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THE HISTORY OF THE POST OFFICE IN
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
C. F. CLAY, Boss
LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.C. 4

NEW YORK : | THE MACMILLAN CO. | |
BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS | } | MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd. |
TORONTO : | THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. | |
TOKYO : | MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA |
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THE HISTORY
OF THE POST OFFICE IN
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA
1639-1870
BY
WILLIAM SMITH
SOMETIME SECRETARY OF THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF CANADA
CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1920
Printed in Great Britain by
Richard Clay & Sons, Limited,
Brunswick St., Stamford St., S.E. 1,
and Bungay, Suffolk.
[Pg v]
[Pg v]
PREFACE
My purpose, in the searches for material which led to the present volume, has been to give as complete an account as it lay in my power to do, of the beginnings and growth of the Canadian post office, with which I was associated for thirty-six years. As my studies progressed, however, I found it would be necessary to widen my field.
My goal in the research for this book has been to provide a thorough account of the origins and development of the Canadian post office, with which I was involved for thirty-six years. However, as my studies evolved, I realized I needed to broaden my scope.
The Canadian post office did not come into being as an independent organization. It was but the extension into newly-acquired territories, of a system which had been in operation for nearly three-quarters of a century, with well-established modes of administration. Obviously, either reference should be made to well-known works on the older colonial postal system, or an account of it must be attempted in this volume.
The Canadian post office wasn't established as an independent organization. It was simply an expansion into newly-acquired territories of a system that had been in place for almost seventy-five years, with established management methods. Clearly, either references should be made to well-known works on the older colonial postal system, or a description of it must be included in this volume.
Although careful studies of some aspects of this history have been made, this part of colonial history has, on the whole, received less of the attention of students than has been devoted to throwing light upon other phases of that history; and, what was important for my purpose, little has been done in the way of describing the relations between the colonial postal system and the general post office in London, to which it was subordinate.
Although careful studies of certain aspects of this history have been conducted, this part of colonial history has, overall, received less attention from scholars than other aspects of that history; and, importantly for my purpose, not much has been done to describe the relationship between the colonial postal system and the general post office in London, to which it was subordinate.
The materials for this portion of the history are to be found in the records of the general post office, London, the British Museum, and in the journals of the colonial legislatures. A very interesting document is Franklin's Account Book, which is in the Boston Public Library.
The materials for this part of the history can be found in the records of the general post office in London, the British Museum, and the journals of the colonial legislatures. A very interesting document is Franklin's Account Book, which is located in the Boston Public Library.
The materials for the history of the post office in the provinces now composing the Dominion of Canada, are in the records of the general post office, the larger portion of which have been transcribed for the Public Archives of Canada; in the correspondence between the colonial governors and the colonial office, which can be found either in the original or in transcripts in the Public Archives, and in the Journals of the Provincial Legislatures.
The materials for the history of the post office in the provinces now making up the Dominion of Canada are found in the records of the general post office, most of which have been copied for the Public Archives of Canada; in the correspondence between the colonial governors and the colonial office, which can be accessed either in the original documents or in copies at the Public Archives, and in the Journals of the Provincial Legislatures.
In the preparation of the chapter on the postal service of Newfoundland, I had the advantage of a rather close acquaintance[Pg vi] with that service, due to my having had charge of it some years ago for a period of several months. The material on which the chapter is founded has been gathered from the records of the general post office, and the legislative papers of the colony.
In getting ready for the chapter on the postal service of Newfoundland, I had the benefit of a fairly close relationship[Pg vi] with that service because I managed it several years ago for a few months. The information used in the chapter has been collected from the records of the general post office and the legislative documents of the colony.
In collecting my material, I have received ready assistance from all to whom I have applied. To all these my hearty gratitude is tendered. A word of special acknowledgment is due to Mr. Edward Porritt, author of The Unreformed Parliament of Great Britain, who kindly read the manuscript, and to whose experience I am indebted for many valuable suggestions.
In gathering my material, I received helpful support from everyone I reached out to. I extend my sincere thanks to all of them. I would particularly like to acknowledge Mr. Edward Porritt, author of The Unreformed Parliament of Great Britain, who graciously reviewed the manuscript and whose expertise provided me with many valuable suggestions.
William Smith.
William Smith.
August 1920.
August 1920.
[Pg vii]
[Pg vii]
CONTENTS
PAGE | ||
CHAPTER I | 1 | |
Beginnings of postal service in former American colonies. | ||
CHAPTER II | 18 | |
Colonial post office under Queen Anne's act—Early packet service. | ||
CHAPTER III | 37 | |
Communications in Canada prior to the Conquest—Extension of colonial postal service to Canada—Effects of colonial discontents on post office. | ||
CHAPTER IV | 58 | |
The post office during the Revolution—Its suppression. | ||
CHAPTER V | 74 | |
Beginnings of exclusively Canadian postal service—Administration of Hugh Finlay—Opening of communication with England by way of Halifax—Postal convention with United States. | ||
CHAPTER VI | 96 | |
Administration of George Heriot—Extension of postal service in Upper Canada—Irritating restrictions imposed by general post office—Disputes with the administrator of the colony. | ||
CHAPTER VII | 114 | |
Administration of Daniel Sutherland—Postal service on the Ottawa river, and to eastern townships—Ocean mails. | ||
CHAPTER VIII | 131 | |
Postal conditions in Upper Canada—Serious abuses—Agitation for provincial control. | ||
CHAPTER IX | 153 | |
Thomas Allen Stayner deputy postmaster general—Restrictions of general post office relaxed—Grievances of newspaper publishers—Opinion of law officers of the crown that postmaster general's stand is untenable—Consequences. | ||
CHAPTER X | 173 | |
The beginnings of the postal service in the Maritime provinces—Complaints of newspaper publishers—Reception given to imperial act to remedy colonial grievances. | ||
CHAPTER XI | 193 | [Pg viii] |
Continuance of agitation in the Canadas for control of the post office—Much information obtained by committees of legislatures—Difficulty in giving effect to reforms. | ||
CHAPTER XII | 212 | |
Durham's report on the post office—Effects of rebellion of 1837 on the service—Ocean steamships to carry the mails—The Cunard contract—Reduction of Transatlantic postage. | ||
CHAPTER XIII | 230 | |
Diminution of powers of deputy postmaster general—Commission on post office appointed—Its report—Efforts to secure reduction of postal charges. | ||
CHAPTER XIV | 243 | |
Continuation of account of post office in Maritime provinces—Departmental inquiry into conditions—Agitation for reduced postage. | ||
CHAPTER XV | 263 | |
Reversal of attitude of British government on post office control—Instructions to Lord Elgin—Provincial postal conference—Control of post office relinquished to colonies. | ||
CHAPTER XVI | 273 | |
Provincial administration of the post office—Reduced postage—Railway mail service—Arrangements with United States. | ||
CHAPTER XVII | 284 | |
Canadian ocean mail service—Want of sympathy of British government therewith. | ||
CHAPTER XVIII | 302 | |
Canadian ocean mail service (cont.)—Series of disasters to Allan line steamers. | ||
CHAPTER XIX | 316 | |
Postal service of Manitoba, the North-West Provinces and British Columbia—Summary of progress since Confederation. | ||
CHAPTER XX | 333 | |
The post office in Newfoundland. | ||
INDEX | 347 |
[Pg ix]
[Pg ix]
PORTRAITS
WILLIAM HENRY GRIFFIN, C.M.G. | To face page | 273 |
WILLIAM WHITE, C.M.G. | " | 284 |
ROBERT MILLAR COULTER, M.D., C.M.G. | " | 326 |
HISTORY OF THE POST OFFICE
IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA
CHAPTER I
Beginnings of postal service in former American colonies.
Beginnings of postal service in former American colonies.
Benjamin Franklin relates that when the news reached America in 1763 that peace had been concluded between England and France, he made preparations to visit Canada, for the purpose of extending to it the postal service of the North American colonies, and that the joy bells were still ringing when he left Philadelphia on his journey northward. Franklin has universal fame as a philosopher and statesman, but is perhaps less widely known as one of the deputies of the postmaster general of England. He had, however, a long and useful connection with the post office a quarter of a century before this time. He was appointed postmaster of Philadelphia in 1737,[1] and for many years combined the duties of this office with that of newspaper publisher. He became deputy postmaster general in 1753.[2] Canada had been in the hands of the British since 1760, and until a regular system of government was established in 1764, its affairs were administered by a military council, which among other matters provided a rudimentary postal service. The merchants of Quebec were desirous of a regular post office; and, owing to Franklin's promptness, the post office was the first of the institutions of government which was placed on a settled footing after Canada became a British province.
Benjamin Franklin recounts that when the news arrived in America in 1763 that peace had been reached between England and France, he prepared to visit Canada to expand the postal service of the North American colonies. The joy bells were still ringing as he left Philadelphia for his journey north. Franklin is well-known as a philosopher and statesman, but he is perhaps less recognized as one of the deputies of the postmaster general of England. However, he had a long and valuable relationship with the post office starting a quarter of a century before this time. He was appointed postmaster of Philadelphia in 1737,[1] and for many years he combined this role with that of newspaper publisher. He became deputy postmaster general in 1753.[2] Canada had been under British control since 1760, and until a regular government was established in 1764, its affairs were managed by a military council, which provided a basic postal service among other things. The merchants of Quebec wanted a regular post office; thanks to Franklin's efficiency, the post office was the first government institution to be properly established after Canada became a British province.
On arriving at Quebec, Franklin opened a post office there with subordinate offices at Three Rivers and Montreal,[3] and established a monthly service between the Canadian post offices and New York, arranging the trips so that the courier should make as close connection as possible with the packet boats which sailed monthly each way between New York and Falmouth, England.
On arriving in Quebec, Franklin opened a post office there with branches in Trois-Rivières and Montreal,[3] and set up a monthly service between the Canadian post offices and New York, scheduling the trips to ensure the courier connected as closely as possible with the packet boats that sailed monthly in both directions between New York and Falmouth, England.
The postal system into which Canada was thus incorporated was of vast extent. It stretched from the river St. Lawrence to Florida. New York was its pivotal point, the mail couriers running[Pg 2] north and south connecting there with one another, and with the packets from England. The system was under the control of two deputies, of equal authority, one of whom was Franklin, and the other John Foxcroft. As this system had a long history when Canada came to be comprised in it, it seems essential to a proper presentation of the subject that a sketch of that history should be furnished.
The postal system that Canada joined was quite extensive. It stretched from the St. Lawrence River to Florida. New York was its central hub, with mail couriers running[Pg 2] north and south connecting there with one another and with ships from England. The system was managed by two deputies with equal authority, one of whom was Franklin and the other was John Foxcroft. Since this system had a long history by the time Canada became part of it, it's important to provide a brief overview of that history.
The first notice of a post office in North America appears in the records of the general court of Massachusetts Bay for the year 1639. The colony was just ten years old. Letters from home, always eagerly looked for, were then awaited with double anxiety in view of the distracted state of England.
The first mention of a post office in North America shows up in the records of the general court of Massachusetts Bay for the year 1639. The colony was only ten years old. Letters from home, always eagerly anticipated, were then awaited with even more anxiety due to the chaotic situation in England.
King Charles was at this time midway in the course of his great experiment in absolute government, which ten years before had driven these people from their homes, and ten years later was to carry him to the block.
King Charles was at this point halfway through his major experiment in absolute rule, which had forced these people out of their homes ten years earlier, and ten years later would lead him to the executioner's block.
Some effective arrangement for the exchange of correspondence between New and Old England was a necessity. Until 1639 there was none. On the English side, it was the practice for sea captains, who intended making a trip to America, to give public notice of the fact, and to place a bag for the reception of letters in one of the coffee houses. On the day of sailing, the bag was closed and taken on board the vessel to America.
Some efficient way to exchange letters between New and Old England was essential. Until 1639, there was none. In England, it was common for sea captains planning a trip to America to announce their intention publicly and set up a bag at one of the coffee houses for collecting letters. On the day of departure, the bag was sealed and brought on board the ship to America.
It was at this point that the scheme failed. There was no one in America charged with the duty of receiving and distributing the letters; and consequently, many letters were misdelivered, and many not delivered at all. It was to provide a remedy for this state of things that an ordinance[4] was passed on the 5th of November, 1639.
It was at this point that the plan fell apart. There was no one in America responsible for receiving and delivering the letters, which led to many letters being misdelivered and many not being delivered at all. To fix this situation, an ordinance[4] was passed on November 5, 1639.
By this ordinance public notice was given that all letters from beyond the seas were to be taken to the tavern kept by Richard Fairbank, in Boston, who engaged that they should be delivered according to their addresses. He was to receive a penny for every letter he delivered, and was to answer for all miscarriages due to his neglect. The Fairbank's tavern was a resort of some prominence. Through the correspondence of the time, it appears as the meeting place for various committees of the colony, and returns to the surveyor general were ordered to be made at Fairbank's in 1645.
By this ordinance, public notice was given that all letters from overseas were to be taken to the tavern run by Richard Fairbank in Boston, who promised that they would be delivered according to their addresses. He was to receive a penny for every letter he delivered and was responsible for any losses due to his negligence. Fairbank's tavern was a notable gathering spot. Correspondence from that time shows it was the meeting place for various colonial committees, and returns to the surveyor general were instructed to be made at Fairbank's in 1645.
The ordinance of 1639, besides giving directions for the receipt and delivery of letters coming to Boston from beyond the sea,[Pg 3] also authorized Fairbank to provide for the despatch of letters posted at his house, and addressed to places abroad. He was licensed to receive letters from the citizens of Boston for transmission across the sea; but the ordinance laid it down carefully that "no man shall be compelled to bring his letters thither unless he please."
The ordinance of 1639 not only provided instructions for receiving and delivering letters arriving in Boston from overseas,[Pg 3] but also allowed Fairbank to handle the sending of letters mailed at his home and addressed to other countries. He was authorized to collect letters from Boston residents for sending across the ocean; however, the ordinance clearly stated that "no one shall be forced to bring their letters there unless they choose to."
This proviso is quite in keeping with the spirit of the time. At present and for more than two centuries past, the exclusive right of the post office to engage in the conveyance of letters is conceded without question. But at that time, its claims to a monopoly in letter carrying were contested on all sides.
This condition aligns well with the spirit of the era. For now, and for more than two hundred years, the postal service's exclusive right to handle the delivery of letters is accepted without doubt. However, back then, its claims to a monopoly on letter delivery were challenged from all directions.
Indeed anything presenting the appearance of a monopoly found small favour. The natural jealousy with which every claim to exclusive privilege is viewed, was heightened to the point of hatred during the struggle for constitutional government, by the fact that trading monopolies which were granted to courtiers, not only enhanced unreasonably the price of many of the necessities of life, but also furnished the means, which enabled the king to pursue his illegal and arbitrary courses in defiance of parliament.
Indeed, anything that seemed like a monopoly was looked down upon. The natural suspicion towards any claim of exclusive privilege grew into outright resentment during the fight for constitutional government. This was fueled by the fact that trading monopolies given to courtiers not only unreasonably increased the prices of many essential goods, but also provided the king with the resources to carry out his illegal and arbitrary actions against parliament.
The privy council in England had adopted in 1635 a scheme for the administration of the post office, one of the features of which was the bestowal upon it of the sole right to carry on the business of conveying and delivering letters in England. This was contested in the courts, and in 1646 was pronounced illegal.
The Privy Council in England established a plan for managing the post office in 1635, which included granting it the exclusive right to operate the business of sending and delivering letters in England. This was challenged in court and was declared illegal in 1646.
The claim had received an earlier blow at the hands of the long parliament, which in 1642 condemned the post office monopoly. The arguments for monopoly, however, were not long to be gainsaid; and when Cromwell took up the question of the post office, and passed a comprehensive act on the subject in 1656, the monopoly as regards the conveyance of letters was conferred on the post office in express terms.
The claim took a hit earlier from the Long Parliament, which condemned the post office monopoly in 1642. However, the arguments in favor of the monopoly were not easily dismissed. When Cromwell addressed the issue of the post office and enacted a comprehensive law on the matter in 1656, he explicitly granted the post office the monopoly over letter delivery.
This act was confirmed after the Restoration in 1660; and the post office has remained undisturbed in the enjoyment of its monopoly since that date. In the North American colonies, the post office monopoly was never popular, though, owing to the ease with which it was evaded, it was regarded with indifference until close upon the war of the Revolution.
This law was reaffirmed after the Restoration in 1660, and the post office has kept its monopoly uninterrupted since then. In the North American colonies, the post office monopoly was never well-liked; however, because it was so easy to bypass, people generally ignored it until just before the Revolutionary War.
In 1663, the English government began to see the necessity for a postal service between England and its colonies in America. On the 1st of June of that year, the king wrote to the governor of Barbados[5] that it had become a matter of daily complaint that[Pg 4] there was no safe means of communication with Virginia, New England, Jamaica, Barbados and other colonies in America; and he directed the governor to establish a post office within Barbados and the Caribbee Islands.
In 1663, the English government realized the need for a postal service between England and its colonies in America. On June 1 of that year, the king wrote to the governor of Barbados[5] that it had become a daily issue that[Pg 4] there was no reliable way to communicate with Virginia, New England, Jamaica, Barbados, and other colonies in America; he instructed the governor to set up a post office in Barbados and the Caribbean Islands.
The post office was to be under the control of the postmaster general of England, to whom the accounts should be sent; and the rates of postage were to be the same as those fixed for England by the act of 1660. Nothing seems to have been done at this time towards establishing a post office in either Virginia or New England.
The post office was to be managed by the postmaster general of England, who would receive the accounts; and the postage rates were to be the same as those set for England by the act of 1660. It appears that nothing was done at this time to set up a post office in either Virginia or New England.
So far as the interests and convenience of the people of New England were concerned, these in no way suffered from the lack of attention on the part of the home government. The coffee house on the one side, and the tavern on the other, with the vessels passing between as often as business warranted, answered every reasonable demand.
As far as the interests and convenience of the people of New England were concerned, they were not negatively impacted by the home government's lack of attention. The coffee house on one side and the tavern on the other, along with the ships passing between as often as business required, met every reasonable need.
In Virginia it would not appear that the legislature at this period took any steps towards providing a place of deposit and delivery, such as Fairbank's, for letters passing between the colonists and their correspondents beyond the sea. But the want of this convenience caused little restriction on the exchange of letters by means of the trading vessels which visited Jamestown.
In Virginia, it doesn't seem like the legislature at this time made any moves to set up a place for depositing and delivering letters, like Fairbank's, for communication between the colonists and their correspondents overseas. However, the lack of this convenience didn’t significantly hinder the exchange of letters through the trading ships that came to Jamestown.
New York contained the only other considerable group of settlers at this time. It was a recent acquisition, having passed into the hands of the English in 1664. The Dutch, the former possessors, had arrangements for the exchange of letters with Amsterdam, not dissimilar from those in force in New England. In 1652 the Dutch West India Company informed their director general in New Amsterdam, that having observed that "private parties give their letters to this or that sailor or free merchant, which letters to their great disadvantage are often lost through neglect, remaining forgotten in the boxes or because one or the other removes to another place," they had a box hung up at their place of meeting in which letters might be deposited for despatch by the first vessel sailing; and they directed that the same step might be taken in New Netherland.[6]
New York had the only other significant group of settlers at this time. It was a recent acquisition, having come under English control in 1664. The Dutch, the previous owners, had systems for exchanging letters with Amsterdam that were similar to those in New England. In 1652, the Dutch West India Company notified their director general in New Amsterdam that they had noticed "private parties giving their letters to this or that sailor or free merchant, which letters are often lost due to neglect, left forgotten in the boxes, or because one or the other moves to another place." They set up a box at their meeting place where letters could be dropped off to be sent by the first ship that left; and they instructed that the same measure should be implemented in New Netherland.[6]
Seven years later, finding that the people of New Netherland persisted in disregarding the measures taken for the safety of their letters, the company repeated their order, and reinforced it by a fine of one hundred Carolus guilders for each infraction.[7]
Seven years later, seeing that the people of New Netherland continued to ignore the rules set for the safety of their correspondence, the company repeated their order and added a penalty of one hundred Carolus guilders for each violation.[7]
For some years after 1664, the trade between England and its new possession was of small proportions, and the opportunities[Pg 5] for sending letters from one to the other, few. Lord Cornbury, as late as 1702,[8] informed the Lords of Trade that there were so few vessels running between New York and ports in England that he had to depend for his correspondence on Boston or Philadelphia, which places had regular communication with the mother country.
For several years after 1664, trade between England and its new territory was minimal, and there were few chances[Pg 5] to send letters back and forth. As late as 1702, Lord Cornbury[8] informed the Lords of Trade that there were so few ships traveling between New York and ports in England that he had to rely on correspondence through Boston or Philadelphia, which had regular connections with the homeland.
Nor was the case of New York materially improved in 1708. Cornbury, in that year, pleaded with the board of trade for a regular packet service to some part of the American continent. Sometimes many months elapsed, without his hearing in any way from home. Before he received his last letters in May, he had heard nothing from England for fifteen months.
Nor was the situation in New York significantly better in 1708. Cornbury, that year, requested the board of trade to establish a regular mail service to some part of the American continent. Sometimes several months went by without him receiving any communication from home. Before he got his last letters in May, he hadn't heard from England for fifteen months.
There were but two safe ways of sending letters to England, which were the Virginia fleet, and the Mast fleet of New England. From Virginia there was no post, and it was very hard to know when that fleet would sail. From Boston there was a post by which Cornbury could hear once a week in summer, and once a fortnight in winter, so that they had a sure conveyance by the Mast fleet. Advantage had to be taken, as opportunity offered, Cornbury informed the board of trade, of the packets running from the West Indies to England, but as several of the packet boats had been captured, this was a very uncertain mode of communication.
There were only two reliable ways to send letters to England: the Virginia fleet and the Mast fleet of New England. In Virginia, there was no postal service, and it was difficult to know when that fleet would set sail. From Boston, there was a postal service that allowed Cornbury to receive updates once a week in summer and once every two weeks in winter, providing a dependable way to send letters via the Mast fleet. Whenever the opportunity arose, Cornbury informed the board of trade about the packets operating from the West Indies to England, but since several of the packet boats had been captured, this method of communication was very unreliable.
But, although the three groups of colonies had each its own connection with England, until 1672 there was no connection whatever between these groups. Nor was any thought to be necessary. The groups were separated from one another not only by space, but by social and political differences.
But, even though the three groups of colonies each had their own ties to England, there was no connection at all between these groups until 1672. And no one thought it was needed. The groups were separated not just by distance, but also by social and political differences.
The Puritans of New England and the Cavaliers of Virginia, had little in common but the memories of a quarrel, which was still warm; and New York was still largely Dutch, though even at that date it was taking on the cosmopolitan character, which has since distinguished it.
The Puritans of New England and the Cavaliers of Virginia had little in common except for the fresh memories of a conflict; meanwhile, New York was still mostly Dutch, although by that time it was starting to develop the cosmopolitan vibe that would later define it.
As for the trade of the colonies, Mr. Woodrow Wilson stated—"the main lines of trade run straight to the mother country, and were protected when there was need by English fleets. Both the laws of parliament and their own interest bound the trade of the colonies to England. The Navigation Act of 1660 forbade all trade with the colonies except in English bottoms; forbade also, the shipment of tobacco any whither but to England itself; and an act of 1663 forbade the importation of anything at all except out of England, which it was then once for all determined must[Pg 6] be the entrepôt and place of staple for all foreign trade. It was the Dutch against whom these acts were aimed."[9]
As for the trade of the colonies, Mr. Woodrow Wilson stated—"the main trading routes go directly to the mother country, and were safeguarded when necessary by English fleets. Both parliamentary laws and their own interests tied the trade of the colonies to England. The Navigation Act of 1660 prohibited all trade with the colonies except on English ships; it also banned the shipment of tobacco anywhere except to England itself; and a law from 1663 prohibited the importation of anything at all unless it came from England, which was then definitively established as the hub and main trading location for all foreign trade. These laws were specifically aimed at the Dutch."[Pg 6]
As has happened so often, however, that which could not be accomplished by reason of the feebleness of the common interest was brought about by the presence of impending danger. In 1672, war broke out between the English and the Dutch, the object of which was maritime supremacy and colonial expansion. The stakes were the colonies in Africa, the East Indies, the West Indies and America.
As has happened so often, however, what couldn't be achieved due to the lack of shared interest was finally prompted by the threat of danger. In 1672, war erupted between the English and the Dutch, aimed at gaining control of the seas and expanding their colonies. The stakes included colonies in Africa, the East Indies, the West Indies, and America.
The English having ousted their rivals from New York presented a strong front on the North American continent; and the only thing lacking was cohesion among the several colonies. At the outbreak of the war, the king directed governor Lovelace, of New York, to see what could be done towards establishing a regular postal communication between the colonies.
The English, having removed their competitors from New York, showed a strong presence on the North American continent; the only thing missing was unity among the various colonies. At the start of the war, the king instructed Governor Lovelace of New York to explore options for setting up a regular postal communication system between the colonies.
Lovelace arranged for a monthly service by courier between New York and Boston.[10] There was no road between the two places; and governor Winthrop was asked to provide an expert woodman, who would guide the courier by the easiest road.
Lovelace set up a monthly courier service between New York and Boston.[10] There was no direct road between the two cities, so Governor Winthrop was asked to recommend a skilled woodsman to lead the courier along the best route.
The courier was directed to blaze the route, and it was hoped that a good road might be made along the route pursued. The courier made his trips for a few months only, when New York was captured by a Dutch fleet which came suddenly upon it. The town was restored to the English at the conclusion of the war in 1674, and with the disappearance of the danger, the communication also was dropped.
The courier was told to map out the route, and there was hope that a good road could be built along the path taken. The courier only made his trips for a few months until a Dutch fleet unexpectedly captured New York. The town was returned to the English at the end of the war in 1674, and with the threat gone, the communication also stopped.
A few years later danger of a more serious character threatened from another quarter, and again the colonies were compelled to recognize the necessity of yielding something from the attitude of jealous independence, which characterized them. Between the English colonies and the French in Canada there was a steady rivalry for the possession of the fur trade of the Western country. Each had Indian allies, whose methods of warfare carried terror among their opponents.
A few years later, a more serious threat emerged from another direction, and once again, the colonies had to acknowledge the need to compromise their stance of jealous independence. There was constant competition between the English colonies and the French in Canada for control of the fur trade in the West. Both sides had Indian allies, whose warfare tactics instilled fear in their enemies.
The English were in numbers very much superior to the French; and if united and determined could have overwhelmed them. The unwillingness of the English to take any action in common was costing them dearly, as the outlying parts of all the colonies were being constantly harassed by the Indian tribes in league with the French.[Pg 7]
The English had many more numbers than the French, and if they had worked together and been determined, they could have easily defeated them. The English's hesitation to take action together was costing them a lot, as the remote areas of all the colonies were continuously attacked by the Indian tribes allied with the French.[Pg 7]
In 1684 a conference took place at Albany between the representatives of the several colonies and of the Iroquois nations. This conference was important in several respects, but particularly in the fact that it was the first in which all the colonies took part. Even remote Virginia sent a delegate.
In 1684, a conference was held in Albany with representatives from various colonies and the Iroquois nations. This conference was significant for several reasons, especially because it was the first time all the colonies participated. Even distant Virginia sent a delegate.
While the colonies were in this mind, Colonel Dongan, governor of New York, determined to make an effort to establish a permanent postal service among them. His plan was to establish a line of post houses along the coast from the French boundaries to Virginia. The king, who was much pleased with the proposition, directed Dongan to farm out the undertaking to some enterprising contractor, for a period of three or five years, and to turn over at least one-tenth of the profits to the Duke of York.[11]
While the colonies were in this mindset, Colonel Dongan, the governor of New York, decided to try to set up a permanent postal service among them. His plan was to create a line of post offices along the coast from the French borders to Virginia. The king, who was very pleased with the idea, instructed Dongan to outsource the project to an ambitious contractor for a period of three to five years, and to give at least one-tenth of the profits to the Duke of York.[11]
The duke appears to have had a claim on the revenues of the post office on two grounds. He was proprietor of the colony of New York; and under the post office act of 1660, he was recognized as entitled to a share in the profits from the English post office.
The duke seems to have had a claim on the post office's revenues for two reasons. First, he owned the colony of New York; second, under the post office act of 1660, he was acknowledged as entitled to a portion of the profits from the English post office.
How far Dongan succeeded with this extensive scheme does not appear. He planned to visit Connecticut, Boston, and, if possible, Pemaquid. In March 1685, he had an ordinance adopted in the council of New York for a post office throughout the colonies, and fixed the charges for the conveyance of letters at threepence for each hundred miles they were carried, and for the hire of horses for riding post, threepence a mile.
How successful Dongan was with this extensive plan is unclear. He intended to visit Connecticut, Boston, and, if possible, Pemaquid. In March 1685, he got an ordinance approved in the New York council for a post office across the colonies, setting the rates for sending letters at three pence for every hundred miles they were transported, and for hiring horses for riding post, three pence per mile.
Dongan's jurisdiction did not, however, extend beyond the colony of New York; and the records of the other colonies are silent as to their acquiescence in this arrangement. The only evidence that has appeared as to the operation of the service, and it establishes the fact that the service was performed for a time at least, is that Leisler, an insurrectionary leader, who seized the government of the colony in 1689, arrested the mail carrier on his way from New York to Boston, and confiscated his letters.[12]
Dongan's authority, however, did not extend beyond the colony of New York, and the records from other colonies do not indicate their agreement with this arrangement. The only evidence regarding the service's operation—which confirms that the service was functioning for at least some time—is that Leisler, a rebellious leader who took control of the colony in 1689, arrested the mail carrier on his route from New York to Boston and seized his letters.[12]
In July 1683, a weekly post was established in Pennsylvania. Letters were carried from Philadelphia to the Falls of Delaware for threepence; to Chester for twopence; to New Castle for fourpence; and to Maryland for sixpence.[13]
In July 1683, a weekly mail service was started in Pennsylvania. Letters were delivered from Philadelphia to the Falls of Delaware for three pennies; to Chester for two pennies; to New Castle for four pennies; and to Maryland for six pennies.[13]
As part of the scheme of James II for the confederation of the New England States under a royal governor, a postmaster was appointed for the united colonies. The choice fell upon Edward[Pg 8] Randolph, who had just previously been made secretary and registrar of the new province. The appointment was dated 23rd of November, 1685.[14] He seems to have discharged the duties of postmaster[15] until the fall of the Andros government, which followed closely the deposition of James II in 1689.
As part of James II's plan for the confederation of the New England States under a royal governor, a postmaster was appointed for the united colonies. Edward[Pg 8] Randolph was chosen, having just been made secretary and registrar of the new province. The appointment was dated November 23, 1685.[14] He seems to have carried out the duties of postmaster[15] until the fall of the Andros government, which came soon after the deposition of James II in 1689.
Until this time, then, the post office would be classed generally among the merely temporary conveniences of the state, and not among its permanent institutions. When William III was settled on his throne, he managed, amid his cares at home and abroad, to give some attention to the affairs of the colonies. Those in North America had been growing rapidly, and at the end of the period of the revolution in England, the population is believed to have been about 200,000.
Until this point, the post office was generally seen as just a temporary convenience of the state, not a permanent institution. When William III was established on his throne, he managed, amidst his concerns at home and abroad, to pay some attention to the colonies. The colonies in North America had been growing quickly, and by the end of the revolution in England, the population was estimated to be around 200,000.
The greater part of the increase was in the middle states of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania; though in the south, the colonies of Maryland and Virginia showed considerable gain, and a beginning was made in the settlement of the Carolinas.
The majority of the increase happened in the middle states of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; however, in the south, the colonies of Maryland and Virginia saw significant growth, and the settlement of the Carolinas started to take shape.
The question of providing the American colonies with a postal system was submitted to the king by Thomas Neale, Master of the Mint, who coupled his representations on the subject with a petition for authority to establish such a system in America at his own charges. He pointed out in his memorial that there had never been a post for the conveying of letters within or between Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New York, New England, East and West Jersey, Pennsylvania, and northward as far as the king's dominions reach in America; and that the want thereof had been a great hindrance to the trade of those parts.
The issue of setting up a postal system for the American colonies was brought to the king by Thomas Neale, the Master of the Mint. He combined his request on this matter with a petition for permission to create such a system in America at his own expense. In his memorial, he pointed out that there had never been a way to send letters within or between Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New York, New England, East and West Jersey, Pennsylvania, and northward to the extent of the king’s territories in America; and that the lack of this service had significantly hindered trade in those regions.
The king thereupon, on the 17th of February, 1691, granted a patent to Neale, conferring upon him authority to set up one or more post offices in each of the chief ports of the several islands, plantations and colonies in America, and to carry on all the functions of postmaster, either in person or by deputy. He might collect as his own, the postage accruing from the business, the rates being fixed by the English post office act of 1660; or he was at liberty to charge such other rates "as the planters and others will freely agree to give for their letters or packets upon the first settlement of such office or offices."
The king, on February 17, 1691, granted a patent to Neale, giving him the authority to set up one or more post offices in each of the main ports of the various islands, plantations, and colonies in America, and to carry out all the duties of postmaster, either personally or through a deputy. He could keep the postage generated from this service, with the rates set by the English post office act of 1660; or he was free to charge other rates "as the planters and others will freely agree to give for their letters or packets upon the first settlement of such office or offices."
In order to secure to Neale a monopoly of the postal business, the patent imposed a prohibition on any person except Neale[Pg 9] from setting up post offices during the term of the patent, which was twenty-one years. Neale was held bound to provide an efficient service; in case of dissatisfaction, or of his failure to put the service in operation within two years, the patent was to become invalid. The consideration that Neale was to give for the patent was merely nominal; he was to remit six shillings and eightpence to the exchequer each year at the Feast of St. Michael the Archangel.
To ensure that Neale had exclusive control over the postal business, the patent prohibited anyone other than Neale[Pg 9] from establishing post offices for the duration of the patent, which lasted twenty-one years. Neale was required to deliver a reliable service; if customers were unhappy or if he failed to start the service within two years, the patent would become void. The payment Neale was required to make for the patent was minimal; he had to send six shillings and eightpence to the treasury each year on the Feast of St. Michael the Archangel.
Having secured his patent, Neale sought a suitable person to act as his deputy. His choice fell upon Andrew Hamilton, an Edinburgh merchant, who after seven years' residence in New Jersey, was made governor of that province in 1692. Hamilton was a man of energy and ability; and in the difficult task of conciliating sensitive legislatures, and bringing them into agreement with his views, he had much success. It was to him that the colonies were indebted for their first effective postal system.
Having secured his patent, Neale looked for a suitable person to serve as his deputy. He chose Andrew Hamilton, a merchant from Edinburgh, who, after spending seven years in New Jersey, became the governor of that province in 1692. Hamilton was a man of energy and skill; and in the challenging job of winning over sensitive legislatures and getting them to align with his ideas, he achieved a lot of success. It was thanks to him that the colonies got their first effective postal system.
Neale's patent did not give him power to set up a postal service, and fix his charges without regard to the will of the people. He might either apply the rates fixed by the act of 1660; or come to terms with the people or their representatives as to the rates they would agree to pay. The latter was the alternative chosen.
Neale's patent didn't give him the authority to establish a postal service and set his prices without considering what people wanted. He could either use the rates established by the act of 1660 or negotiate with the people or their representatives about the rates they would agree to pay. He chose the latter option.
Accordingly, during the year 1693, Hamilton addressed himself to the several colonial governments, setting forth his plan, and begging that they might "ascertain and establish such rates and terms as should tend to quicker maintenance of mutual correspondence among the neighbouring colonies and plantations, and that trade and commerce might be better preserved."
Accordingly, in 1693, Hamilton reached out to various colonial governments, presenting his plan and requesting that they "determine and establish rates and terms that would promote faster communication between neighboring colonies and plantations, and that trade and commerce could be better maintained."
The colonies having responded favourably to his overtures, Hamilton prepared a draft bill, which he submitted to the legislatures for their acceptance. This bill provided for a general post office or chief letter office in the principal town of each colony, the postmaster of which was to be appointed by Hamilton. The monopoly conferred on Neale by his patent was enforced in the proposed bill by considerable penalties for infringements.
The colonies responded positively to his proposals, so Hamilton created a draft bill and submitted it to the legislatures for approval. This bill called for a general post office, or main letter office, in the main town of each colony, with the postmaster to be appointed by Hamilton. The bill also reinforced the monopoly granted to Neale by his patent, imposing significant penalties for any violations.
The postal charges, as well as the privileges and appurtenances to be granted to post masters and mail couriers, were discussed between Hamilton and the several legislatures. There was some variety in the privileges allowed to postmasters and couriers. In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, the mail couriers were granted free ferriage over the rivers and other water courses which lay along their routes. In the acts passed by New York and New Hampshire, there was no mention of free ferries, but in each of these acts a rather peculiar exemption is made in favour[Pg 10] of the postmasters, that they should not be subject to excise charges on the ale and other liquors which formed the stock in trade of their business as innkeepers.
The postage rates and the benefits and perks for postmasters and mail couriers were talked about between Hamilton and the various legislatures. There were some differences in the benefits given to postmasters and couriers. In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, mail couriers were allowed to cross rivers and other bodies of water for free while on their routes. However, in the laws passed by New York and New Hampshire, there was no mention of free ferry crossings, but each of these laws included a rather unique exemption for postmasters, stating that they wouldn't have to pay excise taxes on the ale and other drinks that were part of their business as innkeepers.[Pg 10]
The postmasters in all the colonies were made exempt from all public services, such as keeping watch and ward, and sitting on juries. Shipmasters on arriving at a port with letters in their care were enjoined to deliver them to the nearest post office, where they would receive one halfpenny for each letter.[16]
The postmasters in all the colonies were exempt from public duties, like keeping watch and ward, and serving on juries. When shipmasters arrived at a port with letters, they were required to deliver them to the nearest post office, where they'd get half a penny for each letter.[16]
The principal postal rates, as settled between Hamilton and the legislatures concerned were as follows: on letters from Europe or from any country beyond sea, if for Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania twopence; if for New York ninepence. In the interchange among the colonies themselves, the charge on a letter passing between Boston and Philadelphia was fifteen pence, and between New York and Philadelphia fourpence-halfpenny.
The main postal rates, as agreed upon by Hamilton and the relevant legislatures, were as follows: for letters from Europe or any overseas country, if addressed to Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, the cost was two pence; if to New York, the cost was nine pence. For letters exchanged between the colonies, the fee for a letter traveling from Boston to Philadelphia was fifteen pence, and from New York to Philadelphia, it was four and a half pence.
There was a peculiarity in the postage on letters passing between Boston and New York. It differed according to the direction the letter was conveyed. A letter from New York to Boston cost twelvepence; while ninepence was the charge from Boston to New York. This is one of the consequences of the separate negotiations carried on by Hamilton with the different legislatures.
There was a strange thing about the postage on letters sent between Boston and New York. It changed depending on which direction the letter was going. A letter from New York to Boston cost twelve pence, while sending one from Boston to New York only cost nine pence. This is one of the results of the separate negotiations Hamilton had with the different legislatures.
The Massachusetts act fixed the charge on the letters for delivery in Boston; and the New York act on the letters for New York. From Virginia, to Philadelphia, New York and Boston, the charges were ninepence, twelvepence and two shillings respectively. All the acts concurred in the stipulation that letters on public business should be carried free of charge.
The Massachusetts law set the delivery fees for letters in Boston, while the New York law established similar fees for New York. From Virginia to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, the charges were nine pence, twelve pence, and two shillings, respectively. All the laws agreed that letters related to public business should be delivered free of charge.
The foregoing contains the substance of the acts passed by New York and Pennsylvania. Massachusetts went a step further. To that legislature it appeared desirable to put a binding clause requiring Hamilton to give a satisfactory service. Massachusetts was as willing as the others to grant a monopoly of letter carrying to Hamilton, but it was of opinion that the exclusive privilege should carry an obligation with it. The postal service was being established as a public convenience; and if Hamilton was to have the power to prevent any person else from providing the convenience, he should be bound to meet the public requirements himself.[Pg 11]
The above summarizes the laws passed by New York and Pennsylvania. Massachusetts went a step further. That legislature felt it was important to include a clause that required Hamilton to provide satisfactory service. Massachusetts was just as willing as the others to grant Hamilton a monopoly on letter delivery, but believed that this exclusive privilege should come with an obligation. The postal service was being set up as a public convenience; and since Hamilton was given the authority to stop anyone else from offering that convenience, he should be responsible for meeting the public's needs himself.[Pg 11]
The Massachusetts legislature, after authorizing Hamilton to settle a post office in Boston, fixing the postal charges, and conferring a monopoly on him, accordingly added a clause binding Hamilton to maintain constant posts for the carriage of letters to the several places mentioned in the act; to deliver the letters faithfully and seasonably; and it imposed a fine of £5 for each omission.
The Massachusetts legislature, after allowing Hamilton to set up a post office in Boston, establishing the postal rates, and granting him a monopoly, added a requirement that Hamilton maintain regular mail service for delivering letters to the locations specified in the act; to deliver the letters reliably and on time; and imposed a £5 fine for each failure to do so.
In order that the public might be in a position to detect any delays in the delivery of letters after they reached a post office, the postmaster was required to mark on each letter the date on which it was received at his office. New Hampshire followed Massachusetts in adding this clause to its post office acts.
In order for the public to spot any delays in letter delivery once they arrived at a post office, the postmaster was required to write the date each letter was received at his office. New Hampshire followed Massachusetts in adding this clause to its post office laws.
The four acts were sent to London, and laid before the king in council, as all colonial acts were. The acts of New York, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire passed council and became law. On the advice of the governors of the post office, the Massachusetts act was disallowed.[17]
The four acts were sent to London and presented to the king in council, just like all colonial acts. The acts from New York, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire were approved by the council and became law. However, on the recommendation of the governors of the post office, the Massachusetts act was rejected.[17]
The grounds for the discrimination against Massachusetts are difficult to understand. The Massachusetts act undoubtedly contained departures from the terms of the patent. But they were such departures as might be expected when an act is drawn up, by a person unlearned in the law, who, having the patent before him, aims at substantial rather than at literal conformity therewith. There can be no question that the drafts presented to the several assemblies were prepared by one person. Their practical identity establishes the fact.
The reasons for the discrimination against Massachusetts are hard to grasp. The Massachusetts act definitely had differences from the terms of the patent. However, these differences are what you might expect when a person who isn't well-versed in the law tries to create an act, using the patent as a guide and focusing more on the spirit of the law rather than a word-for-word match. There's no doubt that the drafts submitted to the various assemblies were made by one individual. Their practical similarity proves this point.
There can be equally little doubt that the draftsman was Hamilton himself. The governors of the post office, who framed the objections,[18] noted first that the patent provided that the appointment of Neale's deputy should, at his request, be made by the postmaster general; whereas the Massachusetts act appeared to appoint Andrew Hamilton postmaster general of the colonies, independently of the postmaster general of England, and not subject to the patent.
There is also no doubt that Hamilton himself was the one who drafted it. The governors of the post office, who raised the objections,[18] pointed out first that the patent stated that Neale's deputy should be appointed by the postmaster general at his request; however, the Massachusetts act seemed to appoint Andrew Hamilton as the postmaster general of the colonies, independently from the postmaster general of England, and not subject to the patent.
The patent required Neale to furnish accounts at stated intervals to enable the treasury to establish the profits from the enterprize. It also stipulated for the cancellation of the patent in certain eventualities. Both these terms are omitted from the act. Insufficient care was taken in safeguarding the post office revenue,[Pg 12] and no provision was made for a successor in case of the removal of Hamilton from his position.
The patent required Neale to provide accounts at specified intervals so the treasury could determine the profits from the venture. It also included conditions for canceling the patent under certain circumstances. Both of these terms are missing from the act. Not enough attention was given to protecting the post office revenue,[Pg 12] and there was no plan for a successor if Hamilton was removed from his position.
The points to which the post office drew attention were, as will be seen, far from wanting weight; and if they had not been pressed against the Massachusetts bill alone, would have excited little comment. But the Massachusetts general court noted and resented the discrimination. When Neale was informed of the disallowance, he begged the governors of the post office to prepare a bill which they would regard as free from objections, and to lend their efforts to have it accepted by Massachusetts.[19]
The issues the post office highlighted were quite significant; if they hadn't been specifically focused on the Massachusetts bill, they probably wouldn't have drawn much attention. However, the Massachusetts general court took note of and was upset by the bias. When Neale learned about the rejection, he asked the post office governors to draft a bill they believed would be acceptable and to support its approval by Massachusetts.[19]
Five days later it came up for consideration, but it was resolved that the committee on the bill should "sit this afternoon,"[22] and it appeared in the assembly no more. The rejection of the bill, however, was of little or no practical consequence. The post office was too great a convenience to be refused; and so it was established and conducted as if the bill were in operation, except that it had no monopoly in that colony.
Five days later, it was reviewed, but it was decided that the committee on the bill should "meet this afternoon,"[22] and it didn’t appear in the assembly again. The bill’s rejection didn’t really matter much in practice. The post office was too useful to ignore, so it was set up and run as if the bill were in effect, except that it didn’t have a monopoly in that colony.
But the legislature, which was evidently desirous of extending in its own way all reasonable aid to Hamilton, passed an order in 1703[23] requiring shipmasters to deliver all letters they brought with them from oversea at the post office of the place of their arrival, for which they were to receive a halfpenny each from the postmaster. Massachusetts equally with the other colonies made an annual grant to the post office for the conveyance of its public letters.
But the legislature, clearly wanting to support Hamilton in its own way, passed an order in 1703[23] requiring ship captains to deliver all letters they brought from overseas to the local post office upon arrival, for which they would receive a halfpenny from the postmaster. Massachusetts, like the other colonies, also made an annual grant to the post office for the delivery of its public letters.
So far the narrative deals only with the northern colonies. The proposition for a post office, however, was submitted to Virginia and Maryland as well. It would seem, however, that the mode of approaching these governments differed from that taken in laying the proposition before the northern colonies. In case of the northern colonies Hamilton dealt with the legislatures in person. The draft bill which he prepared was submitted as a basis for discussion. So far as it went it was accepted, and Hamilton agreed to such additions as the legislatures considered necessary in view of local circumstances.[Pg 13]
So far, the story is only focused on the northern colonies. However, the proposal for a post office was also presented to Virginia and Maryland. It seems that the way of approaching these governments was different from how he presented the idea to the northern colonies. In the case of the northern colonies, Hamilton met with the legislatures directly. The draft bill he prepared was put forward as a starting point for discussion. It was accepted as far as it went, and Hamilton agreed to any additions the legislatures thought were necessary based on local circumstances.[Pg 13]
Virginia and Maryland were approached quite differently. They were advised of the scheme not by Hamilton, but by the English court. In the minutes of council of both governments,[24] it is recorded that the proposition was laid before them in a letter from the queen. This fact will account for the very different consideration the proposition received from these colonies. Maryland rejected it outright. On the 13th of May, 1695, the scheme was laid before the house of burgesses. It was set aside,[25] and nothing more was heard of it.
Virginia and Maryland were approached in very different ways. They were informed of the plan not by Hamilton, but by the English court. In the council minutes of both governments,[24] it is noted that the proposal was presented to them in a letter from the queen. This explains the starkly different reactions the proposal received from these colonies. Maryland rejected it completely. On May 13, 1695, the plan was brought before the house of burgesses. It was dismissed,[25] and nothing further was heard about it.
Virginia gave attentive consideration to the proposition to establish a post office, though the ultimate results were no greater than in Maryland. There had been since 1658 an arrangement for the transmission of letters concerning the public affairs of the colony.[26] An order was issued by the council that all letters superscribed for the public service should be immediately conveyed from plantation to plantation to the place and person directed, and that any delay should subject the person at fault to a fine of one hogshead of tobacco.
Virginia carefully considered the idea of setting up a post office, but the final outcomes were no better than in Maryland. Since 1658, there had been a system in place for sending letters related to the colony's public affairs.[26] The council issued an order stating that all letters marked for public service should be promptly delivered from plantation to plantation to the specified location and person, and any delays would result in a fine of one hogshead of tobacco for the responsible party.
No arrangements of a systematic nature were made for the conveyance of private letters. When information of the patent granted to Neale reached Virginia, the colony showed immediate interest. The council on the 12th of January, 1693, appointed Peter Heyman deputy postmaster,[27] and proceeded to draw up a post office bill. This bill, which became law on the 3rd of April 1693,[28] authorized Neale to establish a postal system in the colony, at his own expense.
No formal plans were put in place for sending private letters. When news about the patent granted to Neale reached Virginia, the colony quickly became interested. The council, on January 12, 1693, appointed Peter Heyman as deputy postmaster,[27] and started drafting a post office bill. This bill, which became law on April 3, 1693,[28] allowed Neale to set up a postal system in the colony at his own expense.
The conditions were that he was to set up a general post office at some convenient place, and settle one or more sub-post offices in each county. As letters were posted in the colony or reached it from abroad, they were to be forthwith dispersed, carried and delivered in accordance with the directions they bore, and all letters for England were to be despatched by the first ship bound for any part of that country.
The requirements were that he had to establish a main post office in a convenient location and set up one or more sub-post offices in each county. As letters were mailed in the colony or arrived from other countries, they were to be quickly sorted, transported, and delivered according to their instructions, and all letters going to England were to be sent out on the first ship headed to any part of that country.
The rates of postage were to be threepence a single letter within an eighty mile radius; fourpence-half penny for single letters outside[Pg 14] the eighty mile radius; and eighteen pence for each ounce weight. Public letters were to pass free of postage. No provision was made for postage on letters addressed to places beyond the boundaries of the colony; and it was expressly stipulated that the act did not confer a monopoly on Neale. Merchants were not restrained by this act from employing the services of shipmasters and others, to carry their letters abroad.
The postage rates were set at threepence for a single letter within an eighty-mile radius; fourpence half-penny for single letters outside[Pg 14] that radius; and eighteen pence for each ounce of weight. Public letters were to be free of postage. There was no provision for postage on letters sent to places beyond the colony's borders; and it was clearly stated that the act did not grant a monopoly to Neale. Merchants were not limited by this act from using shipmasters and others to send their letters abroad.
The Virginia act of 1693 was local in its scope and provincial in its character. There is a certain simplicity in the extent of its demands as compared with the paucity of its concessions. Neale, at his own cost, was to establish a postal system, comprising a general post office at a place agreed upon, and one or more subordinate offices in each county. Couriers were to be available to take letters anywhere within the colony—without postage if on public business, at rates fixed by the colony if they were private letters. But no person need employ the post office, should any other more convenient or cheaper mode of conveyance offer itself.
The Virginia act of 1693 was limited in its focus and somewhat narrow in its approach. There’s a certain straightforwardness in its requirements compared to the very few benefits it offered. Neale, at his own expense, was to set up a postal system, which included a main post office at a mutually agreed location and one or more branch offices in each county. Couriers were to be available to deliver letters anywhere within the colony—without charge if it was for public business, and at rates determined by the colony for private letters. However, no one was obligated to use the post office if they found a more convenient or cheaper way to send their mail.
A post office, like other kindred accommodations, creates business for itself; but Virginia did not intend that Neale should have any assurance of the business he had brought into existence. As soon as it reached a point at which it was worth struggling for, a competitor might step in and deprive Neale of the fruits of his enterprise.
A post office, like other similar services, generates business for itself; however, Virginia didn’t want Neale to feel secure about the business he had created. Once it reached a stage where it was worth fighting for, a competitor could come in and take away the rewards of Neale's efforts.
The act of 1693 seems to have been adopted before the colonies were made aware of Hamilton's connection with the American post office. When the council of Virginia were advised of Hamilton's appointment, they opened communication with him. The notes of the correspondence as they appear in the minutes of council[29] do not give much information, but they show that Hamilton's proposition when submitted to council was not found acceptable; and as subsequent communications failed to remove the difficulties, matters remained as they were until after the Neale patent had expired.
The act of 1693 seems to have been passed before the colonies knew about Hamilton's link to the American post office. When the Virginia council learned of Hamilton's appointment, they reached out to him. The notes from the correspondence in the council minutes[29] don't provide much information, but they indicate that Hamilton's proposal was not accepted by the council. As later communications did not resolve the issues, things stayed the same until after the Neale patent expired.
In 1710, the subject was reopened, and the governor reported to the board of trade, that for two months past he had been expecting Hamilton to visit Virginia, for the purpose of opening a post office, and connecting it with the other colonies. The governor believed that the scheme was feasible, and would do his utmost[Pg 15] to encourage it. He foresaw a difficulty in the lack of small currency, tobacco which was the only specie, being in the governor's words "very incommodious to receive small payments in, and of very uncertain value."[30]
In 1710, the topic was brought up again, and the governor informed the board of trade that he had been waiting for two months for Hamilton to come to Virginia to set up a post office and link it with the other colonies. The governor thought the plan was doable and would do everything he could to support it. He anticipated a challenge due to the shortage of small currency, as tobacco, being the only form of currency, was, in the governor's words, "very inconvenient for making small payments and of very uncertain value."[30]
The line of posts established by Hamilton extended from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to Philadelphia. Over this long line, couriers travelled with the mails weekly each way.[31] The volume of correspondence carried cannot be ascertained, as the great mass of it, being on public business, would be free of postage. But the postage collected throughout North America during the first four years, from 1693 to 1697, was only £1456 18s. 3d., an average receipt of considerably less than £400 a year.
The network of posts set up by Hamilton stretched from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to Philadelphia. Along this long route, couriers traveled weekly in both directions with the mail.[31] The total amount of correspondence carried is unclear, since much of it was related to public business and didn't require postage. However, the total postage collected across North America during the first four years, from 1693 to 1697, was just £1456 18s. 3d., averaging less than £400 a year.
By way of comparison it may be noted that, in 1693, the revenue between London and Edinburgh was £500; and it was explained that nearly the whole of that amount was for government despatches. The expenses of the Portsmouth-Philadelphia service during those years were £3817 6s. 11d.[32] The deficit of £2360 8s. 8d. fell upon Neale. Results such as these would be sufficiently discouraging. But Neale and his deputy, Hamilton, were hopeful, and drew comfort from the fact that the revenue of New York which was quite insignificant the first year had doubled itself in the third year.
By comparison, in 1693, the revenue between London and Edinburgh was £500, mostly from government dispatches. The expenses for the Portsmouth-Philadelphia service during those years were £3817 6s. 11d.[32] This left a deficit of £2360 8s. 8d., which Neale had to cover. Results like these would be quite discouraging. However, Neale and his deputy, Hamilton, remained optimistic and took comfort in the fact that New York's revenue, which was very small in the first year, had doubled by the third year.
At the end of the sixth year, the revenue had increased to the point at which all the expenses were met, except Hamilton's salary.[33] In 1699, Hamilton went to England, and joined Neale in an appeal to the treasury.[34] After pointing out the benefits accruing to the colonies from the post office—the increase in the transatlantic and intercolonial trade, the rapid diffusion of intelligence in time of war, and the facilities afforded for the delivery of public letters—they declared that unless steps were taken to secure to them the transmission of the whole, and not a mere portion of the oversea correspondence, they might be compelled to abandon the undertaking.
At the end of the sixth year, the revenue had increased enough to cover all expenses, except Hamilton's salary.[33] In 1699, Hamilton went to England and teamed up with Neale to appeal to the treasury.[34] They highlighted the advantages the colonies gained from the post office—the boost in transatlantic and intercolonial trade, the quick spread of information during wartime, and the help provided for delivering public letters—and stated that if action wasn't taken to ensure that they received the full transmission of all overseas correspondence, and not just a part of it, they might have to give up the project.
The plan Neale and Hamilton proposed to this end, was to put a stop to the collection of letters at the English coffee houses, and to compel the shipmasters to take all their letters from the local post office, where they would be made up in sealed bags.
The plan Neale and Hamilton suggested for this was to stop collecting letters at the English coffeehouses and to require shipmasters to pick up all their letters from the local post office, where they would be gathered in sealed bags.
Besides ensuring to Neale, by this means, the postage on all[Pg 16] the correspondence passing between the mother country and the colonies, the measure proposed would prevent certain abuses which were incident to the existing arrangement. Where the bag hung open in a coffee house, any person might examine its contents on the pretext that he wanted to get his own letter back, and when the ship had reached its destination it was the practice of some captains to delay the delivery of the letters in their hands until they are ready to sail again, and then they got rid of their letters in any way they could.
Besides ensuring that Neale would cover the postage on all[Pg 16] the correspondence between the mother country and the colonies, the proposed measure would prevent certain abuses that were part of the current system. When the bag was left open in a coffee house, anyone could look through its contents, claiming they were trying to find their own letter. Additionally, once the ship arrived at its destination, some captains would often hold back the delivery of the letters they had until they were ready to sail again, and then they would dispose of the letters however they could.
If the mails were made up in post offices, and the captains were compelled by law to deliver them to the post office at the port of destination before they broke bulk, these evils would be corrected, and a large revenue now lost to the post office would be saved.
If the mail was prepared in post offices, and the captains were required by law to deliver it to the post office at the destination before unloading, these problems would be fixed, and a significant revenue currently lost to the post office would be recovered.
Neale and Hamilton also submitted a revised tariff of postal charges, in which there was a general increase. The postmasters general in England rather deprecated the increased postal rates, stating that experience had taught them that low rates were found to be more productive of revenue than those which placed the post office beyond the reach of the mass of the people. They approved of the suggestion that post offices should be established in England for the handling of oversea mails, and hoped that a few years of good management would make the service a remunerative one.
Neale and Hamilton also submitted an updated list of postal rates, which included a general increase. The postmasters general in England were not in favor of the higher postal rates, arguing that their experience showed that lower rates generated more revenue than rates that made the post office inaccessible to most people. They supported the idea of setting up post offices in England for managing overseas mail and hoped that with a few years of effective management, the service would become profitable.
At this point the postmasters general in London threw out a suggestion, which was worth discussion. They doubted whether a post office in private hands would ever commend itself to the colonies in the same way as if it were directly in the hands of the king. The post office depended for its prosperity on the maintenance of its monopoly, a thing naturally distasteful. The monopoly was easily evaded, even if the colonial governments supported it heartily, but any lack of inclination on their part would leave it valueless. They were of opinion that it would require all the authority possessed by the king to induce the colonial governments to co-operate with the heads of the post office in the efforts of the latter to put the service on a sound footing.
At this point, the postmasters general in London proposed an idea that was worth discussing. They were unsure if a post office in private hands would be accepted by the colonies in the same way as one that was directly managed by the king. The post office's success relied on maintaining its monopoly, which was naturally unpopular. This monopoly could easily be avoided, even if the colonial governments fully supported it; however, any lack of enthusiasm from them would render it ineffective. They believed that it would take all the king's authority to get the colonial governments to work together with the post office leaders to establish a reliable service.
Neale, who was sinking deeper and deeper into debt, seized on this expression of opinion, and offered to surrender his patent at any time, on such consideration as seemed just. The treasury, however, were not yet ready to take over the American posts, but they directed the postmasters general to give Hamilton every assistance in their power, and requested the governors of the colonies to do the same, adding that when the value of the post office could[Pg 17] be ascertained, they would give the question of the resumption of the patent, further consideration.
Neale, who was sinking deeper into debt, jumped on this opinion and offered to give up his patent at any time, for a fair compensation. However, the treasury wasn’t ready to take over the American postal services yet, but they instructed the postmasters general to provide Hamilton with all the help they could and asked the governors of the colonies to do the same, noting that when the value of the post office could[Pg 17] be determined, they would further consider the issue of resuming the patent.
Neale's indebtedness to Hamilton for salary now amounting to £1100, he assigned his patent to Hamilton, and to one Robert West, who had made some advances to Neale some years before. The new patentees besought the government to extend their term, which in ordinary course would expire in 1712. Their confidence in the eventual success of the scheme, however, suggested to the postmasters general that the time was now ripe for the crown to take back the patent, and manage the postal service through the general post office in England.
Neale owed Hamilton a salary of £1100, so he transferred his patent to Hamilton and to Robert West, who had lent Neale some money years earlier. The new patent holders asked the government to extend their term, which would normally end in 1712. Their belief in the eventual success of the project, however, led the postmasters general to think that it was the right time for the crown to reclaim the patent and run the postal service through the general post office in England.
The transfer was made; and John Hamilton,[35] son of the founder of the American post office, who died in 1703, was entrusted with the management of the service, as the deputy of the postmaster general. The results were no better than when the service was privately administered. In 1709, there was a yearly deficit of £200; and as the queen would not allow her losses on this head to be augmented, the postmasters were not being paid.[36]
The transfer was completed, and John Hamilton,[35] son of the founder of the American post office, who passed away in 1703, was given the responsibility of managing the service as the deputy to the postmaster general. The outcomes were no better than when the service was run privately. In 1709, there was an annual shortfall of £200, and since the queen wouldn’t allow her losses on this matter to increase, the postmasters weren’t getting paid.[36]
The postmaster of New England made a strong representation to the government of Massachusetts, pointing out that he had received nothing from the government since 1706, although he had saved the colony £150 a year by the delivery of the public letters. The remonstrance was fruitless, and he renewed his application in 1711. The legislative council on each occasion was prepared to pay what was due to the postmaster, but the assembly could not be brought to authorize it.
The postmaster of New England strongly appealed to the Massachusetts government, noting that he hadn't received anything from them since 1706, even though he had saved the colony £150 a year by delivering public letters. His complaint didn’t lead to any results, so he made another request in 1711. The legislative council was ready to pay what was owed to the postmaster each time, but the assembly refused to give the authorization.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Ibid., p. 330.
[3] G.P.O., Treasury Letter-Book, 1760-1771, p. 95.
[7] Ibid., p. 446.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid, p. 446.
[16] The several colonial acts were as follows: New York, passed November 11, 1692 (Laws of Colony of N. Y., I. 293); Massachusetts, June 9, 1693 (ch. 3, 1 sess. Province Laws, I. 115); Pennsylvania, May 15, June 1, 1693 (Duke of York's Laws, p. 224); New Hampshire, June 5, 1693 (N. H. Prov. Laws, p. 561); Connecticut, May 10, 1694 (Pub. Rec. of Conn., 1689-1706 p. 123).
[16] The various colonial laws were as follows: New York, enacted on November 11, 1692 (Laws of Colony of N. Y., I. 293); Massachusetts, June 9, 1693 (ch. 3, 1 sess. Province Laws, I. 115); Pennsylvania, May 15 and June 1, 1693 (Duke of York's Laws, p. 224); New Hampshire, June 5, 1693 (N. H. Prov. Laws, p. 561); Connecticut, May 10, 1694 (Pub. Rec. of Conn., 1689-1706 p. 123).
[20] Ibid., no. 1286.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., no. 1286.
[22] Ibid., p. 420.
[24] Minutes of council, Virginia, January 12, 1693, Cal. S. P. Col. Am. and W. I., 1693-1696, no. 21; minutes of council, Maryland, September 24, 1694, ibid., no. 1339.
[24] Records of the council, Virginia, January 12, 1693, Cal. S. P. Col. Am. and W. I., 1693-1696, no. 21; records of the council, Maryland, September 24, 1694, ibid., no. 1339.
[26] Hening's Statutes at Large, I. 436.
[29] Minutes of council, Virginia, May 25, November 10, 1693; October 19, 25, 1694; May 3, July 25, 1695; Cal. S. P. Col. Am. and W. I., 1693-1696, nos. 371, 671, 1430, 1454, 1804, 1975.
[29] Minutes of the council, Virginia, May 25, November 10, 1693; October 19, 25, 1694; May 3, July 25, 1695; Cal. S. P. Col. Am. and W. I., 1693-1696, nos. 371, 671, 1430, 1454, 1804, 1975.
[32] G.P.O., Treasury, II. 256.
[34] G.P.O., Treasury, II. 253.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ G.P.O., Treasury, II. 253.
CHAPTER II
Colonial post office under Queen Anne's act—Early packet service.
Colonial post office under Queen Anne's act—Early mail delivery service.
For some years various circumstances had been arising which made it necessary that the post office in Great Britain and the colonies should be established on a footing different from that on which it then stood. The legislative union between England and Scotland in 1707 called for a uniform postal service throughout Britain; but without additional legislation the postmaster general of England could not dispose of the revenues of the post office in Scotland.
For several years, various circumstances made it necessary for the post office in Great Britain and its colonies to be set up differently than it was at the time. The legislative union between England and Scotland in 1707 required a uniform postal service across Britain; however, without further legislation, the postmaster general of England couldn't manage the revenues of the post office in Scotland.
The colonies were in their infancy when the English law of 1660 was enacted, and they were not mentioned in it at all. The only clause in that act which affected the colonies in any way was that which required all masters of ships who brought letters with them from beyond the seas, to deposit them at the nearest post office. There was no penalty attached to the disregard of this clause, and the attempt to induce the shipmasters to obey the law by paying them a penny for every letter they delivered in the English post office was pronounced by the auditors to be illegal, and there was a threat made that these payments would be disallowed in the accounts.
The colonies were still young when the English law of 1660 was put into effect, and they weren't mentioned at all in it. The only part of that act that had any impact on the colonies was the requirement for all ship captains bringing letters from overseas to drop them off at the nearest post office. There was no punishment for ignoring this rule, and the effort to encourage shipmasters to follow the law by offering them a penny for every letter they delivered to the English post office was deemed illegal by the auditors, along with a warning that these payments might be rejected in the accounts.
There were a number of other circumstances arising out of the growth of the kingdom and its colonial expansion, which compelled the postmaster general to take action in advance of legal authority. When the treasury, after the union of England and Scotland, learned that a new post office law was necessary, they determined to take advantage of the fact to serve their own purposes. The war of the Spanish Succession, which began in 1702, while ruinous to France, also seriously crippled England; and the treasury saw that the enactment of a new post office act might be utilized to increase the postal charges, and additional sums raised for carrying on and finishing the war.
There were several other factors resulting from the growth of the kingdom and its colonial expansion that forced the postmaster general to act before having legal authority. When the treasury, following the merger of England and Scotland, realized that a new post office law was needed, they decided to use the situation to benefit their own interests. The War of the Spanish Succession, which started in 1702, devastated France but also significantly weakened England; the treasury recognized that passing a new post office act could be a way to raise postal fees and generate extra funds to continue and complete the war.
The effect of the new law on the colonial post office was profound. Until 1710 the terms and conditions under which the post office in the colonies was operated, were matters of arrangement between Hamilton and the several legislatures. While the Neale patent enabled Hamilton to set up post offices in the colonies, the postal charges were fixed by the colonial legislatures at such rates as "the planters shall agree to give."
The impact of the new law on the colonial post office was significant. Until 1710, the terms and conditions for operating the post office in the colonies were decided through arrangements between Hamilton and the various legislatures. Although the Neale patent allowed Hamilton to establish post offices in the colonies, the colonial legislatures set the postal charges at rates that "the planters shall agree to pay."
The Neale patent had been resumed by the crown in 1706, but not abrogated. Hence, until the new act came into force, the crown simply stood in the place of the patentees, and operated under the legislation agreed upon between Hamilton and the colonial governments. New York and Pennsylvania, as their short term acts expired, renewed them with the crown; and New Jersey, which established a postal system in 1709, fixed the rates of postage by act of the legislature, but placed the management of the service in the hands of the postmaster general.
The Neale patent was taken over by the crown in 1706, but it wasn't cancelled. So, until the new law was put into effect, the crown acted as the patentees and worked under the agreements made between Hamilton and the colonial governments. New York and Pennsylvania renewed their short-term acts with the crown as they expired; and New Jersey, which set up a postal system in 1709, determined postage rates through a legislative act but put the management of the service in the hands of the postmaster general.
The post office act of 1710 made it no longer necessary to consult the colonial legislatures as to the charges to be made for the conveyance and delivery of letters in North America. The supreme control of the postal system throughout the British dominions, beyond the sea, as well as at home, was vested in the postmaster general of England. The rates of payment were fixed by the act, and the mode in which the surplus revenues were to be disposed of was set forth in the same enactment.
The Post Office Act of 1710 eliminated the need to consult colonial legislatures about the fees for sending and delivering letters in North America. The postmaster general of England had complete control over the postal system across all British territories, both overseas and at home. The act established the payment rates and outlined how the surplus revenue would be handled.
In America, the general post offices at Boston, New York and Philadelphia, which stood quite independent of one another, were reduced to the rank of ordinary offices, and made parts of the system, the headquarters of which were placed by the act in New York.[38] The administration of the system, as reconstructed, was continued in the hands of John Hamilton.
In America, the main post offices in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, which were previously independent, were downgraded to regular offices and became part of the system, with the headquarters set in New York by the act.[38] The administration of the restructured system remained under John Hamilton.
As in all other parts of the British dominions, the rates of postage were sensibly increased.[39] Under the Neale patent, a letter from New York for Philadelphia cost fourpence-halfpenny. The[Pg 20] act of Queen Anne raised the charge to ninepence, just double the former rate. A letter posted in Boston, and addressed to Philadelphia, which under the Neale patent cost for postage fifteen pence, cost twenty-one pence under the act of 1710. But these figures give no adequate idea of the magnitude of the postal charges as fixed by the act of Queen Anne.
As with all other areas of the British Empire, postage rates were significantly increased.[39] Under the Neale patent, a letter from New York to Philadelphia cost four and a half pence. The[Pg 20] act of Queen Anne raised the cost to nine pence, which is twice the previous rate. A letter sent from Boston to Philadelphia, which cost fifteen pence under the Neale patent, now cost twenty-one pence under the 1710 act. However, these numbers don't accurately reflect the scale of the postal charges set by the act of Queen Anne.
An explanation of the system to which these rates applied will make the matter clearer. At the present time the postage on a letter passing anywhere within the British Empire, or from Canada to any part of the United States or Mexico, is two cents per ounce weight, whether the letter is addressed to the next town or to the farthermost post office in the Yukon.
An explanation of the system these rates applied to will clarify things. Right now, the postage for a letter sent anywhere within the British Empire, or from Canada to any part of the United States or Mexico, is two cents per ounce, whether the letter is addressed to the nearest town or the most remote post office in the Yukon.
In 1710, and indeed in Canada until 1851, the distance a letter was carried was an element which entered into the cost. It would have been thought no more proper to ignore the element of distance in fixing the postage on a letter than in fixing the charge for the conveyance of a parcel of goods. By the act of 1710 the postage on a single letter passing between two places sixty miles apart or less was fourpence; where the places were from sixty miles to one hundred miles apart the charge was sixpence.
In 1710, and actually in Canada until 1851, the distance a letter traveled was a factor in determining its cost. It would have been considered just as inappropriate to overlook the distance when setting the postage on a letter as it would be when deciding the charge for shipping a package. According to the act of 1710, the postage for a single letter sent between two places less than sixty miles apart was fourpence; for places that were sixty to one hundred miles apart, the charge was sixpence.
Besides the distance, however, there was another factor which helped to determine the amount of the postage. This factor will appear from a description of the classes into which letters were divided.
Besides the distance, there was another factor that influenced the amount of postage. This factor will become clear from a description of the categories into which letters were divided.
Letters were single, double, and treble, and ounce. A single letter was one consisting of one sheet or piece of paper, weighing less than one ounce. If with this single sheet letter, a piece of paper was enclosed, no matter how small, the letter was called a double letter. The treble letter was a letter consisting of more than two sheets or pieces of paper, under the weight of an ounce.
Letters were single, double, treble, and ounce. A single letter was one made up of one sheet of paper that weighed less than one ounce. If a piece of paper, no matter how small, was included with that single sheet, it was called a double letter. A treble letter was a letter that included more than two sheets of paper, still under the weight of an ounce.
Whatever the postage of a single letter might be, the postage on a double letter was equal to that of two such single letters; and that on a treble letter was three times that on a single letter. There were no envelopes in use at this period, and the sheet on which the letter was written was so folded that an unwritten portion came on the outside, and on this space the address was written.
Whatever the postage for a single letter was, the postage for a double letter was the same as that for two single letters; and the postage for a treble letter was three times that of a single letter. There were no envelopes used at this time, and the sheet on which the letter was written was folded in such a way that an unwritten part was on the outside, and the address was written on this space.
The question will occur as to how the presence of enclosures could be detected among the folds of the larger single sheet. There were several means of detection born of ingenuity and experience. The approved method and the one long in service, was to hold[Pg 21] every letter up to a lighted candle, and by some skilful manipulating, the taxable enclosures could be seen.
The question will arise regarding how to identify the presence of enclosures within the layers of the larger single sheet. There were various detection methods developed from creativity and experience. The standard method, which had been used for a long time, was to hold[Pg 21]each letter up to a lit candle, and with some clever handling, the taxable enclosures could be revealed.
But it was not only enclosures to which the attention of the officials was directed. The postal charges were found so oppressive that several merchants who had letters to send to the same town used to write their several communications on the same sheet, which on reaching the person addressed was by him passed on to the others, whose letters were on the same sheet.
But it wasn't just enclosures that the officials were focused on. The postal fees were so burdensome that several merchants who needed to send letters to the same town would write their individual messages on the same sheet of paper. When the person received it, they would pass it on to the others whose letters were included on the same sheet.
In the post office the practice was much condemned. As it was not specifically provided against in the act, it had to be tolerated until the act was amended; and thereafter when several letters were written on one paper, each was to be charged as a distinct letter. The letter inspectors then had to satisfy themselves that there was no more than one person's handwriting in the sheet, which was, of course, carefully sealed with wax.
In the post office, the practice was widely criticized. Since it wasn't explicitly prohibited in the law, it had to be tolerated until the law was updated; afterward, when multiple letters were written on one piece of paper, each would be charged as a separate letter. The letter inspectors then had to ensure that there was only one person's handwriting on the sheet, which was, of course, carefully sealed with wax.
The ounce letter needs no explanation. At present the ounce is the unit of weight for letters sent from Canada to every part of the civilized world. In this aspect it corresponds with the single letter of the pre-penny postage days. But the ounce letter of 1710 and of over a century afterwards was far removed from the single letter in the matter of postage.
The ounce letter needs no explanation. Right now, the ounce is the weight unit for letters sent from Canada to everywhere in the civilized world. In this sense, it lines up with the single letter from the pre-penny postage days. However, the ounce letter of 1710 and for more than a century after was very different from the single letter in terms of postage.
In that respect the ounce letter was equal to four single letters, and was charged four times the rate of the single letter. Thus, while a single sheet weighing less than an ounce could pass between two neighbouring towns not over sixty miles apart for fourpence, if it tipped the ounce weight it was chargeable with sixteen pence.
In that sense, the ounce letter was equivalent to four regular letters and was charged four times the rate of a single letter. So, while a single sheet weighing less than an ounce could be sent between two neighboring towns no more than sixty miles apart for four pence, if it weighed over an ounce, it would cost sixteen pence.
The act of 1710 offered a problem to the paper makers. A sheet of paper had to be made stout enough to stand the handling of the post office without the protection of an envelope, and be yet so light as to allow the largest space possible within the ounce weight.
The act of 1710 posed a challenge for paper manufacturers. A sheet of paper needed to be strong enough to withstand the postal service without an envelope, yet light enough to maximize the allowable space within the ounce weight.
Under this system, in which distance, number of enclosures and weight were all factors, the charges for letters, such as are posted by thousands in our larger offices every day, were very high. An ounce letter, which at the present time costs but two cents to convey to the remotest post office in the North West of Canada, or to Southern Mexico, in 1710 cost three shillings to carry from New York to Philadelphia. From New York to Boston, the postage on the same letter was four shillings. Between the outermost points of the North American postal system in 1710—Portsmouth, N.H., and Charlestown, N.C.—the postage for an ounce letter was ten shillings.[Pg 22]
Under this system, where distance, number of stops, and weight all played a role, the postage for letters, like those sent by thousands in our larger offices every day, was really expensive. An ounce letter, which now costs just two cents to deliver to the farthest post office in the Northwest Territories of Canada or to Southern Mexico, cost three shillings to send from New York to Philadelphia in 1710. From New York to Boston, the postage for the same letter was four shillings. Between the farthest points of the North American postal system in 1710—Portsmouth, N.H., and Charlestown, N.C.—the postage for an ounce letter was ten shillings.[Pg 22]
The act of Queen Anne's reign, so long the charter of the British postal system, also greatly increased the charges on letters passing between the mother country and the colonies. In place of the penny or twopence which satisfied the captains for the delivery in America of the letters which had been placed in the letter bags hung up in the London coffee houses, the postage on a single letter passing from London to New York became one shilling. If the letter weighed an ounce, the charge was four shillings.
The act during Queen Anne's reign, which had been the foundation of the British postal system for a long time, also significantly raised the fees for letters sent between Britain and the colonies. Instead of the penny or twopence that pleased captains for delivering letters in America that had been left in the letter bags at London coffee houses, the postage for a single letter going from London to New York increased to one shilling. If the letter weighed an ounce, the cost was four shillings.
Captains of vessels, moreover, were no longer at liberty to disregard the requirements of the post office that they should deliver their letters at the post office of the port of arrival. If they failed, they laid themselves open to a ruinous fine.
Captains of ships, moreover, were no longer allowed to ignore the post office's requirement that they deliver their letters at the post office of the arrival port. If they failed to do so, they risked facing a hefty fine.
Remembering the resentment with which half a century later the Americans greeted every scheme, which could be construed into imposing a tax without their consent, one wonders how the post office act of 1710 was regarded in the colonies.
Remembering the anger with which the Americans greeted every plan, fifty years later, that could be seen as imposing a tax without their approval, one wonders how the post office act of 1710 was viewed in the colonies.
The question is interesting enough to warrant some inquiry. The legislative records have been searched carefully, and also, so far as they were available, the newspapers of the period. With one exception about to be mentioned, the only reference to the post office act which has been discovered is in the New Hampshire records. There it is stated that the act was read before the council on the 13th of September, 1711, and afterwards proclaimed by beat of drum in the presence of the council and of some members of the house of representatives.
The question is intriguing enough to deserve some investigation. The legislative records have been thoroughly examined, along with, to the extent possible, the newspapers from that time. With one exception that will be noted soon, the only mention of the post office act found is in the New Hampshire records. It states that the act was read before the council on September 13, 1711, and later announced by drumbeat in front of the council and some members of the house of representatives.
The case in which the act came into question occurred in Virginia. This colony had no post office in 1710, nor for a considerable period afterwards; and it was the attempt to put the post office in operation in 1717 which led to the protest and the countervailing action.
The case that raised the issue happened in Virginia. This colony didn’t have a post office in 1710, nor for quite a while after that; it was the effort to establish the post office in 1717 that sparked the protest and the opposing actions.
Virginia seems to have had no desire to be included in the American postal system. In 1699 Hamilton reported on the proposition of extending the system southward to Virginia.[40] The extension would cost £500; and Hamilton declared that the desire for communicating with the northern colonies was so slight that he did not believe there would be one hundred letters a year exchanged between Virginia and Maryland and the other colonies. Practically all the correspondence of the two colonies was with Great Britain and other countries in Europe.
Virginia didn't seem interested in joining the American postal system. In 1699, Hamilton reported on the idea of expanding the system southward to Virginia.[40] The expansion would cost £500, and Hamilton stated that the desire to communicate with the northern colonies was so minimal that he doubted there would be even a hundred letters exchanged each year between Virginia and Maryland and the other colonies. Almost all the correspondence for both colonies was with Great Britain and other countries in Europe.
In the autumn of 1717, steps were taken to establish a post office in the two colonies, and to connect them with the other[Pg 23] colonies. Postmasters were appointed in each colony. Couriers carried the mails into several of the more populous counties; and a fortnightly service was established between Williamsburg and Philadelphia. This was quite satisfactory, until the people began to read the placards which they observed affixed to every post office wall, directing that all letters, not expressly excepted by the act of parliament, should be delivered to the local postmasters. Here was matter for thought.
In the fall of 1717, efforts were made to set up a post office in the two colonies and connect them with the other[Pg 23] colonies. Postmasters were appointed in each colony. Couriers delivered the mail to several of the more populated counties, and a bi-weekly service was established between Williamsburg and Philadelphia. This was generally acceptable until people started noticing the signs posted on every post office wall, stating that all letters, except those specifically excluded by the act of parliament, should be given to the local postmasters. This sparked some thought.
A glance at the tariff showed that the charge made by the post office on a letter from England was one shilling for a single letter. The letters from England were the only letters the people of Virginia cared anything about, and they were accustomed to pay only a penny as postage for them.
A quick look at the rates revealed that the post office charged one shilling for a letter coming from England. The letters from England were the only ones that mattered to the people of Virginia, and they were used to paying just a penny for postage on them.
There was some little trouble, and perhaps a slight risk attending the safe delivery of letters by the existing arrangement. Virginians were, however, used to it, and had no great fault to find. It might be that if they could have received their letters at the post office for the same charge as they paid for receiving them direct from the ship captains, they would have preferred going to the post office.
There were some minor issues, and maybe a slight risk involved in the safe delivery of letters with the current setup. Virginians were, however, accustomed to it and didn't have many complaints. It's possible that if they could have picked up their letters at the post office for the same cost as getting them directly from the ship captains, they would have preferred going to the post office.
But the difference in convenience between the two places of receipt was not worth the difference between one penny and one shilling; and indeed it looked uncommonly as if the government were using this means to tax them elevenpence on every letter they received.
But the difference in convenience between the two pickup locations wasn’t worth the gap between one penny and one shilling; in fact, it seemed quite suspicious that the government was using this method to tax them elevenpence on every letter they received.
The people, on realizing the condition of things, made a great clamour.[41] Parliament, they declared, could levy no tax on them but with the consent of the assembly; and besides that, their letters were all exempted from the monopoly of the postmaster general because they nearly all, in some way or other, related to trade.
The people, upon realizing the situation, raised a huge outcry.[41] They stated that Parliament couldn't impose any taxes on them without the assembly's approval; plus, their letters were all exempt from the postmaster general's monopoly because they were mostly related to trade in one way or another.
The Virginians were putting an unwarrantably broad interpretation on an exemption, which appears in all post office acts, in favour of letters relating to goods which the letters accompany on the vessel. It has always been the practice to allow shipmasters, carrying a consignment of goods, to deliver the invoice to the consignee with the goods, in order that the transaction might be completed with convenience.
The Virginians were interpreting an exemption too broadly, which can be found in all post office laws, in favor of letters related to goods that the letters accompany on the ship. It has always been standard practice to allow ship captains, transporting a shipment of goods, to deliver the invoice to the recipient along with the goods, so that the transaction can be completed smoothly.
It would not be practicable, however, to confine this exemption to invoices accompanying goods, as this would require a knowledge of the contents of letters, which could not be obtained[Pg 24] without an intolerable inquisition. Consequently, it has been customary to allow all letters accompanying consignments of goods to be delivered with the goods, without asking whether they relate to the goods or not. But the scope of the exemption is clearly defined, and has never been allowed to include ordinary business letters, not accompanied by goods.
It wouldn’t be practical to limit this exemption to invoices that come with goods since that would require knowing the contents of letters, which could only be done through an unreasonable investigation. As a result, it’s common practice to allow all letters that come with shipments of goods to be delivered with the goods, without inquiring about whether they pertain to the goods or not. However, the limits of the exemption are clearly defined and have never been allowed to include regular business letters that aren't sent with goods.[Pg 24]
The Virginians, however, were not content to leave their case to the precarious chances of a legal or constitutional argument. They set about neutralizing the post office act by an effective counter measure. A bill was submitted to the legislature which, while it acknowledged the authority of the post office act, imposed on postmasters giving effect to it certain conditions which it was impossible to fulfil, and attached extravagant penalties for the infraction of those conditions. The postmasters were to be fined £5 for every letter which they demanded from aboard a ship—letters of a character which the British statute exempted from the postmaster general's exclusive privilege.
The Virginians, however, weren't willing to leave their situation to the uncertain outcomes of a legal or constitutional debate. They took action to counter the post office act with an effective measure. A bill was presented to the legislature that, while recognizing the authority of the post office act, placed impossible conditions on postmasters who were to enforce it and imposed harsh penalties for not meeting those conditions. Postmasters would be fined £5 for every letter they requested from a ship—letters that the British law exempted from the postmaster general's exclusive rights.
Now every ship's letter bag would contain probably many letters relating to goods aboard the ship, as well as many which were in no way so related. But how was the postmaster to tell the letters accompanying goods from those which did not? Even if the ship's captain assisted to the best of his ability, which was more than doubtful, there would be many letters about which the postmaster could not be certain, and with a £5 penalty for every mistake, his position was not an enviable one.
Now, every ship's letter bag likely held many letters related to the goods on board, along with others that weren’t connected at all. But how was the postmaster supposed to distinguish the letters that accompanied the goods from those that didn’t? Even if the ship's captain tried to help as much as possible, which was questionable, there would still be many letters the postmaster couldn’t be sure about. With a £5 penalty for every mistake, his job was definitely not a desirable one.
Another clause in the bill of the legislature of Virginia contained a schedule of hours for every courier. The terms of the schedule were so exacting that compliance with it was impossible. The penalty attached to every failure to observe the hours set forth, was twenty shillings for each letter delayed.[42] As the governor pointed out, the difficulties of travel during the winter season, owing to the number of great rivers to be passed, would subject the postmasters to the risk of a fine for every letter they accepted for transmission at that period of the year.
Another clause in the Virginia legislature's bill included a schedule of hours for every courier. The requirements of the schedule were so demanding that meeting them was impossible. The penalty for every failure to follow the hours set forth was twenty shillings for each delayed letter.[42] As the governor pointed out, the challenges of traveling during winter, due to the many large rivers to cross, would put postmasters at risk of being fined for every letter they accepted for delivery during that time of year.
The bill of 1718, when sent up for the governor's assent, was promptly vetoed; but on the other hand, the intention of the deputy postmaster general to establish a post office in Virginia was not pressed. It was not until 1732, when the governor had relinquished his office, and had himself been appointed deputy postmaster general, that Virginia was included in the postal system of North America.[Pg 25]
The bill of 1718 was quickly vetoed when it was sent to the governor for approval; however, the deputy postmaster general's plan to set up a post office in Virginia wasn't pushed forward. It wasn't until 1732, after the governor stepped down and became the deputy postmaster general himself, that Virginia was added to North America's postal system.[Pg 25]
Even after that date the post office in Virginia was on a somewhat irregular footing, at least in regard to the conveyance of the mails. In a gazetteer published in 1749,[43] it is stated that while regular trips are made by mail courier from Portsmouth to Philadelphia, southward to Williamsburg the courier's movements were uncertain, as he did not set out until there were sufficient letters posted for the south, to guarantee his wages from the postage on them. There was a post office at this period as far south as Charlestown, but the post carriage for that office was still more uncertain.
Even after that date, the post office in Virginia was operating a bit irregularly, especially when it came to delivering the mail. A gazetteer published in 1749,[43] notes that while mail couriers regularly made trips from Portsmouth to Philadelphia, their schedules were unpredictable south to Williamsburg. The courier wouldn't leave until there were enough letters collected for the south to ensure he would earn enough from the postage. At that time, there was a post office as far south as Charlestown, but the mail delivery for that office was even more unreliable.
With the exception of the Virginian contretemps, the period from 1710 until after the middle of the eighteenth century was one of quiescence. Deputy postmaster general succeeded deputy postmaster general; and the annals of their administrations carry little that is interesting. After the retirement of Hamilton in 1721, a change was made in the relations between the deputy postmaster general and the general post office, by which the post office in London was relieved of all expense in connection with the maintenance of the North American postal system.
With the exception of the Virginian incident, the time period from 1710 to after the middle of the eighteenth century was pretty uneventful. Deputy postmaster general kept taking over from one another, and their records are mostly unremarkable. After Hamilton retired in 1721, there was a shift in the relationship between the deputy postmaster general and the general post office, which allowed the London post office to no longer cover any costs related to maintaining the North American postal system.
Hamilton had a salary of £200 a year. But the profits from the post office did not quite cover that amount, as on his withdrawal, there was due to him £355 arrears of salary. In recommending the claim to the treasury, the postmaster general stated that the post office in America had been put on such a footing that if it produced no profit, it would no longer be a charge on the revenue.[44]
Hamilton had a salary of £200 a year. But the profits from the post office didn’t fully cover that amount, as when he left, he was owed £355 in back pay. In endorsing the claim to the treasury, the postmaster general noted that the post office in America had been set up in such a way that if it made no profit, it would no longer be a burden on the revenue.[44]
The facilities given to the public were not increased during that period. Indeed, in 1714, they were diminished, as the courier's trips between Boston and Philadelphia, which in 1693 were performed weekly throughout the year, were reduced to fortnightly during the winter months, and they remained at that frequency until 1753.
The services available to the public didn’t improve during that time. In fact, in 1714, they were actually reduced, as the courier trips between Boston and Philadelphia, which were weekly in 1693 year-round, were cut to every two weeks during the winter months, and they stayed that way until 1753.
It is obvious that the post office was not used by the public any more than was absolutely necessary, and that every means was taken to evade the regulations designed to preserve the postmaster general's monopoly. Thomas Hancock, in a letter written in 1740, to Governor Talcott of Connecticut, told him that he saved the colony from forty shillings to three pounds every year, through the interest he had with the captains of the London ships, who delivered the letters to him instead of handing them over to the post office.[45][Pg 26]
It’s clear that the public only used the post office when absolutely necessary, and that people tried every way possible to get around the rules meant to keep the postmaster general's monopoly intact. In a letter he wrote in 1740 to Governor Talcott of Connecticut, Thomas Hancock mentioned that he saved the colony between forty shillings and three pounds each year because of his connections with the captains of the London ships, who delivered the letters directly to him instead of taking them to the post office.[45][Pg 26]
The line of undistinguished representatives of the British post office in America came to an end in 1753, when Benjamin Franklin was made deputy postmaster general, jointly with William Hunter of Virginia.
The series of average representatives of the British post office in America ended in 1753, when Benjamin Franklin was appointed deputy postmaster general alongside William Hunter of Virginia.
Franklin, besides being a man of eminent practical ability, brought to his task a large experience in post office affairs. He had been postmaster of Philadelphia for fifteen years prior to his appointment to the deputyship; and for some time before had acted as post office controller, his duty being to visit and instruct the postmasters throughout the country.
Franklin, besides being a highly skilled individual, had a wealth of experience in postal services. He had served as the postmaster of Philadelphia for fifteen years before his appointment as deputy; and for a while before that, he had worked as a post office controller, responsible for visiting and training postmasters across the country.
At the time Franklin and Hunter entered upon their office they found little to encourage them. The couriers who conveyed the mails were much slower than most other travellers on the same roads. It took six weeks to make the trip from Philadelphia to Boston and back, and during the three winter months, the trips were made only once a fortnight.
At the time Franklin and Hunter took on their roles, they had little to motivate them. The couriers carrying the mail were much slower than most other travelers on the same routes. It took six weeks to travel from Philadelphia to Boston and back, and during the three winter months, the trips were only made once every two weeks.
The new deputies so reorganized the service that the trips were made weekly throughout the year, and they shortened the time by one-half; and many other improvements were made.[46] For a time the expenditure of the post office largely outran the revenue. But the usual rewards of additional facilities to the public followed.
The new deputies revamped the service so that trips were made weekly all year round, cutting the travel time in half; they also made many other improvements.[46] For a while, the post office's costs exceeded its revenue significantly. However, the expected benefits of better services for the public came as a result.
In 1757, when the outlay had reached its highest point, and the public response to the increased facilities was still but feeble, the post office was over £900 in debt to the deputy postmasters general. Three years later this debt was entirely cleared off, and the operations showed a surplus of £278. In 1761 the surplus reached the amount of £494, and this sum was transmitted to the general post office in London.
In 1757, when expenses had peaked and the public's reaction to the improved services was still quite weak, the post office was over £900 in debt to the deputy postmasters general. Three years later, this debt was completely paid off, and operations showed a surplus of £278. By 1761, the surplus had grown to £494, and this amount was sent to the general post office in London.
The receipt of this first remittance was the occasion of much satisfaction to the postmasters general. For a generation the post office in America had been nearly forgotten. Since 1721, it had cost the home office nothing for its maintenance, and for long before that time it had yielded nothing to the treasury, and so it had been allowed to plod along unregarded.
The arrival of this first payment brought a lot of satisfaction to the postmasters general. For a long time, the post office in America had been largely overlooked. Since 1721, it hadn't cost the home office anything to keep it running, and for a long time before that, it hadn’t contributed anything to the treasury, so it had been allowed to continue on without much attention.
A remittance from this source was quite unexpected, and one can imagine the pleasure with which the entry was made in the treasury book, and the words added "this is the first remittance ever made of its kind."[47] But though the first, it was by no means[Pg 27] the last; for until Franklin's dismissal in 1774, a remittance from the American post office was an annual occurrence. Franklin declared that, at the time of his dismissal, the American office yielded a revenue three times that from Ireland.[48]
A remittance from this source was totally unexpected, and you can imagine the joy with which it was recorded in the treasury book, along with the note that said, "this is the first remittance ever made of its kind."[47] But while it was the first, it was definitely not[Pg 27] the last; because until Franklin was dismissed in 1774, a remittance from the American post office happened every year. Franklin stated that, at the time of his dismissal, the American office generated three times the revenue of the one in Ireland.[48]
The success of the post office under Franklin's regime suggests the question, as to the share Franklin had in that success. During the whole course of his administration, he had with him an associate deputy postmaster general, William Hunter, from 1753 until 1761, and John Foxcroft, from 1761 until his connection with the post office ceased.
The success of the post office during Franklin's time raises the question of how much Franklin contributed to that success. Throughout his entire administration, he had an associate deputy postmaster general, William Hunter, from 1753 to 1761, and John Foxcroft, from 1761 until his involvement with the post office ended.
Little is known of the capacity of either of these officials; of Hunter, practically nothing. Foxcroft was certainly a man of intelligence, but nothing is known to warrant the belief that he possessed unusual qualities. That the routine of post office management was left in the hands of the associates, may be inferred not so much from the multifarious character of Franklin's activities, for he seems to have been equal to any demands made upon him, as from the fact that out of the twenty-one years of his administration, fifteen years were spent in England as the representative of the province of Pennsylvania in its negotiations with the home government.
Little is known about the abilities of either of these officials; we know practically nothing about Hunter. Foxcroft was definitely an intelligent man, but there’s nothing to suggest he had any extraordinary qualities. The fact that the routine management of the post office was left to the associates can be inferred not just from the wide range of Franklin's activities—he seemed capable of handling any demands placed on him—but also from the reality that out of his twenty-one years in charge, he spent fifteen years in England representing the province of Pennsylvania in discussions with the home government.
That Franklin's occupations in England did not absorb all his time is amply proven by his voluminous correspondence which shows him to have been engaged in abstruse speculations in science, and in economic and philosophic studies. But to administer an institution like the post office one must be on the spot, and the Atlantic ocean lay between him and his work from May 1757, until November 1762, and from November 1764, until his dismissal in 1774. Franklin was in America while the measures were taken which put the post office on an efficient footing, and again in 1763, when the treaty of Paris confirmed England in her possession of Canada.
That Franklin's work in England didn't take up all his time is clearly shown by his extensive correspondence, which indicates he was involved in deep scientific theories as well as economic and philosophical studies. However, running an institution like the post office requires being present, and the Atlantic Ocean stood between him and his responsibilities from May 1757 until November 1762, and again from November 1764 until he was dismissed in 1774. Franklin was in America when the steps were taken to make the post office more efficient, and he was also in America in 1763 when the Treaty of Paris confirmed England's control over Canada.
Franklin's contribution to the North American post office consisted mainly, it would seem, in certain important ideas, the application of which turned a half century of failure into an immediate success. It is a commonplace that money spent in increased facilities to the public is sure of a speedy return with interest, and in private enterprises competition keeps this principle in fairly active employment.
Franklin's impact on the North American post office mainly involved a few key ideas that transformed decades of failures into immediate success. It's well-known that investing in better services for the public usually leads to quick returns with interest, and in the private sector, competition keeps this principle in play.
This is not the case with an institution like the post office, until, at least, each new application of the principle had been[Pg 28] justified by success. A post office is a monopoly, and at certain stages of its history that fact has been its bane. To-day when the demands of social and commercial intercourse make an efficient vehicle for the transmission of correspondence a necessity, the evils inherent in monopolies sink out of sight so far as the post office is concerned.
This is not true for an institution like the post office, at least until each new use of the principle has been[Pg 28] validated by success. A post office operates as a monopoly, and at certain points in its history, that has been a major issue. Today, as the demands of social and commercial communication require an efficient way to send correspondence, the problems typically associated with monopolies become less visible regarding the post office.
A peremptory public takes the place of competitors as a motive for alertness. The faults of the institution are freely exposed, and correction insisted upon; and, what is as much to the point, the public contributes of its ingenuity for the improvement of the service. When, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the British public was disgusted with the slowness of its mail carts, and dismayed at the number of robberies, Palmer, a Bath theatre manager, came forward with his scheme for the employment of fast passenger coaches for the conveyance of the mails.
A demanding public replaces competitors as a reason to stay alert. The shortcomings of the institution are openly criticized, and changes are demanded; in addition, the public offers its ideas to enhance the service. When, in the late eighteenth century, the British public was fed up with the slow mail carts and troubled by the frequent robberies, Palmer, a theater manager from Bath, proposed his plan to use fast passenger coaches for delivering the mails.
A half century later the public united in a demand for lower postage rates; and Rowland Hill, a schoolmaster, produced a scheme, which for originality and efficacy, has given him a high place among the inventors of the world. To-day the Universal Postal Union affords a medium by means of which the results achieved by every postal administration are brought into a common stock for the benefit of all.
A half century later, the public came together to demand lower postage rates. Rowland Hill, a schoolteacher, came up with a plan that, due to its creativity and effectiveness, has earned him a prominent spot among the inventors of the world. Today, the Universal Postal Union provides a platform through which the accomplishments of every postal service are combined for the benefit of everyone.
But when Franklin took hold of the North American post office, he had none of these aids to improvement. The measure of the public interest in the post office may be taken from the fact that its total revenue during the first three years of his administration, from 1753 to 1756, was £938 16s. 10d.—but little more than £300 a year.
But when Franklin took charge of the North American post office, he had none of these tools for improvement. The level of public interest in the post office can be gauged by the fact that its total revenue during the first three years of his administration, from 1753 to 1756, was £938 16s. 10d.—which was just over £300 a year.
As for encouragement or stimulus from the outside, there was none. The only connection the American post office had was with the home office; and it is doubtful whether, even if it had been disposed, the British post office could have lent any helpful advice in those days.
As for support or inspiration from outside, there was none. The only link the American post office had was with the central office; and it's questionable whether, even if they had been willing, the British post office could have offered any useful advice back then.
The British post office was at that time passing through one of its unprogressive periods. It had come to know by long years of observation what was the volume of correspondence which would be offered for exchange, and it provided the means of transmission, taking care that these should not cost more than the receipts.
The British post office was going through one of its unproductive phases at that time. It had learned through many years of observation the volume of mail that would be sent for exchange, and it set up the means of transmission, ensuring that the costs did not exceed the income.
Franklin's merit lay in his rising above an indolent reliance on his monopoly, and in his generous outlay for additional facilities, by means of which he not only drew to the post office a large[Pg 29] amount of business, which was falling into other hands, but called into existence another class of correspondence altogether.
Franklin's strength came from his decision to go beyond a lazy dependence on his monopoly and his willingness to invest in additional services. This not only attracted a significant amount of business to the post office that was slipping away to competitors but also created an entirely new type of correspondence.
It is tolerably certain that had Franklin's work lay in England instead of America, he would have anticipated Palmer's suggestion that the stage coaches be used for the conveyance of the mails, instead of the wretched mail carts which came to be regarded as the natural prey of the highwayman.
It’s fairly certain that if Franklin's work had been in England instead of America, he would have predicted Palmer's idea of using stagecoaches to transport the mail, rather than the terrible mail carts that became seen as easy targets for thieves.
At the beginning of 1764 the post riders between New York and Philadelphia made three trips a week each way; and at such a rate of speed that a letter could be sent from one place to the other and the answer received the day following.[49] In reporting this achievement to the general post office, Franklin states that the mails travel by night as well as by day, which had never been done before in America.
At the start of 1764, the mail riders between New York and Philadelphia made three trips a week in both directions, moving fast enough that a letter could be sent from one city to the other and have a reply received the next day.[49] In reporting this success to the general post office, Franklin mentions that the mail travels at night as well as during the day, which had never happened in America before.
Franklin planned to have trips of equal speed made between New York and Boston in the spring of 1764, and the time for letter and reply between the two places reduced from a fortnight to four days. When his arrangements were completed a letter and its reply might pass between Boston and Philadelphia in six days, instead of three weeks.
Franklin intended to establish fast trips between New York and Boston in the spring of 1764, aiming to cut the time for sending a letter and receiving a reply between the two cities from two weeks to four days. Once his plans were in place, a letter and its response could travel between Boston and Philadelphia in six days, instead of the usual three weeks.
As a result of these arrangements Franklin anticipated that there would be a large increase in the number of letters passing between Boston and Philadelphia and Great Britain by the packets from New York. That the fruits of his outlay answered his expectations is clear from the fact that the revenues, which up to the year 1756 had scarcely exceeded £300 a year, mounted up to £1100[50] in 1757, and that became the normal revenue for some time after.
As a result of these plans, Franklin expected a significant rise in the number of letters being sent between Boston, Philadelphia, and Great Britain via the packets from New York. It's clear that his investment paid off since the revenue, which had barely exceeded £300 a year until 1756, surged to £1100[50] in 1757, and that became the standard revenue for a while after.
It was during this period that the British government began to employ packet boats for the conveyance of the mails to the American colonies. Until this time there had been no regular arrangements for the conveyance of the mails between Great Britain and the colonies. There were no vessels under specific engagement to leave either Great Britain or America at any fixed time.
It was during this time that the British government started using packet boats to transport mail to the American colonies. Until then, there hadn't been any consistent plans for moving mail between Great Britain and the colonies. No ships were specifically scheduled to depart from either Great Britain or America at any set times.
This is not, of course, to say that there were no means of exchanging correspondence between England and America, or even that the post office had no control over the vessels by which letters were carried. Vessels were continually passing between[Pg 30] Falmouth or Bristol and New York or Boston in the course of trade; and these were employed for the conveyance of mails. Sometimes the letters were made up in sealed bags by the post office before being handed to the shipmasters; and sometimes they were handed loose to the captains, or picked up from the coffee houses.
This doesn’t mean that there were no ways to exchange letters between England and America, nor that the post office had no control over the ships that carried them. Ships were constantly traveling between[Pg 30] Falmouth or Bristol and New York or Boston as part of trade, and these were used for carrying mail. Sometimes the post office would prepare letters in sealed bags before giving them to the ship captains; other times, letters were given directly to the captains or collected from coffee houses.
The captains were under heavy penalties to hand over to the post office all letters in their possession, when they reached their port of destination, and they were entitled to one penny for each letter so delivered to the local postmasters. By this arrangement, the cost of carrying the letters across the Atlantic fell in no degree upon the post office. Indeed, after the act of 1710, the post office made a very good bargain of the business. The postmasters paid the shipmasters a penny a letter, and the act of 1710 authorized them to collect a shilling for each letter delivered to the public.
The captains faced strict penalties for not handing over all the letters they had when they arrived at their destination, and they earned one penny for each letter delivered to the local postmasters. This setup meant that the cost of transporting the letters across the Atlantic didn't fall on the post office. In fact, after the act of 1710, the post office struck a pretty good deal. The postmasters paid the shipmasters a penny per letter, and the act of 1710 allowed them to charge a shilling for each letter delivered to the public.
A service so irregular had its disadvantages, however. Captains were of all degrees of trustworthiness. Some could be depended upon to deliver the letters at the post office as the law directed; others were careless or unfaithful. These either did not deposit their letters with the postmasters promptly as they should have done, or they had private understandings with friends by which the letters did not go into the post office at all, but were delivered by the captains directly to the persons to whom they were directed.
A service that inconsistent had its downsides, though. The captains varied widely in how trustworthy they were. Some could be relied on to drop off the letters at the post office as required by law; others were careless or dishonest. These would either fail to give their letters to the postmasters on time as they were supposed to, or they had private arrangements with friends that meant the letters never made it to the post office but were instead delivered directly by the captains to the intended recipients.
In 1755 the board of trade called attention to the great "delays, miscarriages and other accidents which have always attended the correspondence between this kingdom and His Majesty's colonies in America, from the very precarious and uncertain method in which it has been usually carried on by merchant ships." The remedy sought was a line of sailing vessels devoted entirely to the conveyance of correspondence. Services of this class were not uncommon, although they were usually confined to a time of war. During the war of Spanish Succession, packet ships ran regularly to Holland and to France.
In 1755, the board of trade highlighted the significant "delays, mistakes, and other issues that have always affected the communication between this kingdom and His Majesty’s colonies in America, due to the risky and unpredictable way it's typically handled by merchant ships." The solution they proposed was a fleet of sailing vessels dedicated solely to carrying correspondence. Services like this weren't unheard of, although they were usually limited to wartime. During the War of Spanish Succession, packet ships operated regularly to Holland and France.
It was during this war when French and Spanish privateers held the southern seas, that the first line of mail packets was established, which ran to North America. In 1705, the British government contracted for five vessels of one hundred and forty tons each, to carry the mails to and from the West Indies.[51] Each vessel was to carry twenty-six men and ten guns. The contractor was paid £12,500 a year.[Pg 31]
It was during this war, when French and Spanish privateers controlled the southern seas, that the first line of mail ships was created to run to North America. In 1705, the British government hired five vessels, each weighing one hundred and forty tons, to transport the mail to and from the West Indies.[51] Each ship was supposed to carry twenty-six crew members and ten cannons. The contractor was paid £12,500 a year.[Pg 31]
A curious feature of the contract was that the contractor was required to enter into a warranty that the receipts from the vessels for mails and passengers would not be less than £8000. If they did not come up to this amount, the contractor had to make up the shortage, up to the sum of £4500 a year. The contract was for three years certain, with an additional two years if the war should last so long.
A notable aspect of the contract was that the contractor had to guarantee that the revenue from the ships carrying mail and passengers would be no less than £8,000. If the earnings fell short of this amount, the contractor was required to cover the difference, up to £4,500 a year. The contract was for three years, with a possible extension of two more years if the war lasted that long.
The postal business of the West Indies was comparatively large at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The receipts for the two years ending January 1706—£10,112[52]—make the American continental business, even under Franklin's capable management, very small by comparison. In 1760 the receipts from the colonial post office of North America were only £1100. This packet service to the West Indies was maintained until the peace of Utrecht in 1713.
The postal service in the West Indies was relatively sizable at the start of the eighteenth century. The earnings for the two years ending in January 1706 were £10,112[52], which makes the American continental postal service, even under Franklin's skilled management, look quite small in comparison. By 1760, the earnings from the North American colonial post office were just £1,100. This packet service to the West Indies continued until the peace of Utrecht in 1713.
During the same period, repeated efforts were made by English merchants, to have a packet service to the North American colonies. In 1704 a petition was presented to the government for a mail service between England and New York.[53] The petitioners asked that the vessels be employed for letters only, in order that by their greater speed they might outrun the merchant vessels on their homeward trips and by giving timely notice, make it possible to send out cruisers to meet the merchant vessels and escort them home in safety. They observed that, in the year before, eighteen of the Virginia fleet were captured because they had set out later than was expected.
During the same time, English merchants made repeated attempts to establish a packet service to the North American colonies. In 1704, a petition was submitted to the government for a mail service between England and New York.[53] The petitioners requested that the ships be used solely for letters, so their greater speed could allow them to outpace the merchant vessels on their return journeys. This way, they could provide timely notifications and enable the dispatch of cruisers to meet the merchant ships and escort them home safely. They noted that the previous year, eighteen ships from the Virginia fleet were captured because they had departed later than expected.
The treasury were unimpressionable. They read the memorial, and after adding to it the curt query "Whether the merchants intend to be at the charge," they dismissed it from further consideration. In 1707, the question was again brought to the attention of the treasury, and they asked Blathwayt, a commissioner of trade, to give them a report upon it.
The treasury was unimpressed. They read the memorial, and after adding the blunt question "Are the merchants willing to cover the cost?" they dismissed it from further consideration. In 1707, the issue was brought back to the treasury's attention, and they asked Blathwayt, a trade commissioner, to provide them with a report on it.
Blathwayt was hearty in support of the proposition.[54] He declared that "Her Majesty's plantations in America are at present the chief support of the kingdom without impairing their own proper strength and yet capable of very great improvements by their trade and other means." He pressed for the establishment of a service with trips six or eight times a year. In view of the war, however, Blathwayt considered it inadvisable to fix upon a[Pg 32] certain rendezvous on either side of the Atlantic, as this would enhance the opportunities for interception by the enemy.
Blathwayt was fully in favor of the proposal.[54] He stated that "Her Majesty's plantations in America are currently the main support of the kingdom without weakening their own strength and are still capable of significant improvements through their trade and other means." He advocated for establishing a service with trips six to eight times a year. However, given the war, Blathwayt deemed it unwise to settle on a specific meeting point on either side of the Atlantic, as this would increase the chances of interception by the enemy.
The treasury were willing to have one or two experimental trips made to ascertain what revenue might be expected from the service, if these could be secured without expense; and they accepted a proposition, made about this time, by Sir Jeffry Jeffrys, who was preparing to make two trips to New York.[55] Jeffrys asked that his vessel might be commissioned as a packet boat, and that he might be allowed to retain the postage on all the correspondence which he carried between England and America. There is no record of the result, but from what is known of the postal business in America, it cannot be supposed that it would be of a magnitude to encourage the establishment of a packet service.
The treasury was open to having one or two trial trips to see what kind of revenue could be expected from the service, as long as these could be done at no cost. They agreed to a proposal from Sir Jeffry Jeffrys, who was getting ready to make two trips to New York.[55] Jeffrys requested that his ship be commissioned as a packet boat and that he be allowed to keep the postage on all the mail he carried between England and America. There's no record of the outcome, but based on what we know about the postal business in America, it's unlikely that it would have been significant enough to justify starting a packet service.
Other offers were made to the government, but they were not seriously considered until the outbreak of the war in America between England and France in 1744. Orders were at once given for the restoration of the packet service to the West Indies; and in 1745 armed packets again carried the mails on this route.[56] The service was very expensive; for though the revenue reached the respectable figure of £3921 in the first year, this amount was far from covering the outlay; and as soon as the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed in 1749, the packets were discontinued.
Other offers were made to the government, but they weren't taken seriously until the war broke out in America between England and France in 1744. Orders were immediately given to restart the packet service to the West Indies; and in 1745, armed packets once again carried the mail on this route.[56] The service was very costly; even though the revenue hit a respectable £3921 in the first year, it was nowhere near enough to cover the expenses, and as soon as the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed in 1749, the packets were stopped.
The peace, which followed the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, was of short duration. So far as America was concerned, the treaty did little more than to impose upon the combatants a momentary suspension of arms. It did nothing to remove the causes of war, and while these remained a permanent peace was impossible.
The peace that came after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle didn't last long. For America, the treaty mainly just forced a temporary halt to fighting. It did nothing to address the underlying reasons for the conflict, and as long as those reasons stayed, a lasting peace was out of reach.
The grounds of dispute were almost entirely territorial. The French claimed the whole vast stretch of country to the west of the Alleghanies, and set up a line of forts along the valley of the Alleghany and Ohio rivers. The English disregarded these claims, and their traders pushed over the mountains into the disputed territory. The French displayed so much energy in dispossessing the encroaching English, that the border country was kept in a state of alarm, and the governors of the English colonies appealed to have a regular means of communication established between the mother country and the colonies, so that help might be obtained if required.
The main issue was almost entirely about land. The French asserted their claim over the huge area west of the Alleghanies and built a series of forts along the Alleghany and Ohio rivers. The English ignored these claims, and their traders moved into the disputed territory across the mountains. The French were very active in pushing out the encroaching English, which kept the border region in a constant state of tension. This situation led the governors of the English colonies to request a reliable way to communicate with the mother country, so they could get help if necessary.
The representations of governors Shirley of Massachusetts,[Pg 33] Delancey of New York, and Dinwiddie of Virginia, were vigorously supported by governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia.[57]
The governors of Massachusetts, Shirley, New York, Delancey, and Virginia, Dinwiddie, received strong backing from Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia.[57]
The situation of Nova Scotia was one of peculiar danger. The province was hemmed in between Cape Breton, with its powerful fortress at Louisburg, on the one side, and Canada on the other. The control which the French exercised over the valley of the St. John, and over the isthmus of Baie Verte, gave them a safe and easy passage from Canada to Cape Breton, by way of the St. John river, the bay of Fundy, the isthmus of Baie Verte, and the straits of Northumberland. The Acadians who were scattered over Nova Scotia were naturally in hearty sympathy with their own people in Cape Breton; and in order to send supplies of cattle to the fortress, they made a small settlement at Tatamagouche, on the straits of Northumberland, which served as an entrepôt.[58]
The situation in Nova Scotia was particularly dangerous. The province was trapped between Cape Breton, which had a strong fortress at Louisburg on one side, and Canada on the other. The French had control over the St. John Valley and the isthmus of Baie Verte, allowing them a safe and easy route from Canada to Cape Breton via the St. John River, the Bay of Fundy, the isthmus of Baie Verte, and the Straits of Northumberland. The Acadians scattered throughout Nova Scotia were naturally sympathetic to their people in Cape Breton; to send cattle supplies to the fortress, they established a small settlement at Tatamagouche on the Straits of Northumberland, which served as a hub.[58]
The first result of the appeal of the governors was the establishment of a post office at Halifax, in the spring of 1755,[59] and the opening up of communication with New England by the vessels which plied to and from Boston. It required a ruder prompting before the government could be induced to spend the money necessary for a packet service, and this was not long in coming.
The first outcome of the governors' appeal was the creation of a post office in Halifax in the spring of 1755,[59] and the establishment of communication with New England through ships traveling to and from Boston. The government needed a stronger push before it could be convinced to allocate funds for a packet service, and that push came soon enough.
In the early spring of 1755, General Braddock, with two regiments, was sent to America to oppose the large claims made by the French. In concert with the governors of Massachusetts and Virginia, a plan of attack was arranged which involved movements against four different points as widely separated as fort Duquesne on the Ohio river, and Beausejour on the bay of Fundy.
In early spring of 1755, General Braddock was sent to America with two regiments to challenge the extensive claims made by the French. Along with the governors of Massachusetts and Virginia, a plan of attack was set up that included actions against four widely separated locations, including Fort Duquesne on the Ohio River and Beausejour on the Bay of Fundy.
Braddock undertook the expedition against fort Duquesne, which if successful would break down the barrier which was confining the English colonies to the Atlantic seaboard, and relieve the more westerly settlements of Virginia and Pennsylvania from the harassing attacks which were making life on the frontiers unendurable. The execution of his part of the campaign was beset by difficulties, arising partly from the mountainous and woody character of the country through which he had to pass, and partly from his ignorance of the methods of forest warfare, in which his enemies excelled.
Braddock launched the mission against Fort Duquesne, which, if successful, would break the hold keeping the English colonies limited to the Atlantic coast and protect the more western settlements of Virginia and Pennsylvania from the constant attacks that were making life on the frontiers unbearable. His efforts in the campaign faced numerous challenges, partly due to the mountainous and wooded terrain he had to navigate, and partly because he was unfamiliar with the guerrilla tactics used by his enemies, in which they were skilled.
Whatever could be accomplished by dogged energy was done successfully. Braddock managed to get his army within sight of his destination. But here his good fortune left him. While still[Pg 34] in the thick woods he was attacked by the French and their Indian allies. Employing methods to which Braddock was a stranger, methods which would have seemed to him to be unworthy of soldiers, the French and their allies managed to keep themselves in perfect cover, while the British army stood exposed, the easiest of marks.
Whatever could be achieved through relentless effort was accomplished successfully. Braddock got his army close to their goal. But this is where his luck ran out. While still [Pg 34] in the dense woods, he was attacked by the French and their Indian allies. Using tactics that Braddock was unfamiliar with—tactics that would have seemed dishonorable to him—the French and their allies stayed completely hidden, while the British army remained vulnerable, an easy target.
There could be but one outcome. The British were overwhelmed and Braddock slain; and the only result of the campaign was to redouble the fury of the enemy against the unfortunate border settlements.
There could be only one outcome. The British were overwhelmed and Braddock was killed; and the only result of the campaign was to increase the enemy's anger towards the unfortunate border settlements.
The disaster and its consequences were brought home to the government with a directness that put an end to all hesitation about establishing the closest possible communication between the mother country and the colonies. On the 18th of September, the board of trade, which administered the affairs of the colonies, approached the treasury on the subject. After emphasizing the inconveniences of the existing arrangements, the board insisted that it was of the highest importance that the king should have "early and frequent intelligence of what is in agitation" in the colonies, and recommended that packet boats be established to New York.[60]
The disaster and its fallout hit the government hard, ending any uncertainty about the need for direct communication between the mother country and the colonies. On September 18th, the board of trade, which managed colonial affairs, approached the treasury about this issue. They stressed the problems with the current arrangements and insisted it was crucial for the king to receive "early and frequent updates on what’s happening" in the colonies, recommending the establishment of packet boats to New York.[60]
The treasury approved, and directed the postmasters general to arrange for regular monthly trips to New York, and to restore the West Indian service, which was discontinued in 1749. Four vessels of 150 tons each were provided for the latter route.[61] They were to carry twenty-six men each, and be fully armed for war.
The treasury approved and instructed the postmasters general to set up regular monthly trips to New York and to bring back the West Indian service, which had been stopped in 1749. Four ships of 150 tons each were allocated for this route.[61] They were to carry twenty-six men each and be fully equipped for battle.
For the New York route, larger vessels were thought necessary, owing to the roughness of the winter seas; the vessels placed on this line were each of 200 tons, and carried thirty men. The carrying of any merchandise was forbidden, so that the vessels were devoted entirely to the service of the post office.
For the New York route, bigger ships were considered essential because of the rough winter seas; the ships used on this route weighed 200 tons each and had a crew of thirty. Shipping any goods was prohibited, so the vessels were solely dedicated to serving the post office.
In the elaborate instructions which the commanders received, they were directed, when they had a mail for a place at which a postmaster had not been appointed, to open the bags themselves, and deliver the letters for that place to a magistrate or other careful man, who would undertake to have the letters handed to the persons to whom they were addressed. In case the vessel was attacked, and could not avoid being taken, the commander must, before striking, throw the mails overboard, with such a weight attached as would immediately sink them, and so prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.[Pg 35]
In the detailed instructions that the commanders received, they were told that if they had mail for a location without an appointed postmaster, they should open the bags themselves and give the letters to a magistrate or another trustworthy individual who would make sure the letters were delivered to the intended recipients. If the vessel was attacked and couldn't avoid capture, the commander must, before surrendering, throw the mails overboard with enough weight attached to sink them quickly and prevent the enemy from getting them.[Pg 35]
The new service was a most expensive one, and when peace was concluded in 1762, the question of continuing it came up for immediate consideration. During the seven years of its course, the New York service cost £62,603; while the produce in postage was only £12,458. The service was popular, however; and the revenue had been increasing latterly, and an effort was made to reduce the cost.[62] In this the postmasters general were successful, and as the treasury saw reasons for indulging the hope that before long the service would be self-sustaining, they sanctioned the amended terms.
The new service was quite expensive, and when peace was established in 1762, the question of whether to keep it going was brought up right away. Over the seven years it ran, the New York service cost £62,603, while the income from postage was only £12,458. However, the service was popular, and the revenue had been increasing recently, prompting an effort to lower costs.[62] The postmasters general were successful in this, and since the treasury believed there was a good chance that the service would soon be self-sustaining, they approved the revised terms.
So far as the district in the neighbourhood of New York was concerned, the service was very satisfactory. But the people in the more remote southern colonies had ground for complaint in the length of time it took for their letters to reach them after arriving at New York.
So far as the area around New York was concerned, the service was really good. But the people in the more distant southern colonies had a reason to complain about how long it took for their letters to get to them after arriving in New York.
No time was lost in despatching the couriers to the south; but, at the best, between bad roads and no roads at all, there were great delays in delivering the mails to Charlestown. In the fall of 1763, a proposition was made to extend the West Indies service to the mainland, and to require the mail packet to visit Pensacola, fort St. Augustine and Charlestown, before returning to Falmouth.
No time was wasted sending the couriers to the south; however, due to poor roads and sometimes no roads at all, there were significant delays in getting the mail to Charlestown. In the fall of 1763, a proposal was put forward to expand the West Indies service to the mainland and to have the mail packet stop at Pensacola, Fort St. Augustine, and Charlestown before returning to Falmouth.
The extended scheme, which was accepted in 1764, involved an entire reorganization of the postal service of the southern colonies. The colonies to the south of Virginia were separated from the colonies to the north and, with the Bahama Islands, were erected into a distinct postal division, with headquarters at Charlestown.[63]
The new plan, which was approved in 1764, included a complete overhaul of the postal service in the southern colonies. The colonies south of Virginia were set apart from those to the north and, along with the Bahama Islands, were established as a separate postal division, with headquarters in Charleston.[63]
A sufficient number of vessels were added to make a regular monthly service,[64] but in spite of this, the arrangements did not give satisfaction. The route was too long to make it possible to deliver the mails at Charlestown within a reasonable time. The postmasters general reported that letters for those parts often lay forty or fifty days in London before starting on their way.
A sufficient number of ships were added to establish a regular monthly service,[64] but despite this, the arrangements were unsatisfactory. The route was too long to allow for timely mail delivery to Charlestown. The postmasters general reported that letters for that area often sat in London for forty or fifty days before being sent out.
It was then resolved to break up the connection between the mainland and the West Indies, and have a separate monthly[Pg 36] service between Falmouth and Charlestown. To secure the greatest measure of advantage from this service a courier was sent off with the mails for Savannah and St. Augustine as soon as they arrived at Charlestown from England.[65]
It was decided to sever the link between the mainland and the West Indies and establish a separate monthly service between Falmouth and Charlestown. To maximize the benefits of this service, a courier was dispatched with the mail for Savannah and St. Augustine as soon as it arrived at Charlestown from England.[Pg 36][65]
There were thus, from 1764, three lines of sailing packets running between England and the North American colonies—one to New York, another to Charlestown, and a third to the West Indies. There was but one defect in these arrangements. They did not provide connections between the several systems except through the mother country.
There were, starting in 1764, three routes of sailing packets operating between England and the North American colonies—one to New York, another to Charleston, and a third to the West Indies. However, there was one drawback to these arrangements. They didn't offer connections between the different routes except through the mother country.
A letter sent from New York to Charlestown or to the West Indies had to travel across to London and back again by the first outward packet to its destination. To connect the two systems on the mainland, a courier travelled from Charlestown northward to Suffolk, Virginia, where he met with the courier from New York.
A letter sent from New York to Charlestown or the West Indies had to go to London first and then return by the first outward packet to reach its destination. To link the two systems on the mainland, a courier traveled from Charlestown north to Suffolk, Virginia, where he met up with the courier from New York.
In dealing with the means for establishing communication between the mainland and the West Indies, the treasury were called upon to consider a petition from the merchants who traded to Florida. The termination of the war was followed by the withdrawal of the troops which were stationed at Pensacola, the principal trading settlement in Florida, and the merchants feared the savages would plunder their goods, if succour could not be easily obtained from the sister provinces.
In addressing the ways to establish communication between the mainland and the West Indies, the treasury was asked to review a petition from the merchants trading to Florida. After the war ended, the troops stationed at Pensacola, the main trading hub in Florida, were withdrawn, and the merchants worried that the local tribes would steal their goods if they couldn't quickly get help from nearby provinces.
The first step taken to meet the difficulty was to run a small forty-five ton vessel from Jamaica to Pensacola and on to Charlestown. This was satisfactory as far as it went, but as it took eighty-three days to cover this route and return to Jamaica, this service had to be doubled before the people concerned were content.
The first step taken to address the issue was to operate a small forty-five-ton ship from Jamaica to Pensacola and then on to Charleston. This was adequate as far as it went, but since it took eighty-three days to complete this route and return to Jamaica, this service had to be increased to satisfy the people involved.
FOOTNOTES:
[39] The postal rates as fixed by the act of Queen Anne were as follows: London to Jamaica, Barbadoes, 1s. 6d.; to New York, 1s. New York, to West Indies, 4d.; to New London or Philadelphia, 9d.; to Boston or Portsmouth, 1s.; to Williamsburg, Va., or Piscataway, 1s. 3d.; to Charlestown, 1s. 6d.; to within 60 miles, 4d.; to within 100 miles, 6d. These charges were for single letters.
[39] The postal rates set by Queen Anne's act were as follows: London to Jamaica or Barbados: 1s. 6d.; to New York: 1s.; New York to the West Indies: 4d.; to New London or Philadelphia: 9d.; to Boston or Portsmouth: 1s.; to Williamsburg, Va., or Piscataway: 1s. 3d.; to Charlestown: 1s. 6d.; to locations within 60 miles: 4d.; to locations within 100 miles: 6d.. These charges were for single letters.
[40] G.P.O., Treasury, II. 253.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ G.P.O., Treasury, II. 253.
[43] Douglas' Historical and Political Summary.
[44] G.P.O., Treasury, VI. 206-207.
[45] Talcott Papers, vol. 5.
[47] G.P.O., Treasury Letter-Book, 1760-1761, p. 96.
[50] G.P.O., General Accounts, 1761-1770.
[51] G.P.O., Treasury, III. 236.
[52] G.P.O., Treasury volume.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ G.P.O., Treasury volume.
[54] Treasury Papers, CII. 120.
[55] G.P.O., Treasury, III. 127.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ G.P.O., Treasury, III. 127.
[57] C. O. 5.
[58] C. O. 5, vol. 15.
[60] C. O. 5, Bundle 7.
[61] G.P.O., Treasury, VII. 248-249.
[62] G.P.O., Treasury, vol. 8.
[63] The first deputy postmaster general for the southern division was Benjamin Barons, who was appointed December 19, 1764 (G.P.O., Orders of the Board, II. 126). He resigned on August 26, 1766, and was succeeded by Peter Delancy, who was killed in a duel with Dr. John Hale, in August 1771. His successor was George Roupell, who held office until displaced by the Revolution (G.P.O., Orders of the Board, 1737-1770, II. 211b).
[63] The first deputy postmaster general for the southern division was Benjamin Barons, who was appointed on December 19, 1764 (G.P.O., Orders of the Board, II. 126). He resigned on August 26, 1766, and was succeeded by Peter Delancy, who was killed in a duel with Dr. John Hale in August 1771. His successor was George Roupell, who held the position until he was replaced by the Revolution (G.P.O., Orders of the Board, 1737-1770, II. 211b).
[64] G.P.O., Instructions, pp. 16-21.
[65] G.P.O., Treasury, June 6, 1768.
CHAPTER III
Communications in Canada prior to the Conquest—Extension of colonial postal service to Canada—Effects of colonial discontents on post office.
Communications in Canada before the Conquest—Expansion of colonial postal service to Canada—Impact of colonial grievances on the post office.
Having described the several arrangements, which were made to enable the older British colonists to correspond with the mother country and with one another, we shall now turn to Canada.
Having outlined the various setups that were created to help the older British colonists communicate with the mother country and each other, we will now shift our focus to Canada.
In the first place an account must be given of the route pursued by the courier, who was shortly to begin regular trips between New York and Montreal. The route is the oldest in North America and the best known. Before either Frenchman or Englishman came to America, the Indian tribes, dwelling on the stretch of land which lies between the waters running south and those running north, passed and repassed over this natural highway in the prosecution of their perpetual wars; and in the long struggle between France and England for mastery of the continent, many of the most decisive battles were fought at different places on the route.
First, we need to describe the route taken by the courier, who was about to start regular trips between New York and Montreal. This route is the oldest in North America and the most well-known. Long before either the French or the English arrived in America, the Indigenous tribes living in the area between the rivers flowing south and those flowing north traveled back and forth over this natural highway in their ongoing conflicts. During the prolonged struggle between France and England for control of the continent, many of the most important battles were fought at various locations along this route.
The forts erected by each nation at the several strategic points on the route within its territory indicate their conviction that this was the ordinary course of passage from one country to the other.
The forts built by each nation at various key locations along the route in their territory show that they believed this was the usual pathway from one country to another.
A glance at the map confirms this view. From New York to the boundaries of Canada, the few miles of watershed between the Hudson and the lake Champlain systems are the only part of this long route, which could not be easily travelled by vessel. The first long stretch on the journey from New York to Montreal was that between New York and Albany. This part of the trip was made in one of the sloops, which were employed by the merchants of Albany to carry furs, lumber and grain to New York, and which usually returned to Albany empty or with a cargo of brandy, which was considered necessary in their dealings with the Indians. The trip up the river occupied about three days.
A look at the map supports this perspective. From New York to the Canadian border, the only stretch along this long route that can't be easily traveled by boat is the few miles of watershed between the Hudson and Lake Champlain systems. The first major leg of the journey from New York to Montreal was the stretch between New York and Albany. This part of the trip was made on one of the sloops used by Albany merchants to transport furs, lumber, and grain to New York, which usually returned to Albany either empty or with a load of brandy that was considered essential for their trade with the Native Americans. The trip up the river took about three days.
From Albany northward, there was a good road on the west side of the Hudson as far as fort Edward, which stood at the bend of the river, where it made a sharp turn to the west. At fort Edward there was a choice of routes, one leading directly north[Pg 38] to lake George, and the other to the north-east to Wood Creek, from which there was a navigable course into lake Champlain.
From Albany to the north, there was a decent road on the west side of the Hudson River all the way to Fort Edward, which was located at the bend of the river where it sharply turns west. At Fort Edward, you had two options: one route went straight north to Lake George, and the other headed northeast to Wood Creek, leading to a navigable path into Lake Champlain.
The lake George route also led into lake Champlain, though the difficulties of the passage from one lake to the other subjected the traveller to the inconvenience of a portage. Lake Champlain offered an uninterrupted course to St. John's in Canada, from which point there was a pleasant trip by carriage to Laprairie, followed by a sail across the St. Lawrence to Montreal. The time taken by travellers over this route was from nine to ten days.
The Lake George route also connected to Lake Champlain, but the challenges of getting from one lake to the other forced travelers to deal with the hassle of a portage. Lake Champlain provided a direct path to St. John's in Canada, where travelers could enjoy a nice carriage ride to Laprairie, followed by a boat trip across the St. Lawrence to Montreal. The journey typically took travelers about nine to ten days.
The population of Canada at the period when it became a British province was about seventy thousand, all of whom dwelt on the shores of the St. Lawrence and its tributaries. Travellers between Montreal and Quebec taking the river passage were wont to declare that they seemed to be passing through one long village, so closely were the settlements on each side of the river drawn to one another.
The population of Canada when it became a British province was around seventy thousand, all of whom lived along the shores of the St. Lawrence and its tributaries. Travelers between Montreal and Quebec who took the river route often said it felt like they were passing through one long village, because the settlements on each side of the river were so close together.
Below Quebec, the country on the north shore in the seigneuries of Beauport and Beaupré, as far east as Cap Tourmente, was as thickly populated as any part of Canada. Beyond that point settlement rather straggled on to Murray Bay. On the south shore from Levis eastward, the census of 1765 showed a population of over ten thousand. A gentleman travelling from Rivière du Loup to Quebec a few years later stated that there were from twelve to sixteen families to every mile of road.
Below Quebec, the area on the north shore in the seigneuries of Beauport and Beaupré, all the way to Cap Tourmente, was as densely populated as any other part of Canada. Beyond that point, settlements were more spread out towards Murray Bay. On the south shore from Levis eastward, the 1765 census recorded a population of over ten thousand. A gentleman traveling from Rivière du Loup to Quebec a few years later noted that there were between twelve to sixteen families for every mile of road.
Although people travelling in Canada preferred making their journey by boat, there was a good road from Montreal to Quebec and, what was unique in America at the time, there was a regular line of post houses over the whole road, where calèches or carrioles were always kept in readiness for travellers.
Although people traveling in Canada preferred to make their journey by boat, there was a good road from Montreal to Quebec, and, what was unique in America at the time, there was a regular line of post houses along the entire road, where calèches or carrioles were always kept ready for travelers.
Each maître de poste had the exclusive privilege of carrying passengers from his post house to the next, which was usually about nine miles distant, his obligation being to have the horse and carriage ready on fifteen minutes' notice during the day, and in half an hour, if he were called during the night.
Each maître de poste had the exclusive privilege of transporting passengers from his post house to the next, which was typically about nine miles away. He was required to have the horse and carriage ready within fifteen minutes during the day and within half an hour if he was called at night.
This facility for travel, the advantages of which are obvious, was a gift from France, where it had been in operation since the fifteenth century. When the road between Montreal and Quebec was completed in 1734,[66] the post road system was at once established upon it. It was a convenience which cost the government nothing, the habitant who was appointed maître de poste receiving his pay from the persons whom he conveyed within his limits.[Pg 39] The government confined its attention to seeing that the maître de poste furnished the horses and vehicles promptly.
This travel system, which has clear benefits, was a gift from France, where it had been in use since the fifteenth century. When the road between Montreal and Quebec was finished in 1734,[66] the postal road system was immediately set up along it. It was a service that cost the government nothing; the local inhabitant appointed as maître de poste received pay from the people he transported within his area.[Pg 39] The government just focused on making sure the maître de poste provided the horses and vehicles on time.
In September 1760, when the English became masters of Canada by the capitulation of Montreal, Sir Jeffery Amherst, commander-in-chief of the British forces, issued new commissions to the maîtres de poste, and fixed the rate at which they should be paid for their services, but gave directions that they should let their horses to no person, who was not provided with a written order from the governor.[67]
In September 1760, when the English took control of Canada after the surrender of Montreal, Sir Jeffery Amherst, the commander-in-chief of the British forces, issued new commissions to the maîtres de poste and set the pay rate for their services. However, he instructed them not to rent their horses to anyone without a written order from the governor.[67]
A question of much interest is suggested by the fact that the post road between Montreal and Quebec had its origin during the French regime. In France the post roads were part of the postal system of the country, and the question occurs, by what means were letters conveyed within Canada during the period of French rule? It is probable that there was a considerable correspondence between Canada and France, and the lines on which the business of the country was conducted would seem to call for a fairly large interchange of letters within the colony itself. Though the great mass of the people were unable either to read or to write, they differed but little in this respect from the same class of people in other countries. It was not the custom of the time to look to the working classes for patronage for the post office, though even here it is to be observed that the girls of Canada had many opportunities for securing the elements of education, which did not fall in the way of the young men, and with the instinct for graceful expression, which is nature's endowment to French women, it is probable that many letters came from this class. From the towns, however, there would be a relatively large correspondence. Although the populations of Quebec and Montreal were less than that of many of our country towns, and Three Rivers would not bear comparison in that respect with many villages, the social life in these towns was on a high plane. From Charlevoix to Montcalm, every visitor to Canada expressed his astonishment at the refinement and even elegance which he found in the towns. This society, with its seigneurs, military officers, clergy and civil service, would beyond doubt have an extensive correspondence with friends at home. Indeed, mention of the clergy brings up that remarkable series of letters written by Jesuit missionaries from the wilds of Canada, known as the Jesuit Relations, which forms so large a part of the foundation on which the history of the country in the seventeenth century rests. The commercial correspondence was, also,[Pg 40] considerable. All the trade between Canada and France was carried on through the merchants of Quebec. Montreal from its situation at the junction of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa rivers had been the chief town for the Indian trade in furs for over a century, but it did not send its furs directly to France. The Quebec merchants had been the intermediaries for this trade, and they held jealously to the profitable privilege. The imports from France which included a large part of the necessities and conveniences of life, were also handled by the Quebec merchants, who acted as wholesalers to the merchants in Montreal and the other parts of the colony.
A question of great interest arises from the fact that the post road between Montreal and Quebec originated during the French regime. In France, post roads were part of the country’s postal system, leading one to wonder how letters were delivered within Canada during French rule. It’s likely that there was significant correspondence between Canada and France, and the way business was conducted in the country suggests there was a fair amount of letter exchange within the colony itself. Although a large portion of the population couldn't read or write, they were not much different from working-class people in other countries. At that time, it wasn't common to expect the working class to support the post office. However, it’s worth noting that Canadian girls had more opportunities for education than young men did, and with their natural talent for elegant expression, many letters probably came from this group. In contrast, there would have been a sizeable correspondence from towns. Although the populations of Quebec and Montreal were smaller than those of many of our country towns, and Three Rivers couldn’t compare to many villages in that regard, the social life in these towns was quite sophisticated. From Charlevoix to Montcalm, every visitor to Canada was amazed by the refinement and even elegance found in these towns. This society, with its seigneurs, military officers, clergy, and civil servants, undoubtedly had extensive correspondence with friends back home. Mentioning the clergy brings to mind the remarkable series of letters written by Jesuit missionaries from the wilderness of Canada, known as the Jesuit Relations, which is a significant part of the foundation for the country’s history in the seventeenth century. The commercial correspondence was also considerable. All trade between Canada and France was conducted through the merchants of Quebec. For over a century, Montreal, situated at the junction of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa rivers, had been the main hub for the Indian fur trade, but it didn’t send its furs directly to France. The Quebec merchants acted as middlemen for this trade and guarded their profitable privilege closely. The imports from France, which included many of life’s necessities and comforts, were also managed by the Quebec merchants, who served as wholesalers for the merchants in Montreal and other parts of the colony.
It will be obvious from a view of all these circumstances that there must have been a large volume of correspondence to and from as well as within Canada during the French regime. The greater part of it would be between Quebec and the ports of France and the means by which this was carried on, are known. In the Royal Almanach for 1723, it is announced that on letters to Canada there would be a charge of seven sols (about seven cents) which would pay for the conveyance from Paris to Rochelle, while between Rochelle and Canada, letters were carried free of all charge. Between Old and New France, therefore, there was little restriction on correspondence. If a letter going to France were destined for Paris, it would be carried there for seven cents; if for other parts of France, local and personal arrangements would have to be made for their delivery. The case was the same with letters coming to Canada, but addressed to other places than Quebec. Persons living in Montreal, Three Rivers or any other place, who had correspondence with France would arrange with friends in Quebec to take their letters from the captain of the incoming ship, and send the letters to them by the first opportunity. Kalm, the Swedish naturalist, who was travelling through Canada as the guest of the governor, states that, on the way up to Montreal on the governor's bateau, they put in at Three Rivers in order that the officer in charge might deliver some letters, which had been entrusted to him.
It’s clear from looking at all these circumstances that there must have been a significant amount of correspondence to and from as well as within Canada during the French regime. Most of it would have been between Quebec and the ports of France, and the methods for this communication are known. In the Royal Almanach for 1723, it’s stated that sending letters to Canada would cost seven sols (about seven cents), which would cover the trip from Paris to Rochelle, while letters moved from Rochelle to Canada for free. Therefore, there were few restrictions on correspondence between Old and New France. If a letter addressed to France was meant for Paris, it would be delivered there for seven cents; for other parts of France, personal arrangements would need to be made for delivery. The same applied to letters sent to Canada but directed to places other than Quebec. People living in Montreal, Three Rivers, or anywhere else who had correspondence with France would arrange with friends in Quebec to collect their letters from the captain of the incoming ship and send them out at the first opportunity. Kalm, the Swedish naturalist, who was traveling through Canada as the guest of the governor, mentions that on their way to Montreal on the governor's bateau, they stopped at Three Rivers so the officer in charge could deliver some letters that had been entrusted to him.
The question of establishing such a postal system as existed in France was laid before the governor as early as 1721. In that year Nicholas Lanoullier, a clerk in the treasury, made application for the exclusive privilege of carrying on a postal system between Montreal and Quebec. He pointed out that the only means for the conveyance of letters between Quebec, Three Rivers and Montreal was the canoe, and as there was no regular canoe service,[Pg 41] a person desiring to send a letter had either to hire a canoe, or wait until some person would be found willing to take the letter in the course of his journey. Either mode was obviously unsatisfactory. Lanoullier proposed to open post offices at the three towns, for letters and couriers, and to maintain messageries or an express service, and a line of post houses. There was no road between Montreal and Quebec at this time, and as Lanoullier's scheme involved the construction of a road, the governor granted the application, and in addition gave Lanoullier the exclusive privilege of establishing ferries over the rivers, which would cross the road he undertook to build. As the total population of Canada in 1721 did not exceed 25,000, and the towns of Quebec, Three Rivers and Montreal contained no more than 2300, 325 and 3200 people respectively, an enterprise of that magnitude could not possibly be profitable. Lanoullier no doubt realized this, for he did nothing in pursuance of the scheme. It was ten years after this period before any serious effort was made to construct a continuous road from Quebec to Montreal, and by that time Nicholas Lanoullier's connection with the work had ceased entirely. By a somewhat curious coincidence, when the governor and intendant resolved that the road should be constructed, the duty of superintending the work fell upon a brother of Lanoullier, who was appointed grand voyer or general overseer of the roads of the colony. The office of grand voyer had existed in the colony since 1657, but until Lanoullier's time, it seems to have been neglected, and when the habitants along the road were called upon to work upon it, they obeyed with much reluctance. Lanoullier's difficulties were increased by the hostility of the seigneurs through whose estates the road was to pass, and who resented his making his surveys without deference to their wishes and opinions. He pushed forward the work with much energy, however, and by 1734 the road was opened. The intendant, Hocquart, who had followed the road building with much interest, reported to the king that he himself had made the journey in a carriage from Quebec to Montreal in four days. As soon as the road was declared fit for travel post houses were placed upon it at intervals of about nine miles, and ferries were established for transportation across the broader rivers which crossed the road.
The idea of creating a postal system like the one in France was presented to the governor as early as 1721. In that year, Nicholas Lanoullier, a treasury clerk, applied for the exclusive right to operate a postal system between Montreal and Quebec. He highlighted that the only way to send letters between Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal was by canoe, and since there was no regular canoe service, someone wanting to send a letter had to either hire a canoe or wait for someone willing to take the letter during their trip. Both options were clearly unsatisfactory. Lanoullier suggested opening post offices in the three towns for letters and couriers, maintaining messageries or an express service, and creating a line of post houses. At that time, there was no road connecting Montreal and Quebec, and since Lanoullier's plan included building a road, the governor approved the application and also granted Lanoullier the exclusive right to set up ferries over the rivers that would cross the road he planned to build. With Canada's total population in 1721 not exceeding 25,000, and the towns of Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal housing only about 2,300, 325, and 3,200 people respectively, a venture of that size couldn't possibly be profitable. Lanoullier likely realized this, as he took no further action on the plan. It wasn't until ten years later that any serious effort was made to create a continuous road from Quebec to Montreal, and by then, Nicholas Lanoullier was completely out of the picture. Interestingly, when the governor and intendants decided to build the road, the responsibility for overseeing the work fell to Lanoullier's brother, who was appointed grand voyer or general overseer of the colony's roads. The position of grand voyer had been in place since 1657, but until Lanoullier's time, it seems to have been overlooked, and when the local farmers were asked to work on it, they complied very reluctantly. Lanoullier faced added challenges due to the opposition from the seigneurs whose land the road would traverse, as they resented his surveying without considering their wishes. Despite these challenges, he pushed forward with the project and by 1734 the road was completed. The intendant, Hocquart, who was closely following the road construction, reported to the king that he had traveled from Quebec to Montreal by carriage in four days. Once the road was deemed suitable for travel, post houses were established along it about every nine miles, and ferries were set up for crossing the wider rivers that intersected the road.
But although no regular postal system was in operation during the French regime, an arrangement existed from an early period, by which the letters of the governor and intendant were carried by an appointed messenger, who was permitted to take with him,[Pg 42] in addition to the official letters, any that might be entrusted to him by private persons. The fee allowed the messenger by the intendant's commission was ten sous for a letter carried from Quebec to Montreal and five sous to Three Rivers, with proportionate charges for greater or shorter distances. The commission which was issued in 1705 by Raudot, the intendant, to Pierre Dasilva dit Portugais, made no provision for regular conveyance, but as the messenger conveyed all the governor's despatches within the colony, it is probable that he made his trips with fair frequency. Another messenger, Jean Morau, received a commission in 1727, though he had been performing the duties of the service for ten years before that date.[68]
But even though there was no regular postal system in place during the French regime, there was an arrangement from an early time that allowed the governor and intendant’s letters to be carried by an appointed messenger. This messenger was allowed to take any private letters that people entrusted to him as well.[Pg 42] The messenger’s fee set by the intendant's commission was ten sous for a letter delivered from Quebec to Montreal and five sous to Three Rivers, with proportional charges for longer or shorter distances. In 1705, the intendant Raudot issued a commission to Pierre Dasilva dit Portugais, which didn’t provide for regular transport, but since the messenger handled all the governor's dispatches within the colony, it’s likely that he made his trips quite often. Another messenger, Jean Morau, received a commission in 1727, although he had already been performing the job for ten years before that. [68]
A curious fact is disclosed in a memorandum prepared during the period between the capitulation of Canada in 1760 and the treaty of Paris, which settled definitively the possession of the country. The writer, who had hopes that the country would be restored to France, was discussing several measures for improving the administration, when the French returned to the government. Among these was the establishment of a royal post office. In submitting his suggestion he pointed out that the system of royal messengers was expensive to the country, as the letters of private persons were carried and delivered free of charge. By the establishment of a post office, the charges of maintaining it would fall on the persons whose letters were carried, and the treasury would be relieved of the expense.[69]
A curious fact is revealed in a memo written between the surrender of Canada in 1760 and the Treaty of Paris, which permanently determined control of the territory. The author, who hoped the country would be returned to France, was discussing various ways to improve administration when the French returned to power. One suggestion was to establish a royal post office. In putting forward this idea, he noted that the system of royal messengers was costly for the country since private letters were transported and delivered free of charge. By creating a post office, the costs of operating it would be borne by those sending letters, relieving the treasury of the financial burden.[69]
As has been already stated, when Franklin learned that Canada was to remain a British possession, he came to Quebec to arrange for the establishment of a postal service between Quebec, Three Rivers and Montreal, and for a regular exchange of mails between those places and New York. At Quebec he met with Hugh Finlay, a young Scotchman who had been in the country for three years and who had been performing the very important duties of justice of the peace. In 1765, Finlay was made a member of the governor's council, and until his death, thirty-six years later, took a leading part in the affairs of the colony. Franklin opened a post office in Quebec with Finlay as postmaster and put under his charge subordinate offices at Three Rivers and Montreal. A monthly service by courier was established between Montreal and New York, whose duty it was to have the Canadian mails in New York in time to place those for Great Britain on board the outgoing packet.[Pg 43] In making his arrangements for the exchange of mails between the Canadian offices themselves, Finlay sought and obtained the co-operation of the governor, who directed the maîtres de poste to provide saddle horses for the mail couriers at sixpence a league, which was just half the charge made to the public for the same service, and who issued orders to the ferrymen along the route to pass the couriers over their rivers promptly and without charge.[70] The captains of boats running on the river were instructed in their duty to deliver the letters in their hands to the nearest postmasters who would pay them one cent for each letter. The courier's trips between Montreal and Quebec were made weekly each way, and each trip took about thirty hours. As the distance is one hundred and eighty miles, the advantages of the post house system in facilitating the movements of the couriers are manifest.
As already mentioned, when Franklin found out that Canada would remain a British territory, he traveled to Quebec to set up a postal service connecting Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal, as well as a regular mail exchange between those places and New York. In Quebec, he met Hugh Finlay, a young Scotsman who had lived in the country for three years and had been fulfilling the important role of justice of the peace. In 1765, Finlay became a member of the governor's council and played a key role in the colony's affairs until his death thirty-six years later. Franklin established a post office in Quebec with Finlay as the postmaster and placed him in charge of the subordinate offices in Three Rivers and Montreal. A monthly service by courier was set up between Montreal and New York, which was responsible for ensuring that the Canadian mail arrived in New York in time to be loaded onto the outbound packet for Great Britain.[Pg 43] When arranging the mail exchange between the Canadian offices, Finlay sought and gained the support of the governor, who directed the maîtres de poste to provide saddle horses for the mail couriers at sixpence per league, which was half the fee charged to the public for the same service. The governor also ordered the ferrymen along the route to transport the couriers across their rivers promptly and at no charge.[70] The boat captains operating on the river were instructed to deliver the letters they carried to the nearest postmasters, who would then pay them one cent for each letter. The couriers made weekly trips between Montreal and Quebec in both directions, each taking about thirty hours. With a distance of one hundred and eighty miles, the benefits of the post house system in facilitating the movement of the couriers are clear.
A difficulty for which provision had to be made was the extreme magnitude of the postage charges. In 1763 the American post office was still working under the act of 1710, which was enacted at a time when Canada as an English colony was not in contemplation.
A challenge that needed to be addressed was the high cost of postage. In 1763, the American post office was still operating under the act of 1710, which was put in place when Canada was not yet considered an English colony.
The system for which provision was made by the act extended from Piscataway (now Portsmouth, New Hampshire) to Charlestown; and if letters were sent beyond the range of this system, the charge for single letters conveyed up to sixty miles was fourpence; and when the conveyance was from sixty to one hundred miles the charge was sixpence. At the rate of sixpence for one hundred miles, it cost two shillings to send a single letter from New York to Montreal and three shillings from New York to Quebec.
The system established by the act covered the area from Piscataway (now Portsmouth, New Hampshire) to Charlestown. If letters were sent outside this system, the cost for a single letter delivered up to sixty miles was four pence. For distances from sixty to one hundred miles, the charge was six pence. At a rate of six pence for one hundred miles, it cost two shillings to send a single letter from New York to Montreal and three shillings from New York to Quebec.
This rate was quite prohibitive. Governors Murray of Quebec, and Gage of Montreal, in 1760, represented to the home government[71] that the people of Canada were almost destitute of cash, and that they would not write to their friends in England until they found private occasions to send their letters to New York. The governors suggested that every interest would be better served if the rates could be made so that the charge on letters between any two places in America might not exceed one shilling and sixpence for a single letter.
This rate was really high. Governors Murray of Quebec and Gage of Montreal, in 1760, told the home government[71] that the people of Canada were almost out of cash and that they wouldn’t reach out to their friends in England until they found private ways to send their letters to New York. The governors suggested that it would be better for everyone if the rates could be adjusted so that the cost for letters sent between any two places in America wouldn’t exceed one shilling and sixpence for a single letter.
In 1765, the act of 1710 was amended to meet the governor's views.[72] The scale of fourpence for sixty miles and sixpence for one hundred miles was not changed, but an addition was made[Pg 44] to it by providing that for each one hundred miles or less beyond the first hundred miles, the additional charge was to be twopence.
In 1765, the 1710 act was updated to align with the governor's perspective.[72] The rates remained the same, with fourpence for sixty miles and sixpence for one hundred miles, but it was added that for every additional one hundred miles or less beyond the first hundred miles, there would be an extra charge of twopence.[Pg 44]
The reduction for the longer distances was very considerable. Between New York and Montreal, the act of 1765 lowered the charge for a single letter from two shillings to one shilling, and between New York and Quebec from three shillings to one shilling and fourpence.
The reduction for longer distances was quite significant. Between New York and Montreal, the act of 1765 cut the cost for a single letter from two shillings to one shilling, and between New York and Quebec from three shillings to one shilling and fourpence.
Halifax, which had had a post office since 1755, had until this time but little benefit from it owing to the excessive charges. But the amendment of 1765 provided a rate of fourpence on single letters passing between any two seaports in America, and thus put Halifax in comparatively easy communication with Boston and New York.
Halifax, which had a post office since 1755, had until now seen little benefit from it due to the high fees. However, the amendment of 1765 set a rate of fourpence on single letters sent between any two seaports in America, making it much easier for Halifax to communicate with Boston and New York.
Here then in its entirety is the postal system of North America as it was completed by the inclusion within it of the new province of Canada. The most important communications were those between America and Great Britain. Of these there were three: with New York, Charlestown and the West Indies. Between each of these places and Great Britain, packet boats carried the mails once a month. These several divisions were united with one another by a small packet from Jamaica to Charlestown, and by a courier from Charlestown to Suffolk, Virginia, where he met with a courier from New York.
Here it is in full: the postal system of North America, which was completed by adding the new province of Canada. The key communications were those between America and Great Britain. There were three main routes: to New York, Charlestown, and the West Indies. Packet boats delivered the mail once a month between each of these locations and Great Britain. These different areas were connected by a small packet service from Jamaica to Charlestown and by a courier from Charlestown to Suffolk, Virginia, where he would meet a courier coming from New York.
Within the northern district, the centre of which was at New York, there was a well-organized mail service, in which all existing travelling facilities were employed to the limit of their usefulness.[73] Mails were transported regularly as far south as Virginia and as far north and east as Quebec and Halifax. Within the better settled parts of the country, the service was excellent. Before the Revolution, two trips were made weekly between New York and Boston, and three between New York and Philadelphia. From Quebec to Montreal, there were two trips every week. The courier service at this time was quite equal, if not superior, to the service in England.
Within the northern district, centered in New York, there was a well-organized mail service that made full use of all available travel options. Mails were regularly transported as far south as Virginia and as far north and east as Quebec and Halifax. In the more developed areas of the country, the service was excellent. Before the Revolution, there were two trips each week between New York and Boston, and three between New York and Philadelphia. There were also two trips every week from Quebec to Montreal. The courier service at that time was quite comparable, if not better, than the service in England.
But the political troubles were rendering the post office an object of unpopularity, and making it a duty on the part of the patriots to employ agencies other than the post office for the transmission of their letters. As these unofficial agencies were usually satisfied with a much lower compensation than the post office demanded, the pleasant circumstance arose for the patriot that the line of interest coincided with the line of duty.
But the political issues were making the post office unpopular, and it became a responsibility for the patriots to use alternatives to the post office for sending their letters. Since these unofficial channels were typically okay with a much lower fee than what the post office charged, it worked out well for the patriots that their interests aligned with their responsibilities.
During the period between the establishment of the post office in Canada in 1763, and the outbreak of the war of the Revolution in 1775, the post office pursued on the whole an even, uneventful course. Canada did not entirely escape the influence of the sentiments which in the older colonies were leading to the Revolution; and, as the war approached, the post office was made to feel the effects.
During the time from when the post office was established in Canada in 1763 to the start of the Revolutionary War in 1775, the post office generally had a steady and calm operation. Canada wasn't completely unaffected by the feelings that were driving the older colonies toward the Revolution; as the war drew closer, the post office began to experience the impact.
There were, at the time of the peace of 1763, along with the seventy thousand Canadians which made up nearly the whole of the population, a number of the older British subjects, most of whom had come from the British American colonies. At this time they numbered about two hundred, and when the war broke out in 1775, the number had doubled.
There were, at the time of the peace of 1763, along with the seventy thousand Canadians who made up nearly the entire population, a number of older British subjects, most of whom had come from the British American colonies. At this time, they numbered about two hundred, and when the war broke out in 1775, that number had doubled.
These new-comers to Canada were not without the usual practical ability of Americans, and they very soon gathered into their hands the greater part of the business of the colony. They were, however, a source of much trouble and offence to the governor, and to their Canadian fellow subjects. The governor reported that their arrogance, and repugnance to the social and religious customs of the new subjects—the former subjects of France—as well as the factious opposition they displayed to the mode of government then existing, retarded seriously the progress of the efforts which were made towards conciliating the Canadians to the new regime.
These newcomers to Canada were not lacking the usual practical skills of Americans, and they quickly took control of most of the colony's businesses. However, they caused a lot of trouble and annoyance for the governor and their Canadian fellow citizens. The governor reported that their arrogance and disdain for the social and religious customs of the former French subjects, along with their disruptive opposition to the existing government, seriously hindered the efforts to win over the Canadians to the new regime.
Nothing short of the complete domination of these few hundred English-speaking people over the French Canadians would have satisfied them. The spirit of rebellion grew no faster in the older British colonies than among the few of English extraction in Canada, and the mutual distrust between these people and the government hampered the work of the post office a few years later.
Nothing less than total control of these few hundred English speakers over the French Canadians would have satisfied them. The sense of rebellion grew just as slowly in the older British colonies as it did among the small number of English descent in Canada, and the lack of trust between these people and the government hindered the post office's operations a few years later.
In 1767 Finlay was called upon to remove a certain friction which had arisen between the maîtres de poste and the travelling public. The regulations, which confined travelling by post to persons having special permits from the governor, were no longer insisted upon. Any person desiring to do so was at liberty to[Pg 46] hire horses and carriages at any of the post houses for travel to the next post house.
In 1767, Finlay was asked to address a conflict that had come up between the maîtres de poste and the traveling public. The rules that limited post travel to people with special permits from the governor were no longer enforced. Anyone wanting to travel was free to[Pg 46] hire horses and carriages at any of the post houses to go to the next post house.
The easing of restrictions enlarged the business of the maîtres de poste. But it evidently did not give unmixed satisfaction, as complaints were made that many persons riding post imposed upon the postmen, "threatening and abusing them contrary at all law."
The relaxation of restrictions expanded the business of the maîtres de poste. However, it clearly didn't bring complete satisfaction, as there were complaints that many people traveling by post took advantage of the postmen, "threatening and abusing them in violation of the law."
Finlay had no actual warrant for interfering on behalf of the maîtres de poste, but as postmaster of the province, he had a strong motive for picking up the reins of authority where he found them lying in slack hands. He required the services of the maîtres de poste to help him with the conveyance of the mails, and as those services were rendered for half the charge which was made to the travelling public, he kept the maîtres de poste under his influence by constituting himself their champion. Finlay pointed to the fact that in England the postmaster general was also general master of the post houses, and declared that as deputy of the postmaster general he would take the same position in Canada.
Finlay didn’t have any real authority to step in for the maîtres de poste, but as the postmaster of the province, he had a strong reason to take charge when he saw others not doing their job. He needed the maîtres de poste to help him transport the mail, and since they provided their services for half the price charged to the traveling public, he kept them on his side by acting as their advocate. Finlay pointed out that in England, the postmaster general was also in charge of the post houses, and asserted that as the deputy of the postmaster general, he would adopt the same role in Canada.
There was the essential difference between the situation in England and in Canada that the postmaster general had statutory authority for exercising control over the post houses in England, whereas there was no such authority for control over the post houses in Canada. However, Finlay was a member of the legislative council, and he assumed, without opposition or question, the charge of the maîtres de poste, and in 1767 issued public notice that the post house system was to be under the same regulations as were in force in England.[76] The maîtres de poste were confirmed in their monopoly, and protected against imposition on the part of the public.
There was a key difference between the situation in England and Canada: the postmaster general had legal authority to oversee post offices in England, while there was no such authority in Canada. However, Finlay was a member of the legislative council and took on the responsibility for the maîtres de poste without any opposition or questions. In 1767, he publicly announced that the post office system would follow the same regulations that were in place in England.[76] The maîtres de poste were granted their monopoly and protected from being taken advantage of by the public.
Finlay's energetic management of the affairs of the Canadian post office attracted the attention of his superiors, and as Franklin had resided continuously in England since 1764 as agent for Pennsylvania and other of the American colonies, the expanding scope of the American post office demanded a greater degree of supervision than Franklin's associate, Foxcroft, was able to give.
Finlay's dynamic management of the Canadian post office caught the eye of his superiors, and since Franklin had been living in England since 1764 as the representative for Pennsylvania and other American colonies, the growing needs of the American post office required more oversight than Franklin's partner, Foxcroft, could provide.
It was resolved to create another office, until then unknown in America, called a surveyorship. The duties of the surveyor in England are the same as those of the inspector in the Canadian or United States services, and call for a general control over the postal service within certain defined limits. The office of surveyor was established in 1772, and Finlay was appointed to the position.[Pg 47] He was allowed to retain his charge of the post office in Canada, though his salary here underwent an abatement.
It was decided to create a new office, which was not previously known in America, called a surveyorship. The responsibilities of the surveyor in England are similar to those of the inspector in the Canadian or United States services, and involve overseeing the postal service within specific defined limits. The surveyor position was established in 1772, and Finlay was appointed to the role.[Pg 47] He was permitted to keep his role at the post office in Canada, although his salary there was reduced.
The first duty assigned to Finlay as post office surveyor was to explore the uninhabited country beyond the last settlements on the river Chaudiere extending over the height of land into New England.[77] The purpose of the trip was to ascertain the practicability of a direct road between Quebec and New England. The merchants of Quebec had made much complaint of the slowness and irregularity of the ordinary communication with New York, which was by way of Montreal, and they hoped that the proposed road would materially shorten the journey to the principal places in the northern colonies.
The first task given to Finlay as a post office surveyor was to explore the uninhabited land beyond the last settlements on the Chaudiere River, stretching over the highlands into New England.[77] The goal of the trip was to determine if a direct road between Quebec and New England was feasible. The merchants of Quebec had complained a lot about the slow and inconsistent communication with New York, which went through Montreal, and they were hopeful that this new road would significantly reduce travel time to the main locations in the northern colonies.
The road which the merchants of Quebec desired to see built was a project which had occupied public attention at various times for over a century before this time. When Louis XIV, Colbert his minister, and Talon the intendant, were devising schemes for the creation of a New France in North America, they observed that the long Canadian winters, which shut up the port of Quebec, made it desirable that there should be free access to an ocean port.
The road that the merchants of Quebec wanted to see built was a project that had captured public interest at various points for over a century before this time. When Louis XIV, his minister Colbert, and Talon the intendant were coming up with plans to create a New France in North America, they noticed that the long Canadian winters, which closed off the port of Quebec, made it important to have free access to an ocean port.
The treaty of Breda confirmed England in 1667 in its possession of New York and New Jersey, and also established the right of France to Acadia, which in the French view comprised not only Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, but also that section of the state of Maine which lies east of the Kennebec river. In 1671[78] the king directed Talon to see what could be done towards constructing a road between the mouth of the Chaudiere and fort Pentegoet at the mouth of the Penobscot, which was the headquarters of the French governor in Acadia.
The Treaty of Breda in 1667 confirmed England's ownership of New York and New Jersey and established France's right to Acadia, which, from the French perspective, included not just Nova Scotia and New Brunswick but also the part of Maine that lies east of the Kennebec River. In 1671[78] the king instructed Talon to explore ways to build a road from the mouth of the Chaudière River to Fort Pentegoet at the mouth of the Penobscot, which served as the base for the French governor in Acadia.
The purposes of the king were not unlike those of the fathers of the present confederation. Canada was French and so was Acadia, and the association of the inland with the maritime settlements could not but be productive of good. The populations were small: Canada had six thousand seven hundred, and Acadia four hundred and forty-one,[79] but, for a short period, imperial ideas prevailed.
The king's goals were similar to those of the founding fathers of the current confederation. Canada was French, and so was Acadia, and the connection between the inland and coastal areas could only lead to positive outcomes. The populations were small: Canada had 6,700 people, and Acadia had 441,[79] but for a brief time, imperial ideas dominated.
Talon in 1671 despatched two explorers to Pentegoet. They took different routes, although following the watercourses, and their reports confirmed Talon as to the desirability of establishing permanent communication between the two provinces. His[Pg 48] plans embraced a line of settlements on the Penobscot and Kennebec rivers with a view to imposing a barrier to the advances of the English. But Talon's health gave way, and he returned to France in the fall of 1672, and as the king's ardour towards Canada was cooling off, owing to his absorption in his European wars, the road was abandoned.
Talon, in 1671, sent out two explorers to Pentegoet. They took different routes, but followed the waterways, and their reports confirmed Talon’s belief in the need for permanent communication between the two provinces. His[Pg 48] plans included a series of settlements along the Penobscot and Kennebec rivers to create a barrier against the English advances. However, Talon's health declined, and he returned to France in the fall of 1672. With the king's interest in Canada fading due to his focus on European wars, the plan was ultimately abandoned.
The project was revived eleven years afterwards by de Meulles, a later intendant. He was persuaded that if communication were opened, the merchants of Quebec might secure the trade of the Acadians which went entirely to New England, and the Acadians would become attached to Canada. The road would have to be settled upon, and de Meulles' plan was to place old soldiers upon it, as he did not think the Canadians could be induced to give up their comfortable lives, to enter upon a venture of that kind. De Meulles' proposition, however, fell upon deaf ears, as did all others calling for the outlay of money, and the scheme was allowed to lie until Finlay took it up.
The project was revived eleven years later by de Meulles, a subsequent intendant. He believed that if communication was established, the merchants of Quebec could capture the trade of the Acadians, which was entirely going to New England, and the Acadians would become loyal to Canada. They would need to settle on a road, and de Meulles’ plan was to assign old soldiers to it, as he didn’t think the Canadians would be willing to give up their comfortable lives to take on such a venture. However, de Meulles’ proposal fell on deaf ears, as did all other requests for funding, and the plan was left unattended until Finlay picked it up.
From the New England side a movement towards the height of land separating Canada from the English colonies was made in 1754.[80] Governor Shirley of Massachusetts in the early part of that year, set out from Falmouth (now Portland) with eight hundred men on an expedition up the Kennebec river. His purpose was to dislodge any Frenchman who might be settled on the height of land, and to establish a fort to secure the country against attack.
From the New England side, a push towards the high ground that separates Canada from the English colonies began in 1754.[80] Governor Shirley of Massachusetts set out from Falmouth (now Portland) early that year with eight hundred men on an expedition up the Kennebec River. His goal was to remove any French settlers who might be located on the high ground and to build a fort to protect the area from attacks.
Fort Halifax was erected at the junction of a stream called the Sebastoocook with the Kennebec, and the Plymouth company built a storehouse at the head of navigation on the Kennebec. A carriage road was laid between the fort and the storehouse. The governor anticipated that with fort Halifax as base he might secure the mastery of the Chaudiere and even threaten Quebec.
Fort Halifax was built where a stream called the Sebastoocook flows into the Kennebec, and the Plymouth company constructed a storehouse at the furthest point you could navigate on the Kennebec. A road was created to connect the fort and the storehouse. The governor hoped that with Fort Halifax as a base, he could gain control of the Chaudiere and even pose a threat to Quebec.
As Talon in 1671, and Shirley in 1754, so Finlay in 1772 was persuaded that a direct road from Quebec to New England was altogether desirable, and that it might be made without unusual difficulty. It was not, however, in the scheme of things that Finlay should succeed any more than his predecessors. His preparations were soon made. He explained his views to lieutenant governor Cramahe, who headed a subscription to pay Finlay's expenses, and inside of twenty-four hours he had ample means at his disposal for his purpose.[81]
As Talon in 1671 and Shirley in 1754, Finlay in 1772 also believed that a direct road from Quebec to New England was highly desirable and could be constructed with relative ease. However, it was not meant to be that Finlay would succeed any more than his predecessors. He quickly made his preparations. He shared his plans with Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, who organized a fund to cover Finlay's expenses, and within twenty-four hours, he had sufficient resources at his disposal for his project.[81]
Finlay set out in September 1773 with a party of Indians,[Pg 49] and reached Falmouth after seventeen days of canoeing and following trails. Having become satisfied as to the practicability of the road, he addressed himself to the task of securing the co-operation of those who might be supposed to benefit by the enterprise.
Finlay left in September 1773 with a group of Indians,[Pg 49] and arrived in Falmouth after seventeen days of canoeing and hiking along trails. After confirming that the route was feasible, he focused on getting the support of those who would likely benefit from the project.
At Portsmouth, New Hampshire, he discussed the subject with governor Wentworth. The governor was eager to help with the scheme of establishing a further connection between Canada and the colonies to the south, but was of opinion that the best route would be over the tract of country between the Connecticut river and the St. Francis river in Canada.
At Portsmouth, New Hampshire, he talked about the subject with Governor Wentworth. The governor was keen to assist with the plan to strengthen the connection between Canada and the colonies to the south, but he believed that the best route would be through the area between the Connecticut River and the St. Francis River in Canada.
This route had several advantages. It avoided the watercourses which made the road from Montreal to New York, and the proposed Kennebec road, useless for so long a period every year; the passage over the height of land was easy, and the country along the line of the route between the height of land and the St. Francis was favourable for settlement.
This route had several benefits. It bypassed the waterways that made the road from Montreal to New York and the suggested Kennebec road unusable for a long time each year; crossing over the height of land was simple, and the area along the route between the height of land and the St. Francis was good for settlement.
As Finlay was prepossessed with the governor's plans, the governor set about putting them into execution. He laid a carriageable road along the Connecticut to the boundary of his province, and by April 1774 had a line of settlements along the road so that the post rider would always have a stage at which to pass the night, and generally have one within four hours' travel from any point on the road.
As Finlay was caught up in the governor's plans, the governor started putting them into action. He built a road along the Connecticut to the edge of his province, and by April 1774, he had established a series of settlements along the road so that the mail carrier would always have a place to stay overnight, and usually be within four hours' travel from any point on the road.
Governor Wentworth lent to Finlay the services of his own surveyor to explore the country on the Canadian side of the route, but before anything could be accomplished in this way, the discontents in the south had broken out in acts of rebellion, and the post office was the first of the institutions of government to be suspended.
Governor Wentworth provided Finlay with his own surveyor to explore the land on the Canadian side of the route, but before they could achieve anything, the unrest in the south erupted into acts of rebellion, and the post office was the first government institution to shut down.
At Boston, Finlay laid his plans before governor Hutchinson.[82] The interview was not encouraging. The governor declared that, in the existing temper of the people, it would be enough for the legislature to know that the governor favoured a scheme, to ensure its defeat. The New Englanders had, besides this, but moderate grounds for assisting in establishing further communication with Canada.
At Boston, Finlay presented his plans to Governor Hutchinson.[82] The meeting was not promising. The governor stated that, given the current mood of the people, simply knowing that he supported a proposal would be enough to guarantee its failure. Furthermore, the New Englanders had only a limited reason to help establish more communication with Canada.
The proposed road would be beneficial to Massachusetts in so far as it aided colonization in the northern parts of the province, but as the tract through which the proposed Kennebec road would run lay largely in the grants of the Plymouth company, it would be this company which would be the chief beneficiary of the enterprise,[Pg 50] and the legislature considered that the company should bear the burden of the expense.
The proposed road would help Massachusetts by supporting colonization in the northern areas of the province. However, since most of the land the proposed Kennebec road would pass through belongs to the Plymouth company, that company would be the primary beneficiary of the project,[Pg 50] and the legislature believed that the company should cover the costs.
The company were not averse from assisting, but they indulged the hope that with their interest in the legislature the government might be induced to bear the cost. Another circumstance that tended to cool the interest of the legislature was the belief that in a short time this northern country was to be detached from Massachusetts, and erected into a separate government. Altogether Finlay concluded that unless the British government undertook the scheme on the New England side, it would not be accomplished at all.
The company wasn't against helping, but they hoped that with their connections in the legislature, the government might agree to cover the costs. Another reason the legislature's interest began to fade was the belief that this northern area would soon separate from Massachusetts and become its own government. Overall, Finlay concluded that unless the British government took on the project on the New England side, it simply wouldn't happen.
Finlay's tour of exploration was ended by his arrival in Falmouth at the beginning of October. He then entered upon the more extensive duty of inspecting the whole postal service from Maine to Georgia.[83] He travelled southward from Falmouth, inspected every post office, studied the conditions under which the mails were carried, and made a full report of his investigations to the postmaster general.
Finlay's exploration tour concluded when he arrived in Falmouth at the start of October. He then took on the broader responsibility of overseeing the entire postal service from Maine to Georgia.[83] He traveled south from Falmouth, checked every post office, looked into how the mail was transported, and submitted a comprehensive report of his findings to the postmaster general.
It is plain from his report that the service had deteriorated seriously since Franklin and Foxcroft had made their last inspection ten years before. Franklin, it will be remembered, had resided in England since 1764, and Foxcroft undoubtedly found it impossible to give proper attention to the post offices throughout the country, and at the same time to keep abreast of the official routine at the head office.
It’s clear from his report that the service had seriously declined since Franklin and Foxcroft did their last inspection ten years ago. As you might recall, Franklin had been living in England since 1764, and Foxcroft surely found it impossible to adequately oversee the post offices across the country while also staying on top of the official processes at the main office.
The postmasters on the whole impressed Finlay favourably. They understood their duties and seemed to be making a commendable struggle against the demoralization which confronted them however they turned. Only a small proportion of the letters which circulated within the colonies passed through the post office, although their conveyance by any other means was illegal. The consequence was that the revenues of the post office were small.
The postmasters generally left a good impression on Finlay. They understood their responsibilities and appeared to be making a commendable effort to fight against the demoralization around them. Only a small percentage of the letters that circulated within the colonies went through the post office, even though sending them any other way was illegal. As a result, the post office's revenue was low.
At Falmouth the greater part of the letters from Boston were delivered by the masters of sailing vessels. The postmaster on one occasion attempted to enforce the law against illegal conveyance by seizing the letter bag on one of the incoming ships; but the populace made so marked a manifestation of its displeasure that he did not venture on that course a second time.
At Falmouth, most of the letters from Boston were delivered by the captains of sailing ships. One time, the postmaster tried to enforce the law against illegal transportation by taking the letter bag from one of the incoming ships. However, the local people showed their strong disapproval, so he didn't try that again.
It was not so much, however, by direct defiance of the postal law, although instances of this were not wanting, as by evasions of it, that the monopoly of the post office was broken down. But[Pg 51] in many cases the evasions were so palpable that they could deceive nobody. A popular mode of escape from the penalties attaching to the breach of the monopoly was to seek shelter under one of the exceptions which the post office act allowed.
It wasn’t so much through outright defiance of the postal law—though there were certainly examples of that—but rather through clever loopholes that the post office's monopoly was undermined. However, in many cases, these loopholes were so obvious that they fooled no one. A common way to avoid the penalties associated with breaking the monopoly was to take refuge under one of the exceptions permitted by the post office act.
In none of the acts, for instance, is objection made to a person sending a letter to a correspondent by his own servant, or by a friend who happened to be journeying to the place where the letter should be delivered. Another exception to the monopoly was made in favour of letters which accompanied merchandise to which letters related. Thus a merchant in filling an order for goods has always been at liberty to send with them the invoice, or any other communication, having presumable reference to them. This was the excepted article, which served the turn of those eluding the monopoly.
In none of the acts, for example, is there any objection to a person sending a letter to a recipient through their own servant or a friend who just happens to be traveling to the place where the letter needs to go. Another exception to the monopoly was made for letters that accompanied merchandise they were related to. So, a merchant filling an order for goods has always been allowed to send along the invoice or any other message that presumably relates to them. This was the exception that allowed those trying to get around the monopoly to do so.
What Finlay saw at New Haven illustrates fairly what was going on throughout the colonies. Riders came in from other towns, their carts laden with bundles, packages, boxes and canisters, and every package had a letter attached. Some of the parcels consisted of no more than little bundles of chips, straw, or old paper, but they served their purpose. If the postmaster made objection to the number of letters they carried, the riders asserted their right to carry letters accompanying goods, and the public saw to it that neither postmaster or magistrate took too narrow a view of what constituted goods.
What Finlay observed in New Haven illustrates quite well what was happening across the colonies. Riders arrived from other towns, their carts filled with bundles, packages, boxes, and canisters, and each package had a letter attached. Some of the parcels were nothing more than small bundles of chips, straw, or old paper, but they got the job done. If the postmaster complained about the number of letters they carried, the riders claimed their right to carry letters along with goods, and the public made sure that neither the postmaster nor the magistrate took too strict a view of what counted as goods.
On the route between Boston and Newport the mail carrier was a certain Peter Mumford, who did a much larger business in the illegal conveyance of letters than as the servant of the post office. At Newport the postmaster declared that there were two post offices—the king's and Mumford's—and the latter did the larger business. There was no remedy, as the postmaster declared that whoever should attempt to check the illegal practice would be denounced as the friend of slavery and oppression and the declared enemy of America.
On the route between Boston and Newport, the mail carrier was a guy named Peter Mumford, who actually handled way more illegal mail than he did official postal work. In Newport, the postmaster said there were two post offices—the king's and Mumford's—and the latter was more popular. There was no way to fix it, since the postmaster claimed that anyone who tried to put a stop to the illegal activity would be labeled as a supporter of slavery and oppression, and an enemy of America.
Many of the couriers did so large a carrying business that the conveyance of the mails became a mere incident with them. As he approached New Haven, Finlay was accosted with the inquiry whether he had overtaken the post bringing in a drove of oxen, which the courier had engaged to do, when he came in with the mail.
Many of the couriers had such a big transporting business that delivering the mail became just a small part of what they did. As he got closer to New Haven, Finlay was asked if he had come across the post that was bringing in a herd of oxen, which the courier had agreed to transport when he delivered the mail.
In all respects but one, the situation described by Finlay presented no unexpected features. There had been no general inspection since Franklin made his tour in 1763, at the time he opened the[Pg 52] post office in Quebec. This fact fully explains the shortcomings of the postmasters and couriers. That the postmasters were chargeable with so few irregularities in their accounts, or were open to so little censure for faults in management, is high testimony to their intelligence and fidelity to duty.
In every way except one, the situation described by Finlay had no surprises. There hadn't been a general inspection since Franklin's tour in 1763, when he opened the [Pg 52] post office in Quebec. This fact completely explains the shortcomings of the postmasters and couriers. The fact that the postmasters had so few irregularities in their accounts, or faced so little criticism for management faults, speaks volumes about their intelligence and commitment to their duties.
Mail couriers have always been less completely identified with the postal service than postmasters. They are held by contract, not by appointment, and their engagements are for short terms. There is nothing irregular in their practice of combining the conveyance of the mails with other means of gaining a livelihood, but in the absence of supervision there was a constant tendency to give undue attention to what should have been merely auxiliary employments of carrying passengers and parcels.
Mail couriers have always been less closely tied to the postal service than postmasters. They are contracted rather than appointed, and their contracts are for short durations. It's not unusual for them to combine mail delivery with other ways of making a living, but without supervision, there was always a tendency to focus too much on what should have just been side jobs like transporting passengers and packages.
People employing the couriers demanded prompt service, while there was no person to insist on the prior claims of the post office, and indeed there were probably few people in any community at that time to whom an hour more or less was of any consequence in the receipt of their letters.
People using the couriers wanted quick service, while no one was there to enforce the previous rights of the post office, and in fact, there were probably very few people in any community back then for whom an hour more or less mattered in receiving their letters.
The evasion of the postmaster general's monopoly also was too common to excite particular remark. It was beyond doubt a breach of the law, but that it was wrong was a proposition to which few even good citizens gave assent, at least by their practice. Thomas Hancock made a merit of his saving the colony of Connecticut from thirty to forty shillings a year through the interest he had with certain captains, which enabled him to secure the colonial letters, as they came over in the ships, and thus prevent their passing through the post office.
The evasion of the postmaster general's monopoly was so common that it didn’t raise much concern. It was undoubtedly against the law, but very few good citizens actually believed it was wrong, at least not by their actions. Thomas Hancock took pride in saving the colony of Connecticut thirty to forty shillings a year through his connections with certain captains, which allowed him to obtain the colonial letters as they arrived on ships, thereby keeping them out of the post office.
In England, also, the practice was wellnigh universal. The increased rates imposed by the act of 1710 gave an immense impetus to clandestine traffic. Every pedlar and driver of public coaches lent himself to the profitable business of carrying letters for a few halfpence a letter. In London an effort was made to stop the practice by having officials of the post office frequent the roads leading into the city, for the purpose of searching the vehicles of those who had made themselves objects of suspicion.
In England, this practice was almost universal. The higher rates set by the act of 1710 gave a huge boost to illegal mail delivery. Every street vendor and coach driver got involved in the lucrative business of carrying letters for a few pennies each. In London, attempts were made to put an end to this practice by having postal officials patrol the roads leading into the city to search the vehicles of those who seemed suspicious.
It is interesting to note that the work for which the post office surveyors or inspectors were first appointed was to detain the mail couriers in the course of travel, and check the contents of the mail bags, and thus prevent postmasters from becoming parties, as they too frequently were, to frauds on the revenue, to their own great advantage.[Pg 53]
It's noteworthy that the initial task of the post office surveyors or inspectors was to stop mail couriers during their travels and inspect the contents of the mail bags, thereby stopping postmasters from becoming involved in revenue frauds, which they often did for their own significant benefit.[Pg 53]
As late as 1837, when Rowland Hill[84] laid his penny postage scheme before a public which was impatient for its adoption, Richard Cobden declared to a committee appointed to report on the scheme, that five-sixths of the letters passing between Manchester and London were conveyed by private hand. This state of things continued until the postage rates were brought down to a point, at which the service offered by the post office was cheaper as well as better than any other. The only certain means by which a government monopoly in a free country can maintain its position is to outbid its rivals. There is no safe dependence to be placed in legal process.
As late as 1837, when Rowland Hill[84] presented his penny postage plan to a public eager for its approval, Richard Cobden told a committee assigned to evaluate the plan that five-sixths of the letters traveling between Manchester and London were delivered by private means. This situation persisted until postage rates were lowered to a level where the service provided by the post office was not only cheaper but also better than any other option available. The only reliable way a government monopoly in a free country can maintain its standing is by outbidding its competitors. You cannot rely on legal processes for security.
In ordinary times, then, the evasion of the exclusive privilege of the postmaster general by any community would deserve no more than passing mention. It is as part of a general boycott of the government that the action of the Americans is worthy of note.
In normal circumstances, the evasion of the postmaster general’s exclusive privilege by any community would hardly be worth mentioning. However, it’s the Americans’ actions as part of a broader boycott against the government that makes this significant.
From the time of the passage of the stamp act in 1765, the attitude of the colonies towards all schemes in which taxation by Parliament could be detected was one of resistance active or passive. When this act went into operation, the Americans bound themselves to import nothing from England, a self-imposed obligation which in the undeveloped state of their manufactures entailed much inconvenience and even distress.
From the time the Stamp Act was passed in 1765, the colonies reacted to any taxation by Parliament with either active or passive resistance. When this law went into effect, Americans committed to not importing anything from England, a choice that, given the underdeveloped state of their manufacturing, caused significant inconvenience and even hardship.
There was an essential difference between the English and the American methods of avoiding the penalties for infractions of the post office law. In England, and to some extent doubtless in America as well, men engaged in the illegal conveyance of letters did their best to conceal their operations from the authorities. The efforts of a public coach driver were directed to rendering the search made by the post office inspectors fruitless. If letters were found in his possession, he suffered the legal penalties as the smuggler does to-day. It was one of the chances of his trade.
There was a key difference between how the English and Americans avoided the penalties for breaking post office laws. In England, and likely to some extent in America too, people involved in the illegal transport of letters tried their hardest to hide their activities from the authorities. A public coach driver aimed to make any inspections by post office inspectors ineffective. If letters were found in his possession, he faced legal penalties, just like a smuggler does today. It was simply part of his trade's risks.
In the colonies men who were bent on circumventing the post office pursued another course. They indulged their taste for legal technicalities by carrying their letters openly, and maintaining that the packages which accompanied them took them outside the monopoly, and they gave scope to their humour by making the packages as ridiculous as possible. They incurred no great risk, for the active spirits in every community threatened a prosecutor with a coat of tar and feathers.[Pg 54]
In the colonies, men determined to bypass the post office took a different approach. They openly carried their letters and argued that the packages they attached to them fell outside the monopoly. They had fun by making the packages as absurd as they could. They faced little risk since the lively members of each community warned any potential prosecutor with a coat of tar and feathers.[Pg 54]
The stamp act was repealed in the year following its enactment, and for the moment trade resumed its wonted course. But it was not for long. The British government was determined that the legislative supremacy of parliament should be recognized in America, and the colonies were equally persistent in their denial of this supremacy; and in the conflict which ensued the principle weapons employed by the Americans until the outbreak of the war were non-importation and non-exportation agreements.
The Stamp Act was repealed in the year after it was enacted, and for a brief period, trade went back to its normal flow. But this didn't last long. The British government was adamant about having Parliament's legislative authority acknowledged in America, while the colonies were just as determined to reject that authority. In the ensuing conflict, the main tactics used by the Americans until the war broke out were agreements to stop importing and exporting goods.
As the British merchant exercised a preponderating influence with the government, the stoppage of trade with America, as the result of a constitutional dispute, was an effective instrument in making the government consider the situation seriously. The difficulty with the government was to understand the attitude of mind which prevailed among the Americans.
As the British merchant had a strong influence over the government, halting trade with America due to a constitutional dispute was a powerful tool that made the government take the situation seriously. The challenge for the government was grasping the mindset of the Americans.
The government had no quarrel with the principle that representation should be a condition of taxation. It would have asserted the principle on any occasion, but it could not see that the course it was pursuing was a violation of that principle. Parliament, it declared, was the great council of the nation, representing those parts beyond the sea as well as those at home, and its measures bound the whole nation.
The government agreed with the idea that you should have representation if you're being taxed. It would have supported this idea anytime, but it couldn’t recognize that its actions were going against that principle. Parliament, it said, was the main council of the nation, representing both overseas territories and those at home, and its decisions affected everyone in the country.
It was still, it must be remembered, half a century before the time when the agitations which preceded the great reform bill of 1832 had familiarized the country with the distinction between virtual and actual representation. The British parliament was far from being, and indeed made no pretence of being a representative assembly in the sense in which the phrase is now used. The right to send members to parliament had for centuries been exercised by the electors of counties and certain ancient boroughs, and no enlargement of the representation was made from 1677 until 1832,[85] in spite of the great changes in population and industrial importance which had taken place in the course of time.
It’s important to remember that it was still half a century before the events that led to the significant reform bill of 1832 made the distinction between virtual and actual representation well-known across the country. The British Parliament was far from being, and didn’t even pretend to be, a representative assembly in the way we understand the term today. For centuries, the right to send members to Parliament had been held by the voters of counties and certain historic boroughs, and there was no expansion of representation from 1677 until 1832,[85] despite the significant changes in population and industrial importance that had occurred over time.
Great manufacturing towns such as Manchester and Leeds sent no members to represent them in parliament, while Old Sarum which did not contain a single house elected two members. To a people, who saw nothing in this state of things inconsistent with the theory of representative government, the colonial view would be quite incomprehensible.
Great manufacturing cities like Manchester and Leeds had no representatives in parliament, while Old Sarum, which had no houses, elected two members. For a people who saw nothing wrong with this situation in the context of representative government, the colonial perspective would be completely baffling.
The colonist on the other hand with his strict representation in town meetings and colonial assemblies, and without the historical aids to an understanding of the point of view of the home government,[Pg 55] saw little of a truly representative character in the British system. But he did see, what the home government did not, that a body of distinct and separate interests had grown up in America of which parliament had a very inaccurate conception, and with which it was in no way qualified to deal.
The colonist, on the other hand, with his strict representation in town meetings and colonial assemblies, and without the historical context to understand the home government's perspective,[Pg 55] saw little of a truly representative nature in the British system. However, he recognized, unlike the home government, that a body of distinct and separate interests had developed in America, which Parliament had a very inaccurate understanding of and was in no position to address.
The attitude of the colonists did not appear to the government to be quite free from insincerity. For half a century and more, the government declared, the colonists had been subject to taxes in the shape of post office charges imposed by the act of 1710, and they had never raised a question.
The government's view was that the colonists' attitude seemed somewhat insincere. For over fifty years, the government argued, the colonists had been paying taxes through post office fees set by the act of 1710, and they had never questioned it.
In the Newcastle correspondence, there is a paper, dated 1765, containing a discussion on the legality of a tax on the trade with the Spanish West Indies. In the course of the paper it is asserted that parliament, by the post office act of Queen Anne, imposed an internal tax on the colonies without their presuming to dispute the jurisdiction of parliament over them.
In the Newcastle correspondence, there's a document from 1765 discussing the legality of a tax on trade with the Spanish West Indies. In this document, it is stated that Parliament, through the Post Office Act of Queen Anne, imposed an internal tax on the colonies without them challenging Parliament's authority over them.
The disturbances in America which followed upon the attempts to enforce the stamp act surprised and alarmed the government, and a committee of parliament was appointed to consider what their future course would be. Franklin who, as the representative of several of the colonies, had been in London for a considerable time, was among the witnesses examined by the committee. His examination took a wide range, but the point of interest was the question as to what ground in principle the Americans stood upon in objecting to the stamp act, since they had accepted the post office act of 1710.
The unrest in America that followed the efforts to enforce the Stamp Act took the government by surprise and caused concern, leading to the appointment of a parliamentary committee to discuss their next steps. Franklin, who had been in London for a significant period as the representative of several colonies, was among the witnesses called to testify before the committee. His testimony covered a broad spectrum of topics, but the key question was about the principle behind the Americans' objections to the Stamp Act, given that they had accepted the Post Office Act of 1710.
For Franklin this was a crucial question, as he had been not only administering the post office in America for twelve years past, but he did not conceal his satisfaction that by his management he had been able for several years to send substantial sums to Great Britain as profits from the institution.
For Franklin, this was an important issue because he had been running the post office in America for the past twelve years, and he wasn't shy about expressing his pride that his leadership had allowed him to send significant profits to Great Britain from the business for several years.
Franklin answered the questions with much ingenuity. The money paid for the postage of a letter was not in the nature of a tax; it was merely a quantum meruit for a service done; no person was compellable to pay the money if he did not choose to receive the service. A man might still, as before the act, send his letter by a servant, a special messenger, or a friend, if he thought it safer and cheaper.
Franklin answered the questions with a lot of creativity. The money paid for mailing a letter wasn't really a tax; it was just a quantum meruit for a service provided. No one had to pay the money if they didn’t want to use the service. A person could still, as before the law, send their letter with a servant, a special messenger, or a friend if they thought it was safer and cheaper.
The answer would have been quite just, if the postmaster general of England had not held a monopoly of letter carrying in America. While a person is free to use or not to use a certain service, the charge for the service is not in the nature of a tax.[Pg 56] If a person does not like the price demanded by the post office for its services, he may seek other means of having his letters carried. But the post office act does not leave a person free to employ other agencies for the conveyance of his letters. The monopoly has attached to it heavy penalties for its infringement.
The answer would have been fair, if the postmaster general of England hadn’t had a monopoly on mail delivery in America. While someone can choose whether or not to use a particular service, the fee for that service isn’t really a tax.[Pg 56] If someone doesn’t like the price set by the post office for its services, they can look for other ways to send their letters. But the post office act doesn’t allow a person to freely use other options for sending their letters. The monopoly comes with severe penalties for breaking the rules.
It is true, as Franklin said, that the post office act leaves it open to a man to employ a servant, special messenger, or friend in the course of his travel, to carry his letters. But the mention of these agencies shows the absurdity of Franklin's contention. A merchant in New York having business to transact by letter with a customer in Boston or Philadelphia could not afford to pay the expenses of his messenger or servant unless the transaction were one of considerable magnitude. Nor could he await the chance of a friend's making a visit to either of these places. He might, if he were free to do so, have entrusted his letters to a coach driver who made a business of passing between New York and the other two towns, but the monopoly of the post office stood in his way, and the coachman would have made himself liable to a heavy fine.
It’s true, as Franklin pointed out, that the post office law allows someone to hire a servant, special messenger, or friend to carry their letters while traveling. But mentioning these options highlights the ridiculousness of Franklin's argument. A merchant in New York dealing with a customer in Boston or Philadelphia couldn’t afford to pay for a messenger or servant unless the deal was really significant. Plus, he couldn’t just wait for a friend to visit one of those cities. He might have been able to hand his letters to a coach driver who regularly traveled between New York and those other two cities, but the post office monopoly prevented that, and the coach driver would risk facing a hefty fine.
In short, if the merchant had to correspond with neighbouring places he was compelled to employ the post office. With a country so extended and so highly civilized as the American colonies were at that day, a postal system was an absolute necessity; and if the system maintained by the government were protected by a monopoly, its charges were a tax on the users of the system in so far as those charges exceeded the strict cost of carrying on the service.
In short, if the merchant needed to communicate with nearby places, he had to use the post office. With a country as large and civilized as the American colonies were at that time, a postal system was essential; and if the government maintained a monopoly on the system, its fees were effectively a tax on those using the service, to the extent that those fees were higher than the actual cost of providing the service.
Furthermore, since the post office act of 1710 was imposed on the colonies without their consent, and since Franklin's good management had enabled him to pay all the expenses of the service and send a considerable surplus to England for some years past, it is plain that to the extent of the yearly surplus the colonies had been subject to a tax laid on them without their consent, and that Franklin himself was the tax gatherer. This was undoubtedly where the point lay in the question which was asked of Franklin.
Furthermore, since the Post Office Act of 1710 was imposed on the colonies without their consent, and since Franklin's effective management allowed him to cover all the service's expenses while sending a significant surplus to England for several years, it’s clear that to the extent of the annual surplus, the colonies were subject to a tax enforced without their approval, with Franklin himself serving as the tax collector. This was undoubtedly the core issue in the question posed to Franklin.
Franklin's views on the constitutionality of the post office charges were part and parcel of his views on taxation generally. For instance, he drew a clear line of distinction between a tax on imported goods and an internal tax such as the stamp act. A duty on imported goods it was permissible for parliament to impose on the colonies, while an internal tax could not properly be levied without consent.
Franklin's opinions on the constitutionality of post office charges were closely tied to his overall views on taxation. For example, he made a clear distinction between taxes on imported goods and internal taxes like the Stamp Act. He believed that Parliament could impose duties on imported goods in the colonies, but that an internal tax couldn’t be imposed without consent.
The stamp act required that all commercial and legal documents[Pg 57] and newspapers should be written or printed upon stamped paper which was sold by agents of the government at varying prices prescribed by the law. As this was a tax which could not be avoided so long as men carried on their business in the ordinary way and by the ordinary means, it was one for which the consent of the colonies was necessary.
The Stamp Act required that all commercial and legal documents[Pg 57] and newspapers be written or printed on stamped paper that was sold by government agents at different prices set by law. Since this was a tax that couldn't be avoided as long as people conducted their business in the usual way, it was one that needed the consent of the colonies.
An import tax stood on a different footing. It was simply one of the elements entering into the price of the goods imported. If people objected to the price as enhanced by the tax, it was open to them to decline to buy the goods. A tax of this sort was in Franklin's view quite within the powers of the sovereign state.
An import tax was different. It was just one of the factors that affected the price of imported goods. If people disagreed with the higher price due to the tax, they could choose not to buy the goods. In Franklin's opinion, this type of tax was totally within the rights of the government.
The ultimate test applied by Franklin to determine whether a tax could in a given case be constitutionally imposed, was whether or not there was a legal mode of escape from the tax. If the tax were an avoidable one, it was constitutional, since submission to it implied consent. If, on the other hand, the tax were one which from the necessities of the case could not be avoided, it ought not to be imposed until it had been assented to by the people.
The final test that Franklin used to figure out if a tax could be constitutionally enforced in a specific situation was whether there was a legal way to avoid the tax. If the tax could be avoided, it was constitutional because agreeing to it meant consent. However, if the tax was one that, due to the circumstances, couldn't be avoided, it shouldn’t be imposed until the people had agreed to it.
Opinions may differ as to which of the two classes the application of the test would place postal charges in. They constituted a tax beyond any question since they turned into the government a surplus of revenue after all expenses had been met. Whether they were to be regarded as an avoidable tax to be paid or not as one cared to employ the services of a post office or not, or whether as a tax which the circumstances of the community made it necessary to accept, will depend on one's views as to whether a post office is indispensable to the community.
Opinions may vary on which of the two categories postal charges fall into. There's no doubt they acted as a tax since they generated extra revenue for the government after covering all expenses. Whether these charges are seen as an optional tax to pay only if someone chooses to use postal services, or a necessary tax due to the community's needs, depends on one's perspective on the importance of a post office to the community.
It is difficult to see how Franklin, who of all men of his generation knew best the requirements of a highly developed industrial community, could believe that the necessities for the interchange of correspondence on the part of a people like the American colonists could be satisfied by private messengers, or travelling friends, or indeed by any agency less comprehensive than a national postal system.
It’s hard to understand how Franklin, who understood the needs of a highly developed industrial society better than anyone of his time, could think that the American colonists could manage their correspondence with just private messengers, friends traveling, or any system less extensive than a national postal service.
FOOTNOTES:
[71] G.P.O., Treasury, 1760-1771, p. 99.
[76] Quebec Gazette, February 16, 1767.
[77] Finlay's Journal.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Finlay's Journal.
[83] Finlay's Journal, Brooklyn, 1867.
CHAPTER IV
The post office during the Revolution—Its suppression.
The post office during the Revolution—Its suppression.
But the time was well past when the question as to what was or what was not an allowable tax possessed any but an academic interest. Though the stamp act was repealed a few months after it went into operation, the trouble it aroused was not allayed. The gratitude of the colonists which followed upon the repeal gave way to renewed irritation when it was found that the ministry in London had only postponed, not definitely abandoned, its schemes of taxation, and the late triumph gave vigour to the determination of the colonists to continue their resistance.
But it was long past the time when the question of what was or wasn't an acceptable tax was just a matter of academic interest. Although the Stamp Act was repealed a few months after it was put into effect, the issues it caused didn’t go away. The colonists' gratitude after the repeal quickly turned into frustration when they realized that the government in London had only delayed, not completely scrapped, its tax plans. This recent victory fueled the colonists' resolve to keep resisting.
Step followed step. All went to widen the breach, and diminish the chances of a peaceful settlement. The post office soon became involved. As we have seen, the ministry endeavoured to convict the colonists of, at least, inconsistency when they objected to the stamp act, while tolerating the post office. Franklin explained what seemed to him the points of difference between the two things, without convincing the ministry.
Step followed step. All contributed to widening the gap and reducing the chances of a peaceful resolution. The post office soon got involved. As we saw, the government tried to accuse the colonists of, at the very least, being inconsistent when they opposed the stamp act while accepting the post office. Franklin pointed out what he thought were the differences between the two issues, but he failed to convince the government.
The colonists had fully shared Franklin's opinions, but the attitude of the ministry caused them to look more thoughtfully into the matter. They finally agreed that the ministry might be right in insisting that the post office charges were a tax, and refused to use the institution any longer. Finlay found that everywhere the view prevailed that the post office was unconstitutional, and it was becoming hazardous to patronize it.
The colonists had completely shared Franklin's views, but the ministry's stance made them reconsider the situation more carefully. They ultimately agreed that the ministry could be correct in arguing that the post office fees were a tax, and they decided to stop using the service. Finlay discovered that the belief that the post office was unconstitutional was widespread, and it was becoming risky to support it.
While Finlay was in the southern states the Boston tea riots took place, and before he reached New York on his return home, Franklin had been dismissed, and he had been appointed to replace Franklin.
While Finlay was in the southern states, the Boston tea riots happened, and before he got back to New York, Franklin had been dismissed, and he was appointed to replace Franklin.
The reasons which led to Franklin's removal have been frequently stated. They must be related again in order to complete the narrative. Franklin had become possessed, by means still unrevealed, of a number of private letters written by Hutchinson, governor of Massachusetts, and Oliver, the lieutenant governor, to a friend in England. The letters dealt with the condition of[Pg 59] affairs in the colony, and discussed the situation with the full freedom which a confidential correspondence is apt to encourage.
The reasons for Franklin's removal have been mentioned many times. They need to be repeated to complete the story. Franklin had somehow obtained a number of private letters written by Hutchinson, the governor of Massachusetts, and Oliver, the lieutenant governor, to a friend in England. The letters discussed the state of[Pg 59] affairs in the colony and talked about the situation with the kind of openness that confidential correspondence tends to promote.
Hutchinson and Oliver dwelt upon the turbulent disposition of Boston, expressed grave doubts as to the possibility of allowing the full measure of English liberty in the colonies, and asserted the necessity of a military force to support the government. When these letters were brought to Franklin, he saw the advantage that a knowledge of them would give the colonists in the struggle then going on, and as the agent for Massachusetts, he asked for permission to send the letters to the colony for perusal by a few of the leading men. Permission was granted on Franklin's express undertaking, that the letters should not be printed or copied.
Hutchinson and Oliver discussed the chaotic nature of Boston, raised serious concerns about the feasibility of granting full English liberties in the colonies, and insisted on the need for military support to uphold the government. When Franklin received these letters, he recognized how beneficial sharing their content would be for the colonists in their ongoing struggle. As the agent for Massachusetts, he requested permission to send the letters to the colony for a few key leaders to read. Permission was granted on the condition that Franklin agreed not to print or copy the letters.
In Boston, the letters were passed from hand to hand among the popular leaders, and were finally discussed at a secret sitting of the assembly. The assembly adopted resolutions strongly condemnatory of Hutchinson and Oliver, as sowers of discord between the mother country and the colonies, declared the letters to be incitements to oppression on the part of the ministry, and petitioned the king to remove Hutchinson and Oliver from their government.
In Boston, the letters were circulated among the influential leaders and were eventually talked about in a private meeting of the assembly. The assembly passed resolutions that strongly condemned Hutchinson and Oliver for creating conflict between the mother country and the colonies, labeled the letters as provocations for oppression from the ministry, and requested the king to remove Hutchinson and Oliver from their positions in government.
The publication of the letters gave rise to great astonishment in England, and one of the consequences, before Franklin confessed his part in the transaction, was a duel between a brother of the person to whom the letters were written, and a gentleman whom he accused of disclosing them to the public. In England Franklin met with universal condemnation, and he was at once dismissed from his position as deputy postmaster general in America.
The release of the letters caused a huge uproar in England, and one result, before Franklin admitted his involvement, was a duel between the brother of the person the letters were addressed to and a man he blamed for making them public. In England, Franklin faced widespread criticism, and he was immediately removed from his role as deputy postmaster general in America.
It is noteworthy as illustrating, partly Franklin's good nature, and partly the apparent inability of the officials of the post office to understand the state of mind of the ministry, that in spite of his dismissal or of the reasons for it, Franklin remained on good terms with the heads of the post office.
It’s important to point out that this reflects both Franklin's good nature and the post office officials' obvious inability to grasp the ministry's mindset. Despite his dismissal and the reasons behind it, Franklin maintained a good relationship with the heads of the post office.
There was some delay in settling the accounts of Franklin with the post office, but that was due to a lack of promptness on the part of Foxcroft, Franklin's official associate, in rendering the accounts. When the balance due by Franklin was paid, his relations with the post office did not entirely cease; for he offered himself, and was accepted, as one of the sureties for Foxcroft on the re-appointment of the latter as joint deputy postmaster general with Hugh Finlay.
There was a delay in finalizing Franklin’s accounts with the post office, but that was because Foxcroft, Franklin's official partner, was slow to submit the accounts. Even after Franklin paid the balance owed, his connection with the post office didn’t completely end; he offered to be a guarantor for Foxcroft when Foxcroft was reappointed as joint deputy postmaster general alongside Hugh Finlay.
For some time previous to the events which led to Franklin's[Pg 60] removal from the service, plans were being considered for putting the administration of the post office on a better footing. Although New York was, by the terms of the act of 1710, made the official headquarters of the service, it had not been so up till this time. There seems to have been no fixed official residence. In 1749, the deputy postmaster general resided in Virginia, and his predecessor in North Carolina. Franklin and Foxcroft both happened to live in Philadelphia, and that city accordingly became the headquarters of the postal system.
For a while before the events that led to Franklin's[Pg 60] removal from his position, there were discussions about improving the management of the post office. Although New York was designated as the official headquarters of the service by the act of 1710, it hadn't actually been functioning that way until then. There didn't seem to be a permanent official residence. In 1749, the deputy postmaster general lived in Virginia, and his predecessor was in North Carolina. Since Franklin and Foxcroft both lived in Philadelphia, that city became the headquarters of the postal system.
It was determined in England that, after the 10th of October, 1773, New York should be the permanent administrative centre. A central office was to be established, a general secretary appointed, and suitable clerical assistance provided for the carrying on of the work of administration. When Finlay was made joint deputy postmaster general in Franklin's place, he continued to act as travelling surveyor.
It was decided in England that, after October 10, 1773, New York would be the permanent administrative center. A central office was to be set up, a general secretary appointed, and appropriate clerical support provided for carrying out the administrative tasks. When Finlay was appointed as joint deputy postmaster general in Franklin's position, he continued to work as a traveling surveyor.
But the plans under contemplation did not come to maturity. Already measures were on foot which in a short time deprived the post office of its business in America. In March 1774, the colonists began a movement to establish a postal system, which would be independent of the regular post office.
But the plans being considered didn’t come to fruition. Actions were already underway that soon took away the post office’s business in America. In March 1774, the colonists started efforts to create a postal system that would be independent of the regular post office.
The committee of correspondence in Boston, which was the organ through which the opponents of government carried on their work, wrote to the committee in Salem introducing William Goddard, and suggesting the advisability of establishing a post office in America.[86]
The Boston committee of correspondence, which was the group that worked against the government, wrote to the committee in Salem to introduce William Goddard and suggested that it would be a good idea to set up a post office in America.[86]
The present post office, it was stated, was founded on an act of the British parliament for raising a revenue from the colonies without their consent, and for that reason was as obnoxious as any other revenue act. The post office was being used as a precedent against the colonies when they contested the right of parliament to tax them, and furthermore, was now being employed to prevent the dissemination of popular intelligence. Goddard, for whom the Boston committee bespoke good will, would explain to their associates in Salem by what means certain newspapers identified with the people's cause were prevented from circulating.
The current post office, as stated, was established by an act of the British parliament aimed at generating revenue from the colonies without their approval, and for that reason, it was as resented as any other tax law. The post office was being used as an example against the colonies when they challenged parliament's right to tax them, and moreover, it was now being used to stop the spread of important information. Goddard, whom the Boston committee endorsed, would explain to their friends in Salem how certain newspapers connected to the people's cause were blocked from circulating.
Goddard was not ill-fitted to take the lead in the agitation against the post office. He was the son of the postmaster of New London, and had been himself for two years postmaster of Providence, and in this way was quite familiar with the details of work[Pg 61] in a post office. Moreover, during his residence in Providence, and afterwards in Philadelphia and Baltimore, he was constantly engaged in newspaper enterprises.
Goddard was well-suited to lead the movement against the post office. He was the son of the postmaster of New London and had served as the postmaster of Providence for two years, making him quite familiar with the ins and outs of post office operations[Pg 61]. Additionally, while living in Providence, and later in Philadelphia and Baltimore, he was consistently involved in newspaper ventures.
As Goddard's schemes were, for the most part, unsuccessful, his wits never lost the edge that adversity usually gives. His grievance was that the post office charged rates so excessive on the newspapers he wished to circulate that he was unable to send them to his readers throughout the colonies.
As Goddard's plans mostly failed, he never let his sharp thinking fade like most people do when faced with challenges. He was frustrated that the post office charged such high rates on the newspapers he wanted to distribute, making it impossible for him to send them to his readers across the colonies.
What measure of truth there was in Goddard's statements we have no means of ascertaining. But there was no doubt that the charge might be true, without the post office exceeding its legal rights. The fact was that newspapers had no special legal standing under the post office act.
What level of truth there was in Goddard's statements we have no way of knowing. But there’s no doubt that the accusation could be true without the post office going beyond its legal rights. The reality was that newspapers didn’t have any special legal status under the post office act.
That act was passed in 1710, when newsletters in manuscript were in service and newspapers were too few and unimportant to engage the attention of the post office or of parliament at the time the law was being framed. Consequently no express provision was made for them in the act. If newspapers were to be carried by the post office under the authority of the act, it could only be by treating them as letters, and a glance at the scale of charges will show the impossibility of newspapers bearing so burdensome a tax.
That law was passed in 1710, when handwritten newsletters were common and newspapers were rare and insignificant enough that they didn't capture the attention of the post office or parliament while the law was being created. As a result, there was no specific mention of them in the act. If newspapers were going to be sent by the post office under this law, they would have to be treated like letters, and a look at the fee schedule will demonstrate how impractical it would be for newspapers to bear such a heavy cost.
The newspapers of that day were inconsiderable in size compared with those that are now published, but few even at that time would weigh less than an ounce, and an ounce letter passing between New York and Philadelphia called for a postal charge of three shillings or seventy-two cents. This sum was the lowest charge in the scale for ounce letters passing between any two places of importance in America.
The newspapers back then were pretty small compared to the ones we have today, but even the least substantial ones would weigh at least an ounce. An ounce letter sent between New York and Philadelphia cost three shillings or seventy-two cents to mail. This was the lowest rate for ounce letters traveling between any two major cities in America.
Clearly newspapers could not circulate by means of the post office if they were to be regarded as letters. But as they were not mentioned in the act, newspapers had at least the advantage of not being subject to the postmaster general's monopoly. Publishers were free to turn to account any means of conveyance that happened to be available, for the distribution of their newspapers. Unfortunately, however, this freedom was of little benefit at that period, as there were no courier services regularly operating between the towns in America.
Clearly, newspapers couldn't be sent through the post office if they were considered letters. But since they weren't mentioned in the law, newspapers had the perk of not being under the postmaster general's monopoly. Publishers were free to use any available means of transportation for distributing their newspapers. Unfortunately, this freedom was mostly useless at that time, as there were no regular courier services operating between towns in America.
There was nothing for it but for publishers to take advantage of the postal system if this were at all possible, and the possibility appeared through one of those curious devices, which are the derision of logical foreigners, but which afford a means of escape[Pg 62] from the inconveniences of a law, which it is not desired to alter at the time.
Publishers had no choice but to use the postal system if it was at all feasible, and that opportunity came through one of those odd devices that logical outsiders might mock, but which offered a way to bypass the issues created by a law that people didn't want to change at that moment.[Pg 62]
In England, where the situation of newspaper publishers was the same as it was in America, the privilege of franking newspapers for transmission through the mails was conferred upon certain officials of the post office, called clerks of the road. Clothed with this privilege the clerks of the road bargained with publishers for the conveyance of their newspapers in the ordinary mails, and put the proceeds into their own pockets.
In England, where newspaper publishers faced the same issues as in America, certain post office officials, known as clerks of the road, were granted the privilege of sending newspapers for free through the mail. With this privilege, the clerks of the road made deals with publishers to transport their newspapers in the regular mail and kept the earnings for themselves.
It was a practice that was not regarded as in any way irregular. The post office was quite aware that its vehicles were being used for the conveyance of newspapers, from which it received no revenue, and it congratulated itself that it had hit upon a contrivance for serving the public without having to tamper with the act under which it operated.
It was a practice that was not seen as unusual at all. The post office knew that its vehicles were being used to deliver newspapers, for which it received no payment, and it took pride in finding a way to serve the public without having to change the rules it operated under.
The privilege of franking newspapers, which was enjoyed by the clerks of the road in England, was also conferred upon the deputy postmasters general in America, and colonial newspapers were distributed by the post office under arrangements similar to those described. While the act itself made no provision for the conveyance and delivery of newspapers, this peculiar plan offered great advantages to the publisher.
The privilege of sending newspapers for free, which was enjoyed by the clerks on the roads in England, was also granted to the deputy postmasters general in America, and colonial newspapers were distributed by the post office under similar arrangements. Although the act itself did not provide for the transport and delivery of newspapers, this unique plan offered significant benefits to the publisher.
There was, however, one serious objection to it. Not resting on the law, but on the good will of those in authority, it could be terminated at any time, and the post office might legally charge sums as high as the postage on letters for the conveyance of newspapers. With this power in its hands the post office had complete control over the fortunes of newspaper publishers. If for any reason it desired to suppress a newspaper, all that was necessary was to cancel the special arrangement between the deputy postmaster general and the publisher, and leave to the latter the option of paying letter rates or of finding some other means of conveyance.
There was, however, one serious objection to it. Not relying on the law, but on the goodwill of those in charge, it could be ended at any time, and the post office could legally charge amounts as high as the postage on letters for delivering newspapers. With this power in its hands, the post office had complete control over the fortunes of newspaper publishers. If it wanted to suppress a newspaper for any reason, all it had to do was cancel the special arrangement between the deputy postmaster general and the publisher, leaving the publisher to either pay letter rates or find another way to deliver their newspapers.
Whether this power was exercised in Goddard's case, is not known; that it would be, if considered necessary, is beyond doubt. In 1737, the clerks of the road in England were directed to take particular care that no newspapers were sent by the post office which contained reflections on the government,[87] and to assure themselves on the point, they were to send no newspapers into the country at all, except such as were purchased from a single dealer named in the order, whose loyalty and judgment were not open[Pg 63] to question. The possession of this power by the government was quite sufficient to arouse reasonable apprehensions.
Whether this power was used in Goddard's case is unknown; however, it’s clear that it would be used if deemed necessary. In 1737, road clerks in England were instructed to ensure that no newspapers containing criticism of the government were sent via the post office, and to verify this, they were only allowed to send newspapers into the country that were purchased from a specific vendor listed in the order, whose loyalty and judgment were unquestionable. The existence of this power in the hands of the government was enough to raise legitimate concerns.
Goddard appears to have succeeded in his mission to Salem, as a few days later the committee of that town, responding to the letter from Boston, declared that the act of the British parliament establishing the post office in America, was dangerous in principle and demanded peremptory opposition.[88] A considerable sum was raised for the fund to set up a colonial post office, although Salem was in financial straits at the time.
Goddard seems to have accomplished his mission to Salem, as a few days later the town committee, replying to the letter from Boston, stated that the British parliament's act establishing the post office in America was fundamentally dangerous and required strong opposition.[88] A significant amount of money was raised for the fund to create a colonial post office, even though Salem was facing financial difficulties at that time.
Having succeeded in the first part of his campaign, Goddard went a step forward, and drew up a plan for an independent American post office, and laid it before the committees of correspondence in all the colonies.[89] His proposition was that the colonial post office should be established and maintained by subscription, and that its control should be vested in a committee to be appointed annually by the subscribers. This committee would appoint postmasters and post riders, and fix the rates of postage. The immediate management of the service was to be under the direction of a postmaster general to be selected by ballot, and who should hold his office by a yearly tenure.
Having succeeded in the first part of his campaign, Goddard took the next step and created a plan for an independent American post office, which he presented to the committees of correspondence in all the colonies.[89] His proposal was that the colonial post office should be set up and funded through subscriptions, with its management placed in the hands of a committee elected annually by the subscribers. This committee would appoint postmasters and mail carriers and determine the postage rates. The day-to-day operations would be managed by a postmaster general chosen by vote, who would serve for a year.
Goddard set about procuring subscribers for his scheme, and, it would seem, with much success. In the meantime, however, events were taking place which brought into being a body of more authority than the committees of correspondence, and this body took over the establishment of an American post office.
Goddard started getting subscribers for his plan, and it looks like he was quite successful. Meanwhile, though, events were unfolding that led to the creation of a group with more authority than the committees of correspondence, and this group took over the establishment of an American post office.
The punitive measures of the ministry which followed upon the Boston riots had the unexpected result of uniting all the colonies into common cause with Boston. In September 1774, the delegates of the colonies assembled in congress at Philadelphia, and by degrees took upon themselves all the functions of government. On the 29th of May, 1775, the question of providing for the speedy and secure conveyance of intelligence was submitted to the congress, and a committee, of which Benjamin Franklin was the leading member, was directed to make a report.[90]
The punishments imposed by the ministry after the Boston riots had the surprising effect of bringing all the colonies together in support of Boston. In September 1774, representatives from the colonies gathered in congress in Philadelphia and gradually took on all the roles of government. On May 29, 1775, the issue of ensuring fast and secure communication was brought before the congress, and a committee led by Benjamin Franklin was tasked with preparing a report.[90]
With the report before it, on July 26, the congress resolved[91] to appoint a postmaster general for the United Colonies, whose office would be at Philadelphia, and who was empowered to appoint a secretary and as many postmasters as seemed to him proper and necessary. A line of posts should be established from Falmouth[Pg 64] to Savannah, with as many cross posts as the postmaster general saw fit.
With the report in front of them, on July 26, Congress decided[91] to appoint a postmaster general for the United Colonies, whose office would be in Philadelphia. This person was given the authority to hire a secretary and as many postmasters as they deemed appropriate and necessary. A postal route should be established from Falmouth[Pg 64] to Savannah, along with as many cross-posts as the postmaster general considered necessary.
Goddard was a candidate for the position of postmaster general, but Benjamin Franklin was chosen. Goddard's friends then made an effort to secure to him the secretaryship. In this, also, he was disappointed, as Franklin selected his son-in-law, Bache, for the place, an appointment which brought down upon Franklin a charge of nepotism.
Goddard was in the running for the job of postmaster general, but Benjamin Franklin got picked instead. Goddard's friends then tried to get him the secretary position. He was also let down again, as Franklin chose his son-in-law, Bache, for the role, which led to accusations of nepotism against Franklin.
It seems certain, however, that in no case would he have entrusted the secretaryship to Goddard. Goddard had been postmaster of Providence, and when he relinquished the office, he was a defaulter for a considerable amount.[92] As the loss from Goddard's defalcation fell partly upon Franklin, as joint deputy postmaster general, the latter would be reluctant to place him a second time in a position of responsibility. Notwithstanding the claims he would seem to have created for himself by his work in organizing the colonial post office, Goddard had to be contented with the surveyorship of the posts.[93]
It seems certain, though, that he would never have trusted the secretary position to Goddard. Goddard had been the postmaster of Providence, and when he left the job, he was responsible for a significant amount of missing funds.[92] Since the loss from Goddard's embezzlement affected Franklin as well, in his role as joint deputy postmaster general, Franklin would be hesitant to put him in a position of responsibility again. Despite the claims he seemed to have established for himself through his work in organizing the colonial post office, Goddard had to settle for the post surveyor role.[93]
Shortly after the service had been put in operation, the continental congress discussed whether it would not be advisable to suppress the king's post office.[94] Those in favour of the measure argued that the ministerial posts were no longer necessary to the people; that they merely subserved the interests of the enemy, and that the postmasters held their offices by an illegal tenure. On the other hand, it was urged that, closely watched as they were, the ministerial posts could not lend themselves to harm, and that they furnished the people with so many more means of communication.
Shortly after the service started, the Continental Congress debated whether it would be wise to shut down the king's post office.[94] Supporters of the proposal argued that the ministerial posts were no longer necessary for the public; that they only served the interests of the enemy, and that the postmasters were in their positions illegally. On the other hand, it was pointed out that, since they were closely monitored, the ministerial posts couldn't cause any harm, and they provided the people with many more ways to communicate.
The argument which finally prevailed, however, was presented by the opponents of the proposition. They pointed out that this would be an extreme and irretrievable measure, an act of hostility, which would not be warranted by the position in which they stood. All that the colonies desired, they declared, was a return to the conditions which prevailed in 1763, when the conquest of Canada removed the last of the obstacles which impeded their progress, and the relations of the colonies with the mother country seemed permanently and satisfactorily established. Late advices from England indicated that parliament was showing a renewed spirit of conciliation, and any course was to be deprecated which would prevent an easy return to the old conditions.[Pg 65]
The argument that ultimately won out was made by those against the proposal. They highlighted that this would be a drastic and irreversible action, an act of aggression that was not justified given their current situation. All the colonies wanted, they argued, was a return to the circumstances of 1763, when the conquest of Canada removed the last of the barriers to their progress, and the relationship between the colonies and the mother country seemed to be permanently and satisfactorily established. Recent reports from England suggested that parliament was showing a renewed willingness to negotiate, and any action that could hinder a smooth return to the previous conditions was to be avoided.[Pg 65]
The matter was laid over, but it was settling itself in another way. Great Britain was recognizing the futility of persisting in its efforts to maintain the post office in the colonies. As early as March 1775, the home office advised its deputies in America that all that was to be expected from the postmasters in the colonies was that they should act with discretion to the best of their abilities and judgment.[95] It ceased for the time to give positive directions.
The issue was postponed, but it was resolving itself in a different way. Great Britain was realizing how pointless it was to keep trying to maintain the post office in the colonies. As early as March 1775, the home office informed its representatives in America that all they could expect from the postmasters in the colonies was for them to use their discretion to the best of their abilities and judgment.[95] It stopped issuing clear instructions for the time being.
Finlay, who, at some personal risk, had gone to New York to make up his accounts, reported that the post office was doing but little business, as the rebels were opening and rifling the mails, and were notifying the loyally disposed that it was unconstitutional to use the king's post office.
Finlay, who had taken a personal risk to go to New York and settle his accounts, reported that the post office was barely operational, as the rebels were opening and rummaging through the mail, and were informing loyal citizens that it was unconstitutional to use the king's post office.
There was swift punishment visited upon erroneous constitutional views at that time. Finlay foresaw that the post office could not long continue, and he proposed that the work of distributing the mails should be done on one of the war vessels in New York harbour.[96] At last, on Christmas day 1775, the secretary of the post office at New York gave public notice that on account of the interruptions to the couriers in several parts of the country the inland service would cease from that date, and thus was closed an important chapter in the history of the British post office in North America.[97]
There was quick punishment for incorrect constitutional views back then. Finlay anticipated that the post office wouldn't last much longer, and he suggested that the mail distribution be handled by one of the warships in New York Harbor.[96] Finally, on Christmas Day 1775, the post office secretary in New York announced that due to disruptions for couriers in various parts of the country, the inland service would stop from that day forward, marking the end of an important chapter in the history of the British post office in North America.[97]
With the outbreak of the war, the postal connection between New York and Montreal instantly ceased. When this event took place the service to and from Canada was in a very efficient state. Two couriers travelled each week between Montreal and New York, one passing by way of lake George, and the other pursuing the route through Skenesborough (now Whitehall); and post offices were opened at Crown Point and Fort Edward.
With the start of the war, the mail service between New York and Montreal immediately stopped. At that time, the service to and from Canada was running very smoothly. Two couriers traveled each week between Montreal and New York, one taking the route via Lake George and the other going through Skenesborough (now Whitehall); and post offices were opened at Crown Point and Fort Edward.
It was far, however, from the wishes of the provincial congress of New York to allow the communication with Canada to be broken. This body, after a conference with Price, a gentleman from Montreal, despatched a letter to the merchants of that place, expressing their strong desire that the intercourse existing between New York and Canada should be maintained.[98] They disclaimed any intention of aiming at independence, protested their loyalty to the king, and their attachment to the house of Hanover, which they ranked "among our most singular blessings."
It was far from the wishes of the provincial congress of New York to cut off communication with Canada. After meeting with Price, a gentleman from Montreal, they sent a letter to the merchants there, expressing their strong desire to maintain the trade and interaction between New York and Canada.[98] They denied any intention of seeking independence, affirmed their loyalty to the king, and expressed their attachment to the house of Hanover, which they considered "one of our greatest blessings."
All congress desired was the rights belonging to them as British subjects. They proposed to establish a postal courier[Pg 66] between New York and either Ticonderoga or Crown Point, leaving it to Canadians to open a communication between Montreal and such of these two places as might be decided upon.
All Congress wanted were the rights that belonged to them as British subjects. They suggested setting up a postal courier[Pg 66] between New York and either Ticonderoga or Crown Point, allowing Canadians to create a link between Montreal and whichever of these two locations was chosen.
When the American troops, continuing their advance northward, captured Montreal, Franklin established a post office there, appointing as postmaster George Measam, who afterwards entered the American service.[99] In the ledger kept by Franklin, as postmaster general of the United Colonies, the account of the postmaster of Montreal appears in its place among the colonial post offices. The postage on letters from New York to Montreal was fixed at four pennyweight, and to Quebec at five pennyweight.[100]
When the American troops continued their advance north and captured Montreal, Franklin set up a post office there, appointing George Measam as the postmaster, who later joined the American service.[99] In the ledger kept by Franklin, as postmaster general of the United Colonies, the account for the postmaster of Montreal is listed among the colonial post offices. The postage for letters from New York to Montreal was set at four pennyweight, and to Quebec at five pennyweight.[100]
Until relief arrived, Finlay was confined within the walls of Quebec, and Foxcroft's usefulness was equally curtailed by the fact that he and Dashwood, the departmental secretary, were held prisoners at New York.[101] While the British were being thus deprived of all the usual means of communication, the American service was being put in a high state of efficiency.
Until help came, Finlay was stuck inside the walls of Quebec, and Foxcroft's usefulness was limited because he and Dashwood, the department secretary, were held captive in New York.[101] Meanwhile, while the British were cut off from their usual ways of communication, the American service was being optimized for maximum efficiency.
In this, as in other respects, the colonists were fortunate in having the services of Franklin. In August, following upon the proclamation of independence, Franklin was directed to arrange a system of communications whereby post riders were placed at intervals of twenty-five or thirty miles over the whole stretch from Falmouth (now Portland) to Georgia, the mails being carried from post to post from one end of the country to the other, three times a week.[102]
In this regard, as in others, the colonists were lucky to have Franklin's help. In August, after the declaration of independence, Franklin was tasked with setting up a communication system that positioned post riders every twenty-five to thirty miles along the entire route from Falmouth (now Portland) to Georgia, with mail being transported from one post to another from one end of the country to the other three times a week.[102]
The riders were to travel night as well as day, and there was to be no more delay at the changing posts than was necessary to pass the mails from one rider to the other. Three advice boats, also, were employed to run from North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia to the place of assembly of the continental congress.
The riders would travel day and night, with no more delays at the changing posts than necessary to transfer the mail from one rider to the next. Three boats were also used to travel from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia to the meeting place of the Continental Congress.
After the royal post office was driven off the mainland, it took refuge on one of the war vessels, which lay in New York harbour. The postmaster of New York received and opened the mails on board the ship, and all letters were advertised, so that they might be obtained either directly or through friends. The Americans, however, had a keen sense of the importance of communications, and from the beginning of the struggle, made every effort to intercept the packets.
After the royal post office was forced off the mainland, it took refuge on one of the warships docked in New York harbor. The postmaster of New York received and opened the mail on board the ship, and all letters were announced so they could be picked up either directly or through friends. The Americans, however, understood the importance of communication and from the start of the conflict, did everything they could to intercept the mail.
Early in May 1775, while the more cautious Americans were[Pg 67] opposing any step that would lead to extremities, Finlay reported that he was on board the ship "King Fisher," and that a vessel manned by sixty resolute fellows was cruising about Sandy Hook, in the hope of intercepting the packet "Mercury," which was due to arrive.[103]
Early in May 1775, while the more cautious Americans were[Pg 67] resisting any actions that could escalate tensions, Finlay reported that he was on the ship "King Fisher," and that a boat crewed by sixty determined men was patrolling around Sandy Hook, hoping to catch the incoming packet "Mercury," which was expected to arrive.[103]
In consequence of the burning of Falmouth by a British naval expedition, letters of marque and reprisal were issued in November by the province of Massachusetts Bay; and in the following March, the continental congress sanctioned the fitting out of private armed vessels to prey upon British commerce.[104] Seaport towns were enjoined that on no account should they furnish provisions to war vessels coming to them.
As a result of the British navy's burning of Falmouth, the province of Massachusetts Bay issued letters of marque and reprisal in November. The following March, the Continental Congress approved the outfitting of private armed ships to target British commerce.[104] Coastal towns were instructed not to provide supplies to any warships that approached them.
The ministry were under no delusions as to the situation. At the end of September, the packets were withdrawn from general post office duty, armed as for war, and placed at the orders of the war office. The movements of the packets were clothed with secrecy, and it was only when the vessels were bound for Halifax that the public were notified that a mail was being despatched. From Halifax, the mails were taken by the first opportunity to Boston or New York.
The ministry was fully aware of the situation. At the end of September, the mail packets were taken out of general post office service, outfitted for war, and assigned to the war office. The movements of the packets were kept secret, and the public was only informed when the ships were heading for Halifax that a mail shipment was being sent. From Halifax, the mails were sent at the first opportunity to Boston or New York.
The attitude of the post office to all these preparations for war was very curious. It seemed incapable of understanding why exceptional measures were necessary at that time. A steady murmur of discontent was kept up against the war office. Remonstrance after remonstrance was directed against the commander-in-chief for the detention of the packets beyond what seemed a reasonable delay, and there was continual complaint against the restrictions placed upon the post office.
The post office's response to all these wartime preparations was quite strange. It didn't seem to grasp why special measures were needed at that moment. There was a constant low-level dissatisfaction directed at the war office. One complaint after another was aimed at the commander-in-chief for holding back the mail longer than seemed fair, and people continually complained about the limits imposed on the post office.
Until the middle of the year 1776, although the service had been on a complete war footing for some months past, there had been no actual clash between the British and American vessels. The correspondence, however, reveals a state of great anxiety for the safety of the despatches, and as the vessels put out, the masters were placed under strict injunctions to sink the mails if there was any likelihood of capture.
Until the middle of 1776, even though the service had been fully prepared for war for several months, there had been no actual conflict between the British and American ships. However, the communications show a high level of concern for the safety of the messages, and as the ships set sail, the captains were given strict orders to sink the mail if there was any chance of being captured.
The first recorded engagement in which the packets on any of the North American stations were concerned, took place on the 17th of July. The master of the "Lord Hyde" reported[105] that on his passage from Falmouth to New York, he saw at four o'clock[Pg 68] in the morning of that day a ship and a brig three or four leagues distant. They spoke to one another, and then gave chase to the packet. The ship fell out of sight, but the brig followed hard, and at four in the afternoon came up with the packet and began to fire, at the same time running a red English ensign to the topmast head.
The first recorded engagement involving the packets from any North American stations happened on July 17th. The captain of the "Lord Hyde" reported[105] that while traveling from Falmouth to New York, he spotted a ship and a brig about three or four leagues away at four o'clock in the morning. They communicated with each other and then started chasing the packet. The ship disappeared from view, but the brig kept up the pursuit and caught up with the packet at four in the afternoon, opening fire and running up a red English ensign at the top of the mast.
The master of the packet, seeing no chance for escape, shortened sail and prepared for action. The brig came up alongside, replacing the English ensign by a flag of thirteen stripes with a small union in it, and without more ado poured into the packet a broadside from eight carriage guns, and a number of swivels and small arms. The packet returning the fire, a warm engagement followed for an hour and a half at a distance of fifty or sixty yards. The brig then bore away. The packet was much shattered in her sails and rigging, but wonderful to relate, the only casualties were the slight wounding of five persons.
The captain of the packet, seeing no way to escape, lowered the sails and got ready for a fight. The brig came up beside them, swapping the British flag for one with thirteen stripes and a small union, and without hesitation, unleashed a barrage from eight cannons and several swivels and small arms into the packet. The packet fired back, and an intense battle lasted for an hour and a half at a distance of about fifty or sixty yards. The brig then made off. The packet's sails and rigging were heavily damaged, but incredibly, there were only five minor injuries among the crew.
The "Sandwich" packet, which left New York on the 20th of August, reported[106] an encounter with a fast schooner bearing the New England colours, a white field with a pine tree in the middle. After some manoeuvring, in which it appeared that the plan of the schooner was to keep in the wake of the packet outside the range of the latter's guns, but near enough to take advantage of the superior weight of her own guns, the packet managed to bring the schooner into an action which lasted for nearly two hours. The rigging, sails and masts of both vessels were much damaged, but the packet came out of the encounter without any person being even wounded.
The "Sandwich" packet, which left New York on August 20th, reported[106] a meeting with a fast schooner flying New England colors, featuring a white background with a pine tree in the center. After some maneuvering, where it seemed like the schooner's strategy was to stay behind the packet, out of the reach of its guns but close enough to use its own heavier artillery, the packet managed to engage the schooner in a battle that lasted nearly two hours. Both vessels suffered significant damage to their rigging, sails, and masts, but the packet emerged from the encounter without anyone getting hurt.
The third engagement was a more serious affair. The packet "Harriott," on the New York station, was attacked on the 17th of September by a privateer of twelve guns and over one hundred men. The packet, which was armed and equipped in the same manner as the other packets on this station, had twelve guns, but only forty-five men. Of these five were killed, including the captain, and nine were wounded. Through the gallantry of the mate, Spargo, the packet managed to avoid capture. For his good conduct on this occasion, Spargo was made master of the "Harriott."
The third engagement was a more serious situation. The packet "Harriott," from the New York station, was attacked on September 17th by a privateer with twelve guns and over one hundred men. The packet, which was armed and equipped like the other packets at this station, had twelve guns but only forty-five men on board. Five of them were killed, including the captain, and nine were injured. Thanks to the bravery of the mate, Spargo, the packet was able to avoid capture. For his excellent conduct during this incident, Spargo was promoted to master of the "Harriott."
On the 1st of March, 1778, the "Harriott," in violation, it would seem, of the instructions given to all the masters of packets to avoid a fight, if possible, captured the American vessel "Sea Nymph," of one hundred and twenty tons burden, laden with[Pg 69] gunpowder, saltpetre, gun flints and other wares, and brought it into New York.[107]
On March 1, 1778, the "Harriott," apparently disregarding the orders given to all packet masters to avoid conflict whenever possible, seized the American ship "Sea Nymph," which weighed one hundred and twenty tons and was loaded with gunpowder, saltpetre, gun flints, and other goods, and took it to New York.[Pg 69][107]
While the packet boats were thus occupied in foiling the enemy's attempts upon them, the course of events had restored to the post office a footing on land in America. The arrival of assistance from England in May enabled Carleton to attack the American force which had held Quebec in siege since the November previous, and the retreat of the Americans which ensued was not stayed until they had been driven entirely out of Canada.
While the packet boats were busy fending off the enemy's attempts on them, things had taken a turn that allowed the post office to have a presence on land in America. The arrival of help from England in May gave Carleton the chance to go on the offensive against the American troops that had been besieging Quebec since the previous November, and the American retreat that followed continued until they were completely pushed out of Canada.
Finlay, who had spent the winter in Quebec, and who has been credited with one of the best anonymous accounts which have come down to us of the conditions of the city during the siege, at once prepared to resume his duties as deputy postmaster general. New York, also, fell again into the hands of the British, owing to the withdrawal of Washington's army in September, before the superior forces of Howe.
Finlay, who had spent the winter in Quebec and is known for one of the best anonymous accounts we have of the city's conditions during the siege, immediately got ready to go back to his job as deputy postmaster general. New York also fell back into British control because Washington's army withdrew in September in front of Howe's larger forces.
Here Foxcroft, the deputy postmaster general, and Dashwood, the departmental secretary, were prisoners of war; and Antill, the postmaster of New York, had taken up quarters in one of the war vessels in the harbour. Antill lost no time in returning to the city; and Foxcroft and Dashwood were set free by an exchange for two American officers which took place shortly after.[108]
Here, Foxcroft, the deputy postmaster general, and Dashwood, the departmental secretary, were prisoners of war; and Antill, the postmaster of New York, had taken up residence on one of the war ships in the harbor. Antill quickly returned to the city, and Foxcroft and Dashwood were released in an exchange for two American officers that occurred shortly after.[108]
Like Finlay, Foxcroft made preparations for the resumption of business; but for both Finlay and Foxcroft an unexpected thing happened. Vessels with mails began to arrive at Quebec and New York, but the mails were not taken to the post office, although the statute laid it upon shipmasters as their duty to deliver the mails at the post office before they broke bulk.[109] On the arrival of the vessels, the commanders-in-chief directed the masters to send the letters up to their headquarters, where they were gone over by confidential officers, on whom were imposed the duties of handling the incoming mails.
Like Finlay, Foxcroft got ready to resume business; but for both of them, something unexpected happened. Ships with mail started to arrive in Quebec and New York, but the mail wasn't taken to the post office, even though the law required ship captains to deliver the mail there before they unpacked. On the arrival of the ships, the commanders-in-chief instructed the captains to send the letters to their headquarters, where they were reviewed by trusted officers assigned to handle the incoming mail.
The reason of this step will be sufficiently obvious, although the post office professed that they had never seen any good purpose served by it. Even where there was no suggestion of disloyalty among the citizens, there were infinite possibilities of harm in the unguarded utterances, which are constantly occurring in familiar letters. Matters, which it is of the highest importance to keep concealed from the enemy, may be within the knowledge[Pg 70] of every citizen, and it becomes necessary either to induce or to compel citizens not to write of such matters.
The reason for this step is pretty clear, even though the post office claimed they had never seen any good come from it. Even when there was no hint of disloyalty among the citizens, there were countless ways that careless comments in everyday letters could cause harm. Issues that are crucial to keep hidden from the enemy might be known by every citizen, so it’s important either to persuade or force citizens not to discuss these matters.
But it was not only against the undesigned harm which loyal people might do, that it was necessary to guard. There was good reason to suspect that in Quebec, as well as in New York, there was a considerable proportion of English speaking people who were by no means well affected towards the government, and who would not hesitate to impart to the enemy any information which they thought might be of assistance.
But it wasn’t just the unintentional harm that loyal people might cause that needed to be guarded against. There was good reason to believe that in Quebec, as well as in New York, a significant number of English-speaking people were not exactly supportive of the government and wouldn’t hesitate to share any information with the enemy that they thought could be helpful.
The king, in his instructions to Carleton[110] as governor, enjoined him to signify to the loyal merchants and planters the necessity for caution against allowing their letters to become the means of conveying information to the enemy, and directed him to use every possible effort to frustrate the schemes of the disloyal carried on through the medium of correspondence.
The king, in his instructions to Carleton[110] as governor, urged him to inform the loyal merchants and planters of the need for caution in making sure their letters don’t end up being used to share information with the enemy, and instructed him to do everything he could to thwart the plans of the disloyal that were being carried out through correspondence.
The method employed by the governor to forestall danger from this source was the simple one of standing guard over the channel through which correspondence must ordinarily pass. In this way, he would discover many of the disaffected, and at the same time show such people the danger to them of being implicated in matters of that kind.
The method used by the governor to prevent danger from this source was simply to keep watch over the channel through which communication usually flows. In this way, he would identify many of the discontented and simultaneously show these individuals the risks of getting involved in such matters.
To merchants, however, the governor's course was a great inconvenience. All their letters were delayed, and many not delivered at all, for the governor's staff had neither the training in post office work, nor the sense of the importance of mercantile correspondence necessary to assure the merchants of the safety of their letters, when these passed out of the accustomed courses. The merchants remonstrated against the governor's action, and called upon Finlay to assert the determination of the post office to secure respect for the act, which was being violated by the governor.
To merchants, however, the governor's actions were a major hassle. All their letters were delayed, and many weren’t delivered at all, because the governor’s staff lacked the training in postal work and didn’t understand the importance of business correspondence needed to ensure the security of their letters when they strayed from the normal routes. The merchants complained about the governor’s actions and urged Finlay to make it clear that the post office was committed to enforcing the law, which the governor was violating.
Finlay was a man of tact, and a member of the governor's executive council as well, and he counselled patience to the merchants. They acquiesced for a time, hoping that the governor's surveillance over their correspondence would be relaxed, but the governor continued firm. Each season as the vessels began to come up the river, orders were issued for the renewal of the unpopular practice.
Finlay was a tactful man and also a member of the governor's executive council. He advised the merchants to be patient. They agreed for a while, hoping that the governor would loosen his grip on their correspondence, but the governor remained steadfast. Every season, as the ships started to arrive up the river, orders were given to continue the unpopular practice.
What took place at Quebec was repeated at New York; and during the short period of the British occupation of Philadelphia, in that city, also. The postmaster of Philadelphia, who had[Pg 71] retired to England when the British office was closed in 1775, returned on hearing that the city was again in the king's hands, but only to find that the letters were delivered to the commander-in-chief, who distributed them not only to the army and navy, but also to the merchants, and no steps were taken to collect the postage.[111]
What happened in Quebec happened again in New York and also during the brief time the British occupied Philadelphia. The postmaster of Philadelphia, who had gone back to England when the British office closed in 1775, returned upon hearing that the city was under British control again. However, he found that the letters were given to the commander-in-chief, who distributed them not just to the army and navy but also to the merchants, and no effort was made to collect the postage.[111]
At that time, and indeed until a quite recent date, the postage on letters was not paid until the delivery of them was effected, and when, as during the war of the Revolution, the mails were diverted from their usual channel, the post office was unable to collect anything to meet the expenses it was incurring.
At that time, and even until pretty recently, the postage on letters wasn’t paid until they were delivered, and when, like during the Revolutionary War, the mail was diverted from its usual route, the post office couldn’t collect anything to cover the expenses it was racking up.
To-day, owing to the greater cohesiveness among the departments of government, the post office would rest content in the fact that the loss of revenue was due to the action of the government as a whole, and could not be imputed to any failure on its own part, but, at that time, it viewed the situation as a private institution would. The loss of revenue seemed to affect it alone, and again and again the post office declared to the war office that, unless the revenue was maintained, it would be obliged to cut off the internal services between Montreal and Quebec.
Today, because of the increased collaboration among government departments, the post office would be satisfied knowing that the revenue loss was caused by the government's overall actions and not due to any shortcomings on its part. However, back then, it viewed the situation like a private company would. The revenue loss felt like it was solely its problem, and time and time again, the post office informed the war office that if the revenue wasn't preserved, it would have to stop the internal services between Montreal and Quebec.
There was another matter arising out of the governor's lack of confidence in the English-speaking people in Canada which was a source of much inconvenience to the deputy postmaster general. It has been the practice in Canada to grant exemption to postmasters from the billeting of the troops upon them. The barracks which had been erected in Montreal were destroyed by fire, and it was necessary that the soldiers should be provided for by the citizens. But the duty was grudgingly undertaken, and indeed the disfavour with which the soldiers were regarded in Montreal was one of the chief grounds of complaint on the part of the governors.
There was another issue stemming from the governor's lack of trust in the English-speaking people in Canada, which caused a lot of trouble for the deputy postmaster general. In Canada, it had been customary to exempt postmasters from having to accommodate troops in their homes. The barracks in Montreal had been destroyed by fire, so it became necessary for citizens to provide for the soldiers. However, this responsibility was taken on reluctantly, and the negative feelings toward the soldiers in Montreal were one of the main complaints from the governors.
Exemption from billeting was an ancient privilege of postmasters. In several of the colonies it was expressly granted, and the continental congress relieved its postmasters from all military duties. In Canada the advantages the post office was able to offer to its postmasters were small and insignificant, and one of the most valued privileges was the assurance of relief from billeting.
Exemption from billeting was an old privilege of postmasters. In several colonies, it was specifically granted, and the Continental Congress freed its postmasters from all military duties. In Canada, the benefits the post office could provide to its postmasters were minimal and unimportant, and one of the most appreciated privileges was the guarantee of being relieved from billeting.
The postmaster of Montreal complained to Finlay that, in disregard of the understanding on which he had accepted the postmastership, an officer and his servant had been quartered upon him and he demanded their removal. Finlay, nothing doubting,[Pg 72] laid the postmaster's letter before the governor, who, to Finlay's surprise, took exception to what he termed the extraordinary and peremptory tone of the letter, and commanded Finlay to dismiss the postmaster.[112]
The postmaster of Montreal told Finlay that, contrary to the agreement he had accepted when taking the postmaster position, an officer and his servant had been assigned to him, and he insisted they be removed. Finlay, completely confident, [Pg 72] presented the postmaster's letter to the governor, who, to Finlay's surprise, objected to what he called the letter's unreasonable and bossy tone and ordered Finlay to dismiss the postmaster.[112]
To Finlay this order was a great embarrassment, as suitable postmasters were difficult to find, and, besides, the postmaster had accepted the office merely to oblige Finlay. Finlay laid these facts before the governor and pleaded for a reconsideration, but the governor was inexorable. Carleton relinquished the governorship at this time, and Finlay appealed to Haldimand, who succeeded Carleton, but with no better success.
To Finlay, this order was a real hassle because finding suitable postmasters was tough, and besides, the current postmaster had only taken the job to help Finlay out. Finlay presented these facts to the governor and asked for another look at the decision, but the governor wouldn’t budge. Carleton stepped down as governor around this time, and Finlay reached out to Haldimand, who took over from Carleton, but had no better luck.
The post office encountered the same kind of ill-will here as elsewhere from the military authorities. With the greatest vigilance on their part, much correspondence was passing backward and forward of which they could know nothing, and the suspicions natural under the circumstances were heightened by what they knew of the opinions of many of the people.
The post office faced the same hostility here as it did in other places from the military authorities. Despite their best efforts to keep an eye on things, a lot of correspondence was moving back and forth that they had no knowledge of, and the suspicions that were natural under the circumstances were intensified by what they knew about the opinions of many people.
The regularity of the trips between Quebec and Montreal, which were resumed soon after the Americans had withdrawn from the country, seemed to Haldimand a source of danger. Although there was no large hostile force in the province, affairs were still unsettled, and a mail courier whose movements were known in every detail could easily be waylaid by the marauding parties which infested the long route on the banks of the St. Lawrence. Haldimand would have preferred holding the regular service in suspense until peace was obtained, depending on occasional expresses to maintain necessary communications.
The regular trips between Quebec and Montreal, which started again shortly after the Americans left the country, seemed like a risk to Haldimand. Even though there wasn't a large enemy force in the province, things were still unstable, and a mail courier whose schedule was well-known could easily be ambushed by the raiding groups that roamed the lengthy route along the St. Lawrence River. Haldimand would have preferred to suspend the regular service until peace was achieved, relying on occasional express deliveries to keep essential communications going.
During the year 1777 there was no material change in the situation. When the British occupied New York in the autumn of 1776, the monthly trips between England and New York were resumed. But the activity of the privateers was greatly increased; and while none of the packets on the New York station were taken, the "Swallow" on its way to Lisbon in February was captured by the war vessel which had carried Franklin to France,[113] and the "Weymouth," which was taking the mails from the West Indies was obliged to strike to the "Oliver Cromwell" of New London, a privateer carrying twenty guns and one hundred and fifty-three men.[114]
During 1777, there wasn’t any significant change in the situation. After the British took over New York in the fall of 1776, the monthly trips between England and New York started again. However, the activity of privateers ramped up considerably; although none of the packets on the New York route were captured, the "Swallow," which was heading to Lisbon in February, was seized by the warship that had brought Franklin to France,[113] and the "Weymouth," which was transporting mail from the West Indies, had to surrender to the "Oliver Cromwell" from New London, a privateer armed with twenty guns and carrying one hundred and fifty-three men.[114]
France, though not at war with England, saw in the revolt of the colonies an opportunity for revenge for late humiliations, and she strained the laws of neutrality to the utmost in her effort[Pg 73] to assist the Americans. Cruisers bearing American names, but armed with French guns, and manned by French sailors ranging the channel, wrought havoc with British merchant shipping, and carried their prizes into the harbours of Normandy and Brittany.
France, while not officially at war with England, viewed the colonies' revolt as a chance to get back for past humiliations, and she pushed the limits of neutrality as far as possible in her attempt[Pg 73] to help the Americans. Cruisers with American names, but equipped with French weapons and crewed by French sailors patrolled the channel, causing significant damage to British merchant ships and bringing their captured prizes into the ports of Normandy and Brittany.
Some regard, however, had to be paid to appearances so long as France had not actually broken with England; and it was not until the alliance between the Americans and the French was consummated in February 1778, that the hands of the French were quite free.
Some attention, however, had to be given to appearances as long as France had not officially broken ties with England; and it wasn't until the alliance between the Americans and the French was finalized in February 1778 that the French were completely free to act.
From that time England's position on the sea was changed greatly for the worse, and the record of the packet service was one of almost unbroken disaster. On the 15th of June the packet "Le Despencer" on her way from Falmouth to New York, was set upon by two privateers, the "Nancy" with sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, and another having fourteen guns and one hundred and fifteen men. After an hour's fighting, in which his vessel was disabled, the captain of the "Le Despencer" was obliged to yield to superior force.[115]
From that time on, England's position at sea changed significantly for the worse, and the record of the packet service was nearly one of continuous disaster. On June 15th, the packet "Le Despencer," traveling from Falmouth to New York, was attacked by two privateers, the "Nancy," which had sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, and another ship with fourteen guns and one hundred and fifteen men. After an hour of fighting, during which his vessel was damaged, the captain of the "Le Despencer" had no choice but to surrender to the stronger force.[115]
In September, the "Duke of York," on one of the North American stations, was taken by a French frigate of thirty-six guns;[116] and in the same month, the "Harriott" and the "Eagle," the one bound for New York, and the other for Carolina, both fell as prizes to the "Vengeance," a privateer of twenty guns and one hundred and ten men, belonging to Paul Jones' fleet and commanded by a Frenchman, Captain Ricot.[117]
In September, the "Duke of York," stationed in North America, was captured by a French frigate armed with thirty-six guns;[116] and in the same month, both the "Harriott," heading to New York, and the "Eagle," headed to Carolina, were taken as prizes by the "Vengeance," a privateer with twenty guns and one hundred ten crew members, part of Paul Jones' fleet and led by a Frenchman, Captain Ricot.[117]
From the year 1779 until 1782, nine packets on the several North American stations were captured, and seven were more or less seriously damaged. Some idea of the extent to which the packet service was crippled during the war of the Revolution may be gathered from the fact that of the five vessels on the New York station in 1777, four were taken and one damaged. Of the six on the West Indian station, four were taken and one damaged, and of the three on the Carolina station two were taken.[118] The importance of these facts in their influence on the outcome of the war has not so far received the attention the subject merits.
From 1779 to 1782, nine mail ships on various North American routes were captured, and seven were significantly damaged. You can get a sense of how much the mail service suffered during the Revolutionary War from the fact that of the five ships on the New York route in 1777, four were captured and one was damaged. Of the six on the West Indies route, four were captured and one damaged, and of the three on the Carolina route, two were captured.[118] These facts are important because of their impact on the outcome of the war, but they haven't received the attention they deserve.
FOOTNOTES:
[87] G.P.O., Document in Record Room.
[88] Pickering Papers, vol. 33.
[89] Ibid., vol. 53.
[90] Journals, Continental Congress, II. 71.
[91] Ibid., II. 208.
[94] Journals, Continental Congress, III. 488.
[95] G.P.O., American Letter-Book, 1773-1783, p. 62.
[96] C. O. 5, vol. 135.
[98] Ibid., II. 1294.
[101] C. O. 5, vol. 135.
[102] Journals, Continental Congress, V. 719.
[105] C. O. 5, vol. 135.
[106] C. O. 5, vol. 135.
[107] G.P.O., Treasury, IX. 298-299.
[111] G.P.O., Treasury, X. 20-22.
[113] C. O. 5, vol. 134.
[114] Ibid., 136.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., 136.
[115] C. O. 5, vol. 136.
[116] G.P.O., Treasury, IX. 345.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid., X. 171.
CHAPTER V
Beginnings of exclusively Canadian postal service—Administration of Hugh Finlay—Opening of communication with England by way of Halifax—Postal convention with United States.
Beginnings of a solely Canadian postal service—Administration of Hugh Finlay—Starting communication with England through Halifax—Postal agreement with the United States.
A point has now been reached, beyond which the sequence of events in the American post office no longer forms an integral part of the narrative. There had, indeed, been no actual postal connection between Canada and the revolted colonies since the beginning of war. Communication between Quebec, Montreal and New York had been interrupted in May 1775 by the capture of Ticonderoga.
A point has now been reached where the events in the American post office are no longer essential to the story. In fact, there had been no real postal connection between Canada and the rebellious colonies since the start of the war. Communication between Quebec, Montreal, and New York was cut off in May 1775 due to the capture of Ticonderoga.
The abandonment of the colonial post office by the home authorities at the end of the same year, left the four post offices on the banks of the St. Lawrence the sole remnants of the system which had extended from Quebec to Georgia. Though Finlay was nominally the associate deputy postmaster general for the district between Canada and the southern boundary of Virginia, his real authority was confined to the service of Quebec, Three Rivers, Berthier and Montreal.
The abandonment of the colonial post office by the home authorities at the end of the same year left the four post offices along the St. Lawrence as the only surviving parts of the system that had stretched from Quebec to Georgia. Although Finlay was officially the associate deputy postmaster general for the district from Canada to the southern boundary of Virginia, his actual authority was limited to the service of Quebec, Three Rivers, Berthier, and Montreal.
Finlay occupied important positions in the government of the country, from his arrival in the year when Canada fell into the hands of the British, until his death in 1801. His knowledge of the French language procured for him a nomination as justice of the peace, the duties of which office were, owing to the circumstances of the time, delicate and responsible.
Finlay held key roles in the government of the country from the year Canada came under British control until his death in 1801. His fluency in French earned him a position as a justice of the peace, a role that was, given the circumstances of the time, both sensitive and significant.
Two years after a regular government was established, Finlay was nominated to the legislative council, and a glance over the proceedings of that body will show that he always took an important, and often a leading part in its transactions. He was clerk of the crown in chancery and provincial auditor, and, for a number of years, chairman of the land committee, the duties of which were to superintend the distribution of the crown lands to the settlers, who came into the country in large numbers.
Two years after a regular government was set up, Finlay was nominated to the legislative council, and looking over the proceedings of that body shows that he always played an important, and often leading, role in its activities. He served as the clerk of the crown in chancery and provincial auditor, and for several years, he was the chairman of the land committee, which was responsible for overseeing the distribution of crown lands to the settlers who arrived in large numbers.
Finlay was much attached to the French Canadians. He became their advocate in council, and incurred some displeasure[Pg 75] on the part of the governor for his pertinacity on their behalf. The maîtres de poste were the objects of his special attention. He endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to assimilate their position to that of the masters of the post houses in England. As their standing and rights were but roughly defined, they had to endure much hardship and oppression from the ill-nature and rapacity of travellers, and Finlay's championship was of substantial service to them.[119]
Finlay was very close to the French Canadians. He became their advocate in council and earned some disapproval from the governor for his insistence on their behalf. The maîtres de poste received his special attention. He tried, though unsuccessfully, to align their position with that of the postmasters in England. Since their status and rights were not clearly defined, they had to face a lot of hardship and mistreatment from the bad temper and greed of travelers, and Finlay's support was a significant help to them.[119]
When Canada was invaded by the Americans in 1775, Finlay drew up a form of pledge for the maîtres de poste to sign, in which they bound themselves to defend the country from the king's enemies, to give to the government all useful information they might become possessed of, and to render faithful service in the conveyance of the mail couriers. All the maîtres de poste except three signed the engagement.[120]
When the Americans invaded Canada in 1775, Finlay created a pledge for the maîtres de poste to sign, committing them to defend the country against the king's enemies, share any useful information they might obtain with the government, and provide reliable service in delivering the mail couriers. All the maîtres de poste except three signed the agreement.[120]
To Finlay, in truth, the maintenance of the organization of maîtres de poste was indispensable. Without them the mails could not be carried, except at an outlay which the revenues were not able to bear. It has always been the practice of the post office in this country to take advantage of any carrying agencies which might be operating on a route, to secure the transportation of the mails on approximately the same terms as those at which ordinary freight of the same bulk would be conveyed. Thus, by utilizing a stage coach, the cost of conveyance between two towns was a mere fraction of what it would be, if the same conditions of speed and security were required in a conveyance used exclusively for the mails.
To Finlay, honestly, keeping the organization of maîtres de poste was essential. Without them, the mail couldn't be delivered without exceeding costs that the revenues couldn't support. It's always been the practice of the post office in this country to use any available transportation services on a route to move the mail at roughly the same rates as regular freight of similar size. So, by using a stagecoach, the cost to transport between two towns was only a small fraction of what it would be if the same speed and security were required for a method used solely for the mail.
In the maîtres de poste Finlay had a transportation agency, which was unexcelled at that period, and by protecting them and confirming to them the exclusive right to provide for passenger travel along the road from Montreal to Quebec, he obtained not only all the ordinary advantages accruing to the public from the operation of this agency, but secured the conveyance of his couriers from stage to stage at half the charge paid by travellers.
In the maîtres de poste, Finlay had a transportation agency that was unmatched at that time. By supporting them and granting them the exclusive right to handle passenger travel along the route from Montreal to Quebec, he gained not only all the usual benefits for the public from this agency's operations but also arranged for his couriers to be transported from stage to stage at half the price paid by travelers.
Finlay's efforts on behalf of the maîtres de poste were first exerted in the legislative council.[121] He desired to obtain an ordinance defining their duties, and declaring their right to the exclusive privilege of providing horses and vehicles to travellers. Having succeeded in this, he endeavoured to have himself appointed superintendent of the maîtres de poste.[Pg 76]
Finlay's efforts on behalf of the maîtres de poste began in the legislative council.[121] He aimed to get an ordinance that outlined their responsibilities and confirmed their exclusive right to provide horses and vehicles for travelers. After achieving this, he sought to have himself appointed as the superintendent of the maîtres de poste.[Pg 76]
In this he had to encounter the opposition of the governor who, though personally friendly to Finlay, was unwilling to allow himself to be occupied with the matter, while he was engaged with the more important duty of providing for the defence of the country. Finlay was a man of much persistence, and when he found the governor indisposed to give him the appointment, he sought the aid of the postmaster general, to whom he represented that on his control over the maîtres de poste depended his ability to secure the conveyance of the mails at a reasonable charge.[122]
In this situation, he had to deal with the governor's opposition who, although friendly with Finlay, was reluctant to get involved while he focused on the more pressing responsibility of ensuring the country's defense. Finlay was very persistent, and when he realized the governor was not inclined to give him the appointment, he sought help from the postmaster general. He explained that his control over the maîtres de poste was crucial to securing the mail delivery at a reasonable cost.[122]
Governor Haldimand resented the pressure thus brought on him, declaring that the postal service of Canada was quite equal, if not superior, to the service in England. Not long afterwards, however, the governor relented so far as to give Finlay a temporary holding of the position he coveted, and when conditions became settled, his appointment was made permanent.[123]
Governor Haldimand didn’t like the pressure he was under, stating that Canada’s postal service was just as good, if not better, than England’s. However, not long after, he softened his stance enough to give Finlay a temporary role in the position he wanted, and when things became more stable, his appointment was made permanent.[123]
The stoppage of the service to New York made it necessary to provide otherwise for the maintenance of the connection with Great Britain. While navigation was open on the St. Lawrence occasional visits were made to Quebec by war vessels and merchantmen, and all such opportunities to send mails to England were taken advantage of.
The interruption of service to New York made it essential to find other ways to maintain the connection with Great Britain. While navigation on the St. Lawrence was still open, warships and merchant vessels occasionally visited Quebec, and all opportunities to send mail to England were utilized.
With Halifax, also, communication was opened by means of a vessel which ran from Quebec to Tatamagouche, on the straits of Northumberland, from which point the journey to Halifax was an easy overland trip.[124] During the summer, therefore, communication with Great Britain was maintained without special difficulty. When navigation on the St. Lawrence closed, however, and vessels could no longer reach Quebec, the situation was entirely changed.
With Halifax, communication was established through a ship that traveled from Quebec to Tatamagouche, located on the Northumberland Strait. From there, it was an easy overland trip to Halifax.[124] As a result, during the summer, communication with Great Britain was kept up without much trouble. However, when navigation on the St. Lawrence ended and ships could no longer reach Quebec, everything changed completely.
Haldimand, in a letter to a friend, written in November 1778, bemoans his isolation. He will receive no news whatever, unless the rebels should manage to get into the province, an eventuality he has done his best to prevent by destroying their supplies on lake Champlain. The only possible means of establishing a winter communication with Great Britain was to send couriers by the inland route to Halifax.
Haldimand, in a letter to a friend, written in November 1778, laments his isolation. He won't receive any news unless the rebels manage to get into the province, something he has tried hard to stop by destroying their supplies on Lake Champlain. The only way to set up a winter communication with Great Britain was to send couriers via the inland route to Halifax.
At this period and for a long time afterwards, this route presented many difficulties. It was very long, and at certain seasons the natural obstacles in the way of travel were nearly insuperable. The connecting links between the Maritime provinces and Quebec[Pg 77] were the portages between the waters running into the St. Lawrence and those running into the St. John river. Of those there were several, but the one which was adopted ran from Notre Dame du Portage, a few miles west of River du Loup, in south-easterly direction until it reached lake Temiscouata.
During this time, and for a long while afterward, this route had many challenges. It was very lengthy, and at certain times of the year, the natural barriers to travel were almost impossible to overcome. The connections between the Maritime provinces and Quebec[Pg 77] were the portages linking the waters flowing into the St. Lawrence and those flowing into the St. John River. There were several of these, but the one that was chosen went from Notre Dame du Portage, just a few miles west of River du Loup, in a southeast direction until it reached Lake Temiscouata.
During the French regime, despatches were not infrequently carried between the governor of Quebec and the governor of Louisburg. The courier, who had despatches from the governor of Quebec for Halifax, would travel on foot over a fair road on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, to the portage between Kamouraska and River du Loup. From this point his course ran over the portage between the St. Lawrence and the St. John river systems.
During the French rule, messages were often sent back and forth between the governor of Quebec and the governor of Louisburg. The messenger, carrying messages from the governor of Quebec to Halifax, would walk along a decent road on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, reaching the portage between Kamouraska and River du Loup. From there, his route continued over the portage connecting the St. Lawrence and St. John river systems.
After a toilsome journey of thirty-seven miles over a country alternating between mountains and swamps, the courier reached lake Temiscouata. Having crossed this lake, he came to the entrance of the Madawaska river, which runs due south until it empties into the St. John river. From this point to fort Howe, the site of the present city of St. John, there was a long river journey of two hundred and twenty-eight miles.
After a tough journey of thirty-seven miles through a landscape that switched between mountains and swamps, the courier arrived at Lake Temiscouata. After crossing this lake, he reached the mouth of the Madawaska River, which flows straight south until it meets the St. John River. From this point to Fort Howe, where the modern city of St. John is located, there was a lengthy river trip of two hundred and twenty-eight miles.
The trip from St. John to Halifax took the courier across the bay of Fundy to Annapolis, thence along the Annapolis valley to Windsor, and so on to Halifax. The distance from Quebec to Halifax by this route was six hundred and twenty-seven miles. This route was followed frequently by couriers during the winters of the years of the war of the Revolution.
The journey from St. John to Halifax took the courier across the Bay of Fundy to Annapolis, then along the Annapolis Valley to Windsor, and finally to Halifax. The distance from Quebec to Halifax by this route was six hundred and twenty-seven miles. Couriers regularly took this route during the winters of the Revolutionary War years.
In 1775, Finlay proposed to introduce some system into the arrangements by having couriers from Quebec and Halifax meet at fort Howe for the exchange of despatches. While the war lasted, the arrangement was to be kept secret. In 1781, the merchants in London who traded to Quebec urged the adoption of this route for a regular winter service, but the danger of having the couriers intercepted by prowling parties of Americans on the long unprotected stretches made it impossible to have more than an occasional trip. The trips, also, cost at least £100 each, a not unimportant consideration in those days.
In 1775, Finlay suggested setting up a system where couriers from Quebec and Halifax would meet at Fort Howe to exchange messages. This arrangement was meant to stay secret as long as the war continued. In 1781, the merchants in London who traded with Quebec pushed for this route to be used for a regular winter service, but the risk of couriers being intercepted by roaming American groups along the long, unprotected areas made it hard to manage more than occasional trips. Additionally, each trip cost at least £100, which was a significant amount at that time.
Finlay's activity as deputy postmaster general was confined to the inland service in Canada, and he gave his attention to improving the conditions under which the service was performed. The state of the roads was a matter which occupied him considerably. They were probably, as Finlay reported, as bad as they could be.[Pg 78]
Finlay's role as deputy postmaster general was limited to the domestic postal service in Canada, and he focused on enhancing the conditions under which the service operated. The condition of the roads was a significant concern for him. According to Finlay's report, they were likely as bad as they could get.[Pg 78]
For many years before Canada passed into the possession of the British, the habitants were fully occupied with the war, and when peace was restored, the roads remained as the war had left them. Work on the roads was never willingly undertaken by the habitants. When Lanoullier constructed the great highway between Montreal and Quebec, it was only by his personal superintendence that he was able to keep the habitant to his task. As soon as his eye was withdrawn the work lagged.
For many years before Canada came under British control, the residents were completely focused on the war, and when peace was finally established, the roads were left in the same condition as they had been during the conflict. The residents were never eager to work on the roads. When Lanoullier built the major highway between Montreal and Quebec, he had to personally oversee the work just to keep the residents committed to their tasks. The moment he looked away, the progress slowed down.
Lanoullier lived until 1751, and during the last few years of his service he failed to maintain the energy that had been an earlier characteristic; and after his death, the country was in a constant state of war, so that even if there had been an efficient grand voyer to succeed him, the general neglect into which the domestic affairs fell must have affected the condition of the roads.
Lanoullier lived until 1751, and during the last few years of his service, he struggled to keep up the energy that had previously defined him; after his death, the country was in a constant state of war, so even if there had been an effective grand voyer to take over, the overall neglect of domestic affairs would have surely impacted the state of the roads.
The procedure employed in calling upon the habitants to work upon the roads was that the grand voyer issued an order to the local captains of militia, who published the order to the habitants by notice at the church doors. The grand voyer complained to Finlay that it was impossible to induce the habitants to work upon the roads. When the order was read at the church, the habitants would dismiss the matter with a shrug, and the remark "c'est un ordre anglais."
The process for getting the locals to work on the roads was that the chief road overseer would give an order to the local militia leaders, who then announced it to the residents by posting a notice at the church doors. The chief overseer told Finlay it was pointless to try to get the locals to work on the roads. When the order was read at the church, the locals would just shrug it off and say, "it's an English order."
The consequence of this neglect was seen in the details of Finlay's reports[125] as he travelled from Quebec to Montreal. As he passes from post house to post house, his journals are a monotonous, though indignant, recital of ruts, bogs and rocks.
The result of this neglect was evident in the specifics of Finlay's reports[125] as he journeyed from Quebec to Montreal. As he moved from one inn to another, his journals were a dull, yet frustrated, account of potholes, swamps, and boulders.
The roads were unditched, and the bridges dangerous trap holes. The bridges were no more than rows of poles lying crosswise, and scarcely longer than the width of a calèche. When the water rose, the poles were set afloat. The post houses should have been three leagues apart, but the difficulty of inducing the habitants to undertake the irksome and thankless duties of maître de poste, often compelled Finlay to choose persons whose houses were at a considerable distance from where they should have been, and consequently post houses were found quite close together.
The roads were undrained, and the bridges were dangerous pitfalls. The bridges were just rows of poles lying across, barely longer than the width of a calèche. When the water level rose, the poles floated away. The post houses were meant to be three leagues apart, but the challenge of getting the locals to take on the tedious and thankless job of maître de poste often forced Finlay to pick people whose homes were much farther away than they should have been, so post houses ended up being found quite close together.
There were places where the post houses were no more than one league apart. As a maître de poste could not carry passengers beyond the next adjoining post house, the inconvenience of the frequent changes of horses was very great.
There were places where the inns were only one league apart. Since a maître de poste couldn't take passengers beyond the nearest inn, having to switch horses so often was quite inconvenient.
The mail couriers were bound to travel by night as well as by day; and it is not difficult to believe Finlay when he says that the[Pg 79] courier travels by night at the risk of his neck. When other means of obtaining help with the road work failed, Finlay offered to put the road in good condition and keep it so if given the services of twelve soldiers of the German legion, and a grant of £100.
The mail couriers had to travel both day and night, and it’s easy to accept Finlay’s claim that the[Pg 79] courier travels at night at great risk. When other ways to get help with the road maintenance didn’t work, Finlay volunteered to fix the road and keep it in shape if he could have the support of twelve soldiers from the German legion and a funding of £100.
An application was made to Finlay in 1781 for a postal service to the settlements and forts along the Richelieu river. This was one of the most prosperous sections of the country. When Catalogne made his report on the state of Canada in 1712, he was particularly struck with the evidences of comfort in some of the parishes bordering on the Richelieu.
An application was submitted to Finlay in 1781 for a postal service to the settlements and forts along the Richelieu River. This area was one of the most prosperous parts of the country. When Catalogne reported on the condition of Canada in 1712, he was especially impressed by the signs of comfort in some of the parishes along the Richelieu.
It was not on this account, however, that it was thought necessary to extend to this district the benefits of the postal service. The valley of the Richelieu was the pathway along which travel from lake Champlain pursued its course into the heart of Canada. Settlements were established along the river at different times by French and English to oppose a barrier to incursions from the south.
It wasn't for this reason, though, that there was a belief that the postal service should be expanded to this area. The Richelieu Valley was the route that travel from Lake Champlain took deep into Canada. Settlements were set up along the river at various times by both the French and English to create a barrier against invasions from the south.
British forces were stationed in 1761 at St. Johns, Chambly and Sorel; and it was to keep up a communication with these forces that a postal service was desired. The detachments at St. Johns and Chambly received their letters and despatches from Montreal, but as the most important communications were with the governor, whose headquarters were at Quebec, the commandant of the forces in this district, Colonel St. Leger, wished to have a regular exchange with Sorel at the mouth of the river.
British troops were stationed in 1761 at St. Johns, Chambly, and Sorel, and a postal service was needed to maintain communication with them. The units at St. Johns and Chambly got their letters and messages from Montreal, but since the most crucial communications were with the governor, who was based in Quebec, the commander of the forces in this area, Colonel St. Leger, wanted to establish a regular exchange with Sorel at the river's mouth.
Although Sorel was on the south side of the St. Lawrence, it had maintained connection with the couriers on the grand route between Quebec and Montreal, by means of a courier who crossed the river to Berthier, where a post office had been established since 1772. The postmaster general was disinclined to open a route between Sorel and St. Johns, and the military authorities took the matter into their own hands.
Although Sorel was located on the south side of the St. Lawrence, it maintained a connection with the couriers on the main route between Quebec and Montreal, using a courier who crossed the river to Berthier, where a post office had been operating since 1772. The postmaster general was not keen on opening a route between Sorel and St. Johns, so the military authorities took matters into their own hands.
The conclusion of peace in 1783 and the recognition of the independence of the United States was immediately followed by the dissolution of the old establishment which administered the postal system of the northern district of North America. The services of Finlay, as deputy postmaster general of that system, ceased forthwith; and in July 1784, he was appointed to the much humbler position of deputy postmaster general of Canada.
The peace treaty in 1783 and the acknowledgment of the United States' independence quickly led to the breakup of the old system that managed the postal services in the northern part of North America. Finlay's role as deputy postmaster general of that system ended immediately, and in July 1784, he was appointed to the much less significant position of deputy postmaster general of Canada.
Foxcroft, Finlay's associate in the deputyship was made British agent at New York for the packet boat service, which was resumed between Great Britain and the United States. Dashwood,[Pg 80] the departmental secretary of the old establishment, was appointed postmaster general of Jamaica in 1781.[126]
Foxcroft, who worked with Finlay as his deputy, became the British agent in New York for the packet boat service, which was restarted between Great Britain and the United States. Dashwood,[Pg 80] the departmental secretary of the previous administration, was appointed postmaster general of Jamaica in 1781.[126]
The first question of importance to occupy Finlay under the new order of things was the means by which communication between Great Britain and Canada was thereafter to be carried on. The merchants of Quebec and Montreal hearing that a line of sailing packets was to be re-established between Falmouth and New York,[127] at once demanded that the service between Canada and New York should be restored.
The first important question on Finlay's mind with the new changes was how communication between Great Britain and Canada would work moving forward. The merchants in Quebec and Montreal, upon hearing that a line of sailing ships was being set up again between Falmouth and New York,[127] immediately requested that services between Canada and New York be restored.
Conditions were not favourable to its resumption. The rancours of the war were not yet abated, and one or two messengers, who were sent down to New York by Finlay, were insulted and maltreated by the Americans. The postmaster general of the United States, Hazzard, also set up difficulties.[128]
Conditions were not ideal for it to restart. The resentments from the war still lingered, and one or two messengers sent to New York by Finlay faced insults and mistreatment from the Americans. The U.S. postmaster general, Hazzard, also created obstacles.[128]
Finlay's plan was to have the Canadian mails taken down as far as Albany by his courier, and to pay the American postage on them from Albany to New York. But at this time there were no regular couriers between Albany and New York; and consequently the Canadian mails, having to depend on chance conveyance, would often miss the packet boats for which they were intended. Finlay thought to overcome this difficulty by having his courier take the mails past Albany and on to New York.
Finlay's plan was to have his courier deliver the Canadian mail all the way to Albany and to cover the American postage from Albany to New York. However, at that time, there were no regular couriers running between Albany and New York, so the Canadian mail relied on random transportation and often missed the packet boats it was meant to catch. To solve this issue, Finlay decided to have his courier take the mail directly past Albany to New York.
Hazzard, however, objected to this plan, and informed Finlay that he would have the courier prosecuted if he attempted to go farther south than Albany. Finlay met this objection, but at a ruinous cost. He arranged with the postmaster at Albany that the Canadian courier should go on to New York, and that at the same time Finlay would pay for this privilege at the rate of three shillings sterling per ounce for the mail, the bag being included in the weight. Thus, if the mail bag weighed twenty pounds—no very great weight—Finlay had to pay £48, the cost of wayleave for his courier to travel from Albany to New York. He had, of course, to pay his courier's expenses as well.
Hazzard, however, opposed this plan and informed Finlay that he would have the courier charged if he tried to go any further south than Albany. Finlay countered this opposition, but it came at a huge expense. He made arrangements with the postmaster in Albany for the Canadian courier to continue on to New York, and at the same time, Finlay agreed to pay for this service at a rate of three shillings sterling per ounce for the mail, with the bag included in the weight. So, if the mail bag weighed twenty pounds—which isn’t too heavy—Finlay would have to pay £48, the fee for allowing his courier to travel from Albany to New York. He also had to cover his courier's expenses.
Nor did the situation show a prospect of improvement. The United States perceived that the toll which the Canadian post office would have to pay for leave to pass over their territory might be greatly increased by the simple expedient of establishing a post office near the Canadian boundary, and compelling the Canadian post office to pay a wayleave equal to the ordinary[Pg 81] postage for the distance between that post office and New York, as well as the courier's wages and necessary expenses, for the Americans did not propose to be at any expense in the matter. This scheme would net the Americans four shillings an ounce.
Nor did the situation look like it was going to get better. The United States realized that the fee the Canadian post office would have to pay for permission to cross their territory could be significantly increased just by setting up a post office near the Canadian border and forcing the Canadian post office to pay a fee equal to the normal[Pg 81] postage for the distance from that post office to New York, along with the courier's wages and necessary expenses, because the Americans didn't plan to incur any costs in this matter. This plan would earn the Americans four shillings per ounce.
But as has happened so often since in the relations of Canada with her neighbour to the south, the Canadian post office was driven by these oppressive charges to the development of the alternative, though naturally much less favourable, opening to the sea. The distance from Quebec to Halifax by the Temiscouata route was six hundred and twenty-seven miles as against rather less than four hundred miles, which is the distance from Montreal to New York.
But as has happened so many times in the relationship between Canada and its neighbor to the south, the Canadian post office was forced by these heavy charges to develop an alternative, although it was naturally much less favorable, route to the sea. The distance from Quebec to Halifax via the Temiscouata route was six hundred and twenty-seven miles, compared to just under four hundred miles from Montreal to New York.
The route to New York was the natural highway, which for a century and more had been pursued by Indians, soldiers and travellers on their way from the British American colonies to Canada. On the journey southward from Montreal to New York, there was a good road from Laprairie, opposite Montreal to fort St. John, which was connected by the river Richelieu with lake Champlain.
The path to New York was the natural highway that for over a century had been traveled by Native Americans, soldiers, and travelers making their way from the British American colonies to Canada. On the trip south from Montreal to New York, there was a solid road from Laprairie, across from Montreal, to Fort St. John, which was linked by the Richelieu River to Lake Champlain.
The trip down the lake from fort St. John to Crown Point (or fort Frederic) was easily and pleasantly made by canoe or bateau. From Crown Point, the traveller had a choice of routes to the Hudson river, which bore him to New York. Kalm, the Swedish naturalist who visited Canada in 1749, entered the country by the route described, and his account of the trip suggests no unusual difficulties.[129]
The journey down the lake from Fort St. John to Crown Point (or Fort Frederic) was easy and enjoyable by canoe or bateau. From Crown Point, travelers could choose different routes to the Hudson River, which led them to New York. Kalm, the Swedish naturalist who traveled to Canada in 1749, took this route, and his description of the trip indicates there were no significant challenges.[129]
Before the war the mail couriers from Montreal to New York made the journey in from nine to ten days. The journey to Halifax was of a very different character. At the best it could not be made in less than a month, and during a considerable period at the beginning and the end of each winter season the trip was very arduous and dangerous.
Before the war, the mail couriers from Montreal to New York took about nine to ten days to make the trip. The journey to Halifax was quite different. At best, it couldn’t be done in less than a month, and for a good part of the winter season, especially at the start and end, the journey was very challenging and risky.
There has been preserved the journal of a courier, Durand, who carried a mail from Quebec to Halifax and back in the early winter months of 1784.[130] His trip downwards, starting on the 11th of January, offered no features unusual in a winter journey, most of which must be made on foot through a country a large part of which was unsettled. He reached Halifax on the 29th of February, seven weeks from starting.
There is a preserved journal of a courier, Durand, who delivered mail from Quebec to Halifax and back in the early winter months of 1784.[130] His journey down, which began on January 11th, didn’t have any remarkable aspects typical for a winter trip, most of which had to be made on foot through largely unsettled territory. He arrived in Halifax on February 29th, seven weeks after he started.
The journey homeward was exceedingly toilsome and dangerous,[Pg 82] and as conditions remained unchanged for many years, at this season when winter was relaxing its hold, it may be worth while to note some of the incidents on the route.
The trip back home was incredibly tough and risky,[Pg 82] and since the situation hadn't changed for many years, it might be interesting to highlight some of the events that took place along the way during this time when winter was starting to ease up.
At the Bay du Portage, on the lower St. John, Durand and his three companions broke through the ice, and they with their mails were rescued with difficulty. They managed to get as far as Presqu' Isle, partly on the honeycombed ice, and partly in the woods, when they found themselves face to face with an ice jam. As it was impossible for Durand to land his dogs on the shore, he clambered up the hill of ice, and he and the dogs had to make their way as best they could over the broken heaped-up pieces for twenty miles, when they came upon a stretch of water as clear as in summer.
At Bay du Portage, on the lower St. John, Durand and his three companions broke through the ice, and they, along with their gear, were rescued with great difficulty. They managed to get as far as Presqu' Isle, partly on the porous ice and partly through the woods, when they encountered an ice jam. Since it was impossible for Durand to get his dogs onto the shore, he climbed up the ice hill, and he and the dogs had to navigate over the broken, piled-up chunks for twenty miles until they came upon a stretch of water as clear as in summer.
Durand's guide had abandoned him and taken to the woods, but finding the snow too soft for his snow-shoes, after a league's trudging, he rejoined Durand on the ice. The swift and swollen waters, which they now reached, compelled them to wait till they could build a canoe. Embarking they poled their way for a couple of miles, as the speed of the current prevented rowing, when the ice began again to come down upon them in great masses.
Durand's guide had left him and gone into the woods, but after struggling in the soft snow for about three miles, he returned to join Durand on the ice. The fast and swollen waters they encountered forced them to wait until they could build a canoe. Once they set off, they used poles to navigate for a couple of miles since the swift current made rowing impossible, when large chunks of ice started coming down toward them again.
Harnessing their dogs to an Indian cart, they hauled their canoe another stretch, and on the 14th of April they reached Grand Falls. Above the falls the ice, though bad, was firm enough; and having constructed a sled, they carried their canoe and baggage on it for fifteen leagues. From this point onward, although their difficulties were by no means at an end, they struggled on to the St. Lawrence, and reached Quebec on the 24th of April.
Harnessing their dogs to an Indian cart, they pulled their canoe for another stretch, and on April 14th they arrived at Grand Falls. Above the falls, the ice, while not great, was sturdy enough; and after building a sled, they transported their canoe and gear on it for fifteen leagues. From that point on, although their challenges were far from over, they persevered toward the St. Lawrence and got to Quebec on April 24th.
The trip was a great disappointment to Finlay. He had no intention of having it made at this time; but Sir John Johnston, superintendent general of Indian affairs, had informed him that he was about to make a trip to Halifax, and would be prepared to take a mail with him. Finlay lost no time in advertising the fact throughout the colony, and had gathered a large number of letters when Johnston changed his plans and did not go to Halifax.
The trip was a huge letdown for Finlay. He didn’t plan on making it at this time; however, Sir John Johnston, the superintendent general of Indian affairs, had told him he was about to travel to Halifax and would be able to carry mail with him. Finlay quickly spread the word throughout the colony and collected a lot of letters, but then Johnston changed his plans and didn’t go to Halifax.
There was nothing for Finlay to do but to send a special courier. Durand whom he engaged could not tell him what the cost would be, but from the figures furnished by another courier who had frequently carried despatches, he thought that £120 would be about the expense. Imagine his dismay when the account was shown to be £191, and he had collected less than £75 as postage on the letters contained in the mail.
There was nothing for Finlay to do but send a special courier. Durand, whom he hired, couldn't tell him what the cost would be, but based on the numbers provided by another courier who had often delivered dispatches, he thought it would be around £120. Imagine his shock when the bill turned out to be £191, and he had collected less than £75 in postage for the letters in the mail.
There was no choice open to the colony. At whatever cost,[Pg 83] an easy road must be made between Quebec and Halifax. Dependence on a foreign, and, at the time, hostile nation, for communication with the mother country was not to be thought of, still less endured.
There was no option for the colony. At whatever cost,[Pg 83] an easy route had to be established between Quebec and Halifax. Relying on a foreign, and at that time, hostile nation for communication with the mother country was out of the question, let alone something to be endured.
Indeed, in January 1783, before the peace was signed, Haldimand had taken steps to establish a road between Canada and Nova Scotia. He sent a surveyor with two hundred men down to work on the Temiscouata portage, and at the same time urged governor Parr of Nova Scotia to do what was necessary to facilitate travel in his province.
Indeed, in January 1783, before the peace was signed, Haldimand took steps to build a road between Canada and Nova Scotia. He sent a surveyor with two hundred men to work on the Temiscouata portage, and at the same time urged Governor Parr of Nova Scotia to take the necessary actions to make travel easier in his province.
Haldimand had observed that a considerable part of the expense of a mail service by this route arose from the extortionate charges for guides and forwarding, which were made by the Acadians settled at Aupaque, a few miles above Fredericton.[131] His plan, therefore, was to gather into his own hands all the agencies for transportation on the route; and with that end in view, he proposed to establish some experienced men at the head of lake Temiscouata, with canoes and other facilities for travel, whose business it should be to convey passengers and mail couriers across the lake, down the Madawaska river, and on down the St. John river as far as Grand Falls, where he intended to settle another post.
Haldimand noticed that a significant part of the costs of the mail service along this route came from the outrageous fees charged for guides and forwarding by the Acadians living at Aupaque, just a few miles above Fredericton.[131] His plan was to take control of all the transportation services along the route. To achieve this, he proposed to place experienced individuals at the head of Lake Temiscouata, equipped with canoes and other means of travel, whose job would be to transport passengers and mail couriers across the lake, down the Madawaska River, and further along the St. John River to Grand Falls, where he planned to establish another station.
From an Acadian courier, named Mercure, whom Haldimand frequently employed to convey despatches to Halifax, he learned that a number of Acadians desired to take up land on the upper St. John, in order that they might be nearer ministers of religion, in the parishes on the St. Lawrence. The plan was to place these Acadians on the lands along the river from Grand Falls up to lake Temiscouata, and it was hoped that the settlement thus formed would extend eventually to the St. Lawrence.
From an Acadian courier named Mercure, whom Haldimand often used to send messages to Halifax, he found out that several Acadians wanted to settle on the upper St. John so they could be closer to religious ministers in the parishes along the St. Lawrence. The idea was to set up these Acadians on the land along the river from Grand Falls up to Lake Temiscouata, and the hope was that this settlement would eventually grow and reach the St. Lawrence.
The governor of Nova Scotia responded heartily to Haldimand's proposals, and the settlement, once begun under their united efforts, made rapid progress. When Finlay travelled by this route to Halifax in July 1787, he found no settlers at all on the Madawaska, and only some twenty Acadians huddled together on the south bank of the St. John, opposite the mouth of the Madawaska.[132]
The governor of Nova Scotia enthusiastically responded to Haldimand's proposals, and the settlement, once initiated through their combined efforts, advanced quickly. When Finlay traveled this route to Halifax in July 1787, he found no settlers at all in Madawaska, and only about twenty Acadians clustered together on the south bank of the St. John, across from the mouth of the Madawaska.[132]
From this point downwards to the Grand Falls, a distance of forty miles, the country was entirely unoccupied. In 1791, a gentleman from Scotland, who was making a tour through Canada remarked with satisfaction on the regularity of the settlement[Pg 84] over an extent of fifty miles of very rich country, and on the evidences of material well-being observable on every side.[133] The people carried the modes of life of a self-dependent community with them, as the traveller says that the settlement was entirely isolated and self-contained, electing its own magistrates, and that a high degree of comfort prevailed.
From this point down to the Grand Falls, a distance of forty miles, the area was completely uninhabited. In 1791, a gentleman from Scotland, who was touring Canada, expressed his satisfaction with the organized settlement[Pg 84] spread across fifty miles of rich land and noted the signs of material prosperity all around.[133] The people brought the lifestyle of a self-sufficient community with them, as the traveler mentioned that the settlement was totally isolated and self-sustaining, electing its own officials, and that a high level of comfort was prevalent.
Governor Carleton, of New Brunswick, who had assisted materially in the formation of the settlement, obtained a troop of soldiers from Lord Dorchester, and by manning the posts at Presqu' Isle, Fredericton and St. John, he provided the means for keeping the road in good order.
Governor Carleton of New Brunswick, who played a key role in setting up the settlement, got a troop of soldiers from Lord Dorchester. By staffing the posts at Presqu' Isle, Fredericton, and St. John, he ensured that the road was well maintained.
The section of the long route between Quebec and Halifax, which commenced at the northern end of the Temiscouata portage, and ended at the mouth of the St. John river, was the one presenting most difficulties. But the other parts of the route, that is, the section between Quebec and the Temiscouata portage, which was entirely within the jurisdiction of the governor of Quebec, and the section from St. John to Halifax, which was partly in New Brunswick, and partly in Nova Scotia, remain to be mentioned.
The part of the long route between Quebec and Halifax, starting at the northern end of the Temiscouata portage and ending at the mouth of the St. John River, was the most challenging. However, the other sections of the route—the one between Quebec and the Temiscouata portage, which was completely under the jurisdiction of the governor of Quebec, and the part from St. John to Halifax, which was partly in New Brunswick and partly in Nova Scotia—also need to be addressed.
The courier had a comparatively easy journey from Quebec down the south shore of the St. Lawrence to the entrance of the portage. There had been a fair road for some years through that part of the country, and in 1786 Finlay, by the governor's orders, settled post houses on the route in order to facilitate the travel of mail couriers and others. The gentleman whose travels through Canada have been mentioned, observed that it was a comfortable trip through these parts, and that the country was thickly settled, there being from twelve to sixteen families to the mile.
The courier had a relatively easy journey from Quebec along the south shore of the St. Lawrence to the start of the portage. For several years, there had been a decent road through that area, and in 1786, Finlay established post houses along the route at the governor's request to make it easier for mail couriers and others to travel. The gentleman whose travels through Canada have been noted remarked that it was a pleasant trip through these regions and that the area was densely populated, with about twelve to sixteen families per mile.
The eastern end of the long route, that is, the part from St. John to Halifax, consisted of a trip across the bay of Fundy from St. John to Annapolis, and a journey by land through the Annapolis valley from Annapolis to Windsor, thence to Halifax. The road from Annapolis to Halifax is described by Finlay as very rough, but it was covered in three days in a one-horse carriage, and in two days on horseback.
The eastern end of the long route, which is the section from St. John to Halifax, included a trip across the Bay of Fundy from St. John to Annapolis, followed by a land journey through the Annapolis Valley from Annapolis to Windsor, and then on to Halifax. Finlay describes the road from Annapolis to Halifax as very rough, but it could be covered in three days by a one-horse carriage and in two days on horseback.
The maintenance of a continuous communication between Quebec and Halifax was effected in the following manner.[134] Canada controlled the section from Quebec to Fredericton, and provided[Pg 85] couriers who made fortnightly trips over this part of the route. The section down the St. John river from Fredericton to St. John, and thence by the bay to Annapolis, was under the supervision of the government of New Brunswick; while the eastern part, which lay entirely in Nova Scotia, was naturally managed by that government. In the summer of 1787, the governor, Lord Dorchester, sent Finlay over the route to Halifax, to see what improvements would be required in order to enable this service to compete with the service over the shorter route from Montreal to New York. Dorchester at the same time submitted the whole scheme to the colonial office, intimating that if the home government saw fit to establish a packet service between England and Halifax, the arrangements for the inland conveyance through the provinces would be found satisfactory.
The maintenance of ongoing communication between Quebec and Halifax was carried out in the following way.[134] Canada controlled the section from Quebec to Fredericton and provided[Pg 85] couriers who made trips every two weeks over this part of the route. The section along the St. John River from Fredericton to St. John, and then by the bay to Annapolis, was supervised by the government of New Brunswick, while the eastern part, which was entirely in Nova Scotia, was naturally managed by that government. In the summer of 1787, the governor, Lord Dorchester, sent Finlay over the route to Halifax to determine what improvements would be needed to make this service competitive with the shorter route from Montreal to New York. At the same time, Dorchester submitted the entire plan to the colonial office, indicating that if the home government decided to establish a packet service between England and Halifax, the arrangements for the inland transport through the provinces would be found satisfactory.
Lord Sydney, the colonial secretary, expressed the king's approval of the measures taken,[135] and stated that the postmasters general had directed Finlay to carry the plans into execution in a manner correspondent to Lord Dorchester's wishes. The lack of sufficient packet boats would prevent the establishment of a regular service from England for the moment, but it was hoped that vessels enough might be spared for the route, to make the service though not exactly regular yet of substantial benefit to the colonies.
Lord Sydney, the colonial secretary, shared the king's approval of the actions taken,[135] and mentioned that the postmasters general had instructed Finlay to implement the plans in line with Lord Dorchester's wishes. The shortage of adequate packet boats would temporarily hinder the establishment of a regular service from England, but it was hoped that enough vessels could be allocated for the route, making the service, while not exactly regular, still significantly beneficial to the colonies.
Finlay in the course of his visit to St. John and Halifax found much to encourage the hope that, with the improvement of the route, a satisfactory outlet from Canada to the sea would be obtained at Halifax. The chief trouble, he foresaw, lay in the divided responsibility for the maintenance of an efficient service, owing to the fact that post office authorities in the several provinces were entirely independent of one another. Indeed, at that very time, the deputy postmasters general of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were at strife with one another, and were carrying on an active newspaper war as to which of the two was accountable for certain defects in the service.[136] The distribution of the expense of the part of the service they had undertaken to maintain was another cause of complaint.
During his visit to St. John and Halifax, Finlay found a lot of reasons to be hopeful that, with improvements to the route, Halifax would provide a good connection from Canada to the sea. However, he predicted that the main issue would be the divided responsibility for maintaining an efficient service, since the post office authorities in the different provinces operated completely independently. In fact, at that very moment, the deputy postmasters general of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were in conflict with each other, actively engaging in a newspaper battle over who was responsible for certain shortcomings in the service.[136] The way the costs were shared for the part of the service they were supposed to manage was another source of complaints.
Finlay came back to Canada after his trip to Halifax bringing with him two strong convictions. One was that the service to be successful must be in the hands of one person. The other was that the correspondence between the provinces themselves was not of sufficient volume to cover the outlay, and that unless there were[Pg 86] frequent English mails exchanged at Halifax, the service would have to be dropped for lack of revenue to meet the large expense. He considered that if six mails a year could be exchanged between England and Halifax, the postage arising would more than pay the expenses of the service.
Finlay returned to Canada after his trip to Halifax with two strong beliefs. One was that for the service to succeed, it needed to be managed by a single person. The other was that the amount of correspondence between the provinces wasn't enough to cover the costs, and unless there were[Pg 86] regular mail exchanges between England and Halifax, the service would have to be discontinued due to a lack of revenue to cover the significant expense. He thought that if six mails a year could be exchanged between England and Halifax, the resulting postage would more than cover the costs of the service.
Dorchester lost no time in transmitting to England the substance of Finlay's recommendations, adding his own opinion that as soon as a continuous road to St. John had been constructed, and a sufficient number of people had been settled upon it to keep it open in winter, the foot couriers would be replaced by horsemen, and then the mails would be carried more speedily and securely than by way of New York.
Dorchester quickly sent the key points of Finlay's recommendations to England, adding his own view that once a continuous road to St. John was built and enough people lived along it to maintain it through the winter, foot couriers would be swapped out for horsemen, making mail delivery faster and more secure than using New York.
The governor, also, suggested that the postal service in all the provinces be put under the direction of Finlay, who was a man of much experience, zeal, and practical ability, and who was entitled to this consideration from having lost a similar appointment by the late war.[137]
The governor also suggested that the postal service in all the provinces be placed under Finlay's management, as he was a person with a lot of experience, enthusiasm, and practical skills, and he deserved this recognition after losing a similar position due to the recent war.[137]
The home government approved of Dorchester's recommendation as to Finlay, whose commission as deputy postmaster general was extended to comprise the whole of the colonies in British North America. At the same time Dorchester received the gratifying news that the post office had managed so to arrange matters that commencing with March 1788 the packet boats which ran between Falmouth and New York would pass by way of Halifax, stopping there two days on both the inward and the outward voyages.
The home government agreed with Dorchester's recommendation regarding Finlay, extending his role as deputy postmaster general to cover all the colonies in British North America. At the same time, Dorchester received the encouraging news that the post office had arranged for the packet boats traveling between Falmouth and New York to go through Halifax, stopping there for two days on both the incoming and outgoing trips, starting in March 1788.
The service to Halifax was to be limited, however, to eight monthly trips between March and October, as the admiralty had been informed that the prevailing winds off the Nova Scotia coast during the winter months were so contrary as to make it impracticable for the packets to call there during those months.[138]
The service to Halifax would be limited to eight trips a month from March to October, since the admiralty had been informed that the winds off the Nova Scotia coast in winter were so unfavorable that it would be impractical for the ships to stop there during those months.[138]
In winter, therefore, it was still necessary to send the mails from Canada for England by way of New York. The mails between Nova Scotia and England during the winter months were exchanged by means of a schooner, which the governor of Nova Scotia put on the course between Halifax and New York.
In winter, it was still essential to send the mail from Canada to England via New York. The mail between Nova Scotia and England during the winter months was exchanged using a schooner that the governor of Nova Scotia put on the route between Halifax and New York.
In the winter of 1790, the conditions were made somewhat easier for the Nova Scotians, by the British post office directing that the packet agent at New York should send the Nova Scotia[Pg 87] mails from New York to Boston, so that the governor's schooner was not required to go further south than Boston.
In the winter of 1790, things got a little easier for the people of Nova Scotia because the British post office instructed the packet agent in New York to send the Nova Scotia[Pg 87] mail from New York to Boston, so the governor's schooner didn't have to travel any further south than Boston.
To Canada, the calling of the packet at Halifax, was a great boon. It settled the seaport problem, which had many perplexing aspects. Canada could never dispense with the New York route, unless the charges for transmission through the United States were made quite extortionate, and the success which had attended the efforts of Canada to make an outlet through British territory would not be lost upon the Americans when it became necessary to re-arrange the terms for transit through the United States.
To Canada, the arrival of the packet in Halifax was a huge benefit. It resolved the seaport issue, which had many complicated aspects. Canada could never get rid of the New York route unless the costs for shipping through the United States were set very high. The success that Canada had in creating an outlet through British territory wouldn’t go unnoticed by the Americans when it became time to renegotiate the terms for transit through the United States.
To merchants and others in Quebec who depended exclusively on the Halifax post office for their correspondence with England, the service of the packet boats, curiously enough, developed a grievance, which had a real foundation, as will be seen from the following case.
To merchants and others in Quebec who relied solely on the Halifax post office for their correspondence with England, the service of the packet boats surprisingly created a grievance that had a real basis, as will be illustrated by the following case.
The postmaster of Halifax reported to the postmaster general that the admiral of the "Leander," which was on the point of sailing for England, expressed much dissatisfaction because a mail was not sent by his ship.[139] In explanation of his refusal to do this the postmaster stated that before the packet boats began to call at Halifax, he made up and despatched a mail by every ship of war and merchantman that sailed from Halifax for England, but since the commencement of the packet service, he despatched no mails by any other vessels than the packets.
The postmaster of Halifax reported to the postmaster general that the admiral of the "Leander," which was about to sail for England, was very unhappy because a mail wasn't sent on his ship.[139] To explain his refusal, the postmaster said that before the packet boats started stopping at Halifax, he would prepare and send mail with every warship and merchant ship that left Halifax for England. However, since the packet service began, he only sends mail with the packet ships.
The understanding of the arrangement by the postmaster was that the packet boats would not have been sent to Halifax if they were not to be employed exclusively, and he would no more think of sending a mail by any other steamer than he would send the letters to Annapolis by the first traveller who happened to be going in that direction. The explanation was acceptable to both the post office and the admiralty, but there can be no question that the employment of the packet boats curtailed the opportunities which the Nova Scotians had enjoyed of corresponding with England.
The postmaster understood that the packet boats wouldn't have been sent to Halifax if they weren't meant to be used exclusively. He wouldn’t consider sending mail with any other steamer than he would think of sending letters to Annapolis with the first traveler heading that way. This explanation was acceptable to both the post office and the admiralty, but there’s no doubt that using the packet boats limited the chances Nova Scotians had to communicate with England.
Before leaving the Quebec-Halifax service, it seems proper to mention a remarkable scheme which was submitted to the postmaster general by William Knox, late under secretary of state, for a packet service between England and North America, and between the several parts of the latter.[140] Knox was under[Pg 88] secretary of state during the war, and had in a large measure directed the operations of the packet service on behalf of the army in America.
Before concluding the Quebec-Halifax service, it's worth mentioning an impressive proposal submitted to the postmaster general by William Knox, the former under secretary of state, for a packet service connecting England with North America, and between different regions within North America.[140] Knox served as under secretary of state during the war and played a significant role in overseeing the packet service operations for the army in America.[Pg 88]
The proposition, which was the result of a request by Lord Walsingham, the postmaster general, for an expression of Knox's views, was based on the sound principle that, until the post office provided facilities adequate to the requirements of the correspondence which passed between England and North America, it could never compete successfully with the number of private ships continually crossing the Atlantic.
The proposal, which came from a request by Lord Walsingham, the postmaster general, for Knox's opinion, was based on the solid idea that, until the post office offered services that met the demand of the correspondence between England and North America, it could never effectively compete with the many private ships regularly crossing the Atlantic.
Knox pointed out that there was only a monthly service between England, Halifax and New York, and that, at the very best, five months must elapse before an answer could be returned to a letter written in England and addressed to any of the interior parts of British North America.
Knox noted that there was only a monthly service connecting England, Halifax, and New York, and that, at best, it would take five months for a response to reach a letter sent from England to any of the interior regions of British North America.
The plan Knox unfolded to Walsingham was to have a fleet of fast sailing vessels ply between England and Caplin bay, Newfoundland. At Caplin bay there would be other vessels awaiting the British packets, and, on their arrival, one of these would set off with the mails for Halifax and Rhode Island, and another for Bermuda and Virginia, each vessel returning by its own route, to Caplin bay. These services were to be looped together by auxiliary services, and connected with other lines further south, until Great Britain, Newfoundland, Canada, the United States and the West Indies were all bound together by an elaborate system of intercommunication, which would give an exchange of mails, between all the parts three times a month. This scheme, it is needless to say, was never carried into execution.
The plan Knox shared with Walsingham was to have a fleet of fast sailing ships travel between England and Caplin Bay, Newfoundland. At Caplin Bay, there would be other ships waiting for the British packets, and upon their arrival, one of these would depart with the mail for Halifax and Rhode Island, while another would head for Bermuda and Virginia, with each ship returning along its own route to Caplin Bay. These services were meant to be interconnected by additional routes and linked to other lines further south, creating a comprehensive network that would connect Great Britain, Newfoundland, Canada, the United States, and the West Indies, allowing for mail exchanges three times a month between all locations. This scheme, needless to say, was never implemented.
The results of the war had other important consequences for Canada, besides that of forcing upon Quebec and the Maritime provinces the first of the series of steps in the direction of common action, which led eventually to confederation. When peace was concluded in 1783, the disbanded soldiers and other adherents of the British cause came and settled in Canada, and there was an early demand for postal accommodation in the newly peopled districts.
The war's outcome had other significant effects on Canada, aside from pushing Quebec and the Maritime provinces to take the first steps towards working together, which ultimately resulted in Confederation. When peace was established in 1783, the disbanded soldiers and other supporters of the British cause moved to Canada, creating an early need for postal services in the newly populated areas.
The first settlement in Upper Canada was at Niagara, where four or five families took up land in 1780. These were reinforced in 1784, by a number of the men of Butler's Rangers, and at the end of that year, the settlement was increased to over six hundred. Americans came over in large numbers, and between them and the steady stream inwards of loyalists, the district from Niagara[Pg 89] to the head of the lake at Hamilton was rapidly settled. A gentleman travelling through that part of the province in 1800 remarked that it was all under settlement.[141]
The first settlement in Upper Canada was at Niagara, where four or five families settled in 1780. This was bolstered in 1784 by several men from Butler's Rangers, and by the end of that year, the population grew to over six hundred. Americans crossed the border in large numbers, and along with the constant influx of loyalists, the area from Niagara[Pg 89] to the head of the lake at Hamilton was quickly populated. A traveler passing through that part of the province in 1800 noted that it was all being developed.[141]
At the other end of the province, settlement was going forward with much rapidity. From the eastern boundary westward as far as the township of Elizabethtown, near the present site of Brockville, there was a continuous line of settlers. The extreme east was taken up by Highland Scotch as far as Dundas county, and the western part of this county was occupied by Germans. Both Highlanders and Germans came from the same district on the Mohawk river in New York state.
At the other end of the province, settlement was moving quickly. From the eastern boundary all the way west to the township of Elizabethtown, near what is now Brockville, there was a constant line of settlers. The far east was settled by Highland Scots all the way to Dundas County, while the western part of this county was occupied by Germans. Both Highlanders and Germans came from the same area along the Mohawk River in New York State.
Westward from Dundas county the settlers were more largely of British-American origin. At Elizabethtown there was a break in the settlement until Frontenac county was reached, as the land in that intermediate district did not appear so favourable. At Kingston, settlement was recommended, and from that point to the western end of the bay of Quinte, farms were taken up with an alacrity that was unsurpassed in any part of the province.
Westward from Dundas County, the settlers were mostly of British-American descent. At Elizabethtown, there was a gap in the settlement until they reached Frontenac County, as the land in that area didn't seem as promising. Settlement was encouraged in Kingston, and from there to the western end of the Bay of Quinte, farms were claimed with enthusiasm unmatched in any other part of the province.
The incomers were all from the states to the south, and in their old homes had enjoyed many of the conveniences of civilized life. In 1787, as soon as they had become fairly established, they petitioned the government for the extension of the post office into the new districts, and two years later post offices were opened at Lachine, Cedars, Coteau du Lac, Charlottenburg, Cornwall, New Johnston, Lancaster, Osnabruck, Augusta, Elizabethtown and Kingston.[142]
The newcomers were all from the states to the south, and back home, they had enjoyed many of the comforts of modern life. In 1787, once they had settled in, they asked the government to extend the post office to the new areas, and two years later, post offices were opened in Lachine, Cedars, Coteau du Lac, Charlottenburg, Cornwall, New Johnston, Lancaster, Osnabruck, Augusta, Elizabethtown, and Kingston.[142]
This was as far as the regular mail couriers ran. Trips were made once a year during the winter, and in summer, every opportunity afforded by vessels going up to lake Ontario, was taken advantage of for the despatch of mails.
This was the limit of the regular mail couriers' routes. They made trips once a year in winter, and during summer, they seized every chance to send mail via vessels heading to Lake Ontario.
In the first advertisement of the service of the new districts, it was stated that the mails would be despatched every four weeks, but this regularity could not be attained without a considerable outlay, and it was found better to utilize such means of conveyance as happened to be offering, for the carriage of the mails. Though the line of post offices along the St. Lawrence terminated at Kingston, reasonable provision was made for communication with the remote settlements of Niagara, Detroit and Michillimackinac.
In the first ad for the new districts' service, it was mentioned that mail would be sent every four weeks. However, maintaining that schedule required a significant investment, so it was decided to use whatever transportation options were available for mail delivery. Although the line of post offices along the St. Lawrence ended at Kingston, there were still plans in place for communication with the far-off settlements of Niagara, Detroit, and Michillimackinac.
Detroit and Michillimackinac are in the territory of the United States, but the forts at these places were detained in the hands[Pg 90] of the British until 1796 as security, until the obligations imposed on the Americans by the treaty of Paris were fulfilled. Offices were established in each of the three settlements mentioned, and the post office undertook to send the mails forward from Kingston as opportunities occurred of doing so with safety.[143]
Detroit and Michillimackinac are located in the territory of the United States, but the forts at these sites remained under British control until 1796 as a form of security, waiting for the Americans to meet the obligations set by the Treaty of Paris. Offices were set up in each of the three mentioned settlements, and the post office was responsible for forwarding the mails from Kingston whenever it was safe to do so.[Pg 90][143]
In 1792 the first postal convention to which Canada was a party, was concluded with the United States. Under its terms[144] the United States post office engaged to act as intermediary for the conveyance of mails passing between Canada and Great Britain. When a mail for Canada reached New York by the British packet, it was taken in hand by the British packet boat agent, who after assorting it, placed it in a sealed bag, which he delivered to the New York post office.
In 1792, Canada signed its first postal agreement with the United States. According to this agreement[144], the United States Postal Service agreed to act as an intermediary for the delivery of mail between Canada and Great Britain. When mail for Canada arrived in New York via the British packet, the British packet boat agent would sort it, put it in a sealed bag, and then deliver it to the New York post office.
The postmaster of New York sent this bag forward by messenger as far as Burlington, Vermont, from whence it was taken to Montreal by a Canadian courier, who travelled between Montreal and Burlington every two weeks. In 1797 these trips were made weekly.
The postmaster of New York sent this bag forward by messenger to Burlington, Vermont, from where it was taken to Montreal by a Canadian courier, who traveled between Montreal and Burlington every two weeks. In 1797, these trips were made weekly.
For this service the Canadian post office agreed to pay the United States department the sum which the latter would have been entitled to collect on the same number of United States letters passing between Burlington and New York. As the mails were contained in a sealed bag, the United States post office had no means of arriving at the amount due to them for this service, and they agreed to accept the sworn statement of the British and Canadian officials on this point.
For this service, the Canadian post office agreed to pay the United States department the amount it would have collected for the same number of United States letters sent between Burlington and New York. Since the mails were in a sealed bag, the United States post office had no way of determining the amount owed to them for this service, so they agreed to accept the sworn statement from the British and Canadian officials on this matter.
The convention, also, provided for the interchange of correspondence between Canada and the United States. According to the practice of the period, a letter from Montreal for New York, for instance, was chargeable with the postage due for conveyance from Montreal to the United States boundary. This was collected by the Canadian post office. In addition to this, the United States post office charged the postage due to it for the conveyance from the boundary to New York.
The agreement also set up a system for exchanging mail between Canada and the United States. Back then, if you were sending a letter from Montreal to New York, you had to pay the postage for getting it from Montreal to the U.S. border. This charge was collected by the Canadian post office. On top of that, the U.S. post office would charge for the delivery from the border to New York.
The arrangements for the collection of the postage due to each administration were somewhat peculiar. On a letter from Canada to the United States, the Canadian postage as far as Burlington had to be paid at the time the letter was posted. The United States postage was collected from the person to whom the letter was delivered. On letters passing the other way, that is, from the United States to Canada, another arrangement was[Pg 91] possible. The sender could, of course, if he chose, pay the United States postage to Burlington, and the Canadian post office would collect its own postage from the addressed.
The way postage was collected for each administration was a bit unusual. When a letter was sent from Canada to the United States, the Canadian postage had to be paid at the time of mailing, up to Burlington. The United States postage was collected from the person who received the letter. For letters going the other way, from the United States to Canada, there was a different option. The sender could, if they wanted to, pay the United States postage all the way to Burlington, and then the Canadian post office would collect its own postage from the recipient.
But besides this arrangement, which was common to letters passing in either direction, a person in the United States could post a letter for Canada entirely unpaid, and the total amount due would be collected on the delivery of the letter to the person addressed in Canada. In this case, the postage due to the United States was collected by the postmaster at Montreal, who assumed the duties of agent, in this respect, for the United States post office. The United States did not allow any of their postmasters to act as agents for the collection of Canadian postage in the United States, alleging that there were too many post offices in that country for Burlington to look after them properly. The convention of 1792 contained a feature which was at that time novel in post office arrangements. It provided for the conveyance of periodical magazines between Canada and Great Britain, charging for its services the unusually low figure of eight cents a magazine. The convention was signed by the deputy postmaster general of Canada and the postmaster general of the United States.
But besides this setup, which was standard for letters going both ways, someone in the United States could send a letter to Canada without paying upfront, and the full amount owed would be collected upon delivery to the recipient in Canada. In this case, the postage owed to the United States was collected by the postmaster in Montreal, who acted as the agent for the U.S. post office in this regard. The United States did not let any of their postmasters serve as agents for collecting Canadian postage within the United States, claiming that there were too many post offices in that country for Burlington to manage properly. The agreement from 1792 included a feature that was innovative for postal services at that time. It allowed for the transport of periodical magazines between Canada and Great Britain, charging a remarkably low rate of eight cents per magazine for its services. The agreement was signed by the deputy postmaster general of Canada and the postmaster general of the United States.
Under this convention the arrangements for the exchange of correspondence between Canada and Great Britain were very satisfactory. During the eight months when the packet boats called at Halifax, the mails passed by the route through the Maritime provinces. In the winter, while the packet boats did not visit Halifax, the mails were sent by way of New York.
Under this agreement, the system for exchanging correspondence between Canada and Great Britain worked really well. During the eight months when the packet boats stopped at Halifax, the mail was routed through the Maritime provinces. In winter, when the packet boats didn't go to Halifax, the mail was sent through New York.
The improvements in the roads on the route through the United States, reduced greatly the time of conveyance between Montreal and New York. Travellers from Montreal to New York in 1800 noted that there was a rough road as far as Burlington, and a rather better one to Skenesborough (Whitehall), while from this place to New York, the journey was made by coach.[145]
The upgrades to the roads across the United States significantly decreased travel time between Montreal and New York. Travelers from Montreal to New York in 1800 observed that the road was bumpy all the way to Burlington, but it improved somewhat towards Skenesborough (Whitehall). From there to New York, the trip was taken by coach.[145]
In Upper Canada, postal affairs were brought into some prominence when that part of the country was erected into a separate province by the constitutional act of 1791. As will be recalled, the service beyond Kingston was conducted in rather haphazard fashion. It was maintained largely in the interest of the little garrisons at Niagara, Detroit and Michillimackinac.
In Upper Canada, postal services gained attention when that region became a separate province under the constitutional act of 1791. As you may remember, the service beyond Kingston was managed in a rather chaotic manner. It was primarily provided to support the small military outposts at Niagara, Detroit, and Michillimackinac.
The first governor of the new province, General Simcoe, was a man of great energy, and zealous in the discharge of any duty laid upon him. The total population in Upper Canada at the[Pg 92] time did not exceed ten thousand. But though these were not neglected, it was in preparation for the thousands whom Simcoe foresaw thronging into the province, that his attention was chiefly occupied.
The first governor of the new province, General Simcoe, was a very energetic man who was dedicated to fulfilling any duty assigned to him. The total population in Upper Canada at the[Pg 92] time was fewer than ten thousand. However, even though these residents were not overlooked, Simcoe's main focus was on preparing for the thousands he anticipated would soon flock to the province.
Before he left London for Canada, Simcoe had written to the government several letters, some of them of great length, discussing every conceivable topic of colonial policy. In submitting the list of officials which he considered necessary for the government of the province, the newly appointed governor stated that he had in mind a proper person who would go to Canada as printer, if he had a salary, and the governor thought that by making this person provincial postmaster[146] as well as government printer, a salary might be raised from the two offices, sufficient to induce him to go.
Before leaving London for Canada, Simcoe wrote several letters to the government, some quite lengthy, covering every possible topic related to colonial policy. While submitting the list of officials he believed were essential for governing the province, the newly appointed governor mentioned that he had a suitable candidate in mind for the printer position in Canada, provided there was a salary. The governor thought that by appointing this individual as the provincial postmaster[146] along with the government printer role, it might be possible to raise a salary from both positions that would convince him to accept the job.
When Simcoe reached Quebec in November 1791, he consulted with Finlay on the subject, and was confirmed in his opinion as to the desirability of a post office establishment in Upper Canada. There was, however, a preliminary question of great importance which it appeared to him necessary to have settled.
When Simcoe arrived in Quebec in November 1791, he discussed the matter with Finlay and his views on the need for a post office in Upper Canada were reinforced. However, there was a crucial preliminary question that he felt needed to be addressed.
The question was akin to that which formed the subject of a later controversy between the home government and the colonies, as to whether sums collected from the public as postage were to be regarded as a tax, and as such would require the consent of the colonies before they could be appropriated to the use of the postmaster general in Great Britain.
The question was similar to one that sparked a later debate between the home government and the colonies about whether the money collected from the public for postage should be seen as a tax, which would mean it needed the colonies' approval before it could be used by the postmaster general in Great Britain.
Franklin, it will be remembered, contended that these sums were not a tax, but simply compensation for services rendered by the post office. The government, which founded an argument for the legality of its course in laying taxes in America, on the fact that the colonies had hitherto contentedly paid postage on the letters conveyed by the post office, and made no objection that the profits of the American post office should be sent to England, insisted that the postage collected was a tax.
Franklin argued that these amounts weren’t a tax, but just payment for services provided by the post office. The government claimed it was legal to impose taxes in America because the colonies had previously accepted paying for postage on letters sent through the post office and hadn’t objected to the profits of the American post office being sent to England. They insisted that the postage collected was a tax.
Simcoe had no doubt on the subject himself. He fully shared the earlier view of the British government, and proceeded to a further discussion of the subject. In 1778, in a belated attempt to stay the progress of the rebellion in the colonies by a course of conciliation, the government, by an act of parliament,[147] renounced the right it had hitherto claimed of taxing the colonies except so far as might be necessary for the regulation of commerce; and[Pg 93] in the case of such regulative duties, the proceeds from them were to ensure to the benefit, not of the home government, but of the colony from which the duties were collected.
Simcoe was completely confident about this issue. He shared the earlier perspective of the British government and continued the discussion. In 1778, in a late effort to stop the rebellion in the colonies through a conciliatory approach, the government, through an act of parliament,[147] gave up its previous claim to tax the colonies, except as necessary to regulate trade; and[Pg 93] with these regulatory duties, the revenue generated would benefit not the home government, but the colony where the duties were collected.
Whether a post office tax was to be classed among duties for the regulation of commerce was a point on which Simcoe could not quite make up his mind. But if it were to be so regarded, then by the act of 1778, which was embodied in the constitutional act of 1791, the net produce from the Upper Canadian post office should be appropriated to the use of the province, and the question Simcoe asked was whether it did not lie with the general assembly of the province, rather than with the parliament of Great Britain, to superintend the public accounts of duties so levied and collected.[148] In order that the whole matter might be placed beyond doubt, Simcoe suggested that when a post office bill for the new province came to be drawn up, it should contain a preamble describing its connection with duties for the regulation of commerce, and vesting the collection of the tax in the deputy postmaster general of Lower Canada, who should be made accountable for the revenue so raised, to the legislature of Upper Canada.
Whether a post office tax should be considered a duty for regulating commerce was something Simcoe wasn't entirely sure about. However, if it was regarded that way, then according to the act of 1778, which was included in the constitutional act of 1791, the net revenue from the Upper Canadian post office should be used for the province. Simcoe questioned whether it was up to the provincial assembly, rather than the British Parliament, to oversee the public accounts of duties imposed and collected.[148] To clarify the issue, Simcoe proposed that when drafting a post office bill for the new province, it should include a preamble outlining its relationship to duties for regulating commerce, and appoint the deputy postmaster general of Lower Canada to collect the tax, holding them accountable for the revenue generated to the Upper Canada legislature.
Dundas,[149] the home secretary, to whom the matter was submitted, expressed no decided opinion upon it, but suggested that bills of that nature ought not to be passed upon by the governor, but should be reserved in order that the king's pleasure might be signified regarding them.
Dundas,[149] the home secretary, to whom the matter was submitted, didn't give a clear opinion on it but suggested that bills like that shouldn't be decided by the governor and should be set aside so the king could express his wishes about them.
The question of a separate establishment for Upper Canada, as will be seen hereafter, occupied the attention both of the local government and of the general post office in England, but though several propositions were submitted by both sides, the objections to it were found insuperable.
The issue of creating a separate establishment for Upper Canada, as will be discussed later, captured the interest of both the local government and the general post office in England. However, despite several proposals from both parties, the objections to it were deemed insurmountable.
The only other event of importance occurring in Upper Canada at this period which affected the history of the post office was the founding of the city of Toronto. Until 1794, when the lines of the present city were laid out under the direction of governor Simcoe, and for some years later, the future capital of Ontario[150] was in a state of the most complete isolation.
The only other significant event happening in Upper Canada during this time that impacted the history of the post office was the establishment of the city of Toronto. Until 1794, when the current city layout was created under Governor Simcoe's guidance, and for several years afterward, what would become the capital of Ontario[150] was completely isolated.
On the way up lake Ontario, settlement reached no further than the western end of the bay of Quinte. An official sent from York, as Toronto was named in 1792, to Kingston, to meet and[Pg 94] accompany immigrants to York, found very few desirous of going so great a distance from all settlements.
On the way up Lake Ontario, settlement extended only to the western end of the Bay of Quinte. An official sent from York, which was named Toronto in 1792, to Kingston, to meet and[Pg 94] accompany immigrants to York, found very few people interested in traveling such a long distance from all other settlements.
The country to the west of Toronto was equally unsettled. The line of farm holdings from Niagara westward, came to an end at the head of the lake about the site of the present city of Hamilton. From that point to York, the country was occupied by the Mississauga Indians. When it was determined to remove the seat of government to York in 1797, the chief justice complained that the lack of accommodation of any kind was so great that the larger part of those whom business or duty called to York must remain during their stay there, either in the open air, or crowded together in huts or tents, in a manner equally offensive to their feelings and injurious to their health.[151]
The area west of Toronto was just as unsettled. The line of farms stretching from Niagara to the west ended at the north shore of the lake, near where Hamilton is now located. From that point to York, the land was inhabited by the Mississauga Indians. When it was decided to move the government seat to York in 1797, the chief justice complained that the lack of lodging was so severe that most people who needed to be in York for business or duty had to spend their time either outside in the open or crammed together in huts or tents, which was both uncomfortable and harmful to their health.[151]
The exact date on which the post office was established at York, and the name of the first postmaster are unfortunately not disclosed by the records, which are far from complete. There is a probability, however, which amounts to practical certainty, that the post office was opened in either 1799 or 1800, and that the first postmaster was William Willcocks.
The exact date when the post office was established in York, and the name of the first postmaster, are unfortunately not available in the records, which are quite incomplete. However, it's highly likely that the post office opened in either 1799 or 1800, and that the first postmaster was William Willcocks.
Lieutenant governor Hunter states that in 1799, excepting the single trip made annually from Montreal to Niagara, there was no service beyond Kingston, the mails for the posts west of that point being taken by the king's vessels, and their distribution effected by the commandants at the posts.[152]
Lieutenant Governor Hunter says that in 1799, apart from the one trip made each year from Montreal to Niagara, there was no service past Kingston. The mail for the posts to the west of that point was carried by the king's ships, and the commandants at those posts managed the delivery.[152]
In 1800, there was certainly a regular postmaster at York, as the legislative council in that year directed the surveyor general to give Wilcox, the postmaster, such information as would enable Finlay to answer certain questions asked by the governor general respecting the establishment of regular couriers between Quebec and York.[153]
In 1800, there was definitely a regular postmaster in York, as the legislative council that year instructed the surveyor general to provide Wilcox, the postmaster, with the information needed for Finlay to respond to specific questions from the governor general about setting up regular courier services between Quebec and York.[153]
Besides the inhabitants of the rapidly growing town of York, the post office at that place served to accommodate for many years the German settlement in Markham township, which was begun in 1797 under the leadership of Berczy, an enterprising promoter.
Besides the people of the rapidly growing town of York, the post office there served for many years the German settlement in Markham township, which was started in 1797 under the leadership of Berczy, an ambitious promoter.
In October 1799, Finlay's connection with the post office in Canada ceased, and it is unpleasant to add that he was dismissed as a defaulter. He admitted an indebtedness to the postmaster general, amounting to £1408.
In October 1799, Finlay's connection with the post office in Canada ended, and unfortunately, he was let go for being a defaulter. He acknowledged owing the postmaster general £1408.
To the lieutenant governor Finlay explained[154] that a large[Pg 95] part of the debt arose in 1794 from the disallowance for a number of years past, of certain items of credit, which had been accepted and passed at the general post office. The death in bankruptcy of the postmaster at Three Rivers increased considerably the amount of Finlay's obligations to the postmaster general.
To the lieutenant governor, Finlay explained[154] that a large[Pg 95] part of the debt originated in 1794 due to the rejection for several years of certain credit items that had been approved and processed at the general post office. The bankruptcy of the postmaster at Three Rivers significantly raised Finlay's liabilities to the postmaster general.
Finlay pointed out, with truth, that he had not only successfully maintained the post office in Canada under very trying circumstances, but that through the relations he had established with the maîtres de poste, he had saved to the postmaster general not less than £12,000. He pleaded, therefore, that as large an allowance as possible be made, on account of these considerations, and that he might be given time to pay any balance which might thereafter be found due.
Finlay pointed out, truthfully, that he had not only managed to keep the post office running in Canada under very challenging conditions, but that through the connections he had built with the maîtres de poste, he had saved the postmaster general no less than £12,000. He requested, therefore, that as large an allowance as possible be made, considering these factors, and that he be given time to pay any balance that might later be found due.
Finlay's plea was strongly supported by the leading merchants in the colony, and by the lieutenant governor, who represented that he was the oldest servant of the crown in Canada, being senior executive and legislative councillor. When the land committee was formed he was made chairman, and on him fell practically all the onerous duties devolving on the committee during that period. He was seventy years of age, forty of which had been spent in the service of the colony, and was suffering from an incurable disease, from which he died not long after his dismissal.
Finlay's request was strongly backed by the top merchants in the colony and by the lieutenant governor, who pointed out that he was the longest-serving crown official in Canada, being the senior executive and legislative counselor. When the land committee was established, he was appointed chairman, and he basically took on all the heavy responsibilities of the committee during that time. He was seventy years old, having spent forty of those years serving the colony, and he was battling an incurable illness, from which he passed away not long after he was let go.
Notwithstanding these pleas, judgment was obtained for the amount of the debt, and some land which had been granted to him in Stanstead county as a special recognition of his services, was attached by the orders of the postmaster general. Either the claim was not pressed rigorously, or the land did not suffice to cover the debt, for after standing on the departmental books as uncollectable for many years, Finlay's debt was finally wiped off in 1830.
Notwithstanding these requests, a judgment was made for the amount of the debt, and some land that had been granted to him in Stanstead County as a special recognition of his services was seized by the orders of the postmaster general. Either the claim wasn't pursued aggressively, or the land wasn't enough to cover the debt, because after being listed as uncollectable on the departmental books for many years, Finlay's debt was finally erased in 1830.
FOOTNOTES:
[121] Finlay "Papers," Can. Arch., M. 412.
[122] C. O. 5, vol. 136.
[123] Can. Arch., B., CC. 114.
[124] Ibid., LXII. 164.
[125] Can. Arch., B., CC. passim.
[126] G.P.O., Commission Book, 1759-1854.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ G.P.O., Commission Book, 1759-1854.
[127] Quebec Gazette, November 18, 1783.
[130] Can. Arch., B., LXXI 72.
[132] Finlay Papers, Can. Arch., M. 411.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Finlay Papers, Can. Arch., M. 411.
[134] Finlay's "Report," Can. Arch., M. 412.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Finlay's "Report," Can. Arch., M. 412.
[136] Finlay's "Report," Can. Arch., M. 412.
[141] Freer Papers, I. 47.
[142] Quebec Gazette, May 28, 1789.
[143] Quebec Gazette, May 28, 1789.
[145] Freer Papers, I. 54.
[147] 18, Geo. III. c. 22.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 18, Geo. III. c. 22.
[152] Ibid., C. 284, p. 21.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., C. 284, p. 21.
[153] Ibid., Q. 290, p. 200.
[154] Ibid., 87, pp. 251-268.
CHAPTER VI
Administration of George Heriot—Extension of postal service in Upper Canada—Irritating restrictions imposed by general post office—Disputes with the administrator of the colony.
Administration of George Heriot—Expansion of postal service in Upper Canada—Irritating restrictions set by the general post office—Conflicts with the colony's administrator.
George Heriot, who succeeded Finlay, had been a clerk in the board of ordinance for many years before his appointment as deputy postmaster general. He was a man of some literary ability, his history of Canada which was published in 1801 being a high-priced item in catalogues of Americana. Of Heriot's zeal and intelligence the general post office had no reason to complain, but he had a sensitive self-esteem, which was a most unfortunate possession as matters then stood.
George Heriot, who took over from Finlay, had worked as a clerk in the board of ordinance for many years before becoming deputy postmaster general. He was somewhat literate, and his history of Canada, published in 1801, is considered a valuable item in Americana catalogs. The general post office had no complaints about Heriot's enthusiasm and intelligence, but he had a fragile self-esteem, which was an unfortunate trait given the circumstances at that time.
Ordinarily, personal characteristics such as these would call for no mention, but the relations between the post office and the provincial authorities at this time were so difficult that the utmost tact on the part of the deputy postmaster general would scarcely gain more than a tolerable success. The position of the deputy postmaster general towards the governor and the legislatures was peculiar.
Ordinarily, personal traits like these wouldn't warrant mention, but the relationship between the post office and the provincial authorities was so strained at this time that even the best efforts from the deputy postmaster general would only achieve a moderate success. The deputy postmaster general's position towards the governor and the legislatures was unique.
As an official of the general post office in London, he was subject to the orders of the postmaster general and to no other authority whatever. Neither the governors nor the legislatures had the least right to give him instructions. Although the postal service was indispensable to the conduct of the official and commercial transactions of the colony, and its maintenance in a state of efficiency a matter of first importance to the colony, the power of the colonial authorities went no further than the submission of their views and desires to the postmaster general or to his deputy in Canada.
As an official of the general post office in London, he had to follow the orders of the postmaster general and no one else. The governors and the legislatures had no right to give him any instructions. Even though the postal service was essential for the official and business operations of the colony, and keeping it running efficiently was crucial for the colony, the colonial authorities could only express their opinions and requests to the postmaster general or his deputy in Canada.
To a community jealous of its rights of self-government, the situation was irritating enough, but the natural annoyance might have been largely relieved by an appreciative regard, on the part of the post office, for the wants of the rapidly increasing settlements. This, however, was the last trait the post office was likely to show at this period.
To a community protective of its self-governing rights, the situation was quite frustrating, but the natural irritation could have been mostly eased by the post office recognizing the needs of the quickly growing settlements. Unfortunately, this was the least likely thing for the post office to demonstrate at this time.
The post office was subordinate to the treasury, a relationship[Pg 97] it never permitted itself to disregard. The deputy postmaster general was under strict injunctions not to enter upon any scheme for the extension or improvement of the postal service, unless he was fully satisfied that the resulting expense would be covered by the augmented revenue. Each application for improvement in the service was dealt with from this standpoint.
The post office was under the treasury, a relationship[Pg 97] it never ignored. The deputy postmaster general had strict orders not to pursue any plans for extending or improving the postal service unless he was completely sure that the additional costs would be balanced by increased revenue. Each request for service improvement was considered from this perspective.
The fact that the service in any part of the country was very profitable to the post office was held to be no justification for applying any portion of the profits to make up the deficiencies of revenue in districts less favourably situated. On one occasion, where the needs in some new districts in course of settlement appeared to Heriot to demand special consideration, he directed that for a time the whole of the surplus revenue from Upper Canada should be applied to extensions and improvements. When his action was reported to the postmaster general, it was promptly disavowed, and he was compelled to cancel the arrangements he had made.[155]
The fact that the service in any part of the country was highly profitable for the post office was considered no reason to use any of those profits to cover the revenue shortfalls in less favorable districts. Once, when the needs in some new districts under settlement seemed to warrant special attention, Heriot decided that for a while, all the surplus revenue from Upper Canada should be used for extensions and improvements. However, when his actions were reported to the postmaster general, they were quickly rejected, and he had to cancel the plans he had put in place.[155]
A policy of this kind was ill-adapted to colonies, which were steadily expanding by the implanting of small, widely-separated communities, and the man on whom devolved the duty of carrying on a postal service under these conditions had no easy task. Finlay had certain advantages as a member of the legislative council which Heriot did not enjoy, and moreover his difficulties were not so great.
A policy like this was poorly suited for colonies that were constantly growing through the establishment of small, scattered communities, and the person responsible for managing a postal service under these circumstances faced a tough challenge. Finlay had some advantages as a member of the legislative council that Heriot didn't have, and his difficulties were also not as significant.
It was only after Finlay had ceased to be deputy postmaster general that the settlements in Upper Canada began to insist on a regular postal service; and in cases where demands were made upon him which his instructions forbade him to grant, he could always depend on the good will of his associates in the council to relieve him from unreasonable pressure. As superintendent of post houses, his influence with the maîtres de poste enabled him to keep the cost of their services on the main routes at a low figure.
It was only after Finlay stepped down as deputy postmaster general that the settlements in Upper Canada started pushing for a reliable postal service. When he faced requests that his instructions prohibited him from fulfilling, he could always count on the support of his colleagues in the council to alleviate any unreasonable pressure. As the superintendent of post houses, his connections with the maîtres de poste allowed him to keep the costs of their services on the main routes low.
Although Finlay's connection with the post office was terminated under disagreeable circumstances, no attempt was made to deprive him of his provincial appointments, which he held until his death at the end of 1801. Heriot then lost no time in applying to be appointed to the vacancy in the legislative council, and to the superintendency of post houses. He was successful in neither case.
Although Finlay's relationship with the post office ended under unpleasant circumstances, no effort was made to take away his provincial appointments, which he maintained until his death at the end of 1801. Heriot then quickly applied to fill the vacancy in the legislative council and to oversee the post houses. He was unsuccessful in both instances.
Heriot was uniformly unfortunate in his relations with the[Pg 98] governors of the colony. His self-assertiveness irritated those who were accustomed to look for nothing but deference from the persons about them. Heriot seems to have accepted the decision as respects the council as final. But he made a strong effort to force the hand of lieutenant governor Milnes with regard to the post houses. He appealed to the postmaster general in England, who made representations to the colonial office in the matter.
Heriot consistently had a tough time with the[Pg 98] governors of the colony. His confidence annoyed those who expected nothing less than submission from those around them. Heriot appeared to accept the council's decision as final. However, he made a strong attempt to push lieutenant governor Milnes regarding the post houses. He reached out to the postmaster general in England, who then communicated with the colonial office about it.
The post office had already begun to feel the inconvenience of separating the control of the maîtres de poste from the office of the deputy postmaster general, as these officials declined to continue to carry the mail couriers on terms more favourable than those granted to the ordinary travelling public.
The post office had already started to feel the hassle of separating the control of the maîtres de poste from the office of the deputy postmaster general, as these officials refused to keep carrying the mail couriers on terms better than those offered to the regular traveling public.
The colonial office was inclined to the post office view on the subject, but the lieutenant governor was firm in maintaining the position he had taken. The maîtres de poste, he stated, were habitants who possessed, each of them, a small property which rendered them quite independent. Their service, which was to carry passengers on the king's road, was an onerous one, and the advances in the price of the articles of life, coupled with the fact that their exclusive privilege was systematically disregarded, made them reluctant to take the appointments.
The colonial office favored the post office's perspective on the matter, but the lieutenant governor was determined to stick to his stance. He pointed out that the maîtres de poste were locals who each had a small piece of land that made them quite self-sufficient. Their job, which involved transporting passengers along the king's road, was a tough one. The rising cost of living, along with the ongoing disregard for their exclusive rights, made them hesitant to accept the positions.
Men of this kind, Milnes declared, required management as they would not submit to coercion. Finlay through his personal influence with the maîtres de poste had managed to obtain the conveyance of the mails at sixpence a league, which was only half the charge made to the public for the same service. For some time before his death, Finlay had difficulty in inducing the maîtres de poste to continue this favourable arrangement, and on his death they refused to work under it any longer.
Men like this, Milnes stated, needed to be managed because they wouldn’t respond to force. Finlay, using his personal connections with the maîtres de poste, had secured the delivery of mail at sixpence a league, which was only half of what the public paid for the same service. For a while before he died, Finlay struggled to convince the maîtres de poste to keep this beneficial deal going, and after his death, they refused to continue under it.
The maîtres de poste had the full sympathy of the lieutenant governor who saw no reason for the discrimination in favour of the post office. Although he endeavoured to obtain a favourable arrangement for the mail couriers, he considered it would be most impolitic on the part of the post office to insist on continuing to occupy their position of advantage.
The maîtres de poste had the complete support of the lieutenant governor, who saw no reason for the favoritism towards the post office. Although he tried to secure a beneficial deal for the mail couriers, he felt it would be very unwise for the post office to keep holding onto their advantageous position.
But valuable as the post house system was in the early period of the country's growth, it soon had to yield to a higher class of travelling facility. As travel in the colony increased the two-wheeled calèches drawn by a single horse and barely holding two persons would no longer do. The changes at the post houses, every hour or little more, with the long delays while the horses were secured and harnessed, were very wearisome. Before Heriot's[Pg 99] term expired, stage coaches had been placed on the principal roads.
But as valuable as the post house system was during the early growth of the country, it soon had to make way for better travel options. As travel in the colony grew, the two-wheeled calèches pulled by a single horse and barely fitting two people became inadequate. The constant stops at post houses, every hour or so, along with the long waits while the horses were secured and harnessed, were very tiresome. Before Heriot's[Pg 99] term ended, stagecoaches were introduced on the main roads.
In leaving the old system and its ways, it will be interesting to record the impressions of Hugh Gray, an English gentleman, who travelled from Quebec to Montreal in 1806.[156] The mode of travel, he said, would not bear comparison with that in England, and the inns were very far from clean, but he found many things to lighten the hardships of travel in Canada. If, leaving England aside, he compared the accommodations in Canada with those in Spain, Portugal, or even in parts of France, he found the balance in favour of Canada.
In moving away from the old system and its traditions, it’s worth noting the impressions of Hugh Gray, an English gentleman who traveled from Quebec to Montreal in 1806.[156] He mentioned that the way of traveling here didn't compare to that in England, and the inns were far from clean. However, he discovered many things that made the travel hardships in Canada more bearable. If he set England aside and compared the accommodations in Canada with those in Spain, Portugal, or even in some parts of France, he found that Canada came out ahead.
The politeness and consideration Gray received at the inns in Canada offset many inconveniences. Often on the continent, after a day of fatiguing travel, sometimes wet and hungry, he was obliged to carry his own luggage into the inn at which he had arrived and see, himself, that it was put in a place of safety. But in Canada he was charmed with the politeness and urbanity with which he was welcomed at every inn: "Voulez-vous bien, Monsieur, avoir la complaisance d'entrer; voilà une chaise, Monsieur, asseyez vous, s'il vous plait."
The politeness and consideration Gray received at the inns in Canada made up for many inconveniences. Often on the continent, after a tiring day of travel, sometimes wet and hungry, he had to carry his own luggage into the inn where he arrived and make sure it was stored safely himself. But in Canada, he was delighted by the politeness and warmth with which he was welcomed at every inn: "Would you please, Sir, be so kind as to come in; here’s a chair, Sir, please have a seat."
"If they had the thing you wanted," continued Gray, "it was given to you with a good grace; if they had not they would tell you so in such a tone and manner as to show they were sorry for it." "Je n'en ai point. J'en suis mortifié." "You saw it was their poverty that refused you, not their will. Then if there was no inn to be had, you were never at a loss for shelter. There was not a farmer, shopkeeper, nay, nor even a seigneur or country gentleman who, on being civilly applied to for accommodation, would not give you the best in the house and every accommodation in his power."
"If they had what you wanted," Gray continued, "they would gladly give it to you; if not, they would let you know in a way that clearly showed they felt bad about it." "I don't have any. I'm really sorry about it." "You could see it was their lack of resources that was the issue, not their willingness. So if there was no inn available, you were never stuck without a place to stay. Not a single farmer, shopkeeper, or even a landowner or country gentleman would turn you away if you asked politely for a place to stay; they would give you the best they had and do everything they could to accommodate you."
The determination of the lieutenant governor to hold Heriot at arm's length, and allow him no part in the local government was unfortunate, as it prevented the mutual understanding between the colonial authorities and the post office which must have been beneficial to both. Heriot made several later efforts to secure the control of the maîtres de poste, but always without success.
The lieutenant governor's decision to keep Heriot at a distance and not involve him in the local government was unfortunate, as it hindered the mutual understanding between the colonial authorities and the post office, which could have been beneficial for both. Heriot made several attempts later to gain control of the maîtres de poste, but he was never successful.
The principal feature of Heriot's administration was the establishment of a regular mail service to the settlements in Upper Canada. The single opportunity for the exchange of correspondence afforded by the post office authorities during the many months when navigation was closed was absurdly inadequate to[Pg 100] the needs of the rapidly increasing province. The courier set out from Montreal in January of each year, travelling on foot or snow-shoes with his mail bag slung over his shoulder. He did very well when he covered eighteen miles a day. The journey to Niagara, with the return to Montreal, was not accomplished until spring was approaching, three months later.
The main highlight of Heriot's leadership was the creation of a consistent mail service to the settlements in Upper Canada. The limited chance for exchanging correspondence provided by the post office during the many months when navigation was shut down was ridiculously insufficient to[Pg 100] meet the needs of the rapidly growing province. The courier would leave from Montreal each January, traveling on foot or on snowshoes with his mail bag over his shoulder. He managed well when he covered eighteen miles a day. The round trip to Niagara and back to Montreal wasn’t completed until late spring, three months later.
The lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, General Hunter, was anxious to improve the communication in that province, and opened correspondence with Heriot on the subject.[157] Heriot laid the lieutenant governor's proposition before the postmaster general with his warm commendation. He pointed out that the rapid increase in the population, the salubrity of the climate, and the fertility of the soil, all encouraged the belief that Upper Canada would soon become one of the first of the British settlements in North America.
The lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, General Hunter, was eager to improve communication in the province and started a conversation with Heriot about it.[157] Heriot presented the lieutenant governor's proposal to the postmaster general with his strong support. He noted that the fast-growing population, the healthy climate, and the fertile land all suggested that Upper Canada would soon become one of the leading British settlements in North America.
General Hunter, Heriot also reminded the postmaster general, had in course of construction a road from the bay of Quinte to York, which in a few months would allow of easy travel by any of the common conveyances of the country. More, his excellency when informed of the views held by the post office on proposals involving expenditure, readily undertook that the province should make up any deficiency arising from the carrying of his schemes into execution.
General Hunter, Heriot also reminded the postmaster general, was building a road from Bay of Quinte to York, which in a few months would make travel easy using any of the typical vehicles of the time. Additionally, his excellency, when told about the post office's concerns regarding spending proposals, readily agreed that the province would cover any shortfall from implementing his plans.
This was the first considerable proposition submitted by Heriot since his appointment, and the postmaster general made it the occasion of an admonition as to the considerations Heriot should have in mind in dealing with a proposition of that kind. He sent extracts of letters addressed to Finlay on the question of establishing new posts, pointing out that they served to show that unless any new proposition had for its object both the public convenience and the interests of the revenue, it was not to be encouraged.
This was the first significant proposal put forward by Heriot since he took the position, and the postmaster general used it as a chance to remind Heriot of the factors he should consider when handling such a proposal. He sent excerpts from letters addressed to Finlay regarding the establishment of new post offices, highlighting that they indicated that unless a new proposal aimed to benefit both public convenience and revenue interests, it should not be supported.
The system of posts, the postmaster general went on to say, might be made, comparatively speaking, as perfect in Canada as in Great Britain, but the question was, would the board as a board of revenue be justified in so doing when the amount of the revenue was so trifling. However, he directed Heriot to report fully on the several aspects of the lieutenant governor's proposition, not overlooking the general's offer of indemnification in the event of the postage not amounting to sufficient to defray the expense.
The postmaster general continued, stating that the postal system could be made almost as perfect in Canada as it is in Great Britain. However, the real question was whether the revenue board would be justified in this when the revenue amount was so small. Still, he instructed Heriot to provide a detailed report on the various aspects of the lieutenant governor's proposal, including the general's offer to cover costs in case the postage didn't cover the expenses.
The lieutenant governor having repeated his assurance that[Pg 101] any insufficiency in the revenue to meet the additional expense would be made up from the provincial treasury, Heriot set about improving the service—but cautiously. At that time he contented himself with providing monthly instead of yearly trips to Upper Canada during the winter. In summer he continued to depend on the occasional trips of the bateaux on the river and the king's ships on the lake.
The lieutenant governor reiterated his promise that[Pg 101] any shortfall in revenue to cover the extra expenses would be covered by the provincial treasury. Heriot began to enhance the service—but he was careful about it. At that time, he settled for offering monthly trips to Upper Canada instead of yearly ones during the winter. In the summer, he continued to rely on the occasional trips of the bateaux on the river and the king's ships on the lake.
In order to assist Heriot, who had some difficulty in procuring the services of suitable couriers for the winter trips, the lieutenant governor directed the commandants at Kingston and York to place trusty soldiers at the disposal of the post office.
To help Heriot, who had trouble finding reliable couriers for the winter trips, the lieutenant governor instructed the commandants at Kingston and York to assign dependable soldiers to the post office.
There were few letters carried during this period except for the public departments, and they found it less expensive to employ a messenger of their own to visit the several posts and take the bulky accounts and vouchers which constituted the greater part of their correspondence, than to utilize the services of the post office. When it was pointed out to the lieutenant governor that by his failure to employ the post office, he was setting a bad example to the inhabitants who used every means to evade the postmaster general's monopoly, the lieutenant governor agreed to have the correspondence from the outposts carried by the mail couriers.
There were hardly any letters sent during this time, except for those from public departments. They found it cheaper to hire their own messenger to visit the various post offices and collect the large accounts and vouchers that made up most of their correspondence, rather than use the post office services. When it was pointed out to the lieutenant governor that by not using the post office he was setting a poor example for the residents, who tried to evade the postmaster general's monopoly in every way, the lieutenant governor agreed to have the correspondence from the outposts delivered by the mail couriers.
The territory served by the regular post office did not extend beyond Niagara. But at Amherstburg, the western end of lake Erie, and over two hundred miles beyond Niagara, there were a military post and the beginnings of a settlement, which it was desirable to provide with the means of communication.
The area served by the regular post office didn’t go past Niagara. However, at Amherstburg, on the western end of Lake Erie, more than two hundred miles beyond Niagara, there was a military post and the start of a settlement that needed communication services.
During his visit to Niagara in 1801, Heriot devised a plan[158] for this purpose, which appears to have contained all the advantages of a regular postal service, with the charges so much less than the ordinary postage rates as to give the people of the district cause to regret the advent of the regular postmaster and mail courier.
During his visit to Niagara in 1801, Heriot came up with a plan[158] for this purpose, which seemed to include all the benefits of a regular postal service, with the costs being significantly lower than the usual postage rates, making the people in the area wish the regular postmaster and mail courier had never arrived.
Heriot proposed that the postmaster of Amherstburg should receive letters for despatch, and, from time to time as one of the vessels on the lake happened to be going to fort Erie, at the eastern end of the lake, make up a bag, seal it with the official seal, and deliver it to the captain of the vessel.
Heriot suggested that the postmaster of Amherstburg should collect letters for sending, and occasionally, when one of the ships on the lake was headed to Fort Erie at the eastern end of the lake, prepare a bag, seal it with the official seal, and hand it to the captain of the ship.
At fort Erie the bag was to be placed on one of the flat-bottomed bateaux, which traded between that village and Chippewa and the Niagara river. Between Chippewa, Queenstown and Niagara, on the Niagara portage, there were stage coaches running, and[Pg 102] the bag was taken to Niagara by this means. If the letters were intended for places beyond Niagara, they were put into the regular post office at that point.
At Fort Erie, the bag was supposed to be placed on one of the flat-bottomed bateaux that traveled between that village and Chippewa, as well as the Niagara River. Between Chippewa, Queenstown, and Niagara, there were stagecoaches running, and[Pg 102] the bag was transported to Niagara this way. If the letters were meant for locations beyond Niagara, they were put into the regular post office at that point.
This arrangement was quite as safe and expeditious as the postal service between Niagara and Kingston, and yet the charges were very much less than if the letters had been carried the same distance within the authorized system. The ordinary postage on a letter from Amherstburg to fort Erie by land would be tenpence. Heriot did not consider that he could properly charge more than twopence a letter. From fort Erie to Niagara the postage would have been fourpence, which was the rate Heriot proposed to charge.
This setup was just as safe and efficient as the postal service between Niagara and Kingston, yet the costs were significantly lower than if the letters had been sent the same distance within the official system. The standard postage on a letter from Amherstburg to Fort Erie by land would be ten pence. Heriot thought it was fair to charge no more than two pence per letter. From Fort Erie to Niagara, the postage would have been four pence, which was the rate Heriot intended to charge.
The question will arise, in what regard this scheme differed from the ordinary postal arrangements, the charges for which were fixed by statute. The point of difference lay simply in this, that Heriot did not propose to administer the oath of office to the courier, who effected the transportation of the mails from Amherstburg to Niagara. There would be none but trustworthy men employed to look after the mails, and the couriers were under effective supervision in the fact that the postmaster in making up the mail enclosed with it a certificate as to the number of letters in it, which the receiving postmaster verified before the courier was paid for his services.
The question will come up about how this plan was different from regular postal services, which had their fees set by law. The difference was simply that Heriot didn’t intend to administer an oath of office to the courier who transported the mail from Amherstburg to Niagara. Only reliable people would be hired to handle the mail, and the couriers were closely monitored since the postmaster included a certificate with the mail detailing the number of letters, which the receiving postmaster verified before the courier got paid for his work.
Heriot's scheme, then, was identical with the ordinary arrangements in all respects but one, and that one was purely formal. Heriot's scruples would lead one to suspect a desire to show how excessive the ordinary charges were.
Heriot's plan was the same as the usual arrangements in every way except for one, which was just a formality. Heriot's concerns would make someone think he wanted to highlight how excessive the regular fees were.
There was no change in the arrangements for the postal service in Upper Canada until 1810, though before that date there had been some agitation for improvements. In 1808, the legislative assembly requested that a regular service be established through the year, instead of monthly trips during the winter merely.
There were no changes to the postal service in Upper Canada until 1810, although there had been some push for improvements before that date. In 1808, the legislative assembly asked for a regular service to be set up year-round, instead of just monthly trips during the winter.
Further representations were made on the insufficiency of the existing service, and in 1810 Heriot provided fortnightly trips throughout the year between Montreal and Kingston, but owing to the badness of the road beyond Kingston, he was unable to give a regular service to York except in the winter. During this period, however, the trips between Kingston and York were made fortnightly.
Further requests were made about the inadequacy of the current service, and in 1810, Heriot started offering biweekly trips year-round between Montreal and Kingston. However, due to the poor condition of the road beyond Kingston, he couldn't provide a regular service to York except during the winter. During this time, though, the trips between Kingston and York were conducted every two weeks.
Efficient roadmaking throughout Canada was attended with many difficulties, owing to the great stretches of land which were in the hands either of the crown or held as clergy reserves or[Pg 103] which were held by speculators. These absentee holders were not bound by the obligation which lay on the residents to make and maintain good roads through their property, and consequently, even where roads were made by the government through the province, they soon fell into disrepair in those districts, where there were no resident owners to keep them up.
Efficient road building across Canada faced many challenges because large areas of land were owned by either the crown, held as clergy reserves, or[Pg 103] owned by speculators. These absentee owners weren't obligated like the local residents to create and maintain good roads on their property. As a result, even when the government constructed roads in the province, they quickly deteriorated in areas without any resident owners to look after them.
General Hunter in 1800 and 1801 had a road made from Kingston to York, and then on to Ancaster, near Hamilton, where it connected with the road to Niagara, but at their best such roads were little more than bridle paths through the woods. In the autumn of 1811 Heriot yielded another step and placed couriers fortnightly on the road from Kingston to Niagara by way of York. He also arranged for a courier to go to Amherstburg or Sandwich as often as commercial requirements demanded it.
General Hunter in 1800 and 1801 constructed a road from Kingston to York, and then on to Ancaster, near Hamilton, where it connected with the road to Niagara. However, at their best, these roads were barely more than bridle paths through the woods. In the fall of 1811, Heriot took another step and established couriers every two weeks on the road from Kingston to Niagara via York. He also set up a courier service to Amherstburg or Sandwich as often as needed for commercial purposes.
Heriot at this time took a step which drew upon him the sharp attention of the home authorities. He directed the postmaster at York to hold the surplus revenue from the western part of the province instead of sending it to Quebec for transmission to England, and to apply it to improving the arrangements in that section of the province.
Heriot, at this time, took an action that caught the close attention of the home authorities. He instructed the postmaster in York to keep the excess revenue from the western part of the province instead of sending it to Quebec for forwarding to England, and to use it to enhance the arrangements in that area of the province.
The secretary of the general post office expressed a doubt as to whether the whole of the revenue should have been applied towards improving the service, and intimated that approval of his action should be held for the postmaster general. Shortly after, Heriot was informed that his action had not been approved, and that it would be necessary to cancel his instructions to the postmaster of York.[159]
The secretary of the general post office questioned whether all of the revenue should have been used to improve the service and suggested that the postmaster general should approve his actions. Soon after, Heriot was told that his actions hadn’t been approved and that he needed to cancel his instructions to the postmaster of York.[159]
This incident fairly illustrates how far Heriot's hands were tied by orders from home, and how little he deserved the censures so freely meted out to him for his unwillingness to provide the country with a system of communication adequate to its requirements. In yielding to any extent to the reasonable demands of the provincial authorities, he was courting disapproval and even reprimand from his superiors.
This incident clearly shows how restricted Heriot was by orders from the home office, and how unfair the criticism he received was for not supplying the country with a communication system that met its needs. By giving in at all to the reasonable requests from the provincial authorities, he risked disapproval and even reprimand from his superiors.
But in spite of the determination of the postmaster general that no expenditure should be made for postal service, which did not promise an immediate return equal to or greater than the outlay, the country was growing too rapidly to permit of any great delay in providing increased facilities for correspondence. While the post office held on to the monopoly in letter carrying, it had to make some sort of provision for doing the work itself.[Pg 104]
But despite the postmaster general's insistence that no spending should happen for postal services unless it guaranteed an immediate return that was equal to or greater than the investment, the country was growing too quickly to allow for any significant delay in enhancing communication facilities. While the post office maintained its monopoly on letter delivery, it needed to make some arrangement to handle the work itself.[Pg 104]
In 1815, when peace had been concluded with the United States, Sir Gordon Drummond, the commander of the forces, and administrator of Canada, directed Heriot to arrange for two trips a week between Montreal and Kingston, Heriot invited tenders for this service, and was dismayed to find that the lowest offer was for £3276, an amount double the anticipated revenues.
In 1815, when peace was established with the United States, Sir Gordon Drummond, the commander of the forces and administrator of Canada, instructed Heriot to set up two trips a week between Montreal and Kingston. Heriot sought bids for this service and was shocked to discover that the lowest bid was £3,276, which was twice the expected revenue.
With his instructions from the postmaster general before him, an outlay of that magnitude was not to be thought of, but Heriot did go the length of authorizing weekly trips over the whole route between Montreal and Niagara and arranged for fortnightly trips to Amherstburg from Dundas, a village on the grand route between York and Niagara.[160] The mails were carried between Montreal and Kingston by coach; between Kingston and Niagara on horseback or by sleigh; and between Dundas and the settlements at the western end of lake Erie on foot.
With the instructions from the postmaster general in mind, spending that much money wasn’t feasible. However, Heriot did approve weekly trips along the entire route between Montreal and Niagara, and he set up biweekly trips to Amherstburg from Dundas, a village along the main route between York and Niagara.[160] The mail was transported by coach between Montreal and Kingston, via horseback or sleigh between Kingston and Niagara, and on foot between Dundas and the settlements at the western end of Lake Erie.
In reporting these arrangements to the postmaster general, Heriot explained that, with the close of the war, military expresses had been discontinued, and it became necessary to provide additional accommodation to the commissariat and other military departments, but the increased postage more than covered the expense incurred.
In updating the postmaster general about these arrangements, Heriot explained that with the end of the war, military mail services had stopped, and it was important to offer extra support to the supply and other military departments. However, the higher postage rates more than offset the costs incurred.
In March 1816 the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada pressed for further improvements in order to facilitate communication between the several courts of justice and every part of the province, so that notices might be sent to jurors and others having business with the courts.[161] In concluding his letter to the general post office recommending the application of the lieutenant governor, Heriot added that there was a strong desire on the part of influential people in Upper Canada that there should be a deputy postmaster general for that province, as well as one for Lower Canada.
In March 1816, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada urged for more improvements to make communication easier between the various courts of justice and all regions of the province, so that notices could be sent to jurors and others involved with the courts.[161] In closing his letter to the general post office supporting the lieutenant governor's request, Heriot mentioned that there was a strong interest among influential people in Upper Canada for a deputy postmaster general to be appointed for that province, as well as one for Lower Canada.
Heriot favoured the idea and recommended William Allan, postmaster of York for the position. The postmaster general, however, disapproved of the proposal of an independent deputy for Upper Canada. He agreed with Heriot that there would be advantages in having an official residing in Upper Canada with a wider authority than that ordinarily exercised by a mere postmaster, but thought that the postmaster of York might without change of title be made to answer all the requirements of an assistant to the deputy postmaster general.
Heriot liked the idea and suggested William Allan, the postmaster of York, for the position. However, the postmaster general did not agree with the proposal for an independent deputy in Upper Canada. He concurred with Heriot that having an official in Upper Canada with broader authority than just a regular postmaster would be beneficial, but he believed that the postmaster of York could, without changing his title, meet all the requirements of an assistant to the deputy postmaster general.
Before leaving the service in Upper Canada, an incident should be mentioned, showing the difficulties military men stationed[Pg 105] far from a post office had in corresponding with Great Britain. At the end of the campaign of 1813 in the Niagara peninsula, the officers of the right division, which was quartered at Stoney Creek, presented a memorial to the governor general laying before him their hard case, and praying for relief.[162] They desired to write to their friends and relatives at home, but could not do so, owing to the post office regulation which required that all letters sent to Great Britain should have the postage paid on them as far as Halifax.
Before leaving their posts in Upper Canada, an incident worth mentioning highlights the challenges faced by military personnel stationed far from a post office in communicating with Great Britain. At the end of the 1813 campaign in the Niagara peninsula, the officers of the right division, based at Stoney Creek, submitted a formal request to the governor general, outlining their difficult situation and asking for assistance. They wanted to write to their friends and family back home but were unable to do so because the post office rules required that all letters sent to Great Britain had to have the postage prepaid up to Halifax.
The sea postage did not require to be paid, as that could be collected from the person receiving the letter, but unless the letter was fully paid to Halifax, it was detained and returned to the writer. As the nearest post office in operation was York, nearly fifty miles away, and as they had no acquaintance there or at Montreal or Quebec, who might pay the postage for them, they were without the means of relieving the anxiety of their parents, wives and others who could not learn whether they were alive or not. They asked that a bag be made up monthly, as Lord Wellington did from Portugal, and sent free of expense to the Horseguards in London, from which place the letters might be carried to the post office for delivery.
The sea postage didn’t need to be paid upfront since it could be collected from the person receiving the letter, but if the sender didn’t fully pay for postage to Halifax, the letter would be held and sent back to them. With the nearest operational post office being York, nearly fifty miles away, and without any contacts in York, Montreal, or Quebec who could pay the postage for them, they were unable to ease the worries of their parents, wives, and others who were left wondering if they were even alive. They requested that a bag be put together each month, similar to what Lord Wellington did from Portugal, and sent free of charge to the Horseguards in London, from where the letters could be taken to the post office for delivery.
The postal service in Lower Canada and eastward underwent no change from the time of Heriot's accession to office until the war of 1812. As in 1800, the couriers between Montreal and Quebec still left each place on Monday and Thursday mornings, and meeting at Three Rivers, exchanged their mails, and returned, reaching their points of departure two days later. The mails between Quebec and Fredericton continued to be exchanged fortnightly in summer, and monthly in winter, and between Fredericton and St. John, and St. John and Halifax, there were weekly exchanges as in Finlay's time.
The postal service in Lower Canada and to the east didn't change from the time Heriot took office until the war of 1812. Just like in 1800, the couriers between Montreal and Quebec still left each place on Monday and Thursday mornings, met at Three Rivers, swapped their mail, and returned, getting back to their starting points two days later. The mail between Quebec and Fredericton was still exchanged every two weeks in the summer and monthly in the winter, and there were weekly exchanges between Fredericton and St. John, and St. John and Halifax, just like in Finlay's time.
Lower Canada still found its principal outlet to Great Britain in the weekly mail carried between Montreal and one of the towns of the United States near the Canadian boundary. In 1810, the place of exchange of mails between Lower Canada and Boston and New York was Swanton, a small town in Vermont.
Lower Canada still relied on its main connection to Great Britain through the weekly mail service that ran between Montreal and a town in the United States near the Canadian border. In 1810, the location for exchanging mail between Lower Canada and Boston and New York was Swanton, a small town in Vermont.
But, though the service arrangements remained unchanged, they by no means escaped criticism. In 1810, Sir James Craig, the governor general, complained of the slowness of the communication with the United States and with the Maritime provinces.[163] Letters from New York seldom reached Quebec in less[Pg 106] than fifteen or sixteen days, and it usually took a month for the courier to travel from Halifax to Quebec.
But even though the service arrangements stayed the same, they definitely faced criticism. In 1810, Sir James Craig, the governor general, complained about the slow communication with the United States and the Maritime provinces.[163] Letters from New York rarely arrived in Quebec in less[Pg 106] than fifteen or sixteen days, and it typically took a month for the courier to travel from Halifax to Quebec.
For the course of the post from New York, the governor was not disposed to blame Heriot entirely, as he knew the connections from New York to Swanton to be faulty, but he thought that, by a little exertion, Heriot could do much to remedy the defects. As for the movement of the couriers between Quebec and Halifax, the governor had been informed by certain London merchants that the journey could be made in six days. He would not insist on a speed equal to that, but sixteen or seventeen days ought to be easily within the capacity of the couriers.
For the duration of the post from New York, the governor wasn't inclined to blame Heriot completely, as he recognized the connections from New York to Swanton were unreliable. However, he believed that with some effort, Heriot could do a lot to fix the issues. Regarding the travel of the couriers between Quebec and Halifax, the governor had been told by some London merchants that the trip could be completed in six days. He wouldn't require them to be that fast, but sixteen or seventeen days should definitely be doable for the couriers.
Dealing with the Quebec-Halifax complaint first, Heriot was aware that the journey from Halifax to Quebec had been made in six days, but as the distance was six hundred and thirty-three miles, three hundred and sixty-eight of which could not be travelled by horse and carriage, he regarded the trip as an extraordinary performance. The circumstances, however, were unusually favourable. The weather was at its best, and no expense was spared to make the journey as rapidly as possible.
Dealing with the Quebec-Halifax complaint first, Heriot knew that the trip from Halifax to Quebec took six days, but since the distance was six hundred and thirty-three miles, three hundred and sixty-eight of which couldn't be traveled by horse and carriage, he considered the journey an impressive feat. However, the conditions were particularly favorable. The weather was perfect, and no expense was spared to make the trip as quick as possible.
But it was useless, Heriot insisted, to compare speed of that kind with that which was within the power of a courier who had to carry a load sometimes weighing two hundred pounds on his back, for a distance of forty miles, after having rowed and poled up rivers and across lakes for two hundred miles. If the contractor was able to disregard considerations of expense, and employ as many couriers as could be done with advantage, much time might doubtless be saved.
But it was pointless, Heriot insisted, to compare that kind of speed with what a courier could manage while carrying a load that sometimes weighed two hundred pounds on his back for forty miles, after rowing and pushing his way up rivers and across lakes for two hundred miles. If the contractor could overlook costs and use as many couriers as needed effectively, a lot of time could certainly be saved.
Heriot was sure there were no grounds for believing that there would be any material increase in the revenue as the result of such expenditure. The commerce between the Canadas and the Maritime provinces was so trifling that it was all carried on by three or four small coasting vessels. Indeed, were it not for the correspondence between the military establishments, it would be better to drop regular trips between Quebec and Halifax, as the British mails could be carried much more cheaply and with greater celerity by expresses.
Heriot was certain there was no reason to believe that spending more money would lead to any significant increase in revenue. Trade between Canada and the Maritime provinces was so minimal that it was conducted by just three or four small coastal ships. In fact, if it weren't for the communication between the military bases, it would make more sense to stop regular trips between Quebec and Halifax, since British mail could be transported much more cheaply and quickly by express services.
The connection with New York offered matter for criticism, but Heriot could not be reproached for remissness in this regard. He had proposed to the authorities at Washington that his couriers should carry the mails all the way between Montreal and New York, offering to pay the United States just as if their couriers had done the service within their territory, but the United States[Pg 107] department would not entertain the proposition. He had also endeavoured, without success, to have the British mails landed at Boston during the winter months, instead of at New York. If this could have been accomplished, there would have been a considerable saving in the time required for the delivery of the British mails at Montreal and Quebec.
The connection with New York faced criticism, but Heriot couldn’t be blamed for being neglectful in this matter. He had suggested to the authorities in Washington that his couriers should carry the mail the entire way between Montreal and New York, offering to pay the United States just as if their couriers had handled the service within their own territory, but the United States[Pg 107] department rejected the proposal. He also tried, without success, to have the British mail delivered in Boston during the winter months instead of New York. If this had been achieved, it would have significantly reduced the time needed for the British mail to reach Montreal and Quebec.
The war of 1812 had noticeable effects on the postal service. The mails passing between Quebec and Halifax had to be safeguarded against attack on the part of hostile parties from across the border and against privateers, who infested the lower waters of the St. John river and the bay of Fundy.
The War of 1812 had significant impacts on the postal service. The mail traveling between Quebec and Halifax had to be protected from attacks by enemy forces from across the border and from privateers, who plagued the lower waters of the St. John River and the Bay of Fundy.
From the time the courier on his way eastward left the shores of the St. Lawrence, he was in danger of surprise. The portage between the St. Lawrence and lake Temiscouata was wild and uninhabited, and it would have been an easy matter for the enemy to waylay the courier if he travelled unprotected. When he reached the St. John river his course lay along the United States border. Indeed a considerable part of his route lay in territory which was afterwards adjudged by the Ashburton treaty to belong to the United States.
From the moment the courier headed east from the shores of the St. Lawrence, he was at risk of being caught off guard. The area between the St. Lawrence and Lake Temiscouata was rugged and empty, making it easy for enemies to ambush the courier if he traveled alone. Upon reaching the St. John River, his path followed the U.S. border. In fact, a significant portion of his journey passed through land that was later determined by the Ashburton Treaty to be part of the United States.
Heriot facilitated the couriers' journey over the portage by placing twenty-two old soldiers with their families at intervals on the route. They were supplied with arms, ammunition and rations, as the country was so mountainous, sterile and inhospitable, that no man could derive a subsistence from the soil. The couriers on entering the portage were, also, accompanied by an escort of two soldiers, who travelled with them as far as the Madawaska settlement. From that point downwards, the local captains of militia had orders to render all needful assistance and protection to the couriers.
Heriot helped the couriers' journey across the portage by placing twenty-two old soldiers and their families along the route at regular intervals. They were provided with weapons, ammunition, and supplies since the area was so mountainous, barren, and unwelcoming that no one could make a living from the land. When the couriers entered the portage, they were also accompanied by two soldiers who escorted them as far as the Madawaska settlement. From that point onward, the local militia captains were instructed to provide any necessary assistance and protection to the couriers.
At Fredericton an entire change was made in the route. The route had till then followed the course of the St. John river to the city of St. John, from which place the couriers were taken across the bay of Fundy to Annapolis, in a small sloop. In order to avoid the chances of capture on the water stretches or in the bay, the couriers were sent across the country through the centre of the province to Cumberland, as Amherst was then called, and thence on to Halifax.
At Fredericton, the route was completely changed. Until then, the route had followed the St. John River to the city of St. John, where couriers would be taken across the Bay of Fundy to Annapolis on a small sloop. To avoid the risk of capture on the water or in the bay, the couriers were now sent overland through the center of the province to Cumberland, which was then called Amherst, and from there on to Halifax.
This arrangement left St. John unprovided with connection with either Quebec or Halifax, but it was brought into the scheme by a separate courier who met the couriers on the main route at Sussexvale. The travel on the new route was at first very bad,[Pg 108] but the lieutenant governors of the two Maritime provinces, who were interested in the success of the scheme, promised to do their best to induce their assemblies to put the roads in good condition.
This setup left St. John without a direct link to either Quebec or Halifax, but it was included in the plan by a separate courier who met the messengers on the main route at Sussexvale. Initially, travel on the new route was quite poor,[Pg 108] but the lieutenant governors of the two Maritime provinces, who were keen on the project's success, promised to do everything they could to urge their assemblies to improve the roads.
In changing the route from Fredericton to Halifax, and requiring the couriers to travel inland, instead of along the waterways, the deputy postmaster general was taking a measure in the direction of safety, but those who had a particular interest in the transmission of their correspondence intact could not look without concern at the exposure of the mails on the long stretch between the foot of lake Temiscouata and Fredericton.
In changing the route from Fredericton to Halifax and requiring the couriers to travel inland instead of along the waterways, the deputy postmaster general was making a move towards safety. However, those who had a vested interest in the secure delivery of their mail were understandably worried about the vulnerability of the letters over the long stretch between the foot of Lake Temiscouata and Fredericton.
The lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia and the admiral of the Halifax station were both uneasy at the possibility of their despatches being intercepted by the Americans, and grasped eagerly at a suggestion thrown out that the courier from Halifax should not go to Fredericton at all, but on leaving Amherst should pursue a north-westerly course till he reached the Matapedia river at the western end of the bay of Chaleurs. From this point, the route would lie across the bottom of the Gaspe peninsula to the St. Lawrence near Metis.
The lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia and the admiral of the Halifax station were both worried about their messages being intercepted by the Americans, and they quickly jumped on the idea that the courier from Halifax shouldn't go to Fredericton at all. Instead, after leaving Amherst, he would take a northwestern route until he reached the Matapedia River at the western end of Chaleurs Bay. From there, the route would cross the bottom of the Gaspé Peninsula to the St. Lawrence near Métis.
The suggested route encountered the strong opposition of Heriot.[164] "The heights of the interior," he declared, "are more elevated than those towards the sea, and some of them with snow on their summits which remain undissolved from one year to the other. The land between the mountains is probably intersected by rugged defiles, by swamps and by deep and impracticable gullies. A region so inhospitable and desolate as from its interior aspect, and its latitude as this may without exaggeration be conceived to be, can scarcely be visited by savages. Suppose a road were cut through this rugged desert, it would not be possible to find any person who would settle there, and no courier could proceed on foot for a journey of some hundred miles, through a difficult and dreary waste alike destitute of shelter and of the prospect of assistance."
The proposed route faced strong opposition from Heriot.[164] "The heights of the interior," he stated, "are higher than those closer to the sea, and some of them still have snow on their peaks that doesn't melt from one year to the next. The land between the mountains is likely full of steep ravines, swamps, and deep, hard-to-navigate gullies. A place as harsh and barren as this, considering both its remote nature and its latitude, can hardly be imagined to be visited by even the most primitive people. Even if a road were made through this rough landscape, it would be impossible to find anyone willing to live there, and no messenger could travel on foot for hundreds of miles through such a difficult and desolate area, completely lacking in shelter or any hope of help."
Heriot's conviction was that the present route was the only possible one, and if the enemy threatened to cut off communications, it might be necessary to establish two additional military posts, one at the head of the Madawaska settlement, the other between Grand Falls and Presqu' Isle.
Heriot was convinced that the current route was the only viable option, and if the enemy planned to sever communications, it might be essential to set up two more military posts—one at the top of the Madawaska settlement and the other between Grand Falls and Presqu' Isle.
A blockhouse at each point, with a non-commissioned officer, a few privates and two savages attached, would in Heriot's opinion afford sufficient protection. The enemy would scarcely incur the[Pg 109] trouble and expense of marching one or two hundred men from an immense distance to take or destroy these forts with the precarious and doubtful prospect of interrupting a courier, to whom the nature of the country presented a variety of means of eluding their utmost vigilance.
A blockhouse at each location, staffed with a non-commissioned officer, a few privates, and two natives, would, in Heriot's view, provide enough protection. The enemy would hardly want to go through the trouble and expense of sending one or two hundred men from far away to capture or destroy these forts, especially with the uncertain chance of catching a courier, who could easily evade their best efforts given the lay of the land.
The idea of establishing a route between Nova Scotia and the St. Lawrence, which would follow the northern shore of New Brunswick, was not carried into effect at once, but as will be seen it occupied attention from time to time and was eventually realized.
The plan to create a route between Nova Scotia and the St. Lawrence, which would run along the northern coast of New Brunswick, wasn’t executed right away, but as you will see, it gained attention periodically and was eventually accomplished.
The war affected the postal service in Lower Canada to the extent of causing the conveyance of the mails between Montreal and Quebec to be increased from twice a week to daily.[165] Sir George Prevost having pointed out to Heriot the necessity for more frequent communication on account of the war, the latter expressed his willingness to increase the trips, but stipulated that the men employed in the service should not be subject to enlistment as it was very difficult to secure trustworthy men.
The war impacted the postal service in Lower Canada by increasing the frequency of mail delivery between Montreal and Quebec from twice a week to daily.[165] Sir George Prevost highlighted to Heriot the need for more frequent communication due to the war, and Heriot agreed to boost the number of trips but insisted that the workers in the service should be exempt from enlistment, as it was hard to find reliable individuals.
The governor agreed, and directed the colonels of militia that they were to impose no military duties on post office employees. On the conclusion of the war, the couriers' trips were reduced from six to five weekly, at which frequency they remained for many years.
The governor agreed and instructed the militia colonels not to assign any military duties to post office employees. After the war ended, the number of courier trips was reduced from six to five a week, and that schedule stayed in place for many years.
The last year of Heriot's administration was marked by a disagreeable quarrel with Sir Gordon Drummond,[166] who was administrator of Canada on Prevost's retirement. In the beginning of 1815, the legislature of Upper Canada adopted an address pointing out that the postal arrangements were very defective, and expressing the opinion that the revenue from Upper Canada was ample to meet the additional expense necessary to put the service on a satisfactory footing. If an efficient service were provided, and it turned out that they were wrong in their anticipation of increased revenues, they were prepared to pay higher rates of postage.
The final year of Heriot's administration was marked by an unpleasant disagreement with Sir Gordon Drummond,[166] who became the administrator of Canada after Prevost retired. At the start of 1815, the legislature of Upper Canada approved a statement highlighting that the postal system was very flawed and expressing the belief that the revenue from Upper Canada was sufficient to cover the extra costs needed to fix the service. If a better service was established and it turned out they were mistaken about the expected increase in revenue, they were willing to pay higher postage rates.
Herein lay a difficulty for the postmaster general. The postal charges in Canada were the same as those in Great Britain, and were collected by the authority of the same act of parliament. The postmaster general was not free from doubts as to the legality of the proceedings of the post office in taking postage in Canada, and he did not wish to raise the question by the enactment of a special act for Canada. He intimated to Heriot his disinclination to bring the question into prominence in Canada, and asked[Pg 110] Heriot to give his mind to the proposition for an improvement in the service.
Here was a challenge for the postmaster general. The postal rates in Canada were the same as those in Great Britain and were enforced by the same act of parliament. The postmaster general had concerns about the legality of the post office's actions in collecting postage in Canada, and he didn't want to highlight the issue by creating a specific law for Canada. He conveyed to Heriot his reluctance to draw attention to the issue in Canada and asked[Pg 110] Heriot to consider the proposal for improving the service.
About the time the letter from the postmaster general containing this instruction reached Heriot, Drummond himself wrote to Heriot, drawing attention to the shortcomings in the service, expressing his conviction that the necessary improvements would lead to enhanced revenues, and concluding with an intimation that unless he were provided with adequate facilities for communicating with that part of his command which was in Upper Canada, he would be obliged to restore military expresses.
About the time the letter from the postmaster general with this instruction got to Heriot, Drummond himself wrote to Heriot, pointing out the issues in the service, sharing his belief that the necessary improvements would increase revenues, and finishing with a suggestion that if he wasn't given proper means to communicate with the part of his command in Upper Canada, he would have to bring back military messengers.
Sir Gordon Drummond's services to Canada during the war were such as to entitle him to an honourable place in the memory of Canadians, but he did not appear at his best in his controversy with Heriot. He exhibited too much of that arbitrariness and impatience with other people's views which is commonly observed among military chiefs.
Sir Gordon Drummond's contributions to Canada during the war deserved a respected place in the memories of Canadians, but he wasn't at his best in his dispute with Heriot. He showed too much of that stubbornness and impatience with others' opinions typically seen in military leaders.
Heriot replied promptly to the governor's letter, stating that he had invited tenders for a semi-weekly service between Montreal and Kingston, and that the offers he received were quite beyond any possible revenue to be derived from the service. He had, however, accelerated the existing service by having the couriers travel on horseback, the horses being changed at convenient distances along the route.
Heriot quickly responded to the governor's letter, saying that he had asked for bids for a semi-weekly service between Montreal and Kingston, and that the offers he received were far more than any potential revenue from the service. However, he had sped up the current service by having the couriers travel on horseback, with the horses being swapped at convenient points along the route.
As regards the service beyond York, Heriot directed the postmaster of York to arrange for a regular weekly courier to Niagara, and to set about securing a postmaster at Amherstburg to replace the former incumbent, who had resigned. Heriot wound up his letter by stating that he would have been particularly gratified if he had the power to meet his excellency's wishes in every point, but expressed his regret that his instructions obliged him to act on principles of economy.
As for the service beyond York, Heriot instructed the postmaster of York to organize a regular weekly courier to Niagara and to start looking for a postmaster at Amherstburg to take over from the previous one who had resigned. Heriot concluded his letter by saying that he would have been especially pleased to fulfill all of his excellency's requests, but he expressed his regret that his instructions required him to prioritize cost-saving measures.
The letter was courteously expressed, and showed an evident desire to go as far as his instructions would allow, in meeting the governor's wishes. But Drummond was not satisfied. His wrath rose at the appearance of opposition. In repeating his views that increased revenue would follow upon improvements in the service, he declared that the existing arrangements were slovenly and uncertain, and, in the opinion of merchants, insecure. Moreover, he did not believe that Heriot's instructions were intended to be injurious to the interests of Upper Canada.
The letter was politely written and clearly aimed to do as much as possible within his guidelines to meet the governor's wishes. However, Drummond was not happy. His anger grew in response to any opposition. While reiterating his belief that better service would lead to increased revenue, he stated that the current arrangements were messy and unreliable, and, according to merchants, risky. Furthermore, he did not think that Heriot's instructions were meant to harm the interests of Upper Canada.
Drummond then most unreasonably found fault with Heriot for leaving to Allan the duty of attending to the requirements[Pg 111] of Niagara and Amherstburg, when his excellency had ordered Heriot to give the matter his personal attention. Heriot's time was very fully occupied at Quebec with the ordinary duties of his office, a fact of which Drummond could not have been ignorant; and to order him to leave these duties, and make a journey to the western end of the province, involving a travel of scarcely less than twelve hundred miles, to do a piece of work which any subordinate in the district could do equally well, argued either an indifference as regards the daily calls upon Heriot's time, or a determination to annoy him, either of which was discreditable to the governor general.
Drummond then unreasonably criticized Heriot for leaving it to Allan to handle the needs of Niagara and Amherstburg, even though the governor had instructed Heriot to personally oversee the matter. Heriot was extremely busy in Quebec with the usual responsibilities of his job, a fact that Drummond surely knew; and to demand that he drop these responsibilities and travel nearly twelve hundred miles to do a task that any employee in the area could handle just as well showed either a lack of concern for Heriot's daily responsibilities or an intention to irritate him, both of which reflected poorly on the governor general.
Heriot was steadily respectful, however, but maintained that with the powers entrusted to him it was impossible to meet Drummond's views. He cited the incident of 1812, when his recommendation that the whole of the revenue from Upper Canada should be expended on extensions and improvements had been disapproved, and the arrangements founded upon these suggestions had to be cancelled. As for his employment of Allan to secure a postmaster at Amherstburg, Allan knew the district while he himself did not, and in his circumstances he was compelled to rely upon his officials as he did in the west and at Halifax.
Heriot was consistently respectful, but he insisted that, given the powers he had, it was impossible to align with Drummond's views. He mentioned the incident from 1812 when his suggestion that all the revenue from Upper Canada be used for extensions and improvements was rejected, forcing the cancellation of the plans based on those suggestions. Regarding his decision to hire Allan to find a postmaster in Amherstburg, he noted that Allan was familiar with the area while he was not, and under his circumstances, he had to depend on his officials just like he did in the west and in Halifax.
The whole of the case was laid by Heriot before the postmaster general. His situation, he declared, was very disagreeable, as people seemed to imagine that he had carte blanche as to the disposal of the post office revenue. Every governor on coming to Canada assailed Heriot with his particular scheme for improvement. Prevost, who had come from the governorship of Nova Scotia, insisted on a large expenditure on the service in that province. Drummond, whose interests lay in Upper Canada, was peremptory in regard to the claims of that part of the country. The consequence of all this was correspondence always lengthy and frequently unpleasant.
The entire situation was presented by Heriot to the postmaster general. He stated that his position was very uncomfortable, as people seemed to think he had unlimited authority over the post office revenue. Every governor arriving in Canada pressured Heriot with their specific ideas for improvements. Prevost, who had come from running Nova Scotia, pushed for significant spending on services in that province. Drummond, whose interests were in Upper Canada, was insistent about the demands of that region. As a result, the correspondence was always long and often unpleasant.
What Heriot desired to know was whether his conduct was approved or condemned by his superiors. The official silence left him in uncertainty and suspense. Heriot concluded by asking to be relieved of the office and to be allowed some remuneration for past services.
What Heriot wanted to know was whether his actions were approved or criticized by his bosses. The absence of any official response left him feeling uncertain and anxious. Heriot ended by requesting to be relieved of his position and to receive some payment for his previous work.
After a short lull, trouble broke out afresh, and this time Drummond managed to put Heriot clearly in the wrong. A very sharp letter from the governor drew from Heriot the reply that the deputy postmaster general in Canada was governed by several acts of parliament, and by instructions from the general post office,[Pg 112] and he was not subject to any orders, but through the secretary of the post office. He would, however, afford every necessary information when applied to in the mode of solicitation or request.
After a brief pause, problems arose again, and this time, Drummond succeeded in clearly showing that Heriot was in the wrong. A very pointed letter from the governor prompted Heriot to respond that the deputy postmaster general in Canada was bound by several acts of parliament and instructions from the general post office,[Pg 112] and he was not obligated to follow any orders except through the secretary of the post office. He would, however, provide all necessary information if approached properly with a request.
This was not the tone to take in addressing the chief executive in the colony; and the governor promptly laid the whole matter before the colonial secretary, condemning Heriot for his incapacity, insubordination and insolence, and declaring that nothing but the fear of embarrassing the accounts prevented him from instantly suspending Heriot. He urged his dismissal.
This was not the way to talk to the chief executive of the colony; and the governor quickly brought the whole issue to the colonial secretary, criticizing Heriot for his incompetence, disobedience, and rudeness, and stating that only the worry about messing up the accounts kept him from immediately suspending Heriot. He pushed for his dismissal.
A fortnight later Drummond reported further grievances. Indeed, Heriot seems now to have cast prudence as well as respect for the governor's office to the winds. The governor had demanded to see the postmaster general's instructions to Heriot, and it was not until the demand had been twice repeated that Heriot saw fit to obey.
A couple of weeks later, Drummond reported more complaints. It seems that Heriot has thrown caution and respect for the governor's office out the window. The governor insisted on seeing the postmaster general's instructions to Heriot, and it wasn't until the request had been repeated twice that Heriot decided to comply.
Among those instructions was one directing the deputy postmaster general to keep the orders of the postmaster general and the table of rates in his office, for his own guidance, and for the satisfaction of all persons desiring to see them. This Drummond insisted on reading as a direction to the deputy postmaster general to make all his communications from the postmaster general public, and he dilates on the disrespect of Heriot in withholding from the governor what he is under orders to disclose to the first comer.
Among those instructions was one telling the deputy postmaster general to keep the postmaster general's orders and the rate table in his office, for his own reference and for anyone who wanted to see them. Drummond argued that this was a directive for the deputy postmaster general to make all communications from the postmaster general public, and he emphasized Heriot's disrespect in not sharing with the governor what he is required to disclose to anyone who asks.
All this is, of course, manifestly disingenuous, and does not impose on Heriot's superiors in the general post office. The secretary of the general post office in discussing Drummond's complaints, has words of commendation for Heriot's zeal and alacrity. He always considered Heriot a judicious, active and efficient officer. Governors, he affirmed, too commonly entertain the idea that the whole revenue of the post office should be devoted to extending the communications. Whatever view might be held as to the principle, Heriot at all events was precluded by his instructions from acting upon it without the express authority of the postmaster general.
All of this is obviously insincere and doesn’t affect Heriot's superiors at the general post office. The secretary of the general post office, while discussing Drummond’s complaints, praises Heriot’s enthusiasm and promptness. He always saw Heriot as a smart, proactive, and capable officer. He noted that governors often think the entire revenue of the post office should go towards improving communication. Regardless of the perspective on that principle, Heriot was, in any case, restricted by his instructions from acting on it without the explicit authorization of the postmaster general.
While Heriot had, beyond question, given ample grounds for irritation on Drummond's part, it should be remembered, in dealing with the demand for Heriot's dismissal, Drummond was told that he had been sixteen years in the service, and had on many occasions received the thanks of the board. It might be sufficient to enjoin upon Heriot a more respectful attitude towards[Pg 113] the governor, and consult with him as to the extension of communications, and the interests of the revenue.
While Heriot had definitely given Drummond plenty of reasons to be annoyed, it's important to keep in mind that when discussing the call for Heriot's dismissal, Drummond was reminded that Heriot had been in service for sixteen years and had received the board's thanks on multiple occasions. It might be enough to urge Heriot to show a more respectful attitude towards[Pg 113] the governor and to consult with him about improving communication and addressing revenue interests.
The postmaster general concurred in the secretary's views. But the quarrel was now past mending, and when after repeated requests to be relieved, Heriot declared that no motive of interest or advantage could induce him to stay in the service longer than was necessary to appoint his successor, the postmaster general decided to accept his resignation.
The postmaster general agreed with the secretary's opinions. However, the conflict was beyond repair, and after several requests to be relieved, Heriot stated that no personal gain or benefit could persuade him to remain in the service longer than it took to appoint his replacement. The postmaster general then decided to accept his resignation.
FOOTNOTES:
[161] Ibid., Br. P.O. Transcripts, III.
[166] Ibid., Br. P.O. Transcripts, III.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ibid., Br. P.O. Transcripts, III.
CHAPTER VII
Administration of Daniel Sutherland—Postal service on the Ottawa river, and to eastern townships—Ocean mails.
Administration of Daniel Sutherland—Postal service on the Ottawa River and to the Eastern Townships—Ocean mail.
On Heriot's retirement, a number of London merchants who traded to Canada, recommended that the postmaster of Montreal, Daniel Sutherland, be appointed as his successor, and the appointment was made in April 1816.[167] Sutherland entered upon his duties with full knowledge of the postal service in Canada, as he had been postmaster of Montreal since 1807.
On Heriot's retirement, several London merchants who traded with Canada suggested that Daniel Sutherland, the postmaster of Montreal, should be appointed as his successor, and the appointment was made in April 1816.[167] Sutherland began his duties with a thorough understanding of the postal service in Canada, as he had been the postmaster of Montreal since 1807.
An effort was made at this time to remove the headquarters of the department from Quebec to Montreal, but it was not encouraged. The postmaster general was of opinion that, although there were no direct official relations between the governor general and the head of the postal service, it would be inadvisable to diminish in any way the opportunities that then existed of enlisting the good will of the governor towards the post office by the pursuit of a more tactful course than had been taken by Sutherland's predecessor. If, while relations between the chief executive and the deputy postmaster general were thus strained, the office of the latter had been removed to Montreal, the chances of establishing a more cordial feeling on the part of the governor towards the post office would have greatly lessened.
An effort was made at this time to move the department's headquarters from Quebec to Montreal, but it wasn't encouraged. The postmaster general believed that, even though there were no direct official ties between the governor general and the head of the postal service, it would be unwise to reduce the existing chances of gaining the governor's goodwill towards the post office by taking a more diplomatic approach than what Sutherland's predecessor had done. If, while relations between the chief executive and the deputy postmaster general were strained, the latter's office had been moved to Montreal, the chances of fostering a more friendly attitude from the governor towards the post office would have significantly diminished.
The wisdom of the postmaster general in this matter was soon shown. It was not long before the post office incurred the hostility of the legislatures in both Upper and Lower Canada and its case would have been hard indeed, if it had not obtained the steady support of the governors and the executive councils in the two provinces.
The postmaster general's wisdom in this situation became clear quickly. It wasn't long before the post office faced opposition from the legislatures in both Upper and Lower Canada, and its situation would have been quite difficult if it hadn't received consistent support from the governors and executive councils in the two provinces.
A notable feature of Sutherland's administration was the extension of the service into settlements, which lay far off the beaten lines. The first of these to be provided with a post office was the settlement of Perth. In the summer of 1815, a number of Scotch artisans and peasants sailed from Greenock, attracted by the inducements held out to settlers in British North America,[Pg 115] and of these about sixty families spent the winter in Brockville on the St. Lawrence. When spring opened, they proceeded inland till they reached the Rideau river, and took up homes about the site of the present town of Perth.
A notable aspect of Sutherland's administration was the expansion of services into remote settlements. The first of these to get a post office was the settlement of Perth. In the summer of 1815, several Scottish craftsmen and farmers sailed from Greenock, lured by the offers made to settlers in British North America,[Pg 115] and around sixty families spent the winter in Brockville along the St. Lawrence. When spring arrived, they moved inland until they reached the Rideau River and settled around where the current town of Perth is located.
The new settlement was almost immediately joined by a large number of disbanded troops, who were set free on the conclusion of peace with the United States. By October 1816, there were over sixteen hundred settlers in the district. They were fortunate in securing the interest of Sir John Sherbrooke, the governor general, at whose instance a post office was opened, and fortnightly trips were made with the mails from Brockville.[168]
The new settlement quickly attracted a significant number of disbanded soldiers who were released when peace was established with the United States. By October 1816, there were more than sixteen hundred settlers in the area. They were lucky to have caught the attention of Sir John Sherbrooke, the governor general, who helped get a post office started and arranged for mail to be sent biweekly from Brockville.[168]
A road was broken between the two places, but little could be said for it for some time. Dr. Mountain, the son of the first Anglican bishop of Quebec, and himself afterwards third bishop of Quebec, accompanied his father on an episcopal trip into Upper Canada in 1820. Among the places he visited was Perth. Of the road he said: "All the roads I have described before were turnpike and bowling green to this."[169] The road was divided into three stages of seven miles each, and the best the party could do was three hours for each stage.
A road had been constructed between the two locations, but it wasn't in great shape for a while. Dr. Mountain, the son of the first Anglican bishop of Quebec and later the third bishop of Quebec himself, traveled with his father on an episcopal journey to Upper Canada in 1820. One of the places they visited was Perth. About the road, he remarked, "All the roads I've described before were like a turnpike and a bowling green compared to this."[169] The road was split into three segments of seven miles each, and the best they could manage was three hours for each segment.
In 1818, another settlement was formed in the same part of the country about thirty miles north of Perth. It was a military settlement, being made up of officers and men of the 99th and 100th regiments. This group did not enter upon its lands by way of the St. Lawrence, but is notable as the first considerable body to come into Upper Canada by way of the Ottawa river. They landed on the site of the present city of Ottawa, but did not stop there longer than was necessary to break a road through to their lands, which were situated about twenty miles to the westward. The settlement was called Richmond, in honour of the Duke of Richmond, the governor general, and this circumstance gave Ottawa its first name—Richmond Landing.
In 1818, another settlement was established in the same area about thirty miles north of Perth. It was a military settlement comprised of officers and soldiers from the 99th and 100th regiments. This group didn’t access their lands via the St. Lawrence but is significant as the first major group to arrive in Upper Canada through the Ottawa River. They landed at the site of what is now Ottawa, but only stayed long enough to create a road leading to their lands, which were located about twenty miles to the west. The settlement was named Richmond in honor of the Duke of Richmond, the governor general, and this event gave Ottawa its original name—Richmond Landing.
It was at Richmond that the duke came to his melancholy end that same summer, as the result of the bite of a fox. The duke had shown his interest in the settlement which bore his name in a number of ways, and shortly before his death he induced the deputy postmaster general to open a post office there. In order to provide it with mails, a blazed trail was made between the new settlement and Perth.[170][Pg 116]
It was in Richmond that the duke met his sad end that same summer, due to a fox bite. The duke had shown his interest in the settlement named after him in various ways, and just before his death, he convinced the deputy postmaster general to establish a post office there. To facilitate mail service, a marked trail was created between the new settlement and Perth.[170][Pg 116]
The settlement at Richmond was not the first, however, in the Upper Ottawa district. In 1800, Philemon Wright, a New Englander, who had made one or two exploratory tours into the country, determined to form a settlement at Hull, on the Lower Canadian side of the river, and in that year he brought with him a group of his neighbours from Malden, Massachusetts.
The settlement at Richmond wasn't the first in the Upper Ottawa area. In 1800, Philemon Wright, a New Englander who had made a couple of exploratory trips into the region, decided to establish a settlement in Hull, on the Lower Canadian side of the river. That year, he brought along a group of his neighbors from Malden, Massachusetts.
These settlers were thrifty and intelligent, and by 1815, they had brought their settlement to a pitch of prosperity, which won special mention from Bouchette, the surveyor general. At that time there were about thirty families in the district, whose farms were in a respectable state of cultivation; and a large trade in timber, pot and pearl ashes was carried on.
These settlers were resourceful and smart, and by 1815, they had made their settlement quite prosperous, earning special recognition from Bouchette, the surveyor general. At that time, there were around thirty families in the area, whose farms were in good condition; and there was a significant trade in timber, pot ash, and pearl ash.
The little settlement was so far from Montreal—one hundred and twenty miles—that it was at first impracticable to give it the benefit of the postal service. The isolation did not last long. Little bodies of settlers were taking up land at different points, both above and below the Long Sault rapids; and for some time before 1819, there had been a steamer running between Lachine and Carillon, at the foot of the Long Sault.[171]
The small settlement was so far from Montreal—one hundred and twenty miles—that it was initially impossible to provide postal service. This isolation didn’t last long. Small groups of settlers were starting to claim land at various locations, both upstream and downstream of the Long Sault rapids; and for a while before 1819, there had been a steamer operating between Lachine and Carillon, at the base of the Long Sault.[171]
In 1819, a steamer was put on the Upper Ottawa, running between the head of the Long Sault and Hull, and the Duke of Richmond appealed to Sutherland to open post offices on the river route. The deputy postmaster general at first demurred on the ground of expense, but he withdrew his objections on a guarantee being given by a number of gentlemen interested in the district, that the post office should be saved against any loss which might ensue. Offices were accordingly opened at St. Eustache and St. Andrews on the lower Ottawa, and at Grenville, Hawkesbury and Hull on the upper part of the river.[172]
In 1819, a steamboat started operating on the Upper Ottawa, traveling between the head of the Long Sault and Hull. The Duke of Richmond asked Sutherland to set up post offices along the river route. Initially, the deputy postmaster general hesitated due to concerns about the costs, but he changed his mind after several local gentlemen guaranteed that they would cover any potential losses. As a result, post offices were established at St. Eustache and St. Andrews on the lower Ottawa, as well as at Grenville, Hawkesbury, and Hull on the upper part of the river.[172]
Another part of the country to which the postal system was extended during this period was the eastern townships in Lower Canada. These townships lie along the northern border of eastern New York, Vermont and New Hampshire. Owing to their contiguity to the United States, the settlement of these townships gave the British Government much concern.
Another area of the country where the postal system was expanded during this time was the eastern townships in Lower Canada. These townships are located along the northern border of eastern New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire. Because of their proximity to the United States, the settlement of these townships raised significant concerns for the British Government.
Lord North, at the close of the war of the Revolution, desired to settle this border country with old soldiers. Haldimand, the governor general, was of another opinion, believing that the interests of peace would be best served by keeping the country[Pg 117] uncultivated, that it might serve as a barrier to the restless spirits from the south. Some effort was made to give effect to this view but without much success. Indeed the governors who followed Haldimand made grants in the townships freely; and in 1812, it was estimated that there were not less than 17,000 people settled there.
Lord North, at the end of the Revolutionary War, wanted to settle this border area with old soldiers. Haldimand, the governor general, disagreed, believing that keeping the land uncultivated would be better for maintaining peace by acting as a barrier to the restless individuals from the south. Some attempts were made to implement this idea, but they didn’t succeed much. In fact, the governors who came after Haldimand granted land in the townships freely; by 1812, it was estimated that at least 17,000 people had settled there.
Lord Bathurst, the colonial secretary, on learning in 1816 the state of affairs, was highly displeased that the policy of the government had been disregarded in this manner, and directed the governor to do what he could to discourage further settlement, and wherever possible to restore the cultivated country to a state of nature.
Lord Bathurst, the colonial secretary, was really upset in 1816 when he found out what was happening. He was unhappy that the government's policy had been ignored like this, and he instructed the governor to do whatever he could to discourage more settlement and, wherever possible, to return the cultivated land to its natural state.
Mentioning particularly the townships at the western end of the province, the colonial secretary directed that no new roads were to be run into them, and advantage was to be taken of any circumstances that presented themselves of letting the roads already made fall into disuse. For five years this desolating policy was carried into execution.
Mentioning specifically the townships at the western end of the province, the colonial secretary ordered that no new roads were to be built into them, and any opportunities to let the existing roads fall into disuse should be taken advantage of. For five years, this destructive policy was carried out.
In 1821, Lord Dalhousie, the governor general reported that the result was an utter failure. "These townships," he says "are the resort of all the felons escaping from justice within His Majesty's province or from the United States. Forgery, coining, and every crime is committed there with impunity. American lumbermen are cutting everywhere the best timber, and sit down where they please, and move about where they find it convenient."
In 1821, Lord Dalhousie, the governor general, reported that the outcome was a total failure. "These townships,” he remarked, “are where all the criminals escaping justice from His Majesty's province or from the United States gather. Forgery, counterfeiting, and every crime happen there without consequence. American lumbermen are cutting down the best timber everywhere, setting up wherever they want, and moving around as it suits them."
A reversal of the mistaken policy resulted from the Dalhousie report. The first post office opened in the townships was at Stanstead,[173] the centre of a comfortable, well-settled population of about 2500. The village lay on the main stage route from Quebec into the state of Vermont. The post office at Stanstead was opened in 1817, and with three other offices opened at the same time had a weekly exchange of mails with Quebec by way of Three Rivers.
A change in the misguided policy came from the Dalhousie report. The first post office to open in the townships was in Stanstead,[173] a hub of a comfortable, established population of around 2,500. The village was located on the main stage route from Quebec to Vermont. The Stanstead post office opened in 1817, and along with three other offices that opened at the same time, it had weekly mail exchanges with Quebec through Three Rivers.
During Sutherland's administration, there were a considerable number of post offices opened, and many of them established at this period afterwards attained great importance. In 1816, when he became deputy postmaster general, there were only ten offices in Lower Canada and nine in Upper Canada. When he retired in 1827, there were forty-nine in Lower Canada and sixty-five in Upper Canada. In 1816, Belleville post office was opened under the name of bay of Quinte: in 1825, Hamilton, London, Brantford, and St. Thomas were provided with post offices.[Pg 118]
During Sutherland's time in office, a significant number of post offices were opened, and many that were established during this time later became quite important. In 1816, when he became deputy postmaster general, there were only ten offices in Lower Canada and nine in Upper Canada. By the time he retired in 1827, there were forty-nine in Lower Canada and sixty-five in Upper Canada. In 1816, the Belleville post office was opened under the name Bay of Quinte; in 1825, Hamilton, London, Brantford, and St. Thomas also got post offices.[Pg 118]
In Lower Canada, besides those already mentioned, a post office was opened at Sherbrooke in 1819, replacing an office established in Aston township in 1817.
In Lower Canada, in addition to those already mentioned, a post office was opened in Sherbrooke in 1819, taking the place of an office that had been established in Aston township in 1817.
A curious fact appears in the post office list of 1819. At this date Toronto was still called York, and Hamilton was without a post office altogether. Nevertheless a post office called Toronto was on the list of 1819 as having been opened in 1817, with Charles Fothergill as postmaster, and another called Hamilton was opened in 1819 with James Bethune as postmaster. There was nothing to indicate where these post offices were situated until changes were made in the names, and Toronto was converted into Port Hope and Hamilton into Cobourg.
A curious fact shows up in the post office list of 1819. At that time, Toronto was still named York, and Hamilton didn't have a post office at all. However, a post office called Toronto was listed in 1819 as having opened in 1817, with Charles Fothergill as the postmaster, and another post office named Hamilton opened in 1819 with James Bethune as the postmaster. There was no indication of where these post offices were located until the names were changed, with Toronto becoming Port Hope and Hamilton becoming Cobourg.
Fothergill, who had the post office established at Port Hope, appears more than once in the course of post office history. He was member of the house of assembly and king's printer, as well as postmaster. About this time the house began to express dissatisfaction with the service provided by the post office, and to demand information as to its affairs, which the deputy postmaster general was not prepared to furnish. Among the critics was Fothergill, who was speedily punished for his independence. He was dismissed from the office of king's printer by the governor.[174]
Fothergill, who helped set up the post office in Port Hope, shows up multiple times in post office history. He was a member of the House of Assembly and the king's printer, as well as the postmaster. Around this time, the House started voicing dissatisfaction with the service provided by the post office and began demanding information about its operations, which the deputy postmaster general was not ready to supply. Among the critics was Fothergill, who quickly faced consequences for his independence. He was removed from his position as king's printer by the governor.[174]
The conveyance of the mails between Canada and Great Britain occupied much attention during Sutherland's term. The packets, that is the vessels employed expressly for the conveyance of the mails, had at this date almost ceased to be employed for the transmission of any but official correspondence. The interests of the governors and other officials in British North America and Bermuda, and of the British minister at Washington and consuls in the United States, were the only interests considered in the arrangements for this service.
The delivery of mail between Canada and Great Britain was a big focus during Sutherland's time. The mail ships, which were specifically used for carrying the mail, had nearly stopped transporting anything other than official correspondence by this point. The needs of the governors and other officials in British North America and Bermuda, as well as the British minister in Washington and the consuls in the United States, were the only considerations taken into account for this service.
Speedy transmission was sacrificed without a thought, to provide against imagined dangers to safe transmission. When the packet service was established, the vessels made monthly trips during the summer from Falmouth, in England, to Halifax and thence to New York, returning by the same route. The mails for Bermuda were landed at Halifax, and taken to their destination in a war vessel.
Speedy delivery was quickly sacrificed to protect against perceived dangers to safe transmission. When the packet service started, the ships made monthly trips during the summer from Falmouth in England to Halifax and then to New York, returning the same way. The mail for Bermuda was dropped off in Halifax and transported to its destination on a warship.
During the winter, the vessels from Falmouth did not run to Halifax, but proceeded directly to New York. In 1806, at the instance of the admiralty, orders were given that, whenever possible[Pg 119] during the winter, the packets should touch at Bermuda on their way to New York.[175] On the eve of the war of 1812, Prevost, the governor general, who was fearful for the safety of the mails, begged that this course might be adopted as the regular winter course, and that mails for Canada and other parts of British North America should be put off at Bermuda, and conveyed from there to Halifax.
During the winter, the ships from Falmouth didn't go to Halifax but went straight to New York. In 1806, at the request of the admiralty, it was ordered that whenever possible[Pg 119] during the winter, the packets should stop at Bermuda on their way to New York.[175] On the eve of the War of 1812, Prevost, the governor general, who was concerned about the safety of the mail, pleaded for this route to be adopted as the standard winter route, and that mail for Canada and other parts of British North America should be offloaded at Bermuda and taken from there to Halifax.
To make the mails for Canada go as far south as Bermuda seems outrageous, but Prevost was willing to put up with any slowness in transmission rather than have his despatches touch United States soil. This course was pursued until the war ended in 1815, and continued for many winters after that time.
To send the mail for Canada all the way down to Bermuda seems extreme, but Prevost was ready to deal with any delays in delivery rather than let his messages land on United States soil. This practice continued until the war ended in 1815 and carried on for many winters after that.
But it was too bad to escape criticism from officials themselves. At the end of the summer of 1816, when the packets were about to be taken off the Halifax route, the rear-admiral on the North American station asked that the packets should continue to call at Halifax during the winter, and, by way of satisfying the post office of the feasibility of his suggestion, furnished a list of some seventy vessels which had entered Halifax during the previous winter, which was allowed to be the severest for many years, and found no more trouble in making this port than the port of New York.[176]
But it was unfortunate that it faced criticism from officials themselves. At the end of summer 1816, when the mail ships were about to be removed from the Halifax route, the rear-admiral stationed in North America requested that the mail ships continue to stop in Halifax during the winter. To prove that his suggestion was feasible, he provided a list of about seventy vessels that had entered Halifax during the previous winter, which was considered one of the harshest in many years, and encountered no more difficulties in reaching this port than in reaching the port of New York.[176]
The suggestion aroused great opposition—an opposition which would be quite incomprehensible to-day. The agent of the packet service at Falmouth assembled all commanders who happened to be in port, and asked them their opinion. They were unanimous in the belief that the only safe course to Halifax would be to go first to Bermuda, thence to New York, and finally to Halifax.[177] The prevalence of north-westerly winds during the winter would make a direct sailing from Falmouth to Halifax impracticable.
The suggestion faced a lot of opposition—an opposition that would seem totally baffling today. The packet service agent at Falmouth gathered all the commanders who were in port and asked for their opinions. They all agreed that the safest route to Halifax would be to first go to Bermuda, then to New York, and finally to Halifax.[177] The frequent north-westerly winds during the winter made a direct trip from Falmouth to Halifax impractical.
The commanders did not consider it advisable, however, to adopt this course, as it would lengthen the trip by from two to three weeks, and as the voyages would be much rougher, there would be few passengers. The wear and tear on the packets would be greater, and besides the men would require great coats and spirits. During the late war each packet took sixty gallons of rum each way.
The commanders didn’t think it was a good idea to take this route because it would add two to three weeks to the trip, and the journeys would be much bumpier, resulting in fewer passengers. The wear and tear on the ships would be worse, and the crew would need heavy coats and alcohol. During the recent war, each ship transported sixty gallons of rum each way.
Lord Dalhousie became governor general in 1819 and he made bitter complaint of the length of time taken in the delivery of his[Pg 120] winter despatches.[178] The despatches leaving England in November 1821 and 1822, did not reach him until the following February, and his February despatches arrived in Quebec in May. He asked that the mails containing his correspondence should not be put off the packet at Bermuda, but that they be carried to New York, where he would have his messenger on hand to receive them.
Lord Dalhousie became governor general in 1819 and he strongly complained about how long it took to get his winter messages delivered. The messages sent from England in November 1821 and 1822 didn't reach him until the following February, and his February messages arrived in Quebec in May. He requested that the mails with his correspondence shouldn't be taken off the ship at Bermuda, but instead should be taken to New York, where his messenger would be there to receive them.
It is difficult to see why this should not have been done. Ever since the establishment of peace in 1783, there had been a British packet agent at New York, whose sole duty it was to act as intermediary for the despatch by the outgoing British packet boat, of all correspondence reaching him from the governors or other officials in British North America, or from the ambassadors or consuls in the United States.[179]
It’s hard to understand why this wasn’t done. Ever since peace was established in 1783, there has been a British packet agent in New York, whose only job was to serve as the middleman for sending out all correspondence he received from governors or other officials in British North America, or from ambassadors or consuls in the United States.[179]
Dalhousie's messenger took his outgoing despatches to the packet agent, and the governor could not understand the objections to allowing the same messenger to carry the incoming despatches back with him. The packet agent at New York strongly supported the governor's request, and pointed out how his own office might be made of much greater utility, if he were employed freely, not only for the transmission of official correspondence, but for the interchange of general correspondence between Canada and Great Britain. He declared that the United States government had shown the utmost courtesy to the governor's messengers. They had not been molested in any way, and for some time past, the earlier practice of requiring the couriers to be provided with passports had been allowed to drop.[180]
Dalhousie's messenger took his outgoing dispatches to the packet agent, and the governor couldn't understand the objections to allowing the same messenger to bring the incoming dispatches back with him. The packet agent in New York fully supported the governor's request and pointed out how his office could be much more useful if he was employed not just for sending official correspondence but also for exchanging general correspondence between Canada and Great Britain. He mentioned that the United States government had treated the governor's messengers with the highest courtesy. They had not been bothered in any way, and for a while now, the old requirement for couriers to have passports had been dropped.[180]
The agent proposed that during the winter the English exchange office should make up separate bags for Upper and Lower Canada, which on arrival at New York would be delivered to his office. He would then see that the bags were forwarded by special messenger without delay.
The agent suggested that during the winter, the English exchange office should prepare separate bags for Upper and Lower Canada, which would be delivered to his office upon arrival in New York. He would then make sure the bags were sent out by special messenger right away.
His plan, however, was open to strong objection, and the British post office, which was averse to making any change in the direction proposed, was quick to seize upon it. While acknowledging the good will of the United States government regarding the conveyance of official despatches through their territory by British messengers, the secretary stated that the conveyance of ordinary mails by the same means was a very different matter, which would give rise to a justifiable claim on the part of the United States department, and if the charges which would have to be paid to the United[Pg 121] States department were added to the other postage rates, the total postage to be collected from the recipients of the letters would be very large.
His plan, however, faced strong opposition, and the British post office, which was against any changes in the proposed direction, quickly took advantage of it. While they acknowledged the good intentions of the United States government regarding the delivery of official messages through their territory by British messengers, the secretary pointed out that transporting regular mail in the same way was a completely different issue that could lead to a legitimate claim by the United States department. If the fees that would need to be paid to the United[Pg 121] States department were added to the other postage rates, the total postage collected from the recipients of the letters would be quite high.
But the argument of the secretary was based on the supposition that the mails would be carried as the despatches were, by Canadian messengers from New York, and that the letters they carried would be subject to a double charge, viz:—the expenses of the messenger, and the sum which the United States might exact for the mere transit over its territory. If the British mails arriving at New York by the packet were handed over to the United States post office for transmission, as had been the case before the war of 1812, there would have been no such excessive charge.
But the secretary's argument relied on the assumption that the mail would be delivered like the dispatches, by Canadian messengers from New York, and that the letters they carried would incur a double fee: first, the cost of the messenger, and second, the amount the United States might charge just for passing through its territory. If the British mail arriving in New York by the packet were handed over to the United States post office for delivery, as had happened before the War of 1812, there wouldn't have been such a high charge.
This was what was desired on all sides in Canada. The service would have been much faster, and for Montreal and all places in Upper Canada the postage would have been lower. Since the spring of 1817, steamboats were employed to carry the mails between New York and Albany twice a week, and with other improvements on the route, the time between New York and Montreal was shortened to three days in summer and five in winter.
This is what everyone in Canada wanted. The service would have been much quicker, and for Montreal and all areas in Upper Canada, the postage would have been cheaper. Since the spring of 1817, steamboats have been used to transport the mail between New York and Albany twice a week, and with other enhancements along the route, the travel time between New York and Montreal was reduced to three days in summer and five in winter.
From New York to York took from nine to eleven days by way of Montreal, and a day less if the mails were carried from New York along the Mohawk valley route to Queenston on the Niagara river, and thence to York.
From New York to York took nine to eleven days via Montreal, and one day less if the mail was carried from New York through the Mohawk Valley route to Queenston on the Niagara River, and then to York.
Compare this with the time occupied between Halifax and Quebec. A month was the average, and to that had to be added two days to Montreal and eight days to York. No advantage enjoyed by Halifax over New York on the sea trip could compensate for the disparity from which the land route between Halifax and Montreal suffered in comparison with the route from New York to Montreal, and as Montreal was the gateway to Upper Canada, the whole of the new province suffered in equal measure with that city.
Compare this with the time it takes to travel between Halifax and Quebec. The average was about a month, plus two extra days to get to Montreal and eight days to reach York. Any benefits Halifax had over New York for the sea journey couldn't make up for the disadvantages the land route from Halifax to Montreal faced compared to the route from New York to Montreal. And since Montreal was the gateway to Upper Canada, the entire new province faced the same challenges as the city.
The gain in time by the New York route was submitted to the general post office, but the proposition to land the mails at that port was opposed by the secretary. He found that there would be eightpence less postage on each letter to Quebec, if it were sent through the United States instead of through the Maritime provinces, and, besides, he was doubtful as to the propriety of sanctioning any scheme which would permit private and mercantile letters to reach Quebec before the government despatches, which in any case must come by way of Halifax.
The time savings from the New York route were presented to the general post office, but the secretary opposed the proposal to deliver the mail at that port. He discovered that sending each letter to Quebec through the United States would cost eight pence less in postage than if sent via the Maritime provinces. Additionally, he was unsure about allowing a plan that would let private and business letters arrive in Quebec before government dispatches, which would always have to go through Halifax.
But though the comings and the goings of the packets were a matter of much concern to Lord Dalhousie and to others, whose[Pg 122] correspondence had to be carried by this means, they were of little moment to the general public, who had found a very satisfactory means for the conveyance of their correspondence.
But while the arrivals and departures of the packets were a big concern for Lord Dalhousie and others whose[Pg 122] correspondence relied on them, they didn't matter much to the general public, who had found a quite satisfactory way to send their messages.
In 1826, the treasury set on foot inquiries as to the arrangements for the conveyance of correspondence across the Atlantic, and the information they obtained must have surprised them.[181] There were three modes of sending letters to Canada from Great Britain. The first was by the official sailing packets. The usefulness of the packets, however, was limited to the conveyance of official despatches.
In 1826, the treasury began looking into the arrangements for sending mail across the Atlantic, and the information they found must have surprised them.[181] There were three ways to send letters to Canada from Great Britain. The first was through the official sailing packets. However, the usefulness of the packets was limited to carrying official dispatches.
The high charges and the slowness of the service abundantly account for the failure of the public to employ this means of transmission. The postage on a single letter, that is a single sheet of paper weighing less than an ounce, was two shillings and twopence sterling from London to Halifax by way of Falmouth. To this must be added the postage from Halifax to points in Canada, which was one shilling and eightpence to Quebec; one shilling and tenpence to Montreal; two shillings and twopence to Kingston; two shillings and sixpence to York; and three shillings to Amherstburg.
The high costs and slow service clearly explain why the public didn’t use this method of sending messages. The postage for a single letter, just a single sheet of paper weighing under an ounce, was two shillings and two pence sterling from London to Halifax via Falmouth. On top of this, you had to add the postage from Halifax to various locations in Canada: one shilling and eight pence to Quebec; one shilling and ten pence to Montreal; two shillings and two pence to Kingston; two shillings and six pence to York; and three shillings to Amherstburg.
Thus, employing the more familiar decimal currency, the postage on a single sheet, weighing less than one ounce, posted in London and sent by packet to Halifax and thence to its destination in Canada was, to Quebec ninety-two cents; to Montreal ninety-six cents; to Kingston one dollar and four cents; to York one dollar and twelve cents; and to Amherstburg one dollar and twenty-four cents. Remembering Dalhousie's complaint that it took upwards of seventy days for one of these precious letters to reach him, the unpopularity of the packet service can be appreciated.
Thus, using the more familiar decimal currency, the postage for a single sheet, weighing less than one ounce, sent from London to Halifax and then to its final destination in Canada was ninety-two cents for Quebec; ninety-six cents for Montreal; one dollar and four cents for Kingston; one dollar and twelve cents for York; and one dollar and twenty-four cents for Amherstburg. Considering Dalhousie's complaint that it took over seventy days for one of these valuable letters to reach him, it's easy to understand why the packet service was so unpopular.
The second agency for conveying letters from England to Canada, was by private ship, but through the medium of the post office. A person desiring to send a letter from London to a post office in Canada would write on the cover a direction that the letter was to be sent by a ship which he would name, and post it in the ordinary way.
The second way to send letters from England to Canada was through private ships, but using the post office. If someone wanted to send a letter from London to a post office in Canada, they would write on the envelope the name of the ship they wanted it sent by and drop it in the mail like usual.
The post office would accept the direction, and would charge just one half the packet postage for the conveyance to Halifax or Quebec, that is, instead of two shillings and twopence for the sea conveyance, the letter would only be charged one shilling and one penny. But the high charges between the port of arrival in[Pg 123] British North America and the offices in inland Canada prevented the extensive use of this means of conveyance.
The post office would take the direction and only charge half the packet postage for delivery to Halifax or Quebec. So instead of two shillings and two pence for sea delivery, the letter would only cost one shilling and one penny. However, the high fees from the port of arrival in[Pg 123] British North America to the offices in inland Canada made it difficult for this delivery method to be widely used.
The third mode of conveyance was irregular, but it was universally employed. There were lines of sailing vessels, called American packets, running between Liverpool and New York, which were fast sailers, and which would carry letters from England to the United States for twopence a letter, without regard to its weight or the number of enclosures it contained.
The third mode of transportation was inconsistent, but it was widely used. There were routes of sailing ships, known as American packets, operating between Liverpool and New York. These ships were fast and would transport letters from England to the United States for two pence per letter, regardless of its weight or the number of items included.
The agents of these lines kept bags in their offices in London and Liverpool, and when the vessels were due to sail, the bags were sealed and placed on board. The conveyance of the letter bags from London to Liverpool by the messengers of the sailing lines was illegal, as the postmaster general had the exclusive right to convey letters within the United Kingdom. There could have been no possibility of carrying on the traffic in a clandestine manner, as it was wholesale in character, and comprised the correspondence of the most eminent merchants in London. On inquiry it was learned that one merchant alone sent one thousand letters by this means, and not one by the official packets, and the practice was universal.[182]
The agents of these shipping lines stored bags in their offices in London and Liverpool. When the ships were scheduled to sail, the bags were sealed and loaded onto the vessels. The transport of these letter bags from London to Liverpool by the messengers of the shipping lines was illegal, as the postmaster general held the exclusive right to handle letters within the UK. There was no way to carry out this operation secretly, as it was on a large scale and involved correspondence from some of the most prominent merchants in London. Upon investigation, it was discovered that one merchant alone sent a thousand letters this way and none through the official mail services, and this practice was widespread.[182]
On the arrival of the American packets at New York, the letters for Canada were deposited in the New York post office, and forwarded to the Canadian border office in the United States mails, and thence to their destination. The postage by this course was very much less than by either of the other routes.
On the arrival of the American packets at New York, the letters for Canada were dropped off at the New York post office and then sent to the Canadian border office in the U.S. mail, and from there to their destination. The postage for this method was significantly lower than for either of the other routes.
It was made up of three factors: the ocean postage of four cents, the United States postage of nineteen or twenty-five cents—according to the point at which the Canadian border was reached—and the inland Canadian postage. The charge on a single letter to Quebec was forty-seven cents instead of ninety-two cents, which would be due if sent by the packet route. To Montreal, Kingston, York and Amherstburg, the postage on a letter from London or Liverpool was thirty-one cents, forty-seven cents, forty-one cents and sixty-one cents, as against ninety-six cents, one dollar and four cents, one dollar and twelve cents and one dollar and twenty-four cents respectively.
It consisted of three parts: the ocean postage of four cents, the U.S. postage of nineteen or twenty-five cents—depending on where the Canadian border was crossed—and the domestic Canadian postage. The cost to send a single letter to Quebec was forty-seven cents instead of ninety-two cents, which would have been the fee if sent via the packet route. For letters sent from London or Liverpool, the postage to Montreal, Kingston, York, and Amherstburg was thirty-one cents, forty-seven cents, forty-one cents, and sixty-one cents, compared to ninety-six cents, one dollar and four cents, one dollar and twelve cents, and one dollar and twenty-four cents, respectively.
Letters to York coming from New York had the advantage of a daily conveyance to Lewiston, where the transfer to the Canadian[Pg 124] border office at Queenstown was made, and of the lower charges which the United States post office imposed for long distances. These figures, the lowest then attainable, inevitably suggest comparisons.
Letters to York coming from New York could be sent daily to Lewiston, where they would be transferred to the Canadian[Pg 124] border office at Queenstown, all while benefiting from the lower rates that the United States post office charged for long distances. These rates, the lowest available at the time, naturally lead to comparisons.
It is only a few years since good citizens were rejoicing that the postage rate between the mother country and Canada was brought down from five cents to two cents a letter. Here was a link of empire of daily utility. Communication could be kept up between the British immigrant and his friends at home without too heavy a draft on slender purses. His heart would remain British, and as he prospered he would induce others of his friends and neighbours to come over and settle.
It’s only been a few years since good citizens were celebrating that the postage rate between the UK and Canada was reduced from five cents to two cents per letter. This was a practical connection to the empire. Communication could continue between British immigrants and their friends back home without putting too much strain on tight budgets. Their hearts would stay British, and as they thrived, they would encourage more friends and neighbors to come over and settle.
A glance backward will show how little these agencies of empire were able to effect in our grandfather's time. The lowest possible postage charge from London to York fifty years ago was forty-one cents, and that would carry no more than one sheet of paper weighing less than an ounce. If within the folds of this sheet were found another piece of paper no larger than a postage stamp, the charge of conveyance from New York to York was doubled, and with the ocean postage of four cents, the poor immigrant would have to pay seventy-eight cents for his letter.
A look back reveals how little these empires could accomplish in our grandfather's time. Fifty years ago, the cheapest postage from London to York was forty-one cents, and that covered just one sheet of paper weighing less than an ounce. If that sheet contained another piece of paper the size of a postage stamp, the cost to send it from New York to York would double, and with the ocean postage of four cents, the struggling immigrant would have to pay seventy-eight cents for their letter.
If the letter weighed an ounce, that is, if it were such a letter as would pass anywhere within the British Empire for four cents, the charge for it coming from London to York would be one dollar and fifty-two cents. Finally, if this ounce letter were sent by the All-Red route, that is by the British packet to Halifax and thence over British soil to York, the postage charge would be four dollars and forty-eight cents. Imperial sentiment must have rivalled wit in economy of expression in those days.
If the letter weighed an ounce, meaning it was the kind that would cost four cents anywhere in the British Empire, the fee for sending it from London to York would be one dollar and fifty-two cents. In the end, if this ounce letter was sent via the All-Red route, which means through the British packet to Halifax and then over British land to York, the postage would be four dollars and forty-eight cents. Back then, imperial pride probably competed with cleverness in how people expressed themselves.
While the British post office was unwilling to encourage the use of the United States mails for the conveyance of letters between Canada and Great Britain, it was anxious to put the British packet service on a better footing. But the service had been going from bad to worse, and it had reached a stage where it satisfied nobody.
While the British post office wasn't keen on promoting the use of United States mail for sending letters between Canada and Great Britain, it was eager to improve the British packet service. However, the service had been declining steadily and had reached a point where it pleased no one.
Of the three points to which mails were carried—Halifax, New York and Bermuda—the last named always held the position of advantage during the winter. Until the winter of 1826 the packet called first at Bermuda, leaving Canadian mails there, and continuing on to New York. At the beginning of the winter of 1826 a change was made.[183] The packet sailed to Bermuda, put off the United States mails there, and sailed northward to Halifax,[Pg 125] omitting New York. The United States mails were conveyed by mail boat from Bermuda to Annapolis, Maryland.
Of the three destinations for mail delivery—Halifax, New York, and Bermuda—Bermuda always had the upper hand in the winter. Up until the winter of 1826, the mail packet would first stop in Bermuda to drop off Canadian mail before heading to New York. However, at the start of the winter of 1826, there was a change.[183] The packet sailed to Bermuda, dropped off the U.S. mail there, and then headed north to Halifax,[Pg 125] skipping New York altogether. The U.S. mail was then taken by a mail boat from Bermuda to Annapolis, Maryland.
This scheme remedied none of the defects of its predecessor, and brought with it the additional disadvantage that it cut off all direct connection between the British minister at Washington, and the governors of the British colonies.
This plan didn’t fix any of the problems of the one before it, and it also added the drawback of severing all direct communication between the British minister in Washington and the governors of the British colonies.
The secretary of the post office in explaining the arrangements to the postmaster general washed his hands of all responsibility for them. He declared that the plan originated with the admiralty, and was sanctioned by the foreign and colonial secretaries as a practical measure. The postmaster general on reviewing the correspondence was not surprised at the general dissatisfaction, and was glad that the arrangements could not be laid at the door of the post office.
The post office secretary, while explaining the plans to the postmaster general, completely disclaimed any responsibility for them. He stated that the idea came from the admiralty and was approved by the foreign and colonial secretaries as a practical step. The postmaster general, after going through the correspondence, wasn’t surprised by the widespread dissatisfaction and was relieved that the arrangements couldn’t be blamed on the post office.
The ocean mail service was beyond the control of the deputy postmaster general of Canada. The postal relations with the United States were not, and he exerted himself to improve these. A hardship under which Canadian merchants doing business with the United States laboured was that they had to pay the postage on all their letters as far as the United States border.
The ocean mail service was out of the deputy postmaster general of Canada’s hands. However, he worked hard to enhance the postal relationships with the United States. One challenge Canadian merchants faced when dealing with the United States was that they had to pay postage for all their letters up to the U.S. border.
It will be difficult to-day to see wherein the grievance of the early Canadian merchants lay. But at that time the postage was a considerable item in every transaction, and the merchant could not afford to disregard it. When he sold a bill of goods to a customer in the United States, he was obliged to throw on the customer the burden of the postage on the correspondence relating to the goods, and the only sure way of doing this was to post the letters unpaid, and leave the customer to pay the postage on the delivery of the letters. If he had to pay from eight to twenty cents which were required to take each single letter as far as the border, he was apt to lose this sum.
It’s hard today to understand what the early Canadian merchants were upset about. Back then, postage was a significant expense in every transaction, and merchants couldn’t ignore it. When they sold goods to customers in the United States, they had to pass the postage costs for the related correspondence onto the customers. The only reliable way to do this was to send the letters without pre-paying the postage and have the customer cover the delivery cost. If the customer had to pay anywhere from eight to twenty cents to send each letter to the border, they often ended up losing that money.
To protect themselves the Canadian merchants used to employ private messengers to carry their letters as far as the nearest post office in the United States, and post them there. From this United States office the letters would go to their destination without pre-payment.
To protect themselves, the Canadian merchants used to hire private messengers to take their letters as far as the nearest post office in the United States and mail them from there. From this U.S. office, the letters would be sent to their destination without needing pre-payment.
Sutherland informed the postmaster general that some of the leading mercantile houses in Canada sent hundreds of letters into the United States by private hand.[184]
Sutherland told the postmaster general that some of the top trading companies in Canada were sending hundreds of letters into the United States by private delivery.[184]
The United States merchant selling goods in Canada stood in a better position as regards his correspondence. He was able to[Pg 126] post his letters for Canada unpaid, and the letter came into Canada and went to its destination, where the person addressed paid the postage on delivery of the letter. This was made possible by an arrangement between the deputy postmaster general of Canada, and the post office department at Washington, by which the former undertook to collect and pay over to the latter the share of the postage which was due to the United States department, receiving twenty per cent. for his trouble.
The American merchant selling goods in Canada had an advantage when it came to his mail. He could send his letters to Canada without prepaying postage, and once the letter arrived, the recipient would pay the postage upon delivery. This system was established through an agreement between the deputy postmaster general of Canada and the post office department in Washington, where the Canadian office agreed to collect and forward the U.S. postage share, keeping twenty percent for their efforts.
The arrangement was a purely private one, for which Sutherland did not feel called upon to account to the general post office. What he desired was that there should be some postmaster in the United States who would act as agent for the collection of Canadian postage on letters entering the United States from Canada, and he found the postmaster of Swanton, Vermont, quite willing to act in this capacity.
The arrangement was strictly private, and Sutherland didn’t feel the need to explain it to the general post office. What he wanted was for there to be a postmaster in the United States who would serve as an agent for collecting Canadian postage on letters coming into the U.S. from Canada, and he found that the postmaster of Swanton, Vermont, was more than willing to take on this role.
As Swanton was the United States post office through which all correspondence passed from Lower Canada into the United States, the postmaster was well situated for this duty. The only difficulty was about the commission of twenty per cent., which would have to be paid to the postmaster as compensation. It was necessary to obtain the consent of the British post office to this arrangement, as the deputy postmaster general had no power to make abatements in the postage due to Canada, without the authority of the postmaster general.
As Swanton was the U.S. post office that handled all mail coming from Lower Canada into the United States, the postmaster was in a good position for this responsibility. The only issue was the twenty percent commission that the postmaster would need to be paid as compensation. It was important to get the British post office's approval for this arrangement since the deputy postmaster general didn’t have the authority to make reductions in the postage owed to Canada without the postmaster general's permission.
But this consent the postmaster general was not disposed to give.[185] Besides the objection that the Canadian post office would receive only eighty per cent. of the postage due on letters going to the United States, the secretary suggested to the postmaster general that it would seem inadvisable, politically, to encourage unlimited correspondence between all sorts of persons in the two countries, without possibility of restriction or of learning (should it be necessary) with whom any particular person was in correspondence.
But the postmaster general was not inclined to agree to this. [185] In addition to the concern that the Canadian post office would only get eighty percent of the postage for letters sent to the United States, the secretary pointed out to the postmaster general that it wouldn't be politically wise to promote unlimited communication between all kinds of people in both countries, without any way to restrict it or find out (if it became necessary) who any specific person was in contact with.
Indeed, the secretary had his doubts as to the legality of the arrangement by which Sutherland acted as agent for the collection of the United States postage on letters coming from that country into Canada. The rates of postage, said he, are distinctly specified in various acts of parliament, and the Canadian post office had no power to demand more than the sum required by the statutes. If it were thought advisable to have Canadian postmasters collect United States postage, a new legislative provision would have to be[Pg 127] made, which would lead to similar applications from other countries, and the result would be confusion and loss of revenue.
Indeed, the secretary doubted whether the arrangement for Sutherland to act as an agent for collecting United States postage on letters coming into Canada was legal. He stated that the postage rates are clearly outlined in various acts of parliament, and the Canadian post office had no authority to demand more than what the laws required. If it was considered necessary for Canadian postmasters to collect United States postage, new legislation would need to be[Pg 127] established, which would lead to similar requests from other countries, resulting in confusion and lost revenue.
Whatever might have been the consequence of a strict interpretation of the law, as intimated by the postmaster general, the deputy postmaster general did not discontinue the convenient, and, to him, profitable practice of providing for the transmission of unpaid letters from the United States addressed to Canada.
Whatever the outcome of a strict interpretation of the law might have been, as suggested by the postmaster general, the deputy postmaster general did not stop the convenient and, for him, profitable practice of sending unpaid letters from the United States to Canada.
So far from that, Sutherland improved on this arrangement. At the solicitation of Canadian merchants, he obtained the consent of the United States department to having British mails, landed at New York, passed on to Canada without being held for the United States postage. The postage due for the conveyance of the letters through the United States was collected by the deputy postmaster general, and transmitted by him to Washington, and the delays incident to having this work done in the United States were avoided.[186]
Sutherland built on this arrangement. At the request of Canadian merchants, he got permission from the United States department for British mail to land in New York and move on to Canada without being held for U.S. postage. The postage owed for transporting the letters through the United States was collected by the deputy postmaster general and sent to Washington, avoiding the delays that came with handling this work in the United States.[186]
On the 15th of February, 1825, a memorial[187] was addressed to the British government by the Marquess of Ormonde, the Knight of Kerry and Simon McGillivray, proposing to establish communication between Great Britain and the British North American colonies by steam vessels, and asking for the exclusive privilege of providing such a service for fourteen years.
On February 15, 1825, a memorial[187] was submitted to the British government by the Marquess of Ormonde, the Knight of Kerry, and Simon McGillivray. They proposed to set up communication between Great Britain and the British North American colonies using steam vessels and requested the exclusive right to operate this service for fourteen years.
At this time steamboats were in pretty general use in the inland and coastal waters of Great Britain, United States and Canada, but nothing had up to this time been done to demonstrate that it would be practicable to cross the Atlantic by a steamboat.
At this time, steamboats were commonly used in the inland and coastal waters of Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, but nothing had been done so far to prove that it would be feasible to cross the Atlantic by steamboat.
In 1819, a sailing vessel, the "Savannah," fitted up with a boiler and engine and provided with a pair of paddles which could be hauled on deck at will, started from Savannah, Georgia, for Liverpool. The voyage occupied twenty-seven days. Only for three days and eight hours was the "Savannah" under steam.
In 1819, a sailing ship called the "Savannah," equipped with a boiler and engine and featuring a pair of paddles that could be brought on board as needed, departed from Savannah, Georgia, headed for Liverpool. The journey took twenty-seven days. The "Savannah" was powered by steam for only three days and eight hours.
There was nothing in this experiment to induce the conviction that steam could be successfully employed as a means of propulsion on the transatlantic service, and as a matter of fact the machinery was removed from the "Savannah" on her return to her American port, and she spent the rest of a short existence as an ordinary sailing vessel between New York and Savannah.
There was nothing in this experiment to convince anyone that steam could be effectively used for propulsion on transatlantic routes. In fact, the machinery was taken out of the "Savannah" when she returned to her American port, and she continued her short life as a regular sailing ship between New York and Savannah.
Lord Ormonde and his associates were convinced of the practicability of steam navigation across the Atlantic, but to make an enterprise of that kind a success, they would have to satisfy the public on the point, and this would involve a large outlay. In[Pg 128] asking for a fourteen years' monopoly, they argued that their proposition would not produce the ordinary ill-effects of a monopoly, as any tendency they might exhibit towards excessive charges would be held in check by sailing vessels, and by steamships, which would inevitably be run between the United States and ports on the continent of Europe.
Lord Ormonde and his colleagues were confident that steam navigation across the Atlantic was feasible, but to make such a venture successful, they needed to convince the public of this, which would require significant investment. In[Pg 128] their request for a fourteen-year monopoly, they argued that their proposal wouldn’t lead to the usual negative effects of a monopoly, since any tendency they might have to impose high prices would be kept in check by sailing vessels and by steamships that would inevitably operate between the United States and European ports.
The proposed line was to consist of six vessels, three of 1000 tons, and three of 600 tons, which would make their way across the Atlantic in pairs, one large and one small steamer. The vessels would sail together between Valentia, Ireland, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. On arrival at Halifax, the vessels would separate, one going to New York and the other to Quebec. When the two vessels reached Valentia on the voyage home, one would proceed to Glasgow, and the other to Bristol. The memorial was not entertained, and the project dropped.
The proposed line was to consist of six ships: three that were 1,000 tons and three that were 600 tons. They would cross the Atlantic in pairs, one large and one small steamer. The ships would travel together between Valentia, Ireland, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. Once they arrived at Halifax, they would split up, with one heading to New York and the other to Quebec. When the two ships got back to Valentia on the return trip, one would continue to Glasgow, and the other to Bristol. The proposal was not approved, and the project was abandoned.
Sutherland, in his personal relations, showed much more tact than Heriot; and in the controversies which arose between him and the colonial legislatures, Sutherland contrived to range himself on the side of the governors, thus making the post office one of the matters of which the ultra-British parties undertook the defence against the attacks of the Radicals.
Sutherland, in his personal interactions, demonstrated much more tact than Heriot; and in the disputes that arose between him and the colonial legislatures, Sutherland managed to align himself with the governors, making the post office one of the issues that the ultra-British factions defended against the Radicals' attacks.
But the situation of the deputy postmaster general was too difficult for him to secure unalloyed success. The various interests he had to serve, and, as far as possible, to reconcile, were too antagonistic for complete success. On the one side was a country being settled rapidly and clamouring for postal service in all directions. On the other stood the general post office fixed in its determination that its profits should not be diminished, and scanning anxiously every fresh item of expenditure.
But the deputy postmaster general’s situation was too complicated for him to achieve complete success. The different interests he had to serve and try to balance were too conflicting for total achievement. On one side was a country quickly being settled and demanding postal service in all directions. On the other side was the general post office, firmly intent on not decreasing its profits and closely monitoring every new expense.
Any serious inclination in one direction was sure to arouse resentment in the other. A curious instance of this occurred in 1819, three years after Sutherland had taken office. A number of merchants and others in Montreal appointed a committee to wait on the deputy postmaster general with a memorial containing an expression of their opinions and desires respecting the postal service in Canada.
Any strong leaning in one direction was bound to provoke anger in the other. A remarkable example of this happened in 1819, three years after Sutherland took office. Several merchants and others in Montreal formed a committee to meet with the deputy postmaster general with a petition outlining their opinions and wishes regarding the postal service in Canada.
The post office in Montreal it was urged had become unsuitable as regards site and space for the accommodation of the public, and the assistance employed by the postmaster was unequal to the requirements of an efficient service. The communications with the United States, Upper Canada and within the province, should be increased in frequency, and an interchange of mails[Pg 129] should be opened with the Genesee and other settlements in New York state by way of Prescott and Ogdensburg. The memorialists also desired that letters might be sent to the United States without prepayment of postage.
The post office in Montreal has been criticized for being inadequate in terms of location and space for public use, and the staff employed by the postmaster is not sufficient for an efficient operation. The connections with the United States, Upper Canada, and within the province should be made more frequent, and a mail exchange should be established with the Genesee and other communities in New York State via Prescott and Ogdensburg. The petitioners also requested that letters be allowed to be sent to the United States without needing to prepay postage.[Pg 129]
Sutherland, in his reply to the memorial, dealt with the committee with an engaging frankness.[188] He was well aware, he said, that the accommodation in Montreal post office was inadequate, but what was to be done? The postmaster had only £300 a year salary, and out of that he had to pay office rent and stationery. It was not to be wondered at, that the postmaster endeavoured to economize in every way possible. He, himself, had on more than one occasion advised the postmaster general of the necessity for greater clerical help, but so far without the desired effect.
Sutherland, in his response to the memorial, addressed the committee with a charming honesty.[188] He acknowledged that the Montreal post office was lacking in space, but what could be done? The postmaster earned only £300 a year, and from that, he had to cover office rent and supplies. It was no surprise that the postmaster tried to cut costs wherever he could. He had, on several occasions, suggested to the postmaster general the need for more clerical support, but so far, it had not resulted in any change.
Only the year before, Sutherland told the memorialists, he had submitted to the postmaster general with his strongest recommendation, a petition from the postmaster of Montreal for increased salary and assistance, but the petition was refused. As for the increase in the frequency of the communications it was beyond his power to authorize such an expenditure. He had done his best on two recent occasions to induce the postmaster general to allow letters to go into the United States without the prepayment of postage, but was told that British postage must be paid on letters going into foreign states.
Only the year before, Sutherland told the memorialists, he had sent a petition to the postmaster general with his strongest recommendation, requesting an increased salary and support for the postmaster of Montreal, but the petition was denied. As for increasing the frequency of communications, he didn't have the authority to approve such an expense. He had tried his best on two recent occasions to convince the postmaster general to allow letters to be sent to the United States without prepaying postage, but was informed that British postage had to be paid on letters going to foreign countries.
The memorial and Sutherland's reply were transmitted to the general post office. There they excited much indignation. Freeling, the secretary, in a minute to the postmaster general, professed his inability to understand whether this unreserved disclosure of Sutherland's proceeded merely from indiscretion or from some other motive. The postmaster general was, in effect, accused of inattention and supineness in the discharge of his duties. His decisions were placed in the most invidious light before the inhabitants of Montreal.
The memorial and Sutherland's reply were sent to the general post office. There, they caused a lot of anger. Freeling, the secretary, noted in a memo to the postmaster general that he couldn't figure out if Sutherland's open communication came from just being careless or if there was another reason behind it. The postmaster general was basically accused of being neglectful and sluggish in his job. His decisions were presented in the worst possible way to the people of Montreal.
Indeed the whole circumstance had to Freeling the air of an understanding between Sutherland and the committee. The postmaster general was equally indignant, and ordered Sutherland's dismissal. But, as so often happened, Freeling changed his attitude, urging a number of countervailing circumstances against this extreme measure, and the postmaster general, who appeared to do little more than to convert the opinions and suggestions which Freeling so humbly submitted into departmental decisions, concurred in this recommendation.[189][Pg 130]
Indeed, the whole situation gave Freeling the impression of an agreement between Sutherland and the committee. The postmaster general was just as upset and ordered Sutherland’s dismissal. But, as often happened, Freeling changed his mind, pointing out several counterarguments against such a harsh action, and the postmaster general, who seemed to do little more than turn Freeling's humble suggestions into official decisions, agreed with this recommendation.[189][Pg 130]
In 1824, Sutherland met with a serious financial loss. The postmaster at Montreal became a defaulter to the extent of £1706. Sutherland took action against the postmaster's sureties, but owing to informalities his suit was thrown out. He appealed to the general post office, alleging that the reason of his non-suit was its failure to answer certain questions which he had put to the postmaster general. The appeal was not allowed. In 1827, Sutherland retired owing to ill-health, and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Thomas Allen Stayner, the last and, in some respects, the most distinguished of the representatives of the British post office in Canada.
In 1824, Sutherland faced a significant financial loss. The postmaster in Montreal defaulted on £1706. Sutherland took legal action against the postmaster's guarantors, but due to mistakes in the process, his case was dismissed. He appealed to the general post office, claiming that the dismissal happened because they didn’t respond to certain questions he had asked the postmaster general. His appeal was denied. In 1827, Sutherland retired due to health issues and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Thomas Allen Stayner, the last and, in many ways, the most notable representative of the British post office in Canada.
FOOTNOTES:
[174] Quebec Gazette, July 17, 1826.
[177] Ibid.
[179] Ibid., C. 285, p. 63.
[180] Ibid., Br. P.O. Transcripts, III.
[182] At the inquiry respecting Hill's proposition for penny postage, the assistant secretary of the general post office stated that the American packet, which sailed from England every ten days, carried 4000 letters each voyage, which did not pass through the post office (Life of Sir Rowland Hill, by George Birkbeck Hill, I. 303).
[182] During the inquiry about Hill's idea for penny postage, the assistant secretary of the general post office mentioned that the American packet, which departed from England every ten days, carried 4,000 letters on each trip that didn't go through the post office (Life of Sir Rowland Hill, by George Birkbeck Hill, I. 303).
[187] Ibid., Q. 173, p. 372.
[189] Ibid., II.
CHAPTER VIII
Postal conditions in Upper Canada—Serious abuses—Agitation for provincial control.
Postal conditions in Upper Canada—Significant issues—Push for provincial management.
To those who have followed the course of events thus far, noting the uncompromising attitude of the general post office towards all propositions for the extension of the postal system in Canada, it will be obvious that a struggle for the means of communication impended, which the rapid growth of the country was fast precipitating.
To those who have been keeping up with the events so far, seeing the general post office's firm stance against any suggestions to expand the postal system in Canada, it will be clear that a battle for communication methods was on the horizon, driven by the country's rapid growth.
The general post office claimed that it, and it alone, had power to establish a postal service in any part of the country, and it used its arrogated powers in the same manner as any commercial monopoly would be exercised. Post offices were opened in all the better settled parts of the country, where they could be operated profitably. They were refused in the newer districts, unless satisfactory guarantees were given that there would be no loss in working them.
The general post office asserted that it was the sole authority to set up a postal service anywhere in the country, using its assumed powers just like any commercial monopoly. Post offices were established in all the more developed areas where they could operate profitably. They were not opened in newer districts unless satisfactory guarantees were provided to ensure there would be no loss in running them.
A population was coming into the country rapidly, and was tending towards the inland parts of the province far from the line of post offices which skirted the shores of the St. Lawrence and lake Ontario, and the situation was becoming embarrassing, as well as humiliating to the sensitive pride of the people.
A population was rapidly moving into the country and gravitating towards the inland areas of the province, far from the network of post offices that lined the shores of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario. This situation was becoming both awkward and humiliating for the proud feelings of the people.
It was easy enough to open post offices on the route pursued by the mail courier from the eastern boundary of the province to Niagara. But it was frequently expensive to open new routes, and the provincial government of Upper Canada was disinclined to give guarantees against loss on particular routes, while it had evidence that considerable profits were being taken from the older routes, and sent to the general post office in London.
It was straightforward to set up post offices along the route taken by the mail courier from the eastern border of the province to Niagara. However, opening new routes often came with high costs, and the provincial government of Upper Canada was not keen on providing guarantees against losses for specific routes, especially when there was clear evidence that significant profits were being generated from the existing routes and sent to the main post office in London.
Just how acute the position of matters was becoming will be clear from a survey of the distribution of population in Upper Canada at this time, with a view of the post offices provided for the accommodation of the several parts. We are able to throw out our sketch of the state of settlement in Upper Canada, by employing the results of the census of 1824.[Pg 132]
Just how serious the situation was becoming becomes evident when we look at the population distribution in Upper Canada at that time, along with the post offices available to serve the different areas. We can present an overview of the settlement conditions in Upper Canada by using the results from the 1824 census.[Pg 132]
The total population of the province in 1824 was 149,941, of whom 63,000 were in the western district, that is, west of York. Between the eastern boundary of the province and York, there were twenty-six post offices. Four of these—Perth, Lanark, Richmond and Hawkesbury—served inland settlements, the nearest of which was over twenty-five miles from the St. Lawrence. The line of settlements which these four offices served was scattered over a territory over one hundred miles in length, and from twenty to thirty in width. It comprised a population of 12,476.
The total population of the province in 1824 was 149,941, with 63,000 living in the western district, meaning west of York. Between the eastern edge of the province and York, there were twenty-six post offices. Four of these—Perth, Lanark, Richmond, and Hawkesbury—served inland communities, the closest of which was more than twenty-five miles from the St. Lawrence. The settlements these four post offices served were spread out over an area more than one hundred miles long and from twenty to thirty miles wide. This area had a population of 12,476.
The remaining twenty-two offices, east of York, were, with one exception, situated on the shores of the river St. Lawrence and lake Ontario. Each afforded accommodation to a district about fourteen miles in length, and between twenty and thirty miles in depth. The mails were carried twice a week over this route. These arrangements gave a fair service to the settlements through which the couriers passed, but they compared meanly with the daily service from New York to Buffalo, on the other side of lake Ontario.
The remaining twenty-two offices, east of York, were, with one exception, located along the shores of the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario. Each one served an area about fourteen miles long and between twenty and thirty miles deep. The mail was delivered twice a week along this route. These arrangements provided an adequate service to the communities along the way, but they were quite inferior to the daily service from New York to Buffalo, on the other side of Lake Ontario.
But it was the inland settlements west of York that had most reason to complain of the lack of facilities for communication. The Niagara peninsula, embracing the territory between lake Ontario and lake Erie, and lying west of a line dropped perpendicularly from Hamilton to lake Erie, contained a population of 20,000, distributed with fair evenness over a stretch of country forty-five miles in length, and from twenty-five to thirty in breadth.
But it was the inland towns west of York that had the most reason to complain about the lack of communication facilities. The Niagara Peninsula, covering the area between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, and lying west of a line drawn straight down from Hamilton to Lake Erie, had a population of 20,000, spread fairly evenly over a stretch of land forty-five miles long and twenty-five to thirty miles wide.
The people of this district were served by four offices on its northern border—Dundas, Grimsby, St. Catherines and Niagara—and one office—Queenstown—on its eastern border. Although there were settlements in every part of the district, there was not a single post office within it on the lake Erie shore, or, indeed, anywhere farther inland than three miles from the shore of lake Ontario, or of the Niagara river.
The people in this area were served by four offices on its northern border—Dundas, Grimsby, St. Catharines, and Niagara—and one office—Queenston—on its eastern border. While there were communities in every part of the district, there wasn’t a single post office along the Lake Erie shore or, in fact, anywhere more than three miles inland from the shores of Lake Ontario or the Niagara River.
Poorly provided as the Niagara district was, the people living in it had less ground for grievance in respect of post office facilities than the settlers in the London district. This district was an immense irregular block made up of the counties of Middlesex, Oxford, Brant, Norfolk and Elgin. It measured eighty miles in length, and from forty to fifty miles in depth. It contained in 1824 a population of 16,588, which, as in the other districts, was distributed through every part.
Poorly equipped as the Niagara area was, the people living there had fewer complaints about post office services than the settlers in the London area. This district was a huge irregular block consisting of the counties of Middlesex, Oxford, Brant, Norfolk, and Elgin. It stretched eighty miles long and was between forty to fifty miles wide. In 1824, it had a population of 16,588, which, like in the other districts, was spread throughout the entire area.
This great district had but five post offices in it, one in each county. The two offices on the lake Erie shore—Vittoria and[Pg 133] Port Talbot—were sixty miles apart; while the three offices—Burford, Woodstock and Delaware—were twenty miles from lake Erie.
This large area had only five post offices, one in each county. The two offices on the Lake Erie shore—Vittoria and [Pg 133] Port Talbot—were sixty miles apart, while the three offices—Burford, Woodstock, and Delaware—were twenty miles from Lake Erie.
As illustrating the difficulty of moving the general post office to recognize the responsibility, which its claims of a monopoly seemed to impose on it, Dr. Rolph, who represented the county of Middlesex in the house of assembly, stated[190] that before the post office was opened at Delaware, he had made application to the deputy postmaster general for a post office in Middlesex county, and was told that the office would be established in the county if he would guarantee the expenses of the conveyance of the mails, but that his application could not be considered on any other terms.
As an example of the challenge the general post office faced in acknowledging the responsibility that came with its monopoly claims, Dr. Rolph, who represented Middlesex County in the assembly, stated[190] that before the post office opened in Delaware, he had requested a post office in Middlesex County from the deputy postmaster general. He was told that the office would be set up in the county if he guaranteed the costs of transporting the mail, but that his request couldn't be considered under any other conditions.
As individual effort was plainly hopeless, the subject was taken up by the house of assembly of Upper Canada. The house dealt with the question vigorously, but not on the lines suggested by the foregoing review of the state of the postal service. More serious aspects of the case engaged their attention. Men on the streets and in farm houses believed that they were victims of imposition on the part of the deputy postmaster general, and that he was charging them more for the conveyance of their letters than the imperial statutes warranted, high as the legitimate charges were.
As individual efforts were clearly useless, the matter was taken up by the assembly of Upper Canada. The assembly approached the issue with determination, but not according to the suggestions made in the previous examination of the postal service. They focused on more serious aspects of the situation. People in the streets and in farmhouses felt that they were being cheated by the deputy postmaster general, believing that he was charging them more for delivering their letters than what the laws allowed, even though the legitimate charges were already high.
Discussion on these grievances brought the people forward to another point, and they asked themselves by what right the British government imposed on a self-governing community an institution like the post office, which not only fixed its charges without reference to the people of Upper Canada, but which insisted on preventing the people from establishing an institution of the same sort under their own authority.
Discussion about these grievances led the people to another point, and they asked themselves by what right the British government imposed an institution like the post office on a self-governing community. Not only did it set its charges without consulting the people of Upper Canada, but it also insisted on stopping the people from creating a similar institution under their own authority.
It was to these questions that the house of assembly addressed itself. The rates of postage which were charged in Canada, were collected under the authority of an act of the imperial parliament passed in 1765. This act amended the act of Queen Anne's reign, which was regarded as the charter of the post office in British America.
It was to these questions that the assembly focused its attention. The postage rates charged in Canada were collected under the authority of an act of the imperial parliament passed in 1765. This act modified the one from Queen Anne's reign, which was seen as the foundation of the post office in British America.
The rates, as fixed by the act of 1765, were, for a single sheet of paper weighing less than an ounce, fourpence-halfpenny currency, if the distance the letter was carried did not exceed sixty miles; if the distance were from sixty to one hundred miles, the charge[Pg 134] was sevenpence; from one hundred to two hundred miles, ninepence, and for every one hundred miles beyond two hundred miles, twopence.
The rates set by the act of 1765 were, for a single sheet of paper weighing less than an ounce, four and a half pence in currency, as long as the distance the letter was carried didn’t exceed sixty miles; for distances from sixty to one hundred miles, the charge[Pg 134] was seven pence; from one hundred to two hundred miles, it was nine pence, and for every additional one hundred miles beyond two hundred miles, it was two pence.
The first inquiry of the house was as to whether these rates, and no more, were charged for conveyance in Upper Canada. On February 29, 1820, William Allan, postmaster of York, was called to the bar of the house, and questioned as to the rates charged by him for letters to the several post offices in Upper Canada.
The first question from the house was whether these rates, and no more, were charged for delivery in Upper Canada. On February 29, 1820, William Allan, the postmaster of York, was called to the bar of the house and asked about the rates he charged for letters to the various post offices in Upper Canada.
Allan did not know the distance to the post offices, but he furnished the table of rates which had been given to him. The house asked one of its members, Mahlon Burwell, a land surveyor, to state the several distances, when it appeared that every rate charged by the postmaster of York, was higher than the imperial act warranted.[191]
Allan wasn't sure how far the post offices were, but he provided the rate table that he had received. The group asked one of its members, Mahlon Burwell, who was a land surveyor, to specify the different distances. It turned out that every rate set by the postmaster of York was higher than what the law allowed.[191]
Thus the legal charge on a letter to Dundas was fourpence-halfpenny. The charge made by the postmaster of York was sevenpence. On letters to Grimsby, St. Catharines, Niagara and Queenston, the legal charge was sevenpence—Allan charged tenpence. Amherstburg, which was at the western limit of the province, was between two hundred and three hundred miles from York, and the charge should have been elevenpence. Instead of this sixteen pence was charged.
Thus, the legal postage on a letter to Dundas was four and a half pence. The rate set by the postmaster of York was seven pence. For letters to Grimsby, St. Catharines, Niagara, and Queenston, the legal charge was seven pence—Allan charged ten pence. Amherstburg, located at the western edge of the province, was between two hundred and three hundred miles from York, and the charge should have been eleven pence. Instead, sixteen pence was charged.
So far the house had made out its case, and on the following day it adopted a resolution that for several years past the rates of postage charged in Upper Canada had exceeded the charges authorized by law, and that the lieutenant governor should be requested to submit the question to the imperial authorities for a remedy.
So far, the house had made its case, and the next day it passed a resolution stating that for several years, the postage rates in Upper Canada had been higher than what was allowed by law. It requested that the lieutenant governor bring this issue to the imperial authorities for a solution.
Peregrine Maitland, the lieutenant governor, did as he was requested, and, when the resolution came before the postmaster general in England, Freeling, the secretary of the general post office, admitted, in reply[192] to the postmaster general's request for information, that the rates in British North America were regulated by the imperial act of 1765, but he held that there were other circumstances to be considered.
Peregrine Maitland, the lieutenant governor, did what he was asked, and when the resolution was presented to the postmaster general in England, Freeling, the secretary of the general post office, acknowledged in response[192] to the postmaster general's request for information that the rates in British North America were governed by the imperial act of 1765, but he argued that there were other factors to take into account.
Freeling did not know whether the ordinary rates would produce sufficient revenue to cover the expenses of the service. If not, then he would refer the postmaster general to a letter written by General Hunter, the lieutenant governor in 1800, which contained[Pg 135] an undertaking on the part of the lieutenant governor that, in case there was a deficit, the amount of the shortage would be made good either from the contingencies of the province, or by a vote of the legislature. Freeling would call upon the deputy postmaster general in Canada to report whether the legal postage would be equal to the expense. If so, there was no reason to require the province to grant any aid.
Freeling wasn’t sure if the standard rates would generate enough revenue to cover the service’s costs. If they didn’t, he planned to show the postmaster general a letter from General Hunter, the lieutenant governor back in 1800, which included[Pg 135] a promise from the lieutenant governor that if there was a shortfall, the deficit would be covered either by the province’s contingency funds or through a vote by the legislature. Freeling would ask the deputy postmaster general in Canada to check if the legal postage would match the expenses. If it did, then there would be no need for the province to provide any support.
This explanation, like so many which had to be made at that period, lacked the essential element of sincerity. Hunter's engagement was to make good deficits, not by allowing illegal postal charges to be made, but by withdrawing the amount of the deficit from the provincial treasury. This was a point on which Freeling himself insisted on several occasions.
This explanation, like so many that had to be given at that time, was missing the crucial element of sincerity. Hunter's responsibility was to cover deficits, not by permitting illegal postal fees to be charged, but by taking the amount of the deficit from the provincial treasury. This was a point that Freeling himself emphasized on several occasions.
In Sir Gordon Drummond's time, there was an application from the military authorities for a more frequent service between Kingston and Montreal, which was coupled with an offer to pay such extra postage as would be necessary to cover the cost of the service desired. Freeling declared that such an offer could not be accepted, unless the additional charges were sanctioned by the British parliament.[193]
In Sir Gordon Drummond's time, the military authorities requested a more frequent service between Kingston and Montreal, along with an offer to cover any extra postage needed to pay for the desired service. Freeling stated that this offer could not be accepted unless the additional charges were approved by the British parliament.[193]
Another case, involving the same principle, arose about this time. Sutherland, the deputy postmaster general, desired to facilitate the interchange of correspondence with the United States, and reported to the postmaster general that he had arranged to have the American postage on letters coming from the United States to Canada collected by postmasters in Canada, at the same time as they collected the Canadian postage. Freeling objected to this arrangement as of doubtful legality, on the ground that the act of 1765 prescribed the amount which postmasters should take on every letter, and it might be necessary to amend the act to permit this scheme.[194]
Another case, involving the same principle, came up around this time. Sutherland, the deputy postmaster general, wanted to make it easier to exchange mail with the United States and reported to the postmaster general that he had set up a system for Canadian postmasters to collect American postage on letters coming from the U.S. at the same time they collected the Canadian postage. Freeling objected to this plan as questionable in terms of legality, arguing that the act of 1765 specified the amount postmasters should charge for each letter, and it might be necessary to change the act to allow for this arrangement.[194]
The house of assembly, however, did not wait for the answer to their remonstrance. In the following session they gave themselves up to the consideration of the more vital questions, as to "how far the present system is sanctioned by law, and whether and in what manner the same can be beneficially altered." This was not the first occasion on which the right of the British post office to collect postage in Canada was called in question.
The assembly, however, didn’t wait for a response to their complaint. In the next session, they focused on more important issues, like “how much of the current system is allowed by law, and whether and how it can be effectively changed.” This wasn’t the first time the right of the British post office to collect postage in Canada was challenged.
Governor Simcoe, in 1791,[195] assumed it as indisputable that, when a postal system was established in Upper Canada, it would[Pg 136] be under the control of the legislature, unless the British government by express enactment, retained the management of it in the hands of the British post office, paying over to the local government all surplus revenues arising therefrom. The question was not decided at that time, and it was only when the course pursued by the general post office was so unsatisfactory to Canadians that it was again raised.
Governor Simcoe, in 1791,[195] assumed it was clear that when a postal system was set up in Upper Canada, it would[Pg 136] be overseen by the legislature, unless the British government specifically decided to keep it under the control of the British post office, sending any extra revenue to the local government. This issue wasn’t resolved at that time, and it only came up again when Canadians found the approach taken by the general post office to be very unsatisfactory.
A committee was appointed in 1821, to investigate the subject with Dr. W. W. Baldwin as chairman. On December 10 the report was laid before the assembly.[196] The committee had little help from the post office in pursuit of its inquiries. The only official available, the postmaster of York, was examined, but whether from unwillingness or want of knowledge, he contributed little information to the inquiry.
A committee was formed in 1821 to look into the matter, with Dr. W. W. Baldwin as the chair. On December 10, the report was presented to the assembly.[196] The committee received minimal assistance from the post office in its investigation. The only official who was available, the postmaster of York, was questioned, but either due to reluctance or lack of knowledge, he provided very little useful information.
Allan stated that he was appointed by the deputy postmaster general under his hand and seal. He occasionally received instructions from the deputy postmaster general, but had no idea as to the authority under which the latter acted. He had never been referred to any particular statute for his guidance, and, indeed, the postage on letters within the province had been charged at arbitrary rates, which were fixed by the deputy postmaster general.
Allan said he was appointed by the deputy postmaster general with his signature and seal. He sometimes got directions from the deputy postmaster general, but had no clue about the authority the latter was operating under. He was never directed to any specific law for guidance, and in fact, the postage on letters within the province had been set at random rates determined by the deputy postmaster general.
Some valuable information respecting the revenue of his office was submitted by Allan, which completely disproved the intimation of the secretary of the general post office, that the offices in that part of the country were conducted at a loss. The post office at York yielded an annual revenue of between £800 and £900, which was remitted to the deputy postmaster general at Quebec.
Some valuable information regarding the revenue of his office was provided by Allan, which completely disproved the statement from the secretary of the general post office that the offices in that region were running at a loss. The post office at York generated an annual revenue of between £800 and £900, which was sent to the deputy postmaster general in Quebec.
The committee found it impracticable to call the postmasters of the more distant offices, but having regard to all the circumstances, they were satisfied that there was remitted each year to the deputy postmaster general at Quebec an amount exceeding £2500, of which perhaps ten per cent. or eleven per cent. was foreign postage collected in Canada, and, therefore, due to Great Britain or the United States.
The committee decided it was not practical to contact the postmasters of the more distant offices. However, considering all the circumstances, they were convinced that each year, over £2500 was sent to the deputy postmaster general in Quebec, of which around ten or eleven percent was foreign postage collected in Canada, and was therefore owed to Great Britain or the United States.
Next the committee addressed themselves to the question as to how this surplus was disposed of, which, after deducting the amount owing to the other postal administrations was probably more than £2000. Allan believed, though he was unable to give it as a fact, that the money was passed over to London. What was beyond doubt, however, was that this revenue in no way inured to the benefit of Upper Canada.[Pg 137]
Next, the committee focused on how this surplus was handled, which, after subtracting the amount owed to the other postal services, was probably over £2000. Allan believed, although he couldn't confirm it as a fact, that the money was sent to London. What was certain, however, was that this revenue did not benefit Upper Canada in any way.[Pg 137]
Assuming, as the committee felt they might safely do, that the surplus from Canada was made part of the revenue of the general post office in London, the committee then sought to ascertain how the revenue of the general post office was dealt with, and whether any part of it was employed for the benefit of the colonies.
Assuming, as the committee felt they could confidently do, that the surplus from Canada became part of the revenue for the general post office in London, the committee then aimed to find out how the revenue of the general post office was managed, and whether any portion of it was used for the benefit of the colonies.
The post office acts of 1710[197] and 1801[198] made this point clear. It appeared that after certain deductions had been made for pensions, the revenue of the post office was applied in various specified ways to the service of Great Britain, the postal rates being avowedly levied for raising the necessary supplies, and for making a permanent addition to the public revenue. The committee could find no instance in which any part of the post office revenues was devoted to the use of the colonies.
The post office acts of 1710[197] and 1801[198] made this point clear. It seemed that after certain deductions for pensions, the post office's revenue was used in various specific ways for the service of Great Britain, with postal rates clearly intended to raise necessary funds and contribute permanently to the public revenue. The committee couldn't find any case where part of the post office revenues was used for the colonies.
Taking it, then, as established that a sum exceeding £2000 was raised each year in Upper Canada as profit from its post office, and that this sum was applied, not for the benefit of Upper Canada, but for the purposes of the public service in Great Britain, the committee next turned its attention to the laws bearing on the situation.
Taking it as a given that over £2000 was raised each year in Upper Canada as profit from its post office, and that this amount was used, not for the benefit of Upper Canada, but for public service in Great Britain, the committee then shifted its focus to the laws relevant to the situation.
There was an act passed in 1778[199] in the hope of staying the rising rebellion in the American colonies entitled "an act for removing all doubts and apprehensions concerning taxation by the parliament of Great Britain in any of the colonies and plantations in North America and the West Indies." It declared that the king and parliament would not impose any duty, tax or assessment whatever, payable in any of the colonies in North America or the West Indies, except any such duties as it might be expedient to impose for the regulation of commerce.
There was a law passed in 1778[199] aimed at calming the growing rebellion in the American colonies called "an act for removing all doubts and apprehensions concerning taxation by the parliament of Great Britain in any of the colonies and plantations in North America and the West Indies." It stated that the king and parliament would not impose any duties, taxes, or assessments of any kind, payable in any of the colonies in North America or the West Indies, except for those it might find necessary for regulating commerce.
But although the collection of such duties should be made by officials of the British government, it was not intended that the proceeds should go into the British treasury; for it was provided that the net produce from them should be paid over to the colony in which they were levied, to form part of the general revenue of such colony. This seems sufficiently explicit, but that there might be no doubt as to the applicability of the provisions of this act to the provinces of Canada, they were expressly incorporated in the constitutional act of 1791, which was the charter under which the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada were established.
But even though the collection of these duties was to be handled by officials of the British government, it wasn’t meant for the proceeds to go into the British treasury. Instead, it was stipulated that the net revenue from them should be paid to the colony where they were collected, contributing to the general revenue of that colony. This is pretty clear, but to eliminate any doubt about the application of this act's provisions to the provinces of Canada, they were specifically included in the constitutional act of 1791, which was the charter that established the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada.
As in the act of 1778, there was reserved to the British parliament,[Pg 138] in the general interest of the empire, the power to make laws for the regulation of commerce, but there was also the same stipulation that the proceeds from such laws should be applied to the use of the province in which the taxes were levied, and in any manner the legislature of the province might think fit.
As established in the 1778 act, the British Parliament[Pg 138] retained the authority to create laws governing trade in the overall interest of the empire. However, there was also a similar agreement that the revenue from these laws would be used for the province where the taxes were collected, and in whatever way the provincial legislature deemed appropriate.
Applying the acts of 1778 and 1791 to the circumstances of the case in hand, the committee were of opinion that the collection of postage could not be regarded as a regulation of commerce, and as such within the scope of imperial legislation.
Applying the acts of 1778 and 1791 to the situation at hand, the committee believed that collecting postage couldn't be seen as a regulation of commerce and, therefore, wasn't within the scope of imperial legislation.
But even if it should appear that they were wrong in this opinion, and that the British government had the power to set up a post office in Upper Canada with the exclusive right to carry letters within the province, there was one thing the British government could not properly do. While the constitutional act of 1791 remained unrepealed, the British government could not take the net produce from the post office in Upper Canada, and use it as part of the general revenue of Great Britain.
But even if it seems like they were mistaken in their belief, and that the British government had the authority to establish a post office in Upper Canada with the exclusive right to handle mail within the province, there was one thing the British government couldn't justifiably do. As long as the constitutional act of 1791 was still in effect, the British government couldn't take the profits from the post office in Upper Canada and use them as part of Great Britain's overall revenue.
Having satisfied themselves that, however strong the grounds might be on which the postmaster general of England had proceeded in establishing a post office in Canada, they could not prevail against the acts which have been considered, the committee next gave their attention to inquiring what those grounds might be, and how far they would bear out the pretensions of the postmaster general.
Having confirmed that, no matter how valid the reasons were for the postmaster general of England establishing a post office in Canada, they couldn’t overcome the relevant laws they had reviewed, the committee then focused on investigating what those reasons might be and to what extent they supported the claims of the postmaster general.
The two acts, which it seemed to the committee the postmaster general would most likely depend upon, were the acts of 1710 and of 1801. The act of 1710, which was the charter for the post office in British America, was dismissed from consideration as not even by its own provisions applying to the colony of Canada, and as annulled so far as concerned any of the colonies by the act of 1778, and as regards Canada by the constitutional act of 1791.
The two laws that the committee thought the postmaster general would rely on the most were the laws from 1710 and 1801. The 1710 law, which was the charter for the post office in British America, was ruled out because it didn’t even apply to the colony of Canada according to its own terms, and it was canceled for all the colonies by the law of 1778, and for Canada by the constitutional act of 1791.
The second of the two acts—that of 1801—repealed all the rates of postage enacted by the act of 1710, and fixed new rates for Great Britain, but made no mention of new colonial rates. Hence, since 1801, there had been no colonial postage rates having the sanction of law, and the committee concluded that the colonies were designedly omitted, when the rates for Great Britain were fixed by the act of 1801, for the reason that the act of 1778 supervened, which made it illegal for the British parliament to impose a tax on a colony for the financial benefit of Great Britain.
The second of the two acts—that of 1801—repealed all the postage rates established by the act of 1710 and set new rates for Great Britain, but it didn't mention new rates for the colonies. Therefore, since 1801, there have been no lawful postage rates for the colonies, and the committee concluded that the colonies were intentionally left out when the rates for Great Britain were set by the act of 1801, because the act of 1778 came into play, which made it illegal for the British Parliament to impose a tax on a colony for the financial benefit of Great Britain.
The committee admitted that it was a matter for argument whether the unrepealed parts of the act of 1710 might not be held[Pg 139] applicable to Canada, but conceding the whole argument on this point, the utmost power remaining in the act was to authorize the establishment of a postal system in Canada. All power to fix the postal charges was taken away by the act of 1801.
The committee acknowledged that it was debatable whether the parts of the act of 1710 that hadn't been repealed could still be considered relevant to Canada, but even stepping back on this issue, the only authority left in the act was to allow the creation of a postal system in Canada. The authority to set postal rates was completely removed by the act of 1801.
As for the act of 1801, which established a scale of rates, by no liberality of construction could it be made to apply to Canada, because the act of 1778 was against it, and the constitutional act of 1791 was against it, and the fact that the revenues to be raised by the act were to be appropriated to the purposes of the United Kingdom made it illegal for the postmaster general to enforce it in the province.
As for the act of 1801, which set a rate scale, it could by no stretch of the imagination be applied to Canada, because the act of 1778 prohibited it, and the constitutional act of 1791 was also against it. Additionally, since the revenues generated by the act were to be allocated for the purposes of the United Kingdom, it was illegal for the postmaster general to enforce it in the province.
There were other acts passed by the imperial parliament affecting the postage rates, but an examination of these disclosed no intention to make the acts operative in the colonies. Rates were fixed for conveyance in the United Kingdom, and to and from the colonies in America, but nothing was said as to the rates within the colonies. It was quite clear to the committee, therefore, that the only acts, which by any possibility could be made applicable to the colonies, were inoperative in the Canadas.
There were other laws passed by the imperial parliament that impacted postage rates, but looking into these revealed no intention to apply them in the colonies. Rates were set for transportation within the United Kingdom and to and from the colonies in America, but nothing was mentioned about the rates within the colonies themselves. It was quite clear to the committee, then, that the only laws that could possibly apply to the colonies were not in effect in Canada.
The committee clinched the argument by a survey of the laws passed by the British parliament, levying taxes on the colonies. They showed that whenever such taxes were imposed, the proceeds were never applied to the purposes of the United Kingdom, but always to the use of the colony concerned. There was an act passed in 1764 imposing duties on the sugar plantations. The revenue was devoted to the protection of their trade.
The committee won the argument by looking at the laws passed by the British parliament that taxed the colonies. They demonstrated that whenever these taxes were imposed, the money was never used for the needs of the United Kingdom, but always for the benefit of the specific colony. There was an act passed in 1764 that placed duties on sugar plantations, and the revenue was used to protect their trade.
The Quebec revenue act of 1774[200] was the other case. This act imposed duties on rum, brandy, and other liquors coming into the province, and employed the proceeds for the establishment of a fund to aid in defraying the charges of the administration of justice and of the civil government in the province of Quebec. It was clear, then, that the acts of 1778 and 1791 contained no new principle, but were simply declaratory of the steady policy of the British government as disclosed by a review of its earlier practice; and everything combined to satisfy the committee that the legislature of the mother country never contemplated the raising of a tax by inland postage in the colony of Upper Canada.
The Quebec revenue act of 1774[200] was another example. This act placed duties on rum, brandy, and other liquors entering the province and used the money to set up a fund to help cover the costs of administering justice and running the civil government in Quebec. It was clear that the acts of 1778 and 1791 introduced no new principle but were merely a reflection of the consistent policy of the British government as shown by a look at its earlier actions; and everything led the committee to conclude that the legislature of the mother country never intended to impose a tax through inland postage in the colony of Upper Canada.
The committee concluded by submitting for the acceptance of the house a resolution to the effect that the present system of public posts for the conveyance of letters within the province had grown into use without the sanction of law, and that a bill should be introduced[Pg 140] establishing public posts and fixing the rates of postage on letters and packets for the purpose of raising a permanent revenue, applicable solely to the improvement of the roads throughout the province.
The committee wrapped up by presenting a resolution for the approval of the house, stating that the current system for public mail delivery in the province had developed without legal approval, and that a bill should be introduced[Pg 140] to establish official mail services and set rates for postage on letters and packages to generate a steady income, designated exclusively for improving the roads across the province.
The proposition of the assembly was thoroughly conservative. It was simply that the profits from the post office should be devoted to improving the means by which the post office was carried on. Settlements were springing up in all parts of the province which reason and policy made it necessary to connect with the more central districts, and it was only proper that the profits arising from the system should be used for improving and extending it.
The assembly's proposal was entirely conservative. It was just that the profits from the post office should be used to enhance the services provided by the post office. New communities were emerging throughout the province, and it made sense—both logically and strategically—to link them to the more central areas. Therefore, it was only right that the profits generated by the system should be used to improve and expand it.
At this period and for a long time afterwards the roads throughout the province were in a wretched condition. One of the principal mail contractors informed a committee of the house in 1829, that all the main roads in the province were very bad, and that those in the neighbourhood of York were bringing discredit on the inhabitants. The deputy postmaster general informed the same committee that he had just been advised that the contractors on the road from Montreal to Niagara had to swim their horses over some of the rivers on the route, the bridges having been carried away.
At this time and for a long while after, the roads across the province were in terrible shape. In 1829, one of the main mail contractors told a committee of the house that all the major roads in the province were really bad, and that those around York were embarrassing for the residents. The deputy postmaster general informed the same committee that he had just been told that the contractors on the road from Montreal to Niagara had to swim their horses across some of the rivers on the route, as the bridges had been washed away.
Peregrine Maitland, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, forwarded the report of the committee of 1821 to the colonial office, with a letter in which he explained that what the legislature desired was to have the control of the provincial posts vested in them, or at least to have a deputy postmaster general for Upper Canada. With the latter request he fully sympathised, as he was convinced that a deputy postmaster general residing in Quebec could not possibly appreciate the requirements of the rapidly rising communities, situated so far from his headquarters.
Peregrine Maitland, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, sent the 1821 committee report to the colonial office, along with a letter explaining that the legislature wanted control of the provincial post offices or, at the very least, a deputy postmaster general for Upper Canada. He completely agreed with the latter request, as he believed that a deputy postmaster general based in Quebec would not be able to understand the needs of the fast-growing communities that were far from his headquarters.
The lieutenant governor shared the opinion of the legislature that it was contrary to the acts of 1778 and 1791 to send remittances from Canada to England, but he did not believe that the legislature would have concerned themselves with the subject, if the post office authorities had provided a satisfactory service.
The lieutenant governor agreed with the legislature that it went against the laws of 1778 and 1791 to send money from Canada to England, but he thought that the legislature wouldn't have worried about this issue if the postal service had delivered a reliable service.
At the general post office in London the report was turned over to the solicitor with directions to prepare a case for submission to the law officers of the crown. The law officers were requested to give their opinion as to whether the postmaster general of the United Kingdom had the right to control and manage the internal posts in the provinces of North America, and, if so, whether the proceeds derived from the inland conveyance of letters in North[Pg 141] America ought to be paid into the exchequer of the United Kingdom or whether they ought to be applied to the use of the province from which they were taken.
At the main post office in London, the report was handed over to the lawyer with instructions to prepare a case to present to the law officers of the crown. The law officers were asked to provide their opinion on whether the postmaster general of the United Kingdom had the authority to control and manage the internal postal system in the provinces of North America, and if so, whether the revenue generated from the domestic delivery of letters in North[Pg 141] America should be deposited into the UK treasury or used for the benefit of the province it came from.
But the case as prepared did not reach the law officers. The postmaster general had the good sense to see that his case was precarious, and he did not care to risk an adverse decision.
But the case that was prepared didn't get to the law officers. The postmaster general had the good sense to realize that his case was risky, and he didn't want to take the chance of an unfavorable decision.
Freeling, accordingly, wrote to Maitland,[201] admitting that the postal transactions of Upper and Lower Canada together showed a small surplus, but he inclined to the view that the share of Upper Canada in the surplus must be very small. A number of post offices had been opened in Upper Canada and the impression in the general post office was that they were unprofitable.
Freeling, therefore, wrote to Maitland,[201] admitting that the postal transactions of Upper and Lower Canada together showed a small surplus, but he believed that Upper Canada's portion of the surplus had to be very limited. Several post offices had been opened in Upper Canada, and the general post office felt that they were not profitable.
If, as Maitland had intimated, the wishes of Upper Canada would be satisfied by the appointment of a separate deputy postmaster general for Upper Canada, the postmaster general, Freeling informed the governor, would make no difficulty on the point, but would naturally select for the position one of the more experienced officers such as the postmaster of York or of Kingston.
If, as Maitland had suggested, the desires of Upper Canada would be met by appointing a separate deputy postmaster general for Upper Canada, the postmaster general, Freeling told the governor, wouldn’t have any issues with that. He would naturally choose someone more experienced for the position, like the postmaster of York or Kingston.
In the meantime, while the report of 1821 was being discussed by the secretary of the post office and the lieutenant governor, the members of the assembly were endeavouring to procure further information to strengthen the position they had taken. They desired to learn definitely the amount which was sent to London as postal revenue. The postmaster of York could tell them little beyond the transactions of his own office, but the contribution from that office made it clear that the revenue from the whole province must be considerable.
In the meantime, while the 1821 report was being discussed by the post office secretary and the lieutenant governor, the assembly members were trying to get more information to support their position. They wanted to know the exact amount sent to London as postal revenue. The postmaster of York could only provide details about his own office, but the revenue from that office indicated that the total revenue from the entire province must be significant.
No information could be obtained by direct inquiry of the deputy postmaster general, but it was thought that the post office would not refuse to answer a question on the subject asked by a member of parliament.
No information could be obtained by directly asking the deputy postmaster general, but it was believed that the post office wouldn’t refuse to answer a question on the topic posed by a member of parliament.
A question was accordingly put in the house of commons in 1822, but Freeling informed the representative of the post office[202] in the house of commons that the information should not be given, as the provinces were manifesting a disposition to interfere with the internal posts, and to appropriate their revenues to their own purposes, instead of allowing them to flow into the exchequer of the United Kingdom. The maintenance of the packet service, he declared to be of the greatest political importance, as ensuring despatches against passing through foreign hands.[Pg 142]
A question was raised in the House of Commons in 1822, but Freeling told the representative of the post office that the information shouldn’t be disclosed, as the provinces were showing a tendency to interfere with the internal postal systems and divert their revenues for their own use, rather than letting them go into the UK’s treasury. He stated that maintaining the packet service was critically important for political reasons, as it ensured that dispatches wouldn't fall into foreign hands.[Pg 142]
The course pursued by the post office under the influence of Freeling was in no way creditable to it. At a time when it was making grudging admissions that there was a small profit from the Canadian post offices, there was being sent over to London from the two provinces a sum exceeding £6000 a year, an amount which, wisely spent, would have been a considerable contribution to the road fund of the provinces.
The approach taken by the post office under Freeling's influence was anything but commendable. While it was reluctantly acknowledging a small profit from the Canadian post offices, over £6000 a year was being sent to London from the two provinces, an amount that, if used wisely, could have made a significant contribution to the provinces' road fund.
The packet, the importance of which Freeling emphasized, was scarcely of any utility to the people of the Canadas. The service by the packets was so slow and expensive that it was not employed at all for commercial or social correspondence, the merchants in London and Liverpool using exclusively the lines of sailing vessels running between Liverpool and New York. But Freeling was obstinate and often disingenuous in maintaining his view that it was proper that the surplus revenues from the provincial post offices should be turned into the British exchequer.
The packet, which Freeling stressed was important, was hardly useful to the people of Canada. The service provided by the packets was so slow and costly that it wasn't used for business or personal communication at all; merchants in London and Liverpool relied solely on the sailing ships operating between Liverpool and New York. However, Freeling was stubborn and often misleading in his insistence that the extra revenue from the provincial post offices should go to the British treasury.
The disinclination of the general post office to discuss the question of the colonial post office was not likely to suppress the subject for long. The assembly of Upper Canada had too strong a case. The political grievances from which the province was suffering were bringing into the political life of Upper Canada a group of men to voice the general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs, and so undeniable an abuse could not remain unexploited.
The general post office's reluctance to talk about the issue of the colonial post office wasn't going to keep the topic quiet for long. The assembly of Upper Canada had a solid argument. The political problems that the province was facing were bringing together a group of individuals who were ready to express the widespread discontent with the situation, and such a clear abuse couldn't be ignored.
The house, which adopted the resolution of 1821, was on the whole favourable to the lieutenant governor and his advisers. The succeeding house, which was elected in 1825, contained a majority opposed to the government. This fact did not, however, lead to the overthrow of the lieutenant governor's advisers. They were his own choice and were in no sense responsible to the house. It was not until sixteen years later that responsible government, as now understood, was established in Canada.
The house, which passed the resolution of 1821, was generally supportive of the lieutenant governor and his advisors. The next house, elected in 1825, had a majority that opposed the government. However, this didn’t result in the removal of the lieutenant governor's advisors. They were his own appointment and weren’t accountable to the house. It wasn’t until sixteen years later that responsible government, as we understand it today, was established in Canada.
The turn of affairs in 1825, which placed the control of the house in the hands of the opponents of the government had its effect on the attitude of the parties towards the provincial post office. In 1821, the lieutenant governor cordially supported the views of the house, and did what he could to make them prevail with the postmaster general. In 1825, when the post office grievance was brought up for discussion, the lieutenant governor's party upheld the position taken by the postmaster general in England.
The change in events in 1825, which gave control of the house to the government opponents, affected how the parties viewed the provincial post office. In 1821, the lieutenant governor fully backed the house's views and did everything he could to make them known to the postmaster general. However, in 1825, when the issue with the post office was discussed, the lieutenant governor's party supported the stance of the postmaster general in England.
The consequence was that, for the opposition, the post office was but one more of the many matters calling for redress, while[Pg 143] for the government party it was another element in the burden which they had to sustain in their resistance to reform.
The result was that, for the opposition, the post office was just one more issue in need of fixing, while[Pg 143] for the government party, it was another part of the struggle they had to bear in their fight against reform.
In the beginning of 1825, William Lyon Mackenzie presented a petition to the house of assembly to have the affairs of the post office investigated. Mackenzie, who had come to Upper Canada in 1820, was engaged in business until 1824, when, impressed with the various political abuses from which the country was suffering, he abandoned what had every appearance of a successful career, and gave himself to agitation. He established a newspaper—The Colonial Advocate—in 1824, and in 1828 secured a seat in the house of assembly. These vehicles of publicity he employed in ceaseless attacks on the governing clique, which from the intimacy of the ties binding its members together was known as the Family Compact, and became the principal actor in the abortive rebellion of 1837. The post office as then managed incurred his unremitting hostility.
In early 1825, William Lyon Mackenzie submitted a petition to the house of assembly to investigate the operations of the post office. Mackenzie, who arrived in Upper Canada in 1820, was involved in business until 1824 when he became aware of the various political abuses plaguing the country. He left what seemed like a successful career to focus on activism. He started a newspaper—The Colonial Advocate—in 1824, and in 1828 he won a seat in the house of assembly. He used these platforms to relentlessly criticize the governing group known as the Family Compact, which was closely connected by personal ties and emerged as a key player in the failed rebellion of 1837. He was consistently hostile toward the way the post office was managed at the time.
A committee was appointed having as chairman Captain John Matthews, who represented the county of Middlesex along with Dr. Rolph, subsequently one of the leaders of rebellion in 1837. Matthews was a retired army officer, who entertained advanced political views, which were irritating to the lieutenant governor. He was later on made to feel the lieutenant governor's resentment for his opposition. As chairman of the committee Matthews reported on the 9th of March, 1825,[203] that it was in evidence that there were abuses which would be remedied, if the post offices in the province were, as they should be, under the control and supervision of the legislature.
A committee was formed, chaired by Captain John Matthews, who represented Middlesex County along with Dr. Rolph, later one of the leaders of the 1837 rebellion. Matthews was a retired army officer with progressive political views that annoyed the lieutenant governor. Eventually, he experienced the lieutenant governor's resentment for his dissent. As the chairman of the committee, Matthews reported on March 9, 1825,[203] that it was evident there were issues that could be fixed if the province's post offices were, as they should be, under the control and oversight of the legislature.
The committee found that there were many populous districts, in which post offices were much required; that many postmasters performed their duties indifferently, letters and newspapers being opened and read before being delivered; and that complaints to the deputy postmaster general had no appreciable effect. The mail bags, the committee also discovered, were often filled with goods, having nothing to do with the post office, to the injury of contractors as well as of the post office revenues.
The committee discovered that there were many busy areas where post offices were greatly needed; that several postmasters were doing their jobs poorly, with letters and newspapers being opened and read before delivery; and that complaints made to the deputy postmaster general had little impact. The committee also found that mail bags were often filled with items unrelated to the post office, which harmed both the contractors and the post office's revenues.
Editors of newspapers, it was also ascertained, suffered from the hardship of having to pay the postage on their newspapers in advance, and the committee recommended that the postage on newspapers should be collected as the postage on letters was, from those who received the newspapers. Letters on public business should, in the opinion of the committee, be carried free[Pg 144] of postage; and the surplus revenue should be expended on the public roads and bridges which were in a deplorable state.
Editors of newspapers were also found to be burdened by the need to pay for postage on their newspapers upfront. The committee suggested that newspaper postage should be collected in the same way as letter postage, from those who received the newspapers. The committee believed that letters related to public business should be sent without any postage fees, and any extra revenue should be used to improve the public roads and bridges, which were in terrible condition.[Pg 144]
The final conclusion of the committee was that the provincial legislature should take on itself the entire management of the post office, even though this should involve some temporary expense. It was not anticipated that such would be the case, but in any event the deficits would be of short duration.
The committee ultimately decided that the provincial legislature should take over the entire management of the post office, even if it meant incurring some temporary costs. They didn't expect this to happen, but in any case, the deficits would be short-lived.
In the following session—1826—the post office was again discussed. This time the discussion was on a motion of Charles Fothergill to take into consideration the state of the province. Fothergill was king's printer, and had been postmaster of Port Hope. He was dismissed from the post office for his criticism of the administration, and was soon to be deprived of the office of king's printer, on account of his advocacy of measures distasteful to the lieutenant governor.
In the next session—1826—the post office was discussed again. This time, the conversation revolved around a motion by Charles Fothergill to consider the state of the province. Fothergill was the king's printer and had been the postmaster of Port Hope. He got fired from the post office for criticizing the administration and was soon going to lose his position as king's printer because of his support for measures that the lieutenant governor didn't like.
Fothergill in his attack on the post office,[204] had the advantages of experience, and of some inside knowledge. Arguing from the revenue of Port Hope, he declared his belief that the sum remitted to London each year could not be less than £10,000, and that the business was increasing so rapidly that in a few years the surplus revenue from the post office would pay the whole expenses of civil government in the province.
Fothergill, in his criticism of the post office,[204] had the benefits of experience and some insider knowledge. Using the revenue from Port Hope as a basis, he expressed his belief that the amount sent to London each year was no less than £10,000, and that the business was growing so quickly that in a few years, the extra revenue from the post office would cover all the expenses of civil government in the province.
Some of the postmasters, Fothergill complained, acted with much insolence towards those not in favour with the government. Their newspapers were thrown about. Their letters were handed to them open. The mails were often opened in public bar rooms. Sutherland, the deputy postmaster general, had admitted to Fothergill that he was ignorant of the geography of the province, which was a strong reason for the appointment of a resident deputy postmaster general. Fothergill's great objection to the existing arrangements was that they were unconstitutional, and that the tax on newspapers was so oppressive as to check their circulation. To test the feeling of the house Fothergill offered a resolution declaring that the acts of 1778 and 1791 were part of the constitution of the province.
Some of the postmasters, Fothergill complained, behaved very arrogantly towards those who weren’t in the government’s good graces. Their newspapers were carelessly tossed around. Their letters were given to them open. The mail was often opened in public bars. Sutherland, the deputy postmaster general, admitted to Fothergill that he didn’t know the geography of the province, which was a strong argument for appointing a local deputy postmaster general. Fothergill's main issue with the current setup was that it was unconstitutional and that the tax on newspapers was so burdensome that it hindered their distribution. To gauge the sentiment of the house, Fothergill proposed a resolution stating that the acts of 1778 and 1791 were part of the province's constitution.
John Beverly Robinson, the attorney general, traversed Fothergill's statements, and desired the house to take satisfaction from the fact that all the other colonies sent their surplus post office revenues to the general post office, without remonstrance. He did not believe that any large sum was sent from Canada. Indeed, Freeling told him (what was quite untrue) that the Canadian post office was a burden on the home department.[Pg 145]
John Beverly Robinson, the attorney general, went through Fothergill's statements and wanted the house to take comfort in the fact that all the other colonies sent their extra post office revenues to the general post office without complaint. He didn’t think that Canada sent a significant amount. In fact, Freeling told him (which was completely untrue) that the Canadian post office was a strain on the home department.[Pg 145]
Fothergill was supported by Rolph, and also by Bidwell, one of the leaders of the opposition, and afterwards speaker of the house. Rolph recalled that the postmasters who had appeared before the committee testified that the provincial post office was a remunerative institution. He was satisfied that it could not be otherwise, as he had learned by experience that a post office, however much required, would not be opened until the deputy postmaster general was guaranteed against any loss which might arise. But even if the post office could be shown to be unproductive, he would propose to take it off the hands of the mother country while it was a burden to her, and not to wait until it began to be profitable.
Fothergill was backed by Rolph and also by Bidwell, one of the opposition leaders and later the speaker of the house. Rolph remembered that the postmasters who had appeared before the committee testified that the provincial post office was a profitable venture. He was convinced it couldn't be anything else, as he had learned from experience that a post office, no matter how necessary, wouldn't be opened until the deputy postmaster general was assured against any potential losses. But even if the post office could be shown to be unprofitable, he would suggest taking it off the mother country's hands while it was still a burden to her, rather than waiting until it became profitable.
Rolph moved an address to the king affirming that the present system was being carried on contrary to the act of 1791, an act which was held by the house to be a fundamental part of the constitution of the province; that a well-regulated post office, responsible to the constituted authorities of the province, and extended in the number of its establishments would tend to correct and prevent abuses which were found to exist under the present system, would facilitate commercial intercourse, promote the diffusion of knowledge and would eventually become an important branch of the provincial revenue. The assembly therefore begged, with many expressions of loyalty and gratitude, that the control and emoluments of the post office so far as they concerned the province might be conceded to them. There was some opposition to Rolph's motion. Eventually the address was adopted by a vote of nineteen to five.
Rolph presented a petition to the king stating that the current system was operating in violation of the act of 1791, which the assembly considered a fundamental part of the province's constitution. He argued that a properly managed post office, accountable to the province's authorities and with more facilities, would help fix and prevent the issues seen in the existing system. It would also make trade easier, spread knowledge, and ultimately become a significant source of revenue for the province. Therefore, the assembly respectfully requested, with many expressions of loyalty and gratitude, that they be given control over and the benefits from the post office as it relates to the province. There was some opposition to Rolph's motion, but eventually, the petition was approved with a vote of nineteen to five.
The address, which it will be recalled had originated with the opposition, was laid before the colonial office under very different circumstances from those attending the report of 1821. On that occasion, the memorial was brought to the foot of the throne with the good wishes of both the government and the legislature. It was accompanied by a letter from the lieutenant governor, commending it to the favourable consideration of the home authorities.
The address, which originated from the opposition, was presented to the colonial office under very different circumstances than those surrounding the report of 1821. At that time, the memorial was brought before the throne with the support of both the government and the legislature. It was accompanied by a letter from the lieutenant governor, urging the home authorities to consider it favorably.
The address of 1826 was also accompanied by a letter[205] from the lieutenant governor, but so far from commending it, the purpose of the letter was to suggest an answer confuting the arguments of the assembly. Dealing first with the allegation of the assembly that the postage charges were a tax, and as such repugnant to the act of 1778, Maitland recalled Franklin's contention before the British house of commons in 1765, that postage[Pg 146] duty was not a tax, but rather a consideration for a service performed, and exacted only from those who chose to avail themselves of that service.
The address of 1826 also came with a letter[205] from the lieutenant governor. Instead of supporting it, the letter aimed to refute the assembly's arguments. Addressing the assembly's claim that postage charges were a tax, which went against the act of 1778, Maitland referenced Franklin's argument made before the British House of Commons in 1765, that postage duty was not a tax but a fee for a service rendered, and it was only charged to those who chose to use that service.
Assuming, as the governor did, that the revolted colonies generally acquiesced in the justice of Franklin's view, while objecting to other duties as unconstitutional, he could not see on what valid grounds the legislature rested its case. This reasoning is directly the opposite of the view expressed by the lieutenant governor in 1821. He then gave it as his opinion that the acts of 1778 and 1791 made it illegal for the Canadian post office to make remittances to London of surplus revenue, but that the matter would not have been noticed in the province, if a satisfactory service had been given by the deputy postmaster general.
Assuming, like the governor did, that the rebellious colonies mostly agreed with Franklin's perspective on justice, while rejecting other duties as unconstitutional, he couldn't understand the valid reasons behind the legislature's stance. This line of reasoning is completely opposite to what the lieutenant governor stated in 1821. He expressed his belief that the laws from 1778 and 1791 made it illegal for the Canadian post office to send surplus revenue to London, but that this issue wouldn't have been raised in the province if the deputy postmaster general had provided acceptable service.
Indeed, Maitland left no doubt that his real opinion was unchanged, for he went on to intimate that he would not depend upon Franklin's argument, if it could be shown that there was any considerable surplus from the postal operations in Upper Canada. The lieutenant governor enjoyed his little excursions among the statutes, however, and although the postmaster general had the benefit of the advice of the law officers of the crown, Sir Peregrine did not scruple to take on himself the rôle of legal adviser of the general post office.
Indeed, Maitland made it clear that his true opinion remained unchanged, as he went on to suggest that he wouldn't rely on Franklin's argument if it could be demonstrated that there was any significant surplus from the postal operations in Upper Canada. The lieutenant governor took pleasure in his brief explorations of the statutes, and even though the postmaster general had the support of the crown's legal advisors, Sir Peregrine was not hesitant to assume the role of legal advisor for the general post office.
Even if the duties were declared to be a tax within the meaning of the act of 1778, since the duties were collected under the amendment of 1765 to the act of 1710 which was anterior to the act of 1778, Maitland argued that it was questionable whether their collection could be regarded as a violation of the act of 1778. But there was one person to whom this gratuitous argument carried no conviction, and that was the propounder of it himself. He would still hark back to his underlying idea, and intimated his persuasion that the British government had no desire to raise a revenue from the colonies through the post office, and suggested that if it could be shown that the post office yielded a large revenue after paying the charges, the government would be prepared to reduce the rates or to place the surplus at the disposal of the colony.
Even if the duties were classified as a tax under the 1778 law, Maitland argued that since the duties were collected under the 1765 amendment to the 1710 act, which came before the 1778 law, it was debatable whether their collection could be seen as a breach of the 1778 act. However, there was one person who wasn't convinced by this argument, and that was Maitland himself. He continued to cling to his core belief and suggested that the British government didn't actually want to generate revenue from the colonies through the post office. He indicated that if it could be demonstrated that the post office brought in significant revenue after expenses, the government would be willing to lower the rates or allocate the surplus to the colony.
Although the assembly stated that it would be desirable in the interests of the province to have the post office under the control of its legislature, the lieutenant governor believed that the preponderance of the better opinion, whether in or out of the assembly, would be found opposed to that proposition. It would be impossible to carry on an independent system in an inland province,[Pg 147] and the attempt to do so would involve the colony in heavy expenditure. The lieutenant governor discredited entirely the allegations that there were abuses in the service, and he had much reason for thinking that Sutherland, the deputy postmaster general, discharged his duties to the general satisfaction of the public.
Although the assembly suggested that it would be beneficial for the province to have the post office managed by its legislature, the lieutenant governor felt that most people, both inside and outside the assembly, would disagree with that idea. It would be impossible to maintain an independent system in an inland province,[Pg 147] and trying to do so would lead to significant expenses for the colony. The lieutenant governor completely dismissed the claims that there were issues with the service, and he had ample reason to believe that Sutherland, the deputy postmaster general, was performing his duties to the public's overall satisfaction.
Maitland's letter, which bears all the marks of having been written by the attorney general, Beverly Robinson, is a capital illustration of the vicious circle of deception sometimes practised by persons having a common purpose with reference to a scheme. The official class in York, as well as the secretary of the general post office, desired to defeat the wishes of the house of assembly respecting the post office, the family compact group, because any victory gained by the house threatened the privileges enjoyed by that class; Freeling, secretary of the post office, because it would diminish the revenues of which he was a most zealous guardian.
Maitland's letter, showing all the signs of being written by Attorney General Beverly Robinson, is a prime example of the self-perpetuating cycle of deception sometimes employed by people with a common goal regarding a scheme. The official class in York, along with the secretary of the general post office, wanted to undermine the house of assembly's wishes about the post office and the family compact group, as any success the house achieved threatened the privileges held by that class; Freeling, the secretary of the post office, because it would reduce the revenues he was fiercely protective of.
Freeling told the attorney general that the Canadian post office was a burden on the revenues of the general post office, and the attorney general, accepting this statement, told the secretary that such being the case, the statutes on which the house of assembly relied were not applicable. The secretary's statement was demonstrably incorrect, but it furnished the foundation for the opinion which he desired, that the law did not require, nor did expediency suggest, the transfer to the Upper Canadian legislature of the control of the post office in that province.
Freeling informed the attorney general that the Canadian post office was straining the finances of the general post office. The attorney general, agreeing with this claim, told the secretary that since that was the situation, the laws that the house of assembly relied on weren't relevant. The secretary's claim was clearly wrong, but it provided the basis for the opinion he wanted, which was that the law didn't require and common sense didn't recommend handing over control of the post office in that province to the Upper Canadian legislature.
Robinson wrote to Freeling supporting the views of the lieutenant governor; and at the same time Freeling received a letter from Markland, a member of the executive and legislative council of Upper Canada, protesting against the attempt on the part of the assembly to interfere with the post office as the assumption of a right to which they had not the least pretension. The best-intentioned and the best-informed people in the province were against such interference.
Robinson wrote to Freeling backing the lieutenant governor's views; at the same time, Freeling got a letter from Markland, a member of the executive and legislative council of Upper Canada, objecting to the assembly's attempt to meddle with the post office, claiming it was a right they had no claim to. The most well-meaning and well-informed people in the province opposed this interference.
By way of parrying the demand of the assembly for control over the post office, Markland suggested that it would be well to appoint a post office superintendent for the upper province. Upper Canada was entirely distinct from Lower Canada in all matters of government. The post office alone was subject to the control of a person, outside of the province, who never visited it. The people of Upper Canada were, he declared, energetic and enterprising, and immigration was coming in on a full tide. Freeling considered this an important letter, and laid it before the postmaster general.[Pg 148]
To address the assembly's demand for control over the post office, Markland suggested that it would be a good idea to appoint a post office supervisor for the upper province. Upper Canada was completely separate from Lower Canada in all government matters. The post office was the only service managed by someone from outside the province who never actually visited. He stated that the people of Upper Canada were dynamic and entrepreneurial, with immigration flowing in steadily. Freeling thought this was an important letter and presented it to the postmaster general.[Pg 148]
The agitation in Upper Canada aroused a flutter of interest in London. When newspaper reports of the discussions in the house of assembly in December 1825, reached St. Martins-le-Grand, they fell under the notice of the postmaster general, who was moved to ask Freeling what it all meant. Freeling replied that the accounts related to great disputes in Canada as to the application of the rates of postage levied in that country, whether the rates should not be devoted to local purposes. At that time, Freeling stated, the rates formed part of the consolidated fund.
The unrest in Upper Canada caught the attention of people in London. When newspaper reports about the debates in the house of assembly from December 1825 got to St. Martins-le-Grand, they caught the interest of the postmaster general, who asked Freeling what it was all about. Freeling explained that the reports were about major disagreements in Canada regarding how the postage rates were applied there and whether those rates should be used for local needs. At that time, Freeling pointed out, the rates were part of the consolidated fund.
The colonial office and the treasury also made inquiries. The colonial office was informed that the revenues of Upper and Lower Canada were blended, and that for seven years previous there had been a surplus from the two provinces which amounted on the average to £5790 a year.[206] It was also pointed out that the estimated cost of the packet service was £10,000 a year.
The colonial office and the treasury also looked into the matter. The colonial office was informed that the revenues of Upper and Lower Canada were combined, and that for the past seven years, there had been a surplus from the two provinces that averaged £5,790 a year.[206] It was also noted that the estimated cost of the packet service was £10,000 a year.
Robinson,[207] the chancellor of the exchequer, with whom Freeling had an interview in October 1826,[208] did not fall in with Freeling's views quite as readily as the others had done. He expressed the opinion that Canada's contention was in the main sound. The net revenue from the Canadian post office ought in fairness to be applied to colonial purposes, not in the mode or on the principle put forward by the assembly, but under the direction of the home government. It should be in the nature of a civil list.
Robinson,[207] the chancellor of the exchequer, who had a meeting with Freeling in October 1826,[208] didn't agree with Freeling's views as easily as others had. He shared the opinion that Canada’s argument was mostly valid. The net revenue from the Canadian post office should fairly be used for colonial purposes, not necessarily in the way or based on the principle suggested by the assembly, but under the guidance of the home government. It should function like a civil list.
Freeling was alarmed at the chancellor's utterances, and reminded him that what was granted to Canada could not be withheld from Jamaica. The chancellor admitted this to be the case. Freeling insisted that there could be no doubt as to the legality of the present practice, though he confessed that the law officers gave no opinion on the case prepared in 1822. Indeed, it had not been submitted to them, as Lord Chichester, the postmaster general, had an invincible reluctance to taking their opinion, and would not do so unless positively instructed by the government.
Freeling was worried about what the chancellor was saying and reminded him that what was given to Canada couldn’t be denied to Jamaica. The chancellor agreed with this point. Freeling stressed that there was no question about the legality of the current practice, although he admitted that the law officers hadn't provided an opinion on the case from 1822. In fact, it hadn't even been brought to their attention, as Lord Chichester, the postmaster general, was very reluctant to seek their opinion and would only do so if explicitly directed by the government.
Then there were the packets. Freeling could not let the opportunity pass of mentioning Canada's obligations with respect to the packet service. He did not, however, endeavour to impose on the chancellor of the exchequer his view that the cost of this service should be set against Canada's post office surplus. In his memorandum of the interview, Freeling merely notes that the opinion[Pg 149] between them inclined to the view that as the packets were maintained for the benefit of Canada as well as of Nova Scotia, some part of the expense should be borne by Canada.
Then there were the packages. Freeling couldn’t let the chance slip by to mention Canada’s responsibilities regarding the package service. However, he didn’t try to convince the chancellor of the exchequer that the cost of this service should be offset by Canada’s post office surplus. In his notes from the meeting, Freeling simply states that the opinion[Pg 149] between them leaned towards the idea that since the packages were maintained for the benefit of both Canada and Nova Scotia, some of the expenses should be covered by Canada.
Up to this point, the agitation against the post office was confined to Upper Canada, which indeed was the more aggressive province during the whole course of the dispute. In 1827, however, the legislative assembly of Lower Canada took a hand in the controversy, contributing a strictly legal and even technical memorandum embodying an argument in favour of its contention that the colonies should participate with the United Kingdom in the profits of the general post office.[209]
Up to this point, the unrest against the post office was limited to Upper Canada, which was definitely the more assertive province throughout the whole dispute. In 1827, however, the legislative assembly of Lower Canada stepped into the controversy, providing a strictly legal and even technical memorandum that presented an argument supporting its claim that the colonies should share in the profits of the general post office.[209]
The memorandum pointed out that the act of Queen Anne established a general post office for, and throughout Great Britain and Ireland, the colonies and plantations in North America and the West Indies, and all other of Her Majesty's dominions and territories; and that of the duties arising by virtue of this act, £700 a week were to be paid into the exchequer for public purposes in Great Britain. Certain annuities and encumbrances charged on the postal revenues by earlier acts, were continued by the act of Queen Anne. When these charges amounting to £111,461 17s. 10d., and the £700 a week already mentioned were satisfied, one-third of the remaining surplus was reserved to the disposal of parliament "for the use of the public."
The memorandum pointed out that Queen Anne's act established a general post office for Great Britain, Ireland, the colonies and plantations in North America and the West Indies, and all other territories under Her Majesty’s rule. It noted that £700 a week from the duties arising from this act was to be paid into the exchequer for public purposes in Great Britain. Certain annuities and encumbrances tied to the postal revenues from earlier acts were continued by Queen Anne's act. Once these charges, totaling £111,461 17s. 10d., and the previously mentioned £700 a week were cleared, one-third of the remaining surplus was set aside for parliament to use "for the public."
The house of assembly argued that this act, which by later acts was declared to be in force in Canada, applied to the people of England, Ireland and colonies of North America and in the West Indies. The word "public," therefore, being used without limitation, or qualification, could not signify exclusively the people of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the colonies. On the contrary, being equally applicable to all who were within the purview of the act, it designated the people of all the dominions of the crown in which the postal revenue was to be levied. The statute thus carried on the face of it a parliamentary declaration that the colonies were entitled to a share of the post office revenues, and it enacted, by implication, that the amount of the share should be determined by parliament at some future period.
The house of assembly argued that this act, which was later confirmed to be in effect in Canada, applied to the people of England, Ireland, the North American colonies, and the West Indies. The term "public," therefore, used without restrictions or qualifications, could not only refer to the people of Great Britain and Ireland or the colonies. Instead, it applied equally to everyone covered by the act, signifying the people across all crown dominions where postal revenue was to be collected. The statute clearly indicated a parliamentary declaration that the colonies were entitled to a portion of the post office revenues, and it implied that Parliament would determine the size of that share at a later date.
Here followed a novel and ingenious application of the statute of 1778, which was enacted for the purpose of conciliating the colonies by conceding the point at issue between them and the mother country.
Here was a new and clever use of the law from 1778, which was created to bring the colonies together by giving in on the main issue between them and the mother country.
The assembly stated that by this act it was declared that, for[Pg 150] the peace and welfare of His Majesty's dominions, the net produce of all duties, which after the passing of that act were imposed by parliament upon the colonies, should be applied to the use of the colony in which it is levied. Unlike the assembly of Upper Canada, the assembly of Lower Canada did not maintain that the act of Queen Anne was annulled by the act of 1778.
The assembly declared that this action meant that, for[Pg 150] the peace and well-being of His Majesty's territories, the total revenue from all duties imposed by parliament on the colonies after the passing of this act would be used for the benefit of the colony where it was collected. Unlike the assembly of Upper Canada, the assembly of Lower Canada did not claim that the act of Queen Anne was canceled by the act of 1778.
It will be remembered that the British post office rested its claim to collect the colonial postages on Queen Anne's act with its amendments, while the Upper Canada assembly asserted that the act of 1778, which was made part of the constitutional act of 1791, deprived the British government of any right it formerly had to impose a tax on the colonies.
It’s important to remember that the British post office based its claim to collect postage from the colonies on Queen Anne's act and its amendments. Meanwhile, the Upper Canada assembly argued that the act of 1778, which became part of the constitutional act of 1791, took away any rights the British government previously had to impose taxes on the colonies.
The Lower Canadian house of assembly made another use of the act of 1778. It submitted that, so far as postal revenues were concerned, it was the complement of the act of Queen Anne. The earlier act, in the view of the assembly, left the amounts of the shares of the postal revenues to which the colonies were entitled, to be determined by a future act of parliament, and the act of 1778 had this effect, if not in the letter, at least in its spirit; and consequently Lower Canada, as one of the colonies had a fair and equitable claim to the net produce of the post office revenue levied within the province, after deducting the expenses of the post office established therein.
The Lower Canadian House of Assembly had another interpretation of the act from 1778. It argued that, in terms of postal revenues, it complemented Queen Anne’s act. The assembly believed that the earlier act left the determination of the share of postal revenues due to the colonies to a future act of Parliament, and the 1778 act had this effect, if not literally, then at least in its intent; therefore, Lower Canada, being one of the colonies, had a fair and just claim to the net income from post office revenue collected in the province, after covering the expenses of the post office set up there.
Shortly before the house of assembly at York took into its consideration the question of the legality of the postal system in operation in Upper Canada, the home authorities were discussing a matter, which was a source of much embarrassment to the deputy postmaster general. The steamboats, which had been running since 1809, between Montreal and Quebec, had so far improved that they outdistanced the mail couriers, who travelled on the shore of the river, and a great many letters were carried between the two towns by the steamers.
Shortly before the assembly in York considered the legality of the postal system in Upper Canada, the authorities back home were discussing an issue that caused a lot of trouble for the deputy postmaster general. The steamboats running since 1809 between Montreal and Quebec had improved so much that they were faster than the mail couriers traveling along the riverbank, and many letters were being transported between the two cities by the steamers.
The deputy postmaster general made provision for the conveyance of letters by steamers, by placing official letter boxes on the boats. He allowed the captains twopence for each letter they carried, and charged the public the regular postage rates. But the public paid little attention to the letter boxes. They simply threw their letters on a table in the cabin, and when the steamer reached its destination, those expecting letters sent down to the landing and got them, paying a small gratuity to the captain.
The deputy postmaster general arranged for letters to be transported by steamboats by adding official letterboxes on the ships. He paid the captains two pence for each letter they carried and charged the public the usual postage rates. However, the public mostly ignored the letterboxes. They just tossed their letters onto a table in the cabin, and when the steamboat arrived at its destination, those waiting for letters sent someone down to the landing to pick them up, giving the captain a small tip.
Moreover, in cases where the letters had been deposited in the letter boxes on the steamer, and were delivered by the captain[Pg 151] at the post office, many of the people to whom the letters were addressed refused to pay the same charges as if the letters were conveyed by land, alleging that such charges were illegal.
Moreover, in cases where the letters were dropped in the letterboxes on the steamer and delivered by the captain[Pg 151] at the post office, many of the recipients refused to pay the same fees as if the letters were transported by land, claiming that those charges were unlawful.
The deputy postmaster general laid the facts before his superiors in England in 1819, asking for some document of an authoritative character, which, when published, would put a stop to the illegal practices. The solicitor of the post office to whom the matter was referred had no doubt that the acts complained of were illegal, and would render the offenders liable to penalties, if the practice were carried on in England, but he could not be sure that penalties for the infraction of the post office act could be recovered in Canada.
The deputy postmaster general presented the facts to his superiors in England in 1819, requesting an official document that, when published, would put an end to the illegal activities. The post office's solicitor, to whom the issue was referred, was confident that the actions in question were illegal and would expose the offenders to penalties if the practice continued in England. However, he couldn't be certain that penalties for violating the post office act could be enforced in Canada.
Freeling, the secretary, thereupon made a suggestion[210] which must have caused him some pain. The right of the post office to protect its monopoly was quite clear, and the natural course of the postmaster general would be to direct his deputy in Canada to enforce the law. But as the legislatures had in several instances manifested an inclination to interfere with the internal posts, he recommended that, instead of taking proceedings to protect His Majesty's revenues, and, as he says, to enable them to continue to flow into the exchequer of the United Kingdom, the postmaster general should state the circumstances to the colonial secretary, and request his opinion before instructions were sent out to the deputy postmaster general.
Freeling, the secretary, then made a suggestion[210] that must have been difficult for him. The post office’s right to protect its monopoly was pretty clear, and typically, the postmaster general would tell his deputy in Canada to enforce the law. However, since the legislatures had shown a tendency to interfere with internal postal matters in several cases, he suggested that instead of taking action to protect the King's revenues and, as he put it, to ensure they continued flowing into the UK's treasury, the postmaster general should explain the situation to the colonial secretary and ask for his opinion before any instructions were sent to the deputy postmaster general.
Bathurst, the colonial secretary, fully concurred in the view of the postmaster general that the subject was one of great delicacy, and wrote to the governor general, Lord Dalhousie, setting forth the facts and stating that under ordinary circumstances he would have had no difficulty in recommending a prosecution.
Bathurst, the colonial secretary, completely agreed with the postmaster general's perspective that the matter was quite sensitive. He wrote to the governor general, Lord Dalhousie, outlining the facts and mentioning that under normal circumstances, he would have had no trouble recommending a prosecution.
In view of the attention which the house of assembly had been giving to the revenues of the colonial post office, and of the doubt which had been suggested as to the right of Great Britain to receive those revenues, the colonial secretary thought it possible that the enforcement of those rights at that time might embarrass the governor general by giving the assembly an additional ground for contention with the mother country. He, therefore, had given directions that the deputy postmaster general should communicate with the governor general on the subject, and should not institute proceedings without the full concurrence of the latter.
In light of the attention the assembly had been giving to the revenue from the colonial post office, and the uncertainty raised about Great Britain's right to collect those revenues, the colonial secretary felt that enforcing those rights at that moment might complicate things for the governor general by providing the assembly with another reason to clash with the mother country. Therefore, he instructed the deputy postmaster general to discuss the matter with the governor general and to not take any action without the governor general's complete agreement.
The deputy postmaster general was instructed in this sense in September 1820, and matters remained in abeyance until 1826, when the deputy postmaster general, presumably with the concurrence[Pg 152] of the governor general requested the opinion of the attorney general of Lower Canada on the subject. The attorney general, James Stuart (afterwards Sir James) advised that the right of the post office was clear, and he conceived that there should be no difficulty in recovering pecuniary penalties for the infringement of the postmaster general's privilege.
The deputy postmaster general was instructed on this matter in September 1820, and things remained on hold until 1826, when the deputy postmaster general, likely with the approval[Pg 152] of the governor general, asked the attorney general of Lower Canada for his opinion on the matter. The attorney general, James Stuart (later Sir James), advised that the post office's rights were clear, and he believed there should be no issue in recovering financial penalties for violating the postmaster general's privileges.
But no action was taken on this opinion. The relations between the provincial governors and the assemblies were becoming more strained as time went on, and the governor general had no desire to augment the grievances of the assemblies by introducing irritating matters, in which the right of the home government might with reason be held to be disputable.
But no action was taken on this opinion. The relationships between the provincial governors and the assemblies were getting more strained over time, and the governor general didn't want to add to the grievances of the assemblies by bringing up annoying issues that could reasonably be seen as questionable by the home government.
CHAPTER IX
Thomas Allen Stayner deputy postmaster general—Restrictions of general post office relaxed—Grievances of newspaper publishers—Opinion of law officers of the crown that postmaster general's stand is untenable—Consequences.
Thomas Allen Stayner, deputy postmaster general—Restrictions on the general post office are eased—Concerns of newspaper publishers—View of the crown's legal advisors that the postmaster general's position is unsustainable—Implications.
Owing to failing health, Sutherland retired from the service in 1827. He was succeeded by his son-in-law, Thomas Allen Stayner, the last of the deputies of the postmaster general of England, and in many respects the most notable. Stayner was brought up in the post office, and at the time of his appointment to the position of deputy postmaster general he was in charge of the Quebec post office.
Owing to declining health, Sutherland retired from service in 1827. He was succeeded by his son-in-law, Thomas Allen Stayner, the last of the deputies of the postmaster general of England, and in many ways the most significant. Stayner was raised in the post office and was managing the Quebec post office at the time he was appointed deputy postmaster general.
A man of unusual ability, Stayner gained the confidence of his superiors in England, to a degree at no time enjoyed by his predecessors. What was equally important, he managed to keep on good terms with the governments of the two provinces.
A man of exceptional talent, Stayner earned the trust of his superiors in England, more than any of his predecessors ever had. Equally important, he was able to maintain good relationships with the governments of both provinces.
When the houses of assembly in Upper and Lower Canada denounced the post office as inefficient and unconstitutional, and proposed to take the management of it into their own hands, the governors and legislative councils in the two provinces took the side of Stayner, and while they urged upon him and the postmaster general the expediency of meeting the reasonable demands of the assemblies, they set their faces steadily against any revolutionary propositions respecting the control of the department.
When the legislatures in Upper and Lower Canada criticized the post office as ineffective and unconstitutional, and suggested that they should take control of it themselves, the governors and legislative councils in both provinces sided with Stayner. While they encouraged him and the postmaster general to address the reasonable requests of the legislatures, they firmly opposed any radical ideas about changing who controlled the department.
This attitude was in a measure due to a change in the policy of the postmaster general and his advisers in England. The earlier deputies were held by so tight a rein, and their suggestions and recommendations so little regarded, that they occupied a rôle scarcely more important than that of being the hands and voice of a department, which, unpopular at home on account of its illiberality, aroused general discontent in Canada by adding to its administrative vices, an entire ignorance of the situation with which it had to deal.
This attitude was partly due to a shift in the policy of the postmaster general and his advisers in England. The earlier deputies were kept on such a tight leash, and their suggestions and recommendations were taken so little into account, that they played a role barely more significant than being the hands and voice of a department that, unpopular at home because of its lack of fairness, generated widespread dissatisfaction in Canada by compounding its administrative flaws with complete ignorance of the situation it was dealing with.
At the outset of his administration Stayner's powers were as much restricted as were those of the deputies who preceded him. A few months after his appointment, he opened a post office at Guelph. He assured the postmaster general that he had not done[Pg 154] so until he had satisfied himself that the prospective revenue would more than meet the expense. But he did not escape a warning and an intimation that the departmental approval would depend on the financial results.
At the start of his administration, Stayner's powers were just as limited as those of the deputies before him. A few months after he was appointed, he opened a post office in Guelph. He told the postmaster general that he hadn’t done it until he was sure the expected revenue would exceed the costs. However, he still received a warning and a hint that departmental approval would rely on the financial outcomes.
Shortly afterwards, Stayner established an additional courier on the route between St. John and St. Andrews in New Brunswick, the point at which the mails between the Maritime provinces and the United States were exchanged. This action, though most desirable in the public interest, brought down upon him a rebuke, and a reminder that the postmaster general's sanction must be obtained in all possible cases, before lines of communication were opened which were attended with expense.
Shortly after, Stayner set up another courier on the route between St. John and St. Andrews in New Brunswick, where the mail between the Maritime provinces and the United States was exchanged. Although this was beneficial for the public, it led to a reprimand and a reminder that he needed to get approval from the postmaster general in all cases before establishing communication lines that would incur costs.
The circumstances of the country were making a continuance of this repressive course impossible. Settlements were springing up too rapidly, and the demands for postal facilities were becoming too insistent to leave it possible to delay these demands until formal sanction was obtained from England. In November 1829, Stayner informed the postmaster general that, in Upper Canada, the lieutenant governor, the legislature, the merchants, and indeed the whole population, were calling for increased postal accommodation.
The situation in the country made it impossible to keep up this repressive approach. Settlements were developing too quickly, and the requests for postal services were becoming too urgent to wait for official approval from England. In November 1829, Stayner notified the postmaster general that, in Upper Canada, the lieutenant governor, the legislature, the merchants, and really everyone was asking for better postal services.
In the United States, Stayner pointed out, almost every town and village had a daily mail, and this excited discontent with the comparative infrequency of the Canadian service. He suggested that he be allowed to expand the service, and to increase the frequency of the courier's trips, wherever he was convinced that the ensuing augmentation of correspondence would more than meet the additional expense.
In the United States, Stayner pointed out, almost every town and village had daily mail, which made people unhappy with the more limited Canadian service. He suggested that he should be allowed to expand the service and increase the frequency of the courier's trips, wherever he believed that the resulting rise in correspondence would cover the extra costs.
Stayner had been so fortunate as to impress the postmaster general with the fact that a very considerable discretion might safely be left with him. Besides this, the postmaster general was under a growing sense of the insecurity of the legal foundations of the post office in the colonies. To Stayner's gratification he received a letter from the postmaster general[211] enjoining him to make it his study to extend the system of communication in all directions where the increase of population and the formation of new towns and settlements seemed to justify it.
Stayner was lucky enough to impress the postmaster general with the fact that he could be trusted with considerable discretion. Additionally, the postmaster general was increasingly aware of the shaky legal foundations of the post office in the colonies. To Stayner's satisfaction, he received a letter from the postmaster general[211] urging him to focus on expanding the communication system in all directions where the growth of population and the establishment of new towns and settlements warranted it.
This was a wise step. It gave the department a representative, zealous in its interests, as intimately acquainted with local conditions as the assemblies themselves, and thoroughly competent to undertake the responsibility devolving upon him.
This was a smart move. It provided the department with a representative, passionate about its interests, who was as familiar with local conditions as the assemblies themselves, and fully capable of handling the responsibilities placed on him.
Stayner's commission placed New Brunswick as well as Upper[Pg 155] and Lower Canada, under his charge. But before the close of 1828 the service in New Brunswick was transferred to the control of the deputy postmaster general for Nova Scotia.[212] This change was made at the instance of the deputy of Nova Scotia, who, being in England at the time, explained to the postmaster general how much more closely New Brunswick was associated with Nova Scotia than with Quebec, and pointed out that orders from home affecting New Brunswick and requiring immediate attention were delayed in that they had to pass from Halifax through New Brunswick, and then return to New Brunswick. All the other branches of the imperial service in New Brunswick had their local headquarters in Halifax.
Stayner's commission put New Brunswick along with Upper[Pg 155] and Lower Canada under his oversight. However, before the end of 1828, the service in New Brunswick was transferred to the deputy postmaster general for Nova Scotia.[212] This change happened at the request of the deputy of Nova Scotia, who, while in England at the time, explained to the postmaster general how much more closely New Brunswick was linked to Nova Scotia than to Quebec. He pointed out that orders from England regarding New Brunswick that required immediate action were delayed because they had to go from Halifax through New Brunswick and then back to New Brunswick. All the other branches of the imperial service in New Brunswick had their local headquarters in Halifax.
At the time Stayner was placed in charge of the postal service in the Canadas, the system of communication was still simple enough to be described in a few lines. There was a trunk line from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to Niagara and Amherstburg on the western boundaries of Upper Canada. The distances were to Niagara, one thousand three hundred and fifty-six miles, and to Amherstburg, one thousand five hundred and sixteen miles.
At the time Stayner took over the postal service in Canada, the communication system was straightforward enough to explain in just a few lines. There was a main route from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to Niagara and Amherstburg on the western edges of Upper Canada. The distance to Niagara was one thousand three hundred fifty-six miles, and to Amherstburg, it was one thousand five hundred sixteen miles.
The frequency of the trips made by the mail couriers over the several stretches of this long route varied considerably. Between Halifax and Quebec, a courier travelled each way weekly. The section between Quebec and Montreal, the most populous in the country, was covered by couriers, who passed five times each way weekly between the two cities.
The frequency of trips made by the mail couriers along this long route varied a lot. Between Halifax and Quebec, a courier traveled each way once a week. The section between Quebec and Montreal, which is the most populated area in the country, was serviced by couriers who went back and forth five times a week between the two cities.
From Montreal westward along the shores of the St. Lawrence and lake Ontario to Niagara and Amherstburg, there were semi-weekly trips. Running out from this trunk line there were six cross routes, four in Lower Canada, and two in Upper Canada. Two of these left the trunk line at Three Rivers—one running to Sorel, by way of Nicolet, with semi-weekly mails; and the other to Sherbrooke, Stanstead and other places in the eastern townships. There was a weekly service over this route.
From Montreal heading west along the shores of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario to Niagara and Amherstburg, there were trips twice a week. Branching off from this main line were six cross routes, four in Lower Canada and two in Upper Canada. Two of these departed from the main line at Three Rivers—one going to Sorel, via Nicolet, with mail delivery twice a week; and the other heading to Sherbrooke, Stanstead, and other places in the eastern townships. There was a weekly service along this route.
Mails were carried up the Ottawa river from Montreal as far as Hull, and southward to St. Johns; in both cases twice weekly. In Upper Canada, the only cross routes were one from Cornwall to Hawkesbury, with weekly mails, and another from Brockville to Perth, with mails twice a week. From Perth there was a weekly courier to Richmond.
Mails were transported up the Ottawa River from Montreal to Hull and south to St. Johns, both happening twice a week. In Upper Canada, the only cross routes were one from Cornwall to Hawkesbury, which had weekly mail, and another from Brockville to Perth, with mail service twice a week. From Perth, there was a weekly courier to Richmond.
The two principal points of connection with the United States were at St. Johns, south of Montreal, and Queenston on the[Pg 156] Niagara river. As early as 1828, the United States post office had a daily service by steamer on lake Champlain, which ran as far northward as St. Johns. In 1831, Stayner made a notable improvement in the mail service from Montreal to Niagara, increasing the frequency of the trips to five each week, and reducing the time of conveyance between the two points to six days.
The two main connection points to the United States were at St. Johns, south of Montreal, and Queenston on the[Pg 156] Niagara River. By 1828, the U.S. post office had a daily steamer service on Lake Champlain, which traveled as far north as St. Johns. In 1831, Stayner made a significant improvement to the mail service from Montreal to Niagara, increasing the trips to five each week and cutting the travel time between the two locations down to six days.
The appointment of Stayner in no way diminished the energy with which the houses of assembly pursued their campaign against the administration of the post office. In March 1828, the assembly in Upper Canada named a committee consisting of Fothergill, Ingersoll, Matthews and Beardsley, to inquire into the state of the post office. Their report, which was made in 1829, did not disclose any new facts. Indeed, it would not seem that the assemblies, in the series of inquiries, which were ordered from year to year, thought so much of obtaining new light on the question as of keeping the public alive to the grievances, which they were made to appear to suffer.
The appointment of Stayner did not lessen the determination with which the legislative assemblies pursued their campaign against the post office administration. In March 1828, the assembly in Upper Canada formed a committee made up of Fothergill, Ingersoll, Matthews, and Beardsley to investigate the post office's condition. Their report, released in 1829, revealed no new information. In fact, it seems the assemblies, through a series of yearly inquiries, were less focused on uncovering new facts and more on keeping the public aware of the grievances they were led to believe they suffered.
The committee of 1829, after affirming the illegality of the existing system and declaring that the surplus revenue which was sent annually to Great Britain, was the result of starving the service, recommended the establishment of a provincial post office, subject to the legislatures. Post routes should be opened to every court house, and the charges on letters and newspapers conveyed by steamboats should not exceed twopence and one farthing each respectively.
The committee of 1829, after confirming that the current system was illegal and stating that the surplus revenue sent to Great Britain each year came from neglecting the service, recommended setting up a provincial post office under the authority of the legislatures. Post routes should be established to every courthouse, and the fees for letters and newspapers transported by steamboats should be no more than two pence and one farthing each, respectively.
The lieutenant governor, Sir John Colborne, though friendly to Stayner, and appreciative of his efforts to meet the demands of the public in Upper Canada, was not altogether satisfied with the system. He maintained that it was impossible for Stayner from his headquarters in Quebec to follow the rapid changes in the conditions of settlement in Upper Canada, and was of opinion that the remedy for the existing shortcomings of the post office in that province was to appoint an official of a rank equal, or nearly so, to that held by Stayner, and station him in Toronto.
The lieutenant governor, Sir John Colborne, while supportive of Stayner and recognizing his attempts to address public needs in Upper Canada, wasn't completely happy with the system. He argued that it was impossible for Stayner, based in Quebec, to keep up with the fast changes happening in Upper Canada. He believed that the solution to the current issues with the post office in that province was to appoint an official of similar rank to Stayner and place him in Toronto.
Colborne, in communicating the view to the colonial office,[213] also requested that arrangements should be made for a regular interchange of correspondence between Upper Canada and Great Britain, by way of New York.
Colborne, in sharing his perspective with the colonial office,[213] also asked that plans be put in place for a consistent exchange of messages between Upper Canada and Great Britain, using New York as the route.
Freeling, the secretary of the post office, was quite willing to meet the views of the lieutenant governor, but was inclined to the view that the people on both sides of the Atlantic had already[Pg 157] settled the question their own way. He explained that there was a plan in full operation by which the correspondence between Liverpool and Upper Canada was conveyed across the ocean independently of the post office at twopence a letter, and that there was little likelihood that the public would seek the aid of the post office to have this conveyance done for them, and thereby become subject to charges four times as great.
Freeling, the post office secretary, was happy to consider the lieutenant governor's opinions but believed that people on both sides of the Atlantic had already made up their minds on the issue. He explained that there was an ongoing plan for sending mail between Liverpool and Upper Canada directly across the ocean without involving the post office, costing just two pence per letter. He noted that it was unlikely the public would turn to the post office for this service, especially since it would cost them four times more.
The people of Liverpool, who had the largest correspondence with the United States, Freeling reminded Colborne, scarcely sent one letter per week by post, though thousands were sent outside the post office, by the same vessels as carried the mails for the post office. As for the appointment of a resident deputy in Upper Canada, Freeling thought there would be no objection to such an arrangement.
The people of Liverpool, who had the most contact with the United States, Freeling reminded Colborne, barely sent one letter a week by post, even though thousands were sent outside the post office, on the same ships that carried the mail for the post office. Regarding the appointment of a resident deputy in Upper Canada, Freeling believed there would be no problem with that setup.
In this opinion Stayner by no means concurred. He could see no good reason for such an appointment. The postmaster general was more impressed with the representations on behalf of the province than Freeling thought desirable. Freeling reminded the postmaster general that his powers might not be equal to his desires. He observed that in the lieutenant governor's letter, a question was involved as to whether, and if so, to what extent, the revenues of the post office could be devoted to the general improvement of communications for the public advantage, and he conceived that this was a point of view from which the postmaster general was not empowered to regard the subject.
In this matter, Stayner definitely disagreed. He saw no good reason for such an appointment. The postmaster general was more swayed by the arguments in favor of the province than Freeling thought was appropriate. Freeling pointed out to the postmaster general that his powers might not match his ambitions. He noted that in the lieutenant governor's letter, there was a question about whether, and if so, to what extent, the post office's revenues could be used for the overall improvement of public communications, and he believed this was a perspective that the postmaster general was not authorized to consider.
But the forces were gathering for an attack on the post office, which promised to be much more formidable than any which had preceded it. Until that time, the assailants of the system had been confined to what the official clique regarded as the radicals and republicans and grievance-mongers. In the houses of assembly the grievances of which they complained became the motive of highly effective speeches and resolutions, but the injuries they alleged really hurt nobody.
But the forces were coming together for an attack on the post office, which was expected to be much more powerful than any before it. Until now, those opposing the system had been seen by the officials as just radicals, republicans, and people who complained. In the assembly meetings, the issues they brought up led to compelling speeches and resolutions, but the harms they claimed didn’t really affect anyone.
The rates of postage on letters were, according to present day standards, exorbitant. But they were no higher than those charged in England; and after all the post office was but little used by the masses of the people. It is doubtful if the post office were employed in 1830 any more freely than the telegraph is to-day. In their contention that it was a violation of constitutional guarantees to send the surplus post office revenue to England, the assemblies were undoubtedly correct, but loyal people bear many things of that kind easily.[Pg 158]
The postage rates for letters were, by today’s standards, outrageous. However, they weren’t higher than those in England, and honestly, most people hardly used the post office. It's questionable whether people made much use of the post office in 1830 compared to how we use the telegraph today. The assemblies were definitely right in arguing that sending surplus post office revenue to England violated constitutional guarantees, but loyal citizens typically accept such issues without much fuss.[Pg 158]
At this time, however, the question was taken up by a body to whom the postage rates were a personal grievance, and who at the same time possessed the means of successful agitation. In the beginning of 1829, a number of newspaper publishers in Lower Canada approached the governor general, Sir James Kempt, with a request that they might be relieved of the payment of postage on the newspapers which they sent to subscribers.[214] They did not ask that the postage be remitted altogether. All they desired was that the postage should be collected from the subscribers and not from themselves. They also suggested that the charge might be fixed at one penny per copy.
At this point, however, the issue was taken up by a group that was personally affected by the postage rates and who also had the ability to effectively push for change. In early 1829, several newspaper publishers in Lower Canada approached the governor general, Sir James Kempt, asking to be exempt from paying postage on the newspapers they sent to subscribers.[214] They didn’t request that the postage be eliminated entirely. All they wanted was for the postage to be charged to the subscribers instead of themselves. They also proposed that the fee be set at one penny per copy.
Stayner declared that he had no power to enter into such an arrangement. The publishers thereupon changed their request, and asked that they might be put on the same footing as the newspaper publishers in England stood, and be thus entirely exempt from postage on their newspapers.
Stayner stated that he had no authority to agree to such an arrangement. The publishers then revised their request and asked to be placed on the same terms as the newspaper publishers in England, seeking to be completely exempt from postage on their newspapers.
British publishers had enjoyed this concession since 1825, but as they still had to pay a heavy excise duty on the paper they used, they could not be regarded as free from public charges. In Canada there was no stamp duty on paper. This difference between their situation and that of their brethren in England was pointed out to the publishers, but the explanation failed to satisfy.
British publishers had benefited from this concession since 1825, but since they still had to pay a hefty excise tax on the paper they used, they couldn’t be considered free from public charges. In Canada, there was no stamp tax on paper. This difference between their situation and that of their counterparts in England was brought to the publishers' attention, but the explanation didn’t satisfy them.
One of the publishers, who had some inkling of the fact that the newspaper postage did not go into the public revenue, but formed part of the emoluments of the deputy postmaster general, observed that with as much consistency a toll keeper might insist on farmers paying high charges to him, because they paid no tithes.
One of the publishers, who had some idea that the newspaper postage didn’t go into public funds but instead was part of the deputy postmaster general’s earnings, noted that it was just as reasonable for a toll gate operator to demand high fees from farmers on the grounds that they didn’t pay any tithes.
With the publishers awake to the fact that they had something to complain of, they made the most of their grievance. They were experts in this line of exploitation. They found that the newspaper charges, which they were convinced had no legal sanction, had been steadily advancing for forty years past. In 1790, a shilling a year was all that was charged as postage for each copy of a weekly newspaper. This rate was increased by degrees to one shilling and threepence, one shilling and eightpence, two shillings, two shillings and sixpence, until, in 1830, it had risen to four shillings a year on weekly papers, and to five shillings for papers published twice a week. The discontent of the publishers was not lessened by the knowledge that in the Maritime provinces, the yearly rate for weekly papers was two shillings and sixpence for each copy.[Pg 159]
With the publishers now aware they had valid complaints, they took full advantage of their situation. They were skilled at exploiting this kind of issue. They discovered that the charges for newspapers, which they believed had no legal basis, had been steadily increasing for the past forty years. In 1790, the postage for each copy of a weekly newspaper was just a shilling a year. This rate gradually rose to one shilling and threepence, one shilling and eightpence, two shillings, and two shillings and sixpence, until by 1830 it reached four shillings a year for weekly papers and five shillings for papers published twice a week. The publishers’ frustration only grew as they learned that in the Maritime provinces, the yearly rate for weekly papers was just two shillings and sixpence for each copy.[Pg 159]
The agitation against the newspaper charges was set in motion by Robert Armour, proprietor of the Montreal Gazette. It had come to his knowledge that the sums collected from the publishers did not appear in the accounts of the postmasters with the department, and he suspected that in some way they were retained by Stayner, though on this point he had no certain information.
The uproar against the newspaper fees was started by Robert Armour, owner of the Montreal Gazette. He learned that the money collected from the publishers wasn’t showing up in the postmasters’ accounts with the department, and he suspected that Stayner was somehow keeping it, although he had no definite proof on that.
After Armour learned that the rates had been subjected to a continuous process of enhancement, he made diligent search for any warrant that might exist for the successive advances or indeed for the original charge. Finding none, he turned to the authorities for information. It was he who led the deputation to the governor general for relief in some form. When this step failed, Armour demanded of the deputy postmaster general his authority for the newspaper charges.
After Armour found out that the rates had been consistently increased, he thoroughly searched for any justification that might exist for the ongoing hikes or even for the original fee. When he didn’t find anything, he reached out to the authorities for answers. He was the one who led the group to the governor general asking for some kind of relief. When that didn’t work, Armour asked the deputy postmaster general to explain the basis for the newspaper charges.
Getting no answer from that quarter, Armour endeavoured to bring matters to an issue by refusing to pay the postage on the copies of his paper which he posted in Montreal. The postmaster declined to accept the papers without the postage, and Armour appealed to the postmaster general in London. In due time the reply from the department was received, and while it offered no immediate relief, it put Armour in possession of some exclusive information, which, as a newspaper man, he must have considered valuable.
Getting no answer from that side, Armour tried to resolve the issue by refusing to pay the postage on the copies of his paper that he mailed from Montreal. The postmaster wouldn’t accept the papers without the postage, so Armour reached out to the postmaster general in London. Eventually, he got a response from the department, which didn’t provide any immediate help, but it did give Armour some exclusive information that he, as a newspaper man, likely considered valuable.
Freeling, the secretary, informed Armour that the postmaster of Montreal had failed in his duty, in refusing to transmit the newspapers simply because the postage was not paid. The postmaster should have sent the newspapers forward, and since the postage demanded by Stayner was not paid, it fell upon the postmasters of the offices to which the papers were directed to collect the postage, at the same rates as were charged on letters.
Freeling, the secretary, told Armour that the postmaster of Montreal didn't do his job by refusing to send the newspapers just because the postage wasn't paid. The postmaster should have forwarded the newspapers, and since Stayner didn't pay the required postage, it was up to the postmasters of the offices where the papers were sent to collect the postage at the same rates charged for letters.
As each paper was under this ruling chargeable with the rate which was due on four letters, it may well be imagined that no publisher would offer to pay the post office for the distribution of his papers by that means. On these conditions, the postage on each copy sent from Montreal to any of the post offices on the island of Montreal, to St. Johns or to the nearer settlements in Upper Canada would be thirty-two cents. Each copy sent to Three Rivers or to any points between sixty and one hundred miles from Montreal would cost the subscribers forty-eight cents.
As each publication was considered subject to the fee equivalent to what was owed for four letters, it’s easy to see why no publisher would choose to pay the post office for sending out their papers this way. Under these conditions, the postage for each copy sent from Montreal to any post office on the island, St. Johns, or the closer settlements in Upper Canada would be thirty-two cents. Each copy sent to Three Rivers or to locations that are sixty to one hundred miles from Montreal would cost subscribers forty-eight cents.
It is needless to pursue the charges into districts where the copies were sent over one hundred miles. Freeling went on to explain that, as the post office act had no provision for the conveyance[Pg 160] of newspapers, the postmaster general, in order to accommodate the publishers permitted the deputy postmaster general to make private arrangements with them for the transmission of their newspapers. By ancient and authorized custom, the deputy postmaster general was allowed to treat the receipts from this source as his own perquisite. This information with the comments thereon greatly enlivened many issues of the Gazette.
It’s unnecessary to investigate the charges in areas where the copies were sent over a hundred miles. Freeling went on to explain that since the post office act didn’t include any rules for delivering newspapers, the postmaster general, to help the publishers, allowed the deputy postmaster general to make private deals with them to send their newspapers. According to longstanding and accepted practice, the deputy postmaster general could keep the earnings from this arrangement as his own. This information, along with the related comments, really added some excitement to many editions of the Gazette.
Freeling was denounced as a sinecurist, who permitted impositions in the colonies which he dared not make at home. Armour announced that he would carry the matter into the legislature, and, if necessary, into the courts. He had no desire to escape the payment of postage. All he demanded was the establishment of an equitable rate, placed on a legal basis. His idea was that the postmasters who handled the newspapers should be paid from five to ten per cent. of their cost. The rates charged by Stayner amounted to from twenty to twenty-five per cent. of the subscription price. Armour would resist Stayner's claim to be a sleeping partner in his business, who, contributing neither capital nor talent, dictated what his share of the revenue should be.
Freeling was criticized as someone who benefitted from a comfortable position, allowing unfair practices in the colonies that he wouldn’t dare implement at home. Armour announced that he would take the issue to the legislature and, if necessary, to court. He didn't want to avoid paying for postage; he simply wanted a fair rate established on a legal basis. His idea was that the postmasters handling the newspapers should earn five to ten percent of their cost. The rates charged by Stayner ranged from twenty to twenty-five percent of the subscription price. Armour would challenge Stayner's claim to be a passive partner in his business, one who contributed neither money nor skills but dictated what his share of the profits should be.
Armour could write well, and his onslaught caused Stayner much uneasiness. In a letter to the postmaster general[215] he attributed it to some neglect or indignity, which Armour fancied he suffered at the hands of a former deputy postmaster general, while, he stated, other newspapers were recognizing with gratitude Stayner's efforts to satisfy the reasonable demands of the public.
Armour was a skilled writer, and his attacks made Stayner quite anxious. In a letter to the postmaster general[215] he claimed it was due to some oversight or disrespect he believed he experienced from a previous deputy postmaster general. Meanwhile, he pointed out that other newspapers were thankful for Stayner's attempts to meet the reasonable requests of the public.
Every side of Stayner's work was vigorously attacked in the Gazette. Complaints were made of a lack of necessary mail routes, and of an insufficiency of service on existing routes. It was charged also that Stayner's attention was confined to the older and more thickly settled districts, which yielded the largest revenues. But, according to Stayner, Armour's silence could have been purchased by a share of the official printing which Stayner declined to give him. Whatever grounds Stayner had for making the insinuation, there can be no question as to the energy with which Armour bent himself to the task of exposing the methods of the post office. When his papers were held in the Montreal post office on account of his refusal to prepay the postage, he entered actions for large amounts against Stayner.
Every aspect of Stayner's work was heavily criticized in the Gazette. There were complaints about a lack of necessary mail routes and insufficient service on the existing ones. It was also claimed that Stayner focused mainly on the older, more densely populated areas that brought in the most revenue. However, Stayner suggested that Armour's silence could have been bought with a share of the official printing, which Stayner refused to give him. Regardless of Stayner's reasons for making such a suggestion, there’s no doubt about the determination with which Armour worked to expose the post office's practices. When his papers were held at the Montreal post office due to his refusal to prepay the postage, he filed lawsuits against Stayner for substantial amounts.
These failed, as the courts declined to deal with the cases. He then addressed himself to the legislature. In the beginning of 1831, Armour and a number of other publishers presented a petition[Pg 161] to the house of assembly of Lower Canada, setting forth the high rates they had to pay as postage for the transmission of their newspapers, and the impropriety of Stayner's practice in appropriating the proceeds; and asking that they might be put on an equal footing with the publishers in Great Britain.
These efforts failed, as the courts refused to take on the cases. He then turned to the legislature. In early 1831, Armour and several other publishers submitted a petition[Pg 161] to the house of assembly of Lower Canada, outlining the high postage rates they had to pay for sending their newspapers, and criticizing Stayner's practice of taking the profits for himself; they requested to be treated equally with publishers in Great Britain.
The petition was handed over to a committee of the house, who proceeded to investigate the facts. In this they were only moderately successful, as the only person who was in a position to give them the information they desired, declined to answer the interrogatories put to him.[216]
The petition was given to a committee of the house, who began to look into the facts. They were only somewhat successful, as the only person who could provide the information they needed refused to answer the questions posed to him.[216]
Stayner, in reply to inquiries as to the financial condition of the post office and the disposition of the surplus revenues, pleaded that he was employed by a branch of the imperial government, which in none of its instructions had recognized the right of the assembly to institute the inquiries being made. To answer the questions put to him by the committee might lead to disclosures, which would involve him with his superior officers until he had received specific instructions from them on the point.
Stayner, in response to questions about the financial status of the post office and what happened to the surplus revenues, argued that he worked for a branch of the federal government, which in all its instructions hadn’t acknowledged the assembly's authority to conduct the inquiries. Answering the committee's questions could lead to information that would put him at odds with his superiors until he received clear instructions from them regarding the matter.
But though little was learned from Stayner, the committee had obtained some useful information from inquiries made in the British house of commons by Joseph Hume. It appeared that the large sum of £36,000 had been received by the British treasury as surplus revenue for the years 1825 and 1826.
But even though not much was learned from Stayner, the committee had gathered some useful information from inquiries made in the British House of Commons by Joseph Hume. It turned out that the British treasury had received a large amount of £36,000 as surplus revenue for the years 1825 and 1826.
Stayner endeavoured to lessen the importance of this fact by declaring that more than half the amount was postage paid by the army, which was not properly chargeable with postage at all. The committee declined to accept this view; and while perfectly friendly to Stayner, and admitting that he had effected some considerable improvements, they were persuaded that the service was far from being what the people had a right to expect.
Stayner tried to downplay this fact by saying that more than half of the amount was postage paid by the army, which shouldn’t have been charged for postage at all. The committee refused to accept this perspective; and while they were completely friendly toward Stayner and acknowledged that he had made some significant improvements, they believed that the service was still not meeting the expectations of the people.
Looking outwards from Quebec, the committee observed that there was no postal service whatever in the counties of Montmorency and Saguenay, which embraced the earliest settlements in the country. On the south shore of the St. Lawrence, and along the Etchemin and Chaudiere rivers, there was a wide stretch of well-settled country entirely lacking the means of communication with the capital, though but a short distance from it.
Looking beyond Quebec, the committee noticed that there was no postal service at all in the counties of Montmorency and Saguenay, which included the country's earliest settlements. On the south shore of the St. Lawrence, and along the Etchemin and Chaudiere rivers, there was a large area of well-established communities completely missing the means to communicate with the capital, even though it was just a short distance away.
From Quebec eastward to the New Brunswick boundary there were over 100,000 people, and the only postal accommodation for this great extent of territory was afforded by seven post offices lying along the line of the post route between [Pg 162] Quebec and Halifax. The peninsula of Gaspe, with a line of fishing settlements all along the coast, had but two mails each year.
From Quebec to the New Brunswick border, there were over 100,000 people, and the only postal service available for this vast area was provided by seven post offices located along the main post route between [Pg 162] Quebec and Halifax. The Gaspe Peninsula, which had a series of fishing communities along the coast, received only two mail deliveries each year.
The committee regretted particularly the situation as regards the conveyance of newspapers. The post office was under no legal obligation to carry them except as letters, and yet there was no other means available for their circulation. If the law had not conferred on the post office a monopoly of carrying letters, the publishers would have a resource. They might establish a transportation system, and meet their expenses by carrying letters as well as newspapers.
The committee was especially disappointed about the issue with delivering newspapers. The post office didn’t have a legal requirement to deliver them unless they were sent as letters, and there was no other way for newspapers to be distributed. If the law hadn’t given the post office a monopoly on letter delivery, the publishers would have had an option. They could set up their own transportation system and cover their costs by delivering both letters and newspapers.
The secrecy with which the affairs of the post office were surrounded was much deprecated by the committee, as giving ground for speculation and suspicion that could not fail to do harm to the institution. If, under the present system of imperial control, an adequate service were rendered, there would have been no just grounds for complaint.
The secrecy surrounding the post office's operations was strongly criticized by the committee, as it created opportunities for speculation and suspicion that could harm the institution. If the current system of imperial oversight provided an adequate service, there would be no valid reasons for complaint.
But if the interests of the province were not regarded, the people were entitled to object to their being limited to a means of conveyance which did not meet their requirements, and to assume that the revenue arising from the service was not properly applied. The committee in conclusion expressed their confidence in the good will of both the postmaster general and his deputy in Canada, and their belief that their complaint had only to be laid before the governor general to secure favourable consideration.
But if the province's interests were overlooked, the people had the right to raise concerns about being limited to a mode of transport that didn’t meet their needs, and to believe that the revenue generated from the service wasn’t being used correctly. In the end, the committee expressed their trust in the goodwill of both the postmaster general and his deputy in Canada, and their belief that bringing their complaint to the governor general would ensure it received favorable attention.
Before concluding to withhold from the house of assembly, the information it sought, Stayner with characteristic prudence had enlisted the support of the governor general, who coincided with him in his view as to the impropriety of his submitting to the questioning of the house regarding the affairs of a branch of the imperial service. When he laid the course he had pursued before the postmaster general, Stayner also gained his approval for the zeal and sagacity he had shown.
Before deciding to withhold the information the assembly was looking for, Stayner had wisely gathered the support of the governor general, who agreed with him that it was inappropriate to answer the assembly’s questions about a part of the imperial service. When he presented his actions to the postmaster general, Stayner also received praise for the enthusiasm and insight he had demonstrated.
But Armour persisted in his attacks in the Gazette, and in the two sessions which followed managed to alienate from Stayner a large measure of the good will of the house of assembly. Stayner's determination to withhold information from the assembly was a source of irritation. The facts which had come to their knowledge through questions in the house of commons at Westminster, the ungracious admissions which the possession of these facts enabled the house to extort from Stayner, and his specious and unconvincing defence of his perquisites, all combined to change[Pg 163] the house from an attitude of friendliness to one of criticism and even hostility.
But Armour kept attacking in the Gazette, and during the next two sessions, he managed to turn a lot of the assembly's goodwill away from Stayner. Stayner’s refusal to share information with the assembly was frustrating. The details they learned from questions in the House of Commons at Westminster, the uncomfortable admissions those facts forced Stayner to make, and his weak and unconvincing defense of his benefits all contributed to the assembly shifting from a friendly stance to one of criticism and even hostility.
The house no longer rested in the belief that, to obtain satisfaction, all that was necessary was to lay their grievances before the department. In 1832, it denounced the methods of the department, and presented an address to the governor general praying that the home government might place the post office under the control of the legislature.[217]
The house no longer believed that just presenting their complaints to the department would lead to satisfaction. In 1832, it criticized the department's methods and submitted a request to the governor general, asking that the home government put the post office under the control of the legislature.[217]
In the session of 1833, the pertinacious Armour again appeared before the assembly. He had no new facts to present, but managed to sustain the interest of the house in the facts already before it.
In the 1833 session, the persistent Armour showed up before the assembly once more. He didn't have any new information to share, but he was able to keep the assembly's interest in the facts that were already on the table.
The assembly on this occasion set forth its views at greater length. In an address to the king,[218] it represented that the post office should not be a means of raising a revenue greater than was needed to enable it to establish offices wherever they might be required; that if the rates were higher than was necessary for that purpose they should be lowered; and that any surplus revenue should be at the disposition of the legislature for the improvement of communications by post throughout the country; also, that newspapers should pass through the post office in Lower Canada, free of postage.
The assembly on this occasion expressed its views in more detail. In a message to the king,[218] it stated that the post office should not be used to generate more revenue than necessary to set up offices wherever needed; that if the rates were higher than necessary for that purpose, they should be lowered; and that any surplus revenue should be available to the legislature for improving postal communications across the country; also, that newspapers should be sent through the post office in Lower Canada without postage fees.
In the assembly in Upper Canada the post office was also vigorously assailed. There was general agreement on the proposition that the existing arrangements were not satisfactory, but on the point of remedy opinions differed sharply. The reformers, of whom Dr. Duncombe was the spokesman, adopting the argument of the Baldwin committee of 1821, insisted that the post office had no legal basis in Upper Canada.
In the assembly in Upper Canada, the post office faced strong criticism. Everyone agreed that the current setup was inadequate, but opinions varied widely on how to fix it. The reformers, led by Dr. Duncombe, argued using the points made by the Baldwin committee in 1821, insisting that the post office had no legal foundation in Upper Canada.
Duncombe and his associates held that it was a violation of the constitution to send any surplus revenue to Great Britain, and that it was the obvious duty of the legislature to pass an act, taking to itself the control of the provincial post office. They believed that the revenues from the service would amply suffice to cover all its expenses, but if it should turn out that such was not the case, they were prepared to meet the deficiency from the general revenues of the province.
Duncombe and his associates believed it was against the constitution to send any surplus revenue to Great Britain, and they felt it was clearly the legislature's responsibility to pass a law taking control of the provincial post office. They thought that the revenue from the service would be more than enough to cover all its costs, but if it turned out that wasn’t the case, they were ready to address the shortfall using the general revenues of the province.
The government party, on the other hand, always ready to fight for things as they were, did not accept the argument of the Baldwin committee. They held that the post office was an institution necessary to commerce, and, as such, it was not placed by the acts of 1778 and 1791 under the jurisdiction of the provincial[Pg 164] legislature. They did not believe that the provincial post office furnished a revenue sufficient to cover the expenses, but if it should be shown that they were wrong, and that the post office yielded a surplus, they were convinced that the imperial government had no desire to retain the surplus for its own purposes.
The government party, on the other hand, always eager to fight for things to stay the same, did not agree with the Baldwin committee's argument. They argued that the post office was an essential institution for commerce and, as such, it wasn’t governed by the acts of 1778 and 1791 under the provincial[Pg 164] legislature. They didn’t think that the provincial post office generated enough revenue to cover its costs, but if it could be proven that they were wrong and that the post office did make a profit, they believed the imperial government wouldn’t want to keep that profit for itself.
Colborne, the lieutenant governor, was in general agreement with the government party. But he believed that, having regard to the great distances between Quebec, and the rapidly rising settlements in the remoter parts of Upper Canada, an administrator, having his headquarters at Quebec could never understand the necessities of the new districts, and that it was indispensable that there should be stationed at Toronto an officer with powers nearly, if not quite, equal to those of the deputy postmaster general at Quebec.
Colborne, the lieutenant governor, generally agreed with the government party. However, he believed that given the vast distances between Quebec and the quickly growing settlements in the more remote areas of Upper Canada, an administrator based in Quebec could never truly grasp the needs of these new regions. He felt it was essential to have an officer stationed in Toronto with powers nearly, if not completely, equal to those of the deputy postmaster general in Quebec.
In the sessions of 1832 and 1833, the subject was warmly debated.[219] The views of the reformers were presented by Duncombe and Bidwell. They were opposed by the attorney general (Henry John Boulton), the solicitor general (Christopher Hagerman), and Burwell, who was postmaster at Port Burwell.
In the meetings of 1832 and 1833, the topic was passionately discussed.[219] The reformers' perspectives were shared by Duncombe and Bidwell. They faced opposition from the attorney general (Henry John Boulton), the solicitor general (Christopher Hagerman), and Burwell, who was the postmaster at Port Burwell.
It was one of the complaints of the reformers that there were in the house of assembly a number of postmasters who voted not according to their own convictions, but according to the orders of Stayner.
It was one of the complaints from the reformers that there were several postmasters in the assembly who voted not based on their own beliefs, but according to Stayner's instructions.
As the result of the discussion, it was resolved to present an address to the king, asking that an annual statement of the revenue and expenditure of the department be laid before the legislature; that newspapers should be distributed throughout the province free of postage; that the correspondence of the members of the legislature should pass free during sessions; and finally, that in the event of a surplus being obtained, the postage rates should be reduced, or that the surplus should be devoted to the improvement of the roads.
As a result of the discussion, it was decided to present a proposal to the king, requesting that an annual report of the department's revenue and expenses be submitted to the legislature; that newspapers be distributed throughout the province without postage fees; that the correspondence of the legislature members be sent free of charge during sessions; and finally, that if a surplus is generated, the postage rates should be lowered, or that the surplus should be used for road improvements.
Stayner, in sending to the postmaster general, copies of the addresses from Upper and Lower Canada, expressed his gratification that the assemblies in both provinces appeared to have dropped the idea of independent provincial establishments, and gave it as his opinion that the legislatures would look for nothing further than such reasonable modifications of existing laws and regulations as the imperial government might determine.
Stayner, in sending copies of the addresses from Upper and Lower Canada to the postmaster general, expressed his satisfaction that the assemblies in both provinces seemed to have abandoned the idea of independent provincial governments. He stated that he believed the legislatures would seek only reasonable changes to the current laws and regulations that the imperial government might decide on.
That some changes were necessary Stayner was quite convinced.[Pg 165] The postage on newspapers, for instance, could not long remain in its present position, as regards either the amount of the charges or the mode in which the revenue therefrom was disposed of. As for the request of the legislatures that newspapers should be distributed by the post office free of charge, there seemed no sound reason why this should be done. A moderate rate should be fixed, and some arrangement made for the disposal of the revenue from this source. The present plan aroused dissatisfaction, and indeed the amount collected was fast becoming too large to be appropriated in the existing manner.
Stayner was very sure that some changes were needed.[Pg 165] For example, the postage on newspapers couldn’t stay the same for long, whether it was about how much they charged or how the money made from it was used. As for the legislatures asking for newspapers to be mailed for free, there didn’t seem to be a good reason for that. A reasonable rate should be set, and there should be a plan for how to use the revenue from this. The current system was causing frustration, and the amount collected was quickly getting too large to be handled in the usual way.
The postmaster general expressed his satisfaction with Stayner's report, and indeed it appeared at that moment to be of more than usual consequence to him that the colonies should be well affected towards the post office.
The postmaster general expressed his satisfaction with Stayner's report, and it seemed especially important to him at that moment that the colonies had a favorable attitude toward the post office.
It will be remembered that when the Baldwin report reached England in 1821, the postmaster general was sufficiently impressed with the cogency of the argument against the legal standing of the British post office in the colonies, to call for the opinion of the law officers upon it. When the case was prepared by the solicitor for the post office, it was still more impressive, and the postmaster general thought better of his desire to have a definite opinion upon it, as it appeared more than probable that the opinion might be against the post office. He accordingly directed that the papers should be put away, and they lay undisturbed for eleven years.
It’s worth noting that when the Baldwin report arrived in England in 1821, the postmaster general was convinced by the strength of the argument against the British post office's legal status in the colonies and decided to seek the opinion of legal experts on the matter. Once the case was prepared by the post office’s solicitor, it became even more convincing, leading the postmaster general to reconsider his wish for a definitive opinion, as it seemed likely that the opinion could be unfavorable for the post office. As a result, he ordered that the papers be set aside, and they remained untouched for eleven years.
But the repeated remonstrances of the colonial assemblies, joined to the rising dissatisfaction with the general political conditions in Upper and Lower Canada, made it desirable to remove any real grievances which might be found to exist in the control and management of the postal system.
But the ongoing complaints from the colonial assemblies, along with the growing dissatisfaction with the overall political situation in Upper and Lower Canada, made it necessary to address any genuine grievances related to the control and management of the postal system.
The first step taken in this direction was to ascertain whether there was any foundation for the contention of the assemblies that the whole system rested on an illegal basis, and that the revenues collected by the post office in the colonies were taken in violation of the fundamental principle governing the relations between the mother country and the colonies.
The first step taken in this direction was to determine whether there was any basis for the assemblies' claim that the entire system was built on an illegal foundation, and that the revenue collected by the post office in the colonies was being taken in violation of the basic principle that governs the relationship between the mother country and the colonies.
The case was accordingly submitted to the attorney general and the solicitor general in 1832; and on the 5th of November of that year a decision was given, upholding the colonial contentions on all points.[220]
The case was then presented to the attorney general and the solicitor general in 1832; and on November 5 of that year, a decision was made, supporting the colonial claims on all points.[220]
The questions upon which the opinions of the law officers[Pg 166] were required were (first) whether the power to establish posts, and the exclusive right to the conveyance of letters given by the acts of 1711 and 1765, had the force of law in the Canadas, and (second) whether the postage received for the inland conveyance of letters within those provinces ought to be paid into the exchequer and applied as part of the revenue of the United Kingdom, or whether it ought to be devoted to the use of the province in which it is raised.
The questions that the law officers[Pg 166] were asked to address were (first) whether the authority to set up posts and the exclusive right to deliver letters granted by the acts of 1711 and 1765 were legally valid in Canada, and (second) whether the postage collected for delivering letters within those provinces should go to the treasury and be used as part of the revenue for the United Kingdom, or if it should be used for the benefit of the province where it was collected.
The law officers gave the case the attention its importance called for. It appeared, they stated, to involve practical considerations of the highest political importance, bringing directly into question the principle of the declaratory act of 1778, respecting internal taxation of the colonies by the mother country.
The legal officials really focused on the case like it deserved. They mentioned that it seemed to involve important practical issues, which were highly significant politically, directly questioning the principle of the declaratory act of 1778 about the internal taxation of the colonies by the parent country.
Their opinion was that the rates of internal postage could not be considered as within the exception of duties imposed for the regulation of commerce, but that if they could be so considered, they would by the terms of that act be at the disposal of the province, instead of constituting a part of the revenues appropriated for the general purposes of the empire.
Their view was that the rates for internal postage shouldn't be seen as exempt from the duties imposed for regulating commerce. However, if they could be considered exempt, then according to the terms of that act, they would be under the control of the province, rather than being part of the revenues allocated for the general purposes of the empire.
It had been contended, as a question of law, that since the act of 1765, by which the colonial rates were finally determined, was in operation at the time of the declaratory act of 1788, it had not been annulled by the latter act, the language of which was, not that rates then existing should be no longer levied, but that after the passing of the act of 1778, no tax or duty should be levied. But the law officers had no great confidence in the argument. In their own words they were of opinion that "it would not be safe to agitate the question as a question of law with the colony, and if it could be so discussed, it would not succeed, and that it could not be enforced."
It was argued, from a legal standpoint, that since the act of 1765, which set the colonial rates, was still in effect when the declaratory act of 1788 was passed, it hadn't been canceled by the latter act. The wording of the act indicated that rates in place at that time weren't to be eliminated, but rather that after the act of 1778 was enacted, no new tax or duty could be imposed. However, the legal advisors lacked confidence in this argument. They believed that "it wouldn't be wise to raise the issue legally with the colony, and if it could be discussed, it wouldn't succeed, and it couldn't be enforced."
The opinion of the law officers could not have been unexpected, but it gave the postmaster general much concern. In a note appended to the decision, he accepted the opinion of the law officers as conclusive. The department, he said, was beaten off its first position, and his view was that a plan should be drawn up by which the post office should relinquish to the provinces any surplus revenue after the expenses were paid, and permit an account of the receipts and expenditures to be laid on the tables of the legislatures. While forced to concede this much the postmaster general was convinced that the appointment of the officers of the department should remain with the crown. Otherwise he foresaw the ruin of the colonies, so far as correspondence was[Pg 167] concerned; for the postmaster general and legislature of Upper Canada would be at perpetual strife with the postmaster general and legislature of Lower Canada. However, he concluded that before taking any step in the matter he would consult Goderich, the colonial secretary.
The opinion of the legal advisors was probably not surprising, but it concerned the postmaster general greatly. In a note added to the decision, he accepted the legal advisors' opinion as final. He stated that the department had to back down from its original stance, and he believed a plan should be created so that the post office would give any surplus revenue to the provinces after expenses were covered, and allow a report of the income and spending to be presented to the legislatures. While he had to agree to this, the postmaster general felt strongly that the appointment of the department's officers should stay with the crown. Otherwise, he predicted that the colonies would face disaster in terms of communication; the postmaster general and legislature of Upper Canada would be in constant conflict with the postmaster general and legislature of Lower Canada. Nevertheless, he decided that before making any moves on this issue, he would consult Goderich, the colonial secretary.
It was not until the following March that the postmaster general saw Goderich respecting the post office. The interview was quite satisfactory. The colonial secretary agreed to the propositions. Legislation would be necessary, and to that end Stayner was called to London to give his assistance.
It wasn't until the next March that the postmaster general met with Goderich about the post office. The meeting went really well. The colonial secretary approved the proposals. Legislation would be needed, so Stayner was called to London to help out.
At this time the government received assurances from an unexpected source that the plan settled upon would be satisfactory to the Canadian people. William Lyon Mackenzie, and Denis Benjamin Viger, representing as they maintained, the body of the public in the two provinces, visited England for the purpose of laying before the government the grievances of the Canadian people.
At this time, the government got assurance from an unexpected source that the chosen plan would meet the approval of the Canadian people. William Lyon Mackenzie and Denis Benjamin Viger, who claimed to represent the public in the two provinces, traveled to England to present the grievances of the Canadian people to the government.
On reaching London, Mackenzie and Viger wrote to the secretary of the post office, requesting an interview with the postmaster general. The request was refused on the ground that the postmaster general did not feel authorized to communicate with any person but the colonial secretary on colonial matters. The delegates then addressed themselves to Goderich, who cordially invited them to lay their case before him.
On arriving in London, Mackenzie and Viger wrote to the post office secretary, asking for a meeting with the postmaster general. Their request was denied because the postmaster general felt he could only discuss colonial issues with the colonial secretary. The delegates then turned to Goderich, who warmly welcomed them to present their case.
Mackenzie, thus encouraged, prepared a statement, which, though long and detailed, was studiously moderate in tone.[221] On all other points of colonial policy, Mackenzie declared, people would be found to differ, but as regards the post office there was absolute unanimity. There must be a change. Stayner himself admitted that the arrangements were imperfect.
Mackenzie, feeling encouraged, prepared a statement that, while lengthy and detailed, was intentionally moderate in tone.[221] Mackenzie stated that while people might disagree on other aspects of colonial policy, there was complete agreement when it came to the post office. A change was necessary. Stayner himself acknowledged that the existing arrangements were not ideal.
The colonial governments were in favour of separate establishments, but Mackenzie was of Stayner's opinion that such would be impracticable. His own belief was that the only feasible scheme would be to bring all the colonies of British North America under one deputy postmaster general, who should be responsible to the postmaster general of England. Mackenzie apparently would be quite satisfied to see the office of deputy postmaster general vested in Stayner, whom he described as a persevering, active officer.
The colonial governments supported separate offices, but Mackenzie agreed with Stayner that this would be unworkable. He believed the only practical solution was to have all the colonies of British North America overseen by one deputy postmaster general, who would answer to the postmaster general of England. Mackenzie seemed to be perfectly fine with Stayner holding the position of deputy postmaster general, describing him as a determined and proactive official.
The other suggestions of Mackenzie were in line with the more conservative recommendations of the colonial assemblies. On[Pg 168] one subject, however, he expressed himself strongly. He said the packet service between the Canadian provinces and the mother country was so indifferent that it went far to convince Canadians that Great Britain desired as little correspondence with Canada as possible.
The other suggestions from Mackenzie aligned with the more conservative recommendations of the colonial assemblies. On[Pg 168] one topic, though, he spoke out strongly. He stated that the mail service between the Canadian provinces and the home country was so poor that it largely convinced Canadians that Great Britain wanted to have as little communication with Canada as possible.
As an instance of the inferiority of the packet service, Mackenzie told Goderich that he had shortly before received a letter by the Halifax packet, which was sixty-five days on the way, and which cost five shillings and fourpence-halfpenny for postage, and another by way of New York, which was only thirty-four days in coming, and cost only one shilling and fourpence-halfpenny. The announcement of the arrival of the English mail by the Halifax packet was scarcely heeded, whereas no sooner was it known that the Liverpool mail had arrived from New York than the Montreal post office was crowded. Mackenzie's statement on this point was fully confirmed by Stayner on his arrival in London in June.
As an example of how inferior the packet service was, Mackenzie told Goderich that he had recently received a letter from the Halifax packet that took sixty-five days to arrive and cost five shillings and fourpence-halfpenny for postage. In contrast, he received another letter via New York that took only thirty-four days and cost just one shilling and fourpence-halfpenny. The notice of the English mail arriving by the Halifax packet barely got any attention, while the moment it was announced that the Liverpool mail had arrived from New York, the Montreal post office was packed with people. Stayner confirmed Mackenzie’s statement when he arrived in London in June.
Stayner, when informed of the opinion of the law officers, was not disposed to acquiesce in it as readily as the postmaster general had done. Colonial lawyers, always more imperial and more conservative than the Eldons and Lyndhursts in London, had assured him that the necessity of imperial control of the colonial post office was the strongest reason for believing that parliament never intended to divest itself of the power by the act of 1778. The conviction of the necessity of imperial control was held by all persons qualified to have an opinion, and, Stayner declared, by the legislatures themselves.
Stayner, when he learned the opinion of the legal advisors, was not as quick to accept it as the postmaster general had been. Colonial lawyers, typically more focused on the empire and more conservative than the Eldons and Lyndhursts in London, had convinced him that the need for imperial control over the colonial post office was the main reason to believe that Parliament never intended to give up that authority with the act of 1778. This belief in the need for imperial control was shared by everyone qualified to have an opinion, and Stayner stated, it was also held by the legislatures themselves.
The firm belief of Stayner was that, if the imperial parliament failed to legislate on the present critical situation then they must give up all idea of ever having the question settled. The several colonies could never be brought to concur in their views on this or any other subject. They knew this, and did not ask to have the matter submitted to their own legislation.
Stayner firmly believed that if the imperial parliament didn't address the current critical situation, they would have to abandon any hope of resolving the issue. The various colonies could never agree on their perspectives regarding this or any other topic. They recognized this and didn't request to have the matter presented to their own legislature.
Stayner certainly overstated the reluctance of the legislatures to deal with the question of the provincial post office. But, as his opinion had the support of so ultra a radical as Mackenzie, the postmaster general could not be blamed for accepting, and, as far as possible, acting upon it.
Stayner definitely exaggerated how hesitant the legislatures were to address the issue of the provincial post office. However, since his view had backing from such an extreme radical as Mackenzie, the postmaster general couldn't be faulted for taking it seriously and, as much as possible, acting on it.
There was, however, a difficulty. Indeed, the way back into right courses seemed beset with difficulties. The postmaster general was quite willing to furnish the legislatures with annual statements of the revenue and expenditure, to leave with the colonies all surplus revenues, and to satisfy all the reasonable[Pg 169] desires of the provinces. But by what steps should he proceed, to legalize the course he proposed?
There was, however, a challenge. In fact, the path back to proper actions seemed filled with obstacles. The postmaster general was more than willing to provide the legislatures with annual reports on revenue and spending, to let the colonies keep any surplus revenue, and to meet all the reasonable[Pg 169] requests of the provinces. But what steps should he take to make his proposed course of action legal?
If the necessary legislation could be enacted by the imperial parliament, all would be well. With a free hand, he would have no trouble in satisfying all the interests concerned. But if the bills had to originate with the provincial legislatures, the postmaster general would despair of bringing the matter to a successful conclusion, as he was convinced that the requisite action on the part of the several provincial legislatures would never be taken. The postmaster general again turned to the law officers. It was essential that they be consulted on the question.
If the imperial parliament could pass the necessary laws, everything would be fine. With the freedom to act, he would easily satisfy all the involved interests. But if the bills had to start with the provincial legislatures, the postmaster general would lose hope of reaching a successful outcome, as he believed that the required actions from the various provincial legislatures would never happen. The postmaster general turned to the legal advisors again. It was crucial to get their input on the matter.
The points on which opinion was desired were two. The first was whether, without any further authority of parliament, the surplus of any postal revenue raised within the colonies under the act of 1765, could be appropriated and applied under the direction of the respective legislatures for the use of the province in which such surplus might arise.
The opinions sought were on two points. The first was whether, without any additional authority from parliament, the surplus of any postal revenue generated in the colonies under the act of 1765 could be allocated and used under the direction of the respective legislatures for the benefit of the province where that surplus was collected.
The second was whether it would be competent for the British parliament to fix a new set of rates for the colonies, or whether the acts of 1778 and 1791 made it necessary that the authority for such rates should proceed from the respective colonial legislatures.
The second question was whether the British Parliament had the right to set new rates for the colonies, or if the acts of 1778 and 1791 required that the authority for those rates come from the individual colonial legislatures.
Both of these questions were answered adversely to the hopes of the postmaster general.[222] The law officers had no doubt that the act of 1778 was applicable to the Canadas, and that, if objections were raised in the provinces to the payment of postages fixed by the British parliament, whether by the act of 1765 or by an act to be thereafter passed, the legality of the charges could not be maintained, nor could payment of them be enforced in the absence of authority from the legislature of the province concerned.
Both of these questions were answered in a way that did not meet the hopes of the postmaster general.[222] The legal experts were certain that the act of 1778 applied to the Canadas, and that if there were objections in the provinces regarding the postage rates set by the British parliament, whether from the act of 1765 or from a future act, the legality of those charges couldn't be upheld, nor could collection of them be enforced without authorization from the relevant provincial legislature.
The proper procedure to be followed, in the opinion of the law officers, was for the British parliament to repeal the act of 1765, and leave it to the provinces to establish a new set of rates. The law officers were aware of the difficulties which would arise, if after the act of 1765 had been repealed, the colonial legislatures failed to agree on a scheme of rates or on the necessary arrangements for a uniform postal system throughout the provinces. In such a case, there would be a period in which there would be not even the semblance of legal authority for the postal service within the colonies.
The right approach, according to the legal officials, was for the British Parliament to repeal the 1765 act and allow the provinces to set their own rates. The legal officials understood the challenges that could occur if, after the repeal of the 1765 act, the colonial legislatures couldn't come to an agreement on a rate system or on the necessary setup for a consistent postal system across the provinces. In that situation, there would be a time when there wouldn’t be any legal authority for the postal service in the colonies.
After a further interchange of correspondence between the[Pg 170] postmaster general and the law officers, it was decided to introduce into the imperial parliament a bill repealing the act of 1765, but making the operation of the bill contingent upon suitable legislation being adopted by the legislatures of the several provinces. In order to facilitate the passage of identical legislation by each of the legislatures, a draft act was prepared by the solicitor of the general post office, and a copy was sent to the lieutenant governor in each of the provinces for submission to his legislature.
After further back-and-forth correspondence between the [Pg 170] postmaster general and the legal advisors, it was decided to introduce a bill in the imperial parliament to repeal the act of 1765, but this repeal would only take effect if appropriate legislation was passed by the legislatures of the various provinces. To make it easier for each legislature to pass identical legislation, a draft act was created by the solicitor of the general post office, and a copy was sent to the lieutenant governor in each province for them to present to their legislature.
The act of the imperial parliament was passed and received the king's assent on the 26th of March, 1834.[223] It contained but two clauses. The first provided for the repeal of the imperial act of 1765, so far as that act authorized the collection of postage in the colonies, but stipulated that it should not become operative until acceptable legislation had been adopted in the several provinces, authorizing the collection of postage and making suitable arrangements for a postal service throughout the provinces.
The imperial parliament's act was passed and got the king's approval on March 26, 1834.[223] It had only two clauses. The first called for the repeal of the imperial act of 1765, specifically regarding the authorization of postage collection in the colonies, but it stated that it wouldn't take effect until appropriate laws were enacted in the various provinces to authorize postage collection and establish a proper postal service throughout the provinces.
The second clause stipulated that, in the event of the revenues from the colonial post offices exceeding the expenditures, the surplus should no longer be sent to London to form part of the revenues of the United Kingdom, but should be divided among the several colonies in the proportion of their gross revenues.
The second clause stated that if the revenue from the colonial post offices was greater than the expenses, the surplus wouldn't be sent to London to contribute to the UK's revenue anymore, but would instead be distributed among the various colonies based on their gross revenue.
The draft bill, prepared by the solicitor of the general post office, provided for a complete postal system in each of the provinces.[224] Under this bill, the postmaster general at St. Martin's-le-Grand was to be the head of each provincial system, and the appointment of a deputy postmaster general in each province, who should reside in the province and manage the system therein, was to be in his hands.
The draft bill, drafted by the attorney for the general post office, proposed a full postal system in each province.[224] Under this bill, the postmaster general at St. Martin's-le-Grand would be in charge of each provincial system, and he would have the authority to appoint a deputy postmaster general in each province to live there and oversee the system.
The postage rates were to be the same in the several provinces; and in the case of correspondence between the provinces, the charge for postage was to be fixed in accordance with the entire distance the articles were carried, without regard to provincial boundary lines.
The postage rates were to be the same across the different provinces; and for mail sent between the provinces, the postage charge was to be based on the total distance the items traveled, regardless of provincial borders.
It will be seen that if the provincial legislatures adopted the bills framed in London for them, there would be no change whatever in the practical working of the colonial system. The postmaster general in London would, as theretofore, control the arrangements, and the charges were fixed, regardless of provincial boundaries.[Pg 171] As the imperial act stipulated that any surplus which should arise from the system should be distributed among the colonies, so the proposed provincial bills provided for the contingency of a deficit in its operations.
It will be clear that if the provincial legislatures accepted the bills drafted in London for them, there would be no change at all in the practical operation of the colonial system. The postmaster general in London would continue to oversee the arrangements, and the fees would be set without regard to provincial boundaries.[Pg 171] As the imperial act stated that any surplus generated from the system should be shared among the colonies, the proposed provincial bills included provisions for the possibility of a deficit in its operations.
Each provincial bill empowered the postmaster general to demand from the legislature the amount, which it was agreed that the province should be held responsible for, to make up the deficit. Upper and Lower Canada were to bind themselves to pay in such a case up to £2000 from each province. Nova Scotia was to pay up to £1200; New Brunswick up to £600; and Prince Edward Island up to £200.
Each provincial bill gave the postmaster general the authority to request from the legislature the amount that it was decided each province would be responsible for to cover the deficit. Upper and Lower Canada agreed to pay up to £2000 from each province in this situation. Nova Scotia would contribute up to £1200; New Brunswick up to £600; and Prince Edward Island up to £200.
In anticipation of the adoption of the bills by the several legislatures, the postmaster general appointed an accountant, who should have general charge of the financial transactions of all the colonies. He was to be established at Quebec. His position in relation to the deputy postmaster general of Lower Canada was somewhat peculiar. While, in general, he was subordinate to the deputy postmaster general, in all matters touching the accounts, he was independent of the deputy, and responsible only to the postmaster general in London.
In preparation for the adoption of the bills by the various legislatures, the postmaster general appointed an accountant to oversee the financial transactions for all the colonies. He was to be based in Quebec. His role in relation to the deputy postmaster general of Lower Canada was somewhat unusual. Generally, he was subordinate to the deputy postmaster general, but in terms of accounting matters, he was independent from the deputy and was only accountable to the postmaster general in London.
There were also appointed two travelling surveyors or inspectors in the Canadas, one of whom was stationed at Quebec, and the other at Toronto. Nothing could have been more necessary for the proper administration of the service, and for the expansion of the system to meet the requirements of the new settlements. It was impossible for Stayner to give personal attention to the duty of supervising postmasters, or to inquiries into the merits of the numerous applications from all parts of the country for new post offices.
There were also two traveling surveyors or inspectors assigned in Canada, one based in Quebec and the other in Toronto. This was absolutely essential for effectively managing the service and expanding the system to accommodate the needs of the new settlements. Stayner couldn't personally oversee the supervision of postmasters or handle the many inquiries about the numerous requests for new post offices coming from all over the country.
The necessity for assistance in this direction was impressed on Stayner by a number of robberies which took place on the grand route between Montreal and Toronto—episodes in post office economy which he was helpless to investigate.
The need for help in this area was made clear to Stayner by several robberies that occurred on the main road between Montreal and Toronto—events in postal operations that he was unable to investigate.
Two of these robberies have incidents connected with them, which are deserving of mention. In February 1835, on a stormy night, the mail bag dropped off the courier's sleigh somewhere in the neighbourhood of Prescott, and it could not be found. As the contents of the bag included banknotes to the value of from £10,000 to £12,000, a reward of £200 was offered for the conviction of the thief and the recovery of the money.
Two of these robberies have connected incidents that are worth mentioning. In February 1835, on a stormy night, the mail bag fell off the courier's sleigh somewhere near Prescott, and it couldn't be found. Since the bag contained banknotes worth between £10,000 and £12,000, a reward of £200 was offered for the arrest of the thief and the recovery of the money.
Within half an hour after the placard was on view in Prescott, a man who heard it read, exclaimed excitedly: "I know all about[Pg 172] it, I have the bag at home." It turned out that this man had found the bag, rifled it, and used part of the money, and, carried away with the prospect of the large reward, had actually informed on himself.
Within half an hour after the notice was posted in Prescott, a man who heard it read exclaimed excitedly: "I know all about[Pg 172] it, I have the bag at home." It turned out that this man had found the bag, searched through it, and used some of the money, and, caught up in the excitement of the large reward, had actually reported himself.
The other case is noteworthy on account of the energy displayed by the loser of a valuable letter, in pursuing and securing the conviction of the thief. The letter, which contained £200, was posted in Toronto, and addressed to a gentleman living near L'Original. As the department, owing to the lack of effective aid, was limited in its efforts to advertising the loss in the newspapers and by placards, the loser of the letter took the inquiries into his own hands.
The other case is significant because of the determination shown by the person who lost a valuable letter in tracking down and securing the conviction of the thief. The letter, which contained £200, was sent from Toronto and addressed to a man living near L'Original. Since the department, due to insufficient support, was limited to advertising the loss in newspapers and posting notices, the person who lost the letter took matters into their own hands.
He spent nearly a year in his investigations, travelling up and down the country between Montreal and Toronto, and in the state of New York, covering a distance of upwards of two thousand one hundred miles. It is satisfactory to be able to say that he managed to locate and secure the arrest and conviction of the thief. So well had he done his work, that the deputy postmaster general adjudged him to be entitled to the £50 reward offered by the department.
He spent almost a year doing his research, traveling back and forth between Montreal and Toronto, and throughout New York, covering over two thousand one hundred miles. It’s satisfying to report that he managed to find and get the thief arrested and convicted. He did such a great job that the deputy postmaster general decided he deserved the £50 reward offered by the department.
FOOTNOTES:
[218] Ibid., 1832-1833, p. 561.
[224] The bill for Upper Canada is printed in App. 8 to the Journals of the Assembly for 1835. Those submitted to the other provinces were identical except as to the maximum to be contributed by the province in the event of a financial deficit.
[224] The bill for Upper Canada is printed in App. 8 to the Journals of the Assembly for 1835. The bills given to the other provinces were the same, except for the maximum amount the province would contribute in case of a financial shortfall.
CHAPTER X
The beginnings of the postal service in the Maritime provinces—Complaints of newspaper publishers—Reception given to imperial act to remedy colonial grievances.
The origins of the postal service in the Maritime provinces—Complaints from newspaper publishers—Response to the imperial act aimed at addressing colonial issues.
Up to this point the narrative since the American Revolution has been confined to Upper and Lower Canada. The Maritime provinces have been mentioned only in so far as it was necessary to describe the means by which the Canadas maintained communication with Great Britain. It is now time to relate the events connected with the beginnings of the inland posts in the Maritime provinces.
Up to now, the story since the American Revolution has focused on Upper and Lower Canada. The Maritime provinces have only been mentioned as far as needed to explain how the Canadas stayed in touch with Great Britain. It's now time to discuss the events related to the establishment of the inland posts in the Maritime provinces.
The post office in Halifax was the first opened in the provinces now of the dominion of Canada. It was established as part of the general scheme for closer and more regular communications between the colonies and the mother country which was set on foot as a consequence of the general alarm which seized the British colonies after the annihilation of Braddock's army by the French and Indians at fort Duquesne.
The post office in Halifax was the first one opened in what is now Canada. It was set up as part of a broader plan for improved and more consistent communication between the colonies and Britain, which was initiated after the widespread panic that gripped the British colonies following the destruction of Braddock's army by the French and Native Americans at Fort Duquesne.
With the placing of a direct line of packets on the route between Falmouth and New York for the conveyance of mails and despatches a post office was demanded at Halifax, in order that Nova Scotia might participate with the other colonies in the benefits of the new service. When in 1755 the post office was opened at Halifax, the English settlements in the Maritime provinces were very recent and very few. The city was founded but six years before, for the purpose of providing a military and naval station; and in the year following, the capital of the province was transferred thither from Annapolis.
With the launch of a direct line of ships between Falmouth and New York for transporting mail and messages, there was a push for a post office in Halifax so that Nova Scotia could enjoy the same benefits as other colonies from this new service. When the post office opened in Halifax in 1755, the English settlements in the Maritime provinces were still very new and sparse. The city had only been established six years earlier to serve as a military and naval station, and the following year, the province's capital was moved there from Annapolis.
In 1751 the only other settlement attached to the British interest at this time was commenced. A number of Germans, attracted by the advertising of the British government, arrived at Halifax. After a short stay most of them re-embarked, and sailing along the southern shore reached Malagash harbour, where they laid the foundation of the town of Lunenburg. The settlement was augmented by further arrivals in the two following[Pg 174] years, and in 1753 its population numbered slightly over 1600. In 1755 the total population in the two settlements of Halifax and Lunenburg was about 5000, and these comprehended all that could be regarded as British subjects.
In 1751, the only other settlement associated with British interests at that time was started. A group of Germans, drawn in by advertisements from the British government, arrived in Halifax. After a brief stay, most of them re-boarded ships and sailed along the southern coast to Malagash Harbour, where they began building the town of Lunenburg. The settlement grew with more arrivals over the next two[Pg 174] years, and by 1753, its population was just over 1,600. In 1755, the total population of the two settlements, Halifax and Lunenburg, was around 5,000, and these included everyone who could be considered British subjects.
Few additions were made to the population within the next few years, though the government made a strong effort to re-people the districts from which the Acadians had just been expelled. The only other new settlement founded in the Maritime provinces until the French power in America was broken by the capture of Louisburg and of Quebec, was at Windsor, where a group from New England entered upon the lands from which their former possessors had been removed.
Few new residents joined the population in the next few years, even though the government tried hard to repopulate the areas from which the Acadians had just been driven out. The only other new settlement established in the Maritime provinces until French control in America ended with the capture of Louisburg and Quebec was in Windsor, where a group from New England settled on the lands that had been cleared of their previous occupants.
With the passing of the danger of molestation by the French, there was an active movement into the provinces for a few years. The beginnings of settlements were laid all along the Annapolis valley from Windsor to Annapolis; also at several points on the south shore between Halifax and Liverpool, and at the western extremity of the province in the present county of Yarmouth. Little groups established themselves at Truro and Amherst, and on the adjacent lands of New Brunswick, at Sackville and Hopewell.
With the threat of French attacks gone, there was a surge of activity into the provinces for several years. Settlements started to form all along the Annapolis Valley from Windsor to Annapolis, as well as at various spots along the south shore between Halifax and Liverpool, and in the far west of the province in what is now Yarmouth County. Small groups set up communities in Truro and Amherst, and on the nearby lands of New Brunswick, in Sackville and Hopewell.
On the St. John river, a trading village was laid out in 1762 at Portland, now part of the city of St. John; and in 1763 an important agricultural community was formed farther up the river, at Maugerville, a few miles below Fredericton. In 1767 a census was taken of the province, and the total population was found to be over 13,000. Of these 1200 were in the territory afterwards forming part of the province of New Brunswick, and there were 500 in Prince Edward Island. The remaining number were in Nova Scotia proper. The first movement of immigration had now spent itself, and it was not until after the revolting colonies had gained their independence that any great accession was made to the population.
On the St. John River, a trading village was established in 1762 at Portland, which is now part of the city of St. John. In 1763, an important agricultural community developed further up the river at Maugerville, just a few miles below Fredericton. A census was conducted in 1767, revealing that the total population of the province had surpassed 13,000. Out of this, 1,200 people lived in the area that later became part of New Brunswick, and there were 500 residents in Prince Edward Island. The rest lived in Nova Scotia. The initial wave of immigration had ended, and it wasn't until after the rebellious colonies gained their independence that there was a significant increase in the population.
The incoming of the Loyalists was an event of the first magnitude for the Maritime provinces. During the years 1783 and 1784, the population increased to threefold what it was when the migration from the revolted American colonies began. They took up lands in all parts of the provinces. Eighteen hundred householders made homes for themselves in and about Annapolis, while Digby, which until that time was quite unsettled, leaped into the position of a village with a population of 1300.
The arrival of the Loyalists was a significant event for the Maritime provinces. In 1783 and 1784, the population tripled compared to when the migration from the rebellious American colonies started. They settled on lands throughout the provinces. Eighteen hundred families established homes in and around Annapolis, while Digby, which had been largely uninhabited, quickly grew into a village with a population of 1,300.
Nearly all the settlements formed at this period had within[Pg 175] them the elements of permanence, and they became the foundations of the towns, villages and farming communities which cover the Maritime provinces. Until the arrival of the Loyalists, there were practically no inhabitants east of Halifax and Colchester counties. Pictou was not entirely unoccupied, as a small group from Pennsylvania and Maryland had come into the district in 1765, who were joined by a few Highland Scotch families in 1773. But the total number was insignificant, and the two counties to the eastward, Antigonishe and Guysboro, were still practically in a state of nature. They were settled later by Scotchmen who came to Pictou and Prince Edward Island.
Almost all the settlements established during this time had elements of permanence, and they became the foundations for the towns, villages, and farming communities that now populate the Maritime provinces. Before the Loyalists arrived, there were virtually no inhabitants east of Halifax and Colchester counties. Pictou wasn't completely unoccupied; a small group from Pennsylvania and Maryland had settled in the area in 1765, and they were joined by a few Highland Scotch families in 1773. However, the total population was minimal, and the two counties to the east, Antigonish and Guysborough, were still largely untouched by development. They were later settled by Scotsmen who came from Pictou and Prince Edward Island.
New Brunswick benefited to a relatively greater extent than Nova Scotia by the Loyalist movement. At the close of the war, the number of English colonists in this province did not exceed 2500. These were scattered in small groups on Passamaquoddy bay, on the St. John river, and on the Chignecto bay and Petitcodiac river at the eastern end of the province.
New Brunswick benefited more than Nova Scotia from the Loyalist movement. By the end of the war, the number of English settlers in this province was no more than 2,500. They were spread out in small groups around Passamaquoddy Bay, the St. John River, and Chignecto Bay and the Petitcodiac River at the eastern end of the province.
By 1787, when the Loyalists had settled themselves, there was a continuous line of settlements along the bay of Fundy from the United States boundary at the St. Croix river to St. John harbour, and with longer intervals onward to the eastern limits of the province. On the St. John river and tributaries over 9000 people were settled. The cities of St. John and Fredericton, and the towns of St. Stephen and St. Andrews sprang into existence during this period.
By 1787, after the Loyalists had settled in, there was a continuous line of settlements along the Bay of Fundy stretching from the U.S. border at the St. Croix River to St. John Harbor, with wider gaps further east to the edge of the province. Over 9,000 people had settled along the St. John River and its tributaries. During this time, the cities of St. John and Fredericton, as well as the towns of St. Stephen and St. Andrews, came into being.
On the north and east coasts of New Brunswick permanent settlement had begun, the people being mostly Acadians. There were small Scotch fishing settlements on the Miramichi and the Restigouche rivers.
On the north and east coasts of New Brunswick, permanent settlements had started, mostly with Acadian people. There were small Scottish fishing communities along the Miramichi and Restigouche rivers.
Communication among these settlements was carried on mostly by water. Fishing vessels ran constantly between Halifax and the harbours and coves on the seaboard. The settlements on the bay of Fundy and the St. John river were brought into connection with Halifax by way of Windsor, which lies near the mouth of the Avon, one of the tributaries of the bay of Fundy.
Communication among these settlements mainly happened by water. Fishing boats constantly traveled between Halifax and the harbors and coves along the coast. The settlements around the Bay of Fundy and the St. John River were linked to Halifax through Windsor, located near the mouth of the Avon, one of the tributaries of the Bay of Fundy.
Between Windsor and Halifax a road had been built by the Acadians shortly after Halifax was founded, to enable them to carry their cattle and produce to the new and promising market. The inland settlements along the Annapolis valley had the advantage of an ancient road, made by the Acadians running from Pisiquid, as Windsor was first called, to the Annapolis basin.
Between Windsor and Halifax, the Acadians built a road shortly after Halifax was established, allowing them to transport their cattle and produce to the new and promising market. The inland settlements along the Annapolis Valley benefitted from an older road created by the Acadians that ran from Pisiquid, the original name for Windsor, to the Annapolis Basin.
The Loyalists and disbanded soldiers settled in the provinces[Pg 176] found themselves not ill-supplied with facilities for communicating with one another, but the means of corresponding with the mother country left much to be desired. On the establishment of the packet service between Falmouth and New York in 1755, the mails for Halifax brought out by the packets were sent from New York to Boston, the postmaster of which town was instructed to send them to Halifax by the first suitable war or merchant vessel that offered.
The Loyalists and disbanded soldiers who settled in the provinces[Pg 176] found that they had decent facilities for communicating with each other, but the ability to correspond with the mother country was lacking. When the packet service was established between Falmouth and New York in 1755, the mails for Halifax sent by the packets were first sent from New York to Boston. The postmaster in Boston was instructed to send them to Halifax by the first suitable warship or merchant vessel that became available.
Until the war broke out, there were numerous opportunities for sending the mails to Halifax. The trade returns for 1759 show that during six months of that year one hundred and forty-eight vessels entered Halifax harbour, much the greater proportion of which were from New York or Boston. But with the outbreak of the war, communication with the revolted colonies was carried on at great risks, and the naval and military authorities at Halifax made bitter complaint of the delays to their correspondence with the home government.
Until the war started, there were many chances to send mail to Halifax. The trade reports for 1759 reveal that during six months of that year, one hundred and forty-eight ships docked in Halifax harbor, the majority of which were from New York or Boston. However, with the war beginning, communication with the rebellious colonies became very risky, and the naval and military officials in Halifax expressed strong complaints about the delays in their correspondence with the home government.
With the restoration of peace, an immediate demand was made for a direct packet line to Halifax, and there seemed every likelihood at the time that the line would be established. Lord North wrote to the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia in August 1783[225] that Halifax would doubtless increase in importance in becoming the rendezvous of the fleet, and that he was asking the postmaster general to put on a monthly packet to Halifax.
With peace restored, there was an urgent request for a direct shipping line to Halifax, and it looked likely that the line would be created. In August 1783, Lord North wrote to the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia[225] that Halifax would certainly grow in significance as a meeting point for the fleet, and that he was asking the postmaster general to start a monthly shipping service to Halifax.
But other views prevailed. In November, the postmaster general re-established the packet service to New York, and as there were not sufficient vessels available for a separate line to Halifax, the settlements in the Maritime provinces had to depend on the New York service for their correspondence with the mother country. The British post office maintained a packet agent at New York, whose duty it was to take over the despatches and mails brought by the packets for the British colonies, and send them forward by the first opportunity.
But other opinions took over. In November, the postmaster general reinstated the packet service to New York, and since there weren't enough ships available for a separate line to Halifax, the settlements in the Maritime provinces had to rely on the New York service for their communication with the mother country. The British post office had a packet agent in New York, whose job was to handle the dispatches and mails brought by the packets for the British colonies and send them on at the first opportunity.
The difficulties Finlay found in maintaining correspondence between Canada and Great Britain by way of the New York packets have been related. The Nova Scotia post office had no less difficulty. There were few British vessels running between Halifax and the ports of the United States, and consequently the delays to the correspondence were often intolerable. The complaints of the officials and of the merchants in Halifax were incessant.[Pg 177]
The challenges Finlay faced in keeping in touch between Canada and Great Britain through the New York packets have been mentioned. The Nova Scotia post office struggled just as much. There were hardly any British ships traveling between Halifax and U.S. ports, which often led to unbearable delays in communication. Officials and merchants in Halifax constantly complained.[Pg 177]
A memorial was presented to the government in 1785 by the merchants of Halifax, pointing out the great injury to their trade from the faulty arrangements. Lieutenant governor Parr, in forwarding the memorial, expressed his entire concurrence in its terms, and added that the mails which left England by the November packet did not reach Halifax until the 11th of April following.
A memorial was submitted to the government in 1785 by the merchants of Halifax, highlighting the significant damage to their trade due to poor arrangements. Lieutenant Governor Parr, while forwarding the memorial, stated that he fully agreed with its content and added that the mails which left England on the November packet didn’t arrive in Halifax until April 11th of the following year.
But fortunately Canada was now adding an insistent voice in support of the demand of the Maritime provinces. Before peace was declared, the governors of Canada and Nova Scotia were canvassing the possibilities of facilitating communication between their provinces. Despatch couriers passed between Quebec, fort Howe and Halifax, and efforts were made to overcome the obstacles to travel, particularly on the portage between the St. Lawrence and lake Temiscouata.
But luckily, Canada was now raising a strong voice in support of the Maritime provinces' demands. Before peace was declared, the governors of Canada and Nova Scotia were discussing how to improve communication between their provinces. Messenger couriers traveled between Quebec, Fort Howe, and Halifax, and efforts were made to address the travel challenges, especially on the portage between the St. Lawrence and Lake Temiscouata.
The results had not been specially encouraging, but the determination of the Americans to exact the last farthing that could be got out of the exchanges between Canada and Great Britain, which passed over their territory, and their unwillingness to assist in expediting the exchanges in any way, compelled the Canadian government to keep before it the question of the connections by way of Halifax.
The results hadn't been particularly promising, but the Americans were determined to squeeze every last cent they could out of the exchanges between Canada and Great Britain that went through their territory. Their refusal to help speed up these exchanges forced the Canadian government to keep considering the connections through Halifax.
In 1785 the legislative council of Quebec discussed the question. Finlay, who besides being deputy postmaster general, was a member of the legislative council, impressed on his colleagues the necessity of liberating Canada from its dependence on the United States in its correspondence with the mother country. The refusal of the postmaster general of the United States to allow Canadian couriers to travel to New York, although there was no regular exchange between New York and any United States post office on the road to Canada, led to delays and exorbitant charges, which were unendurable.
In 1785, the legislative council of Quebec talked about the issue. Finlay, who was both the deputy postmaster general and a member of the legislative council, emphasized to his colleagues the importance of freeing Canada from its reliance on the United States for communication with the mother country. The refusal of the U.S. postmaster general to let Canadian couriers travel to New York, even though there was no regular mail exchange between New York and any U.S. post office on the route to Canada, caused delays and unreasonable charges, which were unbearable.
Finlay urged as a first step that Canada should make a passable road as far as the New Brunswick border, believing that the home government would see that the governments of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia would provide the facilities for travel within those provinces. Dorchester, the governor general, who had taken much interest in the question, sent Finlay in 1787 to make a survey of a route from Quebec to Halifax, and to arrange for couriers to pass monthly between the two places. The British government gave its approval to his efforts to establish a connection between the British provinces, and on its part, arranged that, commencing in March 1788, the packets which ran between[Pg 178] Falmouth and New York should call at Halifax during the eight months from March to November of each year.[226]
Finlay suggested that Canada should build a decent road up to the New Brunswick border, thinking that the home government would ensure that New Brunswick and Nova Scotia would set up the necessary travel facilities. Dorchester, the governor general, who was very interested in the issue, sent Finlay in 1787 to survey a route from Quebec to Halifax and to organize for couriers to travel monthly between the two locations. The British government supported his efforts to connect the British provinces and arranged that starting in March 1788, the ships traveling between [Pg 178] Falmouth and New York would stop at Halifax during the eight months from March to November each year.[226]
The call of the packets at Halifax, and the exchange of the mails between Great Britain and Canada at that port marked the commencement of the inland services in the Maritime provinces. Post offices were opened at the important points on the route between Halifax and Quebec.
The arrival of the packets in Halifax and the exchange of mail between Great Britain and Canada at that port marked the beginning of inland services in the Maritime provinces. Post offices were established at key locations along the route between Halifax and Quebec.
The couriers passed through Fredericton and St. John in New Brunswick, and Digby, Annapolis, Horton (now Wolfville) and Windsor in Nova Scotia.[227] St. John post office was opened in 1784, the office of postmaster and king's printer being combined. The courier between St. John and Fredericton travelled over his route fortnightly, and a service of the same frequency was maintained on the route in Nova Scotia.
The couriers traveled through Fredericton and St. John in New Brunswick, and Digby, Annapolis, Horton (now Wolfville) and Windsor in Nova Scotia.[227] The St. John post office opened in 1784, combining the roles of postmaster and king's printer. The courier between St. John and Fredericton made the trip every two weeks, and the same schedule was kept for the route in Nova Scotia.
In order that the post office should have the advantage of conveying the military despatches between the posts on the route, the expresses which had been employed in this duty were suppressed, much to the distaste of the military authorities, who would henceforward have to pay the very high postal charges on their letters.
In order for the post office to take advantage of delivering military dispatches along the route, the expresses that had been used for this job were discontinued, much to the displeasure of the military officials, who would now have to pay the very high postage rates on their letters.
These charges were prohibitive for all but very urgent letters. A letter consisting of a single sheet cost twelve cents to carry it from St. John to Fredericton if it weighed less than an ounce. If it weighed over an ounce the charge was quadrupled. The following are the rates charged by the postmaster at Halifax to the several post offices in Nova Scotia: to Windsor fourpence; to Horton sevenpence, and to Annapolis and Digby ninepence.
These fees were too high for all but the most urgent letters. A letter that was just one sheet cost twelve cents to send from St. John to Fredericton if it weighed less than an ounce. If it weighed more than an ounce, the fee increased to forty-eight cents. Here are the rates charged by the postmaster in Halifax to various post offices in Nova Scotia: to Windsor four pence; to Horton seven pence; and to Annapolis and Digby nine pence.
At the risk of repetition, the reader is reminded that these charges are for letters consisting each of a single sheet, weighing less than one ounce, and that in case the letters should weigh above an ounce, the rates given were multiplied by four, as a letter weighing over an ounce was regarded as equal to four letters.
At the risk of sounding repetitive, we want to remind you that these charges apply to letters that consist of a single sheet and weigh less than one ounce. If the letters weigh more than an ounce, the rates mentioned were multiplied by four, as a letter that weighs over an ounce is considered equivalent to four letters.
The postage from Fredericton to London, England, was sixty-four cents for a single letter. As one glances over the long newsy letters in the published correspondence of the time, he is persuaded that those letters did not pass through the post office. The lately published Winslow correspondence[228] is full of such letters, but they let us into the secret of how they came to be sent.
The postage from Fredericton to London, England, was sixty-four cents for a single letter. Looking through the lengthy, informative letters in the published correspondence from that time, one is convinced that those letters didn't go through the post office. The recently published Winslow correspondence[228] is filled with such letters, but they reveal the secret of how they were sent.
Leading Loyalists, men who had given up their comforts and[Pg 179] taken on themselves the severest hardships for the sake of the old connections, thought no more than the merest rebels of evading the postal laws, and sending their letters by any convenient means that presented themselves. Ward Chipman, the solicitor general of New Brunswick, in writing to Edward Winslow in London, tells him that he would write more freely if it were not for the enormous expense, but he would tax the good will of every person he could hear of, who was going to England. No person was allowed to go on a journey, long or short, without a pocketful of letters entrusted to him by his friends, unless he were unusually disobliging. When he reached his destination, he either delivered the letters in person, or posted them in the local post office, whence they were delivered at a penny apiece.
Leading Loyalists, men who had given up their comforts and[Pg 179] taken on themselves the toughest hardships for the sake of their old connections, thought nothing of bending the postal laws and sending their letters by whatever convenient means were available. Ward Chipman, the solicitor general of New Brunswick, wrote to Edward Winslow in London, stating that he would write more openly if it weren't so expensive, but he would rely on the goodwill of anyone he knew who was going to England. No one was allowed to go on a trip, long or short, without a pocketful of letters entrusted to them by their friends, unless they were particularly unhelpful. When they arrived at their destination, they either delivered the letters personally or dropped them in the local post office, where they were sent out at a cost of a penny each.
The service as established in 1788 was carried on unchanged until the war of 1812 made certain alterations in the routes necessary to secure the safe conveyance of the mails. The presence of American privateers in the bay of Fundy rendered the passage of the packets between St. John and Digby hazardous. The course down the St. John river and across the bay to Digby was, therefore, temporarily abandoned.[229]
The service that started in 1788 was carried out the same way until the War of 1812 required some changes to the routes to ensure the safe delivery of the mail. The presence of American privateers in the Bay of Fundy made the journey of the packets between St. John and Digby dangerous. As a result, the route down the St. John River and across the bay to Digby was temporarily abandoned.[229]
The courier with the mails from Quebec did not continue the river route farther south than Fredericton. At that point he turned inland, taking a road which led to the juncture with the old Westmoreland road which ran from St. John to fort Cumberland, on the eastern boundary of New Brunswick. The road from fort Cumberland was continued on through Truro to Halifax.
The courier carrying the mail from Quebec didn’t take the river route any further south than Fredericton. At that point, he turned inland, taking a road that led to the intersection with the old Westmoreland road, which connected St. John to Fort Cumberland, on the eastern edge of New Brunswick. The road from Fort Cumberland continued on through Truro to Halifax.
For a short period before the war and during its course, the deputy postmaster general was under steady pressure on the part of the provincial governors to extend the means of communication throughout the province of Nova Scotia.[230] Population was increasing rapidly—the census of 1817 gave it as 82,373—and settlement was well distributed over all parts of the province.
For a brief time before and during the war, the deputy postmaster general faced constant pressure from the provincial governors to improve communication across Nova Scotia.[230] The population was growing quickly—the 1817 census recorded it as 82,373—and settlements were spread out across the entire province.
The governors for their part were anxious to have the means of corresponding easily with the militia, who were organized in every county. The deputy postmaster general was in a position of considerable embarrassment. His orders from the home office as respects the expenditure of the postal revenue were as explicit as those under which Heriot was struggling in Canada. He won through his difficulties, however, with more success than attended Heriot's efforts, although he did nothing that Heriot did not do,[Pg 180] to meet the two incompatible demands of the post office, on the one side, that he should establish no routes which did not pay expenses, and of the local administration on the other, that he should extend the service wherever it seemed desirable to the governor.
The governors were eager to have an easy way to communicate with the militia, which was organized in every county. The deputy postmaster general found himself in a tough spot. His orders from the home office regarding the spending of postal funds were as clear as those that Heriot was struggling with in Canada. However, he managed to navigate his challenges more successfully than Heriot, even though he did nothing that Heriot hadn't done,[Pg 180] to handle the conflicting demands of the post office, which insisted that he shouldn’t set up any routes that didn’t cover costs, and of the local administration, which required him to expand the service wherever the governor deemed necessary.
Howe brought a little more tact than Heriot seemed capable of, in dealing with the provincial authorities. He laid the commands which had been impressed on him by the secretary of the general post office before the legislature, and obtained the assistance of that body in maintaining routes, which did not provide sufficient postage to cover their expenses. On his part he engaged, in disregard of the injunctions of the secretary, to allow all the sums which were collected on a route to be applied to paying the postmasters and mail couriers as far as these sums would go, the legislature undertaking to make up the deficiencies.
Howe had a bit more tact than Heriot seemed to have when dealing with the local authorities. He presented the orders from the secretary of the general post office to the legislature and got their help in keeping routes open, even though they didn't generate enough postage to cover their costs. In return, he promised, against the secretary's instructions, to ensure that all the money collected from a route would be used to pay the postmasters and mail couriers as far as that money would stretch, with the legislature agreeing to cover any shortfalls.
In April 1817,[231] Howe made a comprehensive report of the mail services in operation at that date, together with the arrangements for their maintenance.
In April 1817,[231] Howe submitted a detailed report on the mail services in operation at that time, along with plans for their upkeep.
There were two principal routes in the province. The first in local importance was that through the western counties from Halifax to Digby and thence by packet to St. John. The section between Halifax and Digby cost £348 a year, of which the legislature paid £200. The packet service across the bay was maintained by the legislatures of the two provinces. The settlements beyond Digby as far as Yarmouth and on to Shelburne, were served by a courier who received £130 from the legislature, and all the postage on letters going to the settlements, which amounted to £65 a year.
There were two main routes in the province. The first, which was locally important, ran through the western counties from Halifax to Digby, and then by ferry to St. John. The section between Halifax and Digby cost £348 a year, with the legislature covering £200 of that. The ferry service across the bay was supported by the legislatures of the two provinces. The areas beyond Digby, all the way to Yarmouth and up to Shelburne, were served by a courier who received £130 from the legislature, plus all the postage on letters sent to those settlements, totaling £65 a year.
The second leading route was that between Halifax and Fredericton by way of Truro. This route, which was begun in 1812, was discontinued at the close of the war. It had been found so advantageous, however, that it was re-established in the beginning of 1817, as the permanent route between Quebec and Halifax.
The second most popular route was the one between Halifax and Fredericton via Truro. This route, which started in 1812, was stopped at the end of the war. However, it was found to be so beneficial that it was restarted in early 1817 as the main route between Quebec and Halifax.
From Truro, a courier travelled through the eastern counties to Pictou and Antigonishe. This was a district which Howe regarded with much satisfaction. He wrote that the large immigration from Scotland and other parts of Great Britain had increased the number of settlements and thrown open the resources of this part of the province to that extent, that the revenue of the eastern districts would soon surpass that from those in the west.
From Truro, a courier traveled through the eastern counties to Pictou and Antigonish. Howe viewed this area with great satisfaction. He noted that the significant immigration from Scotland and other parts of Great Britain had boosted the number of settlements and unlocked the resources of this region to such an extent that the revenue from the eastern districts would soon exceed that of the western ones.
Antigonishe collected the letters from all the eastern harbours[Pg 181] and settlements, and although the post office had been open for only about nine months, the results, as Howe conceived them, were very encouraging. The expenses of the courier at this period far outran the revenues, and accordingly the legislature made a contribution of £130. The remainder of the shortage was made up partly by postages and partly by private subscriptions.
Antigonishe gathered the letters from all the eastern harbors[Pg 181] and settlements, and even though the post office had only been open for about nine months, Howe thought the results were quite promising. During this time, the costs for the courier far exceeded the income, so the legislature contributed £130. The rest of the deficit was covered by postage fees and private donations.
Howe, the deputy postmaster general, set forth the favourable aspects of the service with an eagerness that betokened nervousness, and indeed there was some reason for this feeling. When his statement reached England, the secretary at once drew the attention of the postmaster general to the fact that, while Howe had done extremely well, his actions in appropriating the revenue to any specific object and in establishing new routes and making new contracts without first receiving departmental sanction were inconsistent with the principles which governed the post office.
Howe, the deputy postmaster general, presented the positive aspects of the service with an eagerness that showed he was a bit nervous, and there was good reason for that feeling. When his statement reached England, the secretary immediately pointed out to the postmaster general that, while Howe had performed incredibly well, his decisions to allocate revenue to specific purposes and to create new routes and make new contracts without first getting approval from the department were against the principles that guided the post office.
But it was something that, while Heriot's official zeal was embroiling him with the governor general of Canada, Howe was managing to secure the good will of the lieutenant governor of his province, and his compromises with post office principles were passed over with a slight warning. Howe retired in 1818 on account of old age, and was succeeded by his son, John Howe, junior.
But it was something that, while Heriot's official enthusiasm was getting him into conflicts with the governor general of Canada, Howe was managing to gain the favor of the lieutenant governor of his province, and his compromises with post office principles were overlooked with a brief warning. Howe stepped down in 1818 due to old age, and was succeeded by his son, John Howe, junior.
The postal service of New Brunswick did not advance with equal step with that of Nova Scotia. Until 1820 there was no progress made in improving the system, except that the conveyance between St. John and Fredericton had been increased from fortnightly to weekly.
The postal service in New Brunswick didn't develop at the same pace as Nova Scotia's. Until 1820, there wasn't any significant improvement in the system, except that the delivery between St. John and Fredericton had been upgraded from every two weeks to every week.
The first district off the established lines to manifest a desire for postal accommodation was that on the Miramichi river.[232] There were two flourishing settlements on the river—Chatham and Newcastle—largely engaged in lumbering and fishing, and some means for the exchange of letters was a necessity.
The first area outside the established routes to express a need for postal services was along the Miramichi River.[232] There were two thriving towns on the river—Chatham and Newcastle—heavily involved in lumber and fishing, so there was a clear need for a way to exchange letters.
For some years before 1820 a courier travelled between these settlements and Fredericton along the course of the Nashwaak river. He was paid partly by a subsidy from the legislature of New Brunswick, and partly by private subscription. Those who did not subscribe to the courier, might or might not receive their letters. It depended on the caprice of the courier. If he chose to deliver them, he exacted a payment of eleven or twelve pence for each letter. This arrangement was far from satisfactory, as the following illustration will show.[Pg 182]
For several years before 1820, a courier traveled between these settlements and Fredericton along the Nashwaak River. He was paid partly through a subsidy from the New Brunswick legislature and partly through private donations. Those who didn’t contribute to the courier might or might not receive their letters, depending on the courier's whim. If he decided to deliver them, he charged eleven or twelve pence for each letter. This setup was far from ideal, as the following example will illustrate.[Pg 182]
In February 1824, a brig from Aberdeen reached Halifax, bringing a mail, which contained sixty letters for the Miramichi settlements. These letters were forwarded to Fredericton by the first courier. It happened that among the persons to whom the letters were addressed were a number who were not subscribers, and the courier refused to take the letters for these persons with him.
In February 1824, a ship from Aberdeen arrived in Halifax, bringing mail that included sixty letters for the Miramichi settlements. These letters were sent to Fredericton by the first courier. It turned out that some of the people the letters were addressed to were not subscribers, and the courier refused to take the letters for those individuals with him.
The consequence was that the letters had to be returned to Halifax, to take the chance of the first vessel that might happen to be sailing in that direction. To guard against any similar mishap in future, Howe left the letters for the Miramichi districts with the captains who had brought them over, and allowed them to arrange for their onward transmission.
The result was that the letters had to be sent back to Halifax to wait for the first ship heading in that direction. To prevent any similar issues in the future, Howe left the letters for the Miramichi districts with the captains who had delivered them and let them handle their further delivery.
The lieutenant governor of New Brunswick urged the establishment of a regular post office on the Miramichi. The trade of the district was of considerable proportions. In 1823, four hundred and eight square-rigged vessels from the United Kingdom loaded on the Miramichi. There was some bargaining between the deputy postmaster general and the lieutenant governor. The expense of the courier would be heavy, and the revenue from it would not be large.
The lieutenant governor of New Brunswick pushed for the setup of a regular post office in Miramichi. The area's trade was quite significant. In 1823, four hundred and eight square-rigged ships from the UK were loaded in Miramichi. There was some negotiation between the deputy postmaster general and the lieutenant governor. The cost of the courier service would be high, and the revenue generated wouldn't be substantial.
Howe proposed that the postages from the route be devoted to its maintenance, and the balance be made up by the legislature. Howe does not seem to have had his usual success in these negotiations, for the governor declined to deal with him, insisting on corresponding directly with the postmaster general in England. This caused some delay, and it was not until 1825 that the post office was sanctioned.
Howe suggested that the funds from the route be used for its upkeep, with any shortfall covered by the legislature. Howe didn’t appear to achieve his usual success in these discussions, as the governor refused to negotiate with him and insisted on communicating directly with the postmaster general in England. This led to some delays, and it wasn't until 1825 that the post office was approved.
The year 1825 was a notable one in the history of the New Brunswick post office. In that year several important offices were opened. Howe, in his report to the postmaster general, gives an interesting account of his trip in establishing these offices.[233] He took a vessel from St. John to Dorchester, where he opened an office; thence to Baie Verte, from which point he sailed to Miramichi and to Richibucto. Returning to Dorchester he travelled to Sussexvale.
The year 1825 was significant in the history of the New Brunswick post office. That year, several important offices were opened. Howe, in his report to the postmaster general, shares an interesting account of his journey to establish these offices.[233] He took a ship from St. John to Dorchester, where he opened an office; then he traveled to Baie Verte, from there he sailed to Miramichi and Richibucto. After returning to Dorchester, he headed to Sussexvale.
Howe appointed postmasters at all these places. On arriving at St. John, he was met by the request of the lieutenant governor to open an office at St. Stephen. He finished up his tour by visiting Gagetown and Kingston where offices were opened.
Howe appointed postmasters at all these places. Upon arriving at St. John, he received a request from the lieutenant governor to open an office at St. Stephen. He wrapped up his tour by visiting Gagetown and Kingston, where offices were opened.
The very considerable enlargement of the system in New Brunswick gave much satisfaction to the lieutenant governor.[Pg 183] But as usual the deputy postmaster general received a douche of criticism from the secretary of the post office, who could not bear to sanction an extension of the service which did not turn in something to the treasury. Howe had, indeed, been careful that the post office should not be even a temporary loser by his arrangements. He had gone no further than to apply the postages collected at the new offices to pay the postmasters and couriers, as far as these sums would go. The postmaster general took a larger view of Howe's activities, and expressed his gratification at what had been accomplished.
The significant expansion of the system in New Brunswick pleased the lieutenant governor.[Pg 183] However, as usual, the deputy postmaster general faced criticism from the post office secretary, who couldn’t stand approving an expansion of services that didn’t generate income for the treasury. Howe had made sure that the post office wouldn’t lose any money with his arrangements. He only used the postage collected at the new offices to pay the postmasters and couriers, to the extent that those funds allowed. The postmaster general took a broader perspective on Howe's efforts and expressed his satisfaction with what had been achieved.
It was during this period that Cape Breton was brought within the postal system of the Maritime provinces. This island, which had been the scene of great exploits during the French and English wars, had not begun to come under permanent settlement until after the close of the American revolution. After the fall of Louisburg, in 1758, the island was attached to Nova Scotia, and remained a part of that province until 1784, when it was erected into a separate government.
It was during this time that Cape Breton was included in the postal system of the Maritime provinces. This island, which had been the site of significant events during the French and English wars, wasn't permanently settled until after the American Revolution ended. After the capture of Louisburg in 1758, the island became part of Nova Scotia and stayed that way until 1784, when it was established as a separate government.
The first lieutenant governor of Cape Breton, Major Desbarres, in casting about for a suitable site for his capital, had the advantage of an intimate knowledge of the coast line of the island, acquired during a series of surveys of the coasts and harbours of the Maritime provinces. Contrary to what might have been expected, he turned away from Louisburg, and placed his capital in a town which he established at the head of the southern arm of Spanish river. Desbarres called the town Sydney, in honour of Lord Sydney, the secretary of state for the colonies.
The first lieutenant governor of Cape Breton, Major Desbarres, while searching for a suitable location for his capital, had the benefit of a deep understanding of the island's coastline, gained through various surveys of the coasts and harbors of the Maritime provinces. Surprisingly, he rejected Louisburg and instead chose to establish his capital in a town at the head of the southern arm of the Spanish River. Desbarres named the town Sydney, in honor of Lord Sydney, the secretary of state for the colonies.
After an inglorious career of thirty-six years, notable only for the perpetual strife which reigned among the administrative officials, during which the domestic affairs of the colony were almost entirely neglected, the colony of Cape Breton was re-annexed to Nova Scotia in 1820.
After a shameful thirty-six-year run, marked only by constant conflict among the administrators, during which the colony's domestic issues were nearly completely ignored, Cape Breton was re-attached to Nova Scotia in 1820.
The growth of population during this period was slow. In 1774 there were 1241 people on the island, including some roving bands of Indians. On the west coast, about Arichat and Petit de Grat, there were 405 persons, all French. About St. Peters there was a mixed English and French population numbering 186; and on the east coast in a line running north and south of Louisburg there were tiny settlements containing in all 420 persons, nearly all English.
The population growth during this time was slow. In 1774, there were 1,241 people on the island, including some roaming bands of Native Americans. On the west coast, around Arichat and Petit de Grat, there were 405 people, all French. Near St. Peters, there was a mix of English and French residents totaling 186; and on the east coast, in a line running north and south of Louisburg, there were small settlements containing a total of 420 people, nearly all English.
So little progress had been made during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, that at the end of 1801 the population was[Pg 184] only 2531, of whom 801 were in the Sydney district, and 192 in and about Louisburg. The remainder were strung along the west coast from Arichat to Margaree harbour.
So little progress had been made during the last quarter of the eighteenth century that by the end of 1801, the population was[Pg 184]only 2,531, with 801 people in the Sydney area and 192 in and around Louisburg. The rest were scattered along the west coast from Arichat to Margaree Harbour.
The increase on the west coast was due to a number of Highland Scotch immigrants, who reached Cape Breton by way of Pictou, and took up land between the Gut of Canso and Margaree harbour. In 1802, the Scotch movement into Cape Breton began to assume considerable proportions. A ship bringing 300 settlers into Sydney, was followed by others year after year, until, at the date when Cape Breton again became part of Nova Scotia, the population had reached between eight and nine thousand, most of whom were Highland Scotch. The district about Arichat remained French.
The growth on the west coast was due to many Highland Scotch immigrants who arrived in Cape Breton via Pictou and settled between the Gut of Canso and Margaree Harbour. In 1802, the Scotch migration to Cape Breton started to become significant. A ship carrying 300 settlers came into Sydney, followed by more ships year after year, until, when Cape Breton rejoined Nova Scotia, the population had reached between eight and nine thousand, most of whom were Highland Scotch. The area around Arichat stayed French.
There was a post office in Cape Breton as early as 1801. It was at Sydney, with A. C. Dodd as postmaster.[234] Dodd was a man of prominence on the island, being a member of the legislative council and afterwards chief justice. He held the postmastership until 1812, when he was succeeded by Philip Eley, who was in office in 1817, when the lieutenant governor, General Ainslie, pointed out to the home government the necessity of improving the communications between the island and Great Britain.
There was a post office in Cape Breton as early as 1801. It was located in Sydney, with A. C. Dodd serving as the postmaster.[234] Dodd was a prominent figure on the island, being a member of the legislative council and later the chief justice. He held the postmaster position until 1812, when Philip Eley took over. Eley was in office in 1817 when the lieutenant governor, General Ainslie, informed the home government about the need to improve communication between the island and Great Britain.
The exchange of correspondence was slow and uncertain. The Cape Breton mails were exchanged by the Halifax packet, but it was usual for two months to elapse between the arrival of the letters from England and the first opportunity of replying to them. Half the delay, Ainslie thought, might be avoided, if the packets on their homeward voyages would lie off the harbour of Louisburg for an hour or two to enable a small boat to reach the packet.
The exchange of letters was slow and unpredictable. The Cape Breton mail was carried by the Halifax packet, but it typically took two months between receiving letters from England and being able to reply. Ainslie thought that half the delay could be avoided if the packets would wait off the harbor of Louisburg for an hour or two on their way back home, allowing a small boat to reach them.
The commanders in port at Falmouth were consulted, and gave it as their opinion that the fogs and currents, which prevailed about Louisburg would make it inadvisable to attempt to land the mails there, and the proposition was rejected. In the winter of 1817, an overland communication was opened between Sydney and Halifax, an Indian carrying the mails between the two places once a month during the winter.[235] When the annexation of Cape Breton to Nova Scotia took place in 1820, the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, Sir James Kempt, managed to obtain a weekly mail between Sydney and Halifax.[236][Pg 185]
The commanders in port at Falmouth were consulted, and they agreed that the fog and currents around Louisburg would make it unwise to try to deliver the mail there, so the idea was turned down. In the winter of 1817, a land route was established between Sydney and Halifax, with an Indian carrying the mail between the two locations once a month during the winter.[235] When Cape Breton was annexed to Nova Scotia in 1820, the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, Sir James Kempt, managed to arrange for a weekly mail service between Sydney and Halifax.[236][Pg 185]
The earliest period in which we find a postal service in operation in Prince Edward Island is 1801.[237] John Ross is mentioned as postmaster of the island in that year. He was succeeded by Benjamin Chappell, in whose hands and in those of his family, the postmastership remained for over forty years.
The earliest time we see a postal service working in Prince Edward Island is 1801.[237] John Ross is noted as the postmaster of the island that year. He was followed by Benjamin Chappell, whose family held the postmaster position for more than forty years.
The connections with the mainland and the mother country were maintained for some years by such vessels as happened to visit the island. The postal service of the island was within the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia. It was not, however, until 1816, that the deputy postmaster general made any mention of the island service in his reports to the general post office in London.
The links to the mainland and the mother country were kept up for a few years by any ships that happened to stop by the island. The island's postal service was managed by Nova Scotia. However, it wasn't until 1816 that the deputy postmaster general mentioned the island's service in his reports to the general post office in London.
Howe then informed the postmaster general[238] that when Lord Selkirk was in Nova Scotia some years before, that nobleman urged upon him the necessity of a courier service to Pictou, and thence to Prince Edward Island by packet. This service was established in 1816, and an arrangement was made with the island government, by which the postage was to be applied as far as it would go to maintain the packet and pay the postmaster's salary, and the government would make up the balance.
Howe then informed the postmaster general[238] that when Lord Selkirk was in Nova Scotia a few years earlier, he emphasized the need for a courier service to Pictou, and from there to Prince Edward Island by packet. This service was established in 1816, and an agreement was made with the island government, where the postage would be used as much as possible to support the packet service and cover the postmaster's salary, while the government would cover any remaining costs.
There were no accounts between the island post office and the general post office. The postmaster simply presented to the deputy postmaster general periodical statements of the postages collected, and his expenses, together with a receipt for the deficiency which was paid by the government. This arrangement had the immense advantage that from the very first the island service was in the hands of the local government, which carried on the post office with no more than a formal reference to the general post office. The postage on a single letter from Charlottetown to Halifax was eightpence.
There were no accounts between the island post office and the general post office. The postmaster just provided the deputy postmaster general with regular statements of the postage collected, along with his expenses and a receipt for the shortfall that was covered by the government. This setup had the huge benefit that from the very start, the island service was managed by the local government, which operated the post office with only a formal nod to the general post office. The postage for a single letter from Charlottetown to Halifax was eight pence.
The communication between the Maritime provinces and the mother country was the subject of some discussion. Halifax was determined to retain, and extend the utility of the packet service at all costs. Owing to the greatness of the charges, and the long delays, the Canadian merchants made but little use of the Halifax packets, but had their letters sent by way of New York.
The communication between the Maritime provinces and the home country was a topic of considerable discussion. Halifax was set on keeping and improving the packet service no matter what. Because of the high costs and long delays, Canadian merchants hardly used the Halifax packets and instead sent their letters through New York.
The merchants of New Brunswick insisted on the same privilege. The provincial government established two courier services between St. John and Fredericton, and St. Andrews on the United States boundary, and the United States post office arranged to have the British mails for New Brunswick conveyed by its couriers to Robbinstown, a point in Maine a short distance from St. Andrews.[Pg 186]
The merchants of New Brunswick demanded the same privileges. The provincial government set up two courier services between Saint John and Fredericton, and Saint Andrews near the U.S. border. The U.S. Post Office coordinated to have the British mail for New Brunswick delivered by its couriers to Robbinstown, a location in Maine just a short distance from Saint Andrews.[Pg 186]
Against this Nova Scotia protested. John Howe, the elder, came out of his retirement in 1820, and made a strong plea for an exclusive packet service between England and Halifax, the vessel to remain at Halifax for one week before returning. He would have the public despatches for New York and Bermuda brought to Halifax, and from that place forwarded to their destination by one of the war vessels in the harbour or by a packet kept for the purpose.
Against this, Nova Scotia protested. John Howe, the elder, came out of his retirement in 1820 and strongly advocated for an exclusive shipping service between England and Halifax, with the ship staying in Halifax for one week before returning. He wanted the public dispatches for New York and Bermuda to be sent to Halifax and then forwarded to their destinations by one of the warships in the harbor or by a designated packet ship.
Buchanan, the British consul at New York, urged the opposite view, that all the British mails for the colonies should be sent by way of New York. Dalhousie, who was lieutenant governor in Nova Scotia, at the time supported Howe's view, and matters remained as they were.
Buchanan, the British consul in New York, argued the opposite perspective, suggesting that all British mail for the colonies should be routed through New York. Dalhousie, who was the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia at the time, backed Howe's position, and things stayed as they were.
The question of newspaper postage was agitated in the Maritime provinces, as well as in the provinces of Canada. Indeed it would be inconceivable that publishers anywhere could be satisfied with the arrangements then in operation. But, most curiously, when the question came before the house of assembly in Nova Scotia, the sympathies of that body ran, not with the publishers, but with the deputy postmaster general.
The issue of newspaper postage was brought up in the Maritime provinces and in the provinces of Canada. It was hard to believe that publishers anywhere would be happy with the current arrangements. However, interestingly, when the matter was discussed in the Nova Scotia assembly, the assembly members sided not with the publishers, but with the deputy postmaster general.
In 1830, Edmund Ward, a printer, who published a newspaper in Fredericton, petitioned the legislature to be relieved of the charges for the conveyance of his paper. The post office committee of the house of assembly in Nova Scotia took the application into their consideration.
In 1830, Edmund Ward, a printer who published a newspaper in Fredericton, asked the legislature to be waived of the charges for delivering his paper. The post office committee of the House of Assembly in Nova Scotia reviewed the application.
The committee reported[239] to the house that, having examined the imperial acts, they were of opinion that it was no part of the duty of the deputy postmaster general to receive, or transmit by post, newspapers printed in the colonies, or coming from abroad except from Great Britain. They found, moreover, that the secretary of the general post office in London, under this view of the case, had for a long time made a charge for each paper sent to the colonies by packet, the proceeds from which he retained to his own use.
The committee reported[239] to the house that, after reviewing the imperial acts, they believed it was not the responsibility of the deputy postmaster general to accept or send newspapers printed in the colonies or coming from abroad, except those from Great Britain. They also discovered that the secretary of the general post office in London had, for a long time, been charging a fee for each newspaper sent to the colonies by packet, keeping the proceeds for himself.
It also appeared that about sixty years before that date (that is about 1770), the deputy postmaster general made a charge of two shillings and sixpence per annum on each newspaper forwarded to country subscribers by post, which was acquiesced in by all the publishers at that time.
It also seemed that around sixty years before that date (which is about 1770), the deputy postmaster general imposed a fee of two shillings and sixpence a year on each newspaper sent to country subscribers by mail, and all the publishers agreed to it at that time.
The committee believed, therefore, that the deputy postmaster general was fully justified in the charges he made, but they were[Pg 187] much in favour of having newspapers transmitted free. In accordance with this idea, the committee suggested that the assembly should take on itself the charges due for the conveyance of newspapers. They found that there were seventeen hundred newspapers of local origin distributed by post each week, and three hundred British or foreign newspapers. The assembly did not act on this suggestion.
The committee believed that the deputy postmaster general had a solid case for the charges he brought forward, but they strongly supported the idea of sending newspapers for free. Following this belief, the committee recommended that the assembly cover the costs for delivering newspapers. They discovered that around seventeen hundred local newspapers were sent by post each week, along with three hundred British or foreign newspapers. However, the assembly did not follow up on this suggestion.
Though the deputy postmaster general was fortunate enough to have the support of the legislature in his contention with the publishers, his position was by no means free from criticism. Indeed, there were certain features in his case, which were peculiarly exasperating to the publishers.
Though the deputy postmaster general was lucky to have the backing of the legislature in his dispute with the publishers, his position was definitely not without criticism. In fact, there were certain aspects of his situation that were particularly frustrating for the publishers.
Howe was not only deputy postmaster general, but was king's printer, and had in his hands the whole of the provincial printing. He was also interested either directly or through his family in most of the newspapers published in Nova Scotia.
Howe was not only the deputy postmaster general, but also the king's printer, and he handled all the provincial printing. He was also involved, either directly or through his family, in most of the newspapers published in Nova Scotia.
The Nova Scotian, The Journal, The Acadian and The Royal Gazette, were all controlled by the Howe family, and it appeared in the examination that all these newspapers were distributed by the post office free of postage. There were two other newspapers published in Halifax—The Acadian Recorder and The Free Press—and the publishers felt, not unnaturally, that in being compelled to pay two shillings and sixpence for each copy transmitted by post, while their rivals had the benefit of distribution by the post office free of charge, they were being subjected to an unjust and injurious discrimination.
The Nova Scotian, The Journal, The Acadian, and The Royal Gazette were all run by the Howe family, and it was found that all these newspapers were sent out by the post office without any postage fees. There were two other newspapers published in Halifax—The Acadian Recorder and The Free Press—and the publishers understandably felt that having to pay two shillings and sixpence for every copy sent by mail, while their competitors benefited from free post office distribution, was an unfair and harmful discrimination.
The publishers of The Recorder and of The Free Press presented a petition to the king, asking that they, also, might be relieved from the burden of paying postage on their newspapers.[240] Just as their claim appeared to be, it had no support from the authorities in the colony. The lieutenant governor in sending the petition to the colonial office, took occasion to speak of the high character of Howe and of his father, the preceding deputy postmaster general, and to express his opinion that the small fee collected on newspapers could not be regarded as an extravagant compensation for the trouble the deputy postmaster general had in the matter.
The publishers of The Recorder and The Free Press submitted a petition to the king, asking to be relieved from the burden of paying postage on their newspapers.[240] Despite their claim, it received no support from the colony's authorities. The lieutenant governor, while forwarding the petition to the colonial office, took the opportunity to highlight the high regard for Howe and his father, the previous deputy postmaster general, and expressed the view that the small fee collected on newspapers couldn't be seen as excessive compensation for the effort the deputy postmaster general put into it.
The case of the publishers came before the postmaster general in 1834. Freeling, the secretary, then reminded him that there was no urgency in the matter, as they were engaged at the time in adjusting the relations between the colonial governments and[Pg 188] the post office, and if the provincial legislatures accepted the settlement proposed by the home government, the question of newspaper postage would be satisfactorily disposed of.
The case of the publishers was brought to the postmaster general in 1834. Freeling, the secretary, reminded him that there was no rush because they were busy working out the relationships between the colonial governments and[Pg 188] the post office. If the provincial legislatures agreed to the settlement proposed by the home government, the issue of newspaper postage would be resolved satisfactorily.
In the meantime, the petition was easily answered. The practice, argued the secretary, was not illegal as it was founded on an act of parliament empowering the postmaster general to give to certain of his officers the right to distribute newspapers by post. This right had been in existence since the first establishment of a post office and of a newspaper in the colony. Consequently the petitioners, in entering upon the business of publishing a newspaper, must have been aware of the charges to which the publishers would be liable.
In the meantime, the petition was quickly addressed. The secretary argued that the practice wasn't illegal because it was based on a parliamentary act that allowed the postmaster general to grant certain officers the right to distribute newspapers by mail. This right had existed since the post office and the newspaper were first established in the colony. Therefore, the petitioners, by starting a newspaper, should have known about the potential charges that publishers would face.
The imperial bill of 1834, together with the draft bill prepared by the post office for the acceptance of the provinces reached the lieutenant governors of the provinces in January 1835. The object of the plans, it will be remembered, was in effect to have the stamp of legality placed on the existing arrangements, by obtaining for them the sanction of the several provincial legislatures.
The imperial bill of 1834, along with the draft bill created by the post office for the provinces' approval, was sent to the lieutenant governors of the provinces in January 1835. The aim of these plans, as you may recall, was essentially to legitimize the current arrangements by getting them approved by the various provincial legislatures.
On the adoption by the legislatures of the several bills, which were identical in form, the postmaster general would relinquish the powers he had until that time exercised over the revenues of the provincial system, and allow the surplus, if any should arise, to be distributed among the provinces, leaving it also with them to make up the deficit in case the expenditure exceeded the revenue.
On the adoption of several identical bills by the legislatures, the postmaster general would give up the authority he had previously held over the revenues of the provincial system, and let any surplus, if there was one, be shared among the provinces. He would also leave it to the provinces to cover any shortfall if the expenses were higher than the revenue.
The proposals of the postmaster general were received characteristically by the different provinces. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had no fault to find with the existing arrangements. So far from objecting to the irregular emoluments of the deputy postmaster general for the Maritime provinces, they recommended, when the question arose, that his emoluments be increased. Whenever the lieutenant governor or the legislature of either of the provinces desired the extension of the postal system into sparsely settled and unremunerative districts, the local governments without demur took the deficiencies on themselves, and did not ask why the profits from the more populous districts were not devoted to meeting these shortages.
The proposals from the postmaster general were received in typical fashion by the various provinces. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had no issues with the current arrangements. Rather than objecting to the irregular earnings of the deputy postmaster general for the Maritime provinces, they suggested, when it came up, that his earnings be increased. Whenever the lieutenant governor or the legislature of either province wanted to expand the postal system into sparsely populated and unprofitable areas, the local governments willingly took on the deficits and didn’t question why the profits from the more populated areas weren’t used to cover these shortfalls.
When the imperial scheme for settling the difficulties of the colonial postal system was laid before the legislatures of the Maritime provinces, it found them quite unprepared to discuss it. Until then, they had apparently not realized that any such difficulties existed. The thirteen years controversy between the British post office and the assemblies in Upper and Lower Canada appears[Pg 189] to have excited no attention in the lower provinces. When the proposition from the British post office was submitted to the assembly in New Brunswick, it was put aside until the following session, and then, as it appeared not to suit the views of the assembly, it was dropped.
When the government plan to address the issues with the colonial postal system was presented to the legislatures of the Maritime provinces, they were not ready to discuss it at all. Until that point, they seemed completely unaware that these problems even existed. The thirteen years of disputes between the British post office and the assemblies in Upper and Lower Canada seemingly went unnoticed in the lower provinces. When the proposal from the British post office was brought to the assembly in New Brunswick, it was postponed until the next session, and then it was abandoned since it didn’t align with the assembly’s views.
In Nova Scotia, the subject received more consideration. The draft bill was referred to a committee of the legislature, which went thoroughly into its merits. The committee were of opinion[241] that, if modified in certain respects, the bill would be well adapted to accomplish the object in view. In their view the bill should not be a permanent one, but should be renewable every three years, in order that any defects, which experience might disclose, could be remedied.
In Nova Scotia, the topic was given more attention. The draft bill was sent to a committee of the legislature, which carefully examined its merits. The committee believed[241] that, with some modifications, the bill would effectively achieve its intended purpose. They thought the bill shouldn't be permanent, but should be renewed every three years, so that any flaws revealed by experience could be addressed.
It also seemed advisable to the committee that the chief administrative officer in the province should be selected, not by the postmaster general, but by the governor of the province, who would be more conversant with the character and abilities of persons qualified to discharge the duties of the office.
It also seemed wise to the committee that the chief administrative officer in the province should be chosen, not by the postmaster general, but by the governor of the province, who would be more familiar with the character and skills of the people qualified to perform the duties of the office.
As the legislatures of Canada and New Brunswick had declined to adopt the bill, the committee would not recommend that any bill should be adopted that session. The only point to which they invited the attention of His Majesty's government was the salary of the deputy postmaster general, which was not only inadequate, but would not bear comparison with the emoluments of the deputy in the other provinces.
As the legislatures of Canada and New Brunswick decided not to pass the bill, the committee would not suggest that any bill be approved during that session. The only issue they brought to the attention of His Majesty's government was the salary of the deputy postmaster general, which was not only insufficient but also couldn't compare to the pay of the deputy in other provinces.
The Nova Scotian assembly did not, however, rest at this point. Though they had acquiesced quite contentedly in the arrangements made by Howe, the deputy postmaster general, and had shown no disposition to join the Canadas in their agitation, the implied admission of the home government that the surplus post office revenues belonged of right to the colonies, put a different face on the subject.
The Nova Scotian assembly didn’t stop there. Even though they had happily accepted the arrangements made by Howe, the deputy postmaster general, and showed no interest in joining the Canadas in their protests, the implied acknowledgment from the home government that the excess post office revenues rightfully belonged to the colonies changed the situation.
The post office committee called the deputy postmaster general before them, and on going over the accounts with his assistance, they discovered that there was a considerable amount remitted annually to England, as profit from their inland posts, and satisfied themselves that if this amount were retained by the deputy postmaster general, and devoted to paying for the unremunerative services, the sum contributed by the province for the maintenance of these services would be much reduced, if not wiped out altogether.[Pg 190]
The post office committee summoned the deputy postmaster general to meet with them, and upon reviewing the accounts together, they found that a significant amount was sent to England each year as profit from their local postal services. They convinced themselves that if this money were kept by the deputy postmaster general and used to cover the unprofitable services, the amount the province contributed for maintaining these services would shrink dramatically, if not disappear completely.[Pg 190]
The legislature, thereupon, with a boldness which seemed to betoken ignorance of the course of events in Canada, resolved to take over the control of the provincial post office. A bill for that purpose was adopted in 1838,[242] and received the assent of the lieutenant governor. By it, the deputy postmaster general was directed to pay into the provincial treasury any surplus revenue, and the legislature on its part undertook to make good any deficiency, if such should arise.
The legislature, showing a boldness that suggested a lack of awareness about what was happening in Canada, decided to take control of the provincial post office. A bill for this purpose was passed in 1838,[242] and it was approved by the lieutenant governor. The bill instructed the deputy postmaster general to transfer any surplus revenue into the provincial treasury, and the legislature agreed to cover any shortfall, if one occurred.
The position of matters as regards the inland service of Nova Scotia was complicated by the geographical situation of the province with reference to the other provinces. The British packets, by which mails were exchanged between Great Britain and the North American colonies, landed at Halifax, and it was essential that the conveyance of the mails across Nova Scotia between Halifax and the inland provinces should be maintained unimpeded.
The situation concerning the inland service of Nova Scotia was complicated by the province's geographic location in relation to the other provinces. The British ships, which transported mail between Great Britain and the North American colonies, arrived at Halifax, and it was crucial that the transportation of mail across Nova Scotia between Halifax and the inland provinces continued without interruption.
The legislature recognized this fact, and agreed to provide for this through service at its own cost, on condition that the British post office should pay the salaries of the deputy postmaster general and his staff at Halifax, from the revenues of the packet service.
The legislature acknowledged this fact and agreed to cover this through their own service, provided that the British post office would pay the salaries of the deputy postmaster general and his team in Halifax, using the revenues from the packet service.
The home government disallowed the Nova Scotia bill as being inconsistent with the objects sought to be accomplished by the imperial act of 1834. The aim of that act was to secure a uniform code of laws for the regulation of the posts in British North America. Any partial legislation would be unacceptable, and this was particularly the case with legislation on the part of Nova Scotia, the key to British North America. By obtaining control over the expenditure for the mail service through the province, the legislature of Nova Scotia would have the entire power over the postal communications with the interior, and they might not only object to defray the expense of particular services, but might interdict them altogether, as, in their opinion, unnecessary.
The home government rejected the Nova Scotia bill because it didn't align with the goals of the imperial act of 1834. The purpose of that act was to ensure a consistent set of laws for managing the postal system in British North America. Any legislation that was only partial wouldn't be acceptable, especially from Nova Scotia, which was crucial to British North America. If Nova Scotia gained control over the expenses for the mail service in the province, the legislature would have complete power over postal communications with the interior. They could not only refuse to cover the costs of certain services but could also completely ban them if they deemed them unnecessary.
The colonial secretary added another consideration to this argument of the postmaster general. One of the chief advantages which the government hoped to derive from the mission of Lord Durham, who was then in Canada, was that of devising some plan for the regulation of questions, which, like that of post office communications, was the subject of common interest to the colonies collectively.
The colonial secretary added another point to the postmaster general's argument. One of the main benefits the government hoped to gain from Lord Durham's mission in Canada was to come up with a plan to address issues, like post office communications, that were of mutual interest to all the colonies.
The assembly showed some resentment at the rejection of their bill. The despatch informing the governor that the measure had[Pg 191] been disallowed, also contained notice of the refusal of the home government to sanction several other acts adopted by the Nova Scotia legislature. In the resolution expressing regret that the measures in question had not been allowed to go into operation, the assembly were careful to intimate their confidence in the disposition of Her Majesty to meet the reasonable expectations of the assembly, and attributed the several disallowances to a want of correct information on the part of the home government due to its not going to the proper sources therefor.
The assembly was frustrated by the rejection of their bill. The message informing the governor that the measure had[Pg 191] been disallowed also mentioned that the home government refused to approve several other acts passed by the Nova Scotia legislature. In the resolution expressing their disappointment that these measures hadn't been allowed to take effect, the assembly made sure to hint at their confidence in Her Majesty's willingness to meet the reasonable expectations of the assembly, attributing the disallowances to the home government's lack of accurate information, which was due to not reaching out to the right sources.
In order to remove the misunderstanding which the assembly conceived to exist between themselves and the home government, William Young and Herbert Huntingdon were sent as delegates to confer with the colonial secretary on this and other subjects lying open. In London the delegates were brought into communication with the treasury.[243]
To clear up the misunderstanding that the assembly believed existed between them and the home government, William Young and Herbert Huntingdon were sent as delegates to discuss this and other open topics with the colonial secretary. In London, the delegates connected with the treasury.[243]
As the chief objection to the Nova Scotia bill for the regulation of the post office was that it would give the government of that province control over the posts to the provinces in the interior, the delegates lost no time in disclaiming any desire to exercise control over any but their own inland service. They were willing that the great through lines should remain within the jurisdiction of the postmaster general of Great Britain, and that the provincial authority should be confined to the management of the side or cross posts. This proposed dual control was, of course, obviously impracticable, as the whole provincial service, with its main lines and cross lines, was so blended together, that any attempt to treat them as under two different administrations could not fail to lead to unfortunate results.
As the main objection to the Nova Scotia bill for regulating the post office was that it would give the provincial government control over the postal services to the interior provinces, the delegates quickly made it clear that they had no intention of controlling anything beyond their own inland service. They agreed that the major main lines should stay under the authority of the postmaster general of Great Britain, and that provincial authority should be limited to handling the local or cross-posts. This suggested dual control was clearly impractical, as the entire provincial service, with its main and cross lines, was so intertwined that any attempt to manage them under two different administrations would inevitably lead to negative outcomes.
The mission of the delegates was, however, far from fruitless. The fact that the legislature had without complaint paid out considerable sums each year for the maintenance of the service, appeared to the British government to entitle Nova Scotia to liberal treatment, as these payments would not have been demanded if the post office had understood the matter.
The delegates’ mission was, however, anything but pointless. The fact that the legislature had willingly paid substantial amounts each year to support the service led the British government to believe that Nova Scotia deserved generous treatment, as these payments wouldn’t have been required if the post office had understood the situation.
The treasury, therefore, decided that so long as the revenue from the inland post office was sufficient to meet the expenditure for the inland communications, no demand for that purpose should be made upon the provincial funds. Should, however, the legislature deem it advisable to add to the lines of communication, the treasury would rely upon the legislature to defray the expenses of such[Pg 192] additional communications, so far as these were not covered by the augmented postage receipts.
The treasury decided that as long as the revenue from the inland post office was enough to cover the costs for inland communications, no funds would need to be taken from the provincial budget for this purpose. However, if the legislature thought it was a good idea to expand the communication lines, the treasury would expect the legislature to cover the expenses for these additional communications, as long as they weren't already covered by the increased postage revenue.[Pg 192]
There was no more than justice in this decision, but the concessions of the treasury did not stop at this point. It also intimated its willingness to allow all the packet or ocean postage collected in the colonies to remain at the disposal of the local government, whenever the imperial act of 1834 should come into operation.
There was nothing more than fairness in this decision, but the treasury's concessions didn't end there. It also hinted at its willingness to let all the packet or ocean postage collected in the colonies stay under the control of the local government, whenever the imperial act of 1834 went into effect.
The British government did not desire to force the imperial act upon the colonies, if, as appeared to be the case, there were valid objections to it. It was prepared to consider any amendments which might be proposed to meet those objections. The packet postage, it should be explained, belonged entirely to the British government which provided and paid all the expenses of the packet service, so that the offer to allow the local governments to retain for their own use the packet postage they collected, was a real concession.
The British government didn't want to impose the imperial act on the colonies if there were legitimate objections to it, as seemed to be the case. It was willing to consider any amendments that could address those concerns. The packet postage, it should be noted, was completely under the British government's control, as it covered all the costs of the packet service. Therefore, the offer to let local governments keep the packet postage they collected for their own use was a genuine concession.
FOOTNOTES:
[226] See p. 86.
See p. 86.
[227] Quebec Gazette, December 13, 1787.
[234] Quebec Almanac, 1802, p. 71.
[237] Quebec Almanac, 1802, p. 71.
CHAPTER XI
Continuance of agitation in the Canadas for control of the post office—Much information obtained by committees of legislatures—Difficulty in giving effect to reforms.
Continuing unrest in Canada over control of the post office—A lot of information gathered by legislative committees—Challenges in implementing reforms.
The proposals of the British post office for removing the objections to the existing arrangements without endangering the efficiency of the colonial postal system had a very different reception in the assemblies of Upper and Lower Canada from that which they met with in the Maritime provinces.
The British post office's suggestions for addressing the issues with the current arrangements while keeping the colonial postal system efficient received a very different response in the assemblies of Upper and Lower Canada than it did in the Maritime provinces.
Owing to a general indisposition on the part of the legislatures of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to push their contentions to extremes, and doubtless also, to the fortunate relationship between the deputy postmaster general of the Maritime provinces and Joseph Howe, the leader of the reform party in Nova Scotia, the post office had been subject to no authoritative criticism in those provinces up to the time when the plans of the British post office were laid before the legislatures.
Due to a general unwillingness from the legislatures of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to take their arguments too far, and likely also because of the good relationship between the deputy postmaster general of the Maritime provinces and Joseph Howe, the leader of the reform party in Nova Scotia, the post office hadn’t faced any significant criticism in those provinces until the British post office's plans were presented to the legislatures.
In the Canadas the situation was exactly the reverse, as regards both the state of public feeling and the claims of the deputy postmaster general upon the forbearance of the assemblies.
In Canada, the situation was completely different, both in terms of public sentiment and the expectations of the deputy postmaster general regarding the patience of the assemblies.
The discussion of political grievances was arousing in the popular party a bitterness which was fast carrying the agitation for remedies beyond constitutional bounds; and as for Stayner, he had quite alienated from himself the good will of the assemblies in Upper and Lower Canada, by his open identification of himself with the government party. When, therefore, the British proposals were laid before the assembly of Upper Canada by the lieutenant governor in 1835, they were rejected with the contemptuous observation that the provisions of the proposed bill were so absurd and inapplicable that no benefit could be expected from any attempt to amend them.[244]
The discussion about political issues was stirring up a resentment in the popular party that was quickly pushing the push for solutions beyond constitutional limits; as for Stayner, he had completely lost the support of the assemblies in Upper and Lower Canada due to his public alignment with the government party. So, when the British proposals were presented to the assembly of Upper Canada by the lieutenant governor in 1835, they were dismissed with the scornful comment that the terms of the proposed bill were so ridiculous and irrelevant that no benefit could be gained from any effort to change them.[244]
The legislatures were not aware of the circumstances which had led to the British proposals. The fact that the views for which they had contended had been upheld by authorities so[Pg 194] eminent as the law officers of the crown was withheld from them. The changed attitude of the postmaster general was therefore regarded by the assemblies as a proof of the success of their agitation, and they girded themselves up for renewed efforts.
The legislatures didn’t know about the situation that led to the British proposals. They weren’t informed that the views they had supported were backed by prominent authorities, like the law officers of the crown. Because of this, the assemblies saw the postmaster general’s changed position as evidence that their efforts had paid off, and they prepared for renewed attempts.
As a preliminary to fresh attacks the assemblies in both provinces demanded from Stayner a mass of information, the extent of which filled him with dismay. But no further refusals on his part were possible. The colonial office was scarcely more pleased with Stayner and his methods than the provincial assemblies were, and the postmaster general was requested to see there were no more concealments.
As a first step before launching new attacks, the assemblies in both provinces demanded a lot of information from Stayner, which overwhelmed him. However, he could no longer refuse their requests. The colonial office was not much happier with Stayner and his approach than the provincial assemblies were, and the postmaster general was instructed to ensure that there would be no more withholding of information.
The work which fell upon Stayner in the preparation of the returns called for was enormous. As printed by the legislature of Lower Canada, the documents produced filled two hundred and sixty-eight quarto pages. Stayner appears to have withheld nothing. He became as effusive as he had formerly been reticent. He published letters written by himself to his official superiors, which must have proved embarrassing to them.
The workload that fell on Stayner for preparing the required returns was huge. As published by the legislature of Lower Canada, the documents he produced filled two hundred sixty-eight quarto pages. Stayner seems to have held back nothing. He became as open as he had once been reserved. He published letters he wrote to his superiors, which must have been awkward for them.
In the correspondence Stayner disclosed was a letter from the postmaster of Montreal, pleading for a more suitable room for his post office.[245] From this letter it appears that in 1835, the post office in Montreal was in the upper storey of a building standing between the Gazette printing establishment and a boarding house, and underneath it was a tailoring and dry goods shop. To get to the post office the public had to grope up an unlighted flight of stairs at the risk of their limbs, and when they reached the top they had to make their way across a small lobby half-filled with firewood.
In the correspondence Stayner shared was a letter from the postmaster of Montreal, asking for a more appropriate room for his post office.[245] According to this letter, back in 1835, the post office in Montreal was located on the upper floor of a building between the Gazette printing company and a boarding house, with a tailoring and dry goods shop below it. To reach the post office, the public had to navigate up a dark flight of stairs, risking injury, and once at the top, they had to cross a small lobby that was half-filled with firewood.
As an inducement to the department to provide more suitable quarters, the postmaster stated that the merchants were so sensible of the inconvenience and danger from fire, that the postmaster thought they would help with the erection of a proper building, if applied to.
As a way to encourage the department to provide better facilities, the postmaster mentioned that the merchants were very aware of the inconvenience and fire hazards, so the postmaster believed they would contribute to the construction of an appropriate building if approached.
Stayner also produced the copy of a letter he had written a short time before, to the secretary of the general post office protesting his inability to meet the wants of the provinces with the means which the postmaster general had placed at his disposal. The letter deals chiefly with the conditions in Upper Canada, and as a description of the situation in that province it could not be bettered. The occasion of the letter was a complaint made by a[Pg 195] gentleman in England that it had taken from the 12th of June until the 12th of October for a letter, addressed by him to his son in Barrie, to reach its destination.
Stayner also showed a copy of a letter he had written recently to the secretary of the general post office, complaining about his inability to meet the needs of the provinces with the resources that the postmaster general had given him. The letter mainly discusses the conditions in Upper Canada, and it provided an accurate depiction of the situation in that province. The letter was prompted by a complaint from a[Pg 195] gentleman in England stating that it took from June 12th to October 12th for a letter he sent to his son in Barrie to arrive.
Stayner in reporting on the subject, admitted that this was quite likely the case, but insisted that no blame was imputable to him. The nearest post office to Barrie was from thirty to forty miles distant, and it was probable that the letter had lain a couple of months at that office before being called for.
Stayner, in reporting on the matter, acknowledged that this was probably true, but insisted that he wasn't to blame. The nearest post office to Barrie was about thirty to forty miles away, and it was likely that the letter had been sitting at that office for a couple of months before anyone picked it up.
The case of the Barrie settlers was typical of that of thousands of well-educated people inhabiting the back parts of Upper Canada, where they had formed thriving towns and villages from twenty to fifty miles from the existing posts. These people with whom postal accommodation was almost a necessity of life were entirely without the means of corresponding with their distant friends, unless they sent and received their letters by private agency.
The situation of the Barrie settlers was typical of thousands of well-educated individuals living in the remote areas of Upper Canada, where they had built thriving towns and villages located twenty to fifty miles away from the existing postal stations. These people, for whom postal services were almost a necessity, had no way to communicate with their distant friends, unless they used private agencies to send and receive their letters.
Stayner declared that he was well within bounds in saying that at that moment there were between two hundred and three hundred distinct societies of people spread over the country in Upper Canada alone, who, like the settlers in Barrie, were suffering from want of that accommodation which he would fain give them, if he had the power to do it. The case was to be the more lamented from the fact that the reasonable wants of these people could be supplied without burdening the post office revenue.
Stayner stated that he was completely justified in saying that at that moment there were between two hundred and three hundred distinct communities of people scattered across Upper Canada alone, who, like the settlers in Barrie, were struggling due to a lack of the support he wished he could provide if he had the ability to do so. This situation was even more regrettable because the basic needs of these people could be met without placing a strain on the post office revenue.
So active was the spirit of enterprise amongst the class of persons crowding into the new settlements throughout the whole extent of Upper Canada, as well as in many parts of the lower province, and so great was their disposition for letter writing, that Stayner was sure in a short time the increased revenue would amply repay the outlay required. But with the assistance allowed him, it was impossible to meet those demands.
The spirit of entrepreneurship was so strong among the people moving into the new settlements across all of Upper Canada, as well as in many areas of the lower province, and they were so eager to write letters that Stayner was confident that the increased revenue would soon more than cover the costs involved. However, with the support he received, it was impossible to meet those demands.
It was indispensable that he should have at least two travelling officers, whose duty it should be to examine into the merits of applications, to settle questions of site, and arrange for mail carriers. As for mail carriers, Stayner believed that the surveyors would save their salaries by that item alone, as in the absence of officials who would make arrangements on the spot, the post office was being constantly exposed to imposition by carriers, against which it was impossible to provide.
It was essential for him to have at least two traveling officers whose job was to review the merits of applications, resolve site issues, and organize mail carriers. Regarding mail carriers, Stayner thought that the surveyors would cover their salaries just through that role, since without officials to handle arrangements on-site, the post office was constantly at risk of being taken advantage of by carriers, and there was no way to prevent it.
During the first five years he had been in office, Stayner had increased the number of offices under his control from ninety to two hundred and seventy, but beyond that it was impossible for him, with his present assistance, to go. The parts of the country[Pg 196] where new offices were called for were so remote, and the means of information so unsatisfactory that it would be improper for him to open offices and make contracts for serving them, without the advice of persons acting under his orders, upon whose judgment he could rely.
During his first five years in office, Stayner had increased the number of offices under his control from ninety to two hundred and seventy. However, with his current support staff, he couldn't go any further. The areas in the country[Pg 196] where new offices were needed were so isolated, and the information available was so inadequate that it would be irresponsible for him to open offices and make contracts for them without guidance from people working under his direction, whose judgment he could trust.
At that moment, Stayner further told the committee, the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada required not less than five hundred offices, that is, practically double the number then in operation, and in ten years, at least one thousand offices would be necessary to provide the requisite accommodation. With proper assistance he could establish and put into successful operation all that were wanted at the rate of one hundred a year. Less than that scale of advancement would fail to satisfy the public.
At that moment, Stayner also told the committee that the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada needed at least five hundred offices, which was basically double the number that were currently in operation. In ten years, at least one thousand offices would be needed to provide the necessary support. With the right help, he could set up and successfully run all the offices needed at a pace of one hundred a year. Anything less than that rate of progress would not meet public expectations.
The complaints of the people had become so loud and threatening that, unless they were speedily met, Stayner was apprehensive they would be engrafted upon the catalogue of provincial grievances. Before he left England, Stayner had the postmaster general's promise that two surveyors would be at once appointed. He had waited as long as he felt that he dared, but the situation had become so alarming, that he had taken it upon himself to appoint two surveyors who would act under his directions, until regular appointments could be made.
The people's complaints had become so intense and concerning that, unless they were addressed quickly, Stayner feared they would be added to the list of local issues. Before he left England, Stayner had secured a promise from the postmaster general that two surveyors would be appointed immediately. He had waited as long as he thought he could, but the situation had become so critical that he decided to appoint two surveyors himself to work under his guidance until formal appointments could be made.
After Stayner laid before the houses of assembly in the two provinces the various returns they had called for, committees were struck in each house to consider the information contained in the statements. The committee in Lower Canada took the evidence of Stayner and of William Lyon Mackenzie who happened to be in Quebec at the time, conferring with the reform leaders in Lower Canada.
After Stayner presented the various returns requested by the houses of assembly in the two provinces, committees were formed in each house to review the information in the statements. The committee in Lower Canada heard from Stayner and William Lyon Mackenzie, who was in Quebec at the time, meeting with the reform leaders in Lower Canada.
Mackenzie's statement was a general arraignment of the administration of the post office. He declared that, as then constituted, the post office in the opinion of the assembly of Upper Canada, was an illegal institution, monopolizing the conveyance of epistolary correspondence which it taxes heavily, and appropriating the proceeds in England, without the knowledge and consent of the assembly.
Mackenzie's statement was a broad critique of how the post office was managed. He argued that, as it was organized at the time, the post office, according to the assembly of Upper Canada, was an illegal entity that monopolized the delivery of letters, heavily taxed it, and took the profits to England without the assembly's knowledge or approval.
It arbitrarily and often capriciously, the reformer from Upper Canada complained, fixed the sites of post offices, and dismissed and appointed the incumbents. It resolved that one section of the country, though thickly settled, should have no post offices, while another part which was almost destitute of inhabitants had regular mails. Newspapers were taxed at such a rate as the[Pg 197] post office thought fit, and the proceeds were held by the deputy postmaster general as his perquisite.
It randomly and often whimsically, the reformer from Upper Canada complained, decided where post offices should be located and hired or fired the staff. It determined that one area of the country, despite being heavily populated, would have no post offices, while another region that was almost empty had regular mail service. Newspapers were taxed at a rate the[Pg 197] post office deemed appropriate, and the revenue was kept by the deputy postmaster general as his personal benefit.
In short, Mackenzie was emphatic in his declaration that the establishment was a poor substitute for a provincial post office, which would be regulated by law, and its revenues disposed of by the authority of the legislature. He gave some curious illustrations of the inequalities which marked the operation of the newspaper regulations.
In short, Mackenzie strongly stated that the establishment was a bad substitute for a provincial post office, which would be governed by law, and its revenues managed by the legislature. He provided some interesting examples of the inequalities present in the newspaper regulations.
While Mackenzie was in England, Joseph Hume secured the production of a number of documents relating to the Canadian post office, which the legislatures in Canada had tried in vain to obtain from Stayner. Among these was a statement showing the amount paid by the several newspaper publishers for the distribution of their papers by the post office. On looking over the list Mackenzie was surprised at the very moderate amounts paid by publishers of some of the most widely-circulated papers. The Montreal Gazette, for instance, distributed nearly two thousand copies by post, but paid postage on only two hundred and fifty copies.
While Mackenzie was in England, Joseph Hume obtained several documents related to the Canadian post office, which the Canadian legislatures had unsuccessfully tried to get from Stayner. Among these was a statement showing how much various newspaper publishers paid for the delivery of their papers through the post office. When Mackenzie reviewed the list, he was surprised by the rather small amounts paid by publishers of some of the most widely circulated papers. The Montreal Gazette, for example, distributed nearly two thousand copies by mail but only paid postage for two hundred and fifty copies.
Mackenzie made some further inquiries, and found that all sorts of irregularities prevailed, which Stayner in the weakness of his position was fain to connive at. The publisher of one paper in Kingston told Mackenzie that he entered seventy-five copies as sent by post, while mailing four hundred copies; another reported sixty copies and sent three hundred. A third publisher, who objected to paying the usual charge of four shillings per copy per annum, was let off with two shillings and sixpence per copy; while a fourth publisher paid no postage at all for several years.
Mackenzie made some more inquiries and discovered that all kinds of irregularities were happening, which Stayner, due to his weak position, was reluctantly ignoring. The publisher of one newspaper in Kingston told Mackenzie that he reported seventy-five copies sent by mail, while actually mailing four hundred copies; another claimed sixty copies but sent three hundred. A third publisher, who refused to pay the usual fee of four shillings per copy each year, was allowed to pay only two shillings and sixpence per copy; while a fourth publisher didn’t pay any postage at all for several years.
Until that time Mackenzie had been paying the regular charges for all copies of his newspaper—The Colonial Advocate—which he sent by mail. But he determined to be no longer the victim of such barefaced discrimination, and he accordingly began to enter for postage only a part of the total issue distributed through the mails.
Until that time, Mackenzie had been paying the regular charges for all copies of his newspaper—The Colonial Advocate—that he sent by mail. However, he decided he would no longer be the target of such blatant discrimination, so he started to charge for postage on only a portion of the total copies sent through the mail.
In order that he might not be open to a charge of dishonesty, and perhaps also to help in the exposure of a vicious system, Mackenzie told the postmaster at Toronto what he was doing, and at the same time published the facts in his newspaper. This, of course, could not be tolerated by Stayner, and he demanded from Mackenzie the full postage on all his papers sent through the mails.
To avoid accusations of dishonesty and possibly to shed light on a corrupt system, Mackenzie informed the postmaster in Toronto about his actions and also published the details in his newspaper. Naturally, Stayner could not accept this and demanded that Mackenzie pay the full postage on all his papers sent through the mail.
Mackenzie refused to pay, but declared that if Stayner would allow the case to go before a jury in Toronto, Stayner might employ all the counsel in the colony to support his demand, and if the jury could be persuaded to render a verdict against him, he pledged[Pg 198] himself to pay the demand and all expenses. The offer was, of course, declined and the claim was dropped.
Mackenzie refused to pay but stated that if Stayner would let the case go before a jury in Toronto, Stayner could hire all the lawyers in the colony to back his claim. If the jury could be convinced to rule against him, he promised[Pg 198] to cover the claim and all expenses. Naturally, the offer was turned down, and the claim was abandoned.
In the course of a long examination, Stayner was taken over all the points in controversy between the postmaster general and the Canadian provinces. Dr. O'Callaghan,[246] who soon afterwards acquired notoriety as a leader in the rebellion, was chairman of the committee. He and his associates in the inquiry had sat on several earlier committees and were well versed in the points at issue.
During a lengthy examination, Stayner covered all the points of disagreement between the postmaster general and the Canadian provinces. Dr. O'Callaghan,[246] who later gained fame as a leader in the rebellion, was the chairman of the committee. He and his colleagues in the inquiry had previously served on several committees and were very familiar with the issues at stake.
With the aid of the documents produced, the O'Callaghan committee managed to elicit from Stayner a fairly complete statement of the position of the post office in the Canadas in 1834-1835. Asked as to his authority for appropriating to his own use the proceeds of the newspaper postage, he was unable to point to it. But he stated that he knew it had been repeatedly recognized by the head of the department in London, and he had never considered it incumbent upon him or even proper to inquire into the date or form of the authority.
With the help of the documents provided, the O'Callaghan committee got Stayner to give a pretty complete overview of the post office situation in Canada from 1834 to 1835. When asked about his authority to use the proceeds from newspaper postage for himself, he couldn't specify it. However, he mentioned that he knew it had been acknowledged multiple times by the head of the department in London, and he never thought it was necessary or even appropriate to look into the date or type of the authority.
To a committee convinced that everything appertaining to the post office bore the marks of illegality, this answer could not be satisfactory. Stayner was consequently next asked whether he considered that any usage, precedent or custom could give him a right to tax any portion of His Majesty's subjects without the express consent of parliament. To this he replied in the negative, but added that he never doubted that the postmaster general, in permitting his deputy in Canada to send newspapers through the post for a compensation to himself, was borne out by law.
To a committee that believed everything related to the post office was illegal, this answer couldn’t satisfy them. Stayner was then asked if he thought any type of usage, precedent, or custom could justify taxing any part of His Majesty's subjects without the explicit approval of parliament. He answered no but added that he never doubted that the postmaster general, by allowing his deputy in Canada to send newspapers through the mail for payment, was supported by the law.
What the statute was which the postmaster general held to be his authority, Stayner could not, with confidence, say. But it occurred to him that it might be an act passed in 1763,[247] which confirmed certain officers attached to the principal secretaries of state and to the postmaster general, in the privilege which they long enjoyed of franking newspapers and other printed matter.
What the statute was that the postmaster general claimed as his authority, Stayner couldn’t say for sure. But he thought it might be an act passed in 1763,[247] which confirmed certain officers connected to the principal secretaries of state and the postmaster general in the privilege they had long enjoyed of sending newspapers and other printed materials without paying postage.
As a matter of fact, this was the statute cited by the postmaster general when required to produce his authority for allowing Stayner and other deputies to treat the proceeds from newspapers as their perquisites, and as we consider this act, we may admire the prudence with which Stayner declined an argument as to its sufficiency as authority for the practice.
As a matter of fact, this was the law referenced by the postmaster general when he had to show his authority for letting Stayner and other deputies consider the earnings from newspapers as their own perks. And as we reflect on this act, we can appreciate the carefulness with which Stayner avoided debating whether it was enough authority for that practice.
Stayner was on firmer ground when he pointed out that the[Pg 199] post office act had made no provision for the conveyance of newspapers, and that, as things stood, the only alternatives before the publishers were to pay the prohibitive letter rates on their newspapers, or to come to terms with him, under the permission of the postmaster general.
Stayner was on solid ground when he pointed out that the [Pg 199] post office act hadn’t included any arrangements for delivering newspapers, and that, as it was, the only options available to the publishers were to pay the outrageous letter rates on their newspapers or to reach an agreement with him, with the postmaster general's approval.
The committee were loath to leave this controversial advantage with Stayner and asked him whether, since the newspapers were carried in the mail bags, he paid from the newspaper postage any part of the mail couriers' wages. He said he did not, and then committed himself to the extraordinary proposition that it cost nothing to carry newspapers because they were in the same bags with the letters. The committee did not waste any time arguing such a point as that, but called the contractor for the conveyance of the mails between Montreal and Quebec, who testified that if he were relieved of the newspapers, he could carry the mails on horseback, at a saving of £200 a year.
The committee was reluctant to leave this controversial advantage with Stayner and asked him whether, since the newspapers were included in the mail bags, he paid any part of the mail couriers' wages from the newspaper postage. He said he didn't, and then put forth the unbelievable claim that it cost nothing to carry newspapers because they were in the same bags as the letters. The committee didn't waste any time debating such a point, but called the contractor for the mail transport between Montreal and Quebec, who testified that if he didn’t have to carry the newspapers, he could transport the mails on horseback, saving £200 a year.
The O'Callaghan committee in their report to the assembly—a report which was made on the 8th of March, 1836, invited attention in the first place to the large sums which were sent by the deputy postmaster general to England from the revenues of the Canadian post office. During the thirteen years ended in 1834, the large amount of £91,685 sterling had been remitted to the British treasury on this account, and the remittances for the last four years averaged annually £10,041 sterling.
The O'Callaghan committee, in their report to the assembly—submitted on March 8, 1836—first drew attention to the significant amounts sent by the deputy postmaster general to England from the revenues of the Canadian post office. Over the thirteen years ending in 1834, a total of £91,685 sterling was sent to the British treasury for this reason, with the remittances for the last four years averaging £10,041 sterling each year.
These remittances, and the usage under which they were made, the committee denounced as a violation of the fundamental rights of the people of the colony, and as an instance of the disregard of the declaratory act of 1778, which had cost Great Britain her American colonies, "now the flourishing and happy United States of America." Regarding the imperial act of 1834 as an admission that the British government had acted illegally in appropriating to its own use the surplus Canadian postal revenues, the committee assumed that the deputy postmaster general would cease to make remittances of Canadian revenues to England.
These remittances, along with how they were used, were condemned by the committee as a violation of the basic rights of the people in the colony and as a clear disregard for the declaratory act of 1778, which had led to Great Britain's loss of its American colonies, "now the thriving and happy United States of America." The committee viewed the imperial act of 1834 as an acknowledgment that the British government had acted illegally by taking surplus postal revenues from Canada for its own use, and they expected that the deputy postmaster general would stop sending Canadian revenues to England.
On discovering that this was not the case, the committee gave Stayner notice that the assembly would probably hold him personally responsible for any further remittances thus improperly made. Stayner, however, paid no attention to this warning, as he had but a short time before deposited $20,000 in the commissariat office for transmission to London.
On finding out that this wasn't true, the committee informed Stayner that the assembly would likely hold him personally accountable for any future payments made incorrectly. Stayner, however, ignored this warning, as he had recently deposited $20,000 in the commissariat office to be sent to London.
Stayner's course in treating the newspaper postage as his perquisite came in for the strongest reprobation. The statutory[Pg 200] authority which he ventured to put forward was easily shown to be no authority at all, and the committee declared it to be a monstrous absurdity that the head of the department should, in defiance of all law, presume to fix the charges on newspapers, and put the proceeds in his pocket.
Stayner's approach to treating the newspaper postage as his personal gain faced intense criticism. The legal authority he tried to claim was quickly proven to be baseless, and the committee stated it was completely ridiculous for the head of the department to, against all laws, assume he could set the charges on newspapers and pocket the earnings.
From the statement furnished by Stayner, it appeared that no less than £9550 currency had been appropriated by him from this source during the six years he had held the office of deputy postmaster general, and the committee suggested that, as he had no shadow of right to any part of this large sum, legal proceedings should be taken by the province to recover the amount from him.
From Stayner's statement, it seemed that he had taken no less than £9,550 from this source during the six years he had been the deputy postmaster general. The committee recommended that, since he had no legal claim to any portion of this large sum, the province should initiate legal action to recover the amount from him.
The total income which Stayner acknowledged having received was beyond belief. In each of the three years ending with and including 1834, his emoluments amounted on the average to £3185 currency. These emoluments were described graphically by the committee as nearly equal to the salary of the governor general, three times more than the salary of any of the puisne judges in the province, almost equal to the whole amount paid as compensation to the one hundred and thirty-seven postmasters in Upper Canada, and one-third more than the total amount received by the one hundred and seventeen postmasters in Lower Canada.
The total income that Stayner admitted to receiving was unbelievable. In each of the three years up to and including 1834, his earnings averaged £3,185 in currency. The committee vividly described these earnings as nearly equal to the salary of the governor general, three times larger than the salary of any of the junior judges in the province, almost equal to the total compensation paid to the one hundred and thirty-seven postmasters in Upper Canada, and one-third more than the total amount received by the one hundred and seventeen postmasters in Lower Canada.
The committee endeavoured to convict Stayner of having misled the postmaster general as to the magnitude of his income. They were unsuccessful in this attempt, as the postmaster general was quite aware of the amount Stayner was receiving, and had expressed no disapproval.
The committee tried to convict Stayner for misleading the postmaster general about the size of his income. They were unsuccessful because the postmaster general was fully aware of how much Stayner was earning and had shown no disapproval.
The committee as a conclusion to its report urged that the provincial government should take over the control of the provincial post office, and they submitted the draft of a bill which they had prepared for the purpose of sanctioning the action recommended. The house of assembly adopted the report of the committee, and having passed the bill, sent it up to the legislative council for approval.
The committee concluded its report by urging the provincial government to take control of the provincial post office. They submitted a draft bill they had prepared to approve this recommendation. The house of assembly accepted the committee's report and, after passing the bill, sent it to the legislative council for approval.
In the legislative council the bill was rejected. The majority of the council were Stayner's friends, and they saw that he had a full chance to express his views before a committee appointed by the council. He set the draft bill prepared by the postmaster general beside the assembly bill, and effectively contrasted the strong points of the former with the weakness of the latter.
In the legislative council, the bill was turned down. Most of the council members were Stayner's supporters, and they ensured he had a fair opportunity to share his opinions before a committee chosen by the council. He placed the draft bill created by the postmaster general next to the assembly bill and effectively highlighted the strong points of the former compared to the weaknesses of the latter.
The imperial bill, Stayner emphasised before the committee of the council, dealt with British North America as one territory[Pg 201] as regards regulations and charges, and in his opinion, unless the several provinces were to be so regarded, an efficient service among the provinces themselves, and between the provinces and other countries, would be impossible.
The imperial bill, Stayner emphasized before the council committee, treated British North America as a single territory[Pg 201] in terms of regulations and fees, and in his view, unless the individual provinces were seen in that way, an efficient service among the provinces and between them and other countries would be impossible.
In order to encourage correspondence between the distant parts of the colonies, the imperial bill fixed the comparatively low rate of eighteen pence for all distances beyond five hundred miles. Thus a letter could be sent from Amherstburg to Halifax or Charlottetown for that sum. If each colony had its own separate postal administration the charge on letters passing between those places would, in the most favourable circumstances, cost two or three times as much. Stayner was far from agreeing that, in all its details, the imperial bill was perfect, but he was convinced that the principle on which it was based was the only practicable one.
To encourage communication between the far-flung parts of the colonies, the imperial bill set a relatively low rate of eighteen pence for all distances over five hundred miles. This meant a letter could be sent from Amherstburg to Halifax or Charlottetown for that price. If each colony had its own postal system, sending letters between those places would, at best, cost two or three times more. Stayner didn’t think the imperial bill was flawless in every detail, but he was sure that the principle it was based on was the only workable option.
The great objection Stayner saw in the bill of the assembly was that it was a local bill operative only within the province. Intercourse between Lower Canada and the other provinces had to be provided for, since where there are several states under one supreme head, the free exchange of correspondence between them is indispensable.
The main issue Stayner noticed with the assembly's bill was that it was a local bill only effective within the province. There needed to be arrangements for interaction between Lower Canada and the other provinces because, when there are multiple states under one central authority, the free exchange of communication between them is essential.
The British government, whose interests in the different provinces required that communication between them and the mother country should be uninterrupted, could never consent, Stayner was sure, to any local arrangements by which those communications might be jeopardized. The cost of communication between province and province would be prohibitive, and the consequence would be moral isolation. The separate states of the American Union, jealous as they were of any impairment of their rights, recognized the necessity of a common postal service.
The British government, which needed smooth communication between its provinces and the mother country, would never agree, Stayner was sure, to any local arrangements that could threaten those communications. The cost of communication between the provinces would be too high, leading to a feeling of moral isolation. The separate states of the American Union, protective of their rights, acknowledged the importance of a shared postal service.
Stayner dwelt convincingly on the technical difficulties of accounting and distributing the charges on inter-provincial correspondence, and on correspondence between Canada and Great Britain. As it happened at the time, most of the letters sent between Canada and England passed by way of the United States. But that was a courtesy on the part of the United States government which might be terminated at any time, and then the Canadian provinces would be entirely dependent on the province by the sea.
Stayner effectively highlighted the technical challenges of managing and distributing the costs of inter-provincial correspondence as well as the correspondence between Canada and Great Britain. At that time, most letters sent between Canada and England went through the United States. However, this was a courtesy from the U.S. government that could be revoked at any moment, leaving the Canadian provinces completely reliant on the coastal province.
If each province charged its full local rates on correspondence passing through it, and Stayner could see no reason why any of the provinces should favour its neighbours at the expense of its own people, the charge on a letter sent from Upper Canada to[Pg 202] England would not be less than six or seven shillings, while under the British draft bill, the charge would scarcely ever exceed two shillings.
If every province applied its full local rates on mail going through it, and Stayner didn’t see why any province should help its neighbors at the expense of its own residents, the cost of sending a letter from Upper Canada to[Pg 202] England would be at least six or seven shillings, while under the British draft bill, the cost would barely ever go above two shillings.
The legislative council adopted Stayner's reasoning entirely. It admitted that if the post office were an institution of merely local utility, there would be little to amend in the bill sent up by the assembly. Since, however, there were several provinces concerned, whose concurrent action was essential, the conflict of interest which must inevitably arise would make the harmonious working of the separate parts of the system difficult, if not impossible.
The legislative council fully accepted Stayner's reasoning. It acknowledged that if the post office was just a local service, there wouldn't be much to change in the bill proposed by the assembly. However, since multiple provinces were involved and their collective action was crucial, the inevitable conflicts of interest would complicate, if not entirely hinder, the smooth operation of the individual parts of the system.
As an instance of the difficulties springing out of the divergence of interest among the provinces, the council recalled the fact that it became necessary to invite the intervention of the mother country to settle the apportionment of the customs revenues between the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. The council suggested to the governor general that if this line of reasoning were found acceptable, a satisfactory settlement of the whole question would be reached by requiring the deputy postmaster general to furnish annually full information as to the conditions, financial and other, of the post office.
As an example of the issues arising from the differing interests among the provinces, the council noted that it became necessary to ask for the mother country's help to resolve the division of customs revenues between Upper and Lower Canada. The council advised the governor general that if this reasoning was seen as valid, a satisfactory resolution to the entire matter could be achieved by having the deputy postmaster general provide complete annual information about the conditions, financial and otherwise, of the post office.
The free transmission of the correspondence of members of the legislature, the council urged, should be provided for. The deputy postmaster general should be removable on the joint address of the two houses of the legislature; the salaries of all officials should be fixed, and perquisites of every kind withdrawn. Finally such alterations should be made in the rates of postage, such post offices established and such arrangements adopted for the regulation and management of the service, as were called for by the joint address of the two houses.
The council insisted that members of the legislature should be able to send their correspondence freely. The deputy postmaster general should be removable based on a joint request from both houses of the legislature; the salaries of all officials should be set, and any extra benefits should be eliminated. Lastly, changes should be made to the postage rates, new post offices should be created, and arrangements should be implemented for the regulation and management of the service, as requested by the joint address of both houses.
The plans elaborated by the British post office for the settlement of the colonial difficulties found no more favour in Upper Canada than in the other provinces. The assembly condemned the draft bill as unworthy of consideration. The terms in which the scheme was dismissed by the assembly were sufficiently slighting, but the colonial secretary was not in the mood to be resentful.
The plans developed by the British post office for resolving the colonial issues were just as unpopular in Upper Canada as in the other provinces. The assembly rejected the draft bill, considering it unworthy of serious discussion. The way the assembly dismissed the proposal was somewhat disrespectful, but the colonial secretary wasn't in the mood to take offense.
Lord Glenelg was impressed with the substantial justice of the claims of the assemblies in the two provinces, and would not make a stand on a point of manners. As Sir Francis Bond Head was about to come to Upper Canada to take up the lieutenant governorship in succession to Colbome, Glenelg, in his letter of instructions[248] [Pg 203] directed Head to make every effort to bring the post office question to a satisfactory conclusion.
Lord Glenelg recognized the fairness of the assemblies' claims in the two provinces and chose not to get hung up on etiquette. As Sir Francis Bond Head was about to head to Upper Canada to take over the lieutenant governorship after Colbome, Glenelg, in his letter of instructions[248] [Pg 203] instructed Head to do everything possible to resolve the post office issue satisfactorily.
Noticing the opinion given by the assembly on the postmaster general's scheme of settlement, Glenelg thought it right to say that the bill had the very careful consideration of the postmaster general before being sent to the several provinces. The government, however, had no desire to urge the adoption of any measure to which well-founded objections existed. They were content that the bill should be withdrawn, to make way for any better bill that might be proposed by the house.
Noting the feedback from the assembly about the postmaster general's settlement plan, Glenelg felt it was important to mention that the postmaster general had thoroughly reviewed the bill before it was sent to the various provinces. However, the government didn't want to push for the adoption of any measure that had legitimate concerns against it. They were fine with withdrawing the bill to allow for any better proposal that might come from the house.
The assembly might find, on approaching the subject more closely, continued Glenelg, that unexpected difficulties would crop up, particularly with regard to intercourse by post with places beyond the limits of the province. The lieutenant governor was authorized to assent to any judicious and practicable measure which the house might incorporate in a bill, and to regard as of no importance, when opposed to the general convenience of the public, any considerations of patronage or revenue derivable from this source.
The assembly might discover, as they look into the matter more closely, continued Glenelg, that unforeseen challenges would arise, especially concerning mail communication with areas outside the province. The lieutenant governor was authorized to agree to any sensible and feasible measures that the house might include in a bill and to disregard any concerns about patronage or potential revenue from this source if they conflicted with the overall convenience of the public.
Notwithstanding this conciliatory statement, the house proceeded along the same lines as those followed by the assembly in Lower Canada. They drew up a series of resolutions[249] providing for the establishment of a post office department with headquarters in Toronto. Specified sums were allotted for the maintenance of a head office, and for the salaries of the postmaster general and his staff. The rates were fixed on letters and newspapers, and the percentage of revenue to be allowed postmasters as salaries was defined.
Despite this conciliatory statement, the house continued on the same path as the assembly in Lower Canada. They created a series of resolutions[249] establishing a post office department with its headquarters in Toronto. Specific amounts were allocated for the upkeep of a main office and for the salaries of the postmaster general and his staff. The rates were set for letters and newspapers, and the percentage of revenue designated for postmasters as salaries was defined.
The house was unsparing in its condemnation of Stayner. They estimated that during the ten years preceding, the large sum of £48,000 had been withdrawn from the province through the exactions of the post office, an amount which they said would have sufficed to establish five district banks, suited to the wants of as many different sections of the country.
The house harshly criticized Stayner. They estimated that over the past ten years, a huge total of £48,000 had been taken out of the province due to the demands of the post office, an amount they claimed could have been enough to set up five district banks tailored to the needs of various parts of the country.
The advantages of a provincial establishment appeared to the house to be very great. A large amount of wealth would be kept in the province, which was sent to Quebec, either for transmission to England, or to make up the perquisites of officials; post offices could be opened wherever they were required, and no distant part of the province would be without the means of cheap[Pg 204] and convenient accommodation; postmasters would be better paid, and the postage on letters and newspapers would be reduced; and extravagance could be checked and abuses corrected.
The benefits of a local establishment seemed to the house to be very significant. A large amount of wealth would stay in the province, which currently goes to Quebec, either for sending to England or to supplement official perks; post offices could be set up wherever needed, ensuring that no remote area of the province would lack affordable[Pg 204] and convenient services; postmasters would receive better compensation, and the cost of mailing letters and newspapers would decrease; plus, excess spending could be curbed and issues addressed.
The house was fully aware of the objections to a local post office system, but in their opinion those objections were not to be mentioned beside the numerous advantages the provincial post office would provide. It would be far easier for the department to open accounts with the present or any other post office department that might be organized, than it was to arrange with the United States for the interchange of correspondence with that country, and yet there was a very extensive exchange between Canada and the United States without the aid of any law whatever.
The house was fully aware of the objections to a local post office system, but in their view, those objections didn't compare to the many benefits the provincial post office would offer. It would be much simpler for the department to set up accounts with the current or any other post office department that might be established than it was to work out an agreement with the United States for exchanging correspondence with that country. Still, there was a significant exchange between Canada and the United States without any legal support.
In considering the terms of a post office bill, the house had before it a list of conditions—thirty-one in number—which a committee recommended for consideration. Many of these were obvious. Others concerned matters of detail. Some were trivial.
In discussing the terms of a post office bill, the house had a list of conditions—thirty-one in total—that a committee suggested for review. Many of these were clear. Others dealt with specifics. Some were minor.
One peculiar condition was that £100 a year should be allotted for the purchase of books and instruments, which might be useful in helping to keep the roads in a proper state of repair. The plans for the establishment of a post office department in Upper Canada did not reach completion, as the assembly was dissolved a month after the resolutions were adopted, in consequence of its refusal to vote supplies.
One unusual requirement was that £100 a year should be set aside for buying books and tools that could help maintain the roads in good condition. The plans to set up a post office department in Upper Canada were never finalized because the assembly was dissolved a month after the resolutions were passed, due to its refusal to approve funding.
The termination of these agitations in the assemblies of Upper and Lower Canada, mark the close of a period in the relations between the provincial legislatures and the post office. The resolutions which were directed against the constitutional status of the post office, and the demands for separate provincial establishments ceased at this point. This was due rather to the disappearance of the opponents of the existing system than to the removal of the causes for complaint.
The end of these protests in the assemblies of Upper and Lower Canada marks the conclusion of a period in the relationship between the provincial legislatures and the post office. The resolutions aimed at challenging the constitutional status of the post office and the calls for separate provincial post offices stopped at this point. This was more because the opponents of the current system had faded away than because the underlying issues had been resolved.
The Lower Canadian assembly held a session of less than a fortnight at the end of September and the beginning of October 1836, and another of a week in August 1837, when it was dissolved, not to be resumed. During those sessions the affairs of the post office were not mentioned. In Upper Canada the election, which followed upon the dissolution of May 1836, resulted in a great victory for the government party.
The Lower Canadian assembly had a session that lasted less than two weeks at the end of September and the beginning of October 1836, and another one for a week in August 1837, when it was dissolved and not resumed. During those sessions, post office matters were not discussed. In Upper Canada, the election that followed the dissolution in May 1836 led to a significant victory for the government party.
Before resuming the narrative of events in the British North American provinces, it will be convenient to see how the late proceedings were regarded by the home government. Lord Gosford, the governor general, in transmitting to the colonial secretary the[Pg 205] bill framed by the assembly of Lower Canada, observed that it was intended as a substitute for the imperial bill of 1834, which did not suit the ideas of the house.
Before continuing the story of events in the British North American provinces, it’s useful to look at how the recent actions were viewed by the home government. Lord Gosford, the governor general, in sending to the colonial secretary the [Pg 205] bill created by the assembly of Lower Canada, noted that it was meant to replace the imperial bill of 1834, which didn’t align with the views of the house.
One of the reasons adduced against the post office was that the money which the deputy postmaster general sent to England was the produce of an illegal tax levied in violation of the act of 1778. In December 1835, some of the members of the assembly waited on Gosford, and requested him to stop the remittance of about £3000 which was being made by Stayner to the department in England.
One of the reasons given against the post office was that the money the deputy postmaster general sent to England came from an illegal tax imposed in violation of the act of 1778. In December 1835, some members of the assembly met with Gosford and asked him to stop the transfer of about £3000 that Stayner was sending to the department in England.
Gosford declined to take such a step for reasons which he set forth. The members, also, asked that the governor should take measures to recover from Stayner the sums which he was shown to have taken as newspaper postage. Gosford replied that as this allowance was permitted by the imperial department, and had been sanctioned by the Duke of Richmond as late as 1831, he could not assume to do what they asked, but he would bring the subject to the attention of the home government.
Gosford refused to take that step for the reasons he explained. The members also requested that the governor take action to recover the money that Stayner was shown to have taken for newspaper postage. Gosford replied that since this allowance was approved by the imperial department and had been authorized by the Duke of Richmond as recently as 1831, he couldn’t do what they asked. However, he would bring the matter to the attention of the home government.
The whole arrangement regarding newspapers appeared to Gosford to be improper. He was of opinion that the emoluments received by Stayner were unreasonably large, and that the practice of allowing the deputy postmaster general to draw a considerable private income from the public business was wrong in principle.
The entire setup about the newspapers seemed wrong to Gosford. He believed that the money Stayner was receiving was way too high, and he thought it was fundamentally wrong for the deputy postmaster general to earn a significant private income from public business.
But the post office in London was already in possession of the Lower Canadian bill. Stayner had sent a copy to the secretary immediately on its adoption by the assembly, and before the legislative council had had time to consider and reject it.
But the post office in London already had the Lower Canadian bill. Stayner had sent a copy to the secretary right after the assembly adopted it, and before the legislative council had a chance to review and reject it.
At the post office the receipt of the bill with the notice that it would go into operation on the 1st of May, 1836, gave rise to great perturbation among the officials. Freeling, in passing the bill on to the postmaster general, declared it to be perhaps the most important document he had ever received.[250] It was neither more nor less than an entire suppression of the postmaster general's patent, and of the powers of an act of parliament, authorizing the levying of certain rates of postage and the payment of the amount of all such postages into His Majesty's exchequer.
At the post office, receiving the bill along with the notice that it would take effect on May 1, 1836, caused a lot of anxiety among the officials. Freeling, while passing the bill to the postmaster general, stated that it was probably the most significant document he had ever received.[250] It represented nothing less than a complete cancellation of the postmaster general's patent and the powers granted by an act of parliament, which allowed for certain postage rates to be charged and required the collection of all postage payments to be sent to His Majesty's treasury.
Freeling was a very old man—he was born in 1764—on the point of retiring from the charge, which he had held for forty-five years, and it may be that he had forgotten that four years before, the law officers had given it as their opinion that there was no act of parliament giving the postmaster general authority over[Pg 206] the colonial post office and postages. At Freeling's instance the postmaster general hastened to put the matter into the hands of Glenelg, the colonial secretary. Having taken time to consider the situation, the colonial office drew up a statement of the subject for the attention of the postmaster general.[251]
Freeling was a very old man—he was born in 1764—about to retire from the position he had held for forty-five years, and it’s possible he had forgotten that four years earlier, the law officers had stated that there was no act of parliament giving the postmaster general authority over[Pg 206] the colonial post office and postage. At Freeling's request, the postmaster general quickly handed the matter over to Glenelg, the colonial secretary. After taking some time to think about the situation, the colonial office drafted a statement on the issue for the postmaster general’s attention.[251]
Observing that the assembly of Lower Canada, not being satisfied with the imperial bill of 1834, had drawn up a bill of their own, and that the legislative council, in declining to approve of this bill, had asked the intervention of the home government with the British parliament, the colonial secretary stated that the British government was not prepared to accede to this proposition.
Noting that the assembly of Lower Canada was unhappy with the imperial bill of 1834 and had created their own bill, and that the legislative council, in refusing to approve this bill, had called on the home government for help from the British parliament, the colonial secretary said that the British government was not ready to agree to this proposal.
By the act of 1834, the regulation of the post office in the several colonies was referred to the local legislatures, and His Majesty's government, the colonial office concluded, could not call in the authority of the imperial parliament for the solution of any difficulties that may arise until it could be shown conclusively that there were no other means of settling them; and then it would be only with the concurrence of the legislatures to whom the matter had been submitted.
By the 1834 act, the management of the post office in the different colonies was handed over to the local legislatures. His Majesty's government and the colonial office determined that they couldn’t involve the imperial parliament to resolve any issues that came up until it could be proven without a doubt that there were no other ways to address them. Even then, it would only be with the agreement of the legislatures to whom the issue had been presented.
But while determined that, in matters involving legislation, the colonies should be left to work out their own salvation, the colonial secretary observed that there were certain matters within the competence of the postmaster general which, if given effect to, would ameliorate the situation.
But while it was decided that the colonies should be allowed to manage their own affairs when it came to legislation, the colonial secretary pointed out that there were certain issues under the postmaster general's authority that, if addressed, would improve the situation.
The legislative council had among their requests asked (1) that all information required by the legislature should be furnished; (2) that the accounts of receipts and expenditures should be laid before the legislature annually; (3) that the officers of the department should be placed on moderate fixed salaries, in lieu of all perquisites and fees.
The legislative council had among their requests asked (1) that all information needed by the legislature should be provided; (2) that the accounts of income and expenses should be presented to the legislature every year; (3) that the department officers should receive reasonable fixed salaries instead of all bonuses and fees.
These objects, Glenelg pointed out, would have been to a certain degree attained by the bill of 1834. But as it had not become law, no time should be lost in putting these changes into effect, as they did not require legislative sanction. The colonial secretary also animadverted on the emoluments of Stayner. These he considered entirely excessive, and besides they were levied on an objectionable principle. The postmaster general was requested to put an end forthwith to the receipt by the deputy postmaster general of any fees on account of the transmission of newspapers. His salary should not be excessive.
These objects, Glenelg pointed out, would have been somewhat achieved by the bill of 1834. But since it hadn't become law, we shouldn't waste any time implementing these changes, as they didn't need approval from the legislature. The colonial secretary also criticized Stayner's pay. He thought it was completely excessive, and besides, it was based on an objectionable principle. The postmaster general was asked to immediately stop the deputy postmaster general from receiving any fees for the delivery of newspapers. His salary shouldn't be too high.
As a guide to the postmaster general in fixing it, the colonial[Pg 207] secretary gave a list of the salaries of the principal officers in the colony. Omitting that of the governor general, the highest salary in Canada was that of the receiver general which was £1000 a year. No other salary exceeded £500 a year. As against these, Stayner's emoluments of £3185 for each of the three preceding years were out of all proportion.
As a guide for the postmaster general in setting it, the colonial [Pg 207] secretary provided a list of the salaries of the main officers in the colony. Excluding the governor general's, the highest salary in Canada was that of the receiver general at £1000 a year. No other salary was above £500 a year. In comparison, Stayner's earnings of £3185 for each of the three previous years were completely disproportionate.
Glenelg further impressed upon the postmaster general the anxiety of His Majesty's government that no time should be lost in removing any real grievances which might be shown to exist. The postmaster general concurred with Glenelg as to the necessity of removing all reasonable grounds of complaint, and stated that steps had been, or were about to be, taken to that end.
Glenelg emphasized to the postmaster general the concern of His Majesty's government that any genuine issues should be addressed without delay. The postmaster general agreed with Glenelg on the importance of resolving all valid complaints and mentioned that actions had been, or were about to be, initiated to that effect.
To the postmaster general the newspaper postage question was one of real difficulty, in view of the absence of necessary legislation. As matters stood, newspapers could only be sent as letters or under the deputy postmaster general's privilege. If the law officers could see any way out of the difficulty, the postmaster general would be glad to adopt it.
To the postmaster general, the newspaper postage issue was a real challenge, especially because there was no necessary legislation in place. As things were, newspapers could only be mailed as letters or under the deputy postmaster general's privilege. If the legal advisors could find a solution to the problem, the postmaster general would be happy to implement it.
As the law officers' ingenuity was not equal to the difficulty, the situation remained essentially unchanged for some years. Meantime Stayner was enjoying to the full the peace and quiet which followed upon the altered conditions in the two provincial assemblies. It was some years since he had heard a complimentary reference to himself in either house, though no man could have shown more zeal for the improvement of the service he administered.
As the legal team's creativity couldn't match the challenge, the situation stayed pretty much the same for several years. Meanwhile, Stayner was fully enjoying the peace and quiet that came with the new circumstances in the two provincial assemblies. It had been years since he had heard anyone say something nice about him in either house, even though no one had shown more enthusiasm for improving the service he was in charge of.
But an agreeable change was at hand. On February 17, 1837, the legislative council of Upper Canada had before it the report of a committee it had appointed to inquire into the post office. The chairman of the committee was John Macaulay, formerly postmaster of Kingston, and Stayner's chief support in Upper Canada. When there was a question of appointing an assistant deputy postmaster general for Upper Canada, it was Macaulay that Stayner desired for the position.
But a welcome change was coming. On February 17, 1837, the legislative council of Upper Canada reviewed the report from a committee it had set up to look into the post office. The committee's chair was John Macaulay, who had previously served as the postmaster of Kingston and was Stayner's main supporter in Upper Canada. When it came to appointing an assistant deputy postmaster general for Upper Canada, Macaulay was the person Stayner wanted for the role.
The burden of the report of the committee of the council of 1837 was that the interests of the several provinces could be maintained only by preserving to the post office its character as an imperial institution. In Stayner's hands the service would be carried on efficiently, now that he had been furnished with the assistance he had applied for. Indeed the magnitude of his labour could be understood only by those connected with the service.
The main point of the council committee's report from 1837 was that the different provinces could only protect their interests by keeping the post office as an imperial institution. With Stayner in charge, the service would run smoothly since he had received the help he requested. In fact, only those involved with the service could truly grasp the extent of his workload.
The committee drew up a series of conditions which they considered[Pg 208] would place the institution on an efficient footing. The conditions were very similar to those suggested by the legislative council of Lower Canada in 1836. The bill of the Lower Canadian assembly appeared to the committee to illustrate the impracticability of any scheme such as that proposed by the imperial government in 1834.
The committee created a list of conditions they believed[Pg 208]would put the institution on solid ground. These conditions were quite similar to what the legislative council of Lower Canada proposed in 1836. The committee thought the bill from the Lower Canadian assembly showed how unrealistic any plan like the one suggested by the imperial government in 1834 would be.
If the acceptance of a post office bill was left to the provincial legislatures, they would almost certainly insist upon a scheme of low rates, based entirely on local considerations. The excessively reduced scale of rates proposed by the Lower Canadian assembly could not fail to leave a large deficit. Hence the wisdom of leaving the rates as they stood until their effects could be seen.
If the decision to accept a post office bill was up to the provincial legislatures, they would almost definitely push for a plan with low rates based solely on local needs. The significantly lower rates suggested by the Lower Canadian assembly would definitely result in a large deficit. That's why it makes sense to keep the rates as they are until we can see their impact.
Ten days after the committee of the legislative council made its report, the house of assembly adopted an address to the king, in which the same ideas were embodied, and in the following month a joint address was prepared by the assembly and the legislative council.[252]
Ten days after the legislative council committee submitted its report, the house of assembly approved a message to the king that reflected the same ideas, and in the next month, a joint message was put together by both the assembly and the legislative council.[252]
The address began with a recital of the facts making up the existing situation, and then proceeded to an effective criticism of the imperial scheme of 1834. It pointed out that the colonial secretary had stated that, in order to conform to the imperial plans, a uniformity of views should pervade the bills passed by the several provinces; that a careful consideration of the bill prepared for the acceptance of the provinces, and of the action taken upon it in the province discloses no reasonable grounds for the hope that the legislatures would soon (if indeed ever) arrive at such uniformity as would ensure the establishment of a practicable system.
The address started by outlining the facts of the current situation and then moved on to a strong critique of the imperial plan from 1834. It highlighted that the colonial secretary had mentioned that, to align with the imperial agenda, there should be a consistency of opinions among the bills passed by the different provinces. However, after carefully reviewing the bill drafted for the provinces’ approval and the actions taken regarding it, it became clear that there are no valid reasons to believe that the legislatures would quickly (if ever) reach such consistency needed to create a workable system.
Even if such unanimity on the terms of a bill were reached, it would doubtless happen frequently, the committee conceived, that amendments in this bill would be necessary, but as all the legislatures would have to be convinced of the necessity of the amendments which seemed desirable or even indispensable to any one of them, the difficulties in the way of making needful alterations to meet the changing conditions in progressive communities would be insuperable.
Even if everyone agreed on the terms of a bill, the committee thought it would often be the case that changes to the bill would be needed. However, since all the legislatures would need to be convinced of the necessity of these changes, which might seem desirable or even essential to any one of them, the challenges of making necessary adjustments to meet the evolving needs of progressive communities would be overwhelming.
These conditions led inevitably to the conclusion on the part of the committee that the only means of securing a practicable system in which all interests, provincial and imperial, would be considered, was to maintain the supremacy of the British post office, and to continue to entrust to it the supreme power of[Pg 209] making laws and regulations for the management of the post office in the several provinces. The interests of the provincial legislatures would be amply safeguarded, the committee was confident, if their demands for information respecting the post office were acceded to, and if it were understood that complaints against the deputy postmaster general, preferred by petition to the legislature and supported by the joint address of the two houses, would have the attention of the postmaster general in London.
These conditions inevitably led the committee to conclude that the only way to create a workable system that considered all interests, both provincial and imperial, was to maintain the British post office's supremacy and to keep it in charge of making laws and regulations for managing the post office in each province. The committee was confident that the interests of the provincial legislatures would be well protected if their requests for information about the post office were met, and if it was understood that complaints against the deputy postmaster general, submitted by petition to the legislature and supported by a joint address from both houses, would be taken seriously by the postmaster general in London.
The turn which affairs had taken was naturally gratifying to Stayner, who urged the postmaster general to give careful heed to the terms of the joint address, which, if carried into effect, would, in his opinion, provide a remedy for all warranted dissatisfaction.
The change in circumstances was naturally pleasing to Stayner, who encouraged the postmaster general to pay close attention to the terms of the joint address, which, if implemented, would, in his view, address all justifiable dissatisfaction.
The secretary of the post office did not share Stayner's hopefulness. He observed to the postmaster general that, however desirable uniformity of system might be in the post offices of British North America, the success of any act of the imperial parliament would be jeopardized, if it involved the imposition of a tax upon the colonies. The secretary was prepared, however, to listen to any suggestion Stayner might have to make in the way of improving the existing system.
The post office secretary wasn’t as optimistic as Stayner. He pointed out to the postmaster general that, while having a uniform system in the post offices across British North America would be great, any action from the imperial parliament could fail if it meant taxing the colonies. However, the secretary was open to any suggestions Stayner had for improving the current system.
Although Stayner's friends were in control of both legislative chambers in Upper Canada, his peace of mind on that account was not of long duration. In April 1837, both houses passed a franking act, under which the members were authorized to send their letters free, during the sittings of the legislature. This act, as Stayner pointed out to the postmaster general, subverted the imperial acts, upon which the existence of the post office depended, and he was placed in a very awkward situation.
Although Stayner's friends were in control of both legislative chambers in Upper Canada, he didn't feel at ease for very long. In April 1837, both houses passed a franking act that allowed members to send their letters for free during the legislature's sessions. This act, as Stayner pointed out to the postmaster general, undermined the imperial acts that the post office relied on, putting him in a pretty uncomfortable position.
Stayner, according to his letter to the postmaster general, had either to violate the instructions from St. Martins-le-Grand or to bring himself into collision with both the legislature and the executive. This act appeared to Stayner to be a fresh illustration of the unfitness of local legislatures to deal with an institution like the post office. If part of the revenues could be withheld, as would be the case where members did not pay their postage, any of the legislatures might, by passing an act for the purpose, oblige him to pay into the local treasury the whole of the revenue which came into his hands, or it might in any other way supersede the laws of the British parliament.
Stayner, in his letter to the postmaster general, felt he had to either disregard the instructions from St. Martins-le-Grand or create a conflict with both the legislature and the executive. He saw this situation as another example of how local legislatures were not equipped to handle an institution like the post office. If part of the revenue could be withheld, as would happen if members didn’t pay their postage, any of the legislatures could, by passing a law for that purpose, force him to deposit all the revenue he collected into the local treasury, or they could undermine the laws of the British Parliament in other ways.
The bill had received the assent of the governor. Constitutionally[Pg 210] it had thereby become an act. But on Stayner's remonstrance the governor admitted to the colonial office that he should not have given his sanction to it. The act was disallowed by the home government.
The bill had been approved by the governor. According to the constitution[Pg 210], it had officially become an act. However, after Stayner's complaint, the governor acknowledged to the colonial office that he shouldn't have approved it. The act was rejected by the home government.
The question of franking the correspondence of the provincial governments and of the members of the legislatures was one upon which the legislatures in the several provinces had particularly strong convictions. For a considerable period before 1837, the legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada had not paid their accounts for postage.
The issue of covering the postage for the correspondence of the provincial governments and the members of the legislatures was something the legislatures in the various provinces felt very strongly about. For a significant time before 1837, the legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada had not settled their postage bills.
The account against Upper Canada, which amounted to £1629, was paid in the beginning of 1837; while the account against Lower Canada was not paid until after the dissolution of the last assembly at the time of the rebellion. It amounted to £4043.
The debt owed to Upper Canada, which totaled £1629, was settled at the start of 1837; however, the debt owed to Lower Canada wasn’t paid until after the last assembly was dissolved during the rebellion. That debt totaled £4043.
The governor general, Gosford, in reporting the payment of the account of Lower Canada, suggested to the colonial secretary that the sum might be remitted as an act of grace on the part of the imperial government, and he urged that if the home government should not feel warranted in making this concession in its entirety, the correspondence of the governor general and his civil secretary, which embraced all the executive business of the province, might be exempt from postage charges.
The governor general, Gosford, in reporting the payment of the account of Lower Canada, suggested to the colonial secretary that the amount could be forgiven as a gesture of goodwill from the imperial government. He argued that if the home government didn't feel justified in granting this concession completely, the correspondence between the governor general and his civil secretary, which included all the executive matters of the province, should at least be exempt from postage charges.
Gosford's suggestions were in harmony with the whole character of his administration. Indeed his persistence in his policy of conciliation brought down upon him the distrust of the ultra-Loyalists.
Gosford's suggestions aligned perfectly with his administration's overall character. In fact, his constant push for a conciliatory approach earned him the distrust of the extreme Loyalists.
Stayner, to whom Gosford's suggestion was referred, opposed it vigorously. If, he argued, this concession were made to Lower Canada, immediate demands of the same character would be made by the other provinces. This would be followed by requests for the free transmission of members' correspondence, and the post office would speedily find itself in a deficit.
Stayner, to whom Gosford's suggestion was directed, strongly opposed it. He argued that if this concession were granted to Lower Canada, other provinces would immediately make similar demands. This would be followed by requests for the free transmission of members' correspondence, and the post office would quickly end up in a deficit.
It would be specially inadvisable to grant this privilege to Lower Canada, Stayner averred, as the postage received from that province, after deducting the British packet postage, which was the admitted due of the British post office, barely sufficed to pay the expenses of the service in the province. The revenues from Upper Canada exceeded the expenses by a considerable sum, and any extension of the advantages now enjoyed by Lower Canada, would be at the expense of the upper province.
It would be especially unwise to give this privilege to Lower Canada, Stayner argued, since the postage collected from that province, after subtracting the British packet postage, which was the acknowledged fee of the British post office, barely covered the costs of the service there. The revenues from Upper Canada exceeded the expenses by a significant amount, and any expansion of the benefits currently enjoyed by Lower Canada would come at the expense of the upper province.
The first of the annual statements of revenue and expenditure for which the legislatures had been contending for many years was[Pg 211] presented to the legislatures on the 17th of January, 1838. The statement contained an undivided account of the operations in Upper and Lower Canada. This was not quite satisfactory to the house in Upper Canada, but as the services for the conveyance of the mails ran from one province into the other, it was impossible to assign accurately to each province its share of the expense for their maintenance.
The first annual report on revenue and expenses that the legislatures had been arguing over for many years was[Pg 211] presented to them on January 17, 1838. The report included a combined account of the activities in Upper and Lower Canada. This wasn't entirely satisfactory to the legislature in Upper Canada, but since mail services crossed over between the two provinces, it was impossible to accurately allocate each province's share of the costs for their upkeep.
As the statement showed a surplus of £11,264 for the years 1836-1837, the legislature of Upper Canada saw no reason for hesitating to press its demand that the franking privilege be granted to its members. They went, indeed, much further, and asked that the whole amount of the surplus revenue, which arose from the post office business in Upper Canada, be transferred to them.
As the statement revealed a surplus of £11,264 for the years 1836-1837, the legislature of Upper Canada saw no reason to hesitate in pushing for the franking privilege to be granted to its members. They even went further and requested that the entire surplus revenue generated from the post office operations in Upper Canada be transferred to them.
In support of their request, the legislature pointed out that, in the imperial act of 1834, it was provided that as soon as the consent of His Majesty should be signified to the bills of the several colonial legislatures, the net revenue from the post office in British North America should be distributed among the several provinces in the proportion indicated by their gross revenues; that the suspension of the legislature in Lower Canada, in consequence of the rebellion, made it impossible to procure joint legislative enactments; and the financial condition of Upper Canada made it necessary that the province should have at its disposal all the means to which it was legally entitled.
In support of their request, the legislature pointed out that, in the imperial act of 1834, it was stated that as soon as the consent of His Majesty was given to the bills from the various colonial legislatures, the net revenue from the post office in British North America would be distributed among the provinces according to their gross revenues; that the suspension of the legislature in Lower Canada due to the rebellion made it impossible to obtain joint legislative actions; and the financial situation in Upper Canada required that the province have access to all the resources it was legally entitled to.
The terms of this memorial were entirely in accord with Stayner's views as to the proper settlement of this long standing difficulty, and he urged the postmaster general to do what was possible to give effect to the petition. He pointed out that, with Mackenzie and Papineau out of the country, and fugitives from justice, there was no further disposition on the part of the legislatures to wrest from the imperial post office the control of the postal systems in the provinces, and that the appropriation of the surplus revenues to provincial purposes removed the only valid argument against existing arrangements.
The terms of this memorial completely aligned with Stayner's views on how to properly resolve this long-standing issue, and he encouraged the postmaster general to take any necessary actions to support the petition. He highlighted that, with Mackenzie and Papineau out of the country and avoiding justice, there was no longer any inclination from the legislatures to take control of the postal systems in the provinces away from the imperial post office. Additionally, the allocation of surplus revenues for provincial purposes eliminated the only legitimate argument against the current arrangements.
The postmaster general, however, was not to be moved from the position he had taken. He replied to the address stating that no disposition could be made of the surplus post office revenues, until the several colonial governments had come to an agreement on the subject.
The postmaster general, however, was not going to change his stance. He responded to the address, stating that no decisions could be made regarding the surplus post office revenues until the different colonial governments reached an agreement on the matter.
CHAPTER XII
Durham's report on the post office—Effects of rebellion of 1837 on the service—Ocean steamships to carry the mails—The Cunard contract—Reduction of Transatlantic postage.
Durham's report on the post office—Impact of the 1837 rebellion on the service—Ocean steamships to transport the mail—The Cunard contract—Decrease in Transatlantic postage.
The long controversy which had agitated the legislatures of the provinces was approaching its end. The decision on the constitutional point was given in their favour, though they did not know it; but the specific thing for which they had contended, they were constrained to relinquish.
The lengthy dispute that had stirred up the legislatures of the provinces was drawing to a close. The ruling on the constitutional issue was in their favor, although they were unaware of it; however, the particular matter they had fought for, they were forced to give up.
The Upper Canada legislature which had commenced the agitation, and elaborated the argument against the constitutional standing of the British post office in the colonies, had become convinced that the provincial system, which they demanded, was not in the interest of either the mother country or the colonies. They therefore asked the British government to put the stamp of legality on the existing system, by suitable legislation in the imperial parliament.
The Upper Canada legislature that had started the push and developed the argument against the constitutional status of the British post office in the colonies had come to believe that the provincial system they were asking for was not beneficial for either the mother country or the colonies. They therefore requested that the British government legitimize the current system through appropriate legislation in the imperial parliament.
But the argument of Upper Canada had done its work too well, and it became the turn of the British government to employ it, to show the impossibility of meeting the desires of Upper Canada. The difficulty now, however, was not one of principle, but of ways and means.
But the argument from Upper Canada had been too effective, and now it was the British government's turn to use it to demonstrate the impossibility of fulfilling Upper Canada's wishes. The challenge now, however, was not a matter of principle, but of methods and resources.
The British government were quite willing that the colonial legislatures should have full information as to the financial operations of their post offices, and that the surplus revenue, if any, should be divided among them. All they required was that the colonial legislatures should by concurrent action devise the means by which the ends in view might be effected. The British parliament was, in the opinion of the law officers, precluded from interposing its authority in the settlement of the difficulty.
The British government was quite willing for the colonial legislatures to have complete information about the financial operations of their post offices, and that any surplus revenue should be shared among them. All they needed was for the colonial legislatures to work together to figure out how to achieve the desired goals. According to the law officers, the British parliament was not allowed to step in and exert its authority to resolve the issue.
Durham, who was sent out to Canada as high commissioner to inquire into, and, if possible, remedy the defects in the system of government, which kept the colonies in a chronic state of dissatisfaction, was directed to give his attention to the condition of affairs in the post office.
Durham, who was sent to Canada as the high commissioner to investigate and, if possible, fix the flaws in the government system that kept the colonies in a constant state of dissatisfaction, was instructed to focus on the situation in the post office.
In his general report, he dealt briefly with this topic, expressing full sympathy with the colonial view, and giving it as his opinion[Pg 213] that if his proposition for a union of the provinces should be adopted the control of the post office should be given up to the colonies.[253] But he added the recommendation that, whatever arrangements of a political nature might be made, the management of the post office throughout the whole of British North America should be conducted by one general establishment. This suggestion was not realized until the confederation of the provinces in 1867.
In his overall report, he briefly addressed this topic, fully supporting the colonial perspective, and expressed his belief[Pg 213] that if his proposal for uniting the provinces was accepted, control of the post office should be handed over to the colonies.[253] However, he also recommended that, regardless of any political arrangements made, the management of the post office across all of British North America should be run by a single general establishment. This idea wasn't implemented until the provinces formed a confederation in 1867.
The rebellion in Upper and Lower Canada in 1837 and the following year was productive of much embarrassment to the post office. Many of the postmasters, particularly in Lower Canada, were open sympathisers with the rebels, and, through the opportunities afforded by their post office duties, assisted largely in the carrying out of their leaders' schemes.
The rebellion in Upper and Lower Canada in 1837 and the following year caused a lot of embarrassment for the post office. Many of the postmasters, especially in Lower Canada, openly supported the rebels and, by using their positions in the post office, played a significant role in helping implement their leaders' plans.
Stayner had realized the impolicy of many of the appointments to post offices in Lower Canada. But as the local government was continually appointing to the highest offices men who were conspicuous in the support they lent to the views of Papineau, he did not conceive himself warranted in noticing facts which were ignored by the governor.
Stayner had recognized the impracticality of many of the appointments to post offices in Lower Canada. However, since the local government was consistently appointing people to the highest positions who were prominent in supporting Papineau's views, he felt he wasn't justified in pointing out issues that the governor overlooked.
There were at least from thirty to forty postmasters besides several mail couriers in Lower Canada implicated in the rebellion. The governor general in Lower Canada, and the lieutenant governor in Upper Canada gave their attention to the conditions, each after his manner.
There were at least thirty to forty postmasters, along with several mail couriers, involved in the rebellion in Lower Canada. The governor general in Lower Canada and the lieutenant governor in Upper Canada each focused on the situation in their own way.
Gosford, the governor general, having been informed of the disloyalty of the postmasters at Stanstead and Lacolle, suggested that these officials should be dismissed as soon as it could be done without prejudice to the service.[254]
Gosford, the governor general, upon hearing about the disloyalty of the postmasters at Stanstead and Lacolle, recommended that these officials be let go as soon as it could be done without harming the service.[254]
Bond Head, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, directed the local surveyor to dismiss the postmaster at Lloydtown instantly, for having, as he said, sent to Mackenzie a series of traitorous resolutions to which the postmaster had attached his name as corresponding secretary of the West King and Tecumseth Political Union. Head explained to Stayner that he was aware that the usual course was to have the dismissal made by the deputy postmaster general, but as he desired to produce a certain moral effect by instant punishment, he was compelled to act through Stayner's agent.
Bond Head, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, ordered the local surveyor to immediately fire the postmaster in Lloydtown because he had sent a series of traitorous resolutions to Mackenzie, to which the postmaster had attached his name as the corresponding secretary of the West King and Tecumseth Political Union. Head informed Stayner that he knew the usual procedure was for the deputy postmaster general to handle such dismissals, but he felt it was necessary to create a certain moral impact through swift punishment, so he had to act through Stayner's agent.
Furthermore, Bond Head asked that Stayner should delegate[Pg 214] to Berezy, the surveyor, the power to dismiss peremptorily any person connected with the post office whom the lieutenant governor should judge to have failed in loyalty. Head was an arbitrary personage, who never gladly suffered the execution of his wishes to linger after their utterance.
Furthermore, Bond Head asked that Stayner delegate[Pg 214] to Berezy, the surveyor, the authority to immediately dismiss any person connected with the post office whom the lieutenant governor deemed disloyal. Head was an authoritative figure who was never comfortable with his wishes hanging around after being expressed.
A painful instance of the hardships inflicted upon innocent men in times of political turmoil was the dismissal of Howard, the postmaster of Toronto.[255] His offence was not disloyalty. Even Bond Head would not venture to say that he was disloyal—but merely that his friendships were so far inclusive as to embrace men of widely differing political opinions.
A painful example of the struggles faced by innocent people during political turmoil was the firing of Howard, the postmaster of Toronto.[255] His wrongdoing wasn’t disloyalty. Even Bond Head wouldn’t dare to claim that he was disloyal—just that his friendships were broad enough to include people with very different political views.
James Howard had been connected with the post office in Toronto for eighteen years, during eight of which he had been postmaster. Testimony abounded as to his zeal and efficiency as a public official. Stayner reported to the postmaster general that Howard was a man of excellent character, and one of the best officers in the service.
James Howard had been with the post office in Toronto for eighteen years, and for eight of those years, he had served as postmaster. There was plenty of testimony about his dedication and effectiveness as a public servant. Stayner informed the postmaster general that Howard was a man of great character and one of the top officers in the service.
An aspect of Howard's conduct, which won Stayner's warm commendation, was his withholding himself from all forms of political activity. "People in our department," wrote Stayner to Howard, some years before, "cannot too carefully abstain from identifying themselves with factions or parties of any kind."
An aspect of Howard's behavior that earned Stayner's strong praise was his avoidance of all types of political activity. "People in our department," Stayner wrote to Howard a few years earlier, "should be very careful not to associate themselves with any factions or parties."
Secure in the approbation of his chief, Howard, following his natural inclination, moved quietly through the troubled times, which were heading for an outbreak, and delivered the letters to Loyalist and Reformer, to Tory and Radical, with even-handed indifference. It would seem, too, that in the choice of his friends, he exhibited a like insensibility to the explosive possibilities of some of their opinions.
Secure in the approval of his boss, Howard, following his natural instincts, moved calmly through the turbulent times, which were on the verge of an outbreak, and delivered the letters to Loyalists and Reformers, Tories and Radicals, with impartial indifference. It also seemed that in choosing his friends, he showed a similar disregard for the potentially explosive nature of some of their views.
A few days after the public disturbances began, it was intimated to Howard that his general attitude towards affairs was not quite satisfactory, and he at once demanded an investigation. There was nothing to investigate. But a hint was conveyed to him that he was too intimate with "those people."
A few days after the public disturbances started, Howard was told that his general attitude towards things was not quite satisfactory, and he immediately requested an investigation. There was nothing to investigate. But he was hinted at that he was too close with "those people."
It was decided to have the correspondence of suspects placed under surveillance. But the duty was not confided to Howard. Letters supposed to contain information of the rebels were sent to the bank of Upper Canada, where they were subjected to scrutiny.
It was decided to monitor the correspondence of suspects. However, the task was not assigned to Howard. Letters believed to contain information about the rebels were sent to the bank of Upper Canada, where they were carefully examined.
On December 13, 1837, eight days after the rebellion broke out,[Pg 215] at Montgomery's Tavern, Toronto, Howard was removed from his office by the orders of the lieutenant governor. He was replaced by Berezy, the post office inspector, who throughout the rebellion was active as the confidential agent of Bond Head. Howard appealed to the lieutenant governor, protesting his perfect loyalty, and declaring that so far from concerning himself with politics, he had never voted in his life.
On December 13, 1837, eight days after the rebellion started,[Pg 215] at Montgomery's Tavern in Toronto, Howard was removed from his position by the lieutenant governor's orders. He was replaced by Berezy, the post office inspector, who was active as Bond Head's confidential agent throughout the rebellion. Howard appealed to the lieutenant governor, asserting his complete loyalty and stating that he had never engaged in politics, having never voted in his life.
No statement could have been more unfortunate. Head, always a partisan, was unable to understand how a man could suppose himself to be loyal, and confess to such a degree of indifference, when the safety of the country was at stake. The admonition of the deputy postmaster general was pleaded. Bond Head would not listen. Friends of the government, of the tried qualities of Fitzgibbon, vouched for Howard's loyalty. It was to no purpose.
No statement could have been more unfortunate. Head, always a supporter of his side, couldn't understand how someone could think of themselves as loyal while admitting to such a level of indifference when the country's safety was at risk. The warning from the deputy postmaster general was brought up. Bond Head refused to listen. Supporters of the government, along with those who knew Fitzgibbon well, vouched for Howard's loyalty. It was all in vain.
The lieutenant governor declared that he had his reasons for believing, not only that Howard favoured the disaffected party, but that he had actually become "subservient to the execution of the treasonable plans." No evidence has ever been produced to support these accusations. But Head, in his flamboyant style, prated about the struggle being waged between monarchy and democracy, and contrasted Howard's indifference with the zealous devotion of the chief justice and one of the judges, who, shedding the ermine, took up their muskets in the defence of the country—and their jobs and perquisites.
The lieutenant governor stated he had his reasons for believing not only that Howard supported the disgruntled group, but also that he had actually become "subservient to the execution of the treasonous plans." No evidence has ever been presented to back up these claims. However, Head, in his extravagant manner, talked about the battle being fought between monarchy and democracy, and compared Howard's indifference to the enthusiastic commitment of the chief justice and one of the judges, who, setting aside their robes, picked up their guns to defend the country—and their positions and benefits.
Head indulged himself in several similar excesses of authority, always justifying himself on the ground that he was a protagonist in a death struggle with the arch-enemy Democracy. When quiet was restored, Howard renewed his appeals for redress, but the clique surrounding the governor contrived to frustrate all his efforts in that direction.
Head indulged in several similar abuses of power, always justifying himself by claiming he was a key player in a life-and-death battle against the arch-enemy Democracy. Once calm was restored, Howard continued to ask for justice, but the group around the governor managed to sabotage all his attempts in that direction.
In the spring of 1839, a robbery of the mails took place on the grand route, at a point between Kingston and Gananoque, under circumstances of peculiar aggravation.[256] The robbers, who lived on an island in the St. Lawrence, within the territory of the state of New York, made no attempt at concealment. They openly declared that this was only the first of a series of similar interferences with the courier passing between Upper and Lower Canada.
In the spring of 1839, a mail robbery happened on the main route, between Kingston and Gananoque, in particularly troubling circumstances.[256] The robbers, who lived on an island in the St. Lawrence River, within New York State, didn't try to hide their actions. They openly stated that this was just the first of several similar disruptions targeting the courier traveling between Upper and Lower Canada.
The New York state authorities, who were appealed to, were powerless to act, but the secretary of state at Albany intimated[Pg 216] that it would not be regarded as a breach of amity if the Canadian officials arrested the robbers on the island. In view, however, of the excitement which prevailed at that period on both sides of the border, it was thought prudent to refrain from so provocative a proceeding.
The New York state officials, who were contacted for help, were unable to take action, but the secretary of state in Albany hinted[Pg 216] that it wouldn't be seen as a violation of friendship if the Canadian authorities arrested the criminals on the island. However, given the tension that existed at that time on both sides of the border, it was considered wise to avoid such a provocative action.
While Durham was occupied with his preparations for his mission to Canada, events occurred which were not only of unsurpassed importance to communication between Europe and America, but which seemed to promise a strengthening of the relations between the mother country and her colonies.
While Durham was busy getting ready for his mission to Canada, important events took place that were not only crucial for communication between Europe and America but also seemed to promise a stronger relationship between the mother country and its colonies.
In April 1838, two steamships sailed from the United Kingdom for New York—the "Great Western" from Bristol, and the "Sirius" from Cork—and reached their destination safely, the former in fifteen days, and the latter in seventeen days.[257]
In April 1838, two steamships left the United Kingdom for New York—the "Great Western" from Bristol and the "Sirius" from Cork—and arrived safely, with the former taking fifteen days and the latter seventeen days.[257]
As the voyages were made in the face of stiff, westerly winds, the speed of the "Great Western" and the "Sirius" gave much satisfaction, and it was accepted as settled that thereafter steam would be the motive power in the faster vessels employed in the transatlantic trade.
As the journeys faced strong westerly winds, the speed of the "Great Western" and the "Sirius" was very satisfying, and it was agreed that from then on, steam would be the driving force in the faster ships used in the transatlantic trade.
The rapidity with which this conviction established itself was remarkable. There is nothing surprising in the immediate recognition of this new achievement of steam by speculative publicists, who saw in the events only the realization of their visions, but the British treasury, the arcanum of conservative caution, yielded with almost equal readiness to the argument provided by the two vessels.
The speed at which this belief took hold was impressive. It's not surprising that forward-thinking publicists quickly recognized this new steam innovation, viewing the events as the fulfillment of their ideas. However, the British treasury, known for its conservative caution, also readily accepted the argument offered by the two ships.
The British consul at New York was the first to bring to official attention the importance of this advance in the art of navigation. By the return of one of the vessels, he suggested to the colonial office that all official despatches and commercial letters for the Canadas should be directed to the consulate at New York. He undertook to assort the correspondence, and forward it to Montreal and Toronto by queen's messengers.
The British consul in New York was the first to highlight the significance of this improvement in navigation. When one of the ships returned, he proposed to the colonial office that all official communications and business letters for Canada should be sent to the consulate in New York. He offered to sort the correspondence and send it to Montreal and Toronto via royal messengers.
By avoiding the delays to which the regular couriers were subject, and taking advantage, wherever possible, of the steamboats running on the inland waters and of the railroads, which were beginning to be constructed throughout the eastern states, the messengers would be able to provide a greatly accelerated service. The answers to letters sent from London or Liverpool to Canada should be back in those cities in from thirty to thirty-five days—approximately the time taken by the Halifax packets on a single trip.[Pg 217]
By avoiding the delays that regular couriers often faced and taking advantage of the steamboats operating on the inland waters and the railroads that were starting to be built across the eastern states, the messengers would be able to offer a much faster service. Replies to letters sent from London or Liverpool to Canada should arrive back in those cities in about thirty to thirty-five days—roughly the same time it took for the Halifax packets to make a single trip.[Pg 217]
The British post office saw reasons for declining the proposal, so far as it regarded commercial correspondence. It was, however, prepared to transmit official despatches by this means, and to arrange for their conveyance from New York in the manner indicated by the consul.
The British post office had reasons to reject the proposal concerning commercial correspondence. However, it was ready to send official messages this way and to organize their transport from New York as suggested by the consul.
The people of Halifax—who had always regarded with a jealous eye the disposition of the inland British colonies, to use the port of New York in preference to their own—managed, at this juncture in the history of ocean transport, by an appeal to imperial considerations to make a strong case for their port. By a happy chance, the "Sirius" on its first homeward voyage, overtook the mail packet from Halifax, and the captain of the packet, impressed by the higher speed of the steam vessel, induced the captain of the "Sirius" to take the mails, with the result that their arrival was advanced by several days.
The people of Halifax—who had always looked enviously at the inland British colonies for choosing the port of New York over their own—managed, at this point in the history of ocean transportation, to make a solid case for their port by appealing to imperial interests. Fortunately, the "Sirius," on its first return voyage, caught up with the mail packet from Halifax, and the captain of the packet, impressed by the faster steamship, persuaded the captain of the "Sirius" to carry the mail, which resulted in the arrival being moved up by several days.
Joseph Howe and some other gentlemen from the Maritime provinces who happened to be passengers on the sailing packet when this incident occurred, were struck with this demonstration of the superiority of steam, and discussed among themselves whether this fact might not indicate the means of overcoming, in favour of Halifax, the advantage enjoyed by the port of New York.
Joseph Howe and a few other gentlemen from the Maritime provinces, who were passengers on the sailing packet when this incident happened, were impressed by this display of steam's superiority. They discussed among themselves whether this fact might show a way to overcome, in favor of Halifax, the advantage held by the port of New York.
On the arrival of Howe in London, a meeting was called of men interested in the subject, and it was resolved to press their views on the attention of the government. Several of the gentlemen wrote to the colonial secretary, and a memorial of a more formal character was submitted, bearing the signatures of Howe, as representative of Nova Scotia, and of William Crane, a member of the legislature of New Brunswick, as representative of that province.[258]
Upon Howe's arrival in London, a meeting was arranged for those concerned about the issue, and it was decided to bring their ideas to the government's attention. Several gentlemen reached out to the colonial secretary, and a more official memorial was presented, signed by Howe as the representative of Nova Scotia and by William Crane, a member of the New Brunswick legislature, as the representative of that province.[258]
The views and arguments were of a character similar to those employed by imperial federation leagues since that period—the shorter sea voyage, the fostering of common interests among the provinces, and the desirability of an interchange within the empire of news and correspondence, uncontaminated by passage through a foreign channel.
The views and arguments were similar to those used by imperial federation leagues since that time—the shorter sea voyage, encouraging common interests among the provinces, and the benefit of sharing news and correspondence within the empire, free from foreign interference.
At that period, the last of these points had a peculiar timeliness. The rebellion in Upper Canada had just been subdued, but the embers were ready to blaze up afresh with the first favouring breeze; while in Lower Canada the outbreak was still unchecked. The fast sailing packets on the New York-Liverpool route so far outsailed the post office packets which ran to Halifax, that the[Pg 218] news carried by way of New York was sometimes weeks in advance of that which arrived by the Halifax packets.
At that time, the last of these points was particularly relevant. The uprising in Upper Canada had just been put down, but the sparks were ready to ignite again with the slightest push; meanwhile, in Lower Canada, the rebellion was still ongoing. The fast sailing ships on the New York-Liverpool route were so much quicker than the postal ships to Halifax that the[Pg 218] news coming through New York was sometimes weeks ahead of what arrived via the Halifax packets.
As American popular sympathies, as distinct from official sympathy at Washington and Albany, lay mainly with the rebels, and as newspaper publishers were in general less scrupulous as to the veracity of their news than they are to-day, it often happened that the British public, and even the government in Downing Street, were grossly misled as to the movement of events in the Canadas. The truth reached England eventually, but it had the proverbial difficulty in catching up with the nimble fiction, which had earlier circulation.
As American public opinion, unlike the official stance in Washington and Albany, mainly supported the rebels, and since newspaper publishers were generally less careful about the accuracy of their news than they are today, it often occurred that the British public, and even the government in Downing Street, were severely misled about the developments in Canada. The truth eventually made its way to England, but it faced the usual challenge of catching up with the quick-spreading falsehoods that had circulated earlier.
In September the treasury made its decision.[259] In the early part of that month, the Great Western Steamship Company, which was organized in 1836 for the purpose of providing a steam service between Great Britain and America, and which had been for some months past demonstrating the entire feasibility of this class of service, applied to the government for a contract for the conveyance of the mails to New York.
In September, the treasury made its decision.[259] In the early part of that month, the Great Western Steamship Company, which was founded in 1836 to offer a steam service between Great Britain and America, and which had been proving the full feasibility of this type of service for several months, asked the government for a contract to transport the mail to New York.
But the plea of Howe and Crane for a direct service prevailed. On September 24 the treasury announced the substitution of steam vessels for the sailing packets on the Halifax route, and directed that tenders should be invited for such a service as the admiralty and post office considered most suitable.
But Howe and Crane's request for a direct service was successful. On September 24, the treasury announced that steam vessels would replace the sailing packets on the Halifax route, and instructed that bids should be invited for a service deemed most suitable by the admiralty and post office.
The treasury deprecated the haste with which the plans were being pushed forward, suggesting that a winter's experience would be valuable in dealing with so important a matter. But there were strong reasons for avoiding unnecessary delay. Relations with the United States were causing some anxiety, and as regards transatlantic correspondence, that country stood in a position of advantage, which it seemed the business of Great Britain to equalize as far as possible.
The treasury criticized the rush to move forward with the plans, suggesting that winter experience would be beneficial in handling such an important issue. However, there were compelling reasons to avoid unnecessary delays. Relations with the United States were causing some concern, and in terms of transatlantic communication, that country had the upper hand, which it seemed was Great Britain's responsibility to balance as much as possible.
Tenders were invited for a steam packet service between Liverpool and Halifax in November. But none of those submitted satisfied the conditions prescribed by the government. Samuel Cunard, of Halifax, who had had a large experience as a contractor for packet services, visited England, and as the result of negotiations, entered into a contract with the admiralty.
Tenders were invited for a steam packet service between Liverpool and Halifax in November. But none of the submissions met the conditions set by the government. Samuel Cunard, from Halifax, who had extensive experience as a contractor for packet services, traveled to England, and after negotiations, signed a contract with the admiralty.
The contract called for two trips monthly each way between Liverpool and Halifax, and for trips of the same frequency between Halifax and Boston, and between Pictou on the gulf of St. Lawrence[Pg 219] and Quebec: the vessels to be employed to be of three hundred horse power for the transatlantic service, and of one hundred and fifty horse power for the other two routes. The contract was signed on May 4, 1839, the rate of payment being £55,000 a year.
The contract required two trips each month in both directions between Liverpool and Halifax, as well as the same frequency for trips between Halifax and Boston, and between Pictou on the Gulf of St. Lawrence[Pg 219] and Quebec. The ships used for the transatlantic service were to have three hundred horsepower, while those for the other two routes were to have one hundred and fifty horsepower. The contract was signed on May 4, 1839, with an annual payment rate of £55,000.
This rate underwent a rapid series of augmentations. Two months after the contract was made £5000 a year was added to the rate on consideration that the vessels should leave the American ports, as well as Liverpool, on fixed dates. On September 1, 1841, the decision was reached that vessels of a larger size than in the service should be employed, and to secure these the rate was raised to £80,000.
This rate saw a quick series of increases. Two months after the contract was signed, £5000 a year was added to the rate on the condition that the ships would leave American ports, as well as Liverpool, on specific dates. On September 1, 1841, it was decided that larger ships than those currently in service would be used, and to secure these, the rate was raised to £80,000.
Two years later, in consequence of representations by the contractors that the amount of payment was insufficient to enable them to carry on the service, £10,000 was added to the subsidy; and further additions were made as the result of changes in the arrangements, which will be detailed in their proper place.
Two years later, due to requests from the contractors that the payment amount was not enough for them to continue the service, £10,000 was added to the subsidy; and additional payments were made as a result of changes in the arrangements, which will be explained in detail later.
In addition to the provision for the exchange of mails by the Cunard steamers, between Great Britain and Canada and the United States, arrangements were made for subsidiary services to Newfoundland and Bermuda. Halifax, indeed, was being made the pivotal point of the most extensive scheme ever attempted for the distribution of mails. All the communications between Great Britain and the North American continent were comprised in the plans.
In addition to the arrangements for mail exchange by the Cunard steamers between Great Britain and Canada and the United States, plans were set up for additional services to Newfoundland and Bermuda. Halifax was, in fact, becoming the central hub of the largest mail distribution scheme ever undertaken. All communication between Great Britain and the North American continent was included in these plans.
The first trip by steamer between Liverpool and Halifax was made by the "Britannia," which left Liverpool on July 1, 1840. The vessel reached Halifax after a passage of twelve and a half days. The mails for Canada were carried overland from Halifax to Pictou, from which point they were delivered at Quebec five and a half days after their landing at Halifax. As the vessel conveying the mails up the St. Lawrence from Pictou to Quebec was delayed a day in the gulf by fog, there was reason for hope that the passage from Liverpool to Quebec would not materially exceed fifteen days.
The first steamer trip between Liverpool and Halifax was made by the "Britannia," which departed Liverpool on July 1, 1840. The ship arrived in Halifax after a journey of twelve and a half days. The mail for Canada was transported overland from Halifax to Pictou, and then it was delivered in Quebec five and a half days after arriving in Halifax. Since the ship carrying the mail up the St. Lawrence from Pictou to Quebec was held up for a day in the gulf due to fog, there was hope that the trip from Liverpool to Quebec would not take more than fifteen days.
The post office authorities at Halifax bent every effort to make the enterprise a success. As an instance of their zealous energy, the "Britannia," on its September sailing, reached Halifax on a morning at seven o'clock. At a quarter to nine the mails for Canada were on their way to Pictou; at ten the "Britannia" set out for Boston; and by noon the vessels for Newfoundland and Bermuda had left for their destinations.
The post office authorities in Halifax made every effort to ensure the enterprise was a success. For example, the "Britannia," during its September journey, arrived in Halifax at seven in the morning. By eight forty-five, the mails bound for Canada were headed to Pictou; at ten, the "Britannia" departed for Boston; and by noon, the ships bound for Newfoundland and Bermuda had left for their destinations.
Prince Edward Island did not at once enjoy the full benefits[Pg 220] of these efficient operations, but by a slight improvement in the arrangements, the island was put on an equal footing with the other colonies.
Prince Edward Island didn't immediately reap all the benefits[Pg 220] of these efficient operations, but with a few tweaks in the arrangements, the island was leveled to the same status as the other colonies.
The scheme, however, admirable as it was in conception, and successful as it appeared to be in operation, had weaknesses, which were revealed by time—weaknesses which before many years led to its abandonment.
The plan, however, impressive as it was in its design and seeming success in execution, had flaws that were uncovered over time—flaws that eventually led to its abandonment after a few years.
The test of the success of such a scheme lay in its capability to provide adequately for the exchanges with Canada. The mails to and from Upper and Lower Canada were not only much greater in volume than those exchanged with the other provinces, but owing to the existing political conditions in the Canadas, were at the time of greater importance; and, if, owing to any lack of co-operation on the part of the provinces participating in the transmission of the mails between Halifax and Quebec, or through other causes, these mails required a notably greater length of time in their passage by the Halifax route than they would have taken if landed at a port in the United States, the Halifax route must be considered a failure.
The success of this plan depended on its ability to handle the mail exchanges with Canada effectively. The volume of mail going to and from Upper and Lower Canada was not only much larger than what was exchanged with other provinces, but due to the political situation in Canada at the time, it was also more significant. If, because of a lack of cooperation from the provinces involved in sending mail between Halifax and Quebec, or for any other reasons, the mail took noticeably longer to travel via the Halifax route than it would have if it were sent to a port in the United States, then the Halifax route would be seen as a failure.
This is exactly what happened. When the British government decided to give the scheme a trial, it reminded the provinces concerned that there were several months in every year when the mails must be carried between Halifax and Quebec overland, and that this could be done successfully only if the roads in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec, over which the mails must pass, were put in a condition to permit of fast travel by carriage, night as well as day.
This is exactly what happened. When the British government decided to test the plan, it reminded the provinces involved that there were several months each year when the mail had to be transported overland between Halifax and Quebec, and that this could only be done successfully if the roads in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec, which the mail had to travel on, were in good enough shape to allow for fast travel by carriage, both day and night.
At the time—1840—the steamships began to run to Halifax, the situation as regards the land routes was as follows: the distance from Halifax to Quebec—seven hundred miles—was rarely covered by the mail couriers in less than ten days. In the depth of winter, when the sleighing was good, and advantage could be taken of the ice road on the St. John river between Fredericton and the mouth of the Madawaska river, the journey was made in some hours less than six days.
At the time—1840—when steamships started operating to Halifax, the land routes were like this: the distance from Halifax to Quebec—seven hundred miles—was seldom covered by mail couriers in under ten days. During the harsh winter, when the sleighing conditions were great and the ice road on the St. John River between Fredericton and the mouth of the Madawaska River could be used, the trip took just under six days.
But it was seldom that conditions combined to make so fast a journey possible, and it was not considered prudent to reckon on an average of less than ten days. In the spring and autumn this length of time was often greatly exceeded. Stayner, who went over the route in the autumn of 1838, after calculating the effect of all practicable ameliorations, did not believe that the time could be reduced to less than seven days. As against this possible[Pg 221] time, there was the fact that the journey from New York to Quebec occupied only six and a half days in winter.
But it was rare for conditions to come together to allow for such a quick trip, and it wasn't wise to expect to make the journey in less than ten days. In the spring and fall, this duration was often significantly longer. Stayner, who traveled the route in the fall of 1838, after considering all feasible improvements, thought that the time couldn't be cut down to less than seven days. Compared to this potential[Pg 221] timeframe, the reality was that the trip from New York to Quebec only took six and a half days in winter.
The farther west the point of comparison was carried, moreover, the greater the disadvantage at which Halifax stood. The shortest time to be anticipated in conveying the mails from Halifax to Montreal, after all improvements had been made, was nine days. The courier from New York, who had but half the distance to travel, delivered his mails in Montreal in five days. Toronto, the capital of Upper Canada, and the entrepôt for the thriving and rapidly-spreading settlements in the west, was still more easily reached from New York than from Halifax. The journey from Halifax to Toronto covered a distance of one thousand two hundred and twelve miles, and occupied more than two weeks. New York was only five hundred and forty miles from Toronto, and the mails were carried between the two places in seven days in winter.
The farther west the comparison was made, the more disadvantageous Halifax appeared. Even after all improvements were made, the shortest time expected to send mail from Halifax to Montreal was nine days. The courier from New York, who only had half the distance to cover, delivered his mail in Montreal within five days. Toronto, the capital of Upper Canada and the hub for the growing settlements in the west, was still easier to reach from New York than from Halifax. The trip from Halifax to Toronto was one thousand two hundred and twelve miles and took over two weeks. New York was just five hundred and forty miles from Toronto, and in winter, the mail was delivered between the two cities in seven days.
Halifax is five hundred and fifty miles nearer Liverpool than is New York, and consequently gained two days on the ocean voyage. But, in point of time, the odds were hopelessly against Halifax, as the landing port for the Canadian mails. The obvious political reasons, however, for maintaining Halifax as the port of exchange between the North American provinces, as a whole, and the mother country, provoked a determined effort to remove, as far as possible, the natural obstacles which seemed to prevent the achievement of that end.
Halifax is five hundred and fifty miles closer to Liverpool than New York, which cuts down the ocean voyage by two days. However, when it comes to timing, Halifax was at a disadvantage as the landing port for Canadian mail. The clear political reasons for keeping Halifax as the exchange point between the North American provinces and the mother country led to a strong push to eliminate the natural barriers that seemed to hinder that goal.
Inquiry was directed first to the question of the best route. From Halifax to Fredericton, the first important point at which the courier arrived on his western journey, there were alternative routes, both of which had been used in the conveyance of the mails to Canada. Since the war of 1812, the courier had travelled along the northern shore of the bay of Fundy, passing Truro, Dorchester and the bend of the Petitcodiac, now Moncton.
Inquiry was first focused on determining the best route. From Halifax to Fredericton, the first significant stop on his western journey, there were several alternative paths, both of which had been used for delivering the mail to Canada. Since the War of 1812, the courier had traveled along the northern shore of the Bay of Fundy, passing through Truro, Dorchester, and the curve of the Petitcodiac, now known as Moncton.
This route was adopted first to avoid the necessity of the mails crossing the bay of Fundy from Annapolis to St. John, with the risks of falling in with American privateers, but after the termination of the war, it was continued from choice.
This route was chosen initially to avoid having the mail cross the Bay of Fundy from Annapolis to St. John, which carried the risk of encountering American privateers. However, after the war ended, it was continued by choice.
The earlier route, from Halifax to Windsor and along the Annapolis valley to Annapolis, still had its advocates, however; and inquiry was made as to the advisability of returning to it. Under certain ideal conditions, a better journey could be made by this route, but as these involved heavy additional expense, and a nicety of connection between the couriers and the packet boat[Pg 222] at Annapolis, which was frequently unattainable, the proposition was rejected.
The earlier route from Halifax to Windsor and through the Annapolis Valley to Annapolis still had its supporters, and there were questions about whether it would be a good idea to return to it. Under perfect conditions, this route could offer a better journey, but since it required significantly higher costs and precise timing between the couriers and the packet boat[Pg 222] at Annapolis, which was often hard to achieve, the suggestion was turned down.
The real difficulties for the courier began when he left Fredericton on his journey to Quebec. The route lay along the shore of the St. John river to the point where the Madawaska empties into it; thence in a generally northern direction until the St. Lawrence is reached at the head of the portage.
The real challenges for the courier started when he left Fredericton on his trip to Quebec. The route followed the shore of the St. John River until it met the Madawaska; then it headed mostly north until reaching the St. Lawrence at the start of the portage.
At this period—1840—there was no road whatever over any part of this section of the route, though in 1839, a road called the Royal Road was in course of construction between Fredericton and Grand Falls. The schemes for the building of a road were embarrassed by the fact that for nearly one hundred miles, the proposed road lay in the territory claimed by the state of Maine, with the resulting risk that the expenditure upon it might be lost.
At this time—1840—there was no road at all over any part of this section of the route, although in 1839, a road known as the Royal Road was being built between Fredericton and Grand Falls. The plans for constructing the road were complicated by the issue that for nearly one hundred miles, the proposed route lay in territory claimed by the state of Maine, creating the risk that the money spent on it might be wasted.
The only mode of travel from Fredericton northward to the mouth of the Madawaska was by canoe in summer. In the winter, when the ice was well set, travel was very easy. But during the early spring and late autumn, the floating ice made the journey in this part of the country one of great hardship. On a trip made in April 1842, it required three men and twelve horses to carry over this section a mail weighing not more than seven or eight hundred pounds.
The only way to travel from Fredericton north to the mouth of the Madawaska was by canoe in the summer. In the winter, when the ice was solid, travel was quite easy. However, during early spring and late autumn, the drifting ice turned the journey in this area into a real challenge. On a trip in April 1842, it took three men and twelve horses to carry a mail shipment weighing no more than seven or eight hundred pounds over this section.
The Special Council of Quebec, which was in existence in 1838-1840, owing to the suppression of the legislature due to suspension of the constitution of 1791 in Lower Canada, at the urgent instance of Sydenham, appropriated £5000 for a road over the portage between the St. Lawrence and the St. John rivers. The legislature of New Brunswick also made a liberal grant for the section lying in that province.
The Special Council of Quebec, which existed from 1838 to 1840, was created because the legislature was suspended due to the constitution of 1791 being put on hold in Lower Canada. At the strong request of Sydenham, they allocated £5000 for a road over the portage connecting the St. Lawrence and St. John rivers. The New Brunswick legislature also made a generous grant for the section in that province.
It is evident, therefore, that Halifax stood at an insurmountable disadvantage as compared with the New York route during the winter season. But, at least so far as concerned eastern Canada, the provincial route was not greatly inferior to that through the United States, during the period of open navigation on the St. Lawrence. The passage from Liverpool to Quebec did not usually exceed sixteen days, and to Montreal eighteen days.
It’s clear that Halifax was at a serious disadvantage compared to the New York route during the winter months. However, for eastern Canada at least, the provincial route wasn’t much worse than the one through the United States during the open navigation season on the St. Lawrence. The trip from Liverpool to Quebec typically took no longer than sixteen days, and to Montreal, it took about eighteen days.
An essential link in this conveyance was the overland route from Halifax to Pictou. As this service furnished the connection between the steamers on the Atlantic and those on the St. Lawrence, it was of the first importance that the route should be traversed at a high rate of speed. The route had been in use for many years[Pg 223] for the exchange of local mails, but the means of conveyance, which were sufficient for that purpose, were entirely inadequate to the requirements of the ocean mail service.
An important part of this transportation was the overland route from Halifax to Pictou. Since this service connected the steamers in the Atlantic with those on the St. Lawrence, it was crucial that the route be traveled quickly. This route had been used for many years[Pg 223] to exchange local mail, but the methods of transportation that worked for that purpose were completely insufficient for the needs of the ocean mail service.
Cunard—who had every motive for expediting not only the mails, but the passengers and freight passing to and from the Canadas—drew attention to the necessity for ample provision for the new conditions. Unless he were able to afford a fast and comfortable conveyance at a moderate charge to his Canadian passengers, he could not hope to hold the business. As it was desirable that he should be able to exercise control over this part of the passage, he offered to provide the service between Halifax and Pictou on terms, which were accepted by the deputy postmaster general of Nova Scotia.
Cunard, who had every reason to speed up not just the mail, but also the passengers and freight traveling to and from Canada, pointed out the need for adequate arrangements for the new circumstances. If he couldn’t offer a fast and comfortable way to travel at a reasonable price for his Canadian passengers, he couldn’t expect to keep the business. Since it was important for him to have control over this part of the journey, he proposed to provide the service between Halifax and Pictou on terms that were accepted by the deputy postmaster general of Nova Scotia.
The service afforded left little to be desired in point of efficiency. Four horse stages ran over the route three times each way weekly in summer, and twice weekly in winter; the trip was to be made within seventeen hours, and the charge to passengers was not to exceed £2 10s. The charge for each person had been, until the contract was made, £6.
The service offered was highly efficient. Four horse-drawn stages ran the route three times a week in summer and twice a week in winter. The journey was to take no more than seventeen hours, and the fare for passengers wouldn't exceed £2 10s. Before the contract was established, the cost for each person had been £6.
But accommodation such as this necessarily entailed considerable expense, and the compensation to Cunard under the contract was so great as seriously to embarrass the financial position of the post office in Nova Scotia. This amount—£1550 per annum—was £1265 in excess of what had been paid for this route before the British mails were carried over it.
But accommodations like this inevitably came with significant costs, and the payment to Cunard under the contract was so high that it seriously strained the financial situation of the post office in Nova Scotia. This amount—£1550 a year—was £1265 more than what had been paid for this route before British mail was transported on it.
The revenues of the provincial post office were quite unequal to this demand upon, them, and relief was sought from the legislature. That body agreed to contribute £550, and Canada was asked to add £750 to that sum. When Howe reported the facts to the postmaster general, the latter was disposed to tax him with having acted without consideration, and Sydenham was asked to give his opinion of the bargain.
The income of the provincial post office was not nearly enough to meet this demand, and help was requested from the legislature. They agreed to contribute £550, and Canada was asked to add £750 to that total. When Howe informed the postmaster general about this, the latter seemed ready to accuse him of acting thoughtlessly, and Sydenham was asked to share his opinion on the deal.
The governor general laid the subject before the post office commission, which was then sitting, and they denounced the whole arrangement. The rate was extravagant, and the service provided for was entirely beyond the necessities of the ocean mails. As the steamers were to sail only twice a month, an express conveyance of that frequency was all that was required.
The governor general presented the topic to the post office commission, which was currently in session, and they criticized the entire arrangement. The rate was excessive, and the service offered was completely unnecessary for ocean mail needs. Since the steamers were set to sail only twice a month, an express service at that frequency was all that was needed.
As for Canada's being at any expense for this service, the commission scouted the idea. The Cunard contract called for the transportation of mails between Great Britain and Canada, which was to be effected by two steamers, one running between Liverpool[Pg 224] and Halifax, and the other between Pictou and Quebec. Any expense there might be for overland conveyance should fall upon the packet postage, that is, it should be a charge upon the postage collected by the British post office for the transmission of letters between Great Britain and Canada.
As for Canada paying any costs for this service, the commission rejected the idea. The Cunard contract required the transportation of mail between Great Britain and Canada, which was to be carried out by two steamers: one operating between Liverpool[Pg 224] and Halifax, and the other between Pictou and Quebec. Any costs for overland transport should be covered by the packet postage, meaning it would be charged against the postage collected by the British post office for sending letters between Great Britain and Canada.
The British post office took a somewhat curious course in the difficulty. It resented the criticism of the commissioners, and sanctioned the agreement made by the deputy in Halifax, for a term of eight years. It made no effort to convince the Canadian authorities of the error in their views, which would indeed have been impossible; and, on the other hand, it refused to allow the additional expense to be thrown upon the packet postage. There was but one alternative—Nova Scotia must bear the whole charge. And that was the decision of the postmaster general.
The British post office took a rather odd approach to the issue. It was unhappy with the commissioners' criticism and approved the agreement made by the deputy in Halifax for a period of eight years. It made no attempt to persuade the Canadian authorities that their views were mistaken, which would have been impossible anyway; on the other hand, it wouldn’t allow the extra costs to be added to the packet postage. There was only one option—Nova Scotia had to cover the entire cost. And that was the postmaster general's decision.
The resentment throughout Nova Scotia at the injustice of this decision, and the manifest inability of the provincial post office to carry the added burden determined the postmaster general to make an effort to put an end to the situation. In 1842 he sent an officer of the department to Halifax to inquire into the whole provincial system, instructing him to give his special attention to the question of the expediency of continuing the use of the port of Halifax as the entrepôt for the Canadian mails.
The anger in Nova Scotia over the unfairness of this decision, along with the clear inability of the provincial post office to handle the extra load, pushed the postmaster general to try to resolve the issue. In 1842, he dispatched a department officer to Halifax to review the entire provincial system, specifically directing him to focus on whether it was practical to keep using the port of Halifax as the hub for Canadian mail.
The thing to be avoided was the long carriage by land, and the agent was directed to consider the ports of St. John, New Brunswick and Boston with this end in view. Boston was regarded with particular favour on account of the railway lines, which were being extended inland from that port. St. John was dismissed from consideration on a report from the admiralty that until some progress had been made in the survey of the bay of Fundy, especially of its tides and soundings, it would be very hazardous to send the mails by that route.
The goal was to avoid the lengthy land journey, so the agent was instructed to look into the ports of St. John, New Brunswick, and Boston for this purpose. Boston was favored especially because of the railway lines that were being expanded inland from that port. St. John was ruled out based on a report from the admiralty stating that until some progress had been made on surveying the Bay of Fundy, particularly its tides and soundings, it would be too risky to send the mail that way.
On the question of the comparative advantages of the Halifax and Boston routes there was practical unanimity in Canada. All classes of the mail-using public were agreed as to the superiority of the Boston route. The editors of newspapers complained that the British newspapers on which they depended for their foreign news—newspapers which were transmitted by way of Halifax—were useless by the time they reached Canada, as the news they contained had been received from New York or Boston several days earlier.
On the issue of the advantages of the Halifax and Boston routes, there was almost universal agreement in Canada. Everyone who used the mail agreed that the Boston route was better. Newspaper editors pointed out that the British newspapers they relied on for foreign news—those sent via Halifax—were outdated by the time they arrived in Canada, since the news had already come from New York or Boston several days before.
As for the objection to having the exchange of mails between Great Britain and Canada carried on through a foreign country,[Pg 225] the publishers made light of it. The mails from England for India, were carried across the Continent through France and Italy; and there was no reason why the mails from England for Canada should not be carried through the United States.
As for the concern about having mail exchanged between Great Britain and Canada going through a foreign country,[Pg 225] the publishers dismissed it. Mail from England to India was transported across the continent through France and Italy, so there was no reason why mail from England to Canada couldn't go through the United States.
These views were strongly presented by Stayner, and reinforced by the secretary of the post office, who laid them before the postmaster general. The Cunards also rendered assistance to the same end. They represented to the postmaster general that the service proved to be much more expensive than they had anticipated when they undertook the contract, and that the steamer on the St. Lawrence was a very heavy burden. In discussing the question of an increased subsidy, the company expressed their willingness to regard relief from the river service as equivalent to £10,000 a year.
These opinions were clearly expressed by Stayner and backed by the post office secretary, who presented them to the postmaster general. The Cunards also offered support for the same cause. They informed the postmaster general that the service ended up being much more costly than they expected when they took on the contract and that the steamer on the St. Lawrence was quite a significant burden. In talks about a higher subsidy, the company indicated that they would view relief from the river service as equivalent to £10,000 per year.
These concurrent appeals, together with the fact that the change in the seat of government from Kingston to Montreal, established the governor in the city which would derive the maximum of benefit from the Boston connection, decided the government to make Boston the landing port for the Canadian mails; and the British minister at Washington was instructed to open negotiations for an arrangement by which the British mails would be permitted to cross the territory of the United States.[260]
These simultaneous requests, along with the shift of the government capital from Kingston to Montreal, placed the governor in the city that would gain the most from the Boston connection, led the government to choose Boston as the landing port for Canadian mail. The British minister in Washington was directed to start talks for an agreement that would allow British mail to pass through United States territory.[260]
It had long been an object of desire with the United States government to retain the hold its geographical situation has given it upon the correspondence between Great Britain and Canada. Before steam service was a practicable scheme, the president in a message to congress suggested that, to that end, the sailing packets should be put under post office regulations, and a greater degree of security to the mails thereby effected.
It had long been a goal of the United States government to maintain its advantageous position regarding the communication between Great Britain and Canada. Before steam service became a viable option, the president proposed in a message to Congress that sailing ships should be placed under postal regulations to enhance the security of the mail.
The United States government consequently were prepared to accept very moderate terms. They based their offer on the terms of the contract between the British and French governments for the conveyance of the Indian mails from Calais on the Channel to Marseilles on the Mediterranean. The British government paid the French government two francs per ounce of letters and ten centimes for each newspaper transmitted across French territory, and as the distance from Boston to St. Johns in Lower Canada was rather less than half that from Calais to Marseilles, they proposed that the British government should pay them half the rates paid to the French government.[Pg 226]
The United States government was therefore ready to accept quite basic terms. They based their offer on the contract between the British and French governments for delivering Indian mail from Calais on the Channel to Marseilles on the Mediterranean. The British government paid the French government two francs per ounce for letters and ten centimes for each newspaper sent across French territory. Since the distance from Boston to St. Johns in Lower Canada was less than half that from Calais to Marseilles, they suggested that the British government should pay them half the rates that the French government received.[Pg 226]
These rates were regarded by the postmaster general of England as unusually favourable, and the proposal of the United States government was at once accepted. Under this arrangement, the postmaster general calculated that, besides the great saving in time that would be effected, there would be a reduction in the charges for the inland conveyance of the mails to and from Canada of £4600 per annum.
These rates were seen by the postmaster general of England as particularly favorable, and the proposal from the United States government was quickly accepted. With this arrangement, the postmaster general estimated that, in addition to the significant time savings, there would be a reduction in the costs for transporting mail to and from Canada of £4,600 per year.
The course of conveyance across the territory of the United States was to be, in summer, from Boston to Burlington, Vermont, towards which a railway line was approaching completion, and from Burlington to St. Johns by steamer on lake Champlain. In the winter, the mails were to be carried from Boston to Highgate, Vermont, where they would be taken over by couriers attached to the Canadian post office. The time occupied would, under usual conditions, be forty-eight hours between Boston and St. Johns, and fifty-three hours between Boston and Highgate.
The route for transporting mail across the United States would be, in the summer, from Boston to Burlington, Vermont, where a railway line was nearly finished, and from Burlington to St. Johns by steamboat on Lake Champlain. In the winter, the mail would be taken from Boston to Highgate, Vermont, where it would be picked up by couriers from the Canadian post office. Typically, it would take forty-eight hours to travel from Boston to St. Johns and fifty-three hours from Boston to Highgate.
Thus was the great experiment brought to its appointed end. It had its origin in one of those imperial impulses, which seem to come most frequently from the colonies, and which now and then carry the Briton off his feet. But, as conditions stood, the scheme was foredoomed to failure. It was not until the construction of the Canadian Pacific railway in 1889, across the state of Maine between Montreal and St. John, that a Canadian ocean port was able to enter into successful competition with a United States port, as the point of exchange for mails passing between Great Britain and Canada.
Thus, the great experiment came to its intended conclusion. It originated from one of those imperial ambitions that often arise from the colonies and occasionally sweep the Briton off his feet. However, given the circumstances, the plan was destined to fail. It wasn't until the Canadian Pacific Railway was built in 1889, running through the state of Maine between Montreal and St. John, that a Canadian ocean port could successfully compete with a United States port as the exchange point for mail between Great Britain and Canada.
While the plans for substituting steam for sailing vessels were being brought to maturity, the question of a substantial reduction in the postage between Great Britain and the colonies in North America were being discussed.[261] Stayner pointed out that it would be useless to enter upon an expensive scheme for reducing the time occupied in conveying the mails between Great Britain and Canada, unless the postage were brought down to a figure that would place the steamship service within reach of the farmers in western Canada.
While the plans to replace sailing ships with steamships were being developed, there was discussion about significantly lowering postage rates between Great Britain and the colonies in North America.[261] Stayner noted that it would be pointless to start an expensive initiative to shorten the time it takes to deliver mail between Great Britain and Canada unless the postage was reduced to an amount that would make the steamship service affordable for farmers in western Canada.
As Sydenham observed, the new settlers, while living in great material comfort, had little money at their disposal. To them it was an impossibility to pay the postage—four shillings or more—which had accumulated on a letter on its way from the inland[Pg 227] parts of the United Kingdom to the backwoods in which they were making homes for themselves. They were served, and far from inefficiently, by the American ocean sailing packets, which left Liverpool weekly for New York; and unless the steam line were able to provide for the exchange of their letters at rates as low as they were paying, they would no more patronize the new line than they had the ten-gun sailing brigs, by which the British packet service was then carried on.
As Sydenham noted, the new settlers, while living comfortably, had very little money to spend. For them, paying the postage—four shillings or more—on a letter coming from the interior regions of the United Kingdom to the backwoods where they were building their homes was impossible. They were efficiently served by the American ocean sailing packets that left Liverpool every week for New York; unless the steam line could offer a way to exchange their letters at the same low rates they were paying, they wouldn’t support the new line any more than they had the ten-gun sailing brigs that the British packet service was using at that time.
Stayner, with full knowledge of the conditions he had to meet, was convinced that the first step towards an effective reform was to sweep away the cumulative rates made up of the inland charges in the United Kingdom, the ocean postage and the inland colonial charge; and replace them by one fixed rate which would carry the letter from any post office in the United Kingdom to any post office in the colonies. When he first laid the proposition before the postmaster general, the Duke of Richmond, he recommended that this uniform rate should be two shillings a single letter.
Stayner, fully aware of the requirements he needed to meet, believed that the first step toward meaningful reform was to eliminate the combined rates made up of the domestic charges in the United Kingdom, ocean postage, and the domestic colonial charge; and replace them with a single fixed rate that would allow a letter to travel from any post office in the United Kingdom to any post office in the colonies. When he initially presented the idea to the postmaster general, the Duke of Richmond, he suggested that this uniform rate should be two shillings for a single letter.
But after some years' opportunity for reflection, aided beyond doubt by the argument of Rowland Hill for penny postage in Great Britain, Stayner concluded that his proposed rate was too high, and that, at one shilling and sixpence, or even one shilling and threepence, the increased patronage of the line by the public in the motherland and the colonies, would bring about an actual augmentation of the revenue.
But after a few years of reflection, definitely influenced by Rowland Hill's argument for penny postage in Great Britain, Stayner concluded that his proposed rate was too high. He believed that at one shilling and sixpence, or even one shilling and threepence, the increased use of the line by the public both in the homeland and the colonies would actually boost the revenue.
How great the reduction in the charges would be, if Stayner's proposition were carried into effect, may be gathered from the fact that one of the elements making up the total postage was much in excess of the whole sum suggested by Stayner. On the supposition that the steamships landed the Canadian mails at Halifax, every letter brought by that means to Toronto would be subject to a charge of two shillings and ninepence for the conveyance from Halifax to Toronto, to say nothing of the shilling charge for its passage from Liverpool to Halifax, and the postage from the office of posting in the United Kingdom to Liverpool.
How much the charges would decrease if Stayner's proposal were implemented can be understood from the fact that one of the components contributing to the total postage was significantly higher than the entire amount suggested by Stayner. Assuming the steamships delivered the Canadian mail at Halifax, each letter sent to Toronto in that way would incur a fee of two shillings and ninepence for transport from Halifax to Toronto, not to mention the shilling charge for its travel from Liverpool to Halifax, as well as the postage from the mailing office in the United Kingdom to Liverpool.
While negotiations with Cunard were still in progress, and the colonies waited expectantly for what was to be achieved by the new service, Stayner was much surprised and gratified to receive from the general post office in London a circular addressed to the postmasters in the United Kingdom stating that the postmaster general had decided to do away altogether with the inland rate or rather to incorporate it with the ocean rate which thenceforward would be one shilling.[Pg 228]
While negotiations with Cunard were still ongoing and the colonies eagerly anticipated the results of the new service, Stayner was pleasantly surprised and pleased to receive a notice from the general post office in London. This circular, addressed to postmasters across the United Kingdom, announced that the postmaster general had decided to eliminate the inland rate entirely and instead combine it with the ocean rate, which would now be set at one shilling.[Pg 228]
This was beyond any anticipations Stayner had formed, and he lost no time in apprizing the public in Canada of the boon conferred upon them. There was rejoicing in Canada over the prospect of easy communication with the mother country, and the postmaster general received many commendations on his statesmanlike measure.[262]
This was beyond anything Stayner had expected, and he quickly informed the public in Canada about the advantage given to them. There was celebration in Canada at the thought of easier communication with the mother country, and the postmaster general received many praises for his smart decision.[262]
But the rejoicing was not of long continuance. With the first intimation at the general post office of the announcement made in Canada there was despatched a letter from the secretary informing Stayner that he had quite mistaken the purport of the circular. Though sent to Stayner for his information, it was not intended to apply to Canada. The intention was merely to take off the British inland postage, and to leave the colonial inland postage to be collected as before. The reduction, in reality, amounted to very little, as the bulk of the postage on letters from Great Britain to Canada passing by way of Halifax had been that part levied for the conveyance from Halifax to the office of delivery in Canada.
But the celebration didn't last long. As soon as the general post office received news about the announcement made in Canada, they sent a letter from the secretary informing Stayner that he had completely misunderstood the purpose of the circular. Although it was sent to Stayner for his information, it wasn't meant to apply to Canada. The intention was simply to remove the British inland postage, while leaving the colonial inland postage to be collected as it had been before. In reality, the reduction was minimal, since most of the postage for letters from Great Britain to Canada traveling through Halifax was the portion charged for delivery from Halifax to the delivery office in Canada.
Stayner was in no way to blame for the interpretation he placed on the circular, and he had the satisfaction of knowing that his misconception made the continuance of the high postage impossible. The public on both sides of the ocean had tasted the blessings of communication with their relatives on the other side, at an expense not considered beyond their means, and they were determined not to have the benefit withdrawn.
Stayner was not at all responsible for how he understood the circular, and he felt satisfied knowing that his misunderstanding made it impossible to keep the high postage rates. People on both sides of the ocean had experienced the advantages of staying in touch with their relatives across the way, at a cost they felt was reasonable, and they were committed to ensuring those benefits weren't taken away.
Accordingly when Poulett Thomson, afterwards Earl of Sydenham, came out as governor general with special instructions to remove all legitimate causes of dissatisfaction, he addressed himself to this question, and after a conference with Stayner, wrote to the colonial secretary urging the adoption of the shilling rate.
Accordingly, when Poulett Thomson, later known as the Earl of Sydenham, arrived as governor general with specific instructions to eliminate all valid reasons for dissatisfaction, he focused on this issue. After talking with Stayner, he wrote to the colonial secretary, recommending the implementation of the shilling rate.
The colonial secretary submitted the governor general's views to the postmaster general, and in practical coincidence with the sailing of the first steamer under the Cunard contract, instructions were issued to make the total charge on letters to the British North American colonies one shilling, if the letter was addressed to Halifax, and one shilling and twopence, if its destination was inland, however distant.[263]
The colonial secretary shared the governor general's opinions with the postmaster general, and just as the first steamer under the Cunard contract was about to set sail, instructions were given to charge a total of one shilling for letters sent to the British North American colonies if addressed to Halifax, and one shilling and twopence for any inland destination, no matter how far away.[263]
At the same time, a change of great importance was made in the principle on which the postage was based. It had been the[Pg 229] practice to charge postage, according to the number of enclosures the letter contained. When penny postage was introduced in England a few months previously, one of the features of the new plan was the establishment of the weight principle in determining the charge on a letter, in substitution of the principle under which letters were taxed according to the number of their contents.
At the same time, a significant change was made to the principle on which postage was based. It had been the[Pg 229] practice to charge postage based on the number of enclosures in a letter. However, when penny postage was introduced in England a few months earlier, one of the key features of the new system was the adoption of the weight principle for determining letter charges, replacing the previous system that taxed letters according to their contents.
The operation of the new plan in Great Britain caused much confusion and loss in the correspondence with the colonies. The British or Irish people, who had become accustomed to having their postage fixed by the application of the rate of one penny for each half ounce, could not in many cases be made to understand why the same principle did not apply to their letters to their friends and relatives beyond the seas.
The implementation of the new plan in Great Britain led to a lot of confusion and disruption in communication with the colonies. The British or Irish people, who were used to paying a flat rate of one penny for every half ounce of postage, often struggled to understand why the same rule didn't apply to their letters to friends and family overseas.
Hence many letters weighing less than half an ounce were sent to Canada, which on examination were found to contain enclosures, and the postage was, in accordance with the regulations, doubled or even trebled, though their weight would not call for a charge of more than one shilling and twopence.
Hence, many letters weighing less than half an ounce were sent to Canada, which, upon inspection, were found to contain enclosures. As a result, the postage was, according to the regulations, doubled or even tripled, even though their weight would only warrant a charge of no more than one shilling and twopence.
Poulett Thomson drew attention to the obvious embarrassment occasioned by the application of the two different principles, and he had the satisfaction of finding a ready acquiescence in his views on the part of the postal authorities at home. Accordingly, by the treasury minute of July 6th, 1840, the rate on letters conveyed by direct packet from any post office in the United Kingdom to Halifax was made one shilling the half ounce. If, for any other post office, the rate was one shilling and twopence.
Poulett Thomson highlighted the clear embarrassment caused by applying two different principles, and he was pleased to see that the postal authorities back home readily agreed with his views. As a result, according to the treasury minute of July 6th, 1840, the rate for letters sent directly by packet from any post office in the United Kingdom to Halifax was set at one shilling per half ounce. For letters sent from any other post office, the rate was one shilling and twopence.
FOOTNOTES:
[261] The papers on the reduction of the ocean postage rates are gathered together as accompaniments to a letter from Mr. Poulett Thomson, the governor general, to Lord Russell, of April 16, 1840. See Q. 271, p. 224.
[261] The documents regarding the decrease in ocean postage rates are compiled alongside a letter from Mr. Poulett Thomson, the governor-general, to Lord Russell, dated April 16, 1840. See Q. 271, p. 224.
CHAPTER XIII
Diminution of powers of deputy postmaster general—Commission on post office appointed—Its report—Efforts to secure reduction of postal charges.
Diminution of powers of deputy postmaster general—Commission on post office appointed—Its report—Efforts to achieve a reduction in postal charges.
The arrival of Poulett Thomson as governor general marks the passing of the uncontrolled authority of Stayner as administrator of the post office in the Canadas. By the terms of their commissions, the deputies of the postmaster general in the colonies, were responsible to the postmaster general alone for the conduct of the affairs of the post offices within their jurisdiction.
The arrival of Poulett Thomson as governor general signifies the end of Stayner's unchecked authority as the administrator of the post office in Canada. According to the terms of their commissions, the postmaster general's deputies in the colonies were only accountable to the postmaster general for the management of post office operations within their areas.
Subject to the approval of the postmaster general, the deputies opened all post offices, appointed all postmasters and other officers of the department, and made all contracts for the conveyance of the mails. Until Stayner's time, the department at home exercised a watchful oversight in one particular. It insisted that the deputy postmaster general should not extend the system, or increase the accommodation within it, unless he could satisfy St. Martins-le-Grand that the additional outlay required should be met by a corresponding increase in the revenue. Assured on this point, the department gave the deputies a practically free hand.
Subject to the approval of the postmaster general, the deputies opened all post offices, appointed all postmasters and other department officers, and made all contracts for delivering the mail. Until Stayner's time, the department at home kept a close eye on one particular aspect. It insisted that the deputy postmaster general should not expand the system or increase its services unless he could prove to St. Martins-le-Grand that the extra expenses would be covered by a corresponding rise in revenue. Once assured on this point, the department allowed the deputies a practically free hand.
Insistence on the point of finances brought the general post office into sharp collision with the colonial legislatures for a number of years. But shortly after Stayner's assumption of office, the department in London loosened the reins, and directed him to study the wants of the rising communities, and extend postal accommodation to whatever districts seemed to him to require it.
Insisting on finances put the general post office in direct conflict with the colonial legislatures for several years. However, shortly after Stayner took office, the department in London eased its grip and instructed him to assess the needs of the emerging communities and expand postal services to any areas he thought needed it.
The confidence bestowed by the postmaster general on his young deputy in the Canadas was not misplaced. Stayner was a man of energy and authority, who had grown up in the service under the administration of his father-in-law, who was his predecessor in office, and his loyalty to the interests of both the postmaster general and the community he served stood unquestioned. With his appointment to his high office, he fell heir to a dispute which had been waged for a number of years between the general post office and the legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada, involving the legal right of the post office to do business in the colonies under existing conditions.[Pg 231]
The confidence the postmaster general placed in his young deputy in Canada was well-founded. Stayner was an energetic and authoritative man who had grown up in the service under his father-in-law, his predecessor, and his loyalty to both the postmaster general and the community he served was unquestionable. With his new high-ranking position, he inherited a long-standing dispute between the general post office and the legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada regarding the legal right of the post office to operate in the colonies under the current conditions.[Pg 231]
Stayner was fortunate in finding in each province differences between the administration and the houses of assembly, which gave little promise of settlement, and he promptly attached himself to the side of the administration. This, indeed, was the only course open to him, in view of his accountability to a department, which, in according him a certain freedom of action, took jealous heed that he should not abuse it.
Stayner was lucky to find that in each province, there were differences between the administration and the houses of assembly, which didn’t seem likely to resolve anytime soon, so he quickly aligned himself with the administration. This was really the only option he had, considering his responsibility to a department that, while allowing him some freedom of action, was very careful to ensure he wouldn’t misuse it.
But Stayner had important interests of his own, which called for protection by the government. His extra-official emoluments—from the postage on newspapers, and from his agency for the collection of United States postage, due in Canada—now far exceeding his official salary, began to excite public attention, and he required all the support he could gather to himself, to enable him to brave it out with the assemblies, when they insisted on his showing by what right he took these emoluments.
But Stayner had important interests of his own that needed protection from the government. His unofficial earnings—from the postage on newspapers and from his role in collecting United States postage owed in Canada—far exceeded his official salary and started to attract public attention. He needed all the support he could get to stand his ground with the assemblies when they demanded he explain the legitimacy of these earnings.
His position, however repugnant to popular notions, was officially unassailable, and as he managed to identify his interests with those of the administrations, the governors of the two provinces remained steadily his friends and protectors. He had even the gratification of being commended for his great services by the assembly of Upper Canada in 1837.
His position, though unpopular, was officially untouchable, and since he was able to align his interests with those of the administrations, the governors of the two provinces remained his loyal allies and supporters. He even had the satisfaction of being praised for his significant contributions by the assembly of Upper Canada in 1837.
But a change was coming for Stayner, and indeed had come. Ever since the amount and the sources of his income became known to the home government, there had been disapprobation. The secretary of the post office, a large part of whose income had been derived from similar extra-official sources, deprecated the criticism which began to spring up, and the postmaster general weakly and reluctantly agreed that Stayner's exceptional services entitled him to exceptional emoluments.
But a change was on the way for Stayner, and in fact, it had already happened. Ever since the details of his income and where it came from became public knowledge to the government, there had been disapproval. The secretary of the post office, whose own income came from similar unofficial sources, denounced the criticism that started to arise, and the postmaster general weakly and reluctantly acknowledged that Stayner's outstanding services warranted exceptional pay.
The colonial secretary, Lord Glenelg, however, was of another mind. The two provinces were seething with dissatisfaction, and it was not clear to him in what the grievances of the colonials consisted. A committee of the house of commons had sat in 1828, heard evidence, and reported, and the leaders of the assembly in Lower Canada had declared that if the recommendations of the committee were carried into effect, the province would be content.
The colonial secretary, Lord Glenelg, had a different perspective. The two provinces were filled with discontent, and he wasn't sure what exactly the colonists' issues were. A committee from the House of Commons had met in 1828, collected evidence, and reported back, while the leaders of the assembly in Lower Canada had stated that if the committee's recommendations were implemented, the province would be satisfied.
Guiding his policy by that report, and seeking every opportunity to make good its findings, the colonial secretary observed that the political dissatisfaction and unrest, so far from disappearing, was spreading year by year. His bewilderment sharpened his eyes, and as they rested on Stayner's case, he saw a condition which offended[Pg 232] his sense of justice, and he at once demanded of the postmaster general that he should remove this obvious wrong.
Guided by that report and looking for every chance to address its findings, the colonial secretary noted that political dissatisfaction and unrest were not fading away but actually growing year after year. His confusion made him more observant, and as he focused on Stayner's case, he recognized a situation that violated his sense of justice. He immediately demanded that the postmaster general correct this clear injustice.
For a time Stayner's tactics, or his luck, held him scatheless. The postmaster general and the colonial secretary had agreed that the remedy for all the ills that afflicted the post office was to be provided by the bill adopted by the imperial parliament in 1834. This bill, however, could not become operative until the acceptance by the several colonial legislatures of a common measure for the regulation of the post office in the several provinces by the postmaster general of England. As all the colonies had rejected this measure, the situation remained unchanged.
For a while, Stayner's strategies, or perhaps his good fortune, kept him unharmed. The postmaster general and the colonial secretary had decided that the solution to all the problems troubling the post office would come from the bill passed by the imperial parliament in 1834. However, this bill couldn't take effect until the various colonial legislatures agreed to a common law for regulating the post office in their provinces, overseen by the postmaster general of England. Since all the colonies had rejected this proposal, the situation stayed the same.
Stayner continued to take his exorbitant emoluments, and the government was helpless. The postmaster general asked the colonial secretary to furnish him with an expedient for settling the matter, but the colonial secretary could think of nothing, to which overriding legal or political objections could not be made. While, however, Stayner enjoyed immunity from attacks by the government, he was a marked man, and when Poulett Thomson came to Canada, he lost no time in making Stayner realize that the period of his exceptional fortunes was at an end.
Stayner kept collecting his huge salary, and the government was powerless to do anything about it. The postmaster general asked the colonial secretary for a way to resolve the issue, but the colonial secretary couldn't come up with any solution that wouldn’t face major legal or political challenges. Meanwhile, even though Stayner was safe from government scrutiny, he was still under watch, and when Poulett Thomson arrived in Canada, he quickly made it clear to Stayner that his lucky streak was over.
Poulett Thomson's special mission to Canada was to lay the foundations of responsible government in the country, and he began by taking things into his own hands. In dealing with the post office he sent for Stayner, and, instead of treating him as an officer of independent authority, Thomson informed Stayner that it was his intention to reform the post office in its construction and duties.
Poulett Thomson's special mission to Canada was to establish the foundations of responsible government in the country, and he started by taking charge. When addressing the post office, he called for Stayner and, instead of treating him as an officer with independent authority, Thomson informed Stayner that he intended to reform the post office's structure and responsibilities.
All the governor general required of Stayner was that the latter should furnish him with any information he considered necessary. Although Thomson had never had any actual experience in the workings of a post office he had opportunities of acquiring a sound theoretical knowledge on the subject. He was a member of the committee of the house of commons which was appointed in 1837 to examine the proposition of Rowland Hill for penny postage.
All the governor general asked of Stayner was that he provide any information he deemed necessary. Although Thomson had never actually worked in a post office, he had the chance to gain a solid theoretical understanding of the subject. He was a member of the House of Commons committee that was established in 1837 to review Rowland Hill's proposal for penny postage.
As Hill's scheme involved an entire change in post office methods, the modus operandi at that time pursued was thoroughly set out to the committee, its weaknesses exposed, and the merits of the new proposition fully discussed. No observant man could attend the work of that committee without gaining definite views as to the principles upon which a post office should be conducted.
As Hill's plan involved a complete overhaul of postal methods, the way things were done at that time was clearly laid out for the committee, its weaknesses highlighted, and the advantages of the new proposal thoroughly discussed. Anyone paying attention to the work of that committee couldn't help but develop clear opinions about the principles on which a post office should operate.
In June 1840, Stayner reported to the secretary of the general[Pg 233] post office a state of affairs that indicated that Thomson had taken the direction of post office affairs into his own hands. He had ordered Stayner to enter into negotiations for the conveyance of mails by steamer between Quebec and Montreal, and upon lake Ontario, and when the negotiations failed, he expressed a determination to obtain authority to build vessels for post office purposes. He also directed Stayner to draw up a bill for the administration of the post office in British North America upon principles to be determined by the governor.
In June 1840, Stayner informed the secretary of the general[Pg 233] post office about a situation that showed Thomson had taken control of post office operations. He instructed Stayner to start discussions for transporting mail by steamer between Quebec and Montreal, and on Lake Ontario. When those negotiations fell through, he made it clear that he intended to get permission to build ships for post office use. He also ordered Stayner to create a bill for managing the post office in British North America based on guidelines that the governor would establish.
The colonial secretary, in July, instructed the governor to appoint a commission to investigate and report upon the post office in the colonies in all its bearings. The committee as appointed consisted of Dowling, legal adviser to the governor, Davidson, senior commissioner of crown lands, and Stayner.
The colonial secretary, in July, told the governor to set up a commission to look into and report on the post office in the colonies in all its aspects. The appointed committee included Dowling, the governor's legal advisor, Davidson, the senior commissioner of crown lands, and Stayner.
In point of ability the committee was a competent one. Its members all had that sort of experience in public affairs, which would enable them to apprize fairly the mass of information laid before them—evidence which would satisfy the public as to the justice of their conclusions.
In terms of ability, the committee was quite capable. Its members all had the kind of experience in public matters that would allow them to fairly assess the large amount of information presented to them—evidence that would convince the public of the fairness of their conclusions.
But having in mind the aims of the committee, its composition was not such as to give hope for harmonious co-operation among its members. The colonial secretary in instructing the governor general to appoint the committee, directed that it should investigate and report on the state of the British North American post office, including its administration.
But considering the goals of the committee, its makeup didn’t inspire much hope for smooth collaboration among its members. The colonial secretary, in instructing the governor general to set up the committee, directed that it should look into and report on the state of the British North American post office, including its management.
The work of the committee was necessarily a scrutiny into the methods of the administration of Stayner, and involved an attitude of defence on his part. And the other members of the committee did not fail to make him feel the difficulty of his dual position. Although he signed the report as a commissioner, he appended a note to it stating that he did so, merely because he conceived it to be his duty as a commissioner.
The committee's work was essentially an examination of Stayner's administration methods, which required him to take a defensive stance. The other committee members made sure to remind him of the challenge of his conflicting role. Even though he signed the report as a commissioner, he added a note saying that he did so only because he believed it was his duty as a commissioner.
But he also intimated that he was far from agreeing with all the conclusions of his associates; and a few months later he presented a statement to the governor general, pointing out the respects in which he differed from the other commissioners, and defending himself against charges which were set forth in the report.
But he also hinted that he didn't fully agree with all the conclusions of his colleagues; and a few months later he submitted a statement to the governor general, highlighting the ways in which he differed from the other commissioners and defending himself against the charges outlined in the report.
The committee entered upon their work by calling upon the deputy postmasters general of Canada and the Maritime provinces for a body of statistics and other matter, which, when furnished, provided them with a survey of the whole colonial system, and its methods of operation.[Pg 234]
The committee started their work by reaching out to the deputy postmasters general of Canada and the Maritime provinces for a collection of statistics and other information. Once received, this information gave them a comprehensive overview of the entire colonial system and how it operated.[Pg 234]
Detailed information was given in tabular form of every post office in the colonies—the name and date of appointment of its postmaster, the revenue of the office, and the several items that composed the postmaster's income; and of every mail route, with its cost of maintenance. All regulations for the guidance of postmasters in the management of their offices were submitted to the commission.
Detailed information was provided in a table for every post office in the colonies—the name and appointment date of its postmaster, the office's revenue, and the various items that made up the postmaster's income; as well as every mail route and its maintenance costs. All regulations to help postmasters manage their offices were presented to the commission.
The commissioners addressed circular letters to all the postmasters, and to prominent people in every section of the colonies, inviting them to give their views on the post offices in their locality, and asking particularly as to the extent letters were carried by agencies other than the post office, and their opinions as to why these other agencies were employed in preference to the post office.
The commissioners sent circular letters to all the postmasters and to influential people in every area of the colonies, asking them to share their thoughts on the post offices in their region. They specifically wanted to know how often letters were delivered by sources other than the post office and what their opinions were on why these other services were preferred over the post office.
The information obtained was most voluminous, and the report of the commission based upon it was comprehensive.[264] It began with a historical sketch of the post office in the colonies, from its origin down to the time of the commission; passed on to a survey of the institution as it then stood; pointed out the defects they discovered in its arrangements; and concluded by a number of recommendations for the removal of the defects, and the improvement of the system.
The information gathered was extensive, and the report from the commission was thorough.[264] It started with a historical overview of the post office in the colonies, from its beginnings to the time of the commission; continued with an assessment of the institution as it existed then; highlighted the flaws they found in its operations; and wrapped up with several recommendations to fix those flaws and enhance the system.
The defects which most impressed the commissioners were the want of uniformity within the system, and the uncontrolled power of the representatives of the postmaster general in the colonies. As illustrating the lack of uniformity, they pointed out that though the colonies were in postal theory an undivided whole, they were under the control of two deputies of the postmaster general, who were entirely independent of one another, and that no effort seemed to have been made to co-ordinate the practice in the two jurisdictions.
The main issues that stood out to the commissioners were the lack of consistency in the system and the unchecked authority of the postmaster general's representatives in the colonies. To highlight the inconsistency, they noted that even though the colonies were theoretically one unified system, they were actually governed by two deputies of the postmaster general who operated completely independently from each other, and it appeared that no attempts had been made to align the practices in the two areas.
The absence of organization was more noticeable in the Maritime provinces, a condition which the commissioners attributed to the failure of the deputy at Halifax to establish general regulations, and to the want of travelling surveyors or inspectors, who might have introduced uniformity of practice among the postmasters.
The lack of organization was more obvious in the Maritime provinces, a situation the commissioners blamed on the deputy in Halifax not setting up general regulations, and on the absence of traveling surveyors or inspectors, who could have brought uniformity to the practices among the postmasters.
A striking instance of unauthorized variation from usual post office practice was the existence of way offices. These were, to all intents and purposes, post offices, and yet they had no official recognition as such.[Pg 235]
A notable example of an unauthorized change from standard post office practices was the establishment of way offices. These operated essentially like post offices but lacked any official acknowledgment as such.[Pg 235]
These way offices were set up at any convenient place along the line of the post roads. They were put in operation, sometimes by local magistrates, or other people of importance in the districts; sometimes by neighbouring postmasters, and sometimes by the deputy postmaster general. They had no accounting relations with the head of the department, but carried on their work under the control of an adjacent postmaster who was held responsible for the postage collected by them.
These way offices were established at convenient locations along the post roads. They were often managed by local officials or other significant individuals in the area; occasionally by nearby postmasters, and sometimes by the deputy postmaster general. They did not have direct accounting ties to the head of the department but operated under the supervision of a nearby postmaster who was accountable for the postage they collected.
In spite of their anomalous character, these way offices had a usefulness of their own; for they were not abolished until after the Nova Scotia post office was absorbed in the post office department of the dominion in 1867.
In spite of their unusual nature, these post offices had their own usefulness; they weren't shut down until after the Nova Scotia post office was integrated into the dominion's post office department in 1867.
The commission in support of their second conclusion, that the power of the deputies of the postmaster general were subject to no practical control, and that the abuses usually associated with irresponsibility were not absent from the administration of the colonial post office, submitted two cases which had come under their notice, and which seemed to show that in these cases at least Stayner was chargeable with maladministration and nepotism.
The commission supporting their second conclusion noted that the power of the deputies of the postmaster general was not practically controlled, and that the usual problems related to irresponsibility were present in the management of the colonial post office. They presented two cases that had caught their attention, which appeared to demonstrate that, in these instances at least, Stayner was guilty of mismanagement and favoritism.
Stayner in his rejoinder defended himself with vigour and success against the imputations of his colleagues, and retorted upon Dowling, the chairman, with charges of unfairness and studied discourtesy towards himself. The bearing of Dowling was so offensive that Stayner was with difficulty restrained from severing his relations with the commission.
Stayner, in his response, defended himself vigorously and successfully against the accusations from his colleagues, and he hit back at Dowling, the chairman, with claims of unfairness and deliberate rudeness towards him. Dowling's attitude was so irritating that Stayner had to be held back from cutting ties with the commission.
The remedies proposed by the commission for the two cardinal defects to which they had drawn attention, were simple and efficacious. They would place the whole colonial postal system in the hands of a single deputy postmaster general, who should own responsibility, not only to his official superior in England, but also, in all points which did not conflict with his primary duty, to the executive heads of the several provinces, so far as related to the parts of the system within their respective jurisdictions.
The solutions suggested by the commission for the two main issues they pointed out were straightforward and effective. They would put the entire colonial postal system under the authority of a single deputy postmaster general, who would be accountable not only to their superior in England but also, in matters that didn’t interfere with their primary responsibilities, to the executive leaders of the different provinces concerning the aspects of the system within their own areas.
The headquarters of the deputy postmaster general, the commission urged, should be at the capital of the province of Canada, and he should be under the orders of the governor general. The authority of the deputy postmaster general in the other provinces should be vested in local inspectors, whose relations with the lieutenant governors were to be identical with those which should subsist between the deputy postmaster general and the governor general.
The commission recommended that the deputy postmaster general's headquarters be located in the capital of Canada, and that he report to the governor general. The deputy postmaster general's authority in the other provinces should be assigned to local inspectors, who would have the same relationship with the lieutenant governors as the deputy postmaster general has with the governor general.
In cases occurring in the other provinces, which appeared to[Pg 236] transcend the powers of the local inspectors, the lieutenant governors might correspond with the governor general, and the inspectors with the deputy. Stayner objected to the plan proposed, in so far as it took the appointments to postmasterships and other offices out of the hands of the representative of the postmaster general, and made them the subject of political patronage.
In situations happening in other provinces that seemed to[Pg 236] exceed the authority of local inspectors, the lieutenant governors could communicate with the governor general, while the inspectors communicated with the deputy. Stayner opposed the suggested plan because it removed the responsibility for appointing postmasters and other positions from the postmaster general’s representative, turning them into political favors.
Having disposed of the questions relating to the organization and administration of the department, the commissioners proceeded to discuss matters bearing upon its operations.
Having dealt with the questions about the organization and management of the department, the commissioners moved on to discuss issues related to its operations.
The first of these was the rates of postage. In dealing with this subject the commission had before them a mass of evidence from all parts of the colonies, which convinced them that the great bulk of the letters exchanged, did not pass through the post office. It was asserted by responsible persons that, in some parts of the country, scarcely ten per cent. of the letters written were conveyed by the post office, and in few cases was the estimate of letters carried by private means less than fifty per cent.
The first issue was the rates of postage. The commission had a lot of evidence from all over the colonies, which showed them that most letters exchanged were not sent through the post office. Responsible individuals claimed that in some areas, barely ten percent of the letters written were sent by the post office, and in many cases, the estimate of letters delivered by private means was at least fifty percent.
Though various other reasons were given for this systematic evasion of the only lawful means of conveying letters—the infrequency of the couriers' services, and the public distrust in the security of the mails—there was practical unanimity in the declaration that the chief obstacle in the way of the public's using the post office was the excessive rates of postage.
Though many other reasons were cited for this consistent avoidance of the only legal way to send letters—like how rare the couriers were and the public's lack of trust in the safety of the mail—everyone agreed that the main reason people didn’t use the post office was because of the high postage rates.
The commission found that there was a strong sentiment among their correspondents, favouring the adoption of the system then recently introduced into England by the genius of Rowland Hill. Until 1840, the postal rates in England were substantially the same as those which hampered the post office in the colonies; and the general avoidance of the post office by the merchants and other writers of letters in that country was as marked as it was in Canada.
The commission discovered a strong feeling among their correspondents in favor of adopting the system that Rowland Hill had recently introduced in England. Until 1840, the postal rates in England were basically the same as those that hindered the post office in the colonies, and the tendency for merchants and other letter writers to avoid using the post office in that country was just as noticeable as it was in Canada.
Richard Cobden declared that not one-sixth of the letters exchanged in England were transmitted through the post office, and other observers of equal authority bore similar emphatic testimony. The displacement of the complicated system of charges based on the number of enclosures and the distance the letters were carried, and the adoption of a penny rate carrying letters to all parts of the United Kingdom, immediately turned all the streams of correspondence into the channels of the post office. Not only were the private letter-carrying agencies put out of business, but the low, easily comprehended rate called into existence a vast body of new correspondence.[Pg 237]
Richard Cobden stated that only one-sixth of the letters sent in England went through the post office, and other respected observers confirmed this. The complicated fee system based on how many items were enclosed and the distance the letters traveled was replaced by a flat penny rate that allowed letters to be sent anywhere in the UK, which quickly shifted all correspondence into the post office system. Not only did this put private letter delivery services out of business, but the simple and affordable rate also led to a significant increase in new correspondence.[Pg 237]
Few people in Canada believed in the possibility of a rate as low as a penny for the Canadian post office, but many were attracted by the fascination of a uniform charge even though it should be higher than that, which was so vastly augmenting correspondence in England.
Few people in Canada thought a rate as low as a penny for the Canadian post office was possible, but many were intrigued by the idea of a standard charge, even if it was higher than that, which was greatly increasing correspondence in England.
To all such, whether the uniform rate they advocated were a penny or higher, the commission addressed themselves, pointing out that the geographical, social and industrial differences between England and the colonies, made it impracticable to base an argument for the one upon the experience of the other.
To all of them, whether they supported a uniform rate of a penny or more, the commission reached out, highlighting that the geographical, social, and industrial differences between England and the colonies made it unrealistic to base an argument for one on the experience of the other.
Uniform penny postage was an immediate success in the United Kingdom because in the United Kingdom there were three thickly-populated countries, with highly developed social and industrial systems. Hill discovered, by a study of the postal statistics laid before the house of commons, that in consequence of the great volume of correspondence exchanged, the comparatively short distances letters were as a rule carried, and the highly developed system of transportation, the average cost of carrying a letter in the United Kingdom did not exceed one farthing. A sum equally small covered the expenses of administration and the maintenance of post offices.
Uniform penny postage was an immediate success in the United Kingdom because it served three densely populated countries with advanced social and industrial systems. Hill found, through an analysis of the postal statistics presented to the House of Commons, that due to the high volume of correspondence exchanged, the relatively short distances letters were typically transported, and the well-developed transportation system, the average cost of delivering a letter in the United Kingdom was no more than one farthing. An equally small amount covered the costs of administration and maintaining post offices.
A further discovery of equal importance, which surprised Hill as much as it did anybody, was that the difference in expense between carrying a letter the shortest and the longest possible distances in the kingdom was so small that it could not be expressed in the least valuable coin in use.
A further discovery of equal importance, which surprised Hill just as much as it did anyone else, was that the difference in cost between sending a letter the shortest and the longest possible distances in the kingdom was so small that it couldn't be represented in the lowest-value coin in circulation.
In these facts lay the whole case for uniform penny postage. At a penny a letter, there was a clear profit to the post office, and the augmentation in the number of letters as a result of this inducement to correspondence made almost any imaginable profits possible; and the insignificant difference in cost between carrying letters long and short distances, led inevitably to the ideal uniform rate.
In these facts lay the entire argument for uniform penny postage. At a penny per letter, the post office saw a clear profit, and the increase in the number of letters due to this incentive to communicate made almost any conceivable profits attainable; and the minimal difference in cost between delivering letters over long and short distances naturally led to the ideal uniform rate.
The conditions in the British North American colonies were in all respects the reverse of those existing in England. The vast extent of their territories, the sparseness of their populations, and their undeveloped state, socially and industrially, all combined to make the postal system very costly, and the returns meagre; and the great, almost unsettled, stretches between the centres of population made the difference in the cost of conveyance between long and short distances very considerable.
The situation in the British North American colonies was completely different from what was happening in England. The large size of their lands, the low population density, and their underdeveloped social and industrial conditions all contributed to making the postal system expensive, with minimal returns. The vast, often unsettled areas between population centers led to a significant difference in transportation costs for long versus short distances.
The commission, with such statistics as were available before[Pg 238] them, estimated that the average expense of delivering a letter was threepence for conveyance, and twopence-halfpenny for overhead and maintenance charges. These figures showed the impracticability of either low or uniform postage rates, unless the legislatures were willing to take on themselves the yearly deficits, which were certain to occur.
The commission, with the available statistics at hand[Pg 238], estimated that the average cost of delivering a letter was three pence for delivery and two and a half pence for overhead and maintenance costs. These numbers highlighted the unfeasibility of low or uniform postage rates unless the legislatures were willing to cover the annual deficits that were bound to arise.
The commission, however, were prepared to recommend considerable reductions in the charges, even though these should result in a noticeable shrinkage in the revenue. Indeed, it seemed to them a distinct advantage that the revenue should be brought down to a point, at which it would no more than meet the expenses. They took it as settled that the British government would adhere to the principle of the imperial bill of 1834, under which the surplus revenues were to be divided among the colonies; and they foresaw serious difficulties among the provinces in dealing with the problem of distributing the surplus.
The commission, however, was ready to suggest significant cuts to the fees, even though this would lead to a noticeable drop in revenue. In fact, they saw it as a clear benefit to reduce the revenue to a level that would only cover expenses. They assumed the British government would stick to the principle of the imperial bill of 1834, which stated that any surplus revenues should be shared among the colonies; and they anticipated major challenges among the provinces in figuring out how to distribute that surplus.
The rates they recommended—ranging from twopence a letter when the conveyance did not exceed thirty miles up to one shilling for a distance over three hundred miles—were much lower than those charged at that time by the post office.
The rates they suggested—starting at two pence per letter for distances up to thirty miles and going up to one shilling for anything over three hundred miles—were much lower than what the post office was charging at that time.
Dealing with the question of newspaper postage, the commission condemned the impropriety of allowing the sums accruing under this head to pass into the pockets of the deputies of the postmaster general, and recommended that newspapers should be charged at the rate of one-halfpenny each, and that the proceeds should go with the other postage into the treasury.
Dealing with the issue of newspaper postage, the commission criticized the inappropriateness of letting the funds collected for this purpose end up in the pockets of the postmaster general's deputies. They recommended that newspapers should be charged at the rate of half a penny each, and that the revenue should be handled along with the other postage and go into the treasury.
A point, interesting as illustrating one of the differences of view between ourselves and our grandfathers, was that the commissioners strongly recommended that the prepayment of postage on newspapers should not continue to be compulsory, but that it should be optional whether the sum should be paid by the sender or recipient of the newspaper.
A point, interesting for showing one of the differing perspectives between us and our grandfathers, was that the commissioners strongly recommended that prepaying postage on newspapers should no longer be mandatory, but rather that it should be optional for the sender or recipient to cover the cost.
It had never been held that the sender of a letter should pay the postage; and to the public it appeared a hardship that there should be a different practice as regards newspapers. Indeed the committee saw very good reasons from the standpoint of the post office why the payment of postage on newspapers should be deferred. If postmasters could add to their revenues, and consequently to their salaries, by collecting the postage when delivering newspapers, they would have a strong motive for seeing that the papers were delivered.
It was never considered that the person sending a letter should cover the postage, and the public found it unfair that newspapers were treated differently. In fact, the committee recognized several valid reasons from the post office's perspective for delaying the postage payment on newspapers. If postmasters could increase their income and, in turn, their salaries by collecting postage when delivering newspapers, they would have a strong incentive to ensure the papers were delivered.
The commission closed their report by noting a number of the[Pg 239] details of post office practice: the demand for more post offices throughout the provinces, which they endorsed; complaints of the inconvenience of sites of post offices; the hours post offices should be open to the public, and the time for closing the mails; special handling of money letters, and the enforcement of the terms of mail contracts, and the salaries of postmasters. On all these matters they commented at length, and made a number of helpful suggestions.
The commission wrapped up their report by highlighting several details about post office practices: the need for more post offices across the provinces, which they supported; complaints about the inconvenient locations of post offices; the hours that post offices should be open to the public and when the mail should be closed; the special handling of money letters; the enforcement of mail contract terms; and the salaries of postmasters. They discussed all these issues in detail and offered a number of helpful suggestions.
The report was presented to the governor general on December 31, 1841. While it was in course of preparation—on November 29, 1841—the post office building in Quebec was destroyed by fire.
The report was presented to the governor general on December 31, 1841. While it was being prepared—on November 29, 1841—the post office building in Quebec was destroyed by fire.
For Stayner this was a serious misfortune. Not only was he compelled to withdraw his attention from the affairs of the commission, in order to make provision for carrying on the departmental work, but he was crippled in drawing up his rejoinder by the fact that all his papers were consumed with the building, and material upon which he had depended for explanation and justification of transactions called in question was no longer available. His statement was not laid before the governor general until the April following.
For Stayner, this was a major misfortune. Not only did he have to shift his focus away from the commission's affairs to ensure the departmental work continued, but he was also hindered in preparing his response because all his documents were lost with the building. The materials he needed to explain and justify the questioned transactions were no longer accessible. His statement wasn’t presented to the governor general until the following April.
In it, besides confuting the conclusions of the other commissioners on the matters affecting his administration of the post office, Stayner discussed a number of questions, in which he differed in opinion from his colleagues. He expressed a qualified approval of the scale of postage rates recommended in the report, and agreed entirely with them in their proposals respecting the postage on newspapers.
In the document, apart from refuting the conclusions of the other commissioners regarding his management of the post office, Stayner addressed several issues where he disagreed with his colleagues. He expressed a conditional approval of the proposed postage rates in the report and fully agreed with them on their suggestions concerning postage for newspapers.
But Stayner was convinced that his colleagues took entirely too favourable a view as to the effect of the postage reductions on the revenue of the department, and he strongly recommended that, before the proposed changes should be approved, the whole scheme should be submitted to the provincial legislatures, with its probable financial consequences, in order that an assurance might be obtained from them that the deficits which he foresaw should be made good by the provinces.
But Stayner was convinced that his colleagues had an overly optimistic view of how the postage reductions would impact the department's revenue. He strongly urged that before the proposed changes were approved, the entire plan should be presented to the provincial legislatures, including its likely financial implications, so that they could provide assurance that the deficits he anticipated would be covered by the provinces.
The first of the measures taken by the government on the report of the commissioners was to deprive Stayner of a portion of his power. The proposal to place him under the direction of the governor general was not entertained in its entirety. But in August 1842, the appointment of his postmasters was taken out of his hands, and transferred to the governor general.[265][Pg 240]
The first action taken by the government based on the commissioners' report was to limit Stayner's authority. The idea of putting him under the control of the governor general was not fully considered. However, in August 1842, the responsibility for appointing postmasters was removed from him and given to the governor general.[265][Pg 240]
Stayner protested that it would be out of his power satisfactorily to discharge his responsibility as resident head of the post office if he were deprived of the selection of his officials. The postmaster general may have agreed with Stayner, but the decision of the matter was not allowed to rest with him. Consequently, he had no choice, but to inform Stayner that the question was closed, and that he would have to conform to the new conditions.
Stayner argued that he wouldn't be able to effectively manage his duties as the resident head of the post office if he couldn't choose his team. The postmaster general might have sided with Stayner, but the final decision wasn't his to make. As a result, he had to tell Stayner that the matter was settled and that he would need to adjust to the new conditions.
So much freedom of action, however, was still left with Stayner that he was not expected to retain the services of any official who failed to satisfy his requirements. But he could no longer dismiss peremptorily. The official under condemnation was to be afforded an opportunity for defence before his case was finally disposed of. Thereafter, and until the post office was transferred to the control of the Canadian government, whenever a vacancy occurred among the postmasters, the nomination was made by the governor, and the official appointment of the person selected, was made by the postmaster general.
So much freedom of action was still left to Stayner that he was not required to keep any official who didn’t meet his standards. However, he could no longer dismiss anyone outright. The official facing dismissal was allowed a chance to defend themselves before their case was fully decided. After that, and until the post office was transferred to the Canadian government, whenever there was a vacancy among the postmasters, the nomination was handled by the governor, and the official appointment of the selected person was made by the postmaster general.
In August 1843, Lord Stanley, the colonial secretary, notified the governor that on assuming office, he found awaiting him the report of the commission, but owing to the complexity of the matters involved, and to the fact that further representations on the same subject had been received from the colonies, the government was unable to arrive at a conclusion until that time.[266]
In August 1843, Lord Stanley, the colonial secretary, informed the governor that when he took office, he found the commission's report waiting for him. However, due to the complicated issues involved and the additional input received from the colonies on the same topic, the government couldn't reach a conclusion until that point.[266]
The decisions arrived at by the government and imparted to the governor were of far-reaching importance. The practice which had prevailed ever since the post office was established, of fixing the postage on letters, according to the number of enclosures they contained was to be abolished, and the weight system to be introduced to replace it. A single letter thereafter was to be one which weighed less than half an ounce, and the postage determined by the number of half ounces it weighed. The rates themselves were not changed, nor was the principle of regarding the distance a letter was carried any factor in the postage, in any way affected.
The decisions made by the government and communicated to the governor were very significant. The long-standing practice, which had been in place since the post office was created, of setting postage on letters based on the number of enclosures they had, was set to be ended, and a weight-based system would take its place. From that point on, a single letter would be one that weighed less than half an ounce, with postage calculated based on the number of half ounces it weighed. The rates themselves remained unchanged, and the principle of considering the distance a letter traveled did not affect the postage at all.
But though the effect of the substitution of the weight system for that based on enclosures was not great, so far as concerned the amount of postage required on a letter, much was gained in the direction of simplicity and propriety, when there was no longer the constant appeal to the postmaster's curiosity, and, at times, cupidity, which was made by the regulation requiring him to hold up every letter between him and a lighted candle, in order to satisfy himself as to the number of its contents.[Pg 241]
But even though switching to a weight-based system for postage didn't dramatically change the cost of sending a letter, it simplified things a lot. We no longer had to deal with the postmaster's constant curiosity and sometimes greed, which came from the old rule that required him to hold up every letter to a lighted candle just to check how many pages were inside.[Pg 241]
Another reform, no less welcome to the public, was the abolition of the privilege conceded to the deputy postmaster general of putting into his own pocket the proceeds of the postage on newspapers. The recommendation of the commission that newspapers should be charged one-halfpenny each, the proceeds to form part of the post office revenue, was adopted by the government.
Another reform, which was just as welcomed by the public, was the removal of the privilege that allowed the deputy postmaster general to pocket the money earned from postage on newspapers. The commission's suggestion that newspapers should be charged half a penny each, with the proceeds contributing to the post office revenue, was accepted by the government.
These changes went into operation on the 5th of January, 1844. By way of compensation to the deputy postmaster general for the loss of his newspaper and other perquisites, he was given the not unhandsome salary of £2500 sterling a year. This was an amount much beyond what the treasury considered should be paid as salary for this office, in the absence of the special circumstances of Stayner's case, and the salary of his successor was fixed at £1500 a year.[267]
These changes took effect on January 5, 1844. To compensate the deputy postmaster general for losing his newspaper and other perks, he was given a generous salary of £2500 a year. This was far more than what the treasury thought should be paid for this position, especially without the unique circumstances of Stayner's situation, and the salary for his successor was set at £1500 a year.[267]
The merchants and other large users of the post office, while perhaps not unmindful of what had been gained, still had little cause for satisfaction with the results of the labours of the commission. Substantial reductions in the postage were still unattained. The movement in the colonies was greatly stimulated by the course of events in England as regards penny postage.
The merchants and other big users of the post office, while maybe aware of what had been achieved, still had little reason to be satisfied with the outcomes of the commission's efforts. Significant cuts in postage were still not achieved. The situation in the colonies was greatly boosted by what was happening in England concerning penny postage.
Post office officials had, from various motives, decried the great reform, and ministers of the crown, with their eyes on the diminished revenue, doubted whether the public benefits had been commensurate with the cost. Opposition to the continuance of the experiment had reached a point when it became a question whether modifications in the direction of higher charges should not be made.
Post office officials had, for various reasons, criticized the major reform, and government ministers, concerned about the drop in revenue, questioned whether the public benefits were worth the expense. The opposition to continuing the experiment had grown to the point where it became a question of whether adjustments towards higher charges should be considered.
In 1844 the government appointed a committee of the house of commons to inquire as to the measure of public benefit that could fairly be attributed to penny postage. The committee made no report, but they submitted a mass of evidence taken from every quarter of the kingdom, and from every walk in life, that effectually silenced objectors, and aroused a desire in all civilized countries for the enjoyment of a similar boon, to the extent that their circumstances would permit. The United States, in 1846, after a period of agitation, reduced its charges to five cents a letter, where the conveyance did not exceed a distance of three thousand miles, doubling the charge for greater distances.
In 1844, the government set up a committee in the House of Commons to investigate the public benefits of penny postage. The committee didn’t issue a report, but they gathered a lot of evidence from all over the country and various walks of life that effectively silenced critics and sparked a desire in all civilized nations for a similar benefit, depending on their circumstances. In 1846, after some discussion, the United States lowered its mailing fees to five cents for letters if the distance was under three thousand miles, charging double for longer distances.
The British North American colonies shared to the full in the general desire for the abatement of the impediments to the freer circulation of correspondence. The Canadian legislature, in[Pg 242] 1845, was called upon to deal with a number of memorials on this subject, and asked Stayner for his advice.
The British North American colonies fully participated in the widespread desire to reduce the obstacles to more open communication. In[Pg 242] 1845, the Canadian legislature was requested to address several petitions on this topic and sought Stayner's advice.
Stayner was prepared to welcome any reductions that the legislature might be able to obtain, but he warned them that whatever might be the ultimate effect of lowered postage rates on the augmentation of correspondence, there would be an intermediate period, in which the shrinkage of revenue would be considerable, and it was for the legislature to determine whether the general financial condition of the province would warrant their incurring even a temporary deficit in the post office.
Stayner was ready to embrace any cuts that the legislature could negotiate, but he cautioned them that regardless of how lower postage rates would ultimately affect the increase in mail, there would be a transitional period where revenue loss would be significant. It was up to the legislature to decide if the overall financial state of the province could justify running a temporary deficit in the post office.
The legislature having in view the fact that the surplus revenue of the post office was only £8000 at the time, decided that it would be unwise to embark on any undertaking that threatened them with additional financial burdens.[268] But the public in Canada were of a different opinion. The boards of trade of Montreal, Toronto and Quebec petitioned the postmaster general for a rate of twopence-halfpenny a letter, and, in 1846, the legislature casting caution aside presented a strong address to the queen. In it they pointed out the hardship endured by British subjects in one portion of the empire, in being compelled to pay extravagant charges for that which is enjoyed by others at merely nominal cost; and begged to be put on an equal footing in this regard with the citizens of the United States.
The legislature, considering that the post office had only a surplus revenue of £8000 at the time, decided it would be unwise to start any project that could lead to extra financial burdens. [268] However, the public in Canada felt differently. The boards of trade in Montreal, Toronto, and Quebec urged the postmaster general for a rate of two and a half pence per letter, and in 1846, the legislature set aside caution and presented a strong petition to the queen. They highlighted the hardship faced by British subjects in one part of the empire, being forced to pay excessive charges for services enjoyed by others at a minimal cost, and requested to be treated equally in this matter with the citizens of the United States.
The legislatures of the Maritime provinces were pressing on the home government demands of a similar character with equal vigour, and as the policy adopted by the home government was the result of the combined pressure, and affected all the colonies identically, it is desirable, before dealing with that policy, to bring the narrative of events in the Maritime provinces forward to this point.
The legislatures in the Maritime provinces were actively urging the home government with similar demands just as strongly, and since the policy adopted by the home government was a result of this combined pressure and impacted all the colonies in the same way, it’s important to bring the account of events in the Maritime provinces up to this point before discussing that policy.
FOOTNOTES:
CHAPTER XIV
Continuation of account of post office in Maritime provinces—Departmental inquiry into conditions—Agitation for reduced postage.
Continuation of the account of the post office in the Maritime provinces—Departmental investigation into conditions—Movement for lower postage rates.
The information elicited from Howe by the general post office in London, and the house of assembly of Nova Scotia, in the course of the inquiry as to the financial position of the post office in that province, disclosed matter for considerable surprise to both of them.
The information obtained from Howe by the general post office in London and the house of assembly of Nova Scotia during the investigation into the financial status of the post office in that province was quite surprising to both parties.
The general post office learned for the first time that for some years the provincial post office was carried on partly with the assistance of the legislature. The assembly on its side was equally unaware of the fact that, while they were making annual grants in aid of the provincial establishment, a very considerable sum was being remitted each year by the deputy postmaster general to the British treasury as surplus postal revenue.
The general post office discovered for the first time that, for several years, the provincial post office had been operating partly with help from the legislature. The assembly was also unaware that, while they were making annual grants to support the provincial setup, a significant amount was being sent each year by the deputy postmaster general to the British treasury as surplus postal revenue.
This anomalous state of affairs was corrected, and a more satisfactory footing was established as the result of the mission of the Nova Scotia delegates to England in 1839. But one is inclined to wonder how this condition of ignorance could continue with Howe, a perfectly honest man, in constant communication with his official superiors in England on the one hand, and with the legislature on the other.
This weird situation was fixed, and a better arrangement was set up thanks to the mission of the Nova Scotia delegates to England in 1839. But it's hard to understand how this lack of knowledge could persist with Howe, an entirely honest man, in regular contact with his official bosses in England on one side, and the legislature on the other.
It would seem to have arisen from the fact that the post office in Nova Scotia was a much more intimate institution than the post office was in Canada. Circumstances, as has been seen, maintained a gulf between the post office in Canada and the provincial legislatures. The antagonism of the legislatures in the two Canadas towards the post office, arising from their belief in the illegality of its foundation, and the steady struggle on their part to bring the institution within the sphere of their authority, operated to prevent the establishment of intimate relations between the legislatures and the deputy postmasters general.
It seems to have come from the fact that the post office in Nova Scotia was a much more personal institution than the post office in Canada. As we've seen, circumstances created a divide between the post office in Canada and the provincial legislatures. The conflict between the legislatures in the two Canadas regarding the post office, stemming from their belief that its foundation was illegal, and their ongoing efforts to bring the institution under their control, hindered the development of close relations between the legislatures and the deputy postmasters general.
All these separative factors were absent in Nova Scotia. The Howes, father and son, had administered the post office for nearly forty years. They were constantly occupied with the public life of the province. They published the principal newspapers, and[Pg 244] Joseph Howe, son of the one, and brother of the other, was one of the leaders in the legislature. The younger Howe was also a commissioner for the summary trial of actions, and for the poor, both of which appointments he held without salary.
All these dividing factors were missing in Nova Scotia. The Howes, father and son, had run the post office for nearly forty years. They were always engaged in the public affairs of the province. They published the main newspapers, and[Pg 244] Joseph Howe, the son of one and brother of the other, was a leading figure in the legislature. The younger Howe was also a commissioner for quick trials and for the welfare of the poor, both positions he held without pay.
The interests of the Howes were as much engaged to the affairs of the province, as to those of the general post office, and this fact was recognized by the legislature. When, therefore, there was a question of extending the postal lines into new districts, Howe was fully sympathetic, and it was felt, by the assembly, when he informed them that they must be prepared to make up any deficiencies in the cost of the new services, that he spoke as one of themselves, but with authority, and there was no more question.
The Howes were just as invested in the province's matters as they were in the general post office's issues, and the legislature recognized this. So, when it came to the question of expanding the postal lines into new areas, Howe was completely on board. The assembly sensed that when he told them they needed to cover any shortfalls in the cost of the new services, he was speaking with their interests in mind but also with authority, and there was no further debate.
As a consequence, new routes sprang up gradually in different parts of the province, under the simple arrangement that the postage collected on the route would be applied as far as it would go to meet the expenses of the postmasters and mail couriers, and that the legislature would make up what was lacking.
As a result, new routes gradually developed in various parts of the province, based on a straightforward plan where the postage collected on the route would be used as far as it could go to cover the expenses of the postmasters and mail couriers, and the legislature would cover any shortfall.
Thus, on the western line, from Halifax to Yarmouth, and around the shore to Lunenburg, the revenue collected was in 1839 only £378, whereas the expenditure was rather more than £900 beyond this sum. On the eastern line, the shortage to be made up by the legislature was over £450. The northern line, that is, through Londonderry, Amherst, Wallace, Dorchester and Parrsboro nearly paid its expenses. The province had to contribute no more than £60, to cover the deficiency.[269]
Thus, on the western line, from Halifax to Yarmouth, and around the shore to Lunenburg, the revenue collected in 1839 was only £378, while the expenses were more than £900 over that amount. On the eastern line, the shortfall that needed to be covered by the legislature was over £450. The northern line, which goes through Londonderry, Amherst, Wallace, Dorchester, and Parrsboro, nearly covered its costs. The province only had to chip in £60 to cover the deficit.[269]
All that the general post office had been informed regarding these routes was that the revenues from them were being held to pay expenses. They had no idea that there were heavy deficiencies, which the legislatures provided for by annual votes, arranged between Howe and the post office committee of the legislative assembly. Howe held, when brought to account for his remissness, that as these routes were under the authority of the province, and not of the postmaster general, there was no object in embodying them in his accounts.
All that the general post office had been told about these routes was that the profits from them were being set aside to cover expenses. They had no clue that there were significant shortfalls, which the legislatures addressed with annual votes, arranged between Howe and the post office committee of the legislative assembly. When Howe was held accountable for his negligence, he argued that since these routes fell under the province's authority and not the postmaster general's, there was no reason to include them in his accounts.
The general post office did not know of the existence of the post offices of Yarmouth, Shelburne, Liverpool and Lunenburg on the west and south coasts; Antigonishe, Wallace and Parrsboro on the north; and Arichat and Sydney in Cape Breton, all of which had been in operation for a number of years.
The general post office was unaware of the post offices in Yarmouth, Shelburne, Liverpool, and Lunenburg on the west and south coasts; Antigonish, Wallace, and Parrsboro in the north; and Arichat and Sydney in Cape Breton, all of which had been operating for several years.
The only route in the province that yielded a revenue sufficient to meet expenses was the grand route leading to Canada, with its[Pg 245] branch to Pictou. As the grand route was employed for the conveyance through the provinces of the valuable mails exchanged between Canada and Great Britain, it was naturally very remunerative.
The only road in the province that brought in enough money to cover expenses was the main route to Canada, with its[Pg 245] branch to Pictou. Since the main route was used for transporting the important mail exchanged between Canada and Great Britain, it was understandably very profitable.
The agreement with the treasury, satisfactory as it was in appearance, had in it the seeds of misunderstanding. The treasury announced its willingness that, so long as the revenue from the internal post office was sufficient to meet the expense of the internal communications, no demand for this object should be made upon the provincial funds. The terms of the minute seem to lack nothing in clearness, unless some of the words employed were held to have a significance other than that usually accepted. That is what was the case in this minute.
The agreement with the treasury, as satisfactory as it looked, contained the potential for misunderstanding. The treasury stated that as long as the revenue from the internal post office was enough to cover the costs of internal communications, there would be no calls for funding from the provincial budget. The wording of the document seemed clear, unless some of the terms were interpreted to have a different meaning than usually intended. That was exactly the issue with this document.
The treasury, in selecting the words it used, meant nothing more or less than that, if the revenue collected on letters passing within the territories of Nova Scotia were sufficient to cover the expense of maintaining the post offices and mail couriers within the province, the provincial authorities would be exempt from all liability.
The treasury, in choosing its words, meant nothing more or less than that if the revenue collected from letters sent within the territories of Nova Scotia was enough to cover the costs of running the post offices and mail couriers in the province, the provincial authorities would not be held responsible for any liabilities.
The legislature accepted this view of the case on all but one point. They maintained that Halifax post office existed mainly for imperial purposes,[270] in that its chief function was to provide for the interchange of the mails between Canada and Great Britain, and that its value as a provincial institution was fully offset by the advantages extended by Nova Scotia to Great Britain and Canada in providing for the transmission of their mails across its territory.
The legislature agreed with this perspective on the case except for one aspect. They argued that the Halifax post office primarily served imperial needs,[270] as its main role was to facilitate mail exchange between Canada and Great Britain, and that its worth as a provincial entity was completely outweighed by the benefits Nova Scotia offered to Great Britain and Canada by handling their mail across its land.
Holding this view, the assembly examined the accounts laid before them by Howe, and satisfied themselves that, omitting the expenses of Halifax post office from consideration, the internal postage practically covered the expenses of the internal service. They therefore resolved that no vote would be required during that session. They pledged themselves, however, in case the revenue of that year should prove inadequate, to provide for the deficiency, so that the services should not be interrupted or diminished.
Holding this view, the assembly reviewed the accounts presented by Howe and confirmed that, leaving out the expenses of the Halifax post office, the internal postage nearly covered the costs of the internal service. They decided that no vote would be necessary during that session. However, they committed to ensuring that, if this year's revenue turned out to be insufficient, they would address the shortfall so that services wouldn't be interrupted or reduced.
In the following year, 1840, there was an unquestionable surplus of revenue over expenditure; consequently no demand was made upon the legislature. In 1841, the friction, which was certain to develop when Howe's loose methods were subjected to any strain, began to make itself felt.[Pg 246]
In 1840, there was definitely more income than expenses; as a result, there was no request made to the legislature. In 1841, the tension that was bound to arise when Howe's relaxed methods faced any pressure started to become noticeable.[Pg 246]
In April of that year, Howe advised the lieutenant governor, Lord Falkland, that the funds available for the payment of the post office expenditure were deficient to the extent of £546.[271] He, at the same time, submitted to the lieutenant governor his correspondence with the general post office in London, from which it appeared that the general post office, fearing that the omission of the legislature to make any provision for the service would lead to a deficiency, intimated that it might be necessary to make some curtailments, and asked whether some of the less productive routes might not be discontinued.
In April of that year, Howe informed the lieutenant governor, Lord Falkland, that the funds available for covering the post office expenses were short by £546.[271] He also presented to the lieutenant governor his correspondence with the general post office in London, which indicated that the general post office, concerned about the legislature's failure to allocate any funding for the service, suggested that some cutbacks might be needed and inquired whether some of the less profitable routes could be eliminated.
Howe, following his usual practice, had consulted with several members of the legislature, and being satisfied that the legislature would make up any shortage that arose, concluded that there would be no necessity of abandoning any of the lines.
Howe, sticking to his usual approach, had talked with several members of the legislature, and feeling confident that the legislature would cover any shortfall that came up, decided that there was no need to give up any of the lines.
It was only when the legislature was prorogued without making provision for a possible shortage, that Howe submitted the question to the governor. Falkland was rather embarrassed by the responsibility thus unnecessarily thrust upon him. But as he was of opinion that it would cause much inconvenience to stop any of the mail routes, he directed the amount of the shortage to be paid. The lieutenant governor, however, in relating the circumstances to the colonial secretary, took occasion to complain of Howe's methods.
It was only when the legislature was dismissed without addressing a potential shortage that Howe brought the issue to the governor. Falkland felt awkward about the responsibility that had been unnecessarily placed on him. However, since he thought it would be very inconvenient to halt any of the mail routes, he instructed that the amount of the shortage be covered. The lieutenant governor, though, while explaining the situation to the colonial secretary, took the opportunity to criticize Howe's approach.
The communications respecting the post office passed him by entirely, unless some trouble arose which made an appeal necessary. In the present case, if he had been made acquainted with the circumstances in time, he would have laid them before the legislature, and left them to decide whether any of the services were to be dropped, or the deficit made up. As a result, Howe was admonished that his irregular practice must cease, and that when recourse to the legislature was necessary, he should approach them through the lieutenant governor alone.
The communications about the post office completely went over his head, unless some issue came up that required him to step in. In this case, if he had been informed of the situation in time, he would have presented it to the legislature and let them determine whether any services should be cut or if the shortfall should be addressed. Consequently, Howe was warned that his unconventional approach needed to stop and that if he needed to go to the legislature, he should do so only through the lieutenant governor.
In 1842, the situation became more acute. The assembly had before them the accounts of 1841, in which figured the additional expenses due to the ambitious transatlantic steamship scheme. At the best, the revenues from the inland services were no more than sufficient to meet its expenses, and the increase in the cost of the conveyance between Halifax and Pictou from £285 a year to £1937 (£1550 sterling), and the additional expense in the Halifax post office from £625 a year to £1694 due to a large augmentation[Pg 247] in the staff, involved the legislature in a situation, to which they were disinclined to submit.
In 1842, the situation became more serious. The assembly had the 1841 accounts in front of them, which included the extra costs from the ambitious transatlantic steamship project. Even at best, the revenue from the inland services barely covered its expenses, and the rise in the cost of transportation between Halifax and Pictou from £285 a year to £1937 (£1550 sterling), along with the increased expense in the Halifax post office from £625 a year to £1694 due to a large increase in staff, put the legislature in a position they were reluctant to accept.[Pg 247]
The trouble was precipitated by a letter from Howe to the lieutenant governor, informing him that, as the sum of £1143 had been advanced by him from the packet postage, which belonged to the British treasury, and as the legislature had appropriated only £550 to meet this advance, there was still the sum of £593 due to His Majesty.
The issue started with a letter from Howe to the lieutenant governor, letting him know that he had advanced £1,143 from the packet postage, which belonged to the British treasury. Since the legislature had only allocated £550 to cover this advance, there was still £593 owed to His Majesty.
The assembly to whom Howe's communication was referred, took the opportunity of reviewing the whole situation. It was beyond doubt that, in 1839, the internal postal service was self-supporting. This condition was disturbed to the detriment of the financial position of the post office by burdening it with the total expense of the Pictou service, which was maintained principally for the benefit of New Brunswick and Canada, and of the Halifax post office, which since the establishment of the ocean steam service for all the colonies was in reality much more an imperial than a provincial institution.
The assembly that reviewed Howe's communication took the chance to look over the entire situation. There was no doubt that in 1839, the internal postal service was financially self-sufficient. This stability was upset by adding the full cost of the Pictou service, which primarily benefited New Brunswick and Canada, and by burdening the Halifax post office, which had become more of an imperial institution than a provincial one since the ocean steam service was established for all the colonies.
As, in justice, the inland colonies were chargeable with the major part of the outlay for the Pictou service, and the maintenance of Halifax post office should properly be defrayed from the packet postage, the legislature declined to meet the demand made upon it by the post office.
As it was fair, the inland colonies were responsible for most of the expenses for the Pictou service, and the upkeep of the Halifax post office should rightly be covered by the packet postage, so the legislature refused to comply with the request made by the post office.
The lieutenant governor was in full sympathy with the legislature, and after fortifying himself with the opinions of his law officers as to the legal aspects of the case, appealed to the governor general to induce the Canadian government to take on themselves the proper share of the charge.
The lieutenant governor fully supported the legislature, and after consulting with his legal advisors about the case's legal aspects, he appealed to the governor general to encourage the Canadian government to take on their fair share of the costs.
The Canadian government for the reasons given could not see the propriety of their taking on themselves any part of the expense of conveying mails to their outport at Quebec, and the British government were powerless to bring pressure on the Canadians, since the treasury was in receipt annually of large remittances from Stayner as surplus post office revenues, which the British government, by their act of 1834, admitted to belong to the colonies, and which only awaited colonial legislation to be handed over to the several legislatures.
The Canadian government, for the reasons stated, could not justify covering any of the costs of delivering mail to their outport in Quebec. The British government was unable to pressure the Canadians, as the treasury was receiving significant annual remittances from Stayner as surplus post office revenues. By their 1834 act, the British government acknowledged that these funds belonged to the colonies, which only needed colonial legislation to be distributed to the various legislatures.
The treasury was willing also as a measure of grace to allow the colonial legislatures to retain the part of the packet postage collected in the colonies, if they would only adopt the scheme involved in the act of 1834. But it was not prepared to admit that any part of the packet was, as a matter of right, chargeable[Pg 248] with the maintenance of the post office at Halifax or of the Pictou coach service, and as it was becoming plain that the scheme of making Halifax the distributing centre for the Canadas, was not proving the success they hoped for, they determined to inquire as to the feasibility of having a port in the United States utilized in the exchange between Canada and Great Britain.
The treasury was also willing, as a gesture of goodwill, to let the colonial legislatures keep part of the packet postage collected in the colonies if they would just adopt the plan included in the act of 1834. However, it was not ready to accept that any part of the packet was, by right, accountable for funding the post office in Halifax or the Pictou coach service. As it became clear that the plan to make Halifax the distribution center for the Canadas was not achieving the success they had hoped for, they decided to look into the possibility of using a port in the United States for exchanges between Canada and Great Britain.[Pg 248]
To that end, an official of the British post office, W. J. Page, was sent to Nova Scotia to investigate this subject, and at the same time to make a thorough inquiry into the condition of the Nova Scotia post office, which had been animadverted upon rather severely by the royal commission, in its report of 1841.
To achieve that goal, an official from the British post office, W. J. Page, was sent to Nova Scotia to look into this matter and to conduct a detailed investigation into the state of the Nova Scotia post office, which had faced quite a bit of criticism from the royal commission in its 1841 report.
By means of Page's reports and of the report of this commission, we are enabled to give a clear account of the Nova Scotia post office in the beginning of the forties. There were eighteen post offices in the province at this period, and fifty-one sub-offices. The mails were carried on the route from Halifax to Pictou and St. John three times a week in summer and twice a week in winter.
By using Page's reports and the report from this commission, we can provide a clear overview of the Nova Scotia post office in the early 1840s. At that time, there were eighteen post offices in the province and fifty-one sub-offices. The mail was delivered on the route from Halifax to Pictou and St. John three times a week in the summer and twice a week in the winter.
From Pictou the mails were carried to Antigonishe twice a week, and with the same frequency from Halifax to Annapolis. Mails were carried in all directions throughout the province, but, with the exceptions mentioned, only once a week.
From Pictou, the mail was delivered to Antigonish twice a week, and the same goes for the route from Halifax to Annapolis. Mail was sent in every direction across the province, but apart from the mentioned routes, it was only once a week.
The management of this considerable system was in the hands of the deputy postmaster general and his assistant. It was impossible with the work demanding their attention in Halifax, and the deficiency of facilities for travel, that these two could give any attention to the offices which were not under their immediate eye, and consequently all attempts to exercise control over the operation of the system came by degrees to be abandoned. When postmasters were appointed, all the instructions they received were a few short directions from the deputy postmaster general, or from an outgoing predecessor, whose knowledge was a combination made up of the official instructions and the interpretations placed upon them, when occasion arose that required some action or decision on his part.
The management of this large system was in the hands of the deputy postmaster general and his assistant. With their work demanding their attention in Halifax and the lack of travel options, they couldn't really address the offices that weren't directly under their supervision. As a result, all attempts to maintain control over the system gradually faded away. When postmasters were appointed, the only guidance they received were a few brief instructions from the deputy postmaster general or from a predecessor, whose knowledge was a mix of official guidelines and the interpretations made when action or decisions were necessary.
The way offices—those peculiar products of the Maritime provinces—excited the ridicule of English and Canadian trained officials. Page, in a letter to the secretary of the general post office, expressed his despair of comprehending the varieties of origin or practice of these offices. Not one in ten of the keepers of these offices were appointed by Howe; nor did he or any one in his office know the names of many of them, though Howe considered the offices to have been sanctioned by him.[Pg 249]
The way offices—those strange products of the Maritime provinces—drew laughter from English and Canadian-trained officials. Page, in a letter to the secretary of the general post office, shared his frustration in trying to understand the different origins or practices of these offices. Not one out of ten of the people running these offices were appointed by Howe; nor did he or anyone in his office know the names of many of them, even though Howe believed the offices had his approval.[Pg 249]
What happened was like this: a postmaster would write to Howe telling him that there ought to be a house for leaving letters at, in such or such a village or settlement. If any person were mentioned as willing to take charge of the letters, Howe generally agreed to his being appointed, and considered the matter settled. If no particular person was mentioned, Howe agreed to the suggestion that there should be a receiving house in the place indicated, and left the selection to the postmaster.
What happened was like this: a postmaster would write to Howe telling him that there should be a place to leave letters in a specific village or settlement. If anyone was mentioned as willing to take care of the letters, Howe generally agreed to their appointment and considered the matter resolved. If no specific person was mentioned, Howe agreed to the idea of having a receiving house in the suggested location and left the choice up to the postmaster.
The whole affair was considered as a private matter between postmaster and way office keeper; no letter bills or forms of any description were ever supplied to the way office keepers, and so long as they paid to the postmasters the amount of postage due on letters sent to them for delivery, the very existence of these offices was ignored.
The whole situation was seen as a private issue between the postmaster and the way office keeper; no letter bills or forms of any kind were ever given to the way office keepers, and as long as they paid the postmasters the amount of postage owed on letters sent to them for delivery, the existence of these offices was overlooked.
These way offices were known locally as twopenny offices, that is, the keepers charged twopence on every letter passing through their hands. An instance will explain the mode of operation in these offices. A gentleman living in Port Hood, on the west coast of Cape Breton, stated that he had sent a double letter weighing less than half an ounce a distance of fifty miles; and as it had to pass through five way offices, the charge was one shilling and eightpence (thirty-three cents). He received letters from England, which cost one shilling and fourpence (twenty-seven cents) from England to the Straits of Canso; but the conveyance from that point to his home, a distance of twenty-six miles, cost one shilling and fourpence more.
These little post offices were called twopenny offices, meaning the operators charged two pence for every letter that went through them. Here’s an example of how these offices worked. A man living in Port Hood on the west coast of Cape Breton said he sent a double letter weighing less than half an ounce over a distance of fifty miles; since it had to go through five twopenny offices, the total charge was one shilling and eight pence (thirty-three cents). He got letters from England that cost one shilling and four pence (twenty-seven cents) to travel from England to the Straits of Canso, but getting it from there to his house, which was another twenty-six miles, cost another one shilling and four pence.
The anomalies were due partly to the mixed character of the control of the system in the province, and partly to the inability of the deputy postmaster general, owing to his lack of efficient help, to supervise the system. Howe was under the authority both of the postmaster general in England, and of the provincial government, which provided for the maintenance of a number of offices, which would not have been sanctioned by the postmaster general on account of the expense.
The irregularities were partly because of the mixed nature of the system's control in the province, and partly due to the deputy postmaster general's inability to manage it effectively due to insufficient assistance. Howe was answerable to both the postmaster general in England and the provincial government, which maintained several offices that the postmaster general would not have approved due to the costs involved.
Illegal conveyance of letters was the rule in this province, as well as in all the others. The great proportion of the correspondence between the towns and villages on the long coast was carried by trading vessels. On some of the main routes, notably from Halifax to Pictou and to Annapolis, there were fast four-horse coaches. They travelled eight miles an hour in summer and five in winter. They were employed to carry the mails, but it never happened that the mail bags contained as many letters as the pockets of the passengers.[Pg 250]
Illegal delivery of letters was common in this province, just like in all the others. A large portion of the communication between the towns and villages along the long coast was handled by trading ships. On some main routes, especially from Halifax to Pictou and Annapolis, there were speedy four-horse coaches. They traveled eight miles an hour in the summer and five in the winter. They were used to transport the mail, but it was rare for the mail bags to have as many letters as the pockets of the passengers.[Pg 250]
In Cape Breton there was not a single carriage road in the island. Most of the roads were mere bridle paths, and in many parts there were no roads of any kind. It took five days to carry the mail bag from Halifax to Sydney during the summer, and from eleven to eighteen in the winter.
In Cape Breton, there wasn't a single carriage road on the island. Most of the roads were just bridle paths, and in many areas, there weren't any roads at all. It took five days to deliver the mail bag from Halifax to Sydney during the summer, and between eleven to eighteen days in the winter.
The deputy postmaster general had a salary of £400 a year, which was supplemented by the amounts collected as newspaper postage. In 1841, the amount of this perquisite was £330 a year. It was a cause of complaint on the part of rival publishers that the Nova Scotian, the leading newspaper in the province, paid no postage. As the circulation of this paper—1400 copies a week—was more than double that of any other paper in the province, the grievance was a real one.
The deputy postmaster general earned £400 a year, which was boosted by the amounts collected for newspaper postage. In 1841, this additional income was £330 a year. Rival publishers complained that the Nova Scotian, the top newspaper in the province, paid no postage. Since the circulation of this paper—1,400 copies a week—was more than double that of any other paper in the province, their concerns were valid.
In explanation of the exemption, Howe stated that for ten years before he purchased the Nova Scotian, the proprietor, Joseph Howe, had assisted him in the management of the office for eleven months while the deputy postmaster general was in England, taking full management of the provincial system. For these services Joseph Howe had asked no compensation, and the deputy postmaster general had therefore taken no remuneration for mailing the newspapers.[272]
In explaining the exemption, Howe mentioned that for ten years before he bought the Nova Scotian, the owner, Joseph Howe, had helped him manage the office for eleven months while the deputy postmaster general was in England, taking full charge of the provincial system. Joseph Howe didn't ask for any payment for these services, so the deputy postmaster general didn't receive any compensation for mailing the newspapers.[272]
There were only two towns in the province where letters were delivered by carriers—Halifax and Yarmouth. In Halifax, the city was divided between two carriers, whose pay consisted of the fees they were entitled to take from the recipients of the letters they delivered, at a penny a letter. They attempted to charge the same sum for the delivery of each newspaper, but many persons would not pay the fee. The carriers received £2 10s. and £2 a week respectively. Yarmouth also had two carriers, whose penny fees gave them each about £12 10s. a year.
There were only two towns in the province where letters were delivered by carriers—Halifax and Yarmouth. In Halifax, the city was split between two carriers, whose pay came from the fees they charged recipients for the letters they delivered, at a penny per letter. They tried to charge the same amount for delivering each newspaper, but many people refused to pay the fee. The carriers earned £2 10s. and £2 a week, respectively. Yarmouth also had two carriers, whose penny fees gave them each about £12 10s. a year.
The relations between the deputy postmaster general and the provincial government were the subject of much critical comment on the part of Page. The fact that the government contributed to the maintenance of the less remunerative routes and post offices gave the executive and the assembly a colour of title to interfere in the management of the post office, which was exercised, in Page's opinion, beyond all due bounds.
The relationship between the deputy postmaster general and the provincial government faced a lot of criticism from Page. The government's financial support for less profitable routes and post offices gave the executive and the assembly a reason to interfere in the post office's management, which Page believed was done excessively.
The governor's secretary was in the habit of giving Howe orders, and if Howe showed any hesitation in complying with them, he became offensively peremptory. Investigations into complaints against postmasters were taken into the hands of a committee of[Pg 251] the assembly, in disregard of Howe's authority. As it appeared to Page, there was a determined effort to set aside the authority of the postmaster general and to take over the management of the system by the government. Howe at Page's instance, took a firm stand and informed the governor that, in case of conflict between the directions he received from England, and those given by the governor, it was the directions from St. Martins-le-Grand he was bound to obey.
The governor's secretary often gave Howe orders, and if Howe hesitated to follow them, the secretary became annoyingly demanding. Investigations into complaints against postmasters were handled by a committee of[Pg 251] the assembly, ignoring Howe's authority. Page believed there was a concerted effort to undermine the authority of the postmaster general and take control of the system for the government. At Page's suggestion, Howe took a strong stance and informed the governor that, in case of a conflict between the orders he received from England and those from the governor, he was obligated to follow the instructions from St. Martins-le-Grand.
The disappointment in the general post office over the failure of the plan to remove the difficulties with the government of Nova Scotia, which was largely due to the hopeless complication of the accounts, changed the attitude of the officials at home towards Howe from one of good will to one of censure, which reached the point that nearly determined them to dismiss Howe.
The disappointment at the main post office over the failure of the plan to sort out the issues with the government of Nova Scotia, mostly because of the complicated accounts, shifted the officials' attitude toward Howe from one of goodwill to one of disapproval, to the extent that they almost decided to fire Howe.
Page pointed out the injustice of such a step. Howe's position was one in which it was impossible to escape criticism from either the provincial authorities or his official superiors, whose views were frequently in sharp antagonism to one another. The part of the provincial system under Howe as deputy of the postmaster general in England had its accounting scheme, and the part, which was maintained by the legislature, had another, separate and distinct.
Page pointed out the unfairness of this action. Howe's role put him in a situation where he couldn't avoid criticism from either the provincial authorities or his official superiors, whose opinions often clashed. The section of the provincial system under Howe as deputy to the postmaster general in England had its own accounting method, while the part supported by the legislature had a different, separate one.
But the passing of letters between the recognized post offices and those established by the legislature, gave rise to accounts between the two systems under Howe's management, which it was practically impossible to adjust satisfactorily, unless by the adoption of a give-and-take system, to which neither the general post office nor the legislature showed any disposition.
But the exchange of letters between the official post offices and those created by the legislature led to accounts between the two systems under Howe's management, which was almost impossible to resolve satisfactorily, unless through a compromise system, to which neither the general post office nor the legislature seemed willing to agree.
Howe's death in January 1843 closed the question as to whether or not his administration was deserving of censure. It also brought to an end an era, within which the postal service had expanded from the single route extending from Halifax to Annapolis and Digby, over which the mail courier travelled but once a month, to the network of routes whose ramifications covered every part of the province.
Howe's death in January 1843 settled the debate over whether his administration deserved criticism. It also marked the end of an era during which the postal service grew from a single route running from Halifax to Annapolis and Digby, with the mail courier traveling just once a month, to a network of routes that reached every part of the province.
Judged by the only possible test, the administration of the Canadian service under Heriot, Sutherland and Stayner, the administration of the two Howes must be pronounced a conspicuous success. The deputies in Canada were faithful to their superiors in London, but they were so at the expense of the popularity of the postal service in the provinces.
Judged by the only possible test, the management of the Canadian service under Heriot, Sutherland, and Stayner, the administration of the two Howes must be considered a clear success. The deputies in Canada were loyal to their superiors in London, but this loyalty came at the cost of the postal service’s popularity in the provinces.
The Howes managed to extend their service equally with their Canadian colleagues, and at the same time held the good will of[Pg 252] the authorities in the province. Howe was a man who left no enemies. The governor, in discussing the postal difficulties of the province with Page, expressed the utmost good will for Howe himself, the only ground of complaint against him being an embarrassing intimacy with the members of the legislature.
The Howes managed to maintain their service just as well as their Canadian colleagues, while also keeping a positive relationship with[Pg 252] the authorities in the province. Howe was a person who had no enemies. The governor, when talking about the postal issues in the province with Page, expressed his complete support for Howe himself, with the only complaint being his close ties with the members of the legislature.
Page, who visited Nova Scotia for the purpose of inspecting Howe's administration, bore testimony, before Howe's death, to his kindly disposition and to the high respect in which he was held, officially and in private life. His rectitude in all his relations was never in question.[273]
Page, who went to Nova Scotia to check out Howe's administration, spoke highly of his warm character and the deep respect he earned, both officially and personally, before Howe passed away. His integrity in all his dealings was never in doubt.[273]
Howe's successor was Arthur Woodgate, who had served in the post office in Jersey. Woodgate administered the post office in Nova Scotia until the provincial system was absorbed in that of the dominion, when the confederation of the several provinces took place; until 1851, he was, as were his predecessors, deputy of the postmaster general in England; after that date he was postmaster general for the province of Nova Scotia.
Howe's successor was Arthur Woodgate, who had worked at the post office in Jersey. Woodgate ran the post office in Nova Scotia until the provincial system was integrated into the dominion during the confederation of the provinces; until 1851, he served, like his predecessors, as the deputy of the postmaster general in England; after that, he became the postmaster general for the province of Nova Scotia.
An immediate consequence of the death of Howe was the removal of the post office in Halifax from the site it had occupied to the Dalhousie college building. The merchants objected to the continuance of the post office in its former situation, and in the search of a more convenient location, it was observed that the ground floor of the college building, which was occupied as a tavern, offered advantages, which satisfied the mercantile community.
An immediate result of Howe's death was the relocation of the post office in Halifax from its previous site to the Dalhousie college building. The merchants objected to keeping the post office in its former location, and while searching for a more convenient spot, they noticed that the ground floor of the college building, currently used as a tavern, offered advantages that pleased the business community.
A lease was effected for the new quarters on the 6th of July, 1844, and the post office surveyor reported to the secretary that there was at the disposal of the department, a large and capacious room solely for the purposes of the inland sorting office; a delivery office, and a large room for sorting papers, all on the ground floor; while in the second storey there was ample accommodation for the deputy postmaster general and his staff.[274]
A lease was signed for the new office space on July 6, 1844, and the postal surveyor informed the secretary that the department had a large and spacious room available specifically for the inland sorting office; a delivery office, and a big room for sorting mail, all located on the ground floor; while on the second floor, there was plenty of space for the deputy postmaster general and his team.[274]
The question of a reduction in the postage rates engaged the attention of the legislature every session, after the beneficial results of penny postage in Great Britain became known. In March 1842, the assembly, which was at this time under the speakership of Joseph Howe, petitioned to have the charges taken entirely off newspapers and pamphlets. As newspapers were almost the only vehicles of information in the province, and the postal charges were collected entirely from the rural parts, they were a heavy burden on people who could least bear it.[Pg 253]
The issue of lowering postage rates grabbed the attention of the legislature in every session after the successful introduction of penny postage in Great Britain became known. In March 1842, the assembly, led by Joseph Howe at the time, petitioned to eliminate charges for newspapers and pamphlets entirely. Since newspapers were nearly the only source of information in the province, and postal fees were mainly collected from rural areas, these charges were a significant burden on those who could least afford it.[Pg 253]
The postmaster general in reply stated that the proposition to relieve newspapers altogether from postage could not be considered, but a reduction in the charge was at that time being considered by the treasury. Newspapers were increasing so rapidly, at the existing rates, that it was becoming a question, with the bad state of the roads, as to how to provide for their transmission. Pamphlets were being charged as letters in England, and it would be impossible to sanction their free conveyance in the colonies.
The postmaster general replied that the idea of completely removing postage for newspapers couldn't be considered, but the treasury was looking into reducing the fees. Newspapers were increasing so quickly at the current rates that, given the poor condition of the roads, it was becoming a challenge to figure out how to deliver them. In England, pamphlets were being charged as letters, and it would be impossible to allow free delivery for them in the colonies.
At the same time the assembly requested the lieutenant governor to have inquiries made as to the feasibility and effect on the revenue of a uniform rate on letters of fourpence per half ounce within the province. The deputy postmaster general, to whom the question was referred, was strongly opposed to the proposition. He was convinced that the increase in the correspondence would be slight, and that, at the rate mentioned, the revenue would not be sufficient to pay the cost of any one of the principal routes in the province.
At the same time, the assembly asked the lieutenant governor to look into how practical it would be and what the impact on revenue might be if there was a uniform rate of fourpence per half ounce for letters across the province. The deputy postmaster general, who was asked to consider the matter, strongly opposed the idea. He believed that the increase in mail volume would be minimal and that, with the proposed rate, the revenue wouldn't be enough to cover the cost of any of the main routes in the province.
At the beginning of 1844, the changes, already mentioned, of charging letters by weight instead of number of enclosures, and of charging newspapers a halfpenny per sheet, came into operation in the Maritime provinces. These ameliorations went as far as the officials of the post office were prepared to recommend, in the existing state of the finances of the provincial post office. The assembly in Nova Scotia were persistent in their demand for a reduction in the charges on letters. They had before them the evidence taken that year in England as to the effect of penny postage, which had then been in operation three years.
At the beginning of 1844, the previously mentioned changes, including charging for letters by weight instead of the number of enclosures and charging newspapers a halfpenny per sheet, were implemented in the Maritime provinces. These improvements were as much as the post office officials were willing to suggest, given the current financial situation of the provincial post office. The assembly in Nova Scotia consistently pushed for a reduction in letter charges. They had the evidence gathered that year in England regarding the impact of penny postage, which had been in effect for three years at that time.
The resolutions the assembly adopted were fully borne out by that evidence. They resolved that the experience of the parent state had clearly established that "the introduction of a uniform rate of penny postage has had a beneficial effect upon the social and commercial classes of the United Kingdom; has largely increased the number of letters passing through the post office and prevented the illicit transmission of letters by private opportunities, and that its effect has been fully counterbalanced by the other important consequences resulting from it."[275]
The resolutions adopted by the assembly were clearly supported by the evidence. They determined that the experience of the parent state had clearly shown that "introducing a standard penny postage rate has positively impacted the social and commercial sectors of the United Kingdom; significantly increased the volume of mail sent through the post office, and prevented the illegal sending of letters by private means, and that its effects have been completely offset by other significant outcomes resulting from it."[275]
The assembly were therefore satisfied that a fourpenny rate established under the same regulations as to the use of postage stamps, would promote the public interests, not add materially to the labour of management, and ultimately increase the public revenue.
The assembly was therefore convinced that a four-penny rate set up under the same rules regarding the use of postage stamps would benefit the public, not significantly increase management work, and eventually boost public revenue.
Coupled with this resolution was another to the effect that it[Pg 254] would be desirable to have the provincial post office under the control and management of the legislature. With this point, the secretary of the post office dealt at length in a memorandum to the postmaster general.
Coupled with this resolution was another one stating that it[Pg 254] would be better to have the provincial post office managed by the legislature. The secretary of the post office elaborated on this point in a memorandum to the postmaster general.
In his opinion very great advantage resulted from the present system, by which the control of the post offices in the greater part of the British colonies was vested in the postmaster general. To abandon it would be extremely prejudicial, and would have the effect of breaking up the existing organization (which he was at that time endeavouring to make as uniform as possible for the whole empire) into various conflicting systems framed according to the views and feelings of each separate colony, to the great detriment of the general interests of the empire.
In his view, there were significant benefits from the current system, which placed control of the post offices in most British colonies under the postmaster general. Abandoning this system would be very damaging and would result in the existing organization (which he was trying to standardize across the entire empire) breaking down into different, conflicting systems based on the perspectives and opinions of each individual colony, ultimately harming the overall interests of the empire.
Loud complaints, the postmaster general was reminded by the secretary, were being made respecting the post offices in Australia, where four different scales of rates of postage were in operation, resulting in inconveniences which a recently appointed commission of inquiry were authorized to obviate. He regarded it as a great advantage that one uniform system of management and one uniform scale of rates of postage should prevail in the North American provinces, in Newfoundland and in the West Indies.
Loud complaints, the postmaster general was reminded by the secretary, were being made about the post offices in Australia, where four different postage rates were in use, creating inconveniences that a recently appointed inquiry commission was set up to fix. He saw it as a significant benefit for there to be one consistent management system and one standard postage rate across the North American provinces, Newfoundland, and the West Indies.
The reply of the postmaster general, which was based on the secretary's report,[276] received the cordial assent of the legislature. After reviewing the condition of the colonial post offices in their relation to the imperial system, the postal committee of the legislature declared that "the promptness and celerity of intercourse is unrivalled in the world, and has greatly contributed to the commercial advancement of the nation. So complicated is the British postal system that, without the details, it is not possible to obtain a conception of its present perfection. Nowhere is inviolability of letters more respected than in England and the United States, and by the constitution of the latter, adopted in 1789, exclusive power is given to congress to establish post offices and post roads, thus preventing the difficulties which would have resulted from leaving this department to the several states."
The response from the postmaster general, which was based on the secretary's report,[276] received enthusiastic support from the legislature. After examining the state of the colonial post offices in relation to the imperial system, the postal committee of the legislature stated that "the speed and efficiency of communication is unmatched in the world, and has significantly contributed to the nation’s commercial growth. The British postal system is so intricate that, without the specifics, it’s impossible to grasp its current effectiveness. Nowhere is the confidentiality of letters more honored than in England and the United States, and under the Constitution of the latter, adopted in 1789, Congress is given exclusive authority to set up post offices and post roads, thereby avoiding the problems that would have arisen from delegating this responsibility to individual states."
On this point, then, the committee advised that the house should yield to the wisdom of the imperial parliament. They returned, however, to the question of a uniform fourpenny rate for letters, which in their opinion would facilitate intercourse, and ultimately carry the revenue far beyond the amount expended[Pg 255] for the maintenance of the service. Since Hill made the use of postage stamps an integral and important part of his scheme for penny postage, the legislature, in again expressing its faith in the benefits and feasibility of the uniform fourpenny rate, directed attention to the merits of postage stamps.
On this matter, the committee recommended that the house should trust the judgment of the imperial parliament. However, they revisited the topic of a standard fourpenny rate for letters, which they believed would enhance communication and eventually generate revenue exceeding the costs[Pg 255] of maintaining the service. Since Hill established the use of postage stamps as a crucial and significant aspect of his plan for penny postage, the legislature, in reaffirming its confidence in the advantages and practicality of the uniform fourpenny rate, highlighted the benefits of postage stamps.
The postmaster general was of opinion that this suggestion should not be entertained. Any proposal for allowing postage stamps to be used in the colonies had hitherto been resisted from a fear, amongst other objections, that forged stamps would find their way into circulation with little fear of detection. The solicitor of the post office was of opinion that if forgery were committed in the United Kingdom it could not be punished in the colonies, whilst on the other hand, if committed in any of the colonies, it could be visited with no penalty on parties in the United Kingdom.
The postmaster general believed that this suggestion shouldn't be considered. Any proposal to allow postage stamps to be used in the colonies had always been opposed due to concerns, among other issues, that counterfeit stamps would circulate with little chance of being detected. The post office's solicitor thought that if forgery happened in the United Kingdom, it couldn't be punished in the colonies, but if it occurred in any of the colonies, there would be no penalty for those in the United Kingdom.
With the acquiescence of the Nova Scotia legislature in the view of the general post office as to the desirability of maintaining a centralized imperial postal system, and the only outstanding question on which there was disagreement that of a reduction of postage rates, it will be expedient to bring forward the narrative of events with respect to the post office in New Brunswick. The information amassed by the royal commission makes this an easy task.
With the approval of the Nova Scotia legislature regarding the importance of keeping a centralized imperial postal system, and the only remaining disagreement being about lowering postage rates, it will be appropriate to present the story of events related to the post office in New Brunswick. The information gathered by the royal commission makes this a straightforward task.
What strikes one at first glance is the little progress that had been made since 1825, when Howe made his official tour through the province. In 1825, the population stood at 75,000, and in 1841 it had risen to nearly 160,000. The increase was distributed with considerable evenness over every part of the province, though the preponderance found its way to the outlying districts. The numerous settlements thus established would seem to call for a wide extension of the postal service.
What stands out at first glance is the minimal progress made since 1825 when Howe officially toured the province. In 1825, the population was 75,000, and by 1841 it had grown to nearly 160,000. The increase was fairly evenly spread across the province, although most of it went to the rural areas. The many settlements established seem to indicate a strong need for an expanded postal service.
But little was done to meet the requirements. There were nine post offices in the province in 1825: in 1841, when the population had more than doubled and was scarcely less than half what it is to-day, there were no more than twenty-three. Between Fredericton and Woodstock, a stretch of sixty-two miles of well-settled country, there were no post offices. The districts lying between Fredericton and Sussexvale, eighty-eight miles, and between Fredericton and Chatham, one hundred and fifteen miles, embracing many farming communities, were equally unprovided for, which is the more inexplicable since couriers travelled through all these districts to the several points mentioned, and the expense[Pg 256] for post offices would have been more than covered by the revenues of the offices.
But not much was done to meet the needs. In 1825, there were nine post offices in the province; by 1841, when the population had more than doubled and was nearly half of what it is today, there were only twenty-three. Between Fredericton and Woodstock, a distance of sixty-two miles of well-populated land, there were no post offices. The areas between Fredericton and Sussexvale, eighty-eight miles, and between Fredericton and Chatham, one hundred and fifteen miles, which included many farming communities, were also without service. This is even more puzzling because couriers traveled through all these areas to various points mentioned, and the costs for post offices would have easily been covered by the revenue from the offices.
The system of mail routes can be described shortly. From Halifax there was a main post road, which entered New Brunswick a few miles west of Amherst, and following in its general lines the course of the inter-colonial railway passed the bend at Moncton, and continued its way on to St. John. At a point near the present Norton station, called the Fingerboard, there was a route to Fredericton.
The mail route system can be summed up briefly. From Halifax, there was a main post road that entered New Brunswick a few miles west of Amherst, and generally followed the path of the inter-colonial railway, passing the bend at Moncton, and continued on to St. John. Near what is now Norton station, at a spot called the Fingerboard, there was a route to Fredericton.
Over these routes the courier travelled twice each way weekly. Between Fredericton and Chatham, there was a service of the same frequency. Chatham was the distributing point for the line of settlements, skirting the shore, northward to Campbellton, and southward to Dorchester. On the former route, the trips were made weekly, and on the latter, twice a week. Mails were carried daily between Fredericton and Woodstock, Fredericton and St. John and St. John and St. Andrews.
Over these routes, the courier traveled twice a week in each direction. Between Fredericton and Chatham, there was the same schedule. Chatham served as the distribution point for the line of settlements along the shore, heading north to Campbellton and south to Dorchester. On the northern route, trips were made weekly, while on the southern route, they were scheduled twice a week. Mails were sent daily between Fredericton and Woodstock, Fredericton and St. John, and St. John and St. Andrews.
Though, in comparison with the other provinces, the mail conveyance in New Brunswick was not greatly open to criticism in point of frequency, the post office was no more popular there than elsewhere. Steamers, which ran daily between St. John and Fredericton, were employed by the post office to carry the mails, but though the steamer carried many every trip, there were few of which the post office got the benefit.
Though the mail delivery in New Brunswick was fairly reliable compared to other provinces, the post office was just as unpopular there as it was elsewhere. The post office used steamers that ran daily between St. John and Fredericton to transport the mail, but even though the steamer carried a good number of passengers each trip, the post office rarely benefited from it.
There was a practice of taking letters to the steamer and tossing them on to the table in the cabin. On the arrival of the steamer in port, a crowd of messenger boys who were awaiting it picked up the letters from the table and delivered them through the town at one penny or twopence each.
There was a routine of taking letters to the steamer and tossing them onto the table in the cabin. When the steamer arrived at the port, a group of messenger boys waiting for it grabbed the letters from the table and delivered them around town for a penny or two.
The stage coaches were laid under contribution in the same irregular manner. Every passenger between St. John and Fredericton was expected to take with him all his friends' letters, which he either delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed, or deposited in the post office, the postmaster receiving a penny each for delivering them. A stratagem sometimes employed was to place letters in the midst of a bundle of paper and sticks of wood, the freight of the bundle being less than the postage on the letters it contained.
The stagecoaches were used in a similar haphazard way. Every passenger traveling between St. John and Fredericton was expected to bring all of his friends' letters, which he either delivered directly to the intended recipients or dropped off at the post office, where the postmaster charged a penny for each letter delivered. One trick sometimes used was to hide the letters among a bundle of paper and firewood, with the shipping cost of the bundle being lower than the postage on the letters inside it.
It was at this time that the legislature of New Brunswick began to manifest an interest in the management of the post office. In 1841, a special committee of the assembly reviewed the operation of the system, and among the questions discussed was the authority.[Pg 257]
It was during this time that the New Brunswick legislature started showing interest in managing the post office. In 1841, a special committee from the assembly examined how the system was operating, and one of the topics discussed was authority.[Pg 257]
The committee expressed the opinion that no arrangement could be satisfactory which did not combine provincial control of the local post office with a general imperial oversight over the whole system; and they recommended that a deputy postmaster general should be appointed whose duty it should be to prescribe mail routes, open post offices, appoint postmasters, and generally to manage the business of the post office in the province.[277]
The committee believes that no solution can be satisfactory unless it combines local control of post offices with overall supervision from the central government; they suggested appointing a deputy postmaster general responsible for setting mail routes, opening post offices, appointing postmasters, and generally managing the postal system in the province.[277]
The question of local management the general post office proposed to solve, not in the manner desired by the assembly, but by separating New Brunswick from the jurisdiction of the deputy postmaster general at Halifax, and establishing a department in the province, under a deputy postmaster general who should be stationed at St. John, and who should be, as the deputies in the other provinces were, subject to the postmaster general of England.
The issue of local management that the general post office aimed to address was not resolved in the way the assembly wanted. Instead, they proposed to pull New Brunswick out of the deputy postmaster general’s authority in Halifax and create a new department in the province. This department would be led by a deputy postmaster general based in St. John, who would also report to the postmaster general in England, just like the deputies in the other provinces.
Local control was partially effected, as in the other provinces, by vesting the appointment of all officials, except the deputy postmaster general and the inspector, in the lieutenant governor. On the 6th of July, 1843, a separate establishment was set up in New Brunswick with John Howe, the son of the late deputy postmaster general for Nova Scotia, in charge as deputy postmaster general.
Local control was partially implemented, as in the other provinces, by placing the appointment of all officials, except for the deputy postmaster general and the inspector, in the hands of the lieutenant governor. On July 6, 1843, a separate office was established in New Brunswick with John Howe, the son of the late deputy postmaster general for Nova Scotia, serving as deputy postmaster general.
The arrangement had, at first, only a qualified success. It was criticized by the legislature as having nearly doubled the expense of the establishment, and by the post office officials on the ground that it introduced the local politician into the system.
The setup had, at first, only limited success. It was criticized by the legislature for nearly doubling the cost of the operation, and by the post office officials on the grounds that it brought local politicians into the mix.
As illustration of the introduction of local political mechanics, Page reported to the secretary of the post office that the deputy postmaster general, having had to dismiss a postmaster for very gross mismanagement, applied to the lieutenant governor for a nomination for the vacant office.[278] The lieutenant governor nominated the dismissed man, and when the nomination was refused, he proposed to appoint the late postmaster's son. The explanation was that the postmaster was a leading politician, and his re-nomination had been insisted upon by the political manager, whom the governor consulted.
As an example of how local political mechanics work, Page reported to the secretary of the post office that the deputy postmaster general had to fire a postmaster due to serious mismanagement and requested a nomination for the open position from the lieutenant governor.[278] The lieutenant governor nominated the fired postmaster, and when that nomination was turned down, he suggested appointing the former postmaster's son instead. The reasoning was that the postmaster was a prominent politician, and his re-nomination had been pushed by the political manager consulted by the governor.
The lieutenant governor viewed with no favour the independent powers of the deputy postmaster general. In the course of a dispute over the dismissal by the deputy postmaster general of a person whom he had appointed, the lieutenant governor laid his[Pg 258] opinions and desires energetically before the colonial secretary. He requested that the general post office should be removed from St. John to Fredericton in order that the latter might be more effectually under the control of the lieutenant governor; and that the post office surveyor or inspector should make his reports to himself and not to the deputy postmaster general. His views were held to be quite untenable, the postmaster general pointing out that if carried into effect, they would make the governor the deputy postmaster general.
The lieutenant governor did not favor the independent powers of the deputy postmaster general. During a dispute over the dismissal of someone the deputy postmaster general had appointed, the lieutenant governor vigorously expressed his opinions and desires to the colonial secretary. He requested that the general post office be moved from St. John to Fredericton so that it would be more effectively under the lieutenant governor's control, and that the post office surveyor or inspector should report to him instead of the deputy postmaster general. His suggestions were considered quite unreasonable, with the postmaster general pointing out that if implemented, they would effectively make the governor the deputy postmaster general.
St. John and Fredericton were the only towns in New Brunswick in which correspondence was delivered by letter carrier. In St. John there were two carriers, who covered the city together, one delivering letters, the other newspapers. They were paid a penny for each letter or newspaper. In Fredericton there was only one carrier, who was in the employ of the postmaster, who retained the sums collected as his own perquisite.
St. John and Fredericton were the only towns in New Brunswick where mail was delivered by a letter carrier. In St. John, there were two carriers who worked together in the city—one delivered letters, while the other delivered newspapers. They earned a penny for each letter or newspaper. In Fredericton, there was just one carrier employed by the postmaster, who kept the money collected as his own personal gain.
New Brunswick was in no respect behind the sister provinces in its demand for the essential thing—a reduced rate of postage. The chamber of commerce of St. John, in 1841, petitioned the postmaster general to reduce the rate on letters exchanged between any of the post offices on the route between St. John and Halifax to threepence, arguing that British letters for places anywhere in the colonies were carried from Halifax inward for one penny (the rate was really twopence), and that letters were exchanged between the remotest places in the United States for one shilling and threepence.
New Brunswick was just as eager as its neighboring provinces for a crucial change—a lower postage rate. In 1841, the St. John Chamber of Commerce asked the postmaster general to lower the rate on letters sent between any post offices along the route from St. John to Halifax to three pence. They pointed out that British letters sent to any location in the colonies were transported from Halifax for just one penny (which was actually two pence), while letters were exchanged between the most distant places in the United States for one shilling and three pence.
To the point respecting the conveyance of British letters, the postmaster general replied that this part of the service was carried on at a heavy loss, which was only to be justified as an imperial measure.
To clarify about the delivery of British letters, the postmaster general responded that this part of the service operated at a significant loss, which could only be justified as a national necessity.
A legislative committee sitting in the same year went beyond the chamber of commerce in its recommendations.[279] It was of opinion that there should be a uniform rate on letters circulating within the province, and that that rate should not exceed twopence. They, also, recommended that newspapers, legislative papers and small pamphlets, being for the political education of the people, should be exempt from postage altogether. They foresaw a temporary loss if their recommendations were carried into effect, but considered that any such loss should be made good by the legislature.
A legislative committee that met that same year went further than the chamber of commerce in its recommendations.[279] They believed there should be a uniform rate for letters sent within the province, and that this rate shouldn't exceed two pence. They also suggested that newspapers, legislative documents, and small pamphlets, which are meant for educating the public politically, should be completely exempt from postage. They anticipated a temporary loss if their recommendations were implemented but thought that any such loss should be compensated by the legislature.
In 1843 the legislature took up the subject again, repeating their desire for free newspapers, and requesting that the rate on[Pg 259] letters exchanged within the province be fixed at threepence a single letter.[280]
In 1843, the legislature revisited the topic, once again expressing their wish for free newspapers and asking that the rate for letters exchanged within the province be set at three pence for each letter.[280]
The assembly, in 1845, addressed the king on the whole question of the post office.[281] After remonstrating on the large increase in the cost of the provincial service, as the result of erecting a separate establishment, they complained that, in order to bring the expenditure within the revenue, the department had cut off several routes and reduced the frequency of the couriers' trips on others. The charges on letters and newspapers were so high as to impede correspondence.
The assembly, in 1845, spoke to the king about the entire issue of the post office.[281] After expressing concern over the significant rise in the cost of the provincial service due to creating a separate establishment, they pointed out that to keep spending in line with revenue, the department had eliminated several routes and decreased how often couriers made trips on others. The fees for letters and newspapers were so high that they hindered communication.
The assembly in this address gave it as their opinion that if the charges on letters were reduced by one-half, and were abolished altogether as regards newspapers, the receipts would soon be greater than they were. The legislature had expended £145,000 on the main roads during the preceding ten years, and it was disheartening that the postal accommodation was less than it had formerly been.
The assembly in this address believed that if the charges on letters were cut by half, and completely eliminated for newspapers, the revenue would quickly increase beyond its previous levels. The legislature had spent £145,000 on the main roads over the last ten years, and it was discouraging that the postal services had become less efficient than before.
In their requests in 1845 for reduction of charges, the legislature were more conservative than they had been in earlier sessions. Still maintaining that newspapers should circulate free of postage, they were content to ask that the charges on letters should range from sixpence to twopence, according to the distance they were carried. They asked that the deputy postmaster general be required to establish such additional service as the legislature might see fit to demand; that the accounts of the provincial system be laid annually, in full detail, before the legislature, and that any surplus revenue be devoted to extending the facilities for inter-provincial communication. In consideration of the foregoing requests being granted, the legislature pledged themselves to provide such additional sums as might from time to time be required to defray the current charges.
In their 1845 requests to lower charges, the legislature was more cautious than in previous sessions. While still believing that newspapers should be delivered without postage, they were okay with asking for letter charges to be between sixpence and twopence, depending on the distance. They requested that the deputy postmaster general set up any extra services that the legislature might need; that the accounts of the provincial system be presented annually in full detail to the legislature, and that any surplus revenue be used to improve inter-provincial communication. In exchange for these requests being granted, the legislature promised to provide any additional funds needed to cover the ongoing charges.
The colonial office replied to this address in October of the same year.[282] The principal points dealt with were the petition for free newspapers, and the complaint that the accommodation to the public had been diminished.
The colonial office responded to this address in October of the same year.[282] The main issues addressed were the request for free newspapers and the complaint that public accommodations had been reduced.
On the latter point, the colonial secretary stated that no services had been affected, except where they were unnecessary. As for the question of free newspapers, if New Brunswick could be dealt with separately from the other provinces, there could be no objection to meeting their wishes, but in view of the fact that the effect[Pg 260] on the other provinces had to be considered, the request of New Brunswick could not be granted.
On the latter point, the colonial secretary said that no services had been impacted, except for those that weren’t needed. Regarding the issue of free newspapers, if New Brunswick could be treated separately from the other provinces, there wouldn’t be any objection to accommodating their request. However, since the impact on the other provinces had to be taken into account, New Brunswick's request could not be approved.
The legislature in the following session took issue with the colonial secretary on this point. It was quite open to Nova Scotia or any of the other provinces to adopt the same policy as New Brunswick considered advisable. The legislature took a course, which had not hitherto been pursued by the other provinces. They besought the co-operation of a sister province in an effort to have their desires carried into effect. They sent a copy of the address of the previous session to Canada and suggested a joint effort to secure reduced rates for the North American colonies, by guaranteeing a sufficient sum in proportion to the business of the respective provinces to make up any deficiency of a temporary nature that might be caused by such reduction.
The legislature in the next session disagreed with the colonial secretary on this issue. It was entirely possible for Nova Scotia or any of the other provinces to adopt the same policy that New Brunswick deemed appropriate. The legislature took a route that had not been taken by the other provinces before. They sought the cooperation of a neighboring province to help get their wishes implemented. They sent a copy of the address from the previous session to Canada and proposed a joint effort to secure lower rates for the North American colonies by promising a sufficient amount based on the business of each province to cover any temporary shortfall that might result from such a reduction.
The post office in Prince Edward Island was involved in none of the controversies, which agitated the people of the other provinces. It owed its immunity to its low estate. Its revenues were never equal to the cost of its maintenance, and consequently it was not a subject for exploitation. A post office was opened at Charlottetown in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and until 1827 it was the only institution of the kind in the island.
The post office in Prince Edward Island wasn't caught up in any of the controversies that stirred the people in other provinces. Its lack of involvement was due to its low status. Its income never matched its operating costs, so it wasn't a target for exploitation. A post office was established in Charlottetown at the start of the nineteenth century, and until 1827, it was the only one of its kind on the island.
Letters addressed to persons dwelling outside of Charlottetown, no matter how far, remained in the post office in that town until called for. This state of things led to many inconveniences, but it was not until 1827 that it received official attention.
Letters sent to people living outside Charlottetown, no matter the distance, stayed in the post office in that town until they were picked up. This situation caused a lot of inconveniences, but it wasn't officially addressed until 1827.
Lieutenant governor Ready, in the course of his speech at the opening of the legislature in that year, pointed out the necessity of establishing a postal system in the island, "as affording the means of a speedy and safe communication with our distant population, and of conveying to them a knowledge of the laws and proceedings of the government, which, while it contributes to the security of the people, serves also to guard them against the effects of misrepresentation and misconception."[283]
Lieutenant Governor Ready, while speaking at the opening of the legislature that year, emphasized the need to set up a postal system on the island "to provide a fast and secure way to communicate with our far-off residents and to inform them about the laws and activities of the government, which not only helps ensure the safety of the people but also protects them from the impacts of misinformation and misunderstandings."[283]
The legislature having expressed their concurrence in these views, the postmaster of Charlottetown was directed to open a number of post offices, and establish the necessary courier routes. The system began operations on the 1st of July following.
The legislature agreed with these views, so the postmaster of Charlottetown was instructed to open several post offices and set up the required courier routes. The system started operations on July 1st of the following year.
There were three routes established. The western courier exchanged mails at New London, Malpeque, Traveller's Rest and Tryon River, his route being nearly ninety miles in length. The eastern courier served St. Peter's Road, St. Peters, Bay[Pg 261] Fortune and Grand River. This route was upwards of one hundred miles. The south-east courier travelled fifty-three miles, and exchanged mails at Seal River and Three Rivers.
There were three established routes. The western courier delivered mail at New London, Malpeque, Traveller's Rest, and Tryon River, covering almost ninety miles. The eastern courier served St. Peter's Road, St. Peters, Bay Fortune, and Grand River, which was over one hundred miles long. The south-east courier traveled fifty-three miles and exchanged mail at Seal River and Three Rivers.
The couriers performed their services weekly in summer and fortnightly in winter. The rates of postage were fixed by the legislature without regard to the postmaster general of England, and were twopence a letter and one-halfpenny a newspaper. The report of these proceedings rather disturbed the deputy postmaster general at Halifax, whose jurisdiction included Prince Edward Island and who expressed his disapproval of the course pursued by the authorities. He notified the postmaster of Charlottetown that there was no power possessed by the government of any colony of Great Britain to establish post offices and set up couriers, and demanded to be furnished with the orders under which the postmaster had acted.
The couriers offered their services weekly in summer and every other week in winter. The postage rates were set by the legislature without consulting the postmaster general of England, and were two pence per letter and one and a half pence per newspaper. The report of these actions upset the deputy postmaster general in Halifax, whose area of responsibility included Prince Edward Island, and he expressed his disagreement with the actions taken by the authorities. He informed the postmaster in Charlottetown that no colony of Great Britain had the authority to create post offices and establish couriers, and requested the orders that the postmaster had followed.
The secretary of the general post office, in a letter to the postmaster general, pointed out that the measures taken by the legislature of Prince Edward Island were entirely illegal, but that it was a question how far it might be expedient or politic to interfere in a settlement where the deputy postmaster general had not thought it necessary to establish internal communications; particularly when the communications, if established, would probably not produce revenue sufficient to cover the expenses.
The secretary of the general post office, in a letter to the postmaster general, pointed out that the actions taken by the legislature of Prince Edward Island were completely illegal, but it was a question of how wise or strategic it would be to intervene in a situation where the deputy postmaster general hadn’t deemed it necessary to set up internal communications; especially since, if those communications were set up, they likely wouldn’t generate enough revenue to cover the costs.
He therefore suggested no interference be made for the present with the arrangements in the island, and that Howe, the deputy postmaster general, should watch the financial results of the system. If it should appear that a revenue should arise, then the local authorities might be advised that the postmaster general would take the arrangements into his own hands, under the powers given by his patent, and by various acts of parliament.
He suggested that there should be no interference with the current arrangements on the island and that Howe, the deputy postmaster general, should monitor the financial outcomes of the system. If it turned out that revenue was generated, then the local authorities could be informed that the postmaster general would take control of the arrangements, using the powers granted by his patent and various acts of parliament.
The postmaster general concurred, and Howe was duly instructed. As it appeared at the end of the first year's operations, that the revenue derived from the posts set up by the legislature amounted to £268, while the expenses were £383, the postmaster general decided to leave the service in the charge of the legislature, with instructions to Howe to keep his attention alive to the subject in case a change in the financial results might make it desirable for the postmaster general to assert his authority.
The postmaster general agreed, and Howe was officially instructed. By the end of the first year's operations, the revenue from the posts established by the legislature totaled £268, while the expenses were £383. The postmaster general decided to leave the service under the legislature's management, instructing Howe to stay alert to the matter in case a shift in financial results would make it necessary for the postmaster general to take back control.
The outcome of the negotiations was that the revenue collected by the post office in its internal system was passed over to the provincial treasury, which defrayed the cost of maintaining the couriers. The situation remained unchanged until 1851, when the[Pg 262] control of the post office was formally transferred to the colonial legislature. The financial results of the system were at no time of any considerable magnitude, and the expenses constantly outran the revenue, though not sufficiently to make the post office a serious burden on the provincial revenues. In the year 1850, the total net receipts were £1441, and the expenditure was £1528.
The result of the negotiations was that the income generated by the post office within its own system was handed over to the provincial treasury, which covered the cost of maintaining the couriers. This situation stayed the same until 1851, when the[Pg 262] control of the post office was officially moved to the colonial legislature. The financial results of the system were never significant, and the expenses consistently exceeded the revenue, though not enough to make the post office a major burden on the provincial finances. In 1850, the total net income was £1441, and the expenses were £1528.
CHAPTER XV
Reversal of attitude of British government on post office control—Instructions to Lord Elgin—Provincial postal conference—Control of post office relinquished to colonies.
Reversal of the British government's stance on post office control—Instructions to Lord Elgin—Provincial postal conference—Control of the post office handed over to the colonies.
The ministry formed by Lord John Russell, which took office on July 6, 1846, gave its immediate attention to the condition of the post office in the North American colonies, and a few weeks after taking office, Lord Clanricarde, the postmaster general, laid a proposition before the treasury[284] which had for its object the severance of the relations between the colonial system and the general post office and the withdrawal of the latter from all responsibility respecting the service in the provinces.
The government led by Lord John Russell, which began its term on July 6, 1846, quickly focused on the state of the post office in the North American colonies. Just a few weeks after taking office, Lord Clanricarde, the postmaster general, presented a proposal to the treasury[284] aimed at breaking the connection between the colonial system and the general post office, effectively removing the latter from any responsibility related to the service in the provinces.
The reversal of policy in this case was as remarkable for suddenness as that which, in the same year, had brought about the abolition of the Corn Laws. As late as June 9, the secretary of the post office submitted a proposition from Stayner for a substantial reduction in the rates, with many doubts as to the propriety of accepting it. He pointed out that it would involve, at least temporarily, so great a shrinkage in the revenues, that the treasury would be faced with alternatives almost equally distasteful, but one of which it would be obliged to adopt. The treasury must be prepared either to take on itself the deficits certain to arise, or must call upon the colonial legislatures to meet them.
The policy change in this case was as striking for its suddenness as the one that led to the repeal of the Corn Laws that same year. Just on June 9, the post office secretary presented a proposal from Stayner for a significant reduction in rates, while expressing many concerns about whether it was appropriate to accept it. He pointed out that it would result, at least in the short term, in such a huge drop in revenue that the treasury would face equally unappealing choices, but would have to choose one. The treasury would need to be ready to either absorb the inevitable deficits or ask the colonial legislatures to cover them.
While the treasury was deliberating, a new postmaster general supervened, who was quite prepared to face the idea of colonial postal systems over which he ceased to have control. With the insistent petitions from Canada and New Brunswick before him, he came to the conclusion that the time had arrived when it was no longer expedient for the general post office to continue responsibility for postal systems, which had to subserve interests understood only by those whom they concerned. With certain safeguards, he had no fear for the impairment of imperial interests.
While the treasury was discussing matters, a new postmaster general stepped in, ready to deal with the idea of colonial postal systems that were no longer under his control. Faced with repeated requests from Canada and New Brunswick, he concluded that it was no longer practical for the general post office to be responsible for postal systems that served interests understood only by those directly involved. With some protections in place, he was confident that imperial interests would not be compromised.
The course of reasoning by which Clanricarde reached the conclusions he communicated to the treasury were as follows:[Pg 264] The unanimity of the demands of the colonial legislatures left no doubt that the postage rates must undergo a very considerable reduction; and there was equally little doubt that the consequences of this reduction would be a diminution of revenue so considerable that a large deficit would be inevitable. New Brunswick, the new postmaster general recalled, had undertaken to make good its portion of the deficiency, and there was every probability that the other provinces would assume the same obligation.
The reasoning that Clanricarde used to reach the conclusions he shared with the treasury was as follows:[Pg 264] The agreement among the colonial legislatures was clear that postage rates needed to be significantly reduced; it was also clear that this reduction would lead to a substantial loss in revenue, resulting in a large deficit. New Brunswick, the new postmaster general recalled, had agreed to cover its share of the deficiency, and it was highly likely that the other provinces would take on the same responsibility.
In these deficiencies, however, in spite of the utmost good will on the part of the provinces, lay the seeds of certain trouble. The principle governing the establishment of a postal system, and its expansion to meet local requirements, was fundamentally different in a new country from the principle by which they were guided at home. In a new country a postal system was expected to afford the means of extending civilization, and to advance with equal step with settlement, whereas in a long settled country, the postal system followed in the train of civilization.
In these shortcomings, however, despite the genuine intentions of the provinces, there were signs of potential problems. The principle behind creating a postal system and adjusting it to local needs was fundamentally different in a new country compared to the one they followed back home. In a new country, a postal system was expected to help spread civilization and to develop in tandem with settlement, while in a long-established country, the postal system evolved alongside civilization.
The consequence of this difference is naturally a frequent clashing of opinion between the authorities at home and the public in the colonies. Disputes were constantly arising as to the extent of the accommodation to be given to new settlements, the amount of the salaries to be paid to officials, and above all as to the principle upon which new and expensive posts should be established.
The result of this difference is a frequent clash of opinions between the authorities back home and the public in the colonies. Disputes constantly arose over how much support should be given to new settlements, how much officials should be paid, and especially about the principle behind establishing new and costly positions.
As to this last point, the general post office had just disposed of an application, which threw a strong light on the different elements, which had sometimes to be taken into consideration in dealing with questions of extensions of the system in a country like Canada.[285]
As for this last point, the general post office had just processed an application that highlighted the various factors that had to be considered when addressing expansion of the system in a country like Canada.[285]
Sir George Simpson, the deputy governor of the Hudson Bay Company, represented that the company had a post at Sault Ste. Marie, for which postal accommodation was desirable. The post office having but one test to apply was disposed to reject the application on account of the insufficiency of the prospective revenue to cover the cost of the service.
Sir George Simpson, the deputy governor of the Hudson Bay Company, noted that the company had a location at Sault Ste. Marie, where postal services were needed. The post office, considering only one criterion, was inclined to deny the application due to the expected revenue not being enough to support the service costs.
Gladstone, at that time colonial secretary, sought information from Lord Cathcart, administrator of the government, as to the merits of the application and learned that, besides the Hudson Bay interest, there were prospects of large mining developments in the district, and that a body of troops was about to be sent to[Pg 265] fort Garry, which would certainly require regular communication with headquarters.
Gladstone, who was the colonial secretary at the time, asked Lord Cathcart, the government administrator, for details on the application. He found out that, apart from the Hudson Bay interest, there were good prospects for significant mining developments in the area, and a group of troops was about to be dispatched to [Pg 265] Fort Garry, which would definitely need regular communication with headquarters.
These were considerations which post office officials in Great Britain would seldom have to take into account, and while the accommodation was authorized in this case, owing to the standing of its advocates, there would be many cases, where the necessity would appear equally great to local authorities, which would not impress the authorities at home sufficiently to cause them to disregard their customary regulations.
These were factors that post office officials in Great Britain rarely had to think about, and while the arrangement was approved in this case due to the reputation of its supporters, there would be many situations where the need seemed just as significant to local authorities, but wouldn't convince the officials back home enough to ignore their usual rules.
Parenthetically it may be stated, as instances, that when the North-West territories were taken over by Canada in 1869, it became necessary to establish a mail service over a stretch of nine hundred miles between Winnipeg and Edmonton, at a cost of $10,000 a year, while the revenue from the route would scarcely exceed as many hundreds; and for many years after the Canadian Pacific railway was carried to Vancouver in 1886, the expenditure of the post office for the conveyance of mails into that country exceeded the revenue by some hundreds of thousands of dollars.
It can be noted, for example, that when Canada took over the North-West territories in 1869, it became necessary to set up a mail service over a distance of nine hundred miles between Winnipeg and Edmonton, costing $10,000 a year, while the revenue from that route barely reached a few hundreds. And for many years after the Canadian Pacific Railway reached Vancouver in 1886, the post office's spending on mail delivery into that region exceeded its revenue by several hundred thousand dollars.
On this point the postmaster general says: "there is no more fertile source of contention in the North American colonies than the establishment of new posts; and if the means of extending such posts throughout the colonies were provided by funds not of the post office, but granted from the general colonial revenue, however well administered a department might be, I fear it would constantly be subjected to accusations of favouritism and of undue influences."
On this topic, the postmaster general says: "There is no bigger source of conflict in the North American colonies than the creation of new postal routes; and if the funding to expand these routes across the colonies came from the general colonial revenue instead of the post office, no matter how well the department is run, I worry it would always face accusations of favoritism and unfair influences."
Clanricarde conceded that it would only be reasonable to expect that the legislative assemblies would endeavour to ascertain whether by rearrangements, or other alterations in the administration, the deficiency would not be diminished, and whether economy could not be introduced with respect to salaries. The struggle of members for local advantages would heighten the feeling with which the department administered from England would be regarded.
Clanricarde agreed that it would be only fair to expect the legislative assemblies to try and find out if changes, or other adjustments in management, could lessen the shortfall and if savings could be made regarding salaries. The competition among members for local benefits would increase the perception of the department managed from England.
The postmaster general summed the situation up by declaring his conviction that any measure producing a large deficiency in the post office revenue would be tantamount to a surrender of the administration by the postmaster general; and as he was of opinion that the general colonial interests called for a large reduction in the postage rates, he considered that it would be better that the postmaster general should resign his control over the post offices at once.
The postmaster general summarized the situation by stating his belief that any actions leading to a significant drop in post office revenue would mean a failure of the postmaster general's leadership; and since he felt that the overall colonial interests required a substantial decrease in postage rates, he thought it would be best for the postmaster general to step down from overseeing the post offices immediately.
The imperial interests, which had determined the department in the past to retain its control over the arrangements remained in[Pg 266] undiminished strength; and in order to safeguard these, it would be necessary to stipulate for certain conditions to which the colonies would be required to agree, before the colonial post offices were relinquished to the colonial legislatures.
The imperial interests, which had previously led the department to maintain its control over the arrangements, remained strong; and to protect these interests, it would be necessary to outline certain conditions that the colonies would need to accept before the colonial post offices were handed over to the colonial legislatures.
The first was that correspondence passing between two colonies through the territory of a third, should not be subject to a charge on the part of the latter for transportation. This stipulation ensured that an intermediate colony should not have the power to compel the colonies on either side of it to raise their charges to meet exorbitant rates for transportation.
The first was that any correspondence sent between two colonies through the territory of a third should not be charged by that third colony for transportation. This agreement made sure that the intermediate colony couldn't force the colonies on either side to increase their fees to cover unreasonable transportation costs.
The second condition was that, in the case of correspondence passing between Great Britain and the colonies, the postage on which was one shilling and twopence, the part of this amount, which was for the inland conveyance, viz. twopence, should remain in operation, unless the ordinary inland rate should be less than twopence. In this case the correspondence to and from Great Britain should have the benefit of the lower rate.
The second condition was that for correspondence between Great Britain and the colonies, which had a postage of one shilling and twopence, the part of this amount that covered the inland delivery, specifically twopence, should still apply, unless the regular inland rate was less than twopence. In that case, the correspondence to and from Great Britain would benefit from the lower rate.
The third condition was that prepayment or payment on delivery should be optional with respect to correspondence passing from one province to another, and, in order to avoid complicated accounts between the provinces, the practice should be for each province to treat as its own all the postage it collected whether it were on letters paid at the time of posting, or on letters from other provinces, the postage of which, being unpaid at the office of posting was collected at the office of delivery. The postmaster general also suggested, as highly desirable, that a uniform system and rate of postage should be maintained throughout the provinces.
The third condition was that prepayment or payment on delivery should be optional for mail moving between provinces. To keep things simple and avoid complicated accounts between the provinces, each province should consider all the postage it collected as its own, whether it was for letters paid at the time of mailing or letters from other provinces where the postage was unpaid at the mailing office and collected at the delivery office. The postmaster general also suggested that it would be ideal to have a consistent system and rate of postage across all the provinces.
As the proposition of the postmaster general provided for the reservation to the treasury of the full amount of the packet postage, part of which had until that time been used in the colonies to defray the expenses of their services, there could be no objection in point of finances to leaving to the colonies the control of their post offices.
As the proposal from the postmaster general allowed for the complete amount of the packet postage to be reserved for the treasury, part of which had previously been used in the colonies to cover their service costs, there was no financial reason to object to giving the colonies control over their post offices.
Lord Elgin, who came out as governor general in the beginning of 1847, brought with him instructions to convey this information to the several legislatures. In these instructions Lord Grey, the colonial secretary, after alluding to the great change in the economic policy of the United Kingdom towards the colonies as a consequence of the adoption of the principle of free trade—the abolition of the preferential tariff which the colonies had hitherto enjoyed, and the concomitant removals of the restrictions, which had existed on their trade with foreign countries—pointed out[Pg 267] that in order that they might reap the largest measure of benefit from the greater freedom of trade, it was necessary that they should be united for customs purposes, on lines perhaps similar to those of the German Zollverein.
Lord Elgin, who became governor general in early 1847, came equipped with instructions to share this information with the various legislatures. In these instructions, Lord Grey, the colonial secretary, referred to the significant shift in the economic policy of the United Kingdom towards the colonies due to the adoption of free trade. This involved the removal of the preferential tariff that the colonies had previously enjoyed and the subsequent lifting of restrictions on their trade with foreign countries. He pointed out[Pg 267] that to maximize the benefits from increased trade freedom, the colonies needed to unify for customs purposes, potentially following a model similar to the German Zollverein.
Grey further intimated that it was also desired, in order to complete the commercial association of the colonies, that some arrangement should be come to for settling the affairs of the post office. He suggested that a conference of the representatives of the colonies should be held in Montreal, to discuss these important subjects, and to endeavour to arrive at some agreement as to the principles to be adopted in giving effect to united colonial action.
Grey further hinted that it was also important, to complete the commercial partnership of the colonies, that some plan should be established for managing the post office. He proposed that a meeting of the representatives of the colonies should take place in Montreal to discuss these key issues and to work towards an agreement on the principles to be followed in implementing united colonial actions.
Elgin delivered his message to the Canadian legislature in opening the session of 1847, on the 4th of June. He stated that he was enabled to inform the legislature that His Majesty's ministers were prepared to surrender to the provincial authorities, the control of the department in the colonies as soon as, by consent between the several legislatures, arrangements should be matured for securing to British North America the advantage of an efficient and uniform postal system.
Elgin delivered his message to the Canadian legislature at the start of the session in 1847, on June 4th. He mentioned that he was able to inform the legislature that the King’s ministers were ready to hand over control of the department in the colonies to the provincial authorities as soon as arrangements were made through agreement among the various legislatures to ensure that British North America benefited from an efficient and uniform postal system.
But before this official intimation reached the colonies, action had been taken in one of them, on lines so closely parallel to those defined in the letter of the postmaster general to the treasury, as to suggest that Elgin, on his arrival in Boston on the 25th of January, had at once despatched a message to Halifax, since, on the 27th of January, the question of the post office was brought up for discussion in the legislature of Nova Scotia.
But before this official notice reached the colonies, one of them had already taken action in a way that closely followed the lines outlined in the postmaster general's letter to the treasury. This suggests that Elgin, upon arriving in Boston on January 25th, immediately sent a message to Halifax because on January 27th, the issue of the post office was raised for discussion in the Nova Scotia legislature.
A committee was appointed to inquire generally into the conditions of the post office, and, particularly, into the advantage of one general system being adopted for the colonies, and the best means of accomplishing such an object.[286] Their task was to submit such a scheme as should be likely to command the approval of the other colonies and of the imperial authorities. This scheme should be founded upon some principle of central supervision and management of the various colonial post offices that would ensure uniformity in their operations, security against conflict with the general post office of the empire, and a proper degree of responsibility of the local heads to their legislatures.
A committee was set up to look into the overall conditions of the post office and specifically to evaluate the benefits of adopting one general system for the colonies, along with the best ways to achieve this goal.[286] Their job was to propose a plan that would likely receive approval from the other colonies and the imperial authorities. This plan should be based on some principle of central oversight and management of the various colonial post offices to ensure uniformity in their operations, avoid conflicts with the empire's main post office, and establish an appropriate level of accountability for the local leaders to their legislatures.
Addressing themselves first to the question of postage rates, the committee at Halifax decided, though with some misgivings, to recommend for adoption the rates proposed by the commission approved by Sydenham to investigate the affairs of the post[Pg 268] office. These rates were based on the principle of charging according to the distance letters were carried.
Addressing the question of postage rates first, the committee in Halifax decided, albeit with some hesitation, to recommend adopting the rates proposed by the commission approved by Sydenham to look into the post[Pg 268] office's operations. These rates were based on the idea of charging according to the distance letters traveled.
The preference of the committee was for a single uniform rate. But they were prepared to waive it, and adopt the rates proposed by the commission, "because those suggestions had already received the sanction of able men well acquainted with the subject, because they believed their adoption would involve very great benefits to the people of this colony, and because they believed those suggestions were more likely to be concurred in by the authorities in England, and by the other colonies, than would be any that proceeded directly from themselves."
The committee preferred a single uniform rate. However, they were willing to set that aside and accept the rates suggested by the commission, "because those proposals had already been approved by knowledgeable people familiar with the topic, because they believed adopting them would bring significant benefits to the people in this colony, and because they thought those suggestions were more likely to be accepted by the authorities in England and other colonies than anything that came directly from them."
The concurrence of the legislatures of the other provinces should be obtained in the recognition of common principles, and of the necessity for an independent authority placed in one of the colonies, whose function it should be to organize and centralize the department within certain limits to be prescribed and defined.
The agreement of the legislatures from the other provinces should be secured in acknowledging shared principles and the need for an independent authority established in one of the colonies, tasked with organizing and centralizing the department within specific boundaries to be outlined and defined.
The report of the committee was submitted to the assembly of Nova Scotia on the 29th of March, and was adopted on all points, except the important one of the rates of postage. The house was not disposed to concur in the continuation of a system of postal charges, which had been definitely abandoned in Great Britain and the United States, and which had been condemned by every public body in the colonies, which had considered the subject. The assembly substituted for the rates proposed by the committee the uniform rate of threepence, and were prepared to face such deficits as should result. The lieutenant governor was requested to send the resolutions to the other colonies, with the earnest desire that they would be pleased to give them consideration.
The committee's report was presented to the assembly of Nova Scotia on March 29th and was approved in every aspect, except for the crucial issue of postage rates. The house was not inclined to agree to continue a system of postal charges that had already been completely rejected in Great Britain and the United States, and which had been disapproved by every public body in the colonies that had looked into the matter. The assembly replaced the rates suggested by the committee with a uniform rate of three pence and was ready to accept any deficits that might occur as a result. The lieutenant governor was asked to send the resolutions to the other colonies, with a strong request for them to consider the proposals.
On the 30th of June, the Nova Scotia resolutions were laid before the Canadian legislature, and no time was lost in carrying into effect the suggestion of a conference between representatives of the colonies on the mainland. Wm. Cayley, the inspector general of Canada (in practice the minister of finance), J. W. Johnston, the solicitor general of Nova Scotia and R. L. Hazen, of the executive council of New Brunswick, were appointed representatives of their respective provinces.
On June 30th, the Nova Scotia resolutions were presented to the Canadian legislature, and they quickly moved to set up a conference between representatives of the mainland colonies. Wm. Cayley, the inspector general of Canada (basically the finance minister), J. W. Johnston, the solicitor general of Nova Scotia, and R. L. Hazen from the executive council of New Brunswick were chosen as representatives for their provinces.
These representatives of three of the four provinces met in Montreal, on the invitation of Elgin; and in October, the result of their deliberations was presented to the governor general.[287]
These representatives from three of the four provinces gathered in Montreal at Elgin's invitation, and in October, they presented the outcome of their discussions to the governor general.[287]
In considering the question of the establishment of an independent management within the provinces, thus taking over the[Pg 269] functions of the general post office so far as they related to the colonies, the delegates discussed the relative advantages of a scheme of a central department for the four provinces with united revenue and management such as then existed, or of one that would place the management of the postal arrangements in the hands of the local governments of each province, with no greater central control than should be necessary for securing imperial and inter-colonial interests.
In looking at the issue of creating independent management in the provinces to take over the[Pg 269] functions of the general post office as they related to the colonies, the delegates talked about the pros and cons of keeping a central department for the four provinces with combined revenue and management like there was at the time, versus giving local governments in each province control over postal services, with only the minimal central oversight needed to protect imperial and inter-colonial interests.
The former of the two alternatives was rejected, as open to practically all the objections that had arisen from the control being continued in England. There was the further consideration that the most practical security against an imprudent excess in postal accommodation would be found in the consideration that undue encroachments on the general revenue for the benefit of the postal service would diminish the means required for other and not less valuable purposes. This motive, powerful when confined within the limits of a single province, might lose much of its force, were the postal revenues of the four provinces gathered into one fund.
The first of the two options was rejected because it faced almost all the objections that had come up from continuing control in England. Additionally, a key consideration was that the best way to prevent reckless overspending on postal services was to recognize that excessive use of the general revenue for the postal service would reduce the funds available for other important purposes. This reason, strong when kept within the bounds of a single province, might lose some of its impact if the postal revenues from the four provinces were combined into one fund.
The other alternative appeared free from the objections mentioned. The delegates, therefore, recommended that the post office departments in the several provinces should be separate and distinct from one another, and under the control, each, of its own provincial government, which should appoint all officers, make arrangements for mail service, pay all expenses, and retain all collections, except the balances due to Great Britain on packet postage.
The other option seemed to avoid the issues mentioned. The delegates, therefore, suggested that the post office departments in each province should be separate and distinct from each other, with each one controlled by its own provincial government. This government would appoint all officials, handle mail service arrangements, cover all expenses, and keep all collections, except for the amounts owed to Great Britain for packet postage.
For expenditures common to all the provinces, there should be an office of central audit in Canada of which the postmaster general of Canada should be the head. The duties of the office were to audit the accounts of the several provinces, returns of which should be presented annually to the different legislatures; to collect and transmit to England the balances due from the four provinces on the packet service; and, in concert with the postmaster general in each province, to make all necessary arrangements for the transmission of the mails along the chief or central route from Canada to Halifax and between Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.
For expenses common to all provinces, there should be a central audit office in Canada, headed by the postmaster general of Canada. The office's duties include auditing the accounts of the various provinces, with annual reports submitted to the different legislatures; collecting and sending to England the balances owed by the four provinces for the packet service; and working together with the postmaster general in each province to coordinate all necessary arrangements for mail delivery along the main route from Canada to Halifax and between Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.
This office was anomalous in character, implying the inability of the several independent provincial departments to make all necessary business arrangements among themselves, and when the provinces assumed control of their post offices, it was not established.[Pg 270]
This office was unusual, indicating that the various independent provincial departments couldn't coordinate their business arrangements effectively. When the provinces took control of their post offices, it was not set up.[Pg 270]
In dealing with the question of the rates of postage, the delegates had before them the various representations from the several provinces as to the desirability of establishing, if possible, a low uniform rate of postage; and the success of penny postage in Great Britain and of the rates adopted in the United States in 1846 encouraged the belief that a low uniform postage would not only confer immeasurable commercial and social benefits, but would within a reasonable time be productive of a revenue ample for all the needs of the service.
In addressing the issue of postage rates, the delegates considered the different requests from various provinces about the importance of establishing a low, uniform postage rate if possible. The success of penny postage in Great Britain and the rates set in the United States in 1846 bolstered the belief that a low, uniform postage would not only provide significant commercial and social benefits but would also generate enough revenue to meet all the service's needs within a reasonable time.
It was, therefore, agreed to recommend to their respective governments the adoption of the threepenny or five-cent rate for each half-ounce letter. Lest, however, any of the provinces should fear for the financial results of conveying letters over the greater distances for this sum, they confined their recommendation to letters carried less than three hundred miles, leaving it optional to charge a double rate for letters carried beyond that distance. For the purpose of fixing the charge the provinces were to be regarded as one territory.
It was agreed to recommend to their respective governments the adoption of a three-penny or five-cent rate for each half-ounce letter. However, to address any concerns from the provinces about the financial implications of delivering letters over longer distances for this amount, they restricted their recommendation to letters sent over distances of less than three hundred miles, allowing for the option to charge a double rate for letters sent beyond that distance. To determine the charge, the provinces were to be treated as a single territory.
No change was recommended in the charges on newspapers, parliamentary documents, or other printed papers, but the several legislatures were left free to exempt these from postage, if they thought fit to do so. Prepayment or payment on delivery of letters should be optional, and franking abolished.
No changes were recommended for the charges on newspapers, parliamentary documents, or other printed materials, but the various legislatures were allowed to exempt these from postage if they desired. Prepayment or payment upon delivery of letters should be optional, and franking should be eliminated.
The treasury to whom this report was submitted, approved of the arrangements proposed, except that relating to the payment for the British mails to and from the port of destination in America. But they contented themselves with observing that this remained a matter of negotiation between the home and the colonial departments; and stated that as soon as the arrangements had been sufficiently matured, the requisite steps would be taken for the transfer of the postal communications to the provincial authorities.
The treasury that received this report approved the proposed arrangements, except for the payment for British mail going to and from the destination port in America. However, they took note that this was still a matter for negotiation between the home and colonial departments and mentioned that once the arrangements were finalized, the necessary steps would be taken to transfer postal communications to the provincial authorities.
Nova Scotia, which had taken the leading part in the negotiations which had brought matters to the point they had reached, again took up the leadership. On the 21st of March, 1848, the legislature adopted the report of the commissioners, and directed the attorney general to prepare a bill based on the view of Grey and Clanricarde, pledging themselves to make good any deficiency which might take place in the post office revenue of that province.
Nova Scotia, which had played a key role in the negotiations that led to the current situation, once again took the lead. On March 21, 1848, the legislature approved the commissioners' report and instructed the attorney general to draft a bill based on the perspectives of Grey and Clanricarde, committing to cover any shortfall that might occur in the province's post office revenue.
The bill to effect this arrangement was adopted by the legislature on April 4.[288] Thus all necessary action on the part of that province was complete, and the measure was ready to be put into[Pg 271] operation, as soon as the British government and the other colonies had taken the necessary action on their part.
Following up the enactment of this measure, the Nova Scotia legislature appointed James B. Uniacke, the chairman of the post office committee, to visit Canada, and lay before the governor general the views of Nova Scotia on the subject of the provincial post office and to endeavour to settle with Canada the questions necessary to be disposed of before the post office could be established.
After the passing of this measure, the Nova Scotia legislature appointed James B. Uniacke, the chair of the post office committee, to visit Canada and present Nova Scotia's views on the provincial post office to the governor general. His goal was to resolve the issues that needed to be addressed before the post office could be established.
Uniacke arrived in Montreal on the 8th of June, and had interviews with Elgin and the executive council. Two days later the council adopted a report drawn up in terms differing but slightly from those of the commission of 1847, and recommending the adoption of a uniform rate of threepence (five cents) throughout British North America.
Uniacke arrived in Montreal on June 8th and met with Elgin and the executive council. Two days later, the council approved a report that was worded slightly differently than the commission of 1847, suggesting the implementation of a uniform rate of threepence (five cents) across British North America.
The other recommendations were the same as those submitted by the committee, with the addition that postage stamps should be issued for the use of the public. The council were of opinion that the provisions recommended should be introduced in a bill, to be laid before parliament, and expressed the hope that the postmaster general might be given full discretionary powers in matters referring to the colonial post office, and that Her Majesty's government might be persuaded to adopt the above rates and regulations without further delay, the council pledging the administration to make good any excess of expenditure over revenue which may possibly arise in carrying out such arrangement.[289]
The other recommendations were the same as those put forward by the committee, with the added suggestion that postage stamps should be issued for public use. The council believed that the recommended provisions should be introduced in a bill to be presented to parliament, and expressed hope that the postmaster general would be granted full discretionary powers regarding the colonial post office. They also hoped that Her Majesty's government would be convinced to adopt the rates and regulations mentioned above without further delay, with the council committing to cover any excess of expenses over revenue that might occur in implementing this arrangement.[289]
The government of Nova Scotia then approached that of New Brunswick, the lieutenant governor at Fredericton being informed of the result of Uniacke's visit to Canada and that all that was now required was the assent of the government of New Brunswick and the approval of the imperial authorities. The governor general added a word to the intimation of the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, and it was settled that legislation would be introduced into the New Brunswick legislature in accordance with the terms agreed upon.[290]
The Nova Scotia government then reached out to New Brunswick, informing the lieutenant governor in Fredericton about the outcome of Uniacke's trip to Canada. They stated that all that was needed now was the approval from the New Brunswick government and the imperial authorities. The governor general added a note to the communication from the Nova Scotia lieutenant governor, and it was decided that legislation would be presented to the New Brunswick legislature based on the agreed terms.[290]
All requisite measures for establishing the colonial post offices on an independent footing were matured, so far as could be done, by the legislatures themselves, and nothing now remained but the imperial sanction. This the law officers were of opinion would require an act of the imperial parliament, and on the 28th of July, 1849,[291] an act was passed empowering the legislative authorities[Pg 272] in any of the colonies to establish and maintain a system of posts, to charge rates of postage for the conveyance of correspondence, and to appropriate to their own uses the revenue to be derived therefrom. With this action taken, the control of the imperial government over the colonial posts should cease and determine.
All necessary steps to set up the colonial post offices independently were completed by the legislatures, and all that was left was approval from the empire. The legal advisors believed this would need a law from the imperial parliament, and on July 28, 1849,[291] a law was passed allowing the legislative authorities[Pg 272] in any of the colonies to create and manage a postal system, charge postage rates for sending mail, and keep the revenue generated from it for their own use. With this decision made, the imperial government's control over the colonial posts would end.
The government of Prince Edward Island, though invited by Elgin to participate in the conference at Montreal in October 1846, took no part in it. In November 1847, Johnston, one of the representatives from Nova Scotia, sent to the lieutenant governor a copy of the report of the Montreal commission, requesting an expression of his sentiments, and inquiring as to the prospect of the legislature concurring in the opinions contained in the report.
The government of Prince Edward Island, despite being invited by Elgin to join the conference in Montreal in October 1846, did not participate. In November 1847, Johnston, a representative from Nova Scotia, sent the lieutenant governor a copy of the Montreal commission report, asking for his thoughts and inquiring about the chances of the legislature agreeing with the opinions expressed in the report.
The deputy postmaster general in the course of an examination of the report pointed out that the only valid objection the government of Prince Edward Island could have to the adoption of its conclusions, was that the uniform charge of threepence on inter-colonial correspondence would make a serious inroad in the receipts of the Prince Edward Island post office.
The deputy postmaster general, during a review of the report, noted that the only valid concern the government of Prince Edward Island could have about accepting its conclusions was that the flat fee of threepence on inter-colonial mail would significantly impact the revenue of the Prince Edward Island post office.
The island post office had been in the practice of adding to the postage charged on inter-colonial letters, the inland rate of twopence a letter. If the terms of the report were adopted in their entirety, and a uniform rate were charged throughout the provinces of threepence a letter, the island would have to relinquish its inland charge.
The island post office had been charging an additional two pence for inter-colonial letters, on top of the normal postage. If the report's recommendations were fully implemented, and a flat rate of three pence per letter was set across all provinces, the island would need to drop this extra charge.
The deputy postmaster general took a serious view of the effect of the proposed relinquishment of the inland postage. The revenue for 1850 was £1440. Applying his estimates of the proportions by which the receipts from the several classes of correspondence would be reduced, he concluded that, under the scheme submitted, the revenue would probably not exceed £660.[292]
The deputy postmaster general was very concerned about the impact of the proposed cancellation of inland postage. The revenue for 1850 was £1,440. Based on his estimates of how much the income from different types of correspondence would decrease, he determined that, with the plan presented, the revenue would likely not go above £660.[292]
Notwithstanding this unfavourable anticipation, the government gave its assent to the scheme agreed upon by the other colonies, and the rate of postage on letters exchanged with other colonies became threepence per half ounce, while the charge on letters exchanged within the island remained twopence per half ounce.
Notwithstanding this unfavorable anticipation, the government approved the plan agreed upon by the other colonies, and the postage rate on letters exchanged with other colonies became three pence per half ounce, while the charge on letters exchanged within the island stayed at two pence per half ounce.
FOOTNOTES:
[286] Journals of Assembly, N.S., 1847.
[288] Journals of Assembly, N.S., 1848.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Journals of Assembly, N.S., 1848.
[290] Ibid., N.S., 1849
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, N.S., 1849
CHAPTER XVI
Provincial administration of the post office—Reduced postage—Railway mail service—Arrangements with United States.
Provincial management of the post office—Lower postage rates—Train mail service—Agreements with the United States.
The several provinces took over the post offices within their territories in 1851, Canada on the 6th of April, and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick three months later. The postmaster general of Canada was made a member of the executive council—the provincial cabinet—from the beginning. The postmaster general of Nova Scotia was never a member of the council, but administered the department as a subordinate official. In New Brunswick, the department was administered on the same plan until 1855, when the postmaster general was made a member of the government.
The various provinces took control of the post offices in their areas in 1851, with Canada doing so on April 6th, followed by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick three months later. The postmaster general of Canada became a member of the executive council—the provincial cabinet—from the start. The postmaster general of Nova Scotia was never part of the council but managed the department as a subordinate official. In New Brunswick, the department operated under the same structure until 1855, when the postmaster general was included in the government.
During the period of separate provincial administrations, which continued until 1867, when they were merged in the post office department of the dominion of Canada, the record is on the whole one of steady uneventful progress. Postal accommodations were extended, always as occasion demanded, and seldom as immediate prospective revenues warranted, with the result that the expenses generally outran the revenues. This condition, however, caused little or no discontent, as the provincial governments realized, as the British government could not, that on the efficiency of the postal service depended in no small measure the welfare of their people.
During the time of separate provincial administrations, which lasted until 1867 when they were combined into the post office department of the Dominion of Canada, the overall record was one of consistent, uneventful progress. Postal services were expanded as needed, often without regard to the immediate revenue it would generate, leading to expenses that typically exceeded income. However, this situation caused little to no dissatisfaction, as the provincial governments understood—unlike the British government—that the effectiveness of the postal service significantly affected the well-being of their citizens.
Stayner, in his valedictory to the postmasters of Canada, took credit for the thriving and effective state in which he left the post office. He believed that the improvements had fully kept pace with the growth of the country during the period of his administration. In that period, he pointed out, the increase in the number of post offices, amount of revenue, and in the number of miles annually travelled with the mails was more than six hundred per cent., a measure of progress not exceeded by any public institution within the province.
Stayner, in his farewell address to the postmasters of Canada, acknowledged the successful and efficient condition he left the post office in. He believed that the enhancements had matched the country’s growth throughout his time in charge. During that time, he noted that the increase in post offices, revenue, and the number of miles traveled annually with the mail was over six hundred percent, a level of progress unmatched by any other public institution in the province.
Stayner's words contained no more than the truth. When he entered on the office of deputy postmaster general he brought[Pg 274] with him considerable experience as a subordinate in the service. He gained early, and retained to the end, the esteem and confidence of his superiors in England, and if he lost popularity for a period in this country, it was because he saw the folly of trying to serve two masters.
Stayner's words were nothing but the truth. When he took on the role of deputy postmaster general, he brought with him a lot of experience as an assistant in the service. He earned and kept the respect and trust of his superiors in England from the start to the end of his career, and if he lost popularity for a while here, it was because he recognized the foolishness of trying to serve two bosses.
No one perceived more keenly than Stayner the inadequacy of the accommodation he was permitted to extend to the rapidly expanding settlements of the country; and no one could be more persevering in bringing the facts to the attention of the postmaster general. The contrast between the mail service on the north and south side of lake Ontario affected him, as it did the people of Kingston and Toronto, and he risked the regard of St. Martins-le-Grand by expressing sympathy with the general feeling. The postal accommodation, which did not hold out the prospect of, at least, self-maintenance, the authorities there did not desire to have brought to their notice.
No one understood better than Stayner the limitations of the services he could provide to the quickly growing settlements in the area; and no one was more persistent in making the postmaster general aware of the situation. The difference in mail services on the north and south sides of Lake Ontario bothered him, as it did the residents of Kingston and Toronto, and he risked upsetting the folks at St. Martins-le-Grand by showing support for the common sentiment. The postal services, which didn’t even promise to be self-sustaining, were something the authorities there preferred to ignore.
While sharing the general sense of the necessity of postal communication in many parts of the country, Stayner took on himself the blame that they were not provided. Fortunately for him, he was abundantly able to take care of himself. By attaching himself to the government party he earned a measure of the odium, which fell on them. But he entrenched himself against too violent attack, and secured champions whom the British government would willingly listen to. He managed to secure a very large income from obnoxious perquisites, but it would seem from later developments that this was rather a matter of good fortune, than of any deliberate effort on his part.
While he recognized the importance of mail services in many areas of the country, Stayner took on the blame for their absence. Fortunately for him, he was more than capable of looking after himself. By aligning himself with the government party, he shared some of the negative attention directed at them. However, he protected himself from severe criticism and found supporters whose voices the British government would be willing to consider. He managed to secure a significant income from unpopular perks, but later developments suggested this was more a stroke of luck than a result of any intentional action on his part.
The postmaster general and the colonial secretary had the strongest objections to these perquisites, but when they sought the means to get rid of them, they tried for some years in vain. The perquisites would fall to somebody, since they were of the appurtenances of that position.
The postmaster general and the colonial secretary strongly opposed these perks, but when they tried to eliminate them, they were unsuccessful for several years. The perks would end up benefiting someone, as they were part of the job's benefits.
That Stayner served the country, as well as his relations with the department in England would permit, admits of no doubt. William Lyon Mackenzie, who abhorred the post office and all its ways, was fain to concede that Stayner was the man, whom, of all he knew, he would most readily support for the position of deputy postmaster general.
That Stayner served the country as much as his relationship with the department in England allowed is beyond question. William Lyon Mackenzie, who disliked the post office and everything about it, was even willing to admit that Stayner was the person he would most eagerly support for the role of deputy postmaster general.
With how vigorous a hand the postmaster general of Canada set about his task of providing adequate postal accommodation for the country, may be judged from the fact that the number of post offices which in 1851 was six hundred and one, was increased[Pg 275] to eight hundred and forty-four during the first twelve months.[293] The system was extended in Canada as far west as Kincardine. The courier services to Sarnia and Goderich on lake Huron were made daily, as was that to Bytown (afterwards Ottawa).
With the strong commitment that the postmaster general of Canada showed towards improving postal services for the country, it's clear from the fact that the number of post offices, which was six hundred and one in 1851, increased[Pg 275] to eight hundred and forty-four within the first year.[293] The postal system was expanded in Canada all the way to Kincardine. Courier services to Sarnia and Goderich on Lake Huron were established daily, as well as the service to Bytown (later known as Ottawa).
Within five years the number of post offices had risen to one thousand three hundred and seventy-five; and in 1861, ten years after the postal service was taken over by the Canadian government, the number had been augmented to one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five offices, practically threefold the number in operation in 1851. When Canada entered confederation it took into the postal system of the dominion two thousand three hundred and thirty-three post offices.
Within five years, the number of post offices increased to one thousand three hundred seventy-five. By 1861, ten years after the Canadian government took over the postal service, the number had grown to one thousand seven hundred seventy-five offices, nearly three times the number in operation in 1851. When Canada entered confederation, it brought two thousand three hundred thirty-three post offices into the dominion's postal system.
The people of Canada responded with great readiness to the invitation to use the post office, which was offered through the reduction in the charges. When the Canadian post office was taken over, the rates varied according to the distance letters were carried. The postmaster general estimated that they yielded on the average ninepence a letter. The reduction to threepence was, therefore, a diminution of two-thirds.
The people of Canada eagerly accepted the invitation to use the post office, which was made possible by the lowered fees. When the Canadian post office was taken over, the rates depended on how far letters had to travel. The postmaster general estimated that they made about nine pence per letter on average. So, the cut to three pence was a reduction of two-thirds.
It is noteworthy how completely fulfilled was the prediction that the low rates would so increase the number of letters carried that, in a short time, the revenue, which was certain to fall for the moment, would recover itself and return to the figures of 1851. For the year ending April 1851, the last year of the high rates, the revenue was $335,208. In the following year, with the reduction of the rate to one-third of what it had been, the revenue fell to $239,608. But it was observed that the number of letters posted had increased by over fifty per cent.
It’s remarkable how accurately the prediction came true that the lower rates would significantly boost the number of letters sent, and that, after some time, the revenue—which was expected to drop temporarily—would bounce back to the levels of 1851. For the year ending in April 1851, the last year with the high rates, the revenue was $335,208. In the following year, after the rate was cut to a third of what it had been, the revenue dropped to $239,608. However, it was noted that the number of letters mailed had increased by more than fifty percent.
In 1855 the effect of the reduction, coupled with the extension of the facilities to the public, was to produce a revenue of $368,168. Ten years after the great reduction in the rates the revenue had risen to $683,035, and at the time of entering confederation it was $914,784.
In 1855, the impact of the price cut, along with the increased access for the public, resulted in a revenue of $368,168. Ten years after the major rate reduction, the revenue had grown to $683,035, and by the time of entering confederation, it was $914,784.
Among the most important of the facilities introduced in 1851 were postage stamps, the values being threepence, sixpence, and one shilling. Curiously enough, the obvious advantages of postage stamps did not strike the people at the time. This is in large measure accounted for by the fact that the use of stamps involved a change in attitude on the question—who should pay the postage.
Among the most important facilities introduced in 1851 were postage stamps, with values of threepence, sixpence, and one shilling. Interestingly, the clear benefits of postage stamps didn’t register with people at the time. This was largely because using stamps required a shift in thinking about who should pay for postage.
The old theory was that the service rendered to an individual by[Pg 276] the post office should not be paid for until the letter was actually delivered. There was always a certain proportion of letters the postage of which was paid at the time they were handed in at the post offices, but the proportion was small. The regular practice was to allow the recipient of the letter to pay for it.
The old theory was that the service provided to someone by[Pg 276] the post office shouldn't be paid for until the letter was actually delivered. There was always a small percentage of letters where the postage was paid when they were dropped off at the post office, but that was rare. Typically, the person receiving the letter would pay for it.
This attitude had to be overcome, and natural conservatism delayed the change for some time. Indeed, it was not until a fine in the shape of additional postage was imposed in cases where letters were not prepaid, that the practice was entirely changed.
This attitude needed to be changed, and people’s natural resistance held off the shift for a while. In fact, it wasn't until an extra charge for unpaid letters was introduced that the practice was completely transformed.
The charges on the transmission of newspapers in Canada were among the matters that received early attention. There was a strong feeling throughout the colonies, that, in the absence of libraries, the high price of books precluded their general diffusion in the several communities, and it was therefore necessary that newspapers, the only remaining means for extending public information should be distributed at the cost of the government.
The costs for sending newspapers in Canada were one of the issues that got early focus. There was a widespread belief across the colonies that, since there were no libraries, the high prices of books prevented them from being widely available in different communities. Therefore, it was essential for newspapers—the only other way to share public information—to be distributed at the government's expense.
In the agreement on the conditions, under which the several colonies should assume the administration of their post offices, it was stipulated that, while threepence should be the charge on letters, and one-halfpenny on newspapers, the several legislatures should have the power to provide for the free circulation of newspapers through the post offices.
In the agreement about the terms under which the different colonies would take over the management of their post offices, it was stated that the cost for letters would be threepence, and for newspapers, it would be half a penny. Additionally, the individual legislatures would have the authority to allow newspapers to be sent for free through the post offices.
Nova Scotia abolished the charges altogether when she took over control; and New Brunswick took the same measure with the restriction that the newspapers to which the free conveyance would apply should not exceed two ounces in weight.
Nova Scotia completely eliminated the charges when she gained control, and New Brunswick followed suit with the condition that the newspapers eligible for free delivery could not weigh more than two ounces.
In Canada the same end was reached but with more deliberation. The rate charged at the close of the old regime—one-halfpenny per sheet—was continued until 1854. In that year this rate was reduced on general newspapers, and was abolished altogether on periodicals devoted exclusively to the furtherance of the special objects of agriculture, education, science and temperance. The postmaster general calculated that this measure would reduce the revenue by $32,000. In the year following, the final step was taken, and the charges on provincial newspapers circulating within the British North American colonies were removed altogether.
In Canada, the same goal was achieved but with more thoughtfulness. The rate charged at the end of the old system—half a penny per sheet—continued until 1854. That year, this rate was lowered for general newspapers and completely eliminated for periodicals focused solely on promoting agriculture, education, science, and temperance. The postmaster general estimated that this change would decrease revenue by $32,000. In the following year, the final step was taken, and the charges on provincial newspapers circulating within the British North American colonies were completely removed.
The money order system was established in Canada in 1855, on the plan of that in operation in the United Kingdom. The amount which might be sent by a single order was limited to $40, and there was a uniform charge of twenty-five cents for each order. In 1857, the amount transmissible by single order was raised to $400, but after a short experience, it was reduced to $100, and[Pg 277] the charges were fixed at one-half of one per cent. for the smaller amounts, and at three-quarters of one per cent. for amounts above $30.
The money order system was set up in Canada in 1855, based on the model used in the United Kingdom. The maximum amount that could be sent with a single order was $40, and there was a standard fee of twenty-five cents for each order. In 1857, the maximum amount that could be sent with a single order was increased to $400, but after a brief period, it was lowered back down to $100, and[Pg 277] the fees were established at one-half of one percent for the smaller amounts, and three-quarters of one percent for amounts over $30.
On the 1st of June, 1857, a money order exchange was established between Canada and the United Kingdom, the limit of a single order being fixed at $20. This was an accommodation which had been called for for a number of years.
On June 1, 1857, a money order exchange was set up between Canada and the United Kingdom, with a cap of $20 for a single order. This was a long-awaited arrangement that had been requested for several years.
The colonial secretary, as early as 1852, wrote to the postmaster general of England, pointing out the large increasing emigration to the colonies, and the desire of persons prospering there to assist their relatives to follow them. He estimated that over £1,000,000 was sent yearly through the agency of private firms for this purpose. This the colonial secretary declared to be worthy of encouragement, and he asked the postmaster general to consider the question of extending to the colonies the system of money orders which had proved so successful in Great Britain. This appeal produced no immediate result.
The colonial secretary, back in 1852, wrote to the postmaster general of England, highlighting the significant rise in emigration to the colonies and the wish of those who were doing well there to help their relatives join them. He estimated that more than £1,000,000 was sent each year through private firms for this purpose. The colonial secretary stated that this was worthy of support and requested the postmaster general to consider the possibility of extending the successful money order system from Great Britain to the colonies. This request did not lead to any immediate action.
In 1855, a registration system was introduced. Long previous to this time, there had been a practice of entering money letters on letter bills accompanying the mails, but as receipts were not given to those posting such letters, nor taken from those to whom they were delivered, the practice was defective as a measure of safety. Under the regulation of 1855 receipts were given and taken, the charge being two cents.
In 1855, a registration system was introduced. Long before this, people had been entering money letters on letter bills that came with the mail, but since no receipts were provided to those mailing the letters or to those receiving them, the system was unreliable for safety. With the regulation of 1855, receipts were issued and acknowledged, and the fee was two cents.
The greatest advantage the post office was enabled to extend to the public during this period was due to the opening of railway lines. For some years progress in this respect was tardy. The first line built ran from Laprairie, opposite Montreal to St. John's. It was constructed in 1836, and its purpose was to improve the communications between the Canadian metropolis and the cities of New England and of the state of New York.
The biggest benefit the post office was able to offer the public during this time was the opening of railway lines. For several years, progress in this area was slow. The first line built ran from Laprairie, across from Montreal, to St. John's. It was constructed in 1836 and aimed to enhance communication between the Canadian capital and the cities of New England and New York state.
No further steps were taken in this direction until 1847, when another link was laid in the connections between Montreal and the eastern states by the building of a line between Montreal and Lachine. These two short lines, with one opened the same year between Montreal and St. Hyacinthe, were all the railway lines in operation in Canada until 1851.
No further actions were taken in this direction until 1847, when another connection was established between Montreal and the eastern states with the construction of a line from Montreal to Lachine. These two short lines, along with one that opened the same year between Montreal and St. Hyacinthe, were the only railway lines operating in Canada until 1851.
During this and the following year, additional lines were laid, but their object was still the same, to improve the facilities for transportation between Montreal and the cities of the United States. The line from Montreal to St. Johns was extended to Rouse's Point, New York, on lake Champlain, and that to St. Hyacinthe was[Pg 278] carried on to Sherbrooke and the international boundary, where it joined with the Atlantic and St. Lawrence railway (an American line), and opened a connection by railway between Montreal and the Atlantic seaboard at Portland. This city became the winter port of the Canadian steamship line, the operations of which began in the winter of 1853.
During this year and the next, more railway lines were constructed, but the goal remained the same: to enhance transportation between Montreal and cities in the United States. The line from Montreal to St. Johns was extended to Rouse's Point, New York, on Lake Champlain, and the one to St. Hyacinthe was[Pg 278] extended to Sherbrooke and the international border, where it connected with the Atlantic and St. Lawrence railway (an American line), creating a rail link between Montreal and the Atlantic coast at Portland. This city became the winter port for the Canadian steamship line, which started operations in the winter of 1853.
Until 1853, no part of what could be described as the Canadian railway system had been built. The lines then under operation were all for the purpose of bringing Montreal within the benefits of the American system. But this year—1853—three extensive schemes of communication were begun: the Grand Trunk Company started building the line running from Quebec to the western limits of the province at Sarnia; the Great Western Company built a line across the Niagara peninsula from the Niagara river to Detroit river; and the Northern Company, a line from Toronto northward to Georgian Bay at Collingwood. These lines brought the advantages of railway communication to every rising settlement in Upper and Lower Canada.
Until 1853, there was no part of what we would call the Canadian railway system. The lines that were in operation at that time were all meant to connect Montreal to the American railway network. However, in 1853, three major communication projects started: the Grand Trunk Company began constructing the line from Quebec to the western edge of the province at Sarnia; the Great Western Company built a line across the Niagara Peninsula from the Niagara River to the Detroit River; and the Northern Company built a line from Toronto north to Georgian Bay at Collingwood. These lines provided railway connections to every growing settlement in Upper and Lower Canada.
As construction progressed the new lines were utilized by the post office department until the completion, in October 1856, of the Grand Trunk from Brockville and Toronto brought Quebec into direct communication by means of the Great Western railway with Windsor at the western end of the province.
As construction continued, the new lines were used by the post office department until the Grand Trunk was completed in October 1856, connecting Brockville and Toronto and establishing direct communication for Quebec via the Great Western railway with Windsor at the western edge of the province.
The reduction in time, which the railways had made it possible to effect in the delivery of the mails between Quebec and the leading points in the western part of the province was great. In 1853 the ordinary time for the winter mails to travel from Quebec to Kingston was four days; in 1857, they were carried between the two places in thirty-one hours; to Toronto the saving in time was the difference between seven days and forty hours. Before the era of railways ten and a half days were occupied in the journey from Quebec to Windsor. The railway carried the mails regularly in forty-nine hours.
The reduction in delivery time that the railways enabled for mailing between Quebec and major locations in the western part of the province was significant. In 1853, the usual time for winter mail to travel from Quebec to Kingston was four days; by 1857, it took just thirty-one hours. The time saved for Toronto was the difference between seven days and forty hours. Before the railway era, the trip from Quebec to Windsor took ten and a half days. The railway managed to deliver the mail regularly in forty-nine hours.
The use of travelling post offices, with mail clerks assorting and distributing the mails from the railways in the course of their trips, was an early feature of the postal service in Canada. This mode of utilizing the railways had been in operation in England since 1838, and before the leading railways in Canada were completed, an officer of the post office department was sent to England to study the system. Thus, by 1857, this system, which is the leading feature of mail conveyance and distribution, was in full course in this country seven years earlier than in the United States.[Pg 279]
The use of traveling post offices, with mail clerks sorting and distributing mail from trains during their journeys, was an early aspect of the postal service in Canada. This method of using the railways had been in place in England since 1838, and before the major railways in Canada were finished, a postal department officer was sent to England to learn about the system. By 1857, this system, which is the main feature of mail transport and distribution, was fully operational in Canada seven years before it was in the United States.[Pg 279]
But gratifying as were the results from the use of railways in the conveyance of mails, through the sparsely-settled districts over the immense stretches of our territory, the substitution of steam for horse conveyance introduced a perplexing financial problem. The postmaster general noted the peculiar fact that while passengers and merchandise reaped the benefit of improved speed with an accompanying reduction in the expense, the change threatened to burden the public with a vastly augmented charge for the mail service.
But while the results from using railways to deliver mail in the sparsely populated areas across our vast territory were satisfying, replacing horses with steam power created a confusing financial issue. The postmaster general pointed out the unusual situation where passengers and goods enjoyed faster service and lower costs, but the change risked imposing a significantly higher price on the public for mail delivery.
Comparing the service by railway with that by stage, it was noted that, while the stage driver waited at each office he visited, until the mail he brought was assorted, and arranged for his farther conveyance, it was impossible owing to the brevity of the stops at the stations, to do this in the case of the mails carried by railway.
Comparing the train service to that of the stagecoach, it was observed that, while the stagecoach driver waited at each office he visited until the mail he delivered was sorted and prepared for further transport, it was impossible to do this for the mail carried by train because the stops at the stations were too brief.
The post office consequently was compelled to train and employ a distinct class of clerks to travel on the trains, and perform that duty while the train was in movement. A portion of a car—generally about one-third—was partitioned off and fitted up exclusively for postal service. The salaries of these clerks constituted what the postmaster general regarded as the enormous expenditure of $32,000 a year; and the necessity created by the nature of the railway service for the provision of an office on the trains, formed the principal ground on which a comparatively high rate of compensation was claimed by the companies.
The post office had to hire and train a separate group of clerks to travel on the trains and handle postal duties while the trains were moving. About a third of a train car was set aside and equipped solely for postal services. The salaries for these clerks were seen by the postmaster general as a substantial expense of $32,000 a year. The need for an office on the trains, due to the nature of the railway service, was the main reason the companies demanded a relatively high rate of compensation.
But that was not all. The railways not being able, like the stage coach, to exchange the mails directly with the post offices of the towns along the line, side services of an expensive character were required to maintain the connection between the post offices and the stations. The expenditure for this class of service, coupled with that for the employment of the clerks who travel on the railway, exceeded, in most cases, the whole of the previous expenditure for the superseded service by stage; and then there were the demands of the railways to be satisfied.
But that wasn't all. Since the railways couldn't directly exchange mail with the post offices in the towns along the route like the stagecoach did, costly side services were needed to keep the connection between the post offices and the stations. The spending for this type of service, along with the cost of hiring the clerks who traveled on the trains, often surpassed the total previous expenditure for the old stagecoach service. And then there were also the demands from the railways to consider.
The rate of compensation for the conveyance of the mails was a subject of dispute between the postmaster general and the railway companies. The claims of the latter, however legitimate, were considered by the postmaster general as out of the power of the department to meet from its revenues. Several tentative settlements were made, but the final adjustments were not reached until the appointment of a royal commission in 1865, which, after hearing the statements of both sides, decided the terms on a basis which lasted practically unchanged for nearly half a century.[Pg 280]
The payment for delivering the mail was a point of contention between the postmaster general and the railway companies. The claims made by the railway companies, no matter how valid, were seen by the postmaster general as beyond what the department could afford from its budget. Several tentative agreements were proposed, but a final resolution wasn’t achieved until a royal commission was appointed in 1865. After hearing from both parties, the commission set terms that remained mostly unchanged for nearly fifty years.[Pg 280]
Nova Scotia entered on the administration of the postal service of the province with much energy.[294] There were one hundred and forty-three offices in the province in 1851. These were rapidly augmented and on the more important routes, that is, those radiating from Halifax to the eastern and western ends of the province, and to New Brunswick, were given a frequency, conformable to the importance of the communications.
Nova Scotia took charge of running the postal service in the province with great enthusiasm.[294] In 1851, there were one hundred forty-three offices in the province. These were quickly increased, and on the main routes—those extending from Halifax to the eastern and western parts of the province, as well as to New Brunswick—the service was adjusted to match the significance of the communications.
The number of post offices was in Nova Scotia doubled in four years; trebled in ten years; more than quadrupled in fifteen years; and had reached a total of six hundred and thirty when the provincial office was absorbed into the postal service of the dominion.
The number of post offices in Nova Scotia doubled in four years, tripled in ten years, and more than quadrupled in fifteen years, reaching a total of six hundred and thirty when the provincial office was merged into the postal service of the dominion.
Communication with Canada was confined to the land route, seven hundred miles in length, over which it took ten days travel to reach the nearest point of importance. By 1854, two other modes of communication had presented themselves. The Cunard steamers, which called at Halifax on their way to Boston and New York, were laid under contribution to carry mails between Halifax and Canada; and the completion of the railway between Montreal and Portland, Maine, afforded an opportunity of a connection which was made by a steamer running between Portland and St. John, New Brunswick.
Communication with Canada was limited to the land route, which stretched seven hundred miles and took ten days to reach the nearest important point. By 1854, two new ways to communicate had emerged. The Cunard steamers, which stopped at Halifax on their way to Boston and New York, were used to carry mail between Halifax and Canada; and the completion of the railway connecting Montreal and Portland, Maine, allowed for a connection via a steamer that operated between Portland and St. John, New Brunswick.
The value of this service was not as great as it afterwards became when there was a complete railway connection between Halifax and St. John, but it nevertheless effected a considerable reduction in time. Thus, in November 1855, mails were carried between Quebec and Halifax by way of St. John and Portland in four days, though the average, through the winter, was about a day more. The steamer carried the mails between St. John and Portland three times a week in summer, and twice a week during the balance of the year.
The value of this service wasn't as significant as it later became when there was a full railway connection between Halifax and St. John, but it still resulted in a notable reduction in travel time. In November 1855, mails were transported between Quebec and Halifax through St. John and Portland in four days, although the average time during the winter was about a day longer. The steamer carried the mails between St. John and Portland three times a week in the summer and twice a week for the rest of the year.
The postage on letters circulating throughout the North American provinces was threepence a half ounce, and newspapers were transmitted free of all postage. The registration of letters was introduced in 1852, the fee being sixpence; and a money order system established in 1859. The limit on the amount of a single order was fixed at the low sum of $20 and the charge on each order was the rather high one of tenpence an order.
The postage on letters sent across the North American provinces was threepence for half an ounce, and newspapers could be sent without any postage. The registration of letters was introduced in 1852, with a fee of sixpence; a money order system started in 1859. The maximum amount for a single order was set at a mere $20, and the fee for each order was quite high at tenpence.
By 1860 a fully equipped postal system was in operation in Nova Scotia. The revenue of the department responded with fair[Pg 281] readiness to the accommodation afforded to the public. For the last year under the old system, when rates were excessively high, and the accommodation limited, the revenue was $28,260. The immediate consequence of the great reduction was a shrinkage in the revenue by $4856 in the following year. Five years after the low rates were established, the revenue for the year 1851 was surpassed, and in thirteen years it was practically doubled. In 1866, the last complete year under the provincial regime the revenue had reached the respectable sum of $69,000.
By 1860, a fully equipped postal system was up and running in Nova Scotia. The department's revenue responded reasonably well to the services provided to the public. In the last year of the old system, when rates were excessively high and services were limited, the revenue was $28,260. As a direct result of the significant rate reduction, revenue dropped by $4,856 in the following year. Five years after the lower rates were implemented, the revenue for 1851 was exceeded, and within thirteen years it had nearly doubled. By 1866, the last complete year under the provincial system, revenue had reached a respectable $69,000.
The steady expansion of the service entailed an outlay which considerably surpassed the revenue. In 1852, the first complete year under the provincial administration, the deficit was $10,500. This deficiency steadily mounted until for the years 1859 to 1861, it averaged $29,000. Thereafter it descended as steadily as it had risen, and during the last three years before the provincial system was absorbed by the post office department at Ottawa the shortage was $17,500 a year.
The ongoing growth of the service required an investment that greatly exceeded the revenue. In 1852, the first full year under provincial management, the deficit was $10,500. This shortfall steadily increased until it averaged $29,000 from 1859 to 1861. After that, it decreased just as consistently as it had increased, and in the last three years before the provincial system was taken over by the post office department in Ottawa, the deficit was $17,500 a year.
Neither Nova Scotia nor New Brunswick had the advantage of an extended railway mail service until some years after Canada had been in enjoyment of it. The service by railway began at the commencement of 1857, the mails being carried between Halifax and Grand Lake, a distance of twenty-two miles. In the following year it was extended to Truro and Windsor, which was the total extent of the railway mail service at the time of confederation.
Neither Nova Scotia nor New Brunswick had the benefit of an extended railway mail service until several years after Canada had already enjoyed it. The railway service started at the beginning of 1857, with the mails being transported between Halifax and Grand Lake, a distance of twenty-two miles. The following year, it was expanded to Truro and Windsor, which was the full extent of the railway mail service at the time of confederation.
It was resolved at the time New Brunswick assumed the administration of its postal system, to make the postmaster general a member of the provincial cabinet. But the legislature did not act on its resolution until 1855, the postmaster general in the interim being, as in Nova Scotia, merely an officer of the government. In 1851, the post office in New Brunswick had, in regular post offices and way offices, exactly one hundred offices.[295] These were increased with much rapidity. After five years, the number had increased to two hundred and forty-six offices; and at the period of confederation, there were four hundred and thirty-eight post offices in New Brunswick.
It was decided when New Brunswick took control of its postal system that the postmaster general would be part of the provincial cabinet. However, the legislature didn't implement this decision until 1855, with the postmaster general, like in Nova Scotia, just acting as a government officer in the meantime. In 1851, New Brunswick had exactly one hundred post offices, including regular and way offices. These grew rapidly. After five years, the number rose to two hundred and forty-six offices, and by the time of confederation, there were four hundred and thirty-eight post offices in New Brunswick.
The conditions under which letters and newspapers were carried in New Brunswick were the same as those which prevailed in the other provinces. The postage was threepence per half ounce for[Pg 282] letters, and newspapers were carried without charge. The effect on the revenue was the same as in the other provinces.
The conditions for carrying letters and newspapers in New Brunswick were the same as those in the other provinces. Postage was threepence for every half ounce of letters, and newspapers were delivered for free. The impact on revenue was similar to that in the other provinces.
In the first year after the low charges were introduced, the reduction in the revenue was considerable. On comparing the revenue for the first six months under the reduced rates with the revenue for the corresponding period of the preceding year, there was found to be a diminution of $3959. But the rebound was as rapid as it was in Canada. In 1853, the revenue had nearly attained the figures of 1850-1851. Thereafter the progress of the revenue was steady, reaching the sum of $50,769 in 1866.
In the first year after the lower fees were introduced, the drop in revenue was significant. When we compared the revenue from the first six months under the reduced rates to the revenue from the same period the year before, there was a decrease of $3,959. However, the recovery was as quick as it was in Canada. By 1853, the revenue had almost reached the levels of 1850-1851. After that, revenue growth was consistent, culminating in a total of $50,769 in 1866.
As in Nova Scotia, the cost of maintaining the service at its existing efficiency outran considerably the revenue produced. The deficiency of revenue to meet expenses amounted in 1854 to $15,316. This shortage increased to nearly $24,000 in the years 1856 and 1857. There were variations during the years that followed, but in the last three years the average annual deficit was rather more than $20,000.
As in Nova Scotia, the cost of keeping the service running at its current efficiency far exceeded the revenue generated. In 1854, the revenue shortfall was $15,316. This deficit grew to nearly $24,000 in 1856 and 1857. While there were fluctuations in the years that followed, the average annual deficit over the last three years was just over $20,000.
The department at Fredericton took a philosophical view of these deficits which the government were called upon annually to make good. The large expenditure, it was maintained, might be fairly viewed in the same light as the amounts annually granted by the legislature for roads and bridges and for the support of common schools. "The mail carriage to all parts of the province secures to the travelling public conveyances which would not otherwise exist, and the very large amount of newspapers, etc., which passes through the post office affords strong evidence that the department may be considered a branch of our educational system."
The department in Fredericton took a thoughtful approach to these deficits that the government had to cover each year. They argued that the significant spending could be seen similarly to the funds allocated annually by the legislature for roads, bridges, and public schools. "The mail services across the province provide transportation options for the public that wouldn't exist otherwise, and the substantial volume of newspapers and other items that go through the post office strongly suggests that the department is part of our education system."
Some friction existed between the three provinces, arising from their geographical relations to one another. The British government made an arrangement in 1845 for the conveyance of the Canadian mails through the United States to and from the port of Boston, paying the United States on the basis of the weight of mails carried. The letters were carried under this arrangement. But, as the newspapers were not regarded as so important, the government decided that they should not be carried on to Boston, but landed them at Halifax, leaving them to be carried by the couriers who conveyed the mails overland from that city to Quebec.
Some tension existed between the three provinces due to their geographical relationships. In 1845, the British government set up a deal to transport Canadian mail through the United States to and from the port of Boston, paying the U.S. based on the weight of the mail carried. The letters were delivered under this arrangement. However, since newspapers weren't considered as crucial, the government decided not to send them to Boston. Instead, they were unloaded in Halifax and then carried by couriers who transported the mail overland from that city to Quebec.
It was an arrangement which gave no satisfaction to any of the provinces. Nova Scotia complained that it had to bear the expense of conveying this mail matter for Canada and New Brunswick across its territory without any sort of compensation. New[Pg 283] Brunswick declared its case was no better than Nova Scotia's, as it had to forward the Canadian matter through that province, while Canada protested that the matter complained of was due to no action or desire on its part, as the arrangements delayed the delivery of the newspapers until they were useless. A combined representation to the British government removed the grievance, by the newspapers as well as the letters being thereafter sent by way of Boston.
It was an arrangement that satisfied none of the provinces. Nova Scotia complained that it had to cover the cost of moving this mail for Canada and New Brunswick through its territory without any compensation. New Brunswick argued that its situation was just as bad as Nova Scotia's, as it had to send Canadian mail through that province. Meanwhile, Canada claimed that the issue was not caused by any actions or wishes on its part, since the arrangements delayed the delivery of newspapers until they were no longer useful. A joint appeal to the British government resolved the problem by ensuring that both newspapers and letters were sent via Boston from then on.
The relations between Canada and the United States were, as was to have been expected, cordial. A convention was made in 1848 between Great Britain and the United States, providing for the conveyance of the mails exchanged between Canada and Great Britain, and in this convention it was stipulated that the letters and newspapers exchanged between Canada and the United States should be subject to the combined postage of the two countries.
The relationship between Canada and the United States was, as expected, friendly. In 1848, a convention was established between Great Britain and the United States that arranged for the delivery of mail exchanged between Canada and Great Britain. This agreement stated that the letters and newspapers exchanged between Canada and the United States would be subject to the combined postage rates of both countries.
Thus the postage on any letter weighing not more than half an ounce, and sent from Canada to any part of the United States was ten cents. An exception was made in the case of letters passing between Canada and California and Oregon. The charge in these cases was fifteen cents.
Thus, the postage for any letter weighing no more than half an ounce, sent from Canada to anywhere in the United States, was ten cents. An exception was made for letters sent between Canada and California or Oregon, where the charge was fifteen cents.
The construction of the Great Western railway between Niagara Falls and Windsor afforded an opportunity to the United States to improve its postal communications between the eastern and the western States, while, on the other hand before the Grand Trunk railway was built, Canada took advantage of the lines in the United States running along the south shore of lake Ontario to accelerate the mails exchanged between Toronto and Montreal.
The construction of the Great Western railway between Niagara Falls and Windsor gave the United States a chance to enhance its postal communications between the eastern and western states. Meanwhile, before the Grand Trunk railway was built, Canada made use of the lines in the United States running along the south shore of Lake Ontario to speed up the mail exchanged between Toronto and Montreal.
FOOTNOTES:
[294] The facts respecting the post office in Nova Scotia are to be found in the reports of the department, in the appendices to the Journals of the Assembly from 1852 onwards.
[294] The details about the post office in Nova Scotia can be found in the department's reports, in the appendices to the Journals of the Assembly starting from 1852.
[295] The facts respecting the post office in New Brunswick are to be found in the reports of the department, in the appendices to the Journals of the Assembly from 1852 onwards.
[295] The details about the post office in New Brunswick can be found in the department's reports, in the appendices to the Journals of the Assembly starting from 1852.
CHAPTER XVII
Canadian ocean mail service—Want of sympathy of British government therewith.
Canadian ocean mail service—Lack of support from the British government for it.
The progress of the Cunard line had a consequence which was neither anticipated nor welcomed by the British government. The plan of the government to concentrate its transatlantic communications on Halifax had been given a thorough trial and had proven a failure, and as the expressed wish of the Canadians to have their correspondence with the mother country exchanged at either Boston or New York coincided with the interests of the owners of the steamers, the principal port of call on this side of the Atlantic shifted through a series of arrangements from Halifax to New York.
The advancement of the Cunard line had an outcome that the British government neither expected nor appreciated. The government's plan to focus its transatlantic communications on Halifax had been fully tested and was a failure. Since the Canadians expressed a desire to have their correspondence with the mother country sent through Boston or New York, which aligned with the interests of the steamer owners, the main port of call on this side of the Atlantic shifted from Halifax to New York through a series of arrangements.
In 1852, the contract between the British government and the Cunards provided for a direct service of weekly frequency between Liverpool and New York, with a subordinate service by slower steamers to Halifax and Boston. The subsidy had also undergone successive augmentations until, in 1852, it reached the immense sum of £173,340 a year.[296] But although the service was now to all appearances Anglo-American in character the British government assumed to regard it as Anglo-colonial, as imperial, because it provided the means for exchanging the mails between Great Britain and Canada.
In 1852, the contract between the British government and the Cunards established a direct weekly service between Liverpool and New York, along with a secondary service by slower steamers to Halifax and Boston. The subsidy had been increased several times until, in 1852, it reached a substantial amount of £173,340 a year.[296] However, even though the service appeared to be Anglo-American, the British government viewed it as Anglo-colonial, as an imperial service, because it facilitated mail exchange between Great Britain and Canada.
In 1855, the British government set on foot one of those large colonial schemes which ought to have excited mistrust both as to its practicability and its expediency. It proposed to establish a low and uniform rate between Great Britain and all her dependencies excepting India, Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius and Van Diemen's Land. The postage was to be reduced from one shilling to sixpence per half ounce letter.[297]
In 1855, the British government launched one of those big colonial projects that should have raised doubts about both its feasibility and its sensibility. It aimed to create a low and uniform postage rate between Great Britain and all her territories, excluding India, Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, and Van Diemen's Land. The postage was set to drop from one shilling to sixpence for a half-ounce letter.[297]
Coupled with the reduction in rate was a proposal that arrangements should be made by which the maintenance of the services, which had hitherto fallen entirely upon the mother country, should be shared by the colonies having the benefit of them.
Coupled with the lower rate was a suggestion that plans should be made so that the cost of maintaining the services, which until now had been entirely managed by the mother country, should be shared by the colonies benefiting from them.
Canada's participation in the scheme was invited, and the arrangement made by the British government with the Australian colonies was submitted to the Canadian government.[298] Under this arrangement the British government was to make the contract for the service, and the colonies should pay half the expense involved.
Canada was invited to join the plan, and the British government presented the arrangement made with the Australian colonies to the Canadian government.[298] Under this arrangement, the British government would handle the contract for the service, and the colonies would cover half of the costs.
The proposal found no favour in Canada. The Cunard service, the expense of which Canada was expected to share, was far from being an unmixed advantage to the British North American provinces. It was indeed a most serious obstacle to the realization of plans, which Canada conceived essential to its expansion on the lines marked out by nature.
The proposal wasn’t well-received in Canada. The Cunard service, which Canada was supposed to help pay for, wasn’t purely beneficial for the British North American provinces. In fact, it posed a significant challenge to the plans Canada saw as crucial for its growth in line with what nature had laid out.
For many years the thought of Upper Canadians had turned to the advantages which were to be derived from the utilizing of the great water system extending through lake and river, from the head waters of the lake Superior to the ocean, and measures had been carried forward to overcome the obstacles caused by the falls and rapids on the course of the passage.
For many years, the people of Upper Canada had focused on the benefits of using the vast water system that runs from the headwaters of Lake Superior to the ocean, and efforts had been made to address the challenges posed by the falls and rapids along the route.
By 1849, the canal system was completed, which permitted the free passage of inland vessels from the upper lakes to Montreal, and it was anticipated that the greater part of the movement of immigration and freight to and from Upper Canada and the western states, would be upon Canadian waterways. Merchandise could be carried from lake Erie to Quebec at less cost than from Buffalo by the Erie Canal to New York. But in spite of these facts, trade on the Erie Canal increased largely and steadily, while the trade on the Canadian water routes increased but slowly.
By 1849, the canal system was finished, allowing inland boats to travel freely from the upper lakes to Montreal. It was expected that most of the movement of immigrants and cargo to and from Upper Canada and the western states would happen on Canadian waterways. Goods could be transported from Lake Erie to Quebec at a lower cost than from Buffalo via the Erie Canal to New York. However, despite this, trade on the Erie Canal grew significantly and steadily, while trade on the Canadian water routes increased only slowly.
The principal reason for the apparent disregard of the economic law that trade will follow the superior route was found in the fact that for a large proportion of the traffic the destination was Europe, and that the charges to the out-ports of New York and Quebec were only a part of the total charge to which the traffic were subject. If, for any reason, the conveyance across the Atlantic from New York to Europe was so much cheaper than the conveyance from Quebec, that the total charge from lake Erie to Europe was lower by way of New York than by way of Quebec, then it is obvious that the trade would not be attracted to the route which seemed to be naturally the superior one.
The main reason for the clear disregard of the economic rule that trade will take the best route was because a large portion of the traffic was headed to Europe. The fees for reaching the out-ports of New York and Quebec were just part of the total expenses that the traffic had to cover. If, for any reason, the cost of transport across the Atlantic from New York to Europe was significantly cheaper than from Quebec, making the total cost from Lake Erie to Europe lower via New York than via Quebec, then it’s clear that trade wouldn’t favor the route that actually seemed to be the better one.
This was the case at that time. Owing to the large subsidies given by the British government to the steamers sailing to and from New York, vessels running to and from Quebec could not compete with those from the rival port. The assistance to the[Pg 286] Cunard line, therefore, which the British government desired Canada to give in part, was a positive detriment to the development of the transport business of upper and lower Canada.
This was the situation back then. Because of the large subsidies provided by the British government to the steamers traveling to and from New York, ships going to and from Quebec couldn’t compete with those from the rival port. The support for the[Pg 286]Cunard line, which the British government wanted Canada to partially provide, actually hurt the development of the transportation business in Upper and Lower Canada.
The question of establishing a steamship line from a St. Lawrence port had engaged the attention of the legislature of the United Provinces as early as 1851. In that year a resolution was offered to the house of assembly, setting forth the advantages of the Canadian route, and the fact that these advantages were offset by the aid given by the British government to the Cunard and Collins lines (the latter was owned by an American company), and asking that the British government be approached with a request that they grant assistance to a Canadian line similar to that given to the lines running in and out of New York.[299]
The idea of starting a steamship line from a St. Lawrence port caught the attention of the legislature of the United Provinces as early as 1851. That year, a resolution was presented to the House of Assembly, highlighting the benefits of the Canadian route. It pointed out that these benefits were countered by the support the British government provided to the Cunard and Collins lines (the latter was owned by an American company) and requested that the British government be approached to grant support to a Canadian line similar to the assistance given to the lines operating in and out of New York.[299]
A committee of the assembly took the subject into consideration, and in the following year a contract was made with a British firm,[300] which was shortly afterwards converted into the Canadian Steam Navigation Company, for a service from Liverpool to Quebec and Montreal during the season of open navigation in the St. Lawrence, and to Portland, Maine, during the five months when the river route was not practicable. The trips were to be fortnightly to the Canadian ports and monthly to Portland; and the steamers to be employed were to be of at least 1200 tons burthen.
A committee of the assembly considered the issue, and the following year, a contract was signed with a British company,[300] which was soon transformed into the Canadian Steam Navigation Company. This company was set up to provide service from Liverpool to Quebec and Montreal during the open navigation season in the St. Lawrence River, and to Portland, Maine, for the five months when the river route wasn’t feasible. The trips were planned to be every two weeks to the Canadian ports and once a month to Portland; and the steamers used had to be at least 1200 tons in capacity.
Twenty-four thousand pounds a year were to be paid to the company by way of subsidy—£19,000 by the government of Canada, £4000 by the Atlantic and St. Lawrence railway (later a section of the Grand Trunk railway) and £1000 by the city of Portland.
Twenty-four thousand pounds a year were to be paid to the company as a subsidy—£19,000 from the government of Canada, £4,000 from the Atlantic and St. Lawrence railway (which later became part of the Grand Trunk railway), and £1,000 from the city of Portland.
Trips were made during the winter of 1853, and throughout the summer of 1854, but there was so general a disregard of the terms of the contract, that it was terminated, and a contract was made with Hugh Allan in September 1855.[301] The new contractor entered upon his engagement with laudable energy; and at the end of the first season the postmaster general of Canada was able to make a comparison between the Canadian service and that to the port of New York.[302]
Trips were made during the winter of 1853 and throughout the summer of 1854, but there was such a general disregard for the terms of the contract that it was terminated, and a new contract was signed with Hugh Allan in September 1855.[301] The new contractor took on his responsibilities with commendable enthusiasm; and by the end of the first season, the postmaster general of Canada was able to compare the Canadian service with that to the port of New York.[302]
On the westbound voyages the Canadian steamers were practically a day slower than the Cunard steamers—the Allan steamers taking twelve days, twenty and a half hours, to eleven days and twenty-two hours occupied by vessels of the Cunard line. The[Pg 287] Canadian steamers were also slower than the Collins line on these trips by four hours. But on the voyage to Great Britain, the Canadian line made the speediest trips of the three. These steamers took but eleven days two hours, while the Cunard steamers were eleven hours and the Collins thirty hours longer in reaching Liverpool.
On the westbound trips, the Canadian steamers were almost a day slower than the Cunard steamers—the Allan steamers took twelve days and twenty and a half hours compared to the eleven days and twenty-two hours for the Cunard vessels. The[Pg 287] Canadian steamers were also four hours slower than the Collins line on these journeys. However, on the voyage to Great Britain, the Canadian line had the fastest trips of the three. These steamers took just eleven days and two hours, while the Cunard steamers took eleven hours longer and the Collins line took thirty hours longer to reach Liverpool.
It was with the successful inauguration of the Canadian service that the friction with the British government began. There developed immediately a clash of interests.
It was with the successful launch of the Canadian service that the friction with the British government began. A clash of interests developed right away.
The first note of dissatisfaction came from Great Britain. The postmaster general communicated to the colonial secretary[303] the information that the earnings of the packet service were much reduced by the fact that the Canadian post office was sending its correspondence by the first steamer that sailed whether it was British or American, and not confining its despatches to the steamers of the Cunard line.
The first hint of dissatisfaction came from Great Britain. The postmaster general informed the colonial secretary[303] that the earnings from the mail service had dropped significantly because the Canadian post office was sending its mail on the first steamer that left, whether it was British or American, instead of only using the Cunard line's steamers.
To the British post office, the Canadian line was an American line, and in spite of all protests and remonstrances, it insisted on treating the Allan line steamers as foreign. Ordinarily there would be no practical consequence of this wilful misunderstanding, but as letters conveyed by the Cunard line were charged eightpence the half ounce, while those carried by the American lines were made to pay fourteen pence, the hostility to the Canadian enterprise was marked.
To the British post office, the Canadian line was considered an American line, and despite all the complaints and objections, it continued to treat the Allan line steamers as foreign. Normally, this intentional misunderstanding wouldn’t have significant consequences, but since letters sent via the Cunard line were charged eight pence for half an ounce, while those carried by the American lines had to pay fourteen pence, the hostility towards the Canadian venture was clear.
The postmaster general did not stop at this point, and leave the public on both sides of the Atlantic to consult their own interests as to whether they would send their letters by the Canadian or British subsidized lines. Taking up the case of interests adversely affected by the discriminatory rates, he pointed out that, as many unpaid letters were sent by the American lines, recipients of these letters had to pay sixpence more than if the letters were sent by the Cunard line.
The postmaster general didn't just stop there, leaving people on both sides of the Atlantic to figure out for themselves whether to send their letters via the Canadian or British subsidized lines. Addressing the concerns of those negatively impacted by the unfair rates, he noted that, since many unpaid letters were sent through American lines, the recipients of these letters had to pay sixpence more than if the letters had been sent by the Cunard line.
That the remedy lay in the hands of the postmaster general, of reducing the rates on letters carried by the Canadian (or American line as he persisted in calling the Allan line) was not to the point. He called upon the colonial secretary, if the secretary concurred in his views, to remonstrate with the Canadian government as to the course it has chosen without reference to the home government. These views do not seem to have been communicated to Canada. But shortly afterwards the British government submitted for the consideration of the Canadian government, the Australian[Pg 288] scheme for a postal service to practically all the self-governing colonies of this period.
That the solution was in the hands of the postmaster general, who could lower the rates on letters sent via the Canadian (or American line, as he kept calling it, the Allan line), was beside the point. He urged the colonial secretary, if he agreed with him, to complain to the Canadian government about the approach they took without consulting the home government. It seems these views were not communicated to Canada. However, soon after, the British government presented the Australian[Pg 288] plan for a postal service to nearly all the self-governing colonies of the time for the Canadian government's consideration.
The postmaster general of Canada had doubts as to the applicability of the Australian arrangement to the Canadian service.[304] He presumed the proposition was limited to the Cunard line, and would not be extended to the equally British line running directly from Canadian ports to Liverpool. Special interests, similar to those which had induced the British government to subsidize the Cunard line, had led the Canadian government to extend assistance to the Allan line, and it seemed scarcely expedient for the Canadian government to lend aid to the British government in the maintenance of the Cunard line in the absence of any evidence of intention on the part of the British government to reciprocate with regard to the Canadian line.
The postmaster general of Canada was skeptical about whether the Australian arrangement applied to the Canadian service.[304] He thought the proposal was only for the Cunard line and wouldn’t cover the other British line that goes straight from Canadian ports to Liverpool. Similar interests that prompted the British government to support the Cunard line had led the Canadian government to back the Allan line. It seemed unreasonable for the Canadian government to help the British government maintain the Cunard line without any sign that the British government intended to support the Canadian line in return.
It was further observed by the postmaster general of Canada that even if the Canadian government should concede the equity of the British proposition it would be impossible to determine satisfactorily the proportion of the cost which should be borne by the North American provinces, since much the larger part of the mails carried by the Cunard line was exchanged between Great Britain and the United States.
It was also noted by the postmaster general of Canada that even if the Canadian government agreed with the fairness of the British proposal, it would be impossible to satisfactorily determine the share of the cost that should be covered by the North American provinces, as a significant majority of the mail transported by the Cunard line was exchanged between Great Britain and the United States.
The position taken by the Canadian government gave rise to great irritation in Great Britain. Fortunately the expression of this feeling was not communicated to the Canadian government until some years later, when the question, though by no means settled, had passed out of the irritation and friction phase.
The stance of the Canadian government caused a lot of annoyance in Great Britain. Thankfully, this sentiment wasn’t shared with the Canadian government until years later, when the issue, although still unresolved, had moved beyond the phase of irritation and conflict.
It is fortunate, also, that the intermediaries between the two governments were men of good sense, with an appreciative understanding of the view of the colonial government. The Duke of Argyle, postmaster general, in the Palmerston government of 1855-1858, declared that the measures taken by the Canadian government afforded no relief whatever to the British government. They had, indeed, withdrawn from the British government part of the postage it was entitled to expect when it embarked on the Cunard contract. If on the expiration of the contract existing, which had still five or six years to run, the Canadian government should undertake to perform half of the effective service, it might fairly claim exemption from all share in the other half of the service, and furthermore might claim a right to apply the amount received by way of sea postage, towards defraying the cost of the Canadian packets.[Pg 289]
It’s lucky, too, that the people acting as go-betweens for the two governments were sensible and understood the perspective of the colonial government. The Duke of Argyle, the postmaster general in the Palmerston government from 1855 to 1858, stated that the actions taken by the Canadian government provided no relief to the British government. In fact, they had taken away part of the postage that the British government was entitled to when it signed the Cunard contract. If at the end of the existing contract, which still had five or six years left, the Canadian government decided to handle half of the effective service, it could reasonably argue that it shouldn’t have to cover any part of the remaining service. Moreover, it could claim the right to use the money collected from sea postage to help cover the costs of the Canadian packets.[Pg 289]
But, Argyle affirmed, the British government could hardly admit the propriety of a demand made upon it for assistance to a line of steamers, which was established by the colony—a line which had no other effect than to diminish the postal revenue upon which the British government relied to meet the outlay occasioned by the contract with the Cunard company.
But Argyle insisted that the British government could hardly agree to a request for help regarding a line of steamers set up by the colony—one that only served to reduce the postal revenue that the British government depended on to cover the expenses from the contract with the Cunard company.
Labouchere, the colonial secretary, to whom the duke's views were communicated, declined to submit them in their existing shape to the colonial government. If the British government had been in no way parties to the agreement made by the Canadian government with Allan, the Canadian government were equally unconsulted when the British government entered into the contract with the Cunard company; and Labouchere pointed out that the British government were without the means of enforcing its views on the Canadian government.
Labouchere, the colonial secretary, to whom the duke's views were shared, refused to present them in their current form to the colonial government. If the British government was not involved in the agreement made by the Canadian government with Allan, then the Canadian government was also not consulted when the British government made the contract with the Cunard company; and Labouchere noted that the British government lacked the means to enforce its views on the Canadian government.
If the postmaster general or the treasury, which coincided in his views, were of a different opinion, Labouchere desired to know what steps they proposed to take in the highly probable case that the province declined the responsibility it was sought to impose upon it. On the whole, the colonial secretary thought the preferable course would be to allow the present arrangements to subsist until the Cunard contract had expired, and then enter upon negotiations with the Canadian government for sharing with it upon equitable terms in the general expense of the transatlantic service.
If the postmaster general or the treasury, who shared his views, had a different opinion, Labouchere wanted to know what actions they planned to take in the likely event that the province refused the responsibility being placed on it. Overall, the colonial secretary believed it would be better to keep the current arrangements in place until the Cunard contract ended, and then start negotiations with the Canadian government to share the overall costs of the transatlantic service on fair terms.
The correspondence between the departments of government in London—the tenor of which has been described—was submitted, confidentially, to the governor general of Canada for his opinion on the 17th of July, 1856. Sir Edmund Walker Head replied, confidentially, to Labouchere, and set out Canada's position with gratifying clearness. A Canadian, he observed, looked at the circumstances from a point of view rather different from that in which they had presented themselves to the postmaster general at St. Martins-le-Grand. The Canadian asked: "Why are we Canadians obliged to pay a subsidy at all for a line of steamers running into the St. Lawrence to a British port, by a route which we hold to be the most advantageous route? The merits of the route itself might make our bounty unnecessary, were it not that Her Majesty's government gives a large bounty to a line running into foreign ports."
The correspondence between the government departments in London—the details of which have been explained—was sent confidentially to the Governor General of Canada for his opinion on July 17, 1856. Sir Edmund Walker Head responded confidentially to Labouchere, clearly outlining Canada's position. He pointed out that a Canadian would view the situation quite differently from how it appeared to the Postmaster General at St. Martins-le-Grand. The Canadian posed the question: "Why do we Canadians have to pay a subsidy at all for a line of steamers operating into the St. Lawrence to a British port, using a route that we believe is the best option? The advantages of the route itself might make our subsidy unnecessary if it weren't for the fact that Her Majesty's government provides a substantial subsidy to a line going to foreign ports."
"It might be admitted," continued the governor general, "that Canada was benefited by the rapid transmission of mails through the United States; but she was no party to an arrangement[Pg 290] as one that could never be revoked. Canada, then, thought that she could arrange for the conveyance of her own mails to and fro by way of Quebec in summer and Portland in winter, more rapidly and advantageously than by Boston and New York. Why should Her Majesty's government discourage this new enterprise on behalf of Her Majesty's subjects and by a large subsidy drive the business to the United States ports?
"It can be acknowledged," the governor general continued, "that Canada benefited from the quick delivery of mail through the United States; however, Canada was not part of an agreement[Pg 290] that could never be changed. Canada believed that it could manage the transportation of its own mail to and from Quebec in the summer and Portland in the winter, faster and more efficiently than through Boston and New York. So why would Her Majesty's government hinder this new endeavor for Her Majesty's subjects and use a large subsidy to direct business to the U.S. ports?"
"Canadians entertained the hope," the governor general further observed, "that no course would be pursued by the British government adverse to the principles of free trade, by the continuance of a large bounty to the Boston and New York lines. Leave the natural resources of the Canadian route to find their own level, and in the meantime do not use all the influence of the British post office so as to bear as hardly as possible on the first effort of the colony to open the St. Lawrence to a regular line of British steamers."
"Canadians hoped," the governor general added, "that the British government wouldn't take any action against the principles of free trade by continuing to give a large subsidy to the Boston and New York routes. Let the natural resources of the Canadian route find their own balance, and in the meantime, don't use all the power of the British post office to make it as difficult as possible for the colony to establish a regular line of British steamers on the St. Lawrence."
Head disclaimed the idea of giving these arguments as his own, but stated that, they expressed the opinion of many Canadians, among whom were some of the members of his council. In December, Labouchere informed the governor general that his view had prevailed, and that it was decided to leave the matter as it stood, until the Cunard contract expired, when it was hoped that an arrangement might be made more in conformity with what was regarded as an equitable consideration for the finances of the United Kingdom.
Head denied that these arguments were his own but mentioned that they represented the views of many Canadians, including some members of his council. In December, Labouchere informed the governor general that his perspective had won out and that they decided to keep the situation as it was until the Cunard contract expired, at which point they hoped to come up with an arrangement that aligned better with what was deemed fair for the finances of the United Kingdom.
The lack of cordiality displayed by the government of the mother country towards the ocean transport enterprise of her colony in its initial stages yielded to no warmer feeling with the progress of the scheme. The Allan service was performed during 1856 and 1857, as the postmaster general stated, with meritorious punctuality.[305]
The coldness shown by the government of the mother country towards the ocean transport business of its colony in the early stages did not lead to any warmer feelings as the plan developed. The Allan service ran during 1856 and 1857, and as the postmaster general noted, it was carried out with impressive punctuality.[305]
In the beginning of 1858 the Quebec-Portland service attracted the attention of the British post office, which intimated a desire to utilize it for the conveyance of mails between Great Britain and the United States during the period of the year when the Allan steamers made Portland their port of arrival and departure.[306]
In early 1858, the Quebec-Portland service caught the eye of the British post office, which expressed interest in using it for transporting mail between Great Britain and the United States during the times of year when the Allan steamers used Portland as their port for arrivals and departures.[306]
Sidney Smith, the postmaster general of Canada, was of the opinion that the Canadian line would be found the preferable one during all seasons, particularly for those parts of the United States bordering on the Great Lakes, as they were brought into direct[Pg 291] connection with the ocean at Quebec by means of the Grand Trunk railway.
Sidney Smith, the postmaster general of Canada, believed that the Canadian route would be the better option year-round, especially for areas of the United States near the Great Lakes, as it had a direct[Pg 291] connection to the ocean at Quebec via the Grand Trunk railway.
As an additional attraction to use the Canadian line, Smith offered to reduce the charge for sea postage, that is, the portion of the total postage between Great Britain and North America, which was allocated to the ocean conveyance, from eightpence to fourpence a letter. This would enable the public on both sides of the Atlantic to send their letters for eightpence instead of twelvepence.
As an extra incentive to use the Canadian route, Smith proposed to cut the sea postage fee—the part of the total postage between Great Britain and North America that covers ocean transport—from eightpence to fourpence per letter. This would allow people on both sides of the Atlantic to send their letters for eightpence instead of twelvepence.
On consideration of this proposition by the governments of Great Britain and the United States, it was found open to the objection that the postage of letters carried by the Cunard line must remain at one shilling, owing to the sea postage claimed by the British government on letters carried by that line. Until arrangements could be made between the British government and that of the United States by which the charge on letters passing between the two countries by the Cunard line could be reduced from one shilling to eightpence, it was deemed inadmissible to accept the Canadian proposition.
Upon review of this proposal by the governments of Great Britain and the United States, it was identified that there was a concern regarding the postage for letters sent via the Cunard line, which had to stay at one shilling because of the sea postage imposed by the British government. Until an agreement could be reached between the British government and the United States to lower the postage on letters traveling between the two countries via the Cunard line from one shilling to eightpence, accepting the Canadian proposal was considered unacceptable.
That seemed a reasonable decision, and it would have been supposed that until the Canadian proposition could be accepted the amount of sea postage paid for the Cunard service would be applied to the Canadian service.
That seemed like a reasonable decision, and it would have been assumed that until the Canadian proposal could be accepted, the amount paid for sea postage through the Cunard service would be applied to the Canadian service.
The British post office took no such view. It maintained that the Canadian post office was entitled to no more than the rate which it offered to accept, viz., fourpence, and as this rate added to the land postage in Great Britain and the United States, would only call for an eightpenny postage, it proposed that the difference between the eightpence and the shilling, which the public were actually charged, should be divided equally between the post offices of Great Britain, the United States and Canada.
The British post office disagreed. It insisted that the Canadian post office was only entitled to the rate it was willing to accept, which was fourpence. Since this rate, when added to the land postage in Great Britain and the United States, would only require an eightpenny postage, it suggested that the difference between the eightpence and the shilling that the public was actually charged should be split equally among the post offices of Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.
Smith protested that his proposition was part of the scheme to reduce the postage from a shilling to eightpence sea postage, and that until the reduction of the postage between Canada and Great Britain to eightpence was affected, the Canadian government were entitled to eightpence sea postage as much as the British government were for the letters carried by the Cunards.
Smith argued that his proposal was meant to lower the postage from a shilling to eight pence for sea mail, and that until the postage between Canada and Great Britain was reduced to eight pence, the Canadian government was just as entitled to eight pence sea postage as the British government was for the letters carried by the Cunards.
Alexander Tulloch Galt, inspector general of Canada, who was in London at the time, laid the whole case before the colonial secretary, pointing out that the attitude of Great Britain, in attempting to make the United States a party to the scheme to force Canada to take one-half the amount for sea postage that was[Pg 292] claimed by and conceded to the United States and Great Britain in respect to their subsidized lines, was the more objectionable, as there was no reason for believing that the United States had attached any such stipulation to their consent to use the Canadian line.
Alexander Tulloch Galt, the inspector general of Canada, who was in London at the time, explained the entire situation to the colonial secretary. He pointed out that Great Britain's attempt to get the United States involved in the plan to force Canada to accept half the sea postage amount that was[Pg 292] claimed by and agreed upon by the United States and Great Britain for their subsidized routes was particularly problematic. This was because there was no evidence to suggest that the United States had imposed any such condition for agreeing to use the Canadian line.
Galt's remonstrance had the effect of inducing the British government to withdraw from its untenable position in this instance. In the course of his communication Galt mentioned the disappointment with which it was learned in Canada that the Cunard contract, which would not have expired until January, 1862, had been renewed in June 1858.
Galt's complaint prompted the British government to back down from its impossible stance in this case. In his message, Galt expressed the disappointment felt in Canada upon learning that the Cunard contract, which wasn't set to expire until January 1862, had been renewed in June 1858.
This action on the part of the British government, Galt insisted, did not seem consistent with the assurance given by the colonial secretary to the governor general in December 1856, when he wrote that the lords of the treasury had apprised him "that the existing arrangements with respect to the Canadian mail service will continue until the expiration of the Cunard contract, when they hope arrangements may be affected more in conformity with what they would regard as an equitable consideration for the finances of this country."
This action by the British government, Galt argued, didn’t seem to match the assurance given by the colonial secretary to the governor general in December 1856, when he wrote that the lords of the treasury had informed him "that the current arrangements regarding the Canadian mail service will remain in place until the Cunard contract expires, when they hope new arrangements can be made that align more closely with what they would consider a fair approach for the finances of this country."
The Canadian legislature on the first opportunity, voted an address to the queen, expostulating strongly against the course of proceedings so injurious to the interests of Canada.
The Canadian legislature, at the first opportunity, voted to send a message to the queen, strongly protesting against the actions that were damaging to Canada's interests.
The action of the British government in prolonging the arrangements with the Cunards was set in a strong light by a review of several circumstances connected with it.[307] The application of the Cunard company, for an extension of their contract, was made in October 1857, only nine months after the discussion with the Canadian government. It was referred by the treasury to the admiralty and to the postmaster general.
The British government's decision to extend its agreement with the Cunard line was highlighted by several relevant circumstances.[307] The Cunard company requested an extension of their contract in October 1857, just nine months after the talks with the Canadian government. This request was sent by the treasury to the admiralty and the postmaster general.
The treasury recommended that it be granted, while the postmaster general deprecated an extension, for reasons not connected with the Canadian representations. On March 2, the treasury decided that it was premature to discuss either an extension or a renewal of the contract, though they expressed their readiness to consider favourably, any application that Cunard might make when the contract had advanced nearer to its termination.
The treasury suggested that it be approved, while the postmaster general was against an extension, for reasons unrelated to the Canadian requests. On March 2, the treasury determined that it was too soon to talk about either an extension or a renewal of the contract, although they indicated their willingness to look favorably on any application Cunard might submit when the contract was closer to its end.
On the 20th of the same month, Cunard made another application on the same general grounds; and this time the treasury, without further light on the subject, yielded, and directed the extension, requesting the postmaster general to communicate his[Pg 293] views as to any modifications that might be introduced into the contract, without materially affecting the basis of the existing agreement.
On the 20th of that month, Cunard filed another request based on the same general reasons; this time the treasury, lacking any more clarity, agreed and ordered the extension, asking the postmaster general to share his[Pg 293] thoughts on any changes that could be made to the contract without significantly altering the foundation of the current agreement.
The postmaster general, in reply, pointed out that the rate of payment made to Cunard was considerably higher than that for any other packet service, also that he had before him another offer for the conveyance of the transatlantic mails for an amount much less than was paid to Cunard. The new offer was from Inman, agent for the Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia line, whose vessels made their voyages at a speed not much inferior to Cunard's, and who agreed to convey the mails for the amount of the sea postage.
The postmaster general responded by highlighting that the payment rate to Cunard was significantly higher than any other packet service. He also mentioned that he had another offer on the table for delivering the transatlantic mails at a much lower cost than what was being paid to Cunard. This new offer came from Inman, who represented the Liverpool, New York, and Philadelphia line. Their ships traveled at a speed nearly equivalent to Cunard's, and they agreed to carry the mails for just the amount of the sea postage.
The offer had been received on the 1st of March, nineteen days before the application of Cunard; and as the postmaster general had had occasion to correspond with the postmaster general of the United States respecting Inman's offer, he had not thought it necessary to communicate this proposal to the treasury, nor did the treasury consider that their duty required them to make any further investigation before awarding the contract for £173,340 a year.
The offer was received on March 1st, nineteen days before Cunard's application. Since the postmaster general had to communicate with the postmaster general of the United States regarding Inman's offer, he didn’t feel it was necessary to inform the treasury about this proposal. The treasury also felt that it wasn't their responsibility to conduct any further investigation before granting the contract for £173,340 a year.
These facts are taken from the report of a select committee appointed by the house of commons in 1860, to inquire into the manner in which contracts have been made for the conveyance of mails by sea. The committee found that, in the making of these contracts, there was an extraordinary division of duty and consequent responsibility, between several departments of government.
These facts come from the report of a select committee appointed by the House of Commons in 1860 to investigate how contracts were made for transporting mail by sea. The committee discovered that there was an unusual division of duties and responsibilities among several government departments when these contracts were created.
The parties by whom these contracts were actually entered into, were the lords of the admiralty, but the authority for making them rested with the treasury, who prescribed their terms and conditions. The treasury before coming to the decisions which they communicated to the admiralty, consulted with the postmaster general, the colonial secretary, and with the admiralty themselves, in reference to the postal, colonial and nautical questions involved.
The contracts were actually entered into by the lords of the admiralty, but the power to make them came from the treasury, which set their terms and conditions. Before making the decisions that they shared with the admiralty, the treasury consulted with the postmaster general, the colonial secretary, and the admiralty itself regarding the postal, colonial, and nautical issues involved.
Theoretically, the arrangements were scarcely open to criticism. It was proper that the information necessary for a decision, respecting, in the first place, whether a service was required at all, and, in the next place, what the terms and conditions should be, on which the service should be performed, should be concentrated somewhere, and there seemed no place more fitting as a focal point than the lords of the treasury, who were responsible for obtaining and spending the money required for the maintenance of all the services called for by the government.[Pg 294]
The arrangements were hardly open to criticism. It made sense for the information needed to decide whether any service was actually required, and what the terms and conditions for that service should be, to be centralized. There didn’t seem to be a more suitable focal point than the treasury officials, who were in charge of securing and spending the funds needed for all the government services.[Pg 294]
But the fault lay not in the organization. It was to be found in the lack of co-ordination among the contributory departments. Several instances are given of the results of the failure of the departments to co-operate with one another. One which has a certain piquancy is the provision for the mail service to Australia.
But the problem wasn't with the organization itself. It was due to the lack of coordination among the contributing departments. There are several examples of the consequences of the departments not working together. One particularly interesting case is the arrangement for the mail service to Australia.
It will be remembered that the first jarring note in the relations between Great Britain and Canada concerning mail services arose when Canada declined to fall in with the proposition that the British government should arrange for the conveyance of the mails across the Atlantic, and that Canada should pay its share of the resulting outlay.
It will be remembered that the first conflict in the relationship between Great Britain and Canada over mail services occurred when Canada refused to agree to the proposal that the British government should handle the transportation of the mail across the Atlantic, and that Canada should cover its portion of the expenses involved.
The colonial secretary submitted, as the model arrangement, one which had been made between the governments of Great Britain and the Australian colonies, under which each government should pay half the cost of the service. The contract was to be arranged for entirely by Great Britain, and the colonies were assured that such care should be exercised in the arrangements that they could depend on their interests being safeguarded.
The colonial secretary proposed a standard agreement that had been established between the governments of Great Britain and the Australian colonies, where each would cover half the cost of the service. Great Britain would handle the entire contract, and the colonies were promised that their interests would be protected through careful planning of the arrangements.
How the government acquitted itself of the trust it assumed on the behalf of Australia, the parliamentary report shall relate. "That contract involved a yearly subsidy of £185,000, of which one-half was to be paid by the Australian colonies, who had no opportunities of being consulted in the framing of the contract; so that special circumspection was required. The tender accepted was that of a new company without experience, and who had no ships fit for the work.
How the government handled the trust it took on for Australia will be discussed in the parliamentary report. "That contract involved an annual subsidy of £185,000, with half of it to be paid by the Australian colonies, which had no chance to be involved in creating the contract; therefore, extra caution was necessary. The accepted bid came from a new company with no experience and no ships suitable for the job.
"One of their vessels," continues the report of the committee, "the 'Oneida' which was reported against, by the professional officer of the admiralty, and had not the horse power or tonnage required by the contract, broke down on her first voyage. Time was not kept, and though the colonies complained, it appears that no steps were taken to ensure the fulfilment of the contract with suitable vessels."
"One of their ships," continues the committee's report, "the 'Oneida,' which was criticized by the professional officer of the admiralty for not meeting the required horsepower or tonnage specified in the contract, broke down on her maiden voyage. The schedule was not maintained, and even though the colonies raised concerns, it seems that no action was taken to guarantee that the contract was fulfilled with appropriate vessels."
"The company," added the report of 1860, "in one year lost their capital, £400,000; the service proved a complete failure, and great risk of an interruption in postal communication was incurred. This contract had been entirely arranged by the then financial secretary, whose acts in these matters do not appear to have received confirmation by any other authority."
"The company," the 1860 report stated, "lost their capital of £400,000 in just one year; the service turned out to be a total failure, and there was a significant risk of disrupting postal communication. This contract was solely negotiated by the financial secretary at the time, and there seems to be no evidence that any other authority approved his actions in these matters."
It is not perhaps surprising, with the Australian venture in mind, that an explanation involving the same sort of incompetence[Pg 295] on the part of the departments of government should be made regarding the Cunard contract.
It’s not really surprising, considering the Australian venture, that a similar kind of incompetence[Pg 295] from government departments is being cited in connection with the Cunard contract.
The explanation of the Cunard contract was that when the decision of the treasury granting the renewal was made, the then financial secretary, who had only entered office with the change of ministry in the month of March immediately preceding, was not aware of the existence of the correspondence between the home government and that of Canada in 1856; nor, though that correspondence was among the records of the treasury, and the authority on which the colonial secretary had written his despatch of December 3, 1856, was a minute of the treasury, did the proceedings appear to have been known to any of the officers of the department charged with this branch of the business.
The explanation of the Cunard contract was that when the treasury decided to grant the renewal, the financial secretary, who had just taken office with the change of ministry in March right before, was unaware of the correspondence from the home government to Canada in 1856. Even though that correspondence was in the treasury's records and was the basis for the colonial secretary's letter from December 3, 1856, it seems that none of the department officials responsible for this matter were familiar with the proceedings.
The committee observed that they had not received any satisfactory explanation of the circumstance that a matter so recent, and of such importance, should have been lost sight of.
The committee noted that they had not received any satisfactory explanation for why such a recent and important issue had been overlooked.
But the painful story of the relations between the government of the mother country and that of her North American colony with respect to the ocean transport enterprise set on foot by Canada, does not end here. In the autumn of 1858, an Irish company known as the Lever or Galway Company, which had a contract with the Newfoundland government for a mail service between Galway and St. Johns, proposed to the British government to establish a service with fortnightly frequency between Galway and America.
But the painful story of the relations between the government of the mother country and that of her North American colony regarding the ocean transport project initiated by Canada doesn't end here. In the fall of 1858, an Irish company called the Lever or Galway Company, which had a contract with the Newfoundland government for a mail service between Galway and St. John's, suggested to the British government that they start a service that would operate every two weeks between Galway and America.
This scheme excited considerable interest, particularly in Ireland; and several representations were made to the government, by deputations and by memorials from chambers of commerce, setting forth their sense of the advantages which it would confer on the trade of that country. The publicity given this project brought into the field the two applicants who had been disappointed when the Cunard contract had been extended in 1857.
This plan generated a lot of interest, especially in Ireland, and several groups, including chambers of commerce, presented their views to the government through petitions and delegations, highlighting the benefits it would bring to the country’s trade. The attention this project received attracted the two applicants who had been let down when the Cunard contract was extended in 1857.
Inman on October 15 protested against the granting of a subsidy to a new line, and expressed the hope that, if it should be decided to give assistance to a line from Galway, the proposed service should be put up to public competition. The treasury replied to Inman, informing him that when a new service was about to be established by the government it was their practice to invite tenders by public advertisement, thereby affording to all parties the opportunity of tendering therefor. Inman heard no more from the government on the subject before the contract with Lever was concluded.[Pg 296]
Inman protested on October 15 against giving a subsidy to a new line and hoped that, if assistance was granted to a line from Galway, the proposed service would be put out for public competition. The treasury responded to Inman, letting him know that when the government plans to establish a new service, it typically invites bids through public advertisements, allowing everyone the chance to submit proposals. Inman did not hear anything more from the government on the matter before the contract with Lever was finalized.[Pg 296]
The Canadian government, also, advanced its claims for consideration. Galt wrote to the colonial secretary on November 11, 1858, and the London agent of the Canadian line on January 18, 1859, submitted an application to the treasury. He pointed out that the effects of this subsidized line would be disastrous to the prospects of his company, and expressed the trust of his principals "that before interfering to crush a provincial company of such magnitude, your lordships will at least afford the company we represent an opportunity of being heard."
The Canadian government also pushed for its claims to be taken seriously. Galt wrote to the colonial secretary on November 11, 1858, and on January 18, 1859, the London agent of the Canadian line submitted an application to the treasury. He noted that the impact of this subsidized line would be disastrous for his company's prospects and expressed his principals' hope "that before stepping in to undermine a provincial company of such significance, your lordships will at least give the company we represent a chance to be heard."
This appeal was so far successful, that it obtained for the company the honour of an interview at the treasury. They were promised that their representations would be considered; but no further notice was taken of their application.
This appeal was successful enough to get the company an interview at the treasury. They were assured that their requests would be considered, but no further action was taken on their application.
On the same day on which the Canadian company's letter was dated, viz., January 18, the Lever company submitted an offer for the conveyance of the mails from Galway to Portland, Boston and New York, calling at Newfoundland for £3000 a voyage. The treasury, following the practice laid down for their guidance, asked the postmaster general for his opinion on the proposal.
On the same day that the Canadian company's letter was dated, January 18, the Lever company made an offer to transport the mail from Galway to Portland, Boston, and New York, stopping in Newfoundland for £3000 per trip. The treasury, following their established guidelines, requested the postmaster general’s opinion on the proposal.
The postmaster general reported adversely, observing that it was not expedient to enter into any contract for the service, which would bind the government to a heavy annual payment. He was also of the opinion that the vast mercantile traffic between the two countries afforded abundant opportunities to secure additional service that might be desired on favourable terms.
The postmaster general reported negatively, noting that it wasn't practical to enter into any contract for the service that would commit the government to a large annual payment. He also believed that the significant trade between the two countries offered plenty of chances to obtain extra service that could be arranged on favorable terms.
Here then were three strong reasons to call for the government staying their hands from entering into a contract with Lever: the remonstrance of Inman, coupled with the intimation from the treasury that in the event of their deciding to establish the service, they would put it to public tender; the expostulation of Galt on November 11, 1858, and the appeal of the Canadian company for an opportunity to be heard on January 18; and the unfavourable report of the selected adviser of the treasury.
Here were three solid reasons for the government to hold off on signing a contract with Lever: Inman's objections, along with the treasury's hint that if they chose to set up the service, it would go to public bidding; Galt's protest on November 11, 1858, and the Canadian company's request for a chance to present their case on January 18; and the negative report from the treasury's chosen advisor.
Yet, in the face of all these circumstances, the treasury on February 22, authorized a contract to be made for a fortnightly service to Galway and New York, and Galway and Boston, alternately, at the rate of £3000 a voyage. The parliamentary committee in seeking an explanation for this extraordinary course, examined Lord Derby, the chancellor of the exchequer, as to the reasons which moved him to authorize this service.
Yet, despite all these circumstances, the treasury on February 22, approved a contract for a bi-weekly service to Galway and New York, and Galway and Boston, alternately, at a rate of £3000 per trip. The parliamentary committee, looking for an explanation for this unusual decision, questioned Lord Derby, the chancellor of the exchequer, about the reasons that led him to authorize this service.
Derby stated that he was influenced mainly by the consideration of the social and commercial advantages which this service would[Pg 297] confer on Ireland, and of the preference due to the Lever Company on account of its enterprize, in first establishing a line of steamers from Galway.
Derby said that he was mainly influenced by the social and commercial benefits that this service would[Pg 297]bring to Ireland, and by the preference given to the Lever Company for its initiative in being the first to set up a line of steamers from Galway.
Derby stated, however, that when he authorized the service he had not before him some materials, nor had he in view some considerations, which, the committee believed, should have been held essential elements in the determination of the question. He had no knowledge of the correspondence which had passed between the home government and that of Canada, and between the treasury and Inman.
Derby said, however, that when he approved the service, he didn't have some materials in front of him, nor did he consider some factors that the committee believed should have been key in deciding the issue. He wasn't aware of the communications that took place between the home government and the Canadian government, or between the treasury and Inman.
Consequently then, in the words of the committee of the house of commons, Derby's decision was given "in ignorance of the strong feeling in Canada as to the injury done to their interests by the system of subsidizing what they deemed rival lines; of the assurance given in 1856, on which the Canadian government relied, as a pledge that they would have an opportunity of being heard before that system was renewed or extended; and of the surprise and dissatisfaction already occasioned by the renewal, without hearing them, of the Cunard contract; and in ignorance, also, of the implied pledge given to Mr. Inman, that the new service would be thrown open to public competition.
As a result, according to the committee of the House of Commons, Derby's decision was made "without understanding the strong feelings in Canada about the harm done to their interests by the practice of funding what they considered competing lines; the assurance given in 1856, which the Canadian government counted on, that they would have a chance to express their views before that practice was renewed or extended; and the surprise and dissatisfaction already caused by the renewal of the Cunard contract without consulting them; and also without knowing about the implied promise made to Mr. Inman that the new service would be opened to public competition."
"It was likewise given," the committee added, "without any consideration of the question, whether, assuming the interests of Ireland warranted the establishment of the service from Galway, that object might not have been secured by an arrangement which would, at the same time, have provided for the wants, and satisfied the just claims of Canada."
"It was also given," the committee added, "without considering whether, if the interests of Ireland justified setting up the service from Galway, that goal could have been achieved through an arrangement that would also address the needs and fulfill the rightful claims of Canada."
The round condemnation by a committee of the house of commons, of the course pursued by the government, gave Smith, the postmaster general of Canada, a handle of which he was not slow to make full use. The report of the committee was laid before the house of commons on May 22, and on the 30th of the same month, Smith again approached the government on the subject, setting forth the grounds of his appeal to the British government, and concluding by asking that the government should aid the Canadian line by a subsidy of £50,000 a year. He pledged the Canadian government to give a like amount for the same purpose.
The strong criticism from a committee of the House of Commons regarding the government's actions gave Smith, the Postmaster General of Canada, an opportunity he was quick to seize. The committee's report was presented to the House of Commons on May 22, and on May 30, Smith again approached the government about the issue, outlining the reasons for his appeal to the British government. He concluded by requesting that the government support the Canadian line with an annual subsidy of £50,000. He committed the Canadian government to provide an equal amount for the same purpose.
The application was refused, and Smith, whose resources seemed endless, approached the subject from another angle.[308] The contract which was made with the Lever Company called for a fortnightly service, the consideration being £3000 a trip, or £78,000 a year.[Pg 298] The Lever Company was in no position to fulfil the terms of its contract, and Smith opened negotiations with the company to take over their contract, stipulating to allow the company £35,000 of the £78,000 which the contract would bring, as the consideration for the assignment.
The application was denied, and Smith, who seemed to have unlimited resources, decided to tackle the issue from a different perspective.[308] The contract with the Lever Company required a service every two weeks, with a payment of £3,000 per trip, totaling £78,000 a year.[Pg 298] The Lever Company couldn't meet the terms of its contract, so Smith started talks with the company to take over their contract, agreeing to give the company £35,000 of the £78,000 expected from the contract as payment for the transfer.
An agreement was concluded on these terms, and the deeds were signed on July 6, 1860. The only condition now was the consent of the British government to the arrangement, which was required by the contract, but which under the circumstances was regarded as purely formal. The terms being laid before the secretary of the treasury and the postmaster general, secured the approval of both those authorities; and on the 11th of July, the sailing arrangements under the contract were settled between Smith and the official in charge of the post office packet service. Success seemed now assured, but before the day was over, the situation had undergone an entire change, for the British government had refused its assent to the assignment of the contract.
An agreement was made on these terms, and the contracts were signed on July 6, 1860. The only condition now was the British government's approval of the arrangement, which was needed by the contract, but was seen as just a formality given the circumstances. After the terms were presented to the secretary of the treasury and the postmaster general, both gave their approval. Then, on July 11, the sailing arrangements under the contract were finalized between Smith and the official in charge of the post office packet service. Success seemed guaranteed, but by the end of the day, the situation had completely changed, as the British government had denied its approval for the assignment of the contract.
No reason was given for the refusal of the British government to sanction the transfer of the Lever contract to the Canadian line. Smith wrote to the secretary of the treasury for an explanation. He pointed out that the negotiations were made with the assent of Lord Palmerston and the treasury, that the arrangements had all been made on the secretary's assurance, and that in view of the strong feeling already existing in Canada on account of the treatment meted out to Canada in regard to its ocean mail service, he would be wanting in respect to the imperial authorities if he accepted the secretary's intimation literally, and in its full significance.
No reason was provided for the British government’s refusal to approve the transfer of the Lever contract to the Canadian line. Smith wrote to the treasury secretary for clarification. He pointed out that the negotiations were conducted with the approval of Lord Palmerston and the treasury, that all arrangements were made based on the secretary’s assurance, and that considering the strong feelings already present in Canada regarding the treatment it received about its ocean mail service, he would be disrespecting the imperial authorities if he took the secretary's message literally and at face value.
The secretary in his reply, gave away the whole case of the government. He admitted that for himself he had never concealed his opinion that the arrangement proposed by the Canadian government would have been a desirable one, but insisted that he had not used Palmerston's name beyond that. He had ascertained Palmerston's views as to the importance of meeting the wishes of Canada, sufficiently to warrant him, not in concluding negotiations, but in advancing them to the point where a definite proposal might be made to the government.
The secretary, in his response, revealed the entire government's position. He acknowledged that he had never hidden his belief that the arrangement suggested by the Canadian government would have been a good one, but insisted that he hadn't used Palmerston's name beyond that. He had confirmed Palmerston's views on the importance of addressing Canada's wishes enough to justify him, not in finalizing negotiations, but in moving them forward to the point where a concrete proposal could be made to the government.
The ground on which the treasury based refusal of assent to the agreement made between the Lever Company and the Canadian government, was that the contract contemplated the grant of £78,000 a year for a fortnightly service from Galway, in addition to the other ocean services which were then in operation, while the[Pg 299] transfer of the Lever contract to the Allan's would have the effect of merely substituting one contract for another, leaving the service just where it stood before—with an additional charge of £78,000 a year against the government.
The reason the treasury refused to approve the agreement between the Lever Company and the Canadian government was that the contract planned for a payment of £78,000 a year for a biweekly service from Galway, on top of the other ocean services that were already running. Meanwhile, transferring the Lever contract to Allan's would only replace one contract with another, keeping the service exactly the same as it was before—while adding an extra cost of £78,000 a year for the government.
There was another consideration and an extraordinary one. The government had suffered severe condemnation at the hands of the committee of the house of commons for their disregard of the pledge given, that, before a contract was awarded it would be put up for public competition. Their action in awarding the contract to the Lever Company without tender was an undeniable injury to the interests of Canada, and now this censure was made the cover for another blow at those same interests.
There was another consideration, and it was an extraordinary one. The government faced intense criticism from the committee of the House of Commons for ignoring the promise they made to put the contract up for public bidding before awarding it. Their decision to give the contract to the Lever Company without a competitive tender was a clear harm to Canada's interests, and now this criticism was being used as an excuse to take another hit at those same interests.
The secretary of the treasury observed that the pledge formerly given and unfortunately overlooked had acquired much notoriety and must in any contingency afterwards arising be treated with rigour. "If the Galway contract be considered binding," he concluded, "the government cannot be accused of breaking this pledge as long as they simply continue to pay the subsidy for the same services and to the same parties." But the case became different if they sanctioned a new arrangement involving material modifications, particularly when the arrangement transferred the contract to a party of undoubted, from one of questioned, solvency.
The treasury secretary noted that the promise made earlier and unfortunately ignored had gained a lot of attention and must be handled strictly in any future situation. "If the Galway contract is seen as binding," he concluded, "the government can’t be blamed for breaking this promise as long as they keep paying the subsidy for the same services and the same parties." However, the situation changes if they approve a new agreement with significant changes, especially if that agreement hands over the contract to a party with confirmed solvency instead of one that is questionable.
Smith next addressed Palmerston, and his letter shows clearly the incomprehensible and provoking course pursued by that statesman. At every step in the negotiations the treasury was consulted, and its approval gained. The solicitor of the Galway Company was also in frequent communication with the treasury, and he actually altered the form of the deed of transfer upon the suggestion of the secretary.
Smith then spoke to Palmerston, and his letter makes it clear how confusing and irritating the approach taken by that politician was. Throughout the negotiations, the treasury was consulted at every turn, and it gave its approval. The solicitor for the Galway Company was also in regular contact with the treasury, and he even changed the format of the deed of transfer based on a suggestion from the secretary.
The resolution of the Galway Company, accepting the proposal of the Canadian government, was adopted, and on the same day the treasury was informed of the fact. A week later—on July 5, 1860—Smith and Galt, the Canadian minister of finance, waited on the secretary of the treasury, who informed them that Palmerston was much gratified that the arrangements had been made, and on the strength of these assurances Smith executed the assignment of the contract, and provided securities for the purchase money, of all of which Palmerston expressed his high approval.
The Galway Company’s decision to accept the Canadian government’s proposal was approved, and the treasury was informed on the same day. A week later—on July 5, 1860—Smith and Galt, the Canadian minister of finance, met with the secretary of the treasury, who told them that Palmerston was very pleased that the arrangements had been finalized. Based on this assurance, Smith signed the contract assignment and provided securities for the purchase money, which Palmerston highly approved of.
The matter was regarded as so far concluded that on July 9 a meeting took place between the Canadian representatives and the officials of the treasury and post office, the details of the scheme were reduced to writing, and the secretary of the post office received[Pg 300] the approval of a communication to the postmaster general of the United States informing him of the arrangement, and that thereafter the Canadian ships would be considered as British and not as United States packets.
The issue was considered so settled that on July 9, a meeting occurred between the Canadian representatives and officials from the treasury and post office. The details of the plan were put in writing, and the post office secretary received[Pg 300] approval for a message to the U.S. postmaster general informing him of the arrangement, stating that from then on, the Canadian ships would be treated as British rather than as U.S. packets.
Considering the arrangements as completed, Smith and Galt decided to return to Canada, and on the 11th they called on Palmerston for the purpose of taking their leave, when, to their utter stupefaction, they were informed that the government peremptorily refused to sanction the transfer.
Considering the arrangements were finalized, Smith and Galt decided to head back to Canada, and on the 11th, they visited Palmerston to say their goodbyes, when, to their complete shock, they were told that the government outright refused to approve the transfer.
The reasons put forward for this unusual action on the part of the government lacked even the merit of plausibility. It was first argued that the Lever contract contemplated the grant of £78,000 a year for a fortnightly service from Galway, in addition to all the ocean service which might be existing, while the transfer would have the effect of substituting the Galway service for one of the existing services, and thus continuing the charge of £78,000 a year with a positive diminution of public accommodation.
The reasons given for this unusual action by the government didn’t even have the merit of being believable. It was initially claimed that the Lever contract included a payment of £78,000 a year for a biweekly service from Galway, along with whatever ocean service might already be in place. However, the transfer would result in replacing the Galway service with one of the current services, meaning the £78,000 annual charge would remain while actually decreasing public convenience.
Smith had a conclusive reply to this argument. He pointed out that at the time the Galway contract was entered into, that is on May 21, 1859, the Canadian service was only fortnightly; and the arrangement for which the sanction of the government was sought would have given exactly the accommodation contemplated when the contract was given—a weekly service between Ireland and America.
Smith had a definitive response to this argument. He noted that when the Galway contract was signed, specifically on May 21, 1859, the Canadian service was only every two weeks; and the proposal for which government approval was requested would have provided exactly the service intended when the contract was made—a weekly service between Ireland and America.
As for the modifications in the contract, which formed part of the ground of the government's refusal to sanction it, the first was that "the arrangement transferred the contract to a party of undoubted, from one of questioned, solvency." Smith's only comment on this was to complete the sentence by adding "or in other words would ensure its performance efficiently."
As for the changes in the contract, which were one of the reasons the government refused to approve it, the first was that "the arrangement transferred the contract to a party with confirmed solvency, instead of one with questionable solvency." Smith's only remark on this was to finish the sentence by adding "or in other words would guarantee its performance effectively."
The only other important modification sought by Canada in the terms of the contract was the substitution of Canadian for United States terminal ports in America. Apart from the slight to Canadian interests involved in putting forward such a reason, it must be clear that the Cunard line, in which the British government did not conceal its interest, would have been benefited and not injured by the withdrawal of a line running to United States ports. Smith concluded his protest by pointing out the distinction which the Canadian people could not fail to draw in comparing Palmerston's refusal, with that of previous governments.
The only other major change Canada wanted in the contract was to replace United States terminal ports with Canadian ones. Besides the slight to Canadian interests in raising such a reason, it’s clear that the Cunard line, which the British government openly supported, would have been helped rather than hurt by dropping a line to U.S. ports. Smith ended his protest by highlighting the difference that Canadians could not miss when comparing Palmerston's refusal to that of earlier governments.
The grants to the Cunard and Galway lines were stated to have been made in ignorance of the Canadian interests, and the inability[Pg 301] of the government to remedy these and other evils was deplored. In the case under consideration the British government, Smith pointed out, deliberately opposed themselves to that which would have benefited Canada, and had determined that the competition of which they complained should be maintained. The protest was quite without avail. The Galway Company entered on the performance of its contract, but its service was marked with so much irregularity, that the postmaster general was compelled to cancel it.
The grants to the Cunard and Galway lines were claimed to have been given without understanding the Canadian interests, and the government's inability to fix these and other problems was lamented. In the situation at hand, Smith noted that the British government purposefully opposed actions that would have helped Canada and had decided to keep the competition they were complaining about. The protest was completely ineffective. The Galway Company started to fulfill its contract, but its service was so inconsistent that the postmaster general had to cancel it.
FOOTNOTES:
[302] Annual report of P.M.G., 1856.
[303] Br. Parl. Pap., 1859, XXII.
[304] Br. Parl. Pap., 1859, XXII.
[305] Report of P.M.G., 1857.
CHAPTER XVIII
Canadian ocean mail service (cont.)—Series of disasters to Allan line steamers.
Canadian ocean mail service (cont.)—A series of disasters involving Allan line steamers.
The year 1859 was a notable one in the history of transportation in Canada. In May, the steamers of the Allan line commenced their weekly trips between Liverpool and Quebec. In November, the completion of the Victoria Bridge over the St. Lawrence carried the lines of the eastern division of the Grand Trunk into Montreal, thus connecting by uninterrupted railway communication the cities of Quebec and Portland with the metropolis, and establishing a continuous line of railway from the Atlantic seaboard to the western boundary of the provinces. In the same month, also, the Grand Trunk extended its line across the border as far as Detroit, bringing, by means of allied systems in the United States, the cities of Chicago and New Orleans into communication with the eastern states and with Europe by the railway system along the shores of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence.
The year 1859 was significant in Canadian transportation history. In May, the Allan line steamers began their weekly journeys between Liverpool and Quebec. In November, the completion of the Victoria Bridge over the St. Lawrence connected the eastern division of the Grand Trunk to Montreal, creating a direct railway link between Quebec and Portland with the city, and establishing a continuous railway route from the Atlantic coast to the provinces' western boundary. Also in November, the Grand Trunk extended its line to Detroit, connecting, through allied systems in the United States, the cities of Chicago and New Orleans with the eastern states and Europe via the railway network along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence.
The system of land transportation between the ports of the Atlantic and the cities on the Mississippi being thus perfected, and available for the conveyance of mails between Europe and the heart of North America by practically continuous conveyance, the postmaster general of Canada, Sidney Smith, proceeded to Europe to improve, as far as possible, the communication between the important cities of Great Britain and the sailing ports of the Canadian vessels, and to arrange for the exploitation of this transportation system, in the interests of Canada.
The land transportation system between the Atlantic ports and the cities along the Mississippi was now perfected and ready to deliver mail between Europe and central North America with virtually nonstop service. The postmaster general of Canada, Sidney Smith, traveled to Europe to enhance communication between major cities in Great Britain and the sailing ports of Canadian ships, and to organize the promotion of this transportation system for Canada’s benefit.
Before leaving for England Smith paid a visit to Washington, and laid before the postmaster general there the advantages offered by the system under his control. He pointed out that, by the Grand Trunk railway, the journey between Portland and Chicago was made in forty-nine hours, and between Quebec and Chicago in forty-five hours, and, by making Cork a port of call for the mails, the voyage between land and land would be several hundred miles shorter than by any other route.
Before heading to England, Smith visited Washington and presented the benefits of the system he managed to the postmaster general. He noted that the Grand Trunk Railway made the trip from Portland to Chicago in forty-nine hours, and from Quebec to Chicago in forty-five hours. By making Cork a mail stop, the journey between land and land would be several hundred miles shorter than any other route.
Smith's proposition was to convey the United States mails to and from Europe for the sea postage only, and to allow these[Pg 303] mails to be carried across Canada without charge on the understanding that the Canadian mails to and from Great Britain should be carried free across the United States territory during the period of winter when the steamers called at Portland. The proposition was accepted by the postmaster general of the United States.
Smith's proposal was to transport the United States mail to and from Europe for just the sea postage, and to permit these [Pg 303] mails to be carried through Canada for free, on the condition that Canadian mail to and from Great Britain would also be carried free across United States territory during the winter months when the steamers docked at Portland. The proposal was approved by the postmaster general of the United States.
In London, where he arrived at the end of November, Smith submitted his scheme to the postmaster general,[309] who made the objection that the sailing arrangements interfered with the plans made for the other transatlantic mail steamers. Fortunately Smith had the support of the postmaster general at Washington, who was much impressed with the merits of the Canadian scheme, and who, in his annual report expressed the opinion that it would afford the most direct and probably the most expeditious communication between Chicago and Liverpool.
In London, where he arrived at the end of November, Smith presented his plan to the postmaster general,[309] who raised concerns that the sailing schedule conflicted with the plans for other transatlantic mail steamers. Fortunately, Smith had the backing of the postmaster general in Washington, who was quite impressed with the advantages of the Canadian proposal and, in his annual report, stated that it would provide the most direct and likely the fastest communication between Chicago and Liverpool.
At the instance of the department at Washington, the general post office agreed to send by the Canadian steamers the correspondence for both the eastern and western States, and also agreed to Smith's request for special trains for the mail service from London to Cork. This special railway service, with its connecting mail boat service across the Irish Channel gave the British public a full business day more to prepare their correspondence for the States.
At the request of the department in Washington, the general post office agreed to send mail for both the eastern and western States via Canadian steamers, and also agreed to Smith's request for special trains for mail service from London to Cork. This special train service, along with its connecting mail boat service across the Irish Channel, provided the British public an entire business day more to prepare their correspondence for the States.
The mails had, in ordinary course, to be prepared in London early Wednesday morning to catch the outgoing steamer which left Liverpool the same evening, but the special train from Dublin to Cork enabled correspondents to hold over their urgent letters until Wednesday evening and send them by the evening mail to Ireland, where connection was made on Thursday morning with the steamer which had left Liverpool on the previous evening.
The letters had to be ready in London early Wednesday morning to catch the outgoing ship that left Liverpool that same evening, but the special train from Dublin to Cork allowed senders to delay their important letters until Wednesday evening and send them by the evening mail to Ireland, where they connected on Thursday morning with the ship that had left Liverpool the night before.
But this was not the only, or perhaps the greatest, of the advantages of the scheme. Transatlantic cables were still in the future, but the telegraphic systems on both sides of the Atlantic were fully developed, and messages for New York or Montreal could be addressed to the steamer, which would deliver them at Father Point, on its way up the St. Lawrence, from there they were sent by telegraph to their destination.
But this wasn't the only, or maybe even the biggest, advantage of the plan. Transatlantic cables were still yet to come, but the telegraphic systems on both sides of the Atlantic were well established. Messages for New York or Montreal could be sent to the steamer, which would drop them off at Father Point while going up the St. Lawrence, and from there they were sent by telegraph to their final destination.
One of the leading London papers declared that the plan would save two full days for telegrams, and permit transactions on the stock exchange in London up to Thursday afternoon to be communicated to the stock exchanges in the United States on the[Pg 304] Saturday of the following week, and the action taken in these centres transmitted to London by the Canadian steamers leaving Quebec the same day.
One of the top newspapers in London announced that the plan would save a full two days for telegrams and allow transactions on the London stock exchange up until Thursday afternoon to be sent to the stock exchanges in the United States on the[Pg 304] Saturday of the following week. The actions taken in these locations would then be relayed back to London by the Canadian steamers departing from Quebec that same day.
Having completed these arrangements in London, Smith next addressed himself to the postal administrations of France, Belgium and Prussia. In the month that had elapsed since the negotiations with London had been concluded, the steamers had crossed the Atlantic both ways, and the Canadian postmaster general was able to inform the continental administrations that on the first voyage the mails from Chicago had reached London in twelve days, and that the conveyance from New Orleans, in which France had a special interest, ought to be effected in less than fifteen days.
Having wrapped up these arrangements in London, Smith then turned his attention to the postal services in France, Belgium, and Prussia. In the month since the negotiations with London were finalized, the steamers had crossed the Atlantic in both directions, and the Canadian postmaster general was able to inform the continental administrations that on the first voyage, the mail from Chicago reached London in twelve days and that the shipment from New Orleans, which was of special interest to France, should be completed in less than fifteen days.
The French government, to whom Smith offered the same terms for conveyance by steamer and railway in Canada as had been accepted in the United States, immediately closed with Smith on these terms, subject to the consent of Great Britain. In a few days Belgium took similar action, while Prussia deferred acceptance until the postmaster general of Canada could confer with the United States.
The French government, to which Smith offered the same terms for transport by steamer and railway in Canada that had been accepted in the United States, quickly agreed to Smith's terms, pending Great Britain's approval. Within a few days, Belgium followed suit, while Prussia postponed its acceptance until the postmaster general of Canada could discuss it with the United States.
Entirely satisfied with the success of his mission to the Continent, Smith returned to London to conclude the transaction by obtaining the permission of the British post office to act as intermediary for the payments which would be made by the French and other Continental governments to Canada for the conveyance of their mails to America.
Entirely satisfied with the success of his mission to the Continent, Smith returned to London to finalize the deal by securing permission from the British post office to act as the middleman for the payments that would be made by the French and other Continental governments to Canada for delivering their mail to America.
The necessity for having Great Britain as the intermediary for the settlement of these accounts arose from the following considerations. Great Britain had open accounts with all these countries. The mails from these countries were carried to the United States by British steamers, for which they became indebted to the British government; while on the other hand mails from Great Britain for the countries of eastern Europe and for India, passed over one or other of these countries through their postal systems, which gave rise to an indebtedness on the part of Great Britain.
The need for Great Britain to act as the intermediary for settling these accounts came from several factors. Great Britain had open accounts with all these countries. The mail from these countries was transported to the United States by British ships, creating a debt to the British government. Meanwhile, mail from Great Britain destined for Eastern Europe and India passed through the postal systems of these countries, which led to a debt owed by Great Britain.
Under conventions with each of them, settlements were made from time to time. None of this accounting machinery existed between Canada and any of these countries. The only country in Europe with which Canada had an open account was Great Britain.
Under agreements with each of them, settlements were made occasionally. None of this accounting system existed between Canada and any of these countries. The only country in Europe with which Canada had an open account was Great Britain.
In consequence of Canada's isolation in this respect the only way these countries could settle their debts to Canada was by direct payments. This, however, would involve legislation, at[Pg 305] least in the case of France, which would have delayed the beginning of the plans for many months. Canada, therefore, had but one way open, which was to ask the British post office to receive from France the amounts due by that country to Canada, and apply these sums to the account between Great Britain and Canada.
Due to Canada's isolation in this regard, the only way these countries could settle their debts to Canada was through direct payments. However, this would require legislation, at[Pg 305] least in the case of France, which would have delayed the start of the plans for several months. Therefore, Canada had only one option: to request that the British post office accept the amounts owed by France to Canada and apply those funds to the account between Great Britain and Canada.
The favour to Canada appeared slight enough but the British post office refused to grant it. First, it objected that the arrangements would involve a great deal of trouble; and afterwards, when driven from that ground, it took an extraordinary position. The British post office declared that the British mails exchanged with the United States were treated in that office as mails carried by packets under contract with the United States, and that it would be inconvenient and objectionable to treat French mails, carried by the same Canadian vessels, as mails conveyed by British packets.
The favor to Canada seemed small enough, but the British post office refused to grant it. First, it claimed that the arrangements would cause a lot of trouble; and later, when that argument fell through, it took an unusual stance. The British post office stated that the British mails exchanged with the United States were handled in that office as mails transported by packets under contract with the United States, and that it would be inconvenient and unacceptable to treat French mails, carried by the same Canadian ships, as mails transported by British packets.
It maintained, furthermore, that the postmaster general of the United States, having entered into an agreement with the Canadian post office for the transmission of United States mails by the Canadian vessels, might very naturally object to any arrangement between the British and French post offices under which the French mails were paid for as mails conveyed by Great Britain's packets.
It also argued that the postmaster general of the United States, having made an agreement with the Canadian post office to send U.S. mail via Canadian ships, could understandably object to any deal between the British and French post offices where French mail was paid for as mail delivered by British packets.
The pettifogging of disobliging illwill could go no further. In no single respect did the service rendered to the United States by the British government, in conveying the mails of that country to Great Britain, differ from the services rendered to the United States by the Canadian government in the conveyance of the United States mails to Great Britain by the steamers of the Canadian line. Both were paid by the United States for the service, and the fact that the British took pay from the United States no more rendered the Cunard an American line, than a similar fact regarding the Canadian government made the Canadian an American line.
The petty disputes driven by unpleasantness couldn’t go any further. In every way, the service provided to the United States by the British government, in delivering mail from the U.S. to Great Britain, was the same as the service provided by the Canadian government in transporting American mail to Great Britain on Canadian steamers. The U.S. paid both for the service, and the fact that the British received payment from the U.S. didn’t make the Cunard an American line, just as a similar situation with the Canadian government didn’t make the Canadian line an American one.
Smith, in dwelling upon this point, affected to discover that the ground of the British official objection, was that the Cunard Company received a subsidy from the British government, while the Canadian Company did not. If this were indeed the difficulty at which the British office stumbled, and the Canadian line could be made British by granting a subsidy for its maintenance, it was important that it should have impressed upon it this distinctive mark of British nationality.
Smith, while discussing this issue, pretended to find that the reason behind the British officials' objection was that the Cunard Company received a subsidy from the British government, while the Canadian Company did not. If this was truly the problem that the British office had, and if the Canadian line could be considered British by providing a subsidy for its support, it was crucial to emphasize this distinct mark of British nationality.
But these arguments fell upon deaf ears. The French office[Pg 306] tried to make the British officials see reason, but their success was no better. The situation became one of real difficulty. The French could have invoked the assistance of the United States and asked that country to act as intermediary in the settlement of the account between France and Canada, but there would have been much delay, as the United States would almost certainly seek an explanation of the attitude of Great Britain toward her colony, and that would not have been easy to give.
But these arguments went unheard. The French office[Pg 306] tried to reason with the British officials, but they had no better luck. The situation became really difficult. The French could have asked the United States for help as a mediator to settle the account between France and Canada, but that would have taken a lot of time. The United States would almost certainly want an explanation for Great Britain's stance on its colony, and that wouldn't have been easy to provide.
The British post office, however, suggested a way out of the difficulty. Taking its stand on the ground that the Canadian steamers were part of the United States packet service, the British post office held that the proper course for France was to arrange the matter of payment with the United States post office. But as the negotiations between the United States and France might delay the start of the service, the British expressed its willingness as a temporary measure to take from the French government the sums due to Canada, and pay them over to whom? To the Canadian government to whom alone they belonged? Not at all. It would pay these sums to the postmaster general of the United States.
The British post office, however, proposed a solution to the problem. They argued that the Canadian steamers were part of the United States postal service, so France should settle payment with the United States post office. But since the discussions between the United States and France could delay the launch of the service, the British offered to temporarily accept the payments owed to Canada from the French government and pay them to whom? To the Canadian government, to whom the money rightfully belonged? Not at all. They would pay these amounts to the postmaster general of the United States.
Smith, the postmaster general of Canada, contended no further. He thanked the postmaster general of England for his consideration, and addressed himself to the director of the French posts, and to the postmaster general in Washington. But the director was completely puzzled, and sought an explanation of the British post office. Disclaiming the right to interfere in any agreement between the British and Canadian offices, he declared himself unable to understand why this payment should be made to the United States, or how it could possibly happen that the United States should have any right to claim any sea rate. He set out all the facts of the case, and after looking them over carefully, he repeated that he did not understand why the amount paid by the French government to the British office for conveyance under the British flag by Canadian packets should be paid over to the United States office.[310]
Smith, the postmaster general of Canada, had nothing more to say. He thanked the postmaster general of England for his attention and turned to the director of the French postal service and the postmaster general in Washington. However, the director was completely confused and wanted an explanation from the British post office. Disavowing any authority to interfere in any agreements between the British and Canadian offices, he stated he couldn’t understand why this payment should be made to the United States, or how the United States could have any right to claim a sea rate. He laid out all the facts of the situation, and after carefully reviewing them, he reiterated that he didn’t understand why the amount paid by the French government to the British office for transport under the British flag by Canadian ships should be given to the United States office.[310]
By the middle of February 1860, Smith was back in the United[Pg 307] States, and at Washington. Within a day he concluded arrangements by which, among the other matters, the United States post office agreed to accept the sums due to Canada by France and the other Continental countries. Provision was also made for the exceptional handling of correspondence for New Orleans and other southern cities by the officials of the Canadian service.
By mid-February 1860, Smith was back in the United[Pg 307] States, and in Washington. Within a day, he finalized arrangements where, among other things, the United States post office agreed to accept the amounts owed to Canada by France and other European countries. They also made special provisions for handling mail for New Orleans and other southern cities through Canadian service officials.
The matter of accounting having been arranged on this basis the Canadian line began to be employed extensively on both sides of the Atlantic. Two changes were made in 1860, which augmented its efficiency. As it was found that Cork was out of the way of steamers from Quebec to Liverpool, in May, Londonderry, at the north of Ireland was substituted as the last port of call.
The accounting issues were settled like this, and the Canadian line started being used widely on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1860, two changes were made that improved its efficiency. Since it turned out that Cork was not on the direct route for steamers from Quebec to Liverpool, Londonderry in northern Ireland was chosen as the last port of call in May.
This change had the additional advantage that it enabled the steamers to take a later mail from Scotland, and it avoided the rivalry with the Cunard and Inman lines, which made Cork their port of call in Ireland.
This change also had the benefit of allowing the steamers to collect a later mail from Scotland, and it avoided competition with the Cunard and Inman lines, which chose Cork as their port of call in Ireland.
The other amelioration in this arrangement was the taking on and the disembarkation of mails at Riviere du Loup, a point on the St. Lawrence one hundred and twenty miles below Quebec. The extension of the Grand Trunk railway to this point shortened the sea-voyage by some hours, as the stretch of water between Quebec and Riviere du Loup present difficulties, and not infrequently dangers, which prevent rapid travel.
The other improvement in this setup was the pick-up and drop-off of mail at Riviere du Loup, a location on the St. Lawrence River about one hundred and twenty miles downstream from Quebec. The extension of the Grand Trunk railway to this location reduced the sea journey by several hours because the stretch of water between Quebec and Riviere du Loup poses challenges, and often dangers, that hinder fast travel.
With the arrangements thus complete, the St. Lawrence route was much superior to any other as far as the Canadian mails were concerned. In 1863, four-fifths of the mail carried between Canada and Britain were carried by the Canadian steamers, the remainder being taken by the Cunards. In order to participate in the exchange between Great Britain and the United States, it was necessary to make its arrangements conform with the arrangements made by those countries.
With all the arrangements in place, the St. Lawrence route was much better than any other for Canadian mail. In 1863, four-fifths of the mail sent between Canada and Britain was delivered by Canadian steamers, while the rest was handled by the Cunards. To join in the exchange between Great Britain and the United States, it was essential to align its arrangements with those of those countries.
Under this scheme, the week was divided into two parts, Great Britain providing for the total conveyance for one of the parts and the United States the other. Thus the United States took upon itself the accumulated mails for the first three days of the week from England, and the Cunard steamers, which left England on Saturday, took those of the last part.
Under this plan, the week was split into two halves, with Great Britain handling all the mail for one half and the United States managing the other. So, the United States took responsibility for the accumulated mail from England for the first three days of the week, while the Cunard steamers, which departed from England on Saturday, carried the mail for the second half.
There was an American steamer which sailed from Southampton on Wednesday, which took all the mails for the United States that could be gathered at that point until the time of its departure, and the Canadian steamer, which was adopted by the American post office, took those which could be gathered at Liverpool for[Pg 308] the sailing from that point on Thursday and at Londonderry on the following day.
There was an American steamship that left Southampton on Wednesday, carrying all the mail for the United States that could be collected at that location until its departure time. The Canadian steamship, which was used by the American post office, took the mail that could be gathered in Liverpool for the departure from there on Thursday and from Londonderry the next day.
The Canadian steamers offered great advantages to northern England and to Ireland and Scotland. In the conveyance from this side of the Atlantic, the arrangements were reversed, the British steamers sailing from New York on Wednesday, and the American later in the week. The Allan Company were fortunate in securing Saturday as their sailing day from Quebec, as their steamers were able to take a large American mail as well as nearly all that from Canadian offices.
The Canadian steamers provided significant benefits to northern England, Ireland, and Scotland. For transport across the Atlantic, the schedules were switched, with British steamers leaving New York on Wednesdays and American ones later in the week. The Allan Company was lucky to choose Saturday as their departure day from Quebec, allowing their steamers to carry a substantial amount of American mail along with almost all the mail from Canadian offices.
Most of the foreign correspondence of Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota and Indiana were carried by the Canadian route, while, during the winter months, half the mail from New England and a large volume from New York were despatched by this line. By the arrangements with the post offices of France, Belgium and Prussia, a considerable quantity of mails were exchanged by this line between the United States and nearly every country in Europe.
Most of the foreign mail from Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, and Indiana was sent via the Canadian route. During the winter months, half of the mail from New England and a significant amount from New York was also sent through this line. Thanks to agreements with the post offices of France, Belgium, and Prussia, a sizable volume of mail was exchanged through this line between the United States and nearly every country in Europe.
The achievement of the Canadian steamship line, in the face of unusual difficulties, was a matter of pride to the people of Canada, and the postmaster general, who had exhibited noteworthy energy in exploiting the possibilities of the service, dwelt with much satisfaction, in his several reports to the legislature, on the measure of success attained in competition with the lines running to the ports of the United States.
The success of the Canadian steamship line, despite facing unusual challenges, was a point of pride for the people of Canada. The postmaster general, who had shown remarkable effort in promoting the potential of the service, expressed great satisfaction in his reports to the legislature about the level of success achieved compared to the lines serving the ports of the United States.
But these successes were bought at a heavy price. In the weekly race across the Atlantic, much was sacrificed to speed. Risks were taken which, with the imperfect knowledge then existing of the sailing route, could lead to but one result. Vessel after vessel was lost under circumstances that excited a growing horror and resentment among all classes of the people. During the seven years between June 1, 1857, and February 22, 1864, no less than eight of the finest vessels in the service went down, carrying with them many hundreds of human beings.
But these successes came at a high cost. In the weekly race across the Atlantic, a lot was sacrificed for speed. Risks were taken that, given the limited knowledge of the sailing route at the time, could only lead to one outcome. Ship after ship was lost under circumstances that sparked increasing horror and anger among people from all walks of life. During the seven years between June 1, 1857, and February 22, 1864, no fewer than eight of the finest vessels in the service sank, taking with them hundreds of lives.
The first mishap took place within six months of the commencement of the service by the Allan line. In November 1856, the "Canadian," in her course up the St. Lawrence, ran ashore, owing to either the negligence or the ignorance of the pilot. She was got off without injury. But the "Canadian" was less fortunate in June 1857, when, from the same cause, she again ran ashore. This time it was impossible to free her, and she had to be abandoned, a total loss. The year 1858 passed without trouble of any kind,[Pg 309] and as the voyages were increased from fortnightly to weekly, confidence was high that the superiority of the Canadian line was to be demonstrated, and the supremacy of the Atlantic wrested from the Cunards.
The first accident happened within six months after the Allan line started its service. In November 1856, the "Canadian," while navigating up the St. Lawrence, ran aground, likely due to the pilot's negligence or lack of knowledge. She was gotten off without any damage. However, the "Canadian" faced more trouble in June 1857 when she ran aground again for the same reason. This time, it was impossible to rescue her, and she had to be abandoned, resulting in a total loss. The year 1858 went by without any issues, [Pg 309] and as the voyages increased from every two weeks to weekly, confidence was high that the Canadian line would prove its superiority and take the top spot on the Atlantic from the Cunards.
But with the inauguration of the weekly service, and of the declared competition with the steamers sailing in and out of New York, a series of disasters commenced, which threw a shadow over the whole enterprise. In the five years following the establishment of weekly service, the Canadian line lost more first class vessels than all the other companies engaged in transatlantic conveyance, and during the same period, as if to remove any doubt as to the locality to which these disasters were attributed, every vessel lost went down on this side of the Atlantic.[311]
But with the launch of the weekly service and the announced competition with the steamers coming in and out of New York, a series of disasters began that cast a shadow over the entire venture. In the five years after the weekly service started, the Canadian line lost more first-class vessels than all the other companies involved in transatlantic transportation combined, and during the same period, as if to eliminate any doubt about where these disasters were happening, every vessel lost sank on this side of the Atlantic.[311]
In the winter of 1859, two of the finest vessels of the line were lost, and with them a great number of lives. The winter route of the Allan steamers between Liverpool and Portland ran westward from Ireland to Cape Race, the south-eastern extremity of Newfoundland, thence to the waters between Sable Island and Nova Scotia, the coast of which the steamers skirted for its whole length. After getting clear of Cape Sable, the southerly point of Nova Scotia, vessels had a deep water passage for the rest of the voyage.
In the winter of 1859, two of the best ships in the fleet were lost, along with many lives. The Allan steamers' winter route between Liverpool and Portland traveled west from Ireland to Cape Race, the southeastern tip of Newfoundland, then to the waters between Sable Island and Nova Scotia, which the steamers followed along the entire coast. After passing Cape Sable, the southern point of Nova Scotia, ships had a deep-water route for the rest of the journey.
The Nova Scotia coast was a source of much anxiety to navigators. The "Columbia," the only vessel of the Cunard line which was lost until this time, was wrecked on this coast, as were also the "Humboldt" of the American line and the "City of Manchester" of the Inman line. It was on this coast also that the two Allan ships were wrecked. On the 29th of November, the "Indian," on her way out from Liverpool, ran ashore on the "Deal Ledges" near the fishing hamlet of Marie Joseph. Parting amidships, some sixty of her passengers were lost. It was made clear that the captain had taken every precaution after leaving Cape Race, but he had been misled by defective charts.
The Nova Scotia coast was a major source of anxiety for navigators. The "Columbia," the only Cunard line vessel lost up to that point, was wrecked on this coast, along with the "Humboldt" from the American line and the "City of Manchester" from the Inman line. Additionally, this coast is where two Allan ships also met their fate. On November 29th, the "Indian," while leaving Liverpool, ran aground on the "Deal Ledges" near the fishing village of Marie Joseph. Breaking apart in the middle, around sixty of her passengers were lost. It was clear that the captain had taken every precaution after departing Cape Race, but he had been misled by faulty charts.
Three months later, on the 20th of February, 1860, the "Hungarian" went down among the rocks off Cape Sable, and not a soul on board was saved. This steamer was the pride of the fleet. She was a new vessel, and had a record of three consecutive passages in twenty-seven days and twenty-three hours. The facts disclosed by the investigation were few. But it did transpire that the captain was noted for a certain dash rather than for seamanly prudence. It was said that by his skill in shaving sharp corners[Pg 310] and scudding over shoals, and by his recklessness in keeping up a head of steam, he had converted the slowest of the Canadian steamers into the fastest.
Three months later, on February 20, 1860, the "Hungarian" sank among the rocks off Cape Sable, and no one on board survived. This steamer was the pride of the fleet. She was a new vessel and had a record of three consecutive trips in twenty-seven days and twenty-three hours. The facts revealed by the investigation were few. However, it was revealed that the captain was known for his boldness rather than his caution on the water. It was said that, thanks to his skill in taking sharp turns and speeding over shallow areas, combined with his recklessness in maintaining a high steam pressure, he had turned the slowest of the Canadian steamers into the fastest.[Pg 310]
News of the disaster to the "Hungarian" soon reached Montreal. It was melancholy news for the city, and public grief was soon followed by popular anger with the Allan Company and with the postmaster general. Smith was denounced by the legislature as particeps criminis in the destruction of the lives which had been lost on the "Hungarian."
News of the disaster to the "Hungarian" quickly reached Montreal. It was sad news for the city, and public mourning was soon followed by rising anger towards the Allan Company and the postmaster general. Smith was condemned by the legislature as particeps criminis in the loss of lives on the "Hungarian."
A parliamentary investigation was ordered into the circumstances, and the report[312] of the committee is instructive in the information it gives on the coast lights, and on the problems, which the substitution of iron for wood in the construction of steam vessels raised for those dealing with questions of navigation.
A parliamentary investigation was launched into the circumstances, and the report[312] from the committee is informative regarding the details about the coastal lights and the issues that arose from replacing wood with iron in the construction of steam vessels for those addressing navigation matters.
Neither Sable Island nor Cape Sable, on the winter route, were provided with lighthouses; and the lower St. Lawrence was most inadequately furnished with the indispensable guides for sailing by night. From Forteau Bay on the straits of Belle Isle, a vessel ran four hundred and fifty miles before it passed a lighthouse, and it then entered a stretch of one hundred and twenty miles which it was obliged to make without the assistance of lights.
Neither Sable Island nor Cape Sable, on the winter route, had lighthouses, and the lower St. Lawrence was definitely lacking the essential navigational aids for nighttime sailing. From Forteau Bay on the straits of Belle Isle, a ship had to travel four hundred and fifty miles before it finally passed a lighthouse, and then it encountered a stretch of one hundred and twenty miles that it had to navigate without any lights.
On the comparative merits of iron and wooden vessels, expert opinion was unanimous in favour of wooden vessels. It was considered that, in the event of a vessel being wrecked or stranded, there was less liability of loss of life in the wooden vessel. There was also the effect of the material of which the vessels were built on the working of the compass. In iron vessels, the compasses were a source of great and continued anxiety.
On the comparative merits of iron and wooden ships, experts agreed that wooden ships were better. They believed that if a ship were to be wrecked or stranded, there was a lower risk of loss of life with a wooden ship. The material of the ships also affected how the compass functioned. With iron ships, the compasses were a constant source of worry.
Before the vessels proceeded to sea, the local attraction from the ship was neutralized by magnets and, thus adjusted, the compasses acted with tolerable accuracy while the vessel was at sea and beyond the influence of land attraction. But when approaching the land the compasses were not to be depended upon. There was, it was asserted, an attraction from the land, but whether the mass of iron in the vessel was first acted upon by the land attraction, was a problem of which the existing state of science did not afford a solution.
Before the ships set out to sea, the local magnetic pull from the ship was neutralized by magnets, allowing the compasses to function with reasonable accuracy while the ship was out at sea and away from any land influence. However, as they got close to shore, the compasses became unreliable. It was claimed that there was a magnetic pull from the land, but whether the ship's iron mass was affected first by this land attraction was a question that the current state of science could not answer.
The Cunard line at this time—1860—consisted of ten vessels. Only two were of iron; and it was noted that the irregular action of the compass on the iron vessel "Persia," after it left Cape Race, led the vessel into danger which was only averted by unusual[Pg 311] care with the soundings. The committee of the legislature concluded by expressing a fear that, until new light had been thrown on the susceptibilities and workings of the mysterious magnetic forces, it might be necessary to abandon the construction of iron vessels.
The Cunard line at this time—1860—had ten ships. Only two were made of iron; and it was observed that the erratic behavior of the compass on the iron ship "Persia," after it departed Cape Race, put the ship in danger, which was only avoided by extraordinary[Pg 311] care with the depth readings. The legislative committee concluded by expressing concern that, until more was understood about the sensitivities and functions of the mysterious magnetic forces, it might be necessary to stop building iron ships.
Misfortune continued to dog the course of the Canadian steamers. In 1861 two more vessels were lost—both on the St. Lawrence route.
Misfortune continued to follow the Canadian steamers. In 1861, two more ships were lost—both on the St. Lawrence route.
The "Canadian," the second of the name, launched in 1860, set out from Quebec for Liverpool on the 1st of June. Reaching the straits of Belle Isle two days later she encountered a heavy gale and great masses of ice. About eight miles from Cape Bauld, the northernmost point of Newfoundland, the vessel was struck by a sunken floe, which tore a hole in her side under the water-line, and she sank in two hours. Twenty-nine of the passengers and crew were drowned, including James Panton, the mail officer, who neglected the means of safety in his endeavours to save the mail.
The "Canadian," the second ship by that name, launched in 1860, left Quebec for Liverpool on June 1st. Two days later, it reached the straits of Belle Isle, where it ran into a severe storm and large ice masses. About eight miles from Cape Bauld, the northernmost point of Newfoundland, the ship was hit by a submerged ice floe, which ripped a hole in its side below the waterline, causing it to sink in two hours. Twenty-nine passengers and crew members drowned, including James Panton, the mail officer, who overlooked safety measures in his attempt to save the mail.
The only criticism made by the board of trade court was that the straits route being a perilous one except at the height of the season, the sailing instructions which gave masters a discretion of taking this route after the 20th of May ought to be amended by fixing the earliest date at a month later.
The only criticism from the trade board was that the straits route is dangerous except during peak season, so the sailing instructions that allow captains to choose this route after May 20 should be updated to start a month later.
At the end of the season—on the 5th of November—the "North Briton" ran ashore in an attempt to make the passage between the Island of Anticosti and the Mingan Islands. The circumstances that the vessel entered the passage an hour after midnight, with a heavy sea running, were noted by the marine court. But they confined themselves to a censure on the captain for some lack of vigilance, not considering it necessary to deprive him of his certificate.
At the end of the season—on November 5th—the "North Briton" ran aground while trying to pass between Anticosti Island and the Mingan Islands. The marine court noted that the ship entered the passage an hour after midnight, with rough seas. However, they simply criticized the captain for some lack of attention, deciding that it wasn't necessary to revoke his certificate.
Again there was a burst of public indignation, and a demand that the government should dissociate themselves from the contract. The postmaster general pleaded that such action would, in the eyes of the foreign governments, be tantamount to a confession that Canadians had lost faith in their route. He assured the legislature that he was bringing effective pressure on the Allan Company to compel them to perform their contract satisfactorily.
Once again, there was a wave of public outrage and a call for the government to distance itself from the contract. The postmaster general argued that taking such action would, in the view of foreign governments, be seen as an admission that Canadians had lost trust in their route. He assured the legislature that he was putting significant pressure on the Allan Company to make sure they fulfilled their contract adequately.
The complete immunity from accident during 1862 seemed to indicate that the measures forced upon the company by the postmaster general were successful. But the faith of the Canadian in the superior advantages of their route was soon to be put to further trials.[Pg 312]
The total lack of accidents in 1862 suggested that the changes imposed on the company by the postmaster general were effective. However, the confidence of the Canadians in the benefits of their route was soon going to be tested further.[Pg 312]
Between the 27th of April, 1863, and the 22nd of February, 1864—a scant ten months—three vessels of the line were lost. The first of these, the "Anglo-Saxon," which crashed into the rocky coast of Newfoundland, a few miles above Cape Race, gave some point to the observations of the commission as to the disturbing influences operating upon the compasses of vessels as they approached land.
Between April 27, 1863, and February 22, 1864—a brief ten months—three warships were lost. The first, the "Anglo-Saxon," ran aground on the rocky coast of Newfoundland, just a few miles north of Cape Race. This incident supported the commission's observations about the troubling factors affecting ship compasses as they got closer to land.
The "Anglo-Saxon" left Liverpool on the 16th of April, and for the first nine days made an uneventful voyage. A clear, bright day on the 26th gave the captain an opportunity to make observations, and ascertain the ship's position; and as the weather was steady, he was able to run under full steam and sail.
The "Anglo-Saxon" left Liverpool on April 16th, and for the first nine days, the voyage was uneventful. A clear, bright day on the 26th gave the captain a chance to take readings and determine the ship's location; and since the weather was steady, he was able to travel at full speed and sail.
Next morning it was foggy; and John Young—a former commissioner of public works, and one of the chief advocates of the Canadian ocean service—asked the captain if it was his intention to make Cape Race. The captain said it was not, as by noon they would be twenty miles south of the Cape. About eleven o'clock Young's attention was directed to what appeared to be a huge iceberg close at hand. He ran towards the deck, but before he could reach it the ship struck, and he found himself facing a precipitous mass of rock so lofty that in the fog he could not see the top of it.
The next morning was foggy, and John Young—a former commissioner of public works and a strong supporter of the Canadian ocean service—asked the captain if he planned to reach Cape Race. The captain replied that he did not, as they would be twenty miles south of the Cape by noon. Around eleven o'clock, Young noticed what looked like a huge iceberg nearby. He hurried to the deck, but before he could get there, the ship hit something, and he found himself staring at a steep mass of rock so tall that he couldn't see the top of it in the fog.
Instead of being sixteen or seventeen miles south of Cape Race, the vessel was four miles above it. Though they were so close to land that many passengers saved themselves by creeping along the mast to the shore, 238 passengers were drowned, including the captain, whose faulty seamanship had brought about the calamity.
Instead of being sixteen or seventeen miles south of Cape Race, the ship was actually four miles north of it. They were so close to shore that many passengers managed to save themselves by crawling along the mast to safety, but 238 passengers drowned, including the captain, whose poor navigation skills led to the disaster.
This shore is the most dangerous on the north Atlantic. Besides the magnetic influences, there is an underplay of powerful currents, which makes navigation in these waters difficult and dangerous. The Newfoundland government published a list in 1901 showing that seventy-seven vessels, great and small, had been lost on the Cape or within a few miles to the north or west of it.
This shore is the most dangerous in the North Atlantic. In addition to the magnetic influences, there are strong undercurrents that make navigation in these waters tricky and risky. The Newfoundland government published a list in 1901 showing that seventy-seven vessels, both large and small, had been lost around Cape or within a few miles to the north or west of it.
Not quite two months later than the disaster of April 27, 1863, while excitement in Canada was still running high, the public were dumbfounded by the news of another disaster. The "Norwegian," a vessel built only two years, left Liverpool on the 4th of June. On the 10th she entered a dense fog which continued at short intervals until the 13th. At noon that day the fog lifted and the steamer put on full steam. At two o'clock in the morning land was sighted, which the captain took to be Newfoundland.[Pg 313]
Not quite two months after the disaster of April 27, 1863, while excitement in Canada was still high, people were shocked by the news of another disaster. The "Norwegian," a vessel built just two years prior, left Liverpool on June 4. On June 10, it entered thick fog that lasted in brief intervals until June 13. At noon that day, the fog cleared, and the steamer went full speed ahead. By two o'clock in the morning, land was sighted, which the captain thought was Newfoundland.[Pg 313]
The ship's course was altered in accordance with that view, and although the fog fell densely, speed was not reduced. At seven o'clock there was a cry of breakers, and before the steamer could be checked or turned, she struck heavily upon the rocks of St. Paul's Island, a point in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, a few miles north of Cape Breton. The ship's position was so dangerous that the passengers were landed on the island. Afterwards the cargo and mails were secured.
The ship's direction was changed based on that perspective, and even though the fog was thick, the speed didn’t drop. At seven o'clock, there was a shout about breakers, and before the steamer could be slowed down or turned, it crashed hard against the rocks of St. Paul's Island, a spot in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, just a few miles north of Cape Breton. The ship was in such a risky position that the passengers were taken ashore to the island. After that, the cargo and mail were secured.
The public were bewildered by the accumulation of disasters. The captain of the "Norwegian" was especially known as a careful and skilful navigator, and there was a persistent and vigorously expressed demand on the Allan Company for an explanation. To their plea of the danger of the route, the answer was that the "Hungarian," "Indian," and "Anglo-Saxon" were wrecked on a route over which the Cunard steamers had been passing in safety for years.
The public was confused by the series of disasters. The captain of the "Norwegian" was particularly recognized as a careful and skilled navigator, and there was a persistent and strongly voiced demand from the Allan Company for an explanation. In response to their concerns about the dangers of the route, the answer was that the "Hungarian," "Indian," and "Anglo-Saxon" had been wrecked on a route that Cunard steamers had been safely traveling for years.
Iron vessels accordingly came in for condemnation. Except two, all the Cunard steamers were of wood, and these iron vessels were run only between Liverpool and New York, over a route all the way on the broad ocean.
Iron vessels were therefore criticized. Except for two, all the Cunard steamers were made of wood, and these iron vessels only operated between Liverpool and New York, on a route that traversed the open ocean.
The wreck of the "African" of the Cunard line on the coast of Newfoundland, which took place about this time, under circumstances similar to those attending the loss of the "Anglo-Saxon," showed, it was claimed, the superiority of the wooden vessels, when overtaken by accident. She was pierced in several places, but was not smashed as an iron hull would have been. Consequently, when the vessel got free of the rocks it was able to reach St. Johns where it put in for repairs.
The wreck of the "African" from the Cunard line on the coast of Newfoundland, which happened around this time, under circumstances similar to those surrounding the loss of the "Anglo-Saxon," demonstrated, it was said, the advantage of wooden ships when faced with accidents. It was damaged in several spots, but wasn’t crushed like an iron hull would have been. As a result, when the ship got free from the rocks, it was able to make it to St. Johns for repairs.
The remainder of the summer of 1863 passed without incident, and a considerable part of the winter, when on the 22nd of February, 1864, the "Bohemian" in her passage to Portland, struck on Alden's Rock, close to her destination, and overturned, sinking within an hour and a half. The passengers and crew numbered 317 persons, and of these forty-three were drowned by the capsizing of one of the lifeboats. The court of inquiry attributed the catastrophe to the neglect of the captain to take the ordinary precautions, when confronted with a perilous situation, and he was deprived of his certificate for twelve months.
The rest of the summer of 1863 went by without any issues, and a big part of the winter did too, until February 22, 1864, when the "Bohemian," on its way to Portland, hit Alden's Rock, just before reaching its destination, and capsized, sinking within an hour and a half. There were 317 people on board, including passengers and crew, and of those, forty-three drowned when one of the lifeboats overturned. The inquiry blamed the disaster on the captain's failure to take standard safety precautions in a dangerous situation, resulting in him losing his captain's certificate for twelve months.
During the period between the wreck of the "Canadian" the first, in 1857, and the sinking of the "Bohemian" in 1864, there were thirteen vessels lost, of all lines engaged in the transatlantic trade, and of these eight were of the Canadian line.[Pg 314]
During the time between the wreck of the "Canadian" the first, in 1857, and the sinking of the "Bohemian" in 1864, thirteen ships were lost from all companies involved in transatlantic trade, with eight of those belonging to the Canadian line.[Pg 314]
The Canadian government and the Allan Company were subjected to a pitiless condemnation; and, with a change of administration in 1863, the new government lost no time in taking steps to end the contract.
The Canadian government and the Allan Company faced harsh criticism, and with a change of administration in 1863, the new government quickly moved to terminate the contract.
Oliver Mowat, the new postmaster general, on the 12th of August, 1863, presented a report to the executive council recounting the attempts of the Canadian government to establish a Canadian line of steamers from 1853, when the first contract was made with the Liverpool firm of Mackeen, McLarty and Company. The contract with this firm called for a fortnightly service in summer and monthly in winter, with screw steamers of not less than 1200 tons, the subsidy from which was to be £24,000 a year.
Oliver Mowat, the new postmaster general, on August 12, 1863, submitted a report to the executive council detailing the Canadian government's efforts to set up a Canadian line of steamers starting from 1853, when the first contract was signed with the Liverpool firm of Mackeen, McLarty and Company. This contract required a biweekly service in the summer and a monthly service in the winter, using screw steamers of at least 1200 tons, with a subsidy of £24,000 a year.
In consequence of the default of the contractors, a new contract was made with Hugh Allan. The frequency of the service, and the amount of the subsidy remained unchanged, but Allan engaged to employ vessels of 1750 tons, instead of 1200.
As a result of the contractors' failure, a new contract was made with Hugh Allan. The frequency of service and the subsidy amount stayed the same, but Allan agreed to use ships of 1750 tons instead of 1200.
On the 12th of October, 1857, a new contract was entered into with Allan for weekly service to commence on the 1st of May, 1859. The size of the vessels required was again increased, and the new steamers had to be built to 2000 tons. The subsidy was to be £55,000. By 1860, three vessels had been lost, and Allan, having found that the loss in carrying on the weekly service was far beyond his calculations, notified the government of his intention to terminate.
On October 12, 1857, a new contract was signed with Allan for weekly service to start on May 1, 1859. The size of the required vessels increased again, and the new steamers needed to be built to 2,000 tons. The subsidy was set at £55,000. By 1860, three vessels had been lost, and Allan, realizing that the losses from running the weekly service were much higher than he had anticipated, informed the government of his plan to end the contract.
The government, believing that it was essential to hold public confidence in the route, and that this could be best done by enabling the contractor to provide larger and more powerful vessels to replace those which had been lost, determined to offer a much larger subsidy, and to stipulate for vessels of 2300 tons. A new contract embodying these conditions was made, and the compensation was fixed at £104,000.
The government, convinced that maintaining public confidence in the route was crucial, believed this could be best achieved by allowing the contractor to provide larger and more powerful vessels to replace those that had been lost. They decided to offer a significantly larger subsidy and required vessels of 2,300 tons. A new contract reflecting these terms was created, with the compensation set at £104,000.
In brief this was the situation when Mowat became postmaster general, though there had been negotiations between Smith and the Allan Company for a reduction of the subsidy. With the sanction of the government, Mowat cancelled the contract on April 1, 1864, and began negotiations for a new contract.
In short, this was the situation when Mowat became postmaster general, although there had been discussions between Smith and the Allan Company about reducing the subsidy. With government approval, Mowat ended the contract on April 1, 1864, and started talks for a new contract.
Mowat perceived that, unless there was to be a lapse in the service on the 1st of April, he must make his arrangements with Allan, since there was no other vessel owner in a position to take up the service on the termination of the contract. Mowat was the less reluctant to renew an engagement with Allan, as he recognized the courage, energy and perseverance of the latter, and was convinced[Pg 315] that Allan's experience would give him a great advantage over any other contractor.
Mowat realized that, unless there was going to be a break in service on April 1st, he needed to make arrangements with Allan, since no other ship owner was ready to take on the service when the contract ended. Mowat was more willing to renew his partnership with Allan because he acknowledged Allan's bravery, energy, and determination, and he was convinced[Pg 315] that Allan's experience would give him a significant edge over any other contractor.
The new contract contained provisions which were a confession that the government had been far from blameless for the losses of the several vessels of the Allan line. The mail steamers were expressly forbidden to approach Cape Race when the weather was so foggy or tempestuous as to make it dangerous to do so; when the presence of fog or ice should render it perilous to run at full speed the captain was to be impressed with the duty of slackening speed or of stopping the vessel as the occasion dictated, and the time so lost was to be allowed to the contractor in addition to the time specified for the length of the voyage.
The new contract had terms that basically admitted the government wasn't completely innocent regarding the losses of several Allan line vessels. The mail steamers were specifically banned from getting close to Cape Race when the weather was too foggy or stormy to do so safely; if there was fog or ice that made it risky to go at full speed, the captain was required to slow down or stop the ship as needed, and the time lost would be credited to the contractor, in addition to the time set for the duration of the voyage.
Other precautions were taken by the contractor. The first vessel lost—the "Canadian" in June 1857—was cast on shore by the incompetency of the pilot, and the contractor made it his business to secure the best pilots, instead of taking the first that presented himself, as the practice had been. Another vessel was wrecked on a dangerous shore of the Island of Anticosti. This channel was thereafter abandoned by the vessels of the line.
Other precautions were taken by the contractor. The first vessel lost—the "Canadian" in June 1857—ran aground because the pilot was inexperienced, and the contractor made it his responsibility to hire the best pilots, rather than just taking the first one who came along, which had been the usual practice. Another vessel was wrecked on a treacherous shore of Anticosti Island. After that, this channel was avoided by the vessels of the line.
As a consequence of these provisions and precautions, aided, doubtless, by greater care on the part of the sailing masters, accidents to the vessels ceased altogether. During the twenty-five years that ensued there was but one vessel lost. The outstanding feature of the whole business was the dogged resolution of Allan to justify his faith in the possibility of the Canadian route, and in his ultimate success he rendered an incalculable service to Canada.
As a result of these rules and safety measures, and probably due to the increased diligence of the captains, accidents at sea stopped completely. Over the following twenty-five years, only one ship was lost. The most notable aspect of the entire situation was Allan's stubborn determination to prove that the Canadian route was viable, and through his eventual success, he provided an immeasurable benefit to Canada.
FOOTNOTES:
[310] A lengthy review of the papers included in the Sess. Papers, No. 8, of 1860, appears in the Toronto Leader, the leading government organ of March 8, 1860. The writer notes that "Lord Elgin and Rowland Hill seem to have been firmly convinced, in their own minds, that a Canadian steamer is an American steamer," and observes that "the English officials shifted the grounds of their objections several times, till finally, as rheumatism is said to do after shifting from one part of the body to the other, they vanished altogether before the force of Mr. Smith's arguments, till nothing but naked obstinacy remained."
[310] A detailed review of the papers included in the Sess. Papers, No. 8, of 1860, appears in the Toronto Leader, the main government publication from March 8, 1860. The author points out that "Lord Elgin and Rowland Hill seemed to be convinced that a Canadian steamer is an American steamer," and notes that "the English officials changed their objections several times, until finally, much like how rheumatism is said to move from one part of the body to another, their arguments completely disappeared in the face of Mr. Smith's reasoning, leaving only sheer stubbornness."
CHAPTER XIX
Postal service of Manitoba, the North-West provinces and British Columbia—Summary of progress since Confederation.
Postal service of Manitoba, the North-West provinces, and British Columbia—Summary of progress since Confederation.
When Sir Adams Archibald, the first lieutenant governor of the newly-formed province of Manitoba, reached Winnipeg in the summer of 1870 for the purpose of taking over his government, he made a survey of the administrative system which he found there.
When Sir Adams Archibald, the first lieutenant governor of the newly formed province of Manitoba, arrived in Winnipeg in the summer of 1870 to take over his government, he assessed the administrative system that was in place.
The postal arrangements were very simple.[313] There were but four post offices in the province, and three mail routes. The principal route, that upon which the settlement depended for its communication with the outer world, ran down the Red River from Pembina, on the border, to Winnipeg. The second followed the river down as far as St. Andrew's; and the third connected the town of Portage La Prairie with Winnipeg, by a weekly-courier service along the Assiniboine river. The mails on the other two routes were carried twice each week.
The postal system was pretty basic.[313] There were only four post offices in the province and three mail routes. The main route, which the settlement relied on for communication with the outside world, went along the Red River from Pembina, at the border, to Winnipeg. The second route followed the river down to St. Andrew's; and the third connected Portage La Prairie to Winnipeg with a weekly courier service along the Assiniboine River. The mail on the other two routes was delivered twice a week.
The carriage of the mails between Pembina and Winnipeg was originally a private enterprise, but was afterwards assumed by the government of Assiniboia. There was a postage charge of one penny on all letters and of one-halfpenny on all newspapers, passing in and out of the territory, in addition to the postage due for conveyance between Pembina and the place of origin or destination.
The mail service between Pembina and Winnipeg started as a private business but was later taken over by the Assiniboia government. There was a postage fee of one penny for all letters and half a penny for all newspapers coming in and out of the territory, plus the postage that was already required for delivery between Pembina and the starting or destination point.
The system in the settlement was not recognized by the United States government, and letters were not considered as regularly posted until they were deposited in Pembina post office. Consequently the only postage stamps were those of the United States, which were sold in the post offices of the settlement.
The system in the settlement wasn’t recognized by the United States government, and letters weren’t considered officially posted until they were dropped off at the Pembina post office. As a result, the only postage stamps available were those from the United States, which were sold at the post offices in the settlement.
The letters and newspapers passing between Winnipeg and Pembina during the month of August 1870 were counted, and it was found that within that period, there were 1018 letters and 196 newspapers sent from Winnipeg to Pembina, and 960 letters and 1375 newspapers passed into the settlement.
The letters and newspapers going back and forth between Winnipeg and Pembina in August 1870 were tallied, and it turned out that during that time, there were 1,018 letters and 196 newspapers sent from Winnipeg to Pembina, and 960 letters and 1,375 newspapers received in the settlement.
The opportunity afforded by the extension of the United[Pg 317] States postal service into the northern parts of Minnesota was a great boon to the inhabitants of the isolated settlement. Until that time, the only communication between the Red River and the world outside was by means of the semi-annual packets, by which the Hudson's Bay Company maintained its communication with its posts, which were scattered over its vast territories.[314]
The extension of the United States postal service into northern Minnesota was a huge benefit for the people living in the remote settlement. Before this, the only way to communicate between the Red River and the outside world was through the twice-a-year shipments that the Hudson's Bay Company used to connect with its various posts spread across its extensive territories.[314]
Once in each year a vessel sailed from the Thames for York Factory on the western shore of Hudson's Bay bringing the goods used for barter with the Indians, and carrying back to London the peltries which were the produce of the previous year's trade. To meet this vessel, a brigade of dog-sleighs set out from fort Garry about December 10, when, the ice having formed and the snow fallen, travelling was easy. The first stopping place was at Norway House, at the northern end of lake Winnipeg. The distance, about 350 miles, was travelled in eight days.
Once a year, a ship would leave the Thames for York Factory on the western shore of Hudson's Bay, carrying goods for trading with the Indigenous people and bringing back pelts from the previous year's trade to London. To meet this ship, a convoy of dog sleds set out from Fort Garry around December 10, when the ice had formed and the snow had fallen, making travel easy. The first stop was Norway House, located at the northern end of Lake Winnipeg. The journey, which was about 350 miles, took eight days.
Here the contents of the packet were separated, one portion being detained for the posts in the west, and the other for York Factory. The couriers with the mails from the ship in Hudson's Bay connected at Norway House with those from Red River, and after mails had been exchanged, each returned to his point of departure. The mail from England reached fort Garry in February.
Here, the contents of the package were divided, with one part kept for the posts in the west and the other for York Factory. The couriers with the mail from the ship in Hudson's Bay met at Norway House with those from Red River, and after the mail had been exchanged, each went back to his starting point. The mail from England arrived at Fort Garry in February.
The other means of communication was by the packet which was despatched overland in the winter to Montreal. The courier returned to the settlement in the spring, travelling by canoes from Lachine up the Ottawa river and along the Mattawin to lake Nipissing, thence down the French river to Georgian Bay. Crossing the bay and lakes Huron and Superior, the travellers entered the Kaministiquia at fort William, and passing by alternate water stretches and portages into the Winnipeg river, they made their way by canoe to lake Winnipeg, and landed at the outlet of the Red River, eighteen miles north of fort Garry. This journey occupied about six weeks.
The other way to communicate was through a packet that was sent overland in the winter to Montreal. The courier returned to the settlement in the spring, traveling by canoe from Lachine up the Ottawa River and along the Mattawin to Lake Nipissing, then down the French River to Georgian Bay. After crossing the bay and Lakes Huron and Superior, the travelers entered the Kaministiquia at Fort William, and by alternating between water stretches and portages into the Winnipeg River, they canoed to Lake Winnipeg, landing at the outlet of the Red River, eighteen miles north of Fort Garry. This journey took about six weeks.
The extent of the isolation of the settlement during the early period is thus vividly described:—[315]
The extent of the isolation of the settlement during the early period is thus vividly described:—[315]
"Thus matters went on during the first forty years of our existence as a settlement. We were kept in blissful ignorance of all that transpired abroad until about eight months after actual occurrence. Our easy-going and self-satisfied gentry received their yearly fyles of newspapers about a twelvemonth after the[Pg 318] date of the last publication, and read them with avidity, patiently wading through the whole in a manner which did no violence to chronology. Wars were undertaken and completed—protocolling was at an end and peace signed, long before we could hear that a musket had been shouldered or a cannon fired."
"That's how things went for the first forty years of our existence as a settlement. We remained blissfully unaware of all that happened beyond our borders until about eight months after it actually occurred. Our easy-going and self-satisfied locals received their annual batches of newspapers about a year after the date of the last publication and read them eagerly, patiently going through everything in a way that didn't disrupt the timeline. Wars were started and finished—treaties were signed, and peace was established long before we even learned that a musket had been lifted or a cannon fired."
The Hudson's Bay packets were placed at the service of the settlers, but not quite without reserve. The company, which employed the packets primarily for the conduct of their business, did not intend that they should be used against their interests. They had a monopoly of the fur-trade, which they proposed to hold, as far as possible, intact. There were a number of traders in the settlement, who bought on their own account, and made use of such means of transport as they were able to discover, to get their furs out of the country.
The Hudson's Bay packets were made available to the settlers, but not without some limitations. The company that operated the packets mainly for their own business didn't want them used in ways that could harm their interests. They had a monopoly on the fur trade and intended to maintain that as much as possible. There were several traders in the settlement who bought furs for themselves and used whatever transportation they could find to get their furs out of the country.
To prevent the operations of these interlopers, the company had recourse to a measure which was vastly unpopular in the settlement. The governor of Assiniboia, in a proclamation, dated December 20, 1844, directed that all letters intended to be despatched by the winter express, must be left at his office on or before the 1st of January. Every letter must bear the writer's name, and if the writer was not one of those who had lodged a declaration against trafficking in furs, he was obliged to deposit the letter open, to be closed at the governor's office.[316] This obnoxious order remained in force until 1848.
To stop the activities of these outsiders, the company resorted to a tactic that was very unpopular in the community. The governor of Assiniboia, in a proclamation dated December 20, 1844, announced that all letters meant to be sent by the winter express had to be submitted at his office by January 1st. Every letter had to include the writer's name, and if the writer was not someone who had officially opposed trading in furs, they were required to leave the letter open, which would then be sealed at the governor's office.[316] This unpopular order remained in effect until 1848.
This arbitrary measure on the part of the company excited intense feelings among the settlers, and disposed them to hail with satisfaction the approach of the lines of the American postal service towards the company's southern borders. In 1853, when the American government established a post office at fort Ripley, a number of the settlers in the Red River settlement formed a post office at fort Garry, and opened a monthly communication with the post office in Minnesota.[317] At the same time a post office was also opened in the settlement of St. Andrews, fourteen miles further down the Red River. In 1857, the United States postal service was extended to the company's border, at Pembina, and the infant system in the settlement was connected with this office.
This random decision by the company stirred strong emotions among the settlers, making them eager to welcome the American postal service as it moved closer to their southern borders. In 1853, when the American government set up a post office at Fort Ripley, several settlers in the Red River settlement established a post office at Fort Garry and started a monthly communication with the post office in Minnesota.[317] At the same time, a post office was opened in the settlement of St. Andrews, which is fourteen miles further down the Red River. In 1857, the United States postal service expanded to the company’s border at Pembina, linking the fledgling system in the settlement to this office.
The relation of dependence, which the Red River settlement was beginning to assume towards the United States, attracted attention in Canada, and fears were expressed as to the political[Pg 319] future of the great hinterland. In 1857, the Toronto board of trade addressed a memorial to the government,[318] pointing out the situation in the north-west, and urged the expediency of establishing a post route and telegraph line between Canada and British Columbia, over Canadian and Hudson's Bay territory.
The growing dependence of the Red River settlement on the United States caught the attention of Canada, raising concerns about the political future of the vast hinterland. In 1857, the Toronto Board of Trade sent a petition to the government, highlighting the situation in the northwest, and recommended the establishment of a mail route and a telegraph line connecting Canada and British Columbia, running through Canadian and Hudson's Bay territory.
The government acted upon the suggestion without loss of time. A mail service was opened in the summer of 1858 to the Red River settlement.[319] Mails were carried twice a month between Collingwood and fort William by steamer, and from the latter point to the Red River by canoe. When winter closed the water routes, a monthly packet by dog-sleigh carried the mails, the carrier travelling along the north shore of lakes Huron and Superior.
The government quickly took action on the suggestion. A mail service was launched in the summer of 1858 to the Red River settlement.[319] Mails were sent twice a month between Collingwood and Fort William by steamer, and from there to the Red River by canoe. When winter froze the waterways, a monthly delivery by dog sled carried the mail, with the carrier traveling along the north shore of Lakes Huron and Superior.
But this effort to establish a direct connection between Canada and the north-west was not a success. The difficulties of travel placed this route at a hopeless disadvantage with that through the United States, which gave the people of the settlement a direct communication with but seventy miles of transportation on their part. The service was abandoned after two years, and shortly afterwards the improvements in the service of Pembina in the United States system, enabled the settlers on the Red River to exchange mails with the outer world twice each week.
But the attempt to create a direct link between Canada and the northwest didn't work out. The challenges of travel made this route vastly less favorable compared to the one through the United States, which required only seventy miles of transportation for the settlers to stay connected. The service was dropped after two years, and soon after, upgrades in the Pembina service within the U.S. system allowed the settlers at Red River to send and receive mail with the outside world twice a week.
But the failure of this scheme was merely the prelude to the greater scheme, advocated by the Toronto board of trade. The Canadian government opened a correspondence with the Hudson's Bay Company on the questions of a post road and telegraph across the Continent.[320] On its part, the government was prepared to adopt any measure which would facilitate travel over the stretch which lay between the settled parts of Canada and the Hudson's Bay territory. Appropriations were made for roads through to Red River, and it was hoped that free grants of land would induce people to settle along the route.
But the failure of this plan was just the beginning of a bigger initiative pushed by the Toronto board of trade. The Canadian government started discussing with the Hudson's Bay Company about creating a postal road and telegraph across the continent.[320] The government was ready to take any steps necessary to make travel easier between the settled areas of Canada and the Hudson's Bay territory. Funds were allocated for roads leading to Red River, and there was hope that offering free land grants would encourage people to settle along the route.
The discovery of gold on the Saskatchewan, with the anticipated influx of gold-seekers from the United States made the question one of great urgency. The only access to the territories was through the state of Minnesota, and it was feared that the settlement at Red River would inevitably imbibe principles inimical to the British interests. Unless Canada could offer a passage into the territories, equal in accommodation to that[Pg 320] afforded by the United States, the territories would in no long time be occupied by foreigners, British rule would virtually have passed away, and the key to the trade to British Columbia and ultimately to China surrendered to rivals.
The discovery of gold in Saskatchewan, along with the expected wave of gold hunters from the United States, made the situation extremely urgent. The only way to access the territories was through Minnesota, and there were concerns that the settlement at Red River would adopt ideas that were harmful to British interests. Unless Canada could provide a route into the territories that matched the accommodations offered by the United States, the territories would soon be filled with foreigners, British rule would effectively disappear, and control over trade to British Columbia and eventually to China would be handed over to competitors.
Dallas, the resident governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, looked at the question from the standpoint of the company's interests. He pointed out that the establishment of a line of communication across the territories of the company would be seriously prejudicial to those interests. The Red River and Saskatchewan valleys, though not in themselves fur-bearing districts, were the sources from which the main supply of winter food were procured for the northern posts, from the produce of the buffalo hunts.
Dallas, the local governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, viewed the question through the lens of the company's interests. He highlighted that setting up a communication route across the company’s territories would significantly harm those interests. While the Red River and Saskatchewan valleys weren't fur-bearing areas themselves, they were the primary sources of winter food for the northern posts, derived from the buffalo hunts.
A chain of settlements through these valleys would not only deprive the company of these vital resources, but would indirectly, in other ways, so interfere with their northern trade as to render it no longer worth prosecuting on an extended scale. It would necessarily be diverted into various channels, possibly to the public benefit, but the company could no longer exist on its present footing.
A series of settlements through these valleys would not only take away these essential resources from the company but would also disrupt their northern trade in ways that would make it no longer worthwhile to pursue on a large scale. It would inevitably be redirected into different paths, possibly benefiting the public, but the company couldn't continue to operate as it currently does.
The Canadian government was far from satisfied with this answer. As they saw it, the question resolved itself into simply this: Should these magnificent territories continue to be merely the source of supply for a few hundreds of the employees of a fur-trading company, or be the means of affording new and boundless contributions to civilization and commerce? Should they remain closed to the enterprise and industry of millions, in order that a few might monopolize all their treasures and keep them for all time to come, as the habitation of wild beasts and the trappers engaged in their pursuit?
The Canadian government was definitely not happy with this answer. In their view, the question came down to this: Should these amazing territories continue to just supply a handful of employees from a fur-trading company, or should they provide endless opportunities for civilization and commerce? Should they stay off-limits to the efforts and industries of millions, so that a few could hoard all their resources and keep them forever as a home for wild animals and the trappers hunting them?
The postmaster general in making his report to the council estimated that the cost of a road and water connections with Red River would cost £80,000, and from that settlement to the passes of the Rocky Mountains, £100,000, and recommended that the Canadian parliament should appropriate $50,000 a year for a number of years for this project.
The postmaster general, in his report to the council, estimated that the cost of building a road and water connections to Red River would be £80,000, and from that settlement to the passes of the Rocky Mountains, £100,000. He recommended that the Canadian parliament allocate $50,000 a year for several years for this project.
The Red River settlement approached the Canadian government on the subject, undertaking to build a road to the head of the Lake of the Woods, if the Canadian or British government would construct a practical passage from lake Superior to meet this road. The British government, to whom a copy of this memorial was sent by Sandford Fleming, replied that plans were[Pg 321] almost matured for establishing a postal and telegraphic communication with British Columbia, and it was expected that with the aid of the two colonies, the scheme would be entered upon at no distant date.
The Red River settlement approached the Canadian government about building a road to the head of the Lake of the Woods, if either the Canadian or British government would construct a viable route from Lake Superior to connect with this road. The British government, which received a copy of this proposal from Sandford Fleming, responded that plans were[Pg 321] nearly finalized for setting up postal and telegraphic communication with British Columbia, and it was anticipated that, with the support of the two colonies, the project would begin soon.
An obstacle to the settlement of the plans lay in the indeterminate nature of the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company to the territory over which the means of communication should pass, and the Canadian government declined to participate in the project while these claims remained unsettled. They opened correspondence with the British government with the view to determine the questions in dispute, maintaining at the same time the right of Canada to take over all that portion of central British America which was in the possession of the French at the period of the session in 1763.[321] The question of postal communication was as a consequence postponed to the larger question of Canada's acquiring these territories, and this was not settled until 1870.
An obstacle to settling the plans was the unclear nature of the Hudson's Bay Company's claims to the territory through which the communication routes would pass, and the Canadian government refused to get involved in the project while these claims were unresolved. They began discussions with the British government to resolve the disputes, while also asserting Canada's right to take over all the part of central British America that the French controlled when the territory was ceded in 1763.[321] As a result, the issue of postal communication was delayed until the larger question of Canada acquiring these territories was resolved, which didn’t happen until 1870.
In 1865, the Hudson's Bay Company sent Dr. John Rae, the Arctic explorer, to ascertain the practicability of establishing communication by telegraph across the continent. His report was favourable, and the company went so far into the scheme as to send a quantity of telegraph wire into the territory. But as their continued ownership and monopoly of the territory became increasingly uncertain, the company suspended operations, and these were not resumed.
In 1865, the Hudson's Bay Company sent Dr. John Rae, the Arctic explorer, to check if it was possible to set up a telegraph connection across the continent. His report was positive, and the company even sent a shipment of telegraph wire into the area. However, as their control and monopoly over the territory became more uncertain, the company stopped its operations, and they were never restarted.
In April 1862 the governor and council of Assiniboia by an ordinance established a postal system in the settlement. James Ross was appointed postmaster in the middle section of the settlement, with a salary of £10 per annum; and Thomas Sinclair, postmaster of the lower section, with a salary of £6 per annum. A mail was to be carried between the settlement and Pembina at the public expense, in connection with the United States mail to Pembina. The postal charges between the settlement and Pembina were fixed at a penny per half ounce for letters, twopence for each magazine or review, and one-halfpenny for each newspaper. For books, the charges were fivepence for half a pound or under, one shilling for one and a half pounds, and twopence for each additional half pound.[322]
In April 1862, the governor and council of Assiniboia established a postal system in the settlement through an ordinance. James Ross was appointed postmaster for the middle section of the settlement, earning a salary of £10 per year, and Thomas Sinclair was named postmaster for the lower section, with a salary of £6 per year. A mail service was set up to transport mail between the settlement and Pembina at public expense, coordinated with the United States mail to Pembina. The postal rates between the settlement and Pembina were set at one penny per half ounce for letters, two pence for each magazine or journal, and half a penny for each newspaper. For books, the rates were five pence for half a pound or less, one shilling for one and a half pounds, and two pence for each additional half pound.[322]
This embryo system was in operation when Sir Adams Archibald arrived in the new province as lieutenant governor. He lost no time in putting the system on as efficient a footing as the[Pg 322] circumstances permitted, and in incorporating it into the postal system of the dominion.
This embryo system was up and running when Sir Adams Archibald arrived in the new province as lieutenant governor. He quickly worked to make the system as efficient as possible given the circumstances and integrated it into the dominion's postal system.
The postmaster general arranged with the post office department of the United States for the transmission across its territory by way of Chicago and St. Paul, of mails between Windsor, Ontario and Winnipeg. The postal rates in force in the dominion were applied to the new province; and in November the post offices were provided with Canadian postage stamps, to replace those of the United States, which had been used until that time.
The postmaster general made arrangements with the post office department of the United States for the handling of mail between Windsor, Ontario, and Winnipeg, using the routes through Chicago and St. Paul. The postal rates that were in effect in the dominion were applied to the new province, and in November, the post offices were stocked with Canadian postage stamps to replace the United States stamps that had been used until then.
The means of transportation through the United States was gradually improved, and advantage was taken of these ameliorations to improve the communication of Manitoba. In 1879 the completion of the railway between the Pembina and Winnipeg left little to be desired in the facilities enjoyed by the province for the exchange of correspondence. But it was still dependent on the good will of the United States for these facilities. It was not until 1884 that the completion of the Canadian Pacific railway between Winnipeg and eastern Canada provided a connection across Canadian territory.
The transportation system across the United States gradually improved, and these advancements were utilized to enhance communication in Manitoba. In 1879, the completion of the railway between Pembina and Winnipeg greatly improved the province's ability to exchange mail. However, it still relied on the goodwill of the United States for these services. It wasn’t until 1884 that the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway between Winnipeg and eastern Canada established a connection across Canadian territory.
The need for a regular postal service in British Columbia did not arise until 1858, the year in which the gold discoveries in the mainland brought large numbers of miners to seek their fortunes in that country. The colony of Vancouver Island had been in the process of settlement by the Hudson's Bay Company since 1849, but the success of the company had been but moderate. The whole population in 1856—scarcely equal to that of a small town—was gathered together in Victoria and its environs, and their requirements as regards correspondence were limited to a communication with Great Britain.
The demand for a regular postal service in British Columbia didn't come up until 1858, the year when gold was discovered on the mainland, attracting many miners eager to strike it rich. The colony of Vancouver Island had been settled by the Hudson's Bay Company since 1849, but their success had been only moderate. By 1856, the entire population—barely equivalent to that of a small town—was concentrated in Victoria and the surrounding area, and their needs for communication were mostly limited to correspondence with Great Britain.
The home government gave early attention to the question of providing these means. On August 3, 1858, the day after the act providing for the government of the new colony had been adopted, the colonial secretary wrote to the treasury, pointing out that the establishment of the new colony, and the large influx of immigrants thereto, made it desirable that some safe and regular communication should be formed between the colony and the kingdom, and asking that the lords commissioners should consider the possibility of such a suggestion.[323]
The home government quickly focused on how to provide these resources. On August 3, 1858, the day after the act to establish the new colony was passed, the colonial secretary wrote to the treasury, highlighting that setting up the new colony and the large number of immigrants arriving made it important to create safe and regular communication between the colony and the kingdom. He requested that the lords commissioners consider the feasibility of this suggestion.[323]
The treasury consulted the admiralty and the post office. Neither department could suggest a scheme which would not[Pg 323] involve an outlay much beyond the ideas of the treasury as to the importance of the objects to be attained. The post office proposed sending mails to Colon, at the entrance to the Panama railway by the steamers of the Royal Mail Packet Company, thence to Panama by railway. The voyage occupied from sixteen to twenty days and the passage across the isthmus about five hours.
The treasury consulted the navy and the post office. Neither department could propose a plan that wouldn't[Pg 323] require spending much more than the treasury thought was reasonable for the goals they wanted to achieve. The post office suggested sending mail to Colon, at the start of the Panama railway, using the steamers of the Royal Mail Packet Company, and then from there to Panama by train. The trip took about sixteen to twenty days, and crossing the isthmus took around five hours.
The conveyance from Panama to Victoria offered greater difficulties. The connection between British mail steamers arriving at Colon and the United States steamers running from Panama to San Francisco, was so faulty, that the mails would have to lie at Panama as long as two weeks before they were taken forward. The passage to San Francisco occupied two weeks, and from this point to Victoria from four to five days. The delay at the isthmus was usually avoided by taking the steamer from England to New York, from whence a line of steamers ran to Colon in close connection with the Pacific steamers from Panama. By the latter route the journey from London to Victoria was made in about forty-five days.
The trip from Panama to Victoria was much more challenging. The link between British mail steamers arriving at Colon and the U.S. steamers traveling from Panama to San Francisco was so unreliable that the mail could sit in Panama for up to two weeks before it was moved on. The journey to San Francisco took two weeks, and from there to Victoria took another four to five days. To avoid the delays at the isthmus, travelers often took a steamer from England to New York, where a line of steamers connected directly to Colon, aligning closely with the Pacific steamers from Panama. Using this route, the trip from London to Victoria took about forty-five days.
But the important consideration with the treasury was the very considerable cost. The preference of the government was for an all-British conveyance. This could be arranged by having a steamer, subsidized by the government, take the mails from the Cunard vessels at either Halifax or New York, and carry them to Colon, and by providing other vessels under its control to make the conveyance from Panama to Victoria. The enormous cost of these services precluded the adoption of this scheme, until the colony had grown to an extent that it could bear, at least, part of the cost. It was estimated that the steamer on the Atlantic coast would call for an outlay of £25,000 a year, while the Pacific line would cost not less than £100,000 a year.
But the key issue with the treasury was the significant cost. The government's preference was for an all-British transport system. This could be set up by having a government-subsidized steamer pick up the mail from the Cunard ships at either Halifax or New York and take it to Colon, while also using other vessels under its control to transport the mail from Panama to Victoria. The huge expense of these services made it impossible to implement this plan until the colony had developed enough to cover at least part of the cost. It was estimated that the steamer on the Atlantic coast would require an expenditure of £25,000 a year, while the Pacific route would cost no less than £100,000 a year.
A solution of the difficulty was found through the good offices of the United States government. There was a service carried on twice a week between St. Louis, Missouri and San Francisco. The route was 2,765 miles in length, and it was covered by four-horse coaches with great regularity in twenty-two days.
A solution to the problem was reached thanks to the assistance of the United States government. There was a service operating twice a week between St. Louis, Missouri, and San Francisco. The route stretched 2,765 miles, and it was consistently covered by four-horse coaches in twenty-two days.
This service, the United States government placed at the disposal of the British post office for the exchange of its correspondence with its distant colony. The mails on their arrival at San Francisco were delivered to the British consul, who arranged for their transmission to their destination.
This service was made available by the United States government to the British post office for exchanging correspondence with its distant colony. When the mails arrived in San Francisco, they were handed over to the British consul, who made arrangements for their delivery to the final destination.
At the best, the isolation of the new settlement was extreme. There had been a newspaper in Victoria since June 1858. It was[Pg 324] published weekly, and for two weeks out of three, its columns were confined to purely local news. The third issue presented the appearance of a modern newspaper. The steamer "Eliza Anderson" had arrived from Olympia, bringing with it the despatches from San Francisco, containing news from all parts of the world.
At best, the isolation of the new settlement was intense. There had been a newspaper in Victoria since June 1858. It was[Pg 324] published weekly, and for two out of three weeks, its pages were dedicated exclusively to local news. The third issue looked like a modern newspaper. The steamer "Eliza Anderson" had arrived from Olympia, bringing dispatches from San Francisco, which included news from around the globe.
How belated the news was may be gathered from a glance over one of the issues. The issue of March 9 contained news from San Francisco, not later than February 8, and from St. Louis, the latest date was February 5. As St. Louis was within the eastern telegraph system, the papers from the city contained despatches from all parts of the United States and Canada. It was observed that among the items of news was the arrival of the steamer "Bohemia" at New York, with the Liverpool newspapers of January 18. So that under ordinary circumstances, news from England was fifty days old before it reached the public in Victoria.
How delayed the news was can be seen from a quick look at one of the editions. The March 9 issue had news from San Francisco, dated no later than February 8, and from St. Louis, the most recent date was February 5. Since St. Louis was part of the eastern telegraph system, the papers from that city included reports from all over the United States and Canada. It was noted that among the news items was the arrival of the steamer "Bohemia" in New York, carrying the Liverpool newspapers from January 18. This meant that, in normal circumstances, news from England was fifty days old by the time it reached the public in Victoria.
The construction of a telegraph line to the Pacific in the autumn of 1861, and the extension of the lines of the California State Telegraphic Company to Portland, Oregon, in 1864, did much to relieve the situation, so far as concerned news important enough to be sent by telegraph to the newspapers in San Francisco.
The building of a telegraph line to the Pacific in the fall of 1861, along with the expansion of the California State Telegraphic Company's lines to Portland, Oregon, in 1864, greatly improved the situation regarding significant news that needed to be sent by telegraph to the newspapers in San Francisco.
But the ordinary news from Canada did not reach Victoria by telegraph, and the length of the delay in the transmission of news from Canada by letter may be seen from the fact that the British Colonist of November 11, 1864, contained a newsletter from Canada, dated September 30—six weeks earlier. Governor Kennedy in his annual report to the colonial secretary on the state of the colony in 1864 observed that "expensive and defective postal and other communications are the great bar to progress, and reflect but little credit on the two great nations—England and America. A Times newspaper costs fourpence postage, and that for a book is entirely prohibitory."
But the usual news from Canada didn’t reach Victoria by telegraph, and the delay in getting news from Canada by mail can be illustrated by the fact that the British Colonist from November 11, 1864, included a newsletter from Canada that was dated September 30—six weeks earlier. Governor Kennedy, in his annual report to the colonial secretary on the state of the colony in 1864, noted that "expensive and inadequate postal and other communications are the main obstacle to progress, and reflect poorly on the two great nations—England and America. A Times newspaper costs fourpence to mail, and that for a book is completely prohibitive."
Arrangements of a simple character were made for the conveyance of letters into the sections occupied by the miners. In November 1858, governor Douglas reported that the men at the mines—nearly all of whom were on the course of the Fraser river—numbered 10,500. He also stated that he had arranged a postal system on a small scale, which provided for the wants of the country, at an expenditure which was fully covered by the receipts.
Arrangements of a simple nature were made for delivering letters to the areas occupied by the miners. In November 1858, Governor Douglas reported that the men at the mines—almost all of whom were along the course of the Fraser River—numbered 10,500. He also mentioned that he had set up a small-scale postal system to meet the needs of the area, which operated at a cost fully covered by the revenue.
The earliest letter delivery in this region was carried on by the express companies, whose operations were extended from[Pg 325] California to British Columbia, with the migration of the miners to the newly-discovered gold districts. This mode of delivery is described by a British naval officer, who spent four years in the country, as one of the safest imaginable. He states that "so great is his faith in them that he would trust anything in even that most insecure country (California) in an envelope bearing the stamp of the Wells Fargo and Company's express."[324]
The first letter deliveries in this area were handled by express companies that expanded their services from[Pg 325] California to British Columbia, following the influx of miners to the newly discovered gold regions. A British naval officer, who spent four years in the area, described this method of delivery as one of the safest possible. He mentioned that "he had such confidence in them that he would trust anything, even in that risky place (California), in an envelope bearing the stamp of Wells Fargo and Company's express."[324]
In May 1858 the colonial administration arranged with the private expresses for conveyance of letters anywhere within the colonies of British Columbia and Vancouver Island on condition of the prepayment of five cents per letter, as colonial postage.[325]
In May 1858, the colonial administration made arrangements with private courier services for delivering letters anywhere within the colonies of British Columbia and Vancouver Island, on the condition that five cents per letter was prepaid as colonial postage.[325]
This rudimentary arrangement was replaced in 1864 by a regular departmental postal service with headquarters at New Westminster.[326] The charges on letters and newspapers sent by post were fixed as follows: for every letter to and from British Columbia and Vancouver Island, delivered at Victoria or New Westminster, threepence per half ounce; on every newspaper posted under the same circumstances, one penny; on every letter from a post office at any one place in the colony to a post office at any other place in the colony, sixpence per half ounce; for a newspaper posted for delivery under the same circumstances, sixpence; on letters from any other place than Vancouver Island, threepence in addition to the foreign postage.
This basic setup was replaced in 1864 by a regular departmental postal service based in New Westminster.[326] The rates for sending letters and newspapers by mail were set as follows: for each letter to and from British Columbia and Vancouver Island, delivered in Victoria or New Westminster, three pence per half ounce; for each newspaper sent under the same conditions, one penny; for every letter sent from a post office in one location in the colony to a post office in another location in the colony, six pence per half ounce; for a newspaper sent for delivery under the same conditions, six pence; and for letters from places other than Vancouver Island, an additional three pence on top of the foreign postage.
The year following the union of the two governments of British Columbia and Vancouver Island, an ordinance was passed by the government, dated April 2, 1867, in which a new set of rates were established. On a letter passing between any two post offices in Vancouver Island or between any of these offices and New Westminster or any port in the colony, the rate was five cents; between Vancouver Island or New Westminster on the one side and Clinton or Savona's Ferry, the rate was twelve and a half cents; where letters pass beyond those distances the charge was twenty-five cents.
The year after the two governments of British Columbia and Vancouver Island merged, an ordinance was passed by the government on April 2, 1867, establishing a new set of rates. For a letter sent between any two post offices on Vancouver Island or between these offices and New Westminster or any port in the colony, the rate was five cents; for letters sent from Vancouver Island or New Westminster to Clinton or Savona's Ferry, the rate was twelve and a half cents; for letters going beyond those distances, the charge was twenty-five cents.
For letters exchanged between any two post offices above Yale, Hope or Douglas, the rate was twelve and a half cents. In each case the unit of weight was an ounce. The charge on newspapers passing between any two post offices in the colony was two cents each. At this period there were eighteen post offices on the mainland and eight on the island.[Pg 326]
For letters sent between any two post offices above Yale, Hope, or Douglas, the rate was 12.5 cents. In each case, the weight unit was an ounce. The cost for newspapers sent between any two post offices in the colony was 2 cents each. At this time, there were 18 post offices on the mainland and 8 on the island.[Pg 326]
The situation of the post office in British Columbia stood thus when the colony became one of the provinces of the dominion. By the act of confederation the postal service was incorporated into the Federal system which was administered by the post office department at Ottawa. The rates of postage in British Columbia were made uniform with the charges in the other provinces, viz., three cents per half ounce for letters, and one cent for newspapers.
The status of the post office in British Columbia was as follows when the colony joined the dominion as one of the provinces. Through the act of confederation, the postal service became part of the Federal system, managed by the post office department in Ottawa. The postage rates in British Columbia were standardized with those in the other provinces: three cents for every half ounce of letters and one cent for newspapers.
Communication between British Columbia and Canada east of the Rocky Mountains was far from satisfactory. Until the completion of the Canadian Pacific railway in 1885, the eastern provinces had to depend entirely upon the United States postal system for the means of communication with British Columbia. At the time of the entrance of the province into the confederation, the opportunities for an exchange of correspondence were limited to twice a week.
Communication between British Columbia and the rest of Canada east of the Rocky Mountains was not great. Before the Canadian Pacific Railway was finished in 1885, the eastern provinces had to rely completely on the United States postal system to communicate with British Columbia. When the province joined the confederation, the opportunities for exchanging letters were limited to two times a week.
The mails were conveyed from San Francisco by railway and stage to Olympia, between which point and Victoria, semi-weekly trips were made by steamer. There was also a service twice a month, between Victoria and San Francisco. The maintenance of these connections between San Francisco and Vancouver Island was stipulated for among the conditions of union of British Columbia with the dominion of Canada.
The mail was transported from San Francisco by train and stagecoach to Olympia, and from there, there were semi-weekly trips by steamer to Victoria. There was also a service twice a month between Victoria and San Francisco. The upkeep of these connections between San Francisco and Vancouver Island was included in the conditions of British Columbia's union with the Dominion of Canada.
Within the province, the mails were carried by the steamer "Sir James Douglas" along the east coast of Vancouver Island and Comox. The mainland was supplied with mails by a steamer which ran twice a week between Vancouver and New Westminster. In the interior of the province, the mails were carried by steamer up the Fraser river to Yale, thence northward to Barkerville. The distance between New Westminster and Barkerville was 486 miles. The service from Yale to Barkerville was by means of stages, drawn by four or six horses. This service was carried on weekly during summer, and fortnightly during the winter. Striking off westward from this route at Quesnelle, there was another to Omenica, 350 miles, over which the mails were carried monthly.[327]
Within the province, the mail was transported by the steamer "Sir James Douglas" along the east coast of Vancouver Island and Comox. The mainland received its mail from a steamer that operated twice a week between Vancouver and New Westminster. In the interior of the province, the mail was taken by steamer up the Fraser River to Yale, and then north to Barkerville. The distance from New Westminster to Barkerville was 486 miles. The service from Yale to Barkerville used stages pulled by four or six horses, running weekly in the summer and every two weeks in the winter. Heading west from this route at Quesnelle, there was another route to Omenica, covering 350 miles, with mail delivered monthly.[327]
In bringing the narrative to a point where the several provincial systems were incorporated into one system controlled by the post office department at Ottawa, I have completed the task I undertook. It remains only to note in a summary manner the progress that was made by the post office from Confederation to the Great War.
In bringing the story to a point where the different provincial systems were combined into one system managed by the post office department in Ottawa, I have finished the task I set out to do. It only remains to briefly outline the progress that the post office made from Confederation to the Great War.
[Pg 327] On the formation of the present department, there were 3477 post offices in the system. In 1914 this number had been increased to 13,811. The expansion of the lines of the service in the four older provinces, though considerable, is not comparable with that in the provinces comprehended in the territories west of the Great Lakes. In Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the better settled parts of Quebec and Ontario, the characteristic of the increase is the greater frequency of travel on already established roads, and, particularly, the acceleration of correspondence by the introduction of railways into the parts of the provinces.
[Pg 327] When the current department was established, there were 3,477 post offices in the system. By 1914, that number had grown to 13,811. While the expansion of service lines in the four older provinces was significant, it doesn't compare to the growth in the provinces located in the territories west of the Great Lakes. In Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the more developed areas of Quebec and Ontario, the increase is characterized by more frequent travel on existing roads and, especially, faster mail delivery thanks to the introduction of railways in those regions.
In 1867 there were but 2278 miles of railway in Canada. In the forty-seven years which followed this mileage was augmented to 30,795.
In 1867, there were only 2,278 miles of railway in Canada. In the forty-seven years that followed, this increased to 30,795 miles.
The narrow line of settlement in Ontario from the Quebec boundary to Toronto had expanded to a breadth, covering the extent of country from lake Ontario to the watershed, dividing the waters flowing south from those running into Hudson's Bay.
The narrow strip of settlement in Ontario stretching from the Quebec border to Toronto had widened, encompassing the region from Lake Ontario to the watershed that separates the rivers flowing south from those that flow into Hudson's Bay.
But the great expansion has taken place in the provinces on the plains between the Great Lakes and the Rocky Mountains—in the New Canada beyond the Great Lakes. On entering Confederation, the postal arrangements in this vast territory comprised but six post offices, with a system of mail service of no more than 145 miles. Since 1867 a system has been created in these western provinces containing in 1914 over 42,000 miles, of which 16,500 miles are of railroad. The number of post offices in this year was 3402.
But the major growth has happened in the areas on the plains between the Great Lakes and the Rocky Mountains—in the New Canada beyond the Great Lakes. When it joined Confederation, the postal system in this huge territory had only six post offices, with a mail service covering just 145 miles. Since 1867, a system has been developed in these western provinces that, by 1914, included over 42,000 miles, of which 16,500 miles were railway. The number of post offices that year was 3,402.
The expansion in British Columbia if not equal in magnitude to that in the prairie and grain-growing provinces, keeps full pace with the requirements of that province. There were thirty post offices in the province in 1871 when the colony entered Confederation. These had increased to 799 in 1914. The system in the earlier period comprised 3412 miles. This had increased to over 12,000 miles in 1914; of these 3200 were by railroad, and 5000 by steam or sailing vessel.
The growth in British Columbia, while not as large as that in the prairie and grain-growing provinces, still keeps up with the needs of the area. There were thirty post offices in the province in 1871 when the colony joined Confederation. This number grew to 799 by 1914. The system back then included 3,412 miles of routes. By 1914, this expanded to over 12,000 miles, with 3,200 miles covered by railroads and 5,000 miles by steam or sailing vessels.
The outstanding feature of the interchange of correspondence between the several provinces at the time they entered Confederation is the dependence on the postal service of the United States for the means by which it was carried on. As between the old province of Canada and the Maritime provinces, there was indeed a mail service by coach between Truro, sixty miles west of Halifax,[Pg 328] and Riviere du Loup, 120 miles east of Quebec. But, apart from the fact that the trips were made no more frequently than three times a week, the utter inadequacy of such a mode of conveyance over a route 485 miles in length was obvious to those who could use the railways of the United States for the same purpose.
The key aspect of the communication between the various provinces when they joined Confederation was their reliance on the postal service of the United States to facilitate this exchange. There was a mail service by coach connecting the old province of Canada and the Maritime provinces, specifically between Truro, which is sixty miles west of Halifax,[Pg 328] and Riviere du Loup, located 120 miles east of Quebec. However, aside from the infrequency of service, which was only three times a week, it was clear to those who could take advantage of the U.S. railways that such a slow method of transport was inadequate over a distance of 485 miles.
The provinces had been united politically for nine years before the completion of the inter-colonial railway provided the means of direct communication between them. Until 1876 the usual course for the mails between the Maritime provinces and the old province of Canada was by railway from St. John, New Brunswick to Bangor, Maine, thence to Portland, where connection was made with the Grand Trunk system.
The provinces had been politically united for nine years before the inter-colonial railway was completed, providing a way for direct communication between them. Until 1876, the typical route for mail between the Maritime provinces and the old province of Canada was by railway from St. John, New Brunswick, to Bangor, Maine, and then to Portland, where it connected with the Grand Trunk system.
As the western provinces came into the Confederation they exhibited in an even more marked degree the dependence on the good will of the United States for communication with the older provinces. The construction of the Canadian Pacific railway westward around the head of lake Superior and the continuance of its course across the plains of the north-west territories, and over the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, gradually relaxed that dependence.
As the western provinces joined the Confederation, they showed an even greater reliance on the goodwill of the United States for communication with the older provinces. The building of the Canadian Pacific Railway westward around the shores of Lake Superior and its ongoing path across the plains of the Northwest Territories and over the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean slowly eased that reliance.
But Manitoba had been a province of the dominion for fourteen years before the first train ran over an all-Canadian route between that province and Ontario, and it was two years later before British Columbia was linked up with its sister provinces by this means.
But Manitoba had been a province of the dominion for fourteen years before the first train ran over an all-Canadian route between that province and Ontario, and it was two years later before British Columbia was connected with its sister provinces by this means.
During these periods the mails for Manitoba were despatched from Windsor by way of Chicago, St. Paul's and Pembina, Dakota: those for British Columbia, by way of San Francisco. Fortunately, the geographical position of Canada with reference to the western and north-western states, enabled the post office of this country to reciprocate, more or less adequately, the services rendered in the maintenance of communication between the several provinces.
During these times, the mail for Manitoba was sent from Windsor through Chicago, St. Paul, and Pembina, Dakota; and the mail for British Columbia went through San Francisco. Luckily, Canada’s geographical position in relation to the western and northwestern states allowed the postal service in this country to somewhat adequately reciprocate the services provided to maintain communication between the various provinces.
Concurrently with the expansion of the postal system has gone a steady reduction in the postal rates. The charge of five cents per half ounce on letters was lowered to three cents per half ounce in the first session of parliament after Confederation. The effect of the reduction on the volume of correspondence exchanged was manifested in the fact that, although the reduction was the very considerable one of forty per cent., the revenue in 1871 was greater by $55,000 than the amount collected three years before.[Pg 329]
At the same time that the postal system was expanding, postal rates were steadily declining. The cost of five cents per half ounce for letters was cut to three cents per half ounce in the first session of parliament after Confederation. The impact of this price drop on the amount of correspondence being sent was clear; even though the reduction was a significant forty percent, the revenue in 1871 was $55,000 higher than what was collected three years earlier.[Pg 329]
The rate of three cents per half ounce, which was fixed in 1868, remained unchanged for twenty-one years, when the unit of weight was changed from half an ounce to one ounce, the rate becoming in 1889 three cents per ounce. The final reduction in the rate was made on January 1, 1899, two cents being substituted for three cents as the rate of postage for an ounce letter.
The rate of three cents per half ounce, set in 1868, stayed the same for twenty-one years until the weight unit changed from half an ounce to one ounce, making the rate in 1889 three cents per ounce. The last reduction in the rate happened on January 1, 1899, when the rate for an ounce letter was lowered from three cents to two cents.
In 1878 Canada became a member of the Universal Postal Union, an organization whose purpose it was to make in effect a single postal territory of the whole world. The obstacles to the interchange of correspondence between the various countries owing to differences in charges and regulations, had long been felt as a serious impediment to the cultivation of social and commercial relations which there was a general desire to foster, and some tentative efforts had been made, notably by the United States, to ameliorate the conditions governing international correspondence by the establishment of uniform regulations for this class of correspondence.
In 1878, Canada joined the Universal Postal Union, an organization aimed at creating a single postal territory for the entire world. The challenges in exchanging mail between different countries, due to varying charges and regulations, were seen as a significant barrier to developing social and commercial relationships that people wanted to encourage. Some initial efforts had been made, particularly by the United States, to improve the conditions for international mail by establishing uniform regulations for this type of correspondence.
Twenty-two states, comprising the leading countries in Europe, the United States, and Egypt sent delegates to a conference that assembled at Berne in 1874, and the result of their deliberations was a convention which established a code of regulations and fixed uniform postage rates respecting correspondence passing anywhere within the union.
Twenty-two states, including the leading countries in Europe, the United States, and Egypt, sent representatives to a conference that took place in Berne in 1874. The outcome of their discussions was a convention that created a set of regulations and established uniform postage rates for correspondence sent anywhere within the union.
The benefits conferred by the union on those, who, for any reason, had to carry on correspondence with foreign countries were inestimable. Some illustrations drawn from the case of Canada will be enlightening. In 1873 letters sent to India were subject to two different rates, according to the route by which they were directed. If sent by Canadian steamers to Great Britain, and thence on to their destination, the charge was twenty-two cents; if sent by the United States, the charge was thirteen cents. To Chili, Peru, and Ecuador, there were two routes and two rates; by way of England, the charge was forty cents, by way of the United States, twenty-five cents.
The benefits of the union for those who needed to communicate with foreign countries were huge. A few examples from Canada will help illustrate this. In 1873, letters sent to India had two different rates depending on the route taken. If sent via Canadian steamers to Great Britain and then on to their final destination, the cost was twenty-two cents; if sent from the United States, the cost was thirteen cents. For Chili, Peru, and Ecuador, there were also two routes and two rates: sending via England cost forty cents, while shipping via the United States was twenty-five cents.
The extreme instance of variation in the charges according to the route chosen was in the case of letters from the United States to Australia. There were six different routes, and the postal guide set out the different charges: five cents, thirty-three cents, forty-five cents, fifty-five cents, sixty cents, and one dollar, according to the route by which the letters were sent.
The extreme variation in charges based on the chosen route was seen in letters from the United States to Australia. There were six different routes, and the postal guide listed the different charges: five cents, thirty-three cents, forty-five cents, fifty-five cents, sixty cents, and one dollar, depending on the route used to send the letters.
Difficulties of an accounting nature arising from different standards of weights hampered the operations of the officials in[Pg 330] preparing the mails. Thus a letter from Great Britain to Germany, passing through France was taxed at a certain rate per half ounce in England, another rate per ten grams in France, and, finally, a third rate per loth[328] in Germany.
Difficulties with accounting caused by different weight standards hindered the officials' work in[Pg 330] preparing the mail. For example, a letter from Great Britain to Germany, passing through France, was charged a specific rate per half ounce in England, a different rate per ten grams in France, and finally, a third rate per loth[328] in Germany.
Many of these trammels to correspondence were removed by special conventions before the Postal Union came into being. But how many remained may be judged from the fact that the Canadian postal guide, issued shortly before Canada was admitted to the Postal Union, contained a list of rates to 127 different countries, which must be consulted by correspondents and postal officials before the charge on a letter going abroad could be ascertained.
Many of these restrictions on correspondence were lifted through special agreements before the Postal Union was established. However, the number that remained can be gauged from the fact that the Canadian postal guide, published just before Canada joined the Postal Union, included a list of rates for 127 different countries, which had to be checked by senders and postal officials before the cost of sending a letter overseas could be determined.
The immediate effect of coming into the union was the removal of these extensive and complicated lists from the postal guide, and their replacement by a single sentence, in which the charge on letters for all the countries in the union was stated to be five cents per half ounce. The Postal Union did not at that time comprehend all countries, though it did all the most important, but since then adhesions have been made from year to year until to-day there is scarcely a country to which letters are written, which does not come within its scope.
The immediate effect of joining the union was the removal of those long and complicated lists from the postal guide, replaced by a simple sentence stating that the charge for letters to all countries in the union was five cents per half ounce. At that time, the Postal Union didn’t include all countries, although it did cover the most significant ones, but since then, more countries have joined year after year until now there’s barely a country to which letters are sent that isn’t included.
In 1898, at Canada's instance, a closer union was formed for penny postage within the British Empire. It went into effect on Christmas day of that year. It did not include all parts of the Empire at the time it was formed, Australia being deterred from associating itself with the scheme, by financial considerations.
In 1898, at Canada's request, a closer union was established for penny postage within the British Empire. It started on Christmas day of that year. Not all parts of the Empire joined when it was created, as Australia chose not to participate due to financial concerns.
A few years ago Australia found itself able to adjust the difficulties with which it was confronted when the union was formed, and the imperial penny postage scheme is operative in all parts of the Empire.
A few years ago, Australia was able to tackle the challenges it faced when the union was formed, and the imperial penny postage scheme is now functioning in all parts of the Empire.
In 1903 the postmaster general of Canada opened negotiations with the administrations of the various parts of the Empire for a reduction of the postal rates on newspapers. His proposition was to allow newspapers to circulate throughout the Empire at the same rates as were charged for their transmission within the countries from which they were sent. The proposition encountered much opposition at the outset, but it made gradual progress, and to-day a newspaper may be sent from Canada to Great Britain and several other portions of the Empire at the same rate as would carry it from one place to another in Canada.
In 1903, the postmaster general of Canada started talks with different parts of the Empire to lower postal rates for newspapers. His proposal was to let newspapers be sent across the Empire at the same rates charged for sending them within their home countries. The idea faced a lot of pushback at first, but it slowly gained traction, and now a newspaper can be sent from Canada to Great Britain and several other regions of the Empire for the same rate as sending it from one place to another in Canada.
The auxiliary postal services—the money order and the[Pg 331] savings bank—have expanded in their operations enormously between the period of Confederation and the present time. In 1868 there were 515 money order offices in the provinces comprising the dominion, and the amount of the orders issued by them was $3,342,574. The corresponding figures for 1914 were 4274 offices, which issued orders to the amount of $118,731,966.
The extra postal services—the money order and the[Pg 331] savings bank—have grown tremendously in their operations from the time of Confederation to now. In 1868, there were 515 money order offices across the provinces of the dominion, and they issued a total of $3,342,574 in orders. By 1914, there were 4,274 offices, which issued orders totaling $118,731,966.
The post office savings bank was not in operation prior to Confederation. It was established in April 1868, and at the end of the first year 213 post offices were charged with the duty of receiving and paying out savings deposits. The deposits at the end of the first year amounted to $861,655. In 1914 there were 1250 post offices doing savings bank business, and the deposits amounted to $11,346,457, and the balance standing at the credit of depositors was $41,591,286.
The post office savings bank wasn't active before Confederation. It was set up in April 1868, and by the end of its first year, 213 post offices were responsible for handling savings deposits. The total deposits at the end of that year were $861,655. By 1914, there were 1,250 post offices offering savings bank services, with deposits reaching $11,346,457, and the balance credited to depositors was $41,591,286.
The financial operations of the Canadian post office have undergone a great expansion. The revenues which at the end of the first year of Confederation were $1,024,711, have, in spite of the steady reduction in the charges, been multiplied sixteen-fold within the forty-eight years since that period. In 1914 the amount collected for its services reached $16,865,451.
The financial operations of the Canadian post office have greatly expanded. The revenues, which were $1,024,711 at the end of the first year of Confederation, have increased sixteen times in the forty-eight years since then, despite a steady reduction in charges. By 1914, the amount collected for its services had reached $16,865,451.
It is interesting, as illustrating the much greater use made of the post office by the public in Canada, to note that while the revenue has increased sixteen times, the population has not much more than doubled within the same period. In 1868, when the population of the four original provinces was given as 3,879,885, the amount paid to the post office was $1,024,711; in 1914, when the population was 8,075,000 the revenue was $16,865,451. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that for every letter posted during the first year of Confederation five cents was exacted by the post office, while in 1914 two cents only was demanded, the average expenditure for each member of the population was in 1868, rather less than twenty-seven cents, while in 1914 it was a small fraction over two dollars.
It's interesting to see how much more the public in Canada uses the post office now. While revenue has increased sixteen times, the population has only a little more than doubled in the same period. In 1868, when the population of the four original provinces was 3,879,885, the post office collected $1,024,711. By 1914, with a population of 8,075,000, the revenue was $16,865,451. Even though the post office charged five cents for each letter sent in the first year of Confederation and only two cents in 1914, the average spending per person was just under twenty-seven cents in 1868, compared to a bit over two dollars in 1914.
The Canadian post office has been on a sound footing as a business institution for a number of years past. This fact is more notable than would perhaps appear. The postal system of this country embraces a territory more extended than that served by any other system on earth, except the United States and Russia; and the population to utilize its services, and thereby furnish its revenues, is very much less than that of either of these countries.
The Canadian post office has been solidly established as a business for several years now. This is more significant than it might seem. The postal system in this country covers a larger area than any other system in the world, except for the United States and Russia; and the population using its services, and thus generating its revenue, is much smaller than that of either of these countries.
Circumstances, incident to the expansion of settlement or the[Pg 332] providing of new facilities, are constantly arising, which compel the department to embark on expenditures from which adequate returns can be expected only in the distant future.
Circumstances related to the expansion of settlement or the[Pg 332] provision of new facilities are always coming up, forcing the department to make expenditures that will only yield sufficient returns far down the line.
As instances, when Manitoba and the north-west territories were added to the dominion, one of the early measures of the department was to establish a line of mail route from Winnipeg to Edmonton, at a cost of $10,000, while the receipts from the whole north-west territories was considerably less than $100. The completion of the Canadian Pacific railway to Vancouver in 1885 involved the department in outlays, which exceeded the revenues by over $200,000 a year.
As examples, when Manitoba and the Northwest Territories were added to the dominion, one of the early actions of the department was to set up a mail route from Winnipeg to Edmonton, costing $10,000, while the revenues from the entire Northwest Territories were significantly less than $100. The completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway to Vancouver in 1885 resulted in the department spending over $200,000 more each year than it brought in.
Nor has it been only by the weight of unavoidable expenditure that the department has been impeded in its efforts to make ends meet. The policy of the government has also operated to deprive it of what in all other countries is regarded as a source of legitimate revenue.
Nor has it been only by the burden of unavoidable spending that the department has struggled to balance its budget. The government's policy has also prevented it from accessing what is considered a legitimate source of revenue in all other countries.
Newspapers have always been circulated through Canada by the post office on terms most advantageous to the public. In 1875 publishers were permitted to send their papers to subscribers at the rate of one cent per pound. Even this small charge was removed in 1882, and for the following seventeen years newspapers addressed to subscribers were exempt from all charges.
Newspapers have always been delivered across Canada by the post office on terms that are most beneficial to the public. In 1875, publishers were allowed to send their papers to subscribers for just one cent per pound. This small fee was eliminated in 1882, and for the next seventeen years, newspapers sent to subscribers were free of all charges.
In 1899 a small charge was imposed, which, after some variations, was fixed at a quarter cent per pound. As the cost to the post office of handling and transmitting newspapers is estimated as from four cents to six cents per pound, it is clear that the loss to the department on this head reaches a large amount each year. In spite of these facts, however, the revenues of the department have steadily increased, and since 1903, when they first surpassed the outlay, they have maintained an ascendancy which it is improbable will be overcome.
In 1899, a small fee was introduced, which, after some changes, was set at a quarter cent per pound. Since the cost for the post office to handle and send newspapers is estimated to be between four and six cents per pound, it's clear that the department incurs a significant loss each year in this area. Despite these facts, however, the department's revenues have consistently risen, and since 1903, when they first exceeded expenditures, they have maintained an upward trend that is unlikely to be reversed.
FOOTNOTES:
[314] Hargrave's Red River, p. 155.
[315] The Nor'-Wester, January 28, 1860.
[317] Hargrave's Red River, p. 100.
CHAPTER XX
The post office in Newfoundland.
The post office in Newfoundland.
The position of Newfoundland, as regards postal requirements, was very similar to that of the other colonies situated on the Atlantic seaboard. The social and commercial relations of the island were almost exclusively with the mother country, and the trade was from an early period very considerable. A number of vessels sailed each year from the ports of Great Britain to those of the colony, which provided the means for the interchange of correspondence.
The postal needs of Newfoundland were quite similar to those of the other colonies along the Atlantic coast. The island's social and commercial ties were almost entirely with the mother country, and trade had been significant from an early stage. Each year, several ships traveled from ports in Great Britain to those in the colony, facilitating the exchange of correspondence.
On this side but one thing was needed—a fixed place in St. Johns at which letters for despatch by outgoing vessels could be deposited, and at which captains on their arrival could deliver the letters with which they had been entrusted in Great Britain.
On this side, only one thing was needed—a designated spot in St. Johns where letters for outgoing vessels could be dropped off, and where captains could deliver the letters they had been entrusted with in Great Britain upon their arrival.
The first post office was established in 1806 by Sir Erasmus Gower, who appointed Simon Solomon postmaster. The governor communicated with the secretary of the general post office, who though not prepared to include Newfoundland in the British postal system, promised to forward all letters addressed to the island, by the first outgoing vessels. Three years later, the number of merchants settled at Brigus, Harbour Grace and Carbonear on Conception Bay made necessary an arrangement, by which the letters reaching St. John for any of those places were forwarded to their destination by any vessels which might be going thither.
The first post office was set up in 1806 by Sir Erasmus Gower, who appointed Simon Solomon as the postmaster. The governor communicated with the secretary of the general post office, who, while not ready to include Newfoundland in the British postal system, promised to send all letters addressed to the island on the first outgoing ships. Three years later, the number of merchants living in Brigus, Harbour Grace, and Carbonear on Conception Bay made it necessary to arrange for letters arriving in St. John for those places to be forwarded to their destinations by any vessels that were headed that way.
The charge on letters passing through the London post office to Newfoundland was one shilling and threepence, if conveyed to Halifax by packet, and eightpence, if sent by private vessel, to which sums was added the postage from the place in Great Britain at which the letter was deposited, to London. There can be little doubt that but a small proportion of the correspondence passing between Newfoundland and Great Britain was exchanged by these expensive means. Advantage would be taken of the departure of any vessel, to place the letters in charge of the captain, who would collect the sum of a penny or twopence for each letter from the person to whom he delivered them at the port of arrival.[Pg 334]
The cost for letters sent through the London post office to Newfoundland was one shilling and threepence if taken to Halifax by packet, and eightpence if sent by a private vessel. On top of that, there was the postage from wherever in Great Britain the letter was mailed to London. It's clear that only a small fraction of the correspondence between Newfoundland and Great Britain was sent using these pricey methods. People would take advantage of any departing ship to hand over their letters to the captain, who would then collect a penny or twopence for each letter from the recipient at the port of arrival.[Pg 334]
The course of post within the island was also very expensive. The owners of sailing vessels running between St. John's and ports on Conception Bay collected a shilling for each single letter they delivered.
The cost of mail on the island was also very high. The owners of sailing ships operating between St. John's and ports on Conception Bay charged a shilling for each letter they delivered.
Governor Cochrane, in 1826, appealed to the postmaster general in London to establish a regular post office in St. John's, in order that his despatches from the colonial office might reach him with security. Failing that, he asked that the despatches might be sent, to a company in London, which was in constant communication with Newfoundland.
Governor Cochrane, in 1826, asked the postmaster general in London to set up a regular post office in St. John's so that his dispatches from the colonial office could reach him securely. If that wasn't possible, he requested that the dispatches be sent to a company in London that was in constant communication with Newfoundland.
The chamber of commerce of St. John's, in 1836, presented a memorial to the colonial office, asking that the sailing packets running between Falmouth and Halifax might call at St. John's on their voyages. But the governor, in forwarding the memorial, deprecated the application, on account of the fogs and gales which prevail on those coasts, and the ignorance of the sailing masters regarding the localities. The admiralty refused to entertain the application.
The St. John's chamber of commerce, in 1836, submitted a request to the colonial office asking that the sailing ships traveling between Falmouth and Halifax make stops at St. John's during their journeys. However, the governor, while sending the request along, discouraged the application due to the fog and storms common in that area, as well as the lack of knowledge among the captains about the local waters. The admiralty declined to consider the request.
With the establishment in 1840 of the Cunard steamship line to run between Halifax and Liverpool, and the inauguration of the scheme to make the Nova Scotia port the distributing centre for the mails for all parts of North America, provision was made for a sailing vessel of not less than 120 tons to leave Halifax for St. John's in connection with the steamer arriving at Halifax, and the post office at St. John's was incorporated into the imperial system. The postmaster, Simon Solomon, who had died in December 1839, was succeeded by his son, William Lemon Solomon, and the latter was placed on the pay-roll of the general post office with a salary of £100 per annum.
With the start of the Cunard steamship line in 1840 to travel between Halifax and Liverpool, and the launch of the plan to make the Nova Scotia port the main hub for mail distribution across North America, arrangements were made for a sailing vessel of at least 120 tons to depart from Halifax for St. John's, connecting with the steamer arriving in Halifax. The post office in St. John's was incorporated into the imperial system. The postmaster, Simon Solomon, who passed away in December 1839, was succeeded by his son, William Lemon Solomon, who was then placed on the payroll of the general post office with an annual salary of £100.
Governor Prescott gave his attention to the inland post office and endeavoured to have established a regular colonial system, but the assembly to which he directed his recommendation did not act upon it. The governor had, however, managed to secure to the postmaster some regular compensation for his services in attending to the exchanges on the island.
Governor Prescott focused on the inland post office and tried to set up a regular colonial system, but the assembly he recommended it to did not take action. However, the governor was able to ensure that the postmaster received some regular pay for his work in managing the exchanges on the island.
There was at this period a communication every second day with the ports of Brigus, Harbour Grace and Carbonear, by a sailing vessel, which carried passengers and letters. The postmaster received a payment of sixpence each upon all letters, and twopence on all newspapers received from other places, and twopence each upon letters despatched from his office. This brought him an income of between £30 and £40 a year.[Pg 335]
There was during this time a communication every other day with the ports of Brigus, Harbour Grace, and Carbonear, by a sailing ship that carried passengers and letters. The postmaster earned sixpence for each letter and twopence for each newspaper he received from other places, as well as twopence for every letter sent from his office. This gave him an income of between £30 and £40 a year.[Pg 335]
The establishment of the post office and its peremptory intervention in the exchange of communications between the merchants of St. John's and their correspondents abroad was a novelty, which was not wholly welcomed in that city. Although the post office had been at their service for thirty-five years, it was without official authority to claim exclusive right to the transmission of correspondence. The merchants could use it or not as suited their convenience.
The establishment of the post office and its forceful involvement in communication between the merchants of St. John's and their foreign correspondents was a new development that wasn’t entirely embraced in the city. Even though the post office had been available for thirty-five years, it lacked official authority to assert exclusive rights over the delivery of correspondence. The merchants could choose to use it or not, depending on what worked best for them.
There were few communities that could dispense with the benefits of a post office more easily than St. John's. The merchants all did business on Water Street, and their warehouses looked out on the harbour; consequently the arrival or departure of a vessel was known to every person interested, and letters could be placed in the hands of an outgoing captain or received from one who had just arrived, with the least possible inconvenience. They could be delivered up to the last moment before the vessel left the harbour, and received as soon as it had been made fast at the docks.
There were few towns that could get along without the advantages of a post office more easily than St. John's. The merchants all operated on Water Street, and their warehouses faced the harbor; as a result, everyone interested knew when a ship was arriving or leaving, and letters could be handed to an outgoing captain or received from one that had just come in, with minimal hassle. They could be delivered right up until the ship left the harbor and collected as soon as it was secured at the docks.
The necessary formalities of a post office proved inexpressibly irksome to the merchants of St. John's, and Solomon was made to feel the irritations of their impatience. He seems to have been one of those officials who make much of the functions of their offices. He delighted in the parti-coloured pencils, which his regulations prescribed. He was indignant with the merchants, who could not be made to understand why he used a red pencil to indicate that a letter had been prepaid, and a blue one to show the receiving postmaster in England that the postage had not been paid. All the trappings dear to the accountant's soul, were to them merely hindrances to the prompt posting and receiving of their letters.
The necessary formalities of a post office were incredibly annoying to the merchants of St. John's, and Solomon felt their impatience acutely. He seemed to be one of those officials who took great pride in the duties of his position. He enjoyed the colorful pencils that his rules required. He was frustrated with the merchants, who just couldn’t understand why he used a red pencil to show that a letter had been prepaid and a blue one to indicate to the receiving postmaster in England that the postage hadn’t been paid. All the details that an accountant valued were just obstacles to the swift posting and receiving of their letters.
Then there were difficulties of another sort. One of the merchants was notified that there was a packet in the post office for him, on which postage to the amount of five shillings and threepence was due. He, at first, refused to accept the packet, declaring that it could only contain newspapers, but, yielding to curiosity, he took it, and finding his surmise to be correct, endeavoured to return the packet to the postmaster, declining to pay the postage. The postmaster reported the case to England for instructions. He was told that the acceptance of the parcel carried with it the necessity on the part of the merchant of paying the postage, but whether the postmaster succeeded in bringing the recalcitrant merchant to a sense of his obligation is not recorded.
Then there were difficulties of another kind. One of the merchants was notified that there was a package at the post office for him, which had a postage due of five shillings and threepence. At first, he refused to accept the package, insisting that it could only contain newspapers, but, driven by curiosity, he took it. When he found that he was right, he tried to return the package to the postmaster, refusing to pay the postage. The postmaster reported the situation to England for instructions. He was informed that accepting the parcel meant the merchant had to pay the postage, but it’s not recorded whether the postmaster managed to convince the stubborn merchant of his obligation.
The postal situation in Newfoundland remained unchanged until 1848, when Elgin, the governor general, of the British North[Pg 336] American provinces announced to the government of the island, that the British government had decided to grant autonomy to the several administrations in the colony, and called a conference in Montreal to settle the questions arising from this concession.
The postal situation in Newfoundland stayed the same until 1848, when Elgin, the Governor General of the British North[Pg 336] American provinces, informed the island's government that the British government had decided to give autonomy to the various administrations in the colony and called for a conference in Montreal to address the issues that came from this concession.
Newfoundland was not represented at the conference, but the decisions adopted and the course taken by the other colonies stimulated the Newfoundland government to establish a postal system within the island. On April 26, 1850, a committee of the assembly was appointed to inquire into the subject. That the question had been fully discussed before this action was taken by the assembly is evident from the fact that three days later the report of the committee was presented to the house.
Newfoundland didn't have a presence at the conference, but the decisions made and the direction chosen by the other colonies motivated the Newfoundland government to set up a postal system on the island. On April 26, 1850, a committee from the assembly was tasked with looking into the matter. It's clear that the question had been thoroughly discussed before this action was taken by the assembly, as just three days later, the committee's report was presented to the house.
The interval between the time of its appointment and the date on which it made its report precluded the committee from making anything like exhaustive inquiries. They were satisfied, however, from the information they had obtained as to the volume of correspondence passing to and from the ports of Conception Bay, that a scheme would be practicable for establishing a system, which should carry postal facilities to the principal settlements as far north as Twillingate and as far as Gaultois on the south-west coast. They were encouraged to make the proposition by the rapid progress made by the post office at St. John's during the eight years of its operation. The revenue of this office had increased from £595 in 1841 to £1545 in 1849.
The time between when it was appointed and when it submitted its report limited the committee from conducting thorough investigations. However, they were confident, based on the information they gathered regarding the amount of correspondence going to and from the ports of Conception Bay, that it would be feasible to establish a system that would provide postal services to the main settlements as far north as Twillingate and as far south as Gaultois on the southwest coast. They felt encouraged to suggest this due to the rapid growth of the post office in St. John's during its eight years of operation. The revenue for this office grew from £595 in 1841 to £1545 in 1849.
The committee proposed as an interim measure that the stipendiary magistrates in the ports at which post offices should be established, might be called upon to act as postmasters in those places. The foundation of the service to the north would be a conveyance by messenger from St. John's to Portugal Cove. From this point, a sailing vessel would carry the mails to Brigus, Harbour Grace and Carbonear; from Carbonear, a messenger would cross the peninsula to Heart's Content on Trinity Bay; a sailing vessel would serve Trinity and Catalina on the other side of the bay, and from the latter point a messenger would continue the transmission to Bonavista. From Bonavista, the mails would be carried to the outermost points of the system, Greenspond, King's Cove, Cat Harbour, Fogo and Twillingate, by vessel and messenger. It was estimated that the several services within this part of the system would cost £575 a year.
The committee suggested that, as a temporary solution, the stipend magistrates at the ports where post offices were to be set up could serve as postmasters in those locations. The service to the north would begin with a messenger transporting mail from St. John's to Portugal Cove. From there, a boat would take the mail to Brigus, Harbour Grace, and Carbonear; then from Carbonear, a messenger would travel across the peninsula to Heart's Content on Trinity Bay. A sailing vessel would serve Trinity and Catalina on the opposite side of the bay, and from there, a messenger would carry on to Bonavista. From Bonavista, the mail would be transported to the furthest points in the system—Greenspond, King's Cove, Cat Harbour, Fogo, and Twillingate—by boat and messenger. It was estimated that these various services in this part of the system would cost £575 a year.
To the south, there would be couriers down the coast to Trepassey, serving Ferryland on the way; and to Placentia, by way of Salmonier and St. Mary's; thence on to Gaultois with stopping[Pg 337] places at Burin and Garnish. The southern route should be covered for £325 a year. These routes would displace services by vessel to Placentia, Bonavista and Fogo, as well as couriers to Ferryland and St. Mary's, which with expenses for the incidentals were a charge of £520 upon the colony. It was expected that the improved services proposed would provide travelling accommodation for the judges, school inspectors and other officials, and by the savings thus effected, the increased outlay for the postal system would be largely made up.
To the south, there would be couriers along the coast to Trepassey, stopping at Ferryland on the way; and to Placentia, through Salmonier and St. Mary's; then on to Gaultois with stops at Burin and Garnish. The southern route should be covered for £325 a year. These routes would replace the services by boat to Placentia, Bonavista, and Fogo, as well as couriers to Ferryland and St. Mary's, which, along with incidental expenses, cost the colony £520. It was expected that the improved proposed services would provide travel accommodations for judges, school inspectors, and other officials, and that the savings from this would largely offset the increased costs for the postal system.
In the following year (1851) an act was passed by the legislature providing £1000 for the establishment and maintenance of the inland post office proposed by the committee. The appointment of all postmasters was vested in the governor, and the management of the system was to be placed in the hands of the postmaster of St. John's. His salary was to be £75 a year (doubtless in addition to the £100 sterling, which he held under his imperial appointment), the postmasters of Harbour Grace and Carbonear were to receive, each, £15 a year, and the other postmasters £10.
In the following year (1851), the legislature passed a law providing £1000 for setting up and maintaining the inland post office suggested by the committee. The governor was responsible for appointing all postmasters, and the management of the system was to be handled by the postmaster of St. John's. His salary was set at £75 a year (likely on top of the £100 sterling he received from his imperial appointment), while the postmasters of Harbour Grace and Carbonear would each make £15 a year, and the other postmasters would earn £10.
The postage on letters passing anywhere within the island was fixed at threepence per half ounce; and on books, twopence where the weight did not exceed six ounces, and threepence on greater weights up to sixteen ounces. The scheme outlined came into operation on October 15, 1851.
The postage on letters sent anywhere within the island was set at three pence per half ounce; and for books, it was two pence if the weight didn't exceed six ounces, and three pence for heavier weights up to sixteen ounces. This plan went into effect on October 15, 1851.
The first report of the postmaster general was a serious disappointment. The total receipts for the year amounted to no more than £52 2s. 11d., and this amount was received entirely from St. John's and the three offices on Conception Bay. Letters, on which postage somewhat under £6 was due, were sent to other offices, but not one penny was collected upon them. The committee of the assembly which examined the accounts inclined to the opinion that the postal system might, for the time, be restricted to the offices on Conception Bay.
The first report from the postmaster general was a big letdown. The total income for the year was only £52 2s. 11d., and this money came solely from St. John's and the three offices in Conception Bay. Letters that had about £6 in unpaid postage were sent to other offices, but not a single penny was collected on them. The assembly's committee that looked over the accounts thought it might be best to limit the postal system to just the offices in Conception Bay for now.
Solomon was rather alarmed by these expressions of the committee, and in his next report he dealt, in some fulness, with the peculiar difficulties that attended the establishment of a postal system in the colony. No very great regularity, he declared, could be anticipated while the couriers were retarded by the marshy and swampy nature of the roads on the most important lines. Under the most favourable circumstances, their journeys were made over mere tracks or footpaths, while the less frequented routes lay through wilds where neither roads nor paths had been formed and where unbridged rivers and streams had to be crossed, the couriers being[Pg 338] often obliged to wade to a considerable depth, exposed to strong, rapid currents.
Solomon was quite concerned about what the committee had said, and in his next report, he thoroughly addressed the unique challenges involved in setting up a postal system in the colony. He stated that no significant consistency could be expected as long as the couriers were held back by the marshy and swampy conditions of the main roads. Even in the best conditions, their trips were taken over nothing more than tracks or footpaths, while less-traveled routes went through untamed areas with no roads or paths at all, forcing the couriers to cross unbridged rivers and streams, often needing to wade through deep water and contend with strong, fast currents.
The postmaster general acknowledged that it was on his advocacy of the system that Delaney, the chairman of the committee, introduced the subject into the assembly. He was under no illusions as to the rapid growth of the revenue; his object was to secure to the inhabitants, who were excluded for the greater part of every year from the advantage of communication with the capital, a ready means of maintaining intercourse with the centre of the social and commercial life of the island. He was encouraged by the increasing revenue to believe that his efforts were being crowned with success.
The postmaster general recognized that it was because of his support for the system that Delaney, the committee chairman, brought up the topic in the assembly. He was fully aware of the quick increase in revenue; his goal was to provide the residents, who were mostly cut off from the benefits of communication with the capital for most of the year, an easy way to stay connected with the heart of the island's social and commercial life. The rising revenue gave him confidence that his efforts were paying off.
The step the committee feared might be forced upon them was not taken. On the contrary, the postal system was extended liberally in every direction in which it seemed to be required, in adherence to the principle which guided the postmaster general in advocating the inland service.
The step that the committee was worried might be imposed on them wasn't taken. Instead, the postal system was expanded generously in every direction that seemed necessary, following the principle that guided the postmaster general in supporting the inland service.
In 1858, the colony, having decided on the desirability of direct communication with the mother country, sent to England two delegates—Little, the attorney general and Lawrence O'Brien—to confer with the government and leading shipowners on the subject of a steam service from a British port to St. John's. When the delegates made their first report, they had not succeeded in their objects, but they were encouraged by the recognition accorded to the scheme by the British government and by the promise of a subsidy of £3000 a year to any satisfactory service the government of Newfoundland might arrange for.
In 1858, the colony, realizing the importance of direct communication with the mother country, sent two delegates to England—Little, the attorney general, and Lawrence O'Brien—to discuss a steam service from a British port to St. John's with the government and major shipowners. When the delegates presented their initial report, they had not achieved their goals, but they were encouraged by the British government's acknowledgment of the plan and the offer of a £3000 annual subsidy for any satisfactory service the government of Newfoundland could organize.
It was not long before plans were submitted for their consideration. In the same year, the North Atlantic Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company laid before Little a proposition for a regular service between Liverpool, St. John's and a port in the United States. The company were prepared to undertake a contract for trips of a frequency of not less than one every four weeks, with additional trips during April, July and August, for £10,000 a year. A contract was made on this basis, the understanding being that the British government would contribute £3000 of this amount. But the British government, being satisfied from earlier experiences with the personnel of this company that they could not be depended upon to fulfil their arrangement, declined to sanction the contract, and the arrangement fell through.
It wasn't long before plans were submitted for consideration. In the same year, the North Atlantic Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company presented a proposal to Little for a regular service between Liverpool, St. John's, and a port in the United States. The company was ready to take on a contract for trips at a frequency of at least once every four weeks, with extra trips in April, July, and August, for £10,000 a year. A contract was made based on this, with the understanding that the British government would contribute £3,000 of that amount. However, the British government, unconvinced by past experiences with this company's staff and their reliability to stick to agreements, refused to approve the contract, and the deal fell through.
In intimating to the Newfoundland government their refusal to endorse the contract, the British government expressed their[Pg 339] willingness to assist in procuring a competent contractor; and in October of the same year, an agreement was made with the Atlantic Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company, known more generally as the Lever or Galway Company, for a service of virtually the same frequency as that provided for in the earlier contract, between Galway, St. John's and a United States port. The rate of compensation was to be £13,000 a year, of which the British government was to contribute £4500 a year.
In notifying the Newfoundland government of their decision not to endorse the contract, the British government stated their[Pg 339] willingness to help find a reliable contractor. In October of that same year, they reached an agreement with the Atlantic Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company, more commonly referred to as the Lever or Galway Company, to provide a service with nearly the same frequency as the one in the previous contract, between Galway, St. John's, and a port in the United States. The compensation was set at £13,000 a year, with the British government contributing £4,500 of that total annually.
Though for political reasons, this company enjoyed an unusual degree of favour on the part of the British government, it failed entirely to satisfy the conditions of the contract, and after a short period of futile effort, it ceased altogether. It was not until 1872 that an arrangement with the Allan line provided the first direct communication with Great Britain.
Though, for political reasons, this company had an unusual level of support from the British government, it completely failed to meet the contract's requirements, and after a brief period of unsuccessful attempts, it stopped altogether. It wasn't until 1872 that an agreement with the Allan Line provided the first direct communication with Great Britain.
In 1860, on the death of Solomon, John Delaney, who had made the postal service his special care while a member of the assembly, was appointed postmaster general. His first measure was to provide for St. John's what he described as a penny delivery service. After consultation with the chief post office inspector in Canada, he submitted his scheme to the legislature. He proposed to divide the city into two sections, to each of which he proposed to appoint a letter carrier to deliver the letters from door to door, not gratuitously as at present, but for a compensation of a penny for each letter delivered. The plan was put into operation on September 1, 1863, but it had little success at the time.
In 1860, after Solomon's death, John Delaney, who had focused on improving the postal service while serving in the assembly, was appointed postmaster general. His first action was to introduce what he called a penny delivery service for St. John's. After discussing his idea with the chief post office inspector in Canada, he presented his plan to the legislature. He suggested dividing the city into two sections and appointing a letter carrier for each section to deliver mail from door to door, not for free like it was before, but for a fee of a penny for each letter delivered. The plan was implemented on September 1, 1863, but it didn’t succeed at that time.
Steps were also taken in 1863 to improve the accommodation to the outports by substituting a steam vessel for the sailing boats, by which the exchange of mails was effected. In November 1860, a contract was made with Aaron DeGraw, of New York, for a service north and south from St. John's. The steamer "Victoria" was to run twice in each month to Twillingate on the north, and to La Poile on the south-west coast, calling at all the post offices en route. The consideration was £3750 a year.
Steps were also taken in 1863 to improve the accommodation for the outports by replacing sailing boats with a steam vessel for mail exchange. In November 1860, a contract was made with Aaron DeGraw from New York for a north-south service from St. John's. The steamer "Victoria" was scheduled to operate twice a month to Twillingate in the north and La Poile on the south-west coast, stopping at all the post offices along the way. The fee was £3750 per year.
The contract provided for the service for five years. But a few months after it went into operation, the contractor represented that he was unable to continue, unless the terms were modified. He asked that the trips on the northern section might be reduced from fortnightly to monthly during the winter, and that he might omit certain of the ports of call; or, if the legislature were unwilling to lower their requirements, that he might have his compensation increased by £1500 a year.
The contract was for a five-year service. However, a few months after it started, the contractor stated that he couldn't continue unless the terms were changed. He requested to reduce the trips on the northern section from every two weeks to once a month during the winter and to skip certain ports of call; or, if the legislature was not willing to lower their requirements, he asked for his pay to be increased by £1500 a year.
The application of DeGraw was not entertained by the legislature,[Pg 340] and the contractor dropped his service shortly after. Recourse was had to the sailing vessels until 1863, when a more satisfactory arrangement was concluded with Robert Grieve on June 2, 1863. The contract stipulated for fortnightly trips in each direction, and the compensation was fixed at £4500. The "Ariel" was the steamer employed by Grieve for the service.
The legislature did not consider DeGraw's application,[Pg 340] and the contractor ceased his services shortly after. They relied on sailing vessels until 1863, when a better arrangement was reached with Robert Grieve on June 2, 1863. The contract required biweekly trips in each direction, with a payment set at £4500. The steamer used by Grieve for the service was the "Ariel."
The coastal service, thus satisfactorily established from St. John's down the east and along the south coasts as far as La Poile, was extended to Port aux Basques on the south-west corner of the island by a sailing vessel. This completed the postal communications on the southern shore of the island.
The coastal service, successfully set up from St. John's along the east and south coasts down to La Poile, was extended to Port aux Basques at the southwest corner of the island by a sailing vessel. This finalized the postal communications on the southern shore of the island.
The west coast was still to be comprised in the system. In 1873, arrangements of an experimental nature were made to send mails from Port aux Basques (or Channel as the post office was called) to St. George's Bay, Bay of Islands and Bonne Bay on this coast. A courier service was also set in operation to provide communications to those settlements during the winter, but many difficulties were encountered owing to the inacquaintance with the country on the part of the couriers, who had to pass on their way between Channel and these bays.
The west coast was still not included in the system. In 1873, experimental arrangements were made to send mail from Port aux Basques (known as Channel at the post office) to St. George's Bay, Bay of Islands, and Bonne Bay on this coast. A courier service was also started to provide communication to those settlements during the winter, but many challenges arose because the couriers were not familiar with the terrain they had to navigate between Channel and these bays.
The arrangement thus experimentally entered upon continued until 1881, when the sailing craft, which carried the mails to Bonne Bay was withdrawn, and the steamer "Curlew," by which Channel post office received its mails from St. John's, extended its trips up the north-west coast as far as Bonne Bay.
The arrangement that started out as an experiment continued until 1881, when the sailing ship that delivered the mail to Bonne Bay was taken out of service, and the steamer "Curlew," which brought mail to the Channel post office from St. John's, expanded its routes up the northwest coast all the way to Bonne Bay.
The conveyance of the mails up this coast was carried on to the top of the island in the following year. Two trips were made by couriers from Bonne Bay to Flower Cove at the gulf entrance to the straits of Belle Isle. From Flower Cove, the journey of the courier ran along the shore of the straits to Pistolet Bay at the northernmost point of the island, and thence on the Griquet which looked from the north of the island on the Atlantic, and down the Atlantic coast to St. Anthony.
The delivery of mail along this coast continued to the top of the island the following year. Couriers made two trips from Bonne Bay to Flower Cove at the entrance of the straits of Belle Isle. From Flower Cove, the courier traveled along the shores of the straits to Pistolet Bay at the northernmost point of the island, and then on to Griquet, which faces the Atlantic from the north of the island, and down the Atlantic coast to St. Anthony.
Another courier set out from Flower Cove and travelling due east across the island carried the mail to Conche, which served the settlements on Hare Bay. At the same time that the process of encirclement was proceeding from the western side, the settlements of Western Cove, Mings and Coachman's Cove on White Bay, the northernmost of the series of great bays by which the Atlantic coast is indented, were having the benefits of communication extended to them from Bett's Cove, in Notre Dame Bay.[Pg 341]
Another courier left Flower Cove and headed due east across the island, delivering mail to Conche, which served the settlements on Hare Bay. While the encirclement was happening from the west, the settlements of Western Cove, Mings, and Coachman's Cove on White Bay—the northernmost of the series of large bays along the Atlantic coast—were gaining improved communication from Bett's Cove in Notre Dame Bay.[Pg 341]
The benefits of these trips were so greatly appreciated by the fishermen in the northern parts of the island that the department arranged for regular fortnightly services during the winter from Bonne Bay along the west coast to the top of the island, and thence down the east coast as far as Canada Bay. On the other side the steamers which carried the mails northward from St. John's to the settlements on Notre Dame Bay, also conveyed bags for the settled districts in White Bay. These were sent forward monthly from Bett's Cove. Thus was completed the system of coastal service by which every part of the island was brought into communication with the capital of the colony.
The fishermen in the northern parts of the island greatly appreciated the benefits of these trips, so the department set up regular bi-weekly services during the winter from Bonne Bay along the west coast to the top of the island, and then down the east coast to Canada Bay. On the other side, the steamers that carried the mail north from St. John's to the settlements on Notre Dame Bay also transported bags for the settled areas in White Bay. These were sent out monthly from Bett's Cove. This completed the coastal service system that connected every part of the island with the capital of the colony.
On the larger and more thickly settled bays, it was obviously impossible for the steamers which sailed from St. John's to stop at any but the more populous villages, and within each of these bays smaller craft plied to the less important settlements. In 1881, there were eight such sailing vessels in the service of the post office: one each in Bonavista and Trinity Bays, three in Placentia Bay, two in Fortune Bay, and one which effected the exchange of mails at Harbour Breton. In Conception Bay, where there were two towns and several villages a steamer was employed.
On the larger and more densely populated bays, it was obviously impossible for the steamers leaving from St. John's to stop at anything other than the more populated villages, and within each of these bays, smaller boats served the less significant settlements. In 1881, there were eight sailing vessels used by the post office: one each in Bonavista and Trinity Bays, three in Placentia Bay, two in Fortune Bay, and one that handled mail exchanges at Harbour Breton. In Conception Bay, where there were two towns and several villages, a steamer was in use.
But though the settlements in Newfoundland were at this period practically all on the coasts, and depended mainly on seacraft for the means of communication, the conveyance of mails to the northern settlements was in the winter one of great danger and difficulty.
But even though the settlements in Newfoundland during this time were mostly located on the coasts and relied heavily on boats for communication, delivering mail to the northern settlements in winter was extremely dangerous and challenging.
As early as 1863, it was determined to make the experiment of serving these settlements by couriers who should travel over an overland route. In February of that year, Smith McKay undertook the delivery by land, so far as that was possible, to Greenspond, on the stretch of coast between Bonavista and Notre Dame Bay, and to Fogo and Twillingate, islands in Notre Dame Bay. The success attending this trip induced the postmaster general to make a contract for three trips each winter.
As early as 1863, it was decided to try serving these settlements with couriers who would travel overland. In February of that year, Smith McKay took on the delivery by land, as much as was possible, to Greenspond, located on the coast between Bonavista and Notre Dame Bay, and to the islands of Fogo and Twillingate in Notre Dame Bay. The success of this trip led the postmaster general to sign a contract for three trips each winter.
The government also planned the construction of a road, which would make communication easier between the northern outports and St. John's. The work was entered upon with vigour, the reports of progress making an interesting feature of the annual papers of the legislature. In 1868, a serviceable road was constructed to Gander Bay, an inlet of Notre Dame Bay, whence the mails were conveyed to the important villages of Twillingate and Fogo by sailing vessel.
The government also planned to build a road that would make communication easier between the northern outports and St. John's. The work was started with enthusiasm, and the progress reports became a noteworthy part of the annual papers of the legislature. In 1868, a usable road was built to Gander Bay, an inlet of Notre Dame Bay, from where the mail was carried to the important villages of Twillingate and Fogo by sailing ship.
In 1870 the road was complete. It was estimated to be 210[Pg 342] miles in length. There were six relay stations on the route, and ten men employed in the conveyance. The course pursued by the courier took him from Harbour Grace, his starting point, down the shore of Conception Bay; thence along the isthmus separating Trinity from Placentia Bay, serving the settlements on each side of the isthmus. From the top of the isthmus, the road maintained a northerly direction, running generally parallel with the Atlantic coast, as far as Greenspond, from which point it turned westward across the country to Gander Bay.
In 1870, the road was finished. It was about 210[Pg 342] miles long. There were six relay stations along the route and ten men working in transportation. The courier's journey started at Harbour Grace, traveling down the shore of Conception Bay; then along the isthmus that separates Trinity from Placentia Bay, serving the communities on both sides. From the top of the isthmus, the road continued north, staying generally parallel to the Atlantic coast, all the way to Greenspond, where it turned west across the land to Gander Bay.
The postal accommodation on the peninsula of Avalon was greatly augmented by the completion of the railway between St. John's and Harbour Grace in 1884. On January 1, 1885, all the principal offices at the bottom of Conception Bay were supplied with mails daily, and Heart's Content and other offices on Trinity Bay had their mails three times a week. The extension of the branch to Placentia in October 1888 gave that village the benefit of an expeditious service three times a week.
The postal service on the Avalon Peninsula got a significant boost when the railway connecting St. John's and Harbour Grace was finished in 1884. Starting January 1, 1885, all the main offices at the bottom of Conception Bay received mail daily, while Heart's Content and other offices on Trinity Bay got their mail three times a week. The branch's expansion to Placentia in October 1888 provided that village with efficient service three times a week.
The northern settlements were given the benefit of the more speedy service afforded by the railway. The winter arrangements were expedited and extended. In 1870, when this service was put on a settled footing, ten couriers were employed. In 1890, their number was increased to fifty-four. The mails for the northern districts were despatched from St. John's by railway to Broad Cove station, where they were taken over by the couriers. Their greater number enabled the couriers, not only to shorten their relays, but to establish a trunk line to the settlements of Hall's Bay and Little Bay on Notre Dame Bay, with branch lines running to the more important settlements to the east and west. The overlapping of the western and northern courier systems at White Bay gave the dwellers in those remote regions the opportunity of replying to their letters without loss of time.
The northern settlements benefited from faster services offered by the railway. Winter arrangements were streamlined and expanded. In 1870, when this service was established, ten couriers were employed. By 1890, that number had increased to fifty-four. Mails for the northern districts were sent from St. John's by train to Broad Cove station, where the couriers took over. With more couriers available, they could not only shorten their routes but also set up a main line to the settlements of Hall's Bay and Little Bay on Notre Dame Bay, with branch lines leading to other important settlements to the east and west. The overlap of the western and northern courier systems at White Bay allowed people in those remote areas to respond to their letters without delay.
Communication was established with the settlers on the Labrador coast in 1875. Previous to that time, mails were sent as the opportunity was afforded by sailing vessels visiting that coast. In that year, a regular fortnightly service was put in operation, the steamer by which the mails were carried connecting with the steamer on the northern route.
Communication was set up with the settlers on the Labrador coast in 1875. Before that, mail was sent whenever sailing ships stopped by the coast. In that year, a regular bi-weekly service was started, with the steamer carrying the mail connecting with the steamer on the northern route.
The "Ariel," which was first employed on this route having been lost in September of the same year, its place was taken by the "Walrus," whose work gave much satisfaction to the department. In 1881, an arrangement was made by which the steamer running on the northern route from St. John's extended its trip to Battle[Pg 343] Harbour, where it was met by the Labrador vessel, which served all the settlements as far north as Nain.
The "Ariel," which was first used on this route but was lost in September of the same year, was replaced by the "Walrus," whose performance pleased the department greatly. In 1881, an agreement was made for the steamer operating on the northern route from St. John's to extend its trip to Battle[Pg 343] Harbour, where it connected with the Labrador vessel that served all the settlements up to Nain.
A money order system was an early adjunct to the primary functions of the post office. In 1862 the postmaster general of Prince Edward Island proposed on exchange with Newfoundland, on the basis of the arrangement between that colony and Canada. The postmaster general, Delaney, was eager to accept the proposition, but there were delays, and it was not until 1864 that an exchange was adopted. This exchange was not with Prince Edward Island, however, but with Great Britain.
A money order system was an early addition to the main functions of the post office. In 1862, the postmaster general of Prince Edward Island suggested an exchange with Newfoundland based on the agreement between that colony and Canada. The postmaster general, Delaney, was eager to accept the proposal, but there were delays, and it wasn't until 1864 that an exchange was established. However, this exchange was not with Prince Edward Island but with Great Britain.
At the beginning of 1865 exchanges were established with Canada, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, and in 1867 with New Brunswick. In 1866 a domestic exchange was set on foot, the system embracing the twelve leading post offices besides St. John's.
At the start of 1865, connections were made with Canada, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, and in 1867, with New Brunswick. In 1866, a domestic exchange was initiated, involving the twelve major post offices in addition to St. John's.
Delaney endeavoured to come to an arrangement of the same character with the United States, but the department at Washington was unable to adopt the proposition at the time, and it was only in 1876 that arrangements were completed for an exchange through the intermediation of the Canadian service.
Delaney tried to reach a similar agreement with the United States, but the department in Washington couldn't accept the proposal at that time. It wasn't until 1876 that arrangements were finalized for an exchange via the Canadian service.
The comparative lack of banking facilities in the island gave the money order system an unusual utility. At the end of 1865, the amount of the money orders exchanged was $13,112. In the first ten years the business expended to $58,712; in twenty years, its volume had increased thirteen-fold, being $174,740.
The limited banking services on the island made the money order system particularly useful. By the end of 1865, the total amount of money orders exchanged was $13,112. In the first ten years, the business grew to $58,712; in twenty years, its volume had increased thirteen times, reaching $174,740.
Though a steam vessel could make the voyage from the shores of Cape Breton to the south-west coast of Newfoundland in a few hours, the course of communication between the island and Canada and the United States was lamentably infrequent. As late as 1895, mails were exchanged with these countries no more frequently than once a week.
Though a steamship could make the trip from the shores of Cape Breton to the southwest coast of Newfoundland in just a few hours, communication between the island and Canada and the United States was unfortunately infrequent. As late as 1895, mail was exchanged with these countries only once a week.
The completion, however, of the railway across the island in the autumn of 1896, changed the aspect of affairs. Trains travelled from St. John's to Port aux Basques, three times a week, touching in their course the bottoms of the great bays, which mark the coast lines on either side of the island. On each of the bays, steamers plied in close connection with the trains, thus giving all the settlements of the island the maximum of benefit to be obtained from a single line of railway. A steamer ran from the western end of the line at Port aux Basques to North Sydney in Cape Breton, and by a night's voyage, Newfoundland was brought into connection with the system of communications on the continent of North America.[Pg 344]
The completion of the railway across the island in the autumn of 1896 changed everything. Trains ran from St. John's to Port aux Basques three times a week, passing through the bottoms of the large bays that outline the coast on either side of the island. On each bay, steamers operated in close connection with the trains, maximizing the benefits for all the island's settlements from a single railway line. A steamer ran from the western end of the line at Port aux Basques to North Sydney in Cape Breton, and with an overnight voyage, Newfoundland was linked to the communication system on the North American continent.[Pg 344]
The exchange of mails between Canada and Newfoundland remained at a frequency of three times a week until 1914 when it was increased to a daily service each way; and the inland service has been so improved that there is no district in the island, however remote, has not at least a weekly communication with the capital, while nearly all the towns and villages of any importance exchange mails with St. John's every day.
The mail exchange between Canada and Newfoundland stayed at three times a week until 1914, when it was ramped up to a daily service in both directions. The inland service has improved so much that there isn't a single district on the island, no matter how remote, that doesn't have at least weekly communication with the capital. Almost all towns and important villages send and receive mail from St. John's every day.
In the sphere of telegraphy the progress has not been less marked. Unlike Canada and the United States, but as in the mother country and most other countries, the telegraphs are under the control of the government, and administered by the postmaster general. Until 1901, this was not the case. By a concession granted by the legislature in 1854, the Anglo-American Telegraph Company obtained the exclusive privilege of communicating abroad by telegraphy, and of erecting and operating lines within the colony.
In the field of telegraphy, the advancements have been equally significant. Unlike Canada and the United States, but similar to the UK and most other countries, telegraphs are controlled by the government and managed by the postmaster general. This wasn't true until 1901. A concession given by the legislature in 1854 allowed the Anglo-American Telegraph Company to have the exclusive right to communicate internationally via telegraph and to set up and operate lines within the colony.
The system established under this privilege was naturally confined to the more populous districts, and indeed, it covered little beyond the peninsula of Avalon. The outlying parts of the island, embracing all the settlements on bays north of Trinity, and west of Placentia Bays were, in general, without the means of communicating with the capital by telegraph.
The system set up under this privilege was primarily limited to the more populated areas, and it mainly included just the Avalon Peninsula. The remote parts of the island, which included all the communities on the bays north of Trinity and west of Placentia Bays, generally lacked the means to connect with the capital via telegraph.
The company turned a deaf ear to all appeals which did not promise an augmentation of their profits. They had no objection to the government running lines to the remoter regions, as such messages as would be sent to St. John's from those parts must pass over the company's lines when they came within the system marked out by the company for themselves in virtue of their monopoly. The government would, in that case, bear the loss entailed by the maintenance of these lines, and the company would absorb the additional revenue arising from the transmission of these extra-territorial messages over their lines.
The company ignored all requests that didn’t promise to boost their profits. They didn’t mind the government extending lines to remote areas since any messages sent to St. John's from those regions would have to go through the company's lines once they entered the area designated by the company due to their monopoly. In that scenario, the government would cover the costs of maintaining these lines, while the company would pocket the extra revenue from the transmission of these out-of-area messages over their lines.
With the development of the fishing, mining and lumbering industries in all parts of the island, the extension of the means of telegraphic communication beyond the peninsula of Avalon became a necessity, and the government had no option but to provide these means, wherever the importance of the districts seemed to demand it.
With the growth of the fishing, mining, and logging industries across the island, expanding telegraphic communication beyond the Avalon Peninsula became essential. The government had no choice but to provide these services wherever the importance of the areas warranted it.
Thus there grew up two systems, an inner and an outer one, the latter depending on the former for the means of access to the capital of the island. All messages to and from the outer system were subject to a double charge, for transmission over both systems.[Pg 345] While messages circulating within the peninsula of Avalon had the advantage of the moderate charge of twenty-five cents for ten words, messages from outside the peninsula were subject to double that rate.
Thus, two systems developed, an inner one and an outer one, with the outer system relying on the inner for access to the capital of the island. All messages to and from the outer system incurred a double charge, as they had to be transmitted over both systems.[Pg 345] Messages sent within the peninsula of Avalon had the benefit of a moderate fee of twenty-five cents for ten words, while messages coming from outside the peninsula were charged double that rate.
The government were helpless in the matter. They endeavoured vainly to come to terms with the company by which they might erect a line of their own from St. John's to Whitbourne, a village about sixty miles from St. John's, at which the lines of the outer system connected with those belonging to the company. The company, however, stood firmly on the letter of the bond, and it was not until the approach of the time when the monopoly, which was for a period of fifty years, would expire, that they became at all unbending.
The government was powerless in this situation. They tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with the company to build their own line from St. John's to Whitbourne, a village about sixty miles away, where the outer system's lines connected with the company's lines. However, the company held firmly to the terms of the contract, and it wasn't until the end of their fifty-year monopoly was approaching that they became somewhat flexible.
An event of far-reaching importance took place in November 1901 in the arrival of Marconi to experiment as to the possibility of opening communication across the Atlantic by his wireless system of telegraphy. Early in December, he caught at his station on Signal Hill near St. John's some signals sent out from the Lizards in Cornwall, thereby establishing a new agency for conducting communication between Europe and America. When he had assured himself of the success of his experiments, he set about obtaining a site for a permanent station on Cape Spear. But no sooner had the Anglo-American company become aware of his intentions than they notified him that his proposed measures would be an infringement of their monopoly.
An event of great significance happened in November 1901 when Marconi arrived to test the possibility of establishing communication across the Atlantic using his wireless telegraph system. Early in December, he picked up signals at his station on Signal Hill near St. John's that were sent from the Lizards in Cornwall, successfully creating a new way to communicate between Europe and America. After confirming the success of his experiments, he began looking for a location for a permanent station at Cape Spear. However, as soon as the Anglo-American company learned of his plans, they informed him that his proposed actions would violate their monopoly.
Thus blocked, Marconi resolved to return to England, but an opportune invitation from the Canadian government led him to turn his attention to the advantages that might be obtained on the eastern coast of Cape Breton. He was not long in selecting a site at Table Head, near Glace Bay, where he erected a station, and has demonstrated the feasibility of wireless communication across the Atlantic for commercial purposes.[Pg 346]
Thus blocked, Marconi decided to head back to England, but a timely invitation from the Canadian government made him consider the opportunities that could be found on the eastern coast of Cape Breton. He quickly chose a location at Table Head, near Glace Bay, where he built a station and proved that wireless communication across the Atlantic could work for commercial use.[Pg 346]
INDEX
Allan, William, postmaster of York, recommended to be deputy postmaster general of Upper Canada, 104
Amherstburg, post office opened at, 101
"Anglo-Saxon" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 312
Annapolis, post office opened in, 178
Antigonishe, distributing office for all settlements to eastward, 180
Antill, (John), postmaster of New York, 69
Augusta, post office opened at, 89
Bache, Richard, appointed secretary of the revolutionary post office, 64
Baie Verte, post office opened at, 182
Barbadoes, postal arrangements for, 4
Barons, Benjamin, deputy postmaster general for southern division, 35, note 2
Belleville, post office opened at, under name of Bay of Quinte, 117
Bermuda, Canadian mails from Great Britain, sent to, 124
Berthier, post office opened at, 79
"Bohemian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 313
Boston, post office opened in, 2;
communication with New York, 6;
postage between Philadelphia and, 10;
postage from Virginia, 10;
Cunard steamers land Canadian mails at, 225
Brantford, post office opened at, 117
"Britannia," Cunard steamer, makes first trip to Halifax, 219
British Columbia, beginnings of postal service to, 322;
inland service, 324, 326;
rates of postage, 325;
incorporation into dominion postal service, 326;
completion of Canadian Pacific railway, 326;
expansion of service between Confederation and, 1914, 327
British North America, royal commission recommends postal systems in, be put under one superior, 235
Buchanan, James, British consul at New York, advocates communication between colonies and Great Britain by way of New York, 186
Canada, Post Office in—
Pre-revolutionary Period.
Post office established by Franklin, 1;
connected by mail service with New York, 1;
arrangements under French régime, 39;
postage rates as fixed by act of 1765, 43
Revolutionary Period.
Connection with New York discontinued, 65;
Americans make proposals for its continuance, 65;
service between Montreal and Quebec resumed after expulsion of Americans, 72;
Haldimand's objections to resumption of regular service, 72
Post-revolutionary Period.
United States forbid Canadian couriers to carry mails over its territory, 80;
Canadian post office obliged to send mails for England by Halifax route, 81;
its disadvantages, 81;
sketch of postal system in 1827, 155;
financial statements to be submitted to legislatures, 206;
fixed salaries to be paid, with exclusion of all perquisites, 206;
difficulties in way of satisfactory arrangements for administration, 207;
first financial statement laid before legislature, 210;
legislature of Upper Canada demands surplus revenues, 211;
Lord Durham's recommendations regarding post office, 212;
defects of postal administration disclosed by royal commission, 234;
legislature concurs in resolutions of interprovincial postal conference, 271;
provincial governments assume control of post office, 273;
great expansion of, 275;
reduction in postage rates, 275;
revenue from 1851 to 1867, 275
Post-Office of Dominion of Canada.
Number of post offices in 1867 and 1914, 327;
railway mail service expansion, 327;
reductions in postage, 328;
Canada becomes a member of the Universal Postal Union, 329;
imperial penny postage introduced, 330;
imperial scheme of newspaper postage proposed by postmaster general of Canada, 330;
expansion of money order and savings bank system, 331
[Pg 348]
"Canadian" (the first) steamship of Allan line wrecked in St. Lawrence, 308
"Canadian" (the second) steamship of Allan line, wrecked, 311
Cape Breton, establishment of postal service in, 183
Cayley, William, inspector general of Canada, representative at postal conference in Montreal, 268
Cedars, post office opened at, 89
Chambly, arrangements for delivery of mails at, 79
Charlestown, delays in postal service of, 35;
included in packet system, 35
Charlottenburg, post office opened at, 89
Chester, Pa., postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7
"City of Manchester" steamship of Inman line lost off Nova Scotia coast, 309
Colonial Postal Systems, in their relations to Great Britain, policy regarding extensions of service, 97, 100, 103;
remonstrance of Upper Canada against excessive and illegal postage, 133;
reply to these remonstrances, 134;
legality of control of colonial systems by Great Britain, 135, 136;
Great Britain refuses information as to revenues, 141;
considerable profit on colonial service, 142;
reception given to address from Upper Canada, 148;
attack on administration of Canadian post office, 160;
contentions against imperial absorption of surplus revenue from, sustained by law officers, 165;
acceptance of decision by postmaster general, 166;
course of procedure to establish proper relations, 169;
act of imperial parliament, 4, William IV. c. 7, 170;
draft act for adoption of legislatures, 170;
accountant appointed, 171;
how the British proposals were viewed in Maritime provinces, 188,
in Upper Canada, 193, 202,
in Lower Canada, 199;
Stayner on British proposals, 200;
Stayner's views accepted by legislative council of Lower Canada, 202;
British government willing to amend proposals, 203;
royal commission appointed to investigate conditions in colonial service, 233;
commission recommends that postal system in British North America be put under one resident deputy postmaster general, 235;
proposition of postmaster general to withdraw from control of, 263;
conditions of withdrawal, 266;
Lord Elgin instructed by colonial secretary on subject, 267;
his message to Canadian legislature, 267;
legislative committee in Nova Scotia consider the subject, 267;
conference of provincial representatives in Montreal, 268;
their report, as laid before governor general, 269;
British treasury approves generally conclusions of report, 270;
Nova Scotia legislature adopts terms of report in act, 270;
Canada and New Brunswick concur, 271;
act sanctioning arrangement passed by imperial parliament, 271;
Prince Edward Island enters arrangement, 272
"Columbia" steamship of Cunard line lost off Nova Scotia coast, 309
Committees of Correspondence take measures to establish colonial post office, 60
Connecticut, terms of first post office bill in, 9
Cornwall, post office opened at, 89
Coteau du Lac, post office opened at, 89
Crane, William, urges direct steamship service between Great Britain and Halifax, 217
Crown Point, post office opened at, 65
Cunard, Samuel, awarded contract for transatlantic steam service, 218
Dashwood, secretary of colonial post office prisoner of war, 66;
liberated by exchange, 69;
appointed postmaster general of Jamaica, 79
Delancy, Peter, deputy postmaster general for southern division, 35 note 2
Delaware, Falls of, postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7
Deputy postmaster general, relations to governor, 96;
limitations on his freedom of administration, 97;
agent for collection of United States postage, 126;
newspaper postage, perquisite of, 160;
nomination of postmasters withdrawn from, 239
Detroit, postal communication opened with, 89
Digby, post office opened in, 178
Dongan, Thomas, governor of New York, endeavoured to establish postal service in colonies, 7
Dorchester, New Brunswick, post office opened at, 182
[Pg 349]
Durand, details of his journey between Quebec and Halifax with mails, 81
Durham, Lord, recommendations respecting Canadian post office, 212
Eastern Townships, mail communication opened between Three Rivers and, 117
Elizabethtown, post office opened at, 89
Fairbank, Richard, first postmaster in Boston, 2
Falmouth, Maine, defiance of post office monopoly at, 50
Finlay, Hugh, appointed postmaster of Quebec, 42;
interferes on behalf of maîtres de poste, 46;
appointed post-office surveyor, 46;
explores country between Quebec and New England, 47;
inspects postal service from Maine to Georgia, 50;
appointed joint deputy postmaster general of northern division of North America, 58;
reputed author of account of siege of Quebec, 69;
his activities outside post office, 74;
appointed superintendent of maîtres de poste, 76;
loses position of deputy postmaster general of northern division of North America, and becomes deputy postmaster general of Canada, 79;
report on route between Quebec and Halifax, 85;
appointed deputy postmaster general of British North America, 86;
removal from this position, 94;
death, 74
Fort Edward, post office opened at, 65
Fothergill, Charles, postmaster of Port Hope, 144;
attacks post office management, 144
Foxcroft, John, joint deputy postmaster general, 2, 27;
prisoner of war, 66;
liberated by exchange, 69;
appointed British packet boat agent at New York, 79
Franking Act, passed by legislature of Upper Canada, 209;
on Stayner's objections it was disallowed, 210
Franklin, Benjamin, postmaster of Philadelphia, 1;
deputy postmaster general, 1, 2, 26;
established post office in Canada, 1;
increases postal facilities, 26;
nature of his influence in administration of post office, 27;
his views on post office revenues as taxes, 55;
his dismissal as joint deputy postmaster general, 58;
his continued good relations with officials of general post office, 59;
appointed postmaster general of revolutionary post office, 64;
his views on nature of postage quoted in support of imperial control, 145
Fredericton, post office opened in, 178
Gagetown, post office opened at, 182
Gaspé, slender postal accommodation in, 162
Goddard, William, labours for establishment of revolutionary post office, 60;
his career, 60;
draws up scheme, 63;
unsuccessful candidate for postmaster generalship, 64;
appointed surveyor, 64
Grand Trunk Railway, construction of, 278
Great Western Railway, construction of, 278
Grenville, post office opened at, 116
Guelph, post office opened at, 153
Halifax, post office established at, 33, 173;
postage rates to, by sea, in 1765, 44;
petition that Halifax be terminal port of transatlantic steamers, 217;
British government agrees, 218;
contract awarded to Samuel Cunard, 218;
scheme for concentrating all mails from Great Britain for North America at, 219;
its failure, 220;
Nova Scotia asks that the post office at, should be maintained by imperial post office, 245;
removal of post office to Dalhousie college building, 252
Hamilton, post office opened at, 117
Hamilton, Andrew, deputy of patentee for American post office, 9;
his plans for establishment of postal service, 9;
his death, 17
Hamilton, John, succeeds his father, Andrew Hamilton, as deputy postmaster general, 17
Hawkesbury, post office opened at, 116
Hazen, R. L. of executive council of New Brunswick, representative at postal conference in Montreal, 268
Head, Sir Francis Bond, orders dismissal of postmaster of Lloydtown, 213;
demands authority to dismiss postmasters whom he deemed guilty of disloyalty, 214;
orders removal of postmaster of Toronto, 214
Heriot, George, succeeds Finlay as deputy postmaster general, 96;
personal characteristics, 96;
unsuccessful aspirant to seat in legislative council, and to superintendency of maîtres de poste, 97;
in disfavour with governor, 98;
altercation with Sir Gordon Drummond, 109;
retirement, 113
Heyman, Peter, appointed postmaster of Virginia, 13
Horton, post office opened in, 178
[Pg 350]
Howard, James, dismissed from postmastership of Toronto, on charge of disloyalty, 214
Howe, John, the elder, deputy postmaster general of Maritime provinces, 180;
his capable management, 180;
his retirement, 181
Howe, John, the younger, succeeds his father, 181;
controlled majority of newspapers in Halifax, 187;
criticism of, 251;
his death, 251
Howe, Joseph, urges direct steamship service between Great Britain and Halifax, 217
Hudson's Bay Company, conveys the mails to and from Manitoba and North-West territories, 317;
limitations on correspondence, 318
Hull, post office opened at, 116
"Humboldt" steamship of the American line lost off Nova Scotia coast, 309
Hume, Joseph, M.P., obtains information respecting Canadian postal service, 161
"Hungarian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 309
Hunter, Peter, Lieutenant Governor, had road constructed from Bay of Quinte to York, 100;
endeavours to secure mail service to Upper Canada, 100
Hunter, William, joint deputy postmaster general, 26
Huntingdon, Herbert, confers with general post office respecting Nova Scotia post office, 191
Illegal conveyance of letters in Canada, 150;
in Nova Scotia, 249;
in New Brunswick, 256
"Indian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 309
Johnston, J. W., Solicitor General of Nova Scotia, representative at postal conference in Montreal, 268
Kennebec route, Finlay explores, 47
Kingston, Upper Canada, post office opened at, 89
Kingston, New Brunswick, post office opened at, 182
Knox, William, scheme of communications between England and North America, 87
Labrador, mail service opened between Newfoundland and, 342
Lachine, post office opened at, 89
Lancaster, post office opened at, 89
Lanoullier, Nicholas, obtained privilege to establish post office in Canada, 40;
his plans, 41;
failure, 41
Lanoullier de Boisclair, his difficulties in maintaining roads, owing to popular indifference, 78;
his death, 78
Letters, mode of calculating postage on, 20
Lloydtown, postmaster of, dismissed for part in affairs of 1837, 213
London, post office opened at, 117
Lovelace, Francis, Governor of New York, arranged for postal service between New York and Boston, 6
Lower Canada, condition of route between Montreal and Quebec, in 1783, 78;
mode of communication with Great Britain, 105;
frequency of service between Quebec and Montreal, 105, 109;
report of assembly on surplus postal revenues, 1827, 149;
Stayner declines to give information to committee of assembly, 161;
lack of postal accommodation in, 161, 196;
address of assembly to King respecting post office, 163;
report of legislative committee on postal affairs, 1836, 199;
Stayner admonished to cease sending surplus revenue to England, 199;
agitation caused in general post office over post office bill of Lower Canada, 205
Macaulay, John, former postmaster of Kingston, chairman of committee of legislative council on postal affairs, 207
Mackenzie, William Lyon, presented petition for investigation of post office, 143;
interviewed Colonial Secretary respecting postal affairs, 167;
his views on administration of post office, 167;
evidence of, before Lower Canada committee on newspaper postage, 196;
challenges action on underpayment, 197
Maîtres de Poste, lack of regulations for, 45;
Finlay's interference on behalf of, 46;
unsuccessful efforts to assimilate their position to that of masters of post houses in England, 75;
indispensable for the carrying of mails, 75;
character of their service, 97;
amenities on post road, 99
Manitoba, and North-West provinces, early postal arrangements in, 316-321;
proposition for direct overland service with Canada, 320;
Manitoba incorporated into Canadian postal system, 322;
United States postal service utilized for communication with other provinces, 322;
direct railway communication with Eastern Canada, 322;
expansion of service between Confederation and, 1914, 327
[Pg 351]
Marconi, Guglielmo, proved success of transatlantic wireless system of telegraphy in Newfoundland, 345
Maritime provinces, early means of communication between places in, 175;
with Great Britain, 176
Maryland, postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7;
proceedings of legislature respecting establishment of post office, 12
Massachusetts, terms of first post office act in, 9, 10;
postal rates to, 10;
post office act of, disallowed, 10;
rejects draft of new bill, 12
Matthews, Captain John, chairman of post office committee of assembly of Upper Canada, 143
Michillimackinac, postal communication opened with, 89
Miramichi, arrangements for delivery of mails at, 181;
post office opened at, 182
Money Order System, establishment of, in Canada, 276;
in Nova Scotia, 280;
in Newfoundland, 343;
expansion of operations between 1868 and 1914, 330
Montreal, post office opened at, 1, 42;
description of route between New York and, 37;
post road between Quebec and, 38;
mail service opened between New York and, 42;
mail service opened between Quebec and, 43;
frequency of service between New York and Montreal at outbreak of revolutionary war, 65;
embraced in revolutionary postal system, 66;
postmaster resents having soldiers billeted on him, 71;
governor orders his dismissal, 72;
Daniel Sutherland postmaster of, 114;
conditions in post office at, 128;
mean situation of post office, 194
Montreal Gazette, proprietor of, begins attack on Stayner respecting newspaper postage, 159
Neale, Thomas, given patent for American post office, 8;
assigns his patent, 17
New Brunswick, postal system of, transferred to control of deputy postmaster general of Nova Scotia, 155;
establishment of inland service in, 178;
postal charges in, 178;
changes in routes as result of war of 1812, 179;
no additions to service until 1820, 181;
communication with Great Britain by way of United States, 185;
objections of Nova Scotia to arrangement, 186;
condition of, in 1841, 255;
report of legislature, 256;
erected into separate department, 257;
demands for reduced postage, 258;
legislature concurs in resolutions of interprovincial postal conference, 271;
provincial government assumes control of, 273;
expansion of postal service, 281;
rates of postage, 281;
revenue and expenditure, 282;
attitude of government towards deficits, 282
New Castle, Pa., postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7
New England, confederation of, postmaster appointed for, 7;
direct route from Quebec to, surveyed, 47;
Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire assists in establishment of another route to Canada, 49;
Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts not encouraging as to route, 49
Newfoundland, post office in, early mode of communication with England, 333;
postage rates to, 333;
connection with England by Cunard steamers at Halifax, 334;
inland postal system established, 336;
efforts to secure direct service to England, 338;
improvements and extensions of inland service, 339-342;
railway available between St. John's and Harbour Grace, 342;
communication with Labrador, 342;
money order system established, 343;
government telegraphs, 344
New Hampshire, terms of first post office act in, 9, 11;
postage rates to, 10;
act allowed by privy council, 11
New Haven, modes of evading post office monopoly at, 51
New Johnston, post office opened at, 89
Newspapers, transmission of, not provided for in imperial postal act, 61;
arrangements for distribution of, by post, 61;
defects in scheme, 62;
agitation for change in method of collecting postage, 158;
rates charged, 158;
postage is perquisite of deputy postmaster general, 160;
attack on this system, 160;
Stayner advises change of system, 165;
question of postage in Maritime provinces, 186;
W. L. Mackenzie's evidence on evasions, 196;
Stayner's defence of his practice in taking perquisites, 198;
abolition of postage, as perquisite, and establishment of fixed rate, 241;
postage after provinces take control of post office, 276;
imperial scheme of postage proposed, 330;
rates between 1875 and 1914, 332
[Pg 352]
New York, city of, earliest postal arrangements for, 4;
communication with Boston, 6;
postage rates from Philadelphia, Boston and Virginia, 10;
headquarters of colonial postal system, 19, 60;
John Antill postmaster of, 69
New York, colony of, terms of first post office act in, 9;
postage rates to, 10;
act allowed by privy council, 11
Niagara, postal communication opened with, 89
North American Colonies (now United States), extent of postal system, 1;
first post office, 2;
mode of communicating with England, 2, 5;
early attempts at postal service between, 6, 7;
patent for postal service granted to Thomas Neale, 8;
line of posts established in 1693, 15;
revenue of postal system, 1693-1697, 15;
proposed arrangement for exchange of mails with England, 15;
effect of imperial act of 1711 on status of colonial post office, 18;
deficient revenues from postal system, 25;
evasion of postmaster general's monopoly, 25, 50;
increase in facilities under Franklin, 26, 29;
prosperous condition of postal system, 26;
sailing packets established between England and, 29, 34;
arrangements for service to southern colonies, 35;
establishment of southern division of the postal system, 35;
summary of packet service in 1764, 36;
summary of whole postal system, 44;
surplus revenue in 1764, 44;
unpopularity of the post office, 45;
inspection report of system from Maine to Georgia, 50;
New York, administrative centre, 60;
proposition to suppress colonial post office, 64;
post office ceases its function, 65;
Foxcroft and Dashwood, prisoners of war, 66
"North Briton" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 311
Northern Railway, construction of, 278
"Norwegian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 312
Nova Scotia, establishment of inland postal service, 178;
postal charges in, 178;
changes in route as result of war of 1812, 179;
difficulties of deputy postmaster general in complying with demands for increased service, 179;
his success, 179;
state of postal service in 1817, 180;
legislature assisted in maintaining mail service, 180, 244;
legislature determines to take control of postal service, 190;
bill to that end disallowed, 190;
satisfactory arrangement arrived at, 191;
mail service between Pictou and Halifax improved at greatly augmented cost, 223;
friction with Canada over maintenance of this service, 223;
defects in postal service disclosed by royal commission, 234;
characteristics of post office as compared with the Canadian post office, 243;
demand of legislature that Halifax should be maintained by imperial post office, 245;
deficit in revenue of, 246;
investigated by British post office official, 248;
findings of investigation, 248;
salary of deputy postmaster general, 250;
interference of local government with, 250;
Arthur Woodgate succeeds Howe as deputy postmaster general on death of latter, 252;
agitation for reduced postage, 252;
legislative committee discuss question of provincial control, 267;
legislature adopts conclusions of interprovincial conference, 270;
provincial government assumes control of, 273;
expansion of service, 280;
mode of communication with Canada, 280;
postage rates, 280;
registration, and money order system introduced, 280;
revenue and expenditure, 281;
railway mail service in, at Confederation, 281
O'Callaghan, Dr. E. B., chairman of legislative committee on postal affairs, 198
Ormonde, Marquess of, makes proposals for ocean steamship service, 127
Osnabruck, post office opened at, 89
Ottawa, first known as Richmond landing, 115
Ottawa River, steamer on river between Long Sault and Hull, 116
Pennsylvania, beginnings of postal service in, 7;
terms of first post office act in, 9;
postage rates to, 10;
act allowed by privy council, 11
Pensacola, included in packet system, 35
Perth, opening of post office at, 114
Philadelphia, postal arrangements between, and outlying places, 7;
postage rates from Boston, New York and Virginia, 10
[Pg 353]
Postage Rates, in former colonies (now United States), 7, 8, 10, 13, 16, 20, 22;
mode of calculating postal charges, 20, 178;
in Canada under act of 1765, 43, 133;
under revolutionary postal system, 66;
general practice to collect on delivery, 71, 238;
mode of collection between Canada and United States, 91, 125;
Governor Simcoe's view as to disposal of surplus postage, 93;
between Canada and Great Britain, under post office regulations, and by private ship, 122, 123;
postage rates in New Brunswick, 178;
great reduction in rate between Canada and Great Britain, 227-229;
royal commission report on inland rates, 236;
weight system introduced, 240;
agitation for reduction, 242, 252, 258;
recommendations of Nova Scotia legislature, 268;
recommendations of interprovincial conference, 270;
reductions in Canada, 275,
in Nova Scotia, 280,
in New Brunswick, 281;
rates in British Columbia, 325;
imperial penny postage, 330;
imperial newspaper rates, 330;
inland rates two cents per ounce, 331;
between St. John's, Newfoundland, and England, 333;
inland postage in Newfoundland, 334;
rates under colonial postal system, 337
Postage Stamps, introduced in Canada, 275
Postal Revenues, from 1693 to 1697, 15;
surplus in 1764, 44;
surplus from Canada in 1822, 142;
average surplus from Canada for seven years ending 1825, 148;
average surplus from Canada for 1825 and 1826, 161;
imperial act of 1834 to transfer revenues to provinces, 170;
reception of act in Maritime provinces, 188,
in Upper Canada, 193;
surplus for period ending 1834, 199;
governor general declines to stop remitting to England, 205;
legislature of Upper Canada petitions for surplus, 211;
surplus from Canada, 242;
expansion of revenue, 1868-1914, 331
Postmasters, exempt from billeting, 71;
postmaster at Montreal represented that he had been excepted from regulation, 71;
nomination of, removed from deputy postmaster general to governor general, 239;
Stayner's fruitless objections thereto, 240
Post Office Commission, personnel, and duties, 233;
report of, 234
Post Office Convention, between Canada and United States, 90;
between Great Britain and United States, 283
Post Office Surveyorship, established, 47;
Finlay appointed to, 47;
two appointed, 171
Post Road, between Montreal and Quebec, account of, 38;
constructed by Lanoullier de Boisclair, 41
Post Roads, arrangements with maîtres de poste for conveyance of post office couriers, 43
Prince Edward Island, early arrangements for postal service, 185;
condition of postal service, 1827-1841, 260;
post office managed by provincial government, 261;
legislature concurs in resolutions of interprovincial postal conference, 272
Quebec and Halifax mail service, details of route, 76;
trip by Durand in 1784, 81;
measures to open communication by land, 83;
improving New Brunswick section of route, 84;
proposition to follow Bay of Chaleurs route, 107;
conditions of service in 1840, 220
Quebec, post office opened at, 1;
post road between Montreal and, 38;
mail service opened between Montreal and, 43;
route from, to New England surveyed, 47;
account of earlier explorations of this route, 47;
expense of journey met by subscription in Quebec, 48;
post office building in, destroyed by fire, 239
Railways, beginnings and development in Canada, 277;
economy of time effected by use of, 278;
postal cars employed on, 278;
augmentation of expenses through using, 279;
rates of payment for mail service on, fixed by royal commission, 279;
railways in Nova Scotia at Confederation, 281;
uninterrupted line between Atlantic seaboard and Chicago and New Orleans, 302
Randolph, Edward, postmaster of confederation of New England, 8
Rebellion of 1837, effects of, on post office, 213
Registration, introduced in Canada, 277
Revolutionary Post Office, suggested, 60;
scheme for, 63;
Franklin made postmaster general, Bache, secretary, and Goddard, surveyor, 64;
extended to Montreal, 66;
postage rates to Canada, 66;
arrangements for mail service, 66
Revolutionary War, mails taken possession of, by Commanders-in-Chief, who direct their distribution, 69
[Pg 354]
Richelieu River, efforts to obtain mail service to settlements on, 79
Richibucto, post office opened at, 182
Richmond, Upper Canada, post office opened at, 115
Roads, between Montreal and Quebec, 38, 41;
between Bay of Quinte and York, 100;
between York and Kingston, and York and Ancaster, 103 (see Quebec and Halifax).
Robbery of mail, between Montreal and Toronto, 171;
curious disclosure by robber, 171;
by sympathizers with disaffected, 215
Robinson, John Beverly, defends imperial control of Canadian postal service, 144, 147
Rolph, Dr. John, correspondence with deputy postmaster general about opening post office at Delaware, 133;
advocates provincial control of postal system, 145
Roupell, George, deputy postmaster general for southern division, 35, note 2
St. Andrews, Lower Canada, post office opened at, 116
St. Augustine, Fort, included in packet system, 35
St. Eustache, post office opened at, 116
St. John, N.B., post office opened in, 178
St. John's, Newfoundland, post office opened at, 333;
embraced in imperial system, 334;
objections of merchants to regular post office, 335;
revenue from 1841 to 1849, 336
St. John's, Quebec, arrangements for delivery of mails to, 79
St. Stephen, post office opened at, 182
St. Thomas, Upper Canada, post office opened at, 117
Sault Ste Marie, post office opened at, 264
Savings Bank, post office, opening of, and expansion of operations, 331
Sherbrooke, post office opened at, 118
Sorel, arrangements for delivery of mails at, 79
Stanstead, post office opened at, 117
Stayner, Thomas Allen, succeeds Sutherland as deputy postmaster general, 153;
gains confidence of superiors and a freer hand in administration, 154;
declines to give information to committee of Lower Canada assembly, 161;
sustained by governor general and postmaster general in his refusal to give information, 162;
convinced that arrangement by which newspaper postage became his perquisite should cease, 165;
compelled to disclose information regarding post office, 194;
disregards admonition of Lower Canada legislative committee to cease sending surplus revenue to England, 199;
his income from newspapers and other sources, 200;
powers curtailed by governor general, 230;
his character 230;
nomination of postmasters withdrawn from him, 239;
perquisites abolished, and fixed salary substituted, 241;
relinquishes control of post office in Canada, 273;
his administration characterized, 273
Steamboats, illegal conveyance of letters by, 150;
no action taken upon, 152
Sussexvale, post office opened at, 182
Sutherland, Daniel, succeeds Heriot as deputy postmaster general, 114;
retires, 130, 153
Sydney, Cape Breton, post office in, 184
Telegraphs in Newfoundland, sketch of system, 344
Three Rivers, post office opened at, 1, 42
Toronto, postmaster of, dismissed by Bond Head for lack of loyalty, 214 (see York).
Transatlantic Mail Service—
Old Colonial Period.
Earliest arrangements for exchange of correspondence with England, 2;
regular packet service established, 29, 34;
service between England and West Indies, 30;
re-arrangement, 35;
summary of system in 1764, 36
Revolutionary Period.
Packets withdrawn from regular routes, 67;
attacked by privateers, 67;
"Lord Hyde" attacked, 67;
"Sandwich," 68;
"Harriott," 68;
"Swallow" captured, 72;
"Weymouth" captured, 72;
"Le Despencer" captured, 73;
"Duke of York" captured, 73;
"Harriott" and "Eagle" captured, 73;
number of packets captured or damaged, 73
Post-revolutionary Period.
Packet service resumed between England and New York, 80;
merchants in Canada demand re-opening of service to England by way of New York, 80;
established between England and Halifax, 85, 86, 173;
winter arrangements for British mails to Halifax, 87;
elaborate scheme proposed by William Knox for communications between England and North America, 87;
conditions of service between 1806 and 1819, 118;[Pg 355]
proposition of Marquess of Ormonde for ocean steam service, 127;
communication between colonies and Great Britain almost entirely through United States, 156;
comments of W. L. Mackenzie upon, 168
Steamship Service.
Steamers "Great Western" and "Sirius" carry mails from British ports to New York, 216;
petition that Halifax be terminal port for steamers, in North America, 217;
British government agrees, and contract is awarded to Samuel Cunard, 218;
comprehensive scheme for concentrating all mails from Great Britain for North America at Halifax, 219;
its failure, 220;
advantages of Boston as terminal port for Canadian mails, 224;
Boston substituted for Halifax, 225;
arrangements with United States post office for transit across its territory, 225;
Cunard steamers make New York principal port of call, 284
Canadian Ocean Mail Service.
Canada invited to join imperial scheme for colonial service, 284;
objections of Canada, 285;
beginnings of, 286;
contract made with Hugh Allan, 286;
comparison in speed of Canadian, Cunard and Collins lines, 287;
unfriendly attitude of British government towards Canadian line, 287;
views of Canadian government on this attitude, 289;
negotiations for employment of Canadian steamers for conveyance of British and United States mails, 290;
favourable treatment accorded to Cunard line, 292;
report of select committee of house of commons, on steamship service, 293;
partiality to Galway line at expense of Canadian and Inman lines, 295;
condemnation of government of Great Britain by select committee of house of commons, 297;
disingenuous conduct of British government towards postmaster general of Canada, 297;
weekly service of steamers between Quebec and Liverpool, 302;
postmaster general of Canada negotiates with governments of Great Britain and France for use of improved facilities, 302;
and with governments of France, Belgium and Prussia, 304;
difficulties owing to hostility of general post office, 304;
great proportion of mails between Canada and Great Britain carried by Canadian line, 307;
series of disasters to steamships of Canadian line, 308-313;
parliamentary investigation, 310;
new contract with Allans, 314
United States Post Office, postal convention with, 90;
goodwill of, towards communication between Canada and Great Britain, 120;
cordial relations with, 283;
convention of 1848 with, 283;
its services utilized for conveyance of mails to Maritime provinces, 280,
to Manitoba, 322,
to British Columbia, 323;
dependence on, for interprovincial correspondence, 327
Universal Postal Union, Canada becomes member of, 329;
beneficent results of, 329
Upper Canada, opening of post offices in, 89;
Simcoe's plan for separate post office department in, 92;
regular mail service established in, 99;
arrangement between Amherstburg and Niagara, 101;
increased service to, 102, 104;
deputy postmaster general recommended for, 104;
difficulties of correspondence in, 105;
postal conditions in, in 1824, 132;
legislature begins agitation for improvements, 133;
exorbitant charges on letters circulating in, 133, 134;
protest of legislature, 134;
raises question of legality of imperial control of Canadian postal system, 135;
report of assembly on subject, 136;
report of committee of assembly in 1825, 143;
recommendation that postal system should be controlled by province, 144;
lieutenant governor opposes pretentions of legislature, 145;
report of assembly in 1829, 156;
proposition for high administrative officer in, 156, 157;
continues agitation against postal administration, 163;
legislature rejects imperial act respecting disposition of surplus revenues, 193;
lack of postal facilities in, 195;
legislative assembly of, draw up scheme for provincial post office, 203;
report of legislative council on post office, 207;
address to King on post office, 208;
legislature passes franking act, 209;
legislature demands surplus revenue, 211;
time occupied in conveying British mails to, by Halifax and by New York, 221
[Pg 356]
Victoria, British Columbia, extreme isolation of, 323
Viger, Denis Benjamin, interviewed Colonial Secretary respecting postal affairs, 167
Virginia, proposition to establish post office in, 4;
rates of postage to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, 10;
proceedings of legislature respecting establishment of post office, 12;
early arrangements, 13;
efforts to attach to colonial system, 22;
frustration of scheme to impose act of 1710 in, 23;
included in colonial system, 24
Way Offices, a peculiarity of Maritime provinces, 248;
explained, 249
West Indies, packet boats established between Great Britain and, 31;
large postal revenues of, 31;
packet service restored, 34
Windsor, Nova Scotia, post office opened in, 178
Wolfville, post office opened under name of Horton, 178
Woodgate, Arthur, succeeds Howe as deputy postmaster general of Nova Scotia, 252
York, first post office at, 94
York, Duke of, claim of, on American postal revenues, 7
Young, William, confers with general post office respecting Nova Scotia post office, 191
Allan, William, postmaster of York, recommended to be deputy postmaster general of Upper Canada, 104
Amherstburg, post office opened at, 101
"Anglo-Saxon" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 312
Annapolis, post office opened in, 178
Antigonishe, distributing office for all settlements to eastward, 180
Antill, (John), postmaster of New York, 69
Augusta, post office opened at, 89
Bache, Richard, appointed secretary of the revolutionary post office, 64
Baie Verte, post office opened at, 182
Barbadoes, postal arrangements for, 4
Barons, Benjamin, deputy postmaster general for southern division, 35, note 2
Belleville, post office opened at, under name of Bay of Quinte, 117
Bermuda, Canadian mails from Great Britain, sent to, 124
Berthier, post office opened at, 79
"Bohemian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 313
Boston, post office opened in, 2;
communication with New York, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postage between Philadelphia and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
shipping from Virginia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Cunard steamers deliver Canadian mail at __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Brantford, post office opened at, 117
"Britannia," Cunard steamer, makes first trip to Halifax, 219
British Columbia, beginnings of postal service to, 322;
inland service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
postage rates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
joining the dominion postal service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
expansion of service between Confederation and 1914, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
British North America, royal commission recommends postal systems in, be put under one superior, 235
Buchanan, James, British consul at New York, advocates communication between colonies and Great Britain by way of New York, 186
Canada, Post Office in—
Pre-revolution Era.
Post office set up by Franklin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
connected by mail service to New York, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
arrangements under French rule, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postage rates set by the 1765 act, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Revolutionary Era.
New York connection ended, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Americans are suggesting ways to keep it going, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Service between Montreal and Quebec resumed after the Americans were expelled, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Haldimand's concerns about the resumption of regular service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Post-revolution Era.
The United States prohibits Canadian couriers from delivering mail across its territory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The Canadian post office is required to send mail to England via the Halifax route, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
its drawbacks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
sketch of the postal system in 1827, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
financial statements to be submitted to legislatures, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
fixed salaries to be paid, excluding all perks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
challenges in establishing satisfactory arrangements for administration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The first financial statement was presented to the legislature, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislature of Upper Canada is requesting surplus revenues, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Lord Durham's suggestions about the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
issues with postal management revealed by the royal commission, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislature agrees with the resolutions from the interprovincial postal conference, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Provincial governments take over the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
great expansion of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
lower postage rates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
revenue from 1851 to 1867, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Canada Post.
The number of post offices in 1867 and 1914, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
railway mail service growth, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
lower postage costs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Canada joins the Universal Postal Union, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
penny postal system launched, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The imperial newspaper postage plan suggested by the Postmaster General of Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
expansion of the money order and savings bank system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
[Pg 348]
"Canadian" (the first) steamship of Allan line wrecked in St. Lawrence, 308
"Canadian" (the second) steamship of Allan line, wrecked, 311
Cape Breton, establishment of postal service in, 183
Cayley, William, inspector general of Canada, representative at postal conference in Montreal, 268
Cedars, post office opened at, 89
Chambly, arrangements for delivery of mails at, 79
Charlestown, delays in postal service of, 35;
included in packet system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Charlottenburg, post office opened at, 89
Chester, Pa., postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7
"City of Manchester" steamship of Inman line lost off Nova Scotia coast, 309
Colonial Postal Systems, in their relations to Great Britain, policy regarding extensions of service, 97, 100, 103;
Protest from Upper Canada against high and unlawful postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
reply to these complaints, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
the legality of Great Britain's control over colonial systems, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
Great Britain is withholding information about revenues, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
significant profit on colonial service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
reception given to the address from Upper Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
attack on the management of the Canadian post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
arguments against the imperial takeover of excess revenue from, supported by legal officers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
acceptance of decision by the Postmaster General, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
procedure to establish proper relations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Act of the Imperial Parliament, 4, William IV, c. 7, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
draft act for the adoption of legislatures, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
accountant hired, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
how the British proposals were perceived in the Maritime provinces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,
in Ontario, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__,
in Quebec, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Stayner on UK proposals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Stayner's views were accepted by the legislative council of Lower Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The British government is open to changing the proposals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
A royal commission was set up to look into the conditions in the colonial service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The commission suggests that the postal system in British North America should be managed by a single resident deputy postmaster general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Proposal from the Postmaster General to withdraw control of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
withdrawal terms, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Lord Elgin was directed by the colonial secretary regarding the matter, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his message to Canadian legislature, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislative committee in Nova Scotia is looking into the topic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
conference of regional representatives in Montreal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
their report, as presented to the governor general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The British treasury has approved the overall findings of the report, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The Nova Scotia legislature agrees to the terms of the report in the act, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Canada and New Brunswick agree, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Act sanctioning the arrangement passed by the imperial parliament, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Prince Edward Island strikes deal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Columbia" steamship of Cunard line lost off Nova Scotia coast, 309
Committees of Correspondence take measures to establish colonial post office, 60
Connecticut, terms of first post office bill in, 9
Cornwall, post office opened at, 89
Coteau du Lac, post office opened at, 89
Crane, William, urges direct steamship service between Great Britain and Halifax, 217
Crown Point, post office opened at, 65
Cunard, Samuel, awarded contract for transatlantic steam service, 218
Dashwood, secretary of colonial post office prisoner of war, 66;
liberated through exchange, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
appointed postmaster general of Jamaica, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Delancy, Peter, deputy postmaster general for southern division, 35 note 2
Delaware, Falls of, postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7
Deputy postmaster general, relations to governor, 96;
limitations on his ability to manage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
agent for collecting United States postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
newspaper postage, benefit of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postmasters' nominations withdrawn from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Detroit, postal communication opened with, 89
Digby, post office opened in, 178
Dongan, Thomas, governor of New York, endeavoured to establish postal service in colonies, 7
Dorchester, New Brunswick, post office opened at, 182
[Pg 349]
Durand, details of his journey between Quebec and Halifax with mails, 81
Durham, Lord, recommendations respecting Canadian post office, 212
Eastern Townships, mail communication opened between Three Rivers and, 117
Elizabethtown, post office opened at, 89
Fairbank, Richard, first postmaster in Boston, 2
Falmouth, Maine, defiance of post office monopoly at, 50
Finlay, Hugh, appointed postmaster of Quebec, 42;
intervenes on behalf of maîtres de poste, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
post-office surveyor appointed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
explores the area between Quebec and New England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
inspects the postal service from Maine to Georgia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
appointed joint deputy postmaster general of the northern division of North America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
renowned author of the account of the siege of Quebec, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his activities outside the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
appointed superintendent of postmasters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
loses the role of deputy postmaster general for the northern division of North America and takes on the position of deputy postmaster general of Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
report on the route between Quebec and Halifax, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
appointed deputy postmaster general of British North America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
removal from this role, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
death, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Fort Edward, post office opened at, 65
Fothergill, Charles, postmaster of Port Hope, 144;
attacks post office management, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Foxcroft, John, joint deputy postmaster general, 2, 27;
POW, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
liberated through exchange, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
appointed British packet boat agent in New York, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Franking Act, passed by legislature of Upper Canada, 209;
Stayner's objections were rejected, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Franklin, Benjamin, postmaster of Philadelphia, 1;
deputy postmaster general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__;
established post office in Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
increases postal services, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
nature of his influence in the management of the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his perspective on post office revenues being considered taxes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his removal from the position of joint deputy postmaster general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his ongoing good relationships with officials at the general post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
appointed postmaster general of the revolutionary post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his views on the nature of postage used to support imperial control, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Fredericton, post office opened in, 178
Gagetown, post office opened at, 182
Gaspé, slender postal accommodation in, 162
Goddard, William, labours for establishment of revolutionary post office, 60;
his career, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
creates plan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
unsuccessful candidate for postmaster general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
appointed surveyor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Grand Trunk Railway, construction of, 278
Great Western Railway, construction of, 278
Grenville, post office opened at, 116
Guelph, post office opened at, 153
Halifax, post office established at, 33, 173;
postage rates by sea in 1765, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
petition for Halifax to be the terminal port for transatlantic steamers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
UK government agrees, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
contract awarded to Samuel Cunard, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
plan to consolidate all mail from Great Britain destined for North America at __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
its failure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Nova Scotia requests that the post office at __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ be kept operational by the imperial post office.
Move the post office to the Dalhousie College building, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Hamilton, post office opened at, 117
Hamilton, Andrew, deputy of patentee for American post office, 9;
his plans for setting up a postal service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his death, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Hamilton, John, succeeds his father, Andrew Hamilton, as deputy postmaster general, 17
Hawkesbury, post office opened at, 116
Hazen, R. L. of executive council of New Brunswick, representative at postal conference in Montreal, 268
Head, Sir Francis Bond, orders dismissal of postmaster of Lloydtown, 213;
demands the authority to dismiss postmasters he considers guilty of disloyalty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
orders the removal of the postmaster of Toronto, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Heriot, George, succeeds Finlay as deputy postmaster general, 96;
personal traits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
unsuccessful candidate for a position in the legislative council and for the superintendency of maîtres de poste, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
out of favor with governor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
altercation with Sir Gordon Drummond, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
retirement, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Heyman, Peter, appointed postmaster of Virginia, 13
Horton, post office opened in, 178
[Pg 350]
Howard, James, dismissed from postmastership of Toronto, on charge of disloyalty, 214
Howe, John, the elder, deputy postmaster general of Maritime provinces, 180;
his effective management, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his retirement, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Howe, John, the younger, succeeds his father, 181;
controlled the majority of newspapers in Halifax, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
critique of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his death, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Howe, Joseph, urges direct steamship service between Great Britain and Halifax, 217
Hudson's Bay Company, conveys the mails to and from Manitoba and North-West territories, 317;
limitations on communication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Hull, post office opened at, 116
"Humboldt" steamship of the American line lost off Nova Scotia coast, 309
Hume, Joseph, M.P., obtains information respecting Canadian postal service, 161
"Hungarian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 309
Hunter, Peter, Lieutenant Governor, had road constructed from Bay of Quinte to York, 100;
tries to establish mail service to Upper Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Hunter, William, joint deputy postmaster general, 26
Huntingdon, Herbert, confers with general post office respecting Nova Scotia post office, 191
Illegal conveyance of letters in Canada, 150;
in Nova Scotia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
in New Brunswick, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Indian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 309
Johnston, J. W., Solicitor General of Nova Scotia, representative at postal conference in Montreal, 268
Kennebec route, Finlay explores, 47
Kingston, Upper Canada, post office opened at, 89
Kingston, New Brunswick, post office opened at, 182
Knox, William, scheme of communications between England and North America, 87
Labrador, mail service opened between Newfoundland and, 342
Lachine, post office opened at, 89
Lancaster, post office opened at, 89
Lanoullier, Nicholas, obtained privilege to establish post office in Canada, 40;
his plans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
failure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Lanoullier de Boisclair, his difficulties in maintaining roads, owing to popular indifference, 78;
his death, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Letters, mode of calculating postage on, 20
Lloydtown, postmaster of, dismissed for part in affairs of 1837, 213
London, post office opened at, 117
Lovelace, Francis, Governor of New York, arranged for postal service between New York and Boston, 6
Lower Canada, condition of route between Montreal and Quebec, in 1783, 78;
way to communicate with Great Britain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
frequency of service between Quebec and Montreal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
Report of the assembly on surplus postal revenues, 1827, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Stayner refuses to provide information to the assembly committee, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
lack of postal service in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
Address to the King regarding the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Report of the Legislative Committee on Postal Affairs, 1836, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Stayner urged to stop sending excess revenue to England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Concerns raised at the general post office regarding the post office bill of Lower Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Macaulay, John, former postmaster of Kingston, chairman of committee of legislative council on postal affairs, 207
Mackenzie, William Lyon, presented petition for investigation of post office, 143;
interviewed the Colonial Secretary about postal matters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his opinions on the management of the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
evidence of, before the Lower Canada committee on newspaper postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
challenges action on underpayment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Maîtres de Poste, lack of regulations for, 45;
Finlay's interference for __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
unsuccessful attempts to align their role with that of post house masters in England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
essential for delivering mail, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
character of their service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
amenities on Post Road, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Manitoba, and North-West provinces, early postal arrangements in, 316-321;
proposal for direct overland service with Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Manitoba was added to the Canadian postal system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The United States Postal Service was used for communication with other states, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
direct train connection with Eastern Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
expansion of service between Confederation and, 1914, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
[Pg 351]
Marconi, Guglielmo, proved success of transatlantic wireless system of telegraphy in Newfoundland, 345
Maritime provinces, early means of communication between places in, 175;
with the UK, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Maryland, postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7;
proceedings of the legislature regarding the establishment of a post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Massachusetts, terms of first post office act in, 9, 10;
postage rates to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
post office act, disallowed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
rejects new bill draft, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Matthews, Captain John, chairman of post office committee of assembly of Upper Canada, 143
Michillimackinac, postal communication opened with, 89
Miramichi, arrangements for delivery of mails at, 181;
post office opened at, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Money Order System, establishment of, in Canada, 276;
in Nova Scotia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
in Newfoundland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
expansion of operations between 1868 and 1914, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Montreal, post office opened at, 1, 42;
description of the route between New York and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
post road between Quebec and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Mail service opened between New York and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Mail service has started between Quebec and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
frequency of service between New York and Montreal at the start of the Revolutionary War, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
embraced in a revolutionary mailing system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The postmaster is unhappy about having soldiers stationed with him, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
governor orders his firing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Daniel Sutherland, postmaster of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
conditions at the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
bad state of post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Montreal Gazette, proprietor of, begins attack on Stayner respecting newspaper postage, 159
Neale, Thomas, given patent for American post office, 8;
assigns his patent, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
New Brunswick, postal system of, transferred to control of deputy postmaster general of Nova Scotia, 155;
establishment of inland service in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
shipping fees in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
changes in routes due to the War of 1812, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
no service additions until 1820, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
communication with Great Britain through the United States, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Nova Scotia's concerns about the arrangement, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
condition of, in 1841, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
legislative report, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
set up as a separate department, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
demands for lower postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislature agrees with the resolutions from the interprovincial postal conference, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
provincial government takes control of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
expansion of postal service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postage rates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
revenue and spending, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
government's attitude towards deficits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
New Castle, Pa., postal rate from Philadelphia to, 7
New England, confederation of, postmaster appointed for, 7;
direct route from Quebec to, surveyed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire is helping to create another route to Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts is not supportive regarding the route, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Newfoundland, post office in, early mode of communication with England, 333;
shipping rates to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
connection with England via Cunard steamers at Halifax, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
inland postal system set up, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
efforts to obtain direct service to England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
improvements and expansions of inland service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
rail service available between St. John's and Harbour Grace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
talking with Labrador, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
money order system set up, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
government notifications, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
New Hampshire, terms of first post office act in, 9, 11;
shipping rates to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
act permitted by privy council, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
New Haven, modes of evading post office monopoly at, 51
New Johnston, post office opened at, 89
Newspapers, transmission of, not provided for in imperial postal act, 61;
arrangements for mailing __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
issues in plan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
push for a new way to collect postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
charges applied, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Postage is a benefit of the deputy postmaster general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
attack on this system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Stayner recommends changing the system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
the issue of postage in the Maritime provinces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
W. L. Mackenzie's evidence on evasion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Stayner's justification for his practice of taking perks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
elimination of postage as a perk and the introduction of a fixed rate, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postage after the provinces take over the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postal service plan proposed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
rates from 1875 to 1914, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
[Pg 352]
New York, city of, earliest postal arrangements for, 4;
communication with Boston, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postage rates from Philadelphia, Boston, and Virginia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
colonial postal system headquarters, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
John Antill, postmaster of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
New York, colony of, terms of first post office act in, 9;
shipping costs to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
act approved by privy council, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Niagara, postal communication opened with, 89
North American Colonies (now United States), extent of postal system, 1;
first post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
way to communicate with England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
early attempts at postal service between __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
Patent for postal service granted to Thomas Neale, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
line of posts set up in 1693, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
revenue of postal system, 1693-1697, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
proposed arrangement for mail exchange with England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
impact of the Imperial Act of 1711 on the status of the colonial post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
low postal revenue, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
evasion of postmaster general's monopoly, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
increase in facilities under Franklin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
prosperous state of postal system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Sailing packets set up between England and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
arrangements for service to the southern colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
establishment of the southern division of the postal system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
summary of packet service in 1764, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
summary of the entire postal system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
surplus revenue in 1764, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
unpopularity of the post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Inspection report of the system from Maine to Georgia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
New York, admin center, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
proposal to close colonial post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
post office stops operating, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Foxcroft and Dashwood, prisoners of war, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"North Briton" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 311
Northern Railway, construction of, 278
"Norwegian" steamship of Allan line wrecked, 312
Nova Scotia, establishment of inland postal service, 178;
postal fees in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
changes in route due to the War of 1812, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
challenges faced by the deputy postmaster general in meeting demands for enhanced service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
his success, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
state of the postal service in 1817, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislature helped keep the mail service running, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
The legislature decides to take control of the postal service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
bill disallowed for that reason, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
satisfactory agreement reached, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Mail service between Pictou and Halifax improved at significantly increased cost, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
tension with Canada regarding the upkeep of this service, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
deficiencies in postal service revealed by royal commission, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
characteristics of the post office compared to the Canadian post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
demand from the legislature that Halifax should be serviced by the imperial post office, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
revenue shortfall of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
investigated by a British post office official, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
investigation findings, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
salary of deputy postmaster general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
local government interference with, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Arthur Woodgate takes over from Howe as deputy postmaster general after Howe's death, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
push for cheaper postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislative committee discusses the issue of provincial control, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislature accepts the conclusions from the interprovincial conference, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
provincial government takes control of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
service expansion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
communication method with Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
shipping costs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
A registration and money order system was introduced, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
revenue and expenses, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
railway mail service in, at Confederation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
O'Callaghan, Dr. E. B., chairman of legislative committee on postal affairs, 198
Ormonde, Marquess of, makes proposals for ocean steamship service, 127
Osnabruck, post office opened at, 89
Ottawa, first known as Richmond landing, 115
Ottawa River, steamer on river between Long Sault and Hull, 116
Pennsylvania, beginnings of postal service in, 7;
terms of the first post office act in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
shipping costs to, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
act approved by the privy council, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Pensacola, included in packet system, 35
Perth, opening of post office at, 114
Philadelphia, postal arrangements between, and outlying places, 7;
postage rates from Boston, New York, and Virginia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
[Pg 353]
Postage Rates, in former colonies (now United States), 7, 8, 10, 13, 16, 20, 22;
postal charge calculation method, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
In Canada under the Act of 1765, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
under a revolutionary postal system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
It's common practice to collect payment upon delivery, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
collection methods between Canada and the United States, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
Governor Simcoe's perspective on the management of excess postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
between Canada and Great Britain, following post office regulations, and by private ship, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
postage rates in New Brunswick, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
significant decrease in the rate between Canada and Great Britain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__-__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__;
royal commission report on inland rates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
weight system introduced, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
agitation for reduction, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__;
recommendations from Nova Scotia legislature, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
recommendations from the interprovincial conference, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
reductions in Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,
in Nova Scotia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,
in New Brunswick, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
rates in BC, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
imperial penny postage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
imperial newspaper prices, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Inland rates are two cents per ounce, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
between St. John's, Newfoundland, and England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
inland shipping in Newfoundland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
rates under colonial mail system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Postage Stamps, introduced in Canada, 275
Postal Revenues, from 1693 to 1697, 15;
surplus in 1764, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
surplus from Canada in 1822, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
average surplus from Canada for the seven years ending in 1825, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
average surplus from Canada for 1825 and 1826, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The imperial act of 1834 to transfer revenues to the provinces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
reception of the act in the Maritime provinces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__,
in Ontario, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
surplus for the year 1834, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The governor general refuses to halt sending payments to England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The Upper Canada legislature is asking for surplus funds, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
surplus from Canada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
revenue growth, 1868-1914, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Postmasters, exempt from billeting, 71;
The postmaster in Montreal claimed that he was exempt from regulation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
nomination of, removed from deputy postmaster general to governor general, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Stayner's unproductive objections to that, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Post Office Commission, personnel, and duties, 233;
report on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Post Office Convention, between Canada and United States, 90;
between Great Britain and the United States, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Post Office Surveyorship, established, 47;
Finlay appointed to __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
two assigned, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Post Road, between Montreal and Quebec, account of, 38;
constructed by Lanoullier de Boisclair, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Post Roads, arrangements with maîtres de poste for conveyance of post office couriers, 43
Prince Edward Island, early arrangements for postal service, 185;
condition of postal service, 1827-1841, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
post office run by the provincial government, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
The legislature agrees with the resolutions from the interprovincial postal conference, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Quebec and Halifax mail service, details of route, 76;
trip by Durand in 1784, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
steps to establish land communication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
upgrading the New Brunswick part of the route, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
proposal to take the Bay of Chaleurs route, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
conditions of service in 1840, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Quebec, post office opened at, 1;
post road between Montreal and, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Mail service began between Montreal and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
route from, to New England surveyed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
account of previous explorations of this route, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
cost of travel covered by contributions in Quebec, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
Post office building that was destroyed by fire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Railways, beginnings and development in Canada, 277;
time savings achieved through the use of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
postal cars used on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
increased costs from using __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
payment rates for mail service established by a royal commission, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
railways in Nova Scotia during Confederation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__;
an uninterrupted line connecting the Atlantic coast with Chicago and New Orleans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Randolph, Edward, postmaster of confederation of New England, 8<
Transcriber's Notes:
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Footnotes have been renumbered and relocated from the middle of the text to the end of the chapters where they appear.
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