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EUREKA:
A prose poem.
BY
BY
EDGAR A. POE.
Edgar Allan Poe.
NEW-YORK:
GEO. P. PUTNAM,
OF LATE FIRM OF “WILEY & PUTNAM,”
155 BROADWAY.
MDCCCXLVIII.
NEW YORK:
GEO. P. PUTNAM
FORMERLY OF THE FIRM "WILEY & PUTNAM,"
155 BROADWAY.
1848.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1848,
By EDGAR A. POE,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New-York.
Leavitt, Trow & Co Prs.,
33 Ann-street.
Joined, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1848,
By EDGAR A. POE,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New-York.
Leavitt, Trow & Co. Prs.,
33 Ann-street.
WITH VERY PROFOUND RESPECT,
This Work is Dedicated
TO
ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT.
WITH GREAT RESPECT,
This Work is Dedicated
TO
ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT.
PREFACE.
To the few who love me and whom I love—to those who feel rather than to those who think—to the dreamers and those who put faith in dreams as in the only realities—I offer this Book of Truths, not in its character of Truth-Teller, but for the Beauty that abounds in its Truth; constituting it true. To these I present the composition as an Art-Product alone:—let us say as a Romance; or, if I be not urging too lofty a claim, as a Poem.
To the few who love me and whom I love—to those who feel rather than those who think—to the dreamers and those who believe in dreams as the only real things—I offer this Book of Truths, not as a fact-checker, but for the beauty that exists within its truths, making it genuine. To these individuals, I present this work as an artistic creation: let’s call it a romance; or, if I’m not being too ambitious, as a poem.
What I here propound is true:—therefore it cannot die:—or if by any means it be now trodden down so that it die, it will “rise again to the Life Everlasting.”
What I’m saying is true:—so it can’t die:—or if somehow it is currently suppressed to the point of dying, it will “rise again to Eternal Life.”
Nevertheless it is as a Poem only that I wish this work to be judged after I am dead.
Nevertheless, I want this work to be judged solely as a poem after I'm gone.
E. A. P.
E. A. Poe
EUREKA:[7]
AN ESSAY ON THE MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE.
It is with humility really unassumed—it is with a sentiment even of awe—that I pen the opening sentence of this work: for of all conceivable subjects I approach the reader with the most solemn—the most comprehensive—the most difficult—the most august.
It is with genuine humility—it’s with a sense of awe—that I write the opening sentence of this work: because among all possible topics, I’m presenting the reader with the most serious—the most all-encompassing—the most challenging—the most profound.
What terms shall I find sufficiently simple in their sublimity—sufficiently sublime in their simplicity—for the mere enunciation of my theme?
What words can I find that are simple yet profound—profound yet simple—enough to just express my theme?
I design to speak of the Physical, Metaphysical and Mathematical—of the Material and Spiritual Universe:—of its Essence, its Origin, its Creation, its Present Condition and its Destiny. I shall be so rash, moreover, as to challenge the conclusions, and thus, in effect, to question the sagacity, of many of the greatest and most justly reverenced of men.[8]
I plan to talk about the Physical, Metaphysical, and Mathematical aspects of the Material and Spiritual Universe: its Essence, its Origin, its Creation, its Current State, and its Destiny. I'm even bold enough to challenge the conclusions and, in effect, question the wisdom of many of the most respected and esteemed individuals.[8]
In the beginning, let me as distinctly as possible announce—not the theorem which I hope to demonstrate—for, whatever the mathematicians may assert, there is, in this world at least, no such thing as demonstration—but the ruling idea which, throughout this volume, I shall be continually endeavoring to suggest.
At the outset, let me clearly state—not the theorem I aim to prove—because, despite what mathematicians might claim, there is, in this world, no such thing as proof—but the main concept that I will be consistently trying to convey throughout this book.
My general proposition, then, is this:—In the Original Unity of the First Thing lies the Secondary Cause of All Things, with the Germ of their Inevitable Annihilation.
My main point is this:—In the Original Unity of the First Thing lies the Secondary Cause of All Things, with the Germ of their Inevitable Annihilation.
In illustration of this idea, I propose to take such a survey of the Universe that the mind may be able really to receive and to perceive an individual impression.
To demonstrate this idea, I suggest conducting a survey of the Universe so that the mind can genuinely receive and perceive a unique impression.
He who from the top of Ætna casts his eyes leisurely around, is affected chiefly by the extent and diversity of the scene. Only by a rapid whirling on his heel could he hope to comprehend the panorama in the sublimity of its oneness. But as, on the summit of Ætna, no man has thought of whirling on his heel, so no man has ever taken into his brain the full uniqueness of the prospect; and so, again, whatever considerations lie involved in this uniqueness, have as yet no practical existence for mankind.
Anyone standing at the top of Mount Etna, taking their time to look around, is mostly struck by the size and variety of the view. The only way to possibly grasp the entire scene in its remarkable unity would be to spin quickly on his heel. But just as no one has ever thought to spin around at the summit of Etna, no one has fully understood the complete uniqueness of the landscape; thus, any ideas tied to this uniqueness have yet to become a reality for humanity.
I do not know a treatise in which a survey of the Universe—using the word in its most comprehensive and only legitimate acceptation—is taken at all:—and it may be as well here to mention that by the term “Universe,” wherever employed without qualification in this essay, I mean to designate the utmost conceivable expanse of space, with all things, spiritual and material, that can be imagined to exist within the compass of that expanse. In speaking of what is ordinarily implied by the expression, “Universe,” I shall[9] take a phrase of limitation—“the Universe of stars.” Why this distinction is considered necessary, will be seen in the sequel.
I don’t know of any study that surveys the Universe—using the term in its broadest and truest sense—at all. It’s important to note that by “Universe,” whenever I use it without any qualifiers in this essay, I’m referring to the farthest imaginable expanse of space, including everything, both spiritual and material, that could possibly exist within that expanse. When discussing what is usually meant by the term “Universe,” I will use a limiting phrase—“the Universe of stars.” The reason for this distinction will be explained later.
But even of treatises on the really limited, although always assumed as the unlimited, Universe of stars, I know none in which a survey, even of this limited Universe, is so taken as to warrant deductions from its individuality. The nearest approach to such a work is made in the “Cosmos” of Alexander Von Humboldt. He presents the subject, however, not in its individuality but in its generality. His theme, in its last result, is the law of each portion of the merely physical Universe, as this law is related to the laws of every other portion of this merely physical Universe. His design is simply synœretical. In a word, he discusses the universality of material relation, and discloses to the eye of Philosophy whatever inferences have hitherto lain hidden behind this universality. But however admirable be the succinctness with which he has treated each particular point of his topic, the mere multiplicity of these points occasions, necessarily, an amount of detail, and thus an involution of idea, which precludes all individuality of impression.
But even with writings on the really limited, yet always assumed as the unlimited, Universe of stars, I know of none that surveys this limited Universe in a way that supports conclusions about its individuality. The closest attempt at such a work is found in the “Cosmos” by Alexander Von Humboldt. He addresses the topic, however, not through its individuality but rather its general aspects. Ultimately, his theme focuses on the law of each part of the purely physical Universe, as this law connects to the laws of every other part of this purely physical Universe. His goal is simply synœretical. In other words, he explores the universality of material relationships and reveals to Philosophy any inferences that have previously remained hidden behind this universality. But regardless of how effectively he has summarized each specific point of his topic, the sheer number of these points inevitably leads to a level of detail and a complexity of ideas that prevents any sense of individuality in impression.
It seems to me that, in aiming at this latter effect, and, through it, at the consequences—the conclusions—the suggestions—the speculations—or, if nothing better offer itself the mere guesses which may result from it—we require something like a mental gyration on the heel. We need so rapid a revolution of all things about the central point of sight that, while the minutiæ vanish altogether, even the[10] more conspicuous objects become blended into one. Among the vanishing minutiæ, in a survey of this kind, would be all exclusively terrestrial matters. The Earth would be considered in its planetary relations alone. A man, in this view, becomes mankind; mankind a member of the cosmical family of Intelligences.
It seems to me that, in pursuing this latter effect, and through it, the outcomes—the conclusions—the suggestions—the speculations—or, if nothing better comes to mind, the mere guesses that might result from it—we need something like a mental spin on our heels. We require such a rapid shift in everything around our central point of view that, while the details completely disappear, even the more obvious objects blend into one. Among the disappearing details in this kind of overview would be everything that is solely earthly. The Earth would be seen in its planetary relationships alone. In this perspective, an individual becomes humanity; humanity becomes a member of the cosmic family of Intelligences.
And now, before proceeding to our subject proper, let me beg the reader’s attention to an extract or two from a somewhat remarkable letter, which appears to have been found corked in a bottle and floating on the Mare Tenebrarum—an ocean well described by the Nubian geographer, Ptolemy Hephestion, but little frequented in modern days unless by the Transcendentalists and some other divers for crotchets. The date of this letter, I confess, surprises me even more particularly than its contents; for it seems to have been written in the year two thousand eight hundred and forty-eight. As for the passages I am about to transcribe, they, I fancy, will speak for themselves.
And now, before getting to our main topic, let me draw your attention to a couple of excerpts from a rather remarkable letter that appears to have been found corked in a bottle and floating on the Mare Tenebrarum—an ocean that the Nubian geographer, Ptolemy Hephestion, described well, but which is rarely visited these days, except by Transcendentalists and some other people looking for quirky ideas. The date of this letter, I admit, surprises me even more than its content; it seems to have been written in the year two thousand eight hundred and forty-eight. As for the passages I’m about to share, I think they will speak for themselves.
“Do you know, my dear friend,” says the writer, addressing, no doubt, a contemporary—“Do you know that it is scarcely more than eight or nine hundred years ago since the metaphysicians first consented to relieve the people of the singular fancy that there exist but two practicable roads to Truth? Believe it if you can! It appears, however, that long, long ago, in the night of Time, there lived a Turkish philosopher called Aries and surnamed Tottle.” [Here, possibly, the letter-writer means Aristotle; the best names are wretchedly corrupted in two or three thousand years.] “The fame of this great man depended mainly upon his demonstration that sneezing is a natural provision, by means of[11] which over-profound thinkers are enabled to expel superfluous ideas through the nose; but he obtained a scarcely less valuable celebrity as the founder, or at all events as the principal propagator, of what was termed the deductive or à priori philosophy. He started with what he maintained to be axioms, or self-evident truths:—and the now well understood fact that no truths are self-evident, really does not make in the slightest degree against his speculations:—it was sufficient for his purpose that the truths in question were evident at all. From axioms he proceeded, logically, to results. His most illustrious disciples were one Tuclid, a geometrician,” [meaning Euclid] “and one Kant, a Dutchman, the originator of that species of Transcendentalism which, with the change merely of a C for a K, now bears his peculiar name.
“Do you know, my dear friend,” says the writer, addressing, no doubt, a contemporary—“Do you know that it’s only been about eight or nine hundred years since metaphysicians first agreed to free people from the strange belief that there are only two valid paths to Truth? Believe it if you can! It seems that long ago, in the depths of Time, there lived a Turkish philosopher named Aries, also known as Tottle.” [Here, the letter-writer likely means Aristotle; the best names often get messed up over two or three thousand years.] “The reputation of this great man mainly rested on his explanation that sneezing is a natural mechanism that allows overly deep thinkers to expel unnecessary ideas through their noses; but he also gained quite a bit of fame as the founder, or at least the main promoter, of what was called the deductive or à priori philosophy. He began with what he claimed were axioms, or self-evident truths:—and the now commonly understood fact that no truths are self-evident doesn’t really undermine his theories at all:—it was enough for his purpose that the truths in question were evident in any way. From axioms, he logically moved to conclusions. His most famous followers were Tuclid, a geometrician,” [meaning Euclid] “and Kant, a Dutchman, who originated that form of Transcendentalism which, with just a change from a C to a K, now carries his unique name.”
“Well, Aries Tottle flourished supreme, until the advent of one Hog, surnamed ‘the Ettrick shepherd,’ who preached an entirely different system, which he called the à posteriori or inductive. His plan referred altogether to sensation. He proceeded by observing, analyzing, and classifying facts—instantiæ Naturæ, as they were somewhat affectedly called—and arranging them into general laws. In a word, while the mode of Aries rested on noumena, that of Hog depended on phenomena; and so great was the admiration excited by this latter system that, at its first introduction, Aries fell into general disrepute. Finally, however, he recovered ground, and was permitted to divide the empire of Philosophy with his more modern rival:—the savans contenting themselves with proscribing all other competitors, past, present, and to come; putting an end to all controversy[12] on the topic by the promulgation of a Median law, to the effect that the Aristotelian and Baconian roads are, and of right ought to be, the solo possible avenues to knowledge:—‘Baconian,’ you must know, my dear friend,” adds the letter-writer at this point, “was an adjective invented as equivalent to Hog-ian, and at the same time more dignified and euphonious.
“Well, Aries Tottle thrived at the top, until one Hog, known as ‘the Ettrick shepherd,’ introduced a completely different system, which he called the à posteriori or inductive. His approach focused entirely on sensation. He observed, analyzed, and classified facts—instantiæ Naturæ, as they somewhat pretentiously called them—and arranged them into general laws. In short, while Aries's method was based on noumena, Hog’s depended on phenomena; and the admiration sparked by this latter system was so great that when it first emerged, Aries fell into general disrepute. Eventually, though, he regained respect and was allowed to share the philosophical realm with his more contemporary rival:—the scholars settling for excluding all other competitors, past, present, and future; ending all debate on the topic by establishing a Median law that declared the Aristotelian and Baconian paths as the only valid routes to knowledge:—‘Baconian,’ you must know, my dear friend,” the letter-writer continues, “was a term created as an equivalent to Hog-ian, but at the same time more dignified and pleasing to the ear.”
“Now I do assure you most positively”—proceeds the epistle—“that I represent these matters fairly; and you can easily understand how restrictions so absurd on their very face must have operated, in those days, to retard the progress of true Science, which makes its most important advances—as all History will show—by seemingly intuitive leaps. These ancient ideas confined investigation to crawling; and I need not suggest to you that crawling, among varieties of locomotion, is a very capital thing of its kind;—but because the tortoise is sure of foot, for this reason must we clip the wings of the eagles? For many centuries, so great was the infatuation, about Hog especially, that a virtual stop was put to all thinking, properly so called. No man dared utter a truth for which he felt himself indebted to his soul alone. It mattered not whether the truth was even demonstrably such; for the dogmatizing philosophers of that epoch regarded only the road by which it professed to have been attained. The end, with them, was a point of no moment, whatever:—‘the means!’ they vociferated—‘let us look at the means!’—and if, on scrutiny of the means, it was found to come neither under the category Hog, nor under the category Aries (which means ram), why then the savans went no farther, but, calling the thinker a fool and[13] branding him a ‘theorist,’ would never, thenceforward, have any thing to do either with him or with his truths.
“Now I assure you very clearly,” the letter continues, “that I'm presenting these issues accurately; and you can easily see how such obviously ridiculous restrictions must have hindered the advancement of true Science, which makes its key breakthroughs—as all History will demonstrate—through what seem like instinctive leaps. These outdated ideas restricted exploration to slow movement; and I don’t need to remind you that crawling, among various ways to move, is quite significant;—but just because the tortoise is steady and sure, should we then ground the eagles? For many centuries, the obsession with Hog particularly was so intense that it halted all genuine thought. No one dared to speak a truth they felt indebted to their own soul for. It didn’t matter if the truth was even demonstrably true; because the dogmatic philosophers of that time focused only on the path by which it claimed to have arrived. The outcome was irrelevant to them:—‘the methods!’ they shouted—‘let us examine the methods!’—and if, upon examining the methods, it was found to fit neither in the Hog category nor in the Aries category (which means ram), then the scholars stopped there, labeling the thinker a fool and branding them a ‘theorist,’ refusing ever after to engage either with them or with their truths.
“Now, my dear friend,” continues the letter-writer, “it cannot be maintained that by the crawling system, exclusively adopted, men would arrive at the maximum amount of truth, even in any long series of ages; for the repression of imagination was an evil not to be counterbalanced even by absolute certainty in the snail processes. But their certainty was very far from absolute. The error of our progenitors was quite analogous with that of the wiseacre who fancies he must necessarily see an object the more distinctly, the more closely he holds it to his eyes. They blinded themselves, too, with the impalpable, titillating Scotch snuff of detail; and thus the boasted facts of the Hog-ites were by no means always facts—a point of little importance but for the assumption that they always were. The vital taint, however, in Baconianism—its most lamentable fount of error—lay in its tendency to throw power and consideration into the hands of merely perceptive men—of those inter-Tritonic minnows, the microscopical savans—the diggers and pedlers of minute facts, for the most part in physical science—facts all of which they retailed at the same price upon the highway; their value depending, it was supposed, simply upon the fact of their fact, without reference to their applicability or inapplicability in the development of those ultimate and only legitimate facts, called Law.
“Now, my dear friend,” the letter-writer continues, “it can’t be argued that relying solely on the crawling system would lead people to discover the maximum amount of truth, even over many ages; because stifling imagination is a problem that can’t be offset by absolute certainty in slow processes. But their certainty was far from absolute. The mistake of our ancestors was similar to that of the know-it-all who believes that the closer he holds something to his eyes, the clearer he must see it. They also blinded themselves with the intangible, tempting Scotch snuff of detail; and so the so-called facts of the Hog-ites were not always facts—this is a minor point except for their assumption that they always were. The main flaw, however, in Baconianism—its most regrettable source of error—was its tendency to give power and importance to merely perceptive individuals—those inter-Tritonic minnows, the microscopic scholars—the collectors and sellers of tiny facts, mostly in physical science—facts all of which they peddled at the same price on the street; their value was thought to be based simply on the fact of their fact, without regard to their relevance or irrelevance in developing those ultimate and truly legitimate facts, known as Law.
“Than the persons”—the letter goes on to say—“Than the persons thus suddenly elevated by the Hog-ian philosophy into a station for which they were unfitted—thus transferred from the sculleries into the parlors of Science—from[14] its pantries into its pulpits—than these individuals a more intolerant—a more intolerable set of bigots and tyrants never existed on the face of the earth. Their creed, their text and their sermon were, alike, the one word ‘fact’—but, for the most part, even of this one word, they knew not even the meaning. On those who ventured to disturb their facts with the view of putting them in order and to use, the disciples of Hog had no mercy whatever. All attempts at generalization were met at once by the words ‘theoretical,’ ‘theory,’ ‘theorist’—all thought, to be brief, was very properly resented as a personal affront to themselves. Cultivating the natural sciences to the exclusion of Metaphysics, the Mathematics, and Logic, many of these Bacon-engendered philosophers—one-idead, one-sided and lame of a leg—were more wretchedly helpless—more miserably ignorant, in view of all the comprehensible objects of knowledge, than the veriest unlettered hind who proves that he knows something at least, in admitting that he knows absolutely nothing.
"Than the people," the letter continues, "than those suddenly elevated by the Hog-ian philosophy into a role they were unprepared for—shifted from the kitchens to the drawing rooms of Science—from its storage rooms to its lecterns—than these individuals, a more intolerant and unbearable group of bigots and tyrants has never existed on this earth. Their creed, their text, and their sermon all revolved around the one word ‘fact’—yet, for the most part, they didn’t even understand the meaning of that word. They showed no mercy to anyone who dared to disturb their facts in an attempt to organize them. All efforts at generalization were immediately dismissed with the terms ‘theoretical,’ ‘theory,’ ‘theorist’—in short, any thought was rightly viewed as a personal attack on them. By focusing on the natural sciences while ignoring Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Logic, many of these Bacon-inspired philosophers—narrow-minded, one-sided, and limping on one leg—were more disastrously helpless and woefully ignorant, considering all the knowledge available, than the most uneducated peasant who at least proves that he knows something by admitting he knows absolutely nothing."
“Nor had our forefathers any better right to talk about certainty, when pursuing, in blind confidence, the à priori path of axioms, or of the Ram. At innumerable points this path was scarcely as straight as a ram’s-horn. The simple truth is, that the Aristotelians erected their castles upon a basis far less reliable than air; for no such things as axioms ever existed or can possibly exist at all. This they must have been very blind, indeed, not to see, or at least to suspect; for, even in their own day, many of their long-admitted ‘axioms’ had been abandoned:—‘ex nihilo nihil fit,’ for example, and a ‘thing cannot act where it is not,’ and[15] ‘there cannot be antipodes,’ and ‘darkness cannot proceed from light.’ These and numerous similar propositions formerly accepted, without hesitation, as axioms, or undeniable truths, were, even at the period of which I speak, seen to be altogether untenable:—how absurd in these people, then, to persist in relying upon a basis, as immutable, whose mutability had become so repeatedly manifest!
“Nor did our ancestors have any better claim to speak about certainty, as they blindly followed the à priori route of axioms, or of the Ram. At countless points, this route was not nearly as straight as a ram’s horn. The plain truth is that the Aristotelians built their theories on a foundation far less stable than air; because no such things as axioms ever existed or could possibly exist. They must have been very oblivious, indeed, not to see, or at least to suspect this; for, even in their own time, many of their once-accepted ‘axioms’ had already been discarded:—‘ex nihilo nihil fit,’ for example, and ‘a thing cannot act where it isn’t,’ and[15] ‘there cannot be antipodes,’ and ‘darkness cannot come from light.’ These and many similar claims once accepted without question as axioms or undeniable truths were, even during the time I’m referring to, seen as completely untenable:—how ridiculous for these people, then, to continue relying on a foundation, as unchanging, whose changeability had become so clearly evident!
“But, even through evidence afforded by themselves against themselves, it is easy to convict these à priori reasoners of the grossest unreason—it is easy to show the futility—the impalpability of their axioms in general. I have now lying before me”—it will be observed that we still proceed with the letter—“I have now lying before me a book printed about a thousand years ago. Pundit assures me that it is decidedly the cleverest ancient work on its topic, which is ‘Logic.’ The author, who was much esteemed in his day, was one Miller, or Mill; and we find it recorded of him, as a point of some importance, that he rode a mill-horse whom he called Jeremy Bentham:—but let us glance at the volume itself!
“But even with the evidence they present against themselves, it's easy to show how unreasonable these a priori reasoners are—it’s easy to demonstrate the uselessness and the intangibility of their basic principles overall. I currently have—note that we’re still following the letter—I currently have a book in front of me that was printed about a thousand years ago. A scholar tells me it’s definitely the smartest ancient work on its subject, which is ‘Logic.’ The author, who was highly regarded in his time, was one Miller, or Mill; and we find it noted about him, as a point of some importance, that he rode a mill-horse he named Jeremy Bentham:—but let’s take a look at the book itself!
“Ah!—‘Ability or inability to conceive,’ says Mr. Mill very properly, ‘is in no case to be received as a criterion of axiomatic truth.’ Now, that this is a palpable truism no one in his senses will deny. Not to admit the proposition, is to insinuate a charge of variability in Truth itself, whose very title is a synonym of the Steadfast. If ability to conceive be taken as a criterion of Truth, then a truth to David Hume would very seldom be a truth to Joe; and ninety-nine hundredths of what is undeniable in Heaven would be demonstrable falsity upon Earth. The proposition[16] of Mr. Mill, then, is sustained. I will not grant it to be an axiom; and this merely because I am showing that no axioms exist; but, with a distinction which could not have been cavilled at even by Mr. Mill himself, I am ready to grant that, if an axiom there be, then the proposition of which we speak has the fullest right to be considered an axiom—that no more absolute axiom is—and, consequently, that any subsequent proposition which shall conflict with this one primarily advanced, must be either a falsity in itself—that is to say no axiom—or, if admitted axiomatic, must at once neutralize both itself and its predecessor.
“Ah!—‘The ability or inability to conceive,’ Mr. Mill rightly states, ‘should never be accepted as a measure of axiomatic truth.’ Now, this is such an obvious truth that no one in their right mind would deny it. Not accepting the proposition implies questioning the very nature of Truth itself, which is synonymous with Steadfastness. If we take the ability to conceive as a standard for Truth, then what is true for David Hume would rarely be true for Joe; and ninety-nine percent of what is indisputable in Heaven would be undeniably false on Earth. Therefore, Mr. Mill's proposition[16] stands firm. I won't call it an axiom; I argue this because I am demonstrating that no axioms actually exist. However, with a distinction that could not be questioned, even by Mr. Mill himself, I am willing to concede that, if an axiom does exist, then the proposition we are discussing rightfully deserves to be viewed as an axiom—that no more absolute axiom exists—and, as a consequence, any later proposition that contradicts this one must either be false in itself—meaning it is not an axiom—or, if accepted as axiomatic, must immediately invalidate both itself and its predecessor.”
“And now, by the logic of their own propounder, let us proceed to test any one of the axioms propounded. Let us give Mr. Mill the fairest of play. We will bring the point to no ordinary issue. We will select for investigation no common-place axiom—no axiom of what, not the less preposterously because only impliedly, he terms his secondary class—as if a positive truth by definition could be either more or less positively a truth:—we will select, I say, no axiom of an unquestionability so questionable as is to be found in Euclid. We will not talk, for example, about such propositions as that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, or that the whole is greater than any one of its parts. We will afford the logician every advantage. We will come at once to a proposition which he regards as the acme of the unquestionable—as the quintessence of axiomatic undeniability. Here it is:—‘Contradictions cannot both be true—that is, cannot cöexist in nature.’ Here Mr. Mill means, for instance,—and I give the most forcible instance conceivable—that a tree must be either a tree or not a tree—that[17] it cannot be at the same time a tree and not a tree:—all which is quite reasonable of itself and will answer remarkably well as an axiom, until we bring it into collation with an axiom insisted upon a few pages before—in other words—words which I have previously employed—until we test it by the logic of its own propounder. ‘A tree,’ Mr. Mill asserts, ‘must be either a tree or not a tree.’ Very well:—and now let me ask him, why. To this little query there is but one response:—I defy any man living to invent a second. The sole answer is this:—‘Because we find it impossible to conceive that a tree can be any thing else than a tree or not a tree.’ This, I repeat, is Mr. Mill’s sole answer:—he will not pretend to suggest another:—and yet, by his own showing, his answer is clearly no answer at all; for has he not already required us to admit, as an axiom, that ability or inability to conceive is in no case to be taken as a criterion of axiomatic truth? Thus all—absolutely all his argumentation is at sea without a rudder. Let it not be urged that an exception from the general rule is to be made, in cases where the ‘impossibility to conceive’ is so peculiarly great as when we are called upon to conceive a tree both a tree and not a tree. Let no attempt, I say, be made at urging this sotticism; for, in the first place, there are no degrees of ‘impossibility,’ and thus no one impossible conception can be more peculiarly impossible than another impossible conception:—in the second place, Mr. Mill himself, no doubt after thorough deliberation, has most distinctly, and most rationally, excluded all opportunity for exception, by the emphasis of his proposition, that, in no case, is ability or inability to conceive, to be taken as[18] a criterion of axiomatic truth:—in the third place, even were exceptions admissible at all, it remains to be shown how any exception is admissible here. That a tree can be both a tree and not a tree, is an idea which the angels, or the devils, may entertain, and which no doubt many an earthly Bedlamite, or Transcendentalist, does.
“And now, based on the logic of its own proposer, let’s test one of the suggested axioms. Let’s give Mr. Mill every fair chance. We won't just address any ordinary issue. We’ll choose something more substantial for our inquiry—not an average axiom—certainly not one from what he absurdly calls his secondary class—as if a positive truth could ever be considered more or less true. We won’t discuss propositions like two straight lines can't enclose a space, or that the whole is greater than any of its parts. We’ll give the logician every advantage. We’ll jump straight to a proposition he views as the peak of certainty— the essence of undeniable axioms. Here it is: ‘Contradictions cannot both be true—that is, they cannot coexist in nature.’ Here Mr. Mill means, for example—and I give the strongest possible instance—that a tree must be either a tree or not a tree—that it can’t be a tree and not a tree at the same time: all of which is perfectly reasonable on its own and serves well as an axiom, until we compare it with another axiom he insisted upon a few pages earlier—in other words—using words I’ve used before—until we examine it with the logic of its own proposer. ‘A tree,’ Mr. Mill asserts, ‘must be either a tree or not a tree.’ Fine:—now let me ask him, why. For this simple question, there’s only one answer: I challenge anyone to come up with another. The only answer is: ‘Because we find it impossible to conceive that a tree can be anything other than a tree or not a tree.’ This, I repeat, is Mr. Mill’s only answer: he won’t pretend to offer another. And yet, by his own logic, his answer is clearly not an answer at all; hasn’t he already required us to accept, as an axiom, that our ability or inability to conceive should never serve as a standard for axiomatic truth? Thus all—absolutely all—of his reasoning is lost without direction. Let’s not argue that there should be an exception to this general rule in cases where the ‘impossibility to conceive’ is especially significant, like when we’re asked to imagine a tree both as a tree and not a tree. I urge you not to make this illogical argument; first of all, there are no degrees of ‘impossibility,’ and so no one impossible idea can be more impossible than another; second of all, Mr. Mill himself, likely after careful thought, has clearly excluded any possibility for exceptions by emphasizing that, in no case, should our ability or inability to conceive be considered a standard for axiomatic truth; and thirdly, even if exceptions were allowed at all, we still need to prove how any exception is acceptable here. That a tree can be both a tree and not a tree is a notion that angels or demons might entertain, and surely many a deluded person or Transcendentalist does.”
“Now I do not quarrel with these ancients,” continues the letter-writer, “so much on account of the transparent frivolity of their logic—which, to be plain, was baseless, worthless and fantastic altogether—as on account of their pompous and infatuate proscription of all other roads to Truth than the two narrow and crooked paths—the one of creeping and the other of crawling—to which, in their ignorant perversity, they have dared to confine the Soul—the Soul which loves nothing so well as to soar in those regions of illimitable intuition which are utterly incognizant of ‘path.’
“Now I don’t argue with these ancients,” the letter-writer continues, “not really because of the obvious foolishness of their logic—which, honestly, was completely unfounded, worthless, and totally absurd—but because of their arrogant and misguided rejection of any other paths to Truth besides the two narrow and twisted routes—the one of creeping and the other of crawling—that they have foolishly chosen to limit the Soul to. The Soul that desires nothing more than to rise and explore those vast realms of limitless intuition that have no awareness of ‘path.’”
“By the bye, my dear friend, is it not an evidence of the mental slavery entailed upon those bigoted people by their Hogs and Rams, that in spite of the eternal prating of their savans about roads to Truth, none of them fell, even by accident, into what we now so distinctly perceive to be the broadest, the straightest and most available of all mere roads—the great thoroughfare—the majestic highway of the Consistent? Is it not wonderful that they should have failed to deduce from the works of God the vitally momentous consideration that a perfect consistency can be nothing but an absolute truth? How plain—how rapid our progress since the late announcement of this proposition! By its means, investigation has been taken out of[19] the hands of the ground-moles, and given as a duty, rather than as a task, to the true—to the only true thinkers—to the generally-educated men of ardent imagination. These latter—our Keplers—our Laplaces—‘speculate’—‘theorize’—these are the terms—can you not fancy the shout of scorn with which they would be received by our progenitors, were it possible for them to be looking over my shoulders as I write? The Keplers, I repeat, speculate—theorize—and their theories are merely corrected—reduced—sifted—cleared, little by little, of their chaff of inconsistency—until at length there stands apparent an unencumbered Consistency—a consistency which the most stolid admit—because it is a consistency—to be an absolute and an unquestionable Truth.
"By the way, my dear friend, isn't it a sign of the mental slavery imposed on those narrow-minded people by their Hogs and Rams that, despite their so-called experts constantly talking about roads to Truth, none of them accidentally stumbled upon what we now clearly see as the broadest, straightest, and most accessible road of all—the great thoroughfare—the majestic highway of the Consistent? Isn't it amazing that they failed to realize from the works of God the crucial fact that a perfect consistency can only be an absolute truth? How clear—how fast our progress has been since the recent announcement of this idea! Because of it, investigation has been taken out of[19] the hands of the blind followers and given as a responsibility, rather than a chore, to the true—to the only true thinkers—to the generally educated men of passionate imagination. These individuals—our Keplers—our Laplaces—‘speculate’—‘theorize’—those are the terms—can you imagine the scornful shout with which our ancestors would respond if they could look over my shoulder as I write? The Keplers, I repeat, speculate—theorize—and their theories are simply refined—reduced—sifted—cleared, little by little, of their inconsistencies—until ultimately there stands before us an unobstructed Consistency—a consistency that even the most stubborn admit—because it is a consistency—to be an absolute and unquestionable Truth.
“I have often thought, my friend, that it must have puzzled these dogmaticians of a thousand years ago, to determine, even, by which of their two boasted roads it is that the cryptographist attains the solution of the more complicate cyphers—or by which of them Champollion guided mankind to those important and innumerable truths which, for so many centuries, have lain entombed amid the phonetical hieroglyphics of Egypt. In especial, would it not have given these bigots some trouble to determine by which of their two roads was reached the most momentous and sublime of all their truths—the truth—the fact of gravitation? Newton deduced it from the laws of Kepler. Kepler admitted that these laws he guessed—these laws whose investigation disclosed to the greatest of British astronomers that principle, the basis of all (existing) physical principle, in going behind which we enter at once the nebulous kingdom[20] of Metaphysics. Yes!—these vital laws Kepler guessed—that is to say, he imagined them. Had he been asked to point out either the deductive or inductive route by which he attained them, his reply might have been—‘I know nothing about routes—but I do know the machinery of the Universe. Here it is. I grasped it with my soul—I reached it through mere dint of intuition.’ Alas, poor ignorant old man! Could not any metaphysician have told him that what he called ‘intuition’ was but the conviction resulting from deductions or inductions of which the processes were so shadowy as to have escaped his consciousness, eluded his reason, or bidden defiance to his capacity of expression? How great a pity it is that some ‘moral philosopher’ had not enlightened him about all this! How it would have comforted him on his death-bed to know that, instead of having gone intuitively and thus unbecomingly, he had, in fact, proceeded decorously and legitimately—that is to say Hog-ishly, or at least Ram-ishly—into the vast halls where lay gleaming, untended, and hitherto untouched by mortal hand—unseen by mortal eye—the imperishable and priceless secrets of the Universe!
"I often think, my friend, that it must have puzzled those dogmatists a thousand years ago to figure out which of their two claimed paths the cryptographers used to solve the more complex ciphers—or how Champollion led humanity to the important and countless truths that had been buried for centuries among the phonetic hieroglyphics of Egypt. Especially, wouldn’t it have been a challenge for these bigots to figure out by which of their paths they reached the most significant and profound of all truths—the truth—the fact of gravitation? Newton derived it from Kepler's laws. Kepler admitted that he guessed these laws—these laws whose investigation revealed to the greatest British astronomer that principle, the foundation of all existing physical principles, behind which we immediately enter the hazy realm of Metaphysics. Yes! Kepler guessed these vital laws—meaning, he imagined them. If he had been asked to identify either the deductive or inductive process by which he arrived at them, his response might have been, 'I know nothing about routes—but I do know the machinery of the Universe. Here it is. I grasped it with my soul—I reached it purely through intuition.' Alas, poor ignorant old man! Couldn’t any metaphysician have explained to him that what he called 'intuition' was just the conclusion formed from deductions or inductions whose processes were so obscure that they escaped his awareness, eluded his reason, or defied his ability to express? What a pity it is that some moral philosopher hadn’t shed light on all this for him! How comforting it would have been for him on his deathbed to know that, instead of going intuitively and thus unbecomingly, he had, in fact, proceeded decorously and legitimately—that is to say, Hog-ishly, or at least Ram-ishly—into the vast halls where lay gleaming, untended, and previously untouched by mortal hands—unseen by mortal eyes—the everlasting and invaluable secrets of the Universe!"
“Yes, Kepler was essentially a theorist; but this title, now of so much sanctity, was, in those ancient days, a designation of supreme contempt. It is only now that men begin to appreciate that divine old man—to sympathize with the prophetical and poetical rhapsody of his ever-memorable words. For my part,” continues the unknown correspondent, “I glow with a sacred fire when I even think of them, and feel that I shall never grow weary of their repetition:—in concluding this letter, let me have the[21] real pleasure of transcribing them once again:—‘I care not whether my work be read now or by posterity. I can afford to wait a century for readers when God himself has waited six thousand years for an observer. I triumph. I have stolen the golden secret of the Egyptians. I will indulge my sacred fury.’”
“Yes, Kepler was essentially a theorist; but this title, now of so much respect, was, in those ancient days, a label of deep disdain. It is only now that people begin to recognize that divine old man—to connect with the prophetic and poetic brilliance of his unforgettable words. For my part,” continues the unknown correspondent, “I feel a sacred passion when I even think of them, and I know I will never tire of saying them again:—as I wrap up this letter, let me have the[21] real joy of writing them down once more:—‘I don’t care whether my work is read now or by future generations. I can wait a hundred years for readers when God himself has waited six thousand years for an observer. I am victorious. I have stolen the golden secret of the Egyptians. I will unleash my sacred fury.’”
Here end my quotations from this very unaccountable and, perhaps, somewhat impertinent epistle; and perhaps it would be folly to comment, in any respect, upon the chimerical, not to say revolutionary, fancies of the writer—whoever he is—fancies so radically at war with the well-considered and well-settled opinions of this age. Let us proceed, then, to our legitimate thesis, The Universe.
Here end my quotes from this very mysterious and, maybe, a bit rude letter; and it might be foolish to say anything about the fantastical, if not downright radical, ideas of the writer—whoever that may be—ideas that are completely at odds with the carefully thought-out and established beliefs of our time. Let’s move on, then, to our main topic, The Universe.
This thesis admits a choice between two modes of discussion:—We may ascend or descend. Beginning at our own point of view—at the Earth on which we stand—we may pass to the other planets of our system—thence to the Sun—thence to our system considered collectively—and thence, through other systems, indefinitely outwards; or, commencing on high at some point as definite as we can make it or conceive it, we may come down to the habitation of Man. Usually—that is to say, in ordinary essays on Astronomy—the first of these two modes is, with certain reservation, adopted:—this for the obvious reason that astronomical facts, merely, and principles, being the object, that object is best fulfilled in stepping from the known because proximate, gradually onward to the point where all certitude becomes lost in the remote. For my present purpose, however,—that of enabling the mind to take in, as if from afar and at one glance, a distinct conception of the[22] individual Universe—it is clear that a descent to small from great—to the outskirts from the centre (if we could establish a centre)—to the end from the beginning (if we could fancy a beginning) would be the preferable course, but for the difficulty, if not impossibility, of presenting, in this course, to the unastronomical, a picture at all comprehensible in regard to such considerations as are involved in quantity—that is to say, in number, magnitude and distance.
This thesis presents a choice between two ways of discussing the topic: we can either go up or go down. Starting from our own perspective—here on Earth—we can move outward to the other planets in our solar system, then to the Sun, then to our system as a whole, and then, through other systems, infinitely outward; or we can start from a high point as clearly defined as we can make it or imagine it and work our way down to where humans live. Typically—in regular essays on Astronomy—the first method is chosen, with some exceptions, for the obvious reason that astronomical facts and principles, being the focus, are best understood by moving from what is known and nearby to what becomes increasingly uncertain and remote. For my current purpose, which is to help the mind grasp a clear understanding of the [22] *individual* Universe at a glance, it seems better to move from the large to the small—from the outskirts to the center (if we could establish a center)—and from the end to the beginning (if we could imagine a beginning). However, this approach poses challenges, if not outright difficulties, in presenting a comprehensible picture to those unfamiliar with astronomy regarding factors like quantity—specifically number, size, and distance.
Now, distinctness—intelligibility, at all points, is a primary feature in my general design. On important topics it is better to be a good deal prolix than even a very little obscure. But abstruseness is a quality appertaining to no subject per se. All are alike, in facility of comprehension, to him who approaches them by properly graduated steps. It is merely because a stepping-stone, here and there, is heedlessly left unsupplied in our road to the Differential Calculus, that this latter is not altogether as simple a thing as a sonnet by Mr. Solomon Seesaw.
Now, clarity—making everything understandable at every point—is a key aspect of my overall plan. When it comes to important subjects, it's much better to be a bit long-winded than even slightly unclear. But complexity isn't an inherent quality of any subject per se. All topics can be equally easy to understand for someone who approaches them with the right gradual steps. It's only because a stepping-stone or two is carelessly missing on our path to Differential Calculus that it isn't quite as straightforward as a poem by Mr. Solomon Seesaw.
By way of admitting, then, no chance for misapprehension, I think it advisable to proceed as if even the more obvious facts of Astronomy were unknown to the reader. In combining the two modes of discussion to which I have referred, I propose to avail myself of the advantages peculiar to each—and very especially of the iteration in detail which will be unavoidable as a consequence of the plan. Commencing with a descent, I shall reserve for the return upwards those indispensable considerations of quantity to which allusion has already been made.
To avoid any misunderstandings, I think it’s best to explain as if the reader is completely unfamiliar with even the basic facts of Astronomy. By combining the two methods of discussion that I mentioned, I plan to take advantage of the strengths of each—especially the need for detailed repetition that this approach will require. Starting with a descent, I’ll save the essential discussions on quantity for the upward return.
Let us begin, then, at once, with that merest of words,[23] “Infinity.” This, like “God,” “spirit,” and some other expressions of which the equivalents exist in all languages, is by no means the expression of an idea—but of an effort at one. It stands for the possible attempt at an impossible conception. Man needed a term by which to point out the direction of this effort—the cloud behind which lay, forever invisible, the object of this attempt. A word, in fine, was demanded, by means of which one human being might put himself in relation at once with another human being and with a certain tendency of the human intellect. Out of this demand arose the word, “Infinity;” which is thus the representative but of the thought of a thought.
Let’s start right away with that simplest of words, [23] “Infinity.” Like “God,” “spirit,” and some other terms that have equivalents in all languages, it doesn’t truly express an idea—but rather an attempt at one. It represents the possible effort to grasp an impossible concept. Humanity needed a term to indicate the direction of this effort—the cloud behind which lay, forever unseen, the object of this attempt. In essence, a word was needed for a human to connect with another human and with a certain tendency of human thought. This need gave rise to the word “Infinity,” which thus symbolizes the thought of a thought.
As regards that infinity now considered—the infinity of space—we often hear it said that “its idea is admitted by the mind—is acquiesced in—is entertained—on account of the greater difficulty which attends the conception of a limit.” But this is merely one of those phrases by which even profound thinkers, time out of mind, have occasionally taken pleasure in deceiving themselves. The quibble lies concealed in the word “difficulty.” “The mind,” we are told, “entertains the idea of limitless, through the greater difficulty which it finds in entertaining that of limited, space.” Now, were the proposition but fairly put, its absurdity would become transparent at once. Clearly, there is no mere difficulty in the case. The assertion intended, if presented according to its intention and without sophistry, would run thus:—“The mind admits the idea of limitless, through the greater impossibility of entertaining that of limited, space.”
As for that infinity we're discussing—the infinity of space—we often hear it said that “the mind accepts the idea because the concept of a limit is harder to grasp.” But this is just one of those phrases that even great thinkers have enjoyed using to deceive themselves over time. The trick lies in the word “difficulty.” “The mind,” we’re told, “entertains the idea of limitless because it finds it more difficult to accept that of limited space.” If the statement were simply stated clearly, its absurdity would be obvious right away. Clearly, it's not just a matter of difficulty here. The true assertion, if expressed according to its meaning and without trickery, would be: “The mind accepts the idea of limitless due to the greater impossibility of entertaining that of limited space.”
It must be immediately seen that this is not a question[24] of two statements between whose respective credibilities—or of two arguments between whose respective validities—the reason is called upon to decide:—it is a matter of two conceptions, directly conflicting, and each avowedly impossible, one of which the intellect is supposed to be capable of entertaining, on account of the greater impossibility of entertaining the other. The choice is not made between two difficulties;—it is merely fancied to be made between two impossibilities. Now of the former, there are degrees—but of the latter, none:—just as our impertinent letter-writer has already suggested. A task may be more or less difficult; but it is either possible or not possible:—there are no gradations. It might be more difficult to overthrow the Andes than an ant-hill; but it can be no more impossible to annihilate the matter of the one than the matter of the other. A man may jump ten feet with less difficulty than he can jump twenty, but the impossibility of his leaping to the moon is not a whit less than that of his leaping to the dog-star.
It should be clear that this isn’t a matter of choosing between two statements based on their credibility—or two arguments based on their validity—where reason is called to make a decision. Instead, it involves two conflicting concepts, each clearly impossible, and the intellect is assumed to be able to entertain one because the other is even more impossible. The choice is not made between two difficulties; it's simply imagined to be made between two impossibilities. Of the former, there are degrees—but of the latter, there are none, just as our annoying letter-writer has already pointed out. A task can be more or less difficult, but it is either possible or impossible—there are no in-betweens. It may be more difficult to climb the Andes than it is to climb an ant hill, but annihilating the matter of one is no more impossible than annihilating the matter of the other. A person might jump ten feet with less difficulty than they can jump twenty, but the impossibility of jumping to the moon is no less than that of jumping to the dog-star.
Since all this is undeniable: since the choice of the mind is to be made between impossibilities of conception: since one impossibility cannot be greater than another: and since, thus, one cannot be preferred to another: the philosophers who not only maintain, on the grounds mentioned, man’s idea of infinity but, on account of such supposititious idea, infinity itself—are plainly engaged in demonstrating one impossible thing to be possible by showing how it is that some one other thing—is impossible too. This, it will be said, is nonsense; and perhaps it is:—indeed[25] I think it very capital nonsense—but forego all claim to it as nonsense of mine.
Since all of this is undeniable: since the choice of the mind has to be made between impossibilities of understanding: since one impossibility can't be greater than another: and since, therefore, one can't be preferred over the other: the philosophers who not only argue, based on the reasons mentioned, for man's idea of infinity but, because of that imagined idea, infinity itself—are clearly trying to prove that one impossible thing is possible by showing how some other thing is impossible too. This may be called nonsense; and maybe it is:—in fact[25] I think it's really ridiculous nonsense—but I won’t claim it as my own nonsense.
The readiest mode, however, of displaying the fallacy of the philosophical argument on this question, is by simply adverting to a fact respecting it which has been hitherto quite overlooked—the fact that the argument alluded to both proves and disproves its own proposition. “The mind is impelled,” say the theologians and others, “to admit a First Cause, by the superior difficulty it experiences in conceiving cause beyond cause without end.” The quibble, as before, lies in the word “difficulty”—but here what is it employed to sustain? A First Cause. And what is a First Cause? An ultimate termination of causes. And what is an ultimate termination of causes? Finity—the Finite. Thus the one quibble, in two processes, by God knows how many philosophers, is made to support now Finity and now Infinity—could it not be brought to support something besides? As for the quibblers—they, at least, are insupportable. But—to dismiss them:—what they prove in the one case is the identical nothing which they demonstrate in the other.
The easiest way to show the flaw in the philosophical argument on this issue is by simply pointing out a fact that has been overlooked: the argument actually proves and disproves itself. "The mind is driven," say theologians and others, "to accept a First Cause because it finds it very hard to imagine a cause without end." The trick, as mentioned before, lies in the word "difficulty"—but what is it used to support? A First Cause. And what is a First Cause? An ultimate end of causes. And what is an ultimate end of causes? Finity—the finite. So in one clever twist, through God knows how many philosophers, this argument shifts between supporting Finity and Infinity—couldn't it also support something different? As for the tricksters—they are, at least, unbearable. But to dismiss them: what they demonstrate in one case is exactly the same nothing they prove in the other.
Of course, no one will suppose that I here contend for the absolute impossibility of that which we attempt to convey in the word “Infinity.” My purpose is but to show the folly of endeavoring to prove Infinity itself or even our conception of it, by any such blundering ratiocination as that which is ordinarily employed.
Of course, no one would think that I’m arguing for the absolute impossibility of what we mean when we say “Infinity.” My goal is simply to point out the foolishness of trying to prove Infinity itself or even our understanding of it, using the kind of flawed reasoning that’s typically used.
Nevertheless, as an individual, I may be permitted to say that I cannot conceive Infinity, and am convinced that no human being can. A mind not thoroughly self-conscious—not[26] accustomed to the introspective analysis of its own operations—will, it is true, often deceive itself by supposing that it has entertained the conception of which we speak. In the effort to entertain it, we proceed step beyond step—we fancy point still beyond point; and so long as we continue the effort, it may be said, in fact, that we are tending to the formation of the idea designed; while the strength of the impression that we actually form or have formed it, is in the ratio of the period during which we keep up the mental endeavor. But it is in the act of discontinuing the endeavor—of fulfilling (as we think) the idea—of putting the finishing stroke (as we suppose) to the conception—that we overthrow at once the whole fabric of our fancy by resting upon some one ultimate and therefore definite point. This fact, however, we fail to perceive, on account of the absolute coincidence, in time, between the settling down upon the ultimate point and the act of cessation in thinking.—In attempting, on the other hand, to frame the idea of a limited space, we merely converse the processes which involve the impossibility.
Nevertheless, as an individual, I can say that I cannot grasp Infinity, and I believe that no human can. A mind that isn’t fully self-aware—not[26] used to analyzing its own thoughts—will often trick itself into thinking it has understood the concept we’re discussing. In trying to get a hold of it, we move step by step—we imagine points beyond points; and as long as we keep this effort up, it could be said that we are moving toward forming the idea we intend; however, the strength of the impression that we actually have formed it is related to how long we maintain this mental effort. But it’s when we stop trying—when we believe we’ve completed the idea—when we think we’ve finalized the conception—that we completely dismantle our fantasy by settling on one single, ultimate point. This fact, however, goes unnoticed because of the immediate overlap in time between settling on that ultimate point and stopping the thinking process. On the other hand, when we try to create the idea of a limited space, we merely invert the processes that highlight the impossibility.
We believe in a God. We may or may not believe in finite or in infinite space; but our belief, in such cases, is more properly designated as faith, and is a matter quite distinct from that belief proper—from that intellectual belief—which presupposes the mental conception.
We believe in God. We might or might not believe in finite or infinite space; however, our belief in those cases is better described as faith, and it is quite different from that genuine belief—from that intellectual belief—which requires a mental understanding.
The fact is, that, upon the enunciation of any one of that class of terms to which “Infinity” belongs—the class representing thoughts of thought—he who has a right to say that he thinks at all, feels himself called upon, not to entertain a conception, but simply to direct his mental vision[27] toward some given point, in the intellectual firmament, where lies a nebula never to be resolved. To solve it, indeed, he makes no effort; for with a rapid instinct he comprehends, not only the impossibility, but, as regards all human purposes, the inessentiality, of its solution. He perceives that the Deity has not designed it to be solved. He sees, at once, that it lies out of the brain of man, and even how, if not exactly why, it lies out of it. There are people, I am aware, who, busying themselves in attempts at the unattainable, acquire very easily, by dint of the jargon they emit, among those thinkers-that-they-think with whom darkness and depth are synonymous, a kind of cuttle-fish reputation for profundity; but the finest quality of Thought is its self-cognizance; and, with some little equivocation, it may be said that no fog of the mind can well be greater than that which, extending to the very boundaries of the mental domain, shuts out even these boundaries themselves from comprehension.
The truth is that when someone mentions a term like "Infinity"—a term that represents thoughts about thought—even a person who considers themselves to think at all feels compelled, not to dive into an idea, but simply to focus their mind[27] on a specific point in the intellectual universe, where there's a nebula that will never be fully understood. They don’t actually try to solve it; instead, they quickly grasp both the impossibility and, in terms of all human goals, the inessentiality of finding a solution. They realize that the Deity hasn’t meant for it to be solved. They understand right away that it lies beyond human thought, and even how, if not exactly why, it exists beyond that realm. I know there are people who, in their pursuit of the impossible, easily gain a sort of reputation for depth among those thinkers who equate complexity with clarity, but the true essence of Thought is its self-awareness; and, with a bit of ambiguity, it can be said that no mental fog can be greater than the one that, stretching to the very edges of the mental realm, obscures even those edges from understanding.
It will now be understood that, in using the phrase, “Infinity of Space,” I make no call upon the reader to entertain the impossible conception of an absolute infinity. I refer simply to the “utmost conceivable expanse” of space—a shadowy and fluctuating domain, now shrinking, now swelling, in accordance with the vacillating energies of the imagination.
It should now be clear that, when I use the phrase "Infinity of Space," I’m not asking the reader to imagine the impossible idea of an absolute infinity. I'm simply referring to the “utmost conceivable expanse” of space—a hazy and shifting realm, sometimes contracting, sometimes expanding, based on the changing energies of the imagination.
Hitherto, the Universe of stars has always been considered as coincident with the Universe proper, as I have defined it in the commencement of this Discourse. It has been always either directly or indirectly assumed—at least since the dawn of intelligible Astronomy—that, were it[28] possible for us to attain any given point in space, we should still find, on all sides of us, an interminable succession of stars. This was the untenable idea of Pascal when making perhaps the most successful attempt ever made, at periphrasing the conception for which we struggle in the word “Universe.” “It is a sphere,” he says, “of which the centre is everywhere, the circumference, nowhere.” But although this intended definition is, in fact, no definition of the Universe of stars, we may accept it, with some mental reservation, as a definition (rigorous enough for all practical purposes) of the Universe proper—that is to say, of the Universe of space. This latter, then, let us regard as “a sphere of which the centre is everywhere, the circumference nowhere.” In fact, while we find it impossible to fancy an end to space, we have no difficulty in picturing to ourselves any one of an infinity of beginnings.
So far, the universe of stars has always been thought of as the same as the universe itself, as I’ve defined it at the beginning of this discussion. It has always been either directly or indirectly assumed—at least since the beginning of understandable astronomy—that if we could reach any point in space, we would still find an endless array of stars surrounding us. This was the flawed idea of Pascal when he made perhaps the most successful attempt ever to paraphrase the concept we struggle to express with the word “universe.” “It is a sphere,” he says, “with the center everywhere and the circumference nowhere.” While this definition isn’t really a definition of the universe of stars, we can accept it, with some reservation, as a definition (rigorous enough for all practical purposes) of the universe itself—that is, the universe of space. So, let’s consider this as “a sphere of which the center is everywhere, and the circumference nowhere.” In fact, while we can’t imagine a end to space, we have no trouble visualizing any one of an infinite number of beginnings.
As our starting-point, then, let us adopt the Godhead. Of this Godhead, in itself, he alone is not imbecile—he alone is not impious who propounds—nothing. “Nous ne connaissons rien,” says the Baron de Bielfeld—“Nous ne connaissons rien de la nature ou de l’essence de Dieu:—pour savoir ce qu’il est, il faut être Dieu même.”—“We know absolutely nothing of the nature or essence of God:—in order to comprehend what he is, we should have to be God ourselves.”
As our starting point, let's consider the Godhead. In terms of this Godhead, in itself, only He is not foolish—only He is not disrespectful who proposes—nothing. “Nous ne connaissons rien,” says Baron de Bielfeld—“Nous ne connaissons rien de la nature ou de l’essence de Dieu:—pour savoir ce qu’il est, il faut être Dieu même.”—“We know absolutely nothing about the nature or essence of God:—to understand what He is, we would have to be God ourselves.”
“We should have to be God ourselves!”—With a phrase so startling as this yet ringing in my ears, I nevertheless venture to demand if this our present ignorance of the Deity is an ignorance to which the soul is everlastingly condemned.
“We would have to be God ourselves!”—With a phrase so shocking still echoing in my ears, I still dare to ask if this current lack of understanding of the Deity is an ignorance to which the soul is forever doomed.
By Him, however—now, at least, the Incomprehensible—by[29] Him—assuming him as Spirit—that is to say, as not Matter—a distinction which, for all intelligible purposes, will stand well instead of a definition—by Him, then, existing as Spirit, let us content ourselves, to-night, with supposing to have been created, or made out of Nothing, by dint of his Volition—at some point of Space which we will take as a centre—at some period into which we do not pretend to inquire, but at all events immensely remote—by Him, then again, let us suppose to have been created——what? This is a vitally momentous epoch in our considerations. What is it that we are justified—that alone we are justified in supposing to have been, primarily and solely, created?
By Him, though—now, at least, the Unknowable—by [29] Him—considering Him as Spirit—meaning, as not Matter—a distinction that, for all practical purposes, serves well as a definition—by Him, then, existing as Spirit, let's be satisfied, tonight, with supposing that He was created, or made from Nothing, through His Will—at some point in Space we can consider as a center—at some time we won't delve into, but undoubtedly immensely long ago—by Him, then once more, let’s suppose to have been created——what? This is a critically important moment in our thoughts. What can we rightfully assume—that only we can rightfully assume to have been, primarily and exclusively, created?
We have attained a point where only Intuition can aid us:—but now let me recur to the idea which I have already suggested as that alone which we can properly entertain of intuition. It is but the conviction arising from those inductions or deductions of which the processes are so shadowy as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason, or defy our capacity of expression. With this understanding, I now assert—that an intuition altogether irresistible, although inexpressible, forces me to the conclusion that what God originally created—that that Matter which, by dint of his Volition, he first made from his Spirit, or from Nihility, could have been nothing but Matter in its utmost conceivable state of——what?—of Simplicity?
We’ve reached a point where only intuition can help us:—but let me return to the idea I previously mentioned, which we can accurately think of as intuition. It is simply the belief that comes from those inductions or deductions whose processes are so vague that they slip past our awareness, evade our reasoning, or challenge our ability to articulate. With this understanding, I now state—that an utterly compelling intuition, though inexpressible, drives me to conclude that what God originally created—that Matter which, through his Will, he first brought forth from his Spirit, or from Nothingness, could have only been Matter in its most basic form of——what?—of simplicity?
This will be found the sole absolute assumption of my Discourse. I use the word “assumption” in its ordinary sense; yet I maintain that even this my primary proposition, is very, very far indeed, from being really a mere[30] assumption. Nothing was ever more certainly—no human conclusion was ever, in fact, more regularly—more rigorously deduced:—but, alas! the processes lie out of the human analysis—at all events are beyond the utterance of the human tongue.
This will be the only absolute assumption of my Discourse. I use the word “assumption” in its usual sense; however, I believe that even this primary proposition is very far from being just a mere [30] assumption. Nothing was ever more certain—no human conclusion was ever, in fact, more consistently or rigorously deduced:—but, unfortunately, the processes are beyond human analysis—at least they are beyond what can be expressed by the human tongue.
Let us now endeavor to conceive what Matter must be, when, or if, in its absolute extreme of Simplicity. Here the Reason flies at once to Imparticularity—to a particle—to one particle—a particle of one kind—of one character—of one nature—of one size—of one form—a particle, therefore, “without form and void”—a particle positively a particle at all points—a particle absolutely unique, individual, undivided, and not indivisible only because He who created it, by dint of his Will, can by an infinitely less energetic exercise of the same Will, as a matter of course, divide it.
Let’s now try to imagine what Matter must be like when it reaches its absolute extreme of Simplicity. At this point, Reason instantly jumps to Indistinctness—to a particle—to one particle—a particle of one type—of one character—of one nature—of one size—of one shape—a particle, then, “without form and void”—a particle that is definitely a particle in all aspects—a particle that is completely unique, individual, undivided, and not just indivisible because the one who created it, by the strength of His Will, can easily divide it with a far less intense application of the same Will.
Oneness, then, is all that I predicate of the originally created Matter; but I propose to show that this Oneness is a principle abundantly sufficient to account for the constitution, the existing phænomena and the plainly inevitable annihilation of at least the material Universe.
Oneness, then, is everything I attribute to the originally created Matter; however, I aim to demonstrate that this Oneness is a principle more than enough to explain the structure, the current phenomena, and the clearly unavoidable destruction of at least the material Universe.
The willing into being the primordial particle, has completed the act, or more properly the conception, of Creation. We now proceed to the ultimate purpose for which we are to suppose the Particle created—that is to say, the ultimate purpose so far as our considerations yet enable us to see it—the constitution of the Universe from it, the Particle.
The willingness to bring the primordial particle into existence has accomplished the act, or more accurately the conception, of Creation. We now move on to the ultimate purpose for which we assume the Particle was created—that is, the ultimate purpose as far as our current understanding yet allows us to see it—the formation of the Universe from it, the Particle.
This constitution has been effected by forcing the originally and therefore normally One into the abnormal condition of Many. An action of this character implies rëaction. A diffusion from Unity, under the conditions, involves[31] a tendency to return into Unity—a tendency ineradicable until satisfied. But on these points I will speak more fully hereafter.
This constitution has come about by forcing the originally and thus normally One into the unusual state of Many. Such an action suggests a reaction. A spread from Unity, under these conditions, involves[31] a tendency to revert back to Unity—a tendency that can't be completely removed until it is satisfied. But I will discuss these points in more detail later.
The assumption of absolute Unity in the primordial Particle includes that of infinite divisibility. Let us conceive the Particle, then, to be only not totally exhausted by diffusion into Space. From the one Particle, as a centre, let us suppose to be irradiated spherically—in all directions—to immeasurable but still to definite distances in the previously vacant space—a certain inexpressibly great yet limited number of unimaginably yet not infinitely minute atoms.
The idea of absolute Unity in the original Particle implies that it can be divided infinitely. Let's imagine the Particle as not completely dispersed into Space. From this single Particle, as a center, let's think of it radiating spherically—in all directions—to immeasurable but still definite distances in the previously empty space—a certain incredibly large yet limited number of unimaginably tiny but not infinitely small atoms.
Now, of these atoms, thus diffused, or upon diffusion, what conditions are we permitted—not to assume, but to infer, from consideration as well of their source as of the character of the design apparent in their diffusion? Unity being their source, and difference from Unity the character of the design manifested in their diffusion, we are warranted in supposing this character to be at least generally preserved throughout the design, and to form a portion of the design itself:—that is to say, we shall be warranted in conceiving continual differences at all points from the uniquity and simplicity of the origin. But, for these reasons, shall we be justified in imagining the atoms heterogeneous, dissimilar, unequal, and inequidistant? More explicitly—are we to consider no two atoms as, at their diffusion, of the same nature, or of the same form, or of the same size?—and, after fulfilment of their diffusion into Space, is absolute inequidistance, each from each, to be understood of all of them? In such arrangement, under such conditions, we[32] most easily and immediately comprehend the subsequent most feasible carrying out to completion of any such design as that which I have suggested—the design of variety out of unity—diversity out of sameness—heterogeneity out of homogeneity—complexity out of simplicity—in a word, the utmost possible multiplicity of relation out of the emphatically irrelative One. Undoubtedly, therefore, we should be warranted in assuming all that has been mentioned, but for the reflection, first, that supererogation is not presumable of any Divine Act; and, secondly, that the object supposed in view, appears as feasible when some of the conditions in question are dispensed with, in the beginning, as when all are understood immediately to exist. I mean to say that some are involved in the rest, or so instantaneous a consequence of them as to make the distinction inappreciable. Difference of size, for example, will at once be brought about through the tendency of one atom to a second, in preference to a third, on account of particular inequidistance; which is to be comprehended as particular inequidistances between centres of quantity, in neighboring atoms of different form—a matter not at all interfering with the generally-equable distribution of the atoms. Difference of kind, too, is easily conceived to be merely a result of differences in size and form, taken more or less conjointly:—in fact, since the Unity of the Particle Proper implies absolute homogeneity, we cannot imagine the atoms, at their diffusion, differing in kind, without imagining, at the same time, a special exercise of the Divine Will, at the emission of each atom, for the purpose of effecting, in each, a change of its essential nature:—so fantastic an idea is[33] the less to be indulged, as the object proposed is seen to be thoroughly attainable without such minute and elaborate interposition. We perceive, therefore, upon the whole, that it would be supererogatory, and consequently unphilosophical, to predicate of the atoms, in view of their purposes, any thing more than difference of form at their dispersion, with particular inequidistance after it—all other differences arising at once out of these, in the very first processes of mass-constitution:—We thus establish the Universe on a purely geometrical basis. Of course, it is by no means necessary to assume absolute difference, even of form, among all the atoms irradiated—any more than absolute particular inequidistance of each from each. We are required to conceive merely that no neighboring atoms are of similar form—no atoms which can ever approximate, until their inevitable rëunition at the end.
Now, regarding these atoms that are spread out or dispersed, what conditions can we not just assume, but infer from examining their source and the nature of the pattern evident in their distribution? Unity is their source, and difference from Unity is the nature of the pattern shown in their distribution. We can reasonably assume that this nature is generally maintained throughout the pattern and is part of the design itself: in other words, we can think of ongoing differences at all points from the uniqueness and simplicity of the origin. But, for these reasons, can we truly imagine the atoms as heterogeneous, dissimilar, unequal, and unevenly spaced? More specifically—should we consider that no two atoms, at their dispersion, are of the same nature, shape, or size? And after they are dispersed into Space, does absolute unevenness between them all hold true? In such a setup, under these conditions, we[32] can most easily and quickly grasp the subsequent, most feasible realization of any design like the one I suggested—the design of variety from unity—diversity from sameness—heterogeneity from homogeneity—complexity from simplicity—in short, the greatest possible multiplicity of relation emerging from the distinctly irrelevancy of the One. Therefore, we should be justified in assuming everything that has been mentioned, except for the thought, first, that there’s no need for extra effort in any Divine Act; and, secondly, that the intended objective seems achievable even if some of the mentioned conditions are set aside at the start, just as when all are understood to exist immediately. I mean that some are implied by the others, or are such instant results of them as to make the differences unnoticeable. For example, a difference in size will quickly arise through one atom having a tendency towards a second, rather than a third, due to specific unevenness; this should be understood as specific unevenness between centers of quantity in neighboring atoms with different shapes—a fact that doesn’t interfere with the general even distribution of the atoms. A difference in kind can also be easily seen as just a result of differences in size and shape, taken together: in fact, since the Unity of the Particle Proper implies complete homogeneity, we can’t imagine the atoms, at their distribution, differing in kind without also imagining a special exercise of Divine Will at the release of each atom, aimed at causing a change in its essential nature: such a far-fetched idea is[33] even less reasonable, as the goal at hand is clearly achievable without such complex and thorough intervention. Hence, we come to realize that it would be excessive and thus unphilosophical to attribute to the atoms, considering their purposes, anything more than difference of form at their dispersion, followed by specific unevenness— with all other differences arising immediately from these in the very first processes of mass formation: thus we establish the Universe on a purely geometrical basis. Of course, it is not necessary to assume complete differences, even in form, among all the irradiated atoms—any more than absolute particular unevenness between each atom. We merely need to consider that no neighboring atoms are of similar form—no atoms that could ever come close, until their inevitable reuniting at the end.
Although the immediate and perpetual tendency of the disunited atoms to return into their normal Unity, is implied, as I have said, in their abnormal diffusion; still it is clear that this tendency will be without consequence—a tendency and no more—until the diffusive energy, in ceasing to be exerted, shall leave it, the tendency, free to seek its satisfaction. The Divine Act, however, being considered as determinate, and discontinued on fulfilment of the diffusion, we understand, at once, a rëaction—in other words, a satisfiable tendency of the disunited atoms to return into One.
Although the immediate and ongoing tendency of the separated atoms to return to their original Unity is suggested, as I’ve mentioned, by their abnormal spreading; it’s clear that this tendency will have no effect—it’s just a tendency—until the dispersive energy stops being applied, allowing it, the tendency, to freely seek its fulfillment. The Divine Act, however, when viewed as definitive and ended upon the completion of the diffusion, leads us to understand immediately a rëaction—in other words, a satisfiable tendency of the separated atoms to come back together into One.
But the diffusive energy being withdrawn, and the rëaction having commenced in furtherance of the ultimate design—that of the utmost possible Relation—this design is[34] now in danger of being frustrated, in detail, by reason of that very tendency to return which is to effect its accomplishment in general. Multiplicity is the object; but there is nothing to prevent proximate atoms, from lapsing at once, through the now satisfiable tendency—before the fulfilment of any ends proposed in multiplicity—into absolute oneness among themselves:—there is nothing to impede the aggregation of various unique masses, at various points of space:—in other words, nothing to interfere with the accumulation of various masses, each absolutely One.
But as the diffusive energy is pulled back and the reaction has started to move towards the ultimate goal—that of the utmost possible Relationship—this goal is[34] now at risk of being disrupted in detail because of that very tendency to revert which is meant to achieve it in general. Multiplicity is the aim; however, there’s nothing stopping nearby atoms from immediately slipping back, due to the now achievable tendency—before any proposed goals in multiplicity are fulfilled—into complete unity with one another:—there’s nothing to block the gathering of different unique masses at different points in space:—in other words, nothing to obstruct the collection of various masses, each completely One.
For the effectual and thorough completion of the general design, we thus see the necessity for a repulsion of limited capacity—a separative something which, on withdrawal of the diffusive Volition, shall at the same time allow the approach, and forbid the junction, of the atoms; suffering them infinitely to approximate, while denying them positive contact; in a word, having the power—up to a certain epoch—of preventing their coalition, but no ability to interfere with their coalescence in any respect or degree. The repulsion, already considered as so peculiarly limited in other regards, must be understood, let me repeat, as having power to prevent absolute coalition, only up to a certain epoch. Unless we are to conceive that the appetite for Unity among the atoms is doomed to be satisfied never;—unless we are to conceive that what had a beginning is to have no end—a conception which cannot really be entertained, however much we may talk or dream of entertaining it—we are forced to conclude that the repulsive influence imagined, will, finally—under pressure of the Unitendency collectively applied, but never and in no degree[35] until, on fulfilment of the Divine purposes, such collective application shall be naturally made—yield to a force which, at that ultimate epoch, shall be the superior force precisely to the extent required, and thus permit the universal subsidence into the inevitable, because original and therefore normal, One.—The conditions here to be reconciled are difficult indeed:—we cannot even comprehend the possibility of their conciliation;—nevertheless, the apparent impossibility is brilliantly suggestive.
To effectively and thoroughly complete the overall design, we see the need for a limited repulsion—a separative something that, when the diffusive Volition is removed, allows the atoms to get close but prevents them from joining. It permits them to approach infinitely while denying them direct contact; in short, it has the power—up to a certain point—to stop them from coalescing, but has no ability to interfere with their union in any way or to any extent. This repulsion, which we have already considered to be limited in other ways, must be understood, let me emphasize, as being able to prevent complete fusion only up to a certain point. Unless we think the atoms' desire for Unity will never be fulfilled—unless we believe that something that began will have no end—an idea that we can’t truly accept, no matter how much we might talk about it—we must conclude that the imagined repulsive influence will ultimately yield to a force that, at that final point, will be precisely the force needed and will allow a universal return to the inevitable, which is original and thus normal, One. The conditions that need to be reconciled here are indeed challenging: we can’t even grasp the possibility of their reconciliation; however, the apparent impossibility is strikingly suggestive.
That the repulsive something actually exists, we see. Man neither employs, nor knows, a force sufficient to bring two atoms into contact. This is but the well-established proposition of the impenetrability of matter. All Experiment proves—all Philosophy admits it. The design of the repulsion—the necessity for its existence—I have endeavored to show; but from all attempt at investigating its nature have religiously abstained; this on account of an intuitive conviction that the principle at issue is strictly spiritual—lies in a recess impervious to our present understanding—lies involved in a consideration of what now—in our human state—is not to be considered—in a consideration of Spirit in itself. I feel, in a word, that here the God has interposed, and here only, because here and here only the knot demanded the interposition of the God.
That the disgusting thing actually exists, we see. Humans neither use nor understand a force strong enough to bring two atoms together. This is just the established principle of the impenetrability of matter. All experimentation confirms it—every philosophy accepts it. I have tried to show the purpose of the repulsion and the necessity of its existence; however, I have intentionally avoided investigating its nature. I do this because I have a strong belief that the principle in question is purely spiritual—it lies in a realm that our current understanding can’t access—it’s wrapped up in considering what, in our human condition, is not to be examined—in a consideration of Spirit in itself. In short, I sense that this is where God has intervened, and only here, because it's the only place where the situation required divine intervention.
In fact, while the tendency of the diffused atoms to return into Unity, will be recognized, at once, as the principle of the Newtonian Gravity, what I have spoken of as a repulsive influence prescribing limits to the (immediate) satisfaction of the tendency, will be understood as that which we have been in the practice of designating now as[36] heat, now as magnetism, now as electricity; displaying our ignorance of its awful character in the vacillation of the phraseology with which we endeavor to circumscribe it.
Actually, while the tendency of the spread-out atoms to return to Unity will be immediately recognized as the principle of Newtonian Gravity, what I've referred to as a repulsive force that sets limits on the immediate fulfillment of this tendency will be understood as what we now commonly call[36] heat, sometimes magnetism, and at other times electricity; showing our lack of understanding of its profound nature in the inconsistency of the terminology we use to describe it.
Calling it, merely for the moment, electricity, we know that all experimental analysis of electricity has given, as an ultimate result, the principle, or seeming principle, heterogeneity. Only where things differ is electricity apparent; and it is presumable that they never differ where it is not developed at least, if not apparent. Now, this result is in the fullest keeping with that which I have reached unempirically. The design of the repulsive influence I have maintained to be that of preventing immediate Unity among the diffused atoms; and these atoms are represented as different each from each. Difference is their character—their essentiality—just as no-difference was the essentiality of their source. When we say, then, that an attempt to bring any two of these atoms together would induce an effort, on the part of the repulsive influence, to prevent the contact, we may as well use the strictly convertible sentence that an attempt to bring together any two differences will result in a development of electricity. All existing bodies, of course, are composed of these atoms in proximate contact, and are therefore to be considered as mere assemblages of more or fewer differences; and the resistance made by the repulsive spirit, on bringing together any two such assemblages, would be in the ratio of the two sums of the differences in each:—an expression which, when reduced, is equivalent to this:—The amount of electricity developed on the approximation of two bodies, is proportional[37] to the difference between the respective sums of the atoms of which the bodies are composed. That no two bodies are absolutely alike, is a simple corollary from all that has been here said. Electricity, therefore, existing always, is developed whenever any bodies, but manifested only when bodies of appreciable difference, are brought into approximation.
For now, let's just call it electricity. We know that all experiments on electricity have ultimately shown the principle, or what seems to be the principle, of heterogeneity. Only where things are different does electricity become noticeable; and it's likely that they never differ where it isn’t at least developed, if not visible. This finding aligns perfectly with what I've concluded through non-experimental means. I assert that the purpose of the repulsive force is to prevent immediate unity among the dispersed atoms; these atoms are inherently different from one another. Difference is their defining characteristic—just as no-difference was the defining characteristic of their origin. Thus, when we say that trying to bring any two of these atoms together would provoke the repulsive force to prevent contact, we can just as easily say that attempting to unite any two differences will result in an increase in electricity. All existing matter is, of course, made up of these atoms in close proximity, and should therefore be seen as collections of varying degrees of difference. The resistance exerted by the repulsive force when attempting to bring together any two such collections would be proportional to the sum of differences in each:—which distills down to this:—The amount of electricity generated when two bodies come closer is proportional[37] to the difference between the total values of the atoms that make up those bodies. The fact that no two bodies are absolutely identical is a straightforward conclusion from everything stated here. Therefore, electricity always exists, but it is developed whenever any bodies, but only manifested when there are significant differences, are brought close together.
To electricity—so, for the present, continuing to call it—we may not be wrong in referring the various physical appearances of light, heat and magnetism; but far less shall we be liable to err in attributing to this strictly spiritual principle the more important phænomena of vitality, consciousness and Thought. On this topic, however, I need pause here merely to suggest that these phænomena, whether observed generally or in detail, seem to proceed at least in the ratio of the heterogeneous.
To electricity—so, for now, continuing to call it that—we may not be wrong in linking the different physical manifestations of light, heat, and magnetism; but we are even less likely to be mistaken in connecting this strictly spiritual principle to the more significant phenomena of vitality, consciousness, and Thought. On this subject, however, I need to pause here just to suggest that these phenomena, whether viewed broadly or in detail, seem to occur at least in relation to the diverse.
Discarding now the two equivocal terms, “gravitation” and “electricity,” let us adopt the more definite expressions, “attraction” and “repulsion.” The former is the body; the latter the soul: the one is the material; the other the spiritual, principle of the Universe. No other principles exist. All phænomena are referable to one, or to the other, or to both combined. So rigorously is this the case—so thoroughly demonstrable is it that attraction and repulsion are the sole properties through which we perceive the Universe—in other words, by which Matter is manifested to Mind—that, for all merely argumentative purposes, we are fully justified in assuming that matter exists only as attraction and repulsion—that attraction and repulsion are matter:—there being no conceivable case in which we[38] may not employ the term “matter” and the terms “attraction” and “repulsion,” taken together, as equivalent, and therefore convertible, expressions in Logic.
Setting aside the two vague terms, “gravitation” and “electricity,” let’s use the clearer terms, “attraction” and “repulsion.” The former represents the body; the latter represents the soul: one is the material; the other is the spiritual principle of the Universe. No other principles exist. All phenomena can be attributed to one of these, or to both combined. This is so rigorously demonstrated—that attraction and repulsion are the only properties through which we perceive the Universe—in other words, the ways Matter is shown to Mind—that, for any purely argumentative purposes, we can confidently assume that matter exists only as attraction and repulsion—that attraction and repulsion are matter:—there's no conceivable situation in which we[38] cannot use the term “matter” and the terms “attraction” and “repulsion” together as equivalent, and therefore interchangeable, terms in Logic.
I said, just now, that what I have described as the tendency of the diffused atoms to return into their original unity, would be understood as the principle of the Newtonian law of gravity: and, in fact, there can be little difficulty in such an understanding, if we look at the Newtonian gravity in a merely general view, as a force impelling matter to seek matter; that is to say, when we pay no attention to the known modus operandi of the Newtonian force. The general coincidence satisfies us; but, upon looking closely, we see, in detail, much that appears incoincident, and much in regard to which no coincidence, at least, is established. For example; the Newtonian gravity, when we think of it in certain moods, does not seem to be a tendency to oneness at all, but rather a tendency of all bodies in all directions—a phrase apparently expressive of a tendency to diffusion. Here, then, is an incoincidence. Again; when we reflect on the mathematical law governing the Newtonian tendency, we see clearly that no coincidence has been made good, in respect of the modus operandi, at least, between gravitation as known to exist and that seemingly simple and direct tendency which I have assumed.
I just mentioned that what I've described as the tendency of dispersed atoms to return to their original unity can be understood as the principle of Newton's law of gravity. In fact, this understanding isn't too difficult if we consider Newtonian gravity in a general way—as a force that drives matter to seek out matter. In other words, if we don't focus on the specific way that the Newtonian force operates. The general similarity is satisfying to us; however, upon closer inspection, we find many details that seem inconsistent and many areas where no clear similarity exists. For instance, when we think about Newtonian gravity in certain ways, it doesn't seem like a tendency toward unity at all, but rather a tendency for all bodies to move in all directions—a phrase that suggests a tendency toward diffusion. Here, then, is an inconsistency. Additionally, when we think about the mathematical law that describes the Newtonian tendency, it's clear that there's no clear similarity regarding the way it operates between the gravitational force as we observe it and the seemingly simple and direct tendency I have suggested.
In fact, I have attained a point at which it will be advisable to strengthen my position by reversing my processes. So far, we have gone on à priori, from an abstract consideration of Simplicity, as that quality most likely to have characterized the original action of God. Let us now see whether the established facts of the Newtonian Gravitation[39] may not afford us, à posteriori, some legitimate inductions.
In fact, I’ve reached a point where it’s wise to reinforce my argument by reconsidering my methods. So far, we’ve approached this from a theoretical standpoint, focusing on Simplicity, as that quality most likely to have defined God’s original action. Now, let’s see if the established facts of Newtonian Gravitation[39] can give us, à posteriori, some valid conclusions.
What does the Newtonian law declare?—That all bodies attract each other with forces proportional to their quantities of matter and inversely proportional to the squares of their distances. Purposely, I have here given, in the first place, the vulgar version of the law; and I confess that in this, as in most other vulgar versions of great truths, we find little of a suggestive character. Let us now adopt a more philosophical phraseology:—Every atom, of every body, attracts every other atom, both of its own and of every other body, with a force which varies inversely as the squares of the distances between the attracting and attracted atom.—Here, indeed, a flood of suggestion bursts upon the mind.
What does Newton's law say?—That all objects pull on each other with forces that are proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. I intentionally started with the basic version of the law; and I admit that, like many simplified versions of important truths, it doesn’t offer much insight. Now, let’s use a more philosophical language:—Every atom in every object attracts every other atom, whether it's from the same object or a different one, with a force that varies inversely with the square of the distance between the attracting and attracted atoms.—Now, a wave of insight comes to mind.
But let us see distinctly what it was that Newton proved—according to the grossly irrational definitions of proof prescribed by the metaphysical schools. He was forced to content himself with showing how thoroughly the motions of an imaginary Universe, composed of attracting and attracted atoms obedient to the law he announced, coincide with those of the actually existing Universe so far as it comes under our observation. This was the amount of his demonstration—that is to say, this was the amount of it, according to the conventional cant of the “philosophies.” His successes added proof multiplied by proof—such proof as a sound intellect admits—but the demonstration of the law itself, persist the metaphysicians, had not been strengthened in any degree. “Ocular, physical proof,” however, of attraction, here upon Earth, in accordance with the Newtonian theory, was, at length, much to the[40] satisfaction of some intellectual grovellers, afforded. This proof arose collaterally and incidentally (as nearly all important truths have arisen) out of an attempt to ascertain the mean density of the Earth. In the famous Maskelyne, Cavendish and Bailly experiments for this purpose, the attraction of the mass of a mountain was seen, felt, measured, and found to be mathematically consistent with the immortal theory of the British astronomer.
But let's clearly see what Newton proved—according to the irrational definitions of proof set by the metaphysical schools. He had to settle for showing how well the motions of an imaginary Universe, made up of attracting and attracted atoms following the law he announced, matched those of the real Universe as far as we can observe it. This was the extent of his demonstration—in other words, this was what it amounted to according to the clichéd language of the “philosophies.” His successes added proof upon proof—proof that a rational mind accepts—but the demonstration of the law itself, the metaphysicians insist, hadn’t been validated in any way. “Ocular, physical proof,” however, of attraction here on Earth, following the Newtonian theory, was eventually provided, much to the satisfaction of some intellectual skeptics. This proof came about incidentally (as almost all significant truths do) from an effort to determine the average density of the Earth. In the well-known experiments by Maskelyne, Cavendish, and Bailly for this purpose, the attraction of a mountain’s mass was observed, felt, measured, and found to align mathematically with the timeless theory of the British astronomer.
But in spite of this confirmation of that which needed none—in spite of the so-called corroboration of the “theory” by the so-called “ocular and physical proof”—in spite of the character of this corroboration—the ideas which even really philosophical men cannot help imbibing of gravity—and, especially, the ideas of it which ordinary men get and contentedly maintain, are seen to have been derived, for the most part, from a consideration of the principle as they find it developed—merely in the planet upon which they stand.
But despite this confirmation of something that didn't need it—in spite of the so-called corroboration of the “theory” by so-called “ocular and physical proof”—and despite the nature of this corroboration—the ideas that even truly philosophical people inevitably absorb about gravity—and especially, the ideas ordinary people grasp and happily hold onto, are understood to be largely derived from looking at the principle as they see it expressed—just on the planet they live on.
Now, to what does so partial a consideration tend—to what species of error does it give rise? On the Earth we see and feel, only that gravity impels all bodies towards the centre of the Earth. No man in the common walks of life could be made to see or to feel anything else—could be made to perceive that anything, anywhere, has a perpetual, gravitating tendency in any other direction than to the centre of the Earth; yet (with an exception hereafter to be specified) it is a fact that every earthly thing (not to speak now of every heavenly thing) has a tendency not only to the Earth’s centre but in every conceivable direction besides.[41]
Now, what does such a limited perspective lead to—what kind of mistake does it create? On Earth, we see and feel that gravity pulls everything towards the center of the Earth. No one in everyday life could be made to see or feel anything different—couldn't perceive that anything, anywhere, has a constant, gravitational pull in any other direction than towards the center of the Earth; yet (with an exception that will be mentioned later) it’s a fact that every earthly thing (not to mention every heavenly thing) tends not only to the Earth’s center but in every direction imaginable too.[41]
Now, although the philosophic cannot be said to err with the vulgar in this matter, they nevertheless permit themselves to be influenced, without knowing it, by the sentiment of the vulgar idea. “Although the Pagan fables are not believed,” says Bryant, in his very erudite “Mythology,” “yet we forget ourselves continually and make inferences from them as from existing realities.” I mean to assert that the merely sensitive perception of gravity as we experience it on Earth, beguiles mankind into the fancy of concentralization or especiality respecting it—has been continually biasing towards this fancy even the mightiest intellects—perpetually, although imperceptibly, leading them away from the real characteristics of the principle; thus preventing them, up to this date, from ever getting a glimpse of that vital truth which lies in a diametrically opposite direction—behind the principle’s essential characteristics—those, not of concentralization or especiality—but of universality and diffusion. This “vital truth” is Unity as the source of the phænomenon.
Now, while philosophers can't be said to err with the common people on this issue, they still unknowingly allow themselves to be influenced by the sentiment of popular belief. “Even though the Pagan myths aren't taken seriously,” says Bryant in his insightful “Mythology,” “we constantly forget ourselves and draw conclusions from them as if they were real.” What I'm claiming is that the simple sensitive perception of gravity as we see it on Earth tricks humanity into thinking about concentralization or speciality regarding it—this notion has been continually swaying even the greatest minds—perpetually, though subtly, guiding them away from the true nature of the principle; thus preventing them, even now, from ever catching a glimpse of that essential truth which lies in the completely opposite direction—beyond the principle’s essential characteristics—those, not of concentralization or speciality—but of universality and diffusion. This “vital truth” is Unity as the source of the phenomenon.
Let me now repeat the definition of gravity:—Every atom, of every body, attracts every other atom, both of its own and of every other body, with a force which varies inversely as the squares of the distances of the attracting and attracted atom.
Let me now restate the definition of gravity:—Every atom of every body attracts every other atom, whether it's from its own body or another body, with a force that decreases as the square of the distance between the attracting and attracted atoms increases.
Here let the reader pause with me, for a moment, in contemplation of the miraculous—of the ineffable—of the altogether unimaginable complexity of relation involved in the fact that each atom attracts every other atom—involved merely in this fact of the attraction, without reference to the law or mode in which the attraction is manifested—involved[42] merely in the fact that each atom attracts every other atom at all, in a wilderness of atoms so numerous that those which go to the composition of a cannon-ball, exceed, probably, in mere point of number, all the stars which go to the constitution of the Universe.
Here let the reader take a moment with me to reflect on the miraculous—the indescribable—the entirely unimaginable complexity of the relationship involved in the fact that each atom attracts every other atom—involved simply in this fact of attraction, regardless of the laws or methods through which that attraction is shown—involved[42] simply in the fact that each atom attracts every other atom at all, in a vast sea of atoms so numerous that those making up a cannon-ball likely outnumber, just in sheer quantity, all the stars that make up the Universe.
Had we discovered, simply, that each atom tended to some one favorite point—to some especially attractive atom—we should still have fallen upon a discovery which, in itself, would have sufficed to overwhelm the mind:—but what is it that we are actually called upon to comprehend? That each atom attracts—sympathizes with the most delicate movements of every other atom, and with each and with all at the same time, and forever, and according to a determinate law of which the complexity, even considered by itself solely, is utterly beyond the grasp of the imagination of man. If I propose to ascertain the influence of one mote in a sunbeam upon its neighboring mote, I cannot accomplish my purpose without first counting and weighing all the atoms in the Universe and defining the precise positions of all at one particular moment. If I venture to displace, by even the billionth part of an inch, the microscopical speck of dust which lies now upon the point of my finger, what is the character of that act upon which I have adventured? I have done a deed which shakes the Moon in her path, which causes the Sun to be no longer the Sun, and which alters forever the destiny of the multitudinous myriads of stars that roll and glow in the majestic presence of their Creator.
If we had simply discovered that each atom had a favorite point—some particularly attractive atom—we would have stumbled upon a revelation that could blow our minds. But what are we really supposed to understand? That every atom attracts and responds to the tiniest movements of every other atom, with each one and all of them simultaneously, forever, and according to a complex law that is completely beyond human imagination. If I try to figure out how one speck in a sunbeam affects another speck nearby, I can’t do that without first counting and weighing all the atoms in the universe and pinpointing the exact position of everything at one moment. If I even move the tiny speck of dust that's resting on my finger by a billionth of an inch, what does that action represent? I've committed an act that shakes the Moon in its orbit, makes the Sun no longer the Sun, and forever changes the fate of countless stars that spin and shine in the magnificent presence of their Creator.
These ideas—conceptions such as these—unthoughtlike thoughts—soul-reveries rather than conclusions or even[43] considerations of the intellect:—ideas, I repeat, such as these, are such as we can alone hope profitably to entertain in any effort at grasping the great principle, Attraction.
These ideas—concepts like these—thoughts that are not clearly articulated—soulful reflections rather than conclusions or even[43] intellectual considerations:—ideas, I repeat, like these, are what we can only hope to meaningfully engage with in any attempt to understand the great principle, Attraction.
But now,—with such ideas—with such a vision of the marvellous complexity of Attraction fairly in his mind—let any person competent of thought on such topics as these, set himself to the task of imagining a principle for the phænomena observed—a condition from which they sprang.
But now, with these ideas—with such a vision of the amazing complexity of Attraction clearly in his mind—let anyone capable of thinking about these topics take on the task of imagining a principle for the phenomena observed—a condition from which they originated.
Does not so evident a brotherhood among the atoms point to a common parentage? Does not a sympathy so omniprevalent, so ineradicable, and so thoroughly irrespective, suggest a common paternity as its source? Does not one extreme impel the reason to the other? Does not the infinitude of division refer to the utterness of individuality? Does not the entireness of the complex hint at the perfection of the simple? It is not that the atoms, as we see them, are divided or that they are complex in their relations—but that they are inconceivably divided and unutterably complex:—it is the extremeness of the conditions to which I now allude, rather than to the conditions themselves. In a word, is it not because the atoms were, at some remote epoch of time, even more than together—is it not because originally, and therefore normally, they were One—that now, in all circumstances—at all points—in all directions—by all modes of approach—in all relations and through all conditions—they struggle back to this absolutely, this irrelatively, this unconditionally one?
Doesn’t the clear connection between atoms suggest they share a common origin? Doesn’t such widespread and deeply rooted sympathy imply a shared parentage? Doesn’t one extreme push our reasoning to the other? Does the endless potential for division point to the completeness of individuality? Does the wholeness of the complex hint at the perfection of the simple? It’s not that the atoms, as we observe them, are divided or that they are complex in their relationships—but they are incredibly divided and profoundly complex: it’s the extremity of the conditions I’m referencing, not the conditions themselves. In short, isn’t it because the atoms were, at some distant point in time, even more unified—because originally, and therefore naturally, they were one—that now, in every situation—at all points—in every direction—through every method of approach—in all relationships and under all conditions—they strive to return to this absolute, this independent, this unconditionally one?
Some person may here demand:—“Why—since it is to the One that the atoms struggle back—do we not find and define Attraction ‘a merely general tendency to a centre?’—why,[44] in especial, do not your atoms—the atoms which you describe as having been irradiated from a centre—proceed at once, rectilinearly, back to the central point of their origin?”
Some might ask: “Why, since the atoms are trying to return to the One, don’t we define Attraction as just a general tendency toward a center?—and especially, why don’t your atoms—the ones you say have been emitted from a center—move straight back to where they came from?” [44]
I reply that they do; as will be distinctly shown; but that the cause of their so doing is quite irrespective of the centre as such. They all tend rectilinearly towards a centre, because of the sphereicity with which they have been irradiated into space. Each atom, forming one of a generally uniform globe of atoms, finds more atoms in the direction of the centre, of course, than in any other, and in that direction, therefore, is impelled—but is not thus impelled because the centre is the point of its origin. It is not to any point that the atoms are allied. It is not any locality, either in the concrete or in the abstract, to which I suppose them bound. Nothing like location was conceived as their origin. Their source lies in the principle, Unity. This is their lost parent. This they seek always—immediately—in all directions—wherever it is even partially to be found; thus appeasing, in some measure, the ineradicable tendency, while on the way to its absolute satisfaction in the end. It follows from all this, that any principle which shall be adequate to account for the law, or modus operandi, of the attractive force in general, will account for this law in particular:—that is to say, any principle which will show why the atoms should tend to their general centre of irradiation with forces inversely proportional to the squares of the distances, will be admitted as satisfactorily accounting, at the same time, for the tendency, according to the same law, of these atoms each to each:—for the tendency to the[45] centre is merely the tendency each to each, and not any tendency to a centre as such.—Thus it will be seen, also, that the establishment of my propositions would involve no necessity of modification in the terms of the Newtonian definition of Gravity, which declares that each atom attracts each other atom and so forth, and declares this merely; but (always under the supposition that what I propose be, in the end, admitted) it seems clear that some error might occasionally be avoided, in the future processes of Science, were a more ample phraseology adopted:—for instance:—“Each atom tends to every other atom &c. with a force &c.: the general result being a tendency of all, with a similar force, to a general centre.”
I respond that they do; this will be clearly demonstrated; however, the reason for their behavior is completely unrelated to the centre as such. They all move in straight lines toward a centre, because of the spherical nature with which they have been spread throughout space. Each atom, which is part of a mostly uniform globe of atoms, finds more atoms in the direction of the centre than in any other direction, and thus is pushed in that direction—but is not pushed because the centre is the point of its origin. Atoms are not connected to any specific point. There is no locality, either tangible or abstract, that I think they are tied to. Nothing resembling location was considered as their origin. Their source is the principle of Unity. This is their lost parent. This is what they always seek—directly—in all directions—wherever it can be partially found; thus lessening, to some extent, the unshakeable drive while moving toward its ultimate fulfillment in the end. From all this, it follows that any principle capable of explaining the law or modus operandi of attractive force in general will also explain this law in particular:—that is, any principle that shows why atoms tend toward their general centre of irradiation with forces that are inversely proportional to the squares of the distances will also satisfactorily explain the tendency, under the same law, of these atoms to each other:—for the tendency toward the[45] centre is simply the tendency of each toward each other, and not any tendency toward a centre as such.—Thus, it will be noted that proving my propositions would not require any necessity to modify the terms of Newton's definition of Gravity, which states that each atom attracts every other atom and so forth, and declares this simply; but (assuming that what I propose is ultimately accepted) it seems clear that some errors could sometimes be avoided in future scientific processes if a more comprehensive wording were used:—for example:—“Each atom tends to every other atom &c. with a force &c.: the overall result being a tendency of all, with a similar force, toward a general centre.”
The reversal of our processes has thus brought us to an identical result; but, while in the one process intuition was the starting-point, in the other it was the goal. In commencing the former journey I could only say that, with an irresistible intuition, I felt Simplicity to have been the characteristic of the original action of God:—in ending the latter I can only declare that, with an irresistible intuition, I perceive Unity to have been the source of the observed phænomena of the Newtonian gravitation. Thus, according to the schools, I prove nothing. So be it:—I design but to suggest—and to convince through the suggestion. I am proudly aware that there exist many of the most profound and cautiously discriminative human intellects which cannot help being abundantly content with my—suggestions. To these intellects—as to my own—there is no mathematical demonstration which could bring the least additional true proof of the great Truth which I have advanced—the[46] truth of Original Unity as the source—as the principle of the Universal Phænomena. For my part, I am not so sure that I speak and see—I am not so sure that my heart beats and that my soul lives:—of the rising of to-morrow’s sun—a probability that as yet lies in the Future—I do not pretend to be one thousandth part as sure—as I am of the irretrievably by-gone Fact that All Things and All Thoughts of Things, with all their ineffable Multiplicity of Relation, sprang at once into being from the primordial and irrelative One.
The reversal of our processes has brought us to the same result; however, while intuition was the starting point in the first process, it became the goal in the other. When I started the first journey, I could only say that, with an undeniable intuition, I felt that Simplicity was the hallmark of God's original action:—but as I conclude the second journey, I can only state that, with an undeniable intuition, I see Unity as the source of the observable phenomena of Newtonian gravitation. So, according to the academics, I prove nothing. That's fine:—I only intend to suggest—and to convince through that suggestion. I proudly acknowledge that there are many profound and discerning minds that are entirely satisfied with my suggestions. For these minds—as for my own—no mathematical demonstration could provide even a fraction of the true proof of the great Truth I have put forth—the truth of Original Unity as the source—the principle of Universal Phenomena. As for me, I'm not entirely sure that I speak and see—I’m not completely certain that my heart beats and that my soul is alive:—about the rising of tomorrow's sun—a possibility that still lies ahead—I don't claim to be even a thousandth as sure as I am of the irrevocably past Fact that All Things and All Thoughts of Things, with all their indescribable Variety of Relation, sprang into existence all at once from the primordial and unrelated One.
Referring to the Newtonian Gravity, Dr. Nichol, the eloquent author of “The Architecture of the Heavens,” says:—“In truth we have no reason to suppose this great Law, as now revealed, to be the ultimate or simplest, and therefore the universal and all-comprehensive, form of a great Ordinance. The mode in which its intensity diminishes with the element of distance, has not the aspect of an ultimate principle; which always assumes the simplicity and self-evidence of those axioms which constitute the basis of Geometry.”
Referring to Newtonian Gravity, Dr. Nichol, the articulate author of “The Architecture of the Heavens,” says:—“In reality, we have no reason to believe this significant Law, as it's currently presented, to be the final or simplest, and therefore the universal and all-encompassing, form of a great Ordinance. The way its intensity decreases with distance doesn't seem like a fundamental principle; which always assumes the simplicity and obviousness of those axioms that form the foundation of Geometry.”
Now, it is quite true that “ultimate principles,” in the common understanding of the words, always assume the simplicity of geometrical axioms—(as for “self-evidence,” there is no such thing)—but these principles are clearly not “ultimate;” in other terms what we are in the habit of calling principles are no principles, properly speaking—since there can be but one principle, the Volition of God. We have no right to assume, then, from what we observe in rules that we choose foolishly to name “principles,” anything at all in respect to the characteristics of a principle[47] proper. The “ultimate principles” of which Dr. Nichol speaks as having geometrical simplicity, may and do have this geometrical turn, as being part and parcel of a vast geometrical system, and thus a system of simplicity itself—in which, nevertheless, the truly ultimate principle is, as we know, the consummation of the complex—that is to say, of the unintelligible—for is it not the Spiritual Capacity of God?
Now, it’s true that “ultimate principles,” as most people understand the term, always seem to embody the simplicity of geometric axioms—(and there’s really no such thing as “self-evidence”)—but these principles are clearly not “ultimate.” In other words, what we usually call principles aren’t truly principles at all—since there can only be one principle, which is the Will of God. Therefore, we have no right to assume anything about the characteristics of a principle from what we observe in the rules we foolishly label as “principles.” The “ultimate principles” that Dr. Nichol mentions, which have geometric simplicity, may very well have this geometric aspect, as they are part of a vast geometric system, and thus a system of simplicity itself—yet within that, the truly ultimate principle is, as we know, the culmination of the complex—that is, the unintelligible—because isn’t it the Spiritual Capacity of God?
I quoted Dr. Nichol’s remark, however, not so much to question its philosophy, as by way of calling attention to the fact that, while all men have admitted some principle as existing behind the Law of Gravity, no attempt has been yet made to point out what this principle in particular is:—if we except, perhaps, occasional fantastic efforts at referring it to Magnetism, or Mesmerism, or Swedenborgianism, or Transcendentalism, or some other equally delicious ism of the same species, and invariably patronized by one and the same species of people. The great mind of Newton, while boldly grasping the Law itself, shrank from the principle of the Law. The more fluent and comprehensive at least, if not the more patient and profound, sagacity of Laplace, had not the courage to attack it. But hesitation on the part of these two astronomers it is, perhaps, not so very difficult to understand. They, as well as all the first class of mathematicians, were mathematicians solely:—their intellect, at least, had a firmly-pronounced mathematico-physical tone. What lay not distinctly within the domain of Physics, or of Mathematics, seemed to them either Non-Entity or Shadow. Nevertheless, we may well wonder that Leibnitz, who was a marked exception to the[48] general rule in these respects, and whose mental temperament was a singular admixture of the mathematical with the physico-metaphysical, did not at once investigate and establish the point at issue. Either Newton or Laplace, seeking a principle and discovering none physical, would have rested contentedly in the conclusion that there was absolutely none; but it is almost impossible to fancy, of Leibnitz, that, having exhausted in his search the physical dominions, he would not have stepped at once, boldly and hopefully, amid his old familiar haunts in the kingdom of Metaphysics. Here, indeed, it is clear that he must have adventured in search of the treasure:—that he did not find it after all, was, perhaps, because his fairy guide, Imagination, was not sufficiently well-grown, or well-educated, to direct him aright.
I quoted Dr. Nichol’s comment not so much to challenge its philosophy, but to highlight the fact that, while everyone acknowledges there is some principle behind the Law of Gravity, no one has clearly identified what that principle actually is:—except for maybe some whimsical attempts to link it to Magnetism, Mesmerism, Swedenborgianism, Transcendentalism, or other equally intriguing isms favored by the same type of people. Newton’s brilliant mind, while confidently grasping the Law itself, hesitated to delve into the principle behind it. Similarly, Laplace, whose insights were at least as broad, if not more so, lacked the boldness to tackle it. Yet, it's perhaps understandable why these two astronomers hesitated. They, like all top-tier mathematicians, focused solely on mathematics: their intellects were firmly anchored in mathematical and physical concepts. Anything that didn’t clearly fall within the realm of Physics or Mathematics seemed to them either non-existent or illusory. Still, it is curious that Leibnitz, who was uniquely different in this regard and whose intellect was a fascinating blend of mathematical and physico-metaphysical thinking, didn’t immediately explore and clarify the matter at hand. Either Newton or Laplace might have searched for a principle and, finding none physical, would have concluded that there simply wasn’t one; but it’s hard to imagine that Leibnitz, after exhausting his inquiries in the physical realm, wouldn’t have boldly and hopefully ventured into his well-known territory in Metaphysics. Clearly, he must have sought out the treasure there: the fact that he didn’t find it might be because his imaginative abilities weren’t quite developed or educated enough to guide him properly.
I observed, just now, that, in fact, there had been certain vague attempts at referring Gravity to some very uncertain isms. These attempts, however, although considered bold and justly so considered, looked no farther than to the generality—the merest generality—of the Newtonian Law. Its modus operandi has never, to my knowledge, been approached in the way of an effort at explanation. It is, therefore, with no unwarranted fear of being taken for a madman at the outset, and before I can bring my propositions fairly to the eye of those who alone are competent to decide upon them, that I here declare the modus operandi of the Law of Gravity to be an exceedingly simple and perfectly explicable thing—that is to say, when we make our advances towards it in just gradations and in the true direction—when we regard it from the proper point of view.[49]
I just noticed that there have been some vague attempts to link Gravity to some pretty uncertain theories. These efforts, while seen as bold—and rightly so—only scratch the surface of the general idea behind the Newtonian Law. As far as I know, its way of working has never really been examined in terms of a clear explanation. So, without any irrational fear of being labeled a madman right from the start, and before I can present my ideas to those qualified to judge them, I want to say that the way Gravity works is actually very simple and can be explained perfectly—provided we approach it in the right steps and from the right perspective.[49]
Whether we reach the idea of absolute Unity as the source of All Things, from a consideration of Simplicity as the most probable characteristic of the original action of God;—whether we arrive at it from an inspection of the universality of relation in the gravitating phænomena;—or whether we attain it as a result of the mutual corroboration afforded by both processes;—still, the idea itself, if entertained at all, is entertained in inseparable connection with another idea—that of the condition of the Universe of stars as we now perceive it—that is to say, a condition of immeasurable diffusion through space. Now a connection between these two ideas—unity and diffusion—cannot be established unless through the entertainment of a third idea—that of irradiation. Absolute Unity being taken as a centre, then the existing Universe of stars is the result of irradiation from that centre.
Whether we come to the idea of absolute Unity as the source of all things by considering simplicity as the most likely characteristic of God's original action; whether we reach it by examining the universality of relationships in gravitational phenomena; or whether we arrive at it through the mutual support provided by both methods; the idea itself, if considered at all, is connected inseparably with another idea—that of the condition of the universe of stars as we now perceive it—specifically, a state of immeasurable diffusion throughout space. A link between these two ideas—unity and diffusion—can only be established by introducing a third idea—that of irradiation. If we consider absolute Unity as a center, then the existing universe of stars is the result of irradiation from that center.
Now, the laws of irradiation are known. They are part and parcel of the sphere. They belong to the class of indisputable geometrical properties. We say of them, “they are true—they are evident.” To demand why they are true, would be to demand why the axioms are true upon which their demonstration is based. Nothing is demonstrable, strictly speaking; but if anything be, then the properties—the laws in question are demonstrated.
Now, the principles of irradiation are known. They are an essential part of the sphere. They fall into the category of undeniable geometric properties. We say about them, “they are true—they are obvious.” To ask why they are true would be like asking why the axioms they’re based on are true. Nothing is demonstrable, strictly speaking; but if anything is, then the properties—the laws in question are proven.
But these laws—what do they declare? Irradiation—how—by what steps does it proceed outwardly from a centre?
But these laws—what do they state? Irradiation—how does it work—what steps does it take to radiate outward from a center?
From a luminous centre, Light issues by irradiation; and the quantities of light received upon any given plane, supposed to be shifting its position so as to be now nearer[50] the centre and now farther from it, will be diminished in the same proportion as the squares of the distances of the plane from the luminous body, are increased; and will be increased in the same proportion as these squares are diminished.
From a bright center, Light spreads outwards; the amount of light hitting any particular surface, which is thought to be moving closer to and then farther from[50] the center, will decrease in the same ratio as the squares of the distances from the light source increase; and it will increase in the same ratio as those squares decrease.
The expression of the law may be thus generalized:—the number of light-particles (or, if the phrase be preferred, the number of light-impressions) received upon the shifting plane, will be inversely proportional with the squares of the distances of the plane. Generalizing yet again, we may say that the diffusion—the scattering—the irradiation, in a word—is directly proportional with the squares of the distances.
The law can be summarized like this: the number of light particles (or, if you prefer, the number of light impressions) hitting the moving surface is inversely proportional to the squares of the distances from the surface. To generalize further, we can say that the diffusion—the scattering—the irradiation, in short—is directly proportional to the squares of the distances.

For example: at the distance B, from the luminous centre A, a certain number of particles are so diffused as to occupy the surface B. Then at double the distance—that is to say at C—they will be so much farther diffused as to occupy four such surfaces:—at treble the distance, or at D, they will be so much farther separated as to occupy nine such surfaces:—while, at quadruple the distance, or at E, they[51] will have become so scattered as to spread themselves over sixteen such surfaces—and so on forever.
For example, at distance B from the bright center A, a certain number of particles are spread out enough to cover surface B. Then, at double the distance—meaning at C—they will be so much more spread out that they will cover four of those surfaces. At triple the distance, or at D, they will be so much farther apart that they will cover nine of those surfaces. Meanwhile, at quadruple the distance, or at E, they will have become so dispersed that they will cover sixteen of those surfaces—and this pattern continues infinitely.
In saying, generally, that the irradiation proceeds in direct proportion with the squares of the distances, we use the term irradiation to express the degree of the diffusion as we proceed outwardly from the centre. Conversing the idea, and employing the word “concentralization” to express the degree of the drawing together as we come back toward the centre from an outward position, we may say that concentralization proceeds inversely as the squares of the distances. In other words, we have reached the conclusion that, on the hypothesis that matter was originally irradiated from a centre and is now returning to it, the concentralization, in the return, proceeds exactly as we know the force of gravitation to proceed.
In saying that the radiation increases in direct proportion to the squares of the distances, we use the term radiation to refer to the extent of the spreading as we move outward from the center. If we flip this idea and use the word “concentralization” to describe the extent of coming together as we move back toward the center from an outward position, we can say that concentralization occurs inversely as the squares of the distances. In other words, we've concluded that, based on the assumption that matter was originally radiating from a center and is now returning to it, the concentralization during the return happens exactly as we understand the force of gravitation to work.
Now here, if we could be permitted to assume that concentralization exactly represented the force of the tendency to the centre—that the one was exactly proportional to the other, and that the two proceeded together—we should have shown all that is required. The sole difficulty existing, then, is to establish a direct proportion between “concentralization” and the force of concentralization; and this is done, of course, if we establish such proportion between “irradiation” and the force of irradiation.
Now here, if we could assume that concentralization perfectly represented the force of the tendency to the center—that one was exactly proportional to the other, and that the two moved together—we would have shown everything needed. The only challenge left is to establish a direct proportion between “concentralization” and the force of concentralization; and this can be achieved, of course, if we establish such a proportion between “irradiation” and the force of irradiation.
A very slight inspection of the Heavens assures us that the stars have a certain general uniformity, equability, or equidistance, of distribution through that region of space in which, collectively, and in a roughly globular form, they are situated:—this species of very general, rather than absolute, equability, being in full keeping with my deduction[52] of inequidistance, within certain limits, among the originally diffused atoms, as a corollary from the evident design of infinite complexity of relation out of irrelation. I started, it will be remembered, with the idea of a generally uniform but particularly ununiform distribution of the atoms;—an idea, I repeat, which an inspection of the stars, as they exist, confirms.
A quick look at the sky shows us that the stars have a certain general uniformity, evenness, or equal spacing in the area of space where they are collectively found, roughly shaped like a globe. This type of general, rather than absolute, evenness aligns with my conclusion of uneven spacing within certain limits among the originally spread-out atoms, as a result of the clear design of infinite complexity arising from chaos. It’s worth noting that I began with the idea of a generally uniform but specifically uneven distribution of the atoms—an idea that is supported by observing the stars as they are.
But even in the merely general equability of distribution, as regards the atoms, there appears a difficulty which, no doubt, has already suggested itself to those among my readers who have borne in mind that I suppose this equability of distribution effected through irradiation from a centre. The very first glance at the idea, irradiation, forces us to the entertainment of the hitherto unseparated and seemingly inseparable idea of agglomeration about a centre, with dispersion as we recede from it—the idea, in a word, of inequability of distribution in respect to the matter irradiated.
But even in the general evenness of distribution regarding the atoms, there seems to be a challenge that, no doubt, has already crossed the minds of some of my readers, especially since I propose that this even distribution is achieved through irradiation from a center. Just a quick look at the concept of irradiation leads us to consider the previously unexamined and seemingly inseparable concept of gathering around a center, along with dispersion as we move away from it—the concept, in short, of inequability of distribution concerning the matter that is irradiated.
Now, I have elsewhere[1] observed that it is by just such difficulties as the one now in question—such roughnesses—such peculiarities—such protuberances above the plane of the ordinary—that Reason feels her way, if at all, in her search for the True. By the difficulty—the “peculiarity”—now presented, I leap at once to the secret—a secret which I might never have attained but for the peculiarity and the inferences which, in its mere character of peculiarity, it affords me.
Now, I have previously[1] pointed out that it’s through challenges like the one we’re discussing—those rough spots—those oddities—those bumps above what’s normal—that Reason, if it’s going to make progress at all, navigates its way in search of the Truth. By facing this difficulty—the “peculiarity”—I immediately grasp the secret—a secret I might not have discovered if not for the peculiarity and the insights that, simply because of its peculiarity, it reveals to me.
The process of thought, at this point, may be thus roughly sketched:—I say to myself—“Unity, as I have [53]explained it, is a truth—I feel it. Diffusion is a truth—I see it. Irradiation, by which alone these two truths are reconciled, is a consequent truth—I perceive it. Equability of diffusion, first deduced à priori and then corroborated by the inspection of phænomena, is also a truth—I fully admit it. So far all is clear around me:—there are no clouds behind which the secret—the great secret of the gravitating modus operandi—can possibly lie hidden;—but this secret lies hereabouts, most assuredly; and were there but a cloud in view, I should be driven to suspicion of that cloud.” And now, just as I say this, there actually comes a cloud into view. This cloud is the seeming impossibility of reconciling my truth, irradiation, with my truth, equability of diffusion. I say now:—“Behind this seeming impossibility is to be found what I desire.” I do not say “real impossibility;” for invincible faith in my truths assures me that it is a mere difficulty after all—but I go on to say, with unflinching confidence, that, when this difficulty shall be solved, we shall find, wrapped up in the process of solution, the key to the secret at which we aim. Moreover—I feel that we shall discover but one possible solution of the difficulty; this for the reason that, were there two, one would be supererogatory—would be fruitless—would be empty—would contain no key—since no duplicate key can be needed to any secret of Nature.
The thought process at this point can be roughly outlined like this: I tell myself, “Unity, as I’ve explained it, is a truth—I feel it. Diffusion is a truth—I see it. Irradiation, which is the only way to reconcile these two truths, is a truth I recognize. The equability of diffusion, first deduced à priori and then confirmed by observing phenomena, is also a truth—I fully accept that. So far, everything around me is clear: there are no clouds hiding the secret—the big secret of the gravitational modus operandi—it must be nearby; and if there were any cloud in sight, I’d be led to suspect that cloud.” And right as I say this, a cloud does appear. This cloud represents the seeming impossibility of reconciling my truth of irradiation with my truth of equability of diffusion. I now say: “Behind this seeming impossibility is what I’m looking for.” I don’t say “real impossibility;” my unwavering belief in my truths tells me it’s just a challenge after all—but I continue to assert, with steadfast confidence, that when this difficulty is solved, we will find within the process of solution the key to the secret we’re seeking. Moreover—I believe we will find only one possible solution to the difficulty; this is because if there were two, one would be unnecessary—would be pointless—would be void—would hold no key—since no duplicate key is needed for any secret of Nature.
And now, let us see:—Our usual notions of irradiation—in fact all our distinct notions of it—are caught merely from the process as we see it exemplified in Light. Here there is a continuous outpouring of ray-streams, and with a force which we have at least no right to suppose varies at[54] all. Now, in any such irradiation as this—continuous and of unvarying force—the regions nearer the centre must inevitably be always more crowded with the irradiated matter than the regions more remote. But I have assumed no such irradiation as this. I assumed no continuous irradiation; and for the simple reason that such an assumption would have involved, first, the necessity of entertaining a conception which I have shown no man can entertain, and which (as I will more fully explain hereafter) all observation of the firmament refutes—the conception of the absolute infinity of the Universe of stars—and would have involved, secondly, the impossibility of understanding a rëaction—that is, gravitation—as existing now—since, while an act is continued, no rëaction, of course, can take place. My assumption, then, or rather my inevitable deduction from just premises—was that of a determinate irradiation—one finally discontinued.
And now, let’s take a look:—Our usual ideas about irradiation—in fact all of our specific ideas about it—come solely from the process as we see it demonstrated in Light. Here, there is a continuous outpouring of ray-streams, and with a force that we have no reason to believe varies at[54] all. In any such irradiation like this—continuous and of unchanging force—the areas closer to the center must inevitably have more irradiated matter than the areas farther away. But I have not assumed any such irradiation like this. I did not assume any continuous irradiation; and for the simple reason that such an assumption would have required considering a concept that I have shown no one can accept, and which (as I will explain further later on) is refuted by all observations of the night sky—the idea of the absolute infinity of the Universe of stars—and would have also made it impossible to understand a reaction—that is, gravitation—as existing now—since, while an act is ongoing, no reaction can obviously take place. My assumption, or rather my necessary conclusion from straightforward premises—was that of a determinate irradiation—one that is ultimately discontinued.
Let me now describe the sole possible mode in which it is conceivable that matter could have been diffused through space, so as to fulfil the conditions at once of irradiation and of generally equable distribution.
Let me now explain the only way that it seems possible for matter to have spread out through space, so that it meets the requirements of both irradiation and a generally even distribution.
For convenience of illustration, let us imagine, in the first place, a hollow sphere of glass, or of anything else, occupying the space throughout which the universal matter is to be thus equally diffused, by means of irradiation, from the absolute, irrelative, unconditional particle, placed in the centre of the sphere.
For the sake of illustration, let's first imagine a hollow sphere made of glass or any other material, filling the space where the universal matter will be evenly spread out through irradiation, starting from the absolute, unrelated, unconditional particle located at the center of the sphere.
Now, a certain exertion of the diffusive power (presumed to be the Divine Volition)—in other words, a certain force—whose measure is the quantity of matter—that[55] is to say, the number of atoms—emitted; emits, by irradiation, this certain number of atoms; forcing them in all directions outwardly from the centre—their proximity to each other diminishing as they proceed—until, finally, they are distributed, loosely, over the interior surface of the sphere.
Now, a certain exertion of the spreading power (thought to be the Divine Will)—in other words, a certain force—which is measured by the amount of matter—that[55] is to say, the number of atoms—was emitted; it emits, by radiating, this specific number of atoms; pushing them outward in all directions from the center—their closeness to each other decreasing as they move—until, finally, they are spread out, loosely, over the inner surface of the sphere.
When these atoms have attained this position, or while proceeding to attain it, a second and inferior exercise of the same force—or a second and inferior force of the same character—emits, in the same manner—that is to say, by irradiation as before—a second stratum of atoms which proceeds to deposit itself upon the first; the number of atoms, in this case as in the former, being of course the measure of the force which emitted them; in other words the force being precisely adapted to the purpose it effects—the force and the number of atoms sent out by the force, being directly proportional.
When these atoms reach this position, or while they are on their way to it, a second, lesser exercise of the same force—or a second, lesser force with similar characteristics—produces, in the same way—that is, through irradiation as before—a second layer of atoms that settles on top of the first. The number of atoms, in this case as in the previous one, is of course the measure of the force that produced them; in other words, the force is perfectly suited to the purpose it achieves—the force and the number of atoms released by the force being directly proportional.
When this second stratum has reached its destined position—or while approaching it—a third still inferior exertion of the force, or a third inferior force of a similar character—the number of atoms emitted being in all cases the measure of the force—proceeds to deposit a third stratum upon the second:—and so on, until these concentric strata, growing gradually less and less, come down at length to the central point; and the diffusive matter, simultaneously with the diffusive force, is exhausted.
When this second layer has reached its intended position—or while it's getting close—a third, still weaker exertion of force, or another weaker force of a similar kind—the number of atoms emitted being in all cases the measure of the force—begins to lay down a third layer on top of the second:—and this process continues until these concentric layers, gradually becoming smaller and smaller, eventually reach the central point; and the diffusive matter, along with the diffusive force, is completely used up.
We have now the sphere filled, through means of irradiation, with atoms equably diffused. The two necessary conditions—those of irradiation and of equable diffusion—are satisfied; and by the sole process in which the possibility[56] of their simultaneous satisfaction is conceivable. For this reason, I confidently expect to find, lurking in the present condition of the atoms as distributed throughout the sphere, the secret of which I am in search—the all-important principle of the modus operandi of the Newtonian law. Let us examine, then, the actual condition of the atoms.
We now have the sphere filled, through irradiation, with atoms evenly spread out. The two necessary conditions—irradiation and even distribution—are met; and by the only process where their simultaneous satisfaction is possible. For this reason, I confidently expect to discover, hidden in the current arrangement of the atoms within the sphere, the secret I am looking for—the crucial principle of the modus operandi of Newton's law. Let’s take a look at the actual condition of the atoms.
They lie in a series of concentric strata. They are equably diffused throughout the sphere. They have been irradiated into these states.
They are arranged in layers that are evenly spaced. They are distributed uniformly throughout the sphere. They have been transformed into these states.
The atoms being equably distributed, the greater the superficial extent of any of these concentric strata, or spheres, the more atoms will lie upon it. In other words, the number of atoms lying upon the surface of any one of the concentric spheres, is directly proportional with the extent of that surface.
The atoms are evenly distributed, so the larger the surface area of any of these concentric layers or spheres, the more atoms will be on it. In other words, the number of atoms on the surface of any of the concentric spheres is directly proportional to the size of that surface.
But, in any series of concentric spheres, the surfaces are directly proportional with the squares of the distances from the centre.[2]
But in any series of concentric spheres, the surfaces are directly proportional to the squares of the distances from the center.[2]
Therefore the number of atoms in any stratum is directly proportional with the square of that stratum’s distance from the centre.
Therefore, the number of atoms in any layer is directly proportional to the square of that layer's distance from the center.
But the number of atoms in any stratum is the measure of the force which emitted that stratum—that is to say, is directly proportional with the force.
But the number of atoms in any layer is the measure of the force that created that layer—that is to say, it is directly proportional to the force.
Therefore the force which irradiated any stratum is directly proportional with the square of that stratum’s distance from the centre:—or, generally,
Therefore, the force that spreads out from any layer is directly proportional to the square of that layer’s distance from the center:—or, generally,
The force of the irradiation has been directly proportional with the squares of the distances.
The intensity of the radiation has been directly related to the squares of the distances.
Now, Rëaction, as far as we know anything of it, is Action conversed. The general principle of Gravity being, in the first place, understood as the rëaction of an act—as the expression of a desire on the part of Matter, while existing in a state of diffusion, to return into the Unity whence it was diffused; and, in the second place, the mind being called upon to determine the character of the desire—the manner in which it would, naturally, be manifested; in other words, being called upon to conceive a probable law, or modus operandi, for the return; could not well help arriving at the conclusion that this law of return would be precisely the converse of the law of departure. That such would be the case, any one, at least, would be abundantly justified in taking for granted, until such time as some person should suggest something like a plausible reason why it should not be the case—until such period as a law of return shall be imagined which the intellect can consider as preferable.
Now, Rëaction, as far as we know, is Action talked about. The general principle of Gravity is, first, understood as the rëaction of an act—an expression of a desire from Matter, while it's in a state of diffusion, wanting to return to the Unity from which it was spread out; and, second, the mind is asked to determine the character of that desire—how it would naturally be expressed; in other words, to come up with a reasonable law, or modus operandi, for the return. Thus, it’s hard not to conclude that this law of return would be exactly the opposite of the law of departure. It would be entirely reasonable for anyone to assume this until someone offers a plausible reason for why it shouldn’t be the case—until a law of return is created that the intellect can see as a better option.
Matter, then, irradiated into space with a force varying as the squares of the distances, might, à priori, be supposed to return towards its centre of irradiation with a force varying inversely as the squares of the distances: and I have already shown[3] that any principle which will explain why the atoms should tend, according to any law, to the general centre, must be admitted as satisfactorily explaining, at the same time, why, according to the same law, they should tend each to each. For, in fact, the tendency to the general centre is not to a centre as such, but because of its being a point in tending towards which each atom tends [58]most directly to its real and essential centre, Unity—the absolute and final Union of all.
Matter, then, radiates into space with a force that changes according to the square of the distances. It could be assumed that it would return to its source of radiation with a force that changes inversely to the square of the distances. I have already shown[3] that any principle explaining why the atoms should be drawn toward a general center, according to some law, must also satisfactorily explain why they are drawn to each other according to the same law. In reality, the pull toward the general center isn’t simply to a center; it's because it represents a point that each atom is most directly drawn to as it aims for its true and essential center, Unity—the absolute and final Union of all.
The consideration here involved presents to my own mind no embarrassment whatever—but this fact does not blind me to the possibility of its being obscure to those who may have been less in the habit of dealing with abstractions:—and, upon the whole, it may be as well to look at the matter from one or two other points of view.
The issue at hand doesn't confuse me at all—however, I'm aware that it might be unclear to those who aren't used to thinking abstractly. So, overall, it might be a good idea to consider this from a couple of other perspectives.
The absolute, irrelative particle primarily created by the Volition of God, must have been in a condition of positive normality, or rightfulness—for wrongfulness implies relation. Right is positive; wrong is negative—is merely the negation of right; as cold is the negation of heat—darkness of light. That a thing may be wrong, it is necessary that there be some other thing in relation to which it is wrong—some condition which it fails to satisfy; some law which it violates; some being whom it aggrieves. If there be no such being, law, or condition, in respect to which the thing is wrong—and, still more especially, if no beings, laws, or conditions exist at all—then the thing cannot be wrong and consequently must be right. Any deviation from normality involves a tendency to return into it. A difference from the normal—from the right—from the just—can be understood as effected only by the overcoming a difficulty; and if the force which overcomes the difficulty be not infinitely continued, the ineradicable tendency to return will at length be permitted to act for its own satisfaction. Upon withdrawal of the force, the tendency acts. This is the principle of rëaction as the inevitable consequence of finite action. Employing a phraseology of which the seeming[59] affectation will be pardoned for its expressiveness, we may say that Rëaction is the return from the condition of as it is and ought not to be into the condition of as it was, originally, and therefore ought to be:—and let me add here that the absolute force of Rëaction would no doubt be always found in direct proportion with the reality—the truth—the absoluteness—of the originality—if ever it were possible to measure this latter:—and, consequently, the greatest of all conceivable reactions must be that produced by the tendency which we now discuss—the tendency to return into the absolutely original—into the supremely primitive. Gravity, then, must be the strongest of forces—an idea reached à priori and abundantly confirmed by induction. What use I make of the idea, will be seen in the sequel.
The fundamental, unrelated particle primarily created by the will of God must have existed in a state of positive normalcy or righteousness—because wrongness implies relation. Right is positive; wrong is negative—it's simply the absence of right, just as cold is the absence of heat and darkness is the absence of light. For something to be wrong, there must be some other thing to which it is wrong—some condition it fails to meet, some law it breaks, or some being it harms. If there isn't such a being, law, or condition in relation to which something is wrong—and especially if no beings, laws, or conditions exist at all—then that thing cannot be wrong and must therefore be right. Any deviation from normalcy involves a tendency to revert back to it. A difference from the normal—from the right—from the just—can only be understood as having arisen by overcoming a challenge; and if the force that overcomes this challenge is not infinitely sustained, the inherent tendency to return will eventually have the opportunity to act for its own fulfillment. Once the force is withdrawn, the tendency takes over. This is the principle of reaction as the unavoidable result of finite action. Using a somewhat elevated language that we’ll allow for its expressiveness, we can say that Reaction is the return from the state of as it is and ought not to be to the state of as it was, originally, and therefore ought to be:—and let me add that the absolute force of Reaction would undoubtedly be measured directly in proportion to the reality—the truth—the absoluteness—of the originality—if it were ever possible to quantify this latter:—therefore, the most significant of all conceivable reactions must be that produced by the tendency we are currently discussing—the tendency to return to the absolutely original—to the supremely primitive. Gravity, then, must be the strongest of forces—a thought reached à priori and well-supported by observation. How I use this idea will be apparent later.
The atoms, now, having been diffused from their normal condition of Unity, seek to return to——what? Not to any particular point, certainly; for it is clear that if, upon the diffusion, the whole Universe of matter had been projected, collectively, to a distance from the point of irradiation, the atomic tendency to the general centre of the sphere would not have been disturbed in the least:—the atoms would not have sought the point in absolute space from which they were originally impelled. It is merely the condition, and not the point or locality at which this condition took its rise, that these atoms seek to re-establish;—it is merely that condition which is their normality, that they desire. “But they seek a centre,” it will be said, “and a centre is a point.” True; but they seek this point not in its character of point—(for, were the whole sphere moved from its position, they would seek, equally, the centre;[60] and the centre then would be a new point)—but because it so happens, on account of the form in which they collectively exist—(that of the sphere)—that only through the point in question—the sphere’s centre—they can attain their true object, Unity. In the direction of the centre each atom perceives more atoms than in any other direction. Each atom is impelled towards the centre because along the straight line joining it and the centre and passing on to the circumference beyond, there lie a greater number of atoms than along any other straight line—a greater number of objects that seek it, the individual atom—a greater number of tendencies to Unity—a greater number of satisfactions for its own tendency to Unity—in a word, because in the direction of the centre lies the utmost possibility of satisfaction, generally, for its own individual appetite. To be brief, the condition, Unity, is all that is really sought; and if the atoms seem to seek the centre of the sphere, it is only impliedly, through implication—because such centre happens to imply, to include, or to involve, the only essential centre, Unity. But on account of this implication or involution, there is no possibility of practically separating the tendency to Unity in the abstract, from the tendency to the concrete centre. Thus the tendency of the atoms to the general centre is, to all practical intents and for all logical purposes, the tendency each to each; and the tendency each to each is the tendency to the centre; and the one tendency may be assumed as the other; whatever will apply to the one must be thoroughly applicable to the other; and, in conclusion, whatever principle will satisfactorily explain the one, cannot be questioned as an explanation of the other.[61]
The atoms, now that they've spread out from their usual state of Unity, are trying to return to—what exactly? Not to any specific point, that’s for sure; because it's clear that if, during the spreading out, all the matter in the Universe had been pushed away from the point of irradiation, the atomic tendency toward the overall center of the sphere wouldn’t have been affected at all: the atoms wouldn’t have tried to get back to the absolute space point from which they were originally driven. It’s simply the condition, and not the specific place where this condition started, that these atoms want to go back to;—they just want to re-establish that condition which is their natural state. “But they look for a center,” someone might say, “and a center is a point.” That's true; but they are looking for this point not because of its nature as a point—(because if the whole sphere were moved, they would seek the center just the same; [60] and that center then would be a new point)—but because it turns out, due to the shape in which they collectively exist—(that of the sphere)—that only through this specific point—the center of the sphere—can they achieve their true goal, Unity. In the direction of the center, each atom sees more atoms than in any other direction. Each atom is drawn toward the center because along the straight line connecting it to the center and extending out to the edge, there are more atoms than along any other straight line—a greater number of objects that are seeking it, the individual atom—a greater number of tendencies toward Unity—a greater number of fulfillments for its own inclination toward Unity—in short, because in the direction of the center lies the greatest potential for satisfaction, generally, for its own individual desires. To sum it up, the condition, Unity, is all that’s truly sought; and if the atoms appear to be seeking the center of the sphere, it’s only indirectly—because that center happens to imply, involve, or include the only essential center, Unity. But because of this implication or involvement, there’s no way to practically separate the tendency toward Unity in the abstract from the tendency to the concrete center. Hence, the tendency of the atoms toward the overall center is, for all practical purposes and logical reasons, the tendency of each toward each; and the tendency of each toward each is the tendency to the center; and one tendency can be assumed to be the other; whatever applies to one must fully apply to the other; and, in conclusion, any principle that effectively explains one cannot be doubted as an explanation for the other.[61]
In looking carefully around me for rational objection to what I have advanced, I am able to discover nothing;—but of that class of objections usually urged by the doubters for Doubt’s sake, I very readily perceive three; and proceed to dispose of them in order.
In examining my surroundings for any logical objections to what I've presented, I find nothing;—but I can easily identify three common objections raised by skeptics just for the sake of doubt, and I will address them in order.
It may be said, first: “The proof that the force of irradiation (in the case described) is directly proportional to the squares of the distances, depends upon an unwarranted assumption—that of the number of atoms in each stratum being the measure of the force with which they are emitted.”
It can be said, first: “The proof that the force of irradiation (in the case described) is directly proportional to the squares of the distances relies on an unfounded assumption—that the number of atoms in each layer determines the force with which they are emitted.”
I reply, not only that I am warranted in such assumption, but that I should be utterly unwarranted in any other. What I assume is, simply, that an effect is the measure of its cause—that every exercise of the Divine Will will be proportional to that which demands the exertion—that the means of Omnipotence, or of Omniscience, will be exactly adapted to its purposes. Neither can a deficiency nor an excess of cause bring to pass any effect. Had the force which irradiated any stratum to its position, been either more or less than was needed for the purpose—that is to say, not directly proportional to the purpose—then to its position that stratum could not have been irradiated. Had the force which, with a view to general equability of distribution, emitted the proper number of atoms for each stratum, been not directly proportional to the number, then the number would not have been the number demanded for the equable distribution.
I respond, not only that I have every right to this assumption, but that I would be completely unjustified in any other. What I assume is simply that the effect is a measure of its cause—that every act of the Divine Will will correspond to what requires that effort—that the means of Omnipotence or Omniscience will be perfectly suited to its goals. Neither a lack nor an excess of cause can produce any effect. If the force that positioned any layer was either greater or less than what was necessary for that purpose—that is, not directly proportional to the purpose—then that layer could not have been positioned as it was. If the force that, aiming for general balance in distribution, emitted the right number of atoms for each layer, hadn’t been directly proportional to that number, then that number would not have matched the number required for even distribution.
The second supposable objection is somewhat better entitled to an answer.[62]
The second possible objection deserves a response.[62]
It is an admitted principle in Dynamics that every body, on receiving an impulse, or disposition to move, will move onward in a straight line, in the direction imparted by the impelling force, until deflected, or stopped, by some other force. How then, it may be asked, is my first or external stratum of atoms to be understood as discontinuing their movement at the circumference of the imaginary glass sphere, when no second force, of more than an imaginary character, appears, to account for the discontinuance?
It is a well-known principle in Dynamics that any object, when given an impulse or a reason to move, will continue moving in a straight line in the direction of the force applied until it is redirected or stopped by another force. So, one might wonder, how is it that my first or outer layer of atoms is understood to stop moving at the edge of the imaginary glass sphere when there’s no real force, beyond just a concept, to explain why they stop?
I reply that the objection, in this case, actually does arise out of “an unwarranted assumption”—on the part of the objector—the assumption of a principle, in Dynamics, at an epoch when no “principles,” in anything, exist:—I use the word “principle,” of course, in the objector’s understanding of the word.
I respond that the objection here actually comes from “an unwarranted assumption”—on the part of the person objecting—the assumption of a principle in Dynamics, at a time when no “principles” in anything exist:—I’m using the word “principle” as the objector understands it.
“In the beginning” we can admit—indeed we can comprehend—but one First Cause—the truly ultimate Principle—the Volition of God. The primary act—that of Irradiation from Unity—must have been independent of all that which the world now calls “principle”—because all that we so designate is but a consequence of the rëaction of that primary act:—I say “primary” act; for the creation of the absolute material particle is more properly to be regarded as a conception than as an “act” in the ordinary meaning of the term. Thus, we must regard the primary act as an act for the establishment of what we now call “principles.” But this primary act itself is to be considered as continuous Volition. The Thought of God is to be understood as originating the Diffusion—as proceeding with it—as regulating it—and, finally, as being[63] withdrawn from it upon its completion. Then commences Rëaction, and through Rëaction, “Principle,” as we employ the word. It will be advisable, however, to limit the application of this word to the two immediate results of the discontinuance of the Divine Volition—that is, to the two agents, Attraction and Repulsion. Every other Natural agent depends, either more or less immediately, upon these two, and therefore would be more conveniently designated as sub-principle.
“At the beginning” we can agree—actually, we can understand—there is only one First Cause—the truly ultimate Principle—the Will of God. The initial act—that of radiating from Unity—must have been independent of all the things the world now refers to as “principle”—because everything we label as such is just a result of the reaction from that primary act:—I say “primary” act; because the creation of the absolute material particle should be seen more as a conception than as an “act” in the usual sense. Thus, we need to regard the primary act as an act for establishing what we now call “principles.” But this primary act itself should be viewed as continuous Will. The Thought of God is understood as originating the Diffusion—as continuing it—as regulating it—and, ultimately, as being[63]withdrawn from it once it is completed. Then begins the Reaction, and through Reaction, “Principle,” as we use the term. It is advisable, however, to restrict this term to the two immediate results of the cessation of the Divine Will—that is, to the two agents, Attraction and Repulsion. Every other Natural agent depends, either more or less directly, on these two, and thus would be more conveniently called sub-principle.
It may be objected, thirdly, that, in general, the peculiar mode of distribution which I have suggested for the atoms, is “an hypothesis and nothing more.”
It might be argued, thirdly, that, in general, the unique way of distributing the atoms that I've proposed is “just a hypothesis and nothing more.”
Now, I am aware that the word hypothesis is a ponderous sledge-hammer, grasped immediately, if not lifted, by all very diminutive thinkers, upon the first appearance of any proposition wearing, in any particular, the garb of a theory. But “hypothesis” cannot be wielded here to any good purpose, even by those who succeed in lifting it—little men or great.
Now, I know that the word hypothesis is a heavy sledgehammer, immediately understood, if not fully embraced, by all small-minded thinkers at the first sight of any idea dressed up as a theory. But “hypothesis” can’t be effectively used here by anyone, whether they manage to lift it—small thinkers or big ones.
I maintain, first, that only in the mode described is it conceivable that Matter could have been diffused so as to fulfil at once the conditions of irradiation and of generally equable distribution. I maintain, secondly, that these conditions themselves have been imposed upon me, as necessities, in a train of ratiocination as rigorously logical as that which establishes any demonstration in Euclid; and I maintain, thirdly, that even if the charge of “hypothesis” were as fully sustained as it is, in fact, unsustained and untenable, still the validity and indisputability of my result would not, even in the slightest particular, be disturbed.[64]
I argue, first, that only in the way described is it possible for Matter to be spread out in such a way that it meets the conditions of radiation and a generally even distribution. I argue, second, that these conditions have been presented to me as necessities in a line of reasoning as strictly logical as any proof in Euclid; and I argue, third, that even if the claim of “hypothesis” were fully supported, which it is not, my result's validity and undeniable nature would not be affected in the slightest.[64]
To explain:—The Newtonian Gravity—a law of Nature—a law whose existence as such no one out of Bedlam questions—a law whose admission as such enables us to account for nine-tenths of the Universal phænomena—a law which, merely because it does so enable us to account for these phænomena, we are perfectly willing, without reference to any other considerations, to admit, and cannot help admitting, as a law—a law, nevertheless, of which neither the principle nor the modus operandi of the principle, has ever yet been traced by the human analysis—a law, in short, which, neither in its detail nor in its generality, has been found susceptible of explanation at all—is at length seen to be at every point thoroughly explicable, provided only we yield our assent to——what? To an hypothesis? Why if an hypothesis—if the merest hypothesis—if an hypothesis for whose assumption—as in the case of that pure hypothesis the Newtonian law itself—no shadow of à priori reason could be assigned—if an hypothesis, even so absolute as all this implies, would enable us to perceive a principle for the Newtonian law—would enable us to understand as satisfied, conditions so miraculously—so ineffably complex and seemingly irreconcileable as those involved in the relations of which Gravity tells us,—what rational being could so expose his fatuity as to call even this absolute hypothesis an hypothesis any longer—unless, indeed, he were to persist in so calling it, with the understanding that he did so, simply for the sake of consistency in words?
To explain: The Newtonian Gravity—a natural law—one that no sane person questions—a law that helps us account for nine-tenths of the phenomena in the universe—a law that, precisely because it allows us to explain these phenomena, we are more than willing, without considering any other factors, to accept as a law—a law, however, of which neither the principle nor the way it works has ever been fully traced by human analysis—a law, in short, that has not been explained in detail or in general at all—is now seen to be entirely explicable, provided we agree to——what? An hypothesis? Why, if an hypothesis—if the smallest hypothesis—if an hypothesis for which no reason could be given as in the case of that pure hypothesis of the Newtonian law itself—if an hypothesis, even so absolute as all this suggests, would let us discover a principle for the Newtonian law—would help us understand conditions that are so miraculously complex and seemingly irreconcilable as those related to Gravity, what rational person could expose their ignorance by still calling this absolute hypothesis an hypothesis? Unless, of course, they continued to call it that simply for the sake of consistency in words?
But what is the true state of our present case? What is the fact? Not only that it is not an hypothesis which[65] we are required to adopt, in order to admit the principle at issue explained, but that it is a logical conclusion which we are requested not to adopt if we can avoid it—which we are simply invited to deny if we can:—a conclusion of so accurate a logicality that to dispute it would be the effort—to doubt its validity beyond our power:—a conclusion from which we see no mode of escape, turn as we will; a result which confronts us either at the end of an inductive journey from the phænomena of the very Law discussed, or at the close of a deductive career from the most rigorously simple of all conceivable assumptions—the assumption, in a word, of Simplicity itself.
But what is the real state of our situation right now? What is the fact? Not only is it not a hypothesis that we have to accept in order to understand the principle being discussed, but it is a logical conclusion that we are asked not to accept if we can help it—which we are just encouraged to deny if we can:—a conclusion so logically sound that disputing it would be an effort—to question its validity is beyond our ability:—a conclusion from which we see no way to escape, no matter how we turn; a result that meets us either at the end of an inductive journey from the phenomena of the very Law being examined, or at the end of a deductive process from the simplest of all possible assumptions—the assumption, in short, of Simplicity itself.
And if here, for the mere sake of cavilling, it be urged, that although my starting-point is, as I assert, the assumption of absolute Simplicity, yet Simplicity, considered merely in itself, is no axiom; and that only deductions from axioms are indisputable—it is thus that I reply:—
And if someone argues here, just to pick a fight, that while I claim my starting point is the assumption of absolute simplicity, simplicity itself isn’t an established truth, and that only conclusions drawn from established truths are undeniable—this is my response:—
Every other science than Logic is the science of certain concrete relations. Arithmetic, for example, is the science of the relations of number—Geometry, of the relations of form—Mathematics in general, of the relations of quantity in general—of whatever can be increased or diminished. Logic, however, is the science of Relation in the abstract—of absolute Relation—of Relation considered solely in itself. An axiom in any particular science other than Logic is, thus, merely a proposition announcing certain concrete relations which seem to be too obvious for dispute—as when we say, for instance, that the whole is greater than its part:—and, thus again, the principle of the Logical axiom—in other words, of an axiom in the abstract—is,[66] simply, obviousness of relation. Now, it is clear, not only that what is obvious to one mind may not be obvious to another, but that what is obvious to one mind at one epoch, may be anything but obvious, at another epoch, to the same mind. It is clear, moreover, that what, to-day, is obvious even to the majority of mankind, or to the majority of the best intellects of mankind, may to-morrow be, to either majority, more or less obvious, or in no respect obvious at all. It is seen, then, that the axiomatic principle itself is susceptible of variation, and of course that axioms are susceptible of similar change. Being mutable, the “truths” which grow out of them are necessarily mutable too; or, in other words, are never to be positively depended upon as truths at all—since Truth and Immutability are one.
Every science except Logic deals with specific concrete relationships. For instance, arithmetic is about the relationships of numbers, geometry focuses on the relationships of shapes, and mathematics in general examines relationships of quantity—anything that can be increased or decreased. Logic, on the other hand, is the study of relationships in the abstract—of absolute relationships—considered solely on their own. An axiom in any science other than Logic is just a statement that identifies certain concrete relationships that seem too obvious to dispute—like saying, for example, that the whole is greater than its part. Thus, the principle of the Logical axiom—an axiom in an abstract sense—is simply obviousness of relation. It’s clear that what’s obvious to one person may not be obvious to another, and what seems obvious to someone at one time may not appear so at another time, even to the same person. Also, what is obvious today to most people, or to the best thinkers, might tomorrow be less obvious or not obvious at all. Thus, we can see that the axiomatic principle itself can change, and consequently, axioms can change too. Being changeable, the “truths” derived from them are also necessarily changeable; in other words, they can never be relied upon as absolute truths—because Truth and Immutability are one.
It will now be readily understood that no axiomatic idea—no idea founded in the fluctuating principle, obviousness of relation—can possibly be so secure—so reliable a basis for any structure erected by the Reason, as that idea—(whatever it is, wherever we can find it, or if it be practicable to find it anywhere)—which is irrelative altogether—which not only presents to the understanding no obviousness of relation, either greater or less, to be considered, but subjects the intellect, not in the slightest degree, to the necessity of even looking at any relation at all. If such an idea be not what we too heedlessly term “an axiom,” it is at least preferable, as a Logical basis, to any axiom ever propounded, or to all imaginable axioms combined:—and such, precisely, is the idea with which my deductive process, so thoroughly corroborated by induction, commences. My particle proper is but absolute Irrelation. To sum up[67] what has been here advanced:—As a starting point I have taken it for granted, simply, that the Beginning had nothing behind it or before it—that it was a Beginning in fact—that it was a beginning and nothing different from a beginning—in short that this Beginning was——that which it was. If this be a “mere assumption” then a “mere assumption” let it be.
It should now be clear that no established idea—no idea based on the changing principle or the obviousness of relationship—can possibly provide as secure or reliable a foundation for any structure built by Reason as that idea—(whatever it is, wherever it can be found, or if it’s even possible to find it anywhere)—which is irrelative entirely—which not only does not present any obvious relationships, whether greater or lesser, to consider, but also does not require the intellect, even in the slightest way, to look at any relationship at all. If such an idea isn't what we recklessly call "an axiom," it is at least a better logical foundation than any axiom ever suggested or all conceivable axioms combined:—and that is exactly the idea with which my deductive process, thoroughly supported by induction, begins. My proper particle is simply absolute Irrelation. To summarize[67] what has been presented here:—I’ve taken for granted, to start with, that the Beginning had nothing behind it or before it—that it was a true Beginning—that it was just a beginning, and nothing different from a beginning—in short, that this Beginning was——that which it was. If this is a “mere assumption,” then let it be just a “mere assumption.”
To conclude this branch of the subject:—I am fully warranted in announcing that the Law which we have been in the habit of calling Gravity exists on account of Matter’s having been irradiated, at its origin, atomically, into a limited[4] sphere of Space, from one, individual, unconditional, irrelative, and absolute Particle Proper, by the sole process in which it was possible to satisfy, at the same time, the two conditions, irradiation, and generally-equable distribution throughout the sphere—that is to say, by a force varying in direct proportion with the squares of the distances between the irradiated atoms, respectively, and the Particular centre of Irradiation.
To wrap up this part of the discussion: I am completely justified in stating that the Law that we refer to as Gravity exists because Matter was originally spread out atomically into a defined[4] sphere of Space, originating from a single, unique, unconditional, unrelated, and absolute Particle Proper, through the only method that could fulfill both requirements simultaneously: irradiation and a generally even distribution throughout the sphere—that is to say, by a force that changes in direct proportion to the squares of the distances between the irradiated atoms and the specific center of Irradiation.
I have already given my reasons for presuming Matter to have been diffused by a determinate rather than by a continuous or infinitely continued force. Supposing a continuous force, we should be unable, in the first place, to comprehend a rëaction at all; and we should be required, in the second place, to entertain the impossible conception of an infinite extension of Matter. Not to dwell upon the impossibility of the conception, the infinite extension of Matter is an idea which, if not positively disproved, [68]is at least not in any respect warranted by telescopic observation of the stars—a point to be explained more fully hereafter; and this empirical reason for believing in the original finity of Matter is unempirically confirmed. For example:—Admitting, for the moment, the possibility of understanding Space filled with the irradiated atoms—that is to say, admitting, as well as we can, for argument’s sake, that the succession of the irradiated atoms had absolutely no end—then it is abundantly clear that, even when the Volition of God had been withdrawn from them, and thus the tendency to return into Unity permitted (abstractly) to be satisfied, this permission would have been nugatory and invalid—practically valueless and of no effect whatever. No Rëaction could have taken place; no movement toward Unity could have been made; no Law of Gravity could have obtained.
I’ve already explained why I believe Matter was spread out by a specific force rather than a continuous or infinitely ongoing one. If we assume a continuous force, first of all, we wouldn’t be able to understand any reaction at all; and secondly, we’d have to deal with the impossible idea of Matter extending infinitely. Without getting into the impossibility of that idea, the infinite extension of Matter is a concept which, even if not completely disproven, is certainly not supported by telescopic observations of the stars—a point I’ll clarify later. This empirical reason for believing in the original finiteness of Matter is also backed up in ways that aren’t based on observation. For instance:—If we temporarily accept the idea of Space filled with irradiated atoms—that is, if we accept, as best we can for the sake of argument, that the series of irradiated atoms had absolutely no end—then it becomes clear that, even when God’s will was withdrawn from them, allowing the tendency to return to Unity to be somewhat fulfilled, this allowance would be pointless and invalid—practically useless and ineffective. No reaction could have happened; no movement towards Unity could have occurred; no Law of Gravity could have applied.
To explain:—Grant the abstract tendency of any one atom to any one other as the inevitable result of diffusion from the normal Unity:—or, what is the same thing, admit any given atom as proposing to move in any given direction—it is clear that, since there is an infinity of atoms on all sides of the atom proposing to move, it never can actually move toward the satisfaction of its tendency in the direction given, on account of a precisely equal and counterbalancing tendency in the direction diametrically opposite. In other words, exactly as many tendencies to Unity are behind the hesitating atom as before it; for it is a mere sotticism to say that one infinite line is longer or shorter than another infinite line, or that one infinite number is greater or less than another number that is infinite. Thus[69] the atom in question must remain stationary forever. Under the impossible circumstances which we have been merely endeavoring to conceive for argument’s sake, there could have been no aggregation of Matter—no stars—no worlds—nothing but a perpetually atomic and inconsequential Universe. In fact, view it as we will, the whole idea of unlimited Matter is not only untenable, but impossible and preposterous.
To explain:—Imagine the abstract tendency of any one atom toward any other as the unavoidable result of diffusion from its original unity:—or, put another way, consider any atom as wanting to move in a certain direction—it’s clear that, since there’s an infinity of atoms surrounding the atom that wants to move, it can never actually move toward fulfilling that tendency in the specified direction, because there’s an equally strong counteracting tendency pulling it in the exact opposite direction. In other words, there are just as many tendencies toward unity behind the hesitant atom as there are in front of it; claiming that one infinite line is longer or shorter than another infinite line, or that one infinite number is greater or less than another infinite number, is simply a misunderstanding. Thus[69] the atom in question must remain completely still forever. In the hypothetical scenario we’ve been trying to imagine for the sake of argument, there could be no accumulation of matter—no stars—no worlds—nothing but a constantly atomic and insignificant universe. Indeed, whether we look at it differently or not, the entire concept of infinite matter is not just unsustainable, but impossible and absurd.
With the understanding of a sphere of atoms, however, we perceive, at once, a satisfiable tendency to union. The general result of the tendency each to each, being a tendency of all to the centre, the general process of condensation, or approximation, commences immediately, by a common and simultaneous movement, on withdrawal of the Divine Volition; the individual approximations, or coalescences—not cöalitions—of atom with atom, being subject to almost infinite variations of time, degree, and condition, on account of the excessive multiplicity of relation, arising from the differences of form assumed as characterizing the atoms at the moment of their quitting the Particle Proper; as well as from the subsequent particular inequidistance, each from each.
With the understanding of a sphere of atoms, we immediately notice a satisfiable tendency to come together. The overall effect of each atom's attraction to others leads to a tendency for all to move toward the center, starting the general process of condensation, or coming closer, which begins right away through a shared and simultaneous action when the Divine Volition is withdrawn. The individual pairings, or coalescences—not coalitions—of one atom with another, can vary greatly in terms of time, degree, and conditions due to the immense complexity of relationships that arise from the different shapes that define the atoms when they leave the Particle Proper, as well as from the varying distances between each atom.
What I wish to impress upon the reader is the certainty of there arising, at once, (on withdrawal of the diffusive force, or Divine Volition,) out of the condition of the atoms as described, at innumerable points throughout the Universal sphere, innumerable agglomerations, characterized by innumerable specific differences of form, size, essential nature, and distance each from each. The development of Repulsion (Electricity) must have commenced, of course,[70] with the very earliest particular efforts at Unity, and must have proceeded constantly in the ratio of Coalescence—that is to say, in that of Condensation, or, again, of Heterogeneity.
What I want to convey to the reader is the certainty that, once the diffusive force or Divine Will is withdrawn, countless clusters will emerge from the state of the atoms as described, at countless points throughout the universe, each characterized by various specific differences in shape, size, essential nature, and distance from one another. The development of Repulsion (Electricity) must have begun, of course, with the very first efforts at Unity and must have continued to grow in proportion to Coalescence—that is to say, in terms of Condensation, or, again, of Heterogeneity.[70]
Thus the two Principles Proper, Attraction and Repulsion—the Material and the Spiritual—accompany each other, in the strictest fellowship, forever. Thus The Body and The Soul walk hand in hand.
Thus the two main principles, Attraction and Repulsion—the Material and the Spiritual—are always together, in the closest unity, forever. Thus The Body and The Soul walk hand in hand.
If now, in fancy, we select any one of the agglomerations considered as in their primary stages throughout the Universal sphere, and suppose this incipient agglomeration to be taking place at that point where the centre of our Sun exists—or rather where it did exist originally; for the Sun is perpetually shifting his position—we shall find ourselves met, and borne onward for a time at least, by the most magnificent of theories—by the Nebular Cosmogony of Laplace:—although “Cosmogony” is far too comprehensive a term for what he really discusses—which is the constitution of our solar system alone—of one among the myriad of similar systems which make up the Universe Proper—that Universal sphere—that all-inclusive and absolute Kosmos which forms the subject of my present Discourse.
If we imagine any one of the collections that are in their early stages throughout the universe, and suppose this early collection is forming at the point where the center of our Sun is located—or rather where it originally was, since the Sun is always moving—we’ll find ourselves introduced to the most amazing of theories—the Nebular Cosmogony of Laplace. Although “Cosmogony” is really too broad a term for what he actually discusses, which is the makeup of our solar system alone, one out of the countless similar systems that comprise the universe. This universal sphere, this all-encompassing and complete cosmos, is the focus of my current discussion.
Confining himself to an obviously limited region—that of our solar system with its comparatively immediate vicinity—and merely assuming—that is to say, assuming without any basis whatever, either deductive or inductive—much of what I have been just endeavoring to place upon a more stable basis than assumption; assuming, for example, matter as diffused (without pretending to account for the diffusion) throughout, and somewhat beyond, the space[71] occupied by our system—diffused in a state of heterogeneous nebulosity and obedient to that omniprevalent law of Gravity at whose principle he ventured to make no guess;—assuming all this (which is quite true, although he had no logical right to its assumption) Laplace has shown, dynamically and mathematically, that the results in such case necessarily ensuing, are those and those alone which we find manifested in the actually existing condition of the system itself.
Confining himself to an obviously limited region—that of our solar system and its relatively close surroundings—and merely assuming—that is, making assumptions without any real basis, either deductive or inductive—much of what I've been trying to establish on a more solid foundation than mere assumption; for instance, assuming matter as spread out (without attempting to explain how it spreads) throughout, and somewhat beyond, the space[71] occupied by our system—spread out in a state of mixed nebulosity and subject to that universal law of Gravity which he didn’t even try to guess at;—assuming all of this (which is true, even though he had no logical right to assume it) Laplace has shown, both dynamically and mathematically, that the results that follow from such assumptions are exactly what we see in the current state of the system itself.
To explain:—Let us conceive that particular agglomeration of which we have just spoken—the one at the point designated by our Sun’s centre—to have so far proceeded that a vast quantity of nebulous matter has here assumed a roughly globular form; its centre being, of course, coincident with what is now, or rather was originally, the centre of our Sun; and its periphery extending out beyond the orbit of Neptune, the most remote of our planets:—in other words, let us suppose the diameter of this rough sphere to be some 6000 millions of miles. For ages, this mass of matter has been undergoing condensation, until at length it has become reduced into the bulk we imagine; having proceeded gradually, of course, from its atomic and imperceptible state, into what we understand of visible, palpable, or otherwise appreciable nebulosity.
To explain:—Let’s imagine that specific cluster we just discussed—the one at the location of our Sun’s center—has developed to the point where a large amount of cloudy matter has taken on a roughly spherical shape; its center, of course, aligns with what is now, or rather originally was, the center of our Sun, and its edge reaches beyond the orbit of Neptune, the farthest of our planets:—in other words, let’s assume the diameter of this rough sphere is about 6,000 million miles. For ages, this mass of matter has been compressing, until finally, it has formed into the volume we envision; having gradually transitioned, of course, from its atomic and imperceptible state into what we recognize as visible, tangible, or otherwise noticeable cloudiness.
Now, the condition of this mass implies a rotation about an imaginary axis—a rotation which, commencing with the absolute incipiency of the aggregation, has been ever since acquiring velocity. The very first two atoms which met, approaching each other from points not diametrically opposite, would, in rushing partially past each other, form a[72] nucleus for the rotary movement described. How this would increase in velocity, is readily seen. The two atoms are joined by others:—an aggregation is formed. The mass continues to rotate while condensing. But any atom at the circumference has, of course, a more rapid motion than one nearer the centre. The outer atom, however, with its superior velocity, approaches the centre; carrying this superior velocity with it as it goes. Thus every atom, proceeding inwardly, and finally attaching itself to the condensed centre, adds something to the original velocity of that centre—that is to say, increases the rotary movement of the mass.
Now, the state of this mass suggests a rotation around an imaginary axis—a rotation that, starting from the very beginning of the gathering, has been gaining speed ever since. The very first two atoms that met, coming together from points that aren’t directly opposite each other, would, as they partially passed each other, create a[72] nucleus for the described rotary movement. It's easy to see how this would increase in speed. The two atoms are joined by others:—a group is formed. The mass continues to rotate while it condenses. However, any atom at the edge has, of course, a faster motion than one closer to the center. The outer atom, with its greater speed, moves towards the center, carrying its higher velocity with it. Thus, every atom moving inward and finally attaching itself to the condensed center contributes something to the original velocity of that center—that is, it increases the rotary movement of the mass.
Let us now suppose this mass so far condensed that it occupies precisely the space circumscribed by the orbit of Neptune, and that the velocity with which the surface of the mass moves, in the general rotation, is precisely that velocity with which Neptune now revolves about the Sun. At this epoch, then, we are to understand that the constantly increasing centrifugal force, having gotten the better of the non-increasing centripetal, loosened and separated the exterior and least condensed stratum, or a few of the exterior and least condensed strata, at the equator of the sphere, where the tangential velocity predominated; so that these strata formed about the main body an independent ring encircling the equatorial regions:—just as the exterior portion thrown off, by excessive velocity of rotation, from a grindstone, would form a ring about the grindstone, but for the solidity of the superficial material: were this caoutchouc, or anything similar in consistency, precisely the phænomenon I describe would be presented.[73]
Let’s now imagine this mass so tightly packed that it occupies exactly the space defined by Neptune's orbit, and that the speed at which the surface of this mass rotates is the same speed at which Neptune currently orbits the Sun. At this moment, we should understand that the constantly increasing centrifugal force has overcome the unchanging centripetal force, loosening and separating the outermost and least dense layer, or a few of the outer and least dense layers, at the equator of the sphere, where the tangential speed is highest; so that these layers formed an independent ring around the main body in the equatorial regions:—just like the outer part thrown off by excessive rotation from a grindstone would create a ring around the grindstone, if it weren't for the solidity of the surface material: if this were rubber, or something similar in consistency, exactly the phenomenon I’m describing would occur.[73]
The ring thus whirled from the nebulous mass, revolved, of course, as a separate ring, with just that velocity with which, while the surface of the mass, it rotated. In the meantime, condensation still proceeding, the interval between the discharged ring and the main body continued to increase, until the former was left at a vast distance from the latter.
The ring spun away from the cloudy mass, moving as a distinct ring, at the same speed it rotated while still part of the mass. Meanwhile, as condensation continued, the gap between the released ring and the main body kept growing, until the ring was left far away from the latter.
Now, admitting the ring to have possessed, by some seemingly accidental arrangement of its heterogeneous materials, a constitution nearly uniform, then this ring, as such, would never have ceased revolving about its primary; but, as might have been anticipated, there appears to have been enough irregularity in the disposition of the materials, to make them cluster about centres of superior solidity; and thus the annular form was destroyed.[5] No doubt, the band was soon broken up into several portions, and one of these portions, predominating in mass, absorbed the others into itself; the whole settling, spherically, into a planet. That this latter, as a planet, continued the revolutionary movement which characterized it while a ring, is sufficiently clear; and that it took upon itself also, an additional movement in its new condition of sphere, is readily explained. The ring being understood as yet unbroken, we see that its exterior, while the whole revolves about the parent body, moves more rapidly than its interior. When the rupture occurred, then, some [74]portion in each fragment must have been moving with greater velocity than the others. The superior movement prevailing, must have whirled each fragment round—that is to say, have caused it to rotate; and the direction of the rotation must, of course, have been the direction of the revolution whence it arose. All the fragments having become subject to the rotation described, must, in coalescing, have imparted it to the one planet constituted by their coalescence.—This planet was Neptune. Its material continuing to undergo condensation, and the centrifugal force generated in its rotation getting, at length, the better of the centripetal, as before in the case of the parent orb, a ring was whirled also from the equatorial surface of this planet: this ring, having been ununiform in its constitution, was broken up, and its several fragments, being absorbed by the most massive, were collectively spherified into a moon. Subsequently, the operation was repeated, and a second moon was the result. We thus account for the planet Neptune, with the two satellites which accompany him.
Now, if we assume the ring had a nearly uniform structure due to some seemingly random arrangement of its mixed materials, then this ring, as such, would have continued to revolve around its primary indefinitely. However, as expected, there seems to have been enough irregularity in the arrangement of the materials to cause them to group around centers of greater solidity, which led to the ring's destruction.[5] Clearly, the band quickly broke into several pieces, and one of these pieces, having more mass, absorbed the others, eventually settling spherically into a planet. It’s obvious that this new planet continued the same rotational movement it had while it was still a ring, and it easily picked up an additional spin in its new spherical form. With the ring still intact, we see that the outer part moves faster than the inner part as the whole revolves around the parent body. When the break happened, some section of each fragment must have been moving faster than the others. The faster movement would have spun each fragment around—that is, it caused them to rotate; and the direction of that rotation was, of course, aligned with the direction of the original revolution. All the fragments that became subject to this rotation must have passed it on to the single planet formed by their merging. This planet was Neptune. As its material continued to condense, the centrifugal force generated by its rotation eventually overcame the centripetal force, just like with the parent body, and a ring was also flung off from Neptune's equatorial surface. This ring, which was uneven in its structure, broke apart, and its various pieces were absorbed by the larger mass, ultimately forming a moon. This process happened again, resulting in a second moon. This is how we explain the planet Neptune and its two accompanying moons.
In throwing off a ring from its equator, the Sun re-established that equilibrium between its centripetal and centrifugal forces which had been disturbed in the process of condensation; but, as this condensation still proceeded, the equilibrium was again immediately disturbed, through the increase of rotation. By the time the mass had so far shrunk that it occupied a spherical space just that circumscribed by the orbit of Uranus, we are to understand that the centrifugal force had so far obtained the ascendency that new relief was needed: a second equatorial band was, consequently, thrown off, which, proving ununiform, was[75] broken up, as before in the case of Neptune; the fragments settling into the planet Uranus; the velocity of whose actual revolution about the Sun indicates, of course, the rotary speed of that Sun’s equatorial surface at the moment of the separation. Uranus, adopting a rotation from the collective rotations of the fragments composing it, as previously explained, now threw off ring after ring; each of which, becoming broken up, settled into a moon:—three moons, at different epochs, having been formed, in this manner, by the rupture and general spherification of as many distinct ununiform rings.
When the Sun ejected a ring from its equator, it restored the balance between its inward and outward forces that had been disrupted during the condensation process. However, as this condensation continued, the balance was quickly disturbed again due to increased rotation. By the time the mass had shrunk to fill a spherical space defined by the orbit of Uranus, the outward force had gained enough strength that a new solution was required: a second equatorial band was ejected, which, being uneven, was[75] broken apart, similar to what happened with Neptune; the fragments coalesced into the planet Uranus. The speed at which Uranus revolves around the Sun indicates the rotation speed of the Sun’s equatorial surface at the time of this separation. Uranus, adopting a rotation from the combined rotations of the fragments that make it up, then continued to eject ring after ring, each of which, having broken apart, formed a moon:—three moons, formed at different times, resulted from the breaking and general rounding of three distinct uneven rings.
By the time the Sun had shrunk until it occupied a space just that circumscribed by the orbit of Saturn, the balance, we are to suppose, between its centripetal and centrifugal forces had again become so far disturbed, through increase of rotary velocity, the result of condensation, that a third effort at equilibrium became necessary; and an annular band was therefore whirled off as twice before; which, on rupture through ununiformity, became consolidated into the planet Saturn. This latter threw off, in the first place, seven uniform bands, which, on rupture, were spherified respectively into as many moons; but, subsequently, it appears to have discharged, at three distinct but not very distant epochs, three rings whose equability of constitution was, by apparent accident, so considerable as to present no occasion for their rupture; thus they continue to revolve as rings. I use the phrase “apparent accident;” for of accident in the ordinary sense there was, of course, nothing:—the term is properly applied only to the result of indistinguishable or not immediately traceable law.[76]
By the time the Sun had shrunk to the size just contained by the orbit of Saturn, we assume that the balance between its inward and outward forces had once again been disturbed due to an increase in rotational speed caused by condensation. This disturbance necessitated a third attempt at balance, resulting in another ring being thrown off, just like the two times before. When this ring broke apart unevenly, it became the planet Saturn. Saturn then ejected, initially, seven uniform rings, which, when they broke apart, formed seven moons. Later on, it seems to have released, at three different but closely spaced times, three rings that were surprisingly stable enough not to break apart; so they continue to orbit as rings. I use the term “surprisingly stable” because there was, of course, nothing accidental in the usual sense: the term is rightly applied only to the outcome of laws that are indistinguishable or not immediately obvious.[76]
Shrinking still farther, until it occupied just the space circumscribed by the orbit of Jupiter, the Sun now found need of farther effort to restore the counterbalance of its two forces, continually disarranged in the still continued increase of rotation. Jupiter, accordingly, was now thrown off; passing from the annular to the planetary condition; and, on attaining this latter, threw off in its turn, at four different epochs, four rings, which finally resolved themselves into so many moons.
Shrinking even more until it only took up the area defined by Jupiter's orbit, the Sun now had to make more effort to restore the balance of its two forces, which were constantly disrupted by the ongoing increase in rotation. As a result, Jupiter was pushed away; moving from being a ringed body to a planet; and upon reaching this new status, it in turn released four rings at four different times, which eventually turned into its moons.
Still shrinking, until its sphere occupied just the space defined by the orbit of the Asteroids, the Sun now discarded a ring which appears to have had eight centres of superior solidity, and, on breaking up, to have separated into eight fragments no one of which so far predominated in mass as to absorb the others. All therefore, as distinct although comparatively small planets, proceeded to revolve in orbits whose distances, each from each, may be considered as in some degree the measure of the force which drove them asunder:—all the orbits, nevertheless, being so closely coincident as to admit of our calling them one, in view of the other planetary orbits.
Still getting smaller, until its sphere covered just the area defined by the orbit of the Asteroids, the Sun now lost a ring that seemed to have had eight centers of considerable solidity, and when it broke apart, it separated into eight fragments, none of which was large enough to pull in the others. So, all of them, as distinct but relatively small planets, continued to move in orbits, with the distances between each of them considered as a measure of the force that pushed them apart:—all the orbits, however, being so closely aligned that we can refer to them as one, in comparison to the other planetary orbits.
Continuing to shrink, the Sun, on becoming so small as just to fill the orbit of Mars, now discharged this planet—of course by the process repeatedly described. Having no moon, however, Mars could have thrown off no ring. In fact, an epoch had now arrived in the career of the parent body, the centre of the system. The decrease of its nebulosity, which is the increase of its density, and which again is the decrease of its condensation, out of which latter arose the constant disturbance of equilibrium—must, by this period,[77] have attained a point at which the efforts for restoration would have been more and more ineffectual just in proportion as they were less frequently needed. Thus the processes of which we have been speaking would everywhere show signs of exhaustion—in the planets, first, and secondly, in the original mass. We must not fall into the error of supposing the decrease of interval observed among the planets as we approach the Sun, to be in any respect indicative of an increase of frequency in the periods at which they were discarded. Exactly the converse is to be understood. The longest interval of time must have occurred between the discharges of the two interior; the shortest, between those of the two exterior, planets. The decrease of the interval of space is, nevertheless, the measure of the density, and thus inversely of the condensation, of the Sun, throughout the processes detailed.
As the Sun continued to shrink, it eventually became small enough to only fill the orbit of Mars, which it then expelled—of course, through the same process previously described. Since Mars has no moon, it wouldn't have been able to form a ring. At this point, a significant moment had arrived in the history of the Sun, the central body of the system. The decrease in its nebulosity, which means an increase in its density and a decrease in its condensation, led to constant disturbances of equilibrium. By this time, the efforts to regain stability would have become less effective, especially as they were needed less frequently. Therefore, the processes we've discussed would show signs of exhaustion first in the planets and then in the original mass. We shouldn't mistake the shorter intervals observed among the planets as they get closer to the Sun for evidence of increased frequency in their formation. Quite the opposite is true. The longest time gap must have occurred between the ejections of the two inner planets, while the shortest occurred between the two outer planets. Nonetheless, the decreasing distance between the planets indicates the Sun's increasing density, which is inversely related to its condensation, throughout these processes.
Having shrunk, however, so far as to fill only the orbit of our Earth, the parent sphere whirled from itself still one other body—the Earth—in a condition so nebulous as to admit of this body’s discarding, in its turn, yet another, which is our Moon;—but here terminated the lunar formations.
Having shrunk to the point of just filling the orbit of our Earth, the parent sphere spun off another body—the Earth—still in such a nebulous state that it could also shed yet another body, which is our Moon;—but this is where the formation of moons ended.
Finally, subsiding to the orbits first of Venus and then of Mercury, the Sun discarded these two interior planets; neither of which has given birth to any moon.
Finally, moving into the orbits of Venus and then Mercury, the Sun left behind these two inner planets; neither of which has created any moons.
Thus from his original bulk—or, to speak more accurately, from the condition in which we first considered him—from a partially spherified nebular mass, certainly much more than 5,600 millions of miles in diameter—the great central orb and origin of our solar-planetary-lunar system,[78] has gradually descended, by condensation, in obedience to the law of Gravity, to a globe only 882,000 miles in diameter; but it by no means follows, either that its condensation is yet complete, or that it may not still possess the capacity of whirling from itself another planet.
So, starting from its original size—or, to put it more accurately, from the state we first looked at it—as a partially spherical nebula, definitely more than 5,600 million miles in diameter—the great central sphere and source of our solar-planetary-moon system,[78] has slowly collapsed, due to condensation and following the law of Gravity, into a globe just 882,000 miles in diameter; however, this doesn’t mean that its condensation is finished, or that it couldn’t still have the ability to produce another planet.
I have here given—in outline of course, but still with all the detail necessary for distinctness—a view of the Nebular Theory as its author himself conceived it. From whatever point we regard it, we shall find it beautifully true. It is by far too beautiful, indeed, not to possess Truth as its essentiality—and here I am very profoundly serious in what I say. In the revolution of the satellites of Uranus, there does appear something seemingly inconsistent with the assumptions of Laplace; but that one inconsistency can invalidate a theory constructed from a million of intricate consistencies, is a fancy fit only for the fantastic. In prophecying, confidently, that the apparent anomaly to which I refer, will, sooner or later, be found one of the strongest possible corroborations of the general hypothesis, I pretend to no especial spirit of divination. It is a matter which the only difficulty seems not to foresee.[6]
I've provided an outline here, complete with enough detail for clarity, of the Nebular Theory as conceived by its author. No matter how we look at it, we find it beautifully true. In fact, it's so beautiful that it must inherently possess Truth—and I say this with complete seriousness. There does seem to be something inconsistent in the revolution of the satellites of Uranus when viewed through Laplace’s assumptions; however, to think that one inconsistency can undermine a theory built on millions of intricate consistencies is a fanciful notion. I confidently predict that the apparent anomaly I’m referring to will, in time, be found to be one of the strongest possible confirmations of the general hypothesis. I don't claim to have any special gift of foresight; the only challenge seems not to anticipate it.[6]
The bodies whirled off in the processes described, would exchange, it has been seen, the superficial rotation of the orbs whence they originated, for a revolution of equal velocity about these orbs as distant centres; and the revolution thus engendered must proceed, so long as the centripetal force, or that with which the discarded body gravitates toward [79]its parent, is neither greater nor less than that by which it was discarded; that is, than the centrifugal, or, far more properly, than the tangential, velocity. From the unity, however, of the origin of these two forces, we might have expected to find them as they are found—the one accurately counterbalancing the other. It has been shown, indeed, that the act of whirling-off is, in every case, merely an act for the preservation of the counterbalance.
The bodies that were spun off in the described processes would exchange the superficial rotation of the orbs they came from for a revolution of the same speed around these orbs as distant centers. This resulting revolution must continue as long as the centripetal force, or the force with which the discarded body is pulled toward its origin, is neither greater nor less than the centrifugal force, or more accurately, the tangential speed that caused it to be discarded. However, since these two forces originate from the same source, we would expect them to balance each other out as they do. It has indeed been demonstrated that the act of spinning off is, in every instance, simply an action meant to maintain this balance.
After referring, however, the centripetal force to the omniprevalent law of Gravity, it has been the fashion with astronomical treatises, to seek beyond the limits of mere Nature—that is to say, of Secondary Cause—a solution of the phænomenon of tangential velocity. This latter they attribute directly to a First Cause—to God. The force which carries a stellar body around its primary they assert to have originated in an impulse given immediately by the finger—this is the childish phraseology employed—by the finger of Deity itself. In this view, the planets, fully formed, are conceived to have been hurled from the Divine hand, to a position in the vicinity of the suns, with an impetus mathematically adapted to the masses, or attractive capacities, of the suns themselves. An idea so grossly unphilosophical, although so supinely adopted, could have arisen only from the difficulty of otherwise accounting for the absolutely accurate adaptation, each to each, of two forces so seemingly independent, one of the other, as are the gravitating and tangential. But it should be remembered that, for a long time, the coincidence between the moon’s rotation and her sidereal revolution—two matters seemingly far more independent than those now considered—was[80] looked upon as positively miraculous; and there was a strong disposition, even among astronomers, to attribute the marvel to the direct and continual agency of God—who, in this case, it was said, had found it necessary to interpose, specially, among his general laws, a set of subsidiary regulations, for the purpose of forever concealing from mortal eyes the glories, or perhaps the horrors, of the other side of the Moon—of that mysterious hemisphere which has always avoided, and must perpetually avoid, the telescopic scrutiny of mankind. The advance of Science, however, soon demonstrated—what to the philosophical instinct needed no demonstration—that the one movement is but a portion—something more, even, than a consequence—of the other.
After referring the centripetal force to the ever-present law of Gravity, many astronomical writings have sought explanations beyond mere Nature—that is, beyond Secondary Cause—for the phenomenon of tangential velocity. They attribute this directly to a First Cause—God. They claim that the force that moves a star around its primary source originated from an impulse given directly by the hand—this childish wording is used—by the hand of Deity itself. In this perspective, the planets, fully formed, are thought to have been cast from the Divine hand to a position near the suns, with a force mathematically suited to the masses, or attractive capacities, of the suns themselves. Such a grossly unphilosophical idea, although readily accepted, only arose from the difficulty of explaining the precise adjustment of two seemingly independent forces, gravitational and tangential. However, it should be remembered that for a long time, the match between the moon's rotation and her sidereal revolution—two matters seemingly more independent than those currently discussed—was[80] viewed as positively miraculous; and there was a strong inclination, even among astronomers, to attribute this marvel to the direct and continuous action of God—who, in this case, it was said, needed to intervene through a set of subsidiary regulations to forever hide from human eyes the glories, or perhaps the horrors, of the far side of the Moon—of that mysterious hemisphere which has always evaded, and must always evade, mankind's telescopic scrutiny. The progress of Science, however, soon proved—what needed no proof for the philosophical instinct—that one movement is merely a part—something even more than just a consequence—of the other.
For my part, I have no patience with fantasies at once so timorous, so idle, and so awkward. They belong to the veriest cowardice of thought. That Nature and the God of Nature are distinct, no thinking being can long doubt. By the former we imply merely the laws of the latter. But with the very idea of God, omnipotent, omniscient, we entertain, also, the idea of the infallibility of his laws. With Him there being neither Past nor Future—with Him all being Now—do we not insult him in supposing his laws so contrived as not to provide for every possible contingency?—or, rather, what idea can we have of any possible contingency, except that it is at once a result and a manifestation of his laws? He who, divesting himself of prejudice, shall have the rare courage to think absolutely for himself, cannot fail to arrive, in the end, at the condensation of laws into Law—cannot fail of reaching the conclusion[81] that each law of Nature is dependent at all points upon all other laws, and that all are but consequences of one primary exercise of the Divine Volition. Such is the principle of the Cosmogony which, with all necessary deference, I here venture to suggest and to maintain.
For my part, I have no patience for fantasies that are so fearful, so pointless, and so clumsy. They come from the very essence of cowardice in thought. No thinking person can seriously doubt that Nature and the God of Nature are separate. By Nature, we simply refer to the laws of God. But with the concept of God—being all-powerful and all-knowing—we also embrace the idea of the infallibility of his laws. With Him, there is no Past or Future—everything exists in Now—so isn’t it an insult to believe His laws are crafted in a way that doesn’t account for every possible situation? In fact, what idea can we have of any possible situation, except that it is both a result and a reflection of His laws? Anyone who, free from bias, has the rare courage to think entirely for themselves will inevitably arrive at the condensation of laws into Law—and will conclude[81] that each law of Nature depends at every point on all other laws, and that they are all just consequences of one fundamental act of Divine Will. This is the principle of the Cosmogony which, with all due respect, I now dare to suggest and uphold.
In this view, it will be seen that, dismissing as frivolous, and even impious, the fancy of the tangential force having been imparted to the planets immediately by “the finger of God,” I consider this force as originating in the rotation of the stars:—this rotation as brought about by the in-rushing of the primary atoms, towards their respective centres of aggregation:—this in-rushing as the consequence of the law of Gravity:—this law as but the mode in which is necessarily manifested the tendency of the atoms to return into imparticularity:—this tendency to return as but the inevitable rëaction of the first and most sublime of Acts—that act by which a God, self-existing and alone existing, became all things at once, through dint of his volition, while all things were thus constituted a portion of God.
In this perspective, it will be clear that, dismissing as trivial and even sacrilegious the idea that the tangential force was given to the planets directly by "the finger of God," I view this force as arising from the rotation of the stars: this rotation caused by the influx of primary atoms toward their centers of aggregation: this influx as a result of the law of Gravity: this law simply being the way in which the tendency of atoms to revert to a state of indifference is necessarily shown: this tendency to revert as merely the unavoidable reaction of the very first and most significant act—that act by which a God, existing by Himself and alone, became everything at once through His will, while all things were thus made a part of God.
The radical assumptions of this Discourse suggest to me, and in fact imply, certain important modifications of the Nebular Theory as given by Laplace. The efforts of the repulsive power I have considered as made for the purpose of preventing contact among the atoms, and thus as made in the ratio of the approach to contact—that is to say, in the ratio of condensation.[7] In other words, Electricity, with its involute phænomena, heat, light and magnetism, is to be understood as proceeding as condensation proceeds, and, of course, inversely as density proceeds, [82]or the cessation to condense. Thus the Sun, in the process of its aggregation, must soon, in developing repulsion, have become excessively heated—perhaps incandescent: and we can perceive how the operation of discarding its rings must have been materially assisted by the slight incrustation of its surface consequent on cooling. Any common experiment shows us how readily a crust of the character suggested, is separated, through heterogeneity, from the interior mass. But, on every successive rejection of the crust, the new surface would appear incandescent as before; and the period at which it would again become so far encrusted as to be readily loosened and discharged, may well be imagined as exactly coincident with that at which a new effort would be needed, by the whole mass, to restore the equilibrium of its two forces, disarranged through condensation. In other words:—by the time the electric influence (Repulsion) has prepared the surface for rejection, we are to understand that the gravitating influence (Attraction) is precisely ready to reject it. Here, then, as everywhere, the Body and the Soul walk hand in hand.
The radical ideas in this discourse suggest to me, and actually imply, some significant changes to the Nebular Theory as presented by Laplace. I view the efforts of repulsive force as aimed at preventing contact among atoms, and thus as being proportional to the approach to contact—that is to say, in proportion to condensation.[7] In other words, Electricity, along with its complex phenomena like heat, light, and magnetism, should be understood as following the same process as condensation, and, of course, inversely to density, or the cessation to condense. Therefore, as the Sun aggregates, it must have become extremely hot—possibly even incandescent—due to developing repulsion; and we can see how the process of shedding its rings would be significantly aided by the thin crust that formed on its surface as it cooled. Any simple experiment demonstrates how easily a crust like this can be separated, due to its differences, from the inner mass. However, with each layer that is shed, the new surface would appear incandescent once again; and the time at which it would become so encrusted that it could be easily loosened and removed might well coincide with the moment when the entire mass would need to exert a new effort to restore the balance of its two forces, disturbed by condensation. In other words: by the time the electric influence (Repulsion) has prepared the surface for shedding, we should understand that the gravitational influence (Attraction) is perfectly ready to let it go. Here, then, as always, the Body and the Soul walk hand in hand.
These ideas are empirically confirmed at all points. Since condensation can never, in any body, be considered as absolutely at an end, we are warranted in anticipating that, whenever we have an opportunity of testing the matter, we shall find indications of resident luminosity in all the stellar bodies—moons and planets as well as suns. That our Moon is strongly self-luminous, we see at her every total eclipse, when, if not so, she would disappear. On the dark part of the satellite, too, during her phases, we often observe flashes like our own Auroras; and that these latter, with our various other so-called electrical phænomena,[83] without reference to any more steady radiance, must give our Earth a certain appearance of luminosity to an inhabitant of the Moon, is quite evident. In fact, we should regard all the phænomena referred to, as mere manifestations, in different moods and degrees, of the Earth’s feebly-continued condensation.
These ideas are confirmed at every level. Since condensation can never really be considered completely done in any body, we can expect that whenever we have a chance to test this, we will find signs of lingering luminosity in all celestial bodies—moons and planets as well as stars. We see that our Moon is strongly self-luminous during every total eclipse; if it weren't, it would completely disappear. During its phases, we often observe flashes on the dark side of the Moon that resemble our own Auroras. It's clear that these, along with our various other electrical phenomena,[83] contribute to how our Earth appears luminous to a Moon inhabitant, even without considering any more steady brightness. In fact, we should view all these phenomena as different expressions, in various moods and degrees, of the Earth's ongoing weak condensation.
If my views are tenable, we should be prepared to find the newer planets—that is to say, those nearer the Sun—more luminous than those older and more remote:—and the extreme brilliancy of Venus (on whose dark portions, during her phases, the Auroras are frequently visible) does not seem to be altogether accounted for by her mere proximity to the central orb. She is no doubt vividly self-luminous, although less so than Mercury: while the luminosity of Neptune may be comparatively nothing.
If my views are valid, we should expect to find that the newer planets—meaning those closer to the Sun—are brighter than the older and more distant ones. The intense brightness of Venus (on which the dark areas during her phases often show Auroras) doesn’t seem to be fully explained just by her closeness to the central star. She is certainly very bright on her own, though not as much as Mercury; meanwhile, Neptune's brightness might be relatively minimal.
Admitting what I have urged, it is clear that, from the moment of the Sun’s discarding a ring, there must be a continuous diminution both of his heat and light, on account of the continuous encrustation of his surface; and that a period would arrive—the period immediately previous to a new discharge—when a very material decrease of both light and heat, must become apparent. Now, we know that tokens of such changes are distinctly recognizable. On the Melville islands—to adduce merely one out of a hundred examples—we find traces of ultra-tropical vegetation—of plants that never could have flourished without immensely more light and heat than are at present afforded by our Sun to any portion of the surface of the Earth. Is such vegetation referable to an epoch immediately subsequent to the whirling-off of Venus? At this epoch must[84] have occurred to us our greatest access of solar influence; and, in fact, this influence must then have attained its maximum:—leaving out of view, of course, the period when the Earth itself was discarded—the period of its mere organization.
Admitting what I've pointed out, it's clear that, from the moment the Sun casts off a ring, there has to be a continuous decrease in both its heat and light because of the ongoing buildup on its surface. There would come a time—just before a new discharge—when a significant drop in both light and heat would become obvious. We know that signs of these changes are clearly visible. On the Melville Islands—just to mention one of many examples—we find evidence of tropical vegetation—plants that could never have thrived without significantly more light and heat than our Sun currently provides to any part of the Earth's surface. Could such vegetation be linked to a time right after Venus was ejected? At that time, we must have experienced our greatest exposure to solar influence; in fact, this influence must have reached its peak—excluding, of course, the period when the Earth was formed—the time of its mere creation.
Again:—we know that there exist non-luminous suns—that is to say, suns whose existence we determine through the movements of others, but whose luminosity is not sufficient to impress us. Are these suns invisible merely on account of the length of time elapsed since their discharge of a planet? And yet again:—may we not—at least in certain cases—account for the sudden appearances of suns where none had been previously suspected, by the hypothesis that, having rolled with encrusted surfaces throughout the few thousand years of our astronomical history, each of these suns, in whirling off a new secondary, has at length been enabled to display the glories of its still incandescent interior?—To the well-ascertained fact of the proportional increase of heat as we descend into the Earth, I need of course, do nothing more than refer:—it comes in the strongest possible corroboration of all that I have said on the topic now at issue.
Again:—we know that there are non-luminous suns—that is, suns whose existence we identify through the movements of others, but whose brightness is not enough to catch our attention. Are these suns invisible simply because of the long time that has passed since they discharged a planet? And yet again:—can we not—at least in some cases—explain the sudden appearance of suns where none were previously suspected, by the idea that, after spinning with covered surfaces throughout the few thousand years of our astronomical history, each of these suns, in shedding a new secondary, has finally been able to reveal the brilliance of its still glowing interior?—As for the well-established fact that heat increases as we go deeper into the Earth, I don't need to elaborate:—it strongly supports everything I have said on the topic currently under discussion.
In speaking, not long ago, of the repulsive or electrical influence, I remarked that “the important phænomena of vitality, consciousness, and thought, whether we observe them generally or in detail, seem to proceed at least in the ratio of the heterogeneous.”[8] I mentioned, too, that I would recur to the suggestion:—and this is the proper point at which to do so. Looking at the matter, first, in detail, we [85]perceive that not merely the manifestation of vitality, but its importance, consequence, and elevation of character, keep pace, very closely, with the heterogeneity, or complexity, of the animal structure. Looking at the question, now, in its generality, and referring to the first movements of the atoms towards mass-constitution, we find that heterogeneousness, brought about directly through condensation, is proportional with it forever. We thus reach the proposition that the importance of the development of the terrestrial vitality proceeds equably with the terrestrial condensation.
In a recent discussion about the disturbing or dynamic influence, I noted that "the key phenomena of life, awareness, and thought, whether we look at them broadly or in detail, seem to arise at least in proportion to the diversity.”[8] I also mentioned that I would revisit this idea:—and now is the right time to do so. When we examine this closely, we see that not only the expression of life, but also its significance, effects, and level of character, closely align with the diversity, or complexity, of the biological structure. Now, when we consider the issue more generally, and refer to the initial movements of atoms towards forming mass, we find that diversity, directly resulting from condensation, is always proportional to it. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that the significance of the evolution of life on Earth occurs steadily alongside the condensation of Earth.
Now this is in precise accordance with what we know of the succession of animals on the Earth. As it has proceeded in its condensation, superior and still superior races have appeared. Is it impossible that the successive geological revolutions which have attended, at least, if not immediately caused, these successive elevations of vitalic character—is it improbable that these revolutions have themselves been produced by the successive planetary discharges from the Sun—in other words, by the successive variations in the solar influence on the Earth? Were this idea tenable, we should not be unwarranted in the fancy that the discharge of yet a new planet, interior to Mercury, may give rise to yet a new modification of the terrestrial surface—a modification from which may spring a race both materially and spiritually superior to Man. These thoughts impress me with all the force of truth—but I throw them out, of course, merely in their obvious character of suggestion.
Now this aligns perfectly with what we understand about the evolution of animals on Earth. As life has evolved, more advanced and superior species have emerged. Is it impossible that the geological changes, which have at least coincided with, if not directly caused, these increases in vital conditions—could it be unlikely that these changes were triggered by the sequential planetary emissions from the Sun—in other words, by the changing solar influence on Earth? If this idea holds any merit, we might imagine that the emergence of a new planet, closer to the Sun than Mercury, could lead to a new transformation of the Earth's surface—a transformation that could give rise to a species that is both materially and spiritually more advanced than humans. These thoughts strike me as profoundly true—but I present them here merely as suggestions.
The Nebular Theory of Laplace has lately received far[86] more confirmation than it needed, at the hands of the philosopher, Compte. These two have thus together shown—not, to be sure, that Matter at any period actually existed as described, in a state of nebular diffusion, but that, admitting it so to have existed throughout the space and much beyond the space now occupied by our solar system, and to have commenced a movement towards a centre—it must gradually have assumed the various forms and motions which are now seen, in that system, to obtain. A demonstration such as this—a dynamical and mathematical demonstration, as far as demonstration can be—unquestionable and unquestioned—unless, indeed, by that unprofitable and disreputable tribe, the professional questioners—the mere madmen who deny the Newtonian law of Gravity on which the results of the French mathematicians are based—a demonstration, I say, such as this, would to most intellects be conclusive—and I confess that it is so to mine—of the validity of the nebular hypothesis upon which the demonstration depends.
The Nebular Theory of Laplace has recently gained more confirmation than it needed, thanks to the philosopher, Comte. Together, they have shown—not that matter actually existed at any time as described, in a state of nebular diffusion, but that, if it did exist throughout the space and well beyond what our solar system currently occupies, and started moving toward a center—it must have gradually taken on the various forms and motions we now observe in that system. A demonstration like this—a dynamical and mathematical one, as much as a demonstration can be—unquestionable and widely accepted—unless, of course, by that unproductive and disreputable group, the professional skeptics—the mere lunatics who deny the Newtonian law of Gravity that the results of the French mathematicians rely on—a demonstration like this would be conclusive for most minds—and I admit it is for me—of the validity of the nebular hypothesis that underpins the demonstration.
That the demonstration does not prove the hypothesis, according to the common understanding of the word “proof,” I admit, of course. To show that certain existing results—that certain established facts—may be, even mathematically, accounted for by the assumption of a certain hypothesis, is by no means to establish the hypothesis itself. In other words:—to show that, certain data being given, a certain existing result might, or even must, have ensued, will fail to prove that this result did ensue, from the data, until such time as it shall be also shown that there are, and can be, no other data from which the result in question[87] might equally have ensued. But, in the case now discussed, although all must admit the deficiency of what we are in the habit of terming “proof,” still there are many intellects, and those of the loftiest order, to which no proof could bring one iota of additional conviction. Without going into details which might impinge upon the Cloud-Land of Metaphysics, I may as well here observe that the force of conviction, in cases such as this, will always, with the right-thinking, be proportional to the amount of complexity intervening between the hypothesis and the result. To be less abstract:—The greatness of the complexity found existing among cosmical conditions, by rendering great in the same proportion the difficulty of accounting for all these conditions at once, strengthens, also in the same proportion, our faith in that hypothesis which does, in such manner, satisfactorily account for them:—and as no complexity can well be conceived greater than that of the astronomical conditions, so no conviction can be stronger—to my mind at least—than that with which I am impressed by an hypothesis that not only reconciles these conditions, with mathematical accuracy, and reduces them into a consistent and intelligible whole, but is, at the same time, the sole hypothesis by means of which the human intellect has been ever enabled to account for them at all.
I admit that the demonstration doesn’t really “prove” the hypothesis in the way most people understand the term “proof.” Just showing that certain existing results—that is, established facts—can be explained, even mathematically, by assuming a specific hypothesis doesn’t actually prove that hypothesis itself. In other words: to show that given certain data, a particular existing result might, or even must, have happened doesn’t prove that this result actually did occur based on the data, until it is also proven that there are, and can be, no other data from which the result could just as easily have come. But in the case we are discussing now, even though everyone must acknowledge the limits of what we usually call “proof,” there are still many brilliant minds that wouldn’t be convinced by any proof at all. Without getting into details that might touch on the Cloud-Land of Metaphysics, I can say that the strength of conviction in cases like this will always, for rational thinkers, be proportional to the level of complexity involved between the hypothesis and the result. To put it more plainly: The greater the complexity found in cosmic conditions makes it that much harder to explain all these conditions at once, which in turn strengthens our belief in the hypothesis that satisfactorily accounts for them. And since no complexity can be imagined greater than that of astronomical conditions, the conviction I feel is, at least in my opinion, the strongest when I consider a hypothesis that not only reconciles these conditions with mathematical accuracy and brings them into a coherent and understandable whole, but is also the only hypothesis that has ever allowed human intellect to account for them at all.
A most unfounded opinion has become latterly current in gossiping and even in scientific circles—the opinion that the so-called Nebular Cosmogony has been overthrown. This fancy has arisen from the report of late observations made, among what hitherto have been termed the “nebulæ,” through the large telescope of Cincinnati, and the world-renowned[88] instrument of Lord Rosse. Certain spots in the firmament which presented, even to the most powerful of the old telescopes, the appearance of nebulosity, or haze, had been regarded for a long time as confirming the theory of Laplace. They were looked upon as stars in that very process of condensation which I have been attempting to describe. Thus it was supposed that we “had ocular evidence”—an evidence, by the way, which has always been found very questionable—of the truth of the hypothesis; and, although certain telescopic improvements, every now and then, enabled us to perceive that a spot, here and there, which we had been classing among the nebulæ, was, in fact, but a cluster of stars deriving its nebular character only from its immensity of distance—still it was thought that no doubt could exist as to the actual nebulosity of numerous other masses, the strong-holds of the nebulists, bidding defiance to every effort at segregation. Of these latter the most interesting was the great “nebulæ” in the constellation Orion:—but this, with innumerable other mis-called “nebulæ,” when viewed through the magnificent modern telescopes, has become resolved into a simple collection of stars. Now this fact has been very generally understood as conclusive against the Nebular Hypothesis of Laplace; and, on announcement of the discoveries in question, the most enthusiastic defender and most eloquent popularizer of the theory, Dr. Nichol, went so far as to “admit the necessity of abandoning” an idea which had formed the material of his most praiseworthy book.[9]
A completely unfounded opinion has recently become popular in gossip and even in scientific circles—the view that the so-called Nebular Cosmogony has been disproven. This idea has come from reports of recent observations made through the large telescope in Cincinnati and the famous instrument of Lord Rosse. Certain spots in the sky that appeared, even to the strongest of the old telescopes, as nebulous or hazy had long been taken as evidence supporting Laplace's theory. They were considered stars currently undergoing the process of condensation that I'm trying to describe. Thus, it was believed we “had seen evidence”—which, by the way, has always been very questionable—of the truth of the hypothesis; and although certain improvements in telescopes occasionally allowed us to see that a spot here and there that we classified as a nebula was actually just a cluster of stars appearing nebulous only because of their great distance, it was still thought there was no doubt about the actual nebulosity of many other masses, which were the strongholds of the nebulists, resisting any attempts at separation. Among these, the most interesting was the large “nebula” in the Orion constellation:—but this, along with countless other wrongly labeled “nebulae,” when viewed through the impressive modern telescopes, has turned into a simple collection of stars. Now, this fact has generally been understood as conclusive against Laplace's Nebular Hypothesis; and upon the announcement of these discoveries, the most dedicated supporter and most articulate popularizer of the theory, Dr. Nichol, even went so far as to “admit the necessity of abandoning” an idea that had been central to his highly praised book.[9]
Many of my readers will no doubt be inclined to say that the result of these new investigations has at least a strong tendency to overthrow the hypothesis; while some of them, more thoughtful, will suggest that, although the theory is by no means disproved through the segregation of the particular “nebulæ,” alluded to, still a failure to segregate them, with such telescopes, might well have been understood as a triumphant corroboration of the theory:—and this latter class will be surprised, perhaps, to hear me say that even with them I disagree. If the propositions of this Discourse have been comprehended, it will be seen that, in my view, a failure to segregate the “nebulæ” would have tended to the refutation, rather than to the confirmation, of the Nebular Hypothesis.
Many of my readers will likely want to argue that the outcome of these new investigations has at least a strong tendency to challenge the hypothesis; while some of them, being more thoughtful, will propose that, although the theory is definitely not disproven due to the separation of the specific "nebulae" mentioned, still, a failure to separate them with such telescopes might have been viewed as solid support for the theory. This latter group might be surprised to hear me say that I actually disagree with them. If the points made in this Discourse have been understood, it will be clear that, in my opinion, failing to separate the "nebulae" would have leaned more towards disproving rather than confirming the Nebular Hypothesis.
Let me explain:—The Newtonian Law of Gravity we may, of course, assume as demonstrated. This law, it will be remembered, I have referred to the rëaction of the first Divine Act—to the rëaction of an exercise of the Divine Volition temporarily overcoming a difficulty. This difficulty is that of forcing the normal into the abnormal—of impelling that whose originality, and therefore whose rightful condition, was One, to take upon itself the wrongful condition of Many. It is only by conceiving this difficulty as temporarily overcome, that we can comprehend a rëaction. [90]There could have been no rëaction had the act been infinitely continued. So long as the act lasted, no rëaction, of course, could commence; in other words, no gravitation could take place—for we have considered the one as but the manifestation of the other. But gravitation has taken place; therefore the act of Creation has ceased: and gravitation has long ago taken place; therefore the act of Creation has long ago ceased. We can no more expect, then, to observe the primary processes of Creation; and to these primary processes the condition of nebulosity has already been explained to belong.
Let me explain: The Newtonian Law of Gravity, we can assume, is proven. This law, as we recall, relates to the reaction of the first Divine Act—specifically, the reaction of an exertion of Divine Will temporarily overcoming a challenge. This challenge is about forcing the normal into the abnormal—making something that was originally in a state of One take on the wrong condition of Many. We can only understand this challenge as temporarily overcome if we want to grasp a reaction. [90] There couldn’t have been any reaction if the act continued forever. While the act lasted, no reaction, of course, could begin; in other words, no gravitation could happen—because we’ve viewed one as merely a manifestation of the other. But gravitation has occurred; therefore, the act of Creation has stopped: and gravitation has occurred long ago; hence, the act of Creation has long since ceased. We can no more expect to see the primary processes of Creation; and to these primary processes, the state of nebulosity has already been explained to belong.
Through what we know of the propagation of light, we have direct proof that the more remote of the stars have existed, under the forms in which we now see them, for an inconceivable number of years. So far back at least, then, as the period when these stars underwent condensation, must have been the epoch at which the mass-constitutive processes began. That we may conceive these processes, then, as still going on in the case of certain “nebulæ,” while in all other cases we find them thoroughly at an end, we are forced into assumptions for which we have really no basis whatever—we have to thrust in, again, upon the revolting Reason, the blasphemous idea of special interposition—we have to suppose that, in the particular instances of these “nebulæ,” an unerring God found it necessary to introduce certain supplementary regulations—certain improvements of the general law—certain retouchings and emendations, in a word, which had the effect of deferring the completion of these individual stars for centuries of centuries beyond the æra during which all the other stellar bodies had time,[91] not only to be fully constituted, but to grow hoary with an unspeakable old age.
Through our understanding of how light travels, we have clear evidence that the more distant stars have been around in their current forms for an unimaginably long time. At least back to the moment these stars started to form must have been when the processes that make up their mass began. We can imagine that these processes are still happening in some “nebulas,” while in all other cases, they have completely stopped. This forces us into assumptions that have no solid foundation—we must introduce the troubling idea of divine intervention—we have to assume that, in the specific cases of these “nebulas,” an infallible God found it necessary to implement certain extra rules—some tweaks to the general law—some adjustments and edits, which delayed the formation of these individual stars for many centuries beyond the time when all the other stars had already fully formed and even aged significantly.
Of course, it will be immediately objected that since the light by which we recognize the nebulæ now, must be merely that which left their surfaces a vast number of years ago, the processes at present observed, or supposed to be observed, are, in fact, not processes now actually going on, but the phantoms of processes completed long in the Past—just as I maintain all these mass-constitutive processes must have been.
Of course, it will be immediately argued that since the light we use to see the nebulae now must be the light that left them many years ago, the processes we currently observe, or think we observe, are actually not ongoing processes, but rather echoes of processes that were completed long ago—just as I argue all these mass-forming processes must have been.
To this I reply that neither is the now-observed condition of the condensed stars their actual condition, but a condition completed long in the Past; so that my argument drawn from the relative condition of the stars and the “nebulæ,” is in no manner disturbed. Moreover, those who maintain the existence of nebulæ, do not refer the nebulosity to extreme distance; they declare it a real and not merely a perspective nebulosity. That we may conceive, indeed, a nebular mass as visible at all, we must conceive it as very near us in comparison with the condensed stars brought into view by the modern telescopes. In maintaining the appearances in question, then, to be really nebulous, we maintain their comparative vicinity to our point of view. Thus, their condition, as we see them now, must be referred to an epoch far less remote than that to which we may refer the now-observed condition of at least the majority of the stars.—In a word, should Astronomy ever demonstrate a “nebula,” in the sense at present intended, I should consider the Nebular Cosmogony—not, indeed, as corroborated by the demonstration—but as thereby irretrievably overthrown.[92]
In response, I would say that the current state of the condensed stars is not their actual state, but rather a condition that was established long ago. Therefore, my argument based on the relative state of the stars and the "nebulae" remains unaffected. Additionally, those who support the existence of nebulae do not suggest that the nebulosity is due to extreme distance; they assert that it is a real phenomenon, not just a trick of perspective. For us to imagine a nebular mass being visible at all, we need to think of it as very close to us in comparison to the condensed stars that modern telescopes reveal. By affirming that these appearances are genuinely nebulous, we are also asserting their relative closeness to our viewpoint. Thus, the state in which we see them now must be linked to a time much more recent than the time we can attribute to the current state of most stars. Simply put, if Astronomy were ever to confirm a "nebula" in the way currently intended, I would view the Nebular Cosmogony—not as validated by that finding, but rather as definitively disproven.[92]
By way, however, of rendering unto Cæsar no more than the things that are Cæsar’s, let me here remark that the assumption of the hypothesis which led him to so glorious a result, seems to have been suggested to Laplace in great measure by a misconception—by the very misconception of which we have just been speaking—by the generally prevalent misunderstanding of the character of the nebulæ, so mis-named. These he supposed to be, in reality, what their designation implies. The fact is, this great man had, very properly, an inferior faith in his own merely perceptive powers. In respect, therefore, to the actual existence of nebulæ—an existence so confidently maintained by his telescopic contemporaries—he depended less upon what he saw than upon what he heard.
However, in giving to Caesar only what belongs to him, I want to point out that the hypothesis that led to such an impressive outcome seems to have been influenced greatly by a misunderstanding—specifically, the very misunderstanding we've just discussed—about the true nature of the nebulas, which have been misnamed. He believed they were, in fact, what their name suggests. The truth is, this great man had, quite understandably, limited faith in his own purely perceptive abilities. Thus, concerning the actual existence of nebulas—an existence confidently asserted by his telescopic peers—he relied more on what he heard than on what he saw.
It will be seen that the only valid objections to his theory, are those made to its hypothesis as such—to what suggested it—not to what it suggests; to its propositions rather than to its results. His most unwarranted assumption was that of giving the atoms a movement towards a centre, in the very face of his evident understanding that these atoms, in unlimited succession, extended throughout the Universal space. I have already shown that, under such circumstances, there could have occurred no movement at all; and Laplace, consequently, assumed one on no more philosophical ground than that something of the kind was necessary for the establishment of what he intended to establish.
It will be clear that the only valid objections to his theory are those focused on its hypothesis itself—what led to it—not on what it suggests; on its propositions rather than its results. His most unjustified assumption was that the atoms move toward a center, despite his clear understanding that these atoms, in limitless succession, spread throughout the universe. I have already shown that, under those conditions, no movement could have occurred at all; and Laplace, therefore, assumed one based on no more philosophical reasoning than that something like that was necessary to support what he wanted to prove.
His original idea seems to have been a compound of the true Epicurean atoms with the false nebulæ of his contemporaries; and thus his theory presents us with the singular[93] anomaly of absolute truth deduced, as a mathematical result, from a hybrid datum of ancient imagination intertangled with modern inacumen. Laplace’s real strength lay, in fact, in an almost miraculous mathematical instinct:—on this he relied; and in no instance did it fail or deceive him:—in the case of the Nebular Cosmogony, it led him, blindfolded, through a labyrinth of Error, into one of the most luminous and stupendous temples of Truth.
His original idea seems to have been a blend of true Epicurean atoms and the false nebulas of his time; and so his theory gives us the unusual[93] anomaly of absolute truth derived, like a mathematical conclusion, from a mixed foundation of ancient imagination tangled with modern insight. Laplace's real strength lay in what seemed like a miraculous mathematical intuition: he relied on this, and it never failed or misled him: in the case of the Nebular Cosmogony, it guided him, blindfolded, through a maze of error, into one of the most brilliant and awe-inspiring halls of truth.
Let us now fancy, for the moment, that the ring first thrown off by the Sun—that is to say, the ring whose breaking-up constituted Neptune—did not, in fact, break up until the throwing-off of the ring out of which Uranus arose; that this latter ring, again, remained perfect until the discharge of that out of which sprang Saturn; that this latter, again, remained entire until the discharge of that from which originated Jupiter—and so on. Let us imagine, in a word, that no dissolution occurred among the rings until the final rejection of that which gave birth to Mercury. We thus paint to the eye of the mind a series of cöexistent concentric circles; and looking as well at them as at the processes by which, according to Laplace’s hypothesis, they were constructed, we perceive at once a very singular analogy with the atomic strata and the process of the original irradiation as I have described it. Is it impossible that, on measuring the forces, respectively, by which each successive planetary circle was thrown off—that is to say, on measuring the successive excesses of rotation over gravitation which occasioned the successive discharges—we should find the analogy in question more decidedly confirmed? Is it improbable that we should discover these[94] forces to have varied—as in the original radiation—proportionally to the squares of the distances?
Let’s imagine for a moment that the ring initially released by the Sun—the one that eventually formed Neptune—didn't actually break apart until the ring that created Uranus was released. Then, let’s say that this ring stayed intact until the one that produced Saturn was discharged; and then that one remained whole until the ring that led to Jupiter was discharged—and so forth. Essentially, let’s picture that no breakdown occurred among the rings until the final release of the one that gave rise to Mercury. This allows us to visualize a series of overlapping concentric circles, and as we look at them and the processes by which, according to Laplace’s hypothesis, they were formed, we see a striking similarity to the atomic layers and the process of original radiation as I described. Is it possible that if we measure the forces that caused each successive planetary circle to be released—that is, if we measure the increasing rotation that surpassed gravitational pull leading to these discharges—we could find this similarity even more clearly confirmed? Is it unlikely that we would find these forces varied—like in the original radiation—according to the squares of the distances?
Our solar system, consisting, in chief, of one sun, with sixteen planets certainly, and possibly a few more, revolving about it at various distances, and attended by seventeen moons assuredly, but very probably by several others—is now to be considered as an example of the innumerable agglomerations which proceeded to take place throughout the Universal Sphere of atoms on withdrawal of the Divine Volition. I mean to say that our solar system is to be understood as affording a generic instance of these agglomerations, or, more correctly, of the ulterior conditions at which they arrived. If we keep our attention fixed on the idea of the utmost possible Relation as the Omnipotent design, and on the precautions taken to accomplish it through difference of form, among the original atoms, and particular inequidistance, we shall find it impossible to suppose for a moment that even any two of the incipient agglomerations reached precisely the same result in the end. We shall rather be inclined to think that no two stellar bodies in the Universe—whether suns, planets or moons—are particularly, while all are generally, similar. Still less, then, can we imagine any two assemblages of such bodies—any two “systems”—as having more than a general resemblance.[10] Our telescopes, at this point, thoroughly confirm our deductions. [95]Taking our own solar system, then, as merely a loose or general type of all, we have so far proceeded in our subject as to survey the Universe under the aspect of a spherical space, throughout which, dispersed with merely general equability, exist a number of but generally similar systems.
Our solar system, mainly consisting of one sun and definitely sixteen planets, and maybe a few more, orbits around it at different distances, and is accompanied by seventeen moons for sure, but probably several others—should now be seen as an example of the countless groupings that formed throughout the Universal Sphere of atoms once the Divine Will retreated. In other words, our solar system serves as a typical case of these groupings, or more accurately, of the later conditions they reached. If we focus on the concept of the utmost possible relationship as the design of the All-Powerful, and on the measures taken to achieve it through variations in the form of the original atoms and specific distances, it becomes impossible to believe for even a moment that any two emerging groupings ended up exactly the same in the end. Instead, we are led to think that no two celestial bodies in the Universe—whether they be suns, planets, or moons—are exactly alike, while all are somewhat similar in general. Even less can we imagine any two assemblies of such bodies—any two "systems"—having more than a general resemblance.[10] Our telescopes, at this stage, thoroughly support our conclusions. [95]Taking our own solar system as merely a loose or general type of all, we have so far examined the Universe as a spherical space, where a number of generally similar systems exist, dispersed with only general uniformity.
Let us now, expanding our conceptions, look upon each of these systems as in itself an atom; which in fact it is, when we consider it as but one of the countless myriads of systems which constitute the Universe. Regarding all, then, as but colossal atoms, each with the same ineradicable tendency to Unity which characterizes the actual atoms of which it consists—we enter at once upon a new order of aggregations. The smaller systems, in the vicinity of a larger one, would, inevitably, be drawn into still closer vicinity. A thousand would assemble here; a million there—perhaps here, again, even a billion—leaving, thus, immeasurable vacancies in space. And if now, it be demanded why, in the case of these systems—of these merely Titanic atoms—I speak, simply, of an “assemblage,” and not, as in the case of the actual atoms, of a more or less consolidated agglomeration:—if it be asked, for instance, why I do not carry what I suggest to its legitimate conclusion, and describe, at once, these assemblages of system-atoms as rushing to consolidation in spheres—as each becoming condensed into one magnificent sun—my reply is that μελλοντα ταυτα—I am but pausing, for a moment, on the awful threshold of the Future. For the present, calling these assemblages “clusters,” we see them in the incipient stages of their consolidation. Their absolute consolidation is to come.[96]
Let's now broaden our understanding and view each of these systems as an atom in itself; which it truly is when we consider it as just one among the countless myriad systems that make up the Universe. If we regard all of them as massive atoms, each with the same unchangeable drive toward Unity that defines the actual atoms they consist of, we immediately enter a new realm of aggregations. The smaller systems close to a larger one would naturally be drawn even closer together. A thousand might gather here; a million there—perhaps even a billion in some places—leaving behind vast empty spaces in between. And if it's asked why, in the case of these systems—these gigantic atoms—I use the term “assemblage” instead of describing them, like actual atoms, as more or less condensed clumps: if one were to question why I don’t take it to its logical conclusion and portray these clusters of system-atoms as rushing toward consolidation into spheres—as each one evolving into a magnificent sun—my answer is that μελλοντα ταυτα—I am merely pausing for a moment at the daunting edge of the Future. For now, by calling these collections “clusters,” we see them in the early stages of their consolidation. Their absolute consolidation is yet to come.[96]
We have now reached a point from which we behold the Universe as a spherical space, interspersed, unequably, with clusters. It will be noticed that I here prefer the adverb “unequably” to the phrase “with a merely general equability,” employed before. It is evident, in fact, that the equability of distribution will diminish in the ratio of the agglomerative processes—that is to say, as the things distributed diminish in number. Thus the increase of in-equability—an increase which must continue until, sooner or later, an epoch will arrive at which the largest agglomeration will absorb all the others—should be viewed as, simply, a corroborative indication of the tendency to One.
We have now reached a point where we see the Universe as a spherical space, unevenly filled with clusters. I want to highlight that I prefer the word “unequably” over the earlier phrase “with a merely general equability.” It’s clear that the evenness of distribution will decrease as the grouping processes increase—that is, as the number of distributed items decreases. So, the rise of unevenness—an increase that will keep going until eventually the largest grouping absorbs all the others—should be seen as just a supporting indication of the tendency towards unity.
And here, at length, it seems proper to inquire whether the ascertained facts of Astronomy confirm the general arrangement which I have thus, deductively, assigned to the Heavens. Thoroughly, they do. Telescopic observation, guided by the laws of perspective, enables us to understand that the perceptible Universe exists as a cluster of clusters, irregularly disposed.
And now, it seems fitting to ask whether the confirmed facts of Astronomy support the general layout I've deduced for the Heavens. They absolutely do. Telescopic observation, based on the principles of perspective, allows us to see that the observable Universe exists as a cluster of clusters, arranged irregularly.
The “clusters” of which this Universal “cluster of clusters” consists, are merely what we have been in the practice of designating “nebulæ”—and, of these “nebulæ,” one is of paramount interest to mankind. I allude to the Galaxy, or Milky Way. This interests us, first and most obviously, on account of its great superiority in apparent size, not only to any one other cluster in the firmament, but to all the other clusters taken together. The largest of these latter occupies a mere point, comparatively, and is distinctly seen only with the aid of a telescope. The Galaxy sweeps throughout the Heaven and is brilliantly visible[97] to the naked eye. But it interests man chiefly, although less immediately, on account of its being his home; the home of the Earth on which he exists; the home of the Sun about which this Earth revolves; the home of that “system” of orbs of which the Sun is the centre and primary—the Earth one of sixteen secondaries, or planets—the Moon one of seventeen tertiaries, or satellites. The Galaxy, let me repeat, is but one of the clusters which I have been describing—but one of the mis-called “nebulæ” revealed to us—by the telescope alone, sometimes—as faint hazy spots in various quarters of the sky. We have no reason to suppose the Milky Way really more extensive than the least of these “nebulæ.” Its vast superiority in size is but an apparent superiority arising from our position in regard to it—that is to say, from our position in its midst. However strange the assertion may at first appear to those unversed in Astronomy, still the astronomer himself has no hesitation in asserting that we are in the midst of that inconceivable host of stars—of suns—of systems—which constitute the Galaxy. Moreover, not only have we—not only has our Sun a right to claim the Galaxy as its own especial cluster, but, with slight reservation, it may be said that all the distinctly visible stars of the firmament—all the stars Visible to the naked eye—have equally a right to claim it as their own.
The "clusters" that make up this universal "cluster of clusters" are simply what we have come to call "nebulae," and within these "nebulae," one stands out as especially important to humanity. I'm referring to the Galaxy, or Milky Way. This interests us primarily due to its incredible size, which is not only larger than any single other cluster in the sky but also bigger than all the other clusters combined. The largest of these others takes up only a tiny spot and can only be clearly seen through a telescope. The Galaxy stretches across the sky and shines brightly [97] to the naked eye. However, it matters to humanity most significantly, though less directly, because it is our home; the home of the Earth we live on; the home of the Sun that the Earth orbits; the home of the "system" of celestial bodies with the Sun as the center and primary body—Earth being one of sixteen secondary planets—and the Moon one of seventeen tertiary satellites. Let me emphasize that the Galaxy is just one of the clusters I've been talking about—one of the misnamed "nebulae" revealed to us—sometimes only by telescope—as faint, hazy spots scattered throughout the sky. We have no reason to believe that the Milky Way is truly more extensive than the smallest of these "nebulae." Its apparent superiority in size is simply due to our position relative to it—essentially, because we are located in its center. While this claim may seem strange at first to those unfamiliar with Astronomy, the astronomer readily asserts that we are in the midst of that unimaginable multitude of stars—of suns—of systems that make up the Galaxy. Furthermore, not only do we—not only does our Sun have the right to claim the Galaxy as its special cluster, but, with some minor exceptions, it can be said that all the distinct stars visible in the sky—all the stars we can see with the naked eye—also have a claim to it as their own.
There has been a great deal of misconception in respect to the shape of the Galaxy; which, in nearly all our astronomical treatises, is said to resemble that of a capital Y. The cluster in question has, in reality, a certain general—very general resemblance to the planet Saturn, with its[98] encompassing triple ring. Instead of the solid orb of that planet, however, we must picture to ourselves a lenticular star-island, or collection of stars; our Sun lying excentrically—near the shore of the island—on that side of it which is nearest the constellation of the Cross and farthest from that of Cassiopeia. The surrounding ring, where it approaches our position, has in it a longitudinal gash, which does, in fact, cause the ring, in our vicinity, to assume, loosely, the appearance of a capital Y.
There has been a lot of misunderstanding about the shape of the Galaxy; most of our astronomy books say it looks like a capital Y. The cluster actually has a somewhat general—very general resemblance to the planet Saturn, with its[98] surrounding triple ring. Instead of a solid orb like that planet, we need to imagine a lenticular star-island, or a collection of stars; our Sun is off-center—near the edge of the island—on the side that is closest to the constellation of the Cross and farthest from Cassiopeia. The surrounding ring, where it comes close to us, has a longitudinal gash, which does, in fact, give the ring, in our area, a loose appearance resembling a capital Y.
We must not fall into the error, however, of conceiving the somewhat indefinite girdle as at all remote, comparatively speaking, from the also indefinite lenticular cluster which it surrounds; and thus, for mere purpose of explanation, we may speak of our Sun as actually situated at that point of the Y where its three component lines unite; and, conceiving this letter to be of a certain solidity—of a certain thickness, very trivial in comparison with its length—we may even speak of our position as in the middle of this thickness. Fancying ourselves thus placed, we shall no longer find difficulty in accounting for the phænomena presented—which are perspective altogether. When we look upward or downward—that is to say, when we cast our eyes in the direction of the letter’s thickness—we look through fewer stars than when we cast them in the direction of its length, or along either of the three component lines. Of course, in the former case, the stars appear scattered—in the latter, crowded.—To reverse this explanation:—An inhabitant of the Earth, when looking, as we commonly express ourselves, at the Galaxy, is then beholding it in some of the directions of its length—is looking along the lines of[99] the Y—but when, looking out into the general Heaven, he turns his eyes from the Galaxy, he is then surveying it in the direction of the letter’s thickness; and on this account the stars seem to him scattered; while, in fact, they are as close together, on an average, as in the mass of the cluster. No consideration could be better adapted to convey an idea of this cluster’s stupendous extent.
We must not make the mistake of thinking of the somewhat unclear band as being at all far, in a relative sense, from the also unclear lens-shaped cluster that it surrounds; and so, just for the sake of explanation, we can think of our Sun as actually being located at that point of the Y where its three lines come together; and, imagining this letter as having a certain solidity—of a certain thickness, quite small compared to its length—we can even say that our position is in the middle of this thickness. By picturing ourselves this way, we should no longer struggle to explain the phenomena observed—which are purely about perspective. When we look up or down—that is to say, when we direct our gaze along the letter’s thickness—we see fewer stars than when we look along its length, or along either of the three lines. In the first case, the stars seem scattered—in the latter, they appear crowded.—To turn this explanation around:—An inhabitant of Earth, when looking, as we usually say, at the Galaxy, is in fact seeing it in some of the directions of its length—is looking along the lines of[99] the Y—but when, gazing into the wider sky, he turns his eyes away from the Galaxy, he’s then viewing it in the direction of the letter’s thickness; and for this reason, the stars seem scattered to him; while, in reality, they are just as close together, on average, as in the main part of the cluster. No example could better illustrate the incredible size of this cluster.
If, with a telescope of high space-penetrating power, we carefully inspect the firmament, we shall become aware of a belt of clusters—of what we have hitherto called “nebulæ”—a band, of varying breadth, stretching from horizon to horizon, at right angles to the general course of the Milky Way. This band is the ultimate cluster of clusters. This belt is The Universe. Our Galaxy is but one, and perhaps one of the most inconsiderable, of the clusters which go to the constitution of this ultimate, Universal belt or band. The appearance of this cluster of clusters, to our eyes, as a belt or band, is altogether a perspective phænomenon of the same character as that which causes us to behold our own individual and roughly-spherical cluster, the Galaxy, under guise also of a belt, traversing the Heavens at right angles to the Universal one. The shape of the all-inclusive cluster is, of course generally, that of each individual cluster which it includes. Just as the scattered stars which, on looking from the Galaxy, we see in the general sky, are, in fact, but a portion of that Galaxy itself, and as closely intermingled with it as any of the telescopic points in what seems the densest portion of its mass—so are the scattered “nebulæ” which, on casting our eyes from the Universal belt, we perceive at all points of the firmament—so, I say,[100] are these scattered “nebulæ” to be understood as only perspectively scattered, and as part and parcel of the one supreme and Universal sphere.
If we use a powerful telescope to carefully look at the night sky, we’ll notice a belt of clusters—what we’ve previously called "nebulæ"—a band of varying width stretching from one horizon to the other, perpendicular to the general path of the Milky Way. This band is the ultimate cluster of clusters. This belt is The Universe. Our Galaxy is just one, and possibly one of the least significant, of the clusters that make up this ultimate, universal belt or band. The way we see this cluster of clusters as a belt or band is completely a perspective phenomenon, similar to how we see our own individual roughly spherical cluster, the Galaxy, also appearing as a belt, cutting across the sky at an angle to the Universal one. The overall shape of the all-encompassing cluster is, of course, generally, similar to that of each individual cluster it contains. Just as the scattered stars that we see when looking from the Galaxy are actually just part of that Galaxy itself, closely mixed in with it as any of the telescopic points in what looks like the densest part of its mass—similarly, the scattered “nebulæ” we notice when looking from the Universal belt are perceived at every point in the sky—so, I say, [100]these scattered “nebulæ” should be understood as only perspective scatterings and as integral parts of the one supreme and Universal sphere.
No astronomical fallacy is more untenable, and none has been more pertinaciously adhered to, than that of the absolute illimitation of the Universe of Stars. The reasons for limitation, as I have already assigned them, à priori, seem to me unanswerable; but, not to speak of these, observation assures us that there is, in numerous directions around us, certainly, if not in all, a positive limit—or, at the very least, affords us no basis whatever for thinking otherwise. Were the succession of stars endless, then the background of the sky would present us an uniform luminosity, like that displayed by the Galaxy—since there could be absolutely no point, in all that background, at which would not exist a star. The only mode, therefore, in which, under such a state of affairs, we could comprehend the voids which our telescopes find in innumerable directions, would be by supposing the distance of the invisible background so immense that no ray from it has yet been able to reach us at all. That this may be so, who shall venture to deny? I maintain, simply, that we have not even the shadow of a reason for believing that it is so.
No astronomical misconception is less defensible, and none has been held onto more stubbornly, than the idea that the Universe of Stars is absolutely unlimited. The reasons for believing in limits, as I've already explained a priori, seem to me unarguable; but aside from that, observation clearly shows us that there is, in many directions around us, definitely a positive limit—or at least, we have no ground to think otherwise. If the stars went on forever, then the sky would look uniformly bright, like the light of the Galaxy—since there wouldn't be any point in that background without a star. Therefore, the only way we could understand the voids our telescopes find in countless directions, under such circumstances, would be to assume that the distance to the unseen background is so vast that no light from it has reached us yet. That this might be true, who would dare to deny? I simply argue that we don't even have the slightest reason to believe that it is true.
When speaking of the vulgar propensity to regard all bodies on the Earth as tending merely to the Earth’s centre, I observed that, “with certain exceptions to be specified hereafter, every body on the Earth tended not only to the Earth’s centre, but in every conceivable direction besides.”[11] The “exceptions” refer to those frequent gaps in the Heavens, [101]where our utmost scrutiny can detect not only no stellar bodies, but no indications of their existence:—where yawning chasms, blacker than Erebus, seem to afford us glimpses, through the boundary walls of the Universe of Stars, into the illimitable Universe of Vacancy, beyond. Now as any body, existing on the Earth, chances to pass, either through its own movement or the Earth’s, into a line with any one of these voids, or cosmical abysses, it clearly is no longer attracted in the direction of that void, and for the moment, consequently, is “heavier” than at any period, either after or before. Independently of the consideration of these voids, however, and looking only at the generally unequable distribution of the stars, we see that the absolute tendency of bodies on the Earth to the Earth’s centre, is in a state of perpetual variation.
When talking about the common tendency to see all objects on Earth as being drawn solely to the Earth's center, I noted that, “with certain exceptions that will be discussed later, every object on Earth is not only drawn to the Earth’s center but also in every possible direction.”[11] The “exceptions” refer to those frequent gaps in the sky,[101] where our closest observation reveals not only a lack of stars but also no signs of their presence:—where vast chasms, darker than Erebus, seem to provide us glimpses through the outer edges of the Universe of Stars into the endless Universe of Nothingness beyond. Now, when any object on Earth happens to align, whether through its own movement or that of the Earth, with one of these voids or cosmic abysses, it is clearly not being pulled toward that void, and at that moment, therefore, it is “heavier” than at any other time, either before or after. Aside from these voids, though, and focusing solely on the generally uneven distribution of stars, we can see that the overall pull of objects on Earth toward the Earth’s center is in a constant state of change.
We comprehend, then, the insulation of our Universe. We perceive the isolation of that—of all that which we grasp with the senses. We know that there exists one cluster of clusters—a collection around which, on all sides, extend the immeasurable wildernesses of a Space to all human perception untenanted. But because upon the confines of this Universe of Stars we are compelled to pause, through want of farther evidence from the senses, is it right to conclude that, in fact, there is no material point beyond that which we have thus been permitted to attain? Have we, or have we not, an analogical right to the inference that this perceptible Universe—that this cluster of clusters—is but one of a series of clusters of clusters, the rest of which are invisible through distance—through the diffusion of their light being so excessive, ere it reaches us, as not to produce[102] upon our retinas a light-impression—or from there being no such emanation as light at all, in these unspeakably distant worlds—or, lastly, from the mere interval being so vast, that the electric tidings of their presence in Space, have not yet—through the lapsing myriads of years—been enabled to traverse that interval?
We understand, then, the isolation of our Universe. We recognize the separation of that—of everything we can sense. We know there’s one cluster of clusters—a grouping around which, in every direction, lies the endless expanse of a Space that is to all human perception unoccupied. But just because we have to stop at the edges of this Universe of Stars, due to a lack of further evidence from our senses, is it fair to assume that there is no material point beyond what we have been able to reach? Do we have, or do we not have, a reasonable basis to conclude that this visible Universe—that this cluster of clusters—is just one of a series of clusters of clusters, the rest of which are too far away to see—either because their light is too dispersed by the time it reaches us, so that it doesn’t create[102] an impression on our retinas—or because there’s no light emitted at all from these unimaginably distant worlds—or, finally, because the distance is so immense that the signals of their existence in Space haven’t yet—through countless years—been able to travel across that gap?
Have we any right to inferences—have we any ground whatever for visions such as these? If we have a right to them in any degree, we have a right to their infinite extension.
Do we have any right to make conclusions—do we have any basis at all for ideas like these? If we have any right to them at all, we have a right to their endless expansion.
The human brain has obviously a leaning to the “Infinite,” and fondles the phantom of the idea. It seems to long with a passionate fervor for this impossible conception, with the hope of intellectually believing it when conceived. What is general among the whole race of Man, of course no individual of that race can be warranted in considering abnormal; nevertheless, there may be a class of superior intelligences, to whom the human bias alluded to may wear all the character of monomania.
The human brain clearly has a tendency towards the “Infinite,” and clings to the idea like a ghost. It seems to eagerly yearn for this impossible concept, hoping to intellectually accept it when it’s understood. What is common among all of humanity, certainly no individual should consider abnormal; however, there may be a group of superior intelligences for whom this human tendency might seem like an obsession.
My question, however, remains unanswered:—Have we any right to infer—let us say, rather, to imagine—an interminable succession of the “clusters of clusters,” or of “Universes” more or less similar?
My question, though, is still unanswered:—Do we have any right to assume—let's say, instead, to picture—an endless series of "clusters of clusters," or "Universes" that are more or less alike?
I reply that the “right,” in a case such as this, depends absolutely upon the hardihood of that imagination which ventures to claim the right. Let me declare, only, that, as an individual, I myself feel impelled to the fancy—without daring to call it more—that there does exist a limitless succession of Universes, more or less similar to that of which we have cognizance—to that of which alone we shall ever[103] have cognizance—at the very least until the return of our own particular Universe into Unity. If such clusters of clusters exist, however—and they do—it is abundantly clear that, having had no part in our origin, they have no portion in our laws. They neither attract us, nor we them. Their material—their spirit is not ours—is not that which obtains in any part of our Universe. They could not impress our senses or our souls. Among them and us—considering all, for the moment, collectively—there are no influences in common. Each exists, apart and independently, in the bosom of its proper and particular God.
I say that the “right” in cases like this totally relies on the boldness of the imagination that dares to claim it. I’ll just express that, as an individual, I feel drawn to the idea—without daring to call it anything more—that there is a limitless series of Universes, somewhat similar to the one we know of—the one that we will only ever truly know—at least until our particular Universe returns to Unity. If such clusters of clusters do exist—and they do—it’s clear that, having had no role in our origin, they have no part in our laws. They don’t attract us, nor do we attract them. Their material—their spirit isn’t ours—is not what exists in any part of our Universe. They couldn’t affect our senses or our souls. Between them and us—considering everything collectively for now—there are no shared influences. Each exists separately and independently, in the embrace of its own particular God.
In the conduct of this Discourse, I am aiming less at physical than at metaphysical order. The clearness with which even material phænomena are presented to the understanding, depends very little, I have long since learned to perceive, upon a merely natural, and almost altogether upon a moral, arrangement. If then I seem to step somewhat too discursively from point to point of my topic, let me suggest that I do so in the hope of thus the better keeping unbroken that chain of graduated impression by which alone the intellect of Man can expect to encompass the grandeurs of which I speak, and, in their majestic totality, to comprehend them.
In this discussion, I'm focusing more on metaphysical organization than physical order. I've come to realize that the clarity with which even material phenomena are understood relies very little on a purely natural arrangement and almost entirely on a moral framework. So, if I seem to wander a bit from one point to another, please understand that I'm doing this in hopes of maintaining the continuous flow of graduated impression, which is essential for the human intellect to grasp the vast concepts I'm addressing and understand them in their impressive entirety.
So far, our attention has been directed, almost exclusively, to a general and relative grouping of the stellar bodies in space. Of specification there has been little; and whatever ideas of quantity have been conveyed—that is to say, of number, magnitude, and distance—have been conveyed incidentally and by way of preparation for more definitive conceptions. These latter let us now attempt to entertain.[104]
So far, we've mostly focused on a general and relative classification of the stars in space. We haven't specified much, and any ideas about quantity—like number, size, and distance—have only been hinted at as a setup for clearer concepts. Let's now try to explore these more definite ideas.[104]
Our solar system, as has been already mentioned, consists, in chief, of one sun and sixteen planets certainly, but in all probability a few others, revolving around it as a centre, and attended by seventeen moons of which we know, with possibly several more of which as yet we know nothing. These various bodies are not true spheres, but oblate spheroids—spheres flattened at the poles of the imaginary axes about which they rotate:—the flattening being a consequence of the rotation. Neither is the Sun absolutely the centre of the system; for this Sun itself, with all the planets, revolves about a perpetually shifting point of space, which is the system’s general centre of gravity. Neither are we to consider the paths through which these different spheroids move—the moons about the planets, the planets about the Sun, or the Sun about the common centre—as circles in an accurate sense. They are, in fact, ellipses—one of the foci being the point about which the revolution is made. An ellipse is a curve, returning into itself, one of whose diameters is longer than the other. In the longer diameter are two points, equidistant from the middle of the line, and so situated otherwise that if, from each of them a straight line be drawn to any one point of the curve, the two lines, taken together, will be equal to the longer diameter itself. Now let us conceive such an ellipse. At one of the points mentioned, which are the foci, let us fasten an orange. By an elastic thread let us connect this orange with a pea; and let us place this latter on the circumference of the ellipse. Let us now move the pea continuously around the orange—keeping always on the circumference of the ellipse. The elastic thread, which, of[105] course, varies in length as we move the pea, will form what in geometry is called a radius vector. Now, if the orange be understood as the Sun, and the pea as a planet revolving about it, then the revolution should be made at such a rate—with a velocity so varying—that the radius vector may pass over equal areas of space in equal times. The progress of the pea should be—in other words, the progress of the planet is, of course,—slow in proportion to its distance from the Sun—swift in proportion to its proximity. Those planets, moreover, move the more slowly which are the farther from the Sun; the squares of their periods of revolution having the same proportion to each other, as have to each other the cubes of their mean distances from the Sun.
Our solar system, as already noted, mainly consists of one sun and sixteen planets, though there are likely a few more, all revolving around it as a center, alongside seventeen known moons, with possibly several others that we haven’t discovered yet. These various bodies aren’t perfect spheres; they’re oblate spheroids—spheres flattened at their poles due to rotation. Furthermore, the Sun is not the absolute center of the system; it, along with all the planets, revolves around a constantly shifting point in space, which is the system's overall center of gravity. We should also note that the paths of these different spheroids—moons orbiting planets, planets orbiting the Sun, or the Sun moving around the common center—aren’t circles in the strict sense. They’re actually ellipses—one of the foci being the point around which the revolution occurs. An ellipse is a curve that loops back on itself, where one diameter is longer than the other. In the longer diameter, there are two points equidistant from the midpoint, arranged so that if you draw a straight line from each of them to any point on the curve, the total length of the two lines equals the length of the longer diameter. Now envision such an ellipse. At one of the mentioned points, known as the foci, let’s attach an orange. Use a flexible thread to connect this orange to a pea, placing the pea on the edge of the ellipse. Now let’s move the pea continuously around the orange, always on the edge of the ellipse. The flexible thread, which changes length as we move the pea, will create what geometry calls a radius vector. If we interpret the orange as the Sun and the pea as a planet orbiting it, the planet must move at such a rate—with varying speed—so that the radius vector sweeps out equal areas of space in equal times. The motion of the pea should be—in other words, the motion of the planet is—of course, slow relative to its distance from the Sun, and fast when it’s closer. Additionally, planets that are farther from the Sun move more slowly; the squares of their orbital periods are proportional to the cubes of their average distances from the Sun.
The wonderfully complex laws of revolution here described, however, are not to be understood as obtaining in our system alone. They everywhere prevail where Attraction prevails. They control the Universe. Every shining speck in the firmament is, no doubt, a luminous sun, resembling our own, at least in its general features, and having in attendance upon it a greater or less number of planets, greater or less, whose still lingering luminosity is not sufficient to render them visible to us at so vast a distance, but which, nevertheless, revolve, moon-attended, about their starry centres, in obedience to the principles just detailed—in obedience to the three omniprevalent laws of revolution—the three immortal laws guessed by the imaginative Kepler, and but subsequently demonstrated and accounted for by the patient and mathematical Newton. Among a tribe of philosophers who pride themselves excessively upon[106] matter-of-fact, it is far too fashionable to sneer at all speculation under the comprehensive sobriquet, “guess-work.” The point to be considered is, who guesses. In guessing with Plato, we spend our time to better purpose, now and then, than in hearkening to a demonstration by Alcmæon.
The incredibly complex laws of revolution described here aren't just exclusive to our system. They exist everywhere that Attraction is at play. They govern the Universe. Each twinkling dot in the night sky is likely a shining sun, similar to ours in its general characteristics, surrounded by a varying number of planets. These planets may not be bright enough for us to see from such a great distance, but they still orbit their stars, attended by moons, following the principles we just discussed—complying with the three universal laws of revolution—the three eternal laws imagined by the visionary Kepler and later proven and explained by the diligent and mathematical Newton. Among a group of philosophers who take excessive pride in being pragmatic, it’s all too common to mock speculation with the broad term “guess-work.” The important question is who is making the guesses. Speculating with Plato is often a more productive use of our time than just listening to a demonstration by Alcmæon.
In many works on Astronomy I find it distinctly stated that the laws of Kepler are the basis of the great principle, Gravitation. This idea must have arisen from the fact that the suggestion of these laws by Kepler, and his proving them à posteriori to have an actual existence, led Newton to account for them by the hypothesis of Gravitation, and, finally, to demonstrate them à priori, as necessary consequences of the hypothetical principle. Thus so far from the laws of Kepler being the basis of Gravity, Gravity is the basis of these laws—as it is, indeed, of all the laws of the material Universe which are not referable to Repulsion alone.
In many works on Astronomy, it's clearly stated that Kepler's laws are the foundation of the principle of Gravitation. This idea likely came about because Kepler's suggestions of these laws, along with his evidence of their actual existence, prompted Newton to explain them through the hypothesis of Gravitation. Ultimately, Newton demonstrated them as necessary outcomes of this hypothetical principle. So, rather than Kepler's laws being the foundation of Gravity, it's actually Gravity that underpins these laws—just as it does for all the laws of the material Universe that can't be solely attributed to Repulsion.
The mean distance of the Earth from the Moon—that is to say, from the heavenly body in our closest vicinity—is 237,000 miles. Mercury, the planet nearest the Sun, is distant from him 37 millions of miles. Venus, the next, revolves at a distance of 68 millions:—the Earth, which comes next, at a distance of 95 millions:—Mars, then, at a distance of 144 millions. Now come the eight Asteroids (Ceres, Juno, Vesta, Pallas, Astræa, Flora, Iris, and Hebe) at an average distance of about 250 millions. Then we have Jupiter, distant 490 millions; then Saturn, 900 millions; then Uranus, 19 hundred millions; finally Neptune, lately discovered, and revolving at a distance, say of 28[107] hundred millions. Leaving Neptune out of the account—of which as yet we know little accurately and which is, possibly, one of a system of Asteroids—it will be seen that, within certain limits, there exists an order of interval among the planets. Speaking loosely, we may say that each outer planet is twice as far from the Sun as is the next inner one. May not the order here mentioned—may not the law of Bode—be deduced from consideration of the analogy suggested by me as having place between the solar discharge of rings and the mode of the atomic irradiation?
The average distance from the Earth to the Moon, which is the closest celestial body to us, is 237,000 miles. Mercury, the planet closest to the Sun, is 37 million miles away. Venus, the next planet, orbits at a distance of 68 million miles; Earth follows at 95 million miles; and then Mars at 144 million miles. Next are the eight Asteroids (Ceres, Juno, Vesta, Pallas, Astrea, Flora, Iris, and Hebe) at an average distance of about 250 million miles. After that is Jupiter, which is 490 million miles away, followed by Saturn at 900 million miles, Uranus at 1,900 million miles, and finally, Neptune, which was discovered recently, at a distance of about 2,800 million miles. If we disregard Neptune—about which we still don't know much accurately and which might actually belong to a system of Asteroids—it becomes clear that there is a certain order in the distances between the planets. Generally speaking, we can say that each outer planet is roughly twice as far from the Sun as the one before it. Could the mentioned order—could Bode's law—be inferred from the analogy I suggested between the solar discharge of rings and atomic radiation?
The numbers hurriedly mentioned in this summary of distance, it is folly to attempt comprehending, unless in the light of abstract arithmetical facts. They are not practically tangible ones. They convey no precise ideas. I have stated that Neptune, the planet farthest from the Sun, revolves about him at a distance of 28 hundred millions of miles. So far good:—I have stated a mathematical fact; and, without comprehending it in the least, we may put it to use—mathematically. But in mentioning, even, that the Moon revolves about the Earth at the comparatively trifling distance of 237,000 miles, I entertained no expectation of giving any one to understand—to know—to feel—how far from the Earth the Moon actually is. 237,000 miles! There are, perhaps, few of my readers who have not crossed the Atlantic ocean; yet how many of them have a distinct idea of even the 3,000 miles intervening between shore and shore? I doubt, indeed, whether the man lives who can force into his brain the most remote conception of the interval between one milestone and its next[108] neighbor upon the turnpike. We are in some measure aided, however, in our consideration of distance, by combining this consideration with the kindred one of velocity. Sound passes through 1100 feet of space in a second of time. Now were it possible for an inhabitant of the Earth to see the flash of a cannon discharged in the Moon, and to hear the report, he would have to wait, after perceiving the former, more than 13 entire days and nights before getting any intimation of the latter.
The numbers mentioned quickly in this summary of distance are hard to grasp without looking at them through the lens of abstract math. They aren't something we can touch or visualize easily. They don’t give clear ideas. I've mentioned that Neptune, the planet farthest from the Sun, orbits at a distance of 2.8 billion miles. That's a mathematical fact; even if we don’t fully understand it, we can use it mathematically. But when I say that the Moon orbits Earth at the relatively small distance of 237,000 miles, I don’t expect anyone to really get or feel how far that is from Earth. 237,000 miles! Many of my readers have likely crossed the Atlantic Ocean, yet how many have a clear idea of the 3,000 miles that separate the shores? I seriously doubt there’s anyone who can truly grasp the distance between one milestone and the next on the highway. However, we do have some help in thinking about distance by linking it to the related idea of speed. Sound travels through 1,100 feet in a second. Now, if a person on Earth could see a cannon firing on the Moon and then hear the sound, they would have to wait over 13 full days and nights after seeing the flash before they heard the explosion.
However feeble be the impression, even thus conveyed, of the Moon’s real distance from the Earth, it will, nevertheless, effect a good object in enabling us more clearly to see the futility of attempting to grasp such intervals as that of the 28 hundred millions of miles between our Sun and Neptune; or even that of the 95 millions between the Sun and the Earth we inhabit. A cannon-ball, flying at the greatest velocity with which such a ball has ever been known to fly, could not traverse the latter interval in less than 20 years; while for the former it would require 590.
No matter how weak the impression might be, even so conveyed, of the Moon's real distance from the Earth, it will still serve a good purpose in helping us see more clearly how pointless it is to try to grasp distances like the 2.8 billion miles between our Sun and Neptune; or even the 95 million miles between the Sun and the Earth we live on. A cannonball, traveling at the highest speed ever recorded for such a projectile, would take at least 20 years to cross the latter distance; for the former, it would take 590 years.
Our Moon’s real diameter is 2160 miles; yet she is comparatively so trifling an object that it would take nearly 50 such orbs to compose one as great as the Earth.
Our Moon's actual diameter is 2,160 miles; however, it's such a small object that it would take almost 50 of them to match the size of the Earth.
The diameter of our own globe is 7912 miles—but from the enunciation of these numbers what positive idea do we derive?
The diameter of our planet is 7,912 miles—but what clear idea do we get from these numbers?
If we ascend an ordinary mountain and look around us from its summit, we behold a landscape stretching, say 40 miles, in every direction; forming a circle 250 miles in circumference; and including an area of 5000 square miles.[109] The extent of such a prospect, on account of the successiveness with which its portions necessarily present themselves to view, can be only very feebly and very partially appreciated:—yet the entire panorama would comprehend no more than one 40,000th part of the mere surface of our globe. Were this panorama, then, to be succeeded, after the lapse of an hour, by another of equal extent; this again by a third, after the lapse of another hour; this again by a fourth after lapse of another hour—and so on, until the scenery of the whole Earth were exhausted; and were we to be engaged in examining these various panoramas for twelve hours of every day; we should nevertheless, be 9 years and 48 days in completing the general survey.
If we climb an ordinary mountain and take a look around from its peak, we see a landscape extending about 40 miles in every direction; forming a circle with a circumference of 250 miles; covering an area of 5000 square miles.[109] The vastness of this view, due to how its parts unfold before us, can only be very weakly and partially appreciated:—yet the whole panorama would represent just one 40,000th of the surface of our planet. If this panorama were to be followed, after an hour, by another of the same scale; then another after another hour; then a fourth after another hour—and so on, until we had seen the scenery of the entire Earth; and if we were to spend twelve hours each day examining these different panoramas, we would still need 9 years and 48 days to complete the overall survey.
But if the mere surface of the Earth eludes the grasp of the imagination, what are we to think of its cubical contents? It embraces a mass of matter equal in weight to at least 2 sextillions, 200 quintillions of tons. Let us suppose it in a state of quiescence; and now let us endeavor to conceive a mechanical force sufficient to set it in motion! Not the strength of all the myriads of beings whom we may conclude to inhabit the planetary worlds of our system—not the combined physical strength of all these beings—even admitting all to be more powerful than man—would avail to stir the ponderous mass a single inch from its position.
But if the surface of the Earth is beyond our imagination, what can we say about its cubic contents? It holds a massive amount of matter weighing at least 2 sextillion, 200 quintillion tons. Let's imagine it at rest; now let's try to picture a mechanical force strong enough to set it in motion! Not the combined strength of all the countless beings we might imagine living on the planets in our system—none of them, even if they were all more powerful than humans—would be able to move that enormous mass even a single inch from its spot.
What are we to understand, then, of the force, which under similar circumstances, would be required to move the largest of our planets, Jupiter? This is 86,000 miles in diameter, and would include within its periphery more than a thousand orbs of the magnitude of our own. Yet[110] this stupendous body is actually flying around the Sun at the rate of 29,000 miles an hour—that is to say, with a velocity 40 times greater than that of a cannon-ball! The thought of such a phænomenon cannot well be said to startle the mind:—it palsies and appals it. Not unfrequently we task our imagination in picturing the capacities of an angel. Let us fancy such a being at a distance of some hundred miles from Jupiter—a close eye-witness of this planet as it speeds on its annual revolution. Now can we, I demand, fashion for ourselves any conception so distinct of this ideal being’s spiritual exaltation, as that involved in the supposition that, even by this immeasurable mass of matter, whirled immediately before his eyes, with a velocity so unutterable, he—an angel—angelic though he be—is not at once struck into nothingness and overwhelmed?
What are we to understand about the force needed to move the largest of our planets, Jupiter? It's 86,000 miles in diameter and could fit more than a thousand planets the size of Earth within its range. Yet[110] this massive body is actually orbiting the Sun at a speed of 29,000 miles per hour—that means it's moving 40 times faster than a cannonball! The idea of such a phenomenon is hard to wrap our minds around: it shakes and terrifies us. We often challenge our imagination when we think about an angel's capabilities. Let's imagine such a being a few hundred miles from Jupiter—close enough to witness this planet speeding through its yearly orbit. Now, I ask, can we really create a picture in our minds of this ideal being's spiritual elevation that compares to the idea that, even with this colossal mass of matter spinning right in front of him at such an unimaginable speed, he—an angel—despite being angelic, is not instantly destroyed or overwhelmed?
At this point, however, it seems proper to suggest that, in fact, we have been speaking of comparative trifles. Our Sun, the central and controlling orb of the system to which Jupiter belongs, is not only greater than Jupiter, but greater by far than all the planets of the system taken together. This fact is an essential condition, indeed, of the stability of the system itself. The diameter of Jupiter has been mentioned:—it is 86,000 miles:—that of the Sun is 882,000 miles. An inhabitant of the latter, travelling 90 miles a day, would be more than 80 years in going round a great circle of its circumference. It occupies a cubical space of 681 quadrillions, 472 trillions of miles. The Moon, as has been stated, revolves about the Earth at a distance of 237,000 miles—in an orbit, consequently, of nearly a million[111] and a half. Now, were the Sun placed upon the Earth, centre over centre, the body of the former would extend, in every direction, not only to the line of the Moon’s orbit, but beyond it, a distance of 200,000 miles.
At this point, though, it feels right to point out that we've really been discussing minor details. Our Sun, the main and central star of the system that includes Jupiter, is not only larger than Jupiter but also much larger than all the planets in the system combined. This fact is actually crucial for the stability of the system itself. We've mentioned Jupiter's diameter: it's 86,000 miles. The Sun's diameter is 882,000 miles. If a person on the Sun traveled 90 miles a day, it would take them over 80 years to complete a trip around its circumference. The Sun occupies a volume of 681 quadrillion, 472 trillion miles. The Moon, as stated, orbits the Earth at a distance of 237,000 miles—which means its orbit is nearly one and a half million[111] miles. Now, if the Sun were placed directly over the Earth, its body would reach not just to the Moon's orbit but extend 200,000 miles beyond it in every direction.
And here, once again, let me suggest that, in fact, we have still been speaking of comparative trifles. The distance of the planet Neptune from the Sun has been stated:—it is 28 hundred millions of miles; the circumference of its orbit, therefore, is about 17 billions. Let this be borne in mind while we glance at some one of the brightest stars. Between this and the star of our system, (the Sun,) there is a gulf of space, to convey any idea of which we should need the tongue of an archangel. From our system, then, and from our Sun, or star, the star at which we suppose ourselves glancing is a thing altogether apart:—still, for the moment, let us imagine it placed upon our Sun, centre over centre, as we just now imagined this Sun itself placed upon the Earth. Let us now conceive the particular star we have in mind, extending, in every direction, beyond the orbit of Mercury—of Venus—of the Earth:—still on, beyond the orbit of Mars—of Jupiter—of Uranus—until, finally, we fancy it filling the circle—17 billions of miles in circumference—which is described by the revolution of Leverrier’s planet. When we have conceived all this, we shall have entertained no extravagant conception. There is the very best reason for believing that many of the stars are even far larger than the one we have imagined. I mean to say that we have the very best empirical basis for such belief:—and, in looking back at the original, atomic arrangements for diversity, which have been assumed as a[112] part of the Divine plan in the constitution of the Universe, we shall be enabled easily to understand, and to credit, the existence of even far vaster disproportions in stellar size than any to which I have hitherto alluded. The largest orbs, of course, we must expect to find rolling through the widest vacancies of Space.
And here, once again, let me suggest that, in fact, we have still been talking about relatively minor details. The distance of the planet Neptune from the Sun is stated to be 2,800 million miles; therefore, the circumference of its orbit is about 17 billion miles. Keep this in mind while we look at one of the brightest stars. Between this star and the star of our system, (the Sun), there is an immense expanse of space, which is so vast that we would need the voice of an archangel to convey it. From our system, then, and from our Sun, or star, the star we are considering is completely separate:—still, for the moment, let’s imagine it placed on top of our Sun, centered over it, just as we just imagined this Sun placed on the Earth. Let’s now picture the particular star we have in mind extending in every direction beyond the orbit of Mercury—of Venus—of the Earth:—still on, beyond the orbit of Mars—of Jupiter—of Uranus—until, finally, we imagine it filling the circle—17 billion miles in circumference—that is traced by the revolution of Leverrier’s planet. When we have imagined all this, we will not have entertained an extravagant idea. There is very good reason to believe that many of the stars are even much larger than the one we have imagined. I mean to say that we have the best empirical evidence for such belief:—and looking back at the original atomic arrangements for diversity, which have been assumed as a[112] part of the Divine plan in the constitution of the Universe, we can easily understand and accept the existence of even larger disparities in stellar size than any I have mentioned so far. The largest orbs, of course, we should expect to find moving through the widest gaps in Space.
I remarked, just now, that to convey an idea of the interval between our Sun and any one of the other stars, we should require the eloquence of an archangel. In so saying, I should not be accused of exaggeration; for, in simple truth, these are topics on which it is scarcely possible to exaggerate. But let us bring the matter more distinctly before the eye of the mind.
I just mentioned that to describe the distance between our Sun and any other star, we would need the eloquence of an archangel. I wouldn't be accused of exaggerating; honestly, these are topics where it's hard to exaggerate. But let's clarify the issue more clearly.
In the first place, we may get a general, relative conception of the interval referred to, by comparing it with the inter-planetary spaces. If, for example, we suppose the Earth, which is, in reality, 95 millions of miles from the Sun, to be only one foot from that luminary; then Neptune would be 40 feet distant; and the star Alpha Lyræ, at the very least, 159.
In the beginning, we can have a general, relative idea of the interval mentioned by comparing it to the spaces between planets. For instance, if we imagine the Earth, which is actually 95 million miles away from the Sun, to be just one foot from that shining star; then Neptune would be 40 feet away; and the star Alpha Lyræ, at the very least, would be 159 feet distant.
Now I presume that, in the termination of my last sentence, few of my readers have noticed anything especially objectionable—particularly wrong. I said that the distance of the Earth from the Sun being taken at one foot, the distance of Neptune would be 40 feet, and that of Alpha Lyræ, 159. The proportion between one foot and 159 has appeared, perhaps, to convey a sufficiently definite impression of the proportion between the two intervals—that of the Earth from the Sun and that of Alpha Lyræ from the same luminary. But my account of the matter should, in reality,[113] have run thus:—The distance of the Earth from the Sun being taken at one foot, the distance of Neptune would be 40 feet, and that of Alpha Lyræ, 159——miles:—that is to say, I had assigned to Alpha Lyræ, in my first statement of the case, only the 5280th part of that distance which is the least distance possible at which it can actually lie.
Now I assume that, at the end of my last sentence, few of my readers noticed anything especially objectionable or particularly wrong. I mentioned that if the distance from the Earth to the Sun is taken as one foot, the distance to Neptune would be 40 feet, and that to Alpha Lyræ would be 159. The proportion between one foot and 159 seemed, perhaps, to provide a clear impression of the relationship between the two distances—that of the Earth from the Sun and that of Alpha Lyræ from the same star. However, my explanation should actually have gone like this:—If the distance from the Earth to the Sun is taken as one foot, the distance to Neptune would be 40 feet, and the distance to Alpha Lyræ would be 159——miles:—in other words, I originally assigned to Alpha Lyræ only the 5280th part of the distance which is the least distance possible at which it can actually be located.
To proceed:—However distant a mere planet is, yet when we look at it through a telescope, we see it under a certain form—of a certain appreciable size. Now I have already hinted at the probable bulk of many of the stars; nevertheless, when we view any one of them, even through the most powerful telescope, it is found to present us with no form, and consequently with no magnitude whatever. We see it as a point and nothing more.
To move on:—No matter how far away a simple planet is, when we look at it through a telescope, we see it in a specific shape—of a noticeable size. I have already suggested the likely size of many stars; however, when we observe any one of them, even with the strongest telescope, it appears to show us no shape, and therefore no size at all. We see it as just a point and nothing beyond that.
Again;—Let us suppose ourselves walking, at night, on a highway. In a field on one side of the road, is a line of tall objects, say trees, the figures of which are distinctly defined against the background of the sky. This line of objects extends at right angles to the road, and from the road to the horizon. Now, as we proceed along the road, we see these objects changing their positions, respectively, in relation to a certain fixed point in that portion of the firmament which forms the background of the view. Let us suppose this fixed point—sufficiently fixed for our purpose—to be the rising moon. We become aware, at once, that while the tree nearest us so far alters its position in respect to the moon, as to seem flying behind us, the tree in the extreme distance has scarcely changed at all its relative position with the satellite. We then go on to perceive that the farther the objects are from us, the less they alter[114] their positions; and the converse. Then we begin, unwittingly, to estimate the distances of individual trees by the degrees in which they evince the relative alteration. Finally, we come to understand how it might be possible to ascertain the actual distance of any given tree in the line, by using the amount of relative alteration as a basis in a simple geometrical problem. Now this relative alteration is what we call “parallax;” and by parallax we calculate the distances of the heavenly bodies. Applying the principle to the trees in question, we should, of course, be very much at a loss to comprehend the distance of that tree, which, however far we proceeded along the road, should evince no parallax at all. This, in the case described, is a thing impossible; but impossible only because all distances on our Earth are trivial indeed:—in comparison with the vast cosmical quantities, we may speak of them as absolutely nothing.
Let’s imagine we’re walking at night on a highway. On one side of the road, there’s a line of tall objects, like trees, clearly outlined against the night sky. This line of objects stretches perpendicularly to the road, reaching toward the horizon. As we walk along the road, we notice these objects shifting position relative to a fixed point in the sky, which we’ll suppose is the rising moon. We quickly realize that while the tree closest to us seems to move behind us, the tree far in the distance hardly changes its position in relation to the moon at all. We then observe that the farther away the objects are, the less they shift their positions, and vice versa. As we do this, we start to estimate the distances of individual trees based on how much they change relative to one another. Eventually, we understand how we might be able to determine the actual distance of any tree in this line by using the degree of relative shift in a simple geometry problem. This relative shift is what we call “parallax,” and we use parallax to calculate the distances to celestial bodies. Applying this idea to the trees, we would definitely struggle to figure out the distance of that one tree that shows no parallax at all, no matter how far we walk down the road. In the scenario described, that situation is impossible; but it’s impossible only because the distances on our Earth are quite trivial—when compared to the vast cosmic distances, we can think of them as absolutely nothing.
Now, let us suppose the star Alpha Lyræ directly overhead; and let us imagine that, instead of standing on the Earth, we stand at one end of a straight road stretching through Space to a distance equalling the diameter of the Earth’s orbit—that is to say, to a distance of 190 millions of miles. Having observed, by means of the most delicate micrometrical instruments, the exact position of the star, let us now pass along this inconceivable road, until we reach its other extremity. Now, once again, let us look at the star. It is precisely where we left it. Our instruments, however delicate, assure us that its relative position is absolutely—is identically the same as at the commencement of our unutterable journey. No parallax—none whatever—has been found.[115]
Now, let’s imagine the star Alpha Lyræ directly overhead; and let’s picture that, instead of standing on Earth, we’re at one end of a straight road extending through Space to a distance equal to the diameter of Earth’s orbit—that is, to a distance of 190 million miles. After observing the star’s exact position using the most advanced micrometrical instruments, let’s travel along this unimaginable road until we reach the other end. Now, let’s look at the star again. It is exactly where we left it. Our instruments, no matter how precise, confirm that its relative position is absolutely—the same as at the start of our incredible journey. No parallax—none at all—has been found.[115]
The fact is, that, in regard to the distance of the fixed stars—of any one of the myriads of suns glistening on the farther side of that awful chasm which separates our system from its brothers in the cluster to which it belongs—astronomical science, until very lately, could speak only with a negative certainty. Assuming the brightest as the nearest, we could say, even of them, only that there is a certain incomprehensible distance on the hither side of which they cannot be:—how far they are beyond it we had in no case been able to ascertain. We perceived, for example, that Alpha Lyræ cannot be nearer to us than 19 trillions, 200 billions of miles; but, for all we knew, and indeed for all we now know, it may be distant from us the square, or the cube, or any other power of the number mentioned. By dint, however, of wonderfully minute and cautious observations, continued, with novel instruments, for many laborious years, Bessel, not long ago deceased, has lately succeeded in determining the distance of six or seven stars; among others, that of the star numbered 61 in the constellation of the Swan. The distance in this latter instance ascertained, is 670,000 times that of the Sun; which last it will be remembered, is 95 millions of miles. The star 61 Cygni, then, is nearly 64 trillions of miles from us—or more than three times the distance assigned, as the least possible, for Alpha Lyræ.
The truth is that when it comes to the distance of fixed stars—any of the countless suns shining on the far side of that vast gap separating our solar system from its neighbors in the cluster it belongs to—astronomical science had only been able to provide a somewhat uncertain estimate until very recently. By assuming the brightest stars are the closest, we could say, even about them, that there's a certain unfathomable distance they cannot be closer than: how far they are beyond that point, we couldn't figure out. For instance, we know that Alpha Lyræ can’t be closer than 19 trillion, 200 billion miles; but, as far as we knew, and still know, it could be at a distance that is the square, the cube, or any other power of that number. However, thanks to incredibly precise and careful observations carried out with new instruments over many painstaking years, Bessel, who passed away not long ago, managed to determine the distance to six or seven stars, including the star numbered 61 in the constellation Cygnus. The distance he found for this star is 670,000 times that of the Sun, which is 95 million miles away. Therefore, 61 Cygni is nearly 64 trillion miles from us—or more than three times the minimum distance calculated for Alpha Lyræ.
In attempting to appreciate this interval by the aid of any considerations of velocity, as we did in endeavoring to estimate the distance of the moon, we must leave out of sight, altogether, such nothings as the speed of a cannon-ball, or of sound. Light, however, according to the latest[116] calculations of Struve, proceeds at the rate of 167,000 miles in a second. Thought itself cannot pass through this interval more speedily—if, indeed, thought can traverse it at all. Yet, in coming from 61 Cygni to us, even at this inconceivable rate, light occupies more than ten years; and, consequently, were the star this moment blotted out from the Universe, still, for ten years, would it continue to sparkle on, undimmed in its paradoxical glory.
In trying to understand this time frame by looking at factors like speed, as we did when estimating the distance to the moon, we need to ignore irrelevant things like the speed of a cannonball or sound. However, light, based on the latest[116] calculations from Struve, moves at a speed of 167,000 miles per second. Even thought itself can’t move through this gap any faster—if it can move through it at all. Yet, light traveling from 61 Cygni to us, even at that unimaginable speed, takes more than ten years; therefore, if the star were to suddenly vanish from the Universe, it would still continue to shine brightly for ten years, unchanged in its paradoxical brilliance.
Keeping now in mind whatever feeble conception we may have attained of the interval between our Sun and 61 Cygni, let us remember that this interval, however unutterably vast, we are permitted to consider as but the average interval among the countless host of stars composing that cluster, or “nebula,” to which our system, as well as that of 61 Cygni, belongs. I have, in fact, stated the case with great moderation:—we have excellent reason for believing 61 Cygni to be one of the nearest stars, and thus for concluding, at least for the present, that its distance from us is less than the average distance between star and star in the magnificent cluster of the Milky Way.
Keeping in mind whatever limited understanding we may have of the distance between our Sun and 61 Cygni, let's remember that this distance, although incredibly vast, can be regarded as just the average distance among the countless stars that make up that cluster, or “nebula,” to which both our system and that of 61 Cygni belong. In fact, I've presented the situation with great caution: we have strong reasons to believe that 61 Cygni is one of the nearest stars, leading us to conclude, at least for now, that its distance from us is less than the average distance between stars in the stunning cluster of the Milky Way.
And here, once again and finally, it seems proper to suggest that even as yet we have been speaking of trifles. Ceasing to wonder at the space between star and star in our own or in any particular cluster, let us rather turn our thoughts to the intervals between cluster and cluster, in the all comprehensive cluster of the Universe.
And here, once again and finally, it seems appropriate to suggest that we have been discussing trivial matters. Instead of marveling at the distance between stars in our own or any particular cluster, let's shift our focus to the gaps between clusters in the vast expanse of the Universe.
I have already said that light proceeds at the rate of 167,000 miles in a second—that is, about 10 millions of miles in a minute, or about 600 millions of miles in an hour:—yet so far removed from us are some of the[117] “nebulæ” that even light, speeding with this velocity, could not and does not reach us, from those mysterious regions, in less than 3 millions of years. This calculation, moreover, is made by the elder Herschell, and in reference merely to those comparatively proximate clusters within the scope of his own telescope. There are “nebulæ,” however, which, through the magical tube of Lord Rosse, are this instant whispering in our ears the secrets of a million of ages by-gone. In a word, the events which we behold now—at this moment—in those worlds—are the identical events which interested their inhabitants ten hundred thousand centuries ago. In intervals—in distances such as this suggestion forces upon the soul—rather than upon the mind—we find, at length, a fitting climax to all hitherto frivolous considerations of quantity.
I've already mentioned that light travels at a speed of 167,000 miles per second—that's about 10 million miles in a minute or around 600 million miles in an hour. Yet, some of the[117] “nebulae” are so far away that even at this incredible speed, light takes at least 3 million years to reach us from those mysterious areas. This calculation comes from the elder Herschel and pertains only to those relatively nearby clusters visible through his telescope. There are “nebulae,” though, that through Lord Rosse's remarkable telescope, are currently whispering in our ears the secrets of a million ages gone by. In essence, the events we see right now—in those worlds—are the same events that captivated their inhabitants ten hundred thousand centuries ago. In the gaps—in distances like this idea suggests to the soul—instead of the mind—we ultimately find a fitting conclusion to all the previously trivial thoughts about quantity.
Our fancies thus occupied with the cosmical distances, let us take the opportunity of referring to the difficulty which we have so often experienced, while pursuing the beaten path of astronomical reflection, in accounting for the immeasurable voids alluded to—in comprehending why chasms so totally unoccupied and therefore apparently so needless, have been made to intervene between star and star—between cluster and cluster—in understanding, to be brief, a sufficient reason for the Titanic scale, in respect of mere Space, on which the Universe is seen to be constructed. A rational cause for the phænomenon, I maintain that Astronomy has palpably failed to assign:—but the considerations through which, in this Essay, we have proceeded step by step, enable us clearly and immediately to perceive that Space and Duration are one. That the Universe might endure throughout[118] an æra at all commensurate with the grandeur of its component material portions and with the high majesty of its spiritual purposes, it was necessary that the original atomic diffusion be made to so inconceivable an extent as to be only not infinite. It was required, in a word, that the stars should be gathered into visibility from invisible nebulosity—proceed from nebulosity to consolidation—and so grow grey in giving birth and death to unspeakably numerous and complex variations of vitalic development:—it was required that the stars should do all this—should have time thoroughly to accomplish all these Divine purposes—during the period in which all things were effecting their return into Unity with a velocity accumulating in the inverse proportion of the squares of the distances at which lay the inevitable End.
With our imaginations occupied by cosmic distances, let's take a moment to address the difficulty we've often faced while following the well-trodden path of astronomical thought: understanding the vast emptiness that exists between stars and clusters. In short, we're trying to find a reasonable explanation for the enormous scale of mere *Space* that makes up the Universe. I believe that Astronomy has clearly fallen short in providing a rational cause for this phenomenon. However, the reasoning we've followed in this essay allows us to clearly see that *Space and Duration are one*. For the Universe to *endure* throughout an era that matches the grandeur of its material components and the high nobility of its spiritual aims, it was crucial for the original atomic spread to be so vast that it was almost infinite. In other words, it was necessary for the stars to emerge from invisible clouds, transitioning from nebulosity to solid form, greying as they gave life and death to incredibly numerous and complex forms of development. It was essential for the stars to accomplish all of this—having the time to fulfill these Divine purposes—*during the period* in which everything was returning to Unity at a speed that increased in proportion to the squares of the distances to the inevitable End.
Throughout all this we have no difficulty in understanding the absolute accuracy of the Divine adaptation. The density of the stars, respectively, proceeds, of course, as their condensation diminishes; condensation and heterogeneity keep pace with each other; through the latter, which is the index of the former, we estimate the vitalic and spiritual development. Thus, in the density of the globes, we have the measure in which their purposes are fulfilled. As density proceeds—as the divine intentions are accomplished—as less and still less remains to be accomplished—so—in the same ratio—should we expect to find an acceleration of the End:—and thus the philosophical mind will easily comprehend that the Divine designs in constituting the stars, advance mathematically to their fulfilment:—and more; it will readily give the advance a[119] mathematical expression; it will decide that this advance is inversely proportional with the squares of the distances of all created things from the starting-point and goal of their creation.
Throughout all this, we can easily grasp the perfect accuracy of the Divine adaptation. The density of the stars decreases as their condensation lessens; condensation and diversity go hand in hand. Through the latter, which reflects the former, we gauge the vital and spiritual growth. Thus, in the density of the globes, we have a measure of how well their purposes are being fulfilled. As density increases—as the divine intentions are achieved—as less and less is left to accomplish—so, at the same rate, we should expect to see an acceleration of the End: and so the philosophical mind will easily understand that the Divine designs in creating the stars progress mathematically toward their completion: and furthermore, it will quickly express this progress in a mathematical way; it will determine that this progress is inversely proportional to the squares of the distances of all created things from the starting point and goal of their creation.
Not only is this Divine adaptation, however, mathematically accurate, but there is that about it which stamps it as divine, in distinction from that which is merely the work of human constructiveness. I allude to the complete mutuality of adaptation. For example; in human constructions a particular cause has a particular effect; a particular intention brings to pass a particular object; but this is all; we see no reciprocity. The effect does not re-act upon the cause; the intention does not change relations with the object. In Divine constructions the object is either design or object as we choose to regard it—and we may take at any time a cause for an effect, or the converse—so that we can never absolutely decide which is which.
Not only is this divine adaptation mathematically accurate, but there's something about it that marks it as divine, setting it apart from mere human creation. I'm referring to the complete mutuality of adaptation. For instance, in human creations, a specific cause leads to a specific effect; a particular intention results in a certain outcome; but that's where it ends; we don’t see any reciprocity. The effect doesn’t impact the cause; the intention doesn’t alter its relationship with the object. In divine creations, the object is either a design or an object, depending on how we see it—and at any moment, we can consider a cause as an effect, or vice versa—so we can never definitively determine which is which.
To give an instance:—In polar climates the human frame, to maintain its animal heat, requires, for combustion in the capillary system, an abundant supply of highly azotized food, such as train-oil. But again:—in polar climates nearly the sole food afforded man is the oil of abundant seals and whales. Now, whether is oil at hand because imperatively demanded, or the only thing demanded because the only thing to be obtained? It is impossible to decide. There is an absolute reciprocity of adaptation.
For example: In polar climates, the human body needs a lot of high-nitrogen food, like train oil, to keep warm. However, in these polar regions, the main food source available to people is the oil from plenty of seals and whales. So, is the oil there because it's necessary, or is it the only thing needed because it's the only thing available? It's hard to say. There is a definite reciprocity of adaptation.
The pleasure which we derive from any display of human ingenuity is in the ratio of the approach to this species of reciprocity. In the construction of plot, for example,[120] in fictitious literature, we should aim at so arranging the incidents that we shall not be able to determine, of any one of them, whether it depends from any one other or upholds it. In this sense, of course, perfection of plot is really, or practically, unattainable—but only because it is a finite intelligence that constructs. The plots of God are perfect. The Universe is a plot of God.
The enjoyment we get from any display of human creativity is directly related to how we approach this type of give-and-take. In crafting a story, for instance,[120] in fictional literature, we should try to arrange the events in such a way that we can’t tell if one event leads to another or supports it. In this sense, achieving true perfection in a plot is essentially impossible—only because it’s a limited intelligence doing the creating. The plots of God are flawless. The Universe is a plot of God.
And now we have reached a point at which the intellect is forced, again, to struggle against its propensity for analogical inference—against its monomaniac grasping at the infinite. Moons have been seen revolving about planets; planets about stars; and the poetical instinct of humanity—its instinct of the symmetrical, if the symmetry be but a symmetry of surface:—this instinct, which the Soul, not only of Man but of all created beings, took up, in the beginning, from the geometrical basis of the Universal irradiation—impels us to the fancy of an endless extension of this system of cycles. Closing our eyes equally to deduction and induction, we insist upon imagining a revolution of all the orbs of the Galaxy about some gigantic globe which we take to be the central pivot of the whole. Each cluster in the great cluster of clusters is imagined, of course, to be similarly supplied and constructed; while, that the “analogy” may be wanting at no point, we go on to conceive these clusters themselves, again, as revolving about some still more august sphere;—this latter, still again, with its encircling clusters, as but one of a yet more magnificent series of agglomerations, gyrating about yet another orb central to them—some orb still more unspeakably sublime—some orb, let us rather say, of infinite sublimity[121] endlessly multiplied by the infinitely sublime. Such are the conditions, continued in perpetuity, which the voice of what some people term “analogy” calls upon the Fancy to depict and the Reason to contemplate, if possible, without becoming dissatisfied with the picture. Such, in general, are the interminable gyrations beyond gyration which we have been instructed by Philosophy to comprehend and to account for, at least in the best manner we can. Now and then, however, a philosopher proper—one whose phrenzy takes a very determinate turn—whose genius, to speak more reverentially, has a strongly-pronounced washerwomanish bias, doing every thing up by the dozen—enables us to see precisely that point out of sight, at which the revolutionary processes in question do, and of right ought to, come to an end.
And now we've reached a moment when the mind has to struggle again against its tendency to make analogies—against its obsessive grasping at the infinite. Moons have been seen orbiting planets; planets circling stars; and humanity's poetic instinct—its need for symmetry, even if it’s just a surface-level symmetry—this instinct, which the Soul, not just of Man but of all living beings, took from the geometrical foundation of the Universe's light—drives us to imagine an endless extension of this system of cycles. With our eyes closed to both deduction and induction, we insist on picturing a revolution of all the celestial bodies in the Galaxy around some massive globe that we see as the central point of it all. Each cluster within the vast network of clusters is imagined to be similarly arranged; while to maintain “analogy” without missing anything, we keep conceiving these clusters themselves as orbiting around an even grander sphere; and this new sphere, with its surrounding clusters, as just one of an even more magnificent series of gatherings, spinning around yet another central orb—some orb that's even more indescribably sublime—some orb, let’s say, of infinite sublimity[121] endlessly multiplied by the infinitely sublime. These are the conditions, continuing forever, which what some call “analogy” prompts the Imagination to depict and Reason to contemplate, if possible, without getting upset by the image. Such, in general, are the endless rotations beyond rotation that Philosophy has taught us to understand and address, at least to the best of our ability. However, now and then, a true philosopher—one whose madness takes a specific direction—whose genius, if we are to speak more respectfully, has a clear, practical bias that tackles everything methodically—allows us to see precisely that point just beyond sight, where these revolutionary processes should indeed come to an end.
It is hardly worth while, perhaps, even to sneer at the reveries of Fourrier:—but much has been said, latterly, of the hypothesis of Mädler—that there exists, in the centre of the Galaxy, a stupendous globe about which all the systems of the cluster revolve. The period of our own, indeed, has been stated—117 millions of years.
It might not even be worth it to mock the daydreams of Fourier; however, lately, there’s been a lot of talk about Mädler’s idea—that there’s a massive globe at the center of the Galaxy around which all the systems in the cluster rotate. The period of our own system, in fact, has been stated to be 117 million years.
That our Sun has a motion in space, independently of its rotation, and revolution about the system’s centre of gravity, has long been suspected. This motion, granting it to exist, would be manifested perspectively. The stars in that firmamental region which we were leaving behind us, would, in a very long series of years, become crowded; those in the opposite quarter, scattered. Now, by means of astronomical History, we ascertain, cloudily, that some such phænomena have occurred. On this ground it has[122] been declared that our system is moving to a point in the heavens diametrically opposite the star Zeta Herculis:—but this inference is, perhaps, the maximum to which we have any logical right. Mädler, however, has gone so far as to designate a particular star, Alcyone in the Pleiades, as being at or about the very spot around which a general revolution is performed.
That our Sun moves through space, separate from its rotation and revolution around the system's center of gravity, has been suspected for a long time. If this motion exists, it would be seen from a perspective. The stars in the area we are leaving would gradually become more clustered, while those in the opposite direction would appear scattered. Now, thanks to astronomical history, we can vaguely confirm that some of these phenomena have taken place. Based on this, it has been stated that our system is moving toward a point in the sky directly opposite the star Zeta Herculis; however, this conclusion is probably the furthest extent of what we can logically assert. Mädler has even gone so far as to identify a specific star, Alcyone in the Pleiades, as being close to the very location around which a general revolution takes place.
Now, since by “analogy” we are led, in the first instance, to these dreams, it is no more than proper that we should abide by analogy, at least in some measure, during their development; and that analogy which suggests the revolution, suggests at the same time a central orb about which it should be performed:—so far the astronomer was consistent. This central orb, however, should, dynamically, be greater than all the orbs, taken together, which surround it. Of these there are about 100 millions. “Why, then,” it was of course demanded, “do we not see this vast central sun—at least equal in mass to 100 millions of such suns as ours—why do we not see it—we, especially, who occupy the mid region of the cluster—the very locality near which, at all events, must be situated this incomparable star?” The reply was ready—“It must be non-luminous, as are our planets.” Here, then, to suit a purpose, analogy is suddenly let fall. “Not so,” it may be said—“we know that non-luminous suns actually exist.” It is true that we have reason at least for supposing so; but we have certainly no reason whatever for supposing that the non-luminous suns in question are encircled by luminous suns, while these again are surrounded by non-luminous planets:—and it is precisely all this with which Mädler is[123] called upon to find any thing analogous in the heavens—for it is precisely all this which he imagines in the case of the Galaxy. Admitting the thing to be so, we cannot help here picturing to ourselves how sad a puzzle the why it is so must prove to all à priori philosophers.
Now, since we are initially led to these dreams by “analogy,” it makes sense that we should stick to analogy, at least to some extent, during their development; and that same analogy which suggests the revolution also points to a central orb around which it should occur:—so far the astronomer was consistent. However, this central orb should, in terms of dynamics, be greater than all the orbs combined that surround it. There are about 100 million of these. “Why, then,” it’s only natural to ask, “do we not see this huge central sun—at least equal in mass to 100 million of suns like ours—why do we not see it—we, especially, who occupy the middle region of the cluster—the very area close to where this extraordinary star must be located?” The response was quick—“It must be non-luminous, like our planets.” Here, then, to serve a purpose, analogy is suddenly dropped. “Not so,” one might argue—“we know that non-luminous suns actually exist.” It’s true that we have at least some reason to believe this; but we certainly have no reason to think that these non-luminous suns are surrounded by luminous suns, which are in turn surrounded by non-luminous planets:—and it is precisely all of this that Mädler is[123] tasked with finding something similar for in the heavens—for it is exactly all this that he envisions in the case of the Galaxy. Accepting that as the case, we cannot help but imagine how puzzling the why it is so must be for all à priori philosophers.
But granting, in the very teeth of analogy and of every thing else, the non-luminosity of the vast central orb, we may still inquire how this orb, so enormous, could fail of being rendered visible by the flood of light thrown upon it from the 100 millions of glorious suns glaring in all directions about it. Upon the urging of this question, the idea of an actually solid central sun appears, in some measure, to have been abandoned; and speculation proceeded to assert that the systems of the cluster perform their revolutions merely about an immaterial centre of gravity common to all. Here again then, to suit a purpose, analogy is let fall. The planets of our system revolve, it is true, about a common centre of gravity; but they do this in connexion with, and in consequence of, a material sun whose mass more than counterbalances the rest of the system.
But even if we accept, against all comparisons and everything else, that the vast central orb isn't luminous, we can still ask how this massive orb could fail to be visible despite the flood of light coming from the 100 million brilliant suns shining in every direction around it. In response to this question, the idea of a solid central sun seems to have been set aside, and speculation began to suggest that the systems in the cluster simply rotate around an immaterial center of gravity that is common to all. Once again, to fit a certain purpose, analogy is overlooked. It is true that the planets in our system revolve around a common center of gravity, but they do this in connection with and as a result of a material sun whose mass more than outweighs the rest of the system.
The mathematical circle is a curve composed of an infinity of straight lines. But this idea of the circle—an idea which, in view of all ordinary geometry, is merely the mathematical, as contradistinguished from the practical, idea—is, in sober fact, the practical conception which alone we have any right to entertain in regard to the majestic circle with which we have to deal, at least in fancy, when we suppose our system revolving about a point in the centre of the Galaxy. Let the most vigorous of human imaginations attempt but to take a single step towards the comprehension[124] of a sweep so ineffable! It would scarcely be paradoxical to say that a flash of lightning itself, travelling forever upon the circumference of this unutterable circle, would still, forever, be travelling in a straight line. That the path of our Sun in such an orbit would, to any human perception, deviate in the slightest degree from a straight line, even in a million of years, is a proposition not to be entertained:—yet we are required to believe that a curvature has become apparent during the brief period of our astronomical history—during a mere point—during the utter nothingness of two or three thousand years.
The mathematical circle is a curve made up of endless straight lines. But this idea of a circle—an idea that, in everyday geometry, is just the mathematical concept, set apart from the practical notion—is, in reality, the practical understanding we should embrace regarding the grand circle we contemplate, at least in our imagination, when we think of our system revolving around a point at the center of the Galaxy. Let the most powerful of human imaginations take just a single step toward grasping a sweep so extraordinary! It wouldn't be completely absurd to suggest that even a flash of lightning, traveling forever along the edge of this indescribable circle, would still be traveling in a straight line. The idea that our Sun's path in such an orbit would, to any human perception, stray even slightly from a straight line, even over a million years, is a claim we cannot accept: yet we are expected to believe that a curve has become noticeable during the brief span of our astronomical history—just a tiny moment—in the utter nothingness of two or three thousand years.
It may be said that Mädler has really ascertained a curvature in the direction of our system’s now well-established progress through Space. Admitting, if necessary, this fact to be in reality such, I maintain that nothing is thereby shown except the reality of this fact—the fact of a curvature. For its thorough determination, ages will be required; and, when determined, it will be found indicative of some binary or other multiple relation between our Sun and some one or more of the proximate stars. I hazard nothing however, in predicting, that, after the lapse of many centuries, all efforts at determining the path of our Sun through Space, will be abandoned as fruitless. This is easily conceivable when we look at the infinity of perturbation it must experience, from its perpetually-shifting relations with other orbs, in the common approach of all to the nucleus of the Galaxy.
It can be said that Mädler has truly identified a curve in the direction of our system’s now well-established journey through Space. Accepting, if necessary, that this fact is indeed real, I argue that nothing is proven beyond the existence of this fact—a curvature. To fully determine it will take ages, and once established, it will reveal some binary or multiple relationship between our Sun and one or more nearby stars. However, I risk nothing in predicting that, after many centuries, all attempts to determine the path of our Sun through Space will be given up as fruitless. This seems understandable when we consider the endless disturbances it must face from its constantly changing relationships with other celestial bodies as they all approach the nucleus of the Galaxy.
But in examining other “nebulæ” than that of the Milky Way—in surveying, generally, the clusters which overspread the heavens—do we or do we not find confirmation[125] of Mädler’s hypothesis? We do not. The forms of the clusters are exceedingly diverse when casually viewed; but on close inspection, through powerful telescopes, we recognize the sphere, very distinctly, as at least the proximate form of all:—their constitution, in general, being at variance with the idea of revolution about a common centre.
But when we look at other "nebulae" besides the Milky Way—when we take a general survey of the clusters scattered across the sky—do we find support for Mädler’s hypothesis or not? We do *not*. The shapes of the clusters seem incredibly varied at first glance; however, upon closer examination with powerful telescopes, we can clearly identify the sphere as at least the nearest form of all of them: their structure, in general, contradicts the idea of revolving around a common center.
“It is difficult,” says Sir John Herschell, “to form any conception of the dynamical state of such systems. On one hand, without a rotary motion and a centrifugal force, it is hardly possible not to regard them as in a state of progressive collapse. On the other, granting such a motion and such a force, we find it no less difficult to reconcile their forms with the rotation of the whole system [meaning cluster] around any single axis, without which internal collision would appear to be inevitable.”
“It’s challenging,” says Sir John Herschell, “to understand the dynamic state of such systems. On one hand, without a spinning motion and a centrifugal force, it’s hard not to see them as in a state of progressive collapse. On the other hand, if we assume such motion and force exist, we still find it difficult to align their shapes with the rotation of the entire system [meaning cluster] around a single axis, without which internal collisions would seem unavoidable.”
Some remarks lately made about the “nebulæ” by Dr. Nichol, in taking quite a different view of the cosmical conditions from any taken in this Discourse—have a very peculiar applicability to the point now at issue. He says:
Some recent comments by Dr. Nichol about the "nebulae," which present a completely different perspective on the cosmic conditions compared to what’s discussed in this discourse—are very relevant to the topic currently at hand. He states:
“When our greatest telescopes are brought to bear upon them, we find that those which were thought to be irregular, are not so; they approach nearer to a globe. Here is one that looked oval; but Lord Rosse’s telescope brought it into a circle.... Now there occurs a very remarkable circumstance in reference to these comparatively sweeping circular masses of nebulæ. We find they are not entirely circular, but the reverse; and that all around them, on every side, there are volumes of stars, stretching out apparently as if they were rushing towards[126] a great central mass in consequence of the action of some great power.”[12]
“When we use our best telescopes on them, we discover that what we thought were irregular shapes are actually much closer to being spherical. Here’s one that seemed oval, but Lord Rosse’s telescope showed it as circular... Now, a very interesting detail arises regarding these relatively expansive circular masses of nebulae. We see that they are not perfectly circular; rather, they are the opposite, with volumes of stars surrounding them on all sides, extending outwards as if they’re rushing toward a massive central point due to some powerful force.”[12]
Were I to describe, in my own words, what must necessarily be the existing condition of each nebula on the hypothesis that all matter is, as I suggest, now returning to its original Unity, I should simply be going over, nearly verbatim, the language here employed by Dr. Nichol, without the faintest suspicion of that stupendous truth which is the key to these nebular phænomena.
If I were to describe, in my own words, what the current condition of each nebula must be based on the idea that all matter is, as I propose, returning to its original Unity, I would basically be repeating nearly exactly what Dr. Nichol has said, without the slightest hint of that incredible truth which unlocks these nebular phenomena.
And here let me fortify my position still farther, by the voice of a greater than Mädler—of one, moreover, to whom all the data of Mädler have long been familiar things, carefully and thoroughly considered. Referring to the elaborate calculations of Argelander—the very researches which form Mädler’s basis—Humboldt, whose generalizing powers have never, perhaps been equalled, has the following observation:
And here let me strengthen my argument even more, by citing someone greater than Mädler—someone who is also well acquainted with all of Mädler's data, having studied it carefully and thoroughly. Referring to the detailed calculations of Argelander—the very research that Mädler's work relies on—Humboldt, whose ability to generalize has probably never been matched, made the following observation:
“When we regard the real, proper, or non-perspective motions of the stars, we find many groups of them moving in opposite directions; and the data as yet in hand render it not necessary, at least, to conceive that the systems composing the Milky Way, or the clusters, generally, composing the Universe, are revolving about any particular centre unknown, whether luminous or non-luminous. It is but Man’s longing for a fundamental First Cause, that impels [127]both his intellect and his fancy to the adoption of such an hypothesis.”[13]
"When we look at the actual, proper, or non-perspective movements of the stars, we see many groups of them moving in opposite directions; and the information we have so far makes it unnecessary to believe that the systems that make up the Milky Way, or the clusters that generally make up the Universe, are orbiting around any specific unknown center, whether it's bright or not. It’s just humanity's desire for a fundamental First Cause that drives both our intellect and imagination to accept such a hypothesis." [127] a_id="FNanchor_13_13">[13]
The phænomenon here alluded to—that of “many groups moving in opposite directions”—is quite inexplicable by Mädler’s idea; but arises, as a necessary consequence, from that which forms the basis of this Discourse. While the merely general direction of each atom—of each moon, planet, star, or cluster—would, on my hypothesis, be, of course, absolutely rectilinear; while the general path of all bodies would be a right line leading to the centre of all; it is clear, nevertheless, that this general rectilinearity would be compounded of what, with scarcely any exaggeration, we may term an infinity of particular curves—an infinity of local deviations from rectilinearity—the result of continuous differences of relative position among the multitudinous masses, as each proceeded on its own proper journey to the End.
The phenomenon mentioned here—that of “many groups moving in opposite directions”—can’t be explained by Mädler’s idea; instead, it arises as a necessary consequence of the foundation of this Discourse. While the merely general direction of each atom—of each moon, planet, star, or cluster—would, according to my hypothesis, be absolutely straight; and while the general path of all bodies would be a straight line leading to the center of everything; it’s clear that this general straightness would actually consist of what we might describe, without much exaggeration, as an infinity of specific curves—an infinity of local deviations from straightness—due to continuous differences in relative positions among the countless masses, as each moved along its own unique journey to the End.
I quoted, just now, from Sir John Herschell, the following words, used in reference to the clusters:—“On one hand, without a rotary motion and a centrifugal force, it is hardly possible not to regard them as in a state of progressive collapse.” The fact is, that, in surveying the “nebulæ” [128]with a telescope of high power, we shall find it quite impossible, having once conceived this idea of “collapse,” not to gather, at all points, corroboration of the idea. A nucleus is always apparent, in the direction of which the stars seem to be precipitating themselves; nor can these nuclei be mistaken for merely perspective phænomena:—the clusters are really denser near the centre—sparser in the regions more remote from it. In a word, we see every thing as we should see it were a collapse taking place; but, in general, it may be said of these clusters, that we can fairly entertain, while looking at them, the idea of orbitual movement about a centre, only by admitting the possible existence, in the distant domains of space, of dynamical laws with which we are unacquainted.
I just quoted Sir John Herschel, who said about the clusters: “On one hand, without a rotating motion and a centrifugal force, it’s hard not to see them as in a state of progressive collapse.” The truth is, when we look at the “nebulae” [128] through a powerful telescope, we will find it nearly impossible, once we’ve conceived the idea of “collapse,” not to gather support for that idea from every angle. There’s always a central point where the stars seem to be converging; these central points can’t simply be dismissed as perspective illusions: the clusters are actually denser near the center and sparser in the farther regions. In short, everything we observe looks as if a collapse is happening; however, in general, we can only consider the idea of orbital movement around a center while contemplating these clusters by accepting the possible existence of dynamic laws in the far reaches of space that we’re unaware of.
On the part of Herschell, however, there is evidently a reluctance to regard the nebulæ as in “a state of progressive collapse.” But if facts—if even appearances justify the supposition of their being in this state, why, it may well be demanded, is he disinclined to admit it? Simply on account of a prejudice;—merely because the supposition is at war with a preconceived and utterly baseless notion—that of the endlessness—that of the eternal stability of the Universe.
Herschell, however, clearly shows a hesitation to view the nebulæ as being “in a state of progressive collapse.” But if the evidence—even the way things look—supports the idea that they are in this state, why is he unwilling to accept it? Simply due to a bias;—just because the idea clashes with a preconceived and completely unfounded belief—that of infinity—that of the eternal stability of the Universe.
If the propositions of this Discourse are tenable, the “state of progressive collapse” is precisely that state in which alone we are warranted in considering All Things; and, with due humility, let me here confess that, for my part, I am at a loss to conceive how any other understanding of the existing condition of affairs, could ever have made its way into the human brain. “The tendency to collapse[129]” and “the attraction of gravitation” are convertible phrases. In using either, we speak of the rëaction of the First Act. Never was necessity less obvious than that of supposing Matter imbued with an ineradicable quality forming part of its material nature—a quality, or instinct, forever inseparable from it, and by dint of which inalienable principle every atom is perpetually impelled to seek its fellow-atom. Never was necessity less obvious than that of entertaining this unphilosophical idea. Going boldly behind the vulgar thought, we have to conceive, metaphysically, that the gravitating principle appertains to Matter temporarily—only while diffused—only while existing as Many instead of as One—appertains to it by virtue of its state of irradiation alone—appertains, in a word, altogether to its condition, and not in the slightest degree to itself. In this view, when the irradiation shall have returned into its source—when the rëaction shall be completed—the gravitating principle will no longer exist. And, in fact, astronomers, without at any time reaching the idea here suggested, seem to have been approximating it, in the assertion that “if there were but one body in the Universe, it would be impossible to understand how the principle, Gravity, could obtain:”—that is to say, from a consideration of Matter as they find it, they reach a conclusion at which I deductively arrive. That so pregnant a suggestion as the one just quoted should have been permitted to remain so long unfruitful, is, nevertheless, a mystery which I find it difficult to fathom.
If the ideas in this Discourse are valid, the “state of progressive collapse” is exactly that state in which we are justified in considering everything; and, with due humility, I must admit that I am puzzled as to how any different understanding of the current situation could have ever taken root in people's minds. “The tendency to collapse” and “the attraction of gravity” are interchangeable terms. When we use either, we're discussing the reaction of the First Act. Never has it been less clear that we should assume Matter has an unremovable quality that is part of its essence—a quality, or instinct, that can never be separated from it, and through which this inalienable principle drives every atom to seek out its fellow atom. Never has it been less clear that this unphilosophical notion should be entertained. Boldly moving past common thought, we must conceive, on a metaphysical level, that the gravitational principle belongs to Matter only temporarily—only while it is dispersed—only while it exists as Many rather than as One—belongs to it solely by virtue of its state of irradiation—belongs, in short, entirely to its condition and not at all to itself. From this perspective, when the irradiation returns to its source—when the reaction is completed—the gravitational principle will cease to exist. In fact, astronomers, without fully grasping this idea, seem to have come close to saying that “if there were only one body in the Universe, it would be impossible to understand how the principle of Gravity could exist”—meaning that, based on Matter as they observe it, they arrive at a conclusion that I also reach deductively. That such a profound suggestion as the one just quoted has remained so long unproductive is, however, a mystery I find hard to understand.
It is, perhaps, in no little degree, however, our propensity for the continuous—for the analogical—in the present case more particularly for the symmetrical—which has[130] been leading us astray. And, in fact, the sense of the symmetrical is an instinct which may be depended upon with an almost blindfold reliance. It is the poetical essence of the Universe—of the Universe which, in the supremeness of its symmetry, is but the most sublime of poems. Now symmetry and consistency are convertible terms:—thus Poetry and Truth are one. A thing is consistent in the ratio of its truth—true in the ratio of its consistency. A perfect consistency, I repeat, can be nothing but an absolute truth. We may take it for granted, then, that Man cannot long or widely err, if he suffer himself to be guided by his poetical, which I have maintained to be his truthful, in being his symmetrical, instinct. He must have a care, however, lest, in pursuing too heedlessly the superficial symmetry of forms and motions, he leave out of sight the really essential symmetry of the principles which determine and control them.
It’s probably partly our tendency for the continuous—for the analogical—especially in this case for the symmetrical—that has[130] led us astray. In fact, the sense of symmetry is an instinct that we can rely on almost blindly. It represents the poetic essence of the Universe—of the Universe which, in its perfect symmetry, is the most sublime of poems. Symmetry and consistency are interchangeable:—therefore, Poetry and Truth are the same. A thing is consistent in proportion to its truth—true in proportion to its consistency. A perfect consistency, I repeat, can be nothing but an absolute truth. We can assume, then, that Man cannot be too far off course if he allows himself to be guided by what is poetic, which I argue is truthful, as it is symmetrical instinct. He must be cautious, however, not to get so caught up in the superficial symmetry of forms and movements that he loses sight of the truly essential symmetry of the principles that determine and control them.
That the stellar bodies would finally be merged in one—that, at last, all would be drawn into the substance of one stupendous central orb already existing—is an idea which, for some time past, seems, vaguely and indeterminately, to have held possession of the fancy of mankind. It is an idea, in fact, which belongs to the class of the excessively obvious. It springs, instantly, from a superficial observation of the cyclic and seemingly gyrating, or vorticial movements of those individual portions of the Universe which come most immediately and most closely under our observation. There is not, perhaps, a human being, of ordinary education and of average reflective capacity, to whom, at some period, the fancy in question has not occurred, as if spontaneously,[131] or intuitively, and wearing all the character of a very profound and very original conception. This conception, however, so commonly entertained, has never, within my knowledge, arisen out of any abstract considerations. Being, on the contrary, always suggested, as I say, by the vorticial movements about centres, a reason for it, also,—a cause for the ingathering of all the orbs into one, imagined to be already existing, was naturally sought in the same direction—among these cyclic movements themselves.
The idea that all the stars would eventually come together into one—that all would finally merge into the substance of one massive central orb already in existence—is a thought that has, for quite some time, loosely captured the imagination of people. It's an idea that falls into the category of the excessively obvious. It instantly arises from a casual observation of the cyclic and seemingly spinning or whirling movements of those individual parts of the Universe that we can see most clearly. There is likely not a person, with a basic education and average capacity for reflection, who hasn’t, at some point, had this thought pop into their mind, almost spontaneously,[131] as if it were a very profound and original idea. However, this thought, while commonly held, has never, to my knowledge, stemmed from any abstract reasoning. Instead, as I mentioned, it is always prompted by the whirling movements around centers, leading to a natural search for a reason—a cause—for the gathering of all the celestial bodies into one, thought to be already existing, which was also sought among these cyclic movements.
Thus it happened that, on announcement of the gradual and perfectly regular decrease observed in the orbit of Enck’s comet, at every successive revolution about our Sun, astronomers were nearly unanimous in the opinion that the cause in question was found—that a principle was discovered sufficient to account, physically, for that final, universal agglomeration which, I repeat, the analogical, symmetrical or poetical instinct of Man had predetermined to understand as something more than a simple hypothesis.
So it happened that, when the steady and completely normal decrease in the orbit of Enck's comet was announced for each subsequent revolution around our Sun, astronomers mostly agreed that the cause had been identified—that a principle had been discovered capable of physically explaining that ultimate, universal gathering which, I reiterate, the analogy, symmetry, or poetic instinct of humanity had envisioned as something beyond just a simple hypothesis.
This cause—this sufficient reason for the final ingathering—was declared to exist in an exceedingly rare but still material medium pervading space; which medium, by retarding, in some degree, the progress of the comet, perpetually weakened its tangential force; thus giving a predominance to the centripetal; which, of course, drew the comet nearer and nearer at each revolution, and would eventually precipitate it upon the Sun.
This reason—this sufficient cause for the final gathering—was said to be found in an extremely rare but still physical substance that fills space; this substance, by slowing down the comet's progress to some extent, constantly weakened its outward force; thereby giving an advantage to the inward force, which, of course, pulled the comet closer and closer with each orbit, and would ultimately send it crashing into the Sun.
All this was strictly logical—admitting the medium or ether; but this ether was assumed, most illogically, on the ground that no other mode than the one spoken of could be[132] discovered, of accounting for the observed decrease in the orbit of the comet:—as if from the fact that we could discover no other mode of accounting for it, it followed, in any respect, that no other mode of accounting for it existed. It is clear that innumerable causes might operate, in combination, to diminish the orbit, without even a possibility of our ever becoming acquainted with one of them. In the meantime, it has never been fairly shown, perhaps, why the retardation occasioned by the skirts of the Sun’s atmosphere, through which the comet passes at perihelion, is not enough to account for the phænomenon. That Enck’s comet will be absorbed into the Sun, is probable; that all the comets of the system will be absorbed, is more than merely possible; but, in such case, the principle of absorption must be referred to eccentricity of orbit—to the close approximation to the Sun, of the comets at their perihelia; and is a principle not affecting, in any degree, the ponderous spheres, which are to be regarded as the true material constituents of the Universe.—Touching comets, in general, let me here suggest, in passing, that we cannot be far wrong in looking upon them as the lightning-flashes of the cosmical Heaven.
All of this made sense logically—accepting the idea of a medium or ether; but this ether was assumed, rather irrationally, on the basis that no other explanation could be found for the observed decrease in the comet's orbit:—as if the fact that we could find no other explanation meant that no other explanation could exist at all. It's obvious that countless factors could work together to reduce the orbit, without us ever having the chance to uncover any of them. Meanwhile, it's never been convincingly shown why the slowdown caused by the edges of the Sun's atmosphere, which the comet passes through at perihelion, isn't enough to explain the phenomenon. It's likely that Enck’s comet will be absorbed into the Sun; that all the comets in the system will be absorbed is more than just a possibility; but in that case, the reason for absorption must relate to the eccentricity of their orbits—specifically, the close approach of comets to the Sun at their perihelia; and this principle doesn’t affect the massive spheres, which we should consider the true material building blocks of the Universe.—Regarding comets in general, I’d like to suggest that we’re probably not far off by viewing them as the lightning-flashes of the cosmic skies.
The idea of a retarding ether and, through it, of a final agglomeration of all things, seemed at one time, however, to be confirmed by the observation of a positive decrease in the orbit of the solid moon. By reference to eclipses recorded 2500 years ago, it was found that the velocity of the satellite’s revolution then was considerably less than it is now; that on the hypothesis that its motions in its orbit is uniformly in accordance with Kepler’s law, and was accurately determined then—2500 years ago—it is now in[133] advance of the position it should occupy, by nearly 9000 miles. The increase of velocity proved, of course, a diminution of orbit; and astronomers were fast yielding to a belief in an ether, as the sole mode of accounting for the phænomenon, when Lagrange came to the rescue. He showed that, owing to the configurations of the spheroids, the shorter axes of their ellipses are subject to variation in length; the longer axes being permanent; and that this variation is continuous and vibratory—so that every orbit is in a state of transition, either from circle to ellipse, or from ellipse to circle. In the case of the moon, where the shorter axis is decreasing, the orbit is passing from circle to ellipse and, consequently, is decreasing too; but, after a long series of ages, the ultimate eccentricity will be attained; then the shorter axis will proceed to increase, until the orbit becomes a circle; when the process of shortening will again take place;—and so on forever. In the case of the Earth, the orbit is passing from ellipse to circle. The facts thus demonstrated do away, of course, with all necessity for supposing an ether, and with all apprehension of the system’s instability—on the ether’s account.
The concept of a slowing ether and, through it, a final gathering of everything, once seemed to be confirmed by the observation of a clear decrease in the orbit of the solid moon. By looking at eclipses recorded 2500 years ago, it was found that the speed of the moon's revolution then was significantly slower than it is now; that based on the idea that its motions in its orbit align with Kepler’s law, and were accurately measured then—2500 years ago—it is now in[133] advance of where it should be by almost 9000 miles. The increase in speed indicated, of course, a decrease in orbit; and astronomers were quickly beginning to believe in an ether as the only explanation for the phenomenon, when Lagrange came to the rescue. He showed that, due to the shapes of the spheroids, the shorter axes of their ellipses can change length; the longer axes remain constant; and that this change is ongoing and vibratory—so every orbit is constantly shifting, either from circle to ellipse, or from ellipse to circle. In the case of the moon, where the shorter axis is decreasing, the orbit is moving from circle to ellipse and, therefore, is decreasing as well; but after a long period, the ultimate eccentricity will be reached; then the shorter axis will start to increase, until the orbit becomes a circle; at which point the process of shortening will happen again;—and this will continue indefinitely. For Earth, the orbit is shifting from ellipse to circle. The facts shown here eliminate the need to assume an ether, and all concerns about the stability of the system—concerning the ether.
It will be remembered that I have myself assumed what we may term an ether. I have spoken of a subtle influence which we know to be ever in attendance upon matter, although becoming manifest only through matter’s heterogeneity. To this influence—without daring to touch it at all in any effort at explaining its awful nature—I have referred the various phænomena of electricity, heat, light, magnetism; and more—of vitality, consciousness, and thought—in a word, of spirituality. It will be seen, at once, then,[134] that the ether thus conceived is radically distinct from the ether of the astronomers; inasmuch as theirs is matter and mine not.
It should be noted that I have taken on what we can call an ether. I have talked about a subtle influence that is always present with matter, even though it only becomes noticeable through the differences in matter. To this influence—without trying to explain its frightening nature—I have linked the various phenomena of electricity, heat, light, magnetism; and even more—of life, consciousness, and thought—in short, of spirituality. It will be clear, then,[134] that the ether I have described is fundamentally different from the ether of astronomers; since theirs is matter and mine is not.
With the idea of a material ether, seems, thus, to have departed altogether the thought of that universal agglomeration so long predetermined by the poetical fancy of mankind:—an agglomeration in which a sound Philosophy might have been warranted in putting faith, at least to a certain extent, if for no other reason than that by this poetical fancy it had been so predetermined. But so far as Astronomy—so far as mere Physics have yet spoken, the cycles of the Universe are perpetual—the Universe has no conceivable end. Had an end been demonstrated, however, from so purely collateral a cause as an ether, Man’s instinct of the Divine capacity to adapt, would have rebelled against the demonstration. We should have been forced to regard the Universe with some such sense of dissatisfaction as we experience in contemplating an unnecessarily complex work of human art. Creation would have affected us as an imperfect plot in a romance, where the dénoûment is awkwardly brought about by interposed incidents external and foreign to the main subject; instead of springing out of the bosom of the thesis—out of the heart of the ruling idea—instead of arising as a result of the primary proposition—as inseparable and inevitable part and parcel of the fundamental conception of the book.
The idea of a material ether seems to completely reject the notion of that universal collection long envisioned by humanity's poetic imagination—an amalgamation that a sound philosophy might have had reason to trust, if only because it had been so envisioned by that imagination. But as far as Astronomy and pure Physics have so far communicated, the cycles of the Universe are endless—the Universe has no clear end. If an end had been shown, even from something as indirect as an ether, humanity’s instinct for divine adaptation would have resisted the conclusion. We would have looked at the Universe with the same feeling of dissatisfaction we get when we see an unnecessarily complicated piece of human art. Creation would have seemed like a faulty plot in a story, where the resolution awkwardly arises from unrelated incidents outside of the main theme; instead of naturally emerging from the core of the thesis—out of the essence of the main idea—rather than being a direct result of the fundamental premise, inseparable and essential to the core concept of the work.
What I mean by the symmetry of mere surface will now be more clearly understood. It is simply by the blandishment of this symmetry that we have been beguiled into the general idea of which Mädler’s hypothesis is but a part—the[135] idea of the vorticial indrawing of the orbs. Dismissing this nakedly physical conception, the symmetry of principle sees the end of all things metaphysically involved in the thought of a beginning; seeks and finds in this origin of all things the rudiment of this end; and perceives the impiety of supposing this end likely to be brought about less simply—less directly—less obviously—less artistically—than through the rëaction of the originating Act.
What I mean by the symmetry of just surface will now be clearer. It’s this allure of symmetry that has tricked us into the broader concept of which Mädler’s hypothesis is just a part—the[135]idea of the vortex-like pull of the celestial bodies. Ignoring this purely physical idea, the symmetry of principle sees the end of everything as metaphysically tied to the thought of a beginning; it looks for and finds in this origin of all things the foundation of this end; and recognizes the irreverence of thinking this end could come about in any way less simple—less direct—less obvious—less artistic—than through the reaction of the originating Act.
Recurring, then, to a previous suggestion, let us understand the systems—let us understand each star, with its attendant planets—as but a Titanic atom existing in space with precisely the same inclination for Unity which characterized, in the beginning, the actual atoms after their irradiation throughout the Universal sphere. As these original atoms rushed towards each other in generally straight lines, so let us conceive as at least generally rectilinear, the paths of the system-atoms towards their respective centres of aggregation:—and in this direct drawing together of the systems into clusters, with a similar and simultaneous drawing together of the clusters themselves while undergoing consolidation, we have at length attained the great Now—the awful Present—the Existing Condition of the Universe.
Returning to an earlier idea, let’s comprehend the systems—let's understand each star and its planets—as just a huge atom floating in space, sharing the same drive for Unity that defined the original atoms after they spread throughout the universe. Just as these initial atoms moved towards each other in mostly straight lines, let’s imagine the paths of the system-atoms heading towards their centers of gathering as generally linear:—and in this direct pull of the systems into clusters, along with a similar and simultaneous gathering of the clusters themselves during their consolidation, we have finally reached the great Now—the overwhelming Present—the Existing Condition of the Universe.
Of the still more awful Future a not irrational analogy may guide us in framing an hypothesis. The equilibrium between the centripetal and centrifugal forces of each system, being necessarily destroyed upon attainment of a certain proximity to the nucleus of the cluster to which it belongs, there must occur, at once, a chaotic or seemingly chaotic precipitation, of the moons upon the planets, of the[136] planets upon the suns, and of the suns upon the nuclei; and the general result of this precipitation must be the gathering of the myriad now-existing stars of the firmament into an almost infinitely less number of almost infinitely superior spheres. In being immeasurably fewer, the worlds of that day will be immeasurably greater than our own. Then, indeed, amid unfathomable abysses, will be glaring unimaginable suns. But all this will be merely a climacic magnificence foreboding the great End. Of this End the new genesis described, can be but a very partial postponement. While undergoing consolidation, the clusters themselves, with a speed prodigiously accumulative, have been rushing towards their own general centre—and now, with a thousand-fold electric velocity, commensurate only with their material grandeur and with the spiritual passion of their appetite for oneness, the majestic remnants of the tribe of Stars flash, at length, into a common embrace. The inevitable catastrophe is at hand.
A not irrational analogy can help us imagine a more terrifying future. The balance between the inward and outward forces of each system gets disrupted when it gets too close to the center of its cluster. This leads to a chaotic— or at least seemingly chaotic—falling of moons onto planets, planets onto suns, and suns onto the centers of their clusters; ultimately, this chaos will cause the countless stars we see in the sky to gather into a far smaller number of far more powerful celestial bodies. In being vastly fewer, the worlds of that time will be vastly greater than our own. There, within unfathomable depths, will be blazing suns beyond imagination. But all of this will just be a dramatic spectacle hinting at the great End. This End cannot be completely postponed by the new beginnings described. While coming together, the clusters, with an incredibly accumulating speed, have been racing toward their own center—and now, at a thousand times the speed of electricity, in line with their immense physical presence and their spiritual desire for unity, the majestic remnants of the Star tribe finally merge into a collective embrace. The unavoidable catastrophe is approaching.
But this catastrophe—what is it? We have seen accomplished the ingathering of the orbs. Henceforward, are we not to understand one material globe of globes as constituting and comprehending the Universe? Such a fancy would be altogether at war with every assumption and consideration of this Discourse.
But this disaster—what is it? We have witnessed the gathering of the realms. From now on, are we not to see one material globe of globes as making up and encompassing the Universe? Such an idea would completely contradict every assumption and aspect of this discussion.
I have already alluded to that absolute reciprocity of adaptation which is the idiosyncrasy of the divine Art—stamping it divine. Up to this point of our reflections, we have been regarding the electrical influence as a something by dint of whose repulsion alone Matter is enabled to exist in that state of diffusion demanded for the fulfilment of[137] its purposes:—so far, in a word, we have been considering the influence in question as ordained for Matter’s sake—to subserve the objects of matter. With a perfectly legitimate reciprocity, we are now permitted to look at Matter, as created solely for the sake of this influence—solely to serve the objects of this spiritual Ether. Through the aid—by the means—through the agency of Matter, and by dint of its heterogeneity—is this Ether manifested—is Spirit individualized. It is merely in the development of this Ether, through heterogeneity, that particular masses of Matter become animate—sensitive—and in the ratio of their heterogeneity;—some reaching a degree of sensitiveness involving what we call Thought and thus attaining Conscious Intelligence.
I have already hinted at that complete reciprocity of adaptation which is the unique characteristic of the divine Art—making it divine. Up to this point in our discussion, we have been viewing the electrical influence as something that allows Matter to exist in the state of diffusion needed for achieving its purposes:—so far, we have considered this influence as being intended for Matter's benefit—to serve Matter's objectives. With a valid reciprocity, we can now consider Matter as created solely for the sake of this influence—entirely to serve the aims of this spiritual Ether. It is through the assistance—by the means—through the agency of Matter, and due to its diversity—that this Ether is expressed—is Spirit individualized. It is only through the development of this Ether, through diversity, that specific masses of Matter become alive—sensitive—and in proportion to their diversity;—some achieving a level of sensitivity that involves what we call Thought and thus gaining Conscious Intelligence.
In this view, we are enabled to perceive Matter as a Means—not as an End. Its purposes are thus seen to have been comprehended in its diffusion; and with the return into Unity these purposes cease. The absolutely consolidated globe of globes would be objectless:—therefore not for a moment could it continue to exist. Matter, created for an end, would unquestionably, on fulfilment of that end, be Matter no longer. Let us endeavor to understand that it would disappear, and that God would remain all in all.
In this perspective, we can see Matter as a tool—not as a goal. Its purposes are understood through its spread; and with the return to oneness, those purposes come to an end. The completely unified sphere of spheres would be objectless:—therefore, it couldn’t possibly continue to exist even for a moment. Matter, created for a purpose, would undoubtedly no longer be Matter once that purpose is fulfilled. Let's try to grasp that it would vanish, and that God would be everything to everyone.
That every work of Divine conception must cöexist and cöexpire with its particular design, seems to me especially obvious; and I make no doubt that, on perceiving the final globe of globes to be objectless, the majority of my readers will be satisfied with my “therefore it cannot continue to exist.” Nevertheless, as the startling thought of its instantaneous disappearance is one which the most powerful[138] intellect cannot be expected readily to entertain on grounds so decidedly abstract, let us endeavor to look at the idea from some other and more ordinary point of view:—let us see how thoroughly and beautifully it is corroborated in an à posteriori consideration of Matter as we actually find it.
That every work of divine creation must coexist and expire with its specific design seems especially clear to me; and I’m sure that, upon realizing that the final globe of globes is objectless, most of my readers will agree with my “therefore it cannot continue to exist.” However, since the shocking idea of its sudden disappearance is something even the most powerful intellects might struggle to grasp on such abstract grounds, let’s try to approach the concept from a more familiar perspective:—let’s explore how thoroughly and beautifully it’s supported by an à posteriori examination of matter as we actually encounter it.
I have before said that “Attraction and Repulsion being undeniably the sole properties by which Matter is manifested to Mind, we are justified in assuming that Matter exists only as Attraction and Repulsion—in other words that Attraction and Repulsion are Matter; there being no conceivable case in which we may not employ the term Matter and the terms ‘Attraction’ and ‘Repulsion’ taken together, as equivalent, and therefore convertible, expressions in Logic.”[14]
I’ve previously mentioned that “Attraction and Repulsion are clearly the only properties through which Matter is perceived by the Mind, so we can assume that Matter exists solely as Attraction and Repulsion—in other words, that Attraction and Repulsion are Matter; there’s no situation where we can’t use the term Matter and the terms ‘Attraction’ and ‘Repulsion’ together as equivalent, and therefore interchangeable, expressions in Logic.”[14]
Now the very definition of Attraction implies particularity—the existence of parts, particles, or atoms; for we define it as the tendency of “each atom &c. to every other atom” &c. according to a certain law. Of course where there are no parts—where there is absolute Unity—where the tendency to oneness is satisfied—there can be no Attraction:—this has been fully shown, and all Philosophy admits it. When, on fulfilment of its purposes, then, Matter shall have returned into its original condition of One—a condition which presupposes the expulsion of the separative ether, whose province and whose capacity are limited to keeping the atoms apart until that great day when, this ether being no longer needed, the overwhelming pressure of the finally collective Attraction shall at length just sufficiently [139]predominate[15] and expel it:—when, I say, Matter, finally, expelling the Ether, shall have returned into absolute Unity,—it will then (to speak paradoxically for the moment) be Matter without Attraction and without Repulsion—in other words, Matter without Matter—in other words, again, Matter no more. In sinking into Unity, it will sink at once into that Nothingness which, to all Finite Perception, Unity must be—into that Material Nihility from which alone we can conceive it to have been evoked—to have been created by the Volition of God.
Now, the definition of Attraction implies specific characteristics—the presence of parts, particles, or atoms; we define it as the tendency of “each atom, etc. to every other atom,” according to a certain law. Clearly, where there are no parts—where there is absolute Unity—where the drive towards oneness is fulfilled—there can be no Attraction: this has been clearly demonstrated, and all Philosophy agrees. So, when Matter has fulfilled its purposes and returns to its original state of One—a state that assumes the removal of the separative ether, which is limited to keeping the atoms apart until that great day when this ether is no longer needed, and the overwhelming force of the ultimate collective Attraction prevails just enough to expel it:—when, I say, Matter, finally expelling the Ether, returns to absolute Unity,—it will then (to be paradoxical for a moment) be Matter without Attraction and without Repulsion—in other words, Matter without Matter—again, Matter no more. In sinking into Unity, it will simultaneously sink into that Nothingness which, to all Finite Perception, Unity must be—into that Material Nihility from which alone we can conceive it to have been brought forth—to have been created by the Will of God.
I repeat then—Let us endeavor to comprehend that the final globe of globes will instantaneously disappear, and that God will remain all in all.
I’ll say it again—Let’s try to understand that the ultimate universe will vanish in an instant, and that God will be everything to everyone.
But are we here to pause? Not so. On the Universal agglomeration and dissolution, we can readily conceive that a new and perhaps totally different series of conditions may ensue—another creation and irradiation, returning into itself—another action and rëaction of the Divine Will. Guiding our imaginations by that omniprevalent law of laws, the law of periodicity, are we not, indeed, more than justified in entertaining a belief—let us say, rather, in indulging a hope—that the processes we have here ventured to contemplate will be renewed forever, and forever, and forever; a novel Universe swelling into existence, and then subsiding into nothingness, at every throb of the Heart Divine?
But are we here to stop? Not at all. When it comes to the Universal buildup and breakdown, we can easily imagine that a new and maybe completely different set of conditions could arise—another creation and emission, returning to itself—another action and reaction of the Divine Will. By following that all-encompassing law of laws, the law of periodicity, aren’t we more than justified in believing—let’s rather say, in hoping—that the processes we’ve dared to think about will be repeated forever, and forever, and forever; a new Universe coming into being, and then fading into nothingness, with every beat of the Divine Heart?
And now—this Heart Divine—what is it? It is our own.
And now—this Divine Heart—what is it? It belongs to us.
Let not the merely seeming irreverence of this idea frighten our souls from that cool exercise of consciousness—from that deep tranquillity of self-inspection—through which alone we can hope to attain the presence of this, the most sublime of truths, and look it leisurely in the face.
Don't let the apparent irreverence of this idea scare us away from that calm exercise of awareness—from that deep peace of self-reflection—through which we can hope to confront this, the most profound of truths, and face it openly.
The phænomena on which our conclusions must at this point depend, are merely spiritual shadows, but not the less thoroughly substantial.
The phenomena on which our conclusions must at this point depend are just spiritual shadows, but they're still fully substantial.
We walk about, amid the destinies of our world-existence, encompassed by dim but ever present Memories of a Destiny more vast—very distant in the by-gone time, and infinitely awful.
We walk around, surrounded by the fates of our life on Earth, enveloped by faint but always present Memories of a much greater Destiny—far away in the past, and indescribably terrifying.
We live out a Youth peculiarly haunted by such dreams; yet never mistaking them for dreams. As Memories we know them. During our Youth the distinction is too clear to deceive us even for a moment.
We experience a Youth that's uniquely filled with such dreams; yet we never confuse them for mere fantasies. As Memories, we understand them. During our Youth, the difference is too obvious to fool us, even for a second.
So long as this Youth endures, the feeling that we exist, is the most natural of all feelings. We understand it thoroughly. That there was a period at which we did not exist—or, that it might so have happened that we never had existed at all—are the considerations, indeed, which during this youth, we find difficulty in understanding. Why we should not exist, is, up to the epoch of our Manhood, of all queries the most unanswerable. Existence—self-existence—existence from all Time and to all Eternity—seems, up to the epoch of Manhood, a normal and unquestionable condition:—seems, because it is.
As long as this youth lasts, the feeling that we exist is the most natural feeling of all. We understand it completely. The idea that there was a time when we did not exist—or that it could have been possible that we never existed at all—are the thoughts that we find hard to grasp during this youth. The question of why we should not exist is, until we reach adulthood, the most unanswerable of all questions. Existence—self-existence—existence from all time and for all eternity—seems, until adulthood, a normal and unquestionable state:—seems, because it is.
But now comes the period at which a conventional World-Reason awakens us from the truth of our dream.[141] Doubt, Surprise and Incomprehensibility arrive at the same moment. They say:—“You live and the time was when you lived not. You have been created. An Intelligence exists greater than your own; and it is only through this Intelligence you live at all.” These things we struggle to comprehend and cannot:—cannot, because these things, being untrue, are thus, of necessity, incomprehensible.
But now we reach a point where a conventional understanding of the world wakes us up from the truth of our dream.[141] Doubt, surprise, and confusion hit us all at once. They tell us: "You exist, and there was a time when you did not exist. You have been created. There is an intelligence greater than your own, and it is only through this intelligence that you exist at all." These ideas are hard for us to grasp and we can't:—can't, because these ideas, being false, are necessarily incomprehensible.
No thinking being lives who, at some luminous point of his life of thought, has not felt himself lost amid the surges of futile efforts at understanding, or believing, that anything exists greater than his own soul. The utter impossibility of any one’s soul feeling itself inferior to another; the intense, overwhelming dissatisfaction and rebellion at the thought;—these, with the omniprevalent aspirations at perfection, are but the spiritual, coincident with the material, struggles towards the original Unity—are, to my mind at least, a species of proof far surpassing what Man terms demonstration, that no one soul is inferior to another—that nothing is, or can be, superior to any one soul—that each soul is, in part, its own God—its own Creator:—in a word, that God—the material and spiritual God—now exists solely in the diffused Matter and Spirit of the Universe; and that the regathering of this diffused Matter and Spirit will be but the re-constitution of the purely Spiritual and Individual God.
No thinking person exists who, at some bright moment in their life of contemplation, hasn’t felt lost in the waves of useless attempts to understand or believe that anything exists greater than their own soul. The complete impossibility of any soul feeling inferior to another; the intense, overwhelming dissatisfaction and rebellion against that thought—these, along with the constant drive for perfection, are simply the spiritual struggles that align with the material, striving toward a fundamental Unity—are, at least in my view, a kind of proof that far exceeds what humans call demonstration, that no one soul is inferior to another—that nothing is or can be superior to any single soul—that each soul is, in part, its own God—its own Creator:—in short, that God—the material and spiritual God—now exists only in the distributed Matter and Spirit of the Universe; and that the gathering of this distributed Matter and Spirit will just be the re-creation of the purely Spiritual and Individual God.
In this view, and in this view alone, we comprehend the riddles of Divine Injustice—of Inexorable Fate. In this view alone the existence of Evil becomes intelligible; but in this view it becomes more—it becomes endurable. Our souls no longer rebel at a Sorrow which we ourselves have[142] imposed upon ourselves, in furtherance of our own purposes—with a view—if even with a futile view—to the extension of our own Joy.
In this perspective, and only in this perspective, we understand the mysteries of Divine Injustice—of Unyielding Fate. In this view, the existence of Evil makes sense; but it goes beyond that—it becomes bearable. Our souls no longer resist a Sorrow that we have[142] brought upon ourselves, aimed at achieving our own goals—with the intention—even if it’s a pointless one—of increasing our own Joy.
I have spoken of Memories that haunt us during our youth. They sometimes pursue us even in our Manhood:—assume gradually less and less indefinite shapes:—now and then speak to us with low voices, saying:
I have talked about Memories that stick with us from our youth. They sometimes follow us even into adulthood, taking on clearer shapes over time and occasionally whispering to us, saying:
“There was an epoch in the Night of Time, when a still-existent Being existed—one of an absolutely infinite number of similar Beings that people the absolutely infinite domains of the absolutely infinite space.[16] It was not and is not in the power of this Being—any more than it is in your own—to extend, by actual increase, the joy of his Existence; but just as it is in your power to expand or to concentrate your pleasures (the absolute amount of happiness remaining always the same) so did and does a similar capability appertain to this Divine Being, who thus passes his Eternity in perpetual variation of Concentrated Self and almost Infinite Self-Diffusion. What you call The Universe is but his present expansive existence. He now feels his life through an infinity of imperfect pleasures—the partial and pain-intertangled pleasures of those inconceivably numerous things which you designate as his creatures, but which are really but infinite individualizations of Himself. All these creatures—all—those which you term animate, as well as those to whom you deny life for no better reason than that you do not behold it in operation—all these creatures have, in a greater or less degree, a capacity
“There was a time in the Night of Time, when a still-existing Being existed—one of an absolutely infinite number of similar Beings that fill the absolutely infinite domains of the absolutely infinite space. It is not in the power of this Being—any more than it is in your own—to actually increase the joy of His Existence; but just as it is in your power to expand or concentrate your pleasures (the total amount of happiness always remaining the same), so did and does a similar ability belong to this Divine Being, who thus spends His Eternity in continuous variation of Concentrated Self and almost Infinite Self-Diffusion. What you call The Universe is just His current expansive existence. He now experiences His life through an infinity of imperfect pleasures—the partial and pain-intertwined pleasures of those inconceivably numerous things that you refer to as His creations, but which are really just infinite individualizations of Himself. All these creatures—all—those which you call animate, as well as those to whom you deny life for no better reason than that you don’t see it in action—all these creatures have, to a greater or lesser extent, a capacity
for pleasure and for pain:—but the general sum of their sensations is precisely that amount of Happiness which appertains by right to the Divine Being when concentrated within Himself. These creatures are all, too, more or less conscious Intelligences; conscious, first, of a proper identity; conscious, secondly and by faint indeterminate glimpses, of an identity with the Divine Being of whom we speak—of an identity with God. Of the two classes of consciousness, fancy that the former will grow weaker, the latter stronger, during the long succession of ages which must elapse before these myriads of individual Intelligences become blended—when the bright stars become blended—into One. Think that the sense of individual identity will be gradually merged in the general consciousness—that Man, for example, ceasing imperceptibly to feel himself Man, will at length attain that awfully triumphant epoch when he shall recognize his existence as that of Jehovah. In the meantime bear in mind that all is Life—Life—Life within Life—the less within the greater, and all within the Spirit Divine.”
for pleasure and for pain:—but the overall sum of their feelings is exactly the amount of Happiness that rightfully belongs to the Divine Being when contained within Himself. These beings are all, to varying extents, aware Intelligences; aware, first, of their own identity; aware, secondly and through faint, unclear glimpses, of a connection with the Divine Being we're discussing—of a connection with God. Of the two types of awareness, imagine that the first will diminish while the second will strengthen over the long ages that must pass before these countless individual Intelligences merge—when the bright stars merge—into One. Consider that the sense of individual identity will slowly fade into the broader consciousness—that Man, for instance, will gradually stop feeling like he is just Man and will eventually reach that profoundly triumphant moment when he recognizes his existence as that of Jehovah. In the meantime, remember that all is Life—Life—Life within Life—the smaller within the larger, and all within the Spirit Divine.
THE END.
THE END.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] Laplace assumed his nebulosity heterogeneous, merely that he might be thus enabled to account for the breaking up of the rings; for had the nebulosity been homogeneous, they would not have broken. I reach the same result—heterogeneity of the secondary masses immediately resulting from the atoms—purely from an à priori consideration of their general design—Relation.
[5] Laplace thought of his gas cloud as mixed, just so he could explain why the rings broke up; if the gas cloud had been uniform, they wouldn't have broken apart. I come to the same conclusion—diversity in the smaller bodies directly coming from the atoms—just from a logical look at their overall purpose—Relation.
[6] I am prepared to show that the anomalous revolution of the satellites of Uranus is a simply perspective anomaly arising from the inclination of the axis of the planet.
[6] I am ready to demonstrate that the unusual orbits of Uranus's satellites are simply a perspective issue resulting from the tilt of the planet's axis.
[9] “Views of the Architecture of the Heavens.” A letter, purporting to be from Dr. Nichol to a friend in America, went the rounds of our newspapers, about two years ago, I think, admitting “the necessity” to which I refer. In a subsequent Lecture, however, Dr. N. appears in some manner to have gotten the better of the necessity, and does not quite renounce the theory, although he seems to wish that he could sneer at it as “a purely hypothetical one.” What else was the Law of Gravity before the Maskelyne experiments? and who questioned the Law of Gravity, even then?
[9] “Views of the Architecture of the Heavens.” A letter, supposedly from Dr. Nichol to a friend in America, circulated in our newspapers about two years ago, if I remember correctly, acknowledging “the necessity” I mentioned. In a later lecture, however, Dr. N. seems to have overcome that necessity in some way and doesn't fully renounce the theory, although he appears to wish he could dismiss it as “purely hypothetical.” What was the Law of Gravity before the Maskelyne experiments? And who even questioned the Law of Gravity back then?
[10] It is not impossible that some unlooked-for optical improvement may disclose to us, among innumerable varieties of systems, a luminous sun, encircled by luminous and non-luminous rings, within and without and between which, revolve luminous and non-luminous planets, attended by moons having moons—and even these latter again having moons.
[10] It's not impossible that some unexpected optical advancement could reveal to us, among countless types of systems, a bright sun surrounded by bright and dim rings, around which revolve bright and dim planets, each accompanied by moons that also have their own moons—and those moons could also have moons.
[12] I must be understood as denying, especially, only the revolutionary portion of Mädler’s hypothesis. Of course, if no great central orb exists now in our cluster, such will exist hereafter. Whenever existing, it will be merely the nucleus of the consolidation.
[12] I want to be clear that I specifically reject only the revolutionary part of Mädler’s theory. Obviously, if there isn't a large central body in our cluster right now, there will be one in the future. Whenever it appears, it will simply be the nucleus of the merging.
[13] Betrachtet man die nicht perspectivischen eigenen Bewegungen der Sterne, so scheinen viele gruppenweise in ihrer Richtung entgegengesetzt; und die bisher gesammelten Thatsachen machen es auf’s wenigste nicht nothwendig, anzunehmen, dass alle Theile unserer Sternenschicht oder gar der gesammten Sterneninseln, welche den Weltraum füllen, sich um einen grossen, unbekannten, leuchtenden oder dunkeln Centralkörper bewegen. Das Streben nach den letzten und höchsten Grundursachen macht freilich die reflectirende Thätigkeit des Menschen, wie seine Phantasie, zu einer solchen Annahme geneigt.
[13] When looking at the non-perspectival movements of the stars, many seem to be moving in opposing directions in groups; and the facts collected so far certainly do not require us to assume that all parts of our star layer or even all the star islands filling space are orbiting around a large, unknown, luminous or dark central body. The pursuit of the ultimate and highest causes does, of course, incline human reflection and imagination toward such an assumption.
155 Broadway, New York.142 Strand, London.[1]
Of late firm of Wiley & Putnam.
155 Broadway, NYC.142 Strand, London.[1]
Recently a firm of Wiley & Putnam.
New Works in Press,
Or recently published, by
GEORGE P. PUTNAM,
155 Broadway, New York.
New Works in Press,
Or recently published, by
GEORGE P. PUTNAM,
155 Broadway, New York.
G. P. PUTNAM has the pleasure of announcing that, agreeably to his contract with the distinguished author, he has now in the course of publication
G. P. PUTNAM is pleased to announce that, in accordance with his agreement with the acclaimed author, he is now in the process of publishing
A new, uniform, and complete edition
OF THE
Works of Washington Irving,
Revised and enlarged by the Author,
In Twelve Elegant Duodecimo Volumes,
A fresh, consistent, and complete edition
OF THE
Washington Irving's works,
Updated and expanded by the Author,
In Twelve Stylish Duodecimo Volumes,
Beautifully printed with new type, and on superior paper, made expressly for the purpose.
Beautifully printed with a new font on high-quality paper made specifically for this purpose.
The first volume of the Series will be
The Sketch-Book,
complete in one volume,
which will be ready on the first day of September.
Knickerbocker’s History of New York,
with revisions and copious additions,
will be published on the 1st of October.
The Life and Voyages of Columbus,
Vol. I. on the 1st of November,
The first volume of the Series will be
The Sketchbook,
complete in one volume,
which will be available on September 1st.
Knickerbocker's New York History,
with updates and extensive additions,
will be published on October 1st.
The Life and Voyages of Columbus,
Vol. I. on November 1st,
and the succeeding volumes will be issued on the first day of each month until completed;—as follows:
and the following volumes will be released on the first day of each month until it's finished;—as follows:
- The Sketch-Book, in one volume.
- Knickerbocker’s New York, in one volume.
- Tales of a Traveller, in one volume.
- Bracebridge Hall, in one volume.
- The Conquest of Grenada, in one volume.
- The Alhambra, in one volume.
- The Spanish Legends, in one vol.
- The Crayon Miscellany, in one vol.—Abbotsford, Newstead, The Prairies, &c.
- Life and Voyages of Columbus, and The Companions of Columbus, 2 vols.
- Adventures of Captain Bonneville, one vol.
- Astoria, one volume.
The Illustrated Sketch-Book.
In October will be published,
The Sketch-Book.
By Washington Irving.
One volume, square octavo.
The Illustrated Sketchbook.
Coming in October,
The Sketch-Book.
By Washington Irving.
One volume, square octavo.
Illustrated with a series of highly-finished Engravings on wood, from Designs by Darley and others, engraved in the best style by Childs, Herrick, &c. This edition will be printed on paper of the finest quality, similar in size and style to the new edition of “Halleck’s Poems.” It is intended that the illustrations shall be superior to any engravings on wood yet produced in this country, and that the mechanical execution of the volume, altogether, shall be worthy of the author’s reputation. It will form an elegant and appropriate gift-book for all seasons.[2]
Illustrated with a series of beautifully detailed wood engravings from designs by Darley and others, expertly engraved by Childs, Herrick, etc. This edition will be printed on high-quality paper, similar in size and style to the new edition of “Halleck’s Poems.” The goal is for the illustrations to be better than any wood engravings produced in this country so far, and for the overall production of the volume to reflect the author's reputation. It will be a tasteful and suitable gift book for any occasion.[2]
The Illustrated Knickerbocker,
With a series of Original Designs, in one vol., octavo, is also in preparation.
The Illustrated Knickerbocker,
With a collection of Original Designs, in one volume, octavo, is also being prepared.
Mr. Putnam has also the honor to announce that he will publish at intervals (in connexion, and uniform with the other collected writings),
Mr. Putnam is also pleased to announce that he will publish periodically (in connection with and consistent with the other collected writings),
Mr. Irving’s New Works,
now nearly ready for the press: including
The Life of Mohammed; The Life of Washington; new
volumes of Miscellanies, Biographies, &c.
Mr. Irving's Latest Works,
now almost ready for publication: including
The Life of Mohammed; The Life of Washington; new
volumes of Miscellanies, Biographies, etc.
⁂ This being the first uniform and complete edition of Mr. Irving’s works, either in this country or in Europe, the publisher confidently believes that the undertaking will meet with a prompt and cordial response. To say this, is perhaps superfluous and impertinent; for it is a truism that no American book-case (not to say library) can be well filled without the works of Washington Irving; while the English language itself comprises no purer models of composition.
⁂ This is the first complete and uniform edition of Mr. Irving’s works, both in this country and in Europe, and the publisher believes that this effort will receive an enthusiastic and positive response. Saying this might seem unnecessary and a bit arrogant; after all, it’s obvious that no American bookshelf (let alone library) can be truly complete without the works of Washington Irving, and the English language has no better examples of writing.
G. P. Putnam has also made arrangements for the early commencement of new works or new editions of the works of
G. P. Putnam has also set up plans to start new projects or new editions of the works of
Miss C. M. Sedgwick, | George H. Calvert, | S. Wells Williams, |
Prof. A. Gray, | Mrs. C. M. Kirkland, | W. M. Thackeray, |
Leigh Hunt, | R. Monckton Milnes, | Charles Lamb, |
Chas. Fenno Hoffman, | J. Bayard Taylor, | A. J. Downing, |
Mrs. E. Oakes Smith, | Mary Howitt, | Thos. Hood, |
Thomas Carlyle, | Mrs. Jameson, | Elliot Warburton. |
The following new works are now ready, or will be published this season:
The following new works are now available or will be released this season:
I.
I.
Sophisms of the Protective Policy.
Fallacies of the Protective Policy.
Translated from the French of F. Bastiat. With an introduction by Francis Lieber, LL.D. Professor in South Carolina College, Editor of the Encyclopedia Americana, &c. 12mo. 75 cents.
Translated from the French of F. Bastiat. With an introduction by Francis Lieber, LL.D. Professor at South Carolina College, Editor of the Encyclopedia Americana, etc. 12mo. 75 cents.
“It is a book not for the million but for millions, and we believe if a copy could be put into the hands of every school-boy in the Union, the next generation would be inconceivably wiser, richer, and happier than the present.”—Mirror.
“It’s a book not just for a few but for many, and we believe if a copy could be given to every schoolboy in the country, the next generation would be incredibly wiser, wealthier, and happier than we are today.”—Mirror.
II.
II.
Grecian and Roman Mythology:
Greek and Roman Mythology:
With original illustrations. Adapted for the use of Universities and High Schools, and for popular reading. By M. A. Dwight. With an introduction by Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek, University of New York. 12mo. (On 1st September.)
With original illustrations. Adapted for use in universities and high schools, as well as for general reading. By M. A. Dwight. With an introduction by Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek, University of New York. 12mo. (On September 1st.)
Also a fine edition in octavo, with illustrations.
Also a nice edition in octavo, with illustrations.
⁂ This work has been prepared with great care, illustrated with 20 effective outline drawings, and is designed to treat the subject in an original, comprehensive, and unexceptionable manner, so as to fill the place as a text book which is yet unsupplied; while it will also be an attractive and readable table book for general use. It will be at once introduced as a text book in the University of New York and other colleges and schools.
⁂ This work has been prepared with great care, illustrated with 20 effective outline drawings, and is designed to address the subject in a unique, thorough, and reliable way, filling a gap as a textbook that is currently unavailable; it will also serve as an appealing and easy-to-read resource for general use. It will be introduced as a textbook at the University of New York and other colleges and schools.
III.
III.
Eureka: a Prose Poem.
Or the Physical and Metaphysical Universe.
By Edgar A. Poe, Esq. Handsomely printed, 12mo. Cloth, 75 cents.
Eureka: a Prose Poem.
Or the Physical and Metaphysical Universe.
By Edgar A. Poe, Esq. Beautifully printed, 12mo. Cloth, 75 cents.
“A most extraordinary Essay. We shall be greatly surprised if this work does not create a most profound sensation among the literary and scientific classes.”—New York Express.
“A truly remarkable essay. We would be very surprised if this work doesn’t make a significant impact among the literary and scientific communities.”—New York Express.
IV.
IV.
Oriental Life Illustrated.
Being a new edition of Eöthen, or Traces of Travel in the East. With fine illustrations
on Steel. 12mo. elegantly bound, $1 50.
Asian Life Illustrated.
This is a new edition of Eöthen, or Traces of Travel in the East. Featuring beautiful steel illustrations.
12mo. beautifully bound, $1.50.
⁂ This new and unique volume, superbly illuminated by Mapleson, and comprising[3] original articles by distinguished writers, will be the most elegant and recherché book of the kind ever produced in this country. It will be ready in October.
⁂ This new and unique volume, beautifully illustrated by Mapleson, and featuring[3] original articles by esteemed writers, will be the most elegant and sought-after book of its kind ever produced in this country. It will be available in October.
A new and superior edition of the PEARLS OF AMERICAN POETRY will also be published this season.
A new and improved edition of the PEARLS OF AMERICAN POETRY will also be released this season.
V.
V.
The Book of Dainty Devices.
In an elegant small folio volume.
Lays of the Western World.
The Book of Dainty Devices.
In a stylish small folio edition.
Songs of the West.
VI.
VI.
Dr. Klipstein’s Anglo-Saxon Course of Study.
In uniform 12mo. volumes.
Dr. Klipstein’s Anglo-Saxon Study Program.
In matching 12mo. volumes.
I.
I.
A Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon Language. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen.
A Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon Language. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen.
⁂ This work recommends itself particularly to the attention of every American student who “glories in his Anglo-Saxon descent” or Teutonic lineage, as well as of all who desire an acquaintance with a language which lies as the foundation of the English, and throws a light upon its elements and structure, derivable from no other source. Of the importance and interesting nature of the study there can be no doubt, and we agree with those who think that the time is coming when it will be considered “utterly disgraceful for any well-bred Englishman or American” to have neglected it. With regard to the merits of Dr. Klipstein’s Grammar, we will only say, that it has been already adopted as a text-book in some of the leading Institutions of our country.
⁂ This work especially calls for the attention of every American student who takes pride in their Anglo-Saxon heritage or Teutonic ancestry, as well as anyone who wants to learn about a language that serves as the foundation of English and sheds light on its elements and structure, knowledge that can't be found anywhere else. There’s no doubt about the importance and fascinating nature of this study, and we agree with those who believe that soon it will be seen as “utterly disgraceful for any well-bred Englishman or American” to have ignored it. Regarding Dr. Klipstein’s Grammar, we can only mention that it has already been adopted as a textbook in some of the leading institutions in our country.
[The following are also in press.]
[The following are also in press.]
II.
II.
Analecta Anglo-Saxonica, with an Introductory Ethnographical Essay, Copious Notes, Critical and Explanatory, and a Glossary in which are shown the Indo-Germanic and other Affinities of the Language. By the same.
Analecta Anglo-Saxonica, featuring an Introductory Ethnographical Essay, extensive Notes, Critical and Explanatory content, and a Glossary that highlights the Indo-Germanic and other connections of the Language. By the same.
In this work appear the fruits of considerable research, and, we may add, learning. The Ethnology of Europe is succinctly, but clearly illustrated, the Anglo-Saxon language completely analysed, revealing the utmost harmony of combination from its elements, its forms and roots compared with those in kindred dialects and cognate tongues, its position in the Teutonic family and Indo-Germanic range established, and the genuine relation of the English to its great parent properly set forth. To those who are fond of the comparative study of language, the Glossary will prove an invaluable aid, apart from its particular object.
In this work, you'll find the results of extensive research and, we can say, a lot of learning. The Ethnology of Europe is briefly but clearly explained, the Anglo-Saxon language is thoroughly analyzed, showing a strong harmony in how its elements, forms, and roots combine compared to related dialects and languages. Its place within the Teutonic family and the Indo-Germanic group is established, and the true relationship of English to its main ancestor is clearly outlined. For those who enjoy comparing languages, the Glossary will be an invaluable resource, aside from its specific purpose.
III.
III.
Natale Sancti Gregorii Papæ.—Ælfric’s Homily on the Birth-day of St. Gregory, and Collateral Extracts from King Alfred’s version of Bede’s Ecclesiastical History and the Saxon Chronicle, with a full rendering into English, Notes Critical and Explanatory, and an Index of Words. By the same.
Natale Sancti Gregorii Papæ.—Ælfric’s Homily on the Birthday of St. Gregory, and Additional Extracts from King Alfred’s version of Bede’s Ecclesiastical History and the Saxon Chronicle, with a complete translation into English, Critical and Explanatory Notes, and a Word Index. By the same.
IV.
IV.
Extracts from the Anglo-Saxon-Gospels, a Portion of the Anglo-Saxon Paraphrase of the Book of Psalms, and other Selections of a Sacred Order in the same Language, with a Translation into English, and Notes Critical and Explanatory. By the same.
Extracts from the Anglo-Saxon Gospels, a section of the Anglo-Saxon paraphrase of the Book of Psalms, and other selections of a sacred nature in the same language, along with a translation into English and critical and explanatory notes. By the same.
These two works are prepared in such a way as in themselves, with the aid of the Grammar, to afford every facility to the Anglo-Saxon Student. Ælfric’s Homily is remarkable for beauty of composition, and interesting as setting forth Augustine’s Mission to the “Land of the Angles.”
These two works are designed to provide everything needed for the Anglo-Saxon student, especially with the help of the Grammar. Ælfric’s Homily is notable for its beautiful writing and is interesting for presenting Augustine’s mission to the “Land of the Angles.”
V.
V.
Tha Halgan Godspel on Englisc—the Anglo-Saxon Version of the Holy Gospels. Edited by Benjamin Thorpe, F.S.A. Reprinted by the same. Now ready.
The Holy Gospel in English—the Anglo-Saxon Version of the Holy Gospels. Edited by Benjamin Thorpe, F.S.A. Reprinted by the same. Now available.
This, the earliest “English” version of the Four Gospels, will be found interesting to the antiquarian and theologian, as well as serviceable to the student in his investigations of the language. The Text, besides the usual but unbroken division, appears, with the Rubrics, as read in the early Anglican Church.
This earliest "English" version of the Four Gospels will be interesting to historians and theologians, as well as useful for students studying the language. The text, along with its usual unbroken divisions, appears with the rubrics as they were read in the early Anglican Church.
Nearly Ready.
Dr. Bosworth’s Compendious Anglo-Saxon Dictionary.
Small 8vo.
Almost Ready.
Dr. Bosworth’s Complete Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. Small 8vo.
Study of Modern Languages.
Part First; French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, and English.
By L. F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and Ph.D. One Vol. Imperial 8vo.
75 cents paper; $1 00 cloth.
Modern Language Studies.
Part One: French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, and English.
By L. F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and Ph.D. One Volume. Imperial 8vo.
75 cents paperback; $1.00 hardcover.
This work, which is intended equally for the simultaneous and the separate study of the languages that it sets forth, and which is adapted as well for the native of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, or Portugal, as for him to whom English is vernacular, in the acquirement of any one of the other tongues besides his own, will be found an acceptable manual not only to the tyro, but to the more advanced scholar. The reading portion of the matter is interesting, and the text in every case remarkably correct, while the Elementary Phrases, forms of Cards, Letters, Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Receipts, &c., in the six languages, constitute what has long been a desideratum from the American press. For the comparative study of the Romanic tongues the work affords unusual facilities.
This book is designed for both learning the languages at the same time and studying them separately. It's suitable for people from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, or Portugal, as well as for native English speakers looking to learn any of the other languages. It serves as a useful guide not just for beginners but also for more advanced learners. The reading material is engaging, and the text is consistently accurate. The book includes Elementary Phrases, different forms for Cards, Letters, Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Receipts, etc., in six languages, filling a long-standing need in American publishing. It also offers great opportunities for comparing the Romance languages.
VIII.
VIII.
Pedestrian Tour in Europe.
Views a-Foot; or Europe seen with Knapsack and Staff.
By J. Bayard Taylor.
Europe Walking Tour.
Views on Foot; or Europe seen with a Backpack and a Walking Stick.
By J. Bayard Taylor.
A new edition with an additional chapter, and a sketch of the author in pedestrian costume, from a drawing by T. Buchanan Read. 12mo. Cloth.
A new edition with an extra chapter and a drawing of the author in casual clothes, created by T. Buchanan Read. 12mo. Cloth.
IX.
IX.
A New Edition of
Clarke’s Shakspeare Concordance.
A Complete Concordance to Shakspeare: being a Verbal Index to ALL the PASSAGES
in the Dramatic Works of the Poet. By Mrs. Cowden Clarke.
“Order gave each thing view.”
A New Edition of
Clarke's Shakespeare Reference Guide.
A Complete Concordance to Shakespeare: a Verbal Index to ALL the PASSAGES
in the Poet's Dramatic Works. By Mrs. Cowden Clarke.
“Order gave each thing view.”
One large Vol. comprising 2560 closely printed columns,—(indicating every word and passage in Shakspeare’s Works). Price $6. Cloth.
One large volume containing 2560 closely printed columns—(showing every word and passage in Shakespeare’s works). Price $6. Cloth.
“The result of sixteen years of untiring labor. The different editions of Shakspeare have been carefully collated by the compiler, and every possible means taken to insure the correctness of the work. As it now stands, a person can find a particular passage in Shakspeare by simply remembering one word of it, and is also referred to the act and scene of the play in which it occurs. As a mere dictionary of Shakspearian language and phrases, it is of great value; but it is also a dictionary of his thoughts and imaginations. It altogether supersedes the volumes of Twiss and Ayscough, and should be on every student’s shelves”—Boston Courier.
“The result of sixteen years of tireless work. The various editions of Shakespeare have been carefully compared by the compiler, and every possible effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the work. As it stands now, someone can find a specific passage in Shakespeare by remembering just one word from it, and it also points to the act and scene of the play where it appears. As a simple dictionary of Shakespearean language and phrases, it is highly valuable; but it also serves as a dictionary of his thoughts and creativity. It completely replaces the works of Twiss and Ayscough and should be on every student’s shelf.” —Boston Courier.
⁂ This extraordinary work is printed in London and the price there at present is £2. 5s. 0d. or about $12. A large part of the edition having been purchased for this market, it is furnished here for the very low price of $6, bound in cloth.
⁂ This amazing book is printed in London and the current price there is £2. 5s. 0d. or about $12. Since a large portion of the edition was bought for this market, it’s offered here for the very low price of $6, bound in cloth.
Also—By same Author.
The Book of Shakspeare Proverbs.
18mo. 75 cts.
Also—By the same Author.
Shakespeare’s Book of Proverbs.
18mo. 75 cents.
Dr. Lieber’s Poetical Address to the American Republic.
16mo. 25 cents.
Dr. Lieber’s Poetic Address to the American Republic.
16mo. 25 cents.
The West:
A Metrical Epistle.
By Francis Lieber.
The West:
A Metrical Epistle.
By Francis Lieber.
⁂ Dr. Lieber, the distinguished Professor of Political Economy in South Carolina College, Author of “Political Ethics,” &c., has just sailed for his native country—Germany—with the view of aiding in the great cause of Constitutional and Rational Freedom. This little volume proves that he has well studied that subject during his long residence in this his adopted country—and his able and valuable opinions on American Society and Progress, carry with them a peculiar interest at this time.[5]
⁂ Dr. Lieber, a respected Professor of Political Economy at South Carolina College, author of “Political Ethics,” etc., has just set sail for his homeland—Germany—with the aim of contributing to the important cause of Constitutional and Rational Freedom. This short book shows that he has thoroughly studied this topic during his extensive time in his adopted country—and his insightful and valuable opinions on American Society and Progress are particularly relevant right now.[5]
RECENT PUBLICATIONS.
Alexander.—Commentary on the Earlier Prophecies of Isaiah. By Prof. J. A. Alexander. Royal 8vo. cloth, $3.
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Ancient Moral Tales, from the Gesta Romanorum, &c. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth.
Ancient Moral Tales, from the Gesta Romanorum, etc. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth.
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Architecture.—Hints on Public Architecture; issued under the Direction of the “Smithsonian Institution.” Imperial 4to. with Illustrations. (In preparation.)
Architecture.—Tips on Public Architecture; published under the Direction of the “Smithsonian Institution.” Imperial 4to. with Illustrations. (In preparation.)
This work will contain numerous and valuable illustrations, including two perspective views of the buildings of the Smithsonian Institution. The Appendix will contain the results of a research under the auspices of the Institution to test the properties of the most important building materials throughout the United States.
This work will include many valuable illustrations, featuring two perspective views of the Smithsonian Institution's buildings. The Appendix will present the findings from research supported by the Institution to evaluate the properties of the most important building materials across the United States.
Bastiat.—Sophisms of the Protective Policy. Translated from the French of F. Bastiat. With an Introduction, by Francis Lieber, LL.D., Professor in South Carolina College, Editor of the Encyclopædia Americana, &c., &c. 12mo. 75 cts.
Bastiat.—Sophisms of the Protective Policy. Translated from the French of F. Bastiat. With an Introduction, by Francis Lieber, LL.D., Professor at South Carolina College, Editor of the Encyclopædia Americana, etc., etc. 12mo. 75 cts.
Bibliotheca Sacra and Theological Review. Conducted by B. B. Edwards and E. A. Park, Professors at Andover, with the Special Aid of Dr. Robinson and Professor Stuart. Published quarterly in February, May, August, and November $4 per annum. Vols. 1, 2, 3, and 4, 8vo. cloth, each $4.
Bibliotheca Sacra and Theological Review. Managed by B. B. Edwards and E. A. Park, professors at Andover, with special assistance from Dr. Robinson and Professor Stuart. Published quarterly in February, May, August, and November $4 per year. Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 4, 8vo. cloth, each $4.
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Burton.—The Anatomy of Melancholy. By Burton. New and beautiful edition, with Engravings. 1 vol. royal 8vo. cloth, $2 50.
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Calvert.—Scenes and Thoughts in Europe. By an American. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, 50 cents.
Calvert.—Scenes and Thoughts in Europe. By an American. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, 50 cents.
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Carlyle.—The French Revolution: a History. By Thomas Carlyle. 2 vols. 12mo. green cloth, $2.
Carlyle.—The French Revolution: a History. By Thomas Carlyle. 2 vols. 12mo. green cloth, $2.
“His French Revolution is considered one of the most remarkable works of the age—as at once the poetry and philosophy of history.”—Hunt’s Merchants’ Mag.
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Carlyle.—Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell. By Thos. Carlyle. 2 vols. 12mo. green cloth, $2 50.
Carlyle.—Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell. By Thos. Carlyle. 2 vols. 12mo. green cloth, $2.50.
“A work more valuable as a guide to the study of the singular and complex character of our pious revolutionist, our religious demagogue, our preaching and praying warrior, has not been produced.”—Blackwood’s Magazine.
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Carlyle.—Past and Present: Chartism. By Thomas Carlyle. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, $1
Carlyle.—Past and Present: Chartism. By Thomas Carlyle. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, $1
“To say that the book is replete with instruction, thought, and quaint fancy, is unnecessary: but we may mention it as one, par excellence, which should be read at the present juncture.”-Tribune.[6]
“To say that the book is full of instruction, insight, and charming ideas is unnecessary: but we can point out that it is one, par excellence, that should be read at this time.” -Tribune.[6]
Chaucer and Spenser.—Selections from the Poetical Works of Geoffrey Chaucer. By Charles D. Deshler. Spenser, and the Faery Queen. By Mrs. C. M. Kirkland. 1 vol. 12mo. $1 13.
Chaucer and Spenser.—Selections from the Poetical Works of Geoffrey Chaucer. By Charles D. Deshler. Spenser, and the Faery Queen. By Mrs. C. M. Kirkland. 1 vol. 12mo. $1 13.
—— The same, extra gilt, $1 50.
—— The same, extra gold, $1.50.
“A portion of their writings are presented in a beautiful and convenient form, and with the requisite notes and modifications.”—Home Journal.
“A selection of their writings is presented in a beautiful and convenient format, along with the necessary notes and updates.”—Home Journal.
Coe.—Studies in Drawing, in a Progressive Series of Lessons on Cards; beginning with the most Elementary Studies, and Adapted for Use at Home and Schools. By Benjamin H. Coe, Teacher of Drawing. In Ten Series—marked 1 and 10—each containing about eighteen Studies. 25 cents each.
Coe.—Studies in Drawing, in a Progressive Series of Lessons on Cards; starting with the most basic lessons, suitable for use at home and in schools. By Benjamin H. Coe, Drawing Instructor. In Ten Series—numbered 1 through 10—each featuring around eighteen lessons. 25 cents each.
The design is:
The design is:
I.—To make the exercises in drawing highly interesting to the pupil.
I.—To make the drawing exercises really engaging for the student.
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IV.—To give the pupils a bold, rapid, and artist-like style of drawing.
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Coleridge.—Biographia Literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of my Literary Life and Opinions. By Samuel Taylor Coleridge. From the 2d London edition, Edited by H. N. Coleridge. 2 vols. 12mo. green cloth, $2.
Coleridge.—Biographia Literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of my Literary Life and Opinions. By Samuel Taylor Coleridge. From the 2nd London edition, Edited by H. N. Coleridge. 2 vols. 12mo. green cloth, $2.
Cortez.—Letters and Despatches of Hernando Cortez. Translated by Hon. George Folsom. 1 vol. 8vo. $1 25.
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Dana.—A System of Mineralogy, comprising the most Recent Discoveries. By James D. Dana. Woodcuts and copperplates, 8vo. cloth, $3 50.
Dana.—A System of Mineralogy, featuring the latest discoveries. By James D. Dana. Woodcuts and copperplates, 8vo. cloth, $3.50.
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Downing.—Cottage Homes; or, a Collection of Designs for Country Cottages and Cottage Villas, along with their Gardens and Landscapes; tailored for North America. By A. J. Downing. Many illustrations, 3rd edition, 8vo. cloth, $2.
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Downing.—A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening for North America; with Notes on Country Architecture. By A. J. Downing. Illustrated, 2nd edition, hardcover, $3.50.
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Downing.—The Fruits and Fruit Trees of America; or, the Culture, Propagation, and Management, in the Garden and Orchard, of Fruit Trees generally. By A. J. Downing. Plates, 9th edition, revised, 12mo. cloth, $1.50.
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The same, 8vo. cloth, $2.50.
—— The same, with 80 superb Illustrations, drawn and beautifully colored by Paris Artists, royal 8vo. half morocco, top edge gilt. New edition shortly.
—— The same, with 80 amazing illustrations, drawn and beautifully colored by artists from Paris, royal 8vo. half morocco, top edge gilt. New edition coming soon.
Dwight.—Grecian and Roman Mythology; with original Illustrations. Adapted for the Use of Universities and High Schools, and for Popular Reading. By M. A. Dwight. With an Introduction by Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek, University of New York. 12mo. [In September.
Dwight.—Greek and Roman Mythology; with original Illustrations. Perfect for Universities, High Schools, and general readers. By M. A. Dwight. With an Introduction by Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek, University of New York. 12mo. [In September.
—— Also a fine edition in octavo, with Illustrations.
—— Also a great edition in octavo, with illustrations.
⁂ This work has been prepared with great care, illustrated with twenty effective outline drawings, and is designed to treat the subject in an original, comprehensive, and unexceptionable manner, so as to fill the place as a text-book which is yet unsupplied; while it will also be an attractive and readable table-book for general use. It will be at once introduced as a text-book in the University of New York, and other colleges and schools.
⁂ This work has been carefully prepared, featuring twenty impactful outline drawings, and aims to address the subject in a unique, thorough, and reliable way, filling a gap as a textbook that hasn’t been met yet; it will also serve as an engaging and enjoyable reference book for general use. It will be adopted as a textbook at the University of New York and other colleges and schools.
Ford.—The Spaniards and their Country. By Richard Ford. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, 87 cents.
Ford.—The Spaniards and Their Country. By Richard Ford. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, 87 cents.
“The best description of national character and manners of Spain that has ever appeared.”—Quarterly Review.
“The best description of the national character and customs of Spain that has ever been published.” —Quarterly Review.
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Hahn’s Hebrew Bible.—New and complete stereotype edition, being a facsimile of the Leipzig edition. In 1 vol. 8vo. In press.
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Hazlitt’s (William) Miscellaneous Works. 4 vols. 12mo. cloth, $5.
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Head.—Bubbles from the Brunnen. By Sir Francis Head. 12mo. green cloth.
Head.—Bubbles from the Brunnen. By Sir Francis Head. 12mo. green cloth.
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The same, gold extra, $1.25.
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Howitt.—Ballads and other Poems by Mary Howitt. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, 63 cents.
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Hunt.—Imagination and Fancy. By Leigh Hunt. 1 vol. 12mo. green cloth, 62 cents.
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Hunt.—Stories from the Italian Poets: being a Summary in Prose of the Poems of Dante, Pulci, Boiardo, Aristo, and Tasso; with Comments throughout, occasional passages Versified, and Critical Notices of the Lives and Genius of the Authors. By Leigh Hunt. 12mo. cloth, $1 25.
Hunt.—Stories from the Italian Poets: A Summary in Prose of the Poems by Dante, Pulci, Boiardo, Aristo, and Tasso; with Comments throughout, occasional passages Versified, and Critical Notices of the Lives and Genius of the Authors. By Leigh Hunt. 12mo. cloth, $1.25.
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Irving.—Works of Washington Irving; Revised and Enlarged by the Author. In twelve elegant duodecimo volumes, beautifully printed with new type, and on superior paper, made expressly for the purpose, and bound in cloth.
Irving.—Works of Washington Irving; Revised and Enlarged by the Author. In twelve stylish 12-volume sets, printed beautifully with new type on high-quality paper made specifically for this edition, and bound in cloth.
As follows:—
As follows:—
- The Sketch-Book, in one volume.
- Knickerbocker’s New York, in one volume.
- Tales of a Traveller, in one vol.
- Bracebridge Hall, in one volume.
- The Conquest of Grenada, in one volume.
- The Alhambra, in one volume.
- Astoria, in one volume.
- The Crayon Miscellany, in one volume. Abbotsford, Newstead, The Prairies, &c.
- The Spanish Legends, in one vol.
- The Life and Voyages of Columbus, and The Companions of Columbus, in two volumes.
- Adventures of Capt. Bonneville, in one volume.
(Now publishing.)
(Publishing now.)
Irving.—The Sketch-Book. By Washington Irving. Complete in one volume, 12mo. cloth. In September.
Irving.—The Sketch-Book. By Washington Irving. Complete in one volume, 12mo. cloth. In September.
Irving.—The Illustrated Sketch-Book. By Washington Irving. In October will be published, The Sketch-Book, by Washington Irving, one vol. square octavo, Illustrated with a series of highly-finished Engravings on Wood, from Designs by Darley and others, engraved in the best style by Childs, Herrick, &c. This edition will be printed on paper of the finest quality, similar in size and style to the new edition of “Halleck’s Poems.” It is intended that the illustrations shall be superior to any engravings on wood yet produced in this country, and that the mechanical execution of the volume, altogether, shall be worthy of the author’s reputation. It will form an elegant and appropriate gift-book for all seasons.
Irving.—The Illustrated Sketchbook. By Washington Irving. In October, The Sketchbook by Washington Irving will be published, one square octavo volume, illustrated with a series of beautifully detailed wood engravings based on designs by Darley and others, engraved in the highest quality by Childs, Herrick, etc. This edition will be printed on premium paper, similar in size and style to the new edition of “Halleck’s Poems.” The illustrations are intended to surpass any wood engravings produced in this country so far, and the overall quality of the book is meant to reflect the author’s esteemed reputation. It will serve as an elegant and suitable gift book for any occasion.
Irving.—Knickerbocker’s History of New York. By Washington Irving. With Revisions and copious Additions. Will be published on the 1st of October.
Irving.—Knickerbocker’s History of New York. By Washington Irving. With updates and plenty of new content. It will be published on October 1st.
Irving.—The Illustrated Knickerbocker; with a series of original Designs, in one volume, octavo, uniform with the “Sketch-Book,” is also in preparation.
Irving.—The Illustrated Knickerbocker; featuring a collection of original designs, in one volume, octavo, matching the “Sketch-Book,” is also being prepared.
Irving.—The Life and Voyages of Columbus. By Washington Irving. Vol. I. on the 1st of November.
Irving.—The Life and Voyages of Columbus. By Washington Irving. Vol. I. on November 1st.
The succeeding volumes will be issued on the first day of each month until completed.
The upcoming volumes will be released on the first day of each month until they're finished.
Keats.—The Poetical Works of John Keats. 1 vol. 12mo. cloth.
Keats.—The Collected Poems of John Keats. 1 vol. 12mo. cloth.
—— The same, gilt extra.
—— The same, gold extra.
“They are flushed all over with the rich lights of fancy; and so colored and bestrewn with the flowers of poetry that, even while perplexed and bewildered in their labyrinths, it is impossible to resist the intoxication of their sweetness, or to shut our hearts to the enchantment they so lavishingly present.”—Francis Jeffrey.[9]
“They are filled with vibrant, imaginative light, and so decorated with the beauty of poetry that, even when confused and lost in their intricacies, it's impossible not to be captivated by their sweetness or to close our hearts to the magic they generously offer.”—Francis Jeffrey.[9]
Kinglake.—Eöthen; or, Traces of Travel brought from the East. 12mo. green cloth. 50 cts.
Kinglake.—Eöthen; or, Traces of Travel brought from the East. 12mo. green cloth. 50 cts.
“Eöthen is a book with which everybody, fond of eloquent prose and racy description, should be well acquainted.”—U. S. Gazette.
“Eöthen is a book that everyone who loves expressive writing and vivid descriptions should definitely know about.” —U. S. Gazette.
Klipstein’s Anglo-Saxon Course of Study. In uniform 12mo. volumes, as follows:
Klipstein’s Anglo-Saxon Course of Study. In uniform 12mo. volumes, as follows:
I.
I.
Klipstein.—A Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon Language. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen. 12mo. cloth, $1 25.
Klipstein.—A Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon Language. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen. 12mo. cloth, $1.25.
II.
II.
Klipstein.—Analecta Anglo-Saxonica, with an Introductory Ethnographical Essay, Copious Notes, Critical and Explanatory, and a Glossary in which are shown the Indo-Germanic and other Affinities of the Language. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen.
Klipstein.—Analecta Anglo-Saxonica, featuring an Introductory Ethnographical Essay, extensive Notes, Critical and Explanatory content, and a Glossary that highlights the Indo-Germanic and other connections of the Language. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., from the University of Giessen.
III.
III.
Klipstein.—Natale Sancti Gregorii Papæ.—Ælfric’s Homily on the Birth-day of St. Gregory, and Collateral Extracts from King Alfred’s Version of Bede’s Ecclesiastical History and the Saxon Chronicle, with a full Rendering into English, Notes Critical and Explanatory, and an Index of Words. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen.
Klipstein.—Natale Sancti Gregorii Papæ.—Ælfric’s Homily on the Birthday of St. Gregory, and Related Extracts from King Alfred’s Version of Bede’s Ecclesiastical History and the Saxon Chronicle, with a complete Translation into English, Critical and Explanatory Notes, and a Word Index. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen.
IV.
IV.
Klipstein.—Extracts from the Anglo-Saxon Gospels, a Portion of the Anglo-Saxon Paraphrase of the Book of Psalms, and other Selections of a Sacred Order in the same Language, with a Translation into English, and Notes Critical and Explanatory. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., of the University of Giessen.
Klipstein.—Selected excerpts from the Anglo-Saxon Gospels, a section of the Anglo-Saxon paraphrase of the Book of Psalms, and other sacred selections in the same language, along with an English translation and critical and explanatory notes. By Louis F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D., from the University of Giessen.
V.
V.
Klipstein.—Tha Halgan Godspel on Englisc—the Anglo-Saxon Version of the Holy Gospels. Edited by Benjamin Thorpe, F.S.A. Reprinted by the same. Now ready. 12mo. cloth, $1 25.
Klipstein.—The Halgan Gospel in English—the Anglo-Saxon version of the Holy Gospels. Edited by Benjamin Thorpe, F.S.A. Reprinted by the same. Now available. 12mo. cloth, $1.25.
Klipstein.—Study of Modern Languages.—Part First; French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, and English. By L. F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D. One vol. Imperial 8vo. Cloth, $1; paper 75 cents.
Klipstein.—Study of Modern Languages.—Part One; French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, and English. By L. F. Klipstein, AA.LL.M. and PH.D. One vol. Imperial 8vo. Cloth, $1; paper 75 cents.
Lamb.—Essays of Elia. By Charles Lamb. 1 vol. 12mo., cloth. $1.
Lamb.—Essays of Elia. By Charles Lamb. 1 vol. 12mo., cloth. $1.
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An Alphabetical Index to Subjects treated in the Reviews, and other Periodicals, to which no Indexes have been Published.
An Alphabetical Index of Subjects covered in Reviews and other Periodicals that have not had Indexes published.
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⁂ This volume contains an index to all articles in 560 volumes of the most important periodical works.
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PUBLISHING,
AND THE
IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN BOOKS,
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LONDON
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George Putnam[12]
(OF THE FORMER FIRM OF WILEY AND PUTNAM),
Has moved to a new and spacious location,
155 Broadway, New York
(Next door to the old Firm's location),
And is continuing the business of
AND THE
Importing foreign books,
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PUTNAM’S AMERICAN LITERARY AGENCY, 142 Strand,
LONDON
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