savings; or second, when the capital wouldn’t have been saved at all if this investment option hadn’t been available, or when it would have been wasted on unproductive projects or sent abroad to seek opportunities. When the growth of savings has driven profits down to the lowest level possible—either the absolute minimum or a practical minimum that would stop capital from increasing or push all new savings overseas—governments can annually intercept these new savings without impacting the jobs or wages of workers in the country or potentially any other country. Therefore, to this extent, the loan system can be implemented without facing the complete and strict blame it deserves when it exceeds this limit. What is needed is a way to determine whether, in any specific period, like during the last major war, this limit has been crossed or not.
Such an index exists, at once a certain and an obvious one. Did the Government, by its loan operations, augment the rate of interest? If it only opened a channel for capital which would not otherwise have been accumulated, or which, if accumulated, would not have been employed within the country, this implies that the capital, which the Government took and expended, could not have found employment at the existing rate of interest. So long as the loans do no more than absorb this surplus, they prevent any tendency to a fall of the rate of interest, but they can not occasion any rise. [But] To the full extent to which the loans of government, during the war, caused the rate of interest to exceed what it was before, and what it has been since, those [pg 598] loans are chargeable with all the evils which have been described. If it be objected that interest only rose because profits rose, I reply that this does not weaken, but strengthens, the argument. If the Government loans produced the rise of profits by the great amount of capital which they absorbed, by what means can they have had this effect, unless by lowering the wages of labor? It will, perhaps, be said that what kept profits high during the war was not the drafts made on the national capital by the loans, but the rapid progress of industrial improvements. This, in a great measure, was the fact; and it, no doubt, alleviated the hardship to the laboring-classes, and made the financial system which was pursued less actively mischievous, but not less contrary to principle. These very improvements in industry made room for a larger amount of capital; and the Government, by draining away a great part of the annual accumulations, did not indeed prevent that capital from existing ultimately (for it started into existence with great rapidity after the peace), but prevented it from existing at the time, and subtracted just so much, while the war lasted, from distribution among productive laborers. If the Government had abstained from taking this capital by loan, and had allowed it to reach the laborers, but had raised the supplies which it required by a direct tax on the laboring-classes, it would have produced (in every respect but the expense and inconvenience of collecting the tax) the very same economical effects which it did produce, except that we should not now have had the debt. The course it actually took was therefore worse than the very worst mode which it could possibly have adopted of raising the supplies within the year; and the only excuse, or justification, which it admits of (so far as that excuse could be truly pleaded) was hard necessity; the impossibility of raising so enormous an annual sum by taxation, without resorting to taxes which from their odiousness, or from the facility of evasion, it would have been found impracticable to enforce.356
There is definitely an index that is clear and straightforward. Did the government, through its loan operations, increase the interest rate? If it only created a pathway for capital that wouldn't have been accumulated otherwise, or which, if accumulated, wouldn’t have been used within the country, this means that the capital the government took and spent couldn't have found a use at the current interest rate. As long as the loans merely absorbed this surplus, they prevent any drop in the interest rate, but they can’t cause an increase. To the extent that the government loans during the war pushed the interest rate above what it was before and what it has been since, those loans are responsible for all the negative effects mentioned. If someone argues that interest only rose because profits increased, I would say that rather strengthens the argument. If the government loans caused the profit increase by absorbing a significant amount of capital, how could they have achieved this effect without lowering wages? It may be suggested that the high profits during the war were not due to loans draining national capital, but rather the rapid advancement of industrial improvements. This was largely true; it certainly eased the hardships for the working class and made the financial system less disruptive, but it still went against economic principles. Those very improvements in industry allowed for a greater amount of capital; the government, by taking a sizable portion of the annual savings, didn't prevent that capital from eventually existing (it came into being quickly after the peace), but did stop it from existing at that time and reduced the amount available to productive workers during the war. If the government had refrained from borrowing this capital and had let it reach the workers, while raising the money it needed through direct taxes on the working class, it would have produced the same economic effects it actually did, except without the current debt. The path it chose was, therefore, worse than the worst possible way to raise the funds within that year; and the only justification it has (to the extent that justification could be truly claimed) was sheer necessity—the impossibility of raising such a massive annual sum through taxation without resorting to taxes that would have been too harsh or too easy to evade to enforce effectively.
When government loans are limited to the overflowings of the national capital, or to those accumulations which would not take place at all unless suffered to overflow, they are at least not liable to this grave condemnation. In this case, therefore, the question really is, what it is commonly supposed to be in all cases—namely, a choice between a great sacrifice at once, and a small one indefinitely prolonged. On this matter it seems rational to think that the prudence of a nation will dictate the same conduct as the prudence of an individual; to submit to as much of the privation immediately as can easily be borne, and, only when any further burden would distress or cripple them too much, to provide for the remainder by mortgaging their future income. It is an excellent maxim to make present resources suffice for present wants; the future will have its own wants to provide for. On the other hand, it may reasonably be taken into consideration that, in a country increasing in wealth, the necessary expenses of government do not increase in the same ratio as capital or population; any burden, therefore, is always less and less felt; and, since those extraordinary expenses of government which are fit to be incurred at all are mostly beneficial beyond the existing generation, there is no injustice in making posterity pay a part of the price, if the inconvenience would be extreme of defraying the whole of it by the exertions and sacrifices of the generation which first incurred it.
When government loans are limited to the excess of national capital, or to those savings that wouldn't exist at all if they weren't allowed to accumulate, they are at least not subject to serious criticism. In this situation, the question really boils down to what is commonly thought to be the case in all situations—namely, a choice between making a large sacrifice upfront and a small one that drags on indefinitely. It seems reasonable to believe that the wisdom of a nation will lead to the same decisions as that of an individual; they should accept as much hardship as they can easily handle right away, and only when more burden would cause too much distress should they cover the rest by borrowing against their future income. It's a good principle to make current resources meet current needs; the future will have its own needs to address. On the flip side, it's reasonable to consider that in a country growing in wealth, the necessary expenses of government don’t increase at the same rate as capital or population; thus, any burden is felt less and less over time. Moreover, since the extraordinary expenses of government that are worth incurring generally benefit future generations, there’s no injustice in making them pay some of the costs, especially if it would be excessively burdensome for the present generation to shoulder the entire financial weight through their efforts and sacrifices.
§ 2. It's not advisable to pay off a national debt through a general contribution.
When a country, wisely or unwisely, has burdened itself with a debt, is it expedient to take steps for redeeming that debt? In principle it is impossible not to maintain the affirmative.
When a country, whether wisely or foolishly, has taken on debt, is it advisable to take steps to pay it off? In principle, it's impossible to argue against that.
Two modes have been contemplated of paying off a national debt: either at once by a general contribution, or gradually by a surplus revenue. The first would be incomparably the best, if it were practicable; and it would be practicable if it could justly be done by assessment on property alone. If property bore the whole interest of the debt, property might, with great advantage to itself, pay it off; [pg 600] since this would be merely surrendering to a creditor the principal sum, the whole annual proceeds of which were already his by law, and would be equivalent to what a land-owner does when he sells part of his estate, to free the remainder from a mortgage. But property, it need hardly be said, does not pay, and can not justly be required to pay, the whole interest of the debt. Whatever is the fitting contribution from property to the general expenses of the state, in the same, and in no greater proportion, should it contribute toward either the interest or the repayment of the national debt. This, however, if admitted, is fatal to any scheme for the extinction of the debt by a general assessment on the community. Persons of property could pay their share of the amount by a sacrifice of property, and have the same net income as before.
Two ways of paying off a national debt have been considered: either all at once through a general contribution, or gradually through surplus revenue. The first option would be by far the best if it were feasible, and it would be doable if it could be fairly done by taxing property alone. If property covered the entire interest of the debt, it could, to its great benefit, pay it off; since this would essentially be giving a creditor the principal amount that was already theirs by law, similar to what a landowner does when they sell part of their estate to eliminate a mortgage on the rest. However, it's important to point out that property does not pay, and cannot fairly be expected to pay, the entire interest of the debt. Whatever amount property should fairly contribute to the general expenses of the state, it should contribute to both the interest and repayment of the national debt in the same measure, and not more. This, if accepted, undermines any plan to eliminate the debt through a general tax on the community. Property owners could cover their share of the amount by sacrificing some of their property and still maintain the same net income as before. [pg 600]

If those who have no accumulations, but only incomes, were required to make up by a single payment the equivalent of the annual charge laid on them by the taxes maintained to pay the interest of the debt, they could only do so by incurring a private debt equal to their share of the public debt; while, from the insufficiency, in most cases, of the security which they could give, the interest would amount to a much larger annual sum than their share of that now paid by the state. Besides, a collective debt defrayed by taxes has, over the same debt parceled out among individuals, the immense advantage that it is virtually a mutual insurance [pg 601] among the contributors. If the fortune of a contributor diminishes, his taxes diminish; if he is ruined, they cease altogether, and his portion of the debt is wholly transferred to the solvent members of the community. If it were laid on him as a private obligation, he would still be liable to it, even when penniless.
If people who don't have savings but only income had to pay in one lump sum the equivalent of what they owe each year in taxes to cover the interest on the debt, they would only be able to do this by taking on a personal loan equal to their share of the public debt. Since the collateral they could provide is often insufficient, the interest on that loan would end up being a much larger annual amount than what they currently pay in taxes. Additionally, a collective debt paid through taxes has a huge advantage over the same debt split among individuals, as it acts like a mutual insurance among those contributing. If one person's financial situation declines, their taxes decrease; if they go bankrupt, they stop paying altogether, and their share of the debt is fully passed on to the financially stable members of the community. But if it were treated as a personal responsibility, they would still owe it even when broke.
When the state possesses property, in land or otherwise, which there are not strong reasons of public utility for its retaining at its disposal, this should be employed, as far as it will go, in extinguishing debt. Any casual gain, or god-send, is naturally devoted to the same purpose. Beyond this, the only mode which is both just and feasible, of extinguishing or reducing a national debt, is by means of a surplus revenue.
When the government owns property, whether it’s land or something else, and there’s no strong public reason for it to keep that property, it should be used, as much as possible, to pay off debt. Any unexpected income or windfall should naturally be dedicated to the same goal. Besides that, the only fair and practical way to eliminate or reduce a national debt is through surplus revenue.
§ 3. In which situations is it advisable to keep a surplus revenue for debt repayment?
The desirableness, per se, of maintaining a surplus for this purpose does not, I think, admit of a doubt.
The value, per se, of keeping a surplus for this purpose is, in my opinion, beyond question.
It is not, however, advisable in all cases to maintain a surplus revenue for the extinction of debt. The advantage of paying off the national debt is, that it would enable us to get rid of the worst half of our taxation. But of this worst half some portions must be worse than others, and to get rid of those would be a greater benefit proportionally than to get rid of the rest. If renouncing a surplus revenue would enable us to dispense with a tax, we ought to consider the very worst of all our taxes as precisely the one which we are keeping up for the sake of ultimately abolishing taxes not so bad as itself. In a country advancing in wealth, whose increasing revenue gives it the power of ridding itself from time to time of the most inconvenient portions of its taxation, I conceive that the increase of revenue should rather be disposed of by taking off taxes, than by liquidating debt, as long as any very objectionable imposts remain. In the present state of England, therefore, I hold it to be good policy in the Government, when it has a surplus of an apparently permanent character, to take off taxes, provided these are rightly selected. Even when no taxes remain but such as are not unfit to form part of a permanent [pg 602] system, it is wise to continue the same policy by experimental reductions of those taxes, until the point is discovered at which a given amount of revenue can be raised with the smallest pressure on the contributors. After this, such surplus revenue as might arise from any further increase of the produce of the taxes should not, I conceive, be remitted, but applied to the redemption of debt. Eventually, it might be expedient to appropriate the entire produce of particular taxes to this purpose; since there would be more assurance that the liquidation would be persisted in, if the fund destined to it were kept apart, and not blended with the general revenues of the state. The succession duties would be peculiarly suited to such a purpose, since taxes paid as they are, out of capital, would be better employed in reimbursing capital than in defraying current expenditure. If this separate appropriation were made, any surplus afterward arising from the increasing produce of the other taxes, and from the saving of interest on the successive portions of debt paid off, might form a ground for a remission of taxation.
It's not always advisable to keep a surplus revenue solely for paying off debt. The benefit of eliminating the national debt is that it would allow us to reduce the worst part of our taxes. However, within that worst part, some taxes are worse than others, and eliminating the truly bad ones would be a greater benefit proportionally than getting rid of the rest. If giving up a surplus revenue means we could eliminate a tax, we should focus on the worst of all our taxes as the one we’re maintaining in order to eventually get rid of taxes that are not as bad. In a country that is growing in wealth, with increasing revenue allowing it to gradually eliminate the most troublesome taxes, I believe that any increase in revenue should primarily go toward reducing taxes rather than paying off debt, as long as there are still highly objectionable taxes in place. Therefore, in England’s current situation, I think it’s wise for the Government, when it has a surplus that seems likely to last, to cut taxes, as long as they are chosen wisely. Even when only reasonable taxes remain, it’s beneficial to continue this approach through trial reductions of those taxes until we find the point at which we can raise a certain amount of revenue with the least burden on taxpayers. After that, any additional surplus revenue from further increases in tax income should not be refunded but used to pay down debt. Eventually, it may make sense to dedicate all the revenue from specific taxes to this purpose, since it would be more certain that the debt reduction would continue if the funds were kept separate from the general state revenues. The inheritance taxes would be particularly suitable for this, as taxes paid out of capital would be better used to pay back capital rather than fund ongoing expenses. If this separate allocation were established, any surplus that arises later from increased income from other taxes, along with savings from interest on the parts of the debt that have been paid off, could provide a basis for reducing taxes.
The relative amount of the United States public debt may be seen, by Chart No. XXII, from an early date down to 1880. Since the war, the surplus revenue of the United States has been constantly appropriated for the payment of the public debt incurred during the late war, until, what with the reduction of debt and the fall in the interest charge, our income is now so much greater than expenditure that we are (1884) actually in difficulties owing to the surplus. To the present time the Treasury has been able to use its excess of receipts in redeeming matured debt; but the rapidity of the payment has been such that in two years or more no matured debt will exist to be redeemed: $250,000,000 of 4-½ per cent bonds remain, but they do not fall due until 1891; and the 4 per cent bonds to the amount of $737,620,700 do not mature until 1907. Having once raised a large revenue under war pressure, it seems very difficult for people to understand now why heavy duties were originally levied, and the extraordinary suggestion is often made that the surplus should remain, and new channels of expenditure should be made (such as enormous pensions), simply in order to keep up the heavy taxation. The difficulty is, however, that the unnecessary surplus exists because of customs [pg 603] duties levied for war purposes. But the heavy burden of war taxation ought not to be continued, adding to the cost of production in all industries, without doing a greater wrong than would be done by the passing—and only possible—trouble of a redistribution of capital in a few cases; especially since that distribution of capital will be one from less productive to more productive industries; otherwise, no change would be made.
You can see the relative amount of the United States public debt in Chart __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.No. 22From an early date up to 1880. Since the war, the extra revenue of the United States has been consistently used to pay off the public debt incurred during the recent conflict. Now, due to the reduced debt and lower interest charges, our income is much greater than our spending, leading us (in 1884) to face challenges because of the surplus. So far, the Treasury has been able to use its excess receipts to pay off matured debt; however, at the rate we’re going, in two years or more, there will be no matured debt left to pay off: $250,000,000 in 4-½ percent bonds are outstanding, but they don't mature until 1891, and the 4 percent bonds totaling $737,620,700 don’t mature until 1907. After generating significant revenue under wartime pressure, it seems quite hard for people to understand why high duties were originally imposed. There’s often the odd suggestion that the surplus should be kept, and new spending options (like massive pensions) should be created just to maintain the heavy taxation. The issue is that this unnecessary surplus exists because of customs duties imposed for war purposes. However, the heavy burden of war taxation shouldn’t continue, as it raises production costs across all industries, causing greater harm than the minor inconvenience of redistributing capital in a few cases; especially since that redistribution will move capital from less productive to more productive industries; otherwise, no change would occur.[pg 603]
The condition of foreign debts, and the progress made in their reduction, may be studied in Chart No. XXIII. That of the United States is exceptional. The interest-bearing debt, as given by the last report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1883, has been reduced to $1,312,446,050, and the reduction is more striking than is indicated in the chart for the year 1880.
You can check the status of foreign debts and the progress in reducing them in the Chart.No. 23The situation for the United States is unique. According to the latest report from the Secretary of the Treasury in 1883, the interest-bearing debt has been reduced to $1,312,446,050, and this decrease is even more remarkable than what the chart indicates for the year 1880.

Chapter VI. On Government Interference Based on Incorrect Theories.
§ 1. The principle of Protecting Native Industry.
We proceed to the functions of government which belong to what I have termed, for want of a better designation, the optional class; those which are sometimes assumed by governments and sometimes not, and which it is not unanimously admitted that they ought to exercise. We will begin by passing in review false theories which have from time to time formed the ground of acts of government more or less economically injurious.
We move on to the roles of government that I’ve called, for lack of a better term, the optional class; these are roles that governments sometimes take on and sometimes don’t, and there isn’t a universal agreement on whether they should take them on at all. We will start by reviewing misguided theories that have occasionally been the basis for government actions that are more or less harmful to the economy.
Of these false theories, the most notable is the doctrine of Protection to Native Industry—a phrase meaning the prohibition, or the discouragement by heavy duties, of such foreign commodities as are capable of being produced at home. If the theory involved in this system had been correct, the practical conclusions grounded on it would not have been unreasonable. The theory was that, to buy things produced at home was a national benefit, and the introduction of foreign commodities generally a national loss. It being at the same time evident that the interest of the consumer is to buy foreign commodities in preference to domestic whenever they are either cheaper or better, the interest of the consumer appeared in this respect to be contrary to the public interest; he was certain, if left to his own inclinations, to do what according to the theory was injurious to the public.
Among these false theories, the most significant is the idea of Protecting Native Industry—a term that means banning or heavily taxing foreign goods that can be made at home. If the theory behind this system had been correct, the practical conclusions drawn from it wouldn’t seem unreasonable. The theory claimed that buying locally made products was a benefit to the nation, while introducing foreign goods was generally a loss. However, it was clear that consumers would prefer to buy foreign products if they were cheaper or better, which made consumer interests seem to go against the public interest; if left to their own devices, they would likely do what the theory suggested was harmful to society.
It was shown, however, in our analysis of the effects of international trade, as it had been often shown by former [pg 606] writers, that the importation of foreign commodities, in the common course of traffic, never takes place except when it is, economically speaking, a national good, by causing the same amount of commodities to be obtained at a smaller cost of labor and capital to the country. To prohibit, therefore, this importation, or impose duties which prevent it, is to render the labor and capital of the country less efficient in production than they would otherwise be, and compel a waste of the difference between the labor and capital necessary for the home production of the commodity and that which is required for producing the things with which it can be purchased from abroad. The amount of national loss thus occasioned is measured by the excess of the price at which the commodity is produced over that at which it could be imported. In the case of manufactured goods the whole difference between the two prices is absorbed in indemnifying the producers for waste of labor, or of the capital which supports that labor. Those who are supposed to be benefited, namely, the makers of the protected articles (unless they form an exclusive company, and have a monopoly against their own countrymen as well as against foreigners), do not obtain higher profits than other people. All is sheer loss to the country as well as to the consumer.
It was demonstrated, however, in our analysis of the effects of international trade, as has often been shown by previous writers, that the import of foreign goods, under normal trading conditions, only happens when it is, economically speaking, beneficial for the nation. This occurs by allowing the same amount of goods to be acquired at a lower cost of labor and capital for the country. To therefore prohibit this import or impose tariffs that prevent it makes the labor and capital of the country less productive than they could be, resulting in a waste of the difference between the labor and capital needed for domestic production of the goods and what would be needed to produce those things that could be purchased from abroad. The national loss this causes is determined by the difference between the price at which the goods are produced and the price at which they could be imported. In the case of manufactured products, the entire gap between the two prices goes to compensating producers for wasted labor or the capital that funds that labor. Those who are thought to benefit, namely, the manufacturers of the protected goods (unless they are a monopoly that excludes both their countrymen and foreigners), do not achieve higher profits than others. It is simply a loss for the country and the consumer.
§ 2. —originated from the Mercantile System.
The restrictive and prohibitory policy was originally grounded on what is called the Mercantile System, which, representing the advantage of foreign trade to consist solely in bringing money into the country, gave artificial encouragement to exportation of goods, and discountenanced their importation. The only exceptions to the system were those required by the system itself. The materials and instruments of production were the subject of a contrary policy, directed, however, to the same end; they were freely imported, and not permitted to be exported, in order that manufacturers, being more cheaply supplied with the requisites of manufacture, might be able to sell cheaper, and therefore to export more largely. For a similar reason importation was allowed and even favored, when confined to the productions of countries which were supposed to take from the country still more than it took from them, thus enriching it by a favorable balance of trade. As part of the same system colonies were founded, for the supposed advantage of compelling them to buy our commodities, or at all events not to buy those of any other country: in return for which restriction we were generally willing to come under an equivalent obligation with respect to the staple productions of the colonists. The consequences of the theory were pushed so far that it was not unusual even to give bounties on exportation, and induce foreigners to buy from [England] rather than from other countries by a cheapness which [England] artificially produced, by paying part of the price for them out of [their] own taxes. This is a stretch beyond the point yet reached by any private tradesman in his competition [pg 608] for business. No shopkeeper, I should think, ever made a practice of bribing customers by selling goods to them at a permanent loss, making it up to himself from other funds in his possession.
The strict and prohibitive policy was originally based on what’s known as the Mercantile System, which viewed the benefit of foreign trade as solely about bringing money into the country. This led to artificial support for exporting goods while discouraging imports. The only exceptions to this system were those dictated by the system itself. The materials and tools needed for production were subject to a different policy, aimed at the same goal; they were allowed to be imported freely but not exported, so that manufacturers could get their supplies more cheaply and sell at lower prices, allowing for greater exportation. Similarly, imports were allowed and even encouraged if they came from countries believed to buy more from us than we bought from them, creating a favorable trade balance. Colonies were established under this system to ensure they would purchase our goods and not those of other countries. In exchange for this restriction, we were usually willing to make similar commitments regarding the staple products of the colonies. The consequences of this theory went so far that it was common to offer bounties on exports, enticing foreigners to buy from England rather than other nations by making prices artificially low, funded in part by taxes from England’s own taxpayers. This is a level of competition that no private trader has yet reached. I doubt any shopkeeper would regularly bribe customers by selling goods at a permanent loss and covering it with other resources they have.
The principle of the Mercantile Theory is now given up even by writers and governments who still cling to the restrictive system. Whatever hold that system has over men's minds, independently of the private interests exposed to real or apprehended loss by its abandonment, is derived from fallacies other than the old notion of the benefits of heaping up money in the country. The most effective of these is the specious plea of employing our own countrymen and our national industry, instead of feeding and supporting the industry of foreigners. The answer to this, from the principles laid down in former chapters, is evident. Without reverting to the fundamental theorem discussed in an early part of the present treatise,358 respecting the nature and sources of employment for labor, it is sufficient to say, what has usually been said by the advocates of free trade, that the alternative is not between employing our own people and foreigners, but between employing one class and another of our own people. The imported commodity is always paid for, directly or indirectly, with the produce of our own industry: that industry being, at the same time, rendered more productive, since, with the same labor and outlay, we are enabled to possess ourselves of a greater quantity of the article. Those who have not well considered the subject are apt to suppose that our exporting an equivalent in our own produce, for the foreign articles we consume, depends on contingencies—on the consent of foreign countries to make some corresponding relaxation of their own restrictions, or on the question whether those from whom we buy are induced by that circumstance to buy more from us; and that, if these things, or things equivalent to them, do not happen, the payment must be made in money. Now, in the first place, there [pg 609] is nothing more objectionable in a money payment than in payment by any other medium, if the state of the market makes it the most advantageous remittance; and the money itself was first acquired, and would again be replenished, by the export of an equivalent value of our own products. But, in the next place, a very short interval of paying in money would so lower prices as either to stop a part of the importation, or raise up a foreign demand for our produce, sufficient to pay for the imports. I grant that this disturbance of the equation of international demand would be in some degree to our disadvantage, in the purchase of other imported articles; and that a country which prohibits some foreign commodities, does, cæteris paribus, obtain those which it does not prohibit at a less price than it would otherwise have to pay. To express the same thing in other words: a country which destroys or prevents altogether certain branches of foreign trade, thereby annihilating a general gain to the world, which would be shared in some proportion between itself and other countries, does, in some circumstances, draw to itself, at the expense of foreigners, a larger share than would else belong to it of the gain arising from that portion of its foreign trade which it suffers to subsist. But even this it can only be enabled to do, if foreigners do not maintain equivalent prohibitions or restrictions against its commodities. In any case, the justice or expediency of destroying one of two gains, in order to engross a rather larger share of the other, does not require much discussion; the gain, too, which is destroyed, being, in proportion to the magnitude of the transactions, the larger of the two, since it is the one which capital, left to itself, is supposed to seek by preference.
The principle of the Mercantile Theory is now abandoned even by writers and governments that still support the restrictive system. Whatever influence that system has over people's minds, apart from the private interests worried about real or potential losses from its abandonment, comes from misconceptions other than the outdated belief in the benefits of hoarding money in the country. The most convincing of these is the misleading argument of employing our fellow countrymen and supporting our national industry instead of boosting the industry of foreigners. The response to this, based on the principles explained in earlier chapters, is clear. Without going back to the core theorem discussed earlier in this treatise, regarding the nature and sources of labor employment, it's enough to say, as advocates of free trade have said, that the choice isn’t between hiring our own people and hiring foreigners, but between employing different groups of our own people. The imported goods are always paid for, directly or indirectly, with what we produce ourselves: that industry is also made more productive, since we can obtain a greater quantity of the item with the same labor and investment. Those who haven’t fully considered this topic tend to think that our exporting an equivalent in our own produce for the foreign goods we consume relies on happenstance—on whether foreign countries agree to ease their own restrictions, or whether those we buy from are encouraged by this to purchase more from us; and that if these conditions don’t occur, payment must be made in cash. First, there's nothing inherently wrong with a cash payment compared to payment by any other means if the market situation makes it the most beneficial option; and the money itself was first obtained and would be replenished through the export of an equivalent value of our goods. Moreover, a brief period of cash payments would lower prices significantly enough to either reduce imports or create a foreign demand for our goods, sufficient to cover the imports. I agree that this disruption of the balance of international demand could disadvantage us in purchasing other imported items; and that a country that bans some foreign goods does, all else being equal, obtain those it doesn’t restrict at a lower price than it would otherwise have to pay. To put it differently: a country that hinders or completely prevents certain areas of foreign trade thus eliminates a general benefit to the world, which would be shared to some degree between itself and other countries, but does occasionally pull in a larger share than it would otherwise have from the gains of the portion of foreign trade it allows to continue, at the expense of foreigners. However, it can only do this if foreigners do not impose similar prohibitions or restrictions on its goods. In any case, the fairness or practicality of eliminating one of two gains to capture a slightly larger share of the other doesn’t require much debate; the gain that is destroyed, relative to the volume of transactions, is the larger one, as it is the one that capital, left on its own, is generally expected to pursue.
§ 3. —backed by arguments for national survival and national security.
Defeated as a general theory, the Protectionist doctrine finds support in some particular cases from considerations which, when really in point, involve greater interests than mere saving of labor—the interests of national subsistence and of national defense.359 The discussions on the Corn [pg 610] Laws have familiarized everybody with the plea that we ought to be independent of foreigners for the food of the people; and the Navigation Laws were grounded, in theory and profession, on the necessity of keeping up a “nursery of seamen” for the navy. On this last subject I at once admit that the object is worth the sacrifice; and that a country exposed to invasion by sea, if it can not otherwise have sufficient ships and sailors of its own to secure the means of manning on an emergency an adequate fleet, is quite right in obtaining those means, even at an economical sacrifice in point of cheapness of transport. When the English navigation laws were enacted, the Dutch, from their maritime skill and their low rate of profit at home, were able to carry for other nations, England included, at cheaper rates than those nations could carry for themselves: which placed all other countries at a great comparative disadvantage in obtaining experienced seamen for their ships of war. The navigation laws, by which this deficiency was remedied, and at the same time a blow struck against the maritime power of a nation with which England was then frequently engaged in hostilities, were probably, though economically disadvantageous, politically expedient. But English ships and sailors can now navigate as cheaply as those of any other country, maintaining at least an equal competition with the other maritime nations even in their own trade. The ends which may once have justified navigation laws require them no longer, and afford no reason for maintaining this invidious exception to the general rule of free trade.
Defeated as a general theory, the Protectionist doctrine finds support in certain specific cases due to considerations that, when relevant, involve more significant interests than just saving labor—the interests of national subsistence and national defense. The discussions on the Corn Laws have made it clear that we should aim to be self-sufficient when it comes to feeding our people, and the Navigation Laws were based, in theory and practice, on the need to maintain a “nursery of seamen” for the navy. On this last point, I readily acknowledge that the goal is worth the sacrifice; a country at risk of a naval invasion, if it cannot otherwise have enough ships and sailors to effectively man a fleet in an emergency, is justified in securing those resources, even if it means higher transport costs. When the English navigation laws were put in place, the Dutch, due to their maritime skills and lower profit margins, could transport for other countries, including England, at lower rates than those countries could manage themselves. This put other nations at a significant disadvantage in acquiring experienced sailors for their warships. The navigation laws addressed this shortfall while also targeting the maritime power of a nation with which England often went to war; though economically disadvantageous, they were politically necessary at the time. However, English ships and sailors can now navigate as cost-effectively as those from any other country, maintaining at least equal competition with other maritime nations even in their own trade. The reasons that might have once justified the navigation laws no longer apply, and there is no longer any justification for this unfair exception to the general principle of free trade.
Since the introduction of steamships and the advance of invention in naval contrivances, the plea for navigation laws on the ground that they keep up a “nursery of seamen” for the navy is practically obsolete. The “seaman” employed on the modern naval ships more nearly resembles the artisan in a manufacturing establishment; he need have but comparatively little knowledge of the sea, since the days of sailing-vessels have passed by, so far as naval warfare is concerned. Steam and mechanical appliances now do what was before done by wind and sail.
Since the introduction of steamships and improvements in naval technology, the case for navigation laws stating that they ensure a“sea cadet training ground”The navy is nearly outdated. The“sailor”Working on modern naval ships is similar to being a skilled worker in a factory; one only needs limited knowledge of the sea since the age of sailing ships is mostly behind us for naval combat. Steam and mechanical equipment now handle the tasks that were previously done by wind and sail.
While Mr. Mill thinks navigation laws were economically—that [pg 611] is, so far as increase of wealth is concerned—disadvantageous, yet he believes that they may have been “politically expedient.” It is possible, for example, that retaliation by the United States and other countries against England early in this century brought about the remission of the English restrictions on foreign shipping. But it is quite another thing to say that such laws produced an ability to sail ships more cheaply. That the English navigation acts of 1651 built up English shipping is not supported by many proofs; whereas it is very distinctly shown that English shipping languished and suffered under them.360 Moreover, under the régime of steam and iron (which drew out England's peculiar advantages in iron and coal), in all its history English shipping never prospered more than it has since the abolition in 1849 of the navigation laws—events which have taken place since Mr. Mill wrote.
While Mr. Mill believes navigation laws were economically—that[pg 611]unfavorable for building wealth, he thinks they might have been“politically convenient.”It’s possible that retaliation from the United States and other countries against England earlier this century caused England to lift its restrictions on foreign shipping. However, it’s a completely different issue to claim that these laws made sailing ships cheaper. The argument that the English navigation acts of 1651 improved English shipping lacks strong evidence; in fact, it is clearly demonstrated that English shipping struggled and suffered because of them.360Furthermore, under thedietof steam and iron (which took advantage of England's unique resources in iron and coal), English shipping has never flourished more than it has since the navigation laws were abolished in 1849—events that took place after Mr. Mill wrote.
The United States is still weighed down by navigation laws adapted to mediæval conditions, and the relics of a time when retaliation was the cause of their enactment. So long as wooden vessels did the carrying-trade, the natural advantages of the United States gave us a proud position on the ocean. Now, however, when it is a question of cheaper iron, steel, and coal for vessels of iron and steel, we are at a possible disadvantage, and the bulk of navigation laws proposed in these days are intended to draw capital either by raising prices through duties on ships and materials, or by outright bounties and subsidies from industries in which we have advantages, to building ships. And until of late no distinction has been made between ship-building and ship-owning (or ship-sailing). Within the last year (1884) many burdens on ship-sailing have been removed; but even when we are permitted to sail ships on equal terms with foreigners, we can not yet build them with as small a cost as England (which is proved by the very demand of the builders of iron vessels for the retention of protective duties), and our laws do not as yet allow us to buy ships abroad and sail them under our own flag.361
The United States is still dealing with navigation laws that date back to the medieval period, leftover from a time when retaliation was the main reason for their existence. When wooden ships were the backbone of trade, the U.S. had a great advantage on the ocean. But now that iron, steel, and coal are used to build ships, we could be at a disadvantage. Most of the navigation laws being proposed today aim to attract investment by either raising prices through duties on ships and materials or by providing direct bounties and subsidies to industries where we excel in shipbuilding. Until recently, there was no distinction between building ships and owning or operating them. Over the past year (1884), many of the restrictions on ship operations have been removed; however, even though we can operate ships under the same conditions as foreign ones, we still can’t build them at the same low cost as England (as shown by the demand from iron vessel builders to maintain protective duties), and our laws still don’t allow us to buy ships from abroad and operate them under our own flag.361
With regard to subsistence, the plea of the Protectionists has been so often and so triumphantly met, that it requires little notice here. That country is the most steadily as well as the most abundantly supplied with food which draws its supplies from the largest surface. It is ridiculous to found a general system of policy on so improbable a danger as that of being at war with all the nations of the world at once; or to [pg 612] suppose that, even if inferior at sea, a whole country could be blockaded like a town, or that the growers of food in other countries would not be as anxious not to lose an advantageous market as we should be not to be deprived of their corn.
When it comes to basic needs, the arguments from Protectionists have been addressed so many times and so effectively that we don’t need to spend much time on them here. The country that gets its food supplies from the largest area is not only the most consistently but also the most abundantly fed. It's absurd to base a whole policy on the unlikely threat of being at war with every nation in the world simultaneously; or to think that, even if we were weaker at sea, an entire country could be blockaded like a city, or that the food producers in other countries wouldn’t be just as eager to keep their profitable market as we would be to not lose access to their grain.
In countries in which the system of Protection is declining, but not yet wholly given up, such as the United States, a doctrine has come into notice which is a sort of compromise between free trade and restriction, namely, that protection for protection's sake is improper, but that there is nothing objectionable in having as much protection as may incidentally result from a tariff framed solely for revenue. Even in England regret is sometimes expressed that a “moderate fixed duty” was not preserved on corn, on account of the revenue it would yield. Independently, however, of the general impolicy of taxes on the necessaries of life, this doctrine overlooks the fact that revenue is received only on the quantity imported, but that the tax is paid on the entire quantity consumed. To make the public pay much, that the treasury may receive a little, is no eligible mode of obtaining a revenue. In the case of manufactured articles the doctrine involves a palpable inconsistency. The object of the duty as a means of revenue is inconsistent with its affording, even incidentally, any protection. It can only operate as protection in so far as it prevents importation, and to whatever degree it prevents importation it affords no revenue.
In countries where the system of Protection is declining but not completely abandoned, like the United States, a doctrine has emerged that serves as a sort of middle ground between free trade and restrictions. This doctrine suggests that protection solely for its own sake is inappropriate, but there’s nothing wrong with having as much protection as might incidentally come from a tariff designed only for revenue. Even in England, there is sometimes regret that a "steady fixed responsibility" on corn wasn't kept because of the revenue it could generate. However, aside from the general impracticality of taxing essential goods, this idea ignores the fact that revenue comes only from the quantity imported, while the tax is paid on the total amount consumed. Making the public pay a lot just so the treasury can get a little is not a good way to raise revenue. When it comes to manufactured goods, this doctrine shows a clear inconsistency. The purpose of the duty as a revenue method contradicts its potential to provide any protection, even incidentally. It only acts as protection to the extent that it limits imports, and the more it limits imports, the less revenue it generates.
§ 4. —to promote the growth of young industries; colonial policy.
The only case in which, on mere principles of political economy, protecting duties can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily (especially in a young and rising nation) in hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country. The superiority of one country over another in a branch of production often arises only from having begun it sooner. There may be no inherent advantage on one part, or disadvantage on the other, but only a present superiority of acquired skill and experience. A country which has this skill and experience yet to acquire may in other respects be better [pg 613] adapted to the production than those which were earlier in the field; and, besides, it is a just remark of Mr. Rae that nothing has a greater tendency to promote improvements in any branch of production than its trial under a new set of conditions. But it can not be expected that individuals should, at their own risk, or rather to their certain loss, introduce a new manufacture, and bear the burden of carrying it on, until the producers have been educated up to the level of those with whom the processes are traditional. A protecting duty, continued for a reasonable time, will sometimes be the least inconvenient mode in which the nation can tax itself for the support of such an experiment. But the protection should be confined to cases in which there is good ground of assurance that the industry which it fosters will after a time be able to dispense with it; nor should the domestic producers ever be allowed to expect that it will be continued to them beyond the time necessary for a fair trial of what they are capable of accomplishing.
The only situation where protective tariffs can be justified, based purely on political economy principles, is when they are applied temporarily (especially in a developing nation) with the aim of establishing a foreign industry that is well-suited to the country's conditions. A country may excel in a certain production area simply because it started earlier. There may be no intrinsic advantage for one side or disadvantage for the other, but rather a current edge in acquired skills and experience. A country still gaining this expertise may, in other ways, be better suited for production than those that were early entrants; plus, as Mr. Rae rightly points out, nothing drives improvements in any area of production more than trying it under new conditions. However, it isn't reasonable to expect individuals to take on the risk, or rather a guaranteed loss, of starting a new industry and sustaining it until local producers have reached the same skill level as those with established processes. A protective tariff that lasts for a reasonable period can sometimes be the least burdensome way for the nation to support such an experiment. But this protection should only be applied when there is strong assurance that the industry being supported will eventually be able to continue without it; domestic producers should not expect it to last longer than necessary for a fair evaluation of their capabilities.
The great difficulty with this proposal is that it introduces (what is inconsistent with Mr. Mill's general system) the Socialistic basis of state-help, instead of self-help. If industries will never support themselves, then, of course, it is a misappropriation of the property of its citizens whenever a government takes a slice by taxation from productive industries and gives it to a less productive one to make up its deficiencies. The only possible theory of protection to young industries is that, if protected for a season, the industries may soon grow strong and stand alone. Mr. Mill never contemplated anything else. But the difficulty is constantly met with, in putting this theory into practice, that the industry, once that it has learned to depend on the help of the state, never reaches a stage when it is willing to give up the assistance of the duties. Dependence on legislation begets a want of self-reliance, and destroys the stimulus to progress and good management. It is said: “There has never been an instance in the history of the country where the representatives of such industries, who have enjoyed protection for a long series of years, have been willing to submit to a reduction of the tariff, or have proposed it. But, on the contrary, their demands for still higher and higher duties are insatiable, and never intermitted.”362 The question of fact, as [pg 614] to whether or not the United States is indebted for its present manufacturing position to protection when our industries were young, seems to be capable of answer, and an answer which shows that protection was imposed generally after the industries got a foothold, and that very little assistance was derived from the duties on imports.363
The main issue with this proposal is that it goes against Mr. Mill's overall philosophy by introducing the Socialistic concept of state assistance instead of promoting self-sufficiency. If industries can’t sustain themselves, then taking tax money from successful industries and giving it to a less productive one is simply misusing taxpayers' money. The only justification for protecting fledgling industries is that, if they receive support for a limited time, they might eventually be strong enough to survive independently. This is the only scenario Mr. Mill anticipated. However, the problem with this approach is that when an industry becomes dependent on state assistance, it often never reaches a point where it is ready to forfeit that support. Relying on laws fosters a lack of self-reliance and weakens the drive for progress and effective management. It’s noted:“In the entire history of the country, there has never been a situation where representatives of industries that have enjoyed protection for many years were willing to agree to a reduction in tariffs, or even suggested it. Instead, their calls for increasing tariffs keep coming without end.”362The fact-based question of[pg 614]It appears that the question of whether the United States' current manufacturing status is due to protection in the early stages of our industries has been answered. It shows that protection was mostly put in place after the industries were already established, and that very little assistance came from import duties.363
The following explanation by Mr. Mill364 of the meaning put upon his argument of protection to young industries by those who have applied it to the United States will be of no slight interest:
The following explanation from Mr. Mill364It will be quite interesting to see how his argument for protecting young industries has been interpreted by those who applied it to the United States:
“The passage has been made use of to show the inapplicability of free trade to the United States, and for similar purpose in the Australian colonies, erroneously in my opinion, but certainly with more plausibility than can be the case in the United States, for Australia really is a new country whose capabilities for carrying on manufactures can not yet be said to have been tested; but the manufacturing parts of the United States—New England and Pennsylvania—are no longer new countries; they have carried on manufactures on a large scale, and with the benefit of high protecting duties, for at least two generations; their operatives have had full time to acquire the manufacturing skill in which those of England had preceded them; there has been ample experience to prove that the alleged inability of their manufactures to compete in the American market with those of Great Britain does not arise merely from the more recent date of their establishment, but from the fact that American labor and capital can, in the present circumstances of America, be employed with greater return, and greater advantage to the national wealth, in the production of other articles. I have never for a moment recommended or countenanced any protecting industry except for the purpose of enabling the protected branch of industry, in a very moderate time, to become independent of protection. That moderate time in the [pg 615] United States has been exceeded, and if the cotton and iron of America still need protection against those of the other hemisphere, it is in my eyes a complete proof that they aught not to have it, and that the longer it is continued the greater the injustice and the waste of national resources will be.”
“This passage has been used to argue that free trade doesn’t apply to the United States, and for similar reasons in Australia, which I believe is incorrect, though it might seem more reasonable in Australia since it is a newer country whose manufacturing potential hasn’t been fully explored yet. However, the manufacturing regions of the United States—New England and Pennsylvania—are not new; they have been engaged in large-scale manufacturing with the benefit of high protective tariffs for at least two generations. Their workers have had plenty of time to develop the manufacturing skills that originated in England. There is enough evidence to show that the supposed inability of American manufacturers to compete in the domestic market against those from Great Britain is not just because they are newer but because American labor and capital can currently be used more profitably and beneficially for national wealth by producing different goods. I have never suggested or supported any protective industry except to allow that industry to become independent of protection within a reasonable timeframe. That reasonable timeframe in the [pg 615] United States has already passed, and if cotton and iron in America still need protection against competitors from abroad, it clearly indicates to me that they shouldn’t have it; and the longer this protection lasts, the greater the injustice and waste of national resources will become.”
There is only one part of the protectionist scheme which requires any further notice: its policy toward colonies and foreign dependencies; that of compelling them to trade exclusively with the dominant country. A country which thus secures to itself an extra foreign demand for its commodities, undoubtedly gives itself some advantage in the distribution of the general gains of the commercial world. Since, however, it causes the industry and capital of the colony to be diverted from channels which are proved to be the most productive, inasmuch as they are those into which industry and capital spontaneously tend to flow, there is a loss, on the whole, to the productive powers of the world, and the mother-country does not gain so much as she makes the colony lose. If, therefore, the mother-country refuses to acknowledge any reciprocity of obligations, she imposes a tribute on the colony in an indirect mode, greatly more oppressive and injurious than the direct.
There’s only one aspect of the protectionist strategy that needs more attention: its approach to colonies and overseas territories, specifically forcing them to trade only with the dominant country. A country that secures additional foreign demand for its goods certainly gains an edge in sharing the overall profits of the global market. However, this also means that the industry and capital of the colony are redirected away from the most productive channels, as these are the areas where industry and capital naturally want to flow. Overall, this results in a loss to the world's productive capabilities, and the mother country doesn't benefit as much as it causes the colony to suffer. Therefore, if the mother country refuses to recognize any mutual obligations, it imposes a burden on the colony in a way that's much more oppressive and damaging than a direct tax.
§ 5. —based on high wages.
The discussion by Mr. Cairnes on the question of wages as affected by the tariff is such that I have quoted it as fully as possible: “The position taken in the United States is that protection is only needed and only asked for where American industry is placed under a disadvantage, as compared with the industry of foreign countries.... The rates of wages measured in money are higher in the United States than in Europe, and, therefore, it is argued, the cost of producing commodities is higher.... The high rates of wages in the United States are not peculiar to any branch of industry, but are universal throughout its whole range. If, therefore, a high rate of wages proves a high cost of production, and a high cost of production proves a need of protection, it follows that the farmers of Illinois and the cotton-planters of the Southern States stand in as much need of fostering legislation as the cotton-spinners of New England or the iron-masters of Pennsylvania! A criterion which leads to such results must, I think, be regarded as sufficiently condemned. The fallacy is, in truth, ... that all [pg 616] industries are not in each country equally favored or disfavored by nature, and have not, therefore, equal need of this protecting care. If American protectionists are not prepared to demand protective duties in favor of the Illinois farmer against the competition of his English rival, they are bound to admit either that a high cost of production is not incompatible with effective competition, or else that a high rate of wages does not prove a high cost of production; and if this is not so in Illinois, then I wish to know why the case should be different in Pennsylvania or in New England. If a high rate of wages in the first of these States be consistent with a low cost of production, why may not a high rate of wages in Pennsylvania be consistent with a low cost of producing coal and iron?
Mr. Cairnes' discussion on how tariffs impact wages is significant enough that I've quoted it at length:“In the United States, people believe that protectionism is only needed when American industries are at a disadvantage compared to foreign ones. The wage rates here are higher, in monetary terms, than those in Europe, which leads to the argument that producing goods costs more. These high wage rates in the U.S. aren’t limited to a single sector; they are common across all industries. Therefore, if high wages result in high production costs, and high production costs create the need for protection, it follows that farmers in Illinois and cotton growers in the South need just as much support as cotton mills in New England or steel producers in Pennsylvania! Any standard that leads to such conclusions deserves scrutiny. The real issue is that not all industries in each country are equally affected by their natural resources, so they don’t all need the same level of protective measures. If American protectionists are unwilling to push for protective duties for Illinois farmers against their English competitors, they must either accept that high production costs can exist alongside effective competition or recognize that high wages don’t necessarily mean high production costs. If that isn't the case in Illinois, I want to understand why it would differ in Pennsylvania or New England. If high wages in Illinois can be paired with low production costs, why can't high wages in Pennsylvania also be matched with low costs for coal and iron production?
“The rate of wages, whether measured in money or in the real remuneration of the laborer, affords an approximate criterion of the cost of production,365 either of money, or of the commodities that enter into the laborer's real remuneration, but in a sense the inverse of that in which it is understood in the argument under consideration: in other words, a high rate of wages indicates not a high but a low cost of production.366 ... Thus in the United States the rate of wages is high, whether measured in gold or in the most important articles of the laborer's consumption—a fact which proves that the cost of producing gold, as well as that of producing those other commodities, is low in the United States.... I would ask [objectors] to consider what are the true causes of the high remuneration of American industry. It will surely be admitted that, in the last resort, these resolve themselves into the one great fact of its high productive power.... I must, therefore, contend that the high scale of industrial remuneration in America, instead of being evidence of a high cost of production in that country, is distinctly evidence of a low cost of production—of a low cost of production, that is to say, in the first place, of gold, and, in the next, of the commodities which mainly constitute the real wages of labor—a description which embraces at once the most important raw materials of industry and the most important articles of general consumption. As regards commodities not included in this description, the criterion of wages stands in no constant relation of any kind to their cost, and is, therefore, [pg 617] simply irrelevant to the point at issue. And now we may see what this claim for protection to American industry, founded on the high scale of American remuneration, really comes to: it is a demand for special legislative aid in consideration of the possession of special industrial facilities—a complaint, in short, against the exceptional bounty of nature.
“The wage rate, whether looked at in terms of money or the actual benefits workers receive, gives a basic idea of production costs,365 whether in cash or the goods that constitute the worker's real income, but it's somewhat the opposite of how it's currently understood: in other words, a high wage rate suggests not high but low production costs.366 ... So in the United States, wages are high, whether counted in gold or in the essential items workers consume—a fact that shows the cost of producing gold, along with other goods, is low in the U.S.... I would ask [objectors] to consider the true reasons behind the high wages in American industry. It likely comes down to one main factor: its high productivity.... Thus, I argue that the high levels of industrial pay in America, instead of showing high production costs in that country, actually indicate low production costs—specifically, low costs for gold, and subsequently for the goods that primarily make up workers' real wages—this includes essential raw materials for industry and significant everyday products. For commodities not included in this definition, the measure of wages does not have a clear relationship to their cost, and is therefore, [pg 617] simply irrelevant to the issue at hand. Now we can understand what this call for protection of American industry, based on the high level of American pay, really means: it's a request for special government support due to having unique industrial advantages—a complaint, in short, about nature's extraordinary generosity.
“Perhaps I shall here be asked, How, if the case be so—if the high rate of industrial remuneration in America be only evidence of a low cost of production—the fact is to be explained, since fact it undoubtedly is, that the people of the United States are unable to compete in neutral markets, in the sale of certain important wares, with England and other European countries?367 No one will say that the people of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, are deficient in any industrial qualities possessed by the workmen of any country in the world. How happens it, then, that, enjoying industrial advantages superior to other countries, they are yet unable to hold their own against them in the general markets of commerce? I shall endeavor to meet this objection fairly, and, in the first place, let me state what my contention is with regard to the cost of production in America. I do not contend that it is low in the case of all commodities capable of being produced in the country, but only in that of a large, very important, but still limited group. With regard to commodities lying outside this group, I hold that the rate of wages is simply no evidence as to the cost of their production, one way or the other. But, secondly, I beg the reader to consider what is meant by the alleged ‘inability’ of New England and Pennsylvania to compete, let us say, with Manchester and Sheffield, in the manufacture of calico and cutlery. What it means, and what it only can mean, is that they are unable to do so consistently with obtaining that rate of remuneration on their industry which is current in the United States. If only American laborers and capitalists would be content with the wages and profits current in Great Britain, there is nothing that I know of to prevent them from holding their own in any markets to which Manchester and Sheffield can send their wares. And this brings us to the heart of the question. Over a large portion of the great field of industry the people of the United States enjoy, as compared with those of Europe, (1) advantages of a very exceptional kind; over the rest (2) the advantage is less decided, or (3) they stand on a par with Europeans, or (4) possibly they are, in some instances, [pg 618] at a disadvantage. Engaging in the branches of industry in which their advantage over Europe is great, they reap industrial returns proportionally great; and, so long as they confine themselves to these occupations, they can compete in neutral markets against all the world, and still secure the high rewards accruing from their exceptionally rich resources. But the people of the Union decline to confine themselves within these liberal bounds. They would cover the whole domain of industrial activity, and think it hard that they should not reap the same rich harvests from every part of the field. They must descend into the arena with Sheffield and Manchester, and yet secure the rewards of Chicago and St. Louis. They must employ European conditions of production, and obtain American results. What is this but to quarrel with the laws of nature? These laws have assigned to an extensive range of industries carried on in the United States a high scale of return, far in excess of what Europe can command, to a few others a return on a scale not exceeding the European proportion. American enterprise would engage in all departments alike, and obtain upon all the high rewards which nature has assigned only to some. Here we find the real meaning of the ‘inability’ of Americans to compete with the ‘pauper labor’ of Europe. They can not do so, and at the same time secure the American rate of return on their work. The inability no doubt exists, but it is one created, not by the drawbacks, but by the exceptional advantages of their position. It is as if a skilled artisan should complain that he could not compete with the hedger and ditcher. Let him only be content with the hedger and ditcher's rate of pay, and there will be nothing to prevent him from entering the lists even against this rival.”368
“I might be asked, if this is the case—if the high wages in American industry are merely a sign of low production costs—how do we explain that people in the United States struggle to compete in neutral markets for certain important goods against England and other European countries?367 No one argues that workers in New England, New York, and Pennsylvania lack industrial skills compared to workers anywhere else in the world. So, why can’t they maintain their position against these other countries in general marketplaces? I will try to directly address this objection, and first, let me clarify my stance on production costs in America. I don’t claim that production costs are low for all goods produced in the country, but only for a significant, yet still limited, group of them. For the goods that don’t belong to this group, I believe wage rates don’t affect production costs, regardless of the situation. Secondly, I ask the reader to consider what the alleged ‘inability’ of New England and Pennsylvania to compete, for example, with Manchester and Sheffield in producing calico and cutlery really means. It means—and can only mean—that they are unable to do so while also earning the standard pay for their work in the United States. If American workers and business owners were willing to accept the same wages and profits typical in Great Britain, I believe nothing would stop them from competing successfully in any markets where Manchester and Sheffield sell their products. And this brings us to the heart of the issue. In many parts of industry, people in the United States have, compared to Europeans, (1) very unique advantages; in other areas, (2) the advantages are less clear, or (3) they are on equal footing with Europeans, or (4) in some cases, they may face disadvantages. When they concentrate on industries where they have significant advantages over Europe, they achieve proportionately high returns; as long as they stay within these sectors, they can compete in global markets against others while still benefiting from their abundant resources. However, the people in the Union refuse to limit themselves to these favorable conditions. They want to engage in every area of industrial activity and feel it’s unfair that they don’t get comparable rewards from all segments of the field. They must compete with Sheffield and Manchester while still hoping for the benefits found in Chicago and St. Louis. They want to adopt European standards of production yet achieve American results. What is this if not a conflict with the laws of nature? These laws have assigned a high level of returns to a wide range of industries in the United States, far exceeding what Europe can offer, while the returns of a few others do not surpass European standards. American enterprise wishes to engage in all fields equally and secure the high rewards that nature has designated only for some. Here we find the actual meaning of the ‘inability’ of Americans to compete with the ‘pauper labor’ of Europe. They cannot do so while also securing the American rate of return for their efforts. This inability definitely exists, but it is caused not by deficiencies but by the exceptional advantages of their situation. It’s like a skilled worker complaining that he cannot compete with a laborer. If he would just be satisfied with what the laborer earns, nothing would stop him from entering the competition even against that rival.”368
It is often said that wages are kept at a high rate in the United States by the existence of protected industries. On the other hand, the truth is that the protected industries must pay the current high rate of wages fixed by the general productiveness of all industries in the country. When the facts are investigated, it is surprising how small a portion of the laborers of the United States are employed in occupations which owe their existence to the tariff. A general view of the relative numbers engaged in different occupations may be seen by reference to Chart No. XXIV, based on the returns for the census of 1880. The data are well worth examination:369
People often claim that wages in the United States are high due to protected industries. However, the truth is that these protected industries need to offer the currently high wages determined by the overall productivity of all sectors in the country. When you investigate further, it’s surprising how few workers in the United States have jobs that exist solely because of tariffs. For a general overview of the number of people in various jobs, see Chart __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.No. 24, which is based on the 1880 census data. The information is definitely worth examining more closely:369
Farming | 7.67 million |
Manufacturing, engineering, and mining | 3.8 million |
Commerce and transport | 1,810,256 |
Professional and personal services | 4 million, 74 thousand, 238 |
All jobs | 17,392,099 |

Of the second class, less than 450,000 work-people are engaged in the chief protected industries—cotton, woolen, and iron and steel, combined. This class, it is to be noted, in the census returns, includes bakers, blacksmiths, brick-makers, builders, butchers, cabinet-makers, carpenters, carriage-makers, and so on through the whole list of similar occupations practically unaffected by the tariff (so far as protection to them is concerned). So that, at the most, there are less than a million laborers engaged in industries directly dependent on the tariff, and the number is undoubtedly very much less than a million. When some writers assert, therefore, that the existence of customs-duties allows industries (even including all those employed in producing cotton, wool, iron, and steel) to employ less than a million laborers in such a way that the remuneration is fixed for the remaining 16,000,000 laborers in the United States, keeping wages high for 16,000,000 by paying current wages for less than a million, the extravagance and ignorance of the statement are at once apparent; while, on the other hand, it is distinctly seen that the causes fixing the generally high rates of wages for the 16,000,000 are those governing the majority of occupations, and that the less than one million must be paid the wages which can be obtained elsewhere in the more productive industries. The facts thus strikingly bear out the principles as stated above.
In the second group, fewer than 450,000 workers are involved in the main protected industries—cotton, wool, and iron and steel combined. This group also includes bakers, blacksmiths, brick makers, builders, butchers, cabinet makers, carpenters, carriage makers, and similar jobs that are mostly unaffected by the tariff (in terms of protection for them). So, at most, there are fewer than a million workers in industries that depend directly on the tariff, and the actual number is likely much less than a million. When some writers claim that customs duties allow industries (even those producing cotton, wool, iron, and steel) to employ fewer than a million workers in a way that sets wages for the other 16 million workers in the United States, keeping wages high for 16 million by paying current wages for less than a million, the absurdity and ignorance of that statement become immediately obvious. On the other hand, it’s clear that the factors determining the generally high wages for the 16 million are those affecting most occupations, and the fewer than one million must be paid the wages available elsewhere in more productive industries. The facts strongly support the principles stated above.
Confirmation—if confirmation now seems necessary—may be found in a study370 by our ablest statistician, Francis A. Walker, upon the causes which have operated on the growth of American manufactures. This growth has not been commensurate, he finds, with the remarkable inventive and industrial capacity of our people, and with the richness of our national resources: “I answer that the cause of that comparative failure is found, primarily and principally, in the extraordinary success of our agriculture, as already intimated in what has been said of the investment of capital. The enormous profits of cultivating a virgin soil without the need of artificial fertilization; the advantages which a sparse population derives from the privilege of selecting for tillage only the choicest spots,371 those most accessible, most fertile, most easily brought under the plow; and the consequent abundance of food and other necessaries enjoyed by the agricultural class, have tended continually to disparage mechanical industries, in the eyes alike of the capitalist, looking to the most remunerative investment [pg 621] of his savings, and of the laborer, seeking that avocation which should promise the most liberal and constant support.
If you need confirmation, you can find it in a study.370by our leading statistician, Francis A. Walker, on the factors affecting the growth of American manufacturing. He points out that this growth has not kept pace with the exceptional creative and industrial abilities of our people or the richness of our national resources:“I think the main reason for this relative stagnation is the incredible success of our agriculture, as previously mentioned in relation to capital investment. The huge profits from farming on untouched land without needing artificial fertilizers; the advantages that a sparse population has from being able to choose the best land for cultivation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ the most accessible, fertile, and easiest to plow; and the resulting abundance of food and other essentials enjoyed by farmers have continuously undervalued mechanical industries, in the eyes of both the investor looking for the best return on his savings and the worker seeking the most fulfilling and stable job.”
“It has been the competition of the farm with the shop which, throughout the entire century of our national independence, has most effectually hindered the growth of manufactures. A people who are privileged to cultivate a reasonably fertile soil, under the conditions indicated above, can secure for themselves subsistence up to the highest limit of physical well-being. If that people possess the added advantage of great skill in the use of tools, and great adroitness in meeting the large and the little exigencies of the occupation and cultivation of the soil, the fruits of their labor will include not only everything which is essential to health and comfort, but much that is of the nature of luxury.”
“Over our entire century of independence, the competition between agriculture and retail has really hindered the growth of manufacturing. A community that can farm reasonably fertile land under these conditions can achieve a high standard of living. If that community is also skilled with tools and good at managing both major and minor challenges of farming, their efforts will not only meet essential needs for health and comfort but will also provide many luxuries.””
It remains to be said in this connection that workmen are already discerning the practical and real causes at work affecting their wages—affecting them more directly than any tariff system possibly could—by showing no small alarm at the immigration of foreigners, such as the Hungarian miners and Italian laborers, who willingly underbid them. In other words, they are beginning to realize, in a practical way, the truth that increasing numbers are far more potent than anything else in reducing wages. So long as immigration is free to any race or nationality, there is no such thing as “protection to home laborers”; the only protection to them—not that I am urging the desirability of such measures—can come solely from forces which limit the number of workmen who enter into competition with them. Any other protection to laboring-men than the prohibition of immigration—which no one thinks of (except for the Chinese)—is an economic delusion. Instead of “protecting” them to the extent of affording higher wages, the tariff increases the cost of woolen clothing and other articles of their consumption, in addition to forcing capital into employments which yield a less return, and so insure lower wages.
It's important to recognize that workers are starting to see the true reasons affecting their wages—reasons that influence them more directly than any tariff system ever could. They're voicing serious concerns about the influx of foreign workers, such as Hungarian miners and Italian laborers, who are ready to work for less money. In other words, they're starting to realize in a practical sense that a larger pool of workers is much more effective at pushing down wages than anything else. As long as immigration is open to all races and nationalities, there is no such thing as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“protection for domestic workers”the only real protection for them—not that I'm suggesting we take those steps—comes from reducing the number of workers competing with them. Any labor protections outside of restricting immigration—which few people consider (except for the Chinese)—is just an economic illusion. Instead of“protecting”them by ensuring higher wages, tariffs increase the price of wool clothing and other items they purchase, while also directing investment into jobs that offer lower returns, which ultimately results in lower wages.
§ 6. —to establish a variety of industries.
It must be kept in mind that Political Economy deals only with the phenomena of material wealth; it does not supply ethical or political grounds of action. It is quite conceivable that a legislator, in coming to a decision, may have to balance economic gains against moral or political losses, and may choose to give up the former to prevent the latter. But the economic truth remains unchanged. Political economy, for instance, to the question, Is there any gain in international trade? answers, unequivocally, yes. Would it be a loss of wealth to the community to have the goods formerly bought abroad now produced at home? The answer is, certainly it would. But here it has been ably urged by intelligent writers that a state [pg 622] has other ends to gain than the accumulation of mere riches; that it must aim to secure the greatest moral, social, and elevating influences possible for the working-classes; and that while free exchange of goods may add to wealth, it may injure the social and political well-being of a nation. So far as these are social and political questions they do not belong to Political Economy. But the commonest form of argument is that, under free exchange, the United States would become purely an “agricultural” country, its social horizon would become narrowed, and a lower standard of industrial activity would then ensue; instead of which, it is said, we should, by protection, keep in existence diversified industries by which the national mind may be better stimulated, and greater enterprise may be encouraged in all branches of industry. This argument for “diversity of industries,” however, is not merely a sociological question; it can only be fully discussed from an economic stand-point, and deserves even more than the brief attention we can give it here.
It's important to remember that Political Economy is focused only on material wealth; it doesn’t offer ethical or political justifications for actions. A legislator can weigh economic benefits against moral or political drawbacks and choose to sacrifice economic gains to avoid negative outcomes. However, the economic facts stay the same. When asked if there are benefits to international trade, Political Economy answers with a clear yes. Would it result in a loss of wealth for the community to produce domestically goods that were previously imported? Yes, it definitely would. Nonetheless, some insightful writers argue that a state has goals beyond just accumulating wealth; it should strive to provide the greatest moral, social, and uplifting influences for the working class. While free trade may boost wealth, it could harm the social and political health of a nation. These concerns, being social and political, fall outside the scope of Political Economy. A common argument is that free trade would turn the United States into a purely “agricultural” nation, restricting social growth and leading to a decline in industrial activity. Instead, it's argued that protectionism would support diverse industries, which would better stimulate national intellect and foster greater entrepreneurship across all sectors. However, this argument for “diversity of industries” isn't just a sociological issue; it can only be discussed thoroughly from an economic perspective and deserves more attention than we can give here.[pg 622]
In the first place, as soon as any purely agricultural country gains even a slight density of population—a density only such as to warrant the introduction of the principle of division of labor—there comes an inevitable differentiation of pursuits, wholly outside of legislation, and through the operation of natural causes. Not all of any population is required in agriculture to provide the whole with food. By a division of labor, one man in agriculture can produce the sustenance of himself and many others. “The United States have at the present time but five persons engaged in agriculture for each square mile of settled area.” By the side of the farm must early spring up a wide circle of industries—the shoemaker, the carpenter, the blacksmith, the wagon-maker, the painter, the builder, the mason, and all the ordinary employments which arise in any small community from the earliest division of labor. Moreover, “agriculture” is often used in a too limited sense as confined to producing food alone (although even in that limited sense employing nearly one half of the total number of our laborers). In a new country the natural field of employment is found in the “extractive industries,” which include the preparation for the market not only of food, but also of all ores, coal, minerals, oils, hides, leather, wool, lumber, and the industries intimately connected with them; all the employments which transport these from one part of the country to another (employing at present over one ninth of all our laborers); and professional and personal services of an extended variety. Even, therefore, if we were obliged to forego manufactures entirely, the “extractive industries” would necessarily involve a very extensive diversity of employments.
First, once a purely agricultural country reaches a certain population density—enough to make the division of labor reasonable—there will naturally be a differentiation of jobs, driven by natural factors rather than laws. Not everyone in a population is necessary for agriculture to provide food for the whole community. With the division of labor, one farmer can grow enough food for themselves and many others.“The United States currently has only five people working in agriculture for every square mile of settled land.”Next to the farm, a variety of industries need to develop early on—such as shoemakers, carpenters, blacksmiths, wagon makers, painters, builders, masons, and all the typical jobs that come up in any small community because of the initial division of labor. Additionally,“farming”is often viewed too narrowly, as if it only relates to food production (even in that limited sense, it still employs almost half of all our workers). In a new country, the main area of work is found in the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“extractive industries,”which involve not only getting food ready for market, but also all ores, coal, minerals, oils, hides, leather, wool, lumber, and the industries closely connected to them; all the jobs that move these resources from one part of the country to another (currently employing over one-ninth of our workforce); and various professional and personal services. Therefore, even if we had to completely stop manufacturing, the“resource extraction industries”would still need a wide variety of jobs.
The real question, however, for most persons, centers in the [pg 623] next stage of the industrial evolution—that of the manufactures of these above-mentioned products of the “extractive industries.” It will be remembered, here, that a country does not possess an equal ability in producing each of these or any commodities: the timber formerly near great rivers may vanish into the interior; the oil-sources may be more or less fertile; or the ore-deposits may be more or less rich, more or less accessible, than those of other countries. This being understood, then, as soon as the demand in the country calls for an increased quantity of a particular article, the cost may increase under the law of diminishing returns until a foreign country—having inferior agents of production as compared with our best—may be able to send supplies into our markets. It all depends on whether the United States wants more articles than can be produced on grades of natural agents superior to those possessed by foreigners, taking cost of carriage to this country into consideration. Even though foreign competition appears when we reach poorer grades of natural agents, it does not follow that some of the particular articles will not be produced. What ought to be clear is, that untrammeled exchange between countries will not prevent the existence of various industries, but only limit production to those grades of agents which are its best. This may be better seen by a simple diagram:
The main question for most people, however, is about the[pg 623]next phase of industrial growth—specifically, the production of the products from the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__“extractive industries.”It’s important to remember that a country doesn’t have the same ability to produce each of these or any commodities: timber that used to be found near major rivers may be depleted further inland; oil reserves may have varying levels of productivity; or the mineral deposits may be richer or more accessible than those in other countries. Once we acknowledge this, it follows that when demand in the country increases for a specific item, costs may go up due to diminishing returns until a foreign country—with less efficient production methods compared to our best—can start supplying our markets. It all depends on whether the United States needs more products than can be produced with the superior natural resources we have compared to those of foreign countries, also considering shipping costs. Even if foreign competition arises when we rely on less efficient resources, it doesn’t mean certain products won’t be produced. What should be clear is that unrestricted trade between countries won’t eliminate various industries but will simply limit production to the most efficient resources available. This can be better illustrated with a simple diagram:
Iron and Coal: England | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
Iron and Coal: U.S. | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |||
Wheat: UK | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |||
Wheat: U.S. | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
England may have seven different grades of productiveness in her iron and coal supplies, of which her grades 1, 2, and 3 are superior to the best grade of the United States, while grades 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the United States may compare only with grades 4, 5, 6, 7 of England. So long as England can supply herself and the United States also with coal and iron from the three superior grades, the United States can not work grade 1 at home. But if the supply for England and the world requires grade 5 to be worked, then the United States can begin the industry on her best grade, although that is far inferior to the best grade in England. Likewise, if the United States has three grades of wheat-land superior to England's best grade, the ability of England to grow wheat depends on whether the United States can, or can not, supply both herself and England from grades 1, 2, and 3. If we must resort to grade 4, then England can begin to grow wheat as well as we. In short, [pg 624] under a system of free exchange, as great a diversity as under protection is probably possible, but only in such a way that the best possible advantages in each particular industry are employed. Smaller amounts in some branches, and greater amounts in others, may be produced under a free than under a restrictive system, but with all the greater gain which arises from a proper and healthy adjustment of trade. The most poorly endowed enterprises in each occupation would be given up, but not the whole industry itself. No class of persons feel the competition of rivals more than English farmers since American wheat has come into English markets, and yet it does not follow that England can not grow a bushel of wheat. The fact is, merely, that some kinds of lands were thrown out of cultivation, and a readjustment made, to the benefit of those wanting cheaper food. So with us: we should not, by the free exchange, be forced to give up the iron and coal industries entirely; for the best mines would still keep that occupation in existence to “diversify” the others.
England has seven different levels of productivity for her iron and coal resources. Grades 1, 2, and 3 are better than the highest grade in the United States, while grades 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the U.S. correspond only to grades 4, 5, 6, and 7 in England. As long as England can provide both herself and the United States with coal and iron from the higher grades, the U.S. cannot use grade 1 domestically. However, if demand from England and the rest of the world requires the use of grade 5, then the U.S. can start using its best grade, even though it’s much lower quality than England's top grade. Similarly, if the U.S. has three grades of wheat land that are better than England’s best, England’s wheat production relies on whether the U.S. can supply both itself and England from grades 1, 2, and 3. If we end up needing grade 4, then England can also begin growing wheat. In summary,[pg 624]A system of free exchange could provide just as much diversity as one with protection, but in a way that maximizes the benefits for each specific industry. We might produce less in some areas and more in others under a free system compared to a restrictive one, but with the added advantage of a healthy adjustment in trade. The least productive sectors in each industry would be phased out, but the entire industry itself wouldn’t disappear. No group feels competition more than English farmers since American wheat entered their markets, yet that doesn't mean England can’t grow any wheat. The reality is that some types of land were taken out of production, leading to a reorganization that benefits those looking for cheaper food. The same goes for us: free exchange wouldn’t force us to completely abandon the iron and coal industries; the best mines would still support that sector and help to __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“Diversify”the others.
So far the explanation covers the “extractive industries” only, or those industries affected by the law of diminishing returns when a larger quantity is demanded. The real question arises as to the manufactures of these materials. But we count upon larger industrial rewards, in the form of wages, and profits, here than in England; we must get more from an industry than England in order to satisfy us. Our grades of occupations, therefore, must be more productive to a certain extent, grade for grade, than English grades, in order to allow of their remaining free from competition. But we have this superiority, as regards our home market, owing to natural causes: (1) cheap raw materials (if we except wool and other commodities whose price is raised by the tariff); (2) advantage over England in cost of transportation of raw products; and (3) in the cost of transportation, again, of the finished goods in reaching our markets. Now, the processes of manufacture which do not put much labor upon the materials, especially where the articles are bulky, are conducted in this country without fear of foreign competition. And the range of this class of manufactures is surprisingly large. It includes the manufactures of iron, such as stoves, and the common utensils of every-day life; of hides, such as leather, harnesses, etc.; and of wood, such as all the furniture of common use. The list is too long to be fully stated here. These industries are not kept in existence by the tariff; and a diversity as wide as this would arise under a system of free exchange, as well as of restriction. Indeed, if duties were removed from so-called “raw materials,” it is altogether probable that a wider diversity would exist than ever before.
So far, the explanation covers the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“extractive industries”only, or those industries affected by the law of diminishing returns when demand is higher. The real question arises regarding the manufacturing of these materials. However, we expect greater industrial rewards in terms of wages and profits here than in England; we need to extract more from an industry than England to feel satisfied. Therefore, our job sectors must be more productive to some degree, job for job, compared to those in England to remain competitive. Yet, we have an advantage in our domestic market due to natural factors: (1) cheap raw materials (except for wool and other goods whose prices are raised by tariffs); (2) a transportation cost advantage over England for raw products; and (3) again, in the cost of transporting finished goods to our markets. Currently, manufacturing processes that don't require much labor for materials, especially for bulky items, are done in this country without worry about foreign competition. The variety of this type of manufacturing is surprisingly wide. It includes the production of iron items, such as stoves and everyday utensils; leather products, like hides and harnesses; and wood items, including all standard furniture. The range is too extensive to fully cover here. These industries don’t depend on tariffs for survival; and such a diverse range would still appear under a system of free trade, as well as restrictions. In fact, if tariffs were removed from so-called __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,“materials”It’s likely that there would be even greater diversity than ever before.
And yet, it will be said, there are some things we can not produce in free competition with England. Of course there are; and it is to be hoped it will long continue so. If there are not some kinds of commodities which foreigners can produce to better advantage than we, then there will be no possibility of any foreign trade whatever; since, if they can send us nothing, they can take nothing from us. To deny this position, is to say that the export and import trade of the United States (amounting in 1883 to more than $1,500,000,000) is of no profit, and had best be entirely destroyed, in order that a few industries in which we have no natural advantages (and which employ less than one seventeenth of the laborers in the United States) should be continued at a loss to the general productiveness of our labor and capital, and so to a general diminution of wages and profits.
Some might argue that there are things we can't produce as effectively in competition with England. That's true, and hopefully, it will stay that way for a long time. If there are certain types of goods that foreign countries can produce more efficiently than we can, then there’s no chance for any foreign trade at all. If they can’t send us anything, they can't take anything from us either. Rejecting this idea means claiming that the export and import trade of the United States (which was over $1,500,000,000 in 1883) is worthless and should be entirely eliminated just so a few industries where we have no natural advantages (employing less than one-seventeenth of the laborers in the U.S.) can keep going, even if it results in a loss to the overall productivity of our labor and capital, leading to lower wages and profits for everyone.
§ 7. —because it reduces prices.
The argument—heard less frequently now than formerly—has been advanced, drawn inductively from statistics, that protection does not raise prices; because, after duties are put on, a larger quantity is produced, the advantages of large production are reaped, and then the price of the manufactured commodity falls lower here than it was before the duty was imposed. The position is then held that protection does not raise prices. It is, of course, understood to mean the prices of protected commodities—a necessary precaution, because we find our own agricultural (unprotected) commodities cited to show that prices are lower here than in England.
The argument— which is less common now than it used to be— has been made, based on statistics, that protection doesn’t raise prices. Once tariffs are applied, more goods are produced, the advantages of large-scale production are realized, and then the price of the manufactured product drops lower here than it was before the tariff was imposed. The idea is then put forward that protection doesn’t increase prices. It’s important to point out that this specifically refers to the prices of protected items— a necessary clarification since we often see our own agricultural (unprotected) products used as examples to show that prices are lower here than in England.
No one, however, will deny that there has been a fall in the prices of textile fabrics and manufactured goods. That is the result of a general law of value, and of the tendencies of a progressive state of industry.372 The causes of this acknowledged fall would be at work, no matter whether tariffs existed or not. It is the result of the general forward march of improvements, as evidenced in the application of new inventions and the display of skill and ingenuity in new processes. To say that it comes because of a tariff, is a complete non sequitur. How true this is may be seen by observing that a country like England, without tariffs, shares in the general fall of prices of manufactured goods equally with the country which has heavy customs-duties. The causes must be wider than tariffs, if they are seen working alike in tariff and non-tariff countries.
No one can argue that there has been a decline in the prices of textiles and manufactured goods. This is due to a general law of value and the trends of a growing industrial economy.372These recognized reasons for the price drop would still apply, whether tariffs are present or not. It results from the overall progress of advancements, as demonstrated by the use of new inventions and the display of skill and creativity in new processes. To assert that it occurs only because of a tariff is completelynon sequitur.This is clearly shown by the fact that a country like England, which has no tariffs, sees the same decline in prices of manufactured goods as a country with high customs duties. The reasons must be more extensive than just tariffs since they are noticeable in both tariff and non-tariff countries.
But the fact itself can not be gainsaid that protection does raise the prices of the protected goods in the home market. The comparison is not to be made between prices as they now are in this country and as they were twenty or forty years ago also in this country, for this would show only the general march of [pg 626] improvements in this country; but a comparison is to be made between prices in this country to-day and present prices in foreign countries. Does, for instance, the tariff increase the price of woolen goods and clothing to every consumer far beyond what the price would be if the duty on imported woolens were removed? The very existence of a protecting duty is the answer to this. If the duty does not raise the price, then why does the woolen industry wish a continuance of the duties? If goods can be sold as cheaply here as the foreign goods, why do protectionists want any duties? The duties are intended to keep foreign goods out of our markets; and they would be unnecessary if our goods could be sold as cheaply as the foreign wares.
The undeniable truth is that protection does raise the prices of the goods being protected in the domestic market. We shouldn't compare today's prices in this country to what they were twenty or forty years ago, as that only shows the overall progress in this country; instead, we should compare today's prices here to current prices in foreign markets. For instance, does the tariff increase the price of woolen goods and clothing for consumers significantly more than it would if the duty on imported woolens were removed? The very existence of a protective duty answers this question. If the duty doesn't raise prices, then why does the woolen industry want to maintain these duties? If our goods could be sold here at the same low price as foreign products, why would protectionists support any duties at all? The duties are intended to keep foreign goods out of our markets, and they wouldn't be needed if our goods could be sold at the same price as the foreign products.
The facts, however, are at hand to show that the statement of principle as made above is corroborated by the statistics. In 1883, although average weekly wages in Massachusetts were over 77 per cent higher than in England, the American laborer had to pay more for the articles entering into his real wages; and to that extent lost the advantage of his higher reward in this country. This is to be seen in the following figures,373 which show, in percentages, whether prices are higher or lower here than in England:
The facts clearly demonstrate that the principle mentioned earlier is supported by the statistics. In 1883, even though average weekly wages in Massachusetts were over 77 percent higher than in England, American workers had to spend more on the goods that determine their real wages; as a result, they didn't fully enjoy the advantages of their higher earnings in this country. This is illustrated by the following figures, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,373which show, in percentages, if prices are higher or lower here compared to England:
Types of Articles. | Higher Percentage. | Lower Percentage. |
Groceries | 16 | |
Supplies, including meat, eggs, butter, and potatoes. | 23 | |
Dry goods (all types) | 13 | |
Footwear | 62 | |
Fashion | 45 |
And yet, in spite of the high prices, 31 per cent of the Massachusetts workman's expenditure represents more comfort and better home surroundings than is enjoyed by the English workman. If the American could purchase at English prices, he would have no less than 37 per cent of a surplus for additional enjoyments (after making due allowance for the higher rents paid here than in England). In other words, higher prices cut off the American laborer from reaping all the superiority in comfort which might be expected from knowing that he had an advantage over the English laborer of 77 per cent in the money wages received.
Despite the high prices, 31 percent of Massachusetts workers' spending goes toward more comfort and better living conditions than those of English workers. If Americans could shop at English prices, they would have a 37 percent surplus for extra enjoyment (after accounting for the higher rents paid here compared to England). In other words, higher prices stop American laborers from fully enjoying the comfort they could expect from knowing they earn 77 percent more in wages than English laborers.
In order that the reader may easily find the arguments of the protectionists, he is referred to the following books:
To help the reader easily find the arguments of the protectionists, take a look at the following books:
Carey's “Principles of Social Science” (3 vols.). The form of argument is, briefly, that all industries should be kept going within the bounds of a country so as to avoid foreign trade. The change of form into the finished commodity should, he holds, take place near the spot where the raw materials are produced, so that not so great a share should go to the mere middle-men, or transporters.
Carey’s“Social Science Principles”(3 vols.). The main argument is that all industries should function within a country's borders to reduce foreign trade. He thinks that finished products should be made near where the raw materials are obtained, so that less profit goes to middlemen or transporters.
Bowen's “Political Economy,” Chap. XX, advocates protection on the ground that it is needed to secure diversity of industries, and that it lowers the prices of imported goods.
Bowen's“Political Economy,”Chapter XX argues for protection by stating that it's crucial for maintaining a range of industries and that it reduces the prices of imported goods.
Sir J. B. Byles's “Sophisms of Free Trade” is an answer to Bastiat's “Sophisms of Protection,” the latter having been translated into English by Horace White.
Sir J. B. Byles“Free Trade Fallacies”is a response to Bastiat's"Sophisms of Protection,"which was translated into English by Horace White.
Erastus B. Bigelow's “The Tariff Question.” This is one of the ablest discussions, from the protectionist point of view, based on statistical tables and comparisons of the policy of England and the United States.
Erastus B. Bigelow’s"The Tariff Issue."This is one of the most insightful discussions from a protectionist viewpoint, using statistical data and comparing the policies of England and the United States.
Stebbins's “Protectionists' Manual” is a brief and handy statement.
Stebbins'“Protectionist Guide”is a quick and helpful guide.
Ellis H. Roberts's “Government Revenue” is the form into which he has thrown his lectures at Cornell University (1884) on protection, and is the latest statement emanating from that side of the discussion. He goes at length into the history of taxes in various countries; holds that wages are higher here than in England because of protection; that our manufactures are more flourishing than our agriculture, etc.
Ellis H. Roberts“Government Revenue”This is a compilation of his lectures at Cornell University (1884) on protection, and it offers the latest perspective in that debate. He thoroughly discusses the history of taxes in various countries; argues that wages are higher here than in England due to protection; and claims that our manufacturing sector is doing better than our agricultural one, among other points.
Frederick List's “National Economy” is the German statement of protection, much on Carey's own grounds.
Frederick List's“National Economy”is Germany's perspective on protectionism, closely following Carey's concepts.
“The Congressional Globe” contains numerous speeches of members of Congress on the tariff; and the Iron and Steel Association of Philadelphia send out pamphlets explaining the protectionist position.
“The Congressional Globe”It includes numerous speeches from Congress members discussing tariffs, and the Iron and Steel Association of Philadelphia shares pamphlets that explain the protectionist perspective.
The free-trade arguments may be found also in W. M. Grosvenor's “Does Protection Protect?” He studies the results of the various tariffs of the United States, and gives many very valuable tables and collections of statistics bearing upon this question.
You can also find arguments for free trade in W. M. Grosvenor's __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.“Does Protection Work?”He analyzes the effects of various tariffs in the United States and offers numerous useful tables and statistics related to this topic.
W. G. Sumner's “History of Protection in the United States” is a very vigorous account of the evils of the various tariffs and the protective system.
W. G. Sumner's“The History of Protection in the United States”is a very compelling account of the issues created by various tariffs and the protectionist system.
A. L. Perry's “Political Economy” gives a radical free-trade view.
A. L. Perry's"Political Economy"presents a bold viewpoint on free trade.
Henry Fawcett's “Free Trade and Protection” explains the causes which have retarded the more general adoption of free trade.
Henry Fawcett’s“Free Trade and Protection”discusses the reasons that have hindered the wider acceptance of free trade.
J. E. Cairnes's “Leading Principles of Political Economy” gives the ablest discussion of the economic principles involved in the question which has yet been offered to the reader. Moreover, almost all our systematic writers on political economy (excepting, perhaps, Bowen and R. E. Thompson) give the system of free exchange their support on economic grounds.
J.E. Cairnes's“Leading Principles of Political Economy”offers the most thorough discussion of the economic principles related to the topic that has been shared with readers so far. Moreover, almost all our systematic authors on political economy (except possibly Bowen and R. E. Thompson) endorse the system of free exchange based on economic reasoning.
Appendix I. References.
A Short Bibliography of the Tariffs of the United States.
I. General Works.—Young's “Special Report on the Customs-Tariff Legislation of the United States” contains useful extracts from debates of Congress, and also valuable tables of duties; in the Index, p. cciii, under “Tariff Act,” will be found references to, and dates of, all acts to 1870. See, also, Sumner's “History of American Currency,” and his “Lectures on Protection in the United States”; A. L. Perry's “Political Economy,” chap. xiii; Grosvenor's “Does Protection Protect?” A valuable study is E. J. James's “Studien über den Amerikanischen Zoll tariff.” For different views, see Carey's “Social Science”; Bolles's “Financial History of the United States,” vol. ii, Bk. i, chap. v, Bk. iii, chaps. iii to x; and Stebbins's “American Protectionists' Manual.”
I. General Works.—Young's “Special Report on the Customs-Tariff Legislation of the United States” includes helpful excerpts from Congressional debates and important duty tables; in the Index, p. cciii, under “Tariff Act” you can find references to and dates of all acts up to 1870. Also, check out Sumner's "History of U.S. Currency," and his "Lectures on Protection in the United States"; A. L. Perry's "Political Economy," chap. xiii; Grosvenor's “Does Protection Really Protect?” A valuable study is E. J. James's "Studies on the American customs tariff." For different perspectives, see Carey's "Social Science"; Bolles's "Financial History of the United States," vol. ii, Bk. i, chap. v, Bk. iii, chaps. iii to x; and Stebbins's “American Protectionists' Guide.”
II. Earlier Periods.—H. C. Adams's “Taxation in the United States, 1789-1816”; F. W. Taussig's “Protection to Young Industries”; the works of Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, Webster, and Clay; “The Statesman's Manual”; and of course the Debates in Congress, etc. See, also, Bristed's “Resources of the United States”; Pitkin's “Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States”; Seybert's “Statistical Annals” (1818); and the “American Almanac.”
II. Earlier Times.—H. C. Adams's “Taxation in the United States, 1789-1816”; F. W. Taussig's "Support for Young Industries"; the works of Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, Webster, and Clay; "The Statesman's Manual"; and of course the Congressional Debates, etc. See also Bristed's "U.S. Resources"; Pitkin's “Statistical Overview of U.S. Commerce”; Seybert's "Statistical Annals" (1818); and the “American Almanac.”
III. Noteworthy Documents.—Hamilton's Reports: “Report on Manufactures,” Works, ii, pp. 192-284, or American State Papers, Finance, i, 123-144. Dallas, Treasury Report of 1816, American State Papers, Finance, iii, 87-91.
III. Important Documents.—Hamilton's Reports: “Manufacturing Report,” Works, ii, pp. 192-284, or American State Papers, Finance, i, 123-144. Dallas, Treasury Report of 1816, American State Papers, Finance, iii, 87-91.
A report which is of the greatest importance and weight is Albert Gallatin's “Memorial in Favor of Tariff Reform” (1832). Printed separately. Unfortunately, not in his collected works.
A report that is extremely important and significant is Albert Gallatin's "Memorial Supporting Tariff Reform" (1832). Printed separately. Unfortunately, it is not included in his collected works.
Walker's Report, see Finance Report, December 3, 1845.
Walker's Report, see Finance Report, December 3, 1845.
J. Q. Adams's Report of 1832, Congressional Documents, 1831-1832, H. R. No. 481.
J. Q. Adams's Report of 1832, Congressional Documents, 1831-1832, H. R. No. 481.
D. A. Wells's “Reports as Special Commissioner of the Revenue,” 1866, Senate Documents, second session, Thirty-ninth Congress, vol. i, No. 2; 1868, House Executive Documents, second session, Fortieth Congress, [pg 632] vol. ix, No. 81; 1869, House Executive Documents, third session, Fortieth Congress, vol. vii, No. 16; 1869, House Executive Documents, second session, Forty-first Congress, vol. v, No. 27; and his paper in the Cobden Club Essays (second series).
D. A. Wells's "Reports as Special Commissioner of the Revenue," 1866, Senate Documents, second session, Thirty-ninth Congress, vol. i, No. 2; 1868, House Executive Documents, second session, Fortieth Congress, [pg 632] vol. ix, No. 81; 1869, House Executive Documents, third session, Fortieth Congress, vol. vii, No. 16; 1869, House Executive Documents, second session, Forty-first Congress, vol. v, No. 27; and his article in the Cobden Club Essays (second series).
W. D. Kelley's “Speeches, Addresses, and Letters.”
W. D. Kelley's "Speeches, Addresses, and Letters."
“Report of the Tariff Commission,” 1882 (two vols). H. R. Miscellaneous Documents, No. 6, Part I, Forty-seventh Congress, second session.
“Tariff Commission Report,” 1882 (two vols). H. R. Miscellaneous Documents, No. 6, Part I, Forty-seventh Congress, second session.
IV. Pauper-Labor Argument.—See Taussig, “Protection to Young Industries,” p. 69, note 1; Calhoun's speech, Works, iv, pp. 201-212; Greeley's speech of 1843; Cooper's “Politics,” pp. 99-109; Webster's Works, v, pp. 161-235; Cairnes, “Leading Principles,” pp. 382-388. Fifteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics (1884), by Carroll D. Wright. D. A. Wells, “Princeton Review,” November, 1883, p. 261; Schoenhof, “Wages and Trade.”
IV. Pauper-Labor Argument.—See Taussig, "Support for Emerging Industries," p. 69, note 1; Calhoun's speech, Works, iv, pp. 201-212; Greeley's speech of 1843; Cooper's “Politics” pp. 99-109; Webster's Works, v, pp. 161-235; Cairnes, “Core Values,” pp. 382-388. Fifteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics (1884), by Carroll D. Wright. D. A. Wells, “Princeton Review” November, 1883, p. 261; Schoenhof, "Wages and Trade."
V. View of Early Manufactures.—Bishop, “History of American Manufactures”; Batchelder's “Introduction and Early Progress of the Cotton Manufacture in the United States”; N. Appleton, “Origin of Lowell”; G. S. White, “Memoir of Samuel Slater”; B. F. French, “History of the Rise and Progress of the Iron Trade of the United States for 1621-1857”; H. Scrivenor, “History of the Iron Trade”; “Bulletin of the National Association of Woolen Manufactures,” ii, pp. 479-488. Tench Coxe, “Statement of the Arts and Manufactures of the United States for 1810” (1814).
V. View of Early Manufacturing.—Bishop, “History of American Industry”; Batchelder's "Introduction and Early Development of Cotton Manufacturing in the United States"; N. Appleton, "Origin of Lowell"; G. S. White, "Samuel Slater's Memoir"; B. F. French, "History of the Growth and Development of the Iron Trade in the United States from 1621 to 1857"; H. Scrivenor, “Iron Trade History”; "Bulletin of the National Association of Woolen Manufacturers," ii, pp. 479-488. Tench Coxe, "Statement on the Arts and Industries of the United States for 1810" (1814).
VI. Later View of Manufactures:
VI. Modern Take on Manufacturing:
(1.) The Iron Manufacture.—See Swank's “Reports of Iron and Steel Association,” 1882; ibid., “Census Report,” 1880; ibid., “Iron Trade,” 1876; J. S. Newberry, for an excellent article in “International Review,” i, pp. 768-780.
(1.) The Iron Factory.—See Swank's "Reports from the Iron and Steel Association," 1882; ibid., "Census Report" 1880; ibid., "Iron Trade," 1876; J. S. Newberry, for a great article in “Global Review,” i, pp. 768-780.
For Bessemer steel, Swank, “Census Report,” 1880, pp. 149-153; and Schoenhof, “Destructive Influences of the Tariff,” chap. vii. A. S. Hewett, Speech in Congress, May 16, 1882. Separately printed.
For Bessemer steel, Swank, “Census Report,” 1880, pp. 149-153; and Schoenhof, "Negative Effects of the Tariff" chap. vii. A. S. Hewett, Speech in Congress, May 16, 1882. Separately printed.
(2.) Wool, Woolens, and Cottons.—Production and importation of wool, see “United States Statistical Abstract”; “Tariff Commission Report,” i, pp. 1782-1785; ii, p. 2432.
(2.) Wool, Woolens, and Cottons.—For information on the production and import of wool, refer to "U.S. Statistical Abstract"; "Tariff Commission Report" i, pp. 1782-1785; ii, p. 2432.
Production and importation of woolens, see “Bulletin of Woolen Manufacturers,” vii, p. 359; “Commerce and Navigation Reports.”
Production and importation of woolens, see “Woolen Manufacturers' Bulletin,” vii, p. 359; “Trade and Navigation Reports.”
Prosperity of woolen manufacturers after 1867, see Wells, “Wool and the Tariff” (a letter to the “New York Tribune,” March 20, 1873); R. W. Robinson, article of December, 1872, in “Bulletin of Woolen Manufacturers,” iii, p. 354. Edward Harris, “Memorial of the Manufacturers of Woolen Goods to the Committee of Ways and Means,” Washington, 1872. John L. Hayes, “The Fleece and the Loom.”
Prosperity of wool manufacturers after 1867, see Wells, "Wool and the Tariff" (a letter to the "New York Tribune," March 20, 1873); R. W. Robinson, article from December 1872, in “Woolen Manufacturers Newsletter,” iii, p. 354. Edward Harris, "Memorial from the Woolen Goods Manufacturers to the Committee of Ways and Means," Washington, 1872. John L. Hayes, “The Fleece and the Loom.”
Production and importation of cottons, see “Commerce and Navigation Reports”; Census Report of 1880.
Production and importation of cottons, see "Commerce and Navigation Updates"; Census Report of 1880.
(3.) Silk.—Manufacture since 1860, see “Silk Association Reports”; Wyckoff, “Silk Manufacture in the United States” (1883) for recent history, pp. 42-51. Wyckoff, “The Silk Goods of America” (1880), on methods of manufacture, chaps. ii, iv, vi.
(3.) Silk.—Manufactured since 1860, see “Silk Association Updates”; Wyckoff, "Silk Production in the United States" (1883) for recent history, pp. 42-51. Wyckoff, “American Silk Goods” (1880), on methods of manufacture, chaps. ii, iv, vi.
(4.) Sugar Duties.—D. A. Wells, “Princeton Review,” vi (November, 1880), pp. 319-335; and “The Sugar Industry of the United States and the Tariff” (1878).
(4.) Sugar Taxes.—D. A. Wells, “Princeton Review” vi (November, 1880), pp. 319-335; and “The Sugar Industry in the United States and the Tariff” (1878).
VII. Present Tariff.—Heyl's “United States Duties on Imports” (1881) contains all acts in force to date of publication, and gives all acts since the year 1861 in full. It is used by the United States officials.
VII. Current Rate.—Heyl's "U.S. Tariffs on Imports" (1881) includes all acts in effect up to the publication date and presents all acts since 1861 in their entirety. It is utilized by U.S. officials.
“Imports Duties from 1867 to 1883 inclusive” (House of Representatives, Miscellaneous Documents, No. 49, Forty-eighth Congress, first session) gives duties on each article by years, and reduces specific to ad valorem rates.
"Import Duties from 1867 to 1883, including both years" (House of Representatives, Miscellaneous Documents, No. 49, Forty-eighth Congress, first session) provides the duties on each item by year and converts specific rates to value-based rates.
“The Existing Tariff on Imports into the United States,” 1884 (Senate Document, Report, No. 12, Forty-eighth Congress, first session).
"The Current Tariff on Imports into the United States," 1884 (Senate Document, Report, No. 12, Forty-eighth Congress, first session).
A Short Bibliography on Bimetallism.
“The Report of the International Monetary Conference, 1878” (p. 754), contains an extended bibliography on money, by S. Dana Horton. Chevalier's third volume of his “Cours d'Économie politique,” entitled “Monnaie,” also gives a bibliography.
“The Report of the International Monetary Conference, 1878” (p. 754) includes a comprehensive bibliography on money, by S. Dana Horton. Chevalier's third volume of his "Political Economy Course," titled "Currency," also provides a bibliography.
I. Standard of Value.—See Jevons, “Money and the Mechanism of Exchange,” chaps iii, xxv; S. Dana Horton, “Gold and Silver,” chap. iv, p. 36; F. A. Walker, “Political Economy,” pp. 363-368, “Money, Trade, and Industry,” pp. 56-77; Wolowski, “L'Or et l'Argent,” pp. 7, 22, 207; Mill, “Principles of Political Economy,” book iii, chap. xv; Walras, “Journal des Économistes,” October, 1882, pp. 5-13.
I. Value Standard.—See Jevons, "Money and the Exchange System," chaps iii, xxv; S. Dana Horton, "Gold and Silver," chap. iv, p. 36; F. A. Walker, "Political Economy" pp. 363-368, “Money, Trade, and Industry,” pp. 56-77; Wolowski, “Gold and Silver,” pp. 7, 22, 207; Mill, "Political Economy Principles," book iii, chap. xv; Walras, “Journal of Economists,” October, 1882, pp. 5-13.
II. Bimetallic Theory.—Horton, “Gold and Silver,” p. 29; F. A. Walker, “Money, Trade, and Industry,” p. 157, “Political Economy,” p. 408; Giffen, “Fortnightly Review,” vol. xxxii (1879), p. 279; Wolowski, “L'Or et l'Argent,” p. 35; Jevons, ibid., chap, xii; A. J. Wilson, “Reciprocity, Bimetallism, and Land Reform,” p. 107; S. Bourne, “Trade, Population, and Food,” p. 227; Seyd, “The Decline of Prosperity,” and the various pamphlets of Cernuschi.
II. Bimetallic Theory.—Horton, “Gold and Silver,” p. 29; F. A. Walker, “Money, Trade, and Industry,” p. 157, "Political Economy" p. 408; Giffen, "Biweekly Review," vol. xxxii (1879), p. 279; Wolowski, “Gold and Silver,” p. 35; Jevons, ibid., chap. xii; A. J. Wilson, “Reciprocity, Bimetallism, and Land Reform,” p. 107; S. Bourne, "Trade, Population, and Food" p. 227; Seyd, "Decline of Prosperity," and the various pamphlets of Cernuschi.
III. Operation of Gresham's Law.—Macaulay, chap. xxi for clipped coin of 1695; Jevons, ibid., pp. 80-85, also gives an example taken from the Japanese currency; for the case of France, see “Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Depreciation of Silver, 1876,” p. xlii, and Appendix, pp. 86, 148; for the United States, see supra, book iii, chap. vii, § 3. See, also, Lord Liverpool's “Treatise on the Coins of the Realm,” chap. xii, for changes in the coin of England.
III. How Gresham's Law works.—Macaulay, chap. xxi for clipped coin of 1695; Jevons, ibid., pp. 80-85, also gives an example from the Japanese currency; for the case of France, see "Report from the House of Commons Select Committee on the Depreciation of Silver, 1876," p. xlii, and Appendix, pp. 86, 148; for the United States, see above, book iii, chap. vii, § 3. See also Lord Liverpool's "Treatise on the Coins of the Realm," chap. xii, for changes in the coin of England.
IV. Compensatory Effect of Two Standards.—Jevons, ibid., pp. 139, 140; F. A. Walker, “Political Economy,” pp. 411-416; Wolowski, “L'Or et l'Argent,” p. 28; Mannequin, “Journal des Économistes,” August, 1878, p. 202.
IV. *Compensatory Effect of Two Standards.*—Jevons, ibid., pp. 139, 140; F. A. Walker, "Political Economy," pp. 411-416; Wolowski, "Gold and Silver," p. 28; Mannequin, "Economists' Journal," August 1878, p. 202.
V. Effect of a League of States, or Law, on the Relative Value of Gold and Silver.—Giffen, “Fortnightly Review,” vol. xxxii (1879), pp. 285-290; Wolowski, “L'Or et l'Argent,” pp. 23, 24, 31; F. A. Walker, “Political Economy,” p. 410, “Report of the International Monetary Conference, 1878,” p. 74; Sumner, “Princeton Review,” vol. iv, p. 563; S. Dana Horton, “Report of the International Monetary Conference, 1878,” p. 741; Bourne, “Trade, Population, and Food,” pp. 228, 230; Jevons, “Contemporary Review,” vol. xxxix (1881), p. 750; S. Newcomb, “International Review” (1879), p. 314.
V. Impact of a League of States, or Law, on the Relative Value of Gold and Silver.—Giffen, "Biweekly Review," vol. xxxii (1879), pp. 285-290; Wolowski, “Gold and Silver,” pp. 23, 24, 31; F. A. Walker, "Political Economy," p. 410, "Report of the International Monetary Conference, 1878," p. 74; Sumner, “Princeton Review” vol. iv, p. 563; S. Dana Horton, "Report of the International Monetary Conference, 1878," p. 741; Bourne, "Trade, Population, and Food" pp. 228, 230; Jevons, "Modern Review," vol. xxxix (1881), p. 750; S. Newcomb, "International Review" (1879), p. 314.
VI. Production of Gold and Silver; Relative Value of the Two Metals.—Ad. Soetbeer, Petermann's “Mittheilungen,” No. 57; “House of Commons Report on Depreciation of Silver,” 1876, Appendix, pp. 11, 12, 24; Bourne, “Statistical Journal,” vol. xlii, p. 409, gives Sir H. Hay's figures corrected by him to 1878; Spofford's “American Almanac,” 1878, gives tables from the “Journal des Économistes”; the figures of Seyd, Hay, Jacob, and Tooke and Newmarch are in the “House of Commons Report,” above. Also see, supra, book iii, chap. vi, for references.
VI. Gold and Silver Production; Comparing the Value of Both Metals.—Ad. Soetbeer, Petermann's “Messages,” No. 57; “House of Commons Report on the Decline in Silver Value,” 1876, Appendix, pp. 11, 12, 24; Bourne, "Statistical Journal," vol. xlii, p. 409, provides Sir H. Hay's updated figures to 1878; Spofford's “American Almanac,” 1878, includes tables from the "Economists' Journal"; the data from Seyd, Hay, Jacob, and Tooke and Newmarch are in the "House of Commons Report," mentioned above. Also see, above, book iii, chap. vi, for references.
The relative values of gold and silver since 1834, as given in Pixley and Abell's (London) tables, are trustworthy. Previous to 1834 there is much uncertainty. Soetbeer, ibid., gives Hamburg quotations since 1687. Another table, probably incorrect in places, is that of White, see “Report of the International Monetary Conference,” 1878, p. 647.
The relative values of gold and silver since 1834, as shown in Pixley and Abell's (London) tables, are reliable. Before 1834, there is a lot of uncertainty. Soetbeer, ibid., provides Hamburg quotes starting from 1687. Another table, which may be inaccurate in some areas, is that of White, see "Report of the International Monetary Conference," 1878, p. 647.
VII. Demonetization of Silver by Germany.—For copy of laws of 1871 and 1873, see “Report of Directors of the United States Mint, 1873,” p. 82; “House of Commons Report on Depreciation of Silver,” 1876, p. 18; “Conférence Monétaire Internationale,” 1881, index, p. 215 for “Allemagne.”
VII. Germany's Silver Demonetization.—For a copy of the laws from 1871 and 1873, see "Report of the Directors of the United States Mint, 1873," p. 82; "House of Commons Report on the Decline in Silver Value," 1876, p. 18; "International Monetary Conference," 1881, index, p. 215 for “Germany.”
VIII. Latin Union.—For treaty, see “Journal des Économistes,” May, 1866; “House of Commons Report,” ibid, xxxviii, Appendix, pp. 92, 98, 106-109, 116; “Report of Monetary Conference,” 1878, pp. 779-787.
VIII. Latin Union.—For the treaty, see “Economists' Journal,” May 1866; "House of Commons Report" ibid, xxxviii, Appendix, pp. 92, 98, 106-109, 116; "Monetary Conference Report," 1878, pp. 779-787.
IX. Flow of Silver to the East.—The figures of Sir Hector Hay after 1851, “House of Commons Report,” ibid., App., p. 24, are fullest, and should be combined with Pixley and Abell's figures for years before 1851, ibid., Appendix, p. 21. See also Bourne, “Statistical Journal,” 1879, p. 422; Waterfield, “House of Commons Report,” ibid., Appendix, pp. 171, 172, 174; Quetteville, ibid., p. 184; “Conférence Monétaire Internationale,” 1881, p. 197; London “Economist,” February 24, 1883, Supplement, p. 7; “Parliamentary Documents,” 1881, vol. [pg 635] xciii; “Report of the Director of the United States Mint,” 1880 (in the Finance Report, 1880, p. 194); J. B. Robertson, “Westminster Review,” vol. cxv, p. 200.
IX. The Movement of Silver to the East.—The figures from Sir Hector Hay after 1851, “Commons Report,” ibid., App., p. 24, are the most comprehensive and should be combined with Pixley and Abell's figures for the years prior to 1851, ibid., Appendix, p. 21. Also refer to Bourne, "Stats Journal," 1879, p. 422; Waterfield, "House of Commons Report," ibid., Appendix, pp. 171, 172, 174; Quetteville, ibid., p. 184; "International Monetary Conference," 1881, p. 197; London "Economist" February 24, 1883, Supplement, p. 7; "Parliamentary Papers," 1881, vol. [pg 635] xciii; “Report from the Director of the United States Mint,” 1880 (in the Finance Report, 1880, p. 194); J. B. Robertson, “Westminster Review” vol. cxv, p. 200.
X. Depreciation of Silver, 1876.—Causes, Bourne, ibid., pp. 206, 212, 222, 233; Wilson, ibid., p. 128; “House of Commons Report,” ibid.; Sumner, “Princeton Review,” vol. iv., p. 570; S. Newcomb, “International Review,” vol. vi (1879), p. 326; Cochut, “Revue des Deux Mondes,” i, December, 1883, p. 514; Cairnes, “Essays”; F. Bowen, “Minority Report of the United States Silver Commission,” 1878.
X. *Silver Price Drop, 1876.*—Causes, Bourne, ibid., pp. 206, 212, 222, 233; Wilson, ibid., p. 128; "Commons Report," ibid.; Sumner, “Princeton Review” vol. iv., p. 570; S. Newcomb, “International Review,” vol. vi (1879), p. 326; Cochut, "Review of Two Worlds," i, December, 1883, p. 514; Cairnes, "Essays"; F. Bowen, "Minority Report of the United States Silver Commission," 1878.
Supposed cause of panic of 1873, see Williamson, “Contemporary Review,” April 1879; Seyd, “Decline of Prosperity”; Bourne, ibid., pp. 226, 227.
Supposed cause of the panic of 1873, see Williamson, “Current Review,” April 1879; Seyd, “Decline of Wealth”; Bourne, ibid., pp. 226, 227.
XI. Appreciation of Gold.—Giffen, “Statistical Journal,” vol. xlii, p. 36, started the theory for the period 1873-1879. Also see Bourne, “Statistical Journal,” vol. xlii, p. 406; S. Newcomb, “International Review,” 1879, p. 329; Wolowski, ibid., pp. 29, 30; Goschen, “Journal of the Institute of Bankers” (London), vol. iv, part vi, May, 1883; Patterson, “Statistical Journal,” vol. xliii, p. 1; for table of prices see London “Economist” (e.g., December 28, 1878).
XI. Value of Gold.—Giffen, "Statistical Journal," vol. xlii, p. 36, proposed the theory for the period 1873-1879. Also refer to Bourne, "Stats Journal," vol. xlii, p. 406; S. Newcomb, "International Review" 1879, p. 329; Wolowski, ibid., pp. 29, 30; Goschen, "Journal of the Institute of Bankers" (London), vol. iv, part vi, May, 1883; Patterson, "Stats Journal," vol. xliii, p. 1; for the price table, see London "Economist" (e.g., December 28, 1878).
XII. Bimetallism in the United States.—See supra, book iii, chap. vii; for a vast array of materials, see “Report of the International Monetary Conference,” 1878; Linderman's “Money and Legal Tender”; the Finance Reports of the United States; and Congressional Documents. For the coinage laws of 1792, 1834, 1853, 1873, 1878, see pamphlet, “Extracts from the Laws of the United States relating to Currency and Finance,” by C. F. Dunbar. For detailed account of passage of Act of 1873, see “Report of the Comptroller of the Currency,” 1876, p. 170. Present situation, “Atlantic Monthly,” May, 1884, “The Silver Danger.”
XII. Bimetallism in the U.S.—See above, book iii, chap. vii; for a wide range of sources, check out "Report of the International Monetary Conference," 1878; Linderman's “Currency and Legal Tender”; the Finance Reports of the United States; and Congressional Documents. For the coinage laws of 1792, 1834, 1853, 1873, 1878, see the pamphlet, "Excerpts from the U.S. Laws regarding Currency and Finance," by C. F. Dunbar. For a detailed account of the passage of the Act of 1873, see “Report of the Comptroller of the Currency,” 1876, p. 170. Current situation, “Atlantic” May, 1884, “The Silver Danger.”
A Short Bibliography of American Shipping.
I. English Navigation Acts.—Macpherson's “Annals,” ii, pp. 442, 484; Scobell, “Collection of Acts,” p. 176; Ruffhead, “Statutes at Large,” iii, p. 182; Roger Coke, “Treatise on Trade” (1671), p. 36; Sir Josiah Child, “New Discourse on Trade” (1671); Sir Matthew Decker, “Essay on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade” (1744); Joshua Gee, “Trade and Navigation of Great Britain” (1730); Lindsay, “History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce”; McCulloch, “Dictionary of Commerce” (new edition), articles “Navigation” and “Colonial Trade”; ibid., edition of Adam Smith, note xii, p. 534; Huskisson, speeches, iii, 13, 351; Levi, “History of British Commerce,” p. 158.
I. British Navigation Acts.—Macpherson's "Records," ii, pp. 442, 484; Scobell, "Compilation of Acts," p. 176; Ruffhead, "Public Laws" iii, p. 182; Roger Coke, "Trade Treatise" (1671), p. 36; Sir Josiah Child, “Discussion on Trade” (1671); Sir Matthew Decker, “Essay on the Reasons for the Decrease in Foreign Trade” (1744); Joshua Gee, "Trade and Navigation of Great Britain" (1730); Lindsay, "History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Trade"; McCulloch, "Business Dictionary" (new edition), articles "Navigation" and “Colonial Trade”; ibid., edition of Adam Smith, note xii, p. 534; Huskisson, speeches, iii, 13, 351; Levi, "History of British Trade," p. 158.
II. Navigation Laws of the United States.—“United States Statutes at Large,” i, 27, 287, 305; Act of 1817, Statutes, iii, 351; Revised Statutes (1878), “Commerce and Navigation,” p. 795; Lord Sheffield, “Observations on the Commerce of the United States”; Pitkin, “Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States,” chap, i; D. A. Wells, “Our Merchant Marine,” chap. v; Seybert's “Statistical Annals”; Macgregor, “Commercial Statistics of America.”
II. U.S. Navigation Laws.—"United States Statutes at Large" i, 27, 287, 305; Act of 1817, Statutes, iii, 351; Revised Statutes (1878), “Shopping and Navigation,” p. 795; Lord Sheffield, "Insights on the Trade of the United States"; Pitkin, "Statistical Overview of U.S. Commerce," chap, i; D. A. Wells, "Our Merchant Navy," chap. v; Seybert's “Statistical Reports”; Macgregor, "U.S. Commercial Statistics."
III. Growth of American Shipping.—Rapid growth, 1840-1856. Levi, “History of British Commerce,” p. 582; Bigelow, “Tariff Question,” Appendix No. 57; “Harper's Magazine,” January, 1884, p. 217; Lindsay, “History of Merchant Shipping,” iii, p. 187; for ship-building, see Report of the United States Bureau of Statistics, “Commerce and Navigation,” 1881, p. 927; for tonnage, ibid., pp. 928-930; also, see “United States Statistical Abstract”; Dingley's Report to House of Representatives, December 15, 1882, No. 1,827, Forty-seventh Congress, second session, pp. 5, 8, 254.
III. Rise of American Shipping.—Rapid growth, 1840-1856. Levi, "History of UK Commerce," p. 582; Bigelow, "Tariff Issue," Appendix No. 57; "Harper's Magazine" January, 1884, p. 217; Lindsay, “Merchant Shipping History,” iii, p. 187; for ship-building, see Report of the United States Bureau of Statistics, "Business and Navigation," 1881, p. 927; for tonnage, ibid., pp. 928-930; also, see “U.S. Statistical Abstract”; Dingley's Report to House of Representatives, December 15, 1882, No. 1,827, Forty-seventh Congress, second session, pp. 5, 8, 254.
IV. Steam and Iron Ships.—Preble, “History of Steam Navigation”; Colden, “Life of Fulton”; Porter, “Progress of the Nation,” section 3, chap. iv; Nimmo, “Report to the Secretary of the Treasury in Relation to the Foreign Commerce of the United States and the Decadence of American Shipping” (1870); Dingley's Report, pp. 4, 23; Kelley, “The Question of Ships,” Appendix ii, p. 208.
IV. Steam and Iron Ships.—Preble, “History of Steam Boats”; Colden, "Fulton’s Life"; Porter, “Nation's Progress,” section 3, chap. iv; Nimmo, “Report to the Secretary of the Treasury Regarding the Foreign Trade of the United States and the Decline of American Shipping” (1870); Dingley's Report, pp. 4, 23; Kelley, "The Ship Question," Appendix ii, p. 208.
V. Decline of American Shipping.—“Report on Commerce and Navigation” (1881), pp. 927, 928; Lindsay, ibid., iii, pp. 83, 187, 593, 645; ibid., iv, pp. 163-180, 292, 316, 376; “North American Review,” October, 1864, p. 489; “Report on Commerce and Navigation,” 1881, lxv, pp. 915, 916, 922, 934; Lynch, Report to House of Representatives on “Causes of the Reduction of American Tonnage,” February 17, 1878, pp. ix, 80, 176, 195-213; remission of duties, Revised Statutes of the United States (edition of 1878), section 2,513; Report on “Commerce and Navigation,” xi, 83, 210; Dingley's Report; Nimmo, “Decadence of American Shipping” (which gives several charts), p. 17, “The Practical Workings of our Relations of Maritime Reciprocity” (1871); Kelley, ibid.; Reports of the New York Chamber of Commerce; Sumner, “Shall Americans own Ships?” in “North American Review,” June, 1880; Codman, “Free Ships”; for high-rate profit in the United States, Dingley's Report, p. 4.
V. Fall of American Shipping.—“Commerce and Navigation Report” (1881), pp. 927, 928; Lindsay, ibid., iii, pp. 83, 187, 593, 645; ibid., iv, pp. 163-180, 292, 316, 376; "North American Review," October, 1864, p. 489; "Commerce and Navigation Report," 1881, lxv, pp. 915, 916, 922, 934; Lynch, Report to House of Representatives on “Reasons for the Decrease in American Tonnage,” February 17, 1878, pp. ix, 80, 176, 195-213; remission of duties, Revised Statutes of the United States (edition of 1878), section 2,513; Report on "Commerce and Navigation," xi, 83, 210; Dingley's Report; Nimmo, "Decline of American Shipping" (which gives several charts), p. 17, “The Practical Aspects of Our Maritime Reciprocity Relations” (1871); Kelley, ibid.; Reports of the New York Chamber of Commerce; Sumner, "Should Americans own ships?" in "North American Review" June, 1880; Codman, "Free Shipping"; for high-rate profit in the United States, Dingley's Report, p. 4.
VI. Burdens on Ship-Owners.—Tonnage duties, Wells, p. 179; sailors' wages, Revised Statutes, sections 4,561, 4,578, 4,580-4,584, 4,600; consular fees, Dingley's Report, p. 9; pilotage, taxation, Wells, p. 172, et seq.; see also Act of 1884, abolishing many of these burdens.
VI. Responsibilities of Ship Owners.—Tonnage duties, Wells, p. 179; sailors' wages, Revised Statutes, sections 4,561, 4,578, 4,580-4,584, 4,600; consular fees, Dingley's Report, p. 9; pilotage, taxation, Wells, p. 172, et seq.; see also Act of 1884, which removed many of these burdens.
Appendix II. Exam Questions.
The following problems and questions have been arranged to indicate to the reader the character of examinations set by English374 and American universities. They have been taken in each case from papers actually given. It is hardly necessary to state, perhaps, that these questions do not exhaust the subject, and are only some of a kind of which many more might be added:
The following problems and questions have been organized to show the reader the nature of exams given by English374 and American universities. They have been selected from actual exam papers. It's probably not necessary to mention that these questions don't cover everything and are just a sample of the many more that could be included:
Definitions.
Definitions.
1. Define briefly, Fixed Capital; Unproductive Consumption; Law of Diminishing Returns; Effective Desire of Accumulation; Law of Increase of Labor; Communism; Wages Fund; Wages of Superintendence; Real Wages; Value; Price; Demand; Medium of Exchange; Gresham's Law.
1. Briefly define Fixed Capital; Unproductive Consumption; Law of Diminishing Returns; Effective Desire for Accumulation; Law of Increase of Labor; Communism; Wages Fund; Wages of Superintendence; Real Wages; Value; Price; Demand; Medium of Exchange; Gresham's Law.
2. Explain carefully the following terms: Productive Consumption, Effectual Demand, Margin of Cultivation, Cost of Production, Value of Money, Cost of Labor, Wealth, and Abstinence.
2. Carefully explain the following terms: Productive Consumption, Effectual Demand, Margin of Cultivation, Cost of Production, Value of Money, Cost of Labor, Wealth, and Abstinence.
3. Explain the following terms: Real Wages, Fixed Capital, Allowance System, Margin of Cultivation, Price, Demand, Medium of Exchange, Seignorage, Value of Money, and Bill of Exchange.
3. Explain the following terms: Real Wages, Fixed Capital, Allowance System, Margin of Cultivation, Price, Demand, Medium of Exchange, Seigniorage, Value of Money, and Bill of Exchange.
4. Define Supply, Value of Money, Productive Consumption, Cost of Production, Cost of Labor, Exchange Value, Law of Production from Land, Rate of Profit, Capital, and Gresham's Law.
4. Define Supply, Value of Money, Productive Consumption, Cost of Production, Cost of Labor, Exchange Value, Law of Production from Land, Rate of Profit, Capital, and Gresham's Law.
5. Define Political Economy: State the parts into which it may be divided, and show how they are mutually related.
5. Define Political Economy: State the sections it can be divided into and explain how they are interconnected.
Labor.
Labor.
6. Distinguish between direct and indirect labor, and give an illustration of the distinction.
6. Differentiate between direct and indirect labor, and provide an example of the difference.
7. Apply the distinction between productive and unproductive labor, and productive and unproductive consumption, respectively, to each of [pg 638] the following persons: a tailor, an architect, an annuitant, a sailor, and a brick-layer.
7. Make the distinction between productive and unproductive work, and productive and unproductive consumption, for each of the following people: a tailor, an architect, a person receiving an annuity, a sailor, and a bricklayer.
8. Is an actor to be classed as a productive laborer? The inventor of a machine? A confectioner?
8. Should an actor be considered a productive worker? What about the inventor of a machine? Or a candy maker?
9. In which of the two classes of laborers, productive and unproductive, would you place the following?
9. Where would you classify the following among the two types of workers, productive and unproductive?
(1.) The officers of our Government. | |
(2.) The maker of an organ. | |
(3.) An organist. | |
(4.) A schoolmaster. | |
(5.) An artist. | |
(6.) He who makes an article for which there is no use. |
10. Classify as productive or unproductive the following laborers: a clergyman, musical-instrument maker, actor, soldier, and lace-maker.
10. Classify the following workers as productive or unproductive: a clergyman, musical instrument maker, actor, soldier, and lace maker.
Capital.
Capital.
11. Explain fully what you understand by capital, and what function it discharges in production. Consider whether or not the following ought to be included in capital: (1) the original and acquired powers of the laborer, (2) the original properties of the soil, (3) improvements on land, (4) credit, (5) unsold stock in the hands of a merchant, (6) articles purchased but still in the consumer's hands.
11. Explain fully what you understand by capital and what role it plays in production. Consider whether the following should be included in capital: (1) the natural and developed skills of the worker, (2) the inherent qualities of the land, (3) enhancements made to property, (4) credit, (5) unsold inventory held by a merchant, (6) items bought but still with the consumer.
12. Does a national loan add to the capital of a country?
12. Does a national loan increase a country's capital?
13. Inquire how far, or in what cases, or in what sense, it may be said that a common dwelling-house, an hotel, a school-house, a police-station, a theatre, and a fortification, constitute part of the capital of the country.
13. Ask how far, in what situations, or in what way it can be said that a shared house, a hotel, a school, a police station, a theater, and a fortification are part of the country's capital.
14. Discuss carefully the question whether money lying in a bank (or corn lying in a granary) is always capital, or whether its economic nature depends upon the intentions of the owner.
14. Discuss carefully whether money sitting in a bank (or corn stored in a granary) is always considered capital, or if its economic nature depends on the owner's intentions.
15. Are railway-shares, stocks of wine, wheat, munitions of war, and land, to be considered capital, or not?
15. Should railway shares, wine stocks, wheat, war supplies, and land be considered capital, or not?
16. Explain fully whether you consider that United States bonds are capital or not.
16. Explain in detail whether you think United States bonds are capital or not.
17. Is an investment in government funds capital, or not? Give your reasons.
17. Is investing in government funds considered capital or not? Share your reasons.
18. In what manner does a large expenditure for military purposes affect the operations of capital and labor?
18. How does significant spending on the military impact the activities of capital and labor?
19. Distinguish between wealth and capital. Show that there is no assignable limit to the employment of capital in bettering the condition of the members of a community.
19. Distinguish between wealth and capital. Show that there is no specific limit to how capital can be used to improve the situation of the members of a community.
20. “If there are human beings capable of work, and food to feed them, they may always be employed in producing something.” Explain the meaning of this fully.
20. “If there are people willing to work and food to keep them going, they can always be involved in creating something.” Explain the meaning of this fully.
21. What is meant by saying wealth can only perform the functions of capital by being wholly or partially consumed?
21. What does it mean to say that wealth can only serve the functions of capital if it is fully or partially used up?
22. Explain and illustrate the statement that demand for commodities is not demand for labor.
22. Explain and show an example of the statement that the demand for goods is not the same as the demand for labor.
23. Show that expenditure of money does not necessarily increase the demand for labor.
23. Demonstrate that spending money does not always boost the demand for labor.
24. In what way would a general demand for luxuries affect productive laborers and the wealth of the community?
24. How would a general demand for luxury goods impact workers and the overall wealth of the community?
25. In a community where capital is all employed, what would be the effect if one employer gradually withdrew some of his capital, and spent this for personal luxuries?
25. In a community where all the capital is in use, what would happen if one employer slowly pulled back some of their capital and spent it on personal luxuries?
26. It is contended that “the demand for commodities, which can only be got by labor, is as much a demand for labor as a demand for beef is a demand for bullocks.” Criticise this position.
26. Some argue that "The demand for goods, which can only be produced through work, is just as much a demand for labor as the demand for beef is a demand for cattle." Critique this viewpoint.
27. “It is often said that, though employment is withdrawn from labor in one department, an exactly equivalent employment is opened for it in others, because what the consumers save in the increased cheapness of one particular article enables them to augment their consumption of others, thereby increasing the demand for other kinds of labor.” Point out the fallacy.
27. "People often say that when jobs in one area go away, the same number of jobs will pop up in other areas. They argue that when consumers save money from lower prices on a specific product, they use that extra money to buy other products, increasing the demand for different types of work." Point out the fallacy.
28. A college undergraduate, with the applause of shopkeepers, bought twenty waistcoats, under the plea that he was doing good to trade. Examine the economical soundness of his act.
28. A college student, with the cheers of shopkeepers, bought twenty vests, claiming he was helping the local economy. Analyze the financial logic behind his actions.
29. A man invested a portion of his capital in a loan to a state which subsequently repudiated its debts. The man thereupon gave up his carriage, discharged superfluous gardeners, and reduced the number of his domestic servants. Examine the effect of these changes on the employment of labor in the district where he resides.
29. A man invested some of his money in a loan to a state that later refused to pay its debts. As a result, he sold his carriage, let go of extra gardeners, and cut back on the number of domestic workers. Analyze how these changes impacted job availability in the area where he lives.
30. In the sixteenth century a great change in the mode of expenditure took place. Retainers were dismissed, households were reduced and a demand for commodities was substituted for a demand for labor. How would this change affect wages, and why?
30. In the sixteenth century, a significant shift in spending habits occurred. Retainers were let go, households became smaller, and there was a growing demand for goods instead of labor. How would this change impact wages, and why?
31. It is supposed by some persons that expenditure by the rich in costly entertainments is good for trade. What is your opinion on the subject?
31. Some people believe that spending by wealthy individuals on extravagant parties is beneficial for business. What do you think about this?
32. A is an absentee who spends his income abroad. B spends his income chiefly on American pictures and other works of art. C spends most of his income on American servants. D saves and buys United States bonds. E employs most of his income in the production of manufactures. Explain the various effects of these different modes of expenditure on the amount of wealth in the United States, and on the working-classes of the country.
32. A is someone who doesn't live here and spends his money overseas. B primarily spends his income on American art and other artworks. C uses most of his income to pay American workers. D saves money and buys U.S. bonds. E invests most of his income in manufacturing. Discuss how these different ways of spending affect the overall wealth in the United States and the working class in the country.
33. Compare the economic effects of defraying war expenditure (1) by loans, (2) by increased taxation.
33. Compare the economic effects of covering war expenses (1) through loans, (2) through increased taxes.
34. Define the term capital, and distinguish between fixed and circulating capital, giving instances of each.
34. Define the term capital and explain the difference between fixed and circulating capital, providing examples of each.
35. Distinguish between fixed and circulating capital, and point out how far, or in what manner, each of the following articles belongs to one kind or the other: a dwelling-house, a crop of corn, a wagon, a load of coal, an ingot of gold, a railway-engine, a bale of cotton goods.
35. Differentiate between fixed and circulating capital, and indicate how much, or in what way, each of the following items belongs to one category or the other: a house, a crop of corn, a wagon, a load of coal, a gold ingot, a train engine, a bale of cotton goods.
36. Of the following, which would you class under fixed and which under circulating capital: cash in the hands of a merchant, a cotton-mill, a plow, diamonds in a jeweler's shop, a locomotive, a nursery-gardener's seeds, greenhouses, manures; a carpenter's tools, woods, nails?
36. Which of the following would you classify as fixed capital and which as circulating capital: cash in a merchant's possession, a cotton mill, a plow, diamonds in a jeweler's shop, a locomotive, seeds from a nursery gardener, greenhouses, fertilizers; a carpenter's tools, lumber, nails?
37. If in a country like this a large amount of capital becomes fixed in the building of railroads, what effect will this change taken by itself have upon the laboring-class, supposing the capital to be (1) domestic, or (2) borrowed wholly or in part from abroad?
37. If in a country like this a lot of investment is tied up in building railroads, what impact will this alone have on the working class, assuming the investment is (1) domestic or (2) borrowed entirely or partially from abroad?
38. What conclusion is reached by Mr. Mill respecting the objections to the use of labor-saving machinery?
38. What conclusion does Mr. Mill come to regarding the objections to using labor-saving machinery?
39. Is the extension of machinery beneficial to laborers?
39. Is the expansion of machinery helpful to workers?
40. What is “the conclusive answer to the objections against machinery”?
40. What is “the ultimate response to the criticisms of machinery”?
Efficiency of Production.
Production Efficiency.
41. Explain briefly the chief causes on which the productiveness of labor depends.
41. Briefly explain the main factors that determine how productive labor is.
42. What are the principal ways in which advantage arises from the division of labor?
42. What are the main ways that benefits come from dividing up the labor?
43. What are the principal advantages of division of labor? In what cases and why is it better to carry on a productive enterprise on a large scale?
43. What are the main benefits of dividing labor? In what situations and why is it better to operate a productive business on a large scale?
44. Under what circumstances, and in what callings, can the division of employment be carried out to the fullest extent?
44. In what situations and professions can the division of labor be maximized?
45. Show how the amount of available capital and the extent of the market for products limit division of labor.
45. Demonstrate how the amount of available capital and the size of the product market restrict the division of labor.
Population.
Population.
46. Give a brief statement of Malthus's theory of population, explaining the different checks on population in different stages of civilization.
46. Provide a short overview of Malthus's population theory, detailing the various checks on population at different levels of societal development.
47. Enunciate Malthus's law of population, and give an outline of the reasoning by which he established it. Give an account of any objections that have been brought against Malthus's position, and criticise those objections.
47. State Malthus's law of population and provide a summary of the reasoning he used to establish it. Discuss any objections that have been raised against Malthus's views and critique those objections.
48. When the growth of population outstrips the progress of improvements, what are the means of relief for the laborer?
48. When the population grows faster than advancements in living conditions, what options do workers have for relief?
49. Does the increased facility of emigration nullify the Malthusian law of population in your opinion or not, and why?
49. Do you think the easier process of emigration undermines the Malthusian law of population? Why or why not?
50. Explain the law of diminishing return and the Malthusian doctrine of population; and trace the connection between them.
50. Explain the law of diminishing returns and the Malthusian theory of population; and outline the connection between them.
Increase of Production.
Increase in Production.
51. Compare the motives to saving in the case of savages, and of a country like the United States. State the causes of diversity in the strength of the effective desire of accumulation.
51. Compare the reasons for saving among savages and in a country like the United States. Explain the factors that lead to differences in the strength of the desire to accumulate wealth.
52. Capital is said to be accumulated by saving; what is saving? Is hoarded money a saving while hoarded?
52. People say you build up capital by saving; so, what is saving? Is money that’s just sitting around hoarded really considered saving?
53. How far does the increasing productiveness of manufacturing industry tend to neutralize the effect on profits of the diminishing productiveness of agricultural industry?
53. How much does the growing efficiency of manufacturing help balance out the impact on profits from the declining efficiency of agriculture?
54. What conclusion as to the limit to the increase of production does Mr. Mill deduce from his investigation of the laws of the various requisites of production?
54. What conclusion about the limits on production growth does Mr. Mill draw from his study of the laws governing the different necessities of production?
Property.
Property.
55. What are the essential elements of property? Are the grounds of property in land the same as those of property in movables?
55. What are the essential elements of property? Are the foundations of property in land the same as those of property in movable items?
56. Give what you conceive to be the chief arguments in favor of the institution of private property, as opposed to common ownership.
56. Present what you think are the main arguments for private property instead of shared ownership.
57. What arguments does Mr. Mill suggest in favor of some redistribution of landed property?
57. What reasons does Mr. Mill give in support of redistributing some land ownership?
58. What are the economic arguments for and against Communism?
58. What are the economic pros and cons of Communism?
59. In what way, and by what means, do Socialists want to alter the present distribution of wealth?
59. How do Socialists plan to change the current distribution of wealth, and what methods will they use?
60. Sketch the principal forms of Communistic and Non-communistic Socialism.
60. Outline the main types of Communistic and Non-communistic Socialism.
61. Should the power of bequest be limited?
61. Should the power to bequeath be limited?
Wages.
Pay.
62. On what, according to Mill, does the rate of wages depend? Hence, show the fallacy of the popularly proposed remedies for low wages.
62. According to Mill, what factors determine the rate of wages? Therefore, illustrate the misconceptions in the commonly suggested solutions for low wages.
63. State and examine the principal theories which have been put forward as to the circumstances which regulate the general rate of wages, saying which you deem to be correct, and why so.
63. Describe and analyze the main theories that have been proposed regarding the factors that influence the overall wage rate, stating which one you believe is accurate, and explain why.
64. Mr. Thornton argues that the wages-fund is neither “determined” nor “limited”: not “determined,” because there is no “law” to compel capitalists to devote any portion of their wealth to the payment [pg 642] of labor, nor are they morally “bound” to do so; and not “limited,” because there is nothing to prevent them from adding to the portion of their wealth so applied. Criticise this argument, and, if you dissent from Mr. Thornton's view, state the causes which “determine” and “limit” the fund in question.
64. Mr. Thornton argues that the wages-fund is neither "driven" nor "limited": not "driven," because there is no "legal" forcing capitalists to allocate any part of their wealth to pay for [pg 642] labor, nor are they morally “connected” to do so; and not “restricted,” because there’s nothing stopping them from increasing the portion of their wealth that goes to that. Critique this argument, and if you disagree with Mr. Thornton's perspective, explain the factors that “find out” and "cap" the fund in question.
65. State precisely what you mean by the “wages-fund,” and explain the conditions on which its growth depends.
65. Clearly define what you mean by the "wages fund," and discuss the conditions that influence its growth.
66. Explain generally the circumstances which determine the rate of wages. Mention some of the reasons why wages should be higher in one occupation than in another.
66. Explain the general circumstances that influence wage rates. List some reasons why wages might be higher in one job compared to another.
67. In what way does dearness or cheapness of food affect money wages?
67. How does the cost of food affect wages?
68. What determines—
What decides—
(1.) The general rate of wages in a country? | |
(2.) The relative rates of wages in different employments? |
69. What causes different rates of wages in different employments, and by what methods might wages be raised?
69. What leads to varying wage rates in different jobs, and what ways could wages be increased?
70. How do you explain the fact that some of the most disagreeable kinds of labor are the most badly paid?
70. How do you explain that some of the least pleasant types of work are also the lowest paid?
71. What, according to Mr. Mill, are the most promising means for the improvement of the laboring-classes?
71. According to Mr. Mill, what are the best ways to improve the working class?
72. In the Island of Laputa a law was passed compelling each workman to work with his left hand tied behind his back, and the law was justified on the ground that the demand for labor was more than doubled by it. Examine this argument.
72. In the Island of Laputa, a law was enacted requiring every worker to labor with their left hand tied behind their back, and this law was justified by the claim that it more than doubled the demand for labor. Consider this argument.
73. Some coal-workers are calling for a diminution of the output of coal, so as to keep up their wages. Examine how far, if at all, this result would follow from their proposed action.
73. Some coal workers are asking for a reduction in coal production to maintain their wages. Analyze how much, if any, this outcome would result from their suggested action.
74. Discuss any remedies for low wages that have been or might be suggested.
74. Talk about any solutions for low wages that have been proposed or could be suggested.
75. Why are the wages of women habitually lower than those of men?
75. Why are women's wages usually lower than men's?
Profits.
Profits.
76. What is the cause of the existence of profits? And what, according to Mr. Mill, are the circumstances which determine the respective shares of the laborer and the capitalist?
76. What causes profits to exist? And what, according to Mr. Mill, are the factors that determine the respective shares of the worker and the investor?
77. (1.) What is the lowest rate of profit which can permanently exist? (2.) Why is this minimum variable?
77. (1.) What is the lowest profit rate that can last over time? (2.) Why does this minimum change?
78. Analyze the remuneration received by any of the following: (1) the proprietor of a cotton-mill managing his own mill; (2) a merchant conducting his own business; (3) a railway shareholder; (4) a holder of government funds.
78. Analyze the pay received by any of the following: (1) the owner of a cotton mill running his own mill; (2) a merchant managing his own business; (3) a shareholder in a railway; (4) a holder of government bonds.
79. Into what portions may we divide the return which is usually [pg 643] called profit? Which of these portions would be received by a merchant carrying on business with borrowed capital?
79. How can we break down the return that is typically referred to as profit? Which of these portions would a merchant using borrowed capital receive?
80. Analyze the payment called profits into its various elements. Point out in what respects the earnings of the employer differ from or resemble the wages paid to other classes of laborers.
80. Break down the payment referred to as profits into its different components. Highlight how the earnings of the employer differ from or are similar to the wages paid to other types of workers.
81. It is asserted that “profits tend to an equality.” What conditions must be satisfied before this position can be maintained?
81. It's stated that "profits tend to equalize." What conditions need to be met before this claim can be upheld?
82. How is the alleged tendency of profits to equivalence in different employments to be reconciled with the notorious difference in the profit of different individuals?
82. How can we reconcile the supposed tendency of profits to equalize across different jobs with the well-known differences in profits among various individuals?
83. Which one of the elements in profit has the greatest effect on its amount? Explain by comparing the causes which regulate each element.
83. Which element of profit has the biggest impact on its total amount? Explain by comparing the factors that control each element.
84. How does Mill reconcile the high wages in America with Ricardo's law of profits?
84. How does Mill explain the high wages in America in relation to Ricardo's law of profits?
85. Explain the proposition that the rate of profits depends on the cost of labor, stating carefully what elements are included in cost of labor.
85. Explain the idea that the profit rate depends on labor costs, clearly outlining what factors are included in labor costs.
86. Explain what connection there may be between an increase of population and any of the elements entering into cost of labor.
86. Explain what connection there might be between a growing population and any of the factors that contribute to labor costs.
87. What effect would an increase or diminution of population have upon cost of labor?
87. How would an increase or decrease in population affect the cost of labor?
88. Explain Mill's view as to the cost of labor being a function of three variables, considering the passages in which he says, 1. “If without labor becoming less efficient its remuneration fell, no increase taking place in the cost of the articles composing that remuneration;” 2. “If the laborer obtained a higher remuneration, without any increased cheapness in the things composing it; or if, without his obtaining more, that which he did obtain would become more costly”: profits in the last two cases would suffer a diminution; and discussing—Firstly, if the remuneration of labor falls, what can the cost of the articles composing that remuneration signify to the capitalist? Secondly, if the laborer gets a higher remuneration, what can the increased cheapness of the things composing it signify to the capitalist?
88. Explain Mill's view that the cost of labor is influenced by three factors, considering the passages where he says, 1. “If the efficiency of labor doesn’t drop but the pay does, without any increase in the cost of the items covered by that pay;” 2. “If the worker gets paid more, without any drop in the prices of the items included in that pay; or if, even without earning extra, the pay he receives becomes more costly”: profits in the last two scenarios would decrease; and discussing—Firstly, if the pay for labor decreases, what does the cost of the items that make up that pay mean to the capitalist? Secondly, if the worker receives a higher pay, what does the decreased price of the items that make it up mean to the capitalist?
89. Is the contest between capital and labor permanent and fundamental? If not, give your reasons for your answer.
89. Is the struggle between capital and labor permanent and essential? If not, explain why you think that.
90. What is the effect on wages and profits of the introduction of machinery?
90. How do wages and profits change with the introduction of machinery?
Rent.
Lease.
91. What connection exists between the law of Malthus and Ricardo's doctrine of rent?
91. What connection is there between Malthus's law and Ricardo's theory of rent?
92. What is the reason why land-owners can demand rent?
92. Why can landowners charge rent?
93. Explain and illustrate the distinction between rent and profits. In what cases are they nearly indistinguishable?
93. Explain and illustrate the difference between rent and profits. In what situations are they almost the same?
94. It has often been observed that in America land is much less highly cultivated than in England. Explain the economic reasons for this.
94. It has often been noted that in America, land is way less intensively farmed than in England. Discuss the economic reasons for this.
95. How does the theory of rent apply in a country like the United States, where the farmer owns his land instead of hiring it?
95. How does the theory of rent work in a country like the United States, where farmers own their land instead of leasing it?
96. How is it that some agricultural capital pays rent, even if resort is not had to different grades of land?
96. How is it that some agricultural capital pays rent, even when different types of land aren't used?
97. Give a brief description of the theory of rent, and point out to what payments not usually called rent the theory may be applied.
97. Provide a quick overview of the theory of rent and identify what payments, not commonly referred to as rent, this theory can also be applied to.
98. State briefly Ricardo's theory of rent, and show that, if it be true, the following statements of Adam Smith must be false:
98. Briefly explain Ricardo's theory of rent and demonstrate that if it is true, the following statements by Adam Smith must be false:
“The most fertile coal-mine regulates the price of coals at all the other mines in the neighborhood.”
“The wealthiest coal mine determines the price of coal for all the other nearby mines.”
“In the price of corn one part pays the rent of the landlord, another pays the wages, and another the profit of the farmer.”
"In the price of corn, a portion goes to the landlord as rent, a portion goes to pay the workers, and the rest is the farmer's profit."
99. Why does the farming business pay rent, and the cotton business (ground-rent excluded) pay none? Define rent.
99. Why does the farming business have to pay rent, while the cotton business (excluding ground rent) pays nothing? What is the definition of rent?
100. “As population increases, rents estimated in corn increase, and the price of corn rises; rents, therefore, doubly tend to increase.” Prove this.
100. “As the population increases, the rents measured in corn rise, and the price of corn also rises; therefore, rents tend to increase even more.” Prove this.
101. Professor Rogers adduces, in refutation of the common theory of rent, the fact that land near New York pays a high rent, while land of the same natural fertility in the Western States pays no rent. How far do you admit the force of this objection?
101. Professor Rogers brings up, to counter the common theory of rent, the fact that land near New York has a high rent, while land with the same natural fertility in the Western States pays no rent. To what extent do you agree with this objection?
102. Examine the following doctrine:
102. Review the following doctrine:
103. What answer is made to Mr. Carey's objection to Ricardo's theory of rent, that in point of fact the poorer, not the richer, lands are first brought under cultivation?
103. What response is given to Mr. Carey's objection to Ricardo's theory of rent, which states that in reality, it's the poorer lands, not the richer ones, that are cultivated first?
104. Explain how land, “even apart from differences of situation,... would all of it, on a certain supposition, pay rent.”
104. Explain how land, "Even aside from differences in location,... would all of it, under certain conditions, generate rental income."
105. Explain clearly how it is possible for the land of a country which is all of uniform fertility to pay rent.
105. Explain clearly how it's possible for a country with completely uniform fertile land to pay rent.
107. Show that rent does not increase the price of bread.
107. Demonstrate that rent does not raise the price of bread.
108. How is it shown that “rent does not really form any part of the expenses of production or of the advances of the capitalist?”
108. How is it shown that "Doesn't rent actually count as part of the production costs or the investments of the capitalist?"
109. (1.) What connection exists between the price of agricultural products and the amount of rent paid? (2.) Can rent affect the price?
109. (1.) What relationship is there between the price of farming products and the amount of rent paid? (2.) Can rent influence the price?
110. “Rent is the effect and not the cause of price.” Prove this.
110. "Rent is the outcome, not the cause of price." Prove this.
111. Does rent enter into the cost of production of the following commodities or not, and why: Corn, cloth, the wine of the best vineyards?
111. Does rent factor into the production cost of the following goods or not, and why: corn, cloth, the wine from the best vineyards?
112. “Rent arises from the difference between the least fertile and the most fertile soils, and from the fact that the former have been taken into cultivation.... Rent is the difference between the market price of produce and the cost of production.” Harmonize these statements.
112. "Rent comes from the difference between the least fertile and the most fertile soils, as well as the fact that the least fertile soils have already been cultivated. Rent is the gap between the market price of produce and the production costs." Harmonize these statements.
113. In order that the actual payments made by farmers to landlords should generally correspond with “economic rent,” what conditions must be observed?
113. What conditions need to be met for the payments farmers make to landlords to generally match "economic rent," ?
114. What is assumed, as to competition, in all Mr. Mill's reasoning on wages, profits, and rent? Explain its action in each case.
114. What does Mr. Mill assume about competition in all his reasoning on wages, profits, and rent? Explain how it works in each case.
Value.
Value.
115. Enumerate, compare, and criticise any opinions known to you which have been held concerning the nature, origin, or measure of value in exchange.
115. List, compare, and critique any viewpoints you know about the nature, origin, or measurement of value in exchange.
116. Define precisely what it is which gives value to objects, and point out the causes which vary the value of the same object under differing circumstances.
116. Clearly define what gives value to things, and highlight the factors that change the value of the same item in different situations.
117. Do men dive to the bottom of the sea to get pearls because they are valuable; or are pearls valuable because men must dive to the bottom of the sea to get them?
117. Do men dive to the bottom of the sea for pearls because they are valuable, or are pearls valuable because men have to dive to the bottom of the sea to get them?
118. There are three forms of difficulty of attainment. State the law of value applicable to each.
118. There are three types of difficulty in achieving something. Explain the law of value that applies to each.
119. Explain the exact economic meaning of the words supply and demand.
119. Explain the precise economic meaning of the terms supply and demand.
120. When it is said that the value of certain commodities depends upon supply and demand, what is meant by demand?
120. When people say that the value of certain goods depends on supply and demand, what do they mean by demand?
121. If the supply of all commodities were suddenly doubled, would any changes in their relative values ensue or not, and why?
121. If the supply of all goods suddenly doubled, would there be any changes in their relative values or not, and why?
122. State the laws which regulate the permanent and temporary values of agricultural products.
122. List the laws that govern the permanent and temporary values of agricultural products.
123. How far does the value of commodities depend on the quantity of labor required for their production?
123. To what extent does the value of goods rely on the amount of labor needed for their production?
124. Has the term exchange value any precise meaning when we are comparing times or places very remote from one another?
124. Does the term exchange value have any clear meaning when we compare times or places that are very distant from each other?
125. What is meant by the natural (or normal) price and the market price of commodities? To what extent can they differ?
125. What do we mean by the natural (or normal) price and the market price of goods? How much can they vary?
126. Does a general rise of wages raise the prices of commodities in general or not, and why? Does it tend to cause any change in the relative prices of commodities or not, and why?
126. Does an overall increase in wages lead to a rise in prices of goods in general or not, and why? Does it cause any change in the relative prices of goods or not, and why?
127. Suppose that wages were double, would the values of commodities be affected? What would be the effect on prices and profits of such an increase of wages?
127. Let's say wages doubled; would that change the value of goods? What impact would that have on prices and profits with this increase in wages?
128. Are wages and profits influenced by prices?
128. Do prices affect wages and profits?
129. Can employers recoup themselves by a rise of prices for a rise of—
129. Can employers make up for it by increasing prices for a rise in—
(a.) Wages in particular employments? | |
(b.) General wages? |
How does this question bear on the efficacy of trades-unionism?
How does this question relate to the effectiveness of labor unions?
130. Do values depend on wages?
130. Do values rely on wages?
131. Explain the following statement: “It is true the absolute wages paid have no effect upon values; but neither has the absolute quantity of labor.”
131. Explain the following statement: "It's true that the total wages paid don't affect values, but the total amount of labor doesn't either."
132. Explain the statement that “high general profits can not, any more than high general wages, be a cause of high values.... In so far as profits enter into the cost of production of all things, they can not affect the value of any.”
132. Explain the statement that "High overall profits, just like high overall wages, can't create high values.... Since profits are included in the production cost of everything, they can't affect the value of anything."
133. Explain fully why it is that capitalists can not compensate themselves for a general high cost of labor through any action on values and prices.
133. Explain in detail why capitalists can't make up for a general rise in labor costs through any changes in values and prices.
134. “The value of a commodity depends on its cost of production.” Under what conditions is this true, and what causes interfere with it?
134. "The value of a product depends on how much it costs to make." When is this true, and what factors disrupt this?
135. Describe the hindrances which impede the free movement of capital to those fields which apparently offer the highest return for its employment.
135. Describe the obstacles that prevent the free movement of capital to those areas that seemingly provide the highest returns for investment.
136. Give J. S. Mill's analysis of the “cost of production,” and also Professor Cairnes's, with the arguments for and against each.
136. Provide J. S. Mill's analysis of the “production costs,” along with Professor Cairnes's, including the arguments supporting and opposing each perspective.
137. Analyze cost of production. What is its connection with cost of labor?
137. Analyze the cost of production. How is it related to labor costs?
138. Give an analysis of cost of production of any commodity.
138. Analyze the cost of production for any product.
139. Show carefully the distinction between wages, cost of labor, and cost of production.
139. Clearly show the difference between wages, labor costs, and production costs.
140. Define clearly value, price, real wages, and cost of production.
140. Clearly define value, price, real wages, and cost of production.
141. Define real wages, money wages, cost of labor.
141. Define real wages, money wages, and the cost of labor.
Money.
Money.
142. Point out the difference between the scientific and popular conceptions implied in the terms wealth and money.
142. Highlight the difference between the scientific and popular understandings of the terms wealth and money.
143. Show the fallacy of confounding capital with money. Can there be a glut of capital?
143. Show the mistake of confusing capital with money. Can there be an excess of capital?
144. What is money? To what sort of necessity does it owe its existence? What articles have been used for money? Enumerate the qualities which render a commodity fit to serve as money.
144. What is money? What need does it fulfill? What items have been used as money? List the qualities that make a commodity suitable to be used as money.
145. What are the qualities requisite in any commodity in order that it may serve as money?
145. What qualities must a commodity have in order to be used as money?
146. Distinguish accurately between the functions of money.
146. Clearly differentiate between the roles of money.
147. How far is a fixed standard of value possible?
147. How feasible is it to have a fixed standard of value?
148. What effect does the great durability of gold and silver have upon the value of money?
148. How does the long-lasting nature of gold and silver impact the value of money?
149. How far does the law of demand and supply govern the value of money?
149. To what extent do the laws of demand and supply control the value of money?
150. Explain fully how it is that the value of the precious metals is affected by “questions of quantity only, with little reference to cost of production.”
150. Explain fully how the value of precious metals is influenced by "questions of quantity only, with little consideration of production costs."
151. What is to be said to the following: “Some political economists have objected altogether to the statement that the value of money depends on its quantity combined with the rapidity of circulation; which, they think, is assuming a law for money that does not exist for any other commodity”?
151. What should we make of this: “Some political economists completely disagree with the idea that the value of money depends on how much there is and how quickly it circulates; they think this implies a rule for money that doesn't apply to any other commodity.”?
152. Under what conditions is it true that the “value of money is inversely as its quantity”?
152. Under what conditions is it true that the "The value of money goes down as its quantity goes up."?
153. Explain carefully the following: “The average value of gold is made to conform to its natural value in the same manner as the values of other things are made to conform to their natural value.”
153. Explain carefully the following: "The average value of gold is adjusted to reflect its natural value, just like the values of other items are adjusted to align with their natural value."
154. In what various meanings is the phrase “the value of money” used? How far does the value of money in each of these meanings depend on (1) the cost of production, (2) supply and demand?
154. In what different ways is the phrase “the value of money” used? To what extent does the value of money in each of these contexts rely on (1) the cost of production and (2) supply and demand?
155. Are the values of gold and silver subject to exactly the same natural laws as other commodities?
155. Are the values of gold and silver governed by the same natural laws as other goods?
156. Give the explanations and qualifications required to render the following proposition true: “The quantity of coin in every country is regulated by the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it.”
156. Provide the explanations and conditions needed to make the following statement true: “The amount of currency in each country is based on the value of the goods that are exchanged with it.”
157. Would the world be richer if every individual in it suddenly found the quantity of money in his possession doubled?
157. Would the world be better off if everyone suddenly found their amount of money doubled?
158. How far, or in what way, do you consider it correct to say that the general level of prices in a country depends upon the quantity of gold coin existing in that country?
158. To what extent do you think it's accurate to say that the overall price level in a country depends on the amount of gold coins available in that country?
159. A single good harvest causes a considerable fall in the value of wheat; but a great addition to the year's supply of gold from the mines produces little effect on its general value. How do you account for the difference?
159. A single good harvest significantly lowers the value of wheat; however, a large increase in the year's supply of gold from the mines has little impact on its overall value. Why do you think that is?
160. Show the effect of establishing a double standard.
160. Demonstrate the impact of creating a double standard.
161. Show how Gresham's law is illustrated by the history of the currency in the United States between 1834 and 1873.
161. Illustrate how Gresham's law is demonstrated by the history of currency in the United States from 1834 to 1873.
162. What effect had the discovery of gold in this century upon the coinage of the United States?
162. What impact did the discovery of gold in this century have on the coinage of the United States?
163. What is the system upon which the small silver currency of the United States is coined and issued?
163. What is the system used to mint and issue the small silver coins in the United States?
164. State briefly the aim of the United States coinage act of 1853.
164. Summarize the goal of the United States Coinage Act of 1853.
Credit.
Credit.
165. How do you define credit? Form a classification of credit documents.
165. How do you define credit? Create a classification of credit documents.
166. It has been said that “credit is capital.” Is this so or not?
166. People have said that "Credit is capital." Is this true or not?
167. Define capital, and examine the meaning of the term in the following statements:
167. Define capital and explore the meaning of the term in the following statements:
(a.) Demand for commodities can not create capital.
(a.) Demand for commodities cannot create capital.
(b.) Credit is not a creation, but a transfer of capital.
(b.) Credit isn't created; it's a transfer of capital.
(c.) Wages depend upon the proportion between population and capital.
(c.) Wages are determined by the ratio of population to capital.
168. State the law of the value of money which governs general prices. What change is to be made in the statement, if credit is to be taken into consideration?
168. Explain the law of the value of money that affects overall prices. What adjustment needs to be made to this statement if credit is considered?
169. What is the part which instruments of credit, other than bank-notes, play in the exchange of commodities?
169. What role do credit instruments, other than banknotes, play in the exchange of goods?
170. Mention some of the principal features of a credit crisis.
170. List some of the main characteristics of a credit crisis.
171. What are inconvertible notes? What objections are there to currency of this description?
171. What are inconvertible notes? What are the objections to currency of this type?
172. Can an inconvertible currency be made to maintain the same value as a convertible currency, and, if so, how? Supposing that it can, what objections are there, nevertheless, to it?
172. Can a non-convertible currency be made to keep the same value as a convertible currency, and if so, how? Assuming that it can, what objections are there to it?
173. “Nothing is subject to more variation than paper money, even when it is limited, and has no guarantees; for this simple reason, that, having no value of its own, it depends on the idea that each person forms of those guarantees.” Comment on this passage.
173. “There’s nothing more unpredictable than paper money, even when it’s limited and has no guarantees; simply because it has no intrinsic value and depends on each person's perception of those guarantees.” Comment on this passage.
174. How is it that a bad dollar does the work of buying as well as a good one until it is found out? Is it that it makes no difference whether it is made of gold or not?
174. How can a bad dollar buy just as well as a good one until it's discovered? Does it really not matter if it's made of gold or not?
175. To what extent is a government capable of giving fictitious value to a paper or a metallic currency?
175. How much can a government inflate the value of paper or metal currency?
176. In a country with an inconvertible paper currency, how can it be determined whether the issues are excessive or not, and why?
176. In a country with a non-convertible paper currency, how can we figure out if the amount issued is too much or not, and why?
177. What will be the effect if the circulating medium of a country is increased beyond its natural amount—
177. What will happen if a country's money supply is increased beyond its natural level—
(1) when the medium is coin? | |
(2) when it is coin and convertible paper? | |
(3) when it is inconvertible paper? |
178. What is the error involved in the assumption, frequently made by writers and public speakers, that the currency of a country ought to increase in like ratio with its wealth and population?
178. What is the mistake in the common belief, often held by writers and public speakers, that a country's currency should grow at the same rate as its wealth and population?
179. On what does the desire to use credit depend? What connection exists between the amount of notes and coin in circulation and the use of credit?
179. What does the desire to use credit depend on? What is the relationship between the amount of cash and coins in circulation and the use of credit?
180. Compare the advantages and disadvantages of a metallic and paper currency.
180. Compare the pros and cons of metallic versus paper currency.
181. A member of Congress advocated expansion of the paper currency by the following argument: “Our currency, as well as everything else, must keep pace with our growth as a nation.... France has a circulation per capita of thirty dollars; England, of twenty-five; and we, with our extent of territory and improvements, certainly require more than either.” State your opinion of this argument.
181. A member of Congress pushed for an increase in paper currency using this argument: "Our currency, like everything else, needs to keep pace with our growth as a nation. France has a per capita circulation of thirty dollars; England, twenty-five; and given our large territory and progress, we definitely need more than either of them." Share your thoughts on this argument.
182. Trace the effects, immediate and ultimate, on general prices of (a) an extended system of credit, (b) an enlarged issue of paper money, and (c) an addition to the stock of precious metals, respectively.
182. Follow the effects, both immediate and long-term, on general prices of (a) a widespread system of credit, (b) an increased supply of paper money, and (c) an increase in the supply of precious metals, respectively.
183. What is the error in the common notion that “a paper currency can not be issued in excess so long as every note represents property, or has a foundation of actual property to rest on”?
183. What is the mistake in the common belief that "A paper currency can't be issued beyond what is backed by property, meaning every note represents actual property or has a foundation of real property supporting it."?
184. Explain the action of the check and clearing-house system, and state what is meant by the restoration of barter.
184. Explain how the check and clearing-house system works, and describe what is meant by the revival of barter.
Over-Production.
Overproduction.
185. State the relation between supply and demand as aggregates, e.g., between the aggregate supply of commodities in a given community and the aggregate demand for them, and show the bearing of the principle involved on the doctrine of “general over-production.”
185. Describe the relationship between supply and demand as total amounts, for example, between the total supply of goods in a specific community and the total demand for those goods, and explain how this principle relates to the idea of "general overproduction."
186. Prove that the increase of capital and the extension of industry can not lead to a general over-production of commodities.
186. Show that the growth of capital and the expansion of industry cannot result in a widespread overproduction of goods.
187. What is the error of those who believe in the danger of over-production?
187. What is the mistake of those who think there’s a danger of overproduction?
188. Distinguish “excess of supply” from a “commercial crisis.”
188. Differentiate “oversupply” from a "economic crisis."
189. Give the substance of Mill's examination of the theories of excess of supply.
189. Summarize Mill's analysis of the theories regarding surplus supply.
190. “When production is fully equal to consumption, every discovery in the arts, or in mechanics, is a calamity, because it only adds to [pg 650] the enjoyment of consumers the opportunity of obtaining commodities at a cheaper rate, while it deprives the producers of even life itself.” Discuss this opinion of Sismondi.
190. "When production and consumption are perfectly aligned, any progress in art or technology can be catastrophic. It just allows consumers to buy goods at lower prices, leaving producers with nothing, not even a way to make a living." Discuss this opinion of Sismondi.
191. Explain the difference in the theories of Dr. Chalmers and Mr. Mill on over-production, and the excess of supply.
191. Explain the difference between Dr. Chalmers' and Mr. Mill's theories on overproduction and excess supply.
Peculiar Cases of Value.
Strange Value Cases.
192. It costs as much to produce straw as to produce grain; how, then, do you explain the comparatively low value of straw?
192. It costs just as much to produce straw as it does to produce grain; so how do you explain the relatively low value of straw?
193. Suppose a considerable rise in the price of wool to be foreseen, how should farmers expect the prices of mutton to be affected, and why?
193. If a significant increase in the price of wool is expected, how should farmers anticipate the prices of mutton to be impacted, and why?
194. Explain the operation of the laws of value by which the relative prices of wool and mutton are regulated.
194. Explain how the laws of value operate to regulate the relative prices of wool and mutton.
International Trade and Values.
Global Trade and Values.
195. What is the meaning of the statement that “it is not a difference in the absolute cost of production which determines the interchange [of commodities between countries], but a difference in the comparative cost”?
195. What does the statement that “It’s not the difference in the absolute cost of production that decides how goods are exchanged between countries, but rather a difference in the comparative cost.” mean?
196. What are the advantages which a country derives from foreign trade?
196. What are the benefits that a country gains from international trade?
197. Explain clearly the following passage: “We may often, by trading with foreigners, obtain their commodities at a smaller expense of labor and capital than they cost to the foreigners themselves.”
197. Explain clearly the following passage: "We can often obtain goods from other countries at a lower cost due to their cheaper labor and resources compared to what it takes for those countries to produce them."
198. Is there any essential difference between trade between country and country, and trade between county and county, or even between man and man? What is the real nature of trade in all cases?
198. Is there any fundamental difference between trade between countries, trade between counties, or even trade between individuals? What is the true nature of trade in all these situations?
199. Why is it necessary to make any different statement of the laws of value for foreign than for domestic products? What is the cause for the existence of any international trade?
199. Why is it necessary to have a different explanation of the laws of value for foreign products compared to domestic ones? What causes international trade to exist?
200. How would a serious decline in the efficiency of England, as compared with other countries, in the production of manufactures affect the scale of money incomes and prices in England, and why?
200. How would a significant drop in England's efficiency compared to other countries in manufacturing affect money incomes and prices in England, and why?
201. Mr. Mill refers the value of home products to the “cost of production”; of foreign products to the “cost of acquisition.” Examine the truth of this distinction.
201. Mr. Mill relates the value of domestic products to the “production cost”; and the value of foreign products to the “acquisition cost.” Analyze the validity of this distinction.
202. It is said that in the home market the value of commodities depends on the cost of production, in the foreign market on the cost of acquisition. Comment on this distinction.
202. It's said that in the domestic market, the value of goods is based on the production cost, while in the international market, it's determined by the acquisition cost. Discuss this difference.
203. Is the cost of production the regulator of international values?
203. Is the production cost what regulates international values?
204. Discuss the following statement: “International value is regulated just as inter-provincial or inter-parishional value is. Coals and [pg 651] hops are exchanged between Northumberland and Kent on absolutely the same principles as iron and wine between Lancashire and Spain.”—Ruskin, “Munera Pulveris,” p. 84.
204. Discuss the following statement: "International value is managed in the same way as value between provinces or parishes. Coal and hops are traded between Northumberland and Kent based on the same principles as iron and wine between Lancashire and Spain."—Ruskin, “Gifts of Dust,” p. 84.
205. What determines the value of imported commodities?
205. What decides the value of imported goods?
206. Why does cost of production fail to determine the value of commodities brought from a foreign country? Does it also fail in the case of commodities brought from distant parts of the same country?
206. Why doesn't the cost of production determine the value of goods imported from another country? Does it also not apply to goods brought from far-off regions of the same country?
207. It is on the matter of fact that there is not much migration of capital and labor from country to country that Mr. Mill has based his whole doctrine of “international trade and international values.” Explain and comment on the above statement.
207. Mr. Mill built his entire theory of “global trade and global values.” on the fact that there isn't a lot of migration of capital and labor from one country to another. Explain and comment on the above statement.
208. What are the causes which determine for a nation the cost of its imports?
208. What factors determine the cost of a nation's imports?
209. It follows from the theory of international values, as laid down by Mill, that the permanent residence of Americans in Europe may enhance the cost of foreign imports to Americans residing at home. Explain in what way.
209. According to the theory of international values outlined by Mill, the long-term presence of Americans in Europe might increase the price of foreign imports for Americans living in the U.S. Explain how this works.
210. Suppose two countries, A and B, isolated from the rest of the world, and a trade established between them. In consequence of the labor of A becoming less effective, the cost of production of every article which can be produced in that country is greatly increased, but so that the relation between the costs of any two articles remains the same. What, if any, will be the effect of the change on the trade between A and B? Does your answer depend upon your using the phrase “cost of production” in a sense different from that given to it by some economists?
210. Imagine two countries, A and B, cut off from the rest of the world, with trade established between them. As a result of A's labor becoming less effective, the production cost of every item made in that country significantly increases, but the relationship between the costs of any two items stays the same. What, if anything, will be the impact of this change on the trade between A and B? Does your answer rely on interpreting the term “production cost” in a way that's different from how some economists define it?
211. Show that every country gets its imports at less cost in proportion to the efficiency of its labor.
211. Demonstrate that every country obtains its imports at a lower cost relative to the efficiency of its labor.
Foreign Exchanges.
International Trade.
212. What is the ordinary limit to the premium on foreign bills of exchange, and why?
212. What is the typical limit on the premium for foreign exchange bills, and why?
213. What are the chief effects on the foreign exchanges which are produced by the breaking out of a war? Account for the fact that in 1861 the exchanges on England in America fell considerably below specie point.
213. What are the main effects on foreign exchanges caused by the outbreak of a war? Explain why, in 1861, the exchange rates for England in America dropped significantly below the gold standard.
214. Suppose that the next harvest in England should be very defective, and extraordinary supplies of American grain needed. How would this probably affect the price of bills of exchange between England and America, and the profit on the exportation of English manufactures to the latter, and why?
214. Suppose that the next harvest in England is really bad, and there’s a huge demand for American grain. How would this likely impact the price of exchange rates between England and America, as well as the profit from exporting English goods to America, and why?
215. Trace the process by which the precious metals spread from the mines over the world.
215. Follow the process of how precious metals traveled from the mines around the world.
216. Suppose the exchange between England and the United States to be heavily against England, how will this fact affect the export and import trade between the two countries, and why?
216. If the exchange between England and the United States is strongly in favor of the U.S., how will this situation impact the export and import trade between the two countries, and why?
217. What is meant by exchanges being against a country?
217. What does it mean when exchanges are against a country?
218. Enumerate the principal circumstances which affect the rate of exchange between two countries. How is the par of exchange ascertained?
218. List the main factors that influence the exchange rate between two countries. How is the par of exchange determined?
219. In what way are gold and silver distributed among the different trading countries? Between different parts of the same country?
219. How are gold and silver distributed among various trading countries? And between different regions of the same country?
220. Trace the effects of large and continuous issues of inconvertible paper currency on the prices of commodities, on importation and exportation, and on the foreign exchanges.
220. Analyze how the extensive and ongoing issuance of non-convertible paper currency impacts commodity prices, imports and exports, and foreign exchange rates.
221. State the conditions under which international trade can permanently exist. What will be the ultimate effect of a large movement of foreign gold upon prices, imports, and exports in the receiving country?
221. Describe the conditions that allow international trade to exist indefinitely. What will be the eventual impact of a significant influx of foreign gold on prices, imports, and exports in the country receiving it?
222. State the theory of the value of money (i.e., “metallic money”), and clear up any apparent inconsistencies between the following statements: (1.) The value of money depends on the cost of production at the worst mines; (2.) The value of money varies inversely as its quantity multiplied by its rapidity of circulation; (3.) The countries whose products are most in demand abroad and contain the greatest value in the smallest bulk, which are nearest the mines and have the least demand for foreign productions, are those in which money will be of lowest value.
222. Explain the theory of the value of money (i.e., “coins”), and clarify any apparent contradictions between the following statements: (1.) The value of money is based on the production costs at the least efficient mines; (2.) The value of money inversely varies with its quantity and the speed of its circulation; (3.) The countries with the highest demand for their products abroad, that have the most value in the smallest size, are closest to the mines, and have the least need for foreign products, are the ones where money will hold the lowest value.
228. The effects of the depreciation of the paper currency in the United States are thus described by Mr. Wells: “It renders it impossible to sell abroad the products which have cost too much at home, and invites from other countries the products of a cheaper labor paid for in a sounder currency. It exaggerates imports, while destroying our ability to pay in kind.” State how far you agree with the deductions here drawn, assigning your reasons where you differ.
228. The effects of the depreciation of the paper currency in the United States are thus described by Mr. Wells: "It makes it impossible to sell our products abroad that are overpriced here, and encourages cheaper products from other countries where labor is paid in a more stable currency. It boosts imports while reducing our ability to pay with goods." State how far you agree with the deductions here drawn, assigning your reasons where you differ.
224. When the foreign exchanges are manifestly against a country, and a balance of indebtedness is the cause, the equilibrium can be restored in two ways. State and explain the operation of each.
224. When foreign exchanges clearly favor other countries, and the reason is a balance of debt, there are two ways to restore equilibrium. State and explain how each one works.
225. What are the conditions which determine for a country a high range of general prices? How far is this advantageous?
225. What are the factors that lead to a country having a high overall price level? How beneficial is this?
226. What is the effect of the imposition of a tribute by one country on another upon the course of trade between them, and the terms on which they exchange commodities; and why?
226. How does one country imposing a tribute on another affect their trade and the terms of their commodity exchanges, and why?
227. For what reasons may a nation's exports habitually exceed or fall short of its imports?
227. What reasons might cause a country's exports to regularly be higher or lower than its imports?
228. Explain the real and nominal exchange.
228. Explain the real and nominal exchange.
229. Expound Mr. Mill's theory of the influence which a convertible currency exercises on foreign trade.
229. Explain Mr. Mill's theory about how a convertible currency affects foreign trade.
230. What is the effect of a depreciated currency on (1) foreign trade, and (2) the exchanges?
230. What impact does a devalued currency have on (1) foreign trade, and (2) exchange rates?
Interest.
Interest.
231. How does the general rate of interest determine the selling price of stocks and land?
231. How does the overall interest rate affect the selling price of stocks and real estate?
232. Is there any relation between the rate of interest and the value of money?
232. Is there a connection between interest rates and the value of money?
233. What are the relations of interest and profit? On what causes does the rate of interest depend?
233. What are the connections between interest and profit? What factors influence the rate of interest?
234. “High interest means bad security.” Comment on this saying.
234. “High interest means low security.” Comment on this saying.
235. Is the rate of interest affected by the supply of the precious metals?
235. Does the supply of precious metals influence interest rates?
236. What determines the rate of interest on the loanable funds? Is the “current [or ordinary] rate of interest the measure of the relative abundance or scarcity of capital”?
236. What causes the interest rate on loanable funds? Is the "the current interest rate reflects how much capital is available or lacking"?
237. What are the chief causes that determine the rate of interest?
237. What are the main factors that influence the interest rate?
238. If it be true that in America every man, however rich, is engaged in some business, but that in England many rich men have no trade or profession, how is the rate of interest in each country affected in consequence, and why?
238. If it's true that in America every man, no matter how wealthy, is involved in some kind of business, while in England many wealthy men have no trade or profession, how does this impact the interest rates in each country, and why?
239. How does a fall in the purchasing power of money tend to affect, if at all, and why, (1) the rate of interest, (2) the price of land, (3) the price of government bonds, (4) the price of gold and silver ornaments and plate?
239. How does a decrease in the buying power of money impact, if at all, and why, (1) interest rates, (2) land prices, (3) government bond prices, (4) prices of gold and silver jewelry and tableware?
Foreign Competition.
Global Competition.
240. Explain the grounds of Mr. Mill's proposition that general low wages never caused any country to undersell its rivals, nor did general high wages ever hinder it from doing so. If you think the proposition needs qualification, give your reason.
240. Explain Mr. Mill's argument that low wages in a country never led it to undersell its competitors, and that high wages also never prevented it from doing so. If you believe the argument needs to be qualified, provide your reasoning.
241. (1.) What is the true theory of one country underselling another in a foreign market? (2.) What weight should be attributed to the fact of generally higher or lower wages in one of the competing countries?
241. (1.) What is the real explanation for one country selling its products cheaper than another in an international market? (2.) How much importance should we give to the fact that wages are generally higher or lower in one of the competing countries?
242. Discuss the question whether a high rate of wages necessarily lays the commerce of a country under a disadvantage with reference to a country where the rate of wages is lower.
242. Discuss whether a high wage rate puts a country's commerce at a disadvantage compared to a country with lower wage rates.
243. What are the conditions under which one country can permanently undersell another in a foreign market?
243. What are the conditions that allow one country to consistently sell its products at lower prices than another country in a foreign market?
244. Point out distinctly the connection between the money wages of laborers in the United States and the productiveness of the soil.
244. Clearly highlight the link between the wages of workers in the United States and the productivity of the land.
245. In the Eastern States iron-molders earn from fourteen to seventeen dollars a week; in California their wages run from twenty-one to twenty-seven dollars. Account for this variation.
245. In the Eastern States, iron molders make between fourteen and seventeen dollars a week; in California, their wages range from twenty-one to twenty-seven dollars. Explain why there's this difference.
Progress of Society.
Progress of Society.
246. What are the reasons for the change in the normal values of manufactured and of agricultural commodities, respectively, during the progress of society?
246. What causes the normal values of manufactured and agricultural products to change as society progresses?
247. Wages and profits in different employments and neighborhoods are not uniformly proportional to the efforts of labor and abstinence of which they are the respective rewards. Classify the circumstances which prevent this correspondence, and show how far their effect is likely to be reduced (a) by general economical progress, and (b) by the extension of the division of labor.
247. Wages and profits in various jobs and areas aren't consistently proportional to the effort put into work and the sacrifices made for their respective rewards. Identify the factors that disrupt this relationship and explain how much their impact is likely to decrease (a) with overall economic progress, and (b) with the expansion of the division of labor.
248. What is the law of diminishing returns? Can you point out any connection between this law and the following phenomena?—
248. What is the law of diminishing returns? Can you identify any connection between this law and the following phenomena?—
(a.) Density of population. | |
(b.) Rate of wages. | |
(c.) Rate of profits in different countries. |
249. Sketch the influence on rents and profits of an increase of population and capital concurrently with a stationary state of the arts of production.
249. Describe how an increase in population and capital affects rents and profits while the methods of production remain unchanged.
250. Is there reason to believe that Mr. Mill has underrated the powers possessed by man of extending the area of production and facilitating the market of food? If such a statement has been made, to what extent is his theory of population modified, and the risks he had indicated rendered distant?
250. Is there a reason to think that Mr. Mill has underestimated the ability of people to expand production and improve the food market? If this claim has been made, how much does it change his theory of population, and how far away do the risks he mentioned become?
251. Compare the effects on rent, profits, and wages, of a sudden improvement in the production (a) of food, (b) of some manufactured articles largely consumed by the working-classes.
251. Compare the impacts on rent, profits, and wages of a sudden boost in the production (a) of food, (b) of certain manufactured goods widely used by the working class.
252. Trace the connection between Ricardo's theory of rent and the decline in the general rate of profits as a country increases in population. Explain clearly the connection which exists between wages and profits.
252. Explore the relationship between Ricardo's theory of rent and the decrease in the overall profit rate as a country’s population grows. Clearly explain the connection between wages and profits.
253. What effect is produced upon rents, profits, and wages, respectively, in a country like France, where population is stationary and capital advancing?
253. What impact does a stationary population and growing capital have on rents, profits, and wages in a country like France?
254. If capital continued to increase and population did not, explain the proposition that “the whole savings of each year would be exactly so much subtracted from the profits of the next and of every following year,” if improvements were stationary.
254. If capital kept growing while the population stayed the same, explain the idea that “the total savings from each year would be exactly that amount taken off the profits of the next year and every year after that,” if advancements were consistent.
255. How does social and industrial progress tend to affect the prices of land, raw produce, and manufactures, respectively, and why?
255. How does social and industrial progress impact the prices of land, raw materials, and manufactured goods, and why?
256. The capitalized value of land rises, in the progress of society, from two causes—from one which affects land in common with all investments; from another which is peculiar to land.
256. The value of land increases over time in society for two reasons—one that impacts land just like all other investments, and another that is unique to land.
257. “The tendency of improved communications is to lower existing rents.” How far is this true, and in what directions is it true?
257. "Better communication usually leads to lower rents." How true is this, and in what ways is it true?
258. What would be the effect on profits, wages, and rents of an improvement in a manufactured article consumed by the laboring-class?
258. How would an improvement in a manufactured item used by the working class impact profits, wages, and rents?
259. Explain the doctrine of the tendency of profits to a minimum, the cause of that tendency, and the circumstances which counteract it.
259. Explain the principle that profits tend to trend toward a minimum, the reasons behind this tendency, and the factors that counteract it.
260. What was Adam Smith's doctrine as to the decline of profit in progressive communities? Criticise his argument.
260. What was Adam Smith's theory regarding the decline of profit in advancing societies? Critique his argument.
261. Mention some of the principal causes which, in the ordinary progress of society, respectively tend to increase or to reduce the current rate of profits.
261. List some of the main causes that, in the normal development of society, either increase or decrease the current rate of profits.
262. Why do profits tend to fall as population increases, and how may this result be retarded or prevented?
262. Why do profits usually decrease as the population grows, and how can this outcome be slowed down or avoided?
263. What is the effect of a general rise of money wages, apart from the consideration of a greater efficiency of labor, in prices, profits, and rent? Give reasons for your answer.
263. What happens when there's a general increase in money wages, not considering an improvement in labor efficiency, in terms of prices, profits, and rent? Provide reasons for your answer.
264. How does the general progress of society in wealth and industrial efficiency tend to affect the rate of wages, the rate of profit, and the rate of rent, respectively?
264. How does the overall advancement of society in wealth and industrial efficiency influence the rates of wages, profits, and rent, respectively?
265. What is the general effect of the progress of society on the land-owner, the capitalist, and the laborer?
265. What is the overall impact of societal progress on landowners, capitalists, and workers?
Future of Laboring-Classes.
Future of Working-Class.
266. Examine the influences of machinery on the economic condition of the working-classes.
266. Look into how machinery affects the economic situation of the working class.
267. Mention and discuss some of the popular remedies for low wages, and especially the effect of the subdivision of landed property among peasant proprietors.
267. Talk about some of the common solutions for low wages, and especially how dividing land ownership among small farmers impacts the situation.
268. Explain briefly what is meant by co-operation, and indicate the more prominent forms assumed by the co-operative movement.
268. Explain briefly what co-operation means and highlight the main forms taken by the co-operative movement.
269. What is meant by the co-operative system of industry? Show ways in which this system may affect, for good or for evil, the productiveness of labor; and mention any moral benefits, or the opposite, in which it may be expected to issue.
269. What is meant by the cooperative system of industry? Show how this system can impact the productivity of labor, either positively or negatively, and mention any moral benefits, or the opposite, that may be expected to arise from it.
270. What are the difficulties in the way of co-operation for the production of salable objects?
270. What challenges are there to collaborating on the production of sellable items?
271. Explain the advantages of industrial partnership, in which the employés share, in proportion to the wages received, half the profits of the business beyond a certain fixed minimum which is assigned to the employers.
271. Explain the benefits of industrial partnership, where employees receive half of the profits from the business beyond a certain fixed minimum, based on the wages they earn.
Taxation.
Taxation.
272. How is the state justified in undertaking any manufacture or service which might be performed by private enterprise?
272. How is it okay for the government to take on any production or service that could be handled by private companies?
273. Enumerate Adam Smith's canons of taxation.
273. List Adam Smith's principles of taxation.
274. Examine the argument in favor of the resumption by the state of what is called the unearned increment in the value of land arising from the development of society.
274. Look into the argument supporting the state's reclaiming what is known as the unearned increase in land value that comes from societal development.
275. A picture by Gainsborough and a house in Broadway are sold in the same year at the same price; at the end of fifty years each sells for five times its first cost. Is there any, and, if so, what, reason why the increase should be sequestrated for the public benefit in the one case and not in the other?
275. A painting by Gainsborough and a house in Broadway are sold in the same year for the same price; after fifty years, each sells for five times what it originally cost. Is there any reason, and if so, what, that the increase should be set aside for public benefit in one case and not the other?
276. Explain the incidence of taxes laid on wages.
276. Explain the impact of taxes imposed on wages.
277. Why should a tax on profits, if no improvements follow, fall on the laborer and capitalist?
277. Why should a tax on profits, if there are no improvements, be placed on the worker and the investor?
278. Explain what effect, if any, will be produced on the price of corn by—
278. Explain what effect, if any, will be produced on the price of corn by—
(1) a tax upon rent; | |
(2) a tithe; | |
(3) a tax of so much per acre, irrespective of value; | |
(4) a tax of so much per bushel. |
279. On whom does a tax of a fixed proportion of agricultural produce fall?
279. Who pays a tax based on a fixed percentage of agricultural produce?
280. Discuss the question whether the income-tax ought to be a tax upon income and property, or upon expenditure.
280. Discuss whether the income tax should be based on income and property, or on spending.
281. Discuss the expediency of a graduated income-tax.
281. Talk about the practicality of a graduated income tax.
282. State the arguments which you think strongest both for and against exempting savings from the income-tax.
282. Share the arguments you think are the strongest for and against exempting savings from income tax.
283. Explain the conditions which should be observed in imposing taxes on commodities.
283. Explain the conditions that should be followed when imposing taxes on goods.
284. What taxes does a tradesman get back in the price of the articles he sells, and what does he not?
284. Which taxes can a tradesman claim back in the price of the goods he sells, and which ones can he not?
285. Test by Adam Smith's four maxims of taxation the policy of indirect taxes on the necessaries of life.
285. Evaluate the policy of indirect taxes on essential goods using Adam Smith's four principles of taxation.
286. All indirect taxation violates Adam Smith's fourth canon.
286. All indirect taxes go against Adam Smith's fourth principle.
287. Discuss the following:
287. Talk about the following:
“A man with $100,000 in United States bonds comes to Boston, hires a house...; thus he lives in luxury.... I am in favor of taxing idle investments such as this, and allowing manufacturing investments to go untaxed.”
“A guy with $100,000 in U.S. bonds comes to Boston, rents a house... so he lives in luxury. I believe we should tax idle investments like this, while keeping manufacturing investments tax-free.”
288. Compare the advantages and disadvantages of direct and indirect taxation.
288. Compare the pros and cons of direct and indirect taxation.
289. On what principles is this country now taxed?
289. What are the principles behind the current taxation in this country?
290. Explain the arguments for and against the policy of maintaining a surplus for the purpose of redeeming a national debt.
290. Discuss the reasons for and against the policy of keeping a surplus to pay off national debt.
291. In estimating the ability of the United States to pay its public debts, it is usual to include among the data of the question the increased productiveness of industry in that country. How far is this a pertinent consideration?
291. When assessing the ability of the United States to handle its public debts, it’s common to factor in the growing productivity of industry in that country. How relevant is this consideration?
Protection.
Safety.
292. Mention some of the principal arguments brought forward in favor of protective tariffs.
292. List some of the main arguments made in support of protective tariffs.
293. Connect the principle of the division of employments (or labor) with the policy of free trade and the functions of government.
293. Link the idea of dividing work (or labor) with the approach of free trade and the roles of government.
294. Sketch the effects of discriminating duties, including the operation of the corn laws.
294. Outline the effects of discriminatory tariffs, including how the corn laws function.
295. Examine the following argument, emending, if you think it necessary, the free-trader's doctrine on the point raised: The free-trader's belief is that a customs duty is added to the price of the article upon which it is imposed. If the article is imported, according to his theory, the increase of the price goes into the public treasury; if the article is made in the country, the increase of the price goes into the pocket of the producer. But in the former case there is no protection; and competition will prevent the latter. Therefore protection does not increase the price of the protected article. If a customs duty is imposed upon a commodity, and its price is not raised in consequence, what inference can you draw?
295. Consider the following argument, updating the free-trader's viewpoint if you think it’s necessary: The free-trader believes that a customs duty is added to the price of the item it’s applied to. If the item is imported, according to his theory, the increased price goes into the public treasury; if the item is made domestically, the increased price goes into the producer's pocket. However, in the first case, there’s no protection; and competition will prevent it in the second. Thus, protection does not raise the price of the protected item. If a customs duty is placed on a commodity and its price doesn’t go up as a result, what conclusion can you draw?
296. Under what circumstances did Mr. Mill think nascent states might be justified in adopting a policy of protection? Criticise his opinion, and, if you agree with it, give some examples of its application.
296. Under what circumstances did Mr. Mill believe that newly formed states might be justified in adopting a protectionist policy? Critique his viewpoint, and if you agree with it, provide some examples of how it can be applied.
297. American protectionists allege that the high rate of wages prevailing in the United States disables them from competing with “the pauper labor” of Europe. Examine the grounds of this statement, and consider how far it forms a justification for protection to American industry.
297. American protectionists claim that the high wages in the United States prevent them from competing with “the working-class struggle” of Europe. Look into the reasons behind this statement and think about how much it justifies protecting American industry.
298. A high rate of wages indicates, not a high, but a low cost of production for all commodities measured in which the rate of wages is high.
298. A high wage rate shows, not a high, but a low cost of production for all goods where the wage rate is high.
Explain and prove this proposition, and illustrate it from the circumstances of the United States.
Explain and prove this idea, and provide examples from the situation in the United States.
299. State under what limitations the proposition is correct, that profits vary inversely with wages. Explain the circumstances which cause both a higher rate of wages and profits to prevail in a young country, such as the United States, than in England.
299. State the limitations under which the idea that profits decrease as wages increase is true. Explain the factors that lead to both higher wages and profits being more common in a developing country like the United States compared to England.
301. Examine the following:
301. Check this out:
“It seems to me that protection is absolutely essential to the encouragement of capital, and equally necessary for the protection of the American laborer.... He must have good food, enough of it, good clothing, school-houses for his children, comforts for his home, and a fair chance to improve his condition. To this end I would protect him against competition with the half-paid laborers of European countries.”—Congressional Globe.
"I believe that protection is essential for promoting investment and equally important for protecting American workers. They deserve access to healthy food, adequate supplies, quality clothing, schools for their kids, comforts in their homes, and a real chance to improve their situation. That’s why I would shield them from competing with the underpaid workers in European countries."—Congressional Record.
302. An American newspaper has said of the burning of Chicago: “The money to replace what has been burned will not be sent abroad to enrich foreign manufacturers; but, thanks to the wise policy of protection which has built up American industries, it will stimulate our own manufactures, set our mills running faster, and give employment to thousands of idle working-men.” Comment on this passage.
302. An American newspaper has said about the fire in Chicago: “The funds to replace what has been burned won’t go abroad to help foreign manufacturers; instead, thanks to the wise decision to protect our industries, it will enhance our own manufacturing, get our mills operating more efficiently, and create jobs for thousands of unemployed workers.” Comment on this passage.
303. On whom does a tax on imports, if not prohibitory, fall?
303. Who bears the burden of a tax on imports if it isn’t prohibitive?
304. In what cases would duties on imported commodities fall on the producers?
304. In what situations would taxes on imported goods be the responsibility of the producers?
305. Are taxes on imports in any way paid by foreigners?
305. Do foreigners pay any taxes on imports?
306. Discuss the effects of duties on exports.
306. Talk about the impact of taxes on exports.
307. Trace the effects of duties on the importation of raw materials, and distinguish, with examples, between duties that violate and duties which do not violate the principle of free trade.
307. Outline the impact of tariffs on importing raw materials, and differentiate, with examples, between tariffs that violate and those that do not violate the principle of free trade.
308. Is it possible for any country by legislative enactments to engross a larger share of the advantages of foreign trade than it would naturally have? Discuss the question fully.
308. Can any country, through laws and regulations, capture a bigger share of the benefits from foreign trade than it would normally receive? Discuss this question in detail.
309. “Those are, therefore, in the right who maintain that taxes on imports are partly paid by foreigners; but they are mistaken when they say it is by the foreign producer. It is not on the person from whom we buy, but on all those who buy from us, that a portion of our customs duties spontaneously falls.” Explain and examine the reasons for this conclusion.
309. "Those who say that import taxes are partly paid by foreigners are right; however, they're mistaken in saying that the foreign producer pays them. It's not about the person we buy from, but rather it's those who buy from us who ultimately take on part of the burden of our customs duties." Explain and examine the reasons for this conclusion.
310. State the principle which determines the relation between the amount of a country's imports and that of its exports, and show how this relation is affected by a system of protective duties.
310. State the principle that determines the relationship between the amount of a country's imports and its exports, and explain how this relationship is influenced by a system of protective tariffs.
THE END.
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References
- 1.
- Yet Blanqui diffusively gives nearly one half of his "History of Political Economy" to the period before the sixteenth century, when politico-economic laws had not yet been recognized. A. L. Perry, "Political Economy" (eighteenth edition, 1883), also devotes thirty-five out of eighty-seven pages to the period in which there was no systematic study of political economy.
- 2.
- Xenophon, "Ways to increase the revenues of Attika," ch. ix; also see his "Economics" and Aristotle, "Politics," b. i, ch. vi, b. iii, ch. i.
- 3.
- "Republic," b. ii.
- 4.
- Roscher exhumed this book, entitled "On the Origin, Nature, Law, and Changes of Coins," and it was reprinted in 1864 by Wolowski at Paris, together with the treatise of Copernicus, "On the Minting of Money."
- 5.
- Sermon at St. Paul's Cross, 1549 (also see Jacob, “On Precious Metals,” pp. 244, 245).
- 6.
- 1530-1596. See II. Baudrillart's "J. Bodin and his time" (Paris, 1853). Bodin wrote "Response to Mr. de Malestroit's Paradoxes Regarding the Rising Prices of All Goods and Currency" (1568), and "Discussion on the Increase and Decrease of Currencies" (1578).
- 7.
- "A Brief Overview of English Policy" (1581). The book was published under the initials “W. S.,” and was long regarded as the production of Shakespere.
- 8.
- For information on this as well as a later period, consult Jacob "On Precious Metals" (1832), a history of the production and influences of gold and silver from the earliest times. He is considered a very high authority. Humboldt's "Essay on New Spain" gives estimates and facts on the production of the precious metals in America. A very excellent study has been made by Levasseur in his “History of the working classes in France up to the Revolution.” For pauperism and its history, Nicholl's "History of Welfare Laws" is, of course, to be consulted.
- 9.
- See Cossa, "Guide," p. 119.
- 10.
- See Antonio Serra, "Brief Treatise on the Causes That Can Abound in the Kingdoms of Gold and Silver," Naples, 1613.
- 11.
- Thomas Mun, "England's Wealth from Foreign Trade" (published in 1640 and 1664); "Recommendations from the Council of Trade" (1660), in Lord Overstone's "Choose Essays on Money"; Sir William Petty, "Political Math," etc. (about 1680); Sir Josiah Child, "New Trade Dialogue" (1690); Sir Dudley North, "Trade Talk" (1691); Davenant's Works (1690-1711); Joshua Gee, "Trade and Navigation of Great Britain" (1730); Sir Matthew Decker (according to McCulloch, William Richardson), "Essay on the Reasons for the Decline of Foreign Trade" (1744); Sir James Steuart, "An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy" (1767). For this period also consult Anderson's “History of Business” (1764), Macpherson's "Commerce Journal" (1803), and Lord Sheffield's “Observations on the Trade of the American States” (1783).
- 12.
- The English Navigation Act of 1651 is usually described as the cause of the decline of Dutch shipping. The taxation necessitated by her wars is rather the cause, as history shows it to us. Sir Josiah Child (1668 and 1690) speaks of a serious depression in English commerce, and says the low rate of interest among the Dutch hurts the English trade. This does not show that the acts greatly aided English shipping. Moreover, Gee, a determined partisan of the mercantile theory, says, in 1730, that the ship-trade was languishing. Sir Matthew Decker (1744) confirms Gee's impressions. It looks very much as if the commercial supremacy of England was acquired by internal causes, and in spite of her navigation acts. The anonymous author of "Britannia Languens" confirms this view.
- 13.
- This was, in substance, the whole teaching of one of the leading and most intelligent writers, Sir James Steuart (1767), "Political Economy Principles." See also Held's "Carey's Social Science and the Mercantilism" (1866), which places Carey among the mercantilists.
- 14.
- Forbonnais, "Research on the finances of France" (1595-1721); Pierre Clément, "History of Colbert and His Administration" (1874); "Letters, instructions, and reports from Colbert" (1861-1870); "History of the protective system in France" (1854); Martin, “History of France,” tome xiii.
- 15.
- “Royal tax” (1707).
- 16.
- "Factum de la France" (1707).
- 17.
- When Quesnay was sixty-one years old he wrote the article, “Farmers,” in the "Encyclopedia" (of Diderot and D'Alembert) in 1756; article "Grains," in the same, 1757; "Economic table," 1758; "General Principles of the Economic Governance of a Kingdom"; "Economic issue"; "Dialogues on trade and the work of artisans"; Natural law (1768). "Collection of leading economists," edited by E. Daire (1846), is a collection containing the works of Quesnay, Turgot, and Dupont de Nemours. See also Lavergne, "French economists of the 18th century" (1870); and H. Martin, "History of France." Quesnay's “Economic table” was the Koran of the school.
- 18.
- From χράτησις τῆς φύσεως, as indicating a reverence for natural laws.
- 19.
- The words were not invented by Quesnay, but formed the phrase of a merchant, Legendre, in addressing Colbert; although it was later ascribed, as by Perry, “Political Economy” (p. 46), and Cossa (p. 150), to one of the Economists, Gournay. (See Wolowski, in his Essay prefixed to “Roscher's Political Economy,” p. 36, American translation.)
- 20.
- The Margrave Karl Friedrich was the author of "Summary of the Principles of Political Economy" (1775), and applied the physiocratic system of taxation to two of his villages with disastrous results.
- 21.
- He published a first work on “Population” (1756); the "Tax Theory" (1760); and "Rural Philosophy" (1763). In this latter work Mirabeau adopted the "Economic table" as the key to the subject, and classed it with the discovery of printing and of money.
- 22.
- In 1742 Turgot, when scarcely twenty, appeared as a sound writer on Paper Money in letters to Abbé Cicé. The physiocratic doctrines were presented in a more intelligible form in his greater work, “Reflections on the creation and distribution of wealth” (1766). Three works of Turgot, on mining property, interest of money, and freedom in the corn-trade, bear a high reputation. For works treating of Turgot, see Batbie, “Turgot, philosopher, economist, and administrator” (1861); Mastier, “Turgot, his life and his doctrine” (1861); Tissot, “Turgot, his life, his administration, and his works” (1862).
- 23.
- He was the editor of the works of Quesnay and Turgot, and wrote a "Turgot's Memoir" (1817). He opposed the issue of assignats during the French Revolution, and, falling into disfavor, he barely escaped the scaffold. Having been a correspondent of Jefferson's, when Napoleon returned from Elba, he came to America, and settled in Delaware, where he died in 1817. The connection between the Economists and the framers of our Constitution is interesting, because it explains some peculiarities introduced into our system of taxation in that document. The only direct taxes recognized by the Supreme Court under our Constitution are the poll and land taxes; and it is in this connection that the constitutionality of the income-tax (a direct tax) is doubted.
- 24.
- One of the earliest is that of Roger Coke (1675), in which he argues for free trade, and attacks the navigation acts. Sir Dudley North's "Discussion on Trade" (1691) urges that the whole world, as regards trade, is but one people, and explains that money is only merchandise.
- 25.
- Joseph Harris, an official in the London Mint, published a very clear exposition of this subject in his "Essay on Money and Coins" (1757); but, eighty years before, Rice Vaughan had given a satisfactory statement in his "Treatise on Money."
- 26.
- “Current Review,” January, 1881, “Richard Cantillon.” Adam Smith had quoted Cantillon on his discussion of the wages of labor, b. i, ch. viii, and evidently knew his book.
- 27.
- Born in 1723, and died 1790; he was eleven years younger than Hume. A Professor of Logic (1751) and Moral Philosophy (1752) at Glasgow, he published a treatise on ethical philosophy, entitled the “Moral Sentiments Theory” (1739). Dugald Stewart is the authority as to Smith's life, having received information from a contemporary of Smith's, Professor Miller (see Playfair's edition of Smith's works); for Adam Smith destroyed all his own papers in his last illness. His lectures on political economy at Glasgow outlined the results as they appeared in the "The Wealth of Nations"; it was not until 1764 that he resigned his professorship, and spent two years on the Continent (twelve months of this in France). On his return home he immured himself for ten years of quiet study, and published the "Capitalism" in 1776. (See also McCulloch's introduction to his edition of the "Wealth of Nations," and Bagehot's "Economic Research," iii.)
- 28.
- A glance at Sir James Steuart's treatise (1767) with the "The Wealth of Nations" shows Adam Smith's great qualities; the former was a series of detached essays, although of wide range, but admittedly without any consistent plan.
- 29.
(a.) He went into a vague discussion upon labor as a measure of value. (b.) A legal rate of interest received his support, and his argument was answered effectually by Bentham (“Defense of Usury”). (c.) While not agreeing with the French school that agriculture is the only industry producing more than it consumes, and so land pays rent, yet he thinks that it produces more in proportion to the labor than other industries; that manufactures came next; and exportation and commerce after them. This error, however, did not modify his more important conclusions. Thorold Rogers and even Chevalier, however, claim that Adam Smith drew his inspiration from the French school. (d.) In the discussion of rent, he failed to follow out his ideas to a legitimate end, and did not get at the true doctrine. While hinting at the right connection between price and rent, he yet believed that rent formed a part of price. Of the fundamental principle in the doctrine of rent, the law of diminishing returns, he had no full knowledge, but came very close to it. He points out that in colonies, when the good soil has all been occupied, profits fall. (e.) In saying that every animal naturally multiplies in proportion to, and is limited by, the means of subsistence, Adam Smith just missed Malthus's law of population. In fact, Cantillon came quite as near it.
(a.) He entered into a vague discussion about labor as a measure of value. (b.) He supported a legal interest rate, and Bentham effectively countered his argument in “Defense of Usury.” (c.) While he didn’t agree with the French school that agriculture is the only industry that produces more than it consumes, and thus land generates rent, he believed it produces more relative to labor than other industries; with manufacturing coming next, followed by exportation and commerce. However, this mistake didn’t change his more significant conclusions. Thorold Rogers and even Chevalier argue that Adam Smith was inspired by the French school. (d.) In discussing rent, he failed to follow his ideas to a logical conclusion and did not arrive at the correct doctrine. While he hinted at a proper connection between price and rent, he believed that rent was part of price. He didn’t fully understand the fundamental principle of rent, the law of diminishing returns, but he came very close. He pointed out that in colonies, once all the good soil was taken, profits decline. (e.) By stating that every animal tends to multiply in proportion to and is limited by its means of subsistence, Adam Smith narrowly missed Malthus's law of population. In fact, Cantillon came quite close to it as well.
Book III in his “Wealth of Nations” is concerned with the policy of Europe in encouraging commerce at the expense of agriculture, and has less interest for us. Book V considers the revenue of the sovereign, and much of it is now obsolete; but his discussion of taxation is still highly important.
Book III in his “Wealth of Nations” focuses on Europe's strategy of boosting trade at the cost of farming, which is less relevant to us. Book V looks at the government's income, and a lot of it is outdated; however, his analysis of taxation remains very significant.
- 30.
Among the English Liberals carried away by the French Revolution, and by such theories as those of Condorcet, was William Godwin, the author of “Political Justice” (1793) and the “Inquirer” (1797), who advocated the abolition of government and even marriage, since by the universal practice of the golden rule there would come about a lengthening of life. Malthus tells us that his study was brought forward as an answer to the doctrines of the “Inquirer,” and he applied his principles to Condorcet's and Godwin's ideas. It was a period when pauperism demanded attention from all. Malthus favored the repeal of the old poor-laws, as destroying independence of character among the poor.
Among the English Liberals influenced by the French Revolution and ideas like those of Condorcet was William Godwin, the author of "Social Justice" (1793) and the “Seeker” (1797). He argued for the abolition of government and even marriage, believing that by following the golden rule, life expectancy would increase. Malthus claimed that his study was put forward as a response to the ideas in the “Inquirer,” and he applied his principles to the theories of Condorcet and Godwin. It was a time when poverty needed urgent attention from everyone. Malthus supported the repeal of the old poor laws, arguing that they undermined the independence of character among the poor.
Malthus also wrote “Principles of Political Economy” (1821) and “Definitions in Political Economy” (1827), but the former did not increase his reputation. He believed in taxing imported corn, and he gave in his adherence to the doctrine of over-production. But, on the other hand, he was one of several writers who, almost at the same time, discovered the true theory of rent. His father was a friend of Godwin, and a correspondent of Rousseau. (See Bagehot, “Economic Studies,” p. 135.)
Malthus also wrote “Political Economy Principles” (1821) and "Definitions in Political Economy" (1827), but the first book didn't boost his reputation. He supported taxing imported corn and subscribed to the idea of over-production. However, he was also among a group of writers who, around the same time, uncovered the true theory of rent. His father was friends with Godwin and corresponded with Rousseau. (See Bagehot, "Economic Research," p. 135.)
- 31.
- See Cairnes, “Logical Approach,” Lecture VII, for the best modern statement of the question. Also, Roscher, "Principles of Political Economy" b. v, whose extended notes furnish information on facts and as to books. H. Carey, "Social Studies" (edition of 1877), iii, pp. 263-312, opposes the doctrine, as also Bowen, "U.S. Political Economy" (1870), ch. viii, and Henry George, “Progress and Poverty” (1880), pp. 81-134.
- 32.
- J. Anderson, "An Investigation into the Nature of the Corn Laws" (1777), “Farming Activities,” vol. v, p. 401 (1801); Sir Edward West, "Essay on the Use of Capital in Agriculture" (1815); Rev. T. R. Malthus, "An Investigation into the Nature and Development of Rent" (1815). The last two appeared after Anderson's discoveries had been forgotten, but he has the honor of first discovery.
- 33.
- Born in 1772 of Jewish parentage, Ricardo died in 1824. A rich banker, who made a fortune on the Stock Exchange, he early in life retired from business. The discussions on the Restriction Act and the corn laws led him to investigate the laws governing the subjects of money and rent. He gained notice first by his "Letters on the High Price of Bullion" (1810). The “Respond to Mr. Bosanquet” (1811), and "Research on Rent" (1815), were followed by his greater work, "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" (1817). He entered the House of Commons from Portarlington, a pocket borough in Ireland, and was influential in the discussions on resumption. Although he was not on the committee, his views on depreciated paper are practically embodied in the famous “Bullion Report” (1810). Tooke, "Price History," says the results of the restriction were not known until the time of Ricardo's contributions. Neither Mill nor Say has had so great an influence as Ricardo has gained, through the pages of his "Political Economy."
- 34.
- Johann Heinrich von Thünen, a rich land-owner of Mecklenburg, in his "The Isolated State in Relation to Agriculture and National Economy" (1826), worked entirely by himself, but reached practically the same law of rent as Ricardo's. In spreading the doctrines of Adam Smith he has influenced later German writers.
- 35.
- The first distinct recognition of this important physical law, according to McCulloch (Introduction to "Wealth of Nations," lv), was in a fanciful work of two volumes, entitled "Principles of all government," published in 1766: "When the farmers, having become numerous, have cleared all the good land; through their continuous increase and the ongoing clearing of land, there will come a point where it will be more beneficial for a new settler to lease fertile land than to clear new land that is much less productive." (I, p. 126). The author was, however, unaware of the importance of his discovery.
- 36.
- Carey, "Social Science" (I, ch. iv, v), and Bowen, “U.S. Political Economy” (ch. ix), have denied Ricardo's doctrine of rent. Thesupposed connection between free trade and Ricardo's teachings on rent has prejudiced protectionists against him. Free trade follows from the theory of international trade, and has nothing to do with Ricardo's main doctrines. It is true, Ricardo was a vigorous free-trader. Of opposing views on rent, Carey's argument is the most important.
- 37.
- Say drew considerable attention by his theory of “surpluses.” He based his idea of value wholly on utility, which has lately been taken up again by Professor Jevons. Say was answered on this point by Ricardo in a later edition of his "Political Economy." See Cairnes, "Core Principles," p. 17. As a free-trader and opponent of governmental interference, he went further than his master, Adam Smith. Napoleon did not like this part of Say's teaching, saying that it would destroy an empire of adamant, and tried to induce him to modify his position, but in vain. The second edition was not allowed to be published until 1815.
- 38.
- Educated at Bologna, he went to Geneva in 1816, and was called (1833) by the French Government to succeed Say in the Collége de France. In 1845 he was sent as minister to Rome, led the revolutionary movement there, and was assassinated in 1848. His lectures were taken down in short-hand by one of his disciples, Porée, and later published.
- 39.
- Malthus, who held that the unproductive consumption of the rich was desirable for the poor, supported Sismondi. The latter was answered by Say and McCulloch ("Edinburgh Review" March, 1821), to which Sismondi replied in his second edition, in 1827, and then withdrew from economic discussion.
- 40.
- A native of Riga, educated in Germany, Storch was charged by the Czar Alexander with the duty of instructing his sons, the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, and his treatise is the collection of his lectures. Knowing little of Malthus or Ricardo, he made a near approach to the doctrine of rent. His unsparing denunciation of Russian administrative corruption caused the Government to forbid the publication of the Russian translation.
- 41.
- Cossa, "Guide" (p. 173), points out Sartorius, Lüder, Kraus, and Schlözer as teachers of Adam Smith, in Germany, followed later by G. Hufeland, J. F. E. Lotz, and L. H. von Jakob; Count Hogendorp and Gogel, in Holland; Count Szecheny, in Hungary, and (pp. 211-213) Cagnazzi, Bosellini, Ressi, Sanfilippo, and Scuderi (the last two protectionists), in Italy. Fuoco (1825-1827), in Italy, first saw the value of Ricardo's theory of rent, while Gioja opposed Adam Smith and Say. But K. H. Rau (died 1870), in his "Textbook of Political Economy" (1826, fifth edition 1864), had the most extensive influence in Germany in expounding Adam Smith's system, with proper improvements. Another important writer of this school was F. B. W. von Hermann, “Economic Studies” (1832).
- 42.
- From 1810 to 1840, political economy was a favorite study in England, and many writers deserve mention. There were Huskisson, a great financier; Thomas Tooke (1773-1858), who began his matchless "Price History" (1823); Lord Overstone (Samuel Jones Loyd), "Pamphlets and Other Publications on Metal and Paper Money" (1858); Robert Torrens (1784-1864), "Essay on the Production of Wealth" (1821); Archbishop Whately, "Introductory Talks" (1831), and “Simple Tips on Money Matters”; Cobden and Sir Robert Peel; N. W. Senior (1790-1864), Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, article on "Political Economy" (1836) in the "Metropolitan Encyclopedia," and "Lectures on the Cost of Getting Money" (1830). Senior showed great ability in analyzing cost of production, and stands far above McCulloch in real ability. J. R. McCulloch (1789-1864), who preceded Mill, wrote a good but dry textbook, "Political Economy Principles" (1825), "A Guide to the Principles, Practice, and History of Commerce" (1833), an excellent "Business Dictionary" (last enlarged edition, 1882), "Political Economy Literature" (1845). He edited Ricardo's works, with a biography, published a “Curated Collection of Rare and Valuable Works on Money” (1856), "A Treatise on the Principles and Practical Impact of Taxation and the Funding System" (1845). He contributed nothing practically new to the study. Miss Harriet Martineau (1802-1876) gave some admirable although somewhat extended stories in illustration of the various principles of political economy, entitled “Political Economy Illustrations” (1859). This period in England was signalized by the abolition of the Corn Laws (1846), and the Navigation Laws (1849), the passage of the Bank Act (which separated the issue from the banking department, 1844), and the general abandonment of protective duties. Cf. Noble, “Fiscal Legislation, 1842-1865” (1867).
- 43.
- Born in 1806, he died in 1873. For his extraordinary education see his “Bio.” When thirteen years old, he began the study of political economy through lectures from his father while walking; he then (1819) read Ricardo and Adam Smith, and at fourteen he journeyed to France, where he lived for a time with J. B. Say. He entered the East India Office at seventeen, was occupied finally in conducting the correspondence for the directors, where he remained until 1858. When about twenty, Mill met twice a week in Threadneedle Street, from 8.30 to 10 AM, with a political economy club, composed of Grote, Roebuck, Ellis, Graham, and Prescott, where they discussed James Mill's and Ricardo's books, and also Bailey's "Dissertations on Value" In these discussions, chiefly with Graham, Mill elaborated his theory of international values. In 1865 he entered Parliament for Westminster, and for three years had a singular, characteristic, independent, but uninfluential career. His adherence to two radical reforms, woman suffrage and changes in the tenure of land, lost him any considerable influence.
- 44.
- He (1773-1836) wrote the "History of India" (1817-1819), and "Political Economy Elements" (1821). He was intimate with Ricardo, Bentham, Austin, and Zachary Macaulay.
- 45.
- In his “new industries” argument, and his statement on navigation laws (B. v, ch. x, §1), he conceded a great deal of free-trade ground; but in a private letter, 1866 (see New York “Nation,” May 29, 1873), he denied that he intended the "new industries" argument to apply to the United States. He did not consider New England and Pennsylvania any longer as young countries within the limits of his meaning. See also Taussig's "Support for Young Industries" (1883).
- 46.
- W. T. Thornton (1813-1880), in a volume "On Labor: Its Unjust Demands and Fair Compensation" (1869), attacked Mill's position on demand and supply, and on wages, so that Mill in consequence abandoned his doctrine of wages, in the "Biweekly Review," May 1, 1869. Mr. Cairnes, however, rescued the Wages-Fund theory from Mr. Mill in his "Guiding Principles" (1874). Thornton also wrote "Overpopulation and its Solution" (1846), and an excellent book, “Request for Peasant Ownership” (1848). See also “19th Century,” August, 1879, for an answer by Thornton to Mr. Cairnes on the wages question.
- 47.
- James Eliot Cairnes was born at Drogheda, 1824; was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and made Whately Professor there in 1856. Having been Professor of Political Economy in Queen's College, Galway, he left Ireland in 1866 to accept the chair of Political Economy in University College, London. In that year, through an attack of inflammatory rheumatism, he fell under the power of a painful and growing malady which rendered him physically helpless, and portended certain death in the near future. The three years before his death, while working only in hopeless pain, was the period of his greatest literary activity. He collected his "Essays in Political Economy, Theoretical and Applied" (1873), in which he traced with great ability the effect of the gold-discoveries; brought out his "Core Principles" (1874), and an enlarged edition of his “Logical Approach” (second edition, 1875). The first edition of this last book was the result of lectures delivered in Dublin about 1858. In his earlier years the interest he felt in the United States led him into a very vigorous and masterly study of “The Slave Power: Its Character, Career, and Potential Dangers” (1862); “The American Revolution” (1862). He then wrote "Colonization and Colonial Governance" (1864), and “Black Suffrage” (1866). He finally succumbed to his fatal disease, and passed away prematurely, July 8, 1875. A short sketch of his personal character was written by Professor Fawcett, in the "Biweekly Review," August 1, 1875, p. 149.
- 48.
- Professor Jevons (1835-1882) was educated at University College, London, and spent the years from 1854 to 1859 in the Australian Royal Mint, where he became interested in the gold question. He wrote a study on “A Significant Drop in Gold's Value Confirmed” (1863), which attracted great attention. A fine metaphysician and mathematician, he did not give his whole time to economic work. In 1866 he became Professor of Logic and Cobden Lecturer on Political Economy in Owens College, Manchester, but later became Professor of Political Economy in University College, London. In 1881 he gave up academic teaching, to devote himself to literature. He investigated the permanence of the English coal-supply in "The Coal Issue" (second edition, 1866). “The Theory of Political Economy” (1871) contains his application of the mathematical method, and a bibliography of similar attempts. “The Railways and the State” are to be found in his "Essays and Speeches" (1874). He prepared an elementary book, "Introduction to Political Economy" (second edition, 1878). He was a contributor to the journals, and especially to the “London Stats Journal.” His last books were "The State in Relation to Work" (1882), which deals with the question of state interference; and "Social Reform Methods" (1883), containing a paper on industrial partnerships. He also advanced the theory that the presence of sun-spots affected agriculture unfavorably, and that, coming somewhat regularly, they produced a constant succession of commercial crises. (See "Nature" xix, 33, 588.) At the early age of forty-seven he was unfortunately drowned while bathing near Bexhill, England (1882).
- 49.
- Like Cairnes, Thomas Edward Cliffe Leslie was a native of Ireland, and educated at Trinity College, Dublin. He was called to the bar, but gave up the law when offered the professorship of Political Economy in Queen's College, Belfast. Besides his discussion of land tenures, he published "Political and Moral Philosophy" (1874). He long suffered from bad health, and died January 28, 1882. His volume of "Land Systems" is now (1884) out of print, and scarce. He had also devoted himself to financial reform.
- 50.
- See p. 33.
- 51.
- Born 1826, died 1877. He was early made familiar with banking in connection with the Stuckey Banking Company, in Somersetshire; was educated at University College, London. In 1858 he married the daughter of James Wilson, the editor of the London “Economist” whom he succeeded. He was a political student of a rare kind, as is shown by his "UK Constitution" (second edition, 1872), "Physics and Politics" (1872), "Literature Studies" (second edition, 1879). He also wrote "Decline in Silver Value" (1877).
- 52.
- Established in 1848, and unquestionably the most useful economic publication for English questions.
- 53.
- Born 1833. His eye-sight was lost by an accidental shot in 1858, but he was chosen Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge in 1863. His "Guide" and the "Economic Status of the British Worker" (1865) gave him reputation, in 1865 he entered Parliament, and since 1880 he has been Postmaster-General in Mr. Gladstone's administration. He has published "Poverty: Causes and Solutions" (1871), “Talks” (1878), “Free Trade vs. Protection” (1878). His wife (born 1847), Millicent Garret Fawcett, reduced his “Guide” into “Political Economy 101” (1869), and also wrote “Stories in Political Economy” (1874). Died November 13, 1884.
- 54.
- He has also published “Social Economy” (1872); a small "Political Economy Handbook" (third edition, 1878); and a very considerable work, “Six Centuries of Work and Wages: The History of English Labor,” 1250-1883 (1884). He has edited Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," and written “Cobden and Today's Political Views” (1873), and "The Colonial Issue," in the Cobden Club Essays (1872).
- 55.
- Of other books, mention should be made of G. J. Goschen's most admirable "Foreign Exchange Theory" (eighth edition, 1875); "Reports and Speeches on Local Taxation" (1872); T. Brassey's “Work and Pay” (third edition, 1883); E. Seyd, “Bullion and Foreign Exchanges” (1868); H. D. McLeod, an eccentric writer, "Political Economy Dictionary" (only one vol., A-C, 1863, published); and “Banking Theory and Practice” (second edition, 1875-1876); H. Sidgwick, "Political Economy Principles" (1883); J. Caird, "Landed Interest" (fourth edition, 1880); L. Levi, “History of UK Trade” (1872).
- 56.
- Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) began life in a commercial house at Bayonne, but gained notice first by an article, "On the influence of French and English tariffs on the future of both peoples," in the "Journal of Economists" of 1844, and consequently had a very short period of literary activity. The corn-law agitation in England and the revolutionary movement of 1848 led him to write chiefly against protection and socialism. He translated Cobden's speeches, "Cobden and the League" (1845). His arguments against protection, “Economic fallacies” (1846-1847), have been translated and published in this country; but the more extended exposition of his doctrine of value diminishing with the growth of civilization, and the harmony of all interests is in the "Economic Harmonies" (1850). In this his position is not much different from Carey's. His other books were “Capital and interest” (1849), directed against gratuitous loans; "Protectionism and communism" (1849), showing protection to be communism for the rich; "Property and law" (1848), directed against socialism; and "Essays on Political Economy" (1853); "Free Trade" (1855). “Complete works,” 7 tom. (1855-1864).
- 57.
- Carey, however, claimed, with probable truth, that Bastiat borrowed the idea from him, and Bastiat did not appear well in the controversy. Almost no one has followed the French writer in his theory except Professor A. L. Perry, of Williams College, Massachusetts, who has shaped his general argument according to this view of value. Also see Cairnes, "Essays in Political Economy," p. 312.
- 58.
- Chevalier (1806-1879) first drew attention in an experiment of Saint-Simonism in 1830-1833. After traveling in the United States, and writing excellent books on the country and its railways, he became professor in the Collége de France, where his lectures were collected in a "Political Economy Course" (1842-1850; second edition, 1855-1866). His third volume, "La Monnaie," is a standard treatise on money, with an extensive bibliography. His treatise "Review of the commercial system known as the protective system" (1851) is now somewhat out of date. In his book "Possible drop in gold prices" (1859), translated by Richard Cobden, he held that, unless prevented, gold would drive out the French currency, as against Faucher, who thought the fall temporary, and would progressively diminish. Other books are, "Manufacturing industry in France," and "Freedom of work" (1848).
- 59.
- Émile Levasseur (born 1828) was professor at Alençon, 1852-1854, and elected a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1868. He has published "Historical Research on the Law System" (1854); "The gold question" (1858); "History of the Working Classes in France from the Conquest of Julius Caesar to the Revolution" (1859); the same history continued, "Since 1789 to the present" (1867); “Industrial France” (1865); “Rural economics course, France and its colonies” (1868); "Summary of Political Economy" (fourth edition, 1883).
- 60.
- Born in Berlin in 1816, but since 1821 living in France. He was long connected with the Bureau de Statistique Générale, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, but in 1861 he left office and gave himself wholly to private work. In this year he received the Montyon prize for statistics, not given since 1857. His chief books are: “Responsibilities of agriculture in the different countries of Europe” (1850), a work crowned by the Institute; "Statistics of France, compared with the various states of Europe" (1860); "French Administrative Dictionary" (second edition, 1878); "The finances of France since 1815" (1863); "The theorists of socialism in Germany" (1872); and in connection with M. Guillaumin, "The Directory of Political Economy," since 1856.
- 61.
- Jérôme-Adolphe Blanqui older sibling (1798-1854) in 1833 succeeded to the chair of J. B. Say in the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers, and was one of the founders of the "Journal of Economists." Besides his "History of Political Economy in Europe" (1837-1852), he published a "Summary of the history of commerce and industry" (1826); "Basic Principles of Political Economy" (1826); "Reports on the exhibition of French industrial products in 1827" (1827); "Political Economy Course" (2 vols., 1837-1838), and notices of Huskisson and J. B. Say.
- 62.
- Louis Wolowski (1810-1876), of Polish origin, was Chevalier's chief antagonist, and Professor of Legislation at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers (1839); founded the first Crédit Foncier of Paris, and was elected to the Institute in the place of Blanqui. In 1875 he was chosen senator. He was a fertile writer: "Mobilization of Land Credit" (1839); "Work organization" (1846); "Studies in Political Economy and Statistics" (1848); "Henri IV, economist, introduction of the silk industry in France" (1855); "Introduction to Political Economy in Italy" (1859); "Russia's Finances" (1864); "The banking issue" (1864); his testimony in the "Investigation into the principles and general facts that govern monetary and fiduciary circulation" (1866); "The Bank of England and the Banks of Scotland" (1867); "Commercial freedom and the outcomes of the trade treaty of 1860." (1868); "Gold and silver" (1870); “Change and circulation”; and a translation of Roscher.
- 63.
- Hippolyte-Philibert Passy (1793-1880) was educated for the army, and served at Waterloo. He was more prominent as a statesman than as an economist. In 1838 he entered the Academy in the place of Talleyrand, but politics left him unoccupied, and he wrote "Culture systems and their influence on the social economy" (1846), and "Causes of Wealth Inequality" (1849).
- 64.
- M. Léonce de Lavergne (1809-1880) came from Toulouse to Paris in 1840, elected deputy in 1846, a member of the Institute in 1855, and became professor in the Institut agronomique of Versailles. He was also the author of "The rural economy of England, Scotland, and Ireland" (1854), translated into English (1855); "Agriculture and Population" (1857), a striking confirmation of Malthusianism; “French economists of the eighteenth century” (1870). He also has contributed largely to the "Review of the Two Worlds" and the "Journal of Economists." For a personal sketch by Cliffe Leslie, see "Biweekly Review," February, 1881.
- 65.
- Born at Geneva, 1797, and died at Zurich, 1869. After studying law, he became an advocate, and in 1833 Professor of Law in the place of Rossi. In 1837 he was made Professor of Political Economy and Public Law at Geneva. He was also a member of the Swiss Grand Council. Besides his treatise, he wrote: "Rich or poor" (1840); "Socialism is barbarism." (1848); “Studies on the Causes of Poverty” (1853); and aided in the “Dictionary of Political Economy.”
- 66.
- J. G. Courcelle-Seneuil (born 1813) left a commercial career to become a writer, first for the journals, and later for the "Political Dictionary" (edited by Pagnerre). In 1848 he was connected with the Ministry of Finance, and called to a professorship of Political Economy in Santiago, Chili, 1853-1863. His chief work is a "Theoretical and Practical Treatise on Political Economy" (1858), but he has also published "Bank credit" (1840), reforms for the bank of France; "Treatise on Banking Operations" (1852; sixth edition, 1876); "Treatise on Industrial, Commercial, and Agricultural Enterprises" (1854); "Studies on Social Science" (1862); Basic Lessons in Political Economy (1864); "The free bank" (1867); "Liberty and socialism" (1868); and articles in the “Dictionary of Political Economy.”
- 67.
- Died 1862; author of "On the freedom of work" (1845).
- 68.
- Professor of Political Economy at the Collége de France, author of an extended and able “Treatise on the Science of Finance” (third edition, 1883). He has also published "On the moral and intellectual state of the working population and its influence on wage rates." (1868); "Economic, historical, and statistical research on contemporary wars" (1869); “The worker question in the 19th century” (second edition, 1882); "Local government in France and England" (1872); “Women's work in the 19th century” (1873); "Essay on the Distribution of Wealth" (1880; second edition, 1883); and "On colonization in modern peoples" (1882).
- 69.
- He published two volumes on Socialism (see list of books p. 44). In several volumes on the "Manufacturing system" he described the condition of the silk, woolen, cotton, and iron industries.
- 70.
- The most vigorous advocate of monometallism in France. He also wrote well on taxation, "Tax Treaty" (4 vols., 1866-1867).
- 71.
- His "Report on war compensation" to the Corps Législatif gives the account of the most marvelous exchange operation of modern times, arising from the payment of the indemnity by France to Germany (1871-1873).
- 72.
- An advocate of the mathematical method.
- 73.
- Founded in 1863, published at Berlin, and edited by Dr. Eduard Wiss.
- 74.
- Long Secretary to the Chamber of Commerce at Hamburg, and now honorary professor at Göttingen.
- 75.
- Professor of Political Economy at Zürich in 1866, since 1875 director of statistics at Dresden, and editor of "Worker's Friend." He made a valuable study of industrial partnerships, "Profit sharing" (second edition 1878). He also wrote "Freedom of Work" (1858), and "Contributions to the history of guilds" (1861).
- 76.
- His most important work is "The welfare of the poor and the legislation on poverty in European countries" (1870). Selected essays from this have been translated into English by E. B. Eastwick, "Social Assistance Across Various Regions of Europe" (1873).
- 77.
- Max Wirth is at Vienna, and has devoted himself to a "History of Trade Crises" (1874), including the crisis of 1873. Baron von Hock has written a history of the finances of France, and of the United States—"The finances and financial history of the United States of America" (1867).
- 78.
- This book has been translated into English by G. A. Matile, with notes by Stephen Colwell (1856).
- 79.
- Mohl on administration, and Rau and A. Wagner on finance, also deserve mention. Stein, besides other works, is the author of a handbook, "Public Administration" (1870).
- 80.
- "Biweekly Review" (1876).
- 81.
- In Ely's "The Past and Present of Political Economy" (p. 9) it is clear the new school do not differ so much in reality as in seeming from the methods of the English writers, like Cairnes.
- 82.
The first division of Roscher's (born 1817) treatise, also known under the title of “Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie,” has been translated here by J. J. Lalor, in two volumes, “Principles of Political Economy” (1878), with an essay by Wolowski on the historical method inserted. In 1840 he was made Privat-Docent at Göttingen, and professor extraordinary in 1843. In 1844 he was called to a chair at Erlangen, but since 1848 he has remained at Leipsic. A list of Roscher's works is as follows:
The first part of Roscher's (born 1817) treatise, also known as “Fundamentals of National Economics,” has been translated here by J. J. Lalor in two volumes, "Political Economy Principles" (1878), including an essay by Wolowski on the historical method. In 1840, he became a Lecturer at Göttingen, and was promoted to extraordinary professor in 1843. In 1844, he was appointed to a chair at Erlangen, but has been at Leipsic since 1848. A list of Roscher's works is as follows:
“Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirthschaft nach geschichtlicher Methode” (1843); “Kornhandel und Theuerungspolitik” (third edition, 1852); “Untersuchungen über das Colonialwesen”; “Verhältniss der Nationalökonomie zum klassischen Alterthume” (1849); “Geschichte der englischen Volkswirthschaftslehre im 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts”; “Ein nationalökonom. Princep der Forstwirthschaft”; “Ansichten der Volkswirthschaft aus dem geschichtlichen Standpunkte” (second edition, 1861); “Die deutsche Nationalökonomie an der Grenzscheide des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts” (1862); “Gründungsgeschichte des Zollvereins” (1870); “Betrachtungen über die Währungsfrage der deutschen Müntzreform” (1872); “Geschichte der Nationalökonomie in Deutschland” (1874); “Nationalökonomie des Ackerbaues” (eighth edition, 1875). His histories of political economy in England and Germany are particularly valuable (see review by Cliffe Leslie, “Fortnightly Review,” July, 1875). But he does not rightly estimate the English writers when he takes McLeod as a type; and Carey is the only American to whom he refers.
"Outline for Lectures on Political Economy from a Historical Perspective" (1843); “Grain Trade and Pricing Policy” (third edition, 1852); “Investigations into Colonial Matters”; “The Connection Between the National Economy and Classical Antiquity” (1849); "History of English Political Economy in the 16th and 17th Centuries"; “A National Economist: Forestry Principles”; "Perspectives on Political Economy from a Historical Perspective" (second edition, 1861); “German National Economy at the Turning Point of the 16th and 17th Centuries” (1862); “History of the Customs Union’s Founding” (1870); "Thoughts on the Currency Problem of the German Coinage Reform" (1872); "History of the National Economy in Germany" (1874); “National Agricultural Economy” (eighth edition, 1875). His histories of political economy in England and Germany are especially valuable (see review by Cliffe Leslie, "Biweekly Review," July, 1875). However, he doesn’t accurately assess the English writers when he chooses McLeod as an example; and Carey is the only American he mentions.
- 83.
- Professor at Marburg, then at the University of Friedburg, in Breisgau, and now at Heidelberg. He has also studied railways (1853), and telegraphs (1857), and money and credit, “Money and Credit” (1873-1879).
- 84.
- Died 1878. He devoted himself mainly to criticism of other systems, and seems to be the least able of the three.
- 85.
- “Cathedral Socialists,” or “Professional Socialists.”
- 86.
By far the ablest is Adolph Wagner, of Berlin, editor of Rau's “Lehrbuch der politischen Oekonomie” (1872). He also published “Die russische Papierwährung” (1868); “Staatspapiergeld, Reichs-Kassen Scheine, und Banknoten” (1874); “Unsere Müntzreform” (1877); “Finanzwissenschaft” (1877); and “Die Communalsteuerfrage” (1878).
By far, the most capable is Adolph Wagner from Berlin, editor of Rau's “Textbook of Political Economy” (1872). He also published "The Russian paper currency" (1868); "Government paper money, Reich currency notes, and banknotes" (1874); “Our currency reform” (1877); Public finance (1877); and “Community tax issue” (1878).
Dr. Eduard Engel was formerly the head of the Prussian Bureau of Statistics. Professor Gustav Schönberg, of Tübingen, with the assistance of twenty-one other economists, produced a large “Handbuch der politischen Oekonomie” (1882). The school have expressed their peculiar doctrines in the “Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft” (quarterly, founded 1844, Tübingen), and the “Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie” (established at Jena, 1863). Also, see A. Wagner's “Rede über die sociale Frage” (1872), H. v. Scheel's “Die Theorie der socialen Frage” (1871), and G. Schmoller's “Ueber einige Grundfrage des Rects und der Volkswirthschaft” (1875). A. E. F. Schäffle, once Minister of Commerce at Vienna, gained considerable reputation by “Das gesellschaftliche System der menschlichen Wirthschaft” (third edition, 1873).
Dr. Eduard Engel was previously the head of the Prussian Bureau of Statistics. Professor Gustav Schönberg from Tübingen, along with twenty-one other economists, created a comprehensive "Handbook of Political Economy" (1882). The school has shared their distinctive ideas in the "Journal of Political Science" (quarterly, founded 1844, Tübingen), and the “Annual Review of Economics” (established in Jena, 1863). Also, check out A. Wagner's “Talk about the social issue” (1872), H. v. Scheel's "The Theory of the Social Question" (1871), and G. Schmoller's "About some fundamental questions of law and economics" (1875). A. E. F. Schäffle, who was formerly the Minister of Commerce in Vienna, gained significant recognition with "The social system of human economy" (third edition, 1873).
- 87.
- Émile de Laveleye (born 1822) studied law at Ghent, but since 1848 has given himself up to political economy and public questions. Through the pages of the "Review of the Two Worlds" he gained attention in 1863, and the next year was made Professor of Political Economy at the University of Liége. In 1869 he received an election as corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. While a fertile writer on political subjects, he has produced "The Golden Question" (1860); "Essay on the Rural Economy of Belgium" (1863); a study on "Switzerland," see "Review of the Two Worlds," April 15, 1863; “Rural Economics Studies, the Netherlands” (1864); "Monetary markets over the last fifty years" (1865); "Land Systems of Belgium and the Netherlands," in the Cobden Club volume on "Land Ownership" (1870); "Bi-metallic Currency," translated by G. Walker (1877); "Contemporary Socialism" (1881); "Elements of political economy" (1882), which satisfies a certain modern demand for "ethical political economy."
- 88.
- Leslie found support in a well-known paper read before the Association for the Advancement of Science (see “London Stats Journal,” December, 1878; also see “Penn Monthly” 1879), by J. K. Ingram, who claimed that the old school isolated the study of economic from other social phenomena, and that Ricardo's system was not only too abstract, but that its conclusions were of so absolute a character that they were little adapted for real use. Robert Lowe (Lord Sherbrooke) replied to Leslie and Ingram (“19th Century,” November, 1878). For most of this literature it will be necessary to consult the magazines. Cliffe Leslie, "Biweekly Review" (November, 1870), placed Adam Smith among the inductive economists; D. Syme attacked the old methods, "Westminster Review" vol. xcvi (1871); Cairnes represented the old school, and discussed the new theories, "Political Economy and Comte," in the "Biweekly Review," vol. xiii, p. 579 (1870), “Political Economy and Laissez-Faire,” vol. xvi, p. 80 (1871), and in 1872; see also his admirable "Logical Method"; F. Harrison discussed the limits of political economy, ibid. (1865), and answered Cairnes in an article on "Cairnes on Political Economy and M. Comte," "Biweekly Review," vol. xiv, p. 39 (1870). W. Newmarch gave attention to Ingram's paper, "Stats Journal" (1871). Leslie, “Biweekly Review” (1875), and G. Cohn, ibid. (1873), wrote on political economy in Germany. Leslie also contributed an article on “Political Economy and Sociology” "Biweekly Review," vol. xxxi, p. 25 (1879), and the "200th Anniversary of Political Economy," in the "Bankers' Magazine," vol. xxxii, p. 29. Leslie examined the philosophical method, “Penn Monthly” (1877); Jevons saw the only hope for the future in the mathematical method, “Biweekly Review” (1876); McLeod asks, "What is political economy?" in the “Current Review” (1875); Maurice Block entered the discussion, “Penn Monthly” (1877), and "Bankers' Magazine," March and November, 1878. Henry Sidgwick answers Leslie in a paper on "Economic Method," in the "Biweekly Review," vol. xxxi (1879), p. 301. See also essay by Wolowski prefixed to Roscher's “Political Economy” (English translation); Roscher's own statement in Chapters II and III of the Introduction to his "Political Economy," and Laveleye's “Trends in Political Economy” (1879). See also "Penn Monthly," vol. vii, p. 190, and "Bankers' Magazine" vol. xxxiii, pp. 601, 698, 761; vol. xxxvi, pp. 349, 422; S. Newcomb for an admirable essay "On the Method and Scope of Political Economy," "North American Review" (1875), vol. cxxi, p. 241, in which the Traditional method is strongly supported; and an extreme position in favor of the historical method in a pamphlet, "The Past and Present of Political Economy," by R. T. Ely (1884).
- 89.
- Daniel Raymond, "Political Economy Essentials" (1820). Thomas Cooper, "Lectures on the Basics of Political Economy" (1826); "Political Economy Handbook" (1834). Willard Phillips, "Guide to Political Economy" (1828); "Proposals About Protection and Free Trade" (1860). President Francis Wayland (1796-1865), “Political Economy Basics” (1837). Henry Vethake, “Political Economy Principles” (1838). From 1840 to the civil war there appeared F. Bowen's “Principles of Political Economy” (1856), since changed to “U.S. Political Economy” (1873), which opposed the Malthusian doctrine and defended protection; John Bascom's "Political Economy" (1859); and Stephen Colwell's "Payment Methods" (1859). After the war, "Wealth Science" (1866), by Amasa Walker, a lecturer in Amherst College, and father of F. A. Walker.
- 90.
- Prof. C. F. Dunbar, "North American Review" January, 1876, in an admirable review of economic science in America during the last century (1776-1876).
- 91.
- See supra, p. 16.
- 92.
- Carey (1793-1879) was the son of an Irish exile, and began a business career at the age of twelve. At twenty-eight he was the leading partner in the publishing firm of Carey & Lea, Philadelphia, from which he retired in 1835, to devote himself wholly to political economy. His leading works have been translated into French, Italian, Portuguese, German, Swedish, Russian, Magyar, and Japanese. He has written thirteen octavo volumes, three thousand pages in pamphlet form, and twice that amount for the newspaper press. See "Proceedings of the American Academy of Science" (1881-1882, p. 417), and W. Elder's “Memoir of Henry C. Carey” (January 5, 1880). The latter gives a list of his books.
- 93.
- Bastiat's "Economic Harmonies" appeared in 1850, and the question of his indebtedness to Carey was discussed, rather unfavorably to Bastiat, in a series of letters in the "Economic Journal" for 1851.
- 94.
- See an able study, by Adolphe Held, “Carey's Social Science and the Mercantilist System” (1866).
- 95.
- His system appears also in the books of disciples: E. Peshine Smith, “A Manual of Political Economy” (1853), William Elder's "Daily Questions" (1871), and of Robert E. Thompson's “Social Science and National Economy” (1875). A condensation of Carey's Social Sciences has been made by Kate McKean, in one volume, octavo.
- 96.
- The son of Amasa Walker, and formerly Professor of Political Economy and History in the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale College, he has become well known for his statistical work in connection with the United States census. His "Statistical Atlas of the United States" (1874) is unequaled. He has also published Cash (1878); "Money, Trade, and Industry" (1879); "Political Economy" (1883); and "Land and Rent" (1884). The last book replies to various attacks on Ricardo's doctrine of rent, and particularly to Henry George's “Progress and Poverty.” General Walker in 1883 became President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston. He is also well known as an advocate of bimetallism.
- 97.
- Professor of Political and Social Science in Yale College, and author of a “History of U.S. Currency” (1874); "Lectures on the History of Protection in the United States" (1877); "What Social Classes Owe Each Other" (1883). He is a monometallist, and has devoted himself vigorously to the advocacy of free trade. His last book is a study in sociology, not in political economy.
- 98.
- He has written "Political Economy" (eighteenth edition, 1883), and also “Intro to Political Economy,” an elementary work on the same basis as the former.
- 99.
- Henry George was born in Philadelphia, 1839, ran away to sea, and in 1857 entered a printing-office in San Francisco. In 1871 he was one of the founders of the “San Francisco Chronicle,” which he gave up in 1875, and received a public office. He first began to agitate his views in a pamphlet entitled “Our Land and Housing Policy” (1871), but not until the comparative leisure of his occupation (1875) gave him opportunity did he seriously begin the study which resulted in his "Progress and Poverty." This volume was begun in the summer of 1877, and finished in the spring of 1879. The sale of the book, it is needless to say, has been phenomenal. He has also applied his doctrine of land to Ireland, in a pamphlet entitled “The Irish Land Issue” (1882). His last book is a collection of essays entitled "Social Issues" (1884). His home is now in New York.
- 100.
- Cf. p. 4, supra.
- 101.
- Bowen, “U.S. Political Economy,” p. 25.
- 102.
- This is the beginning of Chapter II in the original treatise.
- 103.
- This is his "give up," which corresponds to the exertion of the laborer.
- 104.
- See Roscher's note 1, section 42, for various definitions of capital.
- 105.
- General Walker ("Political Economy" Part II, Chap. iv) adopts the same position, although seemingly inconsistent with his doctrine on the rate of wages. The “wage rate” is, however, a different thing from the source of a laborer's subsistence. See Book II, Chapter II, § 2.
- 106.
- The opinion mentioned above in the text is that of the believers in over-production, of whom the most distinguished are Mr. Malthus, Dr. Chalmers, and Sismondi.
- 107.
- Page 371, English translation, N. Y. (1871).
- 108.
- Edward Atkinson, "Labor and Capital, Allies Not Enemies" p. 60.
- 109.
- Cf. Bowen, “U.S. Political Economy,” p. 399.
- 110.
- The functions of money are discussed later in the volume, and it is not proposed to unfold them here.
- 111.
- See, for the argument that machinery necessarily injures labor, “Land and Labor,” William Godwin Moody (1883); and for the answer, “North American Review,” May, 1884, p. 510.
- 112.
- Edward Atkinson, "Labor and Capital, Allies not Enemies," p. 33.
- 113.
- See book iv, chap. iv.
- 114.
- See Mr. Babbage's "Economy of Machines and Manufacturing."
- 115.
- Book i, chap. iv, § 6.
- 116.
- Constant use of the same muscles, as by gold-beaters or writers, very often produces paralysis.
- 117.
- Hearn's "Plutology," p. 279.
- 118.
- Cairnes, "Guiding Principles," pp. 299, 300.
- 119.
- “U.S. Political Economy,” p. 134. See also an article, “Malthusianism, Darwinism, and Pessimism,” "North American Review," November, 1879.
- 120.
- See Cairnes, "Logical Method," pp. 170-177.
- 121.
- See also Walker's “Salary Issue,” chap. vi, and Roscher, “Political Economy,” book v, chaps. i, ii, iii.
- 122.
- See Galton's “Hereditary Genius” p. 131-135.
- 123.
- See also Edward Jarvis, “Atlantic Monthly,” 1872, and F. A. Walker, "Social Science Journal," vol. v, 1873, p. 71. For other literature, see "Overview of the History of Political Economy," p. 16.
- 124.
- This is the “preventive checkup” of Mr. Malthus, while the limitation through war, starvation, etc., is the “positive verification.”
- 125.
- This is fully confirmed by the inaugural address of Mr. Giffen as President of the London Statistical Society, November 20, 1883, below, book iv, chap. v, § 1. (See the London "Statistical Journal," 1883.)
- 126.
- See Lavergne's "Agriculture and Population," pp. 305-316.
- 127.
- For tables of relative births and deaths, see “Statesman's Yearbook,” p. 253.
- 128.
- This and the subsequent quotations are taken by Mr. Mill from Rae's "New Principles of Political Economy."
- 129.
- "International Review," article "Colonization," 1881, p. 88. See H. V. Redfield, "Homicide North and South," 1880.
- 130.
- "Letters from the U.S." by John Robert Godley, vol. i. p. 42. See also Lyell's "Traveling in America," vol. ii, p. 83.—Mill.
- 131.
- Cf. “U.S. Agriculture,” "Princeton Review," May, 1882, by F. A. Walker.
- 132.
- "Social Science" vol. iii, p. 19.
- 133.
- “Notes on North America,” 1851, vol. ii, pp. 116, 117.
- 134.
- See also Cairnes, "Logical Approach," p. 35.
- 135.
- I am indebted to Mr. Atkinson for advanced proofs of the annexed charts. See his paper in the "Journal of the American Agricultural Association," vol. i, Nos. 3 and 4, p. 154, and a later discussion in the supplement of the Boston "Manufacturers' Gazette" August 9, 1884, entitled "The Railway, the Farmer, and the Public." His figures are drawn mainly from Poor's “Train Manual.”
- 136.
- Cf. Book IV, Chap. I.
- 137.
- "Manufacturing Economy," pp. 163, 164.
- 138.
- Cf. Book IV, Chap. I, § 4.
- 139.
- “The Coal Debate” (1866).
- 140.
- Henry George, as well as the Socialists, thinks poverty arises from the injustice of society, and here takes issue with the present teaching. But the question can be better discussed under Distribution.
- 141.
- Henry Gannet, "Global Review," 1882, p. 503.
- 142.
- Volume on Population, p. 481.
- 143.
- Estimated.
- 144.
- See article Colonization “International Review” 1881, p. 88.
- 145.
- See F. A. Walker's “Statistical Atlas.”
- 146.
- For a further discussion of the difference between the motive powers under private property and under Communism, see Mr. Mill's posthumous "Chapters on Socialism," "Biweekly Review," 1879 (vol. xxxi).
- 147.
- For an exposition of the varying forms of modern state socialism, and that form of it which advocates the nationalization of land (in H. George's “Progress and Poverty” and Alfred Russel Wallace's "Land Nationalization, its Necessity and its Goals") see a chapter in Henry Fawcett's last (sixth) edition of his "Guide" (1884). For a general and valuable treatise on Socialism, but one which does not describe schemes much later than Owen's, see Louis Reybaud's "Studies on the Reformers, or Modern Socialists" (seventh edition, 1864). An excellent bibliography is given, vol. ii, pp. 453-470.
- 148.
- Pierre Joseph Proudhon (born 1809) made a well-known attack on private property in his "What is Property," "What is Property?" (1840). His answer was, "It's a robbery." See also Ely, "French and German socialism" (1883), p. 140.
- 149.
- Louis Blanc (born 1813, died 1882). His chief book, the “Labor Organization,” appeared in 1840, in the columns of the "Progress Review."
- 150.
- Karl Marx (born 1818, died 1883) published "Critique of Political Economy" (1859); and an extension of the same book under the new title of “Capital” (1867), of which only the first volume has appeared, on "The Process of Producing Capital." This was again enlarged in 1872 to 822 pages. A large part of the work is filled with extracts from parliamentary reports on the condition of English workmen. Before the Revolution of 1848 he edited a communistic journal, and was obliged to leave the country afterward, by which he was led to London. He was an able writer on history and politics. Marx was assisted by Friedrich Engels, who wrote “The Situation of the Working Classes in England” (1845). See Ely, ibid., chap. x.
- 151.
- Born 1825, the son of a rich Jewish merchant. In philosophy and jurisprudence he won the praise of Humboldt and Boeckh. But vanity and wild ambition checked the success due to great abilities and energy of character. He was finally shot in a duel in 1864. He appears as the antagonist of Schultze (of Delitzsch), advocating state-help against the self-help of the originator of the People's Banks.
- 152.
- For an account of this society see Theodore D. Woolsey's “Communism and Socialism” (1880); "19th Century," July, 1878; and Ely, ibid., chap. xi.
- 153.
- See New York "Country," Nos. 684, 686.
- 154.
- From his posthumous “Socialism Chapters,” "Biweekly Review," 1879, p. 513 (vol. xxxi), and written in 1869.
- 155.
- The Count de Saint-Simon served in our Revolutionary War in the French army, while very young, and ended a life of misfortune and poverty in 1825, a month after the publication of his "New Christianity" (Woolsey's “Communism and Socialism,” p. 107). For a fuller account, see R. T. Ely's “French and German Socialism,” p. 53; A. J. Booth's “Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism” (London, 1871); and Reybaud, ibid.
- 156.
- This experiment when put on trial in France first brought up the question of the legal justice of giving an absolute right to inherited property, and numbered among its disciples the economists, Michel Chevalier and Adolphe Blanqui, and the philosopher, Auguste Comte.
- 157.
- Fourier was born at Besançon in 1772. He wrote the “Four Movements Theory” (1808); "A Guide to Community and Agricultural Collaboration" (1822); “The Theory of Universal Unity” (1841). Died 1837. See Ely, ibid., p. 81; Victor Considérant's “Social Destiny” (fourth edition, 1851); and Reybaud, ibid.
- 158.
- Robert Owen (father of Robert Dale Owen), born 1771, in 1799 was engaged in the famous New Lanark Mills, of which Jeremy Bentham was one of the partners. In 1825 he purchased Harmony, in Indiana, from Mr. Rapp. He believed in a full community of property; that the Government should employ the surplus of labor for which there was no demand; and that, until the members became fully trained, affairs should be managed by one head (as in Saint-Simonism).
- 159.
- For Brook Farm, see Noyes's “History of American Socialism” chapter xi, and the life of “George Ripley,” by O. B. Frothingham (1882). In general, also, for American experiments see Charles Nordhoff's "The Communist Societies of the United States"; W. A. Hinds's "U.S. Communists" (1878); Woolsey's “Communism and Socialism” (1880); and Noyes's "U.S. Socialism" (1870).
- 160.
- The extracts in large type in this section are taken from Mr. Mill's "Chapters on Socialism" ("Biweekly Review," 1879), being only the beginning of a larger work begun in 1869, and given to the public since his death. They are of interest because they give his conclusions twenty years after his “Political Economy” was written.
- 161.
- "Logic Method," pp. 34, 36.
- 162.
- Cf. Cairnes, "Core Principles," pp. 180-188.
- 163.
- In the "Biweekly Review," May 1, 1869.
- 164.
- "Core Values," pp. 149-189.
- 165.
- Counting six days to a week and four weeks to a month.
- 166.
- "Core Values," p. 185.
- 167.
- Mr. Thornton replied to Mr. Cairnes ("19th Century," August, 1879). A succinct statement of the condition of the wages-fund controversy has been made by Henry Sidgwick, "Biweekly Review," September 1, 1879. See also W. G. Sumner, "Princeton Review," "Salaries," November, 1882.
- 168.
- He advanced the same view in the "North American Review" vol. cxx, January, 1875. In his "Political Economy" (1883) he advances a more extensive theory of distribution. See "Atlantic" July, 1883, p. 129.
- 169.
- See Cairnes, "Key Principles," p. 209.
- 170.
- This proposition needs to be kept in mind for the future discussion of the cost of production of food and its relation to cost of labor. Book II, Chap. V, § 5.
- 171.
- Mr. Carey takes this ground.
- 172.
- See the explanation of an economic law, Book II, Chap. II, § 1.
- 173.
- "History of England's Constitution," vol. ii, p. 563. See also Nicholls's "History of Welfare Laws," vol. ii, p. 303.
- 174.
- For further discussion of the advantages of small holdings, see Book IV, Chap. V, § 2.
- 175.
- "Guiding Principles," pp. 64-69.
- 176.
- See Young, “Work in Europe.”
- 177.
- Walter Bagehot, "Lombard Street," p. 13.
- 178.
- “Jobs and Pay.”
- 179.
- The reader is advised to consider, in connection with this, the former discussion on the relation between wages and the price of food (pp. 185, 186).
- 180.
- "Logical Approach," p. 206.
- 181.
- “American Political Economy,” p. 164.
- 182.
- Rickards, “Population and Capital,” p. 135.
- 183.
- Rickards, ibid., p. 75.
- 184.
- "Political Economy" p. 288.
- 185.
- "Progress and Poverty," pp. 220, 221.
- 186.
- “U.S. Political Economy,” p. 164.
- 187.
- For other writers opposed to the doctrine of Rent as maintained by Ricardo and Mill, see Bonamy Price, "Practical Political Economy" chap. x; McLeod, “Economics Philosophy Principles,” chap. x; and J. E. T. Rogers, "Manual of Political Economy," chap. xii.
- 188.
- Cairnes, "Logical Approach," p. 199.
- 189.
- “Banking Theory and Practice,” vol. i, p. 13. Cf. Cairnes, "Logical Approach," p. 106.
- 190.
- "Core Principles," p. 11.
- 191.
- "Political Economy" p. 5.
- 192.
- “Social Science” vol. i, p. 158.
- 193.
- "Harmonies," p. 171.
- 194.
- "Political Economy," p. 126.
- 195.
- "Political Economy," Introduction, Chap. I, § 5.
- 196.
- "Summary of Political Economy," p. 175.
- 197.
- "Summary of Economic Science," vol. i, p. 202.
- 198.
- “Political Economy Guide,” p. 98.
- 199.
- "Core Principles," p. 15.
- 200.
- “Political Economy Theory,” pp. 82-91. See Cairnes, ibid., pp. 17-19.
- 201.
- "Political Economy," p. 92.
- 202.
- “Social Sciences,” vol. ii, p. 335.
- 203.
- "Political Economy" Introduction, Chap. I, § 5.
- 204.
- “Summary,” p. 206.
- 205.
- "Political Economy" p. 165.
- 206.
- "Political Economy Logic."
- 207.
- Although here using demand in its proper sense, a little later Mr. Mill defines it as the “quantity demanded.” As he again uses it in the proper sense in discussing excess of money (Book III, Chap. V), supply (Book III, Chap. XI), and foreign trade (Book III, Chap. XIV), I have omitted from his present exposition his evidently inconsistent use of the word.
- 208.
- "Core Principles," p. 25.
- 209.
- "Core Principles," p. 108.
- 210.
- See his chapter on "Natural and Market Price" book i, chap. vii.
- 211.
- "Report from the Director of the Mint," 1883, p. 69.
- 212.
- Above, p. 222.
- 213.
- "Guiding Principles," p. 41.
- 214.
- Book I, Chap. I, § 2.
- 215.
- See supra, p. 210.
- 216.
- "Guiding Principles," part i, chap. iii, p. 87.
- 217.
- “Jobs and Pay.”
- 218.
- “Guiding Principles,” p. 136.
- 219.
- F. A. Walker ("Political Economy" pp. 248-259) expands this idea, and makes it the pivotal part of his whole theory of distribution among laborers, capitalists, and landlords.
- 220.
- “Money and the Exchange Mechanism,” chap. iii.
- 221.
- "Political Economy," p. 127.
- 222.
- “Money and the Exchange Mechanism,” p. 1.
- 223.
- "Political Economy" p. 144.
- 224.
- The substance of Mr. Mill's former chapter, XV (Book III), is here inserted in its direct connection with the functions of money.
- 225.
- F. A. Walker, "Political Economy" p. 363. A German, Count Soden (1805), Joseph Lowe (1822), and G. Poulett Scrope (1833), proposed this scheme. See Jevons, “Money and the Exchange Process,” chap. xxv.
- 226.
- "Money and the Exchange Process," p. 31.
- 227.
- "A Significant Drop in the Value of Gold" (1863).
- 228.
- F. A. Walker defines the demand for money as “the reason for using money in making exchanges; in other words, it refers to the amount of money-related tasks to be completed” ("Political Economy" p. 133); and the supply of money as “the financial resources available to perform the financial tasks that the demand for money shows are necessary in a specific community at a specific time. The supply of money is measured by ... the total amount of money and the speed of circulation.” (ibid., p. 136).
- 229.
- Jevons, “Money and the Exchange System,” pp. 336, 339.
- 230.
- "Precious Metal Production," in Petermann's “Announcements,” Ergänzungsheft, No. 57.
- 231.
- See Jevons's “A Significant Drop in Gold Value.”
- 232.
- In his book "About the Likely Drop in Gold" (1859). See also Cairnes's “Essays.” For authorities on the new gold, see Robinson's "California" (Larkin's and Mason's Reports, pp. 17, 33); Executive Documents of United States, 1848, I, 1; Westgarth's “Victoria Colony,” pp. 122, 315; Wood, "Sixteen Months in the Gold Mines," p. 125; Lalor's "Encyclopedia," II, p. 851; Walker, “Cash,” part i, chaps. vii, viii. For the probable effects, see “North American Review,” October, 1852; Tooke's "Price History," vi, p. 224; "Stats Journal," 1878, p. 230; Levasseur, "Gold Question." As to how far the value of gold was lowered, Jevons, "Serious Autumn," etc.; "Statistical Journal," 1865; ibid., 1869, p. 445; and Giffen's "Finance Essays," p. 82.
- 233.
- “Report of the House of Commons on the Depreciation of Silver” 1876, p. v.
- 234.
- See Macaulay, "History of England" chap. xxi.
- 235.
- "Money and the Process of Exchange," p. 84.
- 236.
- Jevons, ibid., p. 138.
- 237.
- See S. Dana Horton, "Gold & Silver," 1877, p. 84, and following
- 238.
- See Linderman, "Money and Currency," p. 161.
- 239.
- Director of the Mint, Report, 1883, p. 49, and Linderman, ibid., p. 173.
- 240.
- See “Atlantic Monthly” “The Silver Danger,” May, 1884.
- 241.
- See “International Review” September, 1876; and for some further explanation of banks, see "Atlantic" 1882, pp. 196, 695, 696.
- 242.
- "Report of the Comptroller of the Currency," 1883, p. 34.
- 243.
- See "Nature," xix, 33, 588.
- 244.
- See Walker's "Cash," p. 473.
- 245.
- Vol. i, p. 302. See Sumner's "History of U.S. Currency" and Walker's "Cash" for much valuable material.
- 246.
- See Cherbuliez, vol. i, p. 299.
- 247.
- "Money and the Exchange System," p. 232.
- 248.
- For John Law's famous scheme (1718-1720) in France, called the “Mississippi Bubble,” the best authority is Levasseur's "Law System" (1854). Also consult M. Thiers's “The Mississippi Bubble” (translated by F. F. Fiske, 1859); Steuart's "Political Economy" (1767); and McLeod's “Political Economy Dictionary,” article on "Banking in France."
- 249.
- For the best brief account of the issues of assignats, see President A. D. White's “Inflation of Paper Money in France.” See also F. A. Walker, “Cash,” pp. 336-347; Bazot's "Assignats"; and Alison's “History of the French Revolution” vol. ii, p. 606.
- 250.
- See "Overview of the Bills of Credit or Paper Money of Rhode Island, 1710-1786," in “Rhode Island Historical Records,” No. 8 (1880), by E. S. Potter and S. S. Rider.
- 251.
- See Felt's “History of Massachusetts Currency.” Consult also Minot, Hutchinson, and Gouge. Walker, "Cash," and Sumner, “History of U.S. Currency,” have given considerable accounts of paper experiments in the United States, and should be well studied.
- 252.
- See Walker, "Cash," p. 329.
- 253.
- See J. J. Knox's "U.S. Currency" (1884); the Finance Reports during and since the war to 1879; Spaulding's "War Financial History" (1869); Bowen's "U.S. Political Economy," chap. xv; "Erie Chapters," by H. Adams and F. A. Walker; and the voluminous pages of the “Congressional Record.” For the decisions in the legal-tender cases, see "Banker's Magazine," 1869-1870, p. 712, and 1871-1872, pp. 752, 780. A collection of statutes affecting United States finance, especially since 1860, has been made in a small pamphlet, by Professor C. F. Dunbar (published by Sever, Cambridge, Massachusetts).
- 254.
- Report of 1861.
- 255.
- Mr. Malthus, Dr. Chalmers, M. de Sismondi, and various minor writers. It is especially likely that, in times of commercial depression, the journals of the day will contain arguments to show a general over-production.
- 256.
- Book IV, Chap. II.
- 257.
- This is practically the argument of a little book, "Excessive Saving as a Cause of Commercial Distress" (1884), by Uriel H. Crocker.
- 258.
- Book III, Chap. II, § 4.
- 259.
- "Core Principles," pp. 302-307.
- 260.
- "Essays on Some Unresolved Questions of Political Economy," Essay I.
- 261.
- I at one time believed Mr. Ricardo to have been the sole author of the doctrine now universally received by political economists, on the nature and measure of the benefit which a country derives from foreign trade. But Colonel Torrens, by the republication of one of his early writings, "The Economists disproved," has established at least a joint claim with Mr. Ricardo to the origination of the doctrine, and an exclusive one to its earliest publication.—Mill.
- 262.
- I have in this illustration retained almost the exact words quoted by Mr. Mill from his father's book, James Mill's "Elements of Political Economy" but altered it by changing the trade from Poland to the United States, and by speaking of iron instead of cloth.
- 263.
- “U.S. Political Economy,” p. 481.
- 264.
- For a fuller discussion of this question see Cairnes, "Core Principles," p. 319, ff.
- 265.
- "Guiding Principles," p. 323.
- 266.
- Cairnes, “Core Principles,” p. 301.
- 267.
- Book I, chap. VI, § 4.
- 268.
- I have changed the illustration from England to the United States in this example.
- 269.
- Book III, Chap. II, § 4.
- 270.
- Book III, Chap. I, § 3.
- 271.
- See "Statistical Overview," 1883, pp. 32, 33.
- 272.
- This substitution has been made for Brazil.
- 273.
- See close of last chapter.
- 274.
- I have also changed the illustrations in this chapter so as to apply to the United States.
- 275.
- The examples in this and the next section have been altered so as to apply to the United States.
- 276.
- I have changed the names of the countries in the illustrations contained in this chapter, but have not further altered the language beyond the occasional change of a pronoun.
- 277.
The subjoined extract from the separate essay [“Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy”] previously referred to will give some assistance in following the course of the phenomena. It is adapted to the imaginary case used for illustration throughout that essay, the case of a trade between England and Germany in cloth and linen.
The following excerpt from the separate essay ["Some Unresolved Issues in Political Economy"] mentioned earlier will help in understanding the sequence of events. It's tailored to the hypothetical scenario used for illustration throughout that essay, specifically a trade between England and Germany in cloth and linen.
“We may, at first, make whatever supposition we will with respect to the value of money. Let us suppose, therefore, that, before the opening of the trade, the price of cloth is the same in both countries, namely, six shillings per yard. As ten yards of cloth were supposed to exchange in England for fifteen yards of linen, in Germany for twenty, we must suppose that linen is sold in England at four shillings per yard, in Germany at three. Cost of carriage and importer's profit are left, as before, out of consideration.
"At first, we can make any assumptions about the value of money. Let’s say that before trade starts, the price of cloth is equal in both countries, specifically six shillings per yard. Since we assumed that ten yards of cloth would trade in England for fifteen yards of linen and in Germany for twenty, we have to assume that linen sells in England for four shillings per yard and in Germany for three. We will disregard the shipping costs and the importer’s profit, just like we did before."
“In this state of prices, cloth, it is evident, can not yet be exported from England into Germany; but linen can be imported from Germany into England. It will be so; and, in the first instance, the linen will be paid for in money.
"Considering the current prices, it's obvious that cloth can't be exported from England to Germany right now; however, linen can be imported from Germany to England. This will take place, and initially, the linen will be paid for in cash."
“The efflux of money from England and its influx into Germany will raise money prices in the latter country, and lower them in the former. Linen will rise in Germany above three shillings per yard, and cloth above six shillings. Linen in England, being imported from Germany, will (since cost of carriage is not reckoned) sink to the same price as in that country, while cloth will fall below six shillings. As soon as the price of cloth is lower in England than in Germany, it will begin to be exported, and the price of cloth in Germany will fall to what it is in England. As long as the cloth exported does not suffice to pay for the linen imported, money will continue to flow from England into Germany, and prices generally will continue to fall in England and rise in Germany.
The outflow of money from England to Germany will lead to higher prices in Germany and lower prices in England. Linen prices in Germany will rise to over three shillings per yard, and cloth prices will go above six shillings. The linen imported from Germany into England will drop to the same price as in Germany (not including shipping costs), while cloth prices in England will fall below six shillings. Once cloth becomes cheaper in England than in Germany, it will start to be exported, causing the price of cloth in Germany to decrease to match the price in England. As long as the value of the cloth exported doesn't cover the cost of the linen imported, money will continue to flow from England to Germany, leading to overall price drops in England and increases in Germany.
“By the fall, however, of cloth in England, cloth will fall in Germany also, and the demand for it will increase. By the rise of linen in Germany, linen must rise in England also, and the demand for it will diminish. As cloth fell in price and linen rose, there would be some particular price of both articles at which the cloth exported and the linen imported would exactly pay for each other. At this point prices would remain, because money would then cease to move out of England into Germany. What this point might be would entirely depend upon the circumstances and inclinations of the purchasers on both sides. If the fall of cloth did not much increase the demand for it in Germany, and the rise of linen did not diminish very rapidly the demand for it in England, much money must pass before the equilibrium is restored; cloth would fall very much, and linen would rise, until England, perhaps, had to pay nearly as much for it as when she produced it for herself. But, if, on the contrary, the fall of cloth caused a very rapid increase of the demand for it in Germany, and the rise of linen in Germany reduced very rapidly the demand in England from what it was under the influence of the first cheapness produced by the opening of the trade, the cloth would very soon suffice to pay for the linen, little money would pass between the two countries, and England would derive a large portion of the benefit of the trade. We have thus arrived at precisely the same conclusion, in supposing the employment of money, which we found to hold under the supposition of barter.
When cloth prices fall in England, cloth prices in Germany will also decrease, leading to higher demand for it. On the other hand, if linen prices go up in Germany, prices in England will rise as well, resulting in lower demand for it. As cloth prices drop and linen prices increase, there will be a specific price for both items at which the exported cloth and the imported linen will balance out. At that moment, prices will stabilize since money will stop flowing from England to Germany. What this price point will be depends entirely on the situation and preferences of buyers on both sides. If the decline in cloth prices doesn't significantly boost its demand in Germany, and the increase in linen prices doesn't quickly lower demand in England, a lot of money will move back and forth before balance is achieved; cloth prices will drop significantly, and linen prices will rise until England is paying nearly as much for it as when it produced it domestically. However, if the drop in cloth prices leads to a rapid increase in demand for it in Germany, while the rise in linen prices in Germany quickly decreases demand in England, then the cloth will soon cover the cost of the linen, with minimal money exchanged between the two countries, and England will reap a considerable portion of the trade's benefits. This leads us to the same conclusion about the use of money, which we also found to be true under the assumption of barter.
“In what shape the benefit accrues to the two nations from the trade is clear enough. Germany, before the commencement of the trade, paid six shillings per yard for broadcloth; she now obtains it at a lower price. This, however, is not the whole of her advantage. As the money-prices of all her other commodities have risen, the money-incomes of all her producers have increased. This is no advantage to them in buying from each other, because the price of what they buy has risen in the same ratio with their means of paying for it: but it is an advantage to them in buying anything which has not risen, and, still more, anything which has fallen. They, therefore, benefit as consumers of cloth, not merely to the extent to which cloth has fallen, but also to the extent to which other prices have risen. Suppose that this is one tenth. The same proportion of their money-incomes as before will suffice to supply their other wants; and the remainder, being increased one tenth in amount, will enable them to purchase one tenth more cloth than before, even though cloth had not fallen: but it has fallen; so that they are doubly gainers. They purchase the same quantity with less money, and have more to expend upon their other wants.
It’s pretty obvious how both countries benefit from the trade. Before the trade began, Germany paid six shillings per yard for broadcloth, but now she gets it at a lower price. However, that’s not her only gain. As the prices of all her other goods have increased, the incomes of all her producers have also risen. This doesn’t help them when buying from each other because the prices of what they purchase have gone up at the same rate as their ability to pay. But it does help them when buying things that haven’t increased in price, and even more for anything that has gotten cheaper. So, they gain as consumers of cloth, not just from the drop in cloth prices, but also because of the rise in other prices. Let’s say the increase is one-tenth. The same percentage of their incomes as before will still cover their other needs, and the extra, which has increased by one-tenth, will allow them to buy one-tenth more cloth than before, even if clothing prices hadn’t fallen. But since cloth prices did drop, they benefit in two ways. They spend less money for the same amount and have more left over for their other expenses.
“In England, on the contrary, general money-prices have fallen. Linen, however, has fallen more than the rest, having been lowered in price by importation from a country where it was cheaper; whereas the others have fallen only from the consequent efflux of money. Notwithstanding, therefore, the general fall of money-prices, the English producers will be exactly as they were in all other respects, while they will gain as purchasers of linen.
In England, on the other hand, overall prices have decreased. However, the price of linen has fallen even more than others, thanks to imports from a country where it was cheaper; the prices of other goods have only dropped because of the overall reduction in the amount of money. So, despite the general decline in prices, English producers will remain in the same position as before in every other way, while gaining an advantage as buyers of linen.
“The greater the efflux of money required to restore the equilibrium, the greater will be the gain of Germany, both by the fall of cloth and by the rise of her general prices. The less the efflux of money requisite, the greater will be the gain of England; because the price of linen will continue lower, and her general prices will not be reduced so much. It must not, however, be imagined that high money-prices are a good, and low money-prices an evil, in themselves. But, the higher the general money-prices in any country, the greater will be that country's means of purchasing those commodities, which, being imported from abroad, are independent of the causes which keep prices high at home.”
"The more money is needed to restore balance, the more Germany will benefit from the drop in cloth prices and the rise in overall prices. Conversely, the less money is needed, the more England will gain; the price of linen will remain lower, and her overall prices won't decrease as much. However, it's important to realize that high prices aren't always good and low prices aren't always bad. But the higher the overall prices in any country, the more that country can purchase imported goods that aren't impacted by local factors causing prices to rise."
“In practice, the cloth and the linen would not, as here supposed, be at the same price in England and in Germany: each would be dearer in money-price in the country which imported than in that which produced it, by the amount of the cost of carriage, together with the ordinary profit on the importer's capital for the average length of time which elapsed before the commodity could be disposed of. But it does not follow that each country pays the cost of carriage of the commodity it imports; for the addition of this item to the price may operate as a greater check to demand on one side than on the other; and the equation of international demand, and consequent equilibrium of payments, may not be maintained. Money would then flow out of one country into the other, until, in the manner already illustrated, the equilibrium was restored: and, when this was effected, one country would be paying more than its own cost of carriage, and the other less.”—Mill.
In reality, the price of cloth and linen wouldn't be the same in England and Germany, as suggested here: each would cost more in the country that imports it than in the country that produces it, due to shipping costs, plus the typical profit margin on the importer's investment for the time it takes to sell the product. However, this doesn't mean that each country pays the shipping costs for the goods it imports; adding this cost to the price might discourage demand more on one side than the other, and the balance of international demand and payments might not stay stable. Money would then flow from one country to the other until, as previously discussed, balance was restored: and once that happened, one country would end up paying more than its own shipping costs, while the other would be paying less.—Mill.
- 278.
- See Book III, Chap. XVIII, § 5, of Mill's original work.
- 279.
- "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation," third edition, p. 143.
- 280.
- For an exceedingly good study on the conditions of our foreign trade down to 1873, and a prophecy of the panic of 1873, see Cairnes, "Guiding Principles," pp. 364-374.
- 281.
- "Guiding Principles," p. 357.
- 282.
- The illustrations in this chapter have also been changed, but only so far as to make them apply to the United States.
- 283.
- I am here supposing a state of things in which gold and silver mining are a permanent branch of industry, carried on under known conditions; and not the present state of uncertainty, in which gold-gathering is a game of chance, prosecuted (for the present) in the spirit of an adventure, not in that of a regular industrial pursuit.—Mill. It is, however, worth recalling that gold and silver mining have not been—for large effects on the value of the metals—anything like a permanent branch of industry, but that, in the main, great additions have been obtained suddenly and by chance discoveries.—J. L. L.
- 284.
- See Walker, "Cash," Chap. XIX.
- 285.
- Book II, Chap. V, § 1.
- 286.
- I do not include in the general loan fund of the country the capitals, large as they sometimes are, which are habitually employed in speculatively buying and selling the public funds and other securities.—Mill.
- 287.
- The rate of interest at such crises in New York has several times risen to 400 or 500 per cent per annum.
- 288.
- In this illustration I have retained as nearly as possible the form of that given by Mr. Mill for the trade between England and Germany in cloth and linen.
- 289.
- Book II, Chap. V, § 5.
- 290.
- Book II, Chap. II, § 3.
- 291.
- Cf. Cairnes, “Leading Principles” p. 209.
- 292.
- For a brief bibliography on our own Navigation Laws and the Shipping Question, see Appendix I.
- 293.
- Book III, Chap. III, § 1.
- 294.
- Above, Book III, Chap. II, § 2, and Chap. XX, § 4.
- 295.
- Henry George, however, asserts that, "Regardless of the population growth, the impact of advancements in production and exchange methods is to drive up rent." ("Progress and Poverty" p. 220).
- 296.
- "Core Principles," Part I, chap. v.
- 297.
- For the distinction between normal and market values, see supra, Book III, Chap. II, § 4, and p. 269.
- 298.
- Before beginning this discussion the reader is advised to review the relation of profits to cost of labor, and the dependence of the latter on its three factors, Book II, Chap. V, § 5.
- 299.
- Book I, Chap. IX
- 300.
- Mr. Mill commended, as the most scientific treatment of the subject with which he had met, an "Essay on the Impacts of Machinery," by William Ellis, "Westminster Review," January, 1826.
- 301.
- Although their needs now attract more attention through the extension of newspapers and cheap books, the condition of the laboring-class is certainly better than it was fifty years ago. See Mr. Robert Giffen's "Progress of the Working Class in the Last Fifty Years" (1884), referred to in Book IV, Chap. V, § 1.
- 302.
- A comparison of Chart No. XVII with Chart No. VI will furnish some means of learning whether the building of railways has gone on faster than is warranted by the increase of our crops (see above, pp. 138).
- 303.
- Book I, Chap. V, § 2.
- 304.
- Book II, Chap. I, § 6.
- 305.
- “Advancements of the Working Class in the Past Fifty Years” (1884), page 8.
- 306.
- "Core Values," pp. 278-280.
- 307.
- "Progress of the Working Class in the Last Fifty Years" (1884), being his inaugural address as President of the London Statistical Society, November 20, 1883.
- 308.
- 1825.
- 309.
- 1825.
- 310.
- Wages per day.
- 311.
- Wages per day.
- 312.
- Year 1878.
- 313.
- These mills have not been able to pay ten per cent regularly, as mentioned in Chart No. XIX, but it has merely been supposed that ten per cent were demanded by capital, in order to show that, for such a dividend, it required a diminishing proportion of the price to meet that estimate.
- 314.
- Book II, Chap. V, § 5; see also "North American Review," May, 1884, p. 517.
- 315.
- For the influences of small properties in restraining an undue increase of population, see supra, p. 119. For a more general account of the benefits arising from such holdings, consult Mill's original work, Book II, Chaps. VI and VII, and T. E. Cliffe Leslie's “Land Systems.”
- 316.
- Cf. E. L. Godkin, “North American Review” 1868, p. 150.
- 317.
- Fawcett, "Political Economy Handbook" (last edition), chapter on Co-operation.
- 318.
- Giffen, “Advancements of the Working Class in the Past Fifty Years,” p. 19.
- 319.
- “History of Cooperation in England” (2 vols., 1879), p. 105.
- 320.
- Mr. Holyoake ("History of Cooperation in England," p. 99) quotes as follows from another's experience: "My passbook shows that I paid £1 on November 3rd of last year (1860) to become a member of a co-operative store. I haven't paid anything since, and now I have a credit of £3 16s. 6d., which is nearly three hundred percent return on my investment in just one year. This is mainly because my purchases were large compared to my investment. In a co-operative store, you earn five percent on the money you invest as a shareholder, and if the store is well managed, you can receive an additional seven and a half percent."
- 321.
- For a full account of the proper steps to be taken in establishing a store, with many practical details, see Charles Barnard's "Collaboration as a Business," p. 119.
- 322.
- Cf. Walker, "Wage Issues," p. 276.
- 323.
- Godkin, "North American Review" 1868.
- 324.
- “Co-operation History,” vol. ii, chap. ix.
- 325.
- Holyoake, "History of Cooperation," p. 131.
- 326.
- Godkin, "North American Review" 1868.
- 327.
- Pp. 27, 31, 32.
- 328.
- Barnard, "Collaboration as a Business," pp. 150-152.
- 329.
- Holyoake, “Co-operation History,” p. 235.
- 330.
- See Thornton, “On Work,” p. 370. Also see "Parliament Documents," 1868, 1869, xxxi; “Trade Unions of England,” by the Count de Paris; Brassey's "Work and Pay," chap. xiii.
- 331.
- See Walker, "Wage Debate," p. 283. Also see Mill, Book IV, Chap. VII, § 5, for an account of M. Leclaire's experiments in France with house-painters.
- 332.
See also Von Böhmert, “Gewinnbetheiligung,” second edition, 1878, and Jevons's “Methods of Social Reform” (1883). Professor Jevons (“The State in Relation to Labor,” pp. 146, 147) has given a brief bibliography, which I reproduce here:
See also Von Böhmert, "Profit Sharing" second edition, 1878, and Jevons's "Ways to Improve Society" (1883). Professor Jevons (“The State and Labor,” pp. 146, 147) has provided a short bibliography, which I’m sharing here:
Charles Babbage, “Economy of Manufactures,” chap. xxvi; H. C. Briggs, “Social Science Association,” 1869; H. C. and A. Briggs, “Evidence before the Trades-Union Commission,” March 4, 1868, Questions 12,485 to 12,753 [Parliamentary Documents]; “The Industrial Partnerships Record”; Pare, “Co-operative Agriculture” (Longmans) 1870; Jean Billon, “Participation des Ouvriers aux Bénéfices des Patrons,” Genève, 1877; Fougerousse, “Patrons et Ouvriers de Paris” (Chaix), 1880; Sedley Taylor, “Society of Arts Journal,” February 18, 1881, vol. xxix, pp. 260-270; also in “Nineteenth Century,” May, 1881, pp. 802-811, “On Profit-Sharing”; J. C. Van Marken, “La Question Ouvrière: Essai de Solution Pratique” (Chaix) 1881.
Charles Babbage, "Manufacturing Economy," chap. xxvi; H. C. Briggs, "Social Science Association" 1869; H. C. and A. Briggs, “Evidence for the Trades-Union Commission,” March 4, 1868, Questions 12,485 to 12,753 [Parliamentary Documents]; “The Industrial Partnerships Directory”; Pare, "Collaborative Farming" (Longmans) 1870; Jean Billon, "Workers' Participation in the Bosses' Profits," Genève, 1877; Fougerousse, "Workers and Patrons of Paris" (Chaix), 1880; Sedley Taylor, "Journal of the Arts" February 18, 1881, vol. xxix, pp. 260-270; also in "19th Century," May, 1881, pp. 802-811, “On Revenue Sharing”; J. C. Van Marken, "The Working-Class Question: A Practical Solution Essay" (Chaix) 1881.
- 333.
- In his last edition of his "User guide," Professor Fawcett thus describes a co-operative experiment in agriculture: The most notable example dates back nearly forty years and was initiated by Mr. Gurdon on his estate in Assington, near Sudbury, Suffolk. Mr. Gurdon was deeply moved by the poor conditions of the agricultural workers on his estate, motivating him to take action for their benefit. When one of his farms became available, he offered it to the laborers who worked there at the standard rent of £150 a year. Recognizing that they didn’t have enough capital to farm it, he initially lent them the necessary stock and tools. The laborers formed a company with eleven shares, where no one could own more than one share. This initiative was so successful that within a few years, they saved enough from their profits to repay all the advances, and the stock and tools became theirs. Each share significantly increased in value. Mr. Gurdon was encouraged not just by the financial improvements for the laborers, but also by the overall enhancement of their living conditions. Years later, he offered another larger farm under similar terms. Although no financial records have been published, it's clear that the financial benefits for the laborers were substantial, as they earned at least as much as other workers in the area and were able to acquire valuable assets, including the stock and tools from the farms. A particularly significant aspect of this experiment is that it wasn't conducted by a select group; if laborers who were likely among the least educated in the country could achieve this, it suggests that as the intelligence of our rural population improves, cooperative efforts could be even more effectively applied to agriculture, yielding even better outcomes than those seen in Assington. Descriptions of the peasant ownership system often highlight how strongly the laborer's productivity is motivated by property ownership. When workers farm their own land, they put in maximum effort since they reap the full benefits of their labor. With the increasing use of machinery in agriculture each year, large-scale farming is becoming more beneficial. Therefore, as cooperative farming becomes more feasible, land can be cultivated by groups of laborers, securing many of the benefits linked to peasant ownership while avoiding the downsides of small farming. The shift toward cooperative agriculture will likely be gradual and slow.
- 334.
- Godkin, "North American Review," 1868. Also see Hermann Schultze-Delitsch, "The Development of the Cooperative System in Germany" (1870). This eminent philanthropist died April 29, 1883. For other forms of co-operation, building associations, etc., see Barnard, "Collaboration as a Business"; Pajot, "On Progress through Mutual Aid Societies" (1878).
- 335.
- See “Industry Economics,” by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall, p. 223.
- 336.
- "Wealth of Nations" Book V, chap. ii.
- 337.
- Book II, Chap. I, § 6.
- 338.
- Book III, Chap. XIX, § 5.
- 339.
- A higher rate is now imposed on landed than on professional incomes.
- 340.
- Cf. Walker, "Land and Rent," page 134.
- 341.
- I have changed the sums mentioned in this illustration into our own money.
- 342.
Another common objection is that large and expensive accommodation is often required, not as a residence, but for business. But it is an admitted principle that buildings, or portions of buildings, occupied exclusively for business, such as shops, warehouses, or manufactories, ought to be exempted from house-tax.
Another common objection is that large and costly accommodations are often needed, not for living, but for business. However, it's an accepted principle that buildings, or parts of buildings, used solely for business, like stores, warehouses, or factories, should be exempt from property tax.
It has been also objected that house-rent in the rural districts is much lower than in towns, and lower in some towns and in some rural districts than in others; so that a tax proportioned to it would have a corresponding inequality of pressure. To this, however, it may be answered that, in places where house-rent is low, persons of the same amount of income usually live in larger and better houses, and thus expend in house-rent more nearly the same proportion of their incomes than might at first sight appear. Or, if not, the probability will be that many of them live in those places precisely because they are too poor to live elsewhere, and have, therefore, the strongest claim to be taxed lightly. In some cases it is precisely because the people are poor that house-rent remains low.—Mill.
It has also been argued that rent in rural areas is much lower than in cities, and that it varies among towns and rural areas. Therefore, a tax based on rent would create unequal burdens. However, it's important to note that in places where rent is low, people with similar incomes often live in larger and better homes and end up spending a similar proportion of their incomes on rent than it might seem at first. Alternatively, many of them likely choose to live there specifically because they can’t afford to live elsewhere, which means they have a strong case for being taxed lightly. In some situations, it's exactly because people are poor that rents stay low.—Mill.
- 343.
- I have here also changed the amounts into our own money.
- 344.
- This illustration has also been changed, but only so far as to fit the trade between England and the United States.
- 345.
- Probably the strongest known instance of a large revenue raised from foreigners by a tax on exports is the opium-trade with China. The high price of the article under the Government monopoly (which is equivalent to a high export duty) has so little effect in discouraging its consumption that it is said to have been occasionally sold in China for as much as its weight in silver.—Mill.
- 346.
- A land-tax is, to its extent, an evidence that the state claims a certain right in the soil, and that it stands to the contributor, as it were, in the place of a landlord. This tax, however, is generally so small that it does not materially diminish the rent of land. So far as it goes, it is a tax on rent.
- 347.
- Some argue that the materials and instruments of all production should be exempt from taxation; but these, when they do not enter into the production of necessaries, seem as proper subjects of taxation as the finished article. It is chiefly with reference to foreign trade that such taxes have been considered injurious. Internationally speaking, they may be looked upon as export duties, and, unless in cases in which an export duty is advisable, they should be accompanied with an equivalent drawback on exportation. But there is no sufficient reason against taxing the materials and instruments used in the production of anything which is itself a fit object of taxation.—Mill.
- 348.
- See Lalor's "Encyclopedia," article "Spirits" by David A. Wells.
- 349.
- "U.S. Statistical Abstract," 1883, pp. 2, 3.
- 350.
- The old condition of things was well described by Sydney Smith: "We have to pay taxes on everything that goes in our mouths, covers our bodies, or is under our feet. Taxes on everything that pleases our senses—sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste. Taxes on warmth, light, and transportation. Taxes on everything on earth and in the waters below. On everything imported or grown locally. Taxes on raw materials. Taxes on every bit of value added by people's work. Taxes on the food that satisfies our cravings and the medicine that heals us. On the fur that adorns the judge and the rope that hangs the criminal. On the brass nails of the coffin and the ribbons of the bride. At home or at a meal, whether lounging or up and about, we must pay. The young man without facial hair rides his taxed horse with a taxed bridle on a taxed road, and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine (which has already been taxed at 7 percent) into a spoon (which has been taxed at 30 percent), lies back on his chintz bed (which has been taxed at 22 percent), makes his will, and passes away in the arms of the pharmacist (who has paid £100 for the right to assist in his death). His entire estate is then taxed between 2 to 10 percent; on top of the probate, hefty fees are charged to bury him in the chancel: his accomplishments are inscribed on taxed marble, and he is finally laid to rest, no longer subject to taxes."
- 351.
- “Finance Reform Almanac,” 1883, pp. 107-109.
- 352.
- "Handbook of the Constitution and Administration in Prussia and the German Empire," by Graf Hue de Grais (second edition, 1882), p. 138.
- 353.
- “Budget: Revenues and Expenses of France,” by M. Block (1881), pp. 57, 82.
- 354.
- Taken, with modifications, from Milnes's "Political Economy Issues," p. 377.
- 355.
- Book I, Chap. IV, § 5.
- 356.
- Although Mr. Mill had reference to the French wars in the beginning of this century, his words apply also to the circumstances of our own late war, 1861-1865.
- 357.
- Cairnes, “Core Values,” pp. 381, 382.
- 358.
- Book I, Chap. IV.
- 359.
- Mr. Mill here takes up political considerations, which are not properly to be included in a purely economic treatment. (See the beginning of § 6.)
- 360.
- See "Outline of the History of Political Economy," supra, p. 6, note 1.
- 361.
- For bibliography of the United States shipping question, see Appendix I.
- 362.
- D. A. Wells, "Essays from the Cobden Club," second series, p. 533.
- 363.
- See F. W. Taussig's "Support for Young Industries as Seen in the United States" (1883).
- 364.
- In a letter written February 26, 1866, to Mr. Horace White, published in the Chicago "Tribune" and reprinted in the New York "Country," May 29, 1873.
- 365.
- Business men constantly use the term “production cost” when in reality they mean that which to the economist is expressed by "labor costs." If cost of labor becomes higher, it takes from profits—the place where they feel the difficulties of competition—but they say that the cost of production has risen: the cost, to them, only has risen, that is, the “labor costs,” not "production cost."
- 366.
- Cf. Cairnes, "Core Principles," pp. 324-341; and supra, Book III, Chap. II, § 4.
- 367.
- The fact (sufficiently established by Mr. Brassey) is not considered also that England gives higher wages to operatives than the Continent, and yet England is able to undersell France and Germany in neutral markets. It is evident, however, that England can undersell only in occupations in which she has advantages.
- 368.
- Cairnes, "Core Principles," pp. 382-388.
- 369.
- “Collection,” 1880, pp. 1343-1377.
- 370.
- “Princeton Review,” 1883, p. 222.
- 371.
- The United States have at the present time but five persons engaged in agriculture for each square mile of settled area.
- 372.
- Book IV, Chap. I, § 2.
- 373.
- "Fifteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics, 1884," by Carroll D. Wright.
- 374.
- See Milnes's "Challenges in Political Economy."
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