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THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION

BY

BY

HILAIRE BELLOC, M.A.

Hilaire Belloc, M.A.

AUTHOR OF “DANTON,” “ROBESPIERRE,” “MARIE ANTOINETTE,” “THE OLD ROAD,” “THE PATH TO ROME,” “PARIS,” “THE HILLS AND THE SEA,” “THE HISTORIC THAMES,” ETC., ETC.

AUTHOR OF “DANTON,” “ROBESPIERRE,” “MARIE ANTOINETTE,” “THE OLD ROAD,” “THE PATH TO ROME,” “PARIS,” “THE HILLS AND THE SEA,” “THE HISTORIC THAMES,” ETC., ETC.

 

LONDON
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

LONDON
WILLIAMS & NORGATE

 

Richard Clay and Sons, Limited,
BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E.,
AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

Richard Clay and Sons, Ltd.,
BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E.,
AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.


PREFACE

The object of these few pages is not to recount once more the history of the Revolution: that can be followed in any one of a hundred text-books. Their object is rather to lay, if that be possible, an explanation of it before the English reader; so that he may understand both what it was and how it proceeded, and also why certain problems hitherto unfamiliar to Englishmen have risen out of it.

The purpose of these few pages is not to retell the history of the Revolution: that can be found in any number of textbooks. Instead, their aim is to provide an explanation for the English reader, so that he or she can understand what it was, how it unfolded, and why certain issues that were previously unfamiliar to the English have emerged from it.

First, therefore, it is necessary to set down, clearly without modern accretion, that political theory which was a sort of religious creed, supplying the motive force of the whole business; of the new Civil Code as of the massacres; of the panics and capitulations as of the victories; of the successful transformation of society as of the conspicuous failures in detail which still menace the achievement of the Revolution.

First, therefore, it is necessary to state clearly, without any modern additions, that political theory acted like a kind of religious belief, providing the driving force behind everything—the new Civil Code as well as the massacres; the panics and surrenders, as well as the victories; the successful changes in society, as well as the noticeable failures that still threaten the achievement of the Revolution.

This grasped, the way in which the main events followed each other, and [Pg vi]the reason of their interlocking and proceeding as they did must be put forward—not, I repeat, in the shape of a chronicle, but in the shape of a thesis. Thus the reader must know not only that the failure of the royal family’s flight was followed by war, but how and why it was followed by war. He must not only appreciate the severity of the government of the great Committee, but why that severity was present, and of the conditions of war upon which it reposed. But in so explaining the development of the movement it is necessary to select for appreciation as the chief figures the characters of the time, since upon their will and manner depended the fate of the whole. For instance, had the Queen been French either in blood or in sympathy, had the King been alert, had any one character retained the old religious motives, all history would have been changed, and this human company must be seen if its action and drama are to be comprehended.

Once we understand how the main events unfolded, the reasons for their connection and progression must be presented—not as a timeline, but as a thesis. Therefore, the reader needs to grasp not just that the failure of the royal family's escape was followed by war, but also how and why that war occurred. The reader should recognize the harshness of the government's actions by the great Committee, and understand the reasons behind that harshness, as well as the wartime conditions that influenced it. To explain how the movement developed, we must focus on the key figures of the time because the fate of everything depended on their actions and attitudes. For example, if the Queen had been French by heritage or sympathy, if the King had been more proactive, or if any one character had maintained the old religious beliefs, history would have turned out differently. This group of people must be understood to grasp the full scope of their actions and the drama that unfolded.

The reader interested in that capital event should further seize (and but too rarely has an opportunity for seizing) its military aspect; and this difficulty of his proceeds from two causes: the first, that historians, even when they recognise the importance of the military side [Pg vii]of some past movement, are careless of the military aspect, and think it sufficient to relate particular victories and general actions. The military aspect of any period does not consist in these, but in the campaigns of which actions, however decisive, are but incidental parts. In other words, the reader must seize the movement and design of armies if he is to seize a military period, and these are not commonly given him. In the second place, the historian, however much alive to the importance of military affairs, too rarely presents them as part of a general position. He will make his story a story of war, or again, a story of civilian development, and the reader will fail to see how the two combine.

The reader interested in that significant event should also focus on its military side, which they rarely get a chance to do. This challenge comes from two main reasons: first, historians, even when acknowledging the military aspect's importance in some historical movements, often overlook it and think it’s enough to just discuss specific battles and overall strategies. The military face of any era isn't just about those; it involves the campaigns where actions, no matter how crucial, are just parts of the whole. In other words, the reader needs to understand the movements and strategies of armies to grasp a military period, but that information is not usually provided. Second, even if historians recognize the significance of military matters, they infrequently integrate them into a broader context. They tend to tell the story as either a war narrative or a civilian development narrative, leaving the reader unable to see how the two are connected.

Now, the Revolution, more than any other modern period, turns upon, and is explained by, its military history. On this account has so considerable a space been devoted to the explaining of that feature.

Now, the Revolution, more than any other recent era, hinges on and is explained by its military history. This is why a significant amount of space has been dedicated to explaining that aspect.

The reader will note, again, that the quarrel between the Revolution and the Catholic Church has also been dealt with at length.

The reader will notice, once again, that the conflict between the Revolution and the Catholic Church has also been discussed in detail.

To emphasise this aspect of the revolutionary struggle may seem unusual and perhaps deserves a word of apology.

To highlight this part of the revolutionary struggle might seem odd and likely needs a bit of an apology.

The reader is invited to consider the fact that the Revolution took place in a country which had, in the first place, definitely determined [Pg viii]during the religious struggle of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to remain in communion with Rome; and had, in the second place, admitted a very large and important body of converts to the doctrines of the Reformation.

The reader is encouraged to think about the fact that the Revolution happened in a country that, first of all, had firmly decided [Pg viii] during the religious conflict of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to stay in communion with Rome; and, secondly, had welcomed a significant number of converts to the beliefs of the Reformation.

The determination of the French people, in the crisis of 1572-1610, to remain Catholic under a strong central Government, was a capital point in the future history of France. So was the presence of a wealthy, very large, and highly cultivated body of dissentients in the midst of the nation. The two phenomena hardly co-existed elsewhere in Europe. Between them they lent to the political history of France a peculiar character which the nineteenth century, even more than the Revolution itself, has emphasised; and it is the opinion of the present writer that it is impossible to understand the Revolution unless very high relief is given to the religious problem.

The determination of the French people, during the crisis of 1572-1610, to stay Catholic under a strong central government was a crucial factor in France's future history. So was the presence of a large, wealthy, and highly educated group of dissenters within the nation. These two phenomena hardly existed together anywhere else in Europe. Together, they gave the political history of France a unique character that the nineteenth century, even more than the Revolution itself, has highlighted; and it is the opinion of the author that it's impossible to understand the Revolution without placing significant emphasis on the religious issue.

If a personal point may be noted, the fact that the writer of these pages is himself a Catholic and in political sympathy strongly attached to the political theory of the Revolution, should not be hidden from the reader. Such personal conditions have perhaps enabled him to treat the matter more thoroughly than it might have been treated by one who rejected either Republicanism upon the one hand, or Catholicism upon the other; but he[Pg ix] believes that no personal and therefore exaggerated note has been allowed to intrude upon his description of what is a definite piece of objective history lying in the field of record rather than in that of opinion.

If I may share a personal note, the writer of these pages is a Catholic who strongly aligns with the political ideas of the Revolution, and this should be clear to the reader. These personal circumstances may have allowed him to explore the topic more deeply than someone who rejected either Republicanism or Catholicism. However, he[Pg ix] believes that no personal bias or exaggeration has interfered with his account of what is a concrete piece of objective history, rooted in recorded facts rather than opinions.

Some years ago the paramount importance of the quarrel between the Church and the Revolution might still have been questioned by men who had no personal experience of the struggle, and of its vast results. To-day the increasing consequences and the contemporary violence of that quarrel make its presentation an essential part of any study of the period.

Some years ago, the crucial significance of the conflict between the Church and the Revolution might still have been debated by those who had no firsthand experience of the struggle and its enormous outcomes. Today, the growing impacts and the current intensity of that conflict make its examination a key element of any study of the era.

The scheme thus outlined will show why I have given this sketch the divisions in which it lies.

The plan outlined here will explain why I've organized this sketch into the divisions it contains.

H. Belloc.

H. Belloc.

King’s Land,
January 1911.

King’s Land,
January 1911.


CONTENTS

  page
 Prefacev
IThe Political Theory of the Revolution13
IIRousseau 29
IIIRevolutionary Figures:
 King Louis XVI37
 The Queen45
 Mirabeau53
 La Fayette61
 Dumouriez65
 Danton67
 Carnot72
 Marat74
 Robespierre77
IVThe Stages of the Revolution:
 i. From May 1789 to 17th of July 178983
 ii. From the 17th of July 1789 to the 6th of October 178998
 iii. From October 1789 to June 1791102
 iv. From June 1791 to September 1792108
 v. From the Invasion of September 1792 to the Establishment of the Committee of Public Safety, April 1793118
 vi. From April 1793 to July 1794126
VThe Military Side of the Revolution142
 One145
 Two156
 Three163
 Four179
 Five204
VIThe Revolution and the Catholic Church214
 Table of Contents255

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION


I

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE REVOLUTION

The political theory upon which the Revolution proceeded has, especially in this country, suffered ridicule as local, as ephemeral, and as fallacious. It is universal, it is eternal, and it is true.

The political theory behind the Revolution has, especially in this country, been mocked as local, temporary, and false. It is universal, it is timeless, and it is true.

It may be briefly stated thus: that a political community pretending to sovereignty, that is, pretending to a moral right of defending its existence against all other communities, derives the civil and temporal authority of its laws not from its actual rulers, nor even from its magistracy, but from itself.

It can be summed up like this: a political community that claims sovereignty, meaning it claims a moral right to defend its existence against all other communities, gets the civil and temporal authority of its laws not from its current rulers or even from its officials, but from itself.

But the community cannot express authority unless it possesses corporate initiative; that is, unless the mass of its component units are able to combine for the purpose of a common expression, are conscious of a common will, and have something in common which makes the whole sovereign indeed.

But the community can't show authority unless it has corporate initiative; meaning, unless all its parts can come together for a shared purpose, are aware of a common desire, and share something that truly makes the whole united.

It may be that this power of corporate initiative and of corresponding corporate expression is forbidden to men. In that case[Pg 14] no such thing as a sovereign community can be said to exist. In that case “patriotism,” “public opinion,” “the genius of a people,” are terms without meaning. But the human race in all times and in all places has agreed that such terms have meaning, and the conception that a community can so live, order and be itself, is a human conception as consonant to the nature of man as is his sense of right and wrong; it is much more intimately a part of that nature than are the common accidents determining human life, such as nourishment, generation or repose: nay, more intimate a part of it than anything which attaches to the body.

It might be that this power of corporate initiative and the related corporate expression is off-limits for people. If that's true, then no genuine sovereign community can be said to exist. In that case, terms like "patriotism," "public opinion," and "the spirit of a people" become meaningless. However, throughout history and across cultures, humanity has agreed that these concepts do hold meaning, and the idea that a community can sustain itself, organize, and find its identity is deeply rooted in human nature. It is as intrinsic to our nature as our sense of right and wrong; in fact, it is even more essential than the basic conditions that shape human life, such as food, reproduction, or rest, and indeed, more fundamental than anything tied to the physical body.

This theory of political morals, though subject to a limitless degradation in practice, underlies the argument of every man who pretends to regard the conduct of the State as a business affecting the conscience of citizens. Upon it relies every protest against tyranny and every denunciation of foreign aggression.

This theory of political ethics, despite being prone to endless degradation in practice, is the foundation of every person who claims to see the actions of the State as a matter that impacts the conscience of its citizens. Every protest against tyranny and every outcry against foreign aggression rests upon it.

He that is most enamoured of some set machinery for the government of men, and who regards the sacramental function of an hereditary monarch (as in Russia), the organic character of a native oligarchy (as in England), the mechanical arrangement of election by majorities, or even in a crisis the intense conviction and therefore the intense activity and conclusive power of great crowds as salutary to the State, will invariably, if any one of these engines fail him in the achievement of what he desires for his country, fall back upon the doctrine of an ultimately sovereign community.[Pg 15] He will complain that though an election has defeated his ideal, yet true national tradition and true national sentiment were upon his side. If he defends the action of a native oligarchy against the leaders of the populace, he does so by an explanation (more or less explicit) that the oligarchy is more truly national, that is more truly communal, than the engineered expression of opinion of which the demagogues (as he will call them) have been the mouthpieces. Even in blaming men for criticising or restraining an hereditary monarch the adherent of that monarch will blame them upon the ground that their action is anti-national, that is anti-communal; and, in a word, no man pretending to sanity can challenge in matters temporal and civil the ultimate authority of whatever is felt to be (though with what difficulty is it not defined!) the general civic sense which builds up a State.

The person who is most in love with a specific system for governing people, whether they see the ceremonial role of a hereditary king (like in Russia), the structured nature of a local elite (like in England), the organized process of elections by majority, or even during a crisis, the strong belief and therefore the vigorous action and decisive influence of large crowds as beneficial to the State, will inevitably, if any of these systems fail to achieve what he wants for his nation, revert to the idea of a community that is ultimately sovereign.[Pg 15] He will argue that even though an election didn’t align with his ideal, true national tradition and sentiment were on his side. If he defends the actions of a local elite against popular leaders, he does so with an explanation (more or less clear) that the elite is more genuinely national, that is, more truly representative of the community than the manipulated expression of opinion that the demagogues (as he would label them) have voiced. Even when critiquing people for questioning or limiting a hereditary monarch, the supporter of that monarch will argue that their actions are anti-national, meaning anti-community; and, in short, no one claiming to be sane can challenge, in matters of public and civil life, the ultimate authority of what is perceived to be (although it is not easily defined!) the general civic sentiment that forms a State.

Those words “civil” and “temporal” must lead the reader to the next consideration; which is, that the last authority of all does not reside even in the community.

Those words "civil" and "temporal" should lead the reader to the next thought; specifically, that the ultimate authority doesn't even rest with the community.

It must be admitted by all those who have considered their own nature and that of their fellow beings that the ultimate authority in any act is God. Or if the name of God sound unusual in an English publication to-day, then what now takes the place of it for many (an imperfect phrase), “the moral sense.”

It must be acknowledged by everyone who has reflected on their own nature and that of others that the ultimate authority in any action is God. Or if the term God feels out of place in a modern English publication today, then what many people now use instead (an imperfect phrase) is “the moral sense.”

Thus if there be cast together in some abandoned place a community of a few families so depraved or so necessitous that, against the[Pg 16] teachings of their own consciences, and well knowing that what they are doing is what we call wrong, yet they will unanimously agree to do it, then that agreement of theirs, though certainly no temporal or civil authority can be quoted against it, is yet unjustifiable. Another authority lies behind. Still more evidently would this be true if, of say, twelve, seven decided (knowing the thing to be wrong) that the wrong thing should be done, five stood out for the right—and yet the majority possessed by the seven should be determined a sufficient authority for the wrongful command.

So if a small group of families finds themselves in some remote place, so corrupt or in such dire need that, going against the[Pg 16] guidance of their own consciences, and fully aware that what they’re doing is what we call wrong, they all agree to proceed anyway, then that consensus, even though no legal or civil authority can be cited against it, is still unjustifiable. Another authority is at play here. This becomes even clearer if, for instance, out of twelve people, seven decide (knowing it’s wrong) to do the wrong thing while five advocate for the right choice—and yet the majority held by the seven is used as enough justification for the wrongful action.

But it is to be noted that this axiom only applies where the authority of the moral law (God, as the author of this book, with due deference to his readers, would prefer to say) is recognised and yet flouted. If those twelve families do sincerely believe such and such a general action to be right, then not only is their authority when they carry it into practice a civil and a temporal authority; it is an authority absolute in all respects; and further, if, upon a division of opinion among them not perhaps a bare majority, nay, perhaps not a majority at all, but at any rate a determinant current of opinion—determinant in intensity and in weight, that is, as well as in numbers—declares an action to be right, then that determinant weight of opinion gives to its resolve a political authority not only civil and temporal but absolute. Beyond it and above it there is no appeal.

But it's important to note that this principle only applies when the authority of moral law (God, as the author of this book would like to say, with respect to his readers) is acknowledged but ignored. If those twelve families genuinely believe a certain general action is right, then their authority when they put it into practice is both civil and temporal; it's absolute in every way. Moreover, if there's a disagreement among them, not necessarily a clear majority, or maybe not even a majority at all, but still a significant trend of opinion—strong in intensity and weight, as well as in numbers—that declares an action to be right, then this prevailing opinion gives their decision a political authority that is not just civil and temporal, but absolute. There is no higher authority or appeal beyond this.

In other words, men may justly condemn,[Pg 17] and justly have in a thousand circumstances condemned, the theory that a mere decision on the major part of the community was necessarily right in morals. It is, for that matter, self-evident that if one community decides in one fashion, another, also sovereign, in the opposite fashion, both cannot be right. Reasoning men have also protested, and justly, against the conception that what a majority in numbers, or even (what is more compelling still) a unanimity of decision in a community may order, may not only be wrong but may be something which that community has no authority to order since, though it possesses a civil and temporal authority, it acts against that ultimate authority which is its own consciousness of right. Men may and do justly protest against the doctrine that a community is incapable of doing deliberate evil; it is as capable of such an action as is an individual. But men nowhere do or can deny that the community acting as it thinks right is ultimately sovereign: there is no alternative to so plain a truth.

In other words, people can rightfully criticize,[Pg 17] and have rightfully done so countless times, the idea that a simple decision made by the majority of the community is necessarily morally correct. Clearly, if one community decides one way and another community, which is also independent, decides the opposite, then both cannot be correct. Thoughtful individuals have also rightly objected to the notion that whatever the majority decides, or even if there's complete agreement within a community, may not only be wrong but can also be something that community lacks the authority to mandate, because, despite having civil and temporary power, it acts against the ultimate authority of its own sense of right. People can and do rightly argue against the belief that a community cannot commit intentional wrongdoing; it's just as capable of such acts as any individual. However, no one can or does deny that the community, acting as it believes is right, is ultimately sovereign: there is no alternative to this clear truth.

Let us take it, then, as indubitable that where civil government is concerned, the community is supreme, if only from the argument that no organ within the community can prove its right to withstand the corporate will when once that corporate will shall find expression.

Let's accept it as certain that in matters of civil government, the community is in charge, if only because no part of the community can justify resisting the collective will once that collective will is expressed.

All arguments which are advanced against this prime axiom of political ethics are, when they are analysed, found to repose upon a confusion of thought. Thus a man will say, “This doctrine would lead my country to[Pg 18] abandon her suzerainty over that other nation, but were I to consent to this, I should be weakening my country, to which I owe allegiance.” The doctrine compels him to no such muddlement. The community of which he is a member is free to make its dispositions for safety, and is bound to preserve its own life. It is for the oppressed to protest and to rebel.

All the arguments against this core principle of political ethics, when examined, reveal a confusion in thinking. For example, someone might say, “This idea would cause my country to[Pg 18] give up its control over another nation, and if I agree to this, I would be weakening my country, to which I am loyal.” However, the principle doesn’t require him to think this way. The community he belongs to is free to make decisions for its own safety and is obligated to protect its own existence. It is the right of the oppressed to speak out and resist.

Similarly, men think that this doctrine in some way jars with the actual lethargy and actual imbecility of men in their corporate action. It does nothing of the kind. This lethargy, that imbecility, and all the other things that limit the application of the doctrine, in no way touch its right reason, any more than the fact that the speech of all men is imperfect contradicts the principle that man has a moral right to self-expression. That a dumb man cannot speak at all, but must write, is, so far from a contradiction, a proof of the truth that speech is the prime expression of man; and in the same way a community utterly without the power of expressing its corporate will is no contradiction, but a proof, of the general rule that such expression and the imposing of such decisions are normal to mankind. The very oddity of the contrast between the abnormal and the normal aids us in our decision, and when we see a people conquered and not persuaded, yet making no attempt at rebellion, or a people free from foreign oppression yet bewildered at the prospect of self-government, the oddity of the phenomenon proves our rule.[Pg 19]

Similarly, people believe that this idea somehow clashes with the real laziness and actual ignorance of people in their collective actions. It doesn’t do that at all. This laziness, that ignorance, and all the other factors that limit the application of the idea do not affect its validity, just like the fact that everyone’s speech is imperfect doesn’t contradict the principle that people have a moral right to express themselves. The fact that a mute person cannot speak at all but must write is, far from being a contradiction, evidence of the truth that speech is the main form of expression for humans; likewise, a community completely unable to express its collective will is not a contradiction but proof of the general principle that such expression and decision-making are typical for humanity. The unusual contrast between what is abnormal and what is normal helps us make our judgment, and when we observe a group that has been conquered and not convinced, yet makes no effort to rebel, or a people free from foreign oppression yet confused about the idea of self-governance, the peculiarity of the situation confirms our principle.[Pg 19]

But though all this be true, there stands against the statement of our political axiom not a contradiction added, but a criticism; and all men with some knowledge of their fellows and of themselves at once perceive, first, that the psychology of corporate action differs essentially from the psychology of individual action, and secondly, that in proportion to the number, the discussions, the lack of intimacy, and in general the friction of the many, corporate action by a community, corporate self-realisation and the imposition of a corporate will, varies from the difficult to the impossible.

But even if all of this is true, what challenges our political principle isn't a contradiction, but a critique; and everyone with some understanding of people, including themselves, can immediately recognize, first, that the psychology behind group actions is fundamentally different from that of individual actions, and secondly, that as the number of people increases, along with the discussions, the lack of personal connection, and overall friction among many, corporate action by a community, the shared realization of that community, and the enforcement of a collective will, ranges from being difficult to nearly impossible.

On this no words need be wasted. All men who reason and who observe are agreed that, in proportion to distance, numbers, and complexity, the difficulty of self-expression within a community increases. We may get in a lively people explosions of popular will violent, acute, and certainly real; but rare. We may attempt with a people more lethargic to obtain some reflection of popular will through the medium of a permanent machinery of deputation which, less than any other, perhaps, permits a great community to express itself truly. We may rely upon the national sympathies of an aristocracy or of a king. But in any case we know that large communities can only indirectly and imperfectly express themselves where the permanent government of their whole interest is concerned. Our attachment, which may be passionate, to the rights of the Common Will we must satisfy either by demanding a loose federation of small, self-governing states, or submitting the central[Pg 20] government of large ones to occasional insurrection and to violent corporate expressions of opinion which shall readjust the relations between the governor and the governed.

On this, no words need to be wasted. Everyone who thinks and observes agrees that, as distance, numbers, and complexity increase, the difficulty of self-expression within a community also grows. In lively communities, we might see sudden bursts of popular will that are intense, clear, and undeniably real—but these are rare. In more lethargic populations, we might try to capture some reflection of public opinion through a permanent system of representation, which may be the least effective way for a large community to truly express itself. We could rely on the national sentiments of an aristocracy or a monarch. But in any case, we know that large communities can only express themselves indirectly and imperfectly when it comes to their overall governance. Our passionate attachment to the rights of the Common Will must be fulfilled by either pushing for a loose federation of small, self-governing states or by subjecting the central government of larger ones to occasional uprisings and intense collective expressions of opinion that will readjust the balance between those in power and the governed.

All this is true: but such a criticism of the theory in political morals which lay behind the Revolution, the theory that the community is sovereign, is no contradiction. It only tells us that pure right cannot act untrammelled in human affairs and that it acts in some conditions more laboriously than in others: it gives not a jot of authority to any alternative thesis.[1]

All this is true: but this criticism of the political moral theory that motivated the Revolution, the theory that the community is sovereign, isn’t a contradiction. It just shows us that pure rights can’t operate freely in human affairs and that it functions more slowly under certain conditions than under others: it doesn’t lend any support to any alternative argument.[1]

Such is the general theory of the Revolution to which the command of Jean Jacques Rousseau over the French tongue gave imperishable[Pg 21] expression in that book whose style and logical connection may be compared to some exact and strong piece of engineering. He entitled it the Contrat Social, and it became the formula of the Revolutionary Creed. But though no man, perhaps, has put the prime truth of political morals so well, that truth was as old as the world; it appears in the passionate rhetoric of a hundred leaders and has stood at the head or has been woven into the laws of free States without number. In the English language the Declaration of Independence is perhaps its noblest expression. And though this document was posterior to the great work of Rousseau and (through the genius of Jefferson) was in some part descended from it, its language, and still more the actions of those who drafted and supported it, are sufficient to explain what I mean to English readers.

Such is the general theory of the Revolution that Jean Jacques Rousseau's mastery of the French language gave everlasting[Pg 21] expression in that book whose style and logical structure can be compared to a precise and robust piece of engineering. He titled it the Contrat Social, and it became the foundation of the Revolutionary Creed. While no one, perhaps, has articulated the core truth of political ethics quite as well, that truth is as old as time itself; it can be found in the passionate speeches of countless leaders and has been either at the forefront or woven into the laws of countless free states. In English, the Declaration of Independence is perhaps its greatest expression. Although this document came after Rousseau's major work and was partially influenced by it (thanks to Jefferson's genius), its language, and even more so the actions of those who created and supported it, clearly convey what I want to express to English readers.

Now with this general theory there stand connected on the one hand certain great principles without which it would have no meaning, and also on the other hand a number of minor points concerning no more than the machinery of politics. The first are vital to democracy. The second, in spite of their great popularity at the time of the Revolution and of the sanction which the Revolution gave them, nay, of their universality since the Revolution, have in reality nothing to do with the revolutionary theory itself.

Now, with this general theory, there are certain important principles that give it meaning on one side, and on the other side, there are several minor points that only relate to the mechanics of politics. The first group is crucial for democracy. The second group, despite being very popular during the Revolution and being endorsed by it—and having been widely accepted since then—actually has nothing to do with the revolutionary theory itself.

Of these two categories the type of the first is the doctrine of the equality of man; the type of the second is the mere machinery called “representative.”[Pg 22]

Of these two categories, the first is the belief in human equality; the second is just the system known as "representative."[Pg 22]

The doctrine of the equality of the man is a transcendent doctrine: a “dogma,” as we call such doctrines in the field of transcendental religion. It corresponds to no physical reality which we can grasp, it is hardly to be adumbrated even by metaphors drawn from physical objects. We may attempt to rationalise it by saying that what is common to all men is not more important but infinitely more important than the accidents by which men differ. We may compare human attributes to tri-dimensional, and personal attributes to bi-dimensional measurements; we may say that whatever man has of his nature is the standard of man, and we may show that in all such things men are potentially equal. None of these metaphors explains the matter; still less do any of them satisfy the demand of those to whom the dogma may be incomprehensible.

The concept of human equality is a profound idea: a “dogma,” as we refer to such beliefs in the realm of deep spirituality. It doesn’t correspond to any physical reality we can understand, and it’s tough to illustrate even with metaphors taken from physical things. We might try to justify it by saying that what all people share is not just important, but infinitely more important than the differences that separate them. We could liken human traits to three-dimensional aspects and personal traits to two-dimensional aspects; we could argue that whatever is inherent to humanity sets the standard for all humans, and we could demonstrate that in these respects, people are potentially equal. However, none of these metaphors truly clarify the issue, and none of them satisfy those who find the dogma incomprehensible.

Its truth is to be arrived at (for these) in a negative manner. If men are not equal then no scheme of jurisprudence, no act of justice, no movement of human indignation, no exaltation of fellowship, has any meaning. The doctrine of the equality of man is one which, like many of the great transcendental doctrines, may be proved by the results consequent upon its absence. It is in man to believe it—and all lively societies believe it.

Its truth can be reached in a negative way. If people are not equal, then no system of law, no act of justice, no expression of human outrage, and no sense of community has any significance. The belief in human equality, like many of the important abstract ideas, can be shown by the outcomes that occur when it is missing. It's in human nature to believe this—and all vibrant societies embrace it.

It is certainly not in man to prove the equality of men save, as I have said, by negation; but it demands no considerable intellectual faculty to perceive that, void of the doctrine of equality, the conception of political freedom and of a community’s moral[Pg 23] right to self-government disappear. Now to believe that doctrine positively, and to believe it ardently, to go on crusade for that religious point, was indeed characteristic of the French. It required the peculiar and inherited religious temper of the French which had for so many hundred years seized and defined point after point in the character of man, to grow enamoured of this definition and to feel it not in the intellect, but as it were in their bones. They became soldiers for it, and that enormous march of theirs, overrunning Europe, which may not inaptly be compared to their adventures in the twelfth century, when they engaged upon the Crusades, was inspired by no one part of the doctrine of political freedom more strongly than by this doctrine of equality.

It’s definitely not in human nature to prove that all people are equal except, as I mentioned, through negation; but it doesn’t take much intellect to see that without the idea of equality, concepts like political freedom and a community's moral right to self-governance vanish. Now, to truly believe in this idea and to feel passionately about it, to fight for it vigorously, was distinctly French. It took the unique and deeply-rooted religious spirit of the French, which for centuries has shaped and defined aspects of human character, to fall in love with this idea and to feel it deeply—not just intellectually, but almost instinctively. They became warriors for this belief, and that massive campaign of theirs, sweeping across Europe, can be aptly compared to their ventures in the twelfth century during the Crusades, motivated by the doctrine of political freedom but even more so by the doctrine of equality.

The scorn which was in those days universally felt for that pride which associates itself with things not inherent to a man (notably and most absurdly with capricious differences of wealth) never ran higher; and the passionate sense of justice which springs from this profound and fundamental social dogma of equality, as it moved France during the Revolution to frenzy, so also moved it to creation.

The disdain that everyone felt back then for the pride linked to things that aren’t naturally part of a person (especially, and most absurdly, the random differences in wealth) was at an all-time high; and the deep sense of justice that comes from this essential belief in equality, which drove France into a frenzy during the Revolution, also inspired it to create.

Those who ask how it was that a group of men sustaining all the weight of civil conflict within and of universal war without, yet made time enough in twenty years to frame the codes which govern modern Europe, to lay down the foundations of universal education, of a strictly impersonal scheme of administration,[Pg 24] and even in detail to remodel the material face of society—in a word, to make modern Europe—must be content for their reply to learn that the Republican Energy had for its flame and excitant this vision: a sense almost physical of the equality of man.

Those who wonder how a group of men, bearing the heavy burden of civil conflict at home and global war outside, managed to find enough time over twenty years to create the laws that govern modern Europe, establish the fundamentals of universal education, implement a strictly neutral administration system,[Pg 24] and even meticulously reshape the social landscape—in short, to build modern Europe—must accept that the driving force behind this Republican Energy was fueled by a powerful vision: a nearly tangible feeling of human equality.

The minor points which wove themselves into the political practice of democracy during the Revolution, which are not of its principles, and which would not, were they abstracted, affect its essence, are of quite another and less noble kind. I have taken as the chief of these the machinery of deputation or of “representation.”

The minor details that became part of the political practice of democracy during the Revolution, which aren't its core principles and wouldn't change its essence if removed, are of a different and less admirable nature. I have chosen to highlight the system of delegation or "representation" as the main example of this.

The representative system had been designed for a particular purpose under the influence of the Church and especially of the monastic orders (who invented it) in the Middle Ages. It had been practised as a useful check upon the national monarchy in France, and as a useful form of national expression in times of crisis or when national initiative was peculiarly demanded.

The representative system was created for a specific purpose, influenced by the Church and particularly by the monastic orders (who originated it) in the Middle Ages. It was used as an effective check on the national monarchy in France and as a meaningful way for the nation to express itself during times of crisis or when national initiative was especially needed.

In Spain it became, as the Middle Ages proceeded, a very vital national and local thing, varying from place to place. It is not surprising that Spain (seeing that in her territory the first experiments in representation were made) should have thus preserved it, popular and alive.

In Spain, as the Middle Ages went on, it became a very important national and local element, differing from one place to another. It's not surprising that Spain, having been the site of the first experiments in representation, managed to keep it vibrant and relevant.

In England Representation, vigorous as everywhere else in the true Middle Ages, narrowed and decayed at their close, until in the seventeenth century it had become a mere scheme for aristocratic government.[Pg 25]

In England, representation was strong like it was in other parts of the true Middle Ages, but it declined and weakened towards the end, so that by the seventeenth century, it had turned into just a system for aristocratic rule.[Pg 25]

In France for nearly two hundred years before the Revolution it had fallen into disuse, but an active memory of it still remained; especially a memory of its value in critical moments when a consultation of the whole people was required, and when the corporate initiative of the whole people must be set at work in order to save the State.

In France, it had fallen out of use for nearly two hundred years before the Revolution, but there was still a strong memory of it. This was especially true regarding its importance during critical times when the entire populace needed to be consulted, and when the collective action of the whole population was necessary to save the nation.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the French, on the eve of the Revolution, clamoured for a revival of representation, or, as the system was called in the French tongue, “the States-General.” But as a permanent machine of government no one in Europe had the least idea how the system might serve the ends of democracy. In England democracy was not practised nor was representation connected with the conception of it. The nation had forgotten democracy as completely as it had forgotten the religion and the old ideals of the Middle Ages.

It’s no surprise, then, that the French, just before the Revolution, demanded a return to representation, or what they referred to as “the States-General.” However, as a lasting form of government, nobody in Europe understood how this system could actually achieve democratic goals. In England, democracy wasn’t practiced, nor was representation linked to the idea of it. The nation had forgotten democracy just as completely as it had forgotten the religion and the old ideals of the Middle Ages.

In those parts of Christendom in which this ancient Christian institution of a parliament had not narrowed to be the mask of an oligarchy or dwindled to be a mere provincial custom, its use had disappeared. The ancient function of Representation, when it had been most lively and vigorous, that is, in the Middle Ages, was occasionally to initiate a national policy in critical moments, but more generally to grant taxes. What a democratic parliament might do, no one in 1789 could conceive.

In those areas of Christendom where this old Christian institution of parliament hadn’t become just a cover for an oligarchy or shrunk to a simple regional practice, it had faded away. The original role of Representation, which was at its most active and robust during the Middle Ages, occasionally involved kicking off a national policy during crucial times, but more commonly was about granting taxes. What a democratic parliament might accomplish was beyond anyone’s imagination in 1789.

There was indeed one great example of democratic representation in existence: the[Pg 26] example of the United States; but the conditions were wholly different from those of Europe. No true central power yet existed there; no ancient central institution, no Crown nor any Custom of the City. The numbers over which American representative democracy then held power were not to be compared to the twenty-five millions who inhabited the French realm. And even so, most of what counted in their lives was regulated by a system of highly local autonomy: for they were as scattered as they were few, and the wisest and strongest and best were dependent upon slaves. In Europe, I repeat, the experiment was untried; and it is one of the chief faults of the French revolutionaries that, having been compelled in the critical moment of the opening of the Revolution to the use of election and representation, they envisaged the permanent use of a similar machinery as a something sacred to and normal in the democratic State.

There was indeed one great example of democratic representation in existence: the[Pg 26] example of the United States; but the conditions were completely different from those in Europe. No real central power existed there; no ancient central institution, no Crown, nor any City Customs. The population under American representative democracy at that time was not comparable to the twenty-five million people living in France. Even so, most of what mattered in their lives was managed by a system of strong local autonomy: they were as dispersed as they were few, and the wisest, strongest, and best relied on slaves. In Europe, I repeat, the experiment had not been tried; and one of the main mistakes of the French revolutionaries was that, when they were forced to adopt elections and representation at the critical moment of the Revolution, they viewed the ongoing use of such systems as something sacred and normal in a democratic State.

True, they could not foresee modern parliamentarism. Nothing could be more alien to their conception of the State than the deplorable method of government which parliamentarism everywhere tends to introduce to-day.

True, they couldn't predict modern parliamentarism. Nothing could be more foreign to their understanding of the State than the unfortunate way of governing that parliamentarism tends to create today.

True, the French people during the revolutionary wars made short work of parliamentary theory, and found it a more national thing to follow a soldier (being by that time all soldiers themselves), and to incarnate in a dictator the will of the nation.

True, the French people during the revolutionary wars quickly set aside parliamentary theory and found it more meaningful to follow a soldier (since they had all become soldiers themselves) and to embody the nation's will in a dictator.

But though the French revolutionaries[Pg 27] could not have foreseen what we call “Parliamentarism” to-day, and though the society from which they sprang made short work of the oligarchic pretensions of a parliament when the realities of the national struggle had to be considered, yet they did as a fact pay an almost absurd reverence to the machinery of representation and election.

But although the French revolutionaries[Pg 27] couldn't have predicted what we now refer to as "Parliamentarism," and despite the society they came from quickly dismissing the oligarchic claims of a parliament when faced with the challenges of the national struggle, they indeed showed an almost ridiculous respect for the mechanisms of representation and elections.

They went so far as to introduce it into their attempted reform of the Church; they introduced it everywhere into civil government, from the smallest units to the highest. They even for a moment played with the illusion in that most real of games which men can ever play at—the business of arms: they allowed the election of officers. They were led to do this by that common fallacy, more excusable in them than in us, which confounds the individual will with the corporate. A representative (they thought) could in some way be the permanent receptacle of his electorate. They imagined that corporate initiative was always sufficiently active, in no matter what divisions or subdivisions, to react at once upon the delegate, to guide him as may be guided a driven animal, or to command him as may be commanded a servant.

They went so far as to include it in their attempts to reform the Church; they applied it throughout civil government, from the smallest units to the highest levels. For a brief moment, they even entertained the illusion in that most serious of games that people can ever engage in—the business of war: they permitted the election of officers. They were influenced by that common misconception, more forgivable in them than in us, which confuses individual will with collective will. A representative (they believed) could somehow permanently embody the wishes of their voters. They thought that collective action was always active enough, regardless of divisions or subdivisions, to influence the delegate immediately, to guide them like a trained animal, or to command them like a servant.

It was in vain that Rousseau, the great exponent of the democratic theory upon which France attempted to proceed, had warned posterity against the possible results of the representative system: they fell into the error, and it possesses many of their descendants to this day.

It was pointless for Rousseau, the leading advocate of the democratic theory that France tried to adopt, to warn future generations about the potential consequences of the representative system: they made the same mistake, and many of their descendants still deal with it today.

Rousseau’s searching mind perceived indeed[Pg 28] no more than the general truth that men who consent to a representative system are free only while the representatives are not sitting. But (as is so often the case with intuitions of genius) though he saw not the whole of the evil, he had put his finger upon its central spot, and from that main and just principle which he laid down—that under a merely representative system men cannot be really free—flow all those evils which we now know to attach to this method of government. What a rather clumsy epigram has called “the audacity of elected persons” is part of this truth. The evident spectacle of modern parliamentary nations driven against their will into economic conditions which appal them, proceeds again from the same truth; the conspicuous and hearty contempt into which parliamentary institutions have everywhere fallen again proceeds from it, and there proceeds from it that further derivative plague that the representatives themselves have now everywhere become more servile than the electorate and that in all parliamentary countries a few intriguers are the unworthy depositories of power, and by their service of finance permit the money-dealers to govern us all to-day. Rousseau, I say, the chief prophet of the Revolution, had warned the French of this danger. It is a capital example of his talent, for the experiment of democratic representation had not yet, in his time, been tried. But much more is that power of his by which he not only stamped and issued the gold of democracy as it had[Pg 29] never till then been minted. No one man makes a people or their creed, but Rousseau more than any other man made vocal the creed of a people, and it is advisable or necessary for the reader of the Revolution to consider at the outset of his reading of what nature was Rousseau’s abundant influence upon the men who remodelled the society of Europe between 1789 and 1794.

Rousseau’s inquisitive mind recognized that men who agree to a representative system are only free when their representatives are not in session. However, as often happens with brilliant insights, while he didn't see the entire problem, he identified its core issue. From the essential and valid principle he established—that people cannot truly be free under a purely representative system—arises all those problems we now associate with this form of government. What has been awkwardly described as “the audacity of elected officials” is part of this truth. The clear image of modern parliamentary nations being forced into economic conditions they dread comes from the same truth. The evident and widespread disdain for parliamentary institutions everywhere stems from it, as does the additional issue that representatives have now become more submissive than the electorate. In all parliamentary countries, a handful of schemers hold power unworthily, and their ties to financial interests allow money-managers to govern us all today. Rousseau, I assert, the leading prophet of the Revolution, warned the French about this threat. It exemplifies his talent, as the experiment of democratic representation had not yet been conducted in his time. Even more impressive is his ability to produce the gold of democracy as it had never been created before. One individual doesn’t create a people or their beliefs, but Rousseau more than anyone else articulated the beliefs of a people. It’s important for readers of the Revolution to recognize from the start how significant Rousseau’s influence was on those who transformed European society between 1789 and 1794.

Why did he dominate those five years, and how was it that he dominated them increasingly?

Why did he have such control during those five years, and how did he gain more and more power over them?

An explanation of Rousseau’s power merits a particular digression, for few who express themselves in the English tongue have cared to understand it, and in the academies provincial men have been content to deal with this great writer as though he were in some way inferior to themselves.

An explanation of Rousseau’s power deserves a special sidetrack because not many who speak English have bothered to understand it, and in academic circles, local scholars have been satisfied to treat this great writer as if he were somehow beneath them.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] We need not waste any time upon those who talk about such and such a form of government being good because “it works.” The use of such language connotes that the user of it is fatigued by the effort of thought. For what is “working,” i.e. successful action, in any sphere? The attainment of certain ends in that sphere. What are those ends in a State? If material well-being, then there is an end to talk of patriotism, the nation, public opinion and the rest of it which, as we all very well know, men always have regarded and always will regard as the supreme matters of public interest. If the end is not material well-being, but a sense of political freedom and of the power of the citizen to react upon the State, then to say that an institution “works” though apparently not democratic, is simply to say that under such and such conditions that institution achieves the ends of democracy most nearly. In other words, to contrast the good “working” of an institution superficially undemocratic with democratic theory is meaningless. The institution “works” in proportion as it satisfies that political sense which perfect democracy would, were it attainable, completely satisfy.

[1] We shouldn't spend time on those who claim that a certain form of government is good just because "it works." Using that kind of language suggests that the speaker is tired of thinking critically. What does "working," i.e. successful action, really mean in any context? It means achieving specific goals within that context. So, what are those goals in a State? If it's material well-being, then there's no point in discussing patriotism, the nation, public opinion, and similar topics that people have always seen as the most important public issues. If the goal is not material well-being but rather a sense of political freedom and the ability of citizens to influence the State, then saying that an institution "works" even if it isn't democratic just means that under certain conditions, that institution comes closest to achieving democratic goals. In other words, comparing the effective operation of a superficially undemocratic institution to democratic theory is pointless. The institution "works" to the extent that it fulfills that political sense which true democracy would, if it could be achieved, fully satisfy.


II

ROUSSEAU

In order to appreciate what Rousseau meant to the revolutionary movement, it is necessary to consider the effect of style upon men.

To understand what Rousseau meant to the revolutionary movement, we need to think about how style impacts people.

Men are influenced by the word. Spoken or written, the word is the organ of persuasion and, therefore, of moral government.

Men are influenced by the word. Whether spoken or written, the word is the tool of persuasion and, therefore, of moral guidance.

Now, degraded as that term has become in our time, there is no proper term to express the exact use of words save the term “style.”[Pg 30]

Now, even though "degraded" has lost some of its meaning today, there’s no better word to describe the precise use of language than "style."[Pg 30]

What words we use, and in what order we put them, is the whole matter of style; and a man desiring to influence his fellow men has therefore not one, but two co-related instruments at his disposal. He cannot use one without the other. The weakness of the one will ruin the other. These two instruments are his idea and his style.

What words we choose and the order we put them in are the essence of style; someone wanting to influence others has not just one, but two interconnected tools at their disposal. They can’t use one without the other. The weakness of one will undermine the other. These two tools are their idea and their style.

However powerful, native, sympathetic to his hearers’ mood or cogently provable by reference to new things may be a man’s idea, he cannot persuade his fellow men to it if he have not words that express it. And he will persuade them more and more in proportion as his words are well chosen and in the right order, such order being determined by the genius of the language whence they are drawn.

However strong, authentic, or appealing a person's idea may be to their audience, or however convincingly it can be backed up by new evidence, they won't be able to persuade others if they lack the words to express it. They will persuade others increasingly as their words are well-chosen and in the proper order, with that order being shaped by the nuances of the language they are using.

Whether the idea of which Rousseau made himself the exponent in his famous tract be true or false, need not further concern us in this little book. We all know that the difficult attempt to realise political freedom has attracted various communities of men at various times and repelled others. What English readers rarely hear is that the triumph of Rousseau depended not only on the first element in persuasion, which is vision, but also upon the second of the two co-related instruments by which a man may influence his fellows—to wit, style. It was his choice of French words and the order in which he arranged them, that gave him his enormous ascendancy over the generation which was young when he was old.[Pg 31]

Whether the idea that Rousseau advocated in his famous essay is true or false doesn't matter for our purposes in this little book. We all know that the challenging pursuit of political freedom has drawn different groups of people at different times and pushed others away. What English readers often don't realize is that Rousseau's success was based not just on the first element of persuasion, which is vision, but also on the second of the two related tools a person can use to influence others—namely, style. It was his choice of French words and the way he arranged them that gave him significant power over the generation that was young while he was aging.[Pg 31]

I have alluded to his famous tract, the Contrat Social, and here a second point concerning it may be introduced. This book which gave a text for the Revolution, the document to which its political theory could refer, was by no means (as foreign observers have sometimes imagined) the whole body of writing for which Rousseau was responsible. To imagine that is to make the very common error of confusing a man with his books.

I’ve mentioned his famous work, the Contrat Social, and now I can bring up a second point about it. This book, which provided a foundation for the Revolution and served as the reference for its political theory, was by no means, as some outsiders have sometimes thought, all the writing that Rousseau produced. Thinking that way makes the all-too-common mistake of confusing a person with their writings.

Rousseau wrote on many things: his character was of an exalted, nervous and diseased sort. Its excessive sensibility degenerated with advancing years into something not distinguishable from mania. He wrote upon education, and the glory of his style carried conviction both where he was right and where the short experience of a hundred years has proved him to have been wholly wrong. He wrote upon love, and half the lessons to be drawn from his writing will be condemned by the sane. He wrote upon botany at vast length; he wrote also upon music—with what success in either department I am incompetent to determine. He wrote upon human inequality: and though the sentences were beautiful and the sentiment just, the analysis was very insufficient and the historical conception bad. He wrote upon a project for perpetual peace, which was rubbish; and he wrote upon the government of Poland an essay which was a perfect masterpiece.

Rousseau wrote about many topics: his personality was intense, anxious, and troubled. His extreme sensitivity eventually turned into something that resembled mania as he got older. He wrote about education, and the brilliance of his style convinced people both when he was correct and where the brief experience of a hundred years has shown he was completely wrong. He wrote about love, and many of the lessons from his writing will be criticized by rational thinkers. He wrote extensively on botany; he also wrote about music—I'm not qualified to judge his success in either field. He wrote about human inequality: while the sentences were beautiful and the sentiment was right, the analysis was quite lacking and the historical perspective was poor. He wrote a proposal for perpetual peace, which was nonsense; and he wrote an essay on the government of Poland that was truly outstanding.

But when a great writer writes, each of his great writings has a life of its own, and it was[Pg 32] not any of these other writings of Rousseau, on love or botany, which were the text of the Revolution. The text of the Revolution was his Contrat Social.

But when a great writer creates, each of their significant works has its own identity, and it was[Pg 32] none of Rousseau's other writings on love or botany that formed the foundation of the Revolution. The foundation of the Revolution was his Contrat Social.

Now it is not too much to say that never in the history of political theory has a political theory been put forward so lucidly, so convincingly, so tersely or so accurately as in this short and wonderful book. The modern publisher in this country would be ashamed to print it: not for its views (which would now seem commonplace), nor for its excellence, which would ensure it a failure, but for its brevity. It is as short as a gospel, and would cover but a hundred pages of one of our serious reviews. A modern publisher in this city would not know what price to set upon such a work, and the modern reader in this country would be puzzled to understand how a great thing could be got within so narrow a compass. A debate in Parliament or the libretto of a long pantomime is of greater volume.

Now, it’s safe to say that never in the history of political theory has a theory been presented so clearly, so persuasively, so concisely, or so accurately as in this short and amazing book. A modern publisher in this country would be embarrassed to print it: not because of its viewpoints (which would now seem ordinary), nor because of its quality, which would likely lead to its failure, but because of its length. It’s as brief as a gospel and would only take up about a hundred pages in one of our serious journals. A contemporary publisher in this city wouldn’t know what price to set for such a work, and today’s reader in this country would be confused about how such an important thing could be contained within such a small space. A debate in Parliament or the script of a long pantomime is much longer.

Nevertheless, if it be closely read the Contrat Social will be discovered to say all that can be said of the moral basis of democracy. Our ignorance of the historical basis of the State is presumed in the very opening lines of it. The logical priority of the family to the State is the next statement. The ridiculous and shameful argument that strength is the basis of authority—which has never had standing save among the uninstructed or the superficial—is contemptuously dismissed in a very simple proof which forms the third chapter,[Pg 33] and that chapter is not a page of a book in length. It is with the fifth chapter that the powerful argument begins, and the logical precedence of human association to any particular form of government is the foundation stone of that analysis. It is this indeed which gives its title to the book: the moral authority of men in community arises from conscious association; or, as an exact phraseology would have it, a “social contract.” All the business of democracy as based upon the only moral authority in a State follows from this first principle, and is developed in Rousseau’s extraordinary achievement which, much more than any other writing not religious, has affected the destiny of mankind.

Nevertheless, if read closely, the Contrat Social reveals everything that can be said about the moral foundation of democracy. Our lack of knowledge about the historical basis of the State is assumed right from the opening lines. The next point is the logical priority of the family over the State. The silly and shameful argument that strength is the basis of authority—which has only found support among the uninformed or superficial thinkers—is dismissively countered with a simple proof that forms the third chapter,[Pg 33] and that chapter is less than a page long. The powerful argument begins in the fifth chapter, where the logical precedence of human association to any specific form of government is the foundation of that analysis. It is this idea that gives the book its title: the moral authority of individuals in a community arises from conscious association; or, as one might precisely phrase it, a “social contract.” All the workings of democracy based on the only moral authority in a State stem from this foundational principle and are elaborated in Rousseau’s remarkable work, which, more than any other non-religious writing, has shaped the course of humanity.

It is indeed astonishing to one who is well acquainted not only with the matter, but with the manner of the Contrat Social, to remark what criticisms have been passed upon it by those who either have not read the work or, having read it, did so with an imperfect knowledge of the meaning of French words. The two great counter arguments, the one theoretic the other practical, which democracy has to meet, stand luminously exposed in these pages, though in so short a treatise the author might have been excused from considering them. The theoretical argument against democracy is, of course, that man being prone to evil, something external to him and indifferent to his passions must be put up to govern him; the people will corrupt themselves, but a despot or an oligarchy, when it has satisfied its corrupt desires, still has a wide margin[Pg 34] over which it may rule well because it is indifferent. You cannot bribe the despot or the oligarch beyond the limit of his desires, but a whole people can follow its own corrupt desires to the full, and they will infect all government.

It’s truly surprising for someone who is well-informed about both the content and the style of the Contrat Social to see the criticisms it has received from those who either haven’t read the work or, if they have, did so with a limited understanding of French. The two main counterarguments that democracy faces—one theoretical and the other practical—are clearly laid out in these pages, even though the author could have been excused for not addressing them in such a brief treatise. The theoretical argument against democracy is that humans are naturally inclined to do wrong, so something external to them and uninfluenced by their desires must be in charge. The people will corrupt themselves, but a despot or an oligarchy, once their corrupt desires are satisfied, has a significant range[Pg 34] within which they can govern effectively because they are indifferent. You can’t bribe a despot or oligarch beyond their desires, but an entire population can fully pursue its corrupt desires, which will taint all forms of government.

The full practice of democracy, therefore, says Rousseau, is better suited to angels than to men.

The complete practice of democracy, according to Rousseau, is more suited to angels than to humans.

As to the practical argument that men are not sufficiently conscious of the State to practise democracy, save in small communities, that plea also is recognised and stated better than any one else has stated it. For there is not in this book an apology for democracy as a method of government, but a statement of why and how democracy is right.

As for the practical argument that men aren't truly aware of the State to practice democracy, except in small communities, that point is understood and articulated better than anyone has ever done. This book doesn't apologize for democracy as a form of government; instead, it explains why and how democracy is justified.

The silly confusion which regards a representative method as essentially democratic has never been more contemptuously dealt with, nor more thoroughly, than in the few words in which the Contrat Social dismisses it for ever; though it was left to our own time to discover, in the school of unpleasant experience, how right was Rousseau in this particular condemnation.

The foolish mix-up that sees a representative method as fundamentally democratic has never been more scornfully addressed or thoroughly dismissed than in the brief remarks made in the Contrat Social; however, it has taken our era, through a series of unpleasant experiences, to understand just how accurate Rousseau was in this particular criticism.

Exiguous as are the limits within which the great writer has finally decided the theory of democracy, he finds space for side issues which nowhere else but in this book had been orderly considered, and which, when once one has heard them mentioned, one sees to be of the most excellent wisdom: that the fundamental laws, or original and particular bonds, of a new democracy must come from a[Pg 35] source external to itself; that to the nature of the people for whom one is legislating, however democratic the form of the State, we must conform the particulars of law; that a democracy cannot live without “tribunes”; that no utterly inflexible law can be permitted in the State—and hence the necessity for dictatorship in exceptional times; that no code can foresee future details—and so forth.

Although the boundaries within which the great writer has ultimately defined the theory of democracy are narrow, he still finds room for topics that are only organized and explored in this book. Once they are brought up, it's clear they're full of valuable insights: that the fundamental laws, or unique and specific ties, of a new democracy must stem from a[Pg 35] source outside of itself; that the laws must align with the character of the people for whom they are being created, regardless of how democratic the government is; that a democracy cannot survive without “tribunes”; that no completely rigid law can exist in the State—underscoring the need for dictatorship in exceptional circumstances; that no legal code can predict future details—and so on.

It would be a legitimate and entertaining task to challenge any man who had not read the Contrat Social (and this would include most academic writers upon the treatise) to challenge any such one, I say, to put down an argument against democratic theory which could not be found within those few pages, or to suggest a limitation of it which Rousseau had not touched on.

It would be a legitimate and entertaining task to challenge anyone who hadn't read the Contrat Social (and that would include most academic writers on the topic) to come up with an argument against democratic theory that isn't already covered in those few pages or to propose a limitation that Rousseau hadn't addressed.

If proof were needed of what particular merits this pamphlet displayed, it would be sufficient to point out that in a time when the problem represented by religion was least comprehended, when the practice of religion was at its lowest, and when the meaning, almost, of religion had left men’s minds, Rousseau was capable of writing his final chapter.

If proof were needed of the specific qualities this pamphlet showed, it would be enough to note that during a time when the issues surrounding religion were poorly understood, when religious practice was at its lowest, and when the significance of religion had almost vanished from people's thoughts, Rousseau was still able to write his final chapter.

That the great religious revival of the nineteenth century should have proved Rousseau’s view of religion in the State to be insufficient is in no way remarkable, for when Rousseau wrote, that revival was undreamt of; what is remarkable is that he should have allowed as he did for the religious sentiment, and above all, that he should have seen how[Pg 36] impossible it is for a selection of Christian dogma to be accepted as a civic religion.

That the major religious revival of the nineteenth century showed that Rousseau’s perspective on religion in the State was inadequate is not surprising, since when Rousseau wrote, that revival was completely unexpected; what is surprising is that he acknowledged the role of religious sentiment and, more importantly, recognized how[Pg 36] impossible it is for a chosen set of Christian beliefs to be accepted as a civic religion.

It is further amazing that at such a time a man could be found who should appreciate that for the State, to have unity, it must possess a religion, and Rousseau’s attempt to define that minimum or substratum of religion without which unity could not exist in the State unfortunately became the commonplace of the politicians, and particularly of the English politicians who succeeded him. Who might not think, for instance, that he was reading—though better expressed, of course, than a politician could put it—some “Liberal” politician at Westminster, if he were to come on such phrases as these with regard to what should be taught in the schools of the country?

It's also incredible that at such a time, a man could be found who understood that for the State to have unity, it needs a religion. Rousseau’s effort to outline that basic element of religion essential for unity in the State unfortunately became a standard idea among politicians, especially the English politicians who came after him. Who wouldn’t think, for example, that he was reading—although expressed better than any politician could manage—some “Liberal” politician in Westminster if he came across phrases like these about what should be taught in the country’s schools?

“The doctrines taught by the State should be simple, few in number, expressed with precision and without explanation or commentary. The existence of a powerful God, beneficent, providential and good; the future life; the happiness of the good and the punishment of evil; the sanctity of the agreements which bind society together and of laws; while as for negative doctrines, one is sufficient, and that one is the wickedness of intolerance.”

“The beliefs promoted by the State should be straightforward, limited in number, clearly stated, and without any further explanation or commentary. They should include the existence of a powerful, benevolent, and good God; the afterlife; the happiness of the virtuous and the punishment of the wicked; the importance of the agreements that unite society and of laws; as for negative beliefs, just one will do, and that is the evil of intolerance.”

Rousseau’s hundred pages are the direct source of the theory of the modern State; their lucidity and unmatched economy of diction; their rigid analysis, their epigrammatic judgment and wisdom—these are the reservoirs from whence modern democracy has flowed; what are now proved to be the errors of democracy are errors against which[Pg 37] the Contrat Social warned men; the moral apology of democracy is the moral apology written by Rousseau; and if in this one point of religion he struck a more confused and a less determined note than in the rest, it must be remembered that in his time no other man understood what part religion played in human affairs; for in his days the few who studied religion and observed it could not connect it in any way with the political nature of man, and of those who counted in the intellect of Europe, by far the greater number thought political problems better solved if religion (which they had lost) were treated as negligible. They were wrong—and Rousseau, in his generalities upon the soul, was insufficient; both were beneath the height of a final theory of man, but Rousseau came much nearer to comprehension, even in this point of religion, than did any of his contemporaries.

Rousseau’s hundred pages are the direct source of the theory of the modern State; their clarity and unmatched economy of language; their thorough analysis, sharp judgment, and wisdom—these are the foundations from which modern democracy has emerged; what are now recognized as the errors of democracy are the mistakes that the Contrat Social warned people about; the moral justification of democracy is the moral justification written by Rousseau; and if in this one aspect of religion he expressed a more confused and less clear stance than in other areas, it must be noted that in his time, no one else grasped the role religion played in human affairs; back then, the few who studied and practiced religion could not connect it in any way to the political nature of humanity, and among those who were influential in European thought, the vast majority believed that political issues were better addressed if religion (which they had abandoned) was treated as irrelevant. They were mistaken—and while Rousseau’s thoughts on the soul were lacking, he got closer to understanding this aspect of religion than any of his contemporaries.


III

THE CHARACTERS OF THE REVOLUTION

KING LOUIS XVI

As might be expected, the character of King Louis XVI has suffered more distortion at the hands of historians than has any other of the revolutionary figures; and this because he combined with that personal character of his a certain office to[Pg 38] which were traditionally attached certain points of view and methods of action which the historian takes for granted when he deals with the character of the man. As any one thinking of a judge of some standing upon the English bench cannot but believe that he is possessed of some learning or some gravity, etc.; as any one hearing of a famous soldier cannot but believe that he has certain qualities associated with the business of soldiering, so historians tend to confuse the personality and character of Louis XVI with that of his office; they either by contrast exaggerate his unkingly defects or by sympathy exaggerate his kingly opposition to reform.

As you might expect, the character of King Louis XVI has been more distorted by historians than any other revolutionary figure. This is because he blended his personal traits with the responsibilities of his office, which historically come with certain perspectives and methods of action that historians often assume when evaluating him. Just as anyone considering a respected judge in the English courts can't help but think that he possesses some level of knowledge or seriousness, and anyone hearing about a famous soldier is likely to attribute certain qualities related to their profession, historians tend to mix up the personality and character of Louis XVI with that of his role. They either exaggerate his non-kingly flaws in contrast or, out of sympathy, amplify his royal resistance to reform.

The student will do well to avoid this error and its source, and to think of Louis as of a man who had been casually introduced, almost without preparation, into the office which he held. In other words, the student will do well, in his reading of the Revolution, to consider Louis XVI simply as a man, and his character as a private character. For this last of the long, unbroken line of Capetians possessed a character essentially individual. It was of a type which, no matter what accidents of fortune might have fallen upon its possessor, would have remained the same. Nor was ever a man possessed of high office whom high office had less moulded.

The student should avoid this mistake and its cause, and think of Louis as someone who was almost randomly introduced, without much preparation, into the role he held. In other words, the student would benefit, when reading about the Revolution, from viewing Louis XVI simply as a person, focusing on his personal character. This last member of the long, unbroken line of Capetians had a character that was fundamentally unique. It was of a type that, regardless of any twists of fate that might have affected its owner, would have remained unchanged. No one in a high position was ever less shaped by that position than he was.

Men thus impervious to their environment are commonly so from two causes: either from an intense and vivid personal initiative[Pg 39] which may border upon madness, or from something thick and heavy in their moral accoutrement which defends against external action the inner personal temperament. The latter was the case with Louis.

Men who seem unaffected by their surroundings usually have one of two reasons: either they possess a strong and intense personal drive that might verge on madness, or they have a dense and heavy moral framework that protects their inner temperament from outside influences. Louis was the latter type.

He was very slow of thought, and very slow of decision. His physical movements were slow. The movement of his eyes was notably slow. He had a way of falling asleep under the effort of fatigue at the most incongruous moments. The things that amused him were of the largest and most superficial kind. Horse-play, now and then a little touched with eccentricity, and very plain but unexpected jokes. One may express him from one aspect by saying that he was one of those men whom you could never by any chance have hoped to convince of anything. The few things which he accepted he accepted quite simply, and the process of reasoning in the mouth of any who approached him was always too rapid for him to follow. But it must not be imagined on this account that the moral integument so described was wrapped about a void. On the contrary, it enclosed a very definite character. Louis possessed a number of intimate convictions upon which he was not to be shaken. He was profoundly convinced of the existence and value of a certain corporate tradition in the organism which he ruled: the French nation. He was national. In this he differed from many a pedant, many a courtier, many an ecclesiastic, and many a woman about him, especially his wife.[Pg 40]

He was really slow to think and slow to make decisions. His physical movements were sluggish. Even his eyes moved noticeably slowly. He had a habit of dozing off from fatigue at the most awkward times. The things that amused him were large and superficial. He enjoyed horseplay, occasionally mixed with a bit of eccentricity, and very straightforward but surprising jokes. You could say he was one of those people you could never hope to convince of anything. The few things he accepted, he accepted without much thought, and the reasoning of anyone who tried to talk to him was always too fast for him to keep up. But don’t think that the slow nature described here meant he was empty-headed. On the contrary, he had a solid character. Louis held several deep convictions that he would not be swayed from. He was strongly convinced of the existence and importance of a certain united tradition within the community he led: the French nation. He was patriotic. This set him apart from many scholars, courtiers, church officials, and even many women around him, especially his wife.[Pg 40]

He was, again, possessed of all the elements of the Catholic faith.

He had, once again, all the elements of the Catholic faith.

It was, indeed, a singular thing for a man of his position at such a time to hold intimately to religion, but Louis held to it. He confessed, he communicated, he attended mass, he performed his ordinary devotions—not by way of tradition or political duty, or State function, to which religious performance was now reduced in the vast majority of his wealthy contemporaries, but as an individual for whom these things had a personal value. Had he, with precisely the same interior spirit, woken in his bed some morning to find himself a country squire, and to discover that all his past kingship had been a dream of the night, he would have continued the practice of his religion as before.

It was indeed unusual for a man in his position at that time to deeply embrace religion, but Louis did. He confessed, took communion, attended mass, and carried out his daily devotions—not out of tradition, political obligation, or State function, which is how most wealthy people of his time approached religious practices, but as someone for whom these actions held personal significance. If he had woken up one morning as a country squire, with the same internal conviction, and realized that all his experiences as a king had been just a dream, he would have continued practicing his faith just like before.

Now this is a sufficiently remarkable point, for the country squire, the noble, the lawyer, the university professor of the generation immediately preceding the Revolution had, as a rule, no conception of the Catholic Church. With them the faith was dead, save in the case of a very few who made it, if one may say so without disrespect, a mania, and in their exaggerations were themselves the proofs of the depth of decay into which the Church of Gaul had fallen.

Now, this is quite a notable point because the country squire, the noble, the lawyer, and the university professor from the generation right before the Revolution generally had no understanding of the Catholic Church. For most of them, the faith was lifeless, except for a very few who turned it, if I may put it that way without being disrespectful, into an obsession, and in their exaggerations, they themselves became proof of the deep decline the Church of Gaul had experienced.

Louis XVI was possessed, then, of religion: it appeared in many of his acts, in his hesitation to appoint not a few of the many atheist bishops of the time, in his real agony of responsibility upon the Civil Constitution of[Pg 41] the clergy, and in nothing more than the peculiar sobriety and solid ritual whereby he prepared for a tragic, sudden, and ignominious death.

Louis XVI had a strong sense of religion, which showed in many of his actions. He hesitated to appoint several of the numerous atheist bishops of his time, felt a genuine sense of responsibility regarding the Civil Constitution of[Pg 41] the clergy, and perhaps most notably, he demonstrated a unique seriousness and commitment in the way he prepared for a tragic, sudden, and shameful death.

It is next to be observed that though he was a man not yet in middle age, and though he was quite devoid of ardour in any form, he had from the first matured a great basis of courage. It is well to admit that this quality in him was connected with those slow processes of thought and action which hampered him, but it is not to be explained by them. No man yet has become brave through mere stupidity.

It should also be noted that although he was not yet middle-aged and lacked enthusiasm in any way, he had a strong foundation of courage from the beginning. It's important to acknowledge that this trait in him was linked to his slow thought and action processes that held him back, but it can't be entirely explained by that. No one has ever become brave just because they were naive.

It was not only the accidents of the Revolution that proved this quality in him: his physical habits proved it long before. He was a resolute and capable rider of the horse: an aptitude in that exercise is impossible to the coward. Again, in those by-products of courage which are apparent, even where no physical danger threatens, he was conspicuous; he had no hesitation in facing a number of men, and he had aptitude in a mechanical trade—a business by no means unconnected with virility.

It wasn’t just the events of the Revolution that revealed this trait in him; his physical habits showed it long before. He was a determined and skilled horse rider: the ability to ride well is something a coward cannot possess. Additionally, in those signs of courage that are visible even when there's no physical threat, he stood out; he wasn’t afraid to confront a group of men, and he had skills in a hands-on trade—a profession definitely linked to masculinity.

Now in mentioning his virility, it is of prime importance for the student to remember, though the matter can be touched upon but lightly, that Louis, in this department of physical life, suffered from a mechanical impediment which gravely distorted the first years of his marriage, which undoubtedly wounded his self-respect, and which was perhaps the only thing that caused him permanent[Pg 42] anxiety. He was cured by medical aid in the summer of the year 1777, but he was already three years a king and seven years a husband before that relief came to him. The tragedy affected his whole life, and, I repeat, must never be forgotten when one considers either him or Marie Antoinette in their intimate character, and in their effect as actors in the great drama.

Now, when discussing his masculinity, it's crucial for the student to keep in mind, though we can only briefly mention it, that Louis had a physical issue that seriously impacted the early years of his marriage. This condition likely hurt his self-esteem and was probably the only thing that caused him ongoing anxiety. He received treatment in the summer of 1777, but by then, he had already been king for three years and married for seven before he found relief. This struggle affected his entire life, and I stress again that it should never be overlooked when considering either him or Marie Antoinette in their personal lives and their roles in the larger narrative.

For the rest, the character of Louis betrayed certain ineptitudes (the word ineptitude is far more accurate in this connection than the word weakness), which ineptitudes were peculiarly fatal for the military office which he held and for the belligerent crisis which he had to meet.

For his part, Louis's character revealed some clear shortcomings (the word shortcomings is much more fitting here than weakness), which were particularly disastrous for the military position he held and the conflict he had to face.

Few men are possessed of the eye, the subtle sympathy, the very rapid power of decision, and the comprehension of human contrasts and differences which build up the apt leader of an armed force great or small. Most men are mediocre in the combination of these qualities. But Louis was quite exceptionally hopeless where they were concerned. He could never have seen the simplest position nor have appreciated the military aspects of any character or of any body of men. He could ride, but he could not ride at the head of a column. He was not merely bad at this trade, he was nul. Drafted as a private into a conscript army, he would never have been entrusted with the duties of a corporal. He would have been impossible as a sergeant; and, possessed of commissioned rank, ridicule would have compelled him to take his discharge.[Pg 43]

Few men have the insight, the understanding, the quick decision-making ability, and the grasp of human differences that makes a great leader of any size military force. Most people are average in combining these traits. But Louis was exceptionally lacking in them. He could never grasp even the simplest situation or appreciate the military dynamics of any setting or group of soldiers. He could ride a horse, but he couldn't lead a column. He wasn't just poor at this job; he was ineffective. If he had been drafted as a private into a conscript army, he would never have been given the role of a corporal. He would have been unmanageable as a sergeant, and if he had held a commissioned rank, he would have been ridiculed into resigning.[Pg 43]

This lack did not only, or chiefly, betray itself in his inability to meet personally the armed crisis of a revolution; it was not only, or chiefly, apparent in his complete breakdown during the assault upon the palace on the 10th of August: it was also, and much more, the disastrous cause of his inability to oversee, or even to choose, military advisers.

This shortcoming wasn't just evident in his failure to personally face the armed conflict of a revolution; it wasn't only obvious in his total collapse during the attack on the palace on August 10th; it was also, and even more so, the unfortunate reason behind his inability to supervise, or even select, military advisors.

Those who propose in the early part of the Revolution to check the mob in Paris, are excellent commanders: but Louis does not know it. Those who succeed each other at the Ministry of War, or at the head of the armies during the active part of the revolution are various in the extreme: but they all seem one to him. Between a fop like Narbonne and a subtle, trained cavalry man like Dumouriez, Louis made no distinction. The military qualities of La Fayette (which were not to be despised) meant no more to him than does music, good or bad, to a deaf man. From the beginning to the end of the movement, the whole of the military problem escaped him.

Those who suggested in the early days of the Revolution that the mob in Paris should be controlled were great leaders, but Louis didn’t recognize it. The people who came and went at the Ministry of War or led the armies during the active phase of the revolution were extremely different, but to him, they all seemed the same. He couldn’t tell the difference between a dandy like Narbonne and a skilled cavalry officer like Dumouriez. La Fayette's military abilities (which were significant) meant nothing to him, just like music, good or bad, means nothing to a deaf person. From start to finish, the entire military situation went over his head.

Another hole in his character, which was of prime importance at such a time, was his inability to grasp in a clear vision any general social problem. Maps he could well comprehend, and he could well retain statistics; but the landscape, as it were, of the Revolution his protuberant and lethargic eyes completely missed. He was quite unable to see where lay danger and where support, in what large masses such and such forces were[Pg 44] grouped, and the directions in which they were advancing, or upon which they must retreat. In this matter he was, as will be seen in a moment, the very opposite of Mirabeau, and it was on account of this weakness, or rather this form of nullity, that all Mirabeau’s vision was wasted upon Louis.

Another flaw in his character, which was crucial at that time, was his inability to clearly understand any broad social issue. He could easily comprehend maps and remember statistics, but he completely missed the bigger picture of the Revolution. He couldn't see where the danger was or where support lay, how various forces were grouped, or the directions in which they were advancing or retreating. He was, as will be evident shortly, the exact opposite of Mirabeau, and it was because of this weakness, or rather this lack of insight, that all of Mirabeau's vision was wasted on Louis.[Pg 44]

Finally, he had no working comprehension of Europe. He did not even exaggerate the powers of the allies in the later phases of the Revolution when they were marching upon France. He did not either under-estimate or over-estimate the policy and naval force of Great Britain, the military resources of his own subjects, the probable sympathies of the Netherlands (anti-Austrian but Catholic), the decay of Spain, the division and impotence of the Italian Peninsula. Louis saw nothing of all these things.

Finally, he had no real understanding of Europe. He didn't even exaggerate the strength of the allies in the later stages of the Revolution when they were advancing toward France. He neither underestimated nor overestimated the strategy and naval power of Great Britain, the military capabilities of his own people, the likely sympathies of the Netherlands (which were anti-Austrian but Catholic), the decline of Spain, or the division and weakness of the Italian Peninsula. Louis was completely unaware of all these factors.

One may conclude the picture (for the purposes of such a short study as this) by saying that only one coincidence could have led him through the labyrinth of the time with success. That coincidence would have been the presence at his side of a friend fully trusted from childhood, loved, as religious as himself, and yet possessing precisely those qualities which he himself lacked. Had Louis found to hand such a lieutenant, the qualities I have mentioned would have been a sort of keel and ballast which would have secured the monarchy, for he was not weak, he was not impulsive, he was not even foolish: he was only wretchedly alone in his incapacities. Certainly such a nature could trust[Pg 45] and rely upon no one who was not of this intimate kind, and he possessed no such intimate, let alone an intimate who could command the qualities I have suggested.

One could sum up the picture (given the brevity of this study) by saying that only one coincidence could have guided him successfully through the maze of time. That coincidence would have been having a fully trusted friend by his side since childhood, loved just as passionately, equally devout, and yet having the exact qualities he lacked. If Louis had such a lieutenant readily available, those qualities I mentioned would have served as a kind of keel and ballast that would have stabilized the monarchy, because he wasn’t weak, impulsive, or even foolish; he was just terribly alone in his shortcomings. Certainly, someone with such a nature could only trust and depend on those who shared this deep bond, and he didn't have anyone like that, let alone someone who possessed the qualities I suggested.

Being what he was, his character is among the half-dozen which determined the Revolution to take the course which it did.

Being who he was, his character is one of the few that influenced the Revolution to unfold in the way it did.

THE QUEEN

Marie Antoinette presents to history a character which it is of the highest interest to regard as a whole. It is the business of her biographers to consider that character as a whole; but in her connection with the Revolution there is but one aspect of it which is of importance, and that is the attitude which such a character was bound to take towards the French nation in the midst of which the Queen found herself.

Marie Antoinette presents a character that is incredibly interesting when viewed in its entirety. It's the job of her biographers to consider her character as a whole; however, in relation to the Revolution, only one aspect really matters: the stance she took towards the French nation that surrounded her.

It is the solution of the whole problem which the Queen’s action sets before us to apprehend the gulf that separated her not only from the French temperament, but from a comprehension of all French society. Had she been a woman lacking in energy or in decision, this alien character in her would have been a small matter, and her ignorance of the French in every form of their activity, or rather her inability to comprehend them, would have been but a private failing productive only of certain local and immediate consequences, and not in any way determining the great lines of the revolutionary movement.[Pg 46]

It’s the solution to the entire problem that the Queen’s actions highlight, revealing the gap between her and not just the French temperament, but also the understanding of all French society. If she had been a woman without energy or decisiveness, this difference would have been a minor issue, and her lack of understanding of the French in all aspects of their lives—or rather, her inability to grasp them—would have been merely a personal shortcoming resulting in some local and immediate effects, without influencing the broader trends of the revolutionary movement.[Pg 46]

As it was, her energy was not only abundant but steadfast; it grew more secure in its action as it increased with her years, and the initiative which gave that energy its course never vacillated, but was always direct. She knew her own mind, and she attempted, often with a partial success, to realise her convictions. There was no character in touch with the Executive during the first years of the Revolution comparable to hers for fixity of purpose and definition of view.

Her energy was not only plentiful but also constant; it became more reliable in its actions as she got older, and the drive that directed that energy never wavered, always remaining straightforward. She was clear about what she wanted and often tried, with varying degrees of success, to put her beliefs into practice. There was no one in contact with the Executive during the early years of the Revolution who matched her in determination and clarity of perspective.

It was due to this energy and singleness of aim that her misunderstanding of the material with which she had to deal was of such fatal importance.

It was because of this energy and focused purpose that her misunderstanding of the material she had to work with was so critically important.

It was she who chose, before the outbreak of the Revolution, the succession of those ministers both Liberal and Reactionary, whose unwise plans upon either side precipitated violence. It was she who called and then revoked, and later recalled to office the wealthy and over-estimated Necker; she who substituted for him, and then so inopportunely threw over Calonne, the most national of the precursors of the Revolution, and ever after her most bitter enemy; it was she who advised the more particularly irritating details of resistance after the meeting of the first revolutionary Parliament; it was she who presided over (and helped to warp) the plans for the flight of the royal family; it was she who, after this flight had failed, framed a definite scheme for the coercion of the French people by the Governments of Europe; it was she who betrayed to foreign chanceries[Pg 47] the French plan of campaign when war had become inevitable; finally, it was she who inspired the declaration of Brunswick which accompanied the invasion of French territory, and she was in particular the author of the famous threat therein contained to give over Paris to military execution, and to hold all the popular authorities responsible with their lives for the restoration of the pre-revolutionary state of affairs.

It was she who chose, before the Revolution broke out, the succession of ministers, both Liberal and Reactionary, whose unwise plans on either side led to violence. It was she who called and then revoked, and later brought back to office the wealthy and overrated Necker; she who replaced him, and then inconveniently dismissed Calonne, the most national of the precursors of the Revolution, and from then on her most bitter enemy; it was she who advised on the particularly provocative details of resistance after the first revolutionary Parliament met; it was she who oversaw (and helped to distort) the plans for the royal family's escape; it was she who, after this escape failed, devised a concrete scheme to coerce the French people through the Governments of Europe; it was she who revealed to foreign governments[Pg 47] the French campaign plan once war became unavoidable; finally, it was she who inspired the declaration of Brunswick that accompanied the invasion of French territory, and she was specifically the author of the famous threat contained in it to hand over Paris to military action, and to hold all the local authorities accountable with their lives for restoring the pre-revolutionary order.

As research proceeds, the capital effect of this woman’s continual and decided interference will be more and more apparent to historians.

As research continues, the significant impact of this woman's ongoing and definite involvement will become increasingly clear to historians.

Now Marie Antoinette’s conception of mankind in general was the conception that you will find prevalent in such societies as that domestic and warm centre which had nourished her childhood. The romantic affection of a few equals, the personal loyalty of a handful of personal servants, the vague histrionic content which permeates the poor at the sight of great equipages and rich accoutrements, the cheers of a crowd when such symbols accompanying monarchy are displayed in the streets—all these were for Marie Antoinette the fundamental political feelings of mankind. An absence of them she regarded with bewilderment, an active opposition to them she hated as something at once incomprehensible and positively evil.

Now, Marie Antoinette's view of humanity was shaped by the close and nurturing environment of her childhood. She believed in the romantic affection of a few equals, the personal loyalty of a small group of servants, the vague admiration that the less fortunate feel when they see luxurious carriages and rich decorations, and the cheers from crowds when symbols of the monarchy are displayed in the streets. For Marie Antoinette, these represented the core political emotions of people. She was puzzled by their absence and despised any active opposition to them as something utterly incomprehensible and genuinely evil.

There was in all this illusion, of course, a great element of what the English call middle class, and the French bourgeois. To be quite ignorant of what servitors will say of their masters behind their backs; not to appreciate[Pg 48] that heroic devotion is the faculty of a few; never to have imagined the discontents of men in general, and the creative desire for self-expression which inspires men when they act politically; not to know that men as a whole (and particularly the French people) are not deceived by the accidents of wealth, nor attach any real inferiority to poverty; to despise the common will of numbers or to doubt its existence; to see society established in a hierarchy not of office but of leisure: all this may seem to the democrat a very unnatural and despicable mood. But it was not despicable, still less unnatural; in the case of Marie Antoinette: it was the only experience and the only conception of society which had ever been given her. She had always believed, when she gazed upon a mass of the populace, that the difference between the crowd and herself was a moral reality. The contrast in external habits between the wealthy, the middle class, and the poor—a contrast ultimately produced by differences in the opportunity and leisure which wealth affords—she thought to be fundamental. Just as children and certain domestic pet animals regard such economic accidents in society as something real which differentiates men, so did she;—but she happened to nourish this illusion in the midst of a people, and within a day’s walk of a capital, where the misconception had less hold than in any other district of Europe.

There was, in all this illusion, a significant aspect of what the English call the middle class and the French bourgeoisie. To be completely unaware of what servants say about their employers behind their backs; not to realize that true devotion is a trait of only a few; never to have considered the general discontent of people and the creative desire for self-expression that drives them to act politically; not to understand that people as a whole (especially the French) are not fooled by the superficiality of wealth or see poverty as a real inferiority; to disregard the shared will of the majority or question its existence; to view society not as a hierarchy of roles but as one of leisure: all this may seem to a democrat to be very unnatural and contemptible. But it was neither contemptible nor unnatural in the case of Marie Antoinette; it was the only experience and understanding of society she had ever known. She had always believed, when looking at a crowd of common people, that the difference between them and herself was a genuine moral reality. She viewed the differences in behavior among the wealthy, middle class, and poor—differences ultimately created by the opportunities and leisure that wealth provides—as fundamental. Just as children and certain pets see these economic disparities as real distinctions between people, so did she; however, she maintained this illusion in a place and within a day’s journey of a capital where such misconceptions were weaker than in any other part of Europe.

Of the traits peculiar to the French she[Pg 49] knew nothing, or, to put it more strongly, she could not believe that they really existed.

Of the traits unique to the French she[Pg 49] knew nothing, or, to say it more forcefully, she couldn't believe that they actually existed.

The extremes of cruelty into which this people could fall were inconceivable to her, as were also the extremes of courage to which they can rise under the same excitements as arouse them to an excess of hatred. But that character in the French which she most utterly failed to foresee or to comprehend, was their power of corporate organisation.

The levels of cruelty this group could reach were unimaginable to her, just like the heights of bravery they could achieve when stirred by the same passions that drove them to extreme hatred. But the trait in the French that she completely failed to anticipate or understand was their ability for corporate organization.

That a multitude could instruct and order themselves for a common purpose, rapidly acquire and nominate the officers who should bring that purpose to fruition, and in general pass in one moment from a mere multitude to an incipient army—that was a faculty which the French had and have to a peculiar degree, and which she (like so many of our own contemporaries, and especially those of German blood) could not believe to be real. This faculty in the French, when it took action and was apparent in the physical struggles of the Revolution, seemed to her, to the very end, a sort of nightmare; something which, by all the laws of reality, ought not to be happening, but somehow or other was happening in a manner evilly miraculous. It was her ignorance upon this main point of all that caused her to rely so continually upon the use of the regular forces, and of those forces in insufficient numbers. She could not but believe that a few trained soldiery were necessarily the masters of great civilian bodies; their uniforms were a powerful argument with her, and mere civilian bodies,[Pg 50] however numerous, were always, in her conception, a dust of disparate and inchoate humanity. She believed there was nothing to attack or resist in popular numbers but the opinion, the fear, or the cupidity of the individual. In this error of judgment concerning the French people she was not peculiar: it is an error repeated over and over again by foreigners, and even by some native commentators when they seek to account for some national movement of the Gauls. The unlearning of it is the first lesson which those who would either administrate or resist the French should learn.

That a large group could organize and work together for a common goal, quickly elect and name the leaders to achieve that goal, and in general transform from just a crowd into a budding army—this was a skill that the French had and still have in a unique way, and which she (like many of our contemporaries, especially those of German descent) couldn't believe to be real. This ability in the French, when it activated and was visible in the physical struggles of the Revolution, seemed to her, until the very end, like a nightmare; something that, by all laws of reality, should not be happening, but somehow was happening in a disturbingly miraculous way. Her ignorance of this crucial point made her rely so heavily on using regular forces, and those forces in too small numbers. She could only think that a few trained soldiers were necessarily in control of large civilian groups; their uniforms were a strong argument for her, and mere civilian crowds,[Pg 50] no matter how many, were always, in her view, just a mix of disconnected and unformed humanity. She believed there was nothing to confront or resist in large numbers of people except the opinions, fears, or greed of individuals. In this misjudgment concerning the French people, she was not unique: it is a mistake frequently made by foreigners, and even by some local commentators, when they try to explain a national movement among the French. Overcoming this misconception is the first lesson that anyone looking to manage or oppose the French should learn.

In the matter of religion (which the reader may see in these pages to be of such moment in the revolutionary story), the queen was originally far more indifferent than her husband, though she observed a certain measure of personal practice. It was not until her heavy misfortunes came upon her that any degree of personal devotion appeared in her daily life, though it must be admitted that, by a sort of premonition of disaster, she turned to religion in the months immediately preceding the outbreak of the reform.

In terms of religion (which the reader might notice is really important to the revolutionary story), the queen was initially much more indifferent than her husband, even though she practiced some personal rituals. It wasn't until she faced significant hardships that she showed any signs of personal devotion in her daily life. However, it should be noted that, almost as a forewarning of trouble ahead, she began to embrace religion in the months right before the reforms started.

It remains to describe the personal effect she had upon those who were in her immediate presence. Most of the French aristocracy she repelled. The same misfortune which made her unable to understand the French temperament as a whole divorced her from that particular corner of it which took the shape of French aristocratic tradition. She did not understand its stiffness,[Pg 51] its exactitude, its brilliancy or its hardness: and she heartily disliked all four.

It’s important to mention the impact she had on those around her. Most of the French aristocracy found her off-putting. The same issue that made it hard for her to grasp the overall French temperament also isolated her from that specific aspect shaped by French aristocratic tradition. She couldn’t appreciate its rigidity, precision, brilliance, or harshness, and she genuinely disliked all four.

On this account she produced on the great families of her court, and especially upon the women of them, an effect of vulgarity. Had she survived, and had her misfortunes not been of so tragic an intensity, the legend she would have left in French society would certainly have been one of off-handed carelessness, self-indulgence, and lack of dignity which have for the French of that rank the savour that a loud voice, a bad accent, an insufficient usage in the rules of daily conduct, leave upon what is left of a corresponding rank in England to-day.

On this account, she had a vulgarizing effect on the prominent families at her court, especially the women. If she had lived and her misfortunes hadn’t been so tragic, the legacy she would have left in French society would surely have been one of careless nonchalance, self-indulgence, and a lack of dignity. For the French of that status, this is akin to how a loud voice, a poor accent, and a lack of knowledge of basic social etiquette affect what remains of a similar class in England today.

She was, on the other hand, easily deceived by the flattery of place seekers, and the great power which she wielded in politics just before the Revolution broke out made her, as it were, a sort of butt of the politicians.

She was, on the other hand, easily fooled by the compliments of those seeking positions, and the significant influence she had in politics right before the Revolution started made her, in a way, a sort of target for the politicians.

They haunted her presence, they depended upon her patronage, and, at the same time, they secretly ridiculed her. Her carriage, which was designed to impress onlookers and did have that effect upon most foreigners, seemed to most of the French observers (of a rank which permitted them to approach her familiarly) somewhat theatrical and sometimes actually absurd. The earnestness which she displayed in several lines of conduct, and notably in her determined animosity to certain characters (as that of La Fayette, for instance), was of an open and violent sort which seemed to them merely brutal and unintelligent; her luxury, moreover, was noticed by the refined[Pg 52] world of Versailles to be hardly ever of her own choosing, but nearly always practised in imitation of others.

They lingered around her, relying on her support, while secretly mocking her. Her carriage, meant to impress, did affect most foreigners but struck many French observers—those of a status that allowed them to approach her casually—as somewhat theatrical and at times actually ridiculous. The seriousness she showed in various behaviors, especially in her strong dislike for certain individuals (like La Fayette, for example), came off as openly violent, which they viewed as just brutal and unthinking; her luxury was also seen by the sophisticated[Pg 52] society of Versailles as mostly not her own choice, but rather a way of copying others.

In connection with that trait of luxury, the reader must appreciate at the outset that it was grievously exaggerated by her contemporaries, and has been still more exaggerated by posterity. She was not a very frivolous, still less a dissipated, woman. She was woefully loose in tongue, but she was certainly virtuous.

In relation to that trait of luxury, it's important for the reader to understand from the start that her contemporaries greatly exaggerated it, and it has been even more exaggerated by later generations. She wasn't a shallow or, even less, a reckless woman. She did have a tendency to speak carelessly, but she was definitely virtuous.

She gambled, but as the times went, and the supposed unlimited fortune of the Crown, her gambling was not often excessive; her expenditure upon jewellery and dress would be thought most moderate to-day in the case of any lady of our wealthier families. On the other hand, her whims were continual and as continually changing, especially in the earlier part of her life.

She took risks, but as times changed and the Crown's supposed unlimited wealth became more apparent, her gambling wasn't usually excessive; her spending on jewelry and clothes would be considered quite moderate today for any woman from affluent families. On the flip side, her whims were constant and always shifting, especially earlier in her life.

Since that surrounding world of the Court which she misunderstood and which had no sympathy with her was ready to find some handle against her, that handle of dissipation was the easiest for them to seize; but the accusation was not a just one.

Since the world of the Court around her that she didn’t understand and which showed her no empathy was eager to find something to use against her, the idea of her being a party girl was the easiest thing for them to latch onto; but the accusation wasn’t fair.

Had fortune made her the wife of a poor man in a lower class of society, Marie Antoinette would have been a capable housewife: her abundant energy would have found a proper channel, and she was in no way by nature extravagant.

Had fortune made her the wife of a poor man in a lower class of society, Marie Antoinette would have been a skilled housewife: her abundant energy would have found a suitable outlet, and she was by no means naturally extravagant.

She had a few very passionate and somewhat too sentimental friendships, some of which were returned, others of which their objects[Pg 53] exploited to their own advantage. The two most famous were her friendship for the Princess de Lamballe and for Madame de Polignac. These moved her not infrequently to unwise acts of patronage which were immediately seized by the popular voice and turned against her. They were among the few weaknesses apparent in her general temper. They were certainly ill balanced and ill judged.

She had a few very intense and somewhat overly sentimental friendships, some of which were reciprocated, while others were taken advantage of by their subjects[Pg 53]. The two most notable were her friendships with Princess de Lamballe and Madame de Polignac. These often drove her to unwise acts of support that the public quickly criticized and turned against her. They were among the few weaknesses visible in her overall character. They were definitely poorly balanced and poorly judged.

She indulged also in a number of small and unimportant flirtations which might almost be called the routine of her rank and world; she had but one great affection in her life for the other sex, and it was most ardently returned. Its object was a Swedish noble of her own age, the very opposite of the French in his temper, romantically chivalrous, unpractical in the extreme, gentle, intensely reserved; his name Count Axel de Fersen. The affair remained pure, but she loved him with her whole heart, and in the last months of her tragedy this emotion must be regarded as the chief concern of her soul. They saw each other but very rarely, often they were separated for years; it was this, perhaps, which lent both glamour and fidelity to the strange romance.

She also engaged in a few minor and insignificant flirtations that were almost part of her social life; she had only one true love for a man, and it was reciprocated with great passion. The object of her affection was a Swedish nobleman of her age, who was the complete opposite of the French in temperament—romantically chivalrous, highly impractical, gentle, and very reserved; his name was Count Axel de Fersen. Their relationship remained pure, but she loved him wholeheartedly, and in the final months of her tragic life, this feeling became the main focus of her heart. They saw each other very rarely, often being apart for years at a time; perhaps this is what added both allure and loyalty to their unusual romance.

MIRABEAU

Mirabeau, the chief of the “practical” men of the Revolution (as the English language would render the most salient point in their political attitude), needs a very particular[Pg 54] examination. His influence upon the early part of the Revolution was so considerable, the effect of his death was so determinant and final, the speculation as to what might have happened had he survived is so fruitful, so entertaining, and so common, and the positive effect of his attitude upon the development of the Revolution after his death was so wide, that to misunderstand Mirabeau is in a large measure to misunderstand the whole movement; and Mirabeau has unfortunately been ill or superficially understood by many among now three generations of historians; for a comprehension of this character is not a matter for research nor for accumulated historic detail, but rather a task for sympathy.

Mirabeau, the leader of the "practical" men of the Revolution (as we might say in modern terms), requires a very specific[Pg 54] examination. His influence on the early stages of the Revolution was significant, the impact of his death was decisive and final, and the debate over what could have occurred if he had survived is both rich and engaging, as well as quite common. Additionally, the positive impact of his views on the Revolution's development after his death was so extensive that misinterpreting Mirabeau largely means misinterpreting the entire movement. Unfortunately, many historians over the past three generations have misunderstood or superficially grasped his character; understanding him is not merely about research or historical details, but rather requires a sense of empathy.

Mirabeau was essentially an artist, with the powers and the frailties which we properly associate with that term: that is, strong emotion appealed to him both internally and externally. He loved to enjoy it himself, he loved to create it in others. He studied, therefore, and was a master of, the material by which such emotion may be created; he himself yielded to strong emotion and sought it where it might be found. It is foolish alike to belittle and to exaggerate this type of temperament. Upon it or upon its admixture with other qualities is based the music, the plastic art, and in a large measure the permanent literature of the world. This aptitude for the enjoyment and for the creation in others of emotion clothes intellectual work in a manner which makes it permanent. This[Pg 55] is what we mean when we say that style is necessary to a book; that a great civilisation may partly be judged by its architecture; that, as Plato says, music may be moral or immoral, and so forth. The artist, though he is not at the root of human affairs, is a necessary and proper ally in their development.

Mirabeau was fundamentally an artist, possessing both the strengths and vulnerabilities typically associated with that role: intense emotions drew him in, both from within and from the outside. He relished experiencing such emotions himself and loved to inspire them in others. Consequently, he studied and mastered the techniques that could evoke these feelings; he himself surrendered to strong emotions and pursued them wherever they might be found. It’s pointless to either downplay or exaggerate this temperament. The world's music, visual arts, and much of its enduring literature are built on this type of sensitivity or its combination with other traits. This ability to appreciate and incite emotion in others transforms intellectual work in a way that gives it lasting significance. This[Pg 55] is what we mean when we say that style is essential to a book; that a great civilization can be partly assessed by its architecture; that, as Plato wisely notes, music can be either moral or immoral, and so forth. The artist, while not the driving force behind human endeavors, is an essential and valuable partner in their progress.

When I say that Mirabeau was an artist I mean that wherever his energies might have found play he would there have desired to enjoy and to create enjoyment through some definite medium. This medium was in part literary, but much more largely oral expression. To be a tribune, that is the voice of great numbers, to persuade, nay, to please by his very accents and the very rhythm of his sentences, these things occupied the man; but he also brought into his art that without which no great art can exist: mere intellect.

When I say that Mirabeau was an artist, I mean that no matter where he directed his energies, he aimed to enjoy and create enjoyment through a specific medium. This medium was partly literary, but even more so, it was verbal expression. Being a tribune, that is, the voice of many, compelling and pleasing people with his tone and the rhythm of his sentences, occupied him. However, he also infused his art with what is essential for great art to exist: pure intellect.

He believed in the main principles at least which underlay the revolutionary movement, he understood them and he was prepared to propagate them; but his power over men was not due to this conviction: his power over men was wholly that of the artist, and had he by some accident been engaged in maintaining the attack against democracy, he would have been nearly as famous as he became under the title of its defender. We must then always consider Mirabeau as an orator, though an orator endowed with a fine and clear intelligence and with no small measure of reasoned faith.

He believed in the main principles that underpinned the revolutionary movement; he understood them and was ready to share them. But his influence over people didn't come from this conviction. His influence came entirely from his talent as an artist. If by some chance he had been fighting against democracy, he would have been just as famous as he was for defending it. So, we should always see Mirabeau as an orator, though one with sharp and clear intelligence and a significant amount of reasoned faith.

Much else remains to be said of him.[Pg 56]

Much more needs to be said about him.[Pg 56]

He was a gentleman; that is, he both enjoyed and suffered the consequences which attach to hereditary wealth and to the atmosphere that surrounds its expenditure. On this account, he being personally insufficiently provided with wealth, he was for ever in debt, and regarded the sums necessary to his station in life and to his large opportunities as things due to him, so to speak, from society. We are right when we say that he took bribes, but wrong if we imagine that those bribes bound him as they would bind a man meaner in character or less lucky in his birth. He stooped as gentlemen will to all manner of low intrigues, to obtain “the necessary and the wherewith”; that is, money for his rôle. But there was a driving power behind him, bound up with his whole character, which made it impossible for any such sums to control his diction or to make of such a man a mere advocate. He was never that dirtiest of political phenomena, the “party man.” He would never have been, had he been born a hundred years later and thrust into the nastiness of modern parliamentary life, “a parliamentary hand.”

He was a gentleman; that is, he both enjoyed and faced the consequences that come with inherited wealth and the lifestyle that comes with spending it. Because of this, despite not having enough wealth himself, he was constantly in debt, viewing the funds necessary for his social status and vast opportunities as something owed to him by society. We are correct in saying that he accepted bribes, but incorrect if we think those bribes controlled him as they would someone less honorable or less fortunate by birth. He stooped, as gentlemen often do, to all sorts of low dealings to secure “the necessary and the means”; that is, money for his role. However, there was a driving force behind him, deeply intertwined with his character, that made it impossible for any amount of money to dictate his language or reduce him to simply being a spokesperson. He was never the lowest form of political creature, the “party man.” He would not have become, even if born a hundred years later and thrown into the mess of modern parliamentary politics, “a parliamentary hand.”

Mirabeau had behind him a certain personal history which we must read in connection with his temperament.

Mirabeau had a personal history that we need to consider in relation to his character.

He had travelled widely, he knew Englishmen and Germans of the wealthier classes well. The populace he knew ill even in his own country; abroad he knew it not at all. He had suffered from his father’s dislike of him, from the consequence of his own unbridled[Pg 57] passions, also not a little from mere accidental misfortune. Capable of prolonged and faithful attachment to some woman, the opportunity for that attachment had never been afforded him until the last few months before his death. Capable of paying loyal and industrious service to some political system, no political system had chosen him for its servant. It is a fruitful matter of speculation to consider what he might have done for the French monarchy had Fate put him early at Court and given him some voice in the affairs of the French Executive before the Revolution broke out. As it was, the Revolution provided him with his opportunity merely because it broke down old barriers and conventions and was destructive of the framework of the State in which he lived. He was compelled to enter the Revolution as something of a destroyer, for by no other avenue could he be given his chance; but by nature he detested destruction. I mean (since this phrase is somewhat vague) he detested that spirit which will disendow a nation of certain permanent institutions serving definite ends, without a clear scheme of how those institutions should be replaced by others to serve similar ends. It was on this account that he was most genuinely and sincerely a defender of the monarchy: a permanent institution serving the definite ends of national unity and the repression of tendencies to oligarchy in the State.

He had traveled a lot and was familiar with wealthy Englishmen and Germans. He didn’t know the common people well, even in his own country; abroad, he didn’t know them at all. He had suffered from his father's dislike, from the consequences of his own unchecked passions, and also quite a bit from random misfortune. He was capable of long-lasting and devoted love for a woman, but he hadn’t had the chance for that kind of relationship until just a few months before his death. He could have been loyal and hardworking for a political system, but no political system had chosen him to serve. It’s interesting to think about what he might have accomplished for the French monarchy if Fate had brought him to Court early on and given him a say in the French Executive's affairs before the Revolution started. However, the Revolution only offered him his chance because it broke down old barriers and conventions, destroying the structures of the State he lived in. He was forced to join the Revolution as a kind of destroyer, as that was the only way he could find an opportunity; but by nature, he hated destruction. I mean (since this phrase might be a bit unclear), he hated the spirit that strips a nation of its established institutions that serve clear purposes, without a solid plan for how to replace those institutions with others that would serve similar purposes. For this reason, he was genuinely and sincerely a defender of the monarchy: a lasting institution that served the clear goals of national unity and preventing oligarchic tendencies within the State.

Mirabeau had none of the revolutionary Vision. In mind he was prematurely aged, for his mind had worked very rapidly over[Pg 58] a very varied field of experience. The pure doctrine of democracy which was a religion to many of his contemporaries, with all the consequences of a religion, he had never thought of accepting. But certain consequences of the proposed reforms strongly appealed to him. He loved to be rid of meaningless and dead barriers, privileges which no longer corresponded to real social differences, old traditions in the management of trade which no longer corresponded to the economic circumstances of his time, and (this is the pivotal point) the fossils of an old religious creed which, like nearly all of his rank, he simply took for granted to be dead: for Mirabeau was utterly divorced from the Catholic Church.

Mirabeau didn't share the revolutionary vision. He seemed older than his years because his mind had explored a wide range of experiences at a rapid pace. The pure doctrine of democracy, which felt like a religion to many of his peers, was something he never considered accepting. However, certain aspects of the proposed reforms really resonated with him. He wanted to get rid of meaningless, outdated barriers, privileges that no longer matched real social differences, old trade traditions that didn’t fit the economic landscape of his time, and (this is crucial) the remnants of an outdated religious belief that he, like most of his class, simply assumed was no longer alive: Mirabeau was completely disconnected from the Catholic Church.

Much has been said and will be said in these pages concerning the religious quarrel which, though men hardly knew it at the time, cut right across the revolutionary effort, and was destined to form the lasting line of cleavage in French life. There will be repeated again and again what has already been written, that a reconciliation between the Catholic Church and the reconstruction of democracy was, though men did not know it, the chief temporal business of the time, and the reader of these pages will be made well acquainted in them with the degradation to which religion had fallen among the cultivated of that generation. But in the case of Mirabeau this absence of religion must be particularly insisted upon. It would no more have occurred to Mirabeau[Pg 59] that the Catholic Faith had a future than it could occur to (let us say) an English politician of thirty years ago that the Irish might become a wealthy community or that an English Government might within his own lifetime find itself embarrassed for money. I use this parallel for the sake of strengthening my contention, but it is indeed a weak parallel. No contemporary parallel in our strange and rapidly changing times corresponds to the fixed certitude which permeated the whole of the end of the eighteenth century that the Catholic Faith was dead. Mirabeau had perhaps never engaged in his life in intimate conversation a single man who took the Catholic sacraments seriously, or suffered a moment’s anxiety upon the tenets of the creed.

A lot has been said and will be said in these pages about the religious conflict that, although people barely realized it at the time, deeply affected the revolutionary movement and was set to create a lasting divide in French society. It will be repeated time and again what has already been noted: that reconciling the Catholic Church with the rebuilding of democracy was, although unrecognized by most, the main concern of the era. Readers of this text will become well aware of the decline of religion among the educated of that generation. However, in the case of Mirabeau, this lack of religious belief must be particularly emphasized. It would never have crossed Mirabeau[Pg 59]’s mind that the Catholic Faith had a future, just as it wouldn’t have occurred to (let’s say) an English politician thirty years ago that the Irish could become a prosperous community, or that an English Government might, in his lifetime, find itself struggling financially. I use this comparison to reinforce my point, but it really is a weak comparison. There’s no modern parallel in our strange and rapidly changing times that matches the deep certainty that filled the late eighteenth century, which was that the Catholic Faith was dead. Mirabeau likely never had a close conversation with anyone who took the Catholic sacraments seriously, or felt even a moment's concern about the beliefs of the faith.

He knew, indeed, that certain women and a much smaller number of insignificant men wrapped themselves up in old practices of an odd, superstitious kind; he knew that great, dull areas of ignorant peasantry, in proportion to their poverty and isolation, repeated by rote the old formulae of the Faith. But of the Faith as a living thing he could have no conception.

He knew, in fact, that some women and a much smaller number of unremarkable men were caught up in strange, superstitious old practices; he recognized that large, uninformed groups of poor rural people, due to their poverty and isolation, blindly recited the old doctrines of the Faith. But he had no understanding of the Faith as something vibrant and alive.

He saw on the one hand a clerical institution, economic in character, providing places and revenues for men of his own rank; he met those men and never discovered them to have any religion at all. He saw on the other hand a proposed society in which such a fossil, unjust and meaningless, must relinquish its grip upon those large revenues. But of the Faith[Pg 60] as a social force, as a thing able to revive, he could have no conception. It would have seemed to him a mere folly to suggest that the future might contain the possibility of such a resurrection. The dissolution of the religious orders, which was largely his work, the civil constitution of the clergy which he presided over, were to him the most natural acts in the world. They were the mere sweeping away of a quantity of inorganic stuff which cumbered the modern State. He felt of them as we might feel of the purchase of waste spaces in our cities, of the confiscation of some bad landlords’ property in them. The Church served no kind of purpose, no one who counted believed in it, it was defended only by people who enjoyed large revenues from the survival of what had once been, but was now no longer, a living, social function.

He saw a clerical institution that was economically focused, providing jobs and income for men like him; he interacted with those men and never found any of them to actually be religious. On the other hand, he observed a proposed society where this outdated, unfair, and meaningless institution would have to let go of its substantial income. However, he couldn’t imagine Faith[Pg 60] as a social force with the ability to revive. It would have seemed completely ridiculous to him to even suggest that the future might hold the possibility for such a revival. The dissolution of the religious orders, mostly due to his efforts, and the civil constitution of the clergy that he oversaw were, to him, the most sensible actions in the world. They were simply getting rid of a bunch of useless things that cluttered up the modern State. He viewed them like we might view buying up empty lots in our cities or taking over some bad landlords' properties. The Church served no real purpose; no one meaningful believed in it. It was only defended by people who profited from the remnants of what had once been a living, social role.

In everything of the Revolution which he understood Mirabeau was upon the side of caution. He was not oblivious to the conception of popular government, he was not even mistrustful of it, but he could not conceive of it save as acting through the established strength of the wealthier classes. Of military power he judged very largely through Prussian eyes. And in long and enthusiastic passages he described the Prussian army as invincible. Had he lived to see the military enthusiasm of the Republicans he would utterly have distrusted it. He favoured in his heart an aristocratic machinery of society—though not an aristocratic theory of the State; he was quite determined to preserve as a[Pg 61] living but diminished national organ the traditional monarchy of France; he was curious upon a number of details which were present and close to his eyes: methods of voting, constitutional checks, commercial codes and the rest of it. The little equilibriums of diplomacy interested him also, and the watching of men immediately under his eye in the Parliament.

In everything about the Revolution that he understood, Mirabeau was all about caution. He recognized the idea of popular government and wasn’t really distrustful of it, but he could only imagine it functioning through the established power of the wealthier classes. He viewed military power largely through a Prussian lens and often described the Prussian army as unbeatable in long and passionate passages. If he had lived to witness the military enthusiasm of the Republicans, he would have completely distrusted it. Deep down, he supported an aristocratic social structure—though not an aristocratic idea of the State; he was determined to maintain the traditional monarchy of France as a living but diminished national institution. He was also interested in many practical details that were right in front of him: voting methods, constitutional checks, commercial codes, and so on. He was also intrigued by the small balances of diplomacy and the behaviors of the people he observed in Parliament.

It was in the Parliament that his whole activity lay, it was there that he began to guide the Revolution, it was his absence from the Parliament after his death that the Revolution most feels in the summer of 1791.

It was in the Parliament that all his efforts were focused; it was there that he started to lead the Revolution. It was his absence from the Parliament after his death that the Revolution felt the most during the summer of 1791.

This very brief sketch does not present Mirabeau to the reader. He can only be properly presented in his speeches and in the more rhetorical of his documents. It is probable as time proceeds that his reputation in this department will grow. His constitutional ideas, based as they were upon foreign institutions, and especially upon the English of that time, were not applicable to his own people and are now nearly forgotten: he was wrong upon English politics as he was wrong upon the German armies, but he had art over men and his personality endures and increases with time.

This very brief overview doesn’t really show who Mirabeau was. You can only truly understand him through his speeches and the more rhetorical parts of his writings. As time goes on, it’s likely that his reputation in this area will grow. His ideas about the constitution, which were based on foreign institutions, especially those of England at the time, weren’t suitable for his own people and are now mostly forgotten. He was mistaken about English politics just like he was about the German armies, but he had a way with people, and his personality endures and even grows over time.

LA FAYETTE

The character of La Fayette has suffered chiefly from his own aloofness towards his contemporaries on the one hand, and from his rigid adherence to principle upon the other. Both these causes are clearly connected. The[Pg 62] same quality in him which made him so tenacious of principle made him contemptuous of the run of men about him. Fundamentally, he was nearer the extreme Republicans than any other class, from the very fact of his possessing a clear political creed and a determination to follow it out to its logical consequence. But there was no chance of his comprehending the concrete side of the movement or the men engaged upon it, for his great wealth, inherited in very early life, had cut him off from experience. His moral fault was undoubtedly ambition. It was an ambition which worked in the void, as it were, and never measured itself with other men’s capacities or opportunities. He made no plans for advancement, not because he would have despised the use of intrigue in reason, but because he was incapable of working it. He was exceedingly attached to popularity, when it came he thought it his due; unpopularity in its turn seemed to him a proof of the vileness of those who despised him. He made himself too much the measure of his world.

La Fayette's character has largely been affected by his distance from his peers on one side and his strict commitment to his principles on the other. These two factors are definitely linked. The same quality that made him so dedicated to his principles also led him to look down on the average people around him. Essentially, he was closer to the extreme Republicans than to any other group, simply because he had a clear political belief and a strong determination to see it through to its logical end. However, he had no chance of understanding the practical side of the movement or the people involved in it, as his considerable wealth, inherited at a very young age, isolated him from real-world experience. His moral flaw was undoubtedly ambition. It was an ambition that existed in a vacuum and didn't consider the capacities or opportunities of others. He never made plans for advancement, not because he would have looked down on using strategy, but because he lacked the ability to do so. He was very attached to popularity, and when it came, he felt it was deserved; on the flip side, unpopularity seemed to him a sign of the wickedness of those who looked down on him. He made himself the standard for his world.

Undoubtedly a very great part in the moulding of his character proceeded from his experience in the United States of America. He was then at the most impressionable and formative period of human life, little more than a boy, or at least just entering early manhood. He had just married, he had just come into the administration of his vast fortune. At such a moment he took part in the victorious rebellion of the English colonies, and it may be imagined how powerful was the effect of[Pg 63] this youthful vision upon the whole of the man’s future life; because there was no proletariat in the colonies, he never saw or comprehended the dispossessed classes of Paris—for that matter he never saw or comprehended the French peasantry upon his own lands; because a chance and volunteer soldiery had, under the peculiar conditions of the half-populated Atlantic seaboard in conjunction with the French fleet and with the aid of French money and arms, got the better of the small and heterogeneous forces of George III, he believed that a military nation like the French, in the midst of powerful enemies, could make something of an amateur civic force; because a certain type of ease in social relations was the ideal of many, perhaps of most, of those with whom he had served in America, he confused so simple and mundane an ideal with the fierce crusading blast and the sacred passion for equality which was stirring his own nation when his opportunity for leadership came.

A significant part of his character development came from his time in the United States. He was at a very impressionable stage of life, just barely a young man or maybe just starting out in early adulthood. He had recently married and had just begun managing his considerable wealth. At this pivotal moment, he participated in the successful uprising of the English colonies, and it’s easy to see how influential this youthful experience was on his entire future; since there was no working-class population in the colonies, he never encountered or truly understood the displaced classes in Paris—he never even understood the French peasants on his own estates. Because a random and volunteer army, under the unique circumstances of the sparsely populated Atlantic coast along with the support of the French fleet and French finances and weapons, managed to defeat the small and diverse forces of George III, he believed that a military nation like France, surrounded by strong enemies, could create something from a casual civic force. Additionally, because a certain type of social ease was the goal of many, perhaps most, of the people he served with in America, he mistakenly equated this straightforward and mundane ideal with the intense revolutionary fervor and the deep passion for equality that were animating his own country when his chance to lead arrived.

It may be said of La Fayette with justice that he never upon a single occasion did the right thing. It may also be said with justice that he never did politically any major thing for which his own conscience would later reproach him. It is noticeable that the Queen held him in particular odium. He had been a wealthy young noble about the Court, the friend of all her women friends, and his sympathy with the revolutionary movement at its inception therefore seemed to her nothing better than treason. There was also undoubtedly[Pg 64] something in his manner which grievously repelled her; that it was self-sufficient we cannot doubt, and that it was often futile and therefore exasperating to women, events are sufficient to show. But Marie Antoinette’s violent personal antagonism towards La Fayette was not common, though several ardent spirits (Danton’s, for instance) shared it. The mass of those who came across La Fayette felt in connection with him a certain irritation or a certain contempt or a certain rather small and distant respect; he inspired no enthusiasms, and when he timidly attempted a rebellion against the new Government after the fall of the monarchy, no one would sacrifice himself or follow him.

It can be said fairly about La Fayette that he never really did the right thing at any point. It can also be said justly that he never made any major political moves that his conscience later criticized. It's noticeable that the Queen held a special disdain for him. He had been a wealthy young noble at the Court, a friend of all her close acquaintances, and his sympathy for the revolutionary movement at its beginning appeared to her as nothing short of treason. There was also undoubtedly[Pg 64] something in his demeanor that deeply repulsed her; it was certainly self-satisfied, and it often came across as pointless and therefore frustrating to women, as events clearly illustrate. However, Marie Antoinette's intense personal animosity towards La Fayette was not typical, although a few passionate individuals (like Danton, for example) shared it. Most people who encountered La Fayette felt some irritation, a bit of contempt, or a kind of distant respect; he didn’t inspire any enthusiasm, and when he timidly tried to rebel against the new Government after the monarchy fell, no one was willing to sacrifice themselves or follow him.

It may be affirmed of La Fayette that if he had not existed the Revolution would have pursued much the same course as it did, with this exception: that there would not have been formed a definitely middle class armed guard to provoke friction in Paris: the National Guard would have been more open to all ranks.

It can be said of La Fayette that if he hadn't existed, the Revolution would have mostly unfolded in the same way, with one key difference: there wouldn't have been a clearly defined middle-class armed guard to create tension in Paris; the National Guard would have been more inclusive of all social classes.

In religion the man was anodyne, Catholic of course by baptism, but distinctly Protestant in morals and in general tone, in dogma (until the end of his life) freethinking, of course, like all his contemporaries. He was personally courageous but foolishly despised the duel. One anecdote out of many will help to fix his nature in the mind of the reader. Mirabeau, casting about as usual for aid in his indebtedness, sent urgently to him as to a fellow noble, a fellow politician and a fellow supporter of the Crown, begging[Pg 65] a loan of £2000. La Fayette accorded him £1000.

In religion, the man was easygoing, Catholic by baptism, but clearly Protestant in his morals and overall attitude. His beliefs were free-thinking, just like those of his peers, especially in dogma, right up until the end of his life. He was personally brave but foolishly looked down on dueling. One anecdote among many will help paint a picture of his character for the reader. Mirabeau, always looking for help with his debts, urgently reached out to him as a fellow noble, fellow politician, and fellow supporter of the Crown, asking for a loan of £2000. La Fayette gave him £1000.

DUMOURIEZ

Dumouriez presents a character particularly difficult for the modern Englishman to comprehend, so remote is it in circumstance and fundamentals from those of our time.

Dumouriez portrays a character that is especially challenging for the modern Englishman to understand, as it is so far removed in context and basics from today's world.

Of good birth, but born in a generation when social differences had become a jest for intelligent and active men (and he was intelligent and active), courageous, with a good knowledge of his trade of soldiering, of rapid decision and excellent judgment where troops or terrain were concerned, he was all at sea in the comprehension of men, and he bore no loyalty to the State.

Of good background, but born in a time when social differences were mocked by smart and energetic people (and he was smart and energetic), brave, with a solid understanding of his job as a soldier, quick to make decisions and having great judgment when it came to troops or terrain, he struggled to understand people and had no loyalty to the State.

It is this last feature which will particularly surprise the English reader, for it is the singular and permanent advantage of oligarchic communities such as the British that they retain under any stress and show throughout the whole commonwealth the sense of the State. To betray the State, to act against its interests, to be imperfectly conscious of its existence, are crimes or weaknesses unknown to the citizens of an oligarchy, and a citizen of this country cannot easily conceive of them to-day. In democracies and despotisms, on the other hand, to forget one’s duty to the State, to be almost oblivious of its corporate existence, is a common weakness. There is here a compensation, and by just so much as despotism and democracy permit rapid, effective and all-compelling action on[Pg 66] the part of the State, by just so much as they permit sudden and sometimes miraculous enthusiasms which save or which confirm a State, by that also do they lack the quiet and persistent consciousness of the State which oligarchy fosters and determines.

It’s this last aspect that will especially surprise English readers, because one unique and lasting advantage of oligarchic communities like Britain is their ability to maintain a sense of the State under any pressure and to show that sense throughout the whole nation. Betraying the State, acting against its interests, or being only vaguely aware of its existence are offenses or weaknesses that citizens of an oligarchy don’t experience, and someone from this country finds it hard to imagine such things today. In democracies and autocracies, however, forgetting one’s duty to the State or being nearly unaware of its collective existence is a common shortcoming. There’s a trade-off here: as much as autocracy and democracy allow for quick, effective, and compelling action by the State, and as much as they enable sudden and sometimes miraculous enthusiasm that can save or reaffirm a State, they also lack the steady and deep awareness of the State that oligarchy promotes and sustains.

Dumouriez’ excellence as a general can only be appreciated by those who have looked closely into the constitution of the forces which he was to command and the adversaries with whom he had to deal. It is the prime quality of a great commander that his mind stands ready for any change in circumstances or in the material to his hand, and even when we have allowed for the element of luck which is so considerable in military affairs, we must not forget that Dumouriez saved without disaster the wretched and disorganised bands, inchoate and largely mutinous as to their old units, worthless and amateur as to their new, which had to meet, in and behind the Argonne, the model army of Prussia.

Dumouriez’s skills as a general can only be fully recognized by those who have closely examined the makeup of the forces he commanded and the enemies he faced. A great commander’s key trait is their ability to adapt to any changes in circumstances or in the resources available to them. Even accounting for the significant role of luck in military situations, we must remember that Dumouriez managed to save the disorganized and desperate groups—unformed and mostly rebellious with their old units, inexperienced and untrained with their new ones—that had to confront the well-organized Prussian army in and around the Argonne.

We must not forget that his plan for the invasion of the Low Countries was a just and sensible one, nor with what skill, after the inevitable defeat and retreat of the spring of 1793, he saved his command intact.

We must not forget that his plan for the invasion of the Low Countries was fair and sensible, nor should we overlook how skillfully he maintained his command intact after the unavoidable defeat and retreat in the spring of 1793.

As a subordinate to an armed executive, to the Government of Napoleon, for instance, the man would have been priceless. Nay, had circumstances permitted him to retain supreme command of civil as of military power, he would have made no bad dictator. His mere technical skill was so considerable as to make the large sums paid him by the English[Pg 67] Government seem a good bargain even at our distance of time, and his plans for the defence of England and for the attack on Napoleon are a proof of the value at which he was estimated.

As a subordinate to an armed executive, like Napoleon's government, this man would have been invaluable. In fact, if circumstances had allowed him to maintain supreme control over both civil and military power, he could have been an effective dictator. His technical skill was so impressive that the substantial amounts paid to him by the English[Pg 67] government still seem like a good deal even today, and his strategies for defending England and attacking Napoleon show just how highly he was regarded.

But Dumouriez was quite unable to act under the special circumstances in which he happened to be placed at the moment of his treason. A mere ambition had carried him from intrigue to intrigue among the politicians. He despised them as an active and capable soldier was compelled to despise them; he was too old to share any of their enthusiasms, even had his temperament permitted him to entertain any vision, political or religious. He certainly never felt the least moral bond attaching him to what was in his eyes the chance anarchy of the last six months of French Government under which he served, and if he is to be branded with the title of traitor, then we must brand with the same title all that multitude of varied men who escaped from the country in the Emigration, who left it in disgust, or even who remained in France, but despaired of French fortunes, in the turmoil of 1793.

But Dumouriez was completely unable to act given the unique circumstances he found himself in at the moment of his betrayal. A simple ambition had driven him from one political intrigue to another. He looked down on the politicians, as a competent and proactive soldier had to; he was too old to share in any of their passions, even if his temperament allowed for political or religious visions. He certainly never felt any moral obligation to what he saw as the chaotic anarchy of the last six months of the French Government he served under, and if he must be labeled a traitor, then we should apply the same label to the multitude of diverse individuals who fled the country during the Emigration, who left in disgust, or who even stayed in France but despaired of the nation's future in the chaos of 1793.

It is perhaps a worthy excuse for Dumouriez’ failure to point out that he also was one of those whom the Court might have used had it known how to use men; but the Court had no such knowledge.

It might be a valid excuse for Dumouriez’s failure to mention that he was also one of those who could have been used by the Court if they had known how to utilize people, but the Court lacked that knowledge.

DANTON

The character of Danton has more widely impressed the world than that of any other[Pg 68] revolutionary leader, because it contained elements permanently human, independent of the democratic theory of the time, and necessary neither to the support of that theory nor to the criticism of it.

The character of Danton has left a stronger impact on the world than any other[Pg 68] revolutionary leader, because it included aspects that are universally human, not tied to the democratic ideas of his era, and essential for neither supporting nor critiquing those ideas.

The character of Danton appeals to that sense in man which is interested in action, and which in the field of letters takes the form of drama. His vigour, his personal strength of mind and body, the individuality of his outline, arrest equally the man who loves the Revolution, and the man who hates it, and the man who is quite indifferent to its success or failure.

The character of Danton speaks to that part of humanity that's drawn to action, which in literature becomes drama. His energy, his mental and physical strength, and his distinct personality capture the attention of both those who love the Revolution and those who despise it, as well as those who are indifferent to its outcomes.

It is on this very account that historians, especially foreign historians, have tended to misinterpret the man. Thus Carlyle, who has great intuition in the matter, yet makes him out farmer-like—which he certainly was not; Michelet, fascinated by his energy, presents him as something uncouth, and in general those who would describe Danton stand at a distance, as it were, where his loud voice and forcible gesture may best be appreciated; but a man to be seen truly must be seen in intimacy.

It’s for this reason that historians, especially those from other countries, often misunderstand the man. Carlyle, who has a keen sense of the matter, still portrays him as somewhat of a farmer—which he definitely wasn't; Michelet, captivated by his vigor, depicts him as rough around the edges, and overall, those who try to describe Danton keep their distance, as if to better appreciate his loud voice and strong gestures; but to really see a person, you need to understand them up close.

Danton was essentially a compound of two powerful characters in man. He was amative or constructive, and at the same time he not only possessed but liked to exercise lucidity of thought. The combination is among the strongest of all those that go to build up human personalities.

Danton was essentially a mix of two strong traits in a person. He was passionate or creative, and at the same time, he not only had but also enjoyed exercising clear thinking. This combination is one of the strongest in shaping human personalities.

That which was amative and constructive in him, his virility if you will, brought him[Pg 69] into close touch with reality; he knew and loved his own country, for instance, and infinitely preferred its happy survival to the full development of any political theory. He also knew and loved his fellow countrymen in detail and as persons; he knew what made a Frenchman weak and what made him strong. The vein of Huguenotry, though he did not know it for what it was, he disliked in his compatriots. On the other hand, the salt and freshness of the French was native to him and he delighted in it; the freedom of their expression, the noise of their rhetoric, and the military subsoil of them, were things to all of which he immediately responded. He understood their sort of laughter, nor was he shocked, as a man less national would have been, at their peculiarly national vices, and in especial their lapses into rage. It is this which must account for what all impartial judgment most blames in him, which is, his indifference to the cruelties, his absorbed interest in foreign and military affairs, at the moment of the Massacres of September.

What was affectionate and constructive in him, his manhood if you will, connected him[Pg 69] closely with reality; he knew and loved his own country, for example, and greatly preferred its happy survival over any political theory. He also knew and cared for his fellow countrymen personally; he understood what made a Frenchman weak and what made him strong. He disliked the Huguenot streak in his compatriots, even if he didn’t recognize it as such. On the other hand, he naturally enjoyed the saltiness and freshness of the French; he responded immediately to their freedom of expression, the noise of their rhetoric, and their military spirit. He understood their kind of laughter, and unlike a less national man, he wasn’t shocked by their uniquely national flaws, especially their outbursts of anger. This explains what all impartial judgment most criticizes in him: his indifference to cruelty and his absorbed interest in foreign and military matters during the time of the September Massacres.

This touch with reality made him understand in some fashion (though only from without) the nature of the Germans. The foolish mania of their rulers for mere territorial expansion unaccompanied by persuasion or the spread of their ideas, he comprehended. The vast superiority of their armies over the disorganised forces of the French in 1792 he clearly seized: hence on the one hand his grasp of their foreign policy, and on the other his able negotiation of the retreat after Valmy.[Pg 70] He also understood, however, and more profoundly, the rapid self-organisation of which his own countrymen were capable, and it was upon this knowledge that his determination to risk the continuance of the war reposed. It should be remarked that both in his military and in his quasi-military action he was himself endowed in a singular degree with that power of immediate decision which is characteristic of his nation.

This connection with reality helped him to somewhat understand (though only from an outside perspective) the nature of the Germans. He grasped the foolish obsession of their leaders with mere territorial expansion without any persuasion or sharing of their ideas. He clearly recognized the vast superiority of their armies over the disorganized French forces in 1792: this gave him both insight into their foreign policy and the ability to negotiate the retreat after Valmy.[Pg 70] He also understood, more deeply, the rapid self-organization that his own countrymen were capable of, and it was on this knowledge that his decision to continue the war was based. It's worth noting that both in his military actions and in his semi-military efforts, he possessed an exceptional ability for immediate decision-making, which is characteristic of his nation.

His lucidity of thought permitted him to foresee the consequences of many a revolutionary decision, and at the same time inclined him to a strong sympathy with the democratic creed, with the doctrine of equality, and especially with the remoulding of the national institutions—particularly his own profession of the law—upon simple lines. He was undoubtedly a sincere and a convinced revolutionary, and one whose doctrine more permeated him than did that of many of his contemporaries their less solid minds. He was not on that account necessarily republican. Had some accident called his genius into play earlier in the development of the struggle, he might well, like Mirabeau, with whom he presents so curious a parallel, have thought it better for the country to save the Monarchy.

His clear thinking allowed him to anticipate the consequences of many revolutionary decisions, and at the same time made him strongly sympathetic to democratic ideals, the principle of equality, and especially to reshaping national institutions—particularly his own profession, law—along straightforward lines. He was definitely a sincere and committed revolutionary, and his beliefs influenced him more deeply than those of many of his less steadfast contemporaries. However, that didn’t necessarily mean he was a republican. If fate had brought out his genius earlier in the development of the struggle, he might have, like Mirabeau, with whom he shares an intriguing parallel, concluded that it would be better for the country to preserve the Monarchy.

It must always be remembered that he was a man of wide culture and one who had achieved an early and satisfactory professional success; he was earning a sound income at the moment of his youthful marriage; he read English largely and could speak it. His dress was not inexpensive, and though somewhat[Pg 71] disordered (as it often is with men of intense energy and constant gesture) it never gave an impression of carelessness or disarray. He had many and indifferent intellectual interests, and was capable, therefore, of intelligent application in several fields. He appreciated the rapid growth of physical science, and at the same time the complexity of the old social conditions—too widely different from contemporary truths.

It should always be kept in mind that he was a well-educated man who had achieved early professional success; he was earning a decent income at the time of his young marriage; he often read in English and could speak it fluently. His clothing wasn't cheap, and although somewhat[Pg 71] messy (as it often is with men of intense energy and constant movement), it never gave off an impression of carelessness or disorganization. He had many casual intellectual interests and was therefore capable of applying himself intelligently in several areas. He appreciated the rapid advancements in physical science and, at the same time, recognized the complexity of older social conditions—too different from contemporary realities.

To religion he was, of course, like all men of that time, utterly indifferent, but unlike many of them he seized the precise proportion of its remaining effect upon certain districts and certain sections of the countrysides. There has been a tendency latterly to exaggerate the part which Freemasonry played in the launching of him; he was indeed a member of a masonic lodge, as were, for that matter, all the men, conspicuous or obscure, democratic or utterly reactionary, who appeared upon the revolutionary stage: probably the king, certainly old aristocrats like the father of Madame de Lamballe, and the whole host of the middle class, from men like Bailly to men like Condorcet. But it is reading history backwards, and imagining the features of our own time to have been present a century ago, to make of Masonry the determining element in his career.

To religion, he was, of course, like all men of that time, completely indifferent, but unlike many, he understood the specific impact it still had on certain areas and parts of the countryside. Recently, there has been a trend to overstate the role that Freemasonry played in his rise; he was indeed a member of a Masonic lodge, just like many men—prominent or obscure, democratic or completely reactionary—who appeared on the revolutionary scene: probably the king, certainly old aristocrats like Madame de Lamballe's father, and all sorts of middle-class individuals, from men like Bailly to men like Condorcet. However, it's a backward reading of history to view Masonry as the key factor in his success by projecting today's characteristics onto a century ago.

Danton failed and died from two combined causes: first his health gave way, secondly he obtruded his sanity and civilian sense into the heated fury and calculated martial law of the second year of the Republic. To both that[Pg 72] fury and that calculation he was an obstacle; his opposition to the Terror lost him the support of the enthusiasts, but it was the interference which such a judgment made in the plans of the soldiers, and notably of Carnot, that determined his condemnation and death. He also, like Mirabeau, will undoubtedly increase as the years proceed, and, if only as a representative of the national temper, become more and more the typical figure of the Revolution in action.

Danton failed and died for two main reasons: first, his health deteriorated, and second, he tried to impose his rational thinking and civilian perspective on the intense emotions and strategic martial law of the Republic's second year. To both that[Pg 72] intensity and that strategy, he became an obstacle; his opposition to the Terror cost him the support of the zealots, but it was the disruption his views caused to the plans of the military leaders, especially Carnot, that led to his condemnation and death. Like Mirabeau, he will certainly gain more recognition as time goes on, and, as a symbol of the national spirit, he will increasingly embody the Revolution in action.

CARNOT

Carnot, the predecessor of Napoleon, and the organising soldier of the early revolutionary wars, owed his power to backbone.

Carnot, who came before Napoleon and organized the military efforts during the early revolutionary wars, gained his influence through determination.

He had not only a good solidity of brain, but an astonishing power of using it for hours and hours on end. This he owed perhaps to the excellent physical stock of which he came, the eldest of a very large family born to a notable lawyer in Burgundy.

He not only had a solid intellect but also an amazing ability to use it for hours at a time. He likely owed this to his strong physical lineage, being the eldest in a large family born to a prominent lawyer in Burgundy.

It was Carnot’s pride to hold a commission in the learned arms which were to transform at that moment the art of war: for as Bonaparte, his successor, was a gunner, so he was a sapper. His practice of exact knowledge in application, and the liberal education which his career demanded, further strengthened the strong character he had inherited. More important still, in his democratic views he was what none of the older officers had been, convinced and sincere. He had not come within the influence of the very wealthy or of[Pg 73] the very powerful. He was young, and he knew his own mind not only in matters of political faith but in the general domain of philosophy, and in the particular one of military science.

It was Carnot’s pride to hold a position in the academic arms that were about to change the art of war: just as Bonaparte, his successor, was a gunner, he was a sapper. His practice of applying precise knowledge and the broad education required by his career further strengthened the strong character he had inherited. Even more importantly, in his democratic beliefs, he was what none of the older officers had been: convinced and genuine. He had not been influenced by the very wealthy or by the very powerful. He was young and had a clear perspective not only on matters of political belief but also in the broader realm of philosophy and the specific field of military science.

It has been said of him that he invented the revolutionary method of strategical concentration and tactical massing in the field. There is some truth in this; but the method would not have been possible had he not also invented, in company with Danton, and supported after Danton left power, a universal system of conscription.

It has been said that he created the groundbreaking method of strategic concentration and tactical massing in the field. There's some truth to this; however, the method wouldn't have been possible if he hadn't also developed, along with Danton, and supported after Danton lost power, a universal system of conscription.

Carnot understood, as only trained soldiers can, the value of numbers, and he depended with great sagacity upon the national temper; thus at Wattignies, which was a victory directly due to his genius, though it was novel in him to have massed troops suddenly upon the right after a check on the extreme left of the field, yet the novelty would have been of no effect had he not comprehended that, with his young fellow countrymen as troopers, he could depend upon a charge delivered after thirty-six hours of vigil.

Carnot understood, as only trained soldiers can, the importance of numbers, and he wisely relied on the national spirit; thus at Wattignies, which was a victory directly thanks to his genius, even though it was new for him to suddenly concentrate troops on the right after a setback on the far left of the field, that new approach would have meant nothing if he hadn't realized that, with his young compatriots as soldiers, he could count on a charge that was launched after thirty-six hours of watchfulness.

He used not only the national but also the revolutionary temper in war. One of the chief features, for instance, of the revolutionary armies when they began to be successful, was the development of lines of skirmishers who pushed out hardily before the main bodies and were the first in the history of modern warfare to learn the use of cover. This development was spontaneous: it was produced within and by each unit, not by any general[Pg 74] command. But Carnot recognised it at Hoondschoote and used it ever after.

He not only tapped into national pride but also the revolutionary spirit in warfare. One key aspect of the revolutionary armies, when they started to succeed, was the emergence of skirmish lines that boldly advanced ahead of the main forces and were the first in modern military history to effectively use cover. This change happened organically within each unit rather than being directed by any commanding general[Pg 74] orders. However, Carnot noticed it at Hoondschoote and utilized it ever since.

The stoical inflexibility of his temper is the noblest among the many noble characters of his soul. He never admitted the empire, and he suffered exile, seeming thereby in the eyes of the vilest and most intelligent of his contemporaries, Fouché, to be a mere fool. He was as hard with himself as with others, wholly military in the framework of his mind, and the chief controller of the Terror, which he used, as it was intended to be used, for the military salvation of the republic.

The unwavering strength of his character is the most admirable among the many impressive aspects of his personality. He never accepted defeat and endured exile, which led the most contemptible yet clever of his peers, Fouché, to view him as just a fool. He was just as tough on himself as he was on others, completely military in his thinking, and the primary enforcer of the Terror, which he wielded, as it was meant to be wielded, for the military protection of the republic.

MARAT

Marat is easily judged. The complete sincerity of the enthusiast is not difficult to appreciate when his enthusiasm is devoted to a simple human ideal which has been, as it were, fundamental and common to the human race.

Marat is easy to judge. It's not hard to see the genuine passion of someone who is fully committed to a simple human ideal that has been, in a way, fundamental and shared by all of humanity.

Equality within the State and the government of the State by its general will: these primal dogmas, on the reversion to which the whole Revolution turned, were Marat’s creed.

Equality within the State and the governance of the State by its collective will: these fundamental beliefs, to which the entire Revolution aimed to return, were Marat’s principles.

Those who would ridicule or condemn him because he held such a creed, are manifestly incapable of discussing the matter at all. The ridicule and condemnation under which Marat justly falls do not attach to the patent moral truths he held, but to the manner in which he held them. He did not only hold them isolated from other truths—it is the[Pg 75] fault of the fanatic so to hold any truth—but he held them as though no other truths existed. And whenever he found his ideal to be in practice working at a friction or stopped dead, his unnourished and acute enthusiasms at once sought a scapegoat, discovered a responsible agent, and suggested a violent outlet, for the delay.

Those who mock or judge him for his beliefs clearly can't engage in a real discussion about it. The mockery and judgment that Marat rightfully faces aren’t aimed at the obvious moral truths he believed in, but at the way he expressed those beliefs. He didn’t just hold them in isolation from other truths—it’s a common flaw of fanatics to do that—but he believed in them as if no other truths mattered. And whenever he found that his ideals were either facing obstacles or completely halted, his unrefined and intense enthusiasm would immediately look for someone to blame, identify a culprit, and propose a violent solution for the delay.

He was often right when he denounced a political intriguer: he often would have sacrificed a victim not unjustly condemned, he often discovered an agent partially responsible, and even the violent solutions that he suggested were not always impracticable. But it was the prime error of his tortured mind that beyond victims, and sudden violent clutches at the success of democracy, there was nothing else he could conceive. He was incapable of allowing for imperfections, for stupidities, for the misapprehension of mind by mind, for the mere action of time, and for all that renders human life infinitely complex and infinitely adjustable.

He was often right when he criticized a political schemer: he would frequently have sacrificed a victim who wasn't unjustly condemned, he often identified an agent who was partly responsible, and even the drastic solutions he suggested were not always unfeasible. But the main flaw of his troubled mind was that apart from victims and sudden, forceful grabs at the success of democracy, he couldn't imagine anything else. He couldn't consider imperfections, foolishness, misunderstandings between people, the simple passage of time, and all the factors that make human life incredibly complex and adaptable.

Humour, the reflection of such wisdom, he lacked;—“judgment” (as the English idiom has it) he lacked still more—if a comparative term may be attached to two such absolute vacuities.

Humor, which reflects wisdom, was something he didn’t have; "judgment" (as the English saying goes) was something he lacked even more—if you can compare two such complete emptinesses.

It must not be forgotten that so complete an absence of certain necessary qualities in the building up of a mind are equivalent to madness. Marat was not sane. His insanity was often generous, the creed to which it was attached was obvious enough, and in the eyes of most of us it is a creed to be[Pg 76] accepted. But he worked with it as a madman who is mad on collectivism, let us say, or the rights of property, might work in our society, thinking of his one thesis, shrieking it and foaming at the mouth upon it, losing all control when its acceptance was not even opposed but merely delayed. He was valueless for the accomplishment of the ends of the Revolution. His doctrine and his adherence to it were so conspicuously simple and sincere that it is no wonder the populace made him (for a few months) a sort of symbol of their demand.

We must remember that a complete lack of certain essential qualities in forming a mind is equivalent to madness. Marat was not sane. His madness was often generous, and the belief system he clung to was clear enough; for most of us, it’s a belief system to be[Pg 76] accepted. But he approached it like a madman obsessed with collectivism, or the rights of property, might operate in our society, fixated on his single idea, shouting it out and getting furious over it, losing all control when its acceptance was not even opposed but simply postponed. He was ineffective for achieving the goals of the Revolution. His beliefs and commitment to them were so noticeably straightforward and genuine that it’s no surprise the people made him (for a few months) a kind of symbol of their demands.

For the rest, his face, like his character, was tortured; he carried with him a disease of the skin that irritated perpetually his wholly unbalanced temper.

For the rest, his face, like his personality, was strained; he carried with him a skin condition that constantly irritated his completely unsteady temper.

Some say (but one must always beware of so-called “Science” in the reading of history) that a mixture of racial types produced in him a perpetual physical disturbance: his face was certainly distorted and ill-balanced—but physical suggestions of that sort are very untrustworthy.

Some people say (but you should always be cautious of so-called “Science” when looking at history) that a mix of racial backgrounds caused ongoing physical issues for him: his face was definitely distorted and unbalanced—but physical explanations like that are often unreliable.

Those who met him in the management of affairs thought him worthless enough; a few who knew him intimately loved him dearly; more who came across him continually were fatigued and irritated by his empty violence. He was, among those young revolutionaries, almost an elderly man; he was (this should never be forgotten) a distinguished scholar in his own trade, that of medicine; and he effected less in the Revolution than any man to whom a reputation of equal prominence[Pg 77] happened to attach. He must stand responsible for the massacres of September.[2]

Those who dealt with him in managing affairs thought he was pretty worthless; a few who knew him well loved him a lot; and many who encountered him regularly were worn out and annoyed by his pointless aggression. He was, among those young revolutionaries, almost an older man; he was (and this should never be overlooked) a respected expert in his field, which was medicine; and he achieved less in the Revolution than anyone else with a similar level of recognition[Pg 77]. He must be held accountable for the September massacres.[2]

ROBESPIERRE

No character in the Revolution needs for its comprehension a wider reading and a greater knowledge of the national character than Robespierre’s.

No character in the Revolution requires a broader understanding and a deeper knowledge of the national character than Robespierre.

Upon no character does the comprehension of the period more depend, and none (for reasons I will give in a moment) has been more misunderstood, not only in the popular legend but in the weighed decisions of competent historians.

Upon no character does the understanding of the era depend more, and none (for reasons I will explain shortly) has been more misunderstood, not only in popular legends but also in the considered judgments of qualified historians.

So true is this that even time, which (in company with scholarship) usually redresses such errors, has not yet permitted modern authors to give a true picture of the man.

So true is this that even time, which usually helps correct such mistakes alongside scholarship, has not yet allowed modern authors to present an accurate depiction of the man.

The reason of so conspicuous a failure in the domain of history is this: that side by side with the real Robespierre there existed in the minds of all his contemporaries save those who actually came across him in the junctions of government, a legendary Robespierre—a Robespierre popularly imagined; and that this imaginary Robespierre, while it (or he) has proved odious to posterity, seemed, while he lived, a fascinating portrait to the man himself, and therefore he accepted it. For Robespierre, though just, lacked humility.[Pg 78]

The reason for such a noticeable failure in history is this: alongside the real Robespierre, there was a legendary Robespierre in the minds of all his contemporaries except for those who actually encountered him in government. This imagined version of Robespierre, while it (or he) has become distasteful to later generations, appeared to the man himself as a captivating portrait, and so he accepted it. For Robespierre, although fair, lacked humility.[Pg 78]

The problem is an exceedingly subtle as well as an exceedingly difficult one. The historian, as he reads his authorities, has perpetually to distinguish between what is strong and what is weak evidence, and to recall himself, as he reads, to reality by a recollection of what Robespierre himself was. If he does not do so he falls at once into the legend; so powerful is that legend in the numbers that supported it, and so strongly did Robespierre himself support it by his own attitude. The legendary Robespierre may be described in a very few lines.

The issue is both incredibly subtle and incredibly challenging. As historians read their sources, they constantly have to differentiate between strong and weak evidence and remind themselves of who Robespierre really was. If they don't, they quickly get caught up in the myth; the legend is so powerful because of the many who believed in it, and Robespierre himself reinforced it with his demeanor. The legendary Robespierre can be summarized in just a few lines.

Conceive a man sincerely convinced of the purest democratic theory, a man who cared for nothing else but the realisation of that theory, and who had never sacrificed his pursuit of its realisation in the State to any personal advantage whatsoever. This man, trusted by the people and at last idolised by them, becomes more and more powerful. He enters the governing body (the Committee of Public Safety), he is the master both within and without that body, and uses his mastery for establishing an ideal democracy which shall recognise the existence of God and repose upon civic virtue; and to establish this ideal he has recourse to terror. He finds that human defections from his ideal are increasingly numerous: he punishes them by death. The slaughter grows to be enormous; the best of Democrats are involved in it; at last it can be tolerated no longer, his immediate subordinates revolt against him in the Committee, he is outlawed, fails to raise a popular rebellion[Pg 79] in his favour in Paris, is executed, and his system of terror falls to the ground.

Imagine a man who genuinely believes in the purest form of democracy, a man who cares only about making that belief a reality, never compromising his quest for it in the government for any personal gain. This man, trusted by the people and eventually idolized by them, grows increasingly powerful. He joins the governing body (the Committee of Public Safety), becomes the dominant figure both inside and outside that body, and uses his power to create an ideal democracy that acknowledges the existence of God and is based on civic virtue. In order to achieve this vision, he resorts to terror. He discovers that more and more people are abandoning his ideal; he punishes them with death. The bloodshed becomes massive; even the best Democrats are caught up in it. Eventually, it becomes unbearable; his closest associates in the Committee turn against him, he is ousted, fails to spark a popular uprising[Pg 79] in his support in Paris, is executed, and his system of terror collapses.

This picture, though purely legendary in tone, contains not only much truth, but truth of precisely that sort which conspires to make credible what is false in the whole.

This story, while entirely mythological in style, holds a lot of truth, and it's the kind of truth that helps make the overall falsehood seem believable.

Robespierre was sincerely attached to the conception of an ideal democracy; he was incorruptible in the pursuit of it—and to be a politician and incorruptible amounts to something like what the Church calls heroic virtue in a man. He did enter the Committee of Public Safety; he did support the Terror, and when he was overthrown the Terror did come to an end. Where, then, does the legend differ from the truth?

Robespierre was genuinely committed to the idea of an ideal democracy; he was unwavering in his pursuit of it—and being a politician and incorruptible is similar to what the Church defines as heroic virtue in a person. He did join the Committee of Public Safety; he did support the Terror, and when he was removed from power, the Terror did come to an end. So, where does the legend diverge from the truth?

In these capital points, which change it altogether: that Robespierre was not the chief influence in the Committee of Public Safety, i.e. the all powerful executive of the Republic; that he did not desire the Terror, that he did not use it, that he even grew disgusted with it, and that, in general, he was never the man who governed France.

In these key aspects, which completely transform the situation: Robespierre was not the main influence in the Committee of Public Safety, i.e., the all-powerful executive of the Republic; he did not want the Terror, he did not utilize it, he even became disgusted by it, and, in general, he was never the person who governed France.

It need hardly be pointed out how such a truth destroys such a legend. The whole nature of the twelve months between the summer of 1793 and the summer of 1794 must vary according as we regard them as Robespierrean or no: and they were not Robespierrean.

It hardly needs to be said how this truth undermines that legend. The entire character of the twelve months between the summer of 1793 and the summer of 1794 changes depending on whether we see them as related to Robespierre or not: and they were not related to Robespierre.

What were they then, and why has the error that Robespierre was then master, arisen?

What were they at that time, and why did the mistake that Robespierre was in charge arise?

Those months, which may be roughly called[Pg 80] the months of the Terror, were, as we shall see later in this book, months of martial law; and the Terror was simply martial law in action—a method of enforcing the military defence of the country and of punishing all those who interfered with it or were supposed by the Committee to interfere with it.

Those months, which can roughly be called[Pg 80] the months of the Terror, were, as we'll discuss later in this book, months of martial law; and the Terror was essentially martial law in action—a way to enforce the military defense of the country and to punish anyone who interfered with it or was believed by the Committee to be interfering with it.

No one man in the Committee was the author of this system, but the one most determined to use it and the one who had most occasion to use it, was undoubtedly the military organiser, Carnot. Side by side with him one man, such as Barrère, supported it because it kept up the Committee of Public Safety which gave him all his political position. Another, such as Saint-Just, supported it because he believed that the winning of the war (in which he took an active part) would secure democracy everywhere and for ever. Another, such as Jean Bon, supported it from the old sectarian bitterness of the Huguenot. But of all men in the Committee, Robespierre supported the Terror least, and was most suspected by his colleagues—and increasingly suspected as time went on—of desiring to interfere with the martial system of the Terror and to modify it.

No single person in the Committee came up with this system, but the one most eager to implement it and who had the most reason to do so was definitely the military organizer, Carnot. Alongside him, someone like Barrère backed it because it maintained the Committee of Public Safety, which supported his entire political standing. Another member, Saint-Just, supported it because he believed that winning the war (in which he actively participated) would ensure democracy everywhere and forever. Then there was Jean Bon, who backed it out of the old resentment typical of the Huguenots. However, out of everyone in the Committee, Robespierre was the least supportive of the Terror and was increasingly suspected by his colleagues—and more so as time went on—of wanting to interfere with and modify the harsh measures of the Terror.

Why, then, was Robespierre popularly identified with the Terror, and why, when he was executed, did the Terror cease?

Why was Robespierre so closely associated with the Terror, and why did the Terror end when he was executed?

Robespierre was identified with the Terror because he was identified with the popular clamour of the time, with the extreme democratic feeling of the time, and its extreme fear of a reaction. Robespierre being the popular[Pg 81] idol, had become also the symbol of a popular frenzy which was supposed to be ruling the country. But that frenzy was not ruling the country. What was ruling the country was the Committee of Public Safety, in which Carnot’s was the chief brain. Robespierre was indeed the idol of the populace; he was in no way the agent of their power or of any power.

Robespierre was associated with the Terror because he represented the public outcry of the time, the intense democratic feelings, and the extreme fear of a backlash. Being the popular[Pg 81] idol, Robespierre also became the symbol of a mass hysteria that was thought to be controlling the country. However, that hysteria was not what controlled the country. What really held power was the Committee of Public Safety, with Carnot as its leading thinker. Robespierre was indeed the idol of the people; he was in no way the driving force behind their power or any power.

Why, when he fell, did the Terror cease if he were not its author? Because the Terror was acting under a strain; it was with the utmost difficulty that this absolute, intolerant and intolerable martial system could be continued when once the fear of invasion was removed. For some weeks before Robespierre fell the victories had begun to render it unnecessary. When the Committee saw to it that Robespierre should be outlawed by the Parliament, they knocked away, without knowing it, the keystone of their own policy; it was his popular position which made their policy possible. When he was destroyed they suddenly found that the Terror could no longer be maintained. Men had borne with it because of Robespierre, falsely imagining that Robespierre had desired it. Robespierre gone, men would not bear with it any more.

Why did the Terror stop when he fell if he wasn't its creator? Because the Terror was under a lot of pressure; it was extremely difficult to keep this harsh, intolerant military system going once the fear of invasion was lifted. A few weeks before Robespierre fell, their victories had started to make it unnecessary. When the Committee ensured that Robespierre would be outlawed by Parliament, they inadvertently removed the cornerstone of their own strategy; it was his popularity that made their approach workable. After his removal, they suddenly realized that the Terror couldn't be sustained any longer. People had put up with it because of Robespierre, mistakenly thinking he wanted it. With Robespierre gone, people were no longer willing to tolerate it.

Now, finally, if Robespierre himself had always felt opposed to the system of the Terror, why did he not take the lead in the popular reaction against it?

Now, if Robespierre had always been against the system of the Terror, why didn’t he take charge of the public response against it?

He had his opportunity given him by Danton in December 1793—seven months before his own catastrophe. The Committee[Pg 82] determined to put Danton out of the way because Danton, in appealing for mercy, was weakening the martial power of their government. Robespierre might have saved Danton: he preferred to let him be sacrificed. The reason was that Robespierre wrongly believed popularity to lie upon the side of the Terror and against Danton; he was in no way a leader (save in rhetoric and in rhetoric directed towards what men already desired), and his own great weakness or vice was the love of popular acclaim.

He got his chance from Danton in December 1793—seven months before his own downfall. The Committee[Pg 82] decided to eliminate Danton because his pleas for mercy were undermining the military strength of their government. Robespierre could have saved Danton, but he chose to let him be sacrificed. The reason was that Robespierre mistakenly thought that public support was on the side of the Terror and against Danton; he wasn't really a leader (except in rhetoric, which catered to what people already wanted), and his major flaw was his craving for public approval.

Later on, in the summer of 1794, when he actually began to move against the Terror, he only did so privately. He so misread men that he still believed the Terror to be popular, and dared not lose his popular name. A man by nature as sincere as crystal, he was tempted to insincerity in this major thing, during the last months of his life, and he yielded completely to the temptation. For the sake of his memory it was deplorable, and deplorable also for history. His weakness has been the cause of an historical error as grave as any that can be discovered in modern letters, and at the same time has wholly maligned him to posterity.

Later, in the summer of 1794, when he actually started to take action against the Terror, he only did so privately. He misunderstood people so much that he still thought the Terror was popular and didn’t want to risk his good reputation. A man who was naturally as honest as can be, he found himself tempted to be less than honest about this significant issue during the final months of his life, and he completely gave in to that temptation. It was unfortunate for his legacy and also regrettable for history. His weakness has led to a historical misunderstanding as serious as any that can be found in modern literature, and at the same time, has completely misrepresented him to future generations.

A factor in Robespierre’s great public position which is often forgotten is the great effect of his speeches. That men should still debate, after so vast a change in taste, whether those speeches were eloquent or no, is a sufficient proof of their effect. He spoke in an ordered and a reasoned manner, which bored the fine spirits of the earlier Parliaments,[Pg 83] but well suited the violent convictions of the later Revolution. His phraseology, his point of view, just jumped with that of his audience. He could express what they felt, and express it in terms which they knew to be exact, and which they believed to be grand. For his manner was never excessive, and those excessive men who heard him in an excessive mood, were proud to know that their violence could be expressed with so much scholarship and moderated skill.

One aspect of Robespierre’s significant public role that often gets overlooked is the impact of his speeches. The fact that people still debate whether those speeches were eloquent, especially after such a massive shift in taste, is proof of their influence. He spoke in a clear and logical way, which bored the refined individuals of the earlier Parliaments,[Pg 83] but matched well with the intense beliefs of the later Revolution. His language and perspective really resonated with his audience. He was able to articulate what they felt, using words that they found precise and impressive. His delivery was always measured, and those passionate individuals who listened to him in a fervent state felt proud that their intensity could be conveyed with such learnedness and refined skill.

By birth he was of the smaller gentry, though poor. It is an indication of his character that he had thought of taking Orders, and that in early youth literary vanity had affected him. He has left no monument; but from the intensity of his faith and from his practice of it, his name, though it will hardly increase, will certainly endure.

By birth, he came from a lower gentry background, even though he was poor. This reveals something about his character: he considered entering the clergy, and in his younger years, he was influenced by literary ambition. He hasn’t left behind any lasting legacy, but because of the depth of his faith and how he practiced it, his name, while it may not grow in recognition, will definitely last.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] There is but one trustworthy monograph on Marat. It will interest the student as a proof of the enthusiasm which Marat can inspire. It is by Champfleury.

[2] There's only one reliable book about Marat. It should capture the interest of anyone studying him, as it shows the passion Marat can evoke. It's written by Champfleury.


IV

THE PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION

I
From May 1789 to 17th of July 1789.

The first point which the reader must hold in the story of the Revolution is the quarrel between its first Parliament and the Crown.

The first thing the reader needs to understand in the story of the Revolution is the conflict between its first Parliament and the Crown.

Of what nature was that quarrel?

Of what kind was that argument?

It was not, as it has sometimes been represented, a simple issue between privilege and[Pg 84] a democratic demand for equality, or between traditional organs of government and a democratic demand for self-government by the nation. To imagine this is to read history backwards, and to see in the untried conditions of 1789 the matured results which only appeared after years of struggle.

It wasn’t, as it’s sometimes portrayed, just a straightforward conflict between privilege and a democratic demand for equality, or between established government structures and a democratic call for self-governance by the nation. To think this way is to misinterpret history, viewing the untested circumstances of 1789 through the lens of outcomes that only emerged after years of conflict.

The prime issue lay between legality and illegality.

The main issue was about what was legal and what was illegal.

The forms of French law and all the inherited method of French administration demanded a certain form of authority; a centralised government of unlimited power. The King was absolute. From him proceeded in the simplest fashion whatever will was paramount in the State. He could suspend a debtor’s liabilities, imprison a man without trial, release him without revision of his case, make war or peace, and in minor details such as the discipline and administration of public bodies, the power of the Crown was theoretically and legally equally supreme. It was not exercised as the enormous power of modern government is exercised, it did not perpetually enter into every detail of the life of the poor in the way in which the power of a modern English Government enters into it; it is in the very nature of such autocratic power that, while unlimited in theory, it is compelled to an instinctive and perpetual self-limitation lest it break down; and autocracy maybe compared in this to aristocracy, or more properly speaking to oligarchy, the government of a few: for where a few govern they know that their government reposes upon[Pg 85] public opinion or public tolerance; they are very careful not to exceed certain limits the transgression of which would weaken the moral foundation of their power; they welcome allies, they recruit themselves perpetually from other classes in the community.

The forms of French law and the traditional methods of French administration required a certain type of authority: a centralized government with unlimited power. The King had absolute authority. From him came the primary will of the State in the simplest manner. He could suspend a debtor’s obligations, imprison someone without trial, release them without reviewing their case, decide on war or peace, and in smaller matters like the discipline and management of public institutions, the Crown's power was theoretically and legally supreme. However, it wasn’t exercised in the same way that the vast power of modern governments operates; it didn't constantly interfere in every detail of the lives of the poor like modern English government does. The essence of such autocratic power is that, while it is theoretically unlimited, it instinctively and continually self-limits to avoid collapse. Autocracy can be compared to aristocracy, or more accurately to oligarchy, the governance by a few: because when a few govern, they know their authority depends on public opinion or public tolerance. They are very cautious not to overstep certain boundaries, as doing so would undermine the moral basis of their power; they seek allies and continuously recruit from other social classes within the community.

In the same way an autocracy always has the desire to be popular. Its strokes affect the great and the powerful, and are hardly ever aimed at the mass of the community. The intellectual, the wealthy, the privileged by birth, fortune or exceptional personal powers, are suspect to it. As for the mass of men an Autocracy attempts to represent and, in a certain sense, to obey them.

In the same way, an autocracy always wants to be popular. Its actions impact the elite and the influential, and rarely target the general public. The intellectuals, the wealthy, and those privileged by birth, fortune, or extraordinary personal abilities are viewed with suspicion. As for the masses, an autocracy tries to represent them and, in a way, to cater to their needs.

Now the French autocracy (for it was no less) erred not in the will to act thus popularly in the early part of the Revolution, but in the knowledge requisite for such action.

Now the French autocracy (which was no less) didn’t make a mistake in wanting to act in a popular way in the early part of the Revolution, but in the knowledge needed for that action.

The Parliament, shortly after it had met in May 1789, began to show, in the Commons part of it, the working of that great theory which had leavened all France for a generation. The Commons said, “We are the people; at once the symbols of the people, the direct mandatory servants of the people, and” (though this was a fiction) “we are of the people in our birth and origin. We are therefore the true sovereign; and the prince, the head of the Executive, is no more than an organ of government, morally less in authority than ourselves, who are the true source of government.” This attitude, which was at the back of all men’s minds, and which was concentrated, of course, in the[Pg 86] Commons, clashed with legality. It could not express itself in the terms of law, it could not act save in a fashion which should be, in the strictest sense of the word, revolutionary.

The Parliament, shortly after it convened in May 1789, began to demonstrate in the Commons the influence of the significant theory that had permeated all of France for a generation. The Commons declared, “We are the people; we represent the people, are their direct mandatory servants, and” (though this was a fiction) “we originate from the people. Therefore, we are the true sovereign; the prince, the head of the Executive, is merely a government official, morally lower in authority than us, who are the true source of government.” This mindset, which was prevalent in everyone’s thoughts and was particularly focused in the[Pg 86] Commons, conflicted with legality. It couldn’t be articulated in legal terms; it could only act in a way that was, in the strictest sense of the word, revolutionary.

Now the Crown, on the whole national in sympathy, and comprehending this new theory well (I mean by the Crown the general body of advisers round the King, and the King himself), was offended at the illegality not of the theory or of the pretence (for these were not illegal), but of the action of the Commons. And this comparatively small source of friction was the irritant upon which we must fix as the cause of what followed. The Nobles, by 108 to 47, decided, the day after the opening of the Parliament, to sit as a separate House. The Clergy, by a much smaller majority, 133 to 114, came to the same decision, but carefully qualified it as provisional. The Commons declared that the hall in which they met should be regarded as the hall of the National Assembly, and later made it their business (to quote the phrase of the motion) “to attempt to unite in common all the deputies of the nation in that hall and never to abandon the principle of voting individually” (that is, not by separate Houses) “or the principle that the States-General formed one undivided body.” This attitude was qualified and compromised with to some extent in the days that followed, but it held the field, and while the Commons were insisting upon this attitude as a moral right, the Nobles countered by a reaffirmation of the right of each House to a[Pg 87] separate judgment upon public matters. The Nobles were standing upon legal precedent: the Commons had nothing in their favour but political theory; if the orders sat all together and voted as individuals, the Commons, who were in number equal to the two other Houses combined, would, with their noble and clerical sympathisers, have a majority.

Now the Crown, generally supported by the nation and understanding this new theory well (by the Crown, I mean the group of advisers around the King and the King himself), was upset not about the legality of the theory or the pretence (since neither was illegal) but about the actions of the Commons. This relatively minor point of friction was the key reason for what happened next. The Nobles, by a vote of 108 to 47, decided the day after Parliament opened to sit as a separate House. The Clergy, with a much narrower margin of 133 to 114, reached the same decision but made it clear it was provisional. The Commons declared that the hall they met in should be seen as the hall of the National Assembly, and later stated it was their responsibility (to quote the motion) “to attempt to unite in common all the deputies of the nation in that hall and never to abandon the principle of voting individually” (that is, not by separate Houses) “or the principle that the States-General formed one undivided body.” This position was somewhat qualified and compromised in the following days, but it remained firm, and while the Commons were insisting on this stance as a moral right, the Nobles responded by reaffirming each House's right to a[Pg 87] separate judgment on public matters. The Nobles were relying on legal precedent: the Commons had no support other than political theory; if the orders sat together and voted as individuals, the Commons, who were equal in number to the two other Houses combined, would, with their noble and clerical supporters, have a majority.

Now the King and his advisers, notably Necker, who still had great weight, were by no means “Impossiblists” in this struggle. They desired an understanding, and through the last days of May and the first days of June the attempt at an understanding was made. But the attempt dragged, and as it seemed that nothing would come of it, on the 10th of June Sièyes moved that the Assembly should “verify its powers” (a French phrase for admitting and registering the presence of each member as acceptable to the whole body, and to the theory of its Constitution), and that this should be done “in the case of each member” (meaning members of all the three orders and not of the Commons alone), “whether the members of the two privileged Houses were present or absent.” The roll was called and completed upon the 15th. None of the nobles attended the common roll-call, three of the parish clergy (they were from the province of Poitou) did so, and thus admitted the right of the Commons so to act. A dozen of their colleagues joined them later; but that was all.

Now, the King and his advisors, especially Necker, who still had significant influence, were definitely not “Impossiblists” in this conflict. They wanted to reach an agreement, and during the last days of May and the beginning of June, efforts were made toward that goal. However, the process was slow, and as it seemed like nothing would come from it, on June 10th, Sièyes proposed that the Assembly should “verify its powers” (a French term for recognizing and recording the presence of each member as acceptable to the entire body and to the theory of its Constitution). He suggested this be done “in the case of each member” (referring to members of all three estates and not just the Commons), “whether the members of the two privileged houses were present or absent.” The roll call was completed on the 15th. None of the nobles participated in the common roll call, but three parish clergy members (from the province of Poitou) did, thereby acknowledging the Commons' right to take such action. A dozen of their colleagues joined them later, but that was it.

So far there had been no action which could be precisely called illegal or revolutionary.[Pg 88] The Commons had affirmed a right based upon a political theory which the vast majority of the nation admitted, and the legal depositary of power, the King, had not yet reproved. One may draw a parallel and compare the action of the Commons so far to some action which a trade union, for instance, may take in England; some action the legality of which is doubtful but upon which the courts have not yet decided.

So far, there hadn't been any action that could clearly be labeled illegal or revolutionary.[Pg 88] The Commons had confirmed a right based on a political theory that most of the country accepted, and the legal holder of power, the King, hadn't challenged it yet. One might compare the Commons' actions so far to something a trade union might do in England; an action whose legality is questionable but that the courts haven't ruled on yet.

It was upon the 17th of June, two days after the completion of the roll-call by the Commons, that the first revolutionary act took place, and the student of the Revolution will do well to put his finger upon that date and to regard it not indeed as the moral origin of the movement, but as the precise moment from which the Revolution, as a Revolution, begins to act. For upon that day the Commons, though in fact only joined by a handful of the Clerical House, and by none of the nobility, declared themselves to be the National Assembly; that is, asserted the fiction that Clergy, Nobles and Commons were all present and voted together. To this declaration they added a definite act of sovereignty which trespassed upon and contradicted the legal authority of the Crown. True, the motion was only moved and passed “provisionally,” but the words used were final, for in this motion the self-styled “National Assembly” declared that “provisionally” taxes and dues might be raised upon the old authority but that only until the National Assembly should disperse;[Pg 89] “after which day”—and here we reach the sacramental formula, as it were, of the crisis—“the National Assembly wills and decrees that all taxes and dues of whatever nature which have not been specifically formally and freely granted by the said Assembly shall cease in every province of the kingdom no matter how such that province may be administered.” (This is an allusion to the fact that in some provinces there was a representative machinery, in others nothing but the direct action of the Crown.) “The Assembly declares that when it has in concert with (not in obedience to) the King laid down the principle of a national re-settlement, it will busy itself with the examination and ordering of the public debt.” Etc., etc.

It was on June 17th, two days after the Commons finished their roll-call, that the first revolutionary act occurred, and anyone studying the Revolution should mark this date. It's not the moral beginning of the movement, but it is the exact moment when the Revolution started taking action. On that day, the Commons, joined only by a small group from the Clerical House and none of the nobility, declared themselves to be the National Assembly; essentially claiming that the Clergy, Nobles, and Commons were all present and voting together. Along with this declaration, they made a significant move that challenged and contradicted the legal authority of the Crown. While the motion was only introduced and passed "provisionally," the wording was decisive. In this motion, the self-proclaimed "National Assembly" stated that "provisionally," taxes and dues could be collected under the old authority but only until the National Assembly disbanded;[Pg 89] "after which day"—and here we hit the essential principle of the crisis—"the National Assembly wills and decrees that all taxes and dues of any kind that have not been specifically and formally granted by this Assembly shall cease to exist in every province of the kingdom, regardless of how that province is governed." (This refers to the fact that some provinces had representative systems while others were solely under the Crown's direct control.) "The Assembly declares that when it has in concert with (not in obedience to) the King established the principle of a national re-settlement, it will then focus on reviewing and organizing the public debt." Etc., etc.

Such was the point of departure after which sovereignty was at issue between the Crown and the States-General; the Crown a known institution with its traditions stretching back to the Roman Empire, and the National Assembly a wholly new organ according to its own claims, basing its authority upon a political theory stretching back to the very origins of human society.

Such was the starting point where sovereignty became a matter of debate between the Crown and the States-General; the Crown being an established institution with traditions that go back to the Roman Empire, and the National Assembly being a completely new body that, according to its own claims, derived its authority from a political theory rooted in the very beginnings of human society.

Two days later, on the 19th of June, the “National Assembly,” still only self-styled and possessing only the powers which it had ascribed to itself beyond all forms of law, set to work, nominated its committees, and assumed the sovereignty thus claimed. The Nobles protested (notably the Bishops), and the King, on the advice of Barentin, keeper of the Seals, determined upon immediate[Pg 90] resistance. The excuse was taken that the Royal Session, as it was called, in which the King would declare his will, needed the preparation of the hall, and when the Commons presented themselves at the door of that hall on the next day, the 20th, they found it shut against them. They adjourned to a neighbouring tennis court, and took a solemn corporate oath that they would not separate without giving France a Constitution. They continued to meet, using a church for that purpose, but on the 23rd the Royal Session was opened and the King declared his will.

Two days later, on June 19th, the “National Assembly,” still only calling itself that and holding only the powers it had given itself outside of any legal framework, got to work, appointed its committees, and took on the sovereignty it claimed. The Nobles protested (especially the Bishops), and the King, following the advice of Barentin, the keeper of the Seals, decided to resist immediately. They used the excuse that the Royal Session, as it was called, where the King would announce his wishes, needed the hall to be prepared. When the Commons showed up at the hall's door the next day, June 20th, they found it locked. They moved to a nearby tennis court and took a solemn group oath that they wouldn’t leave until they had given France a Constitution. They continued to gather, using a church for their meetings, but on June 23rd, the Royal Session was held, and the King announced his wishes.

The reader must especially note that even in this crisis the Crown did not offer a complete resistance. There was an attempt at compromise. Necker would have had a more or less complete surrender, the Queen and her set would have preferred an act of authority which should have annulled all that the Commons had done. What actually happened was a permission by the Crown that the three Orders should meet as one body for certain common interests, but should preserve the system of voting as separate Houses in “all that might regard the ancient and constitutional rights of the three Orders, the Constitution to be given to future Parliaments, feudal property, and the rights and prerogatives of the two senior Houses.” As a mere numerical test, such a conclusion would have destroyed the power of the Commons, since, as we have seen, numbers were the weapon of the Commons, who were equal to the two other Houses combined, and if all[Pg 91] sat together would, with the Liberal members of the clergy and the nobility, be supreme. But apart from this numerical test, the act of sovereignty affirmed by the National Assembly when it declared itself, and itself only, competent to vote taxes, was annulled. Moreover, the royal declaration ended with a command that on the next day the three Orders should meet separately.

The reader should especially note that even during this crisis, the Crown did not fully resist. There was an attempt at compromise. Necker would have preferred a more or less complete surrender, while the Queen and her group would have liked an authoritative act to nullify everything the Commons had done. What actually happened was that the Crown allowed the three Orders to meet as one body for certain common interests but insisted on keeping the voting system as separate Houses for “all that might pertain to the ancient and constitutional rights of the three Orders, the Constitution to be provided to future Parliaments, feudal property, and the rights and privileges of the two senior Houses.” As just a numerical test, this outcome would have undermined the power of the Commons since, as we have seen, their numbers were their strength, equal to the combined total of the other two Houses. If all[Pg 91] sat together, they would, alongside the Liberal members of the clergy and the nobility, hold supreme power. But aside from this numerical test, the act of sovereignty asserted by the National Assembly when it declared itself as the only body competent to vote on taxes was nullified. Additionally, the royal declaration concluded with a command that the three Orders should meet separately the following day.

Now at this critical point the King was disobeyed. The current of the time chose the revolutionary bed, and as it began to flow deepened and confirmed its course with every passing day and event. Already the majority of the clergy had joined the National Assembly when it had affirmed its right to sit in spite of the check of the 20th of June. There was a half-hour on that decisive day of the Royal Session, the 23rd of June, when armed force might have been used for the arrest and dispersion of the Deputies. They declared themselves inviolable and their arrest illegal, but there was, of course, no sanction for this decree. As a fact, not a corporal’s file was used against them. The next day, the 24th, the majority of the clergy again joined the Commons in their session (in flat defiance of the King’s orders), and on the 25th, forty-seven of the nobles followed their example. The King yielded, and on the 27th, two days later, ordered the three Houses to meet together.

Now, at this critical moment, the King was disobeyed. The tide of the time leaned toward revolution, and as it began to flow, it grew stronger and more determined with each passing day and event. By then, most of the clergy had joined the National Assembly after it asserted its right to meet despite the King's attempt to stop them on June 20th. There was a half-hour on that pivotal day of the Royal Session, June 23rd, when armed forces could have been used to arrest and disperse the Deputies. They declared themselves untouchable and their arrest illegal, but, of course, there was no authority backing this declaration. In reality, not a single soldier was sent against them. The next day, June 24th, the majority of the clergy once again defied the King’s orders and joined the Commons in their session, and on June 25th, forty-seven nobles followed suit. The King gave in, and on June 27th, just two days later, he ordered the three Houses to meet together.

The National Assembly was now legally constituted, and set out upon its career. The Crown, the old centre of authority, had[Pg 92] abandoned its position, and had confirmed the Revolution, but in doing so it had acted as it were in contradiction with itself. It had made technically legal an illegality which destroyed its own old legal position, but it had done so with ill-will, and it was evident that some counter-stroke would be attempted to restore the full powers of the Crown.

The National Assembly was now officially formed and began its work. The Crown, once the main source of authority, had abandoned its role and accepted the Revolution, but in doing so, it seemed to contradict itself. It had made something illegal technically legal, which undermined its own previous legal standing, but it had done this with resentment, and it was clear that some attempt would be made to regain the full powers of the Crown.

At this point the reader must appreciate what forces were face to face in the coming struggle. So far, the illegal and revolutionary act of the 17th of June, the Royal Session which replied to that act upon the 23rd, the King’s decree which yielded to the Commons upon the 27th, had all of them been but words. If it came to action, what physical forces were opposed?

At this point, the reader should understand the forces that were about to clash in the upcoming struggle. So far, the illegal and revolutionary act of June 17th, the Royal Session that responded to that act on the 23rd, and the King’s decree that conceded to the Commons on the 27th had all been just words. If it came down to action, what physical forces were in opposition?

On the side of the Crown was the organised armed force which it commanded. For it must never be forgotten that the Crown was the Executive, and remained the Executive right on to the capture of the palace three years later, and the consummation of the Revolution on the 10th of August, 1792. On the side of the National Assembly was without doubt the public opinion of the country (but that is not a force that can be used under arms), and, what was much more to the point, the municipal organisation of France.

On the Crown's side was the organized military force it controlled. It's important to remember that the Crown was the Executive and stayed that way until the palace was captured three years later, marking the completion of the Revolution on August 10, 1792. On the National Assembly's side was undoubtedly the public opinion of the country (though that isn't a force that can be wielded in battle), and, more significantly, the municipal organization of France.

Space forbids a full description of the origins and strength of the French municipal system; it is enough to point out that the whole of Gallic civilisation, probably from a moment earlier than Cæsar’s invasion, and certainly from the moment when Roman rule[Pg 93] was paramount in Gaul, was a municipal one. It is so still. The countrysides take their names mainly from their chief towns. The towns were the seats of the bishops, whose hierarchy had preserved whatever could be preserved of the ancient world. In the towns were the colleges, the guilds, the discussion and the corporations which built up the life of the nation. The chief of these towns was Paris. The old systems of municipal government, corrupt and varied as they were, could still give the towns a power of corporate expression. And even where that might be lacking it was certain that some engine would be found for expressing municipal action in a crisis of the sort through which France was now passing. In Paris, for instance, it was seen when the time came for physical force that the College of Electors, who had chosen the representatives for that city, were willing to act at once and spontaneously as a municipal body which should express the initiative of the people. It was the towns, and especially Paris, prompt at spontaneous organisation, ready to arm, and when armed competent to frame a fighting force, which was the physical power behind the Assembly.

Space doesn't allow for a complete description of the origins and strength of the French municipal system; it's enough to point out that all of Gallic civilization, probably from before Caesar’s invasion, and certainly from the time when Roman rule[Pg 93] dominated Gaul, was fundamentally municipal. That remains true today. The countryside largely takes its names from its main towns. The towns were where the bishops were based, and their hierarchy preserved whatever could be saved from the ancient world. The towns included colleges, guilds, discussions, and corporations that formed the nation's life. The chief of these towns was Paris. The old municipal government systems, as corrupt and varied as they were, could still grant towns a means of corporate expression. Even where that might be lacking, it was certain that some method would be found to express municipal action in the kind of crisis France was currently facing. In Paris, for example, it was evident when the time came for physical action that the College of Electors, who had selected the city’s representatives, were ready to act immediately and spontaneously as a municipal body to express the people's initiative. It was the towns, especially Paris, quick to organize spontaneously, ready to arm, and once armed, capable of forming a fighting force, that provided the physical power behind the Assembly.

What of the physical power behind the King? His power was, as we have said, the Regular Armed forces of the country: the army. But it is characteristic of the moment that only a part of that armed force could be trusted. For an army is never a mere weapon: it consists of living men; and though it will[Pg 94] act against the general opinion of its members and will obey orders long after civilians would have broken with the ties of technical and legal authority, yet there is for armies also a breaking point in those ties, and the Crown, I repeat, could not use as a whole the French-speaking and French-born soldiery. Luckily for it, a very great proportion of the French army at that moment consisted of foreign mercenaries.

What about the physical power behind the King? His power was, as we mentioned, the Regular Armed Forces of the country: the army. However, it’s noteworthy that only part of that armed force could be trusted. An army is never just a tool: it’s made up of living men; and while it will[Pg 94] act against the general opinion of its members and will follow orders long after civilians would have severed the ties of technical and legal authority, there is still a breaking point in those ties for armies as well, and the Crown, I repeat, could not use the French-speaking and French-born soldiers as a whole. Fortunately for it, a significant portion of the French army at that time consisted of foreign mercenaries.

Since the position was virtually one of war, we must consider what was the strategical object of this force. Its object was Paris, the chief of the towns; and round Paris, in the early days of July, the mercenary regiments were gathered from all quarters. That military concentration once effected, the gates of the city held, especially upon the north and upon the west, by encamped regiments and by a particularly large force of cavalry (ever the arm chosen for the repression of civilians), the Crown was ready to act.

Since the situation was essentially one of war, we need to think about the strategic goal of this force. Its goal was Paris, the main city; and around Paris, in the early days of July, mercenary troops were assembled from all directions. Once this military concentration was achieved, the city gates were held, especially on the north and west sides, by stationed regiments and a notably large cavalry force (always the chosen unit for suppressing civilians), and the Crown was prepared to take action.

On the 11th of July, Necker, who stood for Liberal opinions, was dismissed. A new ministry was formed, and the counter-revolution begun. What followed was the immediate rising of Paris.

On July 11th, Necker, who represented Liberal views, was removed from his position. A new government was established, and the counter-revolution started. This was followed by an immediate uprising in Paris.

The news of Necker’s dismissal reached the masses of the capital (only an hour’s ride from Versailles) on the afternoon of the 12th, Sunday. Crowds began to gather; an ineffectual cavalry charge in one of the outer open spaces of the city only inflamed the popular enthusiasm, for the soldiers who charged were German mercenary soldiers[Pg 95] under the command of a noble. Public forces were at once organised, arms were commandeered from the armourers’ shops, the Electoral College, which had chosen the members of the Assembly for Paris, took command at the Guild Hall, but the capital point of the insurrection—what made it possible—was the seizure of a great stock of arms and ammunition, including cannon, in the depot at the Invalides.

The news of Necker’s dismissal reached the people of the capital (just an hour's ride from Versailles) on the afternoon of Sunday the 12th. Crowds began to gather; a pointless cavalry charge in one of the outer open spaces of the city only fueled the public's excitement, as the soldiers who charged were German mercenaries under the command of a noble. Public forces were quickly organized, weapons were taken from the armories, and the Electoral College, which had selected the members of the Assembly for Paris, took charge at the Guild Hall. The key point of the uprising—what made it possible—was the takeover of a large stock of weapons and ammunition, including cannons, stored in the depot at the Invalides.[Pg 95]

With such resources the crowd attacked, at the other end of the city, a fortress and arsenal which had long stood in the popular eye as the symbol of absolute monarchy, the Bastille. With the absurdly insufficient garrison of the Bastille, its apparent impregnability to anything the mob might attempt, the supposed but doubtful treason of its governor in firing upon those whom he had admitted to parley, we are not here concerned. The Bastille was rushed, after very considerable efforts and an appreciable loss in killed and wounded. By the evening of that day, Tuesday, the 14th of July, 1789, Paris had become a formidable instrument of war. The next news was the complete capitulation of the King.

With those resources, the crowd attacked a fortress and arsenal at the other end of the city that had long been seen as the symbol of absolute monarchy, the Bastille. We're not concerned here with the ridiculously small garrison at the Bastille, its seeming invulnerability to anything the mob could throw at it, or the questionable treason of its governor for firing on those he had let in to negotiate. The Bastille was stormed after significant effort and a noticeable loss of life. By the evening of that day, Tuesday, July 14, 1789, Paris had turned into a powerful war machine. The next news was the complete surrender of the King.

He came on the morrow to the National Assembly, promising to send away the troops; he promised to recall Necker, a municipal organisation was granted to the city, with Bailly for its first mayor, and—a point of capital importance—an armed militia dependent upon that municipality was legally formed, with La Fayette at its head. On the 17th Louis entered Paris to consummate his[Pg 96] capitulation, went to the Guild Hall, appeared in the tricoloured cockade, and the popular battle was won.

He came the next day to the National Assembly, promising to send the troops away; he promised to bring back Necker, a municipal organization was established for the city, with Bailly as its first mayor, and—a crucial point—an armed militia that answered to that municipality was officially formed, with La Fayette in charge. On the 17th, Louis entered Paris to finalize his[Pg 96] capitulation, went to the Guild Hall, showed up in the tricolor cockade, and the people's victory was achieved.

It behoves us here to consider the military aspect of this definitive act from which the sanction of the Revolution, the physical power behind it, dates.

It’s important for us to think about the military side of this decisive action, from which the authority of the Revolution, the actual power supporting it, originates.

Paris numbered somewhat under a million souls: perhaps no more than 600,000: the number fluctuated with the season. The foreign mercenary troops who were mainly employed in the repression of the popular feeling therein, were not sufficient to impose anything like a siege. They could at the various gates have stopped the provisioning of the city, but then at any one of those separate points, any one of their detachments upon a long perimeter more than a day’s march in circumference would certainly have been attacked and almost as certainly overwhelmed by masses of partially armed civilians.

Paris had just under a million people—maybe around 600,000—though the number changed with the season. The foreign mercenary troops mainly used to suppress popular sentiment there weren't enough to really lay siege to the city. They could have blocked supplies at the various gates, but at any of those points, one of their detachments spread out over a long area of more than a day's march would definitely have been attacked and almost certainly overwhelmed by groups of partially armed civilians.

Could the streets have been cleared while the ferment was rising? It is very doubtful. They were narrow and tortuous in the extreme, the area to be dealt with was enormous, the tradition of barricades not forgotten, and the spontaneous action of that excellent fighting material which a Paris mob contains, had been quite as rapid as anything that could have been effected by military orders.

Could the streets have been cleared while the unrest was building? It seems very unlikely. They were extremely narrow and winding, the area in question was huge, the tradition of barricades still fresh in people's minds, and the quick response of the fierce fighting spirit that a Paris mob possesses had been just as swift as anything that could have been achieved through military orders.

The one great fault was the neglect to cover the Invalides, but even had the Invalides not been looted, the stock of arms and powder in the city would have been sufficient to have organised a desperate and prolonged resistance.[Pg 97] The local auxiliary force (of slight military value, it is true), the “French Guards,” as they were called, were wholly with the people. And in general, the Crown must be acquitted of any considerable blunder on the military side of this struggle. It certainly did not fail from lack of will.

The major mistake was not protecting the Invalides, but even if the Invalides hadn't been plundered, the amount of weapons and gunpowder in the city would have been enough to mount a fierce and extended resistance.[Pg 97] The local auxiliary group (which had limited military value, to be fair), known as the “French Guards,” was fully on the side of the people. Overall, the Crown shouldn't be blamed for any significant military errors in this conflict. They definitely didn't lack the determination to succeed.

The truth is (if we consider merely the military aspect of this military event) that in dealing with large bodies of men who are (a) not previously disarmed, (b) under conditions where they cannot be dispersed, and (c) capable by a national tradition or character of some sort of rapid, spontaneous organisation, the issue will always be doubtful, and the uncertain factor (which is the tenacity, decision and common will of the civilians, to which soldiers are to be opposed) is one that varies within the very widest limits.

The reality is that when we focus solely on the military side of this event, dealing with large groups of people who are (a) not disarmed beforehand, (b) in situations where they can't be broken up, and (c) able to quickly and spontaneously organize due to some national tradition or character, the outcome will always be uncertain. The unpredictable factor— which is the determination, resolve, and shared will of the civilians, against whom the soldiers will face—is something that can vary greatly.

In massing the troops originally, the Crown and its advisers estimated that uncertain factor at far too low a point. Even contemporary educated opinion, which was in sympathy with Paris, put it too low. That factor was, as a fact, so high that no armed force of the size and quality which the Crown then disposed of, could achieve its object or hold down the capital.

In gathering the troops at first, the Crown and its advisers underestimated the uncertain factor by a large margin. Even well-educated opinions at the time, which were sympathetic to Paris, also underestimated it. The reality was that that factor was so significant that no armed force of the size and quality the Crown had at that time could accomplish its goal or maintain control over the capital.

As for the absurd conception that any body of men in uniform, however small, could always have the better of civilian resistance, however large and well organised, it is not worthy of a moment’s consideration by those who interest themselves in the realities of military history. It is worthy only of the academies.[Pg 98]

The idea that any group of armed men, no matter how small, could easily overpower civilian resistance, no matter how large and well-organized, isn’t worth considering for anyone interested in the real truths of military history. It’s only something for the academics.[Pg 98]

So ends the first phase of the Revolution. It had lasted from the opening of the States-General in May to the middle of July 1789.

So ends the first phase of the Revolution. It lasted from the opening of the States-General in May to the middle of July 1789.

II
From the 17th of July 1789 to the 6th of Oct. 1789.

We have seen the military conditions under which the attempt at an armed counter-revolution failed. There follows a short phase of less than three months, whose character can be quickly described.

We have observed the military conditions that led to the failure of the armed counter-revolution attempt. Next, there's a brief period of less than three months, which can be easily summarized.

It was that moment of the Revolution in which ideas had the freest play, in which least had been done to test their application, and most scope remained for pure enthusiasm. That is why we find in the midst of that short phase the spontaneous abandonment of the feudal rights by the nobility. And that is why the violent uprisings all over France continued. It is the period in which the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, a document which may fittingly stand side by side with the Declaration of Independence (for together they form the noblest monuments of our modern origins), was promulgated. In the same period were the elements of the future Constitution rapidly debated and laid down, and notably that national policy of a Single Chamber which the modern French have imprudently abandoned. In that same period, however, appeared, and towards the close of it, another form of resistance on the part of the Crown and[Pg 99] of those who advised the Crown. The King hesitated to accept the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and similarly hesitated to promulgate the Decree of the 4th of August in which the nobility had abandoned their feudal dues. It would be foolish to exaggerate the military aspect of what followed. Louis did call in troops, but only in numbers sufficient for personal defence, and we can hardly believe that he intended anything more than to police the surroundings of his throne. But the brigade (for it was no more, nor was it of full strength) which he summoned was sufficient to kindle suspicion; and the determinedly false position of the Queen (who all her life was haunted by the idea that the regular soldiers, especially if they were well dressed and held themselves rigidly, were a sort of talisman) provoked an explosion. A feast was given in which the officers of the Regiment of Flanders, which had just reached Versailles, were entertained by the officers of the Guard. It was made the occasion for a good deal of drunkenness and a violent Royalist manifestation, at which the Queen was present, which she approved, and which some thought she had designed.

It was that moment of the Revolution when ideas were at their most free, when there had been little done to test their application, and there was a lot of room for pure enthusiasm. That's why we see the nobility spontaneously abandoning their feudal rights during that brief period. And that's also why the violent uprisings across France persisted. It was the time when the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was published, a document that can rightfully be compared to the Declaration of Independence (as together they stand as the greatest monuments of our modern beginnings). In this same period, the elements of the future Constitution were quickly debated and established, particularly the national policy of a Single Chamber that modern France has imprudently abandoned. However, toward the end of this period, another form of resistance emerged from the Crown and[Pg 99] those who advised the Crown. The King hesitated to accept the Declaration of the Rights of Man and also hesitated to announce the Decree of August 4th, in which the nobility had given up their feudal dues. It would be unwise to overstate the military aspect of what followed. Louis did call in troops, but only in numbers sufficient for personal protection, and we can hardly believe he intended anything more than to secure his throne's surroundings. But the brigade (which was no more than that and lacked full strength) that he summoned was enough to raise suspicion; and the Queen's stubbornly false position (who was always haunted by the idea that regular soldiers, especially those well-dressed and holding themselves rigidly, were a sort of talisman) triggered an explosion. A feast was held in which the officers of the Regiment of Flanders, just arrived in Versailles, were entertained by the officers of the Guard. It turned into an occasion for excessive drinking and a violent Royalist demonstration, attended and approved by the Queen, which some believed she had orchestrated.

The failure of the harvest to relieve the scarcity of bread in Paris, the permanent state of alarm in which Paris had remained, and of suspicion for the safety of the Parliament which it continually entertained since the early part of the summer, needed no more to provoke an outbreak. It is an error to imagine that that outbreak was engineered[Pg 100] or that such a movement could have been factitious. Great masses of women (in whom the movement originated), and after them a whole flood of the populace, marched upon Versailles.

The failure of the harvest to ease the shortage of bread in Paris, the constant state of alarm that the city had been in, and the ongoing suspicion for the safety of the Parliament that had been present since early summer were enough to spark an uprising. It's a mistake to think that this uprising was orchestrated[Pg 100] or that such a movement could have been fake. Large groups of women (who started the movement), followed by a wave of the general public, marched to Versailles.

There was no direct attack upon the palace, though the palace feared such an attack at any moment. The troops present were sufficient to prevent violence.

There was no direct attack on the palace, but the palace feared such an attack could happen at any time. The troops available were enough to prevent violence.

La Fayette followed in the night at the head of his new Parisian militia force.

La Fayette led his new Parisian militia force through the night.

Too much reliance was placed upon the military character of this force; the palace was invaded in the early morning, an attempt to assassinate the Queen on the part of the mob failed, though two of the Guards were killed. And after scenes whose violence and apparent anarchy only masked the common determination of the populace, the royal family were compelled to abandon Versailles and to take up their place in the Tuileries; the Parliament followed them to Paris, and neither King nor Parliament returned again to the suburban palace.

Too much trust was placed in the military strength of this force; the palace was invaded early in the morning, and an attempt to assassinate the Queen by the mob failed, though two of the Guards were killed. After scenes filled with violence and chaos that only hid the shared resolve of the people, the royal family had to leave Versailles and take refuge in the Tuileries; Parliament followed them to Paris, and neither the King nor Parliament ever returned to the suburban palace.

This recapture of the King by Paris is much more significant than a mere impulse of the mob. The King in Paris, the unison of his person with the capital city, had been the very sacrament of French life for century upon century. It was precisely a hundred years since Paris had been abandoned by Louis XIV for Versailles. The significance of that error may be understood by the citizens of an aristocratic country if they will imagine the abandonment of their countrysides[Pg 101] by the squires, or, again, the future historian of our modern industrial civilisation may understand it when he describes how the wealthy manufacturers abandoned the cities in which their wealth was made, to dwell outside and apart from the living interests of their people.

This reclaiming of the King by Paris is way more important than just a spontaneous act by the crowd. The King being in Paris, connected to the capital city, has been the very essence of French life for hundreds of years. It had been exactly a hundred years since Louis XIV left Paris for Versailles. The importance of that mistake can be understood by the citizens of an aristocratic country if they picture their countryside being left behind by the landowners, or, the future historian of our modern industrial civilization might grasp it when detailing how wealthy manufacturers abandoned the cities where they made their fortune to live apart from the interests of their community.[Pg 101]

With the return of the royal family to Paris, and with the presence of the Assembly within the heart of the national life, one prime factor appears, which is this: that while the National Assembly proceeds step by step to what it imagines to be a complete attainment of democracy (though how partial will soon be seen), the resistance of the Crown is transformed into a resistance of the mere Court. The attack on the Revolution becomes a personal thing. The King is still wholly the chief of the Executive; he can give what commands he wills to the armed force; he controls receipts and payments; he is for all active purposes the Government. But he is no longer considering that prime function of his, nor even using it to restore his old power. He acts henceforward as an individual, and an individual in danger. The Queen, whose view of the Revolution and its dangers had always been a purely personal one, is the directing will in the court-group from this moment, October 1789, onwards; and the chief preoccupation of that group for eighteen months is personal safety. Surrounded by the pomp of the Tuileries and amid all the external appearances of a power still greater than that of any other monarch[Pg 102] in Europe, Louis and his wife and their very few immediate and devoted friends and followers thought of the palace as a prison, and never considered their position save as one intolerable.

With the royal family's return to Paris and the Assembly's presence at the center of national life, one key factor emerges: while the National Assembly takes gradual steps toward what it believes is a complete realization of democracy (though it will soon be clear how limited this really is), the Crown's resistance has shifted to that of the Court. The attack on the Revolution becomes a personal matter. The King remains the head of the Executive; he can issue commands to the military; he manages finances; for all practical purposes, he is the Government. However, he no longer considers his primary function nor uses it to regain his former power. From now on, he acts as an individual, one who feels threatened. The Queen, who has always viewed the Revolution and its dangers solely from a personal perspective, becomes the driving force in the court circle from October 1789 onwards. The main concern of this group for the next eighteen months is personal safety. Surrounded by the grandeur of the Tuileries and all the outward signs of a power that seems greater than any other monarch in Europe, Louis, his wife, and their very few loyal friends perceive the palace as a prison and view their situation as utterly intolerable.

III
From October 1789 to June 1791.

It is this which must explain all that followed in the succeeding phase, which lasted from these early days of October 1789 to the last week of June 1791. Throughout that period of twenty-one months the King is letting the Revolution take its course, with the fixed idea of thwarting it at last by flying from it, and perhaps conquering it by foreign aid. But even this policy is not consecutively followed. The increasing repugnance of the Court and of the King himself to the revolutionary development forbids a consecutive and purely hypocritical acceptation of the National Assembly’s decrees.

It is this that must explain everything that happened in the next phase, which lasted from the early days of October 1789 to the last week of June 1791. Throughout those twenty-one months, the King allowed the Revolution to unfold, with a constant thought of ultimately escaping it and maybe overcoming it with foreign support. However, even this approach wasn't consistently upheld. The growing dislike from the Court and the King himself towards the revolutionary changes prevents a steady and purely insincere acceptance of the National Assembly’s decrees.

Deliberate and calculated intrigue might yet have saved the monarchy and the persons of the royal family. Oddly enough, an ally in the struggle, an excellent intriguer, a saviour of the monarchical institution and a true defender of the royal persons was at hand: it was at hand in the person of Mirabeau.

Deliberate and strategic intrigue might have still saved the monarchy and the members of the royal family. Interestingly, a partner in the fight, a skilled manipulator, a savior of the monarchy, and a true protector of the royals was available: it came in the form of Mirabeau.

This man had more and more dominated the Assembly; he had been conspicuous from its first opening days; he had been its very voice in the resistance to the King at Versailles; it was he who had replied to the Master of[Pg 103] Ceremonies on June 23, that the Commons would not disperse; it was he who had moved that the persons of the Commons were privileged against arrest. He was of a family noble in station and conspicuous before the people by the wealth and eccentricities of its head, Mirabeau’s father. He himself was not unknown even before the Revolution broke out, for his violence, his amours, his intelligence and his debts. He was a few years older than the King and Queen: his personality repelled them; none the less his desire to serve them was sincere; and it was his plan, while retaining the great hold over the National Assembly which his rhetoric and his use of men furnished him, to give to the Court and in particular to the Queen, whom he very greatly and almost reverently admired, such secret advice as might save them. This advice, as we shall see in a moment, tended more and more to be an advice for civil war. But Mirabeau’s death at the close of the phase we are now entering (on April 2, 1791), and the increasing fears of the King and Queen, between them prevented any statesmanship at all; they prevented even the statesmanship of intrigue; and the period became, on the side of the Revolution, a rapid and uncontrolled development of its democratic theory (limited by the hesitation of the middle class), and on the side of the Court an increasing demand for mere physical security and flight, coupled with an increasing determination to return, and to restore as a popular monarchy the scheme of the past.[Pg 104]

This man increasingly dominated the Assembly; he had been prominent since its early days; he was its main voice in resisting the King at Versailles; it was he who replied to the Master of[Pg 103] Ceremonies on June 23, stating that the Commons would not disperse; he was the one who proposed that the members of the Commons were protected from arrest. He came from a noble family and was well-known to the public for the wealth and eccentricities of its head, Mirabeau’s father. He was not unknown even before the Revolution, due to his outbursts, his relationships, his intelligence, and his debts. He was a few years older than the King and Queen, and his personality put them off; nevertheless, his desire to serve them was genuine; he planned to maintain his significant influence over the National Assembly with his skills in rhetoric and manipulation, while also providing secret advice to the Court, especially to the Queen, whom he greatly admired. However, this advice increasingly leaned towards civil war. But Mirabeau’s death at the end of this phase (on April 2, 1791), along with the growing fears of the King and Queen, hindered any effective political strategy; they even obstructed the politics of intrigue; and the period saw the Revolution rapidly and uncontrollably advance its democratic ideals (limited by the middle class's hesitations), while the Court became more focused on immediate physical safety and escape, combined with a growing determination to return and restore a popular monarchy akin to the past.[Pg 104]

The eighteen months that intervened between the fixing of the Assembly and the royal family in Paris, and the death of Mirabeau, are remarkable for the following points, which must all be considered abreast, as it were, if we are to understand their combined effects.

The eighteen months that passed between the establishment of the Assembly and the royal family's arrival in Paris, and the death of Mirabeau, are notable for the following points, which we must consider together to understand their combined effects.

1. This was the period in which the constructive work of the National Assembly was done, and in which the whole face of the nation was changed. The advising bodies of lawyers called “Parliaments” were abolished (eleven months after the King had come to Paris), the Modern Departments were organised in the place of the old provinces, the old national and provincial militia was destroyed; but (as it is very important to remember) the old regular army was left untouched. A new judicature and new rules of procedure were established. A new code sketched out in the place of “Common Law” muddle. In a word, it was the period during which most of those things which we regard as characteristic of the revolutionary work were either brought to their theoretic conclusion or given at least their main lines.

1. This was the time when the National Assembly was busy with its important work, completely transforming the nation. The advisory groups of lawyers known as “Parliaments” were abolished (eleven months after the King arrived in Paris), the Modern Departments were established in place of the old provinces, and the previous national and provincial militias were dismantled; but (and this is crucial to remember) the old regular army remained intact. A new judicial system and new procedures were put in place. A new code was developed to replace the confusion of “Common Law.” In short, this was the period when many of the features we associate with the revolutionary work were either fully realized in theory or at least outlined.

2. Among these constructive acts, but so important that it must be regarded separately, was the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which will be dealt with at length further in this book; it was the principal work (and the principal error) of that year and a half.

2. Among these important actions, one stands out so much that it deserves special attention: the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which will be discussed in detail later in this book; it was the main achievement (and the main mistake) of that year and a half.

3. The general spirit of the Revolution, more difficult to define than its theory but easy to appreciate as one follows the development[Pg 105] of the movement, increased regularly and enormously in intensity during the period. The power of the King, who was still at the head of the Executive, acted more and more as an irritant against public opinion, and—

3. The overall vibe of the Revolution, harder to pinpoint than its theory but clear to see as you follow the growth[Pg 105] of the movement, steadily and significantly intensified during this time. The King's authority, who was still leading the Executive, increasingly irritated public opinion, and—

4. That public opinion began to express itself in a centralised and national fashion, of which the great federation of the 14th of July 1790, in Paris, on the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, was the nucleus and also the symbol. This federation consisted in delegates from the National Guard throughout the country, and it was of this capital importance: that it introduced into the revolutionary movement a feature of soldiery which made even the regular troops for the most part sympathetic with the enthusiasm of the time.

4. Public opinion started to express itself in a centralized and national way, with the big federation on July 14, 1790, in Paris, marking both its core and its symbol. This federation included delegates from the National Guard across the country, and it was critically important because it brought a military aspect into the revolutionary movement that made even the regular troops largely sympathetic to the enthusiasm of the era.

5. These eighteen months were, again, filled with the movement of the “Emigration.” That movement was, of course, the departure of many of the more prominent of the privileged orders and of a crowd of humbler nobles, as also of a few ecclesiastics, from France. The King’s brothers (one fled at the beginning of the emigration, the younger, the Comte d’Artois; the other, the elder, at its close, and coincidently with the flight of the King) must especially be noted in this connection; they formed in company with the more notable of the other emigrants a regular political body, which intrigued continually beyond the frontiers, in Germany and Italy, against the Revolution. And[Pg 106]

5. These eighteen months were again marked by the “Emigration.” This movement involved the departure of many prominent members of the privileged classes, a host of lesser nobles, and a few clergy from France. The King’s brothers should be particularly noted here; one escaped at the beginning of the emigration, the younger one, the Comte d’Artois, while the elder brother fled at the end, coinciding with the King’s escape. Together with other notable emigrants, they formed a political group that constantly plotted against the Revolution from abroad in Germany and Italy. And[Pg 106]

6. It was therefore during these months that the ultimate origins of the large European war must be found. The armed body of the emigrants under Condé formed an organised corps upon the Rhine, and though there was not yet the semblance of an armed movement in Europe besides theirs against the French, yet by the émigrés, as they were called, were sown the seeds the harvest of which was to be the war of 1792.

6. It was during these months that we must look for the true origins of the large European war. The group of emigrants led by Condé formed an organized force along the Rhine, and although there weren't any other armed movements in Europe against the French besides theirs, the émigrés planted the seeds that would lead to the war of 1792.

I have said that during these months in which most of the constructive work of the Revolution was done, in which the seeds of the great war were sown, and in which the absolute position of the Crown as the head of the Executive was increasingly irritating to the public opinion of the French, and especially of the capital, Mirabeau was the one man who might have preserved the continuity of national institutions by the preservation of the monarchy. He received money from the Court and in return gave it advice. The advice was the advice of genius, but it was listened to less and less in proportion as it was more and more practical. Mirabeau also favoured the abandonment of Paris by the King, but he would have had the King leave Paris openly and with an armed force, withdraw to a neighbouring and loyal centre such as Compiègne, and thence depend upon the fortunes of civil war.

I have said that during the months when most of the significant work of the Revolution took place, when the groundwork for the great war was laid, and when the Crown’s position as the head of the Executive became increasingly frustrating to public opinion in France, especially in the capital, Mirabeau was the one person who could have maintained the continuity of national institutions by preserving the monarchy. He received funds from the Court and, in return, provided advice. The advice was brilliant, but it was heeded less and less as it became more and more practical. Mirabeau also supported the King's departure from Paris, but he wanted the King to leave openly with an armed escort, retreat to a nearby and loyal location like Compiègne, and then rely on the outcomes of civil war.

Meanwhile the Queen was determined upon a very different and much more personal plan, into which no conception of statesmanship entered. She was determined to save[Pg 107] the persons of her children, herself and her husband. Plans of flight were made, postponed and re-postponed. It was already agreed at the Court that not Mirabeau’s plan should be followed, but this plan of mere evasion. The army which Bouillé commanded upon the frontier was to send small detachments along the great road from Paris to the east; the first of these were to meet the royal fugitives a little beyond Chalôns and to escort their carriage eastward; each armed detachment in the chain, as the flight proceeded, was to fall in for its defence, until, once the town of Varennes was reached, the King and Queen should be in touch with the main body of the army.

Meanwhile, the Queen had a very different and much more personal plan that involved no notion of politics. She was determined to save[Pg 107] her children, herself, and her husband. Plans for fleeing were made, postponed, and postponed again. The Court had already agreed that they wouldn’t follow Mirabeau’s strategy but go with this plan of simple escape. The army commanded by Bouillé at the border was set to send small units along the main road from Paris to the east; the first of these units were to meet the royal family just beyond Chalôns and escort their carriage eastward. As the escape continued, each armed unit along the way was to join for protection until, once they reached the town of Varennes, the King and Queen would be connected with the main body of the army.

What was then intended to follow remains obscure. It is fairly certain that the King did not intend to pass the frontier but to take refuge at Montmédy. The conflict that would have inevitably broken out could hardly have been confined to a civil war: foreign armies and the German mercenaries in the French service were presumably to be organised, in case the flight succeeded, for a march upon Paris and the complete restoration of the old state of affairs.

What was supposed to happen next is unclear. It's pretty certain that the King didn't plan to cross the border but to seek safety in Montmédy. The conflict that would have undoubtedly erupted could hardly have been limited to a civil war: foreign armies and the German mercenaries in the French service were likely to be organized, in case the escape worked, for a march on Paris and the full restoration of the old order.

Had Mirabeau lived this rash and unstatesmanlike plan might yet have been avoided; it so happened that he died upon April 2, 1791, and soon after we enter the third phase of the Revolution, which is that leading directly to the great war, and to the fall of the monarchy.

Had Mirabeau lived, this hasty and unwise plan might have been avoided; he died on April 2, 1791, and soon after we enter the third phase of the Revolution, which directly leads to the great war and the downfall of the monarchy.

Shortly after Mirabeau’s death a tumult,[Pg 108] which excessively frightened the royal family, prevented the King and Queen from leaving the palace and passing Easter at St. Cloud, in the suburbs. Though further postponements of their flight followed, the evasion actually took place in the night of the 20th to 21st of June. It very nearly succeeded, but by a series of small accidents, the last of which, the famous ride of Drouet to intercept the fugitives, is among the best-known episodes in history, the King and Queen and their children were discovered and arrested at Varennes, within a few hundred yards of safety, and were brought back to Paris, surrounded by enormous and hostile crowds. With the failure of this attempt at flight in the end of June 1791, ends the third phase of the Revolution.

Shortly after Mirabeau’s death, a turmoil,[Pg 108] which greatly frightened the royal family, stopped the King and Queen from leaving the palace to spend Easter at St. Cloud in the suburbs. Although there were further delays in their escape, they actually tried to flee on the night of June 20th to 21st. It almost worked, but due to a series of minor mishaps, the last being the well-known ride of Drouet to catch the fleeing royals, the King, Queen, and their children were found and arrested in Varennes, just a few hundred yards from safety, and were taken back to Paris, surrounded by large and angry crowds. With the failure of this escape attempt at the end of June 1791, the third phase of the Revolution comes to an end.

IV
From June 1791 to September 1792.

To understand the capital effect both of this flight and of its failure, we must once more insist upon the supreme position of the monarchy in the traditions and instinct of French polity. The unwisdom of the flight it would be difficult to exaggerate: it is impossible to exaggerate the moral revolution caused by its failure. It was regarded as virtually an abdication. The strong body of provincial, silent, and moderate opinion, which still centred on the King and regarded it as his function to lead and to[Pg 109] govern, was bewildered, and in the main divorced, in the future, from the Crown.

To grasp the impact of this escape and its failure, we must emphasize the critical role of the monarchy in the traditions and instincts of French politics. It’s hard to overstate how foolish the escape was; the moral shift resulting from its failure is also impossible to exaggerate. It was seen as essentially an abdication. The strong faction of provincial, quiet, and moderate opinion, which still looked to the King to lead and to[Pg 109] govern, was confused and largely separated from the Crown in the future.

It is an excellent proof of what the monarchy had for so long been to France, that even in such a crisis barely the name of “a republic” was mentioned, and that only in the intellectual circles in Paris. All the constitutional and standing forces of society conspired to preserve the monarchy at the expense of no matter what fictions. The middle class Militia Guard under La Fayette repressed, in what is known as the Massacre of the Champ-de-Mars, the beginnings of a popular movement. The more Radical leaders (among whom was Danton) fled abroad or hid. The Duke of Orleans utterly failed to take advantage of the moment, or to get himself proclaimed regent: the monarchical tradition was too strong.

It’s a clear indication of what the monarchy meant to France for so long that even during such a crisis, hardly anyone mentioned the word “republic,” and then only in intellectual circles in Paris. All the established forces in society worked together to keep the monarchy in place, no matter what pretenses they had to maintain. The middle-class militia led by La Fayette suppressed the early signs of a popular movement in what became known as the Massacre of the Champ-de-Mars. The more radical leaders, including Danton, either fled abroad or went into hiding. The Duke of Orleans completely failed to seize the moment or get himself declared regent; the monarchical tradition was just too strong.

Immediately after the second anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, in July, the decrees of Parliament created the fiction that the King was not responsible for the flight, that he “had been carried off,” and in the following September, though until then suspended from executive power, the King, on taking the oath to the Constitution, was once more at the head of all the forces of the nation.

Immediately after the second anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, in July, the decrees from Parliament created the illusion that the King was not to blame for his escape, that he “had been taken away,” and in the following September, despite having been stripped of executive power until then, the King, upon swearing allegiance to the Constitution, once again became the leader of all the nation's forces.

But all this patching and reparation of the façade of constitutional monarchy (a fiction whose tawdriness is more offensive to the French temper than its falsehood) had come too late. Already the Queen had written to her brother, the Emperor of[Pg 110] Austria, suggesting the mobilisation of a considerable force, and its encampment on the frontier, to overawe the revolutionary movement. Her action coincided within a few days with the end of that great Parliament, which had been chosen on the most democratic suffrage, and which had transformed the whole of society and laid the basis of the revolutionary Constitution. With the meeting of the National Assembly’s successor on the 1st of October, 1791, war was already possible; that possibility was to be transformed very soon into probability, and at last into actuality.

But all this patching and fixing of the façade of constitutional monarchy (a sham that's more offensive to the French temperament because of its cheapness than its dishonesty) had come too late. The Queen had already written to her brother, the Emperor of[Pg 110] Austria, suggesting the mobilization of a significant force and its camping on the border to intimidate the revolutionary movement. Her action coincided just days with the end of that great Parliament, which had been elected through the most democratic voting system, and which had transformed society and laid the groundwork for the revolutionary Constitution. With the gathering of the National Assembly’s successor on October 1, 1791, war was already a possibility; that possibility would soon become a likelihood, and eventually, a reality.

In the new Parliament the weight, not of numbers but of leadership, fell to a group of enthusiastic and eloquent men who, from the fact that certain of their principal members came from the Gironde, were called The Girondins. They represented the purest and the most enthusiastic ideal of democracy, less national, perhaps, than that advocated by men more extreme than they, but of a sort which, from that time to this, has been able to rouse the enthusiasm of historians.

In the new Parliament, the influence, not from sheer numbers but from leadership, rested with a group of passionate and articulate men who, since some of their key members were from the Gironde, were called The Girondins. They represented the most genuine and enthusiastic ideal of democracy, possibly less nationalistic than the views of those more extreme than they, but a type that has continued to inspire the enthusiasm of historians from that time to now.

Vergniaud and Isnard were their great orators, Brissot was their intellectual intriguer, and the wife of Roland, one of their members, was, as it were, the soul of the whole group. It was the fact that these men desired war which made war certain, once the temper of this new second Assembly should be felt.

Vergniaud and Isnard were their great speakers, Brissot was their clever schemer, and the wife of Roland, one of their members, was essentially the heart of the whole group. It was the fact that these men wanted war that made war inevitable, once the mood of this new second Assembly became apparent.

The extremists over against them, to whom I have alluded (known as “the Mountain”), were especially Parisian in character. Robespierre,[Pg 111] who had been first an obscure, and later a sectarian orator of the National Assembly, though not sitting in this second Parliament, was perhaps the most prominent figure in that group, for he was the public orator of Paris; and indeed the Mountain was Paris; Paris, whether inside or outside the Parliament; Paris acting as the responsible brain of France. Later, it was the Mountain (that had first opposed the war) which was to ensure the success of the French arms by a rigidity and despotism in action such as the purer and less practical minds of the Girondins abhorred.

The extremists against them, whom I mentioned (known as “the Mountain”), had a distinctly Parisian vibe. Robespierre,[Pg 111] who started as an obscure speaker and later became a key orator for the National Assembly, even though he wasn't part of this second Parliament, was probably the most prominent figure in that group as he was the public voice of Paris; and in reality, the Mountain represented Paris itself—Paris, both inside and outside of Parliament; Paris acting as the guiding intellect of France. Later on, it was the Mountain (which had initially opposed the war) that would secure the success of the French military through a strict and authoritarian approach that the purer and more idealistic minds of the Girondins found off-putting.

On the 3rd of December, 1791 (to quote a fundamental date in the rapid progress towards the war which was to transform the Revolution), the King—writing in a manner which betrays dictation by his wife—begged the King of Prussia (as she had begged the Emperor) to mobilise an armed force, and with it to back a Congress that should have for its object the prevention of the spread of the Revolution. That letter was typical of the moment. From both sides tension was rapidly proceeding to the breaking point. Nor was the tension merely upon generalities. The Revolution had broken a European treaty in the annexation of the Papal State of Avignon, and it had broken European conventions when it had abolished in Alsace feudal rights that were possessed by the princes of the empire. It was as though some State to-day, attempting Collectivism, should confiscate, along with other property,[Pg 112] securities lying in its banks, but held by the nationals of a foreign State.

On December 3, 1791 (a key date in the quick move toward the war that would change the Revolution), the King—writing in a way that clearly shows his wife's influence—asked the King of Prussia (just like she had asked the Emperor) to mobilize an armed force and support a Congress aimed at stopping the Revolution from spreading. That letter was representative of the time. Tension was quickly building to a breaking point on both sides. And the tension wasn’t just about general issues. The Revolution had violated a European treaty by annexing the Papal State of Avignon, and it had gone against European agreements by abolishing feudal rights in Alsace that were held by princes of the empire. It was as if a state today, trying to implement Collectivism, were to seize, along with other assets,[Pg 112] securities held in its banks by nationals of another country.

On the revolutionary side also there was a definite point at issue, which was the permission accorded within the empire for the emigrants to meet in arms and to threaten the French frontier.

On the revolutionary side, there was also a clear point of contention: the approval given within the empire for the emigrants to gather armed and to pose a threat to the French border.

But these precise and legal points were not the true causes of the war. The true causes of the war were the desire of the unreformed European Governments (notably those of Prussia and Austria) that the Revolution should, in their own interests, be checked, and the conviction that their armed forces were easily capable of effecting the destruction of the new French régime.

But these detailed and legal arguments weren't the real reasons for the war. The real reasons were the unreformed European governments' (especially Prussia and Austria) desire to suppress the Revolution for their own benefit, along with the belief that their military forces could easily eliminate the new French regime.

The Court of Vienna refused to accept a just indemnity that was offered the princes of the empire in Alsace for the loss of their old feudal rights; Leopold, the emperor, who was one of the same generation as the French King and Queen, died upon the 1st of March, 1792, and was succeeded by a son only twenty-four years of age and easily persuaded to war.

The Court of Vienna turned down a fair compensation that was offered to the princes of the empire in Alsace for losing their old feudal rights. Leopold, the emperor, who was from the same generation as the French King and Queen, died on March 1, 1792, and was succeeded by a son who was only twenty-four years old and easily convinced to go to war.

On the French side, with the exception of the Mountain and notably of Robespierre, there was a curious coalition of opinion demanding war.

On the French side, aside from the Mountain and specifically Robespierre, there was an interesting mix of opinions calling for war.

The Court and the reactionaries were sufficiently certain of the victory of the Allies to find their salvation in war.

The Court and the conservatives were confident enough in the Allies' victory to see war as their way out.

The revolutionary party, that is, the mass of public opinion and the “patriots,” as they called themselves, the Girondins, also, and especially, desired war as a sort of crusade for[Pg 113] the Revolution; they suffered grievous illusions, as enthusiasts always must, and believed the French armed forces capable of sustaining the shock. The plans had already been drawn up for the campaign (and promptly betrayed to the enemy by the Queen); Dumouriez, an excellent soldier, had from the middle of March 1792 been the chief person in the ministry, and the director of foreign affairs, and a month later, on the 20th of April, war was declared against Austria, or, to be accurate, against “the King of Hungary and Bohemia.”

The revolutionary party, meaning the general public and the "patriots," as they referred to themselves, the Girondins as well, wanted war as a sort of crusade for[Pg 113] the Revolution; they had serious misconceptions, as enthusiasts often do, and thought the French armed forces could handle the challenge. The plans for the campaign had already been prepared (and quickly leaked to the enemy by the Queen); Dumouriez, a skilled soldier, had been the main figure in the ministry and in charge of foreign affairs since mid-March 1792, and a month later, on April 20th, war was declared against Austria, or more precisely, against "the King of Hungary and Bohemia."

Such was still the official title of Marie Antoinette’s nephew, who, though now succeeded to the empire, had not yet been crowned emperor. It was hoped to confine the war to this monarch, and, indeed, the German princes of the empire did not join him (the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was an exception). But the one German power that counted most, the kingdom of Prussia, which Dumouriez had especially hoped to keep neutral, joined forces with Austria. The royal letters had done their work.

Such was still the official title of Marie Antoinette’s nephew, who, although he had now succeeded to the empire, had not yet been crowned emperor. The hope was to limit the war to this monarch, and, in fact, the German princes of the empire did not join him (the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was an exception). However, the one German power that mattered most, the kingdom of Prussia, which Dumouriez had especially hoped to keep neutral, allied with Austria. The royal letters had done their job.

At this critical moment the French armed forces and the French strongholds were at their worst. The discipline of the army was deplorable. The regular soldiers of the old régime had lost from six to nine thousand officers by emigration, and mixed no better than water and oil with the revolutionary volunteers who had been drafted (to the number of over two hundred battalions) into the ranks of the army; moreover, these[Pg 114] volunteer battalions were for the most part ill provided, far below their establishment, some only existed on paper; none were trained as soldiers should be trained. In a more orderly time, when the decrees of the Government corresponded with reality, four hundred thousand men would have held the frontier; such a number was in the estimates. As it was, from the Swiss mountains to the English Channel, the French could count on no more than one-fifth of that number. Eighty thousand alone were under arms. The full Prussian army was, alone, apart from its allies, close upon treble the size of this disorganised and insufficient force.

At this critical moment, the French armed forces and their strongholds were at their lowest point. The discipline of the army was terrible. The regular soldiers from the old regime had lost between six and nine thousand officers due to emigration and mixed poorly with the revolutionary volunteers who had been drafted (over two hundred battalions) into the army; furthermore, these volunteer battalions were mostly poorly equipped, significantly understrength, with some existing only on paper; none were trained as soldiers should be. In a more organized time, when the government’s decrees matched reality, four hundred thousand men would have secured the frontier; that was the estimate. As it stood, from the Swiss mountains to the English Channel, the French could rely on no more than one-fifth of that number. Eighty thousand were actually under arms. The full Prussian army, not counting its allies, was nearly three times the size of this disorganized and insufficient force.

Panics at once ludicrous and tragic opened the campaign upon the French side. The King took advantage of them to dismiss his Girondin Ministry and to form a reactionary Government. The Parliament replied by measures useless to the conduct of war, and designed only to exasperate the Crown, which was betraying the nation. It ordered the dismissal of the royal Guard, the formation of a camp of revolutionary Federals outside Paris, the transportation of the orthodox priests; in pursuit of the Court’s determination to resist the Assembly and to await the victorious allies, Louis vetoed the last two decrees. La Fayette, who was now in command of the army of the centre, with his headquarters at Sedan, right upon the route of the invasion, declared for the King.

Panic, both ridiculous and tragic, marked the start of the campaign on the French side. The King used this chaos to dismiss his Girondin Ministry and set up a reactionary government. In response, Parliament enacted measures that were pointless for the war effort and only aimed at frustrating the Crown, which was betraying the nation. They ordered the dismissal of the royal Guard, the creation of a camp of revolutionary Federals outside Paris, and the banishment of the orthodox priests. In line with the Court’s decision to resist the Assembly and wait for the victorious allies, Louis vetoed the last two decrees. La Fayette, now in charge of the army in the center with his headquarters in Sedan—right on the path of the invasion—declared his support for the King.

Had the armies of Austria and Prussia moved with rapidity at this moment, the Revolution was at an end. As it was, their[Pg 115] mobilisation was slow, and their march, though accurate, leisurely. It gave time for the populace of Paris to demonstrate against the palace and the royal family on the 20th of June. It was not until the first days of August that the main force of the combined monarchs, under the generalship-in-chief of the Duke of Brunswick (who had the reputation of being the best general of his time), set out for the march on Paris. It was not until the 23rd of August that the invaders took the first French frontier town, Longwy.

Had the armies of Austria and Prussia moved quickly at this moment, the Revolution would have been over. As it was, their[Pg 115] mobilization was slow, and their march, while precise, was leisurely. This gave the people of Paris time to protest against the palace and the royal family on June 20th. It wasn't until the first days of August that the main force of the combined monarchs, led by Duke of Brunswick (who was considered the best general of his time), began their march on Paris. The invaders didn’t capture the first French frontier town, Longwy, until August 23rd.

Meanwhile two very important things had lent to the French, in spite of the wretched insufficiency of their armed force, an intensity of feeling which did something to supply that insufficiency. In the first place, the third anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille, the 14th of July, had called to Paris deputations from all the provinces, many of them armed; this gave the national feeling unity. In the second place, Brunswick had issued from Coblentz, which was his base, upon the 25th of that same month of July, a manifesto which was known in Paris three days later, and which (though certain modern historians have questioned this) undoubtedly set revolutionary opinion ablaze.

Meanwhile, two very important factors had given the French, despite the serious lack of their military forces, a strong sense of conviction that somewhat compensated for that lack. First, the third anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille on July 14 had brought delegations from all the provinces to Paris, many of them armed; this brought unity to the national sentiment. Second, Brunswick had issued a manifesto from Coblentz, his base, on July 25 of that same month, which reached Paris three days later and undoubtedly ignited revolutionary sentiment, despite what some modern historians have questioned.

This manifesto demanded, in the name of the Allied Army, a complete restoration of the old régime, professed to treat the French and their new authorities as rebels subject to military execution, and contained a clause of peculiar gravity, which excited an immediate and exasperated response from Paris. The authorship of this clause lay with Marie[Pg 116] Antoinette, and it threatened, if there were any attack upon the palace, to give the capital over to military execution and total subversion.

This manifesto demanded, on behalf of the Allied Army, a complete return to the old régime, claimed that the French and their new leaders were rebels subject to military execution, and included a particularly serious clause that triggered an immediate and furious reaction from Paris. This clause was authored by Marie[Pg 116] Antoinette, and it threatened to hand over the capital to military execution and total chaos if there were any attack on the palace.

Two days later the Federals from Marseilles, a middle-class body of excellent citizens, though merely amateurs at soldiering and small in numbers, marched into the city. Their marching song has become famous under the title of the “Marseillaise.” They had accomplished the astonishing feat of traversing France, drawing cannon with them, at the rate of eighteen miles a day, in the height of a torrid summer, for close upon a month on end. There is no parallel to such an effort in the history of war, nor did contemporary opinion exaggerate when it saw in the battalion of Marseilles the centre of the coming fight.

Two days later, the Federals from Marseilles, a middle-class group of good citizens, though just amateurs at soldiering and few in number, marched into the city. Their marching song has become famous as the "Marseillaise." They achieved the incredible feat of traveling across France, pulling cannons with them, at an average of eighteen miles a day, during the peak of a scorching summer, for nearly a month straight. There’s no comparison to such an effort in the history of warfare, and contemporary opinion was not exaggerating when it viewed the battalion from Marseilles as the center of the upcoming battle.

The shock between the palace and the populace was joined in the morning of the 10th of August. The palace was held by about six thousand men,[3] of whom some twelve hundred were regulars of the Swiss Guard. The palace (the Tuileries) was, or should have been, impregnable. The popular attack, we may be certain, would have been beaten back had the connection between the Tuileries and the Louvre on the south been properly cut. The flooring had indeed been removed at this point for some distance, but either the gap was not wide enough or the post was insufficiently guarded; the populace and the[Pg 117] Federals, badly beaten in their main attack upon the long front of the palace, succeeded in turning its flank where it joined on to the Louvre; they thus enfiladed the suites of rooms and utterly put an end to the resistance of its garrison.

The clash between the palace and the people began on the morning of August 10th. The palace was defended by about six thousand men,[3] including around twelve hundred regulars from the Swiss Guard. The palace (the Tuileries) was supposed to be impregnable. It's clear that the popular attack would have been repelled if the connection between the Tuileries and the Louvre to the south had been properly severed. While the flooring had indeed been removed for some distance at that point, either the gap wasn't wide enough or the post wasn't adequately guarded; the people and the[Pg 117] Federals, having been badly defeated in their main assault on the long front of the palace, managed to flank it where it connected to the Louvre; this allowed them to enfilade the suites of rooms and completely crush the resistance of its garrison.

Meanwhile the King and Queen, the Dauphin and his little sister, with others of the royal household, had taken refuge during the fighting in the hall of the Parliament.

Meanwhile, the King and Queen, the Dauphin and his little sister, along with other members of the royal household, had sought refuge in the hall of the Parliament during the fighting.

After the victory of the populace their fate was debated and decided upon; they were imprisoned in the Tower of the Temple, a mediæval fortress still standing in the north-east of Paris, and though monarchy was not yet formally abolished, the most extreme spirits which the Revolution then contained, and the most vigorous, stepped into the place of the old Executive, with Danton at their head. With them appeared in the seat of Government the spirit of military action, its contempt for forms and its rapid decision. The known accomplices of the supporters of the Court’s resistance and alliance with the invaders were arrested by the hundred. The enrolment of volunteers, already enthusiastic throughout France, was supported with the new vigour of official aid; and the Revolution left at once all its old moorings to enter an extreme phase. At the same moment the frontier was crossed and the national soil invaded on the 19th of August.

After the victory of the people, their fate was discussed and decided; they were imprisoned in the Tower of the Temple, a medieval fortress still standing in the northeast of Paris. Although the monarchy had not yet been formally abolished, the most radical and energetic leaders of the Revolution took the place of the old Executive, with Danton leading the way. With them came a spirit of military action, valuing quick decisions over formal procedures. Hundreds of known allies of the Court's resistance and their collusion with invaders were arrested. The recruitment of volunteers, already enthusiastic across France, received renewed support from official sources, and the Revolution quickly moved away from its previous constraints to enter a more extreme phase. At the same time, on August 19th, the border was crossed, and the national territory was invaded.

It is possible that the delay of the Prussians until that moment had been calculated, for the position in France was complicated and their decision to fight had been tardily arrived[Pg 118] at. It was the news of the fall of the palace that seems to have decided them. The place, like the date, of this grave event, deserves to be more famous than it is. Brunswick touched what was then French soil, in that little triangle where now German and French Lorraine and Luxembourg meet. The village is called Redange: thence did the privileged of Europe set out to reach Paris and to destroy democracy. The first task occupied them for full twenty-two years, upon the latter they are still engaged.

It’s possible that the Prussians delayed their move until that moment on purpose, as the situation in France was complicated and they took their time to decide to fight.[Pg 118] The news of the palace's fall seems to have pushed them into action. The place, much like the date of this significant event, deserves to be better known than it is. Brunswick touched what was then French land, in that small area where present-day German and French Lorraine and Luxembourg meet. The village is called Redange: from there, Europe’s elite set out to reach Paris and dismantle democracy. The first task took them a full twenty-two years; they are still working on the latter.

What forces the French could there bring against Brunswick were contemptuously brushed aside. Four days later he had, as we have seen, taken the frontier stronghold of Longwy; within a week he was in front of Verdun.

What forces the French could bring against Brunswick were dismissively disregarded. Four days later, he had, as we have seen, captured the key stronghold of Longwy; within a week, he was in front of Verdun.

Verdun had no chance of resistance, no garrison to call a garrison, and no opportunity for defence. The news that it must fall reached Paris on the morning of a fatal date, the 2nd of September; after its fall there would lie nothing between it and the capital; and from that moment the whole nature of the Revolution is wholly transformed by the psychological effect of war.

Verdun had no chance to resist, no troops to defend it, and no way to protect itself. The news that it would fall reached Paris on the fateful morning of September 2nd; after its fall, nothing would stand between it and the capital, and from that moment, the whole nature of the Revolution changed entirely due to the psychological impact of war.

V
From the invasion of September 1792 to the establishment of the Committee of Public Safety, April 1793.

The fifth phase of the French Revolution may be said to date from these first days of[Pg 119] September 1792, when the news of the successful invasion was maddening Paris, and when the revolutionary Executive, established upon the ruins of the old dead monarchy and in its image, was firmly in the saddle, up to the establishment of the yet more monarchical “Committee of Public Safety,” seven months later. And these seven months may be characterised as follows:—

The fifth phase of the French Revolution can be considered to have started in the early days of[Pg 119] September 1792, when the news of the successful invasion was driving Paris crazy, and when the revolutionary Executive, built on the ruins of the fallen monarchy and in its likeness, was firmly in control, leading up to the establishment of the even more monarchical “Committee of Public Safety” seven months later. These seven months can be described as follows:—

They were a period during which it was attempted to carry on the revolutionary war against the Governments of Europe upon democratic principles. The attempt failed. In the place of discipline and comprehension and foresight the rising and intense enthusiasm of the moment was depended upon for victory. The pure ideal of the Girondin faction, with the model republic which it hoped to establish, proved wholly insufficient for the conduct of a war; and to save the nation from foreign conquest and the great democratic experiment of the Revolution from disaster, it was necessary that the military and disciplined side of the French, with all the tyranny that accompanies that aspect of their national genius, should undertake the completion of the adventure.

There was a period when they tried to continue the revolutionary war against the European governments based on democratic ideals. The attempt failed. Instead of relying on discipline, understanding, and foresight, they counted on the rising and intense enthusiasm of the moment to achieve victory. The pure ideals of the Girondin faction, along with the model republic they hoped to create, were completely inadequate for waging war. To protect the nation from foreign conquest and to save the great democratic experiment of the Revolution from disaster, it became necessary for the military and disciplined aspect of the French, with all the tyranny that comes with that part of their national character, to take on the responsibility of completing the mission.

This period opens with what are called the Massacres of September. I have said upon a former page that “the known accomplices and supporters of the Court’s alliance with the invaders were arrested by the hundred,” upon the fall of the palace and the establishment of a revolutionary Executive with Danton at its head.

This period starts with what's known as the September Massacres. I mentioned earlier that "the known accomplices and supporters of the Court’s alliance with the invaders were arrested by the hundred" following the fall of the palace and the formation of a revolutionary Executive led by Danton.

These prisoners, massed in the jails of the[Pg 120] city, were massacred to the number of eleven hundred by a small but organised band of assassins during the days when the news of the fall of Verdun was expected and reached the capital. Such a crime appalled the public conscience of Europe and of the French people. It must never be confused with the judicial and military acts of the Terror, nor with the reprisals undertaken against rebellion, nor with the gross excesses of mob violence; for though votes in favour of the immediate execution of those who had sided with the enemies of the country were passed in certain primary assemblies, the act itself was the mechanical, deliberate and voluntary choice of a few determined men. It had, therefore, a character of its own, and that character made it stand out for its contemporaries as it should stand out for us: it was murder.

These prisoners, gathered in the jails of the[Pg 120] city, were killed en masse—totaling eleven hundred—by a small but organized group of assassins during the time when news of the fall of Verdun was anticipated and reached the capital. Such a crime shocked the public conscience of Europe and the French people. It should never be mistaken for the judicial and military actions of the Terror, nor for the reprisals against rebellion, nor for the extreme violence of mobs; because although votes in favor of the immediate execution of those who had sided with the enemies of the country were passed in certain local assemblies, the act itself was the calculated, intentional, and voluntary choice of a few resolute individuals. It thus had its own distinct nature, and that nature made it stand out to its contemporaries as it should stand out for us: it was murder.

The prisoners were unarmed—nay, though treasonable, they had not actually taken arms; their destruction was inspired, in most of those who ordered it, by mere hatred. Those who ordered it were a small committee acting spontaneously, and Marat was their chief.[4][Pg 121]

The prisoners were unarmed—no, even though they were considered traitors, they hadn't actually taken up arms; their destruction was driven, for the most part, by pure hatred from those who ordered it. Those who made the decision were a small group acting on impulse, and Marat was their leader.[4][Pg 121]

It was under the impression of these massacres that the Deputies of the new or third Assembly of the Revolution, known to history as The Convention, met in Paris.

It was with the shock of these massacres that the members of the new or third Assembly of the Revolution, known to history as The Convention, gathered in Paris.

This Parliament was to be at first the actual, later the nominal governing power in France during the three critical years that followed; years which were the military salvation of the Revolution, and which therefore permitted the establishment of the democratic experiment in modern Europe.

This Parliament was initially the real governing authority in France, and later became a nominal one, during the three crucial years that followed; years that were vital for the military survival of the Revolution, which allowed for the establishment of democracy in modern Europe.

It was on the 20th of September that the Convention met for its first sitting, which was held in the palace of the Tuileries. During the hours of that day, while it was electing its officials, choosing its Speaker and the rest, the French Army upon the frontier, to its own astonishment and to that of its enemy, managed to hold in check at the cannonade of Valmy the allied invaders.

It was on September 20th that the Convention had its first meeting, held in the Tuileries Palace. Throughout the day, as it was electing its officials and selecting its Speaker and others, the French Army at the front, to its own surprise and that of its enemies, managed to hold off the allied invaders during the cannonade of Valmy.

Upon the morrow the new Assembly met in the riding school (the Manège), where the two former Assemblies had also sat. It was about to separate after that day’s sitting when one of the members proposed the abolition of Royalty; the Convention voted the reform unanimously and dispersed.

Upon the next day, the new Assembly gathered in the riding school (the Manège), where the two previous Assemblies had also met. It was about to adjourn at the end of that day's session when one of the members suggested abolishing the monarchy; the Convention voted in favor of the reform unanimously and then dispersed.

On the third day, the 22nd of September, it was decreed that the public documents should henceforward bear the date “First Year of the Republic”; but there was no solemnity on the occasion; the idea of “No King” was novel and untried; there was as yet no enthusiasm for any save the monarchic form of government. It was not until the title “Republic” began to connote in men’s[Pg 122] minds political liberty, and had become also the flag, as it were, for the victorious national defence, that the Republican name acquired in our Europe, and from France, that strong and almost religious force which it has since retained.

On the third day, September 22nd, it was decided that public documents would now be dated “First Year of the Republic”; however, there was no formal celebration for this event. The idea of “No King” was new and untested; people still mostly felt attached to the concept of monarchy. It wasn’t until the term “Republic” began to represent political freedom in people’s[Pg 122] minds and became a symbol for the successful defense of the nation that the Republican name gained the strong and almost religious significance in Europe, especially from France, that it holds today.

The check given to the invaders at Valmy (again to the astonishment of both soldiers and statesmen!) determined the campaign. Sickness and the difficulty of communications made the further advance of the invaders impossible. They negotiated for and obtained an unmolested retreat, and a few weeks later they had re-crossed the frontier.

The check given to the invaders at Valmy (to the surprise of both soldiers and politicians!) decided the campaign. Illness and the challenges of communication made it impossible for the invaders to advance any further. They negotiated for and secured a safe retreat, and a few weeks later, they crossed the border again.

Meanwhile, in Paris the great quarrel had begun between the Municipal and the National Government, which, because Paris was more decided, more revolutionary, and, above all, more military in temper than the Parliament, was destined to terminate in the victory of the capital. The Girondins still stood in the Assembly for an ideal republic; a republic enjoying to the utmost limit individual liberty in its citizens and the autonomy of local government in every city and parish; but opposed to this ideal, and far more national, was that of the revolutionary extremists, called in the Convention “the Mountain,” who had the support of the Municipal Government of Paris (known as “the Commune”), and were capable of French victories in the field. These stood for the old French and soldierly conception of a strong central Government, wherewith to carry on the life-and-death struggle into which the Revolution had now entered: therefore they conquered.[Pg 123]

Meanwhile, in Paris, a major conflict began between the Municipal and National Government. Since Paris was more determined, more revolutionary, and especially more militaristic than Parliament, it was destined to end in the capital's victory. The Girondins were still advocating for an ideal republic in the Assembly; a republic that fully embraced individual liberty for its citizens and local government autonomy in every city and parish. However, opposed to this vision was the more national perspective of the revolutionary extremists, known in the Convention as "the Mountain." They had the backing of the Municipal Government of Paris (referred to as "the Commune") and were capable of achieving French victories on the battlefield. They supported the traditional French, soldierly idea of a strong central Government to carry on the life-and-death struggle that the Revolution had now entered: thus, they triumphed.[Pg 123]

All that autumn the quarrel between France and Europe remained doubtful, for though the armies of the Republic under Dumouriez won the battle of Jemappes, swept across the north-eastern frontier and occupied Belgium, while to the south another French army swept right up to the Rhine, Dumouriez himself knew well enough that a campaign undertaken merely upon enthusiasm, and with troops so mixed in character and many of them so undisciplined, would end fatally. But until the advent of the new year public opinion was not instructed upon these lines, and the revolutionary war seemed to have passed suddenly from the defence of the national territory to a crusade against the kings and the aristocratic Governments of Europe. Enthusiasm, and enthusiasm alone, was the force of the moment. Violent decrees such as the Declaration of Fraternity (which decreed an alliance with all people struggling to be free) and the opening of the Scheldt (a direct violation of treaty rights to which England, among other nations, was a partner) were characteristic of the moment; chief act of all, the King was put upon his trial at the bar of the Parliament.

All that autumn, the conflict between France and Europe remained uncertain. Even though the Republic's armies under Dumouriez won the battle of Jemappes, moved across the northeastern border, and took control of Belgium, while another French army advanced all the way to the Rhine, Dumouriez himself understood that a campaign driven only by enthusiasm, with such a mixed and often undisciplined army, would end badly. However, until the new year arrived, public opinion was not aware of this, and the revolutionary war seemed to shift suddenly from defending national territory to waging a crusade against kings and aristocratic governments across Europe. Enthusiasm, and nothing but enthusiasm, was the driving force of the moment. Violent decrees like the Declaration of Fraternity (which declared an alliance with all people fighting for freedom) and the opening of the Scheldt (which directly violated treaty rights to which England, among other nations, was a party) characterized the time; the main event of all was the trial of the King before Parliament.

It was upon the 4th of January, 1793 (the King had already made his will upon Christmas Day), that the chief orator of the Girondins moved that the sentence should be referred to the people for ratification. The fear of civil war more than anything else forbade this just suggestion to pass. Upon the 15th of January the question was put to the Parliament, “whether the King had been[Pg 124] guilty of conspiring against public liberty and of attempting the general safety of the State.” Many were absent and many abstained: none replied in the negative; the condemnation of Louis was therefore technically almost a unanimous one.

It was on January 4, 1793 (the King had already written his will on Christmas Day), that the main speaker of the Girondins proposed that the decision should be sent to the people for approval. The fear of civil war, more than anything else, prevented this reasonable suggestion from being approved. On January 15, the question was raised in Parliament: “Was the King guilty of conspiring against public liberty and threatening the general safety of the State?” Many were absent and many chose not to vote: none answered no; therefore, the condemnation of Louis was practically unanimous.

The voting on these grave issues was what the French call “nominal”: that is, each member was called upon “by name” to give his vote—and an expression of opinion as well if he so chose. A second attempt to appeal to the people was rejected by 424 to 283. On the third question, which was the decisive one of the penalty, 721 only could be found to vote, and of these a bare majority of 53 declared for death as against the minority, of whom some voted for the death penalty “conditionally”—that is, not at all—or voted against it. A respite was lost by a majority of 70; and on the 21st of January, 1793, at about ten in the morning, Louis XVI was guillotined.

The voting on these serious issues was what the French call “nominal”: that is, each member was called out “by name” to cast their vote—and to share their opinion if they wanted to. A second attempt to appeal to the people was rejected by 424 to 283. On the third question, which was the crucial one about the penalty, only 721 votes were cast, and of these, just a slight majority of 53 voted for death, while the rest included some who voted for the death penalty “conditionally”—meaning, not really—or voted against it. A reprieve was shot down by a majority of 70; and on January 21, 1793, around ten in the morning, Louis XVI was guillotined.

Then followed war with England, with Holland, and with Spain; and almost at that moment began the inevitable reflux of the military tide. For the French eruption up to the Rhine in the Low Countries and the Palatinate, had no permanent military basis upon which to depend. Dumouriez began to retreat a month after the King’s execution, and on the 18th of March suffered a decisive defeat at Neerwinden. It was this retreat, followed by that disaster, which decided the fate of the Girondin attempt to found a republic ideally, individually, and locally free. Already, before the battle of Neerwinden[Pg 125] was fought, Danton, no longer a minister, but still the most powerful orator in the Convention, proposed a special court for trying cases of treason—a court which was later called “the Revolutionary Tribunal.” The news of Neerwinden prepared the way for a stronger measure and some exceptional form of government; a special Parliamentary committee already formed for the control of ministers was strengthened when, on the 5th of April, after some negotiation and doubt, Dumouriez, despairing of the armies of the Republic, thought to ally his forces with the invaders and to restore order. His soldiers refused to follow him; his treason was apparent; upon the morrow the Convention nominated that first “Committee of Public Safety” which, with its successor of the same name, was henceforward the true despotic and military centre of revolutionary government. It was granted secrecy in deliberation, the virtual though not the theoretic control of the Ministry, sums of money for secret expenditure, and, in a word, all the machinery necessary to a military executive. Rousseau’s Dictator had appeared, the great mind which had given the Contrat Social to be the gospel of the Revolution had also foreseen one of the necessary organs of democracy in its hardest trial; his theory had been proved necessary and true in fact. Nine members formed this first Committee: Barère, who may be called the clerk of it, Danton its genius, and Cambon its financier, were the leading names.[Pg 126]

Then came the war with England, Holland, and Spain; and almost immediately, the military tide began to turn. The French advance to the Rhine in the Low Countries and the Palatinate had no solid military foundation to rely on. Dumouriez started his retreat just a month after the King’s execution, and on March 18th, he suffered a significant defeat at Neerwinden. This retreat, followed by that disaster, sealed the fate of the Girondin attempt to create a republic that was free in every individual and local sense. Before the battle of Neerwinden[Pg 125] took place, Danton, who was no longer a minister but still the most influential speaker in the Convention, proposed a special court to try cases of treason—a court that later became known as “the Revolutionary Tribunal.” The news from Neerwinden set the stage for stronger measures and a different type of government; a special Parliamentary committee created to oversee ministers gained more power when, on April 5th, after some negotiations and uncertainty, Dumouriez, disillusioned with the Republic's armies, attempted to ally his troops with the invaders to restore order. His soldiers refused to follow him; his betrayal was clear; the next day, the Convention appointed the first “Committee of Public Safety,” which, along with its successor of the same name, became the true center of despotic and military power in the revolutionary government. This committee was granted confidentiality in its discussions, effective control over the Ministry, funds for secret spending, and all the necessary tools for a military executive. Rousseau’s Dictator had emerged; the great thinker who had given the Contrat Social as the guiding principle of the Revolution also anticipated one of democracy's essential components in its greatest challenges; his theories had proven to be both necessary and valid in practice. This first Committee was made up of nine members: Barère, who could be considered its clerk, Danton, its visionary, and Cambon, its financial expert, were the key figures.[Pg 126]

With the establishment of this truly national and traditional thing, whose form alone was novel, but whose power and method were native to all the military tradition of Gaul, the Revolution was saved. We have now chiefly to follow the way in which the Committee governed and in which it directed affairs in the great crisis of the war. This sixth phase lasts for nearly sixteen months, from the beginning of April 1793 to the 28th of July 1794, and it is convenient to divide those sixteen months into two divisions.

With the creation of this genuinely national and traditional entity, which had a new form but used the established power and methods rooted in the military tradition of Gaul, the Revolution was saved. Now, we primarily need to observe how the Committee governed and directed affairs during the major crisis of the war. This sixth phase lasts for almost sixteen months, from early April 1793 to July 28, 1794, and it's helpful to divide those sixteen months into two parts.

VI
From April 1793 to July 1794.

The first division of this period, which ends in the height of the summer of 1793, is the gradual consolidation of the Committee as a new organ of government and the peril of destruction which it runs, in common with the nation it governs at the hands of allied Europe.

The first part of this period, which ends at the peak of summer in 1793, is the slow establishment of the Committee as a new governing body and the risk of destruction it faces, along with the nation it governs, from the threat posed by allied Europe.

The second period includes part of August and all the rest of 1793, and the first seven months of 1794, during which time the Committee is successful in its military effort, the nation is saved, and in a manner curiously dramatic and curiously inconsequential, the martial régime of the Terror abruptly ceases.

The second period covers part of August and all of 1793, along with the first seven months of 1794, during which the Committee succeeds in its military efforts, the nation is saved, and in a strangely dramatic yet oddly unimportant way, the military regime of the Terror suddenly comes to an end.

The first step in the consolidation of the power of the Committee was their letting loose of the Commune of Paris and the populace it governed against the Girondins.

The first step in The Committee's consolidation of power was unleashing the Commune of Paris and the people it governed against the Girondins.

Looked at merely from the point of view of[Pg 127] internal politics (upon which most historians have concentrated) the attack of the populace of Paris and their Commune against the Parliament seems to be no more than the end of the long quarrel between the Girondins with their ideal federal republic, and the capital with its instinct for strong centralised government. But in the light of the military situation, of which the Committee of Public Safety were vividly aware, and which it was their business to control, a very different tale may be told.

Looked at just from the perspective of[Pg 127] internal politics (which most historians have focused on), the attack by the people of Paris and their Commune against the Parliament seems like just the conclusion of the ongoing conflict between the Girondins, who envisioned a federal republic, and the capital, which favored a strong central government. However, considering the military situation, which the Committee of Public Safety was keenly aware of and responsible for managing, a very different story emerges.

When the defeats began the Parliament had voted a levy of three hundred thousand men. It was a mere vote which came to very little: not enough in numbers and still less in moral, for the type of troops recruited under a system of money forfeit and purchased substitutes was wholly beneath the task of the great war.

When the defeats started, Parliament had approved a levy of three hundred thousand men. It was just a vote that meant very little: not enough in numbers and even less in morale, because the troops recruited through a system of money fines and bought replacements were completely unfit for the demands of the major war.

This law of conscription had been passed upon the 24th of February. The date for its first application was, in many villages, fixed for the 10th of March. All that country which borders the estuary of the Loire, to the north and to the south, a country whose geographical and political peculiarities need not here detain us, but which is still curiously individual, began to resist. The decree was unpopular everywhere, of course, as military service is everywhere unpopular with a settled population. But here it had no ally, for the Revolution and all its works were grossly unpopular as well. The error of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was a powerful factor in this revolt. The piety and the[Pg 128] orthodoxy of this district were and are exceptional. Some such resistance in some such quarter was perhaps expected: what was not expected was its military success.

This conscription law was passed on February 24th. The date for its first implementation was set for March 10th in many villages. All the areas along the estuary of the Loire, both north and south, a region with unique geographical and political characteristics that don't need to be discussed here, started to push back. The decree was unpopular everywhere, of course, since military service is generally disliked by a settled population. But here it had no support because the Revolution and its outcomes were also widely disliked. The issue with the Civil Constitution of the Clergy played a significant role in this uprising. The faith and the[Pg 128] traditionalism in this area were and still are exceptional. Some resistance in a place like this was perhaps anticipated: what was unexpected was its military success.

Four days before the defeat of Neerwinden itself, and four days after the decree of conscription in the villages, a horde of peasantry had taken possession of the town of Chollet in the southern part of this district, Vendée. Three days before the Committee of Public Safety was formed the insurgents had defeated regular forces at Machecoul, and had tortured and put to death their prisoners. The month of April, when the Committee of Public Safety was first finding its seat in the saddle, saw the complete success of the rebels. The forces sent against them were worthless, for all military effort had been concentrated upon the frontier. Most of them were not even what we should call militia. A small force of regulars was to have moved from Orleans, but, before they could attack, Thouars, Parthenay, and Fontenay fell into the power of the rebels. These posts afforded an advanced triangle right into the regularly administered territory of the Republic: the great town of Nantes was outflanked. Even in such a moment the Girondins still clung to their ideal: an individually free and locally autonomous republic. It is little wonder that the temper of Paris refused to support them, or their influence over the Parliament, and we can easily understand how the new Committee supported Paris in its revolt.

Four days before the defeat at Neerwinden and four days after the decree for conscription in the villages, a group of peasants took control of the town of Chollet in the southern part of the Vendée district. Three days before the Committee of Public Safety was formed, the insurgents had defeated regular forces at Machecoul and had tortured and executed their prisoners. In April, when the Committee of Public Safety was just getting established, the rebels achieved complete success. The forces sent against them were ineffective because all military efforts were focused on the frontier. Most of these forces wouldn’t even qualify as militia. A small group of regular soldiers was supposed to move from Orleans, but before they could launch an attack, Thouars, Parthenay, and Fontenay fell to the rebels. These locations created an advanced triangle deep into the territory controlled by the Republic: the major city of Nantes was outflanked. Even during this crisis, the Girondins clung to their vision of an individually free and locally autonomous republic. It’s no surprise that the sentiment in Paris refused to support them or their influence over Parliament, and it’s easy to see how the new Committee backed Paris in its uprising.

That revolt took place on the 31st of May.[Pg 129] The forces under the command of the capital did not march, but a deputation of the sections of Paris demanded the arrest of the leading Girondins. The body of the debating hall was invaded by the mob. The Committee of Public Safety pretended to compromise between Paris and the Parliament, but a document, recently analysed, sufficiently proves that their sympathy was with the Parisian attack. They proposed, indeed, to put the armed force of Paris at the disposition of the Assembly: that is, in their own hands.

That revolt happened on May 31st.[Pg 129] The forces under the command of the capital didn’t march, but a group from the sections of Paris demanded the arrest of the prominent Girondins. The mob stormed the debating hall. The Committee of Public Safety acted like they were trying to mediate between Paris and the Parliament, but a recently analyzed document clearly shows that they supported the Parisian attack. They even suggested putting the armed forces of Paris at the Assembly's disposal: essentially, under their own control.

That day nothing of moment was done, but the Parliament had proved of no strength in the face of the capital. On the frontier the advance of the invaders had begun. The great barrier fortress of Valenciennes relied for its defence upon the neighbouring camp of Famars. The garrison of that camp had been compelled to evacuate it by the advance of the Allied Army upon the 23rd of May, and though some days were to be spent before the heavy artillery of the Austrians could be emplaced, Valenciennes was henceforward at the mercy of its besiegers. There was news that La Vendée was not the only rebellion. Lyons had risen three days before. There had been heavy fighting. The Royalists and the Girondins had combined and had carried the town hall and established an insurrectionary and unelected Municipal Government. Such news, coming immediately after the 31st of May, roused the capital to action. This time the Parisian forces actually marched against the Parliament.[Pg 130] The demand for the suspension of the twenty-two named Girondin deputies was made under arms. Much has been written, and by the best historians, to make of this successful day a mere conquest by the Commune of Paris over the Parliament. Though Barère and Danton both protested in public, it was in reality their politics that conquered with Paris. To the twenty-two names that the forces of Paris had listed, seven were added. The great Girondins, Brissot, Vergniaud and the rest, were not indeed imprisoned, they were considered “under arrest in their houses.” But the moral authority of the Convention as an administrative machine, not as a legislative one, was broken on this day, the 2nd of June, 1793. Paris had ostensibly conquered, but the master who was stronger than ever and whom Paris had served, was the Committee of Public Safety.

That day nothing significant happened, but the Parliament showed little strength against the capital. The invaders had started advancing at the frontier. The major fortress of Valenciennes relied on the nearby camp of Famars for its defense. The garrison at that camp had to evacuate due to the Allied Army's advance on May 23rd, and although it would take several days for the Austrians to set up their heavy artillery, Valenciennes was now vulnerable to its besiegers. There was news that La Vendée wasn't the only area in rebellion; Lyons had revolted three days earlier. There had been intense fighting. The Royalists and the Girondins joined forces, took over the town hall, and set up an insurrectionary and unelected Municipal Government. This news, arriving right after May 31st, stirred the capital into action. This time, the Parisian forces actually marched against the Parliament.[Pg 130] They demanded the suspension of the twenty-two named Girondin deputies while armed. Many have written, including distinguished historians, portraying this successful day as a simple victory by the Commune of Paris over the Parliament. While Barère and Danton both publicly protested, it was ultimately their politics that triumphed alongside Paris. To the original twenty-two names listed by the Paris forces, seven more were added. The prominent Girondins, Brissot, Vergniaud, and others, were not actually imprisoned; they were labeled as “under arrest in their houses.” However, the moral authority of the Convention as an administrative body, not as a legislative one, was shattered that day, June 2, 1793. Paris may have appeared to conquer, but the true power, stronger than ever and the one Paris had served, was the Committee of Public Safety.

This first Committee of Public Safety endured to the 10th of July. In the midst of such a war and of such an internal struggle the Convention had voted (upon the initiative of the Committee of Public Safety) the famous Constitution of ’93, that prime document of democracy which, as though to mock its own ideal, has remained no more than a written thing from then until now. Therein will be found universal suffrage, therein the yearly Parliament, therein the referendum, therein the elected Executive—a thing no Parliament would ever give us to-day. The Constitution was passed but three weeks[Pg 131] after the successful insurrection of Paris. A fortnight later still, on the 10th of July, the first of the Committees of Public Safety was followed by its successor.

This first Committee of Public Safety lasted until July 10th. In the midst of such a war and intense internal conflict, the Convention voted (on the initiative of the Committee of Public Safety) for the famous Constitution of ’93, that foundational document of democracy which, ironically, has remained nothing more than a written concept from then until now. It includes universal suffrage, an annual Parliament, a referendum, and an elected Executive—something no Parliament would ever give us today. The Constitution was adopted just three weeks[Pg 131] after the successful uprising in Paris. Two weeks later, on July 10th, the first Committee of Public Safety was succeeded by another.

All this while the Vendeans were advancing. Nantes, indeed, had held out against the rebels, but as we shall see in a moment, the Republican troops had not yet made themselves good. The rebellion of Lyons was fortifying itself, and a week later was to execute the Radical Chalier. Marseilles was rising. On the 10th of July the Convention summoned to its bar Westermann, the friend of Danton, who had just suffered defeat at the hands of the western rebels.

All this time, the Vendeans were making progress. Nantes had held out against the rebels, but as we’ll see shortly, the Republican troops hadn't really proven themselves yet. The rebellion in Lyons was strengthening, and a week later would execute the Radical Chalier. Marseilles was also uprising. On July 10th, the Convention called Westermann, Danton's ally, to its meeting, who had just been defeated by the western rebels.

It is well to note at this point one of those small individual factors which determine the fate of States. Danton, the master of all that first movement towards centralisation, the man who had made the 10th of August, who had negotiated with the Prussians after Valmy, who had determined upon and formed a central government against the Girondin anarchy—had broken down. His health was gone. He was a giant in body, but for the moment he had tired himself out.

It’s important to recognize at this point one of those minor individual factors that shape the fate of nations. Danton, the leader of the initial push toward centralization, the man who orchestrated the events of August 10th, who had negotiated with the Prussians after the Battle of Valmy, and who established a central government to combat the Girondin chaos—had fallen apart. His health was ruined. He was a physical powerhouse, but at that moment, he had exhausted himself.

The renewing of his Committee was proposed: he was thrust out from the new choice. Barère remained to link the old Committee with the new. A violent sectarian Calvinist pastor, Jeanbon Saint-André, among the bravest and most warped of the Revolutionaries; Couthon, a friend of Robespierre; Saint-Just, a still more intimate friend (a young, handsome, enormously courageous[Pg 132] and decisive man), entered, with others to the number of nine, the new Committee. Seventeen days later, on the 27th of July, Robespierre replaced one of the minor members thus chosen. He had precisely a year to live, and it is the moment for fixing before the reader’s mind the nature of his career.

The renewal of his Committee was suggested, but he was excluded from the new selection. Barère stayed on to connect the old Committee with the new one. A radical Calvinist pastor, Jeanbon Saint-André, among the bravest and most extreme of the Revolutionaries; Couthon, a friend of Robespierre; and Saint-Just, an even closer friend (a young, handsome, incredibly brave[Pg 132] and decisive man), joined others to make a total of nine in the new Committee. Seventeen days later, on July 27th, Robespierre replaced one of the lesser members chosen. He had exactly a year to live, and this is the moment to clarify the nature of his career for the reader.

Robespierre was at this moment the chief figure in the eyes of the crowd, and was soon to be the chief revolutionary figure in the eyes of Europe: that is the first point. The second is of equal importance, and is far less generally recognised. He was not, and was never destined to be, the chief force in the revolutionary Government.

Robespierre was, at that moment, the main figure in the eyes of the crowd and was about to become the leading revolutionary figure in Europe: that's the first point. The second point is equally important and is much less recognized. He was not, and was never going to be, the main force in the revolutionary Government.

As to the first point, Robespierre had attained this position from the following combination of circumstances: first, alone of the revolutionary personalities, he had been continually before the public eye from the beginning; he had been a member of the first Parliament of all and had spoken in that Parliament in the first month of its sessions. Though then obscure in Versailles, he was already well known in his province and native town of Arras.

As for the first point, Robespierre reached this position through a unique set of circumstances: first, unlike other revolutionary figures, he had been constantly in the public eye from the start; he was a member of the first Parliament ever and had spoken in that Parliament during its very first month. Although he was relatively unknown in Versailles at that time, he was already quite familiar in his province and hometown of Arras.

Secondly, this position of his in the public eye was maintained without a break, and his position and reputation had increased by accumulation month after month for the whole four years. No one else was left in the political arena of whom this could be said. All the old reactionaries had gone, all the moderate men had gone; the figures of 1793 were all new figures—except Robespierre;[Pg 133] and he owed this continued and steady increase of fame to:—

Secondly, he maintained his public presence without interruption, and his status and reputation had grown steadily month after month for the entire four years. No one else in the political scene could claim the same. All the old reactionaries were gone, all the moderates were gone; the figures of 1793 were all new—except Robespierre;[Pg 133] and he owed this ongoing and consistent rise in fame to:—

Thirdly, his conspicuous and vivid sincerity. He was more wholly possessed of the democratic faith of the Contrat Social than any other man of his time: he had never swerved from an article of it. There is no better engine for enduring fame than the expression of real convictions. Moreover—

Thirdly, his obvious and genuine sincerity. He fully embraced the democratic beliefs from the Contrat Social more than anyone else of his time: he never strayed from any part of it. There’s no better way to achieve lasting fame than expressing true convictions. Moreover—

Fourthly, his speeches exactly echoed the opinions of his audience, and echoed them with a lucidity which his audience could not have commanded. Whether he possessed true eloquence or no is a matter still debated by those who are scholars in French letters. But it is certain that he had in his own time all the effects of a great orator, though his manner was precise and cold.

Fourthly, his speeches mirrored the views of his audience perfectly, and they did so with a clarity that the audience themselves couldn’t have achieved. Whether he had genuine eloquence or not is still a topic of debate among scholars of French literature. However, it's clear that he had all the hallmarks of a great orator in his time, even though his delivery was exact and unemotional.

Fifthly, he was possessed of a consistent body of doctrine: that is, he was not only convinced of the general democratic creed which his contemporaries held, and he not only held it unswervingly and uncorruptedly, but he could supplement it with a system of morals and even something which was the adumbration of religion.

Fifthly, he had a consistent set of beliefs: he was not only convinced of the overall democratic ideals shared by his peers, and he adhered to them unwaveringly and without corruption, but he could also enhance them with a moral framework and even something resembling religion.

Sixthly, he had, as such characters always can, but not often do, gather round themselves, a group of intensely devoted personal admirers and supporters, chief of whom was the young and splendidly courageous Saint-Just.

Sixthly, he had, like those characters usually can but don't often do, gathered around himself a group of fiercely loyal personal admirers and supporters, with the young and incredibly brave Saint-Just being the most prominent among them.

It was the combination of all these things, I say, which made Robespierre the chief[Pg 134] personality in the public eye when he entered the Committee of Public Safety on the 27th of July, 1793.

It was the mix of all these factors, I say, that made Robespierre the main[Pg 134] figure in the public eye when he joined the Committee of Public Safety on July 27, 1793.

Now let it be noted that, unlike his follower Saint-Just, and exceedingly unlike Danton, Robespierre possessed none of those military qualities without which it is impossible to be responsible for government over a military nation—especially if that nation be in the act of war: and such a war! The Committee of Public Safety was the Cæsar of revolutionary France. Robespierre as a member of that Cæsar was hopeless. His popularity was an advantage to his colleagues in the Committee, but his conception of action upon the frontiers was vague, personal, and futile. His ambition for leadership, if it existed, was subordinate to his ambition to be the saviour of his people and of their democratic experiment, and he had no comprehension of those functions of leadership by which it can co-ordinate detail and impose a plan of action. Robespierre, therefore, in every crisis of the last year we are about to study, yielded to his colleagues, never impressed them and never led them, and yet (it was the irony of his fate) was imagined by his fellow countrymen and by the warring Governments of Europe to be the master of them all.

Now, it’s important to note that, unlike his follower Saint-Just, and very unlike Danton, Robespierre lacked the military skills essential for governing a military nation—especially in wartime: and what a war it was! The Committee of Public Safety functioned as the Cæsar of revolutionary France. Robespierre, as a member of that Cæsar, was in over his head. His popularity helped his colleagues in the Committee, but his ideas about action on the frontiers were unclear, personal, and ineffective. His desire for leadership, if it existed, took a backseat to his wish to save his people and their democratic experiment, and he didn’t understand the leadership roles that required coordinating details and enforcing a plan of action. Therefore, in every crisis during the last year we are about to examine, Robespierre gave way to his colleagues, never impressed them, and never truly led them; yet (in an ironic twist of fate) he was perceived by his fellow citizens and the warring governments of Europe as the master of them all.

The first weeks after his appearance in the Committee of Public Safety were the critical weeks of the whole revolutionary movement. The despotic action of Paris (which I have concluded to be secretly supported[Pg 135] by the Committee)[5] had provoked insurrection upon all sides in the provinces. Normandy had protested, and on the 13th of July a Norman girl stabbed Marat to death. Lyons, as we have seen, had been some weeks in revolt; Marseilles had rebelled in the first week of June, Bordeaux and the whole department of the Gironde had of course risen, for their men were at stake. Later Toulon, the great naval depot of France, revolted: a reactionary municipal provincial Government was formed in that port, the little boy imprisoned in the Temple, heir to the kingdom, was proclaimed under the title of Louis XVII, and before the end of August the English and Spanish fleets had been admitted into the harbour and an excellent foreign garrison was defending the town against the national Government.

The first few weeks after his arrival in the Committee of Public Safety were crucial for the entire revolutionary movement. The tyrannical actions in Paris (which I believe were secretly backed[Pg 135] by the Committee)[5] had triggered uprisings across the provinces. Normandy had protested, and on July 13th, a girl from Normandy killed Marat. As we have seen, Lyons had been in rebellion for several weeks; Marseilles had revolted in the first week of June, and Bordeaux, along with the entire Gironde department, had obviously joined in, as their interests were at stake. Later, Toulon, the major naval base of France, rebelled: a reactionary provincial government was established there, and the young boy imprisoned in the Temple, heir to the throne, was declared Louis XVII. By the end of August, the British and Spanish fleets had entered the harbor, and a solid foreign garrison was protecting the town from the national government.

Meanwhile the Allies upon the Belgian frontier were doing what they could, taking fortress after fortress, and while Mayence was falling on the Rhine, Valenciennes and Condé were capitulating on the north-eastern border, and a portion of the Allied Army was marching to besiege Dunquerque. The insurrection in Vendée, which had broken out in the early part of the year, though[Pg 136] checked by the resistance of Nantes, was still successful in the field.

Meanwhile, the Allies along the Belgian border were doing their best, capturing fortress after fortress, and while Mainz was falling on the Rhine, Valenciennes and Condé surrendered on the northeastern border. Part of the Allied Army was marching to lay siege to Dunkirk. The uprising in Vendée, which had started earlier in the year, although [Pg 136] was hindered by the resistance in Nantes, was still performing well in the field.

It was in the month of August that a successful effort was made. Carnot, who soon proved the military genius of the Revolution, entered the Committee of Public Safety. On the 23rd of the month a true levy, very different from the futile and insufficiently applied attempt of the spring, was forced upon the nation by a vote in Parliament. It was a levy of men, vehicles, animals and provision, and soon furnished something not far short of half a million soldiers. With September the tide turned, the first victory in this crisis of the struggle, Hoondschoote, relieved Dunquerque in the early days of September. By mid-October a second and decisive victory, that of Wattignies, relieved Maubeuge. Lyons had been taken, Normandy was pacified long before; by the end of the year Toulon was reoccupied, and at the same time the last cohesive force of the Vendeans destroyed.

It was in August that a successful effort was made. Carnot, who quickly showed his military genius during the Revolution, joined the Committee of Public Safety. On the 23rd of the month, a real draft—very different from the ineffective and poorly executed attempt in the spring—was imposed on the nation by a vote in Parliament. It was a draft of men, vehicles, animals, and supplies, which soon provided nearly half a million soldiers. With September, the tide turned, and the first victory in this crisis, Hoondschoote, relieved Dunkirk in the early days of September. By mid-October, a second and decisive victory, that of Wattignies, relieved Maubeuge. Lyon had been captured; Normandy was settled long before; by the end of the year, Toulon was reoccupied, and at the same time, the last unified force of the Vendeans was destroyed.

But meanwhile the crisis had had a double effect, moral and material. The moral effect had been a sort of national madness in which the most extreme measures were proposed and many of them carried through with what one may call a creative audacity. The calendar itself was changed, the week itself abolished, the months re-named and re-adjusted. Such an act sufficiently symbolises the mental attitude of the Revolutionaries. They were determined upon a new earth.

But in the meantime, the crisis had a dual impact, both moral and material. The moral impact resulted in a kind of national frenzy where the most extreme measures were suggested and many of them were implemented with what could be described as bold creativity. The calendar itself was altered, the week was abolished, and the months were renamed and adjusted. Such an action clearly represents the mindset of the Revolutionaries. They were committed to creating a new world.

There went with this the last and most[Pg 137] violent attack upon what was believed to be the last remnants of Catholicism in the country, a hideous persecution of the priesthood, in which an uncounted number of priests died under the rigours of transportation or of violence. The reprisals against the rebels varied from severity of the most awful kind to cruelty that was clearly insane, and of which the worst examples took place at Arras and at Nantes.

There accompanied this the final and most[Pg 137] brutal assault on what was thought to be the last bits of Catholicism in the country, a horrific persecution of priests, where countless priests lost their lives due to harsh transportation or violence. The retaliation against the rebels ranged from extremely harsh measures to cruelty that was clearly insane, with the worst instances occurring in Arras and Nantes.

In all this turmoil the governing centre of the country, the Committee of Public Safety, not only kept its head but used the enormous forces of the storm for the purposes of achieving military success, under that system known as “the Terror,” which was for them no more than martial law, and an engine of their despotic control. Of the two thousand and more that passed before the revolutionary tribunal and were executed in Paris, the large majority were those whom the Committee of Public Safety judged to be obstacles to their military policy; and most were men or women who had broken some specific part of the martial code which the Government had laid down. Some were generals who had failed or were suspected of treason; and some, among the most conspicuous, were politicians who had attempted to check so absolute a method of conducting the war.

In all this chaos, the governing center of the country, the Committee of Public Safety, not only stayed composed but also harnessed the huge forces of the uproar to achieve military victories through a system known as “the Terror,” which for them was just martial law and a tool for their authoritarian control. Of the more than two thousand individuals who appeared before the revolutionary tribunal and were executed in Paris, the vast majority were deemed by the Committee of Public Safety to be obstacles to their military strategy; most were men or women who had violated some specific part of the martial code established by the Government. Some were generals who had failed or were suspected of treason; while others, among the most prominent, were politicians who had tried to put a stop to such an absolute approach to waging war.

Of these the greatest was Danton. Before the end of 1793 he began to protest against the system of the Terror; he believed, perhaps, that the country was now safe in the[Pg 138] military sense and needed such rigours no more. But the Committee disagreed, and were evidence available we should perceive that Carnot in particular determined that such opposition must cease. Danton and his colleagues—including Desmoulins, the journalist of the Revolution and the chief publicist who promoted the days of July 1789—were executed in the first week of April 1794.

Among these, Danton was the most significant. By the end of 1793, he started to speak out against the system of the Terror; he probably thought that the country was now secure in the[Pg 138] military sense and no longer needed such harsh measures. However, the Committee disagreed, and if we had the evidence, we would see that Carnot in particular was determined to put an end to such opposition. Danton and his colleagues—including Desmoulins, the journalist of the Revolution and the main promoter of the events of July 1789—were executed in the first week of April 1794.

Parallel to this action on the part of the Committee was their sudden attack upon men of the other extreme: the men whose violence, excessive even for that time, threatened to provoke reaction. Hébert was the chief of these, the spokesman of the Commune of Paris; and he also perished.

Parallel to this action by the Committee was their sudden attack on the men at the other extreme: those whose violence, excessive even for that time, risked provoking a backlash. Hébert was the leader of these men, the representative of the Commune of Paris; and he also met his end.

Meanwhile the Committee had permitted other persecutions and other deaths, notably that of the Queen. A sane policy would have demanded that she should be kept a hostage: she was sacrificed to the desire for vengeance, and her head fell on the same day on which the decisive battle of Wattignies was won. Later the King’s sister, Madame Elisabeth, was sacrificed to the same passions, and with her must be counted a certain proportion of the victims whose destruction could be no part of the Committee’s scheme, and proceeded purely from the motives of an ancient hatred, though in the case of many of these who were of aristocratic birth or of influence through their wealth, it is not easy to determine how far the possibility of their intrigue with the foreigner may not have led them to the scaffold.[Pg 139]

Meanwhile, the Committee allowed other persecutions and deaths to happen, especially that of the Queen. A sensible policy would have required her to be held as a hostage; instead, she was sacrificed to the desire for revenge, and her execution took place on the same day that the pivotal battle of Wattignies was won. Later, the King's sister, Madame Elisabeth, met the same fate, and along with her, there were a number of victims whose deaths had nothing to do with the Committee's plans and were purely driven by old hatred. In the cases of many of those who were aristocrats or influential due to their wealth, it’s hard to say how much their potential involvement with foreign powers might have contributed to their being sent to the guillotine.[Pg 139]

In the last four months of the period we are considering in this book, through April, that is, after the execution of Danton, through May and June and almost to the end of July, Robespierre appears with a particular prominence. Fads or doctrines of his own are admitted upon the Statute Book of the Revolution, notably his religious dogmas of a personal God and of the immortality of the soul. Nay, a public solemnity is arranged in honour of such matters, and he is the high priest therein. The intensity of the idolatry he received was never greater; the numbers that shared it were, perhaps, diminishing. It is certain that he did not appreciate how far the supports of his great popularity were failing. It is certain that he saw only the increasing enthusiasm of his immediate followers. The Committee still used him as their tool—notably for an increase of the Terror in June, but it is possible that for the first time in all these months he began to attempt some sort of authority within the Committee: we know, for instance, that he quarrelled with Carnot, who was easily the strongest man therein.

In the last four months of the period we're discussing in this book, until April—which follows Danton's execution—through May, June, and almost to the end of July, Robespierre stands out with particular prominence. His own fads or beliefs are included in the Statute Book of the Revolution, especially his religious ideas about a personal God and the immortality of the soul. In fact, a public ceremony is organized to honor these beliefs, and he acts as the high priest at this event. The intensity of the adoration he received was never greater, although the number of people sharing it may have been declining. It's clear that he didn't realize how much the foundations of his popularity were weakening. He only seemed to see the growing enthusiasm of his closest supporters. The Committee still used him as their tool—especially to ramp up the Terror in June—but for the first time in these months, he may have started to assert some kind of authority within the Committee: for example, we know he had a disagreement with Carnot, who was easily the strongest member there.

In the past they had permitted him to indulge a private policy where it did not interfere with the general military plan. He was largely responsible, not through his own judgment but from his desire to voice opinion, for the trial and execution of the Queen. He had temporised when Danton was beginning his campaign against the Terror at the end of 1793, and it is an ineffaceable[Pg 140] blot upon his memory and his justly earned reputation for integrity and sincerity, that he first permitted and then helped towards Danton’s execution. We may presume from the few indications we have that he protested against it in the secret counsels of the Committee, but he had yielded, and what is more, since Saint-Just desired to be Danton’s accuser he had furnished Saint-Just with notes against Danton. Though it was the Committee who were morally responsible for the extreme extension of the Terror which proceeded during those last few months, Robespierre had the unwisdom to act as their instrument, to draft their last decrees, and, believing the Terror to be popular, to support it in public. It was this that ruined him. The extreme Terrorists, those who were not yet satiated with vengeance, and who hated and feared a popular idol, determined to overthrow him.

In the past, they had allowed him to pursue a personal agenda as long as it didn't conflict with the overall military strategy. He played a significant role, not because of his own judgment but because he wanted to express his views, in the trial and execution of the Queen. He hesitated when Danton was starting his fight against the Terror at the end of 1793, and it remains an indelible[Pg 140] stain on his memory and his well-deserved reputation for integrity and honesty that he first allowed and then aided in Danton’s execution. We can assume from the limited signs available that he voiced his objections in the secret meetings of the Committee, but he eventually gave in, and moreover, since Saint-Just wanted to accuse Danton, he provided Saint-Just with notes against him. Although the Committee was morally responsible for the extreme expansion of the Terror that took place during those final months, Robespierre foolishly acted as their tool, drafted their last decrees, and, believing the Terror to be popular, publicly supported it. This ultimately led to his downfall. The radical Terrorists, those who were still hungry for vengeance and who despised and feared a popular figure, decided to depose him.

The mass of those who might be the next victims and who, knowing nothing of the secret councils of the Committee, imagined Robespierre to be what he posed as being, the master of the Committee, were eager for his removal. In his fictitious character as the supposed chief power in the State, all the growing nausea against the Terror was directed against his person.

The crowd of potential next victims, unaware of the secret meetings of the Committee, believed Robespierre to be what he presented himself as—the leader of the Committee—and were eager for him to be ousted. In his false role as the supposed head of the State, all the increasing disgust towards the Terror was aimed at him.

Coincidently with such forces, the Committee, whom, relying upon his public position, he had begun to interfere with, and probably to check in their military action (he certainly had attempted unsuccessfully to save certain lives against the decision of his colleagues),[Pg 141] determined to be rid of him. The crisis came in the fourth week of July: or as the revolutionary calendar then went, in the second week of Thermidor. He was howled down in the Parliament, an active and clever conspiracy had organised all the latent forces of opposition to him; he still so trusted in his popularity that the scene bewildered him, and he was still so beloved and so ardently followed, that when at that same sitting he was outlawed, his brother sacrificed himself to follow him. Saint-Just was included in the sentence, and his strict friend Lebas voluntarily accepted the same doom.

Coincidentally with these events, the Committee, which he had started to interfere with and probably to impede in their military actions (he had certainly tried, unsuccessfully, to save certain lives against his colleagues' decisions),[Pg 141] decided it was time to get rid of him. The crisis hit in the fourth week of July, or as the revolutionary calendar noted, in the second week of Thermidor. He was shouted down in Parliament; an active and clever conspiracy had rallied all the hidden forces of opposition against him. He was so confident in his popularity that the scene left him stunned, and he was still so loved and followed that when he was declared an outlaw in that same session, his brother sacrificed himself to stay by his side. Saint-Just was also included in the sentence, and his close friend Lebas voluntarily accepted the same fate.

What followed was at first a confusion of authority; put under arrest, the governor of the prison to which Robespierre was dispatched refused to receive him. He and his sympathisers met in the Hôtel de Ville after the fall of darkness, and an attempt was made to provoke an insurrection. There are many and confused accounts of what immediately followed at midnight, but two things are certain: the populace refused to rise for Robespierre, and the Parliament, with the Committee at its back, organised an armed force which easily had the better of the incipient rebellion at the Hôtel de Ville. It is probable that Robespierre’s signature was needed to the proclamation of insurrection: it is certain that he did not complete it, and presumable that he would not act against all his own theories of popular sovereignty and the general will. As he sat there with the paper before him and his[Pg 142] signature still unfinished, the armed force of the Parliament burst into the room, a lad of the name of Merda aimed a pistol from the door at Robespierre, and shot him in the jaw. (The evidence in favour of this version is conclusive.) Of his companions, some fled and were captured, some killed themselves, most were arrested. The next day, the 10th Thermidor, or 28th of July, 1794, at half-past seven in the evening, Robespierre, with twenty-one others, was guillotined.

What happened next was initially a mix-up of power; after being arrested, the governor of the prison where Robespierre was taken refused to accept him. He and his supporters gathered at the Hôtel de Ville after dark, and they tried to spark a rebellion. There are many unclear accounts of what happened next at midnight, but two things are certain: the crowd wouldn’t rally for Robespierre, and the Parliament, backed by the Committee, organized an armed force that easily dealt with the fledgling uprising at the Hôtel de Ville. It's likely that Robespierre’s signature was needed on the insurrection declaration: it’s clear that he didn’t finish it, and it’s reasonable to think he wouldn’t act against his own beliefs in popular sovereignty and the general will. As he sat there with the document in front of him and his[Pg 142] signature still unfinished, the Parliament’s armed force stormed the room, a young man named Merda aimed a gun at Robespierre from the doorway, and shot him in the jaw. (The evidence supporting this account is solid.) Of his associates, some fled and were captured, some took their own lives, and most were arrested. The following day, the 10th of Thermidor, or July 28, 1794, at half-past seven in the evening, Robespierre and twenty-one others were guillotined.

The irony of history would have it that the fall of this man, which was chiefly due to his interference with the system of the Terror, broke all the moral force upon which the Terror itself had resided; for men had imagined that the Terror was his work, and that, he gone, no excuse was left for it. A reaction began which makes of this date the true term in that ascending series of revolutionary effort which had by then discussed every aspect of democracy, succeeded in the military defence of that experiment, and laid down, though so far in words only, the basis of the modern State.

The irony of history is that this man's downfall, mostly because he messed with the system of the Terror, destroyed all the moral authority that the Terror relied on; people believed the Terror was his doing, and once he was gone, there was no justification for it anymore. A reaction started that marks this date as a crucial point in the ongoing series of revolutionary efforts, which had by then explored every aspect of democracy, managed to defend that experiment militarily, and established, at least in words, the foundation of the modern State.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] The reader should be warned that these numbers are hotly disputed. The latest authority will allow no more than 4000. After a full consultation of the evidence I can reduce the garrison to no less than 6000.

[3] The reader should be aware that these figures are heavily contested. The most recent expert allows for no more than 4,000. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, I can confirm the garrison at no fewer than 6,000.

[4] The legend that Danton was connected with the massacres is based on insufficient historical foundation. There are several second or third hand stories in support of it, but the chief positive evidence brought forward in this connection is the stamped paper of the Minister of Justice which, it has been amply proved by Dr. Robinet, was taken by a subordinate and without Danton’s knowledge or complicity. To the much stupider story that the Federals of Marseilles took part in the massacres, the modern student need pay no attention; it has been destroyed piecemeal and on indefeasible documentary evidence in the monograph of Pollio and Marcel.

[4] The claim that Danton was involved in the massacres is based on weak historical evidence. There are a few second- or third-hand accounts that support it, but the main solid evidence presented is the stamped paper of the Minister of Justice, which Dr. Robinet has clearly proven was taken by a subordinate without Danton's knowledge or involvement. The much more absurd claim that the Federals from Marseilles participated in the massacres is not worth the modern scholar's attention; it has been thoroughly debunked with irrefutable documentary evidence in the work of Pollio and Marcel.

[5] On p. 403 of my monograph on Danton (Nisbet & Co., 1899) the reader will find an unpublished report of the Committee of Public Safety, drawn up immediately before the destruction of the Girondins on the 31st of May. It forms, in my view, conclusive evidence, read in the light of their other actions, of the Committee’s determination to side with Paris.

[5] On p. 403 of my book about Danton (Nisbet & Co., 1899), the reader will find an unpublished report from the Committee of Public Safety, created right before the downfall of the Girondins on May 31st. In my opinion, it serves as clear evidence, when considered along with their other actions, of the Committee’s decision to support Paris.


V

THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE REVOLUTION

The Revolution would never have achieved its object: on the contrary, it would have led to no less than a violent reaction against[Pg 143] those principles which were maturing before it broke out, and which it carried to triumph, had not the armies of revolutionary France proved successful in the field; but the grasping of this mere historic fact, I mean the success of the revolutionary armies, is unfortunately no simple matter.

The Revolution would never have accomplished its goals: instead, it would have resulted in a strong backlash against [Pg 143] the principles that were developing before it erupted and that it managed to push to victory, if the revolutionary armies of France hadn't been successful on the battlefield; however, understanding this basic historical fact, specifically the success of the revolutionary armies, is unfortunately not straightforward.

We all know that as a matter of fact the Revolution was, upon the whole, successful in imposing its view upon Europe. We all know that from that success as from a germ has proceeded, and is still proceeding, modern society. But the nature, the cause and the extent of the military success which alone made this possible, is widely ignored and still more widely misunderstood. No other signal military effort which achieved its object has in history ended in military disaster—yet this was the case with the revolutionary wars. After twenty years of advance, during which the ideas of the Revolution were sown throughout Western civilisation, and had time to take root, the armies of the Revolution stumbled into the vast trap or blunder of the Russian campaign; this was succeeded by the decisive defeat of the democratic armies at Leipsic, and the superb strategy of the campaign of 1814, the brilliant rally of what is called the Hundred Days, only served to emphasise the completeness of the apparent failure. For that masterly campaign was followed by Napoleon’s first abdication, that brilliant rally ended in Waterloo and the ruin of the French army. When we consider the spread of Grecian culture over[Pg 144] the East by the parallel military triumph of Alexander, or the conquest of Gaul by the Roman armies under Cæsar, we are met by political phenomena and a political success no more striking than the success of the Revolution. The Revolution did as much by the sword as ever did Alexander or Cæsar, and as surely compelled one of the great transformations of Europe. But the fact that the great story can be read to a conclusion of defeat disturbs the mind of the student.

We all know that, in fact, the Revolution was largely successful in imposing its view on Europe. We all recognize that from that success, modern society has emerged and continues to develop. However, the nature, cause, and extent of the military success that made this possible are often overlooked and even more widely misunderstood. No other significant military effort that achieved its goal in history ended in military disaster—yet this was the case with the revolutionary wars. After twenty years of progress, during which the ideas of the Revolution spread throughout Western civilization and had time to take root, the armies of the Revolution fell into the vast trap of the Russian campaign; this was followed by the decisive defeat of the democratic armies at Leipzig, and the brilliant strategy of the 1814 campaign only highlighted the apparent total failure. That masterful campaign was succeeded by Napoleon’s first abdication, and that impressive comeback ultimately led to Waterloo and the downfall of the French army. When we think about the spread of Greek culture across the East by Alexander's military triumph, or the conquest of Gaul by the Roman armies under Caesar, we encounter political phenomena and successes that are no more striking than those of the Revolution. The Revolution achieved as much through military means as Alexander or Caesar did, and it certainly drove one of the major transformations of Europe. But the fact that this grand narrative can end in defeat troubles the mind of the student.

Again, that element fatal to all accurate study of military history, the imputation of civilian virtues and motives, enters the mind of the reader with fatal facility when he studies the revolutionary wars.

Again, the element that undermines any accurate understanding of military history—the assumption of civilian virtues and motives—easily creeps into the reader's mind when examining the revolutionary wars.

He is tempted to ascribe to the enthusiasm of the troops, nay, to the political movement itself, a sort of miraculous power. He is apt to use with regard to the revolutionary victories the word “inevitable,” which, if ever it applies to the reasoned, willing and conscious action of men, certainly applies least of all to men when they act as soldiers.

He feels drawn to attribute a kind of miraculous power to the enthusiasm of the troops, or even to the political movement itself. He tends to describe the revolutionary victories as "inevitable," a term that, if it ever fits the calculated, deliberate, and aware actions of people, certainly applies the least when they are acting as soldiers.

There are three points which we must carefully bear in mind when we consider the military history of the Revolution.

There are three key points we need to keep in mind when we look at the military history of the Revolution.

First, that it succeeded: the Revolution, regarded as the political motive of its armies, won.

First, it was successful: the Revolution, seen as the political motivation for its armies, won.

Secondly, that it succeeded through those military aptitudes and conditions which happened to accompany, but by no means necessarily accompanied, the strong convictions and the civic enthusiasm of the time.[Pg 145]

Secondly, it succeeded because of the military skills and circumstances that were present, but not necessarily linked, to the strong beliefs and civic passion of the time.[Pg 145]

Thirdly, that the element of chance, which every wise and prudent reasoner will very largely admit into all military affairs, worked in favour of the Revolution in the critical moments of the early wars.

Thirdly, the element of chance, which every smart and careful thinker will mostly acknowledge in all military matters, played a role in favor of the Revolution during the crucial moments of the early wars.

With these points fixed, and with a readiness to return to them when we have appreciated the military story, it is well to begin our study by telling that story briefly, and upon its most general lines. In so doing, it will be necessary to cover here and there points which have already been dealt with in this book, but that is inevitable where one is writing of the military aspect of any movement, for it is impossible to deal with that aspect save as a living part of the whole: so knit into national life is the business of war.

With these points established, and ready to revisit them after we understand the military story, it's best to start our study by briefly telling that story in broad strokes. In doing so, we'll need to touch on some points that have already been discussed in this book, but that's unavoidable when writing about the military side of any movement, as it’s impossible to address that side without connecting it to the larger context: the role of war is deeply woven into national life.

ONE

When the Revolution first approached action, the prospect of a war between France and any other great Power of the time—England, Prussia, the Empire, or let us say Russia, or even Spain—was such a prospect as might have been entertained at any time during the past two or three generations of men.

When the Revolution was about to take action, the idea of a war between France and any other major power of the time—England, Prussia, the Empire, or let's say Russia, or even Spain—was something that could have been considered at any point in the last two or three generations.

For pretty well a hundred years men had been accustomed to the consideration of dynastic quarrels supported by a certain type of army, which in a moment I shall describe.

For almost a hundred years, men had been used to thinking about dynastic conflicts backed by a specific type of army, which I will describe in a moment.

I have called these quarrels dynastic; that is, they were mainly quarrels between the[Pg 146] ruling houses of Europe: were mainly motived by the desire of each ruling house to acquire greater territory and revenue, and were limited by the determination of all the ruling houses to maintain certain ideas inviolate, as, for instance, the sacredness of monarchy, the independence of individual States, etc. Though they were in the main dynastic, yet in proportion as a dynasty might represent a united nation, they were national also. The English oligarchy was in this respect peculiar and more national than any European Government of its time. It is also true to say that the Russian despotism had behind it, in most of its military adventures and in all its spirit of expansion, the subconscious agreement of the people.

I’ve labeled these disputes as dynastic; basically, they were primarily conflicts between the[Pg 146] ruling families of Europe. The main motivation was each ruling house's desire to gain more land and income, but they were also limited by the commitment of all the ruling houses to uphold certain core principles, such as the sanctity of monarchy and the independence of individual states. Even though they were mostly dynastic, the extent to which a dynasty represented a unified nation also made them national. In this sense, the English oligarchy was unique and more national than any other European government of its time. It's also fair to say that Russian despotism had, in most of its military endeavors and its overall expansionist attitude, the underlying support of the people.

Still, however national, the wars of the time preceding the Revolution moved within a fixed framework of ideas, as it were, which no commander and no diplomatist dreamed of exceeding. A, the crowned head of a State, would have some claims against B, the crowned head of another State, with regard to certain territories. C, the crowned head or Government of a third State, would remain neutral or ally himself with either of the two; if he allied himself, then, as a rule, it was with the weaker against the stronger, in order to guarantee himself against too great an increase on the part of a rival. Or, again, a rebellion would break out against the power of A in some part of his dominions; then would B, somewhat reluctantly (as the almost unlimited right of an existing executive[Pg 147] was still a strong dogma in men’s minds), tend to ally himself with the rebels in order to diminish the power of A.

Still, even though the wars before the Revolution were national, they played out within a set framework of ideas that no commander or diplomat thought to challenge. A, the king of one state, would have claims against B, the king of another state, regarding certain territories. C, the king or government of a third state, would either stay neutral or ally with one of the two; if he chose to ally, it was usually with the weaker party against the stronger, to protect himself from a rival getting too powerful. Alternatively, if a rebellion occurred against A's authority in one of his territories, B, somewhat reluctantly (since the almost complete authority of an existing government was still a strong belief), would tend to ally with the rebels to weaken A's power.

Human affairs have always in them very strongly and permanently inherent, the character of a sport: the interest (at any rate of males) in the conduct of human life is always largely an interest of seeing that certain rules are kept, and certain points won, according to those rules. We must, therefore, beware of ridiculing the warfare of the century preceding the Revolution under the epithet of “a game.” But it is true of that warfare, and honourably true, that it attempted limited things in a limited manner; it did not attempt any fundamental change in society; it was not overtly—since the Thirty Years’ War at least—a struggle of ideas; it was conducted on behalf of known and limited interests for known and highly limited objects, and the instruments with which it was conducted were instruments artificial and segregated from the general life of nations.

Human affairs have always had a strong, lasting resemblance to a game: the interest (especially among men) in how human life is conducted often revolves around ensuring that certain rules are followed and specific goals are achieved according to those rules. Therefore, we should be cautious about mocking the conflicts of the century before the Revolution by calling them "a game." However, it is fair to say of those conflicts, and justly so, that they aimed for limited goals in a limited way; they didn't seek any fundamental changes in society; they weren't overtly—a least since the Thirty Years' War—a battle of ideas; they were fought for known and restricted interests with very specific objectives, using tools that were artificial and separated from the general life of nations.

These instruments were what have been called the “professional” armies. The term is very insufficient, and, in part, misleading. The gentry of the various Powers, mixed with whom were certain adventurers not always of gentle blood, were the officers that led these forces; and for the major part of the gentry in most European countries, the military career was the chief field of activity. The men whom they led were not a peasantry nor a working class, still less a civic force[Pg 148] in which the middle class would find itself engaged: they were the poorest and the least settled, some would have said the dregs of European life. With the exception here and there of a man—usually a very young man whom the fabled romance of this hard but glorious trade had attracted—and with the exception of certain bodies that followed in a mass and by order the relics of a feudal lordship, the armies of the period immediately preceding the Revolution were armies of very poor men, who had sold themselves into a sort of servitude often exciting and even adventurous, but not, when we examine it minutely, a career that a free man would choose. The men were caught by economic necessity, by fraud, and in other ways, and once caught were held. No better proof of this could be found than the barbarous severity of the punishments attached to desertion, or to minor forms of indiscipline. So held, they were used for the purposes of the game, not only in what would make them serviceable instruments of war, but also in what would make them pleasing to their masters. Strict alignment, certain frills of parade and appearance, all that is required in a theatre or in a pretentious household, appear in the military regulations of the time.

These forces were what have been called the “professional” armies. The term is quite inadequate and somewhat misleading. The nobility from various powers, along with some adventurers of uncertain lineage, were the officers leading these troops; for the majority of the gentry in most European countries, a military career was the primary path of engagement. The men they commanded were neither peasants nor a working class, and definitely not a civic force that the middle class would typically interact with: they were the poorest and the most unstable, often described as the dregs of European society. With a few exceptions—usually a very young person drawn in by the legendary allure of this tough yet glorious profession—and with the occasional groups following the remnants of a feudal lordship, the armies just before the Revolution were composed mainly of very poor men who had essentially sold themselves into a sort of servitude that could be exciting and adventurous but, upon closer inspection, was not a career a free man would choose. These men were trapped by economic necessity, deception, and various other means, and once trapped, they were held. The brutal severity of the punishments for desertion or even minor acts of indiscipline serves as clear evidence of this. Held captive in this way, they were used for the purposes of the game—not just to make them effective in battle but also to ensure they pleased their superiors. Strict formations, various ceremonial appearances, and all the demands of a performance or an extravagant household can be seen in the military regulations of the time.

I must not in all this be supposed to be belittling that great period between 1660 and 1789, during which the art of war was most thoroughly thought out, the traditions of most of our great European armies fixed, and the permanent military qualities which[Pg 149] we still inherit developed. The men so caught as private soldiers could not but enjoy the game when it was actively played, for men of European stock will always enjoy the game of war; they took glory in its recital and in its memories; to be a soldier, even under the servile conditions of the time, was a proper subject for pride, and it is further to be remarked that the excesses of cruelty discoverable in the establishment of their discipline were also accompanied by very high and lasting examples of military virtue. The behaviour of the English contingents at Fontenoy afford but one of many examples of what I mean.

I shouldn't be seen as downplaying the significant period between 1660 and 1789, when military strategy was thoroughly developed, the traditions of most of our major European armies were established, and the lasting military traits that[Pg 149] we still possess were formed. The soldiers who were engaged in battle surely enjoyed the action when it was in full swing, as men of European descent have always taken pleasure in the chaos of war; they took pride in its stories and memories. Being a soldier, even under the oppressive conditions of that time, was a source of pride, and it should be noted that the cruel practices used to enforce their discipline were also balanced by many examples of commendable military conduct. The conduct of the English troops at Fontenoy is just one of many examples of what I mean.

Still, to understand the wars of the Revolution we must clearly establish the contrast between the so-called professional armies which preceded that movement and the armies which the Revolution invented, used, and bequeathed to the modern world.

Still, to understand the wars of the Revolution, we need to clearly highlight the difference between the so-called professional armies that existed before that movement and the armies that the Revolution created, utilized, and handed down to the modern world.

So also, to revert to what was said above, we must recall the dynastic and limited character of the wars in which the eighteenth century had been engaged; at the outbreak of the Revolution no other wars were contemplated by men.

So, going back to what was mentioned earlier, we need to remember the dynastic and limited nature of the wars that the eighteenth century was involved in; when the Revolution broke out, no other wars were being considered by people.

Had you spoken, for instance, at any moment in 1789, to a statesman, whether of old experience or only introduced to political life by the new movement, of the position of Great Britain, he would at once have discussed that position in the terms of Great Britain’s recent defeat at the hands of France in the affair of the American colonies. Had[Pg 150] you discussed with him the position of Prussia he would at once have argued it in connection with Prussia’s secular opposition to Austria and the Empire. Had you asked him how he considered Spain, he would have spoken of the situation of Spain as against France in the light of the fact that Spain was a Bourbon monarchy allied in blood to the French throne. And so forth. No true statesman imagined at the time, nor, indeed, for many years, that a war of ideas, nor even, strictly speaking, of nations, was possible. Even when such a war was actually in process of waging, the diplomacy which attempted to establish a peace, the intrigues whereby alliances were sought, or neutrality negotiated, were dependent upon the older conception of things; and the historian is afforded, as he regards this gigantic struggle, the ironic satisfaction of seeing men fighting upon doctrines the most universal conceivable and yet perpetually changing their conduct during the struggle according to conceptions wholly particular, local and ephemeral, and soon to be entirely swept away by time.

If you had spoken, for example, at any moment in 1789, to a statesman, whether experienced or just getting involved in politics due to the new movement, about Great Britain's situation, he would immediately discuss it in terms of Great Britain's recent defeat by France over the American colonies. If you had talked with him about Prussia's position, he would have connected it to Prussia’s longstanding opposition to Austria and the Empire. If you had asked for his thoughts on Spain, he would have mentioned Spain's situation against France, considering that Spain was a Bourbon monarchy linked by blood to the French throne. And so on. No true statesman believed at the time, nor for many years afterward, that a war of ideas, or even a war of nations, was possible. Even when such a war was actively happening, the diplomacy that tried to establish peace, the schemes to form alliances, or negotiate neutrality, relied on older understandings of the world; and the historian, looking back at this massive struggle, finds ironically that men were fighting over concepts that were universal yet constantly changing their actions during the conflict based on very specific, local, and fleeting ideas, which would soon be completely erased by time.

Napoleon himself must needs marry an Austrian archduchess as part of this old prejudice, and for years brains as excellent as Danton’s or Talleyrand’s conjecture the possibility of treating now England, now Prussia, as neutral to the vast attempt of the French to destroy privilege in European society!

Napoleon himself had to marry an Austrian archduchess due to this old bias, and for years, brilliant minds like Danton's and Talleyrand's speculated on the possibility of treating England and Prussia as neutral in the grand effort of the French to eliminate privilege in European society!

One may say that for two years the connection of the revolutionary movement with arms had no aspect save that of civil war.[Pg 151] True, whenever a considerable change is in progress in society the possibility of foreign war in connection with it must always arise. Were some European State, for instance, to make an experiment in Collectivism to-day, the chance of foreign intervention would certainly be discussed by the promoters of that experiment. But no serious danger of an armed struggle between the French and any of their neighbours in connection with the political experiment of the Revolution was imagined by the mass of educated men in France itself nor without the boundaries of France during those first two years. And, I repeat, the military aspect of those years was confined to civil tumult. Nevertheless, that aspect is not to be neglected. The way in which the French organised their civil war (and there was always something of it present from the summer of 1789 onwards) profoundly affected the foreign war that was to follow: for in their internal struggles great masses of Frenchmen became habituated to the physical presence, millions to the discussion, of arms.

One could argue that for two years, the revolutionary movement's relationship with weapons was solely characterized by civil war.[Pg 151] It's true that whenever there's a significant change happening in society, the potential for foreign war is always a topic of discussion. If a European country, for example, were to try out Collectivism today, the possibility of outside intervention would definitely be on the table for those promoting that idea. However, during those first two years, most educated people in France, as well as outside its borders, didn’t really see any serious threat of armed conflict between the French and their neighbors stemming from the political experiment of the Revolution. As I said, the military aspect of those years was limited to civil unrest. Still, this aspect shouldn't be overlooked. The way the French organized their civil war (which was always somewhat present from the summer of 1789 onward) had a significant impact on the foreign conflict that followed: through their internal struggles, a large number of French people became accustomed to the physical presence of weapons, and millions engaged in discussions about them.

It is, as we have seen in another part of this book, a repeated and conspicuous error to imagine that the first revolutionary outbreaks were not met sufficiently sternly by royal troops. On the contrary, the royal troops were used to the utmost and were defeated. The populace of the large towns, and especially of Paris, proved itself capable of military organisation and of military action. When to this capacity had been added the institution of the militia called[Pg 152] the National Guard, there were already the makings of a nation wholly military.

It is, as we’ve seen in another part of this book, a common and clear mistake to think that the first revolutionary uprisings were not met with enough force by royal troops. On the contrary, the royal troops were fully deployed and suffered defeats. The people in the large cities, especially in Paris, showed they could organize and take military action. Once this capability was combined with the establishment of the militia known as [Pg 152] the National Guard, it was clear that the foundations of a fully military nation were already being formed.

Much in this exceptional and new position must be ascribed to the Gallic character. It may be said that from the fall of the Roman Empire to the present day that character has been permanently and of its own volition steeped in the experience of organised fighting. Civil tumult has been native to it, the risk of death in defence of political objects has been equally familiar, and the whole trade of arms, its necessary organisation, its fatigues and its limiting conditions, have been very familiar to the population throughout all these centuries. But beyond this the fact that the Revolution prepared men in the school of civil tumult was of the first advantage for its later aptitude against foreign Powers.

A lot of this remarkable and new situation can be attributed to the French character. It's fair to say that from the fall of the Roman Empire to today, that character has been consistently shaped by the experience of organized conflict. Internal strife has been a part of it, the threat of death in pursuit of political aims has been well-known, and the entire concept of warfare—its necessary organization, its demands, and its restrictions—has been very familiar to the population over all these centuries. Moreover, the fact that the Revolution trained people in the chaos of civil unrest gave them a significant advantage later on against foreign powers.

It is always well in history to fix a definite starting-point for any political development, and the starting-point of the revolutionary wars may easily be fixed at the moment when Louis, his queen and the royal children attempted to escape to the frontier and to the Army of the Centre under the command of Bouillé. This happened, as we have seen, in June 1791.

It’s always a good idea in history to establish a clear starting point for any political development, and the beginning of the revolutionary wars can easily be set at the moment when Louis, his queen, and the royal children tried to flee to the frontier and reach the Army of the Centre led by Bouillé. This occurred, as we have seen, in June 1791.

Many factors combine to make that date the starting-point. In the first place, until that moment no actual proof had been apparent in the eyes of European monarchs of the captivity of their chief exemplar, the king of France.

Many factors come together to make that date the starting point. First of all, until that moment, there had been no real evidence apparent to European monarchs of the captivity of their main example, the king of France.

The wild march upon Versailles, in the[Pg 153] days of October 1789, had its parallel in a hundred popular tumults with which Europe was familiar enough for centuries. But the rapidly succeeding reforms of the year 1790, and even the great religious blunder of 1791, had received the signature and the public assent of the Crown. The Court, though no longer at Versailles, was splendid, the power of the King over the Executive still far greater than that of any other organ in the State, and indefinitely greater than that of any other individual in the State. The talk of captivity, of insult and the rest, the outcries of the emigrants and the perpetual complaint of the French royal family in its private relations, seemed exaggerated, or at any rate nothing to act upon, until there came the shock of the King’s attempted flight and recapture. This clinched things; and it clinched them all the more because more than one Court, and especially that of Austria, believed for some days that the escape had been successful.

The wild march on Versailles in the[Pg 153] days of October 1789 had parallels in numerous popular uprisings that Europe had seen for centuries. However, the quickly following reforms of 1790, and even the major religious mistake of 1791, had been approved and publicly accepted by the Crown. The Court, although no longer at Versailles, was still lavish, and the King held significantly more power over the Executive than any other part of the State, and far more than any individual in the State. The talk of captivity, insult, and other grievances from the emigrants and the ongoing complaints of the French royal family about their private situation seemed exaggerated, or at least not a cause for action, until the King’s attempted escape and capture. This changed everything; and it changed even more because several courts, especially Austria's, believed for a few days that the escape had been successful.

Again, the flight and its failure put the army into a ridiculous posture. Action against the Revolution was never likely, so long as the discipline and steadiness of the French army were believed in abroad. But the chief command had hopelessly failed upon that occasion, and it was evident that the French-speaking troops could not easily be trusted by the Executive Government or by their own commanders. Furthermore, the failure of the flight leads the Queen, with her vivacity of spirit and her rapid though[Pg 154] ill-formed plans, to turn for the first time to the idea of military intervention. Her letters suggesting this (in the form of a threat rather than a war, it is true) do not begin until after her capture at Varennes.

Again, the escape and its failure put the army in a ridiculous position. Action against the Revolution was never likely as long as people abroad believed in the discipline and steadiness of the French army. However, the top command had hopelessly failed this time, and it was clear that the French-speaking troops could not easily be trusted by the Executive Government or by their own leaders. Additionally, the failure of the escape prompts the Queen, with her lively spirit and her quick but poorly thought-out plans, to consider for the first time the idea of military intervention. Her letters suggesting this (as a threat rather than a declaration of war, to be fair) didn’t start until after her capture at Varennes.

Finally, coincident with that disaster was the open mention of a Republic, the open suggestion that the King should be deposed, and the first definite and public challenge to the principles of monarchy which the Revolution had thrown down before Europe.

Finally, at the same time as that disaster, there was a clear discussion about a Republic, a straightforward suggestion that the King should be removed, and the first clear and public challenge to the principles of monarchy that the Revolution had put forward to Europe.

We are, therefore, not surprised to find that this origin of the military movement was followed in two months by the Declaration of Pillnitz.

We aren't surprised to see that this start of the military movement was followed two months later by the Declaration of Pillnitz.

With the political nature of that Declaration one must deal elsewhere. Its military character must here be observed.

With the political aspect of that Declaration, we need to address it elsewhere. Its military nature needs to be noted here.

The Declaration of Pillnitz corresponded as nearly as possible to what in the present day would be an order preparatory to mobilising a certain proportion of the reserve. It cannot with justice be called equivalent to an order calling out all the reserves, still less equivalent to an order mobilising upon a war footing the forces of a modern nation, for such an action is tantamount to a declaration of war (as, for instance, was the action of the English Government before the South African struggle), and Pillnitz was very far from that. But Pillnitz was certainly as drastic a military proceeding as would be the public intimation by a group of Powers that the reserves had been warned in connection with their quarrel against another Power. It was, for instance,[Pg 155] quite as drastic as the action of Austria against Servia in 1908. And it was intended to be followed by such submission as is expected to follow upon the threat of superior force.

The Declaration of Pillnitz was, as closely as possible, like a modern order preparing to mobilize a certain percentage of the reserves. It can't fairly be compared to an order calling out all the reserves, much less to an order mobilizing a nation’s forces for war, because such an act would be seen as a declaration of war (like what the British Government did before the South African conflict), and Pillnitz was far from that. However, Pillnitz was definitely a serious military move, similar to a public announcement by a group of Powers that the reserves had been alerted regarding their dispute with another Power. For example, [Pg 155] it was just as severe as Austria's actions against Serbia in 1908. It was meant to be followed by the kind of submission that typically comes after a threat of greater military power.

Such was the whole burden of Marie Antoinette’s letters to her brother (who had called the meeting at Pillnitz), and such was the sense in which the politicians of the Revolution understood it.

Such was the entire message of Marie Antoinette’s letters to her brother (who had called the meeting at Pillnitz), and such was the way the politicians of the Revolution interpreted it.

All that autumn and winter the matter chiefly watched by foreign diplomatists and the clearest of French thinkers was the condition of the French forces and of their command. Narbonne’s appointment to the War Office counted more than any political move, Dumouriez’ succession to him was the event of the time. Plans of campaign were drawn up (and promptly betrayed by Marie Antoinette to the enemy), manifold occasions for actual hostilities were discovered, the Revolution challenged the Emperor in the matter of the Alsatian princes, the Emperor challenged, through Kaunitz, the Revolution in a letter directly interfering with the internal affairs of France, and pretending to a right of ingérence therein; and on the 20th of April, 1792, war was declared against the Empire. Prussia thereupon informed the French Government that she made common cause with the Emperor, and the revolutionary struggle had begun.

All through that autumn and winter, the main focus for foreign diplomats and sharp French thinkers was the state of the French military and its leadership. Narbonne's appointment to the War Office was more significant than any political maneuver, while Dumouriez's succession was the key event of the period. Campaign plans were drafted (and quickly leaked by Marie Antoinette to the enemy), numerous chances for actual conflict arose, the Revolution confronted the Emperor over the Alsatian princes, and the Emperor, through Kaunitz, challenged the Revolution with a letter that directly interfered in France's internal matters, claiming a right to intervene; then, on April 20, 1792, war was declared against the Empire. Prussia then informed the French Government that it was joining forces with the Emperor, marking the start of the revolutionary struggle.

The war discovered no serious features during its first four months: so slow was the gathering and march of the Allies; but the panics into which the revolutionary troops[Pg 156] fell in the first skirmishes, their lack of discipline, and the apparent breakdown of the French military power, made the success of the Invasion in Force, when it should come, seem certain. The invading army did not cross the frontier until more than a week after the fall of the palace. Longwy capitulated at once; a week later, in the last days of August, the great frontier fortress of Verdun was summoned. It capitulated almost immediately.

The war didn’t reveal any significant developments during its first four months: the gathering and movement of the Allies was incredibly slow. However, the panics that the revolutionary troops[Pg 156] experienced during the initial skirmishes, their lack of discipline, and the apparent collapse of French military strength made the success of the planned Invasion in Force seem inevitable. The invading army didn’t cross the border until over a week after the palace fell. Longwy surrendered immediately; a week later, in the closing days of August, the major frontier fortress of Verdun was called upon. It surrendered almost right away.

TWO

On the 2nd of September Verdun was entered by the Prussians, and a little outside the gates of the town, near a village bearing the name of Regret, the allied camp was fixed. Rather more than a week later, on the 11th, the Allies marched against the line of the Argonne.

On September 2nd, the Prussians entered Verdun, and just outside the town gates, near a village called Regret, the allied camp was set up. A little over a week later, on the 11th, the Allies marched towards the Argonne line.

The reader will remember that this moment, with the loss of the frontier fortresses Longwy and Verdun, and the evidence of demoralisation which that afforded, was also the moment of the September massacres and of the horrors in Paris. Dumouriez and the mixed French force which he commanded had been ordered by the Ministers of War to hold the line of the Argonne against which the Allies were marching. And here it is well to explain what was meant in a military sense by this word “line.”

The reader will remember that this moment, with the loss of the frontier fortresses Longwy and Verdun, and the signs of demoralization that came with it, was also the time of the September massacres and the horrors unfolding in Paris. Dumouriez and the combined French forces he led had been ordered by the Ministers of War to secure the line of the Argonne, where the Allies were advancing. And here it’s important to clarify what was meant by the term “line” in a military context.

The Argonne is a long, nearly straight range of hills running from the south northward, a good deal to the west of north.[Pg 157]

The Argonne is a long, almost straight line of hills extending from the south to the north, somewhat to the west of north.[Pg 157]

Their soil is clay, and though the height of the hills is only three hundred feet above the plain, their escarpment or steep side is towards the east, whence an invasion may be expected. They are densely wooded, from five to eight miles broad, the supply of water in them is bad, in many parts undrinkable; habitation with its provision for armies and roads extremely rare. It is necessary to insist upon all these details because the greater part of civilian readers find it difficult to understand how formidable an obstacle so comparatively unimportant a feature in the landscape may be to an army upon the march. It was quite impossible for the guns, the wagons, and therefore the food and the ammunition of the invading army, to pass through the forest over the drenched clay land of that wet autumn save where proper roads existed. These were only to be found wherever a sort of natural pass negotiated the range.

Their soil is clay, and although the hills rise only three hundred feet above the plain, their steep side faces east, where an invasion might come from. They are heavily wooded and range from five to eight miles wide, but the water supply in these areas is poor, with many parts being undrinkable. It’s very rare to find places for habitation, army provisions, or roads. It’s important to emphasize these details because many readers struggle to grasp how a seemingly minor feature in the landscape can pose such a significant barrier to an advancing army. It was nearly impossible for the guns, wagons, and therefore the food and ammunition of the invading army to move through the forest over the soaked clay during that wet autumn unless proper roads were available. These roads could only be found where a natural pass crossed the range.

Three of these passes alone existed, and to this day there is very little choice in the crossing of these hills. The accompanying sketch will explain their disposition. Through the southernmost went the great high road from the frontier and Verdun to Paris. At the middle one (which is called the Gap of Grandpré) Dumouriez was waiting with his incongruous army. The third and northern one was also held, but less strongly. The obvious march for an unimpeded invader would have been from Verdun along the high road, through the southern pass at “Les[Pg 158] Islettes,” and so to Chalôns and on to Paris. But Dumouriez, marching down rapidly from the north, had set an advanced guard to hold that pass and was lying himself with the mass of the army on the pass to the north of it at Grandpré. Against Grandpré the Prussians marched, and meanwhile the Austrians were[Pg 159] attacking the further pass to the north. Both were forced. Dumouriez fell back southward to St. Menehould. Meanwhile Kellermann was coming up from Metz to join him, and all the while the main pass at “Les Islettes,” through which the great road to Paris went, continued to be held by the French.

Three of these passes existed, and even now, there’s not much choice when it comes to crossing these hills. The sketch that follows will illustrate their layout. The southernmost pass carried the main highway from the frontier and Verdun to Paris. At the middle one, known as the Gap of Grandpré, Dumouriez was positioned with his mismatched army. The northern pass was also occupied, but with less strength. The obvious route for an unopposed invader would have been from Verdun along the highway, through the southern pass at “Les Islettes,” and then to Chalôns and on to Paris. However, Dumouriez, quickly advancing from the north, had set an advanced guard to secure that pass and was personally stationed with the bulk of his army at the northern pass in Grandpré. The Prussians marched against Grandpré, while the Austrians were attacking the farther northern pass. Both were forced to retreat. Dumouriez fell back southward to St. Menehould. Meanwhile, Kellermann was coming up from Metz to reinforce him, and throughout this time, the main pass at “Les Islettes,” which led to Paris, remained under French control.

Sketch Map, showing the turning of the positions on the Argonne and the Cannonade at Valmy, September 1792. Sketch map illustrating the positions of the turns at Argonne and the cannon fire at Valmy, September 1792.

The Prussians and the Austrians joined forces in the plain known as the Champagne Pouilleuse, which lies westward of Argonne. It will be seen that as they marched south along this plain to meet Dumouriez and to defeat him, their position was a peculiar one: they were nearer the enemy’s capital than the enemy’s army was, and yet they had to fight with their backs to that capital, and their enemy the French had to fight with their faces towards it. Moreover, it must be remarked that the communications of the Allied Army were now of a twisted, roundabout sort, which made the conveyance of provisions and ammunition slow and difficult—but they counted upon an immediate destruction of Dumouriez’ force and after that a rapid march on the capital.

The Prussians and the Austrians teamed up in the area known as the Champagne Pouilleuse, located west of Argonne. As they moved south across this plain to confront Dumouriez and defeat him, their situation was quite unusual: they were closer to the enemy’s capital than the enemy’s army itself, yet they had to fight with their backs to that capital, while their French opponents faced it. Additionally, it should be noted that the supply lines for the Allied Army were complicated and indirect, making the transport of food and ammunition slow and challenging—but they were counting on quickly defeating Dumouriez and then making a rapid advance toward the capital.

On September 19 Kellermann came up from the south and joined hands with Dumouriez near St. Menehould, and on the morning of the 20th his force occupied a roll of land on which there was a windmill and immediately behind which was the village of Valmy; from this village the ensuing action was to take its name. It must here be insisted upon that both armies had been subjected to the very worst weather for more than a fortnight,[Pg 160] but of the two the Prussian force had suffered from this accident much more severely than the French. Dysentery had already broken out, and the length and tortuousness of their communications were greatly emphasised by the condition of the roads.

On September 19, Kellermann came up from the south and joined forces with Dumouriez near St. Menehould. On the morning of the 20th, his troops took position on a stretch of land that had a windmill, with the village of Valmy right behind it; the upcoming action would be named after this village. It's important to note that both armies had been enduring terrible weather for over two weeks,[Pg 160] but the Prussian forces had been hit much harder by the conditions than the French. Dysentery had already begun to spread, and the length and difficulty of their supply routes were made even worse by the state of the roads.

On the morning of that day, the 20th of September, a mist impeded all decisive movements. There was an encounter, half accidental, between an advanced French battery and the enemy’s guns, but it was not until mid-morning that the weather lifted enough to show each force its opponent. Then there took place an action, or rather a cannonade, the result of which is more difficult to explain, perhaps, than any other considerable action of the revolutionary wars. For some hours the Prussian artillery, later reinforced by the Austrian, cannonaded the French position, having for its central mark the windmill of Valmy, round which the French forces were grouped. At one moment this cannonade took effect upon the limbers and ammunition wagons of the French; there was an explosion which all eye-witnesses have remembered as the chief feature of the firing, and which certainly threw into confusion for some moments the ill-assorted troops under Kellermann’s command. At what hour this took place the witnesses who have left us accounts differ to an extraordinary extent. Some will have it at noon, others towards the middle of the afternoon—so difficult is it to have any accurate account of what happens in the heat of an action. At any rate, if not coincidently[Pg 161] with this success, at some moment not far removed from it, the Prussian charge was ordered, and it is here that the difficulties of the historian chiefly appear. That charge was never carried home; whether, as some believe, because it was discovered, after it was ordered, to be impossible in the face of the accuracy and intensity of the French fire, or whether, as is more probably the case, because the drenched soil compelled the commanders to abandon the movement after it had begun—whatever the cause may have been, the Prussian force, though admirably disciplined and led, and though advancing in the most exact order, failed to carry out its original purpose. It halted halfway up the slope, and the action remained a mere cannonade without immediate result apparent upon either side.

On the morning of September 20th, a mist hindered any decisive movements. There was a semi-accidental encounter between a French battery and the enemy’s guns, but it wasn’t until mid-morning that the weather cleared enough for each side to see its opponent. Then there was an action, or more accurately, a cannonade, the outcome of which is perhaps harder to explain than any other significant event of the revolutionary wars. For several hours, the Prussian artillery, later joined by the Austrian forces, bombarded the French position, targeting the windmill of Valmy, around which the French troops were gathered. At one point, this bombardment affected the limbers and ammunition wagons of the French, resulting in an explosion that all eyewitnesses recalled as the major highlight of the bombardment, which certainly caused some momentary chaos among the poorly organized troops under Kellermann's command. The timing of this event varies significantly among those who have recorded accounts. Some claim it happened at noon, while others place it in the middle of the afternoon—it's challenging to get an accurate account of events in the heat of battle. In any case, if not simultaneously[Pg 161] with this event, at a time not long after, the Prussian charge was ordered, and this is where the historian’s challenges primarily arise. That charge was never fully executed; whether, as some suggest, it was deemed impossible after being ordered due to the accuracy and intensity of the French fire, or more likely because the soaked ground forced commanders to abandon the movement after it began—whatever the reason, the Prussian force, though well-disciplined and led, and advancing in perfect order, failed to achieve its original goal. It halted halfway up the slope, leaving the action as nothing more than a cannonade without any immediate impact visible on either side.

Nevertheless that result ultimately turned out to be very great, and if we consider its place in history, quite as important as might have been the result of a decisive action. In the first place, the one day’s delay which it involved was just more than the calculations of the Allies, with their long impeded line of communications, had allowed for. In the next place, a singular increase in determination and moral force was infused into the disheartened and ill-matched troops of the French commanders by this piece of resistance.

Nevertheless, that outcome ultimately proved to be very significant, and if we think about its place in history, it's just as important as a decisive action might have been. First of all, the one day's delay it caused was just beyond what the Allies, with their severely disrupted communication lines, had accounted for. Additionally, this act of resistance instilled a remarkable boost in determination and morale among the demoralized and mismatched troops of the French commanders.

We must remember that the French force upon the whole expected and discounted a defeat, the private soldier especially had no confidence in the result; and to find that at[Pg 162] the first action which had been so long threatened and had now at last come, he could stand up to the enemy, produced upon him an exaggerated effect which it would never have had under other circumstances.

We need to keep in mind that the entire French force anticipated and accepted a defeat, and the regular soldiers, in particular, had little faith in the outcome. So, when they realized that at[Pg 162] the first battle they had been warned about for so long had finally arrived and they could actually face the enemy, it had a much stronger impact on them than it would have in any other situation.

Finally, we must recollect that whatever causes had forbidden the Prussian charge forbade on the next day a general advance against the French position. And all the time the sickness in the Prussian camp was rapidly increasing. Even that short check of twenty-four hours made a considerable difference. A further delay of but yet another day, during which the Allied Army could not decide whether to attack at once or to stand as they were, very greatly increased the list of inefficients from illness.

Finally, we need to remember that whatever reasons had prevented the Prussian charge also stopped a general advance against the French position the next day. Meanwhile, the sickness in the Prussian camp was quickly growing worse. Even that brief halt of twenty-four hours made a significant difference. Another day of delay, during which the Allied Army couldn't decide whether to attack immediately or stay put, greatly increased the number of those unable to fight due to illness.

For a whole week of increasing anxiety and increasing inefficiency the Allied Army hung thus, impotent, though they were between the French forces and the capital. Dumouriez ably entertained this hesitation, with all its accumulating dangers for the enemy, by prolonged negotiations, until upon the 30th of September the Prussian and Austrian organisation could stand the strain no longer, and its commanders determined upon retreat. It was the genius of Danton, as we now know, that chiefly organised the withdrawal of what might still have been a dangerous invading force. It is principally due to him that no unwise Jingoism was permitted to claim a trial of strength with the invader, that he was allowed to retire with all his guns, his colours and his train. The retreat was lengthy and unmolested,[Pg 163] though watched by the French forces that discreetly shepherded it but were kept tightly in hand from Paris. It was more than three weeks later when the Allied Army, upon which Europe and the French monarchy had counted for an immediate settlement of the Revolution, re-crossed the frontier, and in this doubtful and perhaps inexplicable fashion the first campaign of the European Powers against the Revolution utterly failed.

For an entire week of growing anxiety and rising inefficiency, the Allied Army remained stuck, powerless, even though they were positioned between the French forces and the capital. Dumouriez skillfully maintained this uncertainty, with all its increasing risks for the enemy, through extended negotiations, until on September 30th the Prussian and Austrian forces could no longer handle the pressure, and their commanders decided to retreat. It was primarily Danton's ingenuity that organized the withdrawal of what could have still been a threatening invasion force. Thanks to him, no reckless nationalism was allowed to provoke a confrontation with the invaders, allowing them to retreat with all their artillery, flags, and supplies. The retreat was lengthy and uninterrupted,[Pg 163] though monitored by the French forces that carefully guided it while being kept tightly controlled from Paris. It was more than three weeks later when the Allied Army, which Europe and the French monarchy had relied on for a quick resolution to the Revolution, crossed back over the border, and in this uncertain and perhaps puzzling manner, the first campaign of the European Powers against the Revolution completely failed.

THREE

Following upon this success, Dumouriez pressed on to what had been, from the first moment of his power at the head of the army, his personal plan—to wit, the invasion of the Low Countries.

Following this success, Dumouriez continued with what had been, since the very beginning of his leadership of the army, his personal plan—specifically, the invasion of the Low Countries.

To understand why this invasion failed and why Dumouriez thought it might succeed, we must appreciate the military and political situation of the Low Countries at the time. They then formed a very wealthy and cherished portion of the Austrian dominions; they had latterly suffered from deep disaffection culminating in an open revolution, which was due to the Emperor of Austria’s narrow and intolerant contempt of religion. From his first foolish policy of persecution and confiscation he had indeed retreated, but the feeling of the people was still strongly opposed to the Government at Vienna. It is remarkable, indeed, and in part due to the pressure of a strongly Protestant and aristocratic state, Holland, to the north of them,[Pg 165] that the people of the Austrian Netherlands retained at that time a peculiar attachment to the Catholic religion. The Revolution was quite as anti-Catholic as the Austrian Emperor, but of the persecution of the latter the Belgians (as we now call them) knew something; that of the former they had not yet learnt to dread. It was, therefore, Dumouriez’ calculation that, in invading this province of the Austrian power, he would be fighting in friendly territory. Again, it was separated from the political centre of the empire; it was, therefore, more or less isolated politically, and even for military purposes communication with it was not so easy, unless, indeed, Austria could count on a complete co-operation with Prussia, which Power had been for now so long her ruthless and persistent rival.

To understand why this invasion failed and why Dumouriez thought it might succeed, we need to consider the military and political situation in the Low Countries at the time. They were a very wealthy and valued part of the Austrian empire; however, they had recently experienced strong discontent that erupted into open revolution, fueled by the Emperor of Austria’s narrow-minded and intolerant views on religion. Although he had retreated from his initial foolish policies of persecution and confiscation, the people's feelings were still very much against the government in Vienna. It's noteworthy, partly due to the influence of the strongly Protestant and aristocratic state of Holland to the north of them,[Pg 165] that the people of the Austrian Netherlands maintained a peculiar attachment to the Catholic faith at that time. The revolution was just as anti-Catholic as the Austrian Emperor, but the Belgians (as we now call them) were aware of the Emperor's persecution; they had not yet learned to fear that of the revolutionaries. Therefore, Dumouriez believed that by invading this province of Austrian power, he would be fighting on friendly ground. Additionally, it was politically detached from the center of the empire, making it somewhat isolated, and even for military purposes, communication with it wasn't straightforward unless Austria could rely on complete support from Prussia, which had long been its ruthless and persistent rival.

Sketch Map of towns occupied by French in 1792 and evacuated in March 1793, with sites of battles of Jemappes and of Neerwinden, and of Dumouriez' treason. Sketch map of the towns occupied by the French in 1792 and evacuated in March 1793, showing the locations of the battles of Jemappes and Neerwinden, as well as Dumouriez’s betrayal.

Favourable, however, as the circumstances appeared for an invasion, two factors telling heavily against the French had to be counted: the first was the formation of their army, the second the spirit of rebellion against any anti-Catholic Government which had given such trouble to Joseph II.

Favorable as the situation seemed for an invasion, two significant factors worked against the French: the first was the structure of their army, and the second was the spirit of rebellion against any anti-Catholic government, which had caused so much trouble for Joseph II.

Of these two factors by far the most important was, of course, the first. If the French forces had been homogeneous, in good spirit, and well trained, they might have held what they won; as a fact, they were most unhomogeneous, great portions of them were ill trained, and, worst of all, there was no consistent theory of subordinate command. Men who imagined that subordinate, that is,[Pg 166] regimental, command in an army could be erected from below, and that a fighting force could resemble a somewhat lax and turbulent democracy, marched alongside of and were actually incorporated with old soldiers who had spent their whole careers under an unquestioned discipline, and under a subordinate command which came to them they knew not whence, and as it were by fate. The mere mixture of two such different classes of men in one force would have been bad enough to deal with, but what was worse, the political theories of the day fostered the military error of the new battalions though the politicians dared not interfere with the valuable organisation of the old.

Of these two factors, the first was by far the most important. If the French forces had been unified, motivated, and well-trained, they might have held onto what they gained. In reality, they were very divided, many were poorly trained, and, worst of all, there was no consistent approach to subordinate command. Soldiers who thought that subordinate command—meaning [Pg 166] regimental command—could be developed from the ground up, and that a fighting force could function like a somewhat chaotic and unruly democracy, were marching alongside and even mixed with seasoned soldiers who had spent their entire careers under a strict discipline and a subordinate command that was provided to them seemingly by fate, without any knowledge of its origin. The mere combination of such different groups in one force would have been challenging enough to handle, but what made it worse was that the political ideas of the time encouraged the military mistakes of the new battalions, even though the politicians were afraid to disrupt the valuable organization of the old ones.

The invasion of the Low Countries began with a great, though somewhat informal and unfruitful success, in the victory of Jemappes. It was the first striking and dramatic decisive action which the French, always of an eager appetite for such news, had been given since between forty and fifty years. The success in America against the English, though brilliantly won and solidly founded, had not presented occasions of this character, and Fontenoy was the last national victory which Paris could remember. Men elderly or old in this autumn of 1792 would have been boys or very young men when Fontenoy was fought. The eager generation of the Revolution, with its military appetites and aptitudes, as yet had hardly expected victory, though victory was ardently desired by them and peculiarly suitable to their temper.[Pg 167]

The invasion of the Low Countries started with a significant, yet somewhat casual and unproductive success at Jemappes. It was the first exciting and dramatic decisive action that the French, who were always eager for such news, had experienced in forty to fifty years. The success in America against the English, though impressively achieved and well-established, hadn't provided any moments like this, and Fontenoy was the last national victory that Paris could recall. Those who were elderly or old in the autumn of 1792 would have been boys or very young men when Fontenoy was fought. The enthusiastic generation of the Revolution, with its military aspirations and skills, had not really anticipated victory yet, although they fervently desired it and it suited their temperament perfectly.[Pg 167]

It may be imagined, therefore, what an effect the news of Jemappes had upon the political world in Paris. The action was fought just below the town of Mons, a few miles over the frontier, and consisted in a somewhat ill-ordered but successful advance across the River Haine. Whether because the Austrians, with an inferior force, attempted to hold too long a line, or because the infantry and even the new French volunteer battalions, as yet untried by fatigue, proved irresistible in the centre of the movement, Jemappes was a victory so complete that the attempts of apologists to belittle it only serve to enhance its character.

It’s easy to imagine the impact the news of Jemappes had on the political scene in Paris. The battle took place just outside the town of Mons, a few miles over the border, and involved a somewhat chaotic but ultimately successful advance across the River Haine. Whether it was because the Austrians, despite being outnumbered, tried to defend too long of a line, or because the infantry and even the inexperienced French volunteer battalions, not yet worn out, were unstoppable in the middle of the movement, Jemappes was such a decisive victory that those who tried to downplay it only ended up emphasizing its significance.

Like many another great and apparently decisive action, however, it bore no lasting fruit. Both the factors of which I have spoken above appeared immediately after this success. Belgium was, indeed, over-run by the French, but in their over-running of it with something like eighty thousand men, they made no attempt to spare the traditions or to conciliate the sympathies of the inhabitants. Hardly was Jemappes won when Mons, the neighbouring fortified frontier town, was at once endowed with the whole machinery of revolutionary government. Church property was invaded and occasionally rifled, and the French paper money, the assignats of which we have heard, poured in to disturb and in places to ruin the excellent commercial system upon which Belgium then as now reposed.

Like many other significant and seemingly decisive actions, it didn’t lead to any lasting results. The factors I mentioned earlier became evident right after this success. Belgium was indeed invaded by the French, but in their conquest with around eighty thousand troops, they made no effort to respect the traditions or gain the goodwill of the locals. Hardly had Jemappes been secured when Mons, the nearby fortified border town, was immediately subjected to the full apparatus of revolutionary governance. Church properties were invaded and sometimes looted, and the French paper money, the assignats we’ve heard about, flooded in to disrupt and even damage the strong commercial system on which Belgium relied then and still does.

Jemappes was fought upon the 6th of November, 1792. Brussels was entered upon[Pg 168] the 14th, and throughout that winter the Low Countries lay entirely in the hands of the French. The Commissioners from the Convention, though endowing Belgium with republican institutions, treated it as a conquered country, and before the breaking of spring, the French Parliament voted its annexation to France. This annexation, the determination of the politicians in Paris that the new Belgian Government should be republican and anti-Catholic, the maltreatment of the Church in the occupied country and the increasing ill discipline and lack of cohesion in his army, left Dumouriez in a position which grew more and more difficult as the new year, 1793, advanced. It must be remembered that this moment exactly corresponded with the execution of the King and the consequent declaration of war by or against France in the case of one Power after another throughout Europe. Meanwhile, it was decided, foolishly enough, to proceed from the difficult occupation of Belgium to the still more difficult occupation of Holland, and the siege of Maestricht was planned.

Jemappes was fought on November 6, 1792. Brussels was entered on[Pg 168] the 14th, and throughout that winter, the Low Countries were completely under French control. The Commissioners from the Convention, while giving Belgium republican institutions, treated it as a conquered territory, and before spring arrived, the French Parliament voted to annex it to France. This annexation, along with the decision by the politicians in Paris to make the new Belgian Government republican and anti-Catholic, the mistreatment of the Church in the occupied area, and the growing disorder and disunity in his army put Dumouriez in an increasingly difficult position as 1793 progressed. It's important to note that this moment coincided exactly with the execution of the King and the subsequent declaration of war by or against France from one country after another across Europe. Meanwhile, it was decided, rather foolishly, to move from the challenging occupation of Belgium to the even tougher occupation of Holland, and the siege of Maestricht was planned.

The moment was utterly ill-suited for such a plan. Every Executive in the civilised world was coalescing openly or secretly, directly or indirectly, against the revolutionary Government. The first order to retreat came upon the 8th of March, when the siege of Maestricht was seen to be impossible, and when the great forces of the Allies were gathered again to attempt what was to be the really serious attack upon the Revolution:[Pg 169] something far more dangerous, something which much more nearly achieved success, than the march of the comparatively small force which had been checked at Valmy.

The moment was completely wrong for such a plan. Every leader in the civilized world was uniting, either openly or secretly, directly or indirectly, against the revolutionary Government. The first order to retreat came on March 8th, when it was clear that the siege of Maestricht was impossible, and when the major forces of the Allies regrouped to launch what would be a serious attack on the Revolution:[Pg 169] something far more dangerous, something that was much closer to success compared to the relatively small force that had been halted at Valmy.

For ten days the French retreat continued, when, upon the 18th of March, Dumouriez risked battle at Neerwinden. His army was defeated.

For ten days, the French withdrawal went on until, on March 18th, Dumouriez decided to engage in battle at Neerwinden. His army was defeated.

The defeat was not disastrous, the retreat was continued in fairly good order, but a civilian population understands nothing besides the words defeat and victory; it can appreciate a battle, not a campaign. The news of the defeat, coming at a moment of crisis in the politics of Paris, was decisive; it led to grave doubts of Dumouriez’ loyalty to the revolutionary Government, it shattered his popularity with those who had continued to believe in him, while the general himself could not but believe that the material under his command was rapidly deteriorating. Before the end of the month the army had abandoned all its conquests, and Valenciennes, in French territory, was reached upon the 27th. The dash upon Belgium had wholly failed.

The defeat wasn’t a total disaster, and the retreat was handled fairly well, but the general public only understands defeat and victory; they can appreciate a single battle, not an entire campaign. The news of the defeat, arriving at a crucial moment in Parisian politics, was significant; it raised serious doubts about Dumouriez’s loyalty to the revolutionary Government, and it damaged his popularity among those who still believed in him, while the general himself couldn’t help but think that the troops under his command were quickly declining. By the end of the month, the army had given up all its gains, and they reached Valenciennes, in French territory, on the 27th. The attempt to invade Belgium had completely failed.

At this moment came one of those political acts which so considerably disturb any purely military conspectus of the revolutionary wars. Dumouriez, at the head of his army, which, though in retreat and defeated, was still intact, determined upon what posterity has justly called treason, but what to his own mind must have seemed no more than statesmanship. He proposed an understanding with the enemy and a combined march[Pg 170] upon Paris to restore the monarchical government, and put an end to what seemed to him, as a soldier, a perfectly hopeless situation. He certainly believed it impossible for the French army, in the welter of 1793, to defeat the invader. He saw his own life in peril merely because he was defeated. He had no toleration for the rising enthusiasm or delirium of the political theory which had sent him out, and, even before he had reached French territory, his negotiations with Coburg, the Austrian commander, had begun. They lasted long. Dumouriez agreed to put the frontier fortresses of the French into the hands of the enemy as a guarantee and a pledge; and on the 5th of April all was ready for the alliance of the two armed forces.

At this moment, one of those political actions occurred that severely disrupt any purely military view of the revolutionary wars. Dumouriez, leading his army, which, despite being in retreat and defeated, was still intact, decided on what future generations would rightfully call treason, though to him, it likely seemed like straightforward statesmanship. He suggested a deal with the enemy and a coordinated march[Pg 170] to Paris to restore the monarchy and end what he perceived, as a soldier, to be a completely hopeless situation. He truly believed it was impossible for the French army, caught up in the chaos of 1793, to defeat the invaders. He saw his own life as at risk just because he had been defeated. He had no patience for the rising enthusiasm or madness of the political theories that had sent him out, and even before he reached French territory, he had already started negotiations with Coburg, the Austrian commander. These talks went on for a long time. Dumouriez agreed to hand over the frontier fortresses of France to the enemy as a guarantee and pledge; and by April 5th, everything was set for the alliance of the two armed forces.

But just as the treason of Dumouriez is, in the military sense, abnormal and disturbing to any general conspectus of the campaign, so was the action of his army.

But just as Dumouriez's betrayal is, in military terms, abnormal and unsettling to any overall view of the campaign, so was the behavior of his army.

The doubtful point of a general command which is political in nature, and may be unpopular with the rank and file, lies, of course, in the attitude of the commanders of units, and these unanimously refused to obey the orders of their chief. It was known that Dumouriez had been summoned to the bar of the Convention, which body had sent commissioners to apprehend him. He had arrested the commissioners, and had handed them over as hostages and prisoners to Coburg. So far from Dumouriez upon the critical day handing over his force to the enemy, or constituting it a part of an allied army to march[Pg 171] upon the capital, he was compelled to fly upon the 8th of April; all that disappeared with him, counting many who later deserted back again to the French colours, was less than a thousand men—and these foreign mercenaries.

The questionable aspect of a general command that is political and might be unpopular with the troops really depends on the stance of the unit commanders, who all refused to follow their leader's orders. It was known that Dumouriez had been called before the Convention, which had sent commissioners to capture him. He arrested those commissioners and turned them over as hostages and prisoners to Coburg. Instead of Dumouriez handing over his forces to the enemy, or making them part of an allied army to move[Pg 171] on the capital, he was forced to flee on April 8th; what left with him, including many who later returned to the French side, was less than a thousand men—and they were all foreign mercenaries.

The consequence of this strange passage upon the political history of the time we have already seen. Its consequence upon the military history of it was indirect but profound. The French forces, such as they were, were still intact, but no general officer could in future be trusted by Paris, and the stimulus which nations in the critical moments of invasion and of danger during foreign war seek in patriotism, in the offering of a high wage to the men and of honours and fortunes to their commanders, was now sought by the French in the singular, novel and abnormal experiment of the Terror. Command upon the frontier throughout 1793 and the first part of 1794, during the critical fourteen months, that is, which decided the fate of the Revolution, and which turned the tide of arms in favour of the French, was a task accomplished under the motive power of capital punishment. A blunder was taken as a proof of treason, and there lay over the ordering of every general movement the threat of the guillotine.

The impact of this unusual event on the political history of the time is already clear. Its effect on the military history, however, was indirect yet significant. The French forces, as they were, remained intact, but no general officer could be trusted by Paris in the future. Instead of relying on the patriotism that nations typically draw on during critical moments of invasion and danger during foreign wars, the French turned to the strange, new, and extreme approach of the Terror. Command on the frontier throughout 1793 and the early part of 1794, during the crucial fourteen months that determined the Revolution's fate and shifted the military balance in favor of the French, was driven by the threat of capital punishment. A mistake was seen as an act of betrayal, and the looming threat of the guillotine overshadowed every major military decision.

What we have now to follow is somewhat over a year of a struggle thus abnormally organised upon the French side, and finally successful through the genius of a great organiser, once a soldier, now a politician, Carnot. The French succeeded by the[Pg 172] unshakable conviction which permitted the political leaders to proceed to all extremity in their determination to save the Revolution; by the peculiar physical powers of endurance which their army displayed, and finally, of course, by certain accidents—for accident will always be a determining factor in war.

What we have now is a little over a year of struggle that was unusually organized on the French side, ultimately successful thanks to the brilliance of a great organizer who was once a soldier and is now a politician, Carnot. The French triumphed through the[Pg 172] unwavering conviction that allowed their political leaders to go to any lengths to protect the Revolution; the unique physical endurance their army demonstrated, and, of course, by certain random events—because chance will always play a crucial role in war.

The spring of 1793, the months of April and May, form the first crisis of the revolutionary war. The attack about to be delivered is universal, and seems absolutely certain to succeed. With the exception of the rush at Jemappes, where less than thirty thousand Austrians were broken through by a torrent superior in numbers (though even there obviously ill-organised), no success had attended the revolutionary armies. Their condition was, even to the eye of the layman, bad, and to the eye of the expert hopeless. There was no unity apparent in direction, there were vast lesions in the discipline of the ranks like great holes torn in some rotten fabric. Even against the forces already mobilised against it, it had proved powerless, and it might be taken for granted that by an act more nearly resembling police work than a true campaign, the Allies would reach Paris and something resembling the old order be soon restored. What remains is to follow the process by which this expectation was disappointed.

The spring of 1793, specifically the months of April and May, marks the first crisis of the revolutionary war. The upcoming attack is widespread and seems likely to succeed. Other than the quick advance at Jemappes, where less than thirty thousand Austrians were overwhelmed by a much larger force (though even there it was clearly poorly organized), the revolutionary armies had not achieved any success. Their situation looked bad, even to an outsider, and hopeless to a professional. There was no clear direction, and the discipline within the ranks was severely lacking, resembling large tears in a decaying fabric. Even against the forces already assembled against them, they had shown themselves powerless, and it could be assumed that through actions more akin to policing than to a real military campaign, the Allies would reach Paris and something similar to the old order would soon be reinstated. What remains is to explore how this expectation was ultimately proven wrong.

The situation at this moment can best be understood by a glance at the sketch map on p. 178. Two great French advances had been made in the winter of 1792-93; the one a northern advance, which we have just[Pg 173] detailed, the over-running of Belgium; the other an eastern advance right up to the Rhine and to the town of Mayence. Both had failed. The failure in Belgium, culminating in the treason of Dumouriez, has been read. On the Rhine (where Mayence had been annexed by the French Parliament just as Belgium had been) the active hostility of the population and the gathering of the organised forces of the Allies had the same effect as had been produced in the Low Countries.

The situation right now can best be understood by looking at the sketch map on p. 178. Two major French advances happened during the winter of 1792-93; one was a northern advance, which we just[Pg 173] covered, the takeover of Belgium; the other was an eastern advance all the way to the Rhine and the town of Mainz. Both were unsuccessful. The failure in Belgium, which ended with Dumouriez's betrayal, is well known. On the Rhine (where Mainz was annexed by the French Parliament just like Belgium was), the strong opposition from the locals and the mobilization of the organized forces of the Allies had the same impact as what had occurred in the Low Countries.

It was on March 21, 1793, that the Prussians crossed the Rhine at Bacharach, and within that week the French commander, Custine, began to fall back. On the first of April he was back again in French territory, leaving the garrison of Mayence, somewhat over twenty thousand men, to hold out as best it could; a fortnight later the Prussians had surrounded the town and the siege had begun.

It was on March 21, 1793, that the Prussians crossed the Rhine at Bacharach, and within that week, the French commander, Custine, started to retreat. By April 1, he was back in French territory, leaving the garrison of Mayence, which was just over twenty thousand men, to hold out as best as it could; two weeks later, the Prussians had surrounded the town and the siege had started.

On the north-eastern front, stretching from the Ardennes to the sea, a similar state of things was developing. There, a barrier of fortresses stood between the Allies and Paris, and a series of sieges corresponding to the siege of Mayence in the east had to be undertaken. At much the same time as the investment of Mayence, on April 9, the first step in this military task was taken by the Allies moving in between the fortress of Condé and the fortress of Valenciennes. Thenceforward it was the business of the Austrians under Coburg, with the Allies that were to reach him, to reduce the frontier fortresses[Pg 174] one by one, and when his communications were thus secure, to march upon Paris.

On the northeastern front, stretching from the Ardennes to the sea, a similar situation was unfolding. There, a line of fortresses stood between the Allies and Paris, and a series of sieges parallel to the siege of Mainz in the east needed to be carried out. Around the same time as the encirclement of Mainz, on April 9, the Allies took the first step in this military task by moving between the fortress of Condé and the fortress of Valenciennes. From that point on, it was the responsibility of the Austrians under Coburg, along with the Allies who would join him, to capture the frontier fortresses[Pg 174] one by one. Once his communications were secure, they would march on Paris.

It is here necessary for the reader unacquainted with military history to appreciate two points upon which not a little of contemporary historical writing may mislead him. The first is that both in the Rhine valley and on the Belgian frontier the forces of the Allies in their numbers and their organisation were conceived to be overwhelming. The second is that no competent commander on the spot would have thought of leaving behind him the garrison of even one untaken fortress. It is important to insist upon these points, because the political passions roused by the Revolution are still so strong that men can hardly write of it without prejudice and bias, and two errors continually present in these descriptions of the military situation in the spring of 1793, are, first, that the Allies were weakened by the Polish question, which was then active, and secondly, that the delay of their commanders before the French fortresses was unnecessary.

It’s important for readers who aren’t familiar with military history to understand two points that could mislead them in modern historical writing. First, in the Rhine valley and along the Belgian border, the Allied forces were considered to be overwhelmingly strong in both numbers and organization. Second, no capable commander would have considered leaving behind the garrison of even one unoccupied fortress. These points

Both these propositions are put forward with the object of explaining the ultimate defeat of the enemies of the Revolution: both, however great the authority behind them, are unhistorical and worthless. The French success was a military success due to certain military factors both of design and accident, which will appear in what follows. The Allies played their part as all the art of war demanded it to be played; they were ultimately defeated, not from the commission[Pg 175] of any such gross and obvious error in policy or strategy as historians with too little comprehension of military affairs sometimes pretend, but from the military superiority of their opponents.

Both of these ideas are presented to explain the ultimate defeat of the enemies of the Revolution. However, despite the credibility behind them, they are historically inaccurate and meaningless. The French victory was a military achievement driven by specific military factors, both planned and accidental, which will be discussed later. The Allies played their role according to the principles of warfare; they were ultimately defeated not because they made any major and obvious mistakes in policy or strategy, as some historians with a limited understanding of military matters suggest, but because their opponents had a military advantage.

It is true that the Polish question (that is the necessity the Austrian and Prussian Governments were each under of watching that the other was not lessened in importance by the approaching annexations of further Polish territory with the consequent jealousy and mistrust that arose from this between Austria and Prussia) was a very important feature of the moment. But it is bad military history to pretend that this affected the military situation on the Rhine or in the Netherlands.

It’s true that the Polish issue (which refers to the need for the Austrian and Prussian governments to keep an eye on each other to ensure that neither was diminished in significance by the upcoming annexations of more Polish land, leading to the jealousy and mistrust between Austria and Prussia) was a significant aspect of the time. However, it’s poor military history to claim that this influenced the military situation along the Rhine or in the Netherlands.

Every campaign is conditioned by its political object. The political object in this case was to march upon and to occupy Paris. The political object of a campaign once determined, the size and the organisation of the enemy are calculated and a certain force is brought against it. No much larger force is brought than is necessary: to act in such a fashion would be in military art what paying two or three times the price of an article would be in commerce. The forces of the Allies upon the Rhine and in the Netherlands were, in the opinion of every authority of the time, amply sufficient for their purpose; and more than sufficient: so much more than sufficient that the attitude of that military opinion which had to meet the attack—to wit, the professional military opinion of the French republican soldiers, was that the situation[Pg 176] was desperate, nor indeed was it attempted to be met save by a violent and, as it were, irrational enthusiasm.

Every campaign is shaped by its political goal. In this case, the goal was to march into and take control of Paris. Once the political goal of a campaign is set, the size and organization of the enemy are assessed, and a specific force is mobilized against it. No much larger force is deployed than necessary; acting that way in military strategy is like overpaying for an item in business. The combined forces of the Allies on the Rhine and in the Netherlands were, according to all the experts of the time, more than enough for their objective; so much so that the prevailing military opinion facing the attack—the professional military view of the French republican soldiers—was that the situation[Pg 176] was dire, and they resorted to a strong and almost irrational enthusiasm to confront it.

The second point, the so-called “delay” involved in the sieges undertaken by the Allies, proves, when it is put forward, an insufficient acquaintance with contemporary conditions. Any fortress with a considerable garrison left behind untaken would have meant the destruction of the Austrian or Prussian communications, and their destruction at a moment when the Austrian and Prussian forces were actually advancing over a desperately hostile country. Moreover, when acting against forces wholly inferior in discipline and organisation, an untaken fortress is a refuge which one must take peculiar pains to destroy. To throw himself into such a refuge will always stand before the commander of those inferior forces as a last resource. It is a refuge which he will certainly avail himself of ultimately, if it is permitted to him. And when he has so availed himself of it, it means the indefinite survival of an armed organisation in the rear of the advancing invaders. We must conclude, if we are to understand this critical campaign which changed the history of the world, that Coburg did perfectly right in laying siege to one fortress after another before he began what every one expected to be the necessarily successful advance on Paris. The French despair, as one town after another surrendered, is an amply sufficient proof of the excellence of his judgment.[Pg 177]

The second point, the so-called “delay” involved in the sieges carried out by the Allies, shows, when presented, a lack of understanding of the current situation. Any fortress with a significant garrison left unconquered would have led to the collapse of Austrian or Prussian communications, especially at a time when those forces were advancing through a fiercely hostile area. Furthermore, when facing forces that are much weaker in discipline and organization, an unconquered fortress becomes a refuge that needs to be thoroughly destroyed. For the commander of those weaker forces, seeking refuge in such a stronghold will always be a last resort. If he is allowed to do so, he will definitely take advantage of it eventually. And when he does, it would mean the continued existence of an armed force behind the advancing invaders. To truly understand this crucial campaign that changed the course of history, we must recognize that Coburg was absolutely right to lay siege to one fortress after another before he commenced what everyone expected to be a successful march on Paris. The despair of the French, as town after town surrendered, is clear evidence of his excellent judgment.[Pg 177]

We approach the military problem of 1793, therefore, with the following two fields clear before us:—

We tackle the military issue of 1793 with these two areas clear in front of us:—

1. In the north-east an advance on Paris, the way to which is blocked by a quadrilateral of fortresses: Mons, Maubeuge, Condé, and Valenciennes, with the subsidiary stronghold of Lequesnoy in the neighbourhood of the last. Mons has been in Austrian hands since Dumouriez’ retreat; Condé is just cut off from Valenciennes by Coburg’s advance, but has not fallen; Valenciennes and the neighbouring Lequesnoy are still intact, and so is Maubeuge. All must be reduced before the advance on Paris can begin. Behind these fortresses is a French army incapable as yet of attacking Coburg’s command with any hope of success. Such is the position in the last fortnight of April.

1. In the northeast, there's a push toward Paris, which is blocked by a series of fortresses: Mons, Maubeuge, Condé, and Valenciennes, along with the smaller fort of Lequesnoy near the last one. Mons has been under Austrian control since Dumouriez retreated; Condé is currently cut off from Valenciennes due to Coburg's advance, but it hasn't fallen yet. Valenciennes and the nearby Lequesnoy are still intact, as is Maubeuge. All of these need to be taken down before any advance on Paris can happen. Behind these fortresses, a French army is still not ready to attack Coburg's forces with any chance of success. This situation defines the last two weeks of April.

2. Meanwhile, on the Rhine the French garrison in Mayence is besieged; Custine, the French commander in that quarter, has fallen back on the French town of Landau, and is drawing up what are known in history as the Lines of Weissembourg. The accompanying sketch map explains their importance. Reposing upon the two obstacles of the river on the right and the mountains on the left, they fulfilled precisely the same functions as a fortress; and those functions we have just described. Until these lines were carried, the whole of Alsace may be regarded as a fortress defended by the mountains and the river on two sides, and by the Lines of Weissembourg on the third.[Pg 178]

2. Meanwhile, on the Rhine, the French garrison in Mayence is under siege. Custine, the French commander in that area, has retreated to the French town of Landau and is setting up what became known in history as the Lines of Weissembourg. The sketch map included shows their significance. Positioned between the river on the right and the mountains on the left, they served the same purpose as a fortress; and we have just described those purposes. Until these lines were breached, the entire region of Alsace could be seen as a fortress, protected by the mountains and the river on two sides and by the Lines of Weissembourg on the third.[Pg 178]

A reader unacquainted with military history may ask why the obstruction was not drawn upon the line of the Prussian advance on Paris. The answer is that the presence of a force behind fortifications anywhere in the neighbourhood of a line of communication is precisely equivalent to an obstacle lying right upon those lines. For no commander can go forward along the line of his advance and leave a large undestroyed force close to one side of that line, and so situated that it can come out when he has passed and cut off his communications; for it is by communications that an army lives, especially when it is marching in hostile country.

A reader unfamiliar with military history might wonder why the barrier wasn't placed along the route of the Prussian advance toward Paris. The answer is that having a force behind fortifications near a line of communication is just as significant as having an obstacle directly on that line. No commander can advance along his path while leaving a large, intact enemy force close by, capable of emerging once he has passed to cut off his supply lines. An army relies on its communications to survive, especially when moving through hostile territory.

Strategic situation in early summer of 1793. Mayence besieged, Condé and Valenciennes about to be besieged. Conditions of the double advance on Paris. Strategic situation in early summer of 1793. Mayence is under siege, and Condé and Valenciennes are set to be besieged soon. The circumstances for the simultaneous advance on Paris.

Custine, therefore, behind his Lines of Weissembourg, and the besieged garrison in Mayence, correspond to the barrier of fortresses on the north-east and delayed the advance of the Prussians under Wurmser and Brunswick from the Rhine, just as Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge prevented the advance of[Pg 179] Coburg on the north-east. Such in general was the situation upon the eastern frontier at the end of that month of April, 1793.

Custine, therefore, positioned behind his lines in Weissembourg, and the garrison under siege in Mayence, acted as a barrier of fortresses in the northeast and slowed down the Prussian advance led by Wurmser and Brunswick from the Rhine, just like Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge stopped Coburg's progress in the northeast. This was the overall situation at the eastern frontier by the end of April 1793.

FOUR

Let us first follow the development of the northern position. It will be remembered that all Europe was at war against the French. The Austrians had for allies Dutch troops which joined them at this moment, and certain English and Hanoverian troops under the Duke of York who also joined them.

Let’s first look at how things progressed in the north. Remember, all of Europe was at war with the French. The Austrians had Dutch troops as allies who joined them at this time, along with some English and Hanoverian troops under the Duke of York who also came in to support them.

At this moment, when Coburg found himself in increasing strength, a tentative French attack upon him was delivered and failed. Dampierre, who was in command of all this French “Army of the North,” was killed, and Custine was sent to replace him. The Army of the North did not, as perhaps it should have done, concentrate into one body to meet Coburg’s threatened advance; it was perpetually attempting diversions which were useless because its strength was insufficient. Now it feinted upon the right towards Namur, now along the sea coast on the left; and these diversions failed in their object. Before the end of the month, Coburg, to give himself elbow room, as it were, for the sieges which he was preparing, compelled the main French force to retreat to a position well behind Valenciennes. It was immediately after this success of Coburg’s that Custine arrived to take command on the Belgian frontier, his place on the Rhine being taken by Houchard.[Pg 180]

At this time, when Coburg was gaining more power, a tentative French attack against him was launched but ended in failure. Dampierre, who was leading the French "Army of the North," was killed, and Custine was appointed to replace him. The Army of the North did not, as it perhaps should have, consolidate into one force to counter Coburg’s impending advance; instead, it constantly attempted diversions that were ineffective due to its weak numbers. At one moment, it faked an attack on the right towards Namur, and at another along the coastline on the left; these diversions did not achieve their goals. By the end of the month, Coburg, needing more space to prepare for the sieges he was planning, forced the main French force to retreat to a position well behind Valenciennes. It was right after this victory by Coburg that Custine arrived to take command on the Belgian front, while Houchard took over his position along the Rhine.[Pg 180]

Custine was a very able commander, but a most unlucky one. His plan was the right one: to concentrate all the French forces (abandoning the Rhine) and so form an army sufficient to cope with Coburg’s. The Government would not meet him in this, and he devoted himself immediately to the reorganisation of the Army of the North alone. The month of June and half of July was taken up in that task.

Custine was a skilled commander, but he was very unfortunate. His plan was the right one: to gather all the French forces (abandoning the Rhine) and create an army strong enough to face Coburg’s. The Government wouldn't support him in this, so he focused entirely on reorganizing the Army of the North by himself. He spent June and the first half of July on that task.

Meanwhile, the Austrian siege work had begun, and Condé was the first object of its attention. Upon July 10 Condé fell. Meanwhile Custine had been recalled to Paris, and Valenciennes was invested. Custine was succeeded by Kilmaine, a general of Irish extraction, who maintained his position for but a short time, and was unable while he maintained it to do anything. The forces of the Allies continually increased. The number at Coburg’s disposal free from the business of besieging Valenciennes was already larger than the force required for that purpose. And yet another fifteen thousand Hessian troops marched in while the issue of that siege was in doubt. This great advantage in numbers permitted him to get rid of the main French force that was still present in front of him, though not seriously annoying him.

Meanwhile, the Austrian siege work had started, and Condé was the first target. On July 10, Condé fell. At the same time, Custine had been recalled to Paris, and Valenciennes was under siege. Custine was replaced by Kilmaine, a general of Irish descent, who held his position for only a short time and was unable to accomplish anything during that time. The Allied forces continued to grow. The number available to Coburg, not engaged in the siege of Valenciennes, was already larger than what was needed for that task. Even more, another fifteen thousand Hessian troops arrived while the outcome of that siege was still uncertain. This significant numerical advantage allowed him to eliminate the main French force that was still in front of him, although they were not causing him serious trouble.

This force lay due south-west of Valenciennes, and about a day’s march distant. He depended for the capture of it upon his English and Hanoverian Allies under the Duke of York, but that general’s march failed. The distance was too much for his troops in[Pg 181] the hot summer weather, and the French were able to retreat behind the line of the Scarpe and save their army intact.

This force was located directly southwest of Valenciennes, about a day's march away. He was counting on capturing it with the help of his English and Hanoverian allies under the Duke of York, but that general's march did not succeed. The distance was too great for his troops in[Pg 181] the heat of summer, and the French managed to retreat behind the Scarpe river and preserve their army intact.

The Duke of York’s talents have been patriotically exaggerated in many a treatise. He always failed: and this was among the most signal of his failures.

The Duke of York's skills have been overly praised in various writings. He always failed, and this was one of his most notable failures.

Kilmaine had hardly escaped from York, drawn up his army behind the Scarpe and put it into a position of safety when he in his turn was deprived of the command, and Houchard was taken from the Rhine just as Custine had been, and put at the head of the Army of the North. Before the main French army had taken up this position of safety, Valenciennes had fallen. It fell on the 28th of July, and its fall, inevitable though it was and, as one may say, taken for granted by military opinion, was much the heaviest blow yet delivered. Nothing of importance remained to block the march of the Armies of the Allies, save Maubeuge.

Kilmaine had barely escaped from York, positioned his army behind the Scarpe, and secured it when he was suddenly stripped of command. Houchard was pulled from the Rhine, just like Custine had been, and given control of the Army of the North. Before the main French army could settle into this safe position, Valenciennes fell. It fell on July 28th, and although its collapse was inevitable and largely considered a given by military experts, it was still the most significant blow dealt so far. Nothing important was left to obstruct the advance of the Allied Armies, except Maubeuge.

At about the same moment occurred three very important changes in the general military situation, which the reader must note if he is to understand what follows.

At around the same time, three significant changes took place in the overall military situation, which the reader should pay attention to if they want to grasp what comes next.

The first was the sudden serious internal menace opposed to the Republican Government; the second was the advent of Carnot to power; the third was the English diversion upon Dunquerque.

The first was the sudden serious internal threat to the Republican Government; the second was Carnot's rise to power; the third was the English distraction at Dunkirk.

The serious internal menace which the Government of the Republic had to face was the widespread rebellion which has been dealt with in the earlier part of this book. The[Pg 182] action of the Paris Radicals against the Girondins had raised whole districts in the provinces. Marseilles, which had shown signs of disaffection since April, and had begun to raise a local reactionary force, revolted. So did Bordeaux, Nîmes, and other great southern towns. Lyons had risen at the end of May and had killed the Jacobin mayor of the town in the period between the fall of Condé and that of Valenciennes. The troop which Marseilles had raised against the Republic was defeated in the field only the day before Valenciennes fell, but the great seaport was still unoccupied by the forces of the Government. The Norman march upon Paris had also failed between those two dates, the fall of Condé and the fall of Valenciennes. The Norman bark had proved worse than the Norman bite; but the force was so neighbouring to the capital that it took a very large place in the preoccupations of the time. The Vendean revolt, though its triumphant advance was checked before Nantes a fortnight before the fall of Condé, was still vigorous, and the terrible reprisals against it were hardly begun. Worst of all, or at least, worst perhaps, after the revolt of Lyons, was the defection of Toulon. Toulon rose two days before the fall of Valenciennes, and was prepared to hand itself over (as at last it did hand itself over) to occupation by the English fleet.

The serious internal threat the Government of the Republic faced was the widespread rebellion discussed earlier in this book. The[Pg 182] actions of the Paris Radicals against the Girondins had incited entire regions in the provinces. Marseilles, which had shown signs of discontent since April and had started forming a local reactionary force, revolted. So did Bordeaux, Nîmes, and other major southern cities. Lyons rose up at the end of May and killed the Jacobin mayor during the time between the fall of Condé and the fall of Valenciennes. The troops raised by Marseilles against the Republic were defeated in battle just a day before Valenciennes fell, but the major port city was still unoccupied by government forces. The Norman advance on Paris also failed during that time, between the falls of Condé and Valenciennes. The Norman threat turned out to be less severe than expected; however, because it was so close to the capital, it was a significant concern at the time. The Vendean revolt, though its progress was halted before Nantes two weeks before the fall of Condé, remained strong, and severe reprisals against it were just beginning. Perhaps worst of all, or at least one of the worst developments after Lyons' revolt, was the defection of Toulon. Toulon rebelled two days before Valenciennes fell and was ready to submit itself (as it ultimately did) to occupation by the English fleet.

The dates thus set in their order may somewhat confuse the reader, and I will therefore summarise the general position of[Pg 183] the internal danger thus: A man in the French camp on the Scheldt, listening to the guns before Valenciennes fifteen miles away, and hourly expecting their silence as a signal that the city had surrendered, would have heard by one post after another how Marseilles still held out against the Government; how the counter-attack against the successful Vendeans had but doubtfully begun (all July was full of disasters in that quarter); how Lyons was furiously successful in her rebellion and had dared to put to death the Republican mayor of the town; and that the great arsenal and port at Toulon, the Portsmouth of France upon the Mediterranean, had sickened of the Government and was about to admit the English fleet. His only comfort would have been to hear that the Norman march on Paris had failed—but he would still be under the impression of it and of the murder of Marat by a Norman woman.

The dates laid out in order might confuse the reader a bit, so I'll summarize the overall situation of[Pg 183] the internal threat like this: A soldier in the French camp by the Scheldt, listening to the cannons before Valenciennes fifteen miles away, would be anxiously waiting for silence as a signal that the city had surrendered. He would have heard reports one after another about how Marseilles was still resisting the Government; how the counter-offensive against the successful Vendeans had barely started (July was filled with disasters in that area); how Lyons was fiercely rebelling and had even executed the Republican mayor; and that the major arsenal and port in Toulon, the Portsmouth of France on the Mediterranean, had turned against the Government and was about to welcome the English fleet. His only bit of reassurance would be hearing that the Norman march on Paris had failed—but he would still be lingering under the shadow of that and the murder of Marat by a Norman woman.

There is the picture of that sudden internal struggle which coincides with this moment of the revolutionary war, the moment of the fall of Condé and of Valenciennes, and the exposure of the frontier.

There’s a glimpse of that sudden internal conflict that aligns with this moment of the revolutionary war, the moment when Condé and Valenciennes fell, and the vulnerability of the border was revealed.

The second point, the advent of Carnot into the Committee of Public Safety, which has already been touched upon in the political part of this work, has so preponderating a military significance that we must consider it here also.

The second point, the entry of Carnot into the Committee of Public Safety, which has already been discussed in the political section of this work, has such an overwhelming military significance that we need to address it here as well.

The old Committee of Public Safety, it will be remembered, reached the end of its legal term on July 10. It was the Committee[Pg 184] which the wisdom of Danton had controlled. The members elected to the new Committee did not include Carnot, but the military genius of this man was already public. He came of that strong middle class which is the pivot upon which the history of modern Europe turns; a Burgundian with lineage, intensely republican, he had been returned to the Convention and had voted for the death of the King; a sapper before the Revolution, and one thoroughly well grounded in his arm and in general reading of military things, he had been sent by the Convention to the Army of the North on commission, he had seen its weakness and had watched its experiments. Upon his return he was not immediately selected for the post in which he was to transform the revolutionary war. It was not until the 14th of August that he was given a temporary place upon the Committee which his talents very soon made permanent. He was given the place merely as a stopgap to the odious and incompetent fanatic, Saint-André, who was for the moment away on mission. But from the day of his admission his superiority in military affairs was so incontestable that he was virtually a dictator therein, and his first action after the general lines of organisation had been laid down by him was to impose upon the frontier armies the necessity of concentration. He introduced what afterwards Napoleon inherited from him, the tactical venture of “all upon one throw.”

The old Committee of Public Safety, as you might remember, finished its legal term on July 10. It was the Committee[Pg 184] that Danton's wisdom had guided. The members elected to the new Committee didn't include Carnot, but his military talent was already well known. He came from the strong middle class, which is the foundation of modern European history; a Burgundian with heritage, he was strongly republican, had been elected to the Convention, and had voted for the King’s execution. A sapper before the Revolution and well-versed in military strategy from both practical experience and reading, he was sent by the Convention to the Army of the North on assignment, where he observed its weaknesses and experiments. Upon his return, he wasn't immediately chosen for the role in which he would revolutionize the war effort. It wasn't until August 14 that he was temporarily placed on the Committee, a position his skills quickly made permanent. He was brought in just as a temporary measure to replace the inept fanatic, Saint-André, who was away on a mission. However, from the moment he joined, his superiority in military matters was so undeniable that he effectively became a dictator in that area. His first action, after he established the general organizational framework, was to enforce the need for concentration among the frontier armies. He introduced what Napoleon would later adopt, the tactical approach of “all upon one throw.”

It must be remembered that Carnot’s[Pg 185] success did not lie in any revolutionary discovery in connection with the art of war, but rather in that vast capacity for varied detail which marks the organiser, and in an intimate sympathy with the national character. He understood the contempt for parade, the severity or brutality of discipline, the consciousness of immense powers of endurance which are in the Frenchman when he becomes a soldier;—and he made use of this understanding of his.

It’s important to recognize that Carnot’s[Pg 185] success didn’t come from any groundbreaking discovery in military strategy, but from his incredible ability to handle a wide range of details that a skilled organizer possesses, along with a deep understanding of the national character. He grasped the French disdain for showiness, the strictness or harshness of discipline, and the awareness of the immense endurance that French soldiers have; and he truly leveraged this insight.

It must be further remembered that this powerful genius had behind him in these first days of his activity the equally powerful genius of Danton; for it was Danton and he who gave practical shape to that law of conscription by which the French Revolution suddenly increased its armed forces by nearly half a million of men, restored the Roman tradition, and laid the foundation of the armed system on which Europe to-day depends. With Carnot virtually commander-in-chief of all the armies, and enabled to impose his decisions in particular upon that Army of the North which he had studied so recently as a commissioner, the second factor of the situation I am describing is comprehended.

It should also be noted that this powerful genius had the equally strong genius of Danton behind him in the early days of his work; it was Danton and he who implemented the conscription law that allowed the French Revolution to suddenly boost its military by almost half a million men, revived the Roman tradition, and set up the armed system that Europe relies on today. With Carnot effectively the commander-in-chief of all the armies and able to enforce his decisions especially on the Army of the North, which he had studied recently as a commissioner, the second aspect of the situation I’m describing is clear.

The third, as I have said, was the English diversion upon Dunquerque.

The third, as I've mentioned, was the English attack on Dunkirk.

The subsequent failure of the Allies has led to bitter criticism of this movement. Had the Allies not failed, history would have treated it as its contemporaries treated it. The forces of the Allies on the north-eastern frontier were so great and their confidence[Pg 186] so secure—especially after the fall of Valenciennes—that the English proposal to withdraw their forces for the moment from Coburg’s and to secure Dunquerque, was not received with any destructive criticism. Eighteen battalions and fourteen squadrons of the Imperial forces were actually lent to the Duke of York for this expedition. What is more, even after that diversion failed, the plan was fixed to begin again when the last of the other fortresses should have fallen: so little was the English plan for the capture of the seaport disfavoured by the commander-in-chief of the Allies.

The subsequent failure of the Allies has led to strong criticism of this movement. If the Allies had succeeded, history would have viewed it the way its contemporaries did. The Allied forces on the north-eastern front were so large, and their confidence[Pg 186] was so firm—especially after the fall of Valenciennes—that the English proposal to temporarily pull their troops from Coburg’s to secure Dunkirk wasn’t met with any harsh criticism. Eighteen battalions and fourteen squadrons of the Imperial forces were actually sent to the Duke of York for this mission. Moreover, even after that diversion failed, there were plans to start again once the last of the other fortresses had fallen: the commander-in-chief of the Allies did not disapprove of the English plan for capturing the seaport.

That diversion on Dunquerque turned out, however, to be an error of capital importance. The attempt to capture the city utterly failed, and the victory which accompanied its repulsion had upon the French that indefinable but powerful moral effect which largely contributed to their future successes.

That diversion at Dunkirk turned out to be a significant mistake. The attempt to take the city completely failed, and the victory that came with its defense had that indescribable yet powerful morale boost for the French, which played a big role in their future successes.

The accompanying sketch map will explain the position. Valenciennes and Condé have fallen; Lequesnoy, the small fortress subsidiary to Valenciennes, has not yet been attacked but comes next in the series, when the moment was judged propitious for the detachment of the Anglo-Hanoverian force with a certain number of Imperial Allies to march to the sea.

The accompanying sketch map will clarify the situation. Valenciennes and Condé have fallen; Lequesnoy, the small fortress associated with Valenciennes, hasn’t been attacked yet but is next in line, when the time is deemed right for the Anglo-Hanoverian force, along with a number of Imperial Allies, to advance to the sea.

It must always be remembered by the reader of history that military situations, like the situations upon a chess board, rather happen than are designed; and the situation which developed at the end of September upon the[Pg 188] extreme north and west of the line which the French were attempting to hold against the Allies was strategically of this nature. When the Duke of York insisted upon a division of the forces of the Allies and an attack upon Dunquerque, no living contemporary foresaw disaster.

It should always be kept in mind by anyone reading history that military situations, like those on a chessboard, tend to happen rather than being planned; and the situation that developed at the end of September on the [Pg 188] far north and west of the line the French were trying to defend against the Allies was strategically of this kind. When the Duke of York pushed for dividing the Allied forces and attacking Dunkirk, no one at the time anticipated failure.

Showing condition of the frontier fortresses blocking the road to Paris when the expedition to Dunquerque was decided upon. August 1793. Showing the state of the frontier fortresses blocking the road to Paris when the expedition to Dunkirk was decided in August 1793.

Coburg, indeed, would have preferred the English to remain with him, and asked them to do so, but he felt in no sort of danger through their temporary absence, nor, as a matter of fact, was he in any danger through it.

Coburg would have definitely preferred the English to stay with him and asked them to do so, but he didn't feel in any real danger from their temporary absence, nor was he actually in any danger because of it.

Again, though the positions which the Duke of York took up when he arrived in front of Dunquerque were bad, neither his critics at home, nor any of his own subordinates, nor any of the enemy, perceived fully how bad they were. It was, as will presently be seen, a sort of drift, bad luck combined with bad management, which led to this British disaster, and (what was all-important for the conduct of the war) to the first success in a general action which the French had to flatter and encourage themselves with during all that fatal summer.

Again, even though the positions the Duke of York chose when he got to Dunkirk were poor, neither his critics back home, nor any of his subordinates, nor the enemy fully realized just how bad they were. It was, as will soon be shown, a combination of unfortunate circumstances and poor management that resulted in this British disaster and (what was crucial for the war efforts) the first victory in a major battle that the French could boast about and use to boost their morale during that tragic summer.

The Duke of York separated his force from that of Coburg just before the middle of August; besides the British, who were not quite 7,000 strong, 11,000 Austrians, over 10,000 Hanoverians and 7,000 Hessians were under his command. The total force, therefore, was nearly 37,000 strong. No one could imagine that, opposed by such troops as the French were able to put into line,[Pg 189] and marching against such wretched defences as those of Dunquerque then were, the Duke’s army had not a perfectly easy task before it; and the plan, which was to take Dunquerque and upon the return to join the Austrian march on Paris, was reasonable and feasible.

The Duke of York split his forces from Coburg just before mid-August; along with the British, who numbered just under 7,000, he commanded 11,000 Austrians, over 10,000 Hanoverians, and 7,000 Hessians. This brought the total strength to nearly 37,000. No one could believe that, faced with such troops as the French could field, and marching against such poor defenses as those of Dunkirk at that time, the Duke’s army had an easy task ahead of them; the plan to capture Dunkirk and then return to join the Austrians marching on Paris was sensible and achievable.

It is important that the reader should firmly seize this and not read history backward from future events.

It’s essential for the reader to grasp this clearly and not interpret history in reverse based on future events.

Certain faults are to be observed in the first conduct of the march. It began on the 15th of August, proceeding from Marchiennes to Menin, and at the outset displayed that deplorable lack of marching power which the Duke of York’s command had shown throughout the campaign.[6] From Marchiennes to Tourcoing is a long day’s march: it took the Duke of York four days; and, take the march altogether, nine days were spent in covering less than forty miles. In the course of that march, the British troops had an opportunity of learning to despise their adversary: they found at Linselles, upon the flank of their advance, a number of undisciplined boys who broke the moment the Guards were upon them, and whose physical condition excited the ridicule of their assailants. The army proceeded after this purposeless[Pg 190] and unfruitful skirmish to the neighbourhood of the sea coast, and the siege of Dunquerque was undertaken under conditions which will be clear to the reader from the following sketch map.

Certain issues were evident in the early stages of the march. It started on August 15th, moving from Marchiennes to Menin, and immediately showed the unfortunate lack of effective marching that the Duke of York’s command had demonstrated throughout the campaign.[6] The distance from Marchiennes to Tourcoing is a long day’s march: the Duke of York took four days for this leg, and overall, they spent nine days covering less than forty miles. During this march, the British troops had the chance to look down on their enemy: at Linselles, on their flank, they encountered a group of undisciplined boys who fled the moment the Guards approached, and whose physical condition was a source of mockery for the attackers. After this pointless[Pg 190] and unproductive skirmish, the army moved towards the coast and began the siege of Dunkirk under conditions that will be explained in the following sketch map.

Operations round Dunquerque. September 1793. Operations around Dunkirk. September 1793.

The date of the 20th of August must first be fixed in the mind: on that date the army which was to take Dunquerque was separated into its two component parts. The first, under the Duke of York, was to attack the town itself; the second, under the aged Austrian general, Freytag, was to watch the movement of any approaching enemy and to cover the force which was besieging the town. Two days later, the Duke of York was leaving Furnes, which he had made his base for the advance, and Freytag had with the greatest[Pg 191] ease brushed the French posts—mainly of volunteers—from before him, and was beginning to take up the flanking positions south and east of Bergues which covered the siege of Dunquerque.

The date of August 20th needs to be remembered: on that day, the army planning to capture Dunkirk split into two parts. The first part, led by the Duke of York, was tasked with attacking the town itself; the second part, commanded by the elderly Austrian general Freytag, was responsible for monitoring any enemy movements and supporting the troops besieging the town. Two days later, the Duke of York left Furnes, which he had chosen as his base for the advance, and Freytag had easily pushed aside the French posts—mostly made up of volunteers—before him and was starting to position his forces to the south and east of Bergues to support the siege of Dunkirk.

Two days later again, on August 24, Freytag had occupied Wormhoudt and Esquelbecque, capturing guns by the dozen, doing pretty well what he would with the French outposts, and quite surrounding the town of Bergues. Wilder was his headquarters. On the same day, the 24th, the Duke of York had with the greatest ease driven in the advanced posts of the French before Dunquerque, and shut up the enemy within the town, while he formed his besieging force outside of it, entrenched in a position which he had chosen beforehand, reposing upon the sea at his right, his left on the village of Tetteghem. He was then about 3,000 yards from the fortifications at Dunquerque.

Two days later, on August 24, Freytag took control of Wormhoudt and Esquelbecque, capturing dozens of guns and easily handling the French outposts, completely surrounding the town of Bergues. Wilder was his headquarters. On the same day, the 24th, the Duke of York effortlessly pushed back the French forward posts near Dunkirk and trapped the enemy inside the town while he set up his besieging force outside, digging in at a position he had chosen earlier, with the sea on his right and the village of Tetteghem on his left. He was then about 3,000 yards from the fortifications at Dunkirk.

Such was the situation upon the dawn of the 25th, when everything was ready for active operations. And here the reader must look upon the map for what ultimately proved the ruin of the situation.

Such was the situation at the start of the 25th, when everything was set for active operations. And here the reader needs to check the map for what ultimately led to the demise of the situation.

Supposing Freytag round Bergues in the position which the map shows; the Duke of York in front of Dunquerque as the map also shows him; the two forces are in touch across the road and the belt of country which unites Bergues and Dunquerque. The covering army and the besieging force which it covers are each a wing of one combined[Pg 192] body; each communicates with the other, each can support the other at the main point of effort, and though between the one and the other eastward there stretches a line of marshy country—the “meres” which the map indicates—yet a junction between the two forces exists westward of these, and the two armies can co-operate by the Bergues-Dunquerque road.

Suppose Freytag is positioned around Bergues as shown on the map, and the Duke of York is positioned in front of Dunquerque as the map also shows. The two forces are connected across the road and the area that links Bergues and Dunquerque. The covering army and the besieging force it protects are each a wing of one unified[Pg 192] body; they communicate with each other and can support each other at the main point of effort. Even though there is a stretch of marshy land between them to the east—the “meres” indicated on the map—there is still a connection between the two forces to the west of these, allowing the two armies to cooperate via the Bergues-Dunquerque road.

A factor which the Duke of York may have neglected was the power of flooding all that flat country round, the road which the French in Dunquerque, being in possession of the sluices, possessed. They used it at once: they drowned the low lands to the south of Dunquerque, upon the very day when the last dispositions of the attacking force were completed. But more important—and never yet explained—was the Austrians’ abandonment of Coudequerque. By this error, the main road itself, standing above the flood, was lost, and from being one strong army the force of the Allies became two weak ones. Communication was no longer possible between the Duke of York’s and Freytag’s territories, and it was of this separation that the French, in spite of their deplorable organisation and more deplorable personnel, took advantage.

A factor that the Duke of York might have overlooked was the ability to flood the flat land all around, a tactic the French in Dunkirk used since they controlled the sluices. They put it into action immediately, flooding the lowlands south of Dunkirk on the very day the attacking force's final preparations were completed. But more crucial—and still unexplained—was the Austrians' decision to abandon Coudequerque. This mistake caused the main road, which was above the flood, to be lost, splitting the Allies from one strong army into two weak ones. Communication between the Duke of York’s and Freytag’s territories became impossible, and it was this separation that the French, despite their poor organization and even worse troops, exploited.

They took advantage of it slowly. Houchard gathered altogether forty thousand men near Cassel, but it was ten days before they could be concentrated. It must again be insisted upon and repeated that, large as the number was—it was four times as great as Freytag’s[Pg 193] now isolated force—Houchard’s command was made up of men quite two-thirds of whom were hardly soldiers: volunteers both new and recent, ill-trained conscripts and so forth. There was no basis of discipline, hardly any power to enforce it; the men had behaved disgracefully in all the affairs of outposts, they had been brushed away contemptuously by the small Austrian force from every position they had held. With all his numerical superiority the attempt which Houchard was about to make was very hazardous: and Houchard was a hesitating and uncertain commander. Furthermore, of the forty thousand men one quarter at least remained out of action through the ineptitude and political terror of Dumesny, Houchard’s lieutenant upon the right.

They slowly took advantage of the situation. Houchard gathered a total of forty thousand men near Cassel, but it took ten days to get them all together. It's important to emphasize again that, although the number was large—it was four times greater than Freytag’s[Pg 193] isolated force—Houchard’s troops consisted of about two-thirds who were hardly soldiers: new and inexperienced volunteers, poorly trained conscripts, and so on. There was little discipline and hardly any way to enforce it; the men had acted disgracefully in all the skirmishes and had been easily dismissed by the small Austrian force from every position they occupied. Despite having a numerical advantage, Houchard's upcoming attempt was very risky, and he was a hesitant and uncertain commander. Additionally, at least a quarter of the forty thousand men were out of action due to the ineptitude and political fear created by Dumesny, Houchard’s lieutenant on the right.

It was upon the 6th of September that the French advance began along the whole line; it was a mere pushing in of inferior numbers by superior numbers, the superior numbers perpetually proving themselves inferior to the Austrians in military value. Thus, the capture of old Freytag himself in a night skirmish was at once avenged by the storming of the village near which he had been caught, and he was re-taken. In actual fighting and force for force, Houchard’s command found nothing to encourage it during these first operations.

It was on September 6th that the French advance started along the entire front; it was just a case of larger numbers pushing in against smaller ones, but the larger forces continuously showed themselves to be weaker than the Austrians in terms of military effectiveness. So, the capture of old Freytag during a nighttime skirmish was quickly avenged by the attack on the village where he was captured, and he was rescued. In terms of actual fighting and strength, Houchard’s command found no motivation during these initial operations.

The Austrians in falling back concentrated and were soon one compact body: to attack and dislodge it was the object of the French advance, but an object hardly to be attained.[Pg 194]

The Austrians regrouped as they fell back and soon formed a single strong group: the aim of the French advance was to attack and dislodge them, but that goal was difficult to achieve.[Pg 194]

What happened was not only the unexpected success of this advance, but the gaining by the French of the first decisive action in the long series which was to terminate twenty years later at Leipsic.

What happened was not just the surprising success of this progress, but also the French achieving the first decisive action in the long series that would end twenty years later at Leipzig.

The army of Freytag fell back upon the village of Hondschoote and stood there in full force upon the morning of Sunday, the 8th of September. Houchard attacked it with a force greatly lessened but still double that of the defenders. So conspicuous, however, was the superiority of the Austrian regulars over the French raw troops and volunteers that during this morning of the 8th the result was still doubtful. By the afternoon, however, the work was done, and the enemy were in a retreat which might easily have been turned into a rout. A glance at the map will show that Houchard, had he possessed the initiative common to so many of his contemporaries, might at once have driven the numerically inferior and heavily defeated force (it had lost one-third of its men) to the right, and proceeded himself to cut the communications of the Duke of York and to destroy his army, which lay packed upon the waterless sand dunes where the village of Malo-les-Bains now stands. Houchard hesitated; Freytag escaped; the Duke of York, abandoning his siege-pieces to the number of forty and much of his heavy baggage, retreated precipitately through the night to Furnes, right across the front of the French army, and escaped destruction.[Pg 195]

The army of Freytag fell back to the village of Hondschoote and was fully assembled there on the morning of Sunday, September 8th. Houchard launched an attack with a significantly smaller force, but it was still double the size of the defenders. However, the difference in skill between the Austrian regulars and the inexperienced French troops and volunteers was so evident that the outcome on the morning of the 8th remained uncertain. By the afternoon, though, the battle was decisively over, and the enemy was retreating in a way that could have turned into a complete rout. A look at the map would show that if Houchard had had the common initiative of many of his peers, he could have easily driven the significantly outnumbered and defeated force (which had lost a third of its men) to the right and proceeded to cut off the Duke of York's communications, ultimately destroying his army, which was packed onto the dry sand dunes where the village of Malo-les-Bains now stands. Houchard hesitated; Freytag escaped; the Duke of York, leaving behind forty siege pieces and much of his heavy baggage, hurriedly retreated through the night to Furnes, crossing right in front of the French army and avoided total destruction.[Pg 195]

The Battle of Hoondschoote, therefore, as it is called, raised the siege of Dunquerque. It was, as I have said, the first successful decisive action which the Revolution could count since the moment of its extreme danger and the opening of the general European war. But it was nothing like what it might have been had Houchard been willing to risk a hardy stroke. Houchard was therefore recalled, condemned to death, and executed by the Committee of Public Safety, whose pitiless despotism was alone capable of saving the nation. He remains the single example of a general officer who has suffered death for military incompetence after the gaining of a victory, and his execution is an excellent example of the way in which the military temper of the Committee, and particularly of Carnot, refused to consider any factor in the war save those that make for military success.

The Battle of Hoondschoote, as it’s called, lifted the siege of Dunkirk. As I mentioned, it was the first clear victory the Revolution could claim since the peak of its crisis and the start of the wider European war. However, it didn’t reach its full potential because Houchard wasn’t willing to take a bold risk. As a result, Houchard was dismissed, sentenced to death, and executed by the Committee of Public Safety, whose ruthless leadership was the only thing capable of saving the nation. He stands as the sole example of a general officer who faced execution for military failure despite achieving a victory, and his execution illustrates how the military mindset of the Committee, especially that of Carnot, focused solely on factors that contributed to military success.

Carnot and the Committee had no patience with the illusions which a civilian crowd possesses upon mere individual actions: what they saw was the campaign as a whole, and they knew that Houchard had left the armies opposite him intact.

Carnot and the Committee had no tolerance for the misconceptions that a civilian crowd has about individual actions: what they observed was the entire campaign, and they understood that Houchard had left the armies facing him undamaged.

Perhaps his execution was made more certain by the continuance of bad news from that more important point of the frontier—the direct line of Austrian advance upon Paris. Here, already, Valenciennes had fallen two months before, and Condé also. Lequesnoy, the third point of the barrier line, capitulated on the 11th of September, and[Pg 196] the news of that capitulation reached Paris immediately after the news of Hondschoote. No fortress was now left between the Allies and the capital but Maubeuge. Coburg marched upon it at once.

Perhaps his execution was made more certain by the ongoing bad news from that crucial point on the frontier—the direct route of the Austrian advance toward Paris. Already, Valenciennes had fallen two months earlier, and Condé too. Lequesnoy, the third point of the barrier line, surrendered on September 11th, and[Pg 196] the news of that surrender reached Paris right after the news from Hondschoote. Now, the only fortress left between the Allies and the capital was Maubeuge. Coburg marched toward it immediately.

Not only had he that immense superiority in the quality of his troops which must be still insisted upon, but numerically also he was three to one when, on the 28th of September, at dawn, he crossed the Sambre above and below Maubeuge, and by noon of that day had contained the French army in that neighbourhood within the lines of the fortress.

Not only did he have a huge advantage in the quality of his troops, which should still be emphasized, but he also outnumbered them three to one when, on September 28th at dawn, he crossed the Sambre above and below Maubeuge, and by noon that day had trapped the French army in that area within the fortress lines.

The situation was critical in the extreme: Maubeuge was ill prepared to stand siege; it was hardly provisioned; its garrison was of varied and, on the whole, of bad quality. In mere victuals it could stand out for but a few days, and, worst of all, it had behind it the continued example of necessary and fatal surrenders which had marked the whole summer. The orders of the Committee of Public Safety to its commander were terse: “Your head shall answer for Maubeuge.” After the receipt of that message no more came through the lines.

The situation was extremely critical: Maubeuge was poorly prepared for a siege; it had barely any supplies; its garrison was mixed and, overall, of poor quality. It could only hold out for a few days with its limited food, and, worst of all, it had witnessed numerous necessary and disastrous surrenders all summer long. The orders from the Committee of Public Safety to its commander were straightforward: “Your head will be responsible for Maubeuge.” After receiving that message, no further communications came through the lines.

The reader, if he be unaccustomed to military history, does well to note that in every action and in every campaign there is some one factor of position or of arms or of time which explains the result. Each has a pivot or hinge, as it were, upon which the whole turns. It was now upon Maubeuge that the revolutionary war thus depended.[Pg 197] At risk of oversimplifying a complex story, I would lay this down as the prime condition for the understanding of the early revolutionary wars: had Maubeuge fallen, the road to Paris lay open and the trick was done[7]—and here we must consider again the effect in the field of Carnot’s genius.

The reader, if he's not used to military history, should note that in every battle and campaign, there's always one key factor—whether it's position, weaponry, or timing—that explains the outcome. Each of these elements has a crucial point upon which everything relies. At this moment, the revolutionary war hinged on Maubeuge.[Pg 197] While it risks oversimplifying a complicated story, I would say this is the main point to understand about the early revolutionary wars: if Maubeuge had fallen, the road to Paris would have been clear, and that would have been it[7]—and now we must again consider the impact of Carnot’s brilliance in the field.

In the first place, he had provided numbers not on paper, but in reality; the Committee, through a decree of the Assembly, had despotically “requisitioned” men, animals, vehicles and supplies. The levy was a reality. Mere numbers then raw, but increasing, had begun to pour into the north-east. It was they that had told at Hoondschoote, it was they that were to tell in front of Maubeuge.[Pg 198]

At first, he had provided figures not just on paper, but in real life; the Committee, via a decree from the Assembly, had authoritarianly “requisitioned” people, animals, vehicles, and supplies. The levy was a fact. Raw numbers, which were still growing, had started to flow into the northeast. It was these numbers that had made their point at Hoondschoote, and it was they who would make their mark in front of Maubeuge.[Pg 198]

Secondly, as the Committee supplied the necessary initiative, Carnot supplied the necessary personality of war. His own will and own brain could come to one decision in one moment, and did so. It was he, as we shall see, who won the critical action. He chose Jourdan, a man whose quaint military career we must reluctantly leave aside in so brief a study as this, but at any rate an amateur, and put him in Houchard’s command over the Army of the Northern Frontier, and that command was extended from right away beyond the Ardennes to the sea. He ordered (and Jourdan obeyed) the concentration of men from all down that lengthy line to the right and the left upon one point, Guise. To leave the rest of the frontier weak was a grave risk only to be excused by very rapid action and success: both these were to follow. The concentration was effected in four days. Troops from the extreme north could not come in time. The furthest called upon were beyond Arras, with sixty-five miles of route between them and Guise. This division (which shall be typical of many), not quite eight thousand strong, left on receiving orders in the morning of the 3rd of October and entered Guise in the course of the 6th. The rate of marching and the synchrony of these movements of imperfect troops should especially be noted by any one who would understand how the Revolution succeeded.

Secondly, while the Committee provided the necessary initiative, Carnot brought the essential leadership for the war. His own will and intellect could come to a decision in an instant, and he did just that. He was the one, as we will see, who achieved victory in the key battle. He appointed Jourdan, a man with an unusual military background we must sadly skip over in such a brief analysis, but nevertheless an amateur, and put him in charge of Houchard’s command over the Army of the Northern Frontier, which stretched all the way from beyond the Ardennes to the sea. He ordered (and Jourdan complied) the gathering of troops from along that extensive line to converge on one point, Guise. Leaving the rest of the frontier weak was a serious risk that could only be justified by very swift action and success, both of which were to follow. The concentration took place in four days. Troops from the far north could not arrive in time. The furthest unit called upon was beyond Arras, with a sixty-five-mile journey between them and Guise. This unit (which will be typical of many) was just under eight thousand strong; they left upon receiving orders on the morning of October 3rd and reached Guise during the day on the 6th. The speed of their march and the synchronization of these movements of inadequate troops should be particularly noted by anyone looking to understand how the Revolution succeeded.

The rapid eight days' concentration in front of Maubeuge. October 1783. The quick eight-day focus in front of Maubeuge. October 1783.

A second division of over thirteen thousand men followed along the parallel road, with[Pg 200] a similar time table. From the other end of his line, a detachment under Beauregard, just over four thousand men, was called up from the extreme right. It will serve as a typical example upon the eastern side of this lightning concentration. It had been gathered near Carignan, a town full fourteen miles beyond Sedan. It picked up reinforcements on the way and marched into Fourmies upon the 11th, after covering just seventy miles in the three and a half days. With its arrival the concentration was complete, and not a moment too soon, for the bombardment of Maubeuge was about to begin. From the 11th to the 15th of October the army was advanced and drawn up in line, a day’s march in front of Guise, with its centre at Avesnes and facing the covering army of Coburg, which lay entrenched upon a long wooded crest with the valley of the Sambre upon its right and the village of Wattignies, on a sort of promontory of high land, upon its left.

A second group of over thirteen thousand men followed along the parallel road, with[Pg 200] a similar schedule. From the other end of his line, a unit led by Beauregard, just over four thousand men, was called up from the far right. This serves as a typical example on the eastern side of this rapid buildup. It had been gathered near Carignan, a town a full fourteen miles beyond Sedan. It picked up reinforcements along the way and marched into Fourmies on the 11th, having covered just seventy miles in three and a half days. With its arrival, the buildup was complete, and just in time, as the bombardment of Maubeuge was about to start. From the 11th to the 15th of October, the army advanced and formed up in line, a day's march in front of Guise, with its center at Avesnes, facing the covering army of Coburg, which was entrenched along a long wooded ridge with the valley of the Sambre on its right and the village of Wattignies, positioned on a high land promontory, on its left.

The Austrian position was reconnoitred upon the 14th. Upon the 15th the general attack was delivered and badly repelled. When darkness fell upon that day few in the army could have believed that Maubeuge was succourable—and it was a question of hours.

The Austrian position was surveyed on the 14th. On the 15th, the general attack was launched but was poorly defended. When night fell that day, few in the army could have believed that Maubeuge could be saved—and it was a matter of hours.

Carnot, however, sufficiently knew the virtues as the vices of his novel troops, the troops of the great levy, stiffened with a proportion of regulars, to attempt an extraordinary thing. He marched eight thousand[Pg 201] from his left and centre, over to his right during the night, and in the morning of the 16th his right, in front of the Austrian left at Wattignies had, by this conversion, become far the strongest point of the whole line.

Carnot, however, understood both the strengths and weaknesses of his new army, which combined a large number of conscripts with a smaller proportion of regular soldiers, enough to try something extraordinary. He moved eight thousand[Pg 201] from his left and center to his right overnight, and by the morning of the 16th, his right flank, positioned against the Austrian left at Wattignies, had become the strongest point along the entire line.

A dense mist had covered the end of this operation as the night had covered its inception, and that mist endured until nearly midday. The Austrians upon the heights had no hint of the conversion, and Wattignies was only held by three regiments. If they expected a renewed attack at all, they can only have expected it in the centre, or even upon the left where the French had suffered most the day before.

A thick fog had shrouded the conclusion of this operation just as it had concealed its beginning, and that fog lingered until almost noon. The Austrians on the heights were completely unaware of the change, and Wattignies was only defended by three regiments. If they anticipated another attack, it would likely be in the center, or perhaps on the left where the French had faced the most difficulties the day before.

Initiative in war is essentially a calculation of risk, and with high initiative the risk is high. What Carnot gambled upon (for Jourdan was against the experiment) when he moved those young men through the night, was the possibility of getting active work out of them after a day’s furious action, the forced marches of the preceding week and on top of it all a sleepless night of further marching. Most of the men who were prepared to charge on the French right as the day broadened and the mist lifted on that 16th of October, had been on foot for thirty hours. The charge was delivered, and was successful. The unexpected numbers thus concentrated under Wattignies carried that extreme position, held the height, and arrived, therefore, on the flank of the whole Austrian line, which, had not the effort of the aggressors exhausted them, would have been rolled up[Pg 202] in its whole length. As it was, the Austrians retreated unmolested and in good order across the Sambre. The siege of Maubeuge was raised; and the next day the victorious French army entered the fortress.

Initiative in war is basically a calculation of risk, and with high initiative comes high risk. What Carnot took a chance on (since Jourdan was opposed to the idea) when he moved those young men through the night was the chance of getting them to perform after a day of intense action, the forced marches of the previous week, and on top of it all, a sleepless night of more marching. Most of the men who were ready to charge on the French right as day broke and the mist cleared on that October 16th had been on their feet for thirty hours. The charge was made and succeeded. The unexpected numbers gathered under Wattignies took that key position, held the height, and as a result, arrived on the flank of the entire Austrian line, which, if the effort of the attackers hadn't worn them out, would have been completely overwhelmed[Pg 202]. As it turned out, the Austrians retreated unbothered and in good order across the Sambre. The siege of Maubeuge was lifted; and the next day, the victorious French army entered the fortress.

Thus was successfully passed the turning-point of the revolutionary wars.

Thus, the turning point of the revolutionary wars was successfully passed.

Two months later the other gate of the country was recovered. In the moment when Maubeuge was relieved, the enemy had pierced the lines of Wissembourg. It is possible that an immediate and decisive understanding among the Allies might then have swept all Alsace; but such an understanding was lacking. The disarrayed “Army of the Rhine” was got into some sort of order, notably through the enthusiasm of Hoche and the silent control of Pichegru. At the end of November the Prussians stood on the defensive at Kaiserslautern. Hoche hammered at them for three days without success. What really turned the scale was the floods of men and material that the levy and the requisitioning were pouring in. Just before Christmas the enemy evacuated Haguenau. Landau they still held; but a decisive action fought upon Boxing Day, a true soldiers’ battle, determined by the bayonet, settled the fate of the Allies on this point. The French entered Wissembourg again, and Landau was relieved after a siege of four months and a display of tenacity which had done not a little to turn the tide of the war.

Two months later, the other gate of the country was reclaimed. When Maubeuge was freed, the enemy had broken through the lines at Wissembourg. It's possible that a quick and effective agreement among the Allies could have taken all of Alsace, but that agreement was missing. The disorganized “Army of the Rhine” was somewhat put back together, mainly thanks to Hoche's enthusiasm and Pichegru's steady leadership. By the end of November, the Prussians were on the defensive in Kaiserslautern. Hoche attacked them for three days without any success. What really made the difference was the massive influx of troops and supplies from the draft and requisitions. Just before Christmas, the enemy withdrew from Haguenau. They still occupied Landau, but a decisive battle fought on Boxing Day—a true soldier's battle determined by the bayonet—decided the fate of the Allies in this area. The French re-entered Wissembourg, and Landau was liberated after a four-month siege, during which their determination greatly helped change the course of the war.

Meanwhile the news had come in that the[Pg 203] last of the serious internal rebellions was crushed. Toulon had been re-captured, the English fleet driven out; the town, the harbour and the arsenal had fallen into the hands of the French largely through the science of a young major of artillery (not captain: I have discussed the point elsewhere), Bonaparte, and this had taken place a week before the relief of Landau. The last confused horde of La Vendée had been driven from the walls of Granville in Normandy, to which it had erred and drifted rather than retreated. At Mans on the 13th of December it was cut to pieces, and at Savenay on the 23rd, three days before the great victory in Alsace, it was destroyed. A long peasant-and-bandit struggle, desperate yet hardly to be called guerilla, continued through the next year behind the hedges of Lower Brittany and of Vendée, but the danger to the State and to the Revolution was over. The year 1793 ended, therefore, with the complete relief of the whole territory of the Republic, save a narrow strip upon the Belgian frontier, complete domination of it by its Cæsar, the Committee of Public Safety; with two-thirds of a million of men under arms, and the future of the great experiment apparently secure.

Meanwhile, the news came in that the[Pg 203] last of the serious internal rebellions was crushed. Toulon had been recaptured, and the English fleet was driven out; the town, the harbor, and the arsenal had fallen into the hands of the French, largely thanks to the skills of a young artillery major (not captain: I've discussed that point elsewhere), Bonaparte, and this happened a week before the relief of Landau. The last disorganized group from La Vendée had been pushed away from the walls of Granville in Normandy, to which it had wandered rather than retreated. At Mans on December 13th, it was defeated, and at Savenay on the 23rd, three days before the major victory in Alsace, it was destroyed. A prolonged struggle involving peasants and bandits, desperate yet hardly fitting the definition of guerrilla warfare, continued through the next year behind the hedges of Lower Brittany and Vendée, but the threat to the State and the Revolution was over. The year 1793 ended, therefore, with the complete relief of all the territory of the Republic, except for a narrow strip along the Belgian frontier, complete domination by its Cæsar, the Committee of Public Safety; with two-thirds of a million men under arms, and the future of the great experiment seemingly secure.

The causes of the wonder have been discussed, and will be discussed indefinitely. Primarily, they resided in the re-creation of a strong central power; secondly, in the combination of vast numbers and of a reckless spirit of sacrifice. The losses on the National side[Pg 204] were perpetually and heavily superior to those of the Allies—in Alsace they had been three to one; and we shall better understand the duel when we appreciate that in the short eight years between the opening of the war and the triumph of Napoleon at Marengo, there had fallen in killed and wounded, on the French side, over seven hundred thousand men.

The reasons for the amazement have been talked about, and will continue to be talked about forever. First, they were rooted in the establishment of a strong central authority; second, in the combination of large numbers and a reckless willingness to sacrifice. The losses on the National side[Pg 204] were consistently and significantly higher than those of the Allies—in Alsace, they were three to one; and we will better understand the battle when we realize that in the brief eight years between the start of the war and Napoleon's victory at Marengo, over seven hundred thousand men had been killed or wounded on the French side.

FIVE

The story of 1794 is but the consequence of what we have just read. It was the little belt or patch upon the Belgian frontier which was still in the hands of the enemy that determined the nature of the campaign.

The story of 1794 is just the result of what we've just read. It was the small section along the Belgian border that was still under enemy control that defined the campaign's direction.

It was not until spring that the issue was joined. The Emperor of Austria reached Brussels on the 2nd day of April, and a fortnight later reviewed his army. The French line drawn up in opposition to it suffered small but continual reverses until the close of the month.

It wasn't until spring that the conflict began. The Emperor of Austria arrived in Brussels on April 2nd, and two weeks later, he reviewed his army. The French forces positioned against him faced minor but ongoing setbacks until the end of the month.

On the 29th Clerfayt suffered a defeat which led to the fall, or rather the escape, of the small garrison of Menin. Clerfayt was beaten again at Courtray a fortnight later; but all these early engagements in the campaign were of no decisive moment. Tourcoing was to be the first heavy blow that should begin to settle matters, Fleurus was to clinch them.

On the 29th, Clerfayt faced a defeat that resulted in the fall, or rather the escape, of the small garrison at Menin. Clerfayt was defeated again at Courtray two weeks later, but all these early battles in the campaign weren't really significant. Tourcoing would be the first major setback that would start to resolve the situation, and Fleurus would finalize it.

No battle can be less satisfactorily described[Pg 205] in a few lines than that of Tourcoing, so different did it appear to either combatant, so opposite are the plans of what was expected on either side, and of what happened, so confused are the various accounts of contemporaries. The accusations of treason which nearly always arise after a disaster, and especially a disaster overtaking an allied force, are particularly monstrous, and may be dismissed: in particular the childish legend which pretends that the Austrians desired an English defeat.

No battle can be described less satisfactorily in just a few lines than the one at Tourcoing. It looked so different to each side, and the expectations were so opposite to what actually happened. The various accounts from those who were there are quite confusing. The accusations of treason that often come up after a disaster—especially when it involves an allied force—are especially outrageous and should be ignored, particularly the silly myth that the Austrians wanted the English to lose.

What the French say is that excellent forced marching and scientific concentration permitted them to attack the enemy before the junction of his various forces was effected. What the Allies say is (if they are speaking for their centre) that it was shamefully abandoned and unsupported by the two wings; if they are speaking for the wings, that the centre had no business to advance, when it saw that the two wings were not up in time to co-operate.

What the French believe is that their great forced marching and strategic focus allowed them to strike the enemy before he could bring his different forces together. What the Allies argue is (when speaking for their center) that it was disgracefully left unsupported by the two flanks; when speaking for the flanks, that the center shouldn’t have moved forward when it noticed the two flanks weren’t ready to work together in time.

One story goes that the Archduke Charles was incapacitated by a fit; Lord Acton has lent his considerable authority to this amusing version. At any rate, what happened was this:—

One story goes that Archduke Charles was taken out by a fit; Lord Acton has supported this amusing version with his considerable authority. Regardless, this is what actually happened:—

The Allies lay along the river Scheldt on Friday, the 16th of May: Tournay was their centre, with the Duke of York in command of the chief force there; five or six miles north, down the river, was one extremity of their line at a place called Warcoing: it was a body of Hanoverians. The left, under the Archduke[Pg 206] Charles, was Austrian and had reached a place a day’s march south of Tournay called St. Amand. Over against the Allies lay a large French force also occupying a wide front of over fifteen miles, the centre of which was Tourcoing, then a village. Its left was in front of the fortress of Courtrai. Now, behind the French, up country northward in the opposite direction from the line of the Allies on the Scheldt was another force of the Allies under Clerfayt. The plan was that the Allied right should advance on to Mouscron and take it. The Allied centre should advance on to Tourcoing and Mouveaux and take them, while the left should march across the upper waters of the river Marque, forcing the bridges that crossed that marshy stream, and come up alongside the centre. In other words, there was to be an attack all along the French line from the south, and while it was proceeding, Clerfayt, from the north of the French, was to cross the Lys and attack also.

The Allies were positioned along the Scheldt River on Friday, May 16th: Tournay was their center, with the Duke of York commanding the main force there; five or six miles north down the river was one end of their line at a place called Warcoing, which was occupied by a group of Hanoverians. The left flank, led by Archduke[Pg 206] Charles, was Austrian and had reached a location a day's march south of Tournay called St. Amand. Facing the Allies was a large French force covering a wide front of over fifteen miles, with Tourcoing, then a village, at its center. Its left side was in front of the fortress of Courtrai. Meanwhile, behind the French, further north and away from the Allies' line along the Scheldt, was another Allied force under Clerfayt. The plan was for the Allied right to advance on Mouscron and capture it. The Allied center would push towards Tourcoing and Mouveaux to take them, while the left would march across the upper waters of the Marque River, forcing the bridges over that marshy stream, to join up with the center. In other words, there was to be an attack along the entire French line from the south, and while that was happening, Clerfayt was to cross the Lys from the north and attack as well.

On the day of the 17th what happened was this: The left of the Allies, marching from St. Amand, came up half a day late; the right of the Allies took Mouscron, but were beaten out of it by the French. The centre of the Allies fulfilled their programme, reaching Tourcoing and its neighbourhood by noon and holding their positions. It is to the honour of English arms that this success was accomplished by a force a third of which was British and the most notable bayonet work in which was done by the Guards. Meanwhile,[Pg 207] Clerfayt was late in moving and in crossing the river Lys, which lay between him and his objective.

On the 17th, here's what happened: The left side of the Allies, marching from St. Amand, arrived half a day late; the right side of the Allies captured Mouscron but was pushed out by the French. The center of the Allies carried out their plan, reaching Tourcoing and the surrounding area by noon and holding their ground. It's a point of pride for the British forces that this success was achieved by a group where a third were British, and the most impressive fighting was done by the Guards. Meanwhile,[Pg 207] Clerfayt was delayed in moving and in crossing the river Lys, which was between him and his goal.

Tourcoing. May 16 to 18, 1794. The breakdown of the attempt of the Allies to cut off the French near Courtrai from Lille was due to their failure to synchronise They should have been in line from A to B at noon of the 17th with Clerfayt at C. Tourcoing. May 16-18, 1794.

The breakdown of the attempt of the Allies to cut off the French near Courtrai from Lille was due to their failure to synchronise They should have been in line from A to B at noon of the 17th with Clerfayt at C.

The failure of the Allies' attempt to block the French near Courtrai from Lille was because they couldn't synchronize their movements. They should have lined up from A to B by noon on the 17th with Clerfayt at C.

When night fell, therefore, on the first day of the action, a glance at the map will show that instead of one solid line advancing against the French from A to B, and the northern force in touch with it at C, the Allied formation was an absurd projection in the[Pg 208] middle, due to the success of the mixed and half-British force under the Duke of York: a success which had not been maintained on the two wings. A bulge of this sort in an attacking line is on the face of it disastrous. The enemy have only to be rapid in falling upon either flank of it and the bulge can be burst in. The French were rapid, and burst in the bulge was. By concentrating their forces against this one central part of the Allies they fought three to one.

When night fell on the first day of the action, a look at the map shows that instead of one solid line advancing against the French from A to B, with the northern force in contact at C, the Allied formation was an illogical bulge in the[Pg 208] middle, thanks to the mixed and mostly British force under the Duke of York, which had not been supported on the two flanks. A bulge like this in an attacking line is clearly disastrous. The enemy just needs to act quickly on either side, and the bulge can be breached. The French were quick and broke through the bulge. By focusing their forces on this single central section of the Allies, they fought with three times the numbers.

That same capacity which at Wattignies had permitted them to scorn sleep and to be indefatigable in marching, put them on the road before three o’clock in the morning of Sunday, the 18th, and with the dawn they fell upon the central force of the Allies, attacking it from all three sides.

That same ability that had allowed them to forgo sleep and march tirelessly at Wattignies got them on the road before 3 a.m. on Sunday the 18th, and with the break of dawn, they launched an attack on the central force of the Allies, hitting it from all three sides.

It is on this account that the battle is called the Battle of Tourcoing, for Tourcoing was the most advanced point to which the centre of the Allies had reached. The Germans, upon the Duke of York’s right at Tourcoing, felt the first brunt of the attack. The Duke of York himself, with his mixed, half-British force, came in for the blow immediately afterwards, and while it was still early morning. The Germans at Tourcoing began to fall back. The Duke of York’s force, to the left of them, was left isolated: its commander ought not to have hung on so long. But the defence was maintained with the utmost gallantry for the short time during which it was still possible. The retreat began about nine in the morning and[Pg 209] was kept orderly for the first two miles, but after that point it was a rout. The drivers of the British cannon fled, and the guns, left without teams, blocked the precipitate flight of the cavalry. Their disorder communicated itself at once to the Guards, and to the line.

It’s for this reason that the battle is called the Battle of Tourcoing, since Tourcoing was the furthest point the Allies had reached. The Germans, positioned to the right of the Duke of York at Tourcoing, took the brunt of the attack first. The Duke of York himself, leading his diverse, half-British force, faced the blow shortly after, while it was still early morning. The Germans at Tourcoing began to retreat. The Duke of York’s troops, positioned to their left, found themselves isolated; their commander shouldn’t have held out for so long. However, they defended their position with incredible bravery for as long as they could. The retreat started around nine in the morning and[Pg 209] was organized for the first two miles, but after that, it turned into a rout. The drivers of the British cannons fled, leaving the guns unmanned and blocking the hasty escape of the cavalry. Their chaos quickly spread to the Guards and the rest of the line.

Even in this desperate strait some sort of order was restored, notably by the Guards Brigade, which were apparently the first to form, and a movement that could still be called a retreat was pursued towards the south. The Duke of York himself was chased from spinney to spinney and escaped by a stroke of luck, finding a bridge across the last brook held by a detachment of Hessians. In this way were the central columns, who between them numbered not a third of the total force of the Allies, destroyed.

Even in this desperate situation, some kind of order was restored, particularly by the Guards Brigade, which seemed to be the first to form up, and a movement that could still be called a retreat took place towards the south. The Duke of York himself was pursued from thicket to thicket and managed to escape by a stroke of luck, finding a bridge across the last stream held by a group of Hessians. In this way, the central columns, which together didn’t even make up a third of the total Allied force, were destroyed.

Clerfayt had first advanced—but far too late to save the centre—and then retreated. The Archduke Charles, upon the left, was four hours late in marching to the help of the Duke of York; the right wing of the Allies was not even late: it spent the morning in an orderly artillery duel with the French force opposed to it. By five in the afternoon defeat was admitted and a general retreat of the Allies ordered.

Clerfayt had initially moved forward—but it was way too late to rescue the center—and then he fell back. Archduke Charles, on the left, was four hours late in heading to assist the Duke of York; the right wing of the Allies wasn’t even late: it spent the morning engaged in a structured artillery battle with the French forces facing it. By five in the evening, defeat was acknowledged, and a general retreat of the Allies was commanded.

I have said that many reasons are given to account for the disaster of Tourcoing, one of the very few in which a British force has been routed upon the Continent; but I confess that if I were asked for an explanation of my own, I would say that it was[Pg 210] simply due to the gross lack of synchrony on the part of the Allies, and that this in its turn was taken advantage of by the power both of vigil and of marching which the French troops, still inferior in most military characteristics, had developed and maintained, and which (a more important matter) their commanders knew how to use.

I have mentioned that many reasons have been given to explain the disaster at Tourcoing, one of the very few times a British force has been defeated on the Continent; but I admit that if I were asked for my own explanation, I would say that it was[Pg 210] simply due to the complete lack of coordination among the Allies. This, in turn, was exploited by the French troops, who, despite being inferior in most military aspects, had developed and maintained a remarkable ability to be alert and to march, which their commanders knew how to utilize effectively.

This heavy blow, delivered on the 18th of May, in spite of a successful rally a week later, finally convinced the Emperor that the march on Paris was impossible. Eleven days later, on the 29th, it was announced in the camp of Tournay, upon which the Allied army had fallen back, that the Emperor had determined to return to Vienna. The Allied army was indeed still left upon that front, but the French continued to pour up against it. It was again their numbers that brought about the next and the final victory.

This significant setback, delivered on May 18th, despite a successful rally a week later, finally convinced the Emperor that advancing on Paris was not feasible. Eleven days later, on the 29th, it was announced in the camp of Tournay, where the Allied army had retreated, that the Emperor had decided to return to Vienna. The Allied army was still present on that front, but the French kept advancing against them. Once again, it was their numbers that led to the next and final victory.

Far off, upon the east of that same line, the army which is famous in history and in song as that of the Sambre et Meuse was violently attempting to cross the Sambre and to turn the line of the Allies. Coburg reinforced his right opposite the French left, but numbers had begun to bewilder him. The enthusiasm of Saint-Just, the science of Carnot, decided victory at this eastern end of the line.

Far away, to the east of that same line, the army known historically and in songs as the Sambre et Meuse was fiercely trying to cross the Sambre and outmaneuver the Allied line. Coburg strengthened his right flank against the French left, but the sheer number of troops began to overwhelm him. The energy of Saint-Just and the strategy of Carnot secured victory at this eastern end of the line.

Six times the passage of the Sambre had failed. Reinforcements continued to reach the army, and the seventh attempt succeeded.

Six times the crossing of the Sambre had failed. Reinforcements kept arriving for the army, and the seventh attempt was successful.

Charleroi, which is the main fortress blocking[Pg 211] the passage of the Sambre at this place, could be, and was, invested when once the river was crossed by the French. It capitulated in a week. But the evacuation of Charleroi was but just accomplished when Coburg, seventy thousand strong, appeared in relief of the city.

Charleroi, the main fortress blocking[Pg 211] the passage of the Sambre here, could be, and was, surrounded once the French crossed the river. It surrendered in a week. However, just as the evacuation of Charleroi was finished, Coburg, with seventy thousand troops, arrived to support the city.

Showing effect of Ypres, Charleroi and Fleurus in wholly throwing back the Allies in June 1794. Ypres captured on June 19 by the French, they march on Oudenarde and pass it on June 25 to 27. Meanwhile Charleroi has also surrendered to the French, and when, immediately afterwards, the Austrians try to relieve it, they are beaten at Fleurus and retire on Brussels. English at Tournai and all the Allied Forces at Condé, Valenciennes, Landrecies, and Mons are imperilled and must surrender or retire. The impact of Ypres, Charleroi, and Fleurus completely pushed back the Allies in June 1794.

Ypres captured on June 19 by the French, they march on Oudenarde and pass it on June 25 to 27. Meanwhile Charleroi has also surrendered to the French, and when, immediately afterwards, the Austrians try to relieve it, they are beaten at Fleurus and retire on Brussels.

Ypres was captured on June 19 by the French, who then marched on Oudenarde, passing through it from June 25 to 27. In the meantime, Charleroi also fell to the French, and when the Austrians tried to retake it shortly after, they were defeated at Fleurus and retreated to Brussels.

Thus the English at Tournai and all the Allied Forces at Condé, Valenciennes, Landrecies, and Mons are imperilled and must surrender or retire.

Thus the English at Tournai and all the Allied Forces at Condé, Valenciennes, Landrecies, and Mons are in danger and must either surrender or retreat.

The plateau above the town where the great struggle was decided, is known as that of Fleurus, and it was upon the 26th of June that the armies were there engaged. Never before had forces so equal permitted the French any success. It had hitherto been the ceaseless requisitioning of men to supply their insufficient training and command, which had accomplished the salvation of the country. At Fleurus, though there[Pg 212] was still some advantage on the French side, the numbers were more nearly equal.

The plateau above the town where the major battle was fought is known as Fleurus, and it was on June 26 that the armies clashed there. Never before had equally matched forces allowed the French any success. Until then, it had been the constant drafting of men to compensate for their lack of training and leadership that had saved the country. At Fleurus, although there[Pg 212] was still some advantage for the French, the numbers were much closer.

The action was not determined for ten hours, and on the French centre and left was nearly lost, when the Reserves’ and Marceau’s obstinacy in front of Fleurus village itself at last decided it.

The conflict wasn’t settled for ten hours, and the French center and left were close to being overwhelmed, when the Reserves' and Marceau's stubbornness right in front of Fleurus village finally turned the tide.

The consequences of the victory were final. As the French right advanced from Fleurus the French left advanced from Ypres, and the centre became untenable for the Allies. The four French fortresses which the enemy still garrisoned in that Belgian “belt” of which I have spoken, were invested and re-captured. By the 10th of July the French were in Brussels, the English were beaten back upon Holland, the Austrians retreating upon the Rhine, and the continuous success of the revolutionary armies was assured.

The results of the victory were definitive. As the French right moved forward from Fleurus, the French left pushed up from Ypres, making the center impossible for the Allies to hold. The four French fortresses that the enemy still occupied in that Belgian “belt” I mentioned earlier were surrounded and reclaimed. By July 10th, the French were in Brussels, the English were pushed back into Holland, the Austrians were retreating to the Rhine, and the ongoing success of the revolutionary armies was guaranteed.


While these things were proceeding upon land, however, there had appeared a factor in the war which modern desire for comfort and, above all, for commercial security has greatly exaggerated, but which the student will do well to note in its due proportion. This factor was the military weakness of France at sea.

While these events were unfolding on land, a significant factor in the war emerged that the modern desire for comfort, and especially for commercial security, has greatly exaggerated, but which the student should consider in its proper context. This factor was France's military weakness at sea.

In mere numbers the struggle was entered upon with fleets in the ratio of about two to one, while to the fleet of Great Britain, already twice as large as its opponent, must be added the fleets of the Allies. But numbers did not then, nor will they in the future, really decide the issue of maritime war. It[Pg 213] was the supremacy of English gunnery which turned the scale. This triumphant superiority was proved in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.

In simple numbers, the conflict started with fleets at about two to one, and to Great Britain's fleet, which was already twice the size of its rival, you have to add the fleets of the Allies. But numbers alone never have determined the outcome of naval warfare, nor will they in the future. It[Pg 213] was the dominance of English gunnery that made the difference. This clear superiority was demonstrated in the battle on June 1, 1794.

The English fleet under Lord Howe attacked the French fleet which was waiting to escort a convoy of grain into Brest; the forces came in contact upon the 28th of May, and the action was a running one of three days.

The English fleet led by Lord Howe attacked the French fleet that was waiting to escort a grain convoy into Brest; the armies clashed on May 28th, and the battle lasted for three days.

Two examples must suffice to prove how determining was the superiority of the British fire. The Queen Charlotte, in the final action, found herself caught between the Montagne and the Jacobin. We have the figures of the losses during the duel of these two flagships. The Queen Charlotte lost forty-two men in the short and furious exchange, the Montagne alone three hundred. Again, consider the total figures. The number of the crews on both sides was nearly equal, but their losses were as eleven to five. It cannot be too often repeated that the initial advantage which the English fleet gained in the great war, which it maintained and increased as that war proceeded, and which it made absolute at Trafalgar, was an advantage mainly due to the guns.

Two examples are enough to show how significant the superiority of the British fire was. The Queen Charlotte, during the final battle, found herself trapped between the Montagne and the Jacobin. We have the loss figures from the duel between these two flagship vessels. The Queen Charlotte lost forty-two men in that brief but intense exchange, while the Montagne lost three hundred. Again, look at the overall numbers. The crew sizes on both sides were nearly equal, but their losses were eleven to five. It's important to emphasize that the initial advantage the English fleet gained in the great war, which they maintained and expanded as the conflict continued, and which they secured at Trafalgar, was largely due to their superior firepower.

The reader must not expect in a sketch which ends with the fall of Robespierre any treatise, however short, upon the effect of sea power in the revolutionary wars. It has of late years been grossly exaggerated, the reaction which will follow this exaggeration may as grossly belittle it. It prevented the[Pg 214] invasion of England, it permitted the exasperation and wearing out of the French forces in the Peninsula. But it could not have determined the fate of Napoleon. That was determined by his Russian miscalculation and by his subsequent and consequent defeat at Leipsic.

The reader shouldn't expect a discussion on the impact of naval power in the revolutionary wars in a brief account that ends with Robespierre's fall. Recently, this has been grossly overstated, and the backlash could just as easily downplay it. Naval power prevented the[Pg 214] invasion of England and contributed to the frustration and depletion of French forces in the Peninsula. However, it couldn't have changed Napoleon's fate. That was shaped by his misjudgment in Russia and his resulting defeat at Leipzig.

Upon the early success of the Revolution and the resulting establishment of European democracy, with which alone these pages deal, sea power was of no considerable effect.

Upon the early success of the Revolution and the resulting establishment of European democracy, which is the only topic of these pages, sea power was not significantly impactful.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] Incidentally it should be noted how true it is that this supreme military quality is a matter of organisation rather than of the physical power of troops; in the Napoleonic wars the marching power of the English troops was often proved exceptional, and perhaps the greatest of all feats accomplished by a small body was that of the Light Brigade marching to the succour of Wellington at Talavera.

[6] By the way, it’s worth noting how true it is that this top military quality is more about organization than the physical strength of the troops. During the Napoleonic wars, the marching capability of the English troops was often impressive, and perhaps the greatest achievement by a small group was the Light Brigade marching to support Wellington at Talavera.

[7] I must not, in fairness to the reader, neglect the great mass of opinion, from Jomini to Mr. Fortescue’s classic work upon the British Army, which lays it down that the Allies had but to mask the frontier fortresses and to advance their cavalry rapidly along the Paris road. Historical hypothesis can never be more than a matter of judgment, but I confess that this view has always seemed to me to ignore—as purely military historians and especially foreign ones might well ignore—the social condition of “’93.” Cavalry is the weakest of all arms with which to deal with sporadic, unorganised, but determined resistance. To pass through the densely populated country of the Paris road may be compared to the forcing of an open town, and cavalry can never be relied upon for that. As for the army moving as a whole without a perfect security in its communications, the matter need not even be discussed; and it must further be remembered that, the moment such an advance began, an immediate concentration from the north would have fallen upon the ill-guarded lines of supply. It may be taken that Coburg knew his business when he sat down before this, the last of the fortresses.

[7] I can’t overlook the widespread belief, from Jomini to Mr. Fortescue’s classic work on the British Army, that the Allies only needed to cover the frontier fortresses and quickly move their cavalry down the Paris road. While historical speculation is always subjective, I have to say that this perspective seems to ignore—something purely military historians, especially foreign ones, might overlook—the social conditions of “’93.” Cavalry is the weakest branch when facing scattered, unorganized, but determined opposition. Traveling through the densely populated areas along the Paris road is similar to storming an open town, and cavalry can never be depended on for that. As for the army moving as a whole without solid security for its supply lines, that doesn’t even need to be debated; we must also remember that as soon as such an advance began, an immediate concentration from the north would have threatened the poorly protected supply routes. It’s safe to say that Coburg understood what he was doing when he laid siege to this last fortress.


VI

THE REVOLUTION AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

The last and the most important of the aspects which the French Revolution presents to a foreign, and in particular to an English reader, is the antagonism which arose between it and the Church.

The last and most significant aspect of the French Revolution for a foreigner, especially an English reader, is the conflict that developed between it and the Church.

As this is the most important so it is the most practical of the historical problems which the Revolution sets the student to solve; for the opposition of the Church’s organisation in France has at once been the most profound which the Revolution has had to encounter, the most active in its methods, and the only one which has increased in strength as time proceeded. It is hardly too much to say that the Revolution would, in France at least, have achieved its object and created a homogeneous, centralised democracy, had not this great quarrel between the Republic and the Church[Pg 215] arisen; and one may legitimately contrast the ready pliancy of men to political suggestion and the easy story of their institutions where men knew nothing of the Church, with the great storms that arise and the fundamental quarrels that are challenged wherever men are acquainted with the burning truths of Catholicism.

As this is the most important issue, it is also the most practical of the historical problems that the Revolution challenges students to address. The conflict with the Church's organization in France has been the most significant obstacle the Revolution has faced, the most active in its approach, and the only one that has gained strength over time. It's not an exaggeration to say that the Revolution would have achieved its goals and established a unified, centralized democracy in France if it weren't for the major conflict between the Republic and the Church[Pg 215]. One can rightly compare the flexibility of people in responding to political ideas and the straightforwardness of their institutions where they were unfamiliar with the Church to the intense turmoil and fundamental disputes that arise whenever people are confronted with the profound truths of Catholicism.

Finally, the struggle between the Catholic Church and the Revolution is not only the most important and the most practical, but also by an unhappy coincidence the most difficult of comprehension of all the matters presented to us by the great change.

Finally, the conflict between the Catholic Church and the Revolution is not only the most significant and practical but, unfortunately, also the most challenging to understand among all the issues brought to light by this major change.

We have seen in this book that one department of revolutionary history, the second in importance, perhaps, to the religious department, was also difficult of comprehension—to wit, the military department. And we have seen (or at least I have postulated) that the difficulty of following the military fortunes of the Republic was due to the mass of detail, to the technical character of the information to be acquired and to the natural unfamiliarity of the general reader with the elements of military science. In other words, an accurate knowledge of great numbers of facts, the proper disposition of these facts in their order of military importance, and the correlation of a great number of disconnected actions and plans will alone permit us to grasp the function of the armies in the development and establishment of the modern State through the revolutionary wars.

We’ve seen in this book that one area of revolutionary history, possibly the second most important after religion, is also hard to understand—the military aspect. And we’ve noted (or at least I’ve suggested) that the challenge of following the military outcomes of the Republic is due to the overwhelming amount of detail, the technical nature of the information we need to grasp, and the general reader’s lack of familiarity with military science. In other words, to fully understand the role of the armies in shaping and establishing the modern State through revolutionary wars, we need a precise understanding of numerous facts, the right organization of these facts by their military significance, and the connections between many unrelated actions and strategies.

Now in this second and greater problem, the[Pg 216] problem of the function played by religion, it is an exactly opposite method which can alone be of service.

Now in this second and more significant problem, the[Pg 216] problem of the role that religion plays, it is a completely opposite approach that can be of help.

We must examine the field generally, and still more generally we must forget details that here only bewilder, and see in the largest possible outline what forces were really at issue, why their conflict occurred, upon what points that conflict was vital. Any more particular plan will land us, as it has landed so many thousands of controversialists, in mere invective on one side or the other, till we come to see nothing but a welter of treason on the part of priests, and of massacre upon the part of democrats.

We need to look at the broader picture and, even more so, forget the details that only confuse us here. We should focus on the biggest possible outline to understand what forces were truly involved, why their conflict happened, and which points were critical in that conflict. Any more specific approach will trap us, as it has trapped countless debaters, in empty accusations on one side or the other, until all we perceive is a chaotic mix of betrayal by priests and violence by democrats.

Men would, did they try to unravel the skein by analysing the documents of the Vatican or of the French archives, come apparently upon nothing but a host of petty, base, and often personal calculations; or again, did they attempt to take a local sample of the struggle and to follow it in one department of thought, they would come upon nothing but a whirl of conflict with no sort of clue to the motives that lay behind.

Men, if they tried to untangle the situation by analyzing documents from the Vatican or the French archives, would seemingly find nothing but a bunch of petty, selfish, and often personal motivations; or if they tried to take a local example of the struggle and track it in one area of thought, they would just encounter a chaotic mix of conflict with no clue about the underlying motives.

The contrast between the military and the religious problem of the French Revolution is like the contrast between the geological composition and the topographical contours of a countryside. To understand the first we must bore and dig, we must take numerous samples of soil and subject them to analysis, we must make ourselves acquainted with detail in its utmost recesses. But for the second, the more general our standpoint, the wider[Pg 217] our gaze, and the more comprehensive our judgment, the more accurately do we grasp the knowledge we have set out to seek.

The difference between the military and religious issues of the French Revolution is similar to the difference between the geological makeup and the landscape features of an area. To understand the first, we need to dig deep, take multiple soil samples, and analyze them thoroughly; we have to familiarize ourselves with the details in every hidden corner. But for the second, the broader our perspective, the wider[Pg 217] our view, and the more complete our understanding, the better we grasp the knowledge we’re aiming to find.

We must, then, approach our business by asking at the outset the most general question of all: “Was there a necessary and fundamental quarrel between the doctrines of the Revolution and those of the Catholic Church?

We need to start our discussion by asking the most basic question of all: “Was there a necessary and fundamental conflict between the ideas of the Revolution and those of the Catholic Church?

Those ill acquainted with either party, and therefore ill equipped for reply, commonly reply with assurance in the affirmative. The French (and still more the non-French) Republican who may happen, by the accident of his life, to have missed the Catholic Church, to have had no intimacy with any Catholic character, no reading of Catholic philosophy, and perhaps even no chance view of so much as an external Catholic ceremony, replies unhesitatingly that the Church is the necessary enemy of the Revolution. Again, the émigré, the wealthy woman, the recluse, any one of the many contemporary types to whom the democratic theory of the Revolution came as a complete novelty, and to-day the wealthy families in that tradition, reply as unhesitatingly that the Revolution is the necessary enemy of the Church. The reply seems quite sufficient to the Tory squire in England or Germany, who may happen to be a Catholic by birth or by conversion; and it seems equally obvious to (let us say) a democratic member of some Protestant Church in one of the new countries.

Those who know little about either side and are therefore not prepared to respond often answer confidently in agreement. The French person (and even more so, the non-French Republican) who, by chance in their life, has never encountered the Catholic Church, has no personal connection to any Catholic figure, hasn't read Catholic philosophy, and perhaps hasn't even seen a single external Catholic ceremony, will confidently assert that the Church is the necessary enemy of the Revolution. Similarly, the émigré, the wealthy woman, the recluse, or anyone among the many contemporary types who found the democratic theory of the Revolution entirely new—including today's wealthy families in that tradition—will also assert just as confidently that the Revolution is the necessary enemy of the Church. This response seems entirely satisfactory to the Tory landowner in England or Germany, who might be Catholic by birth or conversion; and it seems just as obvious to, let’s say, a democratic member of some Protestant Church in one of the new countries.

Historically and logically, theologically also, those who affirm a necessary antagonism[Pg 218] between the Republic and the Church are in error. Those who are best fitted to approach the problem by their knowledge both of what the Revolution attempted and of what Catholic philosophy is, find it in proportion to their knowledge difficult or impossible to answer that fundamental question in the affirmative. They cannot call the Revolution a necessary enemy of the Church, nor the Church of Democracy.

Historically, logically, and theologically, those who believe there is an unavoidable conflict[Pg 218] between the Republic and the Church are mistaken. Those who are most qualified to tackle this issue, due to their understanding of both what the Revolution tried to achieve and what Catholic philosophy represents, find it increasingly challenging—or even impossible—to agree with that fundamental question. They cannot label the Revolution as a necessary opponent of the Church, nor the Church as an opponent of Democracy.

What is more, minds at once of the most active and of the best instructed sort are the very minds which find it difficult to explain how any such quarrel can have arisen. French history itself is full of the names of those for whom not so much a reconciliation between the Revolution and the Church, as a statement that no real quarrel existed between them, was the motive of politics; and almost in proportion to a man’s knowledge of his fellows in Catholic societies, almost in that proportion is the prime question I have asked answered by such a man in the negative. A man who knows both the Faith and the Republic will tell you that there is not and cannot be any necessary or fundamental reason why conflict should have arisen between a European Democracy and the Catholic Church.

Moreover, the most active and well-educated minds are often the ones that struggle to explain how any such conflict could have developed. French history is filled with names of those who were motivated politically not by reconciling the Revolution and the Church, but by asserting that no real conflict existed between them. The more a person understands their peers in Catholic societies, the more likely they are to answer my main question in the negative. A person who is knowledgeable about both the Faith and the Republic will tell you that there is no necessary or fundamental reason for a conflict to exist between a European democracy and the Catholic Church.

When we examine those who concern themselves with the deepest and most abstract side of the quarrel, we find the same thing. It is impossible for the theologian, or even for the practical ecclesiastical teacher, to put his finger upon a political doctrine essential to the Revolution and to say, “This doctrine[Pg 219] is opposed to Catholic dogma or to Catholic morals.” Conversely, it is impossible for the Republican to put his finger upon a matter of ecclesiastical discipline or religious dogma and to say, “This Catholic point is at issue with my political theory of the State.”

When we look at those who delve into the most profound and abstract aspects of the conflict, we find the same situation. It's impossible for a theologian, or even a practical church teacher, to identify a political principle that's essential to the Revolution and claim, “This principle[Pg 219] contradicts Catholic beliefs or morals.” Likewise, it’s impossible for a Republican to pinpoint a matter of church discipline or religious doctrine and declare, “This Catholic issue conflicts with my political view of the State.”

Thousands of active men upon either side would have been only too willing during the last hundred years to discover some such issue, and it has proved undiscoverable. In a word, only those Democrats who know little of the Catholic Church can say that of its nature it forbids democracy; and only those Catholics who have a confused or imperfect conception of democracy can say that of its nature it is antagonistic to the Catholic Church.

Thousands of active men on both sides would have been more than happy over the last hundred years to find some resolution, but it has turned out to be elusive. In short, only those Democrats who know very little about the Catholic Church can claim that, by its nature, it opposes democracy; and only those Catholics who have a muddled or incomplete understanding of democracy can say that, by its nature, it conflicts with the Catholic Church.

Much that is taught by the purely temporal theory of the one is indifferent to the transcendental and supernatural philosophy of the other. In some points, where there is contact (as in the conception of the dignity of man and of the equality of men) there is agreement. To sum up, the Republican cannot by his theory persecute the Church; the Church cannot by her theory excommunicate the Republican.

Much of what is taught by the purely temporal theory of the one is disconnected from the transcendental and supernatural philosophy of the other. In certain areas, where there is overlap (such as in the understanding of human dignity and equality among people), there is common ground. In summary, the Republican cannot persecute the Church through his theory; the Church cannot excommunicate the Republican through her theory.

Why, then, it must next be asked, has there in practice arisen so furious and so enormous a conflict, a conflict whose activity and whose consequence are not narrowing but broadening to-day?

Why, then, the next question must be, why has there in practice emerged such a fierce and massive conflict, a conflict whose impact and outcomes are not diminishing but expanding today?

It may be replied to this second question, which is only less general than the first, in one of two manners.

It can be answered in response to this second question, which is just slightly less general than the first, in one of two ways.

One may say that the actions of men are[Pg 220] divided not by theories but by spiritual atmospheres, as it were. According to this view men act under impulses not ideal but actual: impulses which affect great numbers and yet in their texture correspond to the complex but united impulses of an individual personality. Thus, though there be no conflict demonstrable between the theology of the Catholic Church and the political theory of the Revolution, yet there may be necessary and fundamental conflict between the Persons we call the Revolution and the Church, and between the vivifying principles by which either lives. That is one answer that can be, and is, given.

One could argue that people's actions are[Pg 220] influenced not by theories but by the spiritual environments they exist in. From this perspective, people act on impulses that are real rather than ideal: impulses that impact many but still reflect the intricate yet unified urges of an individual personality. Therefore, while there might not be an obvious conflict between the theology of the Catholic Church and the political ideas of the Revolution, there can still be a fundamental conflict between the Persons we refer to as the Revolution and the Church, as well as between the life-giving principles that each follows. That is one explanation that can, and is, offered.

Or one may give a totally different answer and say, “There was no quarrel between the theology of the Catholic Church and the political theory of the Revolution; but the folly of this statesman, the ill drafting of that law, the misconception of such and such an institution, the coincidence of war breaking out at such and such a moment and affecting men in such and such a fashion—all these material accidents bred a misunderstanding between the two great forces, led into conflict the human officers and the human organisations which directed them; and conflict once established feeds upon, and grows from, its own substance.”

Or one might give a completely different answer and say, “There was no conflict between the theology of the Catholic Church and the political theory of the Revolution; rather, the foolishness of this politician, the poor drafting of that law, the misunderstanding of certain institutions, and the timing of war breaking out at specific moments and affecting people in particular ways—all these practical issues created a misunderstanding between the two powerful forces, leading to conflict among the individuals and organizations that directed them; and once conflict arises, it fuels itself and grows from its own nature.”

Now, if that first form of reply be given to the question we have posed, though it is sufficient for the type of philosophy which uses it, though it is certainly explanatory of all human quarrels, and though it in particular[Pg 221] satisfies a particular modern school of thought, it is evident that history, properly so called, cannot deal with it.

Now, if that initial type of response is given to the question we've asked, even though it works for the kind of philosophy that uses it, effectively explains all human conflicts, and even partially satisfies a specific modern school of thought[Pg 221], it's clear that true history can't address it.

You may say that the Revolution was the expression of a spirit far more real than any theory, that this spirit is no more susceptible of analysis or definition than is the personality of a single human character, and that this reality was in conflict with another reality—to wit, the Catholic Church. You may even (as some minds by no means negligible have done) pass into the field of mysticism in the matter, and assert that really personal forces, wills superior and external to man, Demons and Angels, drove the Revolution against the Catholic Church, and created The Republic to be an anti-Catholic force capable of meeting and of defeating that Church, which (by its own definition of itself) is not a theory, but the expression of a Personality and a Will. To put it in old-fashioned terms, you may say that the Revolution was the work of antichrist;—but with that kind of reply, I repeat, history cannot deal.

You might argue that the Revolution was driven by a spirit that's more genuine than any theory, and that this spirit is just as hard to analyze or define as the personality of an individual. This reality was in opposition to another reality—the Catholic Church. Some thinkers, who are by no means insignificant, have even ventured into mysticism on this topic, claiming that actual personal forces, wills that are greater than and outside of humans, like Demons and Angels, pushed the Revolution against the Catholic Church and formed The Republic as an anti-Catholic force capable of confronting and defeating that Church, which, by its own definition, is not just a theory but the manifestation of a Personality and a Will. To phrase it in traditional terms, you could say that the Revolution was the work of the antichrist; however, with that kind of claim, I reiterate, history cannot engage.

If it be true that, in spite of an absence of contradictory intellectual theories, there is a fundamental spiritual contradiction between the Revolution and the Catholic Church, then time will test the business; we shall see in that case a perpetual extension of the quarrel until the Revolution becomes principally a force for the extinction of Catholicism, and the Catholic Church appears to the supporter of the Revolution not as his principal, but as his only enemy. Such[Pg 222] a development has not arisen in a hundred years; a process of time far more lengthy will alone permit us to judge whether the supposed duello is a real matter or a phantasm.

If it's true that, despite the lack of conflicting intellectual theories, there's a fundamental spiritual conflict between the Revolution and the Catholic Church, then time will reveal the truth; in that case, we will see the dispute continually growing until the Revolution mainly serves to undermine Catholicism, and the Catholic Church becomes not just the main adversary but the only one for supporters of the Revolution. Such[Pg 222] a development hasn't occurred in a hundred years; only a much longer passage of time will allow us to determine whether this supposed duel is a genuine issue or just an illusion.

The second type of answer, the answer which pretends to explain the antagonism by a definite series of events, does concern the historian.

The second type of answer, the one that claims to explain the conflict through a specific timeline of events, is relevant to the historian.

Proceeding upon the lines of that second answer, he can bring his science to bear and use the instruments of his trade; and he can show (as I propose to show in what follows) how, although no quarrel can be found between the theory of the Revolution and that of the Church, an active quarrel did in fact spring up between the Revolution in action and the authorities of Catholicism; a quarrel which a hundred years has not appeased, but accentuated.

Following the path of that second answer, he can apply his knowledge and use the tools of his trade; and he can demonstrate (as I plan to show in what comes next) how, although there's no conflict between the theory of the Revolution and that of the Church, a real conflict did arise between the Revolution in practice and the authorities of Catholicism; a conflict that a hundred years has not resolved, but instead heightened.


Behind the revolutionary quarrel lay the condition of the Church in the French State since the settlement of the quarrel of the Reformation.

Behind the revolutionary conflict was the state of the Church in the French State since the resolution of the Reformation dispute.

With what that quarrel of the Reformation was, the reader is sufficiently familiar. For, roughly speaking, a hundred years, from the first years of the sixteenth century to the first years of the seventeenth (from the youth of Henry VIII to the boyhood of Charles I in England), a great attempt was made to change (as one party would have said to amend, as the other would have said to denaturalise) the whole body of Western Christendom. A general movement of attack upon the inherited[Pg 223] form of the Church, and a general resistance to that attack, was at work throughout European civilisation; and either antagonist hoped for a universal success, the one of what he called “The Reformation of religion,” the other of what he called “The Divine Institution and visible unity of the Catholic Church.”

The reader is already familiar with the details of the Reformation conflict. For about a hundred years, from the early 1500s to the early 1600s (from the youth of Henry VIII to the boyhood of Charles I in England), there was a significant effort to change (as one side would say to improve, while the other would say to distort) the whole body of Western Christendom. A general movement was underway to challenge the established[Pg 223] form of the Church, and there was widespread resistance to that challenge throughout European civilization; each side aimed for universal success, one for what it called “The Reformation of religion,” and the other for what it termed “The Divine Institution and visible unity of the Catholic Church.”

At the end of such a period it became apparent that no such general result had been, or could be, attained. All that part of the West which had rejected the authority of the See of Rome began to appear as a separate territorial region permanently divided from the rest; all that part of Europe which had retained the Authority of the See of Rome began to appear as another region of territory. The line of cleavage between the two was beginning to define itself as a geographical line, and nearly corresponded to the line which, centuries before, had divided the Roman and civilised world from the Barbarians.

At the end of that period, it became clear that no overall result had been, or could be, achieved. All the parts of the West that had rejected the authority of the Pope started to look like a separate region permanently divided from the rest; all the parts of Europe that had kept the authority of the Pope began to seem like another region. The dividing line between the two was starting to take shape as a geographical boundary and nearly matched the line that had, centuries earlier, separated the Roman and civilized world from the Barbarians.

The Province of Britain had an exceptional fate. Though Roman in origin and of the ancient civilisation in its foundation, it fell upon the non-Roman side of the new boundary; while Ireland, which the Roman Empire had never organised or instructed, remained, alone of the external parts of Europe, in communion with Rome. Italy, Spain, and in the main southern or Romanised Germany, refused ultimately to abandon their tradition of civilisation and of religion. But in Gaul it was otherwise—and the action of Gaul during the Reformation must be seized if its modern religious quarrels are to be apprehended.[Pg 224] A very considerable proportion of the French landed and mercantile classes, that is of the wealthy men of the country, were in sympathy with the new religious doctrines and the new social organisation which had now taken root in England, Scotland, Holland, northern Germany and Scandinavia, and which were destined in those countries to lead to the domination of wealth. These French squires and traders were called the Huguenots.

The Province of Britain had a unique fate. Although it was originally Roman and had an ancient civilization as its foundation, it ended up on the non-Roman side of the new boundary; meanwhile, Ireland, which the Roman Empire never organized or educated, remained, uniquely among the external parts of Europe, in contact with Rome. Italy, Spain, and mainly the southern or Romanized parts of Germany ultimately refused to give up their traditions of civilization and religion. But it was different in Gaul—and understanding Gaul's actions during the Reformation is essential to grasping its modern religious conflicts.[Pg 224] A significant portion of the French landowning and business classes, meaning the wealthy people in the country, supported the new religious ideas and social structures that had taken hold in England, Scotland, Holland, northern Germany, and Scandinavia, which were set to lead to the control of wealth in those places. These French landowners and merchants were known as the Huguenots.

The succeeding hundred years, from 1615 to 1715, let us say, were a settlement, not without bloodshed, of the unsatisfied quarrel of the preceding century. All Englishmen know what happened in England; how the last vestiges of Catholicism were crushed out and all the social and political consequences of Protestantism established in the State.

The next hundred years, from 1615 to 1715, were a time of resolution, not without violence, of the unresolved conflict from the previous century. All English people are aware of what took place in England; how the final remnants of Catholicism were eliminated and all the social and political effects of Protestantism were established in the government.

There was, even in that same seventeenth century, a separate, but futile, attempt to destroy Catholicism in Ireland. In Germany a struggle of the utmost violence had only led to a similar regional result. The first third of that hundred years concluded in the Peace of Westphalia, and left the Protestant and Catholic territorial divisions much what we now know them.

There was, even in that same seventeenth century, a separate, but futile, attempt to eliminate Catholicism in Ireland. In Germany, a brutal struggle had only led to a similar outcome. The first third of that hundred years ended with the Peace of Westphalia, and left the Protestant and Catholic territorial divisions pretty much as we know them today.

In France, however, the peculiar phenomenon remained of a body powerful in numbers and (what was far more important) in wealth and social power, scattered throughout the territory of the kingdom, organised and, by this time, fixedly anti-Catholic, and therefore anti-national.[Pg 225]

In France, though, there was still the unusual situation of a group that was strong in numbers and (even more importantly) in wealth and social influence, spread across the country's territory, organized, and by this point, firmly anti-Catholic, and thus anti-national.[Pg 225]

The nation had recovered its traditional line and had insisted upon the victory of a strong executive, and that executive Catholic. France, therefore, in this period of settlement, became an absolute monarchy whose chief possessed tremendous and immediate powers, and a monarchy which incorporated with itself all the great elements of the national tradition, including the Church.

The nation had regained its traditional direction and pushed for the victory of a strong executive, specifically a Catholic one. Thus, during this time of settling down, France became an absolute monarchy where the leader had significant and immediate powers, and this monarchy included all the key components of national tradition, including the Church.

It is the name of Louis XIV, of course, which symbolises this great time; his very long reign precisely corresponds to it. He was born coincidently with that universal struggle for a religious settlement in Europe, which I have described as characteristic of the time; he died precisely at its close; and under him it seemed as though the reconstructed power of Gaul and the defence of organised Catholicism were to be synonymous.

It’s the name of Louis XIV that represents this great era; his lengthy reign matches it perfectly. He was born at the same time as the widespread conflict for a religious settlement in Europe, which I’ve noted as typical for the period; he died right when it ended; and under his rule, it seemed like the renewed strength of France and the defense of organized Catholicism were meant to go hand in hand.

But there were two elements of disruption in that homogeneous body which Louis XIV apparently commanded. The very fact that the Church had thus become in France an unshakable national institution, chilled the vital source of Catholicism. Not only did the hierarchy stand in a perpetual suspicion of the Roman See, and toy with the conception of national independence, but they, and all the official organisation of French Catholicism, put the security of the national establishment and its intimate attachment to the general political structure of the State, far beyond the sanctity of Catholic dogma or the practice of Catholic morals.

But there were two disruptive elements in that uniform entity that Louis XIV seemed to control. The mere fact that the Church had become an unshakeable national institution in France drained the life out of Catholicism. Not only did the hierarchy exist in a constant mistrust of the Roman See and entertain the idea of national independence, but they, along with the entire official structure of French Catholicism, prioritized the stability of the national establishment and its close link to the overall political framework of the State over the sanctity of Catholic doctrine or the application of Catholic ethics.

That political structure—the French monarchy—seemed[Pg 226] to be of granite and eternal. Had it indeed survived, the Church in Gaul would doubtless, in spite of its attachment to so mundane a thing as the crown, have still survived to enjoy one of those resurrections which have never failed it in the past, and would have returned, by some creative reaction, to its principle of life. But for the moment the consequence of this fixed political establishment was that scepticism, and all those other active forces of the mind which play upon religion in any Catholic State, had full opportunity. The Church was, so to speak, not concerned to defend itself but only its method of existence. It was as though a garrison, forgetting the main defences of a place, had concentrated all its efforts upon the security of one work which contained its supplies of food.

That political structure—the French monarchy—seemed[Pg 226] solid and everlasting. If it had truly endured, the Church in Gaul would surely have survived as well, and despite its ties to something as ordinary as the crown, it would have experienced one of those comebacks that have always been there in the past, returning, through some creative response, to its core essence. But for now, the result of this stable political establishment was that skepticism and all those other active forces of thought that influence religion in any Catholic state had plenty of breathing room. The Church was, so to speak, not focused on defending itself but only on its method of survival. It was as if a garrison, forgetting the main defenses of a place, had put all its efforts into securing one structure that held its food supplies.

Wit, good verse, sincere enthusiasm, a lucid exposition of whatever in the human mind perpetually rebels against transcendental affirmations, were allowed every latitude and provoked no effective reply. But overt acts of disrespect to ecclesiastical authority were punished with rigour.

Wit, clever poetry, genuine passion, and a clear explanation of anything in the human mind that constantly resists grand declarations were freely accepted and didn’t provoke any serious responses. However, open acts of disrespect towards religious authority were met with strict punishment.

While in the wealthy, the bureaucratic, and the governing classes, to ridicule the Faith was an attitude taken for granted, seriously to attack the privileges or position of its ministers was ungentlemanly, and was not allowed. It did not shock the hierarchy that one of its Apostolic members should be a witty atheist; that another should go hunting upon Corpus Christi, nearly upset the Blessed[Pg 227] Sacrament in his gallop, and forget what day it was when the accident occurred. The bishops found nothing remarkable in seeing a large proportion of their body to be loose livers, or in some of them openly presenting their friends to their mistresses as might be done by any great lay noble round them. That a diocese or any other spiritual charge should be divorced from its titular chief, seemed to them as natural as does to us the absence from his modern regiment of some titular foreign colonel. Unquestioned also by the bishops were the poverty, the neglect, and the uninstruction of the parish clergy; nay—and this is by far the principal feature—the abandonment of religion by all but a very few of the French millions, no more affected the ecclesiastical officials of the time than does the starvation of our poor affect, let us say, one of our professional politicians. It was a thing simply taken for granted.

While among the wealthy, the bureaucratic, and the ruling classes, mocking the Faith was a common attitude, seriously challenging the privileges or position of its ministers was seen as uncouth and unacceptable. The hierarchy wasn't shocked that one of its Apostolic members was a witty atheist; that another went hunting on Corpus Christi, almost knocking over the Blessed[Pg 227] Sacrament during his ride, and forgot what day it was when this happened. The bishops didn't find it unusual to see a large portion of their members as indulgent in their lifestyles, or in some cases, openly introducing their friends to their mistresses like any nobleman would do. To them, it seemed completely normal for a diocese or any other spiritual charge to be disconnected from its titular leader, just as we see it as normal for a modern regiment to be without some titular foreign colonel. The bishops also accepted the poverty, neglect, and lack of education among the parish clergy without question; indeed—and this is the most significant point—the abandonment of religion by almost all of the French population affected the church officials of that time no more than the hunger of our poor impacts, say, one of our professional politicians. It was simply taken for granted.

The reader must seize that moribund condition of the religious life of France upon the eve of the Revolution, for it is at once imperfectly grasped by the general run of historians, and is also the only fact which thoroughly explains what followed. The swoon of the Faith in the eighteenth century is the negative foundation upon which the strange religious experience of the French was about to rise. France, in the generation before the Revolution, was passing through a phase in which the Catholic Faith was at a lower ebb than it had ever been since the preaching and establishment of it in Gaul.[Pg 228]

The reader needs to understand the declining state of religious life in France just before the Revolution, as this is often overlooked by most historians and is crucial for explaining what happened next. The decline of Faith in the eighteenth century serves as the negative foundation upon which the unusual religious experiences of the French were about to emerge. In the generation leading up to the Revolution, France was undergoing a period when the Catholic Faith was at its lowest point since it was first preached and established in Gaul.[Pg 228]

This truth is veiled by more than one circumstance. Thus many official acts, notably marriages and the registration of births, took place under a Catholic form, and indeed Catholic forms had a monopoly of them. Again, the State wore Catholic clothes, as it were: the public occasions of pomp were full of religious ceremony. Few of the middle classes went to Mass in the great towns, hardly any of the artisans; but the Churches were “official.” Great sums of money—including official money—were at the disposal of the Church; and the great ecclesiastics were men from whom solid favours could be got. Again, the historic truth is masked by the language and point of view of the great Catholic reaction which has taken place in our own time.

This truth is hidden by more than one factor. Many official acts, especially marriages and birth registrations, were conducted in a Catholic manner, and Catholic forms dominated these practices. Additionally, the State dressed in Catholic attire: public ceremonies were filled with religious rituals. Few middle-class people attended Mass in large towns, and hardly any of the workers did; yet the Churches were considered “official.” Significant amounts of money—including government funds—were available to the Church, and high-ranking church officials were individuals from whom solid favors could be obtained. Furthermore, the historical truth is obscured by the language and perspective of the major Catholic backlash that has occurred in our time.

It is safe to say that where one adult of the educated classes concerned himself seriously with the Catholic Faith and Practice in France before the Revolution, there are five to-day. But in between lies the violent episode of the persecution, and the Catholic reaction in our time perpetually tends to contrast a supposed pre-revolutionary “Catholic” society with the revolutionary fury. “Look,” say its champions, “at the dreadful way in which the Revolution treated the Church.” And as they say this the converse truth appears obvious and they seem to imply, “Think how different it must have been before the Revolution persecuted the Church!” The very violence of the modern reaction towards Catholicism has exaggerated the revolutionary[Pg 229] persecution, and in doing so has made men forget that apart from other evidence of the decline of religion, it is obvious that persecution could never have arisen without a strong and continuous historical backing. You could not have had a Diocletian in the thirteenth century with the spirit of the Crusaders just preceding him; you could not have had Henry VIII if the England of the fifteenth century just preceding him had been an England devoted to the monastic profession. And you could not have had the revolutionary fury against the Catholic Church in France if the preceding generation had been actively Catholic even in a considerable portion.

It’s fair to say that for every one educated adult in France who took the Catholic Faith and Practice seriously before the Revolution, there are now five. But in between lies the violent episode of persecution, and today’s Catholic reaction often contrasts an imagined pre-revolutionary “Catholic” society with the fury of the Revolution. “Look,” say its supporters, “at the awful way the Revolution treated the Church.” In making this point, they seem to suggest, “Think about how different things must have been before the Revolution persecuted the Church!” The very intensity of the modern reaction to Catholicism has amplified the revolutionary persecution, leading people to forget that, aside from other signs of the decline of religion, it’s clear that persecution couldn’t have occurred without strong and ongoing historical support. You wouldn’t have had a Diocletian in the thirteenth century with the spirit of the Crusaders just before him; you wouldn’t have had Henry VIII if the England of the fifteenth century, just before him, had been fully committed to monastic life. And you wouldn’t have experienced the revolutionary fury against the Catholic Church in France if the previous generation had been significantly Catholic.

As a fact, of course it was not: and in the popular indifference to or hatred of the Church the principal factor was the strict brotherhood not so much of Church and State as of Church and executive Government.

As a fact, of course it was not: and in the general indifference to or dislike of the Church, the main reason was the close connection, not so much between the Church and State, but between the Church and the executive Government.

But there was another factor. We were describing a little way back how in France there had arisen, during the movement of the Reformation, a wealthy, powerful and numerically large Huguenot body. In mere numbers it dwindled, but it maintained throughout the seventeenth century a very high position, both of privilege and (what was its characteristic) of money-power; and even to-day, though their birth-rate is, of course, lower than the average of the nation, the French Huguenots number close upon a million, and are far wealthier, upon the average, than their fellow citizens. It is their wealth which[Pg 230] dominates the trade of certain districts, which exercises so great an effect upon the universities, the publishing trade, and the press; and in general lends them such weight in the affairs of the nation.

But there was another factor. We were just talking about how, during the Reformation in France, there emerged a wealthy, influential, and relatively large Huguenot community. While their numbers decreased over time, they maintained a very high status throughout the seventeenth century, characterized by privilege and financial power. Even today, although their birth rate is lower than the national average, there are nearly a million French Huguenots, and they are generally much wealthier than their fellow citizens. It’s their wealth that[Pg 230] shapes the trade in certain areas, significantly influences universities, the publishing industry, and the media; and overall, gives them considerable weight in national affairs.

Now the Huguenot had in France a special and permanent quarrel with the monarchy, and therefore with the Catholic Church, which, precisely because it was not of the vivid and intense kind which is associated with popular and universal religions, was the more secretly ubiquitous. His quarrel was that, having been highly privileged for nearly a century, the member of “a State within a State,” and for more than a generation free to hold assemblies separate from and often antagonistic to the national Government, these privileges had been suddenly removed from him by the Government of Louis XIV a century before the Revolution. The quarrel was more political than religious; it was a sort of “Home Rule” quarrel. For though the Huguenots were spread throughout France, they had possessed special cities and territories wherein their spirit and, to a certain extent, their private self-government, formed enclaves of particularism within the State.

Now, the Huguenots in France had a long-standing conflict with the monarchy and, by extension, with the Catholic Church. This conflict, which wasn’t as intense or widespread as those seen in popular religions, was more quietly felt everywhere. Their issue was that, after enjoying significant privileges for almost a century as "a State within a State," and being allowed for over a generation to hold meetings that were separate from and often opposed to the national Government, these rights were suddenly taken away by Louis XIV's government a century before the Revolution. The conflict was more political than religious; it was a kind of “Home Rule” issue. While the Huguenots were spread across France, they had specific cities and territories where their culture and, to some extent, their self-governance created enclaves of distinctiveness within the State.

They had held this position, as I have said, for close upon a hundred years, and it was not until a date contemporary with the violent settlement of the religious trouble in England by the expulsion of James II that a similar settlement, less violent, achieved (as it was thought) a similar religious unity in France. But that unity was not achieved. The[Pg 231] Huguenots, though no longer permitted to exist as a State within a State, remained, for the hundred years between the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the outbreak of the Revolution, a powerful and ever-watchful body. They stood upon the flank of the attack which intellectual scepticism was making upon the Catholic Church, they were prepared to take advantage of that scepticism’s first political victory, and since the Revolution they have been the most powerful and, after the Freemasons, with whom they are largely identified, the most strongly organised, of the anti-clerical forces in the country.

They had held this position, as I mentioned, for almost a hundred years, and it wasn't until a time coinciding with the harsh resolution of the religious conflict in England that the expulsion of James II led to a similar, though less aggressive, resolution that was believed to create a similar religious unity in France. But that unity was never achieved. The[Pg 231] Huguenots, although no longer allowed to operate as a State within a State, remained, during the hundred years between the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the start of the Revolution, a strong and vigilant group. They were positioned along the side of the attack that intellectual skepticism launched against the Catholic Church, ready to capitalize on the first political victory of that skepticism, and since the Revolution, they have been the most influential and, after the Freemasons, with whom they are largely associated, the most well-organized of the anti-clerical forces in the country.

The Jews, whose action since the Revolution has been so remarkable in this same business, were not, in the period immediately preceding it, of any considerable influence, and their element in the coalition may be neglected.

The Jews, whose efforts since the Revolution have been so notable in this same matter, did not have much influence in the period just before it, and their role in the coalition can be overlooked.

Such, then, was the position when the Revolution was preparing. Within memory of all men living, the Church had become more and more official, the masses of the great towns had wholly lost touch with it; the intelligence of the country was in the main drawn to the Deist or even to the purely sceptical propaganda, the powerful Huguenot body was ready prepared for an alliance with any foe of Catholicism, and in the eyes of the impoverished town populace—notably in Paris, which had long abandoned the practice of religion—the human organisation of the Church, the hierarchy, the priesthood, and the few but very wealthy religious orders which still lingered on in dwindling numbers, were but[Pg 232] a portion of the privileged world which the populace hated and was prepared to destroy.

This was the situation as the Revolution was gearing up. In living memory, the Church had become increasingly official, and the large town populations had completely lost touch with it. The educated people in the country were mainly drawn to Deism or even outright skepticism, while the strong Huguenot community was ready to ally with any enemy of Catholicism. For the struggling town residents—especially in Paris, where religious practices had long been abandoned—the human structure of the Church, including its hierarchy, priesthood, and the few wealthy religious orders that still existed in diminishing numbers, were just a part of the privileged world that the people despised and were ready to dismantle.[Pg 232]

It is upon such a spirit and in such conditions of the national religious life that the Revolution begins to work. In the National Assembly you have the great body of the Commons which determines the whole, touched only here and there with men in any way acquainted with or devoted to Catholic practice, and those men for the most part individual and eccentric, that is, uncatholic, almost in proportion to the genuineness of their religious feeling. Among the nobility the practice of religion was a social habit with some—as a mental attitude the Faith was forgotten among all but a very few. Among the clergy a very wealthy hierarchy, no one of them prepared to defend the Church with philosophical argument, and almost unanimous in regarding itself as a part of the old political machine, was dominant; while the representatives of the lower clergy, strongly democratic in character, were at first more occupied with the establishment of democracy than with the impending attack upon the material and temporal organisation of the Church.

It is in this spirit and under these conditions of national religious life that the Revolution starts to unfold. In the National Assembly, you have the large body of the Commons that decides everything, only occasionally sprinkled with individuals who are somehow connected to or committed to Catholic practices, and those individuals are mostly unique and eccentric, meaning they are not truly Catholic, almost in line with the authenticity of their religious feelings. Among the nobility, practicing religion was more of a social custom for some—as a mindset, the Faith had been forgotten by all but a handful. Among the clergy, a wealthy hierarchy existed, none of whom were ready to defend the Church with philosophical reasoning, and almost all saw themselves as part of the old political structure; meanwhile, the representatives of the lower clergy, who were largely democratic in nature, were initially more focused on establishing democracy than on the impending threats to the material and organizational aspects of the Church.

Now, that material and temporal organisation offered at the very beginning of the debates an opportunity for attack which no other department of the old régime could show.

Now, that material and temporal organization provided, right from the start of the discussions, an opportunity for criticism that no other area of the old régime could demonstrate.

The immediate peril of the State was financial. The pretext and even to some extent the motive for the calling of the States-General[Pg 233] was the necessity for finding money. The old fiscal machinery had broken down, and as always happens when a fiscal machine breaks down, the hardship it involved, and the pressure upon individuals which it involved, appeared to be universal. There was no immediate and easily available fund of wealth upon which the Executive could lay hands save the wealth of the clergy.

The state's immediate danger was financial. The reason for calling the States-General[Pg 233] was primarily to find money. The old tax system had failed, and as often happens when a tax system falls apart, the resulting hardship and pressure on individuals seemed to affect everyone. There was no quick and accessible source of wealth for the Executive to tap into except for the wealth of the clergy.

The feudal dues of the nobles, if abandoned, must fall rather to the peasantry than to the State. Of the existing taxes few could be increased without peril, and none with any prospect of a large additional revenue. The charge for debt alone was one-half of the total receipts of the State, the deficit was, in proportion to the revenue, overwhelming. Face to face with that you had an institution not popular, one whose public functions were followed by but a small proportion of the population, one in which income was most unequally distributed, and one whose feudal property yielded in dues an amount equal to more than a quarter of the total revenue of the State. Add to this a system of tithes which produced nearly as much again, and it will be apparent under what a financial temptation the Assembly lay.

The nobles' feudal obligations, if dropped, would likely burden the peasantry more than the State. Most of the current taxes couldn’t be raised without risk, and none would bring in a significant extra income. The cost of debt alone accounted for half of the State's total revenue, and the deficit was, compared to the income, staggering. In light of that, there was an unpopular institution, one whose public roles were supported by only a small part of the population, where income was distributed very unevenly, and whose feudal property generated dues that made up over a quarter of the State's total revenue. On top of that, there was a system of tithes that brought in nearly as much again, highlighting the financial pressure the Assembly was under.

It may be argued, of course, that the right of the Church to this ecclesiastical property, whether in land or in tithes, was absolute, and that the confiscation of the one or of the other form of revenue was mere theft. But such was not the legal conception of the moment. The wealth of the Church was not[Pg 234] even (and this is most remarkable) defended as absolute property by the generality of those who enjoyed it. The tone of the debates which suppressed the tithes, and later confiscated the Church lands, was a tone of discussion upon legal points, precedents, public utility, and so forth. There was not heard in it, in any effective degree, the assertion of mere moral right; though in that time the moral rights of property were among the first of political doctrines.

It could be said, of course, that the Church had an absolute right to its ecclesiastical property, whether in land or tithes, and that taking away either form of income was just theft. However, that wasn't how the law was viewed at the time. The wealth of the Church was not[Pg 234] even (and this is quite notable) defended as absolute property by most of those who benefited from it. The discussions that led to the suppression of tithes and later the confiscation of Church lands were focused on legal aspects, precedents, public utility, and so on. The argument for mere moral right was not effectively present, even though moral rights regarding property were among the foremost political ideas of that period.

It was not, however, the confiscation of the Church lands and the suppression of the tithe which founded the quarrel between the Revolution and the clergy. No financial or economic change is ever more than a preparation for, or a permissive condition of, a moral change. It is never the cause of a moral change. Even the suppression of the religious houses in the beginning of 1790 must not be taken as the point of departure in the great quarrel. The religious orders in France were at that moment too decayed in zeal and in numbers, too wealthy and much too removed from the life of the nation, for this to be the case. The true historical point of departure from which we must date the beginning of this profound debate between the Revolution and Catholicism, is to be found in the morning of the 30th of May, 1790, when a parliamentary committee (the Ecclesiastical Committee) presented to the House its plan for the reform of the Constitution of the Church in Gaul.

It wasn't just the confiscation of Church lands and the abolition of the tithe that sparked the conflict between the Revolution and the clergy. No financial or economic change is ever more than a preparation for, or a permissive condition of, a moral change. It never causes a moral change. Even the suppression of religious houses in early 1790 shouldn't be seen as the starting point of this major dispute. At that time, the religious orders in France were too lacking in enthusiasm and numbers, too wealthy, and too disconnected from national life for this to be the case. The actual historical starting point for the deep debate between the Revolution and Catholicism can be traced back to the morning of May 30, 1790, when a parliamentary committee (the Ecclesiastical Committee) presented its plan for reforming the Church's Constitution in Gaul.

The enormity of that act is now apparent[Pg 235] to the whole world. The proposal, at the bidding of chance representatives not elected ad hoc, to change the dioceses and the sees of Catholic France, the decision of an ephemeral political body to limit to such and such ties (and very feeble they were) the bond between the Church of France and the Holy See, the suppression of the Cathedral Chapters, the seemingly farcical proposal that bishops should be elected, nay, priests also thus chosen, the submission of the hierarchy in the matter of residence and travel to a civil authority which openly declared itself indifferent in matters of religion,—all this bewilders the modern mind. How, we ask, could men so learned, so enthusiastic, so laborious and so closely in touch with all the realities of their time, make a blunder of that magnitude? Much more, how did such a blunder escape the damnation of universal mockery and immediate impotence? The answer is to be discovered in what has just been laid down with so much insistence: the temporary eclipse of religion in France before the Revolution broke out.

The magnitude of that act is now clear[Pg 235] to the entire world. The proposal, initiated by chance representatives who were not elected ad hoc, aimed to change the dioceses and the sees of Catholic France. The decision made by a short-lived political body to restrict the bond between the Church of France and the Holy See to such weak ties (and they were very weak) was baffling. The suppression of the Cathedral Chapters, the seemingly absurd idea that bishops should be elected—and even priests as well—the subordination of the Church hierarchy in matters of residence and travel to a civil authority that openly claimed to be indifferent to religion—all of this confounds modern thought. How could such knowledgeable, passionate, hardworking people, who were closely connected to the realities of their time, make such a significant mistake? Furthermore, how did this mistake avoid the scorn of widespread ridicule and immediate ineffectiveness? The answer lies in what has just been emphasized: the temporary decline of religion in France before the Revolution erupted.

The men who framed the Constitution of the Clergy, the men who voted it, nay, even the men who argued against it, all had at the back of their minds three conceptions which they were attempting to reconcile: of those three conceptions one was wholly wrong, one was imperfect because superficial, the third alone was true. And these three conceptions were, first, that the Catholic Church was a moribund superstition, secondly, that it possessed[Pg 236] in its organisation and tradition a power to be reckoned with, and thirdly, that the State, its organs, and their corporate inheritance of action, were so bound up with the Catholic Church that it was impossible to effect any general political settlement in which that body both external to France and internal, should be neglected.

The men who created the Constitution of the Clergy, those who voted for it, and even those who opposed it, all had three ideas in mind that they were trying to balance: one of these ideas was completely wrong, one was flawed because it was only surface-level, and the third was the only true one. These three ideas were, first, that the Catholic Church was an outdated superstition; second, that it held a significant power within its structure and traditions; and third, that the State, its institutions, and their shared history were so intertwined with the Catholic Church that it was impossible to reach any broad political agreement that overlooked either the Church's external influence or its role within France.

Of these three conceptions, had the first been as true as the last, it would have saved the Constitution of the Clergy and the reputation for common-sense of those who framed it.

Of these three ideas, if the first had been as accurate as the last, it would have preserved the Constitution of the Clergy and the common-sense reputation of its creators.

It was certainly true that Catholicism had for so many centuries been bound up in the framework of the State that the Parliament must therefore do something with the Church in the general settlement of the nation: it could not merely leave the Church on one side.

It was definitely true that Catholicism had been intertwined with the State for so many centuries that Parliament had to address the Church in the overall arrangement of the nation; it couldn't just ignore the Church.

It was also superficially true that the Church was a power to be reckoned with politically, quite apart from the traditional union of Church and State—but only superficially true. What the revolutionary politicians feared was the intrigue of those who commanded the organisation of the Catholic Church, men whom they knew for the most part to be without religion, and the sincerity of all of whom they naturally doubted. A less superficial and a more solid judgment of the matter would have discovered that the real danger lay in the animosity or intrigue against the Civil Constitution, not of the corrupt hierarchy, but of the sincere though ill-instructed and dwindling minority which was still loyally attached to the doctrines[Pg 237] and discipline of the Church. But even this superficial judgment would not have been fatal, had not the judgment of the National Assembly been actually erroneous upon the first point—the vitality of the Faith.

It was also superficially true that the Church was a political force to be dealt with, aside from the traditional connection between Church and State—but it was only superficially true. What the revolutionary politicians really feared was the scheming of those in charge of the Catholic Church, most of whom they believed were not religious and whose sincerity they naturally questioned. A deeper and more accurate assessment would have revealed that the real threat came not from the corrupt hierarchy, but from the sincere yet misinformed and shrinking minority that still remained loyal to the Church's doctrines[Pg 237] and discipline. However, even this superficial assessment wouldn't have been disastrous if the National Assembly's judgment hadn't actually been wrong about the first point—the strength of the Faith.

Had the Catholic Church been, as nearly all educated men then imagined, a moribund superstition, had the phase of decline through which it was passing been a phase comparable to that through which other religions have passed in their last moments, had it been supported by ancient families from mere tradition, clung to by remote peasants from mere ignorance and isolation, abandoned (as it was) in the towns simply because the towns had better opportunities of intellectual enlightenment and of acquiring elementary knowledge in history and the sciences; had, in a word, the imaginary picture which these men drew in their minds of the Catholic Church and its fortunes been an exact one, then the Civil Constitution of the Clergy would have been a statesmanlike act. It would have permitted the hold of the Catholic Church upon such districts as it still retained to vanish slowly and without shock. It proposed to keep alive at a reasonable salary the ministers of a ritual which would presumably have lost all vitality before the last of its pensioners was dead; it would have prepared a bed, as it were, upon which the last of Catholicism in Gaul could peacefully pass away. The action of the politicians in framing the Constitution would have seemed more generous with every passing decade[Pg 238] and their wisdom in avoiding offence to the few who still remained faithful, would have been increasingly applauded.

If the Catholic Church had been, as almost all educated people back then believed, a dying superstition, and if its decline were similar to what other religions experience at their end, if it had been upheld by ancient families out of mere tradition, held onto by remote peasants out of ignorance and isolation, and rejected (as it was) in towns simply because towns had better access to intellectual enlightenment and basic knowledge in history and the sciences; if, in short, the picture these men formed in their minds of the Catholic Church and its fate had been an accurate one, then the Civil Constitution of the Clergy would have been a wise political move. It would have allowed the Catholic Church's influence in the areas it still held to fade slowly and without disruption. It aimed to keep the ministers of a tradition alive with a reasonable salary, while they presumably would have lost all vitality before the last of its supporters passed away; it would have essentially created a peaceful environment for the end of Catholicism in Gaul. The actions of the politicians in drafting the Constitution would have seemed more generous with each passing decade[Pg 238], and their wisdom in not offending the few who remained faithful would have been increasingly praised.

On the other hand, and from the point of view of the statesman, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy bound strictly to the State and made responsible to it those ancient functions, not yet dead, of the episcopacy and all its train. It was a wise and a just consideration on the part of the Assembly that religions retain their machinery long after they are dead, and if that machinery has ever been a State machinery it must remain subject to the control of the State: and subject not only up to the moment when the living force which once animated it is fled, but much longer; up, indeed, to the moment when the surviving institutions of the dead religion break down and perish.

On the other hand, from a statesman's perspective, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy tightly linked the church to the State and held accountable those traditional functions of the episcopacy that hadn't yet faded away. The Assembly was wise and fair to recognize that religious institutions often continue to operate long after they're relevant. If those institutions were ever part of state governance, they should still be under the State's control; not just until the vitality that once drove them is gone, but for an even longer period—until the remnants of the outdated religion collapse and fade away.

So argued the National Assembly and its committee, and, I repeat, the argument was just and statesmanlike, prudent and full of foresight, save for one miscalculation. The Catholic Church was not dead, and was not even dying. It was exhibiting many of the symptoms which in other organisms and institutions correspond to the approach of death, but the Catholic Church is an organism and an institution quite unlike any other. It fructifies and expands immediately under the touch of a lethal weapon; it has at its very roots the conception that material prosperity is stifling to it, poverty and misfortune nutritious.

So argued the National Assembly and its committee, and, I’ll say it again, their argument was fair and statesmanlike, careful and insightful, except for one mistake. The Catholic Church was not dead, and it wasn’t even close to dying. It was showing many of the signs that other organizations and institutions display when they're near death, but the Catholic Church is an organization and institution that’s completely different from any other. It thrives and grows immediately when faced with a lethal attack; at its very core is the idea that material wealth stifles it, while poverty and hardship nourish it.

The men of the National Assembly would[Pg 239] have acted more wisely had they closely studied the story of Ireland (then but little known), or had they even made themselves acquainted with the methods by which the Catholic Church in Britain, after passing in the fifteenth century through a phase somewhat similar to that under which it was sinking in Gaul in the eighteenth, was stifled under Henry and Elizabeth.

The members of the National Assembly would[Pg 239] have made better decisions if they had carefully examined the history of Ireland (which was not very well known at the time) or if they had familiarized themselves with the strategies that the Catholic Church in Britain used after experiencing a phase somewhat like the one it was going through in Gaul in the eighteenth century, when it was suppressed under Henry and Elizabeth.

But the desire of the men of 1789 was not to kill the Church but to let it die; they thought it dying. Their desire was only to make that death decent and of no hurt to the nation, and to control the political action of a hierarchy that had been wealthy and was bound up with the old society that was crumbling upon every side.

But the men of 1789 didn't want to kill the Church; they just wanted to let it die, believing it was already on its way out. Their goal was to ensure that death was dignified and didn’t harm the nation, and to oversee the political actions of a hierarchy that had been prosperous and was tied to the old society that was falling apart on all sides.

The Civil Constitution of the Clergy failed: it lit the civil war, it dug the pit which divided Catholicism from the Revolution at the moment of the foreign invasion, it segregated the loyal priest in such a fashion that his order could not but appear to the populace as an order of traitors, and it led, in the furnace of 1793, to the great persecution from the memories of which the relations between the French democracy and the Church have not recovered.

The Civil Constitution of the Clergy was a failure: it sparked a civil war, created a rift between Catholicism and the Revolution during the foreign invasion, isolated loyal priests in a way that made their order seem like a group of traitors to the public, and ultimately led to the severe persecution in 1793. From that point on, the relationship between the French democracy and the Church has never truly healed.

It is important to trace the actual steps of the failure; for when we appreciate what the dates were, how short the time which was left for judgment or for revision, and how immediately disaster followed upon error, we can understand what followed and we can understand it in no other way.[Pg 240]

It’s crucial to examine the specific steps of the failure; because when we recognize the exact dates, how little time was available for judgment or revision, and how quickly disaster came after mistakes, we can comprehend what happened, and we can only understand it this way.[Pg 240]

If we find an enduring quarrel between two families whose cause of contention we cannot seize and whose mutual hostility we find unreasonable, to learn that it proceeded from a cataclysm too rapid and too violent for either to have exercised judgment upon it will enable us to excuse or at least to comprehend the endurance of their antagonism. Now, it was a cataclysm which fell upon the relations of the Church and State immediately after the error which the Parliament had committed; a cataclysm quite out of proportion to their intentions, as indeed are most sudden disasters quite out of proportion to the forces that bring them about.

If we come across a long-lasting feud between two families, where we can't grasp the reason for their conflict and their mutual hostility seems unreasonable, understanding that it stemmed from a drastic event that was too swift and intense for either side to process will help us either excuse or at least grasp the persistence of their rivalry. This disaster occurred in the relationship between the Church and State right after the mistake made by Parliament; it was a catastrophe that was completely disproportionate to their intentions, much like most sudden disasters are compared to the forces that cause them.

It was, as we have seen, in the summer of 1790—upon the 12th of July—that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was approved by the Assembly. But it was not until the 26th of August that the King consented to sign. Nor was there at the moment any attempt to give the law effect. The protests of the bishops, for instance, came out quite at leisure, in the month of October, and the active principle of the whole of the Civil Constitution—to wit, the presentation of the Civic Oath which the clergy were required to take, was not even debated until the end of the year.

It was, as we have seen, in the summer of 1790—on July 12th—that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was approved by the Assembly. However, it wasn't until August 26th that the King agreed to sign it. At that time, there was no effort to put the law into action. The bishops’ protests, for example, came out leisurely in October, and the key aspect of the entire Civil Constitution—the requirement for clergy to take the Civic Oath—wasn't even discussed until the end of the year.

This Civic Oath, which is sometimes used as a bugbear in the matter, was no more than an engagement under the sanction of an oath that the bishop or priest taking it would maintain the new régime—though that régime included the constitution of the clergy; the oath involved[Pg 241] no direct breach with Catholic doctrine or practice. It was, indeed, a folly to impose it, and it was a folly based upon the ignorance of the politicians (and of many of the bishops of the day) as to the nature of the Catholic Church. But the oath was not, nor was it intended to be, a measure of persecution. Many of the parish clergy took it, and most of them probably took it in good faith: nor did it discredit the oath with the public that it was refused by all save four of the acting bishops, for the condition of the hierarchy in pre-revolutionary France was notorious. The action of the bishops appeared in the public eye to be purely political, and the ready acceptance of the oath by so many, though a minority, of the lower clergy argued strongly in its favour.

This Civic Oath, which is often seen as a source of controversy, was simply a commitment made under oath by the bishop or priest taking it to support the new régime—even though that régime included the clergy's constitution; the oath did not involve[Pg 241] any direct conflict with Catholic doctrine or practices. It was, in fact, foolish to impose it, and this foolishness stemmed from the ignorance of politicians (and many bishops of the time) regarding the nature of the Catholic Church. However, the oath was not, nor was it meant to be, a tool of persecution. Many parish clergy took it, and most likely did so in good faith; the fact that only four of the acting bishops refused it did not tarnish the oath's reputation among the public, given the well-known state of the hierarchy in pre-revolutionary France. The bishops' actions appeared to be purely political in the eyes of the public, and the willingness of so many, albeit a minority, of the lower clergy to accept the oath strongly supported its validity.

Nevertheless, no Catholic priest or bishop or layman could take that oath without landing himself in disloyalty to his religion; and that for the same reason which led St. Thomas of Canterbury to make his curious and fruitful stand against the reasonable and inevitable, as much as against the unreasonable, governmental provisions of his time. The Catholic Church is an institution of necessity autonomous. It cannot admit the right of any other power exterior to its own organisation to impose upon it a modification of its discipline, nor, above all, a new conception of its hieratic organisation.

Nevertheless, no Catholic priest, bishop, or layperson could take that oath without being disloyal to their faith; and this is for the same reason that St. Thomas of Canterbury made his notable and impactful stand against both the reasonable and unavoidable, as well as the unreasonable, governmental demands of his time. The Catholic Church is an institution that must be autonomous. It cannot accept the right of any outside authority to impose changes on its practices or, especially, a new understanding of its hierarchical structure.

The reader must carefully distinguish between the acceptation by the Church of a detail of economic reform, the consent to[Pg 242] suppress a corporation at the request of the civil power, or even to forego certain traditional political rights, and the admission of the general principle of civil control. To that general principle the Assembly, in framing the Constitution of the Clergy, was quite evidently committed. To admit such a co-ordinate external and civil power, or rather to admit a superior external power, is in theory to deny the principle of Catholicism, and in practice to make of the Catholic Church what the other State religions of Christendom have become.

The reader must carefully distinguish between the Church's acceptance of a specific economic reform, the agreement to[Pg 242] dissolve a corporation at the request of the government, or even giving up certain traditional political rights, and the acknowledgment of the broader idea of civil control. The Assembly was clearly committed to that broader principle when creating the Constitution of the Clergy. Accepting such a parallel external and civil authority, or rather accepting a superior external authority, theoretically contradicts the principle of Catholicism and practically turns the Catholic Church into what the other state religions of Christianity have become.

I have said that not until the end of the year 1790 was the debate opened upon the proposition to compel the clergy to take the oath.

I said that the debate about forcing the clergy to take the oath didn’t start until the end of 1790.

It is a singular commentary upon the whole affair that compulsion should have been the subject for debate at all. It should have followed, one would have imagined, normally from the law. But so exceptional had been the action of the Assembly and, as they now were beginning to find, so perilous, that a special decree was necessary—and the King’s signature to it—before this normal consequence of a measure which had been law for months, could be acted upon.

It’s quite remarkable that the issue of compulsion became something to discuss at all. One would think it would naturally follow from the law. However, the actions of the Assembly had been so extraordinary and, as they were just starting to realize, so risky, that a special decree was required—along with the King’s signature—before what should have been a standard result of a law that had been in place for months could actually be implemented.

Here let the reader pause and consider with what that moment—the end of 1790—coincided.

Here let the reader pause and think about what that moment—the end of 1790—coincided with.

The assignats, paper-money issued upon the security of the confiscated estates of the Church, had already depreciated 10 per cent. Those who had first accepted them were paying[Pg 243] throughout France a penny in the livre, or as we may put it, a penny farthing on the shilling, for what must have seemed to most of them the obstinacy of one single corporation—and that an unpopular one—against the decrees of the National Assembly.

The assignats, paper money issued based on the confiscated properties of the Church, had already dropped in value by 10 percent. Those who were among the first to accept them were paying[Pg 243] across France a penny for every livre, or to put it another way, a penny farthing on the shilling, for what must have seemed to most of them like the stubbornness of a single organization—and one that wasn't popular—against the decisions of the National Assembly.

It was now the moment when a definite reaction against the Revolution was first taking shape, and when the populace was first beginning uneasily to have suspicion of it; it was the moment when the Court was beginning to negotiate for flight; it was the moment when (though the populace did not know it) Mirabeau was advising the King with all his might to seize upon the enforcement of the priests’ oath as an opportunity for civil war.

It was now the moment when a clear reaction against the Revolution was first beginning to form, and when the people were starting to feel uneasy and suspicious about it; it was the moment when the Court was starting to discuss plans for escape; it was the moment when (even though the populace was unaware) Mirabeau was doing everything he could to advise the King to use the enforcement of the priests’ oath as a chance to spark civil war.

The whole air of that winter was charged with doubt and mystery: in the minds of all who had enthusiastically followed the march of the Revolution, the short days of that rigorous cold of 1790-91 contained passages of despair, and a very brief period was to suffice for making the clerical oath not only the test of democracy against reaction, but the wedge that should split the nation in two.

The atmosphere of that winter was full of uncertainty and intrigue: in the minds of everyone who had passionately supported the Revolution, the short, chilly days of 1790-91 held moments of despair, and just a short time would be enough to turn the clerical oath into not only a measure of democracy against backlash, but also the dividing line that would split the nation in two.

With the very opening of the new year, on the 4th of January, the bishops and priests in the Assembly were summoned to take the oath to the King, the Nation, and the Law; but that law included the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and they refused. Within three months Mirabeau was dead, the flight of the King determined on, the suspicion of Paris at white heat, the oath taken or refused[Pg 244] throughout France, and the schismatic priests introduced into their parishes—it may be imagined with what a clamour and with how many village quarrels! In that same fortnight appeared the papal brief, long delayed, and known as the Brief “Caritas,” denouncing the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Six weeks later, at the end of May, the papal representative at the French Court was withdrawn, and in that act religious war declared.

With the start of the new year, on January 4th, the bishops and priests in the Assembly were called to take the oath to the King, the Nation, and the Law; but that law included the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and they refused. Within three months, Mirabeau was dead, the King had decided to flee, the tension in Paris was at an all-time high, the oath was taken or refused throughout France, and schismatic priests were introduced into their parishes—it can be imagined with what uproar and how many village disputes! In that same two weeks, the long-awaited papal brief known as the Brief “Caritas” was issued, denouncing the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Six weeks later, at the end of May, the papal representative at the French Court was withdrawn, and that act declared religious war.

Throughout this quarrel, which was now exactly of a year’s duration, but the acute phase of which had lasted only six months, every act of either party to it necessarily tended to make the conflict more violent. Not only was there no opportunity for conciliation, but in the very nature of things the most moderate counsel had to range itself on one side or the other, and every public act which touched in any way upon the sore point, though it touched but indirectly, and with no desire on the part of the actors to rouse the passions of the moment, immediately appeared as a provocation upon one side or the other.

Throughout this arguing, which had now been going on for exactly a year, though the intense part only lasted six months, every action from either side contributed to making the conflict more intense. There wasn’t any chance for compromise, and naturally, even the most reasonable advice had to take sides. Any public action that somehow involved the sensitive issue, even if it was only indirectly and without any intention to provoke, immediately seemed to provoke one side or the other.

It was inevitable that it should be so, with a population which had abandoned the practice of religion, with the attachment of the clerical organisation to the organisation of the old régime, with the strict bond of discipline that united the priesthood of the Church in France into one whole, and above all with the necessity under which the Revolution was, at this stage, of finding a definite and tangible enemy.[Pg 245]

It was bound to happen, with a population that had given up on religion, with the clergy's ties to the old regime, with the strong discipline that united the priesthood of the Church in France, and, most importantly, with the Revolution's need at this point to identify a clear and concrete enemy.[Pg 245]

This last point is of the very first importance. Public opinion was exasperated and inflamed, for the King was known to be an opponent of the democratic movement; yet he signed the bills and could not be overtly attacked. The Queen was known to be a violent opponent of it; but she did not actually govern. The Governments of Europe were known to be opponents; but no diplomatic note had yet appeared of which public opinion could make an object for attack.

This last point is extremely important. Public opinion was frustrated and heated because the King was known to be against the democratic movement; however, he signed the bills and couldn't be openly criticized. The Queen was known to strongly oppose it, but she didn't actually govern. The European governments were recognized as opponents, but no diplomatic note had been issued that public opinion could target for criticism.

The resistance, therefore, offered by the clergy to the Civil Constitution, had just that effect which a nucleus will have in the crystallisation of some solution. It polarised the energies of the Revolution, it provided a definite foil, a definite negative, a definite counterpoint, a definite butt. Here was a simple issue. Men wearing a special uniform, pursuing known functions, performing a known part in society—to wit, the priests—were now for the most part the enemies of the new democratic Constitution that was in preparation. They would not take the oath of loyalty to it: they were everywhere in secret rebellion against it and, where they were dispossessed of their cures, in open rebellion. The clergy, therefore, that is the non-juring clergy (and the conforming clergy were an experiment that soon became a fiction), were after April 1791, in the eyes of all the democrats of the time, the plainest and most tangible form of the opposition to democracy.

The resistance from the clergy to the Civil Constitution had the same effect as a nucleus in the crystallization of a solution. It focused the energies of the Revolution, providing a clear contrast, a definite negative, a strong counterpoint, and a solid target. This was a straightforward issue. Men in a specific uniform, performing recognized roles in society—namely, the priests—were mostly the adversaries of the new democratic Constitution being developed. They refused to take the oath of loyalty to it; they were secretly rebelling against it everywhere and openly rebelling where they had lost their parishes. Therefore, the clergy, specifically the non-juring clergy (since the conforming clergy were an experiment that quickly turned into a fiction), were seen after April 1791 by all the democrats of the time as the clearest and most direct form of opposition to democracy.

To the way in which I have presented the problem a great deal more might be added.[Pg 246] The very fact that the democratic movement had come after a period of unfaith, and was non-Catholic in its springs, would have tended to produce that quarrel. So would the necessary attachment of the Catholic to authority and the easy confusion between the principle of authority and claims of a traditional monarchy. Again, the elements of vanity, of material greed, and of a false finality which are to be discovered in any purely democratic theory of the State, will between them always bring this theory into some conflict with religion. The centuries during which the throne and the altar had stood as twin symbols, especially in France, the very terminology of religious metaphor which had been forged during the centuries of monarchical institutions in Europe, helped to found the great quarrel. But, I repeat, the overt act without which the quarrel could never have become the terribly great thing it did, the master blunder which destroyed the unity of the revolutionary movement, was the Civil Constitution of the Clergy.

To the way I've presented the issue, a lot more could be said.[Pg 246] The fact that the democratic movement emerged after a period of disfaith and had non-Catholic origins likely fueled the conflict. Additionally, the Catholic attachment to authority and the easy mix-up between the principle of authority and the claims of a traditional monarchy also contributed. Furthermore, the elements of vanity, material greed, and a misguided sense of finality found in any purely democratic theory of the State will always put this theory at odds with religion. The centuries when the throne and the altar stood as twin symbols, especially in France, along with the religious terminology created during the era of monarchies in Europe, established the foundation for this major conflict. But, I must emphasize, the critical event that made this conflict escalate into something truly massive—the monumental mistake that shattered the unity of the revolutionary movement—was the Civil Constitution of the Clergy.

So much for the first year of the schism, May 1790 to May 1791. The second year is but an intensification of the process apparent in the first.

So much for the first year of the split, May 1790 to May 1791. The second year is just an intensification of what was evident in the first.

It opens with the King’s flight in June 1791: that is, with the first open act of enmity taken against the authority of the National Parliament since, two years before, the National Parliament had declared itself supreme. Already the Court had been generally identified with the resistance of the clergy, and a[Pg 247] particular example of this had appeared in the opinion that the King’s attempted journey to St. Cloud in April had been prompted by a desire to have communion at the hands of a non-juring priest.[8] When, therefore, the King fled, though his flight had nothing whatsoever to do with the clerical quarrel, it was associated in men’s minds with the clerical quarrel through his attempt to leave Paris in April and from a long association of the Court with the clerical resistance. The outburst of anti-monarchical feeling which followed the flight was at the same time an outburst of anti-clerical feeling; but the clergy were everywhere and could be attacked everywhere. The Declaration of Pillnitz, which the nation very rightly interpreted as the beginning of an armed European advance against the French democracy, was felt to be a threat not only in favour of the King but in favour also of the rebellious ecclesiastics.

It starts with the King’s escape in June 1791: the first public act of hostility against the authority of the National Parliament since, two years earlier, the National Parliament had proclaimed itself supreme. The Court had already been largely seen as aligned with the resistance of the clergy, and a[Pg 247] specific example of this perception was the belief that the King’s attempted trip to St. Cloud in April was driven by a wish to receive communion from a non-juring priest.[8] So, when the King fled, even though his escape had nothing to do with the clerical conflict, people connected it to the clerical issue due to his attempt to leave Paris in April and the long-standing association of the Court with clerical resistance. The surge of anti-monarchical sentiment that followed his flight was also a surge of anti-clerical sentiment; however, the clergy were everywhere and became a target everywhere. The Declaration of Pillnitz, which the nation rightly viewed as the start of a military European intervention against French democracy, was seen as a threat, not only supporting the King but also the rebellious clergy.

And so forth. The uneasy approach of war throughout that autumn and winter of 1791-92, the peculiar transformation of the[Pg 248] French temperament which war or its approach invariably produces—a sort of constructive exaltation and creative passion—began to turn a great part of its energy or fury against the very persons of the orthodox priests.

And so on. The uncomfortable onset of war during the fall and winter of 1791-92, the strange shift in the[Pg 248] French mindset that war or its approach always brings—a kind of energizing excitement and creative drive—started to direct much of its energy or anger towards the very people of the traditional clergy.

The new Parliament, the “Legislative” as it was called, had not been sitting two months when it passed, upon November 29, 1791, the decree that non-juring priests should be deprived of their stipend. And here again we must note the curious lack of adjustment between law and fact in all this clerical quarrel! For more than a year public money had been paid to men who, under the law, should not during the whole of that year have touched any salary! Yet, as in the case of the oath, special action was necessary, and moreover the Parliament added to this tardy and logical consequence of the law a declaration that those who had not so taken the oath within eight days of their decree should be rendered “suspect.”

The new Parliament, known as the “Legislative,” had only been in session for two months when it passed a decree on November 29, 1791, stating that non-juring priests would be stripped of their pay. Once again, we see a strange disconnect between law and reality in this whole clerical conflict! For over a year, public funds had been given to individuals who, according to the law, shouldn’t have received any salary during that entire year! Yet, just like with the oath, special action was required, and the Parliament added to this delayed and logical outcome of the law a declaration that anyone who hadn’t taken the oath within eight days of their decree would be considered “suspect.”

The word “suspect” is significant. The Parliament even now could not act, at least it could not act without the King; and this word “suspect,” which carried no material consequences with it, was one that might cover a threat of things worse than regular and legal punishment. It was like the mark that some power not authorised or legal makes upon the door of those whom that power has singled out for massacre in some city.

The word “suspect” is important. Even now, Parliament couldn't act, at least not without the King; and this word “suspect,” which didn’t have any real consequences, was one that could imply a threat of something worse than normal legal punishment. It was like the mark that some unauthorized or illegal power puts on the door of those it has chosen for a violent end in a city.

Three weeks later Louis vetoed the decree[Pg 249] refusing stipends to non-jurors, and the year 1791 ended with the whole matter in suspense but with exasperation increasing to madness.

Three weeks later, Louis rejected the decree[Pg 249] that denied stipends to non-jurors, and the year 1791 ended with the entire situation unresolved, but with frustration escalating to insanity.

The first three months of 1792 saw no change. The non-juring clergy were still tolerated by the Executive in their illegal position, and, what is more extraordinary, still received public money and were still for the most part in possession of their cures; the conception that the clergy were the prime, or at any rate the most obvious, enemies of the new régime now hardened into a fixed opinion which the attempted persecution of religion, as the one party called it, the obstinate and anti-national rebellion of factious priests, as the other party called it, was rapidly approaching real persecution and real rebellion.

The first three months of 1792 showed no change. The non-juring clergy were still accepted by the Executive in their illegal position, and, even more surprisingly, they continued to receive public funds and mostly retained their parishes. The idea that the clergy were the main, or at least the most obvious, enemies of the new régime became a firmly held belief. The attempt to suppress religion, as one side described it, and the stubborn, anti-national defiance of rebellious priests, as the other side termed it, was quickly leading to actual persecution and genuine rebellion.

With April 1792 came the war, and all the passions of the war.

With April 1792 came the war, and all the passions of the war.

The known hostility of the King to the Revolution was now become something far worse: his known sympathy with an enemy under arms. To force the King into the open was henceforward the main tactic of the revolutionary body.

The King’s well-known hostility towards the Revolution had now turned into something much worse: his obvious support for an armed enemy. From now on, getting the King to show his hand was the primary strategy of the revolutionary group.

Now for those whose object was forcing Louis XVI to open declarations of hostility against the nation, his religion was an obvious instrument. In no point could one come to closer grips with the King than on this question of the Church, where already, in December 1791, he had exercised his veto.

Now for those who aimed to pressure Louis XVI into making declarations of hostility against the nation, his religion was a clear tool. There was no issue where one could confront the King more directly than on this matter of the Church, where already, in December 1791, he had used his veto.

On May 27, 1792, therefore, Guadet and Vergniaud, the Girondins, moved that a priest[Pg 250] who had refused to take the oath should be subjected to transportation upon the mere demand of any twenty taxpayers within that assembly of parishes known as a “Canton.” It was almost exactly two years since the Civil Constitution of the Clergy had first been reported to the House by the Ecclesiastical Committee of the Constituent or National Assembly.

On May 27, 1792, Guadet and Vergniaud, the Girondins, proposed that a priest[Pg 250] who refused to take the oath should be exiled simply based on the request of any twenty taxpayers from the assembly of parishes called a “Canton.” It had been almost exactly two years since the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was first presented to the House by the Ecclesiastical Committee of the Constituent or National Assembly.

It must not be forgotten under what external conditions this violent act, the first true act of persecution, was demanded. It was already a month since, upon the 20th of April, the war had opened upon the Belgian frontier by a disgraceful panic and the murder of General Dillon; almost contemporaneous with that breakdown was the corresponding panic and flight of the French troops in their advance to Mons. All Europe was talking of the facile march upon Paris which could now be undertaken; and in general this decree against the priests was but part of the exasperated policy which was rising to meet the terror of the invasion.

It should not be overlooked what external circumstances led to this violent act, the first real act of persecution. It had been a month since the 20th of April, when the war broke out on the Belgian border amid a disgraceful panic and the murder of General Dillon; almost at the same time, there was a corresponding panic and retreat of the French troops as they advanced to Mons. All of Europe was discussing the easy march on Paris that could now take place; and overall, this decree against the priests was just a part of the angry policy that was emerging in response to the fear of invasion.

It was followed, of course, by the decree dismissing the Royal Guard, and, rather more than a week later, by the demand for the formation of a camp of volunteers under the walls of Paris. But with this we are not here concerned. The King vetoed the decree against the non-juring priests, and in the wild two months that followed the orthodox clergy were, in the mind of the populace, and particularly the populace of Paris, identified with the cause of the re-establishment of the[Pg 251] old régime and the success of the invading foreign armies.

It was followed, of course, by the order to dismiss the Royal Guard, and, more than a week later, by the call for volunteers to set up a camp outside the walls of Paris. But that's not our focus here. The King vetoed the order against the non-juring priests, and in the chaotic two months that followed, the traditional clergy became, in the eyes of the public, especially in Paris, associated with the effort to restore the [Pg 251] old régime and the success of the invading foreign armies.

With the crash of the 10th of August the persecution began: the true persecution, which was to the growing bitterness of the previous two years what a blow is to the opening words of a quarrel.

With the crash on August 10th, the real persecution started: the kind of persecution that was to the increasing anger of the previous two years what a punch is to the opening lines of an argument.

The decree of the 27th of May was put into force within eleven days of the fall of the Tuileries. True, it was not put into force in that crudity which the Parliament had demanded: the non-juring priests were given a fortnight to leave the kingdom, and if they failed to avail themselves of the delay were to be transported.

The decree from May 27th took effect within eleven days after the fall of the Tuileries. However, it wasn't implemented as harshly as the Parliament had requested: the non-juring priests were given two weeks to leave the country, and if they didn’t take advantage of the extension, they would be exiled.

From this date to the end of the Terror, twenty-three months later, the story of the relations between the Revolution and the Church, though wild and terrible, is simple: it is a story of mere persecution culminating in extremes of cruelty and in the supposed uprooting of Christianity in France.

From this date until the end of the Terror, twenty-three months later, the story of the relationship between the Revolution and the Church, although chaotic and horrific, is straightforward: it is a tale of pure persecution that peaks in extreme cruelty and the perceived eradication of Christianity in France.

The orthodox clergy were everywhere regarded by this time as the typical enemies of the revolutionary movement; they themselves regarded the revolutionary movement, by this time, as being principally an attempt to destroy the Catholic Church.

The orthodox clergy were seen as the typical enemies of the revolutionary movement by this time; they themselves viewed the revolutionary movement as mainly an effort to destroy the Catholic Church.

Within seven months of the fall of the monarchy, from the 18th of March, 1793, the priests, whether non-juring or schismatic, might, on the denunciation of any six citizens, be subjected to transportation.

Within seven months of the monarchy's collapse, starting on March 18, 1793, priests, whether non-juring or schismatic, could be exiled based on the accusation of any six citizens.

There followed immediately a general attack upon religion. The attempted closing[Pg 252] of all churches was, of course, a failure, but it was firmly believed that such attachment as yet remained to the Catholic Church was due only to the ignorance of the provincial districts which displayed it, or to the self-seeking of those who fostered it. The attempt at mere “de-christianisation,” as it was called, failed, but the months of terror and cruelty, the vast number of martyrdoms (for they were no less) and the incredible sufferings and indignities to which the priests who attempted to remain in the country were subjected, burnt itself, as it were, into the very fibre of the Catholic organisation in France, and remained, in spite of political theory one way or the other, and in spite of the national sympathies of the priesthood, the one great active memory inherited from that time.

There was a widespread attack on religion right afterward. The attempt to close[Pg 252] all churches obviously failed, but people firmly believed that any remaining attachment to the Catholic Church was due solely to the ignorance in rural areas or the selfish motives of those promoting it. The effort to simply "de-christianize," as it was called, didn't succeed, but the months filled with terror and cruelty, the large number of martyrdoms (because that's what they were), and the incredible suffering and indignities that the priests who tried to stay in the country endured, became etched into the very core of the Catholic organization in France. This remained, despite various political theories and the national sympathies of the clergy, the significant memory that was passed down from that time.

Conversely, the picture of the priest, his habit and character, as the fatal and necessary opponent of the revolutionary theory, became so fixed in the mind of the Republican that two generations did nothing to eliminate it, and that even in our time the older men, in spite of pure theory, cannot rid themselves of an imagined connection between the Catholic Church and an international conspiracy against democracy. Nor does this non-rational but very real feeling lack support from the utterances of those who, in opposing the political theory of the French Revolution, consistently quote the Catholic Church as its necessary and holy antagonist.

Conversely, the image of the priest, with his habits and personality, as the unavoidable enemy of revolutionary ideas, became so embedded in the minds of Republicans that two generations did nothing to change it. Even today, older individuals, despite purely theoretical views, struggle to shake off the perceived link between the Catholic Church and an international conspiracy against democracy. This irrational but very real sentiment is also backed by statements from those who, in opposing the political theory of the French Revolution, consistently refer to the Catholic Church as its essential and sacred opponent.

The attempt to “de-christianise” France[Pg 253] failed, as I have said, completely. Public worship was restored, and the Concordat of Napoleon was believed to have settled the relations between Church and State in a permanent fashion. We have lived to see it dissolved; but this generation will not see, nor perhaps the generation succeeding it, the issue of the struggle between two bodies of thought which are divided by no process of reason, but profoundly divorced by the action of vivid and tragic historical memories.

The effort to "de-Christianize" France[Pg 253] completely failed, as I mentioned. Public worship was reinstated, and the Concordat of Napoleon was thought to have permanently settled the relationship between Church and State. We've witnessed it being dissolved; however, this generation, and possibly the next, will not see the outcome of the conflict between two schools of thought that are separated not by logical reasoning, but deeply divided by the impact of vivid and tragic historical memories.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] This opinion has entered into so many Protestant and non-Catholic histories of the Revolution that it is worth criticising once again in this little book. The King was perfectly free to receive communion privately from the hands of orthodox priests, did so receive it, and had received communion well within the canonical times. There was little ecclesiastical reason for the attempted leaving of Paris for St. Cloud on Monday the 18th April, 1791, save the custom (not the religious duty) of communicating in public on Easter Sunday itself; it was a political move.

[8] This viewpoint has made its way into many Protestant and non-Catholic accounts of the Revolution, so it's worth critiquing once more in this short book. The King was completely free to receive communion privately from orthodox priests, and he did so, having received communion well within the established times. There was little church-related reason for trying to leave Paris for St. Cloud on Monday, April 18, 1791, other than the custom (not the religious obligation) of taking communion publicly on Easter Sunday; it was a political tactic.


INDEX

  • Alex the Great, 144
  • Argonne, the, 156
  • Arras, 132, 137
  • Artois, Comte d’, 105
  • Avignon, 111
  • England, 14, 124, 145
  • Elizabeth, Queen of England, 239
  • Esquelbecque, 191
  • Orleans, 128
  • Orleans, Duke of, 109
  • Parthenay, 128
  • Pichegru, 202
  • Pillnitz, 154, 247
  • Poland, 31
  • Polignac, Madame de, 53
  • Pollio, 120

Richard Clay & Sons, Limited, London and Bungay.

Richard Clay & Sons, Limited, London and Bungay.



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