This is a modern-English version of An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, originally written by Smith, Adam, Garnier, M. (Germain). It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling, and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.

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HARVARD
COLLEGE
LIBRARY

 

 

AN

INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES

OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS.

BY

ADAM SMITH LL.D. F.R.S.

WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

ALSO,
A VIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF SMITH, COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE FRENCH ECONOMISTS;
WITH A METHOD OF FACILITATING THE STUDY OF HIS WORKS;
FROM THE FRENCH OF M. GARNIER.

COMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME

London:

T. NELSON AND SONS, PATERNOSTER ROW;
AND EDINBURGH.

MDCCCLII.

 

 

CONTENTS

Page
Life of the Authori
Short View of the Doctrine of Smith, compared with that of the French Economistsxvii
Introduction1
BOOK I.
OF THE CAUSES OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE PRODUCTIVE POWERS OF LABOUR, AND OF THE ORDER ACCORDING TO WHICH ITS PRODUCE IS NATURALLY DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DIFFERENT RANKS OF THE PEOPLE.
CHAP. I.
Of the Division of Labour2
CHAP. II.
Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division of Labour6
CHAP. III.
That the Division of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market8
CHAP. IV.
Of the Origin and Use of Money9
CHAP. V.
Of the real and nominal Price of Commodities, or of their Price in Labour, and their Price in Money12
CHAP. VI.
Of the Component Parts of the Price of Commodities20
CHAP. VII.
Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities23
CHAP. VIII.
Of the Wages of Labour27
CHAP. IX.
Of the Profits of Stock36
CHAP. X.
Of Wages and Profit in the different Employments of Labour and Stock41
Part I. Inequalities arising from the Nature of the Employments themselvesib.
Part II. Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe50
CHAP. XI.
Of the Rent of Land60
Part I. Of the Produce of Land which always affords Rent61
Part II. Of the Produce of Land which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent68
Part III. Of the Variations in the Proportion between the respective Values of that sort of Produce which always affords Rent, and of that which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent74
Digression concerning the Variations in the Value of Silver during the course of the four last centuriesib.
First Periodib.
Second Period81
Third Periodib.
Variations in the Proportion between the respective Values of Gold and Silver89
Grounds of the Suspicion that the Value of Silver still continues to decrease91
Different Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon the real Price of three different sorts of rude Produceib.
First Sort92
Second Sortib.
Third Sort97
Conclusion of the Digression concerning the Variations in the Value of Silver101
Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon the real Price of Manufactures103
Conclusion of the Chapter105
BOOK II.
OF THE NATURE, ACCUMULATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF STOCK.
Introduction111
CHAP. I.
Of the Division of Stock112
CHAP. II.
Of Money considered as a particular Branch of the general Stock of the Society, or of the Expense of maintaining the National Capital115
CHAP. III.
Of the Accumulation of Capital, or of productive and unproductive Labour135
CHAP. IV.
Of Stock lent at Interest144
CHAP. V.
Of the different Employment of Capitals147
BOOK III.
OF THE DIFFERENT PROGRESS OF OPULENCE IN DIFFERENT NATIONS.
CHAP. I.
Of the Natural Progress of Opulence155
CHAP. II.
Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the ancient States of Europe, after the fall of the Roman Empire157
CHAP. III.
Of the Rise and Progress of Cities and Towns, after the fall of the Roman Empire162
CHAP. IV.
How the Commerce of the Towns contributed to the Improvement of the Country167
BOOK IV.
OF THE SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
Introduction173
CHAP. I.
Of the Principle of the Commercial or Mercantile systemib.
CHAP. II.
Of Restraints upon the Importation from Foreign Countries, of such Goods as can be produced at Home183
CHAP. III.
Of the extraordinary Restraints upon the Importation of Goods of almost all kinds, from those Countries with which the Balance is supposed to be disadvantageous192
Part I. Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints, even upon the Principles of the Commercial Systemib.
Digression concerning Banks of Deposit, particularly concerning that of Amsterdam194
Part II. Of the Unreasonableness of these extraordinary Restraints, upon other Principles199
CHAP. IV.
Of Drawbacks203
CHAP. V.
Of Bounties205
Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws213
CHAP. VI.
Of Treaties of Commerce222
CHAP. VII.
Of Colonies227
Part I. Of the Motives for establishing new Coloniesib.
Part II. Causes of the Prosperity of new Colonies231
Part III. Of the Advantages which Europe has derived from the Discovery of America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope243
CHAP. VIII.
Conclusion of the Mercantile System266
CHAP. IX.
Of the Agricultural Systems, or of those Systems of Political Economy which represent the Produce of Land as either the sole or the principal Source of the Revenue and Wealth of every Country275
APPENDIX.
Account of Herring Busses fitted out in Scotland, the Amount of the Cargoes and the Bounties on them287
Account of Foreign Salt imported into Scotland, and of Scotch Salt delivered duty free, for the Herring Fishery288
BOOK V.
OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH.
CHAP. I.
Of the Expenses of the Sovereign or Commonwealth289
Part I. Of the Expense of Defenceib.
Part II. Of the Expense of Justice297
Part III. Of the Expense of Public Works and Public Institutions302
Art. I. Of the Public Works and Institutions for facilitating the Commerce of Society.—1st, For facilitating the general Commerce of the Society.—2d, For facilitating particular Branches of Commerce303
Art. II. Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Education of Youth318
Art. III. Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Instruction of People of all Ages330
Part IV. Of the Expense of supporting the Dignity of the Sovereign342
Conclusion of the Chapterib.
CHAP. II.
Of the Sources of the general or Public Revenue of the Society343
Part I. Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue which may particularly belong to the Sovereign or Commonwealthib.
Part II. Of Taxes347
Art. I. Taxes upon rent; Taxes upon the Rent of Land348
Taxes which are proportioned, not to the Rent, but to the Produce of Land352
Taxes upon the Rent of Houses354
Art. II. Taxes upon Profit, or upon the Revenue arising from Stock357
Taxes upon the Profit of particular Employments359
Appendix to Articles I. and II.—Taxes upon the Capital Value of Lands, Houses, and Stock362
Art. III. Taxes upon the Wages of Labour365
Artworks. IV. Taxes which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon every different Species of Revenue366
Capitation Taxes367
Taxes upon consumable Commodities368
CHAP. III.
Of Public Debts385

SHORT ACCOUNT

OF THE

LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF

DR. ADAM SMITH

Adam Smith, the celebrated author of 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,' was born in the town of Kirkaldy, on the 5th of June 1723. His father, at an early period of life, practised as a writer to the signet in Edinburgh, and officiated as private secretary to the Earl of Loudon, during the time his Lordship was principal secretary of state in Scotland, and keeper of the great seal; but afterwards settled at Kirkaldy, where, for some time before his death, he held the office of comptroller of the customs. He died a few months before the birth of his son.

Adam Smith, the famous author of 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,' was born in the town of Kirkaldy on June 5, 1723. His father, at a young age, worked as a writer to the signet in Edinburgh and served as private secretary to the Earl of Loudon when his Lordship was the principal secretary of state in Scotland and keeper of the great seal. He later settled in Kirkaldy, where he held the position of comptroller of customs for some time before his death. He passed away a few months before his son was born.

The constitution of young Smith, during infancy, was so sickly as to require all the care and solicitude of his surviving parent, whose only child he was. The duty which thus devolved on his mother, it is allowed, she discharged in the most ample manner; and, indeed, carried her indulgence so far as to have drawn on herself, it has been said, some degree of blame. But it certainly does not appear that any bad consequences resulted, on this occasion, from unbounded parental fondness; nor can it be said, that any permanent disadvantage was felt by the retirement, and even seclusion, which long-continued weakness rendered necessary. To the inability of young Smith to engage in the active sports of his early companions, we ought, perhaps, to trace the foundation of those habits, and love of retirement, which distinguished him, in a peculiar manner, during a long life[1].

The young Smith was quite fragile during his infancy, requiring all the care and attention of his surviving parent, who was his only child. His mother took on this responsibility and did it exceptionally well; in fact, it's been said that she was so indulgent that it drew some criticism towards her. However, it definitely seems that there were no negative consequences from this overwhelming parental affection, and it's hard to argue that there was any lasting disadvantage from the long periods of weakness that demanded his seclusion. We might actually trace his tendency towards solitude and the love of staying in, which set him apart for much of his long life, back to his inability to participate in the active games with his peers. [1].

We are informed that Smith received the rudiments of education at the grammar-school of Kirkaldy; and, at that time, attracted some[Pg ii] notice by his passion for books, and by the extraordinary powers of his memory. He was also observed, even at this early period of life, to have contracted those habits of absence in company, and of talking to himself, for which he was afterwards so remarkable.

We learn that Smith got the basics of his education at the grammar school in Kirkaldy. During that time, he caught some[Pg ii] attention because of his love for books and his incredible memory. Even at this young age, it was noted that he had developed the habits of being absent-minded in social situations and talking to himself, which later became well-known traits of his.

In 1737, he was sent to the university of Glasgow, where, it is said, he evinced an uncommon partiality for the study of mathematics and natural philosophy. Being designed for the English church, he left that place in about three years, and entered, in 1740, an exhibitioner on Snell's foundation, at Baliol college, Oxford. But to this celebrated seminary he acknowledged very slender obligations. He had, however, attained a solid foundation of knowledge, and also the precious habits of attention, and the most industrious application. Here he diligently pursued his favourite speculations in private, interrupted only by the regular calls of scholastic discipline. He cultivated, with the greatest assiduity and success, the study of the languages, both ancient and modern; and formed an intimate acquaintance with the works of the poets of his own country, as well as with those of Greece and Rome, France and Italy. Of the turns and delicacies of the English tongue, it has been observed, he then gained such a critical knowledge, as was scarcely to be expected from his northern education. With the view of improving his style, he employed himself in frequent translations, particularly from the French; a practice which he used to recommend to all who cultivate the art of writing. His modest deportment, and his secret studies, however, provoked, it has been said, the jealousy or the suspicion of his superiors. It has been mentioned, that the heads of the college having thought proper to visit his chamber, found him engaged in perusing Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, then recently published. This the reverend inquisitors seized, while they severely reprimanded the young philosopher.

In 1737, he was sent to the University of Glasgow, where he reportedly showed an unusual fondness for studying mathematics and natural philosophy. Aiming for the English church, he left there after about three years and, in 1740, became an exhibitioner on Snell's foundation at Balliol College, Oxford. However, he felt that he owed very little to this renowned institution. Nevertheless, he had developed a solid base of knowledge and cultivated valuable habits of focus and diligent effort. Here, he diligently pursued his favorite interests in private, only interrupted by the regular demands of academic discipline. He worked hard and successfully on studying both ancient and modern languages, and became well-acquainted with the works of poets from his own country as well as those from Greece, Rome, France, and Italy. It's been noted that he gained such a keen understanding of the nuances of the English language that it was surprising for someone with his northern background. To enhance his writing style, he frequently translated works, especially from French, a practice he recommended to anyone interested in writing. However, his modest behavior and private studies reportedly sparked jealousy or suspicion among his superiors. It’s been said that the college heads decided to visit his room and found him engrossed in reading Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, which had just been published. The reverend investigators took the book and reprimanded the young philosopher sternly.

After a residence of seven years at Oxford, he returned, against the wishes of his friends, to Kirkaldy, the place of his nativity, where he lived for some time with his mother, without determining on any fixed plan of life; Mr. Smith having thus chosen to forego every prospect of church preferment, rather than do violence to his conscience by preaching a particular system of tenets.

After living for seven years in Oxford, he came back to Kirkaldy, his hometown, despite his friends' disapproval. He lived there for a while with his mother, not settling on any specific plan for his life. Mr. Smith decided to give up any chance of church promotion instead of compromising his beliefs by preaching a specific set of doctrines.

In 1748, being then in the twenty-fifth year of his age, he took up his residence in the capital of Scotland, when he first entered into public life, by delivering lectures, under the patronage of Lord Kames, on rhetoric and the belles lettres, which he continued for two years. These lectures were never published; but the substance of them appears to have been afterwards communicated to Dr. Blair, as he acknowledges, in his Lectures, to have been indebted to Dr. Smith for a manuscript treatise, from which he had taken several ideas in the eighteenth lecture, on the general characters of style, particularly the plain and the simple; and also the characters of those English authors belonging to the several classes in that and the following lecture.

In 1748, at the age of 25, he moved to the capital of Scotland, marking his entry into public life by giving lectures on rhetoric and literature, sponsored by Lord Kames. He continued this for two years. Although these lectures were never published, it seems that Dr. Blair later received the essence of them, as he acknowledges in his Lectures that he drew on a manuscript treatise from Dr. Smith for ideas in the eighteenth lecture, which focuses on the different styles of writing, particularly the plain and simple styles; he also discusses the characteristics of various English authors in that and the following lecture.

In 1751, he was chosen professor of logic in the university of Glasgow. Of the manner in which he discharged the duties of this important situation, it would be difficult now to present a more satisfactory account than that which has been given by one of his own pupils[Pg iii] 'In the professorship of logic,' it is observed, 'Mr. Smith soon saw the necessity of departing widely from the plan that had been followed by his predecessors, and of directing the attention of his pupils to studies of a more interesting and useful nature than the logic and metaphysics of the schools. Accordingly, after exhibiting a general view of the powers of the mind, and explaining so much of the ancient logic as was requisite to gratify curiosity, with respect to an artificial mode of reasoning, which had once occupied the universal attention of the learned, he dedicated all the rest of his time to the delivery of a system of rhetoric and belles lettres.'

In 1751, he was appointed professor of logic at the University of Glasgow. It's hard to provide a better account of how he fulfilled this significant role than what one of his own students has shared[Pg iii]. "In his role as professor of logic," it’s noted, "Mr. Smith quickly recognized the need to move away from the approach taken by his predecessors and to focus his students' attention on subjects that were more engaging and valuable than the traditional logic and metaphysics. So, after giving an overview of the mind's capabilities and explaining enough of the ancient logic to satisfy curiosity about a formal way of reasoning that once captured the attention of scholars, he dedicated the rest of his time to teaching a system of rhetoric and the fine arts of writing."

During the following year, he was nominated professor of moral philosophy in the same university. By this appointment he was peculiarly gratified, and the duties of it he was well fitted to discharge, as it embraced the study of his favourite science, political economy, many of the doctrines of which, even then, had been familiarised to his mind. After entering on the duties of his new situation, he appears to have turned his attention to the division of the science of morals, which he was induced to divide into four parts. The first contained Natural Theology, in which he considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and those principles of the human mind upon which religion is founded. The second comprehended Ethics, strictly so called. In the third, he treated, at more length, of that branch of morality which relates to Justice, and which, being susceptible of precise and accurate rules, is capable of a more systematic demonstration. In the fourth, he examined these political regulations which are founded upon Expediency, and which are calculated to increase the riches, the power, and the prosperity of a state.

During the following year, he was appointed as a professor of moral philosophy at the same university. He was particularly pleased with this appointment, as he was well-equipped to handle the duties, which included the study of his favorite subject, political economy, many of the principles of which he was already familiar with. After starting his new role, he seemed to focus on dividing the field of moral philosophy into four parts. The first part included Natural Theology, where he examined the evidence for the existence and attributes of God, along with the principles of the human mind that underpin religion. The second part covered Ethics in the strict sense. In the third part, he explored, in more detail, the area of morality related to Justice, which can be defined by clear and accurate rules, allowing for a more systematic analysis. In the fourth part, he investigated political regulations based on Expediency, aimed at enhancing the wealth, power, and prosperity of a state.

His lectures on these subjects were always distinguished by a luminous division of the subject, and by fulness and variety of illustration; and as they were delivered in a plain unaffected manner, they were well calculated to afford pleasure as well as instruction. They, accordingly, excited a degree of interest, and gave rise to a spirit of inquiry in the great commercial city of Glasgow, from which the most favourable consequences resulted. His reputation extended so widely, that, on his account alone, a considerable number of students, from different parts of the country, were attracted to the university of that city; and the science which he taught became so popular, that even the trifling peculiarities in his pronunciation and manner of speaking, were often objects of imitation.

His lectures on these topics were always marked by a clear organization and a rich variety of examples; because they were delivered in a straightforward and genuine way, they were enjoyable as well as informative. As a result, they generated a significant amount of interest and sparked curiosity in the bustling city of Glasgow, leading to very positive outcomes. His reputation was so great that many students from various parts of the country came to the university there just because of him; the subject he taught became so popular that even the minor quirks in his pronunciation and speaking style were often mimicked.

During the time Mr. Smith was thus successfully engaged in his academical labours, he was gradually laying the foundation of a more extensive reputation. In the year 1759, he published his 'Theory of Moral Sentiments, or An Essay towards an Analysis of the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character, first of their Neighbours, and afterwards of Themselves.' This work was founded on the second division of his lectures, and was divided into six parts:—The propriety of action: Merit and demerit, or the objects of reward and punishment: The foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty:[Pg iv] The effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation: The influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation: And, lastly, The character of virtue. To these were added, a brief view of the different systems of ancient and modern philosophy, which is universally acknowledged to be the most candid and luminous that has yet appeared.

During the time Mr. Smith was successfully focused on his academic work, he was gradually building a greater reputation. In 1759, he published his 'Theory of Moral Sentiments, or An Essay towards an Analysis of the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character, first of their Neighbours, and afterwards of Themselves.' This work was based on the second part of his lectures and was divided into six sections: The appropriateness of action; Merit and demerit, or the basis for reward and punishment; The foundation of our judgments about our own feelings and behavior, and our sense of duty: The impact of utility on the feeling of approval; The influence of custom and fashion on moral approval and disapproval; And finally, The nature of virtue. Additionally, it included a brief overview of the various systems of ancient and modern philosophy, which is widely regarded as the most fair and insightful that has been published to date.[Pg iv]

This Essay soon attracted a great share of the public attention, by the ingenuity of the reasonings, and the perspicuity with which they were displayed. The principle on which it is founded may be said to be, That the primary objects of our moral perceptions are the actions of other men; and that our moral judgments, with respect to our own conduct, are only applications to ourselves of decisions which we have already passed on the conduct of others. With this doctrine the author thinks all the most celebrated theories of morality coincide in part, and from some partial view of it he apprehends they are all derived. To the same work was subjoined a short treatise on the first formation of language, and considerations on the different genius of those which were original and compounded.

This essay quickly gained a lot of public attention due to the cleverness of its arguments and the clarity with which they were presented. Its main idea is that the primary focus of our moral perceptions is the actions of other people; our moral judgments about our own behavior are just applications of the conclusions we’ve already made about others' actions. The author believes that this idea overlaps in part with all the most well-known moral theories, and he thinks they all stem from some aspect of it. Accompanying the same work was a brief essay on the early development of language and thoughts on the differences between original and compound languages.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, immediately on its publication, procured a splendid reputation to the author, and led to a change in his situation in life, that was to him no less pleasing in itself, than gratifying from the means by which it was brought about. But the following lively letter to him, at that time, from his friend Mr. Hume, dated London, 12th April, 1759, will best show the manner in which this work was received, and the influence which it had in deciding on the future life of its author:—

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, right after its release, earned the author an impressive reputation and resulted in a change in his life situation that was both personally rewarding and satisfying due to how it happened. However, the following lively letter from his friend Mr. Hume, dated London, April 12, 1759, best illustrates how this work was received and the impact it had on shaping the author’s future:—

'I give you thanks for the agreeable present of your Theory. Wedderburn and I made presents of our copies to such of our acquaintances as we thought good judges, and proper to spread the reputation of the book. I sent one to the Duke of Argyll, to Lord Lyttleton, Horace Walpole, Soame Jenyns, and Burke, an Irish gentleman, who wrote lately a very pretty treatise on the sublime, Millar desired my permission to send one, in your name, to Dr. Warburton. I have delayed writing to you till I could tell you something of the success of the book, and could prognosticate, with some probability, whether it should be finally damned to oblivion, or should be registered in the temple of immortality. Though it has been published only a few weeks, I think there appear already such strong symptoms, that I can almost venture to foretel its fate. It is, in short, this——But I have been interrupted in my letter, by a foolish, impertinent visit of one who has lately come from Scotland. He tells me, that the university of Glasgow intend to declare Rouet's office vacant, upon his going abroad with Lord Hope. I question not but you will have our friend Fergusson in your eye, in case another project for procuring him a place in the university of Edinburgh should fail. Fergusson has very much polished and improved his treatise on Refinement, and with some amendments, it will make an admirable book, and discovers an elegant and a singular genius. The Epigoniad, I hope, will do; but it is somewhat up-hill work. As I doubt not but you consult the reviewers sometimes at present, you will see in the Critical Review a letter upon that poem, and I desire you to employ your conjectures in finding out the author. Let me see a sample of your skill in knowing hands, by your guessing at the person. I am afraid of Lord Kames's Law Tracts. A man might as well think of making a fine sauce[Pg v] by a mixture of wormwood and aloes, as an agreeable composition by joining metaphysics and Scotch law. However, the book, I believe, has merit, though few people will take the pains of diving into it. But to return to your book and its success in this town, I must tell you——A plague of interruptions! I ordered myself to be denied; and yet here is one that has broke in upon me again. He is a man of letters, and we have had a good deal of literary conversation. You told me that you was curious of literary anecdotes, and therefore I shall inform you of a few that have come to my knowledge. I believe I have mentioned to you already Helvetius's book De l'Esprit. It is worth your reading, not for its philosophy, which I do not highly value, but for its agreeable composition. I had a letter from him a few days ago, wherein he tells me that my name was much oftener in the manuscript, but that the censor of books at Paris obliged him to strike it out. Voltaire has lately published a small work, called Candide, ou l'Optimisme I shall give a detail of it——But what is all this to my book? say you.——My dear Mr. Smith, have patience; compose yourself to tranquillity; show yourself a philosopher in practice as well as profession; think on the emptiness, and rashness, and futility of the common judgments of men; how little they are regulated by reason in any subject, much more in philosophical subjects, which so far exceed the comprehension of the vulgar.

Thank you for the pleasant gift of your Theory. Wedderburn and I shared copies with friends we thought would appreciate it and help build its reputation. I sent one to the Duke of Argyll, Lord Lyttleton, Horace Walpole, Soame Jenyns, and Burke, the Irish gentleman who recently wrote a lovely essay on the sublime. Millar asked if he could send one, in your name, to Dr. Warburton. I've delayed writing to you until I could share something about the book's success and predict, with some confidence, whether it will fade into obscurity or be celebrated. Though it has only been out for a few weeks, I’m already seeing strong signs that I can almost predict its outcome. It's this—But I was interrupted by an annoying visit from someone who just returned from Scotland. He told me that the University of Glasgow plans to declare Rouet's position vacant since he's going abroad with Lord Hope. I’m sure you have our friend Fergusson in mind, in case another attempt to get him a position at the University of Edinburgh falls through. Fergusson has significantly polished and improved his treatise on Refinement, and with some adjustments, it will be an excellent book that shows off his elegant and unique talent. I hope The Epigoniad will do well, but it’s a bit of a struggle. As I’m sure you’re checking the reviewers these days, you’ll notice a letter about that poem in the Critical Review, and I’d like you to try to guess the author. Show me your skills in recognizing writing styles by figuring out who it is. I’m concerned about Lord Kames’s Law Tracts. It would be just as reasonable to expect a nice sauce from mixing wormwood and aloes as to hope for something enjoyable from combining metaphysics and Scottish law. Still, I believe the book has merit, even though not many will bother to delve into it. But getting back to your book and its reception here—another interruption! I had instructed myself to not meet anyone, yet someone barged in again. He’s a literary figure, and we’ve had some good discussions about literature. You mentioned you were curious about literary anecdotes, so I’ll share a few that have come my way. I believe I’ve already mentioned Helvetius's book De l'Esprit. It’s worth reading, not for its philosophy, which I don’t think highly of, but for its pleasant writing. I got a letter from him a few days ago, where he told me my name appeared much more often in the manuscript, but the book censor in Paris forced him to remove it. Voltaire recently published a small work called Candide, ou l'Optimisme. I’ll give you the details—But what does this have to do with my book, you say?—My dear Mr. Smith, be patient; calm yourself; show yourself to be a philosopher in practice as well as in name; reflect on the emptiness, impulsiveness, and foolishness of common judgments; consider how little they’re guided by reason in any matter, especially in philosophical topics that far exceed the understanding of ordinary people.

——Non si quid turbida Roma
Elevat, accedas; examenve improbum in illa
Castiges trutina; nec te quæsiveris extra.

If there’s any unrest in Rome
Lift yourself up, or weigh in on the troubled crowd there; Don’t look for answers outside yourself.

A wise man's kingdom is his own breast, or if he ever looks farther, it will only be to the judgment of a select few, who are free from prejudices, and capable of examining his work. Nothing, indeed, can be a stronger presumption of falsehood than the approbation of the multitude; and Phocion, you know, always suspected himself of some blunder when he was attended with the applauses of the populace.

A wise person's realm is their own heart, and if they ever look beyond that, it’s only to the opinions of a few select individuals who are unbiased and can truly evaluate their work. In fact, nothing suggests more strongly that something is false than the approval of the masses; and Phocion, as you know, always doubted his own judgment when he received praise from the crowd.

'Supposing, therefore, that you have duly prepared yourself for the worst, by all these reflections, I proceed to tell you the melancholy news,—that your book has been very unfortunate; for the public seem disposed to applaud it extremely. It was looked for by the foolish people with some impatience and the mob of literati are beginning already to be very loud in its praises. Three bishops called yesterday at Millar's shop, in order to buy copies, and to ask questions about the author. The bishop of Peterborough said he had passed the evening in a company where he heard it extolled above all books in the world. The Duke of Argyll is more decisive than he uses to be in its favour I suppose he either considers it as an exotic, or thinks the author will be serviceable to him in the Glasgow elections. Lord Lyttleton says, that Robertson, and Smith, and Bower, are the glories of English literature. Oswald protests, he does not know whether he has reaped more instruction or entertainment from it. But you may easily judge what reliance can be put on his judgment, who has been engaged all his life in public business, and who never sees any faults in his friends. Millar exults, and brags that two thirds of the edition are already sold, and that he is now sure of success. You see what a son of the earth that is, to value books only by the profit they bring him. In that view, I believe, it may prove a very good book.

Supposing that you’ve prepared yourself for the worst with all these thoughts, I’m sad to share the news: your book has had quite an unfortunate turn; the public seems ready to praise it highly. The foolish crowd has been eagerly awaiting it, and the literary mob is already being very loud in their compliments. Three bishops visited Millar's shop yesterday to buy copies and ask about the author. The Bishop of Peterborough mentioned he spent the evening with people who praised it above all other books. The Duke of Argyll is more enthusiastic about it than usual; maybe he sees it as something fresh or thinks the author could help him in the Glasgow elections. Lord Lyttleton claims that Robertson, Smith, and Bower are the pride of English literature. Oswald insists he’s not sure if he’s gotten more wisdom or enjoyment from it. But you can easily judge how much trust to place in his opinion since he’s been involved in public affairs all his life and never sees faults in his friends. Millar is thrilled and boasts that two-thirds of the edition have already sold, and he feels certain of its success. You can see what a materialistic thinker he is, valuing books only for the profit they bring him. In that sense, I guess it might actually turn out to be a good book.

'Charles Townsend, who passes for the cleverest fellow in England, is so taken with the performance, that he said to Oswald, he would put the Duke or Buccleugh under the author's care, and would make it worth his while to accept of that charge. As soon as I heard this, I called on him twice with[Pg vi] a view of talking with him about the matter, and of convincing him of the propriety of sending that young nobleman to Glasgow; for I could not hope, that he could offer you any terms which would tempt you to renounce your professorship. But I missed him. Mr. Townsend passes for being a little uncertain in his resolutions; so, perhaps, you need not build much on this sally.

'Charles Townsend, who is considered the smartest guy in England, is so impressed with the performance that he told Oswald he would place the Duke of Buccleuch under the author’s care and would make it worth his while to take on that responsibility. As soon as I heard this, I visited him twice with[Pg vi] the goal of discussing it with him and convincing him that sending that young nobleman to Glasgow would be the right move; I didn’t think he could offer you any terms that would entice you to give up your professorship. But I missed him. Mr. Townsend has a reputation for being a bit fickle in his decisions, so maybe you shouldn't count too much on this idea.'

'In recompense for so many mortifying things, which nothing but truth could have extorted from me, and which I could easily have multiplied to a greater number, I doubt not but you are so good a christian as to return good for evil, and to flatter my vanity, by telling me, that all the godly in Scotland abuse me for my account of John Knox and the reformation.'

'In return for so many embarrassing things, which only the truth could have made me admit, and which I could have easily increased, I'm sure you're such a good Christian that you'll respond to evil with good, and boost my ego by telling me that all the righteous people in Scotland criticize me for my take on John Knox and the Reformation.'

Mr. Smith having completed, and given to the world his system of ethics, that subject afterwards occupied but a small part of his lectures. His attention was now chiefly directed to the illustration of those other branches of science which he taught; and, accordingly, he seems to have taken up the resolution, even at that early period, of publishing an investigation into the principles of what he considered to be the only other branch of Moral Philosophy,—Jurisprudence, the subject of which formed the third division of his lectures. At the conclusion of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, after treating of the importance of a system of Natural Jurisprudence, and remarking that Grotius was the first, and perhaps the only writer, who had given any thing like a system of those principles which ought to run through, and be the foundation of the law of nations, Mr. Smith promised, in another discourse, to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law.

Mr. Smith, having finished and shared his system of ethics with the world, later spent only a small portion of his lectures on that topic. His focus was primarily on explaining other areas of science that he taught. Therefore, he seemed to have made a decision, even at that early stage, to publish a study on the principles of what he believed to be the only other area of Moral Philosophy—Jurisprudence, which made up the third part of his lectures. At the end of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, after discussing the significance of a system of Natural Jurisprudence and noting that Grotius was the first, and possibly the only, author to provide a coherent system of principles that should underpin the law of nations, Mr. Smith promised, in another lecture, to cover the general principles of law and government, as well as the various changes they have undergone throughout different ages and periods of society, including aspects related to justice, public order, taxation, military matters, and anything else that relates to the law.

Four years after the publication of this work, and after a residence of thirteen years in Glasgow, Mr. Smith, in 1763, was induced to relinquish his professorship, by an invitation from the Hon. Mr. Townsend, who had married the Duchess of Buccleugh, to accompany the young Duke, her son, in his travels. Being indebted for this invitation to his own talents alone, it must have appeared peculiarly flattering to him. Such an appointment was, besides, the more acceptable, as it afforded him a better opportunity of becoming acquainted with the internal policy of other states, and of completing that system of political economy, the principles of which he had previously delivered in his lectures, and which it was then the leading object of his studies to perfect.

Four years after this work was published, and after living in Glasgow for thirteen years, Mr. Smith decided to give up his professorship in 1763 due to an invitation from the Hon. Mr. Townsend, who had married the Duchess of Buccleugh, to travel with her son, the young Duke. Since this invitation was based solely on his own talents, it must have felt particularly flattering to him. Additionally, this opportunity was even more appealing because it allowed him to learn more about the internal policies of other countries and to finalize the system of political economy that he had previously discussed in his lectures, which was then the main focus of his studies to perfect.

Mr. Smith did not, however, resign his professorship till the day after his arrival in Paris, in February 1764. He then addressed the following letter to the Right Honourable Thomas Millar, lord advocate of Scotland, and then rector of the college of Glasgow:—

Mr. Smith didn't actually resign his professorship until the day after he arrived in Paris, in February 1764. He then wrote the following letter to the Right Honourable Thomas Millar, lord advocate of Scotland, and the rector of the University of Glasgow:—

'My Lord,—I take this first opportunity after my arrival in this place, which was not till yesterday, to resign my office into the hands of your lordship, of the dean of faculty, of the principal of the college, and of all my other most respectable and worthy colleagues. Into your and their hands, there[Pg vii]fore, I do resign my office of professor of moral philosophy in the university of Glasgow, and in the college thereof, with all the emoluments, privileges, and advantages, which belong to it. I reserve, however, my right to the salary for the current half-year, which commenced at the 10th of October, for one part of my salary, and at Martinmas last for another; and I desire that this salary may be paid to the gentleman who does that part of my duty which I was obliged to leave undone, in the manner agreed on between my very worthy colleagues before we parted. I never was more anxious for the good of the college than at this moment; and I sincerely wish, that whoever is my successor, he may not only do credit to the office by his abilities, but be a comfort to the very excellent men with whom he is likely to spend his life, by the probity of his heart and the goodness of his temper.'

'My Lord,—I’m taking this first chance after my arrival here yesterday to officially resign my position into the hands of your lordship, the dean of faculty, the principal of the college, and all my other respectable colleagues. Therefore, I resign my position as professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow and its college, along with all the benefits, privileges, and advantages that come with it. However, I want to keep my right to the salary for the current half-year, which started on October 10th for one part of my salary, and at Martinmas last for another. I request that this salary be paid to the person who takes over the part of my responsibilities that I couldn’t complete, as agreed upon with my esteemed colleagues before we parted. I have never been more concerned about the college's well-being than I am now. I genuinely hope that whoever my successor is, he not only excels in the role but also brings joy to the excellent men he will work with, through his integrity and good nature.'

His lordship having transmitted the above to the professors, a meeting was held; on which occasion the following honourable testimony of the sense they entertained of the worth of their former colleague was entered in their minutes:—

His lordship sent the above to the professors, and a meeting was held; during which, the following honorable acknowledgment of the value they placed on their former colleague was recorded in their minutes:—

'The meeting accept of Dr. Smith's resignation in terms of the above letter; and the office of professor of moral philosophy in this university is therefore hereby declared to be vacant. The university at the same time, cannot help expressing their sincere regret at the removal of Dr. Smith, whose distinguished probity and amiable qualities procured him the esteem and affection of his colleagues; whose uncommon genius, great abilities, and extensive learning, did so much honour to this society. His elegant and ingenious Theory of Moral Sentiments having recommended him to the esteem of men of taste and literature throughout Europe, his happy talents in illustrating abstracted subjects, and faithful assiduity in communicating useful knowledge, distinguished him as a professor, and at once afforded the greatest pleasure, and the most important instruction, to the youth under his care.'

The meeting accepted Dr. Smith's resignation based on the letter mentioned above; therefore, the position of professor of moral philosophy at this university is now declared vacant. At the same time, the university wants to express its sincere regret at Dr. Smith's departure, as his distinguished integrity and kind personality earned him the respect and admiration of his colleagues. His exceptional talent, great abilities, and extensive knowledge brought great honor to this institution. His elegant and insightful Theory of Moral Sentiments has earned him respect among those of taste and literary merit across Europe. His remarkable skill in explaining complex topics and his dedicated effort in sharing valuable knowledge distinguished him as a professor, providing great joy and crucial instruction to the students under his guidance.

In the first visit that Mr. Smith and his noble pupil made to Paris, they only remained ten or twelve days; after which, they proceeded to Thoulouse, where, during a residence of eighteen months, Mr. Smith had an opportunity of extending his information concerning the internal policy of France, by the intimacy in which he lived with some of the members of the parliament. After visiting several other places in the south of France, and residing two months at Geneva, they returned about Christmas to Paris. Here Mr. Smith ranked among his friends many of the highest literary characters, among whom were several of the most distinguished of those political philosophers who were denominated Economists.

On their first trip to Paris, Mr. Smith and his esteemed student stayed for only ten or twelve days. After that, they went to Toulouse, where Mr. Smith spent eighteen months deepening his knowledge of France's internal politics through close relationships with some members of parliament. After visiting several other locations in southern France and staying two months in Geneva, they returned to Paris around Christmas. While there, Mr. Smith counted among his friends many prominent literary figures, including several well-known political philosophers referred to as Economists.

Before Mr. Smith left Paris, he received a flattering letter from the unfortunate Duke of Rochefoucault, with a copy of a new edition of the Maxims of his grandfather. Notwithstanding the unfavourable manner in which the opinions of the author of that work were mentioned in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, the Duke informed Mr. Smith, on this occasion, that he had been prevented only from finishing a translation, which he had begun, of his estimable system of morals, into French, by the knowledge of having been anticipated in the design. He also observed, that some apology might be made for his ancestor, when it was considered, that he formed his opinions of man[Pg viii]kind in two of the worst situations of life,—a court and a camp. The last communication Mr. Smith had with this nobleman was in 1789, when he gave him to understand, that he would no longer rank the name of Rochefoncault with that of the author of the Fable of the Bees; and, accordingly, in the first edition that was afterwards published of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, this promised alteration was made.

Before Mr. Smith left Paris, he received a flattering letter from the unfortunate Duke of Rochefoucault, along with a copy of a new edition of his grandfather's Maxims. Despite the negative way the author of that work was mentioned in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, the Duke informed Mr. Smith that he had only been prevented from finishing a translation he had started of his esteemed moral system into French because he learned that someone else had already taken on the project. He also noted that some understanding could be extended to his ancestor, considering he formed his views on humankind in two of life's most challenging environments—a court and a camp. The last communication Mr. Smith had with this nobleman was in 1789, when he indicated that he would no longer associate the Rochefoucault name with that of the author of the Fable of the Bees; as a result, in the first edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments that was published afterwards, this promised change was made.

The next ten years of his life, after his arrival from the continent, Mr. Smith passed with his mother at Kirkaldy, though he occasionally, during that time, visited London and Edinburgh. Mr. Hume, who considered a town as the proper scene for a man of letters, made many attempts to prevail on him to leave his retirement.

The next ten years of his life, after arriving from the continent, Mr. Smith spent with his mother in Kirkaldy, although he occasionally visited London and Edinburgh during that time. Mr. Hume, who believed that a city was the right place for a man of letters, tried many times to convince him to leave his quiet life.

At length, in the beginning of the year 1776, Mr. Smith accounted to the world for his long retreat, by the publication of his 'Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.' This work chiefly comprehended the subject of the fourth and last division of his lectures, namely, those political regulations that have their origin in expediency. For about twenty years of his life, his attention had been chiefly devoted to the study of subjects connected with the science of political economy. His long residence in the mercantile city of Glasgow afforded him opportunities of deriving information, in many particulars, from the best sources; his travels on the continent contributed to extend his knowledge, and correct many of those misapprehensions of life and manners which the best descriptions of them are found to convey; and the intimacy in which he lived with some of the leaders of the sect of economists, and other writers on the subject of political economy, could not fail to assist him in methodizing his speculations, and of adding to the soundness of his conclusions.—After his arrival in this country, he wanted nothing more than leisure, to arrange his materials, and prepare them for publication: and for this purpose he passed in retirement the subsequent ten years.

At the beginning of 1776, Mr. Smith explained his long absence from public life by publishing his 'Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.' This work mainly covered the topic of the fourth and final section of his lectures, which focused on political regulations based on practical needs. For about twenty years, he had mostly focused on studying subjects related to political economy. His long stay in the commercial city of Glasgow gave him the chance to gain insights from the best sources; his travels across Europe helped broaden his knowledge and correct many misconceptions about life and customs that are often found in the best accounts; and his close relationships with some leading economists and other writers on political economy helped him organize his thoughts and strengthen his conclusions. After arriving in this country, he simply needed time to organize his materials and prepare them for publication, so he spent the next ten years in seclusion.

The great aim of Mr. Smith's Inquiry, the fruit of so much research, and the work of so many years, is, as Professor Stewart observes, to direct the policy of nations with respect to one most important class of its laws,—those which form its system of political economy: 'and he has unquestionably,' the same eloquent writer adds, 'had the merit of presenting to the world the most comprehensive and perfect work that has yet appeared on the general principles of any branch of legislation.'

The main goal of Mr. Smith's Inquiry, the result of extensive research and many years of work, is, as Professor Stewart notes, to guide the policies of nations regarding one very important category of laws—those that make up their system of political economy. "And he has undoubtedly," the same articulate writer adds, "achieved the distinction of presenting to the world the most complete and detailed work that has been published on the general principles of any area of legislation."

'A great and leading object of Mr. Smith's speculations,' as Mr. Stewart also observes, 'is to demonstrate, that the most effectual plan for advancing a people to greatness, is to maintain that order of things which nature has pointed out, by allowing every man, as long as he observes the rules of justice, to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and his capital into the freest competition with these of his fellow citizens.'

'A major focus of Mr. Smith's ideas,' as Mr. Stewart also points out, 'is to show that the best way to help a society become great is to keep the system that nature has laid out, by letting everyone, as long as they follow the rules of fairness, chase their own goals in their own way, and to let both their effort and their resources compete freely with those of their fellow citizens.'

Several authors, in this country, had before written on commercial affairs, but Mr. Smith was the first who reduced to a regular form and order the information that was to be obtained on that subject, and deduced from it the policy which an enlightened commercial nation[Pg ix] ought to adopt. The successful manner in which he has treated this unlimited freedom of trade, as well as some others, and his able exposure of the errors of the commercial system, have rendered the science of which he treats highly interesting to the great body of the people; and a spirit of inquiry, on every branch of political economy, has, in consequence, been excited, which promises now, more than ever, to be attended with the most beneficial effects. This intricate science, the most important to the interests of mankind though long neglected, Dr. Smith has had the merit of advancing so far, as to lay a foundation, on which, it may safely be said, investigation may for a long time proceed.

Several authors in this country had previously written about commercial matters, but Mr. Smith was the first to organize the information on this topic into a regular format and outline the policies that an informed commercial nation[Pg ix] should adopt. His effective treatment of unlimited trade freedom, along with other topics, and his insightful criticism of the commercial system's errors have made the field he discusses very engaging for the general public. As a result, a spirit of inquiry into various aspects of political economy has been sparked, promising more beneficial outcomes than ever before. Despite being long overlooked, this complex science, crucial to humanity's interests, has been significantly advanced by Dr. Smith, laying a foundation for future investigations.

It has frequently been alleged, that Dr. Smith was indebted for a large portion of the reasonings in his Inquiry to the French economists, and that the coincidence between some branches of his doctrine and theirs, particularly those which relate to freedom of trade and the powers of labour, is more than casual. But Professor Stewart has ably vindicated him from this charge, and established his right to the general principles of his doctrine, which, he thinks, were altogether original, and the result of his own reflections. That he, however, derived some advantage from his intimacy with Turgot, and those great men who were at the head of the sect of economists, and, perhaps, adopted some of their illustrations, it would be as unnecessary to deny, as it would he far from discreditable to his talents to acknowledge.

People often claim that Dr. Smith borrowed a lot of his reasoning in his Inquiry from French economists, and that the similarities between some aspects of his ideas and theirs, especially about trade freedom and labor's power, are more than just coincidence. However, Professor Stewart has successfully defended him against this accusation and argued that the fundamental principles of his theory were entirely original and came from his own thoughts. It's true that he benefited from his closeness with Turgot and the prominent economists of that time, and acknowledging that he may have used some of their examples is both unnecessary to deny and far from discrediting to his abilities.

There is also a similar, or perhaps a greater coincidence between many parts of his doctrine and the opinions of Sir James Stewart, as detailed in his 'Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy.' This congruity of opinion is chiefly apparent in their respective conclusions concerning the effects of competition,—the principles of exchangeable value,—the relation between the interest of money and the profit of stock,—the functions of coin,—the rise and progress of credit,—and the sources and limits of taxation. As this author had published his Inquiry many years before Dr. Smith's work appeared, and had, besides, lived in great intimacy with him, there was some reason to believe, what has been often asserted, that he possessed a just claim to some of the doctrines contained in that work, though Dr. Smith never once mentioned his name in any part of his work. But the present Sir James Stewart, who has recently published a full edition of the writings of his father, relinquishes, on his part, all such pretensions. With the partiality of a friend, in ranking his father with Dr. Smith, he gives it as his opinion, however, that both had, with original powers of equal strength, drawn their knowledge from the same source, the French economists.

There's a strong connection, or maybe even a bigger one, between many aspects of his ideas and the views of Sir James Stewart, as explained in his 'Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy.' This alignment is especially noticeable in their conclusions about the effects of competition, the principles of exchangeable value, the relationship between interest on money and profit from investment, the role of currency, the development of credit, and the sources and limits of taxation. Since this author published his Inquiry many years before Dr. Smith's work came out and also had a close relationship with him, there's some basis for the claim, often made, that he had a rightful stake in some of the ideas presented in that work, even though Dr. Smith never mentioned him at all. However, the current Sir James Stewart, who has recently released a complete edition of his father's writings, completely denies any such claims. Out of loyalty to his father, he does think that both he and Dr. Smith, with equally strong original abilities, drew their knowledge from the same source: the French economists.

Dr. Mandeville has also, of late, got the credit of being the author of those Principles of Political Economy, which have interested the world for the last fifty years, and to him alone, it is said, not only the English, but also the French writers, are indebted for their doctrines in that science. In the work of this eccentric writer, there seems, indeed, a similarity of opinion on some of the more obvious sources of wealth, particularly in the division of labour, which Dr. Smith investigates so fully; and in the erroneous doctrine of produc[Pg x]tive and non-productive labour; and also, perhaps, on some other points: but it would be difficult to show, that he ought, on this account, to be considered the author of all, or even the chief part of what has been written on the subject. On this, as well as on all questions of a similar nature, a great diversity of opinions will subsist. But it may be a matter of curiosity to those who are unacquainted with his work, the Fable of the Bees, not only to trace the connection of that author's sentiments with what is advanced by subsequent writers on this important subject, but also to learn his peculiar notions of morality, that attracted, at one time, so much attention. These last, Dr. Smith says, though described by a lively and humorous, yet coarse and rustic eloquence, which throws an air of truth and probability on them, are, almost in every respect, erroneous.

Dr. Mandeville has recently gained recognition as the author of those Principles of Political Economy, which have captured the world's attention for the last fifty years. It is said that both English and French writers owe their ideas in this field to him alone. In the work of this unconventional writer, there is indeed a commonality of opinion on some of the clearer sources of wealth, especially regarding the division of labor, which Dr. Smith explores in depth; along with the mistaken notion of productive and non-productive labor; and perhaps on some other points as well. However, it would be challenging to argue that he should be regarded as the sole or even primary author of everything that has been written on the subject. As with all questions of a similar nature, there will be a wide range of opinions. Nonetheless, it may be interesting for those unfamiliar with his work, the Fable of the Bees, not only to trace the connection between his ideas and those presented by later writers on this significant topic but also to understand his unique views on morality that once attracted a lot of attention. Dr. Smith notes that although these views are expressed with a lively, humorous, yet rough and rustic style that gives them an air of truth and credibility, they are flawed in almost every respect.

Soon after the publication of the Wealth of Nations, Mr. Smith received the following congratulatory letter from Mr. Hume, six months before his death, dated Edinburgh, 1st April 1776.

Soon after the release of the Wealth of Nations, Mr. Smith got the following congratulatory letter from Mr. Hume, six months before his death, dated Edinburgh, April 1, 1776.

'Euge! Belle! Dear Mr. Smith—I am much pleased with your performance, and the perusal of it has taken me from a state of great anxiety. It was a work of so much expectation, by yourself, by your friends, and by the public, that I trembled for its appearance; but am now much relieved; not but that the reading of it necessarily requires so much attention, and the public is disposed to give so little, that I shall still doubt for some time of its being at first very popular. But it has depth, and solidity, and acuteness, and is so much illustrated by curious facts, that it must at last take the public attention. It is probably much improved by your last abode in London. If you were here at my fireside, I should dispute some of your principles. But these, and a hundred other points, are fit, only to be discussed in conversation. I hope it will be soon, for I am in a very bad state of health, and cannot afford a long delay.'

'Awesome! Beautiful! Dear Mr. Smith—I’m really impressed with your work, and reading it has relieved a lot of my anxiety. It was highly anticipated by you, your friends, and the public, which made me nervous about its release; but now I feel much better. However, the reading demands a lot of attention, and the public tends to give so little, so I might still doubt its initial popularity for a while. But it has depth, substance, and insight, and is filled with interesting facts, so it will eventually grab the public’s attention. I bet it’s been improved by your recent time in London. If you were here with me by the fireplace, I would challenge some of your ideas. But these and many other topics are best discussed in conversation. I hope that happens soon, as I’m in pretty bad health and can’t wait too long.'

The publication of this great work drew praise to its author, indeed, from many different quarters.—Dr. Barnard, in a political epistle, addressed to Sir Joshua Reynolds, where the characteristic qualities of some eminent literary men of that time are brought forward, spoke of Smith as one who would teach him how to think. Gibbon made honourable mention of him in his Roman history; and Mr. Fox contributed, in no small degree, to extend his reputation, by observing in the House of Commons, that 'the way, as my learned friend Dr. Adam Smith says, for a nation, as well as an individual, to be rich, is for both to live within their income.'

The publication of this important work brought acclaim to its author from many different places. Dr. Barnard, in a political letter to Sir Joshua Reynolds, highlighted some of the key qualities of prominent literary figures of that time, mentioning Smith as someone who could teach him how to think. Gibbon acknowledged him in his history of Rome, and Mr. Fox helped to enhance his reputation significantly by stating in the House of Commons that, 'the way, as my learned friend Dr. Adam Smith says, for a nation, just like an individual, to be wealthy is for both to live within their means.'

The opinion which Dr. Johnson delivered, at that time, on its being alleged by Sir John Pringle, that a person who, like Dr. Smith, was not practically acquainted with trade, could not be qualified to write on that subject, may also be mentioned here, though somewhat erroneous, as far as it respects the received doctrines of Political Economy:—'He is mistaken,' said Johnson. 'A man who has never been engaged in trade himself, may undoubtedly write well on trade; and there is nothing which requires more to be illustrated by philosophy than trade does. As to mere wealth, that is to say, money, it is clear that one nation, or one individual, cannot increase its store but by[Pg xi] making another poorer; but trade procures what is more valuable, the reciprocation of the peculiar advantages of different countries. A merchant seldom thinks of any but his own trade. To write a good book upon it, a man must have extensive views. It is not necessary to have practised, to write well upon a subject.'[2]

The opinion that Dr. Johnson shared at the time regarding Sir John Pringle's claim—that someone like Dr. Smith, who isn't practically familiar with trade, couldn't be qualified to write about it—can also be noted here, although it may be somewhat misguided in relation to the accepted principles of Political Economy: 'He is mistaken,' Johnson said. 'A person who has never been involved in trade themselves can certainly write effectively about trade; and there is nothing that needs more clarification through philosophy than trade does. As for mere wealth, or money, it's clear that one nation or individual can't increase their wealth without making another poorer; but trade provides something more valuable—the sharing of unique advantages from different countries. A merchant typically only thinks about their own trade. To write a quality book on the topic, one must have a broad perspective. It’s not necessary to have practiced in order to write well on a subject.'

On the Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, it only remains farther to be observed, that its success has been every way commensurate to its merits. It has, however, been often regretted, that the author did not live to favour the world with his reasonings on those important events which have taken place since 1784, when he put the last hand to his invaluable work. That another, with competent talents, and a mind disposed to the task, should soon appear, to treat of these occurrences, and give a satisfactory view of the progress of the science from that time to the present, is not to be expected. But as the honour to be gained from a successful execution of such an undertaking is very considerable, it is not to be wondered at that an attempt of this kind should be made. Accordingly, Mr Playfair of London has had the boldness to follow Smith, by endeavouring to supply, in part, this desideratum, by adding supplementary chapters and notes to the Treatise on the Wealth of Nations.

Regarding the Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, it should be noted that its success has matched its worth in every way. However, it's often lamented that the author did not get to share his insights on the significant events that have occurred since 1784, when he finalized his invaluable work. It’s unlikely that someone else with the right skills and a willingness to tackle the subject will emerge soon to address these events and provide a clear overview of how the field has progressed from then to now. Nevertheless, the prestige that comes from successfully completing such an undertaking is substantial, so it’s not surprising that someone would attempt it. Accordingly, Mr. Playfair of London has had the courage to follow Smith by trying to partially fill this gap, by adding supplementary chapters and notes to the Treatise on the Wealth of Nations.

But it is greatly to be feared, that there are few persons who have read this improved edition, as it is called, of Dr. Smith's Inquiry, but will still look forward to the accomplishment of the wishes they must previously have formed, for a continuation, and probably an illustration, of the discussions contained in that work. Leaving, therefore, the supplementary chapters and elucidations of Mr Playfair, it must be observed, that Dr. Smith has, on this occasion, been equally unfortunate in a biographer. The detail of his peaceful life is almost lost among dissertations on the wickedness of atheism and the horrors of a revolution. But these dissertations, strangely misplaced as they appear to be, would certainly not alone have been sufficient to attract observation here, whatever latitude the author might have allowed to himself on such subjects. When he goes on, however, to apologise for Dr. Smith's acquaintance with some individuals among the economists, and to connect the whole of that sect with those philosophers to whom he ascribes the evils which have so long afflicted France, his opinions become still more insupportable. It will, perhaps, be said, and with some reason, that, in this instance, at least, the writer has followed those alarmists, who, on any men of learning belonging to that country being mentioned, immediately ally them to the revolutionists without regard to difference of opinion, or distance of time.

But it’s quite concerning that very few people have actually read this so-called improved edition of Dr. Smith's Inquiry. Most will continue to hope for the fulfillment of their desire for a continuation, and probably an explanation, of the discussions in that work. So, leaving aside the extra chapters and clarifications by Mr. Playfair, it should be noted that Dr. Smith has also been unlucky in having a biographer this time around. The details of his peaceful life are nearly overshadowed by treatises on the evils of atheism and the terrible consequences of a revolution. However misplaced these treatises might seem, they alone wouldn’t have been enough to draw attention here, no matter how much freedom the author took with such topics. When he continues to justify Dr. Smith's connections with some figures among the economists and links that whole group with the philosophers he blames for the long-standing troubles in France, his views become even less bearable. It might be argued, with some justification, that in this case, the writer has followed those alarmists who, upon hearing mention of any scholars from that country, immediately associate them with the revolutionaries, regardless of differences in opinion or how much time has passed.

The reputation, however, of the economists is too well established to be affected, either by the clamours of the ignorant, or the mad intemperance of political alarmists. The doctrine of the great men who formed the school of the economists, was, that the produce of the land is the sole or principal source of the revenue and wealth of every country; and this doctrine, with the manner of deriving from it the greatest possible advantage, it is almost universally acknowledged, engaged entirely their[Pg xii] attention. Dr. Smith, who lived in great intimacy with many of the founders of that sect, does ample justice, on every occasion, to the purity of their views; and indeed they, as well as himself, it has always been said, by the impartial and well informed, were ever animated by a zeal for the best interests of society.

The reputation of economists is too firmly established to be swayed by the cries of the uninformed or the reckless panic of political alarmists. The belief held by the prominent figures who created the school of economists is that the output of the land is the only or main source of revenue and wealth for every country; this belief, along with how to maximize benefits from it, has almost universally captured their attention. Dr. Smith, who had close ties with many of the founders of that school, always gives fair recognition to the purity of their intentions. Indeed, both they and he have always been described by impartial and knowledgeable observers as being driven by a passion for the best interests of society.

M. Quesnai, the first of that sect, and the author of the Economical Table, a work of the greatest profoundness and originality, was, in particular, represented by Mr. Smith as a man of the greatest modesty and simplicity; and his system he pronounced, with all its imperfections, to be the nearest approximation to the truth, of any that had then been published on the principles of political science. His veneration for this worthy man was even so great, that had he lived, it was his intention to have inscribed to him the Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations.

M. Quesnai, the first of that group and the author of the Economical Table, a work of remarkable depth and originality, was particularly described by Mr. Smith as a person of great modesty and simplicity. He stated that, despite its imperfections, Quesnai's system was the closest approximation to the truth of any published at that time on the principles of political science. His admiration for this esteemed man was so significant that had Quesnai lived, Mr. Smith planned to dedicate the Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations to him.

Nor will the memory of those illustrious men be soon forgotten, notwithstanding the calumnies with which it has been charged. It may safely be predicted, in the words of a highly respectable periodical publication, that 'Those prospects of political improvements which flattered the benevolent anticipations of the economists, will soon be recognised as sound conclusions of science; and it will at length be acknowledged that Turgot, Mirabeau, and Quesnai, were the friends of mankind, and that their genius and their labours were devoted to the refinement of social happiness and the consolidation of the political fabric.'[3]

Nor will the memory of those renowned individuals be easily forgotten, despite the slanders they've faced. It can confidently be said, as noted in a respected publication, that 'The prospects for political improvements that inspired the hopeful expectations of economists will soon be recognized as valid conclusions of science; and it will finally be acknowledged that Turgot, Mirabeau, and Quesnai were advocates for humanity, dedicating their talent and efforts to enhancing social happiness and strengthening the political structure.'[3]

The life of Mr. Smith, after the publication of his Inquiry, might be said to draw towards a close. The following particulars of the last years, are mostly extracted from Professor Stewart's Life of this incomparable writer.

The life of Mr. Smith, after the release of his Inquiry, could be said to be coming to an end. The following details of his final years are mostly taken from Professor Stewart's biography of this remarkable writer.

After residing some time in London, he was appointed one of the commissioners of customs in Scotland, in 1778, when he removed to Edinburgh. He was accompanied by his mother, who, though in extreme old age, possessed a considerable share of good health; and his cousin, Miss Douglass, who had long resided with him at Glasgow, undertook to superintend his domestic economy.

After spending some time in London, he was appointed as one of the customs commissioners in Scotland in 1778, and he moved to Edinburgh. His mother, who, despite being very old, was still in fairly good health, came with him; and his cousin, Miss Douglass, who had lived with him in Glasgow for a while, took on the responsibility of managing his household.

The Duke of Buccleugh had continued to allow Mr. Smith L.300 a-year, and the accession which he now received to his income enabled him to live, not only with comfort and independence, but to indulge the benevolence of his heart, in making numerous private benefactions.

The Duke of Buccleugh had continued to give Mr. Smith £300 a year, and the extra income he now received allowed him to live not only comfortably and independently but also to generously offer many private donations.

During the remaining period of his life, he appears to have done little more than to discharge, with peculiar exactness, the duties of his office, which, though they required no great exertion, were sufficient to divert his attention from his studies. He very early felt the infirmities of old age, but his health and strength were not greatly affected till he was left alone, by the death of his mother, in 1784, and of his cousin four years after. They had been the objects of his affection for more than sixty years; and in their society he had enjoyed, from his infancy, all that he ever knew of the endearments of a family. In return[Pg xiii] for the anxious and watchful solicitude of his mother during infancy, he had the singular good fortune of being able to show his gratitude to her during a very long life; and it was often observed, that the nearest avenue to his heart was through his mother.

During the last part of his life, he seemed to do little more than fulfill the duties of his job with particular precision. These responsibilities, while not demanding much effort, were enough to distract him from his studies. He recognized the signs of old age early on, but his health and strength didn’t significantly decline until he was left by himself after his mother passed away in 1784, followed by his cousin four years later. They had been the center of his affection for over sixty years, and he had experienced all the family closeness he knew in their company since childhood. In gratitude for his mother’s caring and attentive support during his infancy, he had the rare chance to show his appreciation to her throughout his long life; it was often noted that the best way to reach his heart was through his mother.

He now gradually declined till the period of his death, which happened in 1790. His last illness, which arose from a chronic obstruction in the bowels, was lingering and painful; but he had every consolation to soothe it which he could desire, from the tenderest sympathy of his friends, and from the completest resignation of his own mind.

He gradually declined until his death in 1790. His final illness, caused by a chronic blockage in his bowels, was long-lasting and painful; however, he had every comfort he could wish for to ease it, thanks to the deep sympathy of his friends and his own full acceptance of the situation.

His friends had been in use to sup with him every Sunday. The last time he received them, which was a few days before his death, there was a pretty numerous meeting; but not being able to sit up as usual, he retired to bed before supper. On going away, he took leave of the company, by saying, 'I believe we must adjourn this meeting to some other place.'

His friends used to have dinner with him every Sunday. The last time they visited, just a few days before he died, there was quite a big gathering; but since he couldn’t sit up as usual, he went to bed before dinner. As they were leaving, he said to the group, "I think we need to move this meeting to another place."

In a letter addressed, in the year 1787, to the principal of the university of Glasgow, in consequence of his being elected rector of that learned body, a pleasing memorial remains of the satisfaction with which he always recollected that period of his literary career, which had been more peculiarly consecrated to his academical studies. On that occasion he writes:—

In a letter dated 1787 to the head of the University of Glasgow, following his election as rector of that esteemed institution, a nice reminder remains of the fondness with which he always remembered that time in his academic journey, which was especially dedicated to his studies. On that occasion, he writes:—

'No preferment could have given me so much real satisfaction. No man can owe greater obligations to a society than I do to the university of Glasgow. They educated me; they sent me to Oxford. Soon after my return to Scotland, they elected me one of their own members, and afterwards preferred me to another office, to which the abilities and virtues of the never-to-be-forgotten Dr. Hutcheson had given a superior degree of illustration. The period of thirteen years, which I spent as a member of that society, I remember as by far the most useful, and therefore, as by far the happiest and most honourable period of my life; and now, after three-and-twenty years absence, to be remembered in so very agreeable a manner by my old friends and protectors, gives me a heart-felt joy which I cannot easily express to you.'

No job could have given me as much real satisfaction. No one can owe more to a community than I do to the University of Glasgow. They educated me; they sent me to Oxford. Shortly after I returned to Scotland, they elected me as one of their own members and later appointed me to another position, which the talents and virtues of the unforgettable Dr. Hutcheson had elevated. The thirteen years I spent as a member of that community were by far the most useful and, therefore, the happiest and most honorable years of my life; and now, after twenty-three years away, being remembered so kindly by my old friends and supporters fills me with a joy that’s hard to put into words.

Not long before the death of Smith, finding his end approach rapidly, he gave orders to destroy all his manuscripts, excepting some detached essays, which he entrusted to the care of his executors. With the exception of these essays, all his papers were committed to the flames. What were the particular contents of these papers was not known, even to his most intimate friends. The additions to the Theory of Moral Sentiments, most of which were composed under severe illness, had fortunately been sent to the press in the beginning of the preceding winter; and the author lived to see the publication of this new edition.[4][Pg xiv]

Not long before Smith passed away, realizing that his time was running out, he instructed that all his manuscripts be destroyed, except for a few separate essays, which he entrusted to his executors. Besides these essays, all his papers were burned. The specific contents of these papers were unknown, even to his closest friends. Fortunately, the additions to the Theory of Moral Sentiments, most of which were written during a serious illness, had been sent to the press earlier that winter; and the author lived to see this new edition published.[4][Pg xiv]

Some time before his last illness, when he had occasion to go to London, he enjoined his friends, to whom he had entrusted the disposal of his manuscripts, to destroy, in the event of his death, all the volumes of his lectures, doing with the rest what they pleased. When he had become weak, and saw the last period of his life approach, he spoke to his friends again upon the same subject. They entreated him to make his mind easy, as he might depend upon their fulfilling his desire. Though he then seemed to be satisfied, he, some days afterwards, begged that the volume might be immediately destroyed; which was accordingly done.

Some time before his final illness, when he had to go to London, he asked his friends, whom he had entrusted with his manuscripts, to destroy all his lecture volumes if he passed away, letting them do whatever they wanted with the rest. As he grew weaker and realized the end of his life was near, he talked to his friends about it again. They urged him to relax, assuring him they would honor his wishes. Although he seemed okay with it at that point, a few days later, he requested that the volume be destroyed right away; and it was done as he asked.

Mr. Riddell, an intimate friend of Mr. Smith, mentions, that on one of these occasions he regretted he had done so little; 'but I meant,' he added, 'to have done more; and there are materials in my papers of which I could make a great deal.—But that is now out of the question.'

Mr. Riddell, a close friend of Mr. Smith, mentions that on one of these occasions he regretted not doing more: "But I intended," he added, "to do more, and I have materials in my papers that I could do a lot with. —But that's no longer an option."

That the idea of destroying such unfinished works as might be in his possession at the time of his death, was not the effect of any sudden or hasty resolution, appears from the following letter to Mr. Hume, written in 1773, at the time when he was preparing for a journey to London, with the prospect of a pretty long absence from Scotland.

That the idea of destroying any unfinished works he might have had at the time of his death wasn’t a sudden or rash decision is clear from the following letter to Mr. Hume, written in 1773, while he was getting ready for a trip to London, anticipating a fairly long time away from Scotland.

'My dear friend,—As I have left the care of all my literary papers to you, I must tell you, that except those which I carry along with me, there are none worth the publication, but a fragment of a great work, which contains a history of the astronomical systems that were successively in fashion down to the time of Descartes. Whether that might not be published as a fragment of an intended juvenile work, I leave entirely to your judgment, though I begin to suspect myself, that there is more refinement than solidity in some parts of it. This little work you will find in a thin folio paper book in my back-room. All the other loose papers which you will find in that desk, or within the glass folding-doors of a bureau, which stands in my bed-room, together with about eighteen thin paper folio books, which you will likewise find within the same glass folding doors, I desire may be destroyed without any examination. Unless I die very suddenly, I shall take care that the papers I carry with me shall he carefully sent to you.'

My dear friend,—Since I've left all my writing papers in your hands, I need to tell you that, apart from what I'm taking with me, there’s nothing worth publishing, except for a fragment of a larger work that covers the history of astronomical systems that were popular until the time of Descartes. Whether this should be published as part of a planned younger audience piece is completely up to you, though I'm starting to think that some parts may be more polished than substantial. You’ll find this small work in a thin folio notebook in my back room. Please destroy all the other loose papers you find in that desk or in the glass folding doors of the bureau in my bedroom, along with about eighteen thin folio notebooks located in the same glass folding doors, without looking at them. Unless I die unexpectedly, I’ll make sure that the papers I have with me are sent to you properly.

But he himself long survived his friend Mr. Hume. The persons entrusted with his remaining papers were Dr. Black and Dr. Hutton, his executors, with whom he had long lived in habits of the closest friendship. These gentlemen afterwards collected into a volume, such of the writings of Dr. Smith as were fitted for publication: and they appeared in 1795, under the title of Essays on Philosophical Subjects. These essays had been composed early in life, and were designed to illustrate the principles of the human mind, by a theoretical deduction of the progress of the sciences and the liberal arts. The most considerable piece in this volume is, on the principles which lead and direct philosophical inquiries, illustrated by the history of astronomy, ancient physics, and ancient logic and metaphysics. The others, with the exception of an essay on the external senses, relate to the imitative and[Pg xv] liberal arts. The contents of this volume, Mr. Smith's executors observe, appear to be parts of a plan he once had formed for giving a connected history of the liberal sciences and elegant arts; but which he had been obliged to abandon, as being far too extensive; and these parts lay beside him neglected till after his death. In them, however, will be found that happy connection, that full and accurate expression, and the same copiousness and facility of illustration, which are conspicuous in the rest of his writings.

But he outlived his friend Mr. Hume by quite a bit. The people entrusted with his remaining papers were Dr. Black and Dr. Hutton, his executors, with whom he had shared a close friendship for a long time. These gentlemen later compiled a volume of Dr. Smith's writings that were suitable for publication, which came out in 1795 under the title Essays on Philosophical Subjects. These essays were written early in his life and were meant to explain the principles of the human mind through a theoretical exploration of the progress of the sciences and the liberal arts. The most significant piece in this volume discusses the principles that guide philosophical inquiries, using the history of astronomy, ancient physics, and ancient logic and metaphysics as illustrations. The other pieces, except for an essay on the external senses, focus on the imitative and[Pg xv] liberal arts. Mr. Smith's executors note that the contents of this volume seem to be parts of a plan he once envisioned for providing a connected history of the liberal sciences and arts, but he had to abandon it because it was far too ambitious; these parts remained neglected beside him until after his death. However, they contain the same happy connection, clear and precise expression, and abundant and easy illustrations that are prominent in the rest of his writings.

As a writer, the character of Mr. Smith is so well known, that any observation on his merits, must appear almost unnecessary. His literary fame is circumscribed by no ordinary limits. To the voice of his own country, is added the testimony of Europe, and, indeed, of the civilized world. And had even only one volume of his inestimable writings appeared, his name would have been carried down to posterity in the first rank of those illustrious characters that adorn the last century.

As a writer, Mr. Smith is such a well-known figure that any comments on his achievements seem almost unnecessary. His literary reputation knows no ordinary boundaries. Alongside the praise from his own country, he has also received acclaim from Europe and, in fact, from the civilized world. Even if only one volume of his invaluable works had been published, his name would still be remembered among the top figures who defined the last century.

In the words of Professor Stewart, it may be said, that,—of the intellectual gifts and attainments by which he was so eminently distinguished;—of the originality and comprehensiveness of his views; the extent, the variety, and the correctness of his information; the inexhaustible fertility of his invention; and the ornaments which his rich and beautiful imagination had borrowed from classical culture;—he has left behind him lasting monuments.

In the words of Professor Stewart, it can be said that—of the intellectual gifts and accomplishments that made him so remarkably distinguished;—of the originality and thoroughness of his ideas; the breadth, diversity, and accuracy of his knowledge; the endless creativity of his imagination; and the elements that his rich and beautiful imagination drew from classical culture;—he has left behind lasting legacies.

One observation more may he added to what is now said on his writings, that, whatever be the nature of his subject, he seldom misses an opportunity of indulging his curiosity, in tracing, from the principles of human nature, or from the circumstances of society, the origin of the opinions and the institutions which he describes.

One more thing to note about his writings is that, no matter the topic, he rarely passes up a chance to satisfy his curiosity by exploring, whether from the principles of human nature or the context of society, the roots of the beliefs and institutions he talks about.

With regard to the private character of this amiable and enlightened philosopher, it fortunately happens, that the most certain of all testimonies to his private worth may be found in the confidence, respect, and attachment which followed him through all the various relations of life. There were many peculiarities, indeed, both in his manners and in his intellectual habits; but to those who knew him, these peculiarities, so far from detracting from the respect which his abilities commanded, added an irresistible charm to his conversation, and strongly displayed the artless simplicity of his heart. The comprehensive speculations with which he had always been occupied, and the variety of materials which his own invention continually supplied to his thoughts, rendered him habitually inattentive to familiar objects, and to common occurrences. On this account, he was remarkable, throughout the whole of life, for speaking to himself when alone, and for being so absent in company, as, on some occasions, to exceed almost what the fancy of a Bruyere could imagine. In company, he was apt to be engrossed by his studies; and appeared, at times, by the motion of his lips, as well as by his looks and gestures, to be in the fervour of composition. It was observed, that he rarely started a topic himself, or even fell in easily with the common dialogue of conversation. When he did speak, however, he was somewhat apt to[Pg xvi] convey his ideas in the form of a lecture; but this never proceeded from a wish to engross the discourse, or to gratify his vanity. His own inclination disposed him so strongly to enjoy, in silence, the gaiety of those around him, that his friends were often led to concert little schemes, in order to bring on the subjects most likely to interest him.

Regarding the private nature of this friendly and thoughtful philosopher, it’s fortunate that the strongest evidence of his personal value can be found in the trust, respect, and affection that followed him through all aspects of life. He certainly had some quirks, both in his behavior and intellectual habits; however, for those who knew him, these quirks didn't diminish the respect his abilities earned but instead added an undeniable charm to his conversations and highlighted the genuine simplicity of his heart. The broad ideas he was always exploring, along with the diverse inspirations his imagination constantly produced, made him often oblivious to everyday things and common events. Because of this, he was known throughout his life for talking to himself when alone and for being so distracted in social settings that, at times, he seemed almost beyond what even a creative mind like Bruyere could dream up. In social situations, he tended to get lost in his studies and sometimes appeared, through the movement of his lips as well as his expressions and gestures, to be in the heat of writing. It was noted that he rarely initiated a topic himself or easily engaged with the usual flow of conversation. However, when he did speak, he often tended to express his thoughts in a lecture-like manner, but this was never out of a desire to dominate the discussion or to feed his ego. He preferred to enjoy the merriment around him in silence so much that his friends often devised little plans to bring up topics that would most capture his interest.


SHORT VIEW

OF THE

DOCTRINE OF SMITH, COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE
FRENCH ECONOMISTS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF M. GARNIER.

The ancient philosophers were little accustomed to employ themselves in the observation of those laws which regulate the distribution of riches among the different orders of society in a nation, or in the search after the sources of the increase of its wealth. In fact, political economy is a science of very modern origin; for although, towards the end of the seventeenth century, several writers, both of France and England, had begun to discuss the comparative advantages of agriculture and commerce, yet it was not till the middle of the eighteenth, that any thing like a complete system appeared upon the growth and distribution of national wealth. At this period, the philosophical Quesnai directed his attention to this very abstract subject, and became the founder of a celebrated school, which may boast among its adherents many distinguished men of talents and extensive knowledge.

The ancient philosophers weren’t really focused on observing the laws that govern how wealth is distributed among different social classes in a nation, or on exploring the sources of its wealth increase. In fact, political economy is a science that emerged quite recently; although, by the end of the seventeenth century, several writers from both France and England had started to talk about the relative benefits of agriculture and commerce, it wasn’t until the middle of the eighteenth century that a comprehensive system regarding the growth and distribution of national wealth came into being. During this time, the philosopher Quesnai turned his attention to this complex topic and became the founder of a well-known school, which counts many talented and knowledgeable individuals among its followers.

All philosophical sects owe their first origin and foundation to the discovery of some great truth; and it is the madness inspiring their members, to deduce every thing from this new discovery, that contributes most to their downfal. Thus it was with the economists. They saw that the original source of all wealth was the soil, and that the labour of its cultivation produced not only the means of subsisting the labourer, but also a neat surplus, which went to the increase of the existing stock: while, on the other hand, the labour applied to the productions of the earth, the labour of manufactures and commerce, can only add to the material a value exactly equal to that expended during the execution of the work; by which means, in the end, this species of labour operates no real change on the total sum of national riches. They perceived that the landed proprietors are the first receivers of the whole wealth of the community; and that, whatever is consumed by those who are not possessed of land, must come, directly or indirectly, from the former; and hence, that these receive wages from the proprietors, and that the circulation of national wealth, is, in fact, only a succession of exchanges between these two classes of men, the proprietors furnishing their wealth, and the non-proprietors giving as an equivalent their labour and industry. They perceived that a tax, being a portion of the national wealth applied to public use, in every instance, however levied, bears finally upon the landed proprietors, inasmuch as they are the distributors of that wealth, either by retrench[Pg xviii]ing their luxuries, or by loading them with an additional expense; and that, therefore, every tax which is not levied directly on the rude produce of the earth, falls in the end on the landed proprietors, with a surplus produce, from which the amount of the revenue receives no addition.

All philosophical groups trace their beginnings to the discovery of a significant truth, and it’s the extreme enthusiasm of their members to derive everything from this new insight that often leads to their downfall. This was the case with the economists. They recognized that the source of all wealth is the land and that the labor involved in cultivating it not only provides for the laborer’s needs but also generates a surplus that contributes to overall wealth. In contrast, the labor used in producing goods and services—manufacturing and trade—adds value equal to what was spent in the process, meaning this type of labor ultimately doesn't really change the total amount of a nation's wealth. They understood that landowners are the primary recipients of the community's wealth, and anything consumed by those who do not own land must come, either directly or indirectly, from them. Therefore, these individuals earn wages from the landowners, and the flow of national wealth is essentially a series of exchanges between these two groups: landowners providing their wealth and non-landowners offering their labor and efforts in return. They also realized that a tax, being a portion of the national wealth used for public purposes, ultimately impacts landowners, regardless of how it is imposed, since they are the ones distributing that wealth—either by cutting back on their luxuries or taking on additional costs. Thus, every tax not directly imposed on the raw produce of the land ultimately falls on landowners, with a surplus from which the revenue doesn’t gain any increase.

These assertions are almost all incontestible, and capable of a rigorous demonstration; and those who have attempted to shew their falsity, have, in general, opposed them only with idle sophistry. Why, then, has this doctrine met with so little success, and why does every day diminish its reputation? because it agrees in no one point with the moral condition, either of societies or of individuals; because it is continually contradicted by experience, and by the infallible instinct of self-interest; because it does not possess that indispensible sanction of all truths, utility. In fact, of what consequence is it, that the labour of agriculture produces not only what covers its own expenses, but new beings which would never have existed without it, and that it has this advantage over the labour of manufactures and commerce? Does it by any means follow from this, that the former kind of labour is more profitable to the community than the latter? The real essence of all wealth, and that which determines its value, is the necessity under which the consumer lies to purchase it; for, in truth, there is no such thing as wealth properly so called, nor absolute value; but the words wealth and value are really nothing more than the co-relatives of consumption and demand. Even the necessaries of life, in a country which is inhabited, but incapable of commercial intercourse, will not form wealth; and to whatever degree of civilization that country may have reached, still the same principle will hold without alteration. If the sum of national wealth shall in any case have exceeded the sum of demands, then a part of the former sum will cease to bear the name of wealth, and will again be without value. In vain, then, will agriculture multiply her produce; for the instant that it exceeds the bounds of actual consumption, a part will lose its value; and self-interest, that prime director of all labour and industry, seeing herself thus deceived in her expectations, will not fail to turn her activity and efforts to another quarter.

These statements are almost all indisputable and can be rigorously demonstrated; those who have tried to prove them wrong generally just used empty arguments. So, why has this idea struggled to gain acceptance, and why does its reputation decline every day? Because it doesn't align in any way with the moral condition of societies or individuals; it's constantly contradicted by experience and the undeniable instinct of self-interest; and it lacks the essential validation of all truths, utility. In fact, what does it matter that agricultural work not only covers its own costs but also creates new beings that wouldn’t exist without it, giving it an advantage over manufacturing and commerce? Does this mean that agricultural work is more beneficial to the community than the latter? The true essence of all wealth and what determines its value is the necessity for the consumer to buy it; because, in reality, there is no such thing as true wealth or absolute value. The terms wealth and value are really just related to consumption and demand. Even the essentials of life in a populated but commercially isolated country won’t constitute wealth; and no matter how advanced that country's civilization might be, the same principle applies without change. If the total national wealth ever exceeds the total of demands, then part of that wealth will no longer be considered wealth and will lose its value. In vain will agriculture try to increase its production; for the moment it goes beyond actual consumption, part of it will lose its value. And self-interest, the driving force of all labor and industry, seeing this disappointment in its expectations, will surely redirect its efforts elsewhere.

In almost every instance, it is an idle refinement to distinguish between the labour of those employed in agriculture, and of those employed in manufactures and commerce; for wealth is necessarily the result of both descriptions of labour, and consumption can no more take place independently of the one, than it can independently of the other. It is by their simultaneous concurrence that any thing becomes consumable, and, of course, that it comes to constitute wealth. How then are we entitled to compare their respective products, since it is impossible to distinguish these in the joint product, and thus appreciate the separate value of each? The value of growing wheat results as much from the industry of the reaper who gathers it in, of the thrasher who separates it from the chaff and straw, of the miller and baker who convert it successively into flour and bread, as it does from that of the ploughman and of the sower. Without the labour of the weaver, the raw material of flax would lose all its value, and be regarded as no way superior to the most useless weed that grows. What then can we gain by any attempts to determine which of these two species of labour conduces most to the advancement of national wealth; or, are they not as idle, as if we busied ourselves in inquiring, whether the right or the left foot is the most useful in walking?

In almost every case, it’s pointless to try to distinguish between the work done in agriculture and the work done in manufacturing and commerce. Wealth comes from both types of labor, and consumption can’t happen without one or the other. It’s their combined effort that makes anything consumable, and that’s how it becomes part of wealth. So how can we compare the products of each when we can’t separate them in the overall result and therefore can’t appreciate the individual value? The value of wheat comes not just from the farmer who plants it but also from the reaper who harvests it, the thrasher who separates it from the chaff and straw, and the miller and baker who turn it into flour and bread. Without the weaver, the raw flax would lose all its value and be seen as no better than the most useless weed. So what do we really gain by trying to figure out which type of labor contributes more to national wealth? It’s just as pointless as asking whether our right or left foot is more useful for walking.

It is true, indeed, that in every species of manufacture, the workman adds to the value of the raw material a value exactly equal to that which was expended during the process of manufacture; and what is the conclusion we are to draw this? It is merely, that a certain exchange has taken place[Pg xix] and that the food consumed by the manufacturer is now represented by the increase of value resulting from his manual labour. Thus wool, when converted into cloth, has gained a value precisely equal to that expended by the manufacturer during the conversion. But, if it is shown that, without this exchange, the wool would have remained without value, while, on the other hand, the food of the manufacturer would have been without a consumer; it will then appear, that this exchange has, in fact, done what is equivalent to creating these two values, and that it has proved to the society an operation infinitely more useful, than if an equal quantity of labour had been spent in the increase of that rude produce, which already existed in overabundance. The first description of labour has been truly productive; while the last would have been altogether unproductive, since it would not have created any value.

It's true that in every kind of manufacturing, the worker adds to the value of the raw material an amount equal to what was spent during the manufacturing process. So, what conclusion can we draw from this? It's simply that an exchange has occurred[Pg xix] and that the food consumed by the manufacturer is now reflected in the increased value from his manual labor. For instance, when wool is turned into cloth, its value increases by exactly what the manufacturer invested during that process. However, if we show that without this exchange, the wool would have been worthless, while the manufacturer's food would have had no consumer, it becomes clear that this exchange has effectively created these two values. It has proven to be a much more beneficial operation for society than if an equal amount of labor had been used to grow more of something that was already in excess. The first type of labor is genuinely productive, whereas the latter would have been entirely unproductive, as it wouldn't have created any value.

'The soil,' say the economists, 'is the source of all wealth.' But, to prevent this assertion from leading us into erroneous conclusions, it will be necessary to explain it. The materials of all wealth originate primarily in the bosom of the earth; but it is only by the aid of labour that they can ever truly constitute wealth. The earth furnishes the means of wealth; but wealth itself cannot possibly have any existence, unless through that industry and labour which modifies, divides, connects, and combines the various productions of the soil, so as to render them fit for consumption. Commerce, indeed, regards those rude productions as real wealth; but it is only from the consideration, that the proprietor has it always in his power to convert them, at will, into consumable goods, by submitting them to the necessary operations of manufacture. They possess, as yet, merely the virtual value of a promissory-note, which passes current, because the bearer is assured that he can, at pleasure, convert it into cash. Many gold mines, which are well known, are not worked, because their whole produce would not cover the incidental expenses; but the gold which they contain is, in reality, the same with that of our coin; and yet no one would be foolish enough to call it wealth, for there is no probability it will ever be extracted from the mine, or purified; and, of course, it possesses no value. The wild fowl becomes wealth the moment it is in the possession of the sportsman; while those of the very same species, that have escaped his attempts, remain without any title to the term.

"The soil," say the economists, "is the source of all wealth." However, to avoid drawing incorrect conclusions from this statement, we need to clarify it. The materials for all wealth come primarily from the earth; but it is only through labor that they can truly become wealth. The earth provides the means for wealth; however, wealth itself cannot exist without the industry and labor that modify, divide, connect, and combine the various products of the soil to make them suitable for consumption. Commerce considers those raw products as real wealth; but this is only because the owner has the ability to convert them into consumable goods whenever they want, by subjecting them to the necessary manufacturing processes. They hold only the potential value of a promissory note, which circulates because the holder knows they can convert it into cash whenever they choose. Many known gold mines remain untapped because their entire output wouldn’t even cover the operating costs; yet the gold within them is actually the same as our currency. Still, no one would be foolish enough to call it wealth, since it is unlikely to ever be extracted or refined, and therefore, it has no value. The wild fowl becomes wealth the moment it is in the possession of the hunter, while those of the same species that evade capture hold no claim to the term.

It is further, without question, true, that all who do not possess property in land must draw their subsistence from wages received, directly or indirectly, from the proprietors, unless they violate all rights, and become robbers. In this respect, every service is alike; the most honourable and the most disgraceful receives each its wages. It is certain, too, that if the circumstances determining the rate of the various kinds of wages remain the same, that is if the offers of service, and the demand, preserve the same proportion to each other, after as well as before the imposition of a tax; then, of course, the wages will continue at the same rate, and thus the tax, however imposed, will uniformly, in the end, fall on that class in the community who furnish the wages; so that they must suffer, either an addition to their former expenses, or a retrenchment of those luxuries they enjoyed. And according as the tax is less directly levied, the greater will be the burden they are subjected to; for besides indemnifying all the other classes who have advanced the tax-money, a further expense must be incurred, in the additional number of persons now necessary to collect it. The natural conclusion we must draw from the theory is, that a tax, directly levied on the neat revenue of the land proprietors, is that which agrees best with reason and justice, and that which bears lightest on the contributors.[Pg xx]

It's also true, without a doubt, that anyone who doesn't own land has to make a living from wages, directly or indirectly, provided by the property owners, unless they choose to ignore all rights and become thieves. In this sense, all services are the same; both the most honorable and the most disgraceful receive their wages. It's also clear that if the factors affecting the different types of wages stay the same—meaning if the supply of labor and the demand remain in the same ratio, both before and after a tax is imposed—then wages will stay at the same rate. Thus, the tax, no matter how it's implemented, will ultimately fall on the part of the community that provides the wages. This means they'll either face higher costs or have to cut back on the luxuries they once enjoyed. The less direct the tax is levied, the heavier the burden they'll face; in addition to compensating the other groups that provided the tax funds, there will be extra costs from hiring more people to collect it. The obvious conclusion from this reasoning is that a tax directly charged on the net income of landowners is the most rational and fair approach and puts the least strain on those contributing.[Pg xx]

If, however, this theory should be found to throw entirely out of consideration a multitude of circumstances, which possess a powerful influence over the facility of collecting a tax, as well an over its consequences; and if the general result of this influence be of far more importance than the single advantage of a less burden; then the theory, inasmuch as it neglects a part of those particulars which have their weight in the practice, is contradicted by this last. And this is exactly what happens in the question respecting the comparative advantages and inconveniencies of the two modes of levying taxes.

If this theory turns out to ignore many circumstances that strongly affect how easy it is to collect a tax and its consequences, and if the overall impact of these circumstances is far more significant than the simple benefit of a lighter burden, then the theory is contradicted because it overlooks important details that matter in practice. This is precisely what happens when we consider the pros and cons of the two methods of collecting taxes.

The habit which men have acquired, of viewing money as the representation of every thing which contributes to the support or comfort of life, makes them naturally very unwilling to part with what portion of it they possess, unless it be to procure some necessary or enjoyment. We spend money with pleasure, but it requires an effort to pay a debt, and particularly so when the value received in exchange is not very obvious to the generality, as in the case of a tax. But by levying the tax on some object of consumption, by thus confounding it with the price of the latter, and by making the payment of the duty and of the price of enjoyment become one and the same act, we render the consumer desirous to pay the impost. It is amid the profusion of entertainments, that the duties on wine, salt, &c. are paid; the public treasury thus finding a source of gain in the excitements to expense produced by the extravagance and gaiety of feasts.

The way people see money as a representation of everything that supports or comforts life makes them really reluctant to let go of what they have unless it's for something necessary or enjoyable. We spend money happily, but paying back a debt requires effort, especially when the value we get in return isn't obvious to most people, like with taxes. However, by taxing something people consume, mixing it with its purchase price, and making the payment for the tax and the cost of enjoyment one and the same act, we make consumers more willing to pay the tax. It’s during the abundance of entertainment that taxes on wine, salt, etc., are paid; the public treasury finds a source of income in the spending thrills generated by the extravagance and fun of celebrations.

Another advantage of the same nature, possessed by the indirect mode of taxation, is its extreme divisibility into minute parts, and the facility which it affords to the individual, of paying it off day by day, or even minute by minute. Thus the mechanic, who sups on a portion of his day's wages, will sometimes in one quarter of an hour, pay part of four or five different duties.

Another benefit of the same kind that comes with indirect taxation is how easily it can be divided into small amounts, allowing individuals to pay it off day by day, or even minute by minute. For example, a worker who spends part of their daily earnings may end up paying several different taxes in just a quarter of an hour.

In the plan of direct taxation, the impost appears without any disguise; it comes upon us unexpectedly, from the imprudence so common to the bulk of mankind, and never fails to carry with it constraint and discouragement.

In direct taxation, the tax is clear and upfront; it hits us out of nowhere due to the common carelessness of most people, and it always brings along feelings of pressure and discouragement.

All these considerations are overlooked by the friends of direct taxation; and yet their importance must be well known to all who have ever attended to the art of governing men.

All these points are ignored by the supporters of direct taxation; yet their significance must be clear to anyone who has ever engaged in the art of governing people.

But, perhaps, this is not all. An indirect tax, by increasing from time to time the price of the objects of general consumption, when the members of the community have contracted the habit of this consumption, renders these objects a little more costly, and thus gives birth to that increase of labour and industry which is now required to obtain them. But if this tax be so proportioned as not to discourage the consumption, will it not then operate as a universal stimulus upon the active and industrious part of the community? Will it not incite that part to redoubled efforts, by which it may still enjoy those luxuries which, by habit, have become almost necessaries, and, of course, produce a further developement of the productive powers of labour, and of the resources of industry? Are we not, in such a case, to conclude, that after the imposition of a tax, there will exist not only the quantity of labour and industry which was formerly requisite to procure the necessaries and habitual enjoyments of the active class of mankind, but also such an addition to this, as will suffice for the payment of the tax? And will not this tax, or increase of produce required for the tax—as it is spent by the government that receives it—will it not serve to support a new class of consumers, requiring a variety of commodities which the impost enables them to pay? If these conjectures are well founded, it will follow, that indirect taxation, far from having any hurtful influence on wealth and population, must, when wisely regulated, tend to increase and strengthen these two great foundations of national prosperity and power. And it will tend to do this, inasmuch as it bears imme[Pg xxi]diately on the body of the people, and operates on the working and industrious class, which forms the active part of the community; while, on the other hand, direct taxation operates solely on the idle class of landed proprietors—which furnishes us with the characteristic difference existing between these two modes of taxation.[5] These hints, which seem to afford an explanation of that most extraordinary phenomenon in political economy, viz. the rapid and prodigious increase of wealth in those nations which are most loaded with indirect taxes, deserve to be discussed at greater length than our limits will allow. Enough, however, has been said to shew, that no rigorous and purely mathematical calculation will ever enable us to appreciate the real influence of taxes upon the prosperity of a nation. Thus, some of the truths perceived by the economists are of little use in practice; while others are found to be contradicted in their application, by those accessory circumstances which were overlooked in the calculations of the theory.

But maybe that's not everything. When an indirect tax raises the price of everyday items over time, especially when people have gotten used to buying them, it makes those items a bit more expensive. This leads to an increase in labor and effort needed to obtain them. If the tax is set at a level that doesn't discourage consumption, won't it act as a universal motivator for the hardworking members of society? Won't it push them to work harder so they can still enjoy those luxuries that have become almost necessities? This, in turn, would boost the productivity of labor and the resources of industry. In that case, after a tax is imposed, won't there be not only the amount of labor and effort that was previously needed for the basics and everyday comforts, but also an extra amount to cover the tax? And won't this tax, or the increased production needed to pay it—once it's spent by the government—support a new group of consumers who require a range of goods that they can afford because of this tax? If these ideas hold true, then it follows that indirect taxation, instead of harming wealth and population, could actually help increase and strengthen these two key pillars of national prosperity and power when managed wisely. This is because it directly impacts the general public and affects the working class, which is the active part of society; in contrast, direct taxation only affects the idle class of landowners. This highlights the key difference between these two types of taxes. These observations provide insight into the remarkable trend seen in political economy—the rapid and tremendous growth of wealth in countries burdened with indirect taxes—and deserve more in-depth discussion than we can cover here. However, it's clear that no strict mathematical formula can truly quantify the real impact of taxes on a nation's prosperity. As a result, some insights from economists prove less useful in practice, while others are contradicted by the additional factors that were ignored in theoretical calculations.

While this sect of philosophers filled all Europe with their speculations, an observer of more depth and ability directed his researches to the same subject, and laboured to establish, on a true and lasting foundation, the doctrines of political economy.

While this group of philosophers filled all of Europe with their theories, a more insightful and capable observer focused his studies on the same topic, working to establish the principles of political economy on a solid and enduring foundation.

Dr. Smith succeeded in discovering a great truth,—the most fruitful in consequences, the most useful in practice, the origin of all the principles of the science, and one which unveiled to him all the mysteries of the growth and distribution of wealth. This great man perceived, that the universal agent in the creation of wealth is labour; and was thence led to analyse the powers of this agent, and to search after the causes to which they owe their origin and increase.

Dr. Smith discovered a significant truth—it’s the most impactful in terms of consequences, the most practical, the foundation of all scientific principles, and it revealed to him all the mysteries behind the growth and distribution of wealth. This remarkable individual realized that the universal factor in wealth creation is labor; from there, he began to analyze the capabilities of this factor and investigate the reasons behind its origin and growth.

The great difference between the doctrine of Smith and of the economists, lies in the point from which they set out, in the reduction of their consequences. The latter go back to the soil as the primary source of all wealth; while the former regards labour as the universal agent which, in every case, produces it. It will appear, at first sight, how very superior the school of the Scotch professor is to that of the French philosophers, with regard to the practical utility, as well as to the application of its precepts. Labour is a power of which man is the machine; and, of course, the increase of this power can only be limited by the indefinite bounds of human intelligence and industry; and it possesses, like these faculties, a susceptibility of being directed by design, and perfected by the aid of study. The earth, on the contrary, if we set aside the influence which labour has over the nature and quantity of its productions, is totally out of our power, in every respect which can render it more or less useful—in its extent, in its situation, and in its physical properties.

The main difference between Smith's ideas and those of other economists lies in where they start and how they draw their conclusions. The latter view the soil as the basic source of all wealth, while Smith sees labor as the universal force that creates it in every situation. At first glance, it seems that the Scottish professor's school is much more practical and applicable than that of the French philosophers. Labor is a force that humans control, and the only limits to increasing this power are the endless capabilities of human intelligence and effort. Like these abilities, labor can be directed by intention and improved through education. In contrast, the earth, aside from the way labor affects the nature and quantity of what it produces, is completely beyond our control in terms of making it more or less useful—its size, location, and physical properties are fixed.

Thus the science of political economy, considered according to the view of the French economists, must be classed with the natural sciences, which are purely speculative, and can have no other end than the knowledge of the laws which regulate the object of their researches; while, viewed according to the doctrine of Smith, political economy becomes connected with the other moral sciences, which tend to ameliorate the condition of their object, and to carry it to the highest perfection of which it is susceptible.

So, according to the perspective of the French economists, the study of political economy should be grouped with the natural sciences, which are entirely theoretical and aim solely to understand the laws governing their subjects. In contrast, when considered through the lens of Smith's doctrine, political economy aligns with other moral sciences, which seek to improve the conditions of their subjects and help them reach their highest potential.

A few words will suffice to explain the grounds of the doctrine of Smith. The power by which a nation creates its wealth is its labour; and the quantity of wealth created will increase in direct proportion as the power increases.[Pg xxii] But the increase of this last may take place in two ways—in energy, and in extent. Labour increases in energy, when the same quantity of labour furnishes a more abundant product; and the two great means of effecting the increase, or of perfecting the productive powers of labour, are the division of labour, and the invention of such machines as shorten and facilitate the manual operations of industry. Labour increases in extent, when the number of those engaged in it augments in proportion to the increasing number of the consumers, which can take place only in consequence of an increase of capitals, and of those branches of business in which they are employed.

A few words are enough to explain the basis of Smith's theory. The source of a nation’s wealth is its labor, and the amount of wealth created will grow in direct proportion to the power behind it.[Pg xxii] This power can increase in two ways—through energy and through extent. Labor increases in energy when the same amount of work produces a greater output, and the two main ways to achieve this or enhance the productivity of labor are the division of labor and the development of machines that make manual work easier and faster. Labor increases in extent when more people are engaged in it in line with the growing number of consumers, which can only happen due to an increase in capital and the types of businesses where it is used.

Now, to accomplish the increase of labour in both these ways, and to conduct it gradually to the utmost pitch of energy and extent to which it can reach in any nation, considering the situation, the nature, and the peculiarities of its territories, what are the exertions to be made by its government? The subdivision of labour, and the invention and perfecting of machines. These two great means of augmenting the energy of labour, advance in proportion to the extent of the market, or, in other words, in proportion to the number of exchanges which can be made, and to the ease and readiness with which these can take place. Let the government, then, direct all its attention to the enlargement of the market, by forming safe and convenient roads, by the circulation of sterling coin, and by securing the faithful fulfilment of contracts; all of which are indispensible measures, at the same time that, when put in practice, they will never fail to attain the desired end. And the nearer a government approaches to perfection in each of these three points, the more certainly will it produce every possible increase of the national market. The first of the three means is, without doubt, the most essential, as no other expedient whatever can possibly supply its place.

To achieve an increase in labor through both methods and to gradually maximize its energy and extent in any nation, considering the unique situations and characteristics of its land, what efforts should its government make? The division of labor and the development and refinement of machines. These two key ways of enhancing labor efficiency grow in relation to the size of the market, or in other words, relative to the number of transactions that can happen and how easily and quickly they can occur. Therefore, the government should focus on expanding the market by creating safe and convenient roads, by promoting the use of stable currency, and by ensuring the reliable enforcement of contracts; all of these are essential measures that, when implemented, will invariably achieve the desired outcome. The closer a government gets to excellence in each of these three areas, the more certainly it will generate every possible increase in the national market. The first of these three means is undoubtedly the most crucial, as there is no other strategy that can effectively replace it.

The gradual accumulation of capitals is a necessary consequence of the increased productive powers of labour, and it becomes also a cause of still farther increase in these powers; but, in proportion as this accumulation becomes greater and greater, it serves to increase the extent of labour, inasmuch as it multiplies the number of labourers, or the sum of national industry. This increase, however, of the number of hands in the nation employed, will always be regulated by the nature of the business to which the capitals are dedicated.

The gradual buildup of capital is a necessary result of the growing productivity of labor, and it also leads to an even greater increase in these capabilities. However, as this accumulation grows, it expands the scope of labor by increasing the number of workers or the total national industry. Still, this rise in the number of people working in the country will always depend on the type of business for which the capital is used.

Under this second head of the increase of the products of labour, the exertions of government are much more easy. In fact, it has only to refrain from doing harm. It is only required of it, that it shall protect the natural liberty of industry; that it shall leave open every channel into which, by its own tendencies, industry may be carried; that government shall abandon it to its own direction, and shall not attempt to point its efforts one way more than another; for private interest, that infallible instinct which guides the exertions of all industry, is infinitely better suited than any legislator to judge of the direction which it will with most advantage follow. Let government, then, renounce alike the system of prohibitions and of bounties; let it no longer attempt to impede the efforts of industry by regulations, or to accelerate her progress by rewards; let it leave in the most perfect freedom the exertions of labour and the employment of capital; let its protecting influence extend only to the removal of such obstacles as avarice or ignorance have raised up to the unlimited liberty of industry and commerce;—then capitals will naturally develope themselves, by their own movement, in those directions which are at once most agreeable to the private interest of the capitalist, and most favourable to the increase of the national wealth.

Under this second aspect of increasing the productivity of labor, government efforts are much easier. In fact, it just needs to avoid causing harm. All that’s required is that it protects the natural freedom of industry; that it keeps open every avenue through which, by its own nature, industry may flow; that the government steps back and allows it to find its own path, without trying to steer its efforts in one direction over another; because private interest, that reliable instinct guiding all industry, is far better suited than any politician to determine the most beneficial direction to take. So, let the government give up both the system of restrictions and incentives; let it stop trying to hinder industry through regulations, or to speed up its progress with rewards; let it allow the efforts of labor and the use of capital to operate in complete freedom; let its protective role be limited to removing obstacles created by greed or ignorance that block the unrestricted liberty of industry and commerce—then capital will naturally develop on its own in ways that are both most appealing to the private interests of the capitalists and most beneficial for the nation’s wealth.

METHOD OF FACILITATING THE STUDY OF
DR. SMITH'S WORK.

Such are the results of the doctrine of Smith, and the fruits we are to reap from his immortal work. The proofs of the principle upon which his opinions are grounded, and the natural and easy manner in which his deductions flow from it, give it an air of simplicity and truth, which render it no less admirable than convincing. This simplicity, however, to be fully perceived, requires much study and consideration; for it cannot be denied that the 'Wealth of Nations' exhibits a striking instance of that defect for which English authors have so often been blamed, viz. a want of method, and a neglect, in their scientific works, of those divisions and arrangements which serve to assist the memory of the reader, and to guide his understanding. The author seems to have seized the pen at the moment when he was most elevated with the importance of his subject, and with the extent of his discoveries. He begins, by displaying before the eyes of his reader the innumerable wonders effected by the division of labour; and with this magnificent and impressive picture, he opens his course of instructions. He then goes back, to consider those circumstances which give rise to or limit this division; and is led by his subject to the definition of values—to the laws which regulate them, to the analysis of their several elements, and to the relations subsisting between those of different natures and origin; all of which are preliminary ideas, which ought naturally to have been explained to the reader before exhibiting to him the complicated instrument of the multiplication of wealth, or unveiling the prodigies of the most powerful of its resources.

These are the outcomes of Smith's ideas and the benefits we can gain from his timeless work. The evidence of the principles behind his views and the clear, logical way his conclusions stem from them give his work an impression of simplicity and truth that makes it both impressive and persuasive. However, to truly appreciate this simplicity requires a lot of study and thought, as it cannot be denied that the 'Wealth of Nations' presents a striking example of the criticism often aimed at English authors: a lack of structure and a disregard for the divisions and organization that help readers remember and understand the content. It seems the author picked up the pen when he was most inspired by the significance of his topic and the breadth of his findings. He starts by showcasing the countless wonders achieved through the division of labor; with this grand and striking illustration, he begins his teaching. He then steps back to examine the factors that create or restrict this division, leading him to define values, explore the laws that govern them, analyze their various components, and understand the relationships between those of different types and origins— all essential concepts that should have been explained to the reader before introducing the complex mechanisms of wealth multiplication or revealing the astonishing capabilities of its most powerful resources.

On the other hand, he has often introduced long digressions, which interrupt the thread of his discussion, and, in many cases, completely destroy the connection of its several parts. Of this description is the digression

On the other hand, he has often included long side notes that interrupt the flow of his discussion and, in many cases, completely break the connection between its different parts. One example of this is the side note

On the variations in the value of the precious metals during the four last centuries, with a critical examination of the opinions that their value is decreasing—book 1, chap. xi.

On the changes in the value of precious metals over the past four centuries, with a critical look at the views that their value is declining—book 1, chap. xi.

Upon banks of circulation and paper money—book 2, chap. ii.

Upon the banks of circulation and paper money—book 2, chap. ii.

Upon banks of deposit, and particularly that of Amsterdam—book 4, chap. iii.

Upon banks of deposit, especially the one in Amsterdam—book 4, chap. iii.

Upon the advantage of seignorage in the coining of money—book 4, chap. vi.

Upon the benefits of seigniorage in producing currency—book 4, chap. vi.

Upon the commerce of grain, and the laws regarding this trade—book 4, chap. v.

Upon the trade of grain and the laws governing this business—book 4, chap. v.

These different treatises, although they are unquestionably the best that have ever been written on the subjects to which they relate, are, however, so introduced, as to distract the reader's attention—to make him lose sight of the principal object of the work—and to lessen the general effect of it as a whole.

These different writings, while undoubtedly the best ever created on their respective topics, are presented in a way that distracts the reader's focus—making them lose sight of the main purpose of the work—and diminishes its overall impact.

To remedy, as far as I am able, these inconveniencies, and to facilitate to beginners the study of the doctrine of Smith, I have thought proper to point out the order which appears to me most agreeable to the natural progress of ideas, and, on this account, best calculated for the purpose of instruction.

To address, as best as I can, these issues and to help beginners learn Smith's teachings, I've decided to outline the order that seems most in line with the natural flow of ideas and, for this reason, is most effective for teaching.

I would begin by remarking, that the whole doctrine of Smith, upon the origin, multiplication, and distribution of wealth, is contained in his two first books; and that the three others may be read separately, as so many detach[Pg xxiv]ed treatises, which, no doubt, confirm and develope his opinions, but do not by any means add to them.

I want to point out that Smith's entire theory about the origin, growth, and distribution of wealth is in his first two books. The other three can be read independently as separate essays that certainly support and expand his views, but they don't really introduce anything new.

The third book is an historical and political discussion on the progress which wealth would make in a country where labour and industry were left free; and upon the different causes which have tended, in all the countries of Europe, to reverse this progress.

The third book is a historical and political discussion about the advancement that wealth could achieve in a country where labor and industry are given freedom; and about the various factors that have worked, in all the countries of Europe, to hinder this progress.

In the fourth book, the author has endeavoured to combat the various systems of political economy which were popular previous to his time; and, in a particular manner, that which is denominated the mercantile system, which has exercised so strong an influence over the financial regulations of the European governments, and particularly over those of England.

In the fourth book, the author has tried to challenge the different political economy systems that were popular before his time; specifically, the one known as the mercantile system, which has had a significant impact on the financial policies of European governments, especially those of England.

In the fifth and last book, he considers the expenses of government; the most equitable and convenient modes of providing for these expenses; and lastly, public debts, and the influence they have over national prosperity.

In the fifth and final book, he looks into the costs of government; the fairest and easiest ways to cover these costs; and finally, public debts and how they affect national prosperity.

The three last books may be read and studied in the same order and arrangement in which they were written, without any difficulty, by one who is completely master of the general doctrine contained in the two first.

The last three books can be read and studied in the same order they were written, without any trouble, by someone who fully understands the overall concepts presented in the first two.

I regard, then, the two first books, as a complete work, which I would divide into three parts.

I consider the first two books to be a complete work, which I would divide into three parts.

The 1st relates to values in particular. It contains their definition; the laws which regulate them; the analysis of the elements which constitute a value, or enter into its composition; and the relations which values of different origin bear to each other.

The 1st focuses specifically on values. It includes their definition, the laws that govern them, an analysis of the elements that make up a value, and the relationships between values of different origins.

The 2d part treats of the general mass of national wealth, which is here divided into separate classes, according to its destination or employment.

The second part discusses the overall amount of national wealth, which is divided into different categories based on its purpose or use.

The 3d and last part explains the manner in which the growth and distribution of national wealth takes place.

The third and final part explains how national wealth grows and gets distributed.

PART FIRST.—OF VALUES IN PARTICULAR.

The essential quality which constitutes wealth, and without which it would not be entitled to the name, is its exchangeable value.

The key quality that defines wealth, and without which it wouldn't deserve that title, is its exchangeable value.

Exchangeable value differs from the value of utility—book 1, end of chap. iv.

Exchangeable value is different from the value of utility—book 1, end of chap. iv.

The relation existing between two exchangeable values, when expressed by a value generally agreed upon, is denominated price.

The relationship between two exchangeable values, when represented by a value that is widely accepted, is called price.

The value generally agreed on among civilized nations, is that of metals. Motives to this preference. Origin of money—book 1, chap. iv. Relation between money and the metal in the state of bullion—book 1, chap. v.

The value commonly accepted by civilized nations is that of metals. Reasons for this preference. Origin of money—book 1, chap. iv. Relationship between money and metal in the form of bullion—book 1, chap. v.

The price in money, or nominal price of a thing, differs from its real price, which is its valuation by the quantity of labour expended upon it, or which it represents—ibid.

The price in money, or nominal price of something, is different from its real price, which is based on the amount of labor that went into it, or what it represents—ibid.

Laws, according to which the price of wealth is naturally fixed; and those accidental circumstances which occasion the actual to differ from the natural price, and which gave rise to a distinction between the natural and the market price—book 1, chap. vii.

Laws that determine how the value of wealth is set naturally; and those unexpected factors that cause the actual price to differ from the natural price, leading to a distinction between the natural and the market price—book 1, chap. vii.

The price of a thing, in most cases, consists of three distinct elements—the wages of the labour, the profit of the master who directs the labour, and the rent of the ground that furnishes the materials on which it is erected. There are, however, some descriptions of merchandize in which the rent forms no part of the price; and others, in which the profit forms no part of it; but none, in which it is not formed principally by the wages—book 1, chap. vi.

The price of an item, in most cases, includes three main components—the wages paid to the workers, the profit earned by the owner who manages the work, and the cost of the land that provides the materials used in production. However, there are certain types of goods where the cost of the land is not included in the price, and others where the profit is not included; but there are none where the price is not primarily made up of the wages—book 1, chap. vi.

Of wages. Laws, according to which the natural rate of wages is fixed; accidental circumstances which cause them to vary, during a short period, from that natural rate—book 1, chap. viii.[Pg xxv]

Of wages. Laws that determine how the natural rate of wages is established; unexpected events that lead to short-term fluctuations from that natural rate—book 1, chap. viii.[Pg xxv]

Of the profit of capitals. Laws, by which the natural right of profit is fixed; accidental circumstances which, for a long while, increase or diminish it beyond that rate—book 1, chap. ix.

Of the profit of capitals. Laws that establish the natural right to profit; unexpected factors that, for an extended period, either boost or reduce it beyond that rate—book 1, chap. ix.

Labour and capitals tend naturally to diffuse themselves through every species of employment; and, as certain employments are, by their nature, accompanied with inconveniencies and difficulties which do not occur in others, while these, on the contrary, offer some real or imaginary advantages which are peculiar to themselves; wages and profits should rise and fall in proportion to these advantages and disadvantages; thus forming a complete equilibrium between the various kinds of employment. The arbitrary and oppressive policy of Europe, in many instances, opposes the establishment of this equilibrium, which is conformable to the order of nature—book 1, chap. x.

Labor and capital tend to spread themselves across all types of jobs; and since certain jobs naturally come with inconveniences and challenges that others don’t have, while those others might offer some real or imagined benefits unique to them, wages and profits should increase or decrease according to these advantages and disadvantages. This creates a balance among different types of employment. However, the arbitrary and oppressive policies in Europe often prevent this balance from being established, which aligns with the natural order—book 1, chap. x.

Of the rent of the ground. The nature of rent: the manner in which it enters into the price of wealth; and according to what principles it in some cases forms an integral part of that price, while in others it does not—book 1, chap. xi.

Of the rent of the land. The nature of rent: how it factors into the price of goods; and based on what principles it sometimes becomes a key part of that price, while in other cases it does not—book 1, chap. xi.

Division of the rude produce of the earth into two great classes:

Division of the raw products of the earth into two main categories:

1. That produce which is always necessarily disposed of in such a way as to bring a rent to the landed proprietor.

1. That produce is always handled in a way that ensures a return for the landowner.

2. That which, according to circumstances, may be disposed of so as to bring, or so as not to bring, a rent.

2. That which, depending on the situation, can be arranged in a way that generates, or does not generate, rent.

The produce of the first description is derived from the ground appropriated to furnishing subsistence for man, or for those animals which he uses as food. The value of the produce of the ground cultivated for the support of man, determines the value of the produce of all other ground proper for this species of culture. This general rule allows of some exceptions. Causes of these exceptions.

The crops of the first type come from land used to provide food for people or for the animals that people eat. The worth of the crops from the land cultivated for human support sets the value for the crops from all other land suitable for this type of farming. While this is a general rule, there are some exceptions. Reasons for these exceptions.

The produce of the second class consists of the materials of clothing, lodging, fuel, and the ornaments of dress and furniture. The value of this species of produce depends on that of the first description. Some circumstances render it possible that the produce of the second kind may be disposed of in such a way as to furnish a rent to the landed proprietor. Principles which regulate the proportion of the price of these products, which is formed by the rent—book 1, chap. xi.

The products of the second category include clothing materials, housing, fuel, and decorative items for clothing and furniture. The value of these products depends on the value of the first category. Certain conditions make it possible for the products of the second kind to be sold in a way that provides income to the landowner. There are principles that determine how the price of these products is influenced by the rent—book 1, chap. xi.

Relation between the respective values of the produce of the first class, and those of the produce of the second. Variations which may take place in this relation, and the causes of such variations—ibid.

Relation between the respective values of the output of the first class, and those of the output of the second. Changes that may occur in this relationship, and the reasons for such changes—ibid.

Relation existing between the values of the two descriptions of rude produce above mentioned, and the values of the produce of manufacture. Variations which may occur in this relation—ibid.

Relation existing between the values of the two descriptions of raw materials mentioned above, and the values of manufactured goods. Variations that may occur in this relationship—ibid.

Certain kinds of rude produce, procured from very different sources, are, however, intended for the same kind of consumption; and hence it happens, the value of one determines and limits that of another—ibid.

Certain types of rude products, sourced from various places, are, however, meant for the same type of use; and as a result, the value of one affects and restricts that of another—ibid.

The relations between values of different natures vary according to the state of society. This state is improving, declining, or stationary; that is to say, society is either increasing in wealth, or falling into poverty, or remaining in the same unchanged state of opulence.

The relationships between different types of values change based on the state of society. This state is improving, declining, or stationary; meaning society is either growing in wealth, falling into poverty, or staying the same in its level of prosperity.

Of the effects of these different states of society,

Of the effects of these different social states,

Upon the price of wages—book 1, chap. viii.

Upon the price of wages—book 1, chap. viii.

Upon the rate of profit—book 1, chap. ix.

Upon the profit rate—book 1, chap. ix.

Upon the value of the rude produce of the earth, and on that of the produce of manufacture—book 1, chap. xi.

Upon the value of the raw products of the earth and that of manufactured goods—book 1, chap. xi.

Difference, in this respect, between the various kinds of rude produce, viz. 1. Those which the industry of man cannot multiply: 2. Those which his industry can always multiply in proportion to the demand: 3. Those over which human exertions have only an uncertain or limited influence—ibid.

Difference, in this regard, between the different types of raw goods, namely: 1. Those that human effort cannot increase: 2. Those that human effort can always increase in line with demand: 3. Those that human efforts have only an unpredictable or limited impact on—ibid.

PART SECOND.—OF STOCK AND ITS EMPLOYMENT.

Wealth, accumulated in the possession of an individual, is of two descriptions, according to its destination or employment:

Wealth, gathered by an individual, comes in two types, based on its purpose or use:

1. That reserved for immediate consumption.

1. That kept for immediate use.

2. That employed as capital, for the production of a revenue—book 2, chap. i.

2. That used as capital for generating income—book 2, chap. i.

Capital is also of two kinds:

Capital is also of two types:

1. Fixed capital, which produces a revenue and still remains in the same hands

1. Fixed capital, which generates income and still stays in the same ownership

2. Circulating capital, which yields no revenue unless it be employed in trade—book 2 chap. i.

2. Circulating capital doesn’t generate any income unless it’s used in trade—book 2 chap. i.

The whole accumulated wealth of any community may be divided into three parts:

The total wealth of any community can be divided into three parts:

1. The fund appropriated to the immediate consumption of the proprietors of wealth.

1. The money allocated for the immediate use of wealthy owners.

2. The fixed capital of the community.

The community's permanent assets.

3. Its circulating capital.

3. Its operating capital.

The fixed capital of the society consists,

The society's fixed capital consists,

1. Of all machines and instruments of labour;

1. Of all machines and tools for work;

2. Of all buildings and edifices erected for the purposes of industry;

2. Of all the buildings and structures built for industrial purposes;

3. Of every kind of agricultural improvement which can tend to render the soil more productive;

3. Of every type of agricultural improvement that can make the soil more productive;

4. Of the talents and skill which certain members of the community have acquired by time and expense.

4. Of the talents and skills that some members of the community have gained through time and investment.

The circulating capital of a community consists,

The community’s circulating capital consists,

1. In the money in circulation;

1. In the money in circulation;

2. In the stock of provisions in the hands both of the producers and of the merchants, and from the sale of which they expect to derive a profit;

2. In the inventory of supplies held by both the producers and the merchants, from which they hope to make a profit;

3. In the materials of lodging, clothing, dress, and ornament, more or less manufactured, which are in the hands of those who are employed in rendering them fit for use and consumption;

3. In the materials for housing, clothing, attire, and decoration, which are somewhat processed, that are handled by those who are responsible for making them suitable for use and consumption;

4. In the goods more completely fit for consumption, and preserved in warehouses and shops, by merchants who propose to sell them with a profit—book 2, chap. i.

4. In the products that are better suited for consumption and stored in warehouses and shops by merchants aiming to sell them for a profit—book 2, chap. i.

Of the relation existing between the employment of these two kinds of capital—ibid.

Of the relationship between the use of these two types of capital—ibid.

Of the mode in which the capital withdrawn from circulation is disposed of—ibid.

Of how the capital taken out of circulation is handled—ibid.

The sources which continually renew the circulating capital, as soon as it enters into the fixed capital, or the stock for immediate consumption, are,

The sources that keep replenishing the circulating capital, as soon as it transitions into the fixed capital or the stock for immediate consumption, are,

1. Lands;

Lands;

2. Mines and quarries;

2. Mines and quarries;

3. Fisheries—ibid.

3. Fisheries—same source.

Of the purposes accomplished by circulating coin—book 2, chap. ii; and the expedients which may be resorted to, in order to attain these with less expense, and fewer of those inconveniencies to which money is subjected—ibid.

Of the purposes achieved by using coins—book 2, chap. ii; and the methods that can be used to achieve these with less cost and fewer of the inconveniences that money often faces—ibid.

Of the stock lent at interest; and of those things which regulate the proportion that this kind of stock bears to the whole existing stock of the community. The quantity of stock which may be lent depends in no degree upon the quantity of money in circulation—book 2, chap. iv.[Pg xxvii]

Of the stock loaned with interest; and of the factors that determine the ratio that this type of stock holds compared to the total available stock in the community. The amount of stock that can be loaned is not at all dependent on the amount of money in circulation—book 2, chap. iv.[Pg xxvii]

Of the principles which determine the rate of interest—ibid.

Of the principles that determine the interest rate—ibid.

There exists a necessary relation between this and the price of land—ibid.

There is an important connection between this and the price of land—ibid.

PART THIRD—OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE MULTIPLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH TAKES PLACE.

Wealth uniformly increases in proportion to the augmentation which the power producing it receives, whether that be in energy or in extent—book I. introduction.

Wealth consistently grows in relation to the increase in the power that creates it, whether that power comes from energy or from extent—book I. introduction.

Labour, in which this power increases in energy,

Labour, where this power grows in energy,

1. By the division of the parts of the same work;

1. By splitting the sections of the same work;

2. By the invention of such machines as abridge and facilitate labour—book I, chap. i.

2. By the invention of machines that make work easier and more efficient—book I, chap. i.

The division of labour adds to its energy,

The division of labor boosts its energy,

1. By the skill which the workman in this way acquires;

1. Through the skills that the worker gains in this way;

2. By the saving of time—ibid.

2. By saving time—same source.

The invention of machines is itself an effect of the division of labour—ibid.

The invention of machines is, in itself, a result of the division of labor—ibid.

The natural disposition of mankind to exchange with each other the different productions of their respective labours and talents, is the principle which has given birth to the division of labour—book I, chap. ii.

The natural tendency of people to trade the different products of their work and skills with one another is the principle that has led to the division of labor—book I, chap. ii.

The division of labour must of course be limited by the extent of the market; therefore, whatever tends to widen the market, facilitates the progress of a nation towards opulence—book I, chap. iii.

The division of labor should definitely be restricted by the size of the market; so, anything that expands the market helps a nation move toward wealth—book I, chap. iii.

Labour gains in extent,

Labour gains in extent,

1. In proportion to the accumulation of capital;

As capital builds up;

2. In proportion to the manner in which these are employed—book I, introduction.

2. Depending on how these are used—book I, introduction.

The accumulation of capitals is hastened by the increase of the proportion existing between the productive and unproductive consumers—book 2, chap. iii.

The buildup of capital speeds up with the growth of the ratio between productive and unproductive consumers—book 2, chap. iii.

The proportion between these two classes of consumers is determined by the proportion existing between that part of the annual produce destined to the replacement of capital, and that destined for the purpose of revenue—ibid.

The ratio between these two types of consumers is influenced by the ratio of the annual output meant for capital replacement and that meant for revenue—ibid.

The proportion between that part of the annual produce which goes to form capital, and that which goes to form revenue, is great in a rich country, and small in a poor one—ibid.

The ratio of the annual output that contributes to capital versus what contributes to revenue is large in a wealthy country and small in a poor one—ibid.

In a wealthy country, the rent of land, taken absolutely, is much greater than in a poor country; but, taken in relation to the capital employed, it is much less—book 2, chap. iii.

In a rich country, the cost of land is much higher than in a poor country; however, when you consider it relative to the capital used, it is much lower—book 2, chap. iii.

In a wealthy country, the whole profits of its capital are infinitely greater than in one that is poor; although a given quantity of capital will, in a country of the latter description, produce profits much greater than in an opulent one—ibid.

In a rich country, the total profits from its capital are exponentially higher than in a poor one; although a certain amount of capital will, in a poorer country, generate profits much greater than in a wealthy one—ibid.

It is industry that furnishes the produce; but it is economy that places in the capital that part of it which would otherwise have become revenue—ibid.

It’s industry that provides the output; but it’s the economy that allocates part of it to capital that would otherwise have turned into revenue.

The economy of individuals arises from a principle which is universally diffused, and one that is continually in action; the desire of ameliorating their condition. This principle supports the existence and increase of national wealth, in spite of the prodigality of some individuals; and even triumphs over the profusion and errors of governments—ibid.[Pg xxviii]

The economy of individuals stems from a principle that is widely spread and always in motion: the desire to improve their situation. This principle sustains the existence and growth of national wealth, despite the wastefulness of some individuals; it even prevails over the excesses and mistakes of governments—ibid.[Pg xxviii]

Of the different modes of spending money, some are more favourable than others to the increase of national wealth—ibid.

Of the various ways to spend money, some are more beneficial than others for boosting national wealth—ibid.

Those branches of employment which require a capital, never fail to call forth more or less labour; and thus contribute, in a greater or less degree, to increase the extent of national labour.

Jobs that need capital always result in some level of labor, thereby helping to increase the overall amount of work available in the country.

Capital can be employed only in four ways:

Capital can be used in only four ways:

1. In cultivating and improving the earth, or, in other words, multiplying its rude produce;

1. In cultivating and enhancing the land, or, in other words, increasing its raw output;

2. In supporting manufactures;

2. In supporting manufacturers;

3. In buying by the gross, to sell in the same manner;

3. When purchasing in bulk, sell in the same way;

4. In buying by the gross, to sell by retail.

4. When you buy in bulk, sell at retail.

These four modes of employing capital are equally necessary to, and serve mutually to support, each other. The first supports, beyond all comparison, the greatest number of productive hands; the second occupies more than the two remaining; and the fourth the fewest of any.

These four ways of using capital are all equally important and help each other out. The first method supports, by far, the largest number of productive workers; the second combines more than the other two; and the fourth involves the fewest.

Capital may be employed, according to the third mode, in three different ways; each contributing in a very different degree to the support and encouragement of national industry.

Capital can be used, in the third way, in three different manners; each playing a very different role in supporting and promoting national industry.

When capital is employed in exchanging one description of the produce of national industry for another, it then supports as great a portion of industry as can be done by any capital employed in commerce.

When capital is used to trade one type of goods produced by the country for another, it then supports as much industry as any capital used in trade can.

When it is employed in exchanging the produce of national for that of foreign industry, for the purposes of home consumption, half of it goes to the support of foreign industry; by which means, it is only of half that service to the industry of the nation which it would have been had it been employed another way.

When it's used to trade the goods produced in our country for those made abroad, for local consumption, half of it supports foreign businesses. Because of this, it only benefits our national industry half as much as it would if it were used differently.

Lastly, when it is employed in exchanging one description of the produce of foreign industry for another, or in what is termed the carrying trade, it then serves wholly for the support and encouragement of the industry of the two foreign nations, and adds only to the annual produce of the country the profits of the merchant—book 2, chap. v.

Lastly, when it’s used to trade one type of foreign goods for another, or in what’s known as the carrying trade, it mainly supports and promotes the industries of both foreign nations, adding only the merchant's profits to the annual output of the country—book 2, chap. v.

Self-interest, when left uncontrouled, will necessarily lead the proprietors of capitals to prefer that species of employment which is most favourable to national industry, because it is, at the same time, most profitable for themselves—ibid. For, when capitals have been employed in a way different from that suggested by the infallible instinct of self-interest, it has always been in consequence of the peculiar circumstances of the European governments, and of that influence which the vulgar prejudices of merchants have had over the system of administration which these governments have adopted.

Self-interest, when not held in check, will naturally cause the owners of capital to favor the types of work that benefit national industry the most, because it is also the most profitable for them—ibid. When capital has been used in a way that goes against the strong instinct of self-interest, it has always been due to specific conditions of European governments and the impact that common misconceptions held by merchants have had on the administration systems these governments have implemented.

The account of these circumstances, with the discussion of the errors of this system, form the matter of the third and fourth books.

The account of these situations, along with the discussion of the mistakes in this system, makes up the content of the third and fourth books.


Political Economy is, of all sciences, that which affords most room for prejudices, and in which they are most liable to become deeply rooted. The desire of improving our condition, that universal principle, which continually acts upon every member of the community, is ever directing the thoughts of each individual to the means of increasing his private fortune. But should this individual ever chance to raise his views to the management of the public money, he would naturally be led to reason from analogy, and apply to the general interest of his country those principles which reflection and experience have led him to regard as the best guides in the conduct of his own private[Pg xxix] affairs. Thus, from attending to the fact, that money constitutes a part of the productive stock in the fortune of an individual, and that his fortune increases in proportion to the increase of this article, there arises that erroneous opinion so generally received, that money is a constituent part of national wealth, and that a country becomes rich, in proportion as it receives money from those countries with which it has commercial connections.

Political Economy is, of all sciences, the one that allows the most bias and where those biases can become deeply entrenched. The desire to improve our circumstances, a universal principle that affects every member of society, constantly directs each person's thoughts towards ways to increase their own wealth. However, if this individual ever considers how public funds are managed, they will naturally start to draw comparisons and apply the principles they’ve learned from managing their own money to the broader interests of their country. This way of thinking leads to the mistaken belief that because money is part of an individual’s resources and because personal wealth grows with an increase in money, it follows that money is also a key element of national wealth; thus, a country gets richer as it imports more money from its trading partners.

Merchants who have been accustomed to retire each night to their desks, to count, with eagerness, the quantity of currency, or of good debts, which their day's sale has produced, calculating their profits only by this result, and confident that such a calculation has never deceived them, are naturally led to think that the affairs of the nation must follow the same rule; and they have been strengthened in this opinion by that unshaken confidence which a long and never-failing experience, that has been the source of wealth and prosperity, inspires. Hence those extravagant opinions respecting the advantages and profits of foreign commerce, and the importance of money; hence those absurd calculations that have been made regarding what is termed the balance of trade, the thermometer of public prosperity; hence those systems of regulations, and those oppressive monopolies, which are resorted to for the purpose of making one side of the balance preponderate; hence, too, those bloody and destructive wars, which have raged in both hemispheres, from the period in which the road to the Indies, and to the new world, became familiar to European nations.

Merchants who are used to going back to their desks each night to eagerly count the amount of cash or good debts generated by their day's sales, calculating their profits based solely on this outcome, and confident that this method has never failed them, tend to believe that the nation's affairs must follow the same principles. This belief is reinforced by the steadfast confidence that comes from long-lasting and successful experience, which has been the foundation of wealth and prosperity. This leads to those extreme views about the benefits and profits of foreign trade and the significance of money; it explains the absurd calculations made about what is called the balance of trade, seen as a measure of public prosperity; it also accounts for the systems of regulations and oppressive monopolies created to tip the scales in one direction; and it explains the bloody and destructive wars that have erupted in both hemispheres since the routes to the Indies and the New World became known to European nations.

When we observe, that the many bloody wars that have been waged in the different parts of the world for these two last centuries, and even the present war, in many points of view, have had, as their principal end, the maintenance of some monopoly, contrary even to the interest of the nation armed to protect it; we shall feel the full importance of those benefits which the illustrious author of the 'Wealth of Nations' has endeavoured to confer upon mankind, by victoriously combating such strong and baneful prejudices. But we cannot help deeply lamenting, to see how slowly, and with what difficulty, reason in all its strength, and truth in all its clearness, regain the possession of these territories which error and passion have so rapidly overrun.

When we look at the many bloody wars that have taken place around the world over the last two centuries, including the current war, it becomes clear that their main goal has often been to maintain some monopoly, even against the interests of the nation that is fighting to defend it. We realize the significance of the benefits that the esteemed author of 'Wealth of Nations' sought to provide humanity by successfully challenging such strong and harmful prejudices. However, it’s deeply disheartening to see how slowly, and with such difficulty, reason in its full strength and truth in its clarity can reclaim the ground lost to error and passion.

The prejudices so successfully attacked by Dr. Smith, appear again and again, with undiminished assurance, in the tribunals of legislature, in the councils of administration, in the cabinets of ministry, and in the writings of politicians. They still talk of the importance of foreign and colonial commerce; they still attempt to determine the balance of trade; they renew all the reveries of political arithmetic, as if these questions had not been determined by Smith, in a way which renders them no longer capable of controversy.

The biases that Dr. Smith successfully challenged keep popping up with the same confidence in legislative bodies, administrative councils, government cabinets, and in political writings. They still emphasize the significance of foreign and colonial trade; they still try to calculate the balance of trade; they revisit all the daydreams of political math, as if these issues haven't already been settled by Smith in a way that makes them no longer open for debate.

It was in the midst of a country, the most deeply imbued with mercantile prejudices; the most completely subjected to its prohibitory policy, that Dr. Smith sapped the foundations of this absurd and tyrannical system; it was at the very moment when England, in alarm, saw, with terror, the possibility of a separation from her American colonies: it was then that he derided the universal fear, and proudly prophesied the success of the colonists, and their approaching independence; and that he confidently announced, what experience has since completely affirmed, the happy consequences which this separation and this independence, so much dreaded, would produce upon the prosperity, both of Great Britain and her colonies—book 4, chap. vii. part 3.

In the heart of a nation that was heavily influenced by trade biases and fully subjected to restrictive policies, Dr. Smith undermined the foundations of this absurd and oppressive system. This was at a time when England, alarmed and fearful, recognized the potential for separation from its American colonies. It was then that he dismissed the widespread panic and confidently predicted the success of the colonists and their imminent independence. He boldly declared what experience has since confirmed: the positive outcomes that this feared separation and independence would bring to the prosperity of both Great Britain and her colonies—book 4, chap. vii. part 3.

The wealth of communities is so intimately connected with their civil and political existence, that the author has been drawn by his subject into numerous other discussions, which seem more or less removed from it; and in which we discover the same sagacity of observation, the same depth of research, and the same force of reasoning.

The prosperity of communities is closely tied to their civil and political existence, which has led the author to explore many other topics that may seem somewhat unrelated. In these discussions, we see the same sharp observations, thorough research, and strong reasoning.

The advantages of a complete and permanent freedom in the corn trade[Pg xxx] have never been better shown; and they have been proved by Dr. Smith, to arise from that fruitful source of wealth, the division of labour—book 4, chap. v.

The benefits of having total and lasting freedom in the corn trade[Pg xxx] have never been demonstrated more clearly; and Dr. Smith has shown that these benefits come from the rich source of wealth known as the division of labor—book 4, chap. v.

The national defence and public education, two objects of very high importance, have also been discussed at length by our author.

The national defense and public education, two issues of great significance, have also been thoroughly discussed by our author.

He proves, that, in conformity to that desire to better our condition, by which all men are directed, and upon which the author has founded his whole doctrine, the teacher, whose wages are a fixed salary, will have no other end than to spare himself every trouble, and dedicate as little attention as possible to his pupils; while he that is paid in proportion to his labour, will naturally endeavour, by every means in his power, to increase his success, at the same time that he confers a great advantage on his scholars and on society. He confirms his theoretical opinions by incontestible examples—-book 5, chap. i. part 3.

He demonstrates that, in line with the human desire to improve our situation, which drives everyone and forms the basis of his entire doctrine, a teacher with a fixed salary will only aim to avoid any effort and pay as little attention as possible to his students. In contrast, a teacher who is paid based on their efforts will naturally strive in every way they can to succeed, which also benefits their students and society as a whole. He supports his theoretical views with undeniable examples—book 5, chap. i. part 3.

The superiority of regular troops over national militia is proved in theory, by the division of labour; and in practice, by the most remarkable facts in history—book 5, chap. i, part 1.

The superiority of regular troops over national militia is demonstrated in theory by the division of labor and in practice by some of the most notable facts in history—book 5, chap. i, part 1.


AN

INQUIRY

INTO

THE NATURE AND CAUSES

OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS.


INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF THE WORK.

The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniencies of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.

The yearly work of every nation is the source that initially provides it with all the essentials and comforts of life that it consumes each year. This consists either of the direct output of that work or what is bought with that output from other countries.

According, therefore, as this produce, or what is purchased with it, bears a greater or smaller proportion to the number of those who are to consume it, the nation will be better or worse supplied with all the necessaries and conveniencies for which it has occasion.

Therefore, based on how this produce, or what is bought with it, relates to the number of people who will use it, the nation will be better or worse off regarding all the necessities and conveniences it needs.

But this proportion must in every nation be regulated by two different circumstances: first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which its labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. Whatever be the soil, climate, or extent of territory of any particular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must, in that particular situation, depend upon those two circumstances.

But this balance must be managed in every country by two different factors: first, by the skill, expertise, and judgment with which work is generally done; and second, by the ratio of people engaged in productive labor compared to those who aren't. Regardless of the land, climate, or size of a particular country, the amount of resources it produces each year must, in that specific context, rely on those two factors.

The abundance or scantiness of this supply, too, seems to depend more upon the former of those two circumstances than upon the latter. Among the savage nations of hunters and fishers, every individual who is able to work is more or less employed in useful labour, and endeavours to provide, as well as he can, the necessaries and conveniencies of life, for himself, and such of his family or tribe as are either too old, or too young, or too infirm, to go a-hunting and fishing. Such nations, however, are so miserably poor, that, from mere want, they are frequently reduced, or at least think themselves reduced, to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts. Among civilized and thriving nations, on the contrary, though a great number of people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times, more labour than the greater part of those who work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied; and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire.

The availability or scarcity of this supply seems to depend more on the first of those two factors than on the second. Among primitive nations of hunters and fishers, everyone who can work is generally engaged in useful labor and tries to provide, as best as they can, the necessities and comforts of life for themselves and for family or tribe members who are either too old, too young, or too sick to hunt and fish. However, these nations are so incredibly poor that, out of sheer desperation, they are often forced, or at least believe they are forced, to directly abandon or kill their infants, elderly, and those suffering from long-term illnesses, leaving them to starve or be eaten by wild animals. In contrast, in civilized and prosperous nations, even though many people don’t work at all—some consuming the output of ten, or even a hundred, times more labor than most workers—the overall produce of society's labor is so high that all are often well provided for. A laborer, even if they belong to the lowest and poorest class, can, if they are frugal and hardworking, enjoy a greater share of life's necessities and comforts than any savage could ever hope to attain.

The causes of this improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the order according to which its produce is naturally distributed among the different ranks and conditions of men in the society, make the subject of the first book of this Inquiry.

The reasons behind this increase in the productivity of labor and the way its output is naturally shared among the various social classes and conditions of people in society are the focus of the first book of this Inquiry.

Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must depend, during the continuance of that state, upon the proportion between the number of those who are annually employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. The[Pg 2] number of useful and productive labourers, it will hereafter appear, is everywhere in proportion to the quantity of capital stock which is employed in setting them to work, and to the particular way in which it is so employed. The second book, therefore, treats of the nature of capital stock, of the manner in which it is gradually accumulated, and of the different quantities of labour which it puts into motion, according to the different ways in which it is employed.

No matter the actual level of skill, ability, and judgment used in any country, the amount of resources available each year depends on the ratio of people working in useful jobs to those who aren’t, as long as that condition remains the same. The[Pg 2] number of productive workers, as we will discuss later, is always linked to the amount of capital that is invested in putting them to work and to the specific methods of how it is being utilized. Therefore, the second book focuses on the nature of capital, how it is gradually built up, and the different amounts of labor it activates based on how it is utilized.

Nations tolerably well advanced as to skill, dexterity, and judgment, in the application of labour, have followed very different plans in the general conduct or direction of it; and those plans have not all been equally favourable to the greatness of its produce. The policy of some nations has given extraordinary encouragement to the industry of the country; that of others to the industry of towns. Scarce any nation has dealt equally and impartially with every sort of industry. Since the downfall of the Roman empire, the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts, manufactures, and commerce, the industry of towns, than to agriculture, the industry of the country. The circumstances which seem to have introduced and established this policy are explained in the third book.

Nations that are reasonably advanced in skills, dexterity, and judgment in how they apply labor have taken very different approaches to managing it, and these approaches haven't all been equally beneficial for increasing productivity. Some countries have strongly supported the country's industry, while others have focused on the industry in urban areas. Hardly any nation has treated every type of industry fairly and equally. Since the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe's policies have favored the arts, manufacturing, and commerce in towns more than agriculture in rural areas. The factors that appear to have led to this policy are discussed in the third book.

Though those different plans were, perhaps, first introduced by the private interests and prejudices of particular orders of men, without any regard to, or foresight of, their consequences upon the general welfare of the society; yet they have given occasion to very different theories of political economy; of which some magnify the importance of that industry which is carried on in towns, others of that which is carried on in the country. Those theories have had a considerable influence, not only upon the opinions of men of learning, but upon the public conduct of princes and sovereign states. I have endeavoured, in the fourth book, to explain as fully and distinctly as I can those different theories, and the principal effects which they have produced in different ages and nations.

Though those different plans were perhaps first introduced by the personal interests and biases of specific groups, without consideration for their impact on the overall welfare of society, they have led to various theories of political economy. Some emphasize the importance of industry in cities, while others focus on the significance of rural industry. These theories have significantly influenced not only the views of scholars but also the actions of rulers and sovereign states. In the fourth book, I have tried to explain as clearly and thoroughly as possible these different theories and the main effects they have had across different times and nations.

To explain in what has consisted the revenue of the great body of the people, or what has been the nature of those funds, which, in different ages and nations, have supplied their annual consumption, is the object of these four first books. The fifth and last book treats of the revenue of the sovereign, or commonwealth. In this book I have endeavoured to shew, first, what are the necessary expenses of the sovereign, or commonwealth; which of those expenses ought to be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society, and which of them, by that of some particular part only, or of some particular members of it: secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole society may be made to contribute towards defraying the expenses incumbent on the whole society, and what are the principal advantages and inconveniencies of each of those methods; and, thirdly and lastly, what are the reasons and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of this revenue, or to contract debts; and what have been the effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce of the land and labour of the society.

To explain what has made up the income of the vast majority of people, or what types of funds, in different times and places, have provided for their annual needs, is the aim of these first four books. The fifth and final book discusses the income of the sovereign or commonwealth. In this book, I've tried to show, first, what the essential expenses of the sovereign or commonwealth are; which of those expenses should be covered by the general contributions of society as a whole, and which should be paid by specific groups or individuals; secondly, what the various ways are for the entire society to contribute to covering the expenses that affect everyone, along with the main benefits and drawbacks of each method; and thirdly and lastly, what reasons and factors have led almost all modern governments to mortgage part of this income or to take on debts, and what the effects of those debts have been on the actual wealth, the annual output of the land and labor of the society.


BOOK I.

OF THE CAUSES OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE PRODUCTIVE POWERS OF LABOUR, AND OF THE ORDER ACCORDING TO WHICH ITS PRODUCE IS NATURALLY DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DIFFERENT RANKS OF THE PEOPLE.


CHAP. I.

OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.

The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.

The biggest improvements in the productivity of labor, along with most of the skill, dexterity, and judgment used in directing or applying it, appear to be the results of labor division.

The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be more easily understood, by considering in what manner it operates in some particular manufactures. It is commonly supposed to be carried furthest in some very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in others of more importance: but in those trifling manufactures which are destined to supply the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole number of workmen must necessarily be small; and those employed in every different branch of the work can of[Pg 3]ten be collected into the same workhouse, and placed at once under the view of the spectator. In those great manufactures, on the contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs so great a number of workmen, that it is impossible to collect them all into the same workhouse. We can seldom see more, at one time, than those employed in one single branch. Though in such manufactures, therefore, the work may really be divided into a much greater number of parts, than in those of a more trifling nature, the division is not near so obvious, and has accordingly been much less observed.

The impact of the division of labor in society is easier to grasp by looking at how it works in specific industries. People often think it goes further in some trivial ones, but it might not actually be more extensive than in more significant areas. In these minor industries, which are meant to meet the small needs of only a few people, the total number of workers is usually small. Those working in different parts of the process can often be gathered in the same workspace, making it easy for onlookers to see all of them at once. In contrast, in large-scale industries that cater to the significant needs of the general population, each segment of the process employs so many workers that gathering them all in one place is impossible. We rarely see more than those working in one specific area at a time. So, while the division of labor in these larger industries may actually be split into many more parts than in the trivial ones, it’s not as apparent and has consequently received much less attention.

To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture, but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of a pin-maker: a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire; another straights it; a third cuts it; a fourth points it; a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar business; to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have seen a small manufactory of this kind, where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth, part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations.

To illustrate this with a simple example, let's consider the trade of a pin-maker, which often highlights the division of labor. A worker who hasn’t been trained for this job (which has become a specific trade due to the division of labor) and who is unfamiliar with the machinery used (the invention of which was likely inspired by the same division of labor) could maybe make one pin a day at most, but certainly not twenty. However, in the way this business is currently organized, not only is the entire process a specialized trade, but it's also divided into various sub-tasks, most of which are specialized trades as well. One person draws out the wire; another straightens it; a third cuts it; a fourth points it; a fifth grinds the top to prepare for the head; forming the head requires two or three different operations; attaching it is a specialized job; whitening the pins is another task; even putting them into paper is a trade in itself; and the entire process of making a pin is divided into about eighteen distinct tasks. In some factories, all these tasks are done by different people, while in others, the same person may handle two or three of them. I’ve seen a small factory where only ten men were employed, and due to this, some of them performed multiple tasks. Even though they were very poor and had limited machinery, they could, when they worked hard, produce around twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are more than four thousand pins in a pound of average size. So, these ten people could produce over forty-eight thousand pins in a day together. Each individual, therefore, could be seen as making roughly four thousand eight hundred pins daily. But if they had all worked separately and independently, without any of them being trained for this specific job, they definitely wouldn’t have been able to make twenty each, and likely not even one pin a day; meaning, they’d manage to make at most one two-hundred-fortieth, and possibly not even one four-thousand-eight-hundredth of what they're currently able to achieve, thanks to the effective division and combination of their various tasks.

In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labour are similar to what they are in this very trifling one, though, in many of them, the labour can neither be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a simplicity of operation. The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour. The separation of different trades and employments from one another, seems to have taken place in consequence of this advantage. This separation, too, is generally carried furthest in those countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement; what is the work of one man, in a rude state of society, being generally that of several in an improved one. In every improved society, the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer; the manufacturer, nothing but a manufacturer. The labour, too, which is necessary to produce any one complete manufacture, is almost always divided among a great number of hands. How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and woollen manufactures, from the growers of the flax and the wool, to the bleachers and smoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dressers of the cloth! The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business from another, as manufactures. It is impossible to separate so entirely the business of the grazier from that of the corn-farmer, as the trade of the carpenter is commonly separated from that of the smith. The spinner is almost always a distinct person from the weaver; but the ploughman, the harrower, the sower of the seed, and the reaper of the corn, are often the same. The occasions for those different sorts of labour returning with the different seasons of the year, it is impossible that one man should be constantly employed in any one of them. This impossibility of making so complete and entire a separation of all the different branches of labour employed in agriculture, is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the productive powers of labour, in this art, does not always keep pace with their improvement in manufactures. The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former. Their lands are in general better cultivated, and having more labour and expense bestowed upon them, produce more in proportion to the extent and natural fertility of the ground. But this superiority of produce is seldom much more than in pro[Pg 4]portion to the superiority of labour and expense. In agriculture, the labour of the rich country is not always much more productive than that of the poor; or, at least, it is never so much more productive, as it commonly is in manufactures. The corn of the rich country, therefore, will not always, in the same degree of goodness, come cheaper to market than that of the poor. The corn of Poland, in the same degree of goodness, is as cheap as that of France, notwithstanding the superior opulence and improvement of the latter country. The corn of France is, in the corn-provinces, fully as good, and in most years nearly about the same price with the corn of England, though, in opulence and improvement, France in perhaps inferior to England. The corn-lands of England, however, are better cultivated than those of France, and the corn-lands of France are said to be much better cultivated than those of Poland. But though the poor country, notwithstanding the inferiority of its cultivation, can, in some measure, rival the rich in the cheapness and goodness of its corn, it can pretend to no such competition in its manufactures, at least if those manufactures suit the soil, climate, and situation, of the rich country. The silks of France are better and cheaper than those of England, because the silk manufacture, at least under the present high duties upon the importation of raw silk, does not so well suit the climate of England as that of France. But the hardware and the coarse woollens of England are beyond all comparison superior to those of France, and much cheaper, too, in the same degree of goodness. In Poland there are said to be scarce any manufactures of any kind, a few of those coarser household manufactures excepted, without which no country can well subsist.

In every other craft and trade, the effects of dividing tasks are similar to what they are in this rather minor one; however, in many cases, the work can’t be divided as much or simplified to the same extent. The division of labor, wherever it can be applied, leads to a comparable increase in the productive capacity of workers in every craft. The separation of different jobs and occupations seems to have developed as a result of this benefit. This separation is usually most pronounced in countries that have the highest levels of industry and development, where what one person does in a basic society is typically done by several in a more advanced one. In every developed society, the farmer is usually just a farmer, and the manufacturer is just a manufacturer. The tasks necessary to produce any complete item are almost always shared among many hands. Just think of all the different trades involved in each area of linen and wool production, from the growers of flax and sheep to the bleachers and finishers of linen, or to the dyers and tailors of cloth! The nature of agriculture doesn’t allow for as many divisions of labor or such a complete separation of roles as manufacturing does. It’s impossible to completely separate the work of raising livestock from that of growing crops, unlike the separation seen between a carpenter and a blacksmith. The spinner is almost always a different person from the weaver, but the plowman, harrower, seed sower, and grain reaper are often the same. Since the needs for these different types of labor come back around with the changing seasons, it’s not feasible for any one person to work on just one task all the time. This challenge in fully separating the various aspects of agricultural labor might be why improvements in labor productivity in this field don’t always keep up with those in manufacturing. The wealthiest nations generally excel in both agriculture and manufacturing compared to their neighbors; however, they are often more recognized for their superiority in the latter. Their lands are usually better cultivated, and with more labor and investment dedicated to them, they produce more relative to the area and natural fertility of the soil. But this excess production is rarely much greater than the proportionate increase in labor and investment. In agriculture, the labor in wealthier countries isn’t always significantly more productive than in poorer ones; or, at the very least, it isn’t as vastly more productive as it generally is in manufacturing. As a result, the grain from wealthier countries doesn’t always sell for a lower price at the market compared to that from poorer countries while maintaining the same quality. The grain from Poland, at the same quality level, is as affordable as that from France, despite France's greater wealth and development. The grain from France is just as good in its grain-producing regions and usually around the same price as that from England, even though in terms of wealth and progress, France might be inferior to England. However, the grain fields in England are better tended than those in France, and the grain fields in France are said to be much better than those in Poland. Yet, even though the poorer country, despite its lower level of cultivation, can somewhat compete with the wealthier in terms of the affordability and quality of its grain, it doesn't have any such competition in its manufacturing—at least if those manufactures match the soil, climate, and setting of the wealthier country. The silks from France are better and cheaper than those from England because silk production, particularly with the current high duties on imported raw silk, doesn’t suit the climate of England as well as it does that of France. On the other hand, the hardware and coarse woolen goods from England are vastly superior to those from France and are also much cheaper for the same level of quality. In Poland, it’s said that there are hardly any manufactures at all besides a few basic household goods that no country can really survive without.

This great increase in the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and, lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.

This significant increase in the amount of work that the same number of people can do, thanks to the division of labor, is due to three main factors: first, the improvement in skill of each individual worker; second, the reduction of time wasted when switching between different types of jobs; and finally, the invention of many machines that make work easier and quicker, allowing one person to do the work of several.

First, the improvement of the dexterity of the workmen, necessarily increases the quantity of the work he can perform; and the division of labour, by reducing every man's business to some one simple operation, and by making this operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily increases very much the dexterity of the workman. A common smith, who, though accustomed to handle the hammer, has never been used to make nails, if, upon some particular occasion, he is obliged to attempt it, will scarce, I am assured, be able to make above two or three hundred nails in a day, and those, too, very bad ones. A smith who has been accustomed to make nails, but whose sole or principal business has not been that of a nailer, can seldom, with his utmost diligence, make more than eight hundred or a thousand nails in a day. I have seen several boys, under twenty years of age, who had never exercised any other trade but that of making nails, and who, when they exerted themselves, could make, each of them, upwards of two thousand three hundred nails in a day. The making of a nail, however, is by no means one of the simplest operations. The same person blows the bellows, stirs or mends the fire as there is occasion, heats the iron, and forges every part of the nail: in forging the head, too, he in obliged to change his tools. The different operations into which the making of a pin, or of a metal button, is subdivided, are all of them much more simple, and the dexterity of the person, of whose life it has been the sole business to perform them, is usually much greater. The rapidity with which some of the operations of those manufactures are performed, exceeds what the human hand could, by those who had never seen them, be supposed capable of acquiring.

First, improving the skills of workers naturally increases the amount of work they can do; and the division of labor, by simplifying each person's job to one simple task and making that task their primary focus, significantly boosts the worker's proficiency. A typical blacksmith, who is used to handling a hammer but has never made nails, if forced to try it on occasion, will struggle to produce more than two or three hundred nails in a day, and those will be of poor quality. A blacksmith who has made nails but whose main job isn't being a nailer can rarely, even with great effort, create more than eight hundred or a thousand nails in a day. I've seen several boys under twenty years old who have only ever made nails, and when they really pushed themselves, each could produce over two thousand three hundred nails in a single day. However, making a nail is not one of the simplest tasks. The same person operates the bellows, adjusts or stokes the fire as needed, heats the iron, and forges each part of the nail; and when forging the head, they have to switch tools. The tasks involved in making a pin or a metal button are all much simpler, and the skill of someone whose sole job has been performing those tasks is usually much higher. The speed at which some of these manufacturing processes are carried out goes beyond what you'd think the human hand could achieve, even for those who have never seen them done before.

Secondly, The advantage which is gained by saving the time commonly lost in passing from one sort of work to another, is much greater than we should at first view be apt to imagine it. It is impossible to pass very quickly from one kind of work to another, that is carried on in a different place, and with quite different tools. A country weaver, who cultivates a small farm, must loose a good deal of time in passing from his loom to the field, and from the field to his loom. When the two trades can be carried on in the same workhouse, the loss of time is, no doubt, much less. It is, even in this case, however, very considerable. A man commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of employment to another. When he first begins the new work, he is seldom very keen and hearty; his mind, as they say, does not go to it, and for some time he rather trifles than applies to good purpose. The habit of sauntering, and of indolent careless application, which is naturally, or rather necessarily, acquired by every country workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different ways almost every day of his life, renders him almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application, even on the most pressing occasions. Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in point of dexterity, this cause alone must always reduce considerably the quantity of work which he is capable of performing.

Secondly, the advantage gained by saving the time usually lost when switching from one task to another is much greater than we might initially think. It’s hard to move quickly from one type of work to another, especially when it takes place in a different location and requires different tools. A weaver in the countryside who also runs a small farm loses a significant amount of time moving between the loom and the field. When both jobs can be done in the same workspace, the time lost is definitely reduced. However, even in this case, it remains quite substantial. A person usually takes their time when shifting from one task to another. At the start of the new task, they often aren't very enthusiastic; their mind isn’t fully on it, and for a while, they tend to waste time instead of being productive. The tendency to dawdle and the lazy, careless approach that country workers naturally develop—due to having to change tasks and tools every half hour and work in many different ways nearly every day—makes them often sluggish and unmotivated, even in urgent situations. Thus, apart from their lack of skill, this alone significantly lowers the amount of work they can effectively complete.

Thirdly, and lastly, everybody must be sensible how much labour is facilitated and abridged by the application of proper machin[Pg 5]ery. It is unnecessary to give any example. I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those machines by which labour is to much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been originally owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of things. But, in consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object. It is naturally to be expected, therefore, that some one or other of those who are employed in each particular branch of labour should soon find out easier and readier methods of performing their own particular work, wherever the nature of it admits of such improvement. A great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures, must frequently have been shewn very pretty machines, which were the inventions of such workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. In the first fire engines, a boy was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston either ascended or descended. One of those boys, who loved to play with his companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the valve which opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his play-fellows. One of the greatest improvements that has been made upon this machine, since it was first invented, was in this manner the discovery of a boy who wanted to save his own labour.

Thirdly, and finally, everyone needs to understand how much easier and quicker work can be with the right machinery. There's no need to give examples. I'll just point out that the invention of all those machines that make work easier and faster seems to have originally come from the division of labor. People are much more likely to come up with simpler and quicker ways to achieve any goal when all their focus is on that one goal, rather than spreading their attention across many different things. Because of the division of labor, each person's focus naturally narrows down to a specific, simple task. It's only expected that someone involved in a specific line of work will soon discover easier and quicker methods for completing their tasks, wherever the nature of the work allows for such improvements. Many of the machines used in industries with highly specialized labor were originally invented by ordinary workers, who, being engaged in very simple tasks, naturally started thinking of ways to do their jobs more easily and quickly. Anyone who has often visited such industries has probably seen some very clever machines created by these workers to make their specific part of the job easier and faster. In the early fire engines, a boy was regularly assigned to open and close the connection between the boiler and the cylinder, depending on whether the piston was moving up or down. One of those boys, who liked to play with his friends, noticed that by tying a string from the valve handle that controlled this connection to another part of the machine, the valve would automatically open and close without his help, allowing him to play with his friends instead. One of the biggest advancements made to this machine since its invention was, in this way, discovered by a boy who wanted to save his own effort.

All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers, or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing, and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects. In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other employment, too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably increased by it.

All the advancements in machinery, however, haven’t solely come from those who used the machines. Many improvements have been made by the skill of the machine makers, especially as their work became a specialized trade; and others have been developed by those called philosophers, or thinkers, whose role isn’t to create anything, but to observe everything, and because of that, they often can bring together the functions of very different and unrelated objects. As society progresses, philosophy or speculation becomes, like any other profession, the main or only trade and job of a specific group of citizens. Like every other profession, it’s also divided into many different branches, each providing work for a unique group or class of philosophers; and this division of labor in philosophy, like in every other field, enhances skill and saves time. Each person becomes more proficient in their specific area, more work gets done overall, and the amount of knowledge significantly increases because of it.

It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman being exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own goods for a great quantity or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity of theirs. He supplies them abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they accommodate him as amply with what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itself through all the different ranks of the society.

The huge increase in the production of various goods due to the division of labor leads to a widespread prosperity in a well-managed society that reaches even the lowest classes. Each worker has more of their own work to sell than they need for themselves, and since every other worker is in the same position, they can trade a large amount of their own products for a large amount, or essentially the value, of others’ goods. They provide each other generously with what they need, and in return, receive as much of what they require, creating an overall abundance that spreads across all levels of society.

Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people, of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation. The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have been employed in transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others who often live in a very distant part of the country? How much commerce and navigation in particular, how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the world? What a variety of labour, too, is necessary in order to produce the tools of the meanest of those workmen! To say nothing of such complicated machines as the ship of the sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in order to form that very simple machine, the shears with which the shepherd clips the wool. The miner, the builder of the furnace for smelting the ore, the feller of the timber, the burner of[Pg 6] the charcoal to be made use of in the smelting-house, the brickmaker, the bricklayer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the millwright, the forger, the smith, must all of them join their different arts in order to produce them. Were we to examine, in the same manner, all the different parts of his dress and household furniture, the coarse linen shirt which he wears next his skin, the shoes which cover his feet, the bed which he lies on, and all the different parts which compose it, the kitchen-grate at which he prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes use of for that purpose, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him, perhaps, by a long sea and a long land-carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all the furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates upon which he serves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in preparing his bread and his beer, the glass window which lets in the heat and the light, and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art requisite for preparing that beautiful and happy invention, without which these northern parts of the world could scarce have afforded a very comfortable habitation, together with the tools of all the different workmen employed in producing those different conveniencies; if we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that, without the assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the very meanest person in a civilized country could not be provided, even according to, what we very falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in which he is commonly accommodated. Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the great, his accommodation must no doubt appear extremely simple and easy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of an European prince does not always so much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant, as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African king, the absolute masters of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages.

Look at the living standards of a typical worker or laborer in a civilized and prosperous country, and you'll see that the number of people whose efforts have contributed, even if just a little, to providing him with that living standard is beyond count. Take the woolen coat, for instance, which the laborer wears; despite its rough appearance, it results from the combined effort of many workers. There’s the shepherd, the wool sorter, the wool combers, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, and many others who all contribute their skills to create this basic item. And consider how many merchants and transporters must have been involved in moving materials between these workers, many of whom live far apart. How much trade and shipping, in particular, are involved, along with countless shipbuilders, sailors, sailmakers, and rope makers, just to gather the various dyes that often come from the farthest corners of the globe? A variety of labor is also needed to produce the simplest tools for those workers. Without mentioning complex machines like a sailor's ship, a fuller's mill, or even a weaver's loom, let's focus on what it takes to create the simple shears that a shepherd uses to clip wool. The miner, the furnace builder for smelting ore, the lumberjack, the charcoal burner needed for the smelting process, the brickmaker, the bricklayer, the workers at the furnace, the millwright, the blacksmith—all must contribute their specialized skills to produce these tools. If we were to look at every part of his clothing and household items—the coarse linen shirt next to his skin, the shoes on his feet, the bed he sleeps on and its various components, the kitchen grate where he cooks his food, the coal excavated from the earth and transported to him possibly over long distances by sea and land, all the kitchen utensils, his tableware, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates he uses for serving food, the different people working to make his bread and beer, the glass window that allows in light and warmth while blocking wind and rain, along with all the knowledge and skill needed to create such a wonderful and useful invention that makes comfortable living possible in these northern regions—we would realize that, without the effort and cooperation of thousands, even the most modest individual in a civilized nation would not be adequately provided for, despite our mistaken belief that his necessities are easily and simply met. In comparison to the extravagant luxuries of the wealthy, his living situation does indeed seem straightforward and uncomplicated; yet it might be true that the living standards of a European prince do not always far exceed those of a hardworking and thrifty peasant, just as the latter’s situation is much better than that of many African kings, who have complete control over the lives and freedoms of thousands of vulnerable people.


CHAP. II.

OF THE PRINCIPLE WHICH GIVES OCCASION TO THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.

This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature, which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.

This division of labor, which brings about so many benefits, isn't originally the result of any human wisdom that predicts and aims for the overall wealth it creates. It's the inevitable, albeit very slow and gradual, outcome of a specific tendency in human nature, which doesn't seek such broad utility; it's the tendency to trade, barter, and exchange one thing for another.

Whether this propensity be one of these original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given, or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal, by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man, or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion, but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their re[Pg 7]gard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other clothes which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion.

Whether this tendency is one of those fundamental principles of human nature that can't be explained further, or whether, as seems more likely, it's a necessary result of our reasoning and language abilities, isn't something we'll explore now. This tendency is common to all humans and doesn't exist in any other animal species, which don't seem to engage in this or any other form of contracts. Two greyhounds chasing the same hare may sometimes appear to be working together. Each one adjusts its path based on the other, trying to catch the hare when it turns to them. However, this isn't due to any contract, but merely a coincidence of their shared interest at that moment. No one has ever seen a dog intentionally trade one bone for another with another dog. No one has ever observed an animal using gestures and natural sounds to communicate ownership or willingness to trade. When an animal wants something from a person or another animal, its only way to persuade is to win over those whose help it needs. A puppy might cuddle up to its mother, and a spaniel will try to charm its owner during dinner when it wants to be fed. Sometimes, humans use the same tactics with each other, and when they can't get others to act as they wish, they resort to fawning and servile behavior to win their approval. However, it's impractical to do this all the time. In civilized society, individuals need help and cooperation from many others, while their entire lives might barely allow them to gain the friendship of a few. In contrast, most other animals become independent when they reach maturity and don't rely on others for assistance. But humans constantly need help from their fellow beings, and it's pointless to expect this help to come purely from kindness. They are more likely to succeed if they can appeal to others' self-interest and show that helping them is beneficial. Anyone proposing a deal is essentially saying, "Give me what I want, and you'll get what you want." This is how we acquire most of the favors we need from each other. We don't rely on the generosity of the butcher, baker, or brewer for our meals but on their self-interest. We engage them not through appeals to their kindness but to their self-interest, focusing on their benefits rather than our needs. No one, except perhaps a beggar, wants to rely mainly on the goodwill of others. Even a beggar doesn't depend solely on it. The charity of kind-hearted individuals provides him with his essential needs. But while this principle eventually supplies him with all he requires, it doesn't do so at the moment he needs it. Most of his immediate needs are met similarly to everyone else's—through negotiation, barter, and purchase. With the money someone gives him, he buys food. The old clothes another person donates are exchanged for clothing that fits him better, or for lodging, food, or cash he can use to buy these necessities as required.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison, with his companions; and he finds at last that he can, in this manner, get more cattle and venison, than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier; a fourth, a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent of genius he may possess for that particular species of business.

Since we rely on treaties, bartering, and purchases to obtain most of the mutual assistance we need from each other, this same tendency to trade gives rise to the division of labor. In a group of hunters or shepherds, one person might, for example, make bows and arrows more easily and skillfully than anyone else. He often trades them for cattle or venison with his friends and eventually realizes that he can get more cattle and venison this way than if he went out to catch them himself. Therefore, looking out for his own interests, making bows and arrows becomes his main job, and he turns into a kind of armorer. Another person might be better at building the frames and coverings for their small huts or portable homes. He often helps his neighbors, who repay him with cattle and venison, until he sees that it's in his best interest to focus entirely on this work and become a kind of carpenter. Similarly, a third person becomes a blacksmith or metalworker; a fourth an animal hide tanner, which is key to the clothing of the less civilized. Therefore, the certainty of being able to trade any extra part of the output from his own work, which goes beyond what he consumes, for the parts of other people’s work that he needs, motivates everyone to specialize in a particular trade and to develop and perfect any talent or skill they may have for that specific type of work.

The difference of natural talents in different men, is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents.

The difference in natural talents among people is actually much smaller than we think. The distinct abilities that seem to set apart individuals in various professions, once fully developed, are often not the cause, but rather the result of the division of labor. The gap between the most contrasting characters, like a philosopher and a regular street porter, appears to stem less from nature and more from habits, customs, and education. When they first enter the world, especially in their first six to eight years, they are probably quite similar, and neither their parents nor playmates notice any significant differences. Around that age, or soon after, they start working in very different jobs. That’s when their talents begin to be recognized, and the differences gradually expand, to the point where the philosopher is practically unwilling to acknowledge any similarities. However, without the inclination to trade and exchange goods, everyone would need to acquire every essential and convenient item for their lives on their own. Everyone would have had the same responsibilities and tasks to complete, and there wouldn’t be any significant difference in employment that could lead to a major difference in talents.

As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals, acknowledged to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a grey-hound, or a grey-hound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species, are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the grey-hound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself, separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men's talents he has occasion for.[Pg 8]

This difference in natural abilities is what creates the variation in talents that we see among people in different professions, and it’s also what makes that difference valuable. Many animal species, recognized as the same kind, exhibit an even greater range of natural talents than what seems to occur among humans before custom and education take effect. By nature, a philosopher isn’t as different in talent and disposition from a street porter as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, or a spaniel from a shepherd's dog. However, these different breeds of animals, despite being of the same species, are hardly useful to one another. The strength of the mastiff doesn’t benefit from the swiftness of the greyhound, the intelligence of the spaniel, or the obedience of the shepherd's dog. The effects of these differing talents and abilities, due to the lack of ability or willingness to trade and exchange, can’t be pooled together and don’t contribute to the overall advancement and convenience of the species. Each animal must still fend for itself, independently, and gains no advantage from the variety of talents that nature has given to its kind. In contrast, among humans, the most different talents benefit each other; the various outputs of their individual skills, thanks to a general willingness to trade, barter, and exchange, come together into a common resource where anyone can access whatever they need from the talents of others.[Pg 8]


CHAP. III.

THAT THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IS LIMITED BY THE EXTENT OF THE MARKET.

As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occasion for.

The ability to trade is what leads to the division of labor, and the level of this division is always constrained by the extent of that ability, or in simpler terms, by the size of the market. When the market is really small, no one is motivated to focus solely on one job because they lack the means to exchange the extra output from their work—beyond what they consume—for the products of others' labor that they need.

There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried on nowhere but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too narrow a sphere for him; even an ordinary market-town is scarce large enough to afford him constant occupation. In the lone houses and very small villages which are scattered about in so desert a country as the highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be butcher, baker, and brewer, for his own family. In such situations we can scarce expect to find even a smith, a carpenter, or a mason, within less than twenty miles of another of the same trade. The scattered families that live at eight or ten miles distance from the nearest of them, must learn to perform themselves a great number of little pieces of work, for which, in more populous countries, they would call in the assistance of these workmen. Country workmen are almost everywhere obliged to apply themselves to all the different branches of industry that have so much affinity to one another as to be employed about the same sort of materials. A country carpenter deals in every sort of work that is made of wood; a country smith in every sort of work that is made of iron. The former is not only a carpenter, but a joiner, a cabinet-maker, and even a carver in wood, as well as a wheel-wright, a plough-wright, a cart and waggon-maker. The employments of the latter are still more various. It is impossible there should be such a trade as even that of a nailer in the remote and inland parts of the highlands of Scotland. Such a workman at the rate of a thousand nails a-day, and three hundred working days in the year, will make three hundred thousand nails in the year. But in such a situation it would be impossible to dispose of one thousand, that is, of one day's work in the year.

There are some types of jobs, even the most basic ones, that can only thrive in a big city. A porter, for instance, can only find work and a way to live in a large urban area. A village is way too limiting for him; even a typical market town is barely big enough to provide him with ongoing work. In the isolated houses and tiny villages scattered across the remote highlands of Scotland, every farmer has to be their own butcher, baker, and brewer for their family. In these situations, we can hardly expect to find even a blacksmith, carpenter, or mason within less than twenty miles of another person in the same trade. The scattered families living eight or ten miles away from the nearest tradesperson must learn to do many little jobs themselves, for which they would normally hire these workers in more populated areas. Rural workers are almost always forced to take on all kinds of jobs that are closely related and involve the same materials. A rural carpenter handles all sorts of wooden work; a rural blacksmith deals with everything made of iron. The carpenter is not just a carpenter; he’s also a joiner, cabinet-maker, and even a wood carver, as well as a wheelwright, ploughwright, and cart and wagon-maker. The variety of tasks for the blacksmith is even greater. It's not feasible to have a trade like nail making in the remote inland areas of the Scottish highlands. A worker making a thousand nails a day, for three hundred days a year, would produce three hundred thousand nails in a year. However, in such a location, it would be impossible to sell even one thousand nails, which equals just one day's work in an entire year.

As by means of water-carriage, a more extensive market is opened to every sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is frequently not till a long time after that those improvements extend themselves to the inland parts of the country. A broad-wheeled waggon, attended by two men, and drawn by eight horses, in about six weeks time, carries and brings back between London and Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods. In about the same time a ship navigated by six or eight men, and sailing between the ports of London and Leith, frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six or eight men, therefore, by the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring back, in the same time, the same quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh as fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended by a hundred men, and drawn by four hundred horses. Upon two hundred tons of goods, therefore, carried by the cheapest land-carriage from London to Edinburgh, there must be charged the maintenance of a hundred men for three weeks, and both the maintenance and what is nearly equal to maintenance the wear and tear of four hundred horses, as well as of fifty great waggons. Whereas, upon the same quantity of goods carried by water, there is to be charged only the maintenance of six or eight men, and the wear and tear of a ship of two hundred tons burthen, together with the value of the superior risk, or the difference of the insurance between land and water-carriage. Were there no other communication between those two places, therefore, but by land-carriage, as no goods could be transported from the one to other, except such whose price was very considerable in proportion to their weight, they could carry on but a small part of that commerce which at present subsists between them, and consequently could give but a small part of that encouragement which they at present mutually afford to each other's industry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind between the distant parts of the world. What goods could bear the expense of land-carriage between London and Calcutta? Or if there were any so precious as to be able to support this expense, with what safety could they be transported through the territories of so many barbarous nations? Those two cities, however, at present carry on a very considerable commerce with each other, and by mutually affording a market, give a good deal of encouragement to each other's industry.

Just as water transport opens up a much broader market for all kinds of industries compared to just land transport, it’s along the coast and the banks of navigable rivers that various industries naturally start to specialize and improve. Often, it takes quite a while for these improvements to reach the inland areas of the country. A broad-wheeled wagon, operated by two men and pulled by eight horses, can carry about four tons of goods back and forth between London and Edinburgh in roughly six weeks. In the same amount of time, a ship, manned by six or eight crew members, can transport around two hundred tons of goods between the ports of London and Leith. Therefore, with water transport, six or eight men can move the same amount of goods between London and Edinburgh in the same time it would take fifty broad-wheeled wagons operated by a hundred men and drawn by four hundred horses. For transporting two hundred tons of goods using the cheapest land transport from London to Edinburgh, you’d need to consider the costs of maintaining a hundred men for three weeks, in addition to the maintenance and wear and tear of four hundred horses and fifty large wagons. Meanwhile, for the same amount of goods transported by water, you would only need to account for the maintenance of six or eight men and the wear and tear of a two-hundred-ton ship, as well as the added insurance risk associated with land versus water transport. If the only way to connect those two places was through land transport, only goods that were very high in value relative to their weight could be moved, limiting the amount of trade that currently exists between them and reducing the mutual support they provide for each other’s industries. There would be little to no trade of any kind between distant parts of the world. What goods could afford the cost of land transport between London and Calcutta? Or if there were any that precious enough to meet that cost, how safely could they be transported through the regions of various hostile nations? However, those two cities presently engage in significant trade with each other, and by mutually providing a market, they greatly support each other’s industries.

Since such, therefore, are the advantages of water-carriage, it is natural that the first improvements of art and industry should be made where this conveniency opens the whole world for a market to the produce of every sort of labour, and that they should always be[Pg 9] much later in extending themselves into the inland parts of the country. The inland parts of the country can for a long time have no other market for the greater part of their goods, but the country which lies round about them, and separates them from the sea-coast, and the great navigable rivers. The extent of the market, therefore, must for a long time be in proportion to the riches and populousness of that country, and consequently their improvement must always be posterior to the improvement of that country. In our North American colonies, the plantations have constantly followed either the sea-coast or the banks of the navigable rivers, and have scarce anywhere extended themselves to any considerable distance from both.

Since these are the advantages of water transportation, it's natural that the first advancements in art and industry happen where this convenience opens up the entire world as a market for all kinds of labor. Therefore, development tends to happen much later in the inland areas. The inland regions can, for a long time, rely only on the nearby land for their market, which separates them from the coastline and major navigable rivers. The size of the market will therefore be limited for quite some time by the wealth and population of that area, and as a result, their development will always lag behind that of the surrounding country. In our North American colonies, the plantations have consistently followed the coastline or the banks of navigable rivers, hardly extending any significant distance inland.

The nations that, according to the best authenticated history, appear to have been first civilized, were those that dwelt round the coast of the Mediterranean sea. That sea, by far the greatest inlet that is known in the world, having no tides, nor consequently any waves, except such as are caused by the wind only, was, by the smoothness of its surface, as well as by the multitude of its islands, and the proximity of its neighbouring shores, extremely favourable to the infant navigation of the world; when, from their ignorance of the compass, men were afraid to quit the view of the coast, and from the imperfection of the art of ship-building, to abandon themselves to the boisterous waves of the ocean. To pass beyond the pillars of Hercules, that is, to sail out of the straits of Gibraltar, was, in the ancient world, long considered as a most wonderful and dangerous exploit of navigation. It was late before even the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, the most skilful navigators and ship-builders of those old times, attempted it; and they were, for a long time, the only nations that did attempt it.

The nations that, according to the most reliable history, seem to have been the first to become civilized were those located around the Mediterranean Sea. This sea, the largest known inlet in the world, has no tides and therefore no waves, except for those created by the wind. Its calm surface, combined with its numerous islands and close neighboring shores, was very favorable for the early navigation of the world, when people, unaware of the compass, were hesitant to leave sight of the coast. They were also reluctant to face the rough seas of the ocean due to the limitations of shipbuilding at that time. In the ancient world, sailing beyond the pillars of Hercules—meaning to go through the straits of Gibraltar—was long regarded as an incredible and risky feat of navigation. It took a long time before even the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, the most skilled navigators and shipbuilders of their era, attempted it, and for a long while, they were the only nations that did so.

Of all the countries on the coast of the Mediterranean sea, Egypt seems to have been the first in which either agriculture or manufactures were cultivated and improved to any considerable degree. Upper Egypt extends itself nowhere above a few miles from the Nile; and in Lower Egypt, that great river breaks itself into many different canals, which, with the assistance of a little art, seem to have afforded a communication by water-carriage, not only between all the great towns, but between all the considerable villages, and even to many farm-houses in the country, nearly in the same manner as the Rhine and the Maese do in Holland at present. The extent and easiness of this inland navigation was probably one of the principal causes of the early improvement of Egypt.

Of all the countries along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, Egypt appears to be the first where both agriculture and manufacturing were developed and enhanced to a significant extent. Upper Egypt expands only a few miles from the Nile, while in Lower Egypt, the river splits into several canals which, with a bit of effort, have created a system for transporting goods by water. This system connects not only all the major cities but also many important villages and even various farmhouses in the countryside, much like how the Rhine and the Meuse function in the Netherlands today. The extensive and convenient nature of this inland navigation was likely one of the main reasons for Egypt's early advancement.

The improvements in agriculture and manufactures seem likewise to have been of very great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal in the East Indies, and in some of the eastern provinces of China, though the great extent of this antiquity is not authenticated by any histories of whose authority we, in this part of the world, are well assured. In Bengal, the Ganges, and several other great rivers, form a great number of navigable canals, in the same manner as the Nile does in Egypt. In the eastern provinces of China, too, several great rivers form, by their different branches, a multitude of canals, and, by communicating with one another, afford an inland navigation much more extensive than that either of the Nile or the Ganges, or, perhaps, than both of them put together. It is remarkable, that neither the ancient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinese, encouraged foreign commerce, but seem all to have derived their great opulence from this inland navigation.

The advancements in agriculture and manufacturing appear to have a long history in the Bengal region of the East Indies and in some eastern provinces of China, although the exact timeline of this history isn't confirmed by any accounts that we trust in this part of the world. In Bengal, the Ganges and several other major rivers create a network of navigable canals, similar to those of the Nile in Egypt. In the eastern provinces of China, several significant rivers form many canals through their various branches, which connect with one another and provide an extensive inland navigation system that's likely more extensive than that of the Nile or Ganges, or even both combined. Interestingly, neither the ancient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinese promoted foreign trade, but all seemed to have gained their wealth primarily from this inland navigation.

All the inland parts of Africa, and all that part of Asia which lies any considerable way north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, the ancient Scythia, the modern Tartary and Siberia, seem, in all ages of the world, to have been in the same barbarous and uncivilized state in which we find them at present. The sea of Tartary is the frozen ocean, which admits of no navigation; and though some of the greatest rivers in the world run through that country, they are at too great a distance from one another to carry commerce and communication through the greater part of it. There are in Africa none of those great inlets, such as the Baltic and Adriatic seas in Europe, the Mediterranean and Euxine seas in both Europe and Asia, and the gulfs of Arabia, Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam, in Asia, to carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent; and the great rivers of Africa are at too great a distance from one another to give occasion to any considerable inland navigation. The commerce, besides, which any nation can carry on by means of a river which does not break itself into any great number of branches or canals, and which runs into another territory before it reaches the sea, can never be very considerable, because it is always in the power of the nations who possess that other territory to obstruct the communication between the upper country and the sea. The navigation of the Danube is of very little use to the different states of Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary, in comparison of what it would be, if any of them possessed the whole of its course, till it falls into the Black sea.

All the inland areas of Africa, and the part of Asia that lies significantly north of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, including ancient Scythia, as well as modern Tartary and Siberia, have seemed to remain in the same primitive and uncivilized condition that we see today throughout history. The Sea of Tartary is the frozen ocean, which allows for no navigation; and even though some of the largest rivers in the world flow through that region, they are too far apart to support trade and communication across most of it. Africa lacks major inlets like the Baltic and Adriatic seas in Europe, the Mediterranean and Black seas in both Europe and Asia, and the gulfs of Arabia, Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam in Asia, which would facilitate maritime commerce into the interior of that vast continent; additionally, Africa's major rivers are too distanced from one another to enable significant inland navigation. Moreover, any trade that a nation can conduct via a river that doesn’t split into many branches or canals, and which flows into another territory before reaching the ocean, will never be substantial, as the nations controlling that territory can always disrupt the connection between the interior and the sea. The navigation of the Danube is of minimal benefit to the various states of Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary, compared to what it could be if any of them controlled its entire course until it meets the Black Sea.


CHAP. IV.

OF THE ORIGIN AND USE OF MONEY.

When the division of labor has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very small[Pg 10] part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes, in some measure, a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society.

Once the division of labor is fully established, only a small[Pg 10] portion of a person's needs can be met by what they produce themselves. They fulfill most of their needs by trading the extra goods they produce, which exceed their personal consumption, for the products of others' labor that they require. In this way, everyone essentially lives by trading or, to some extent, becomes a merchant, and society evolves into what we truly recognize as a commercial society.

But when the division of labour first began to take place, this power of exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in in operations. One man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity than he himself has occasion for, while another has less. The former, consequently, would be glad to dispose of, and the latter to purchase, a part of this superfluity. But if this latter should chance to have nothing that the former stands in need of, no exchange can be made between them. The butcher has more meat in his shop than he himself can consume, and the brewer and the baker would each of them be willing to purchase a part of it. But they have nothing to offer in exchange, except the different productions of their respective trades, and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which he has immediate occasion for. No exchange can, in this case, be made between them. He cannot be their merchant, nor they his customers; and they are all of them thus mutually less serviceable to one another. In order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in every period of society, after the first establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry. Many different commodities, it is probable, were successively both thought of and employed for this purpose. In the rude ages of society, cattle are said to have been the common instrument of commerce; and, though they must have been a most inconvenient one, yet, in old times, we find things were frequently valued according to the number of cattle which had been given in exchange for them. The armour of Diomede, says Homer, cost only nine oxen; but that of Glaucus cost a hundred oxen. Salt is said to be the common instrument of commerce and exchanges in Abyssinia; a species of shells in some parts of the coast of India; dried cod at Newfoundland; tobacco in Virginia; sugar in some of our West India colonies; hides or dressed leather in some other countries; and there is at this day a village in Scotland, where it is not uncommon, I am told, for a workman to carry nails instead of money to the baker's shop or the ale-house.

But when the division of labor first began, the ability to trade must have often been quite complicated and hindered. Let's say one person has more of a certain item than they need, while another person has less. The first person would be happy to sell some of their excess, and the second person would want to buy it. However, if the second person has nothing that the first person needs, no trade can happen between them. For example, a butcher has more meat than he can eat, and both the brewer and the baker would like to buy some. But they have nothing to offer in exchange except their own products, and the butcher already has all the bread and beer he needs. In this situation, no trade can occur. He can't be their merchant, nor can they be his customers, so they are all less useful to one another. To avoid these awkward situations, every sensible person in every society, after the division of labor began, must have tried to manage their affairs so that they always had some commodity besides the specific products of their own work—something they thought people would be unlikely to refuse in exchange for their goods. It's likely that many different items were considered and used for this purpose over time. In the early ages of society, cattle were said to be the common medium of trade; although they must have been quite inconvenient, things were often valued based on how many cattle had been used in trade. Homer's works mention that Diomede's armor cost only nine oxen, while Glaucus’s armor cost a hundred. Salt is said to be the common medium of trade in Abyssinia, a type of shell on some parts of the coast of India, dried cod in Newfoundland, tobacco in Virginia, sugar in some of the West Indian colonies, hides or tanned leather in other countries, and there's even a village in Scotland where it's not uncommon, as I've been told, for a worker to carry nails instead of money to the baker's or the pub.

In all countries, however, men seem at last to have been determined by irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals above every other commodity. Metals can not only be kept with as little loss as any other commodity, scarce any thing being less perishable than they are, but they can likewise, without any loss, be divided into any number of parts, as by fusion those parts can easily be re-united again; a quality which no other equally durable commodities possess, and which, more than any other quality, renders them fit to be the instruments of commerce and circulation. The man who wanted to buy salt, for example, and had nothing but cattle to give in exchange for it, must have been obliged to buy salt to the value of a whole ox, or a whole sheep, at a time. He could seldom buy less than this, because what he was to give for it could seldom be divided without loss; and if he had a mind to buy more, he must, for the same reasons, have been obliged to buy double or triple the quantity, the value, to wit, of two or three oxen, or of two or three sheep. If, on the contrary, instead of sheep or oxen, he had metals to give in exchange for it, he could easily proportion the quantity of the metal to the precise quantity of the commodity which he had immediate occasion for.

In every country, it seems men have finally been compelled by powerful reasons to prefer metals for trade over all other goods. Metals can be stored with minimal loss, as they are less perishable than most items, and they can also be divided into any number of parts without loss. These parts can easily be melted down and rejoined, a quality that no other equally durable goods have, and which makes them especially suitable for commerce and exchange. For instance, if someone wanted to buy salt but only had cattle to trade, they would have to purchase salt worth an entire ox or sheep at once. It’s rare that they could buy less than that because the trade items couldn’t generally be divided without losing value. If they wanted to buy more, they’d have to get double or triple the amount, equating to the value of two or three oxen or sheep. On the other hand, if they had metals to trade instead of sheep or oxen, they could easily match the amount of metal to what they needed for their purchase.

Different metals have been made use of by different nations for this purpose. Iron was the common instrument of commerce among the ancient Spartans, copper among the ancient Romans, and gold and silver among all rich and commercial nations.

Different countries have used various metals for this purpose. Iron was the main currency of trade for the ancient Spartans, copper for the ancient Romans, and gold and silver were used by all wealthy and trading nations.

Those metals seem originally to have been made use of for this purpose in rude bars, without any stamp or coinage. Thus we are told by Pliny[6], upon the authority of Timæus, an ancient historian, that, till the time of Servius Tullius, the Romans had no coined money, but made use of unstamped bars of copper, to purchase whatever they had occasion for. These rude bars, therefore, performed at this time the function of money.

Those metals seem to have originally been used for this purpose in crude bars, without any stamp or coins. According to Pliny[6], referencing Timæus, an ancient historian, until the time of Servius Tullius, the Romans had no minted money and instead relied on unstamped bars of copper to buy what they needed. These crude bars, therefore, served as money during that period.

The use of metals in this rude state was attended with two very considerable inconveniences; first, with the trouble of weighing, and secondly, with that of assaying them. In the precious metals, where a small difference in the quantity makes a great difference in the value, even the business of weighing, with proper exactness, requires at least very accurate weights and scales. The weighing of gold, in particular, is an operation of some nicety. In the coarser metals, indeed, where a small error would be of little consequence, less accuracy would, no doubt, be necessary. Yet we should find it excessively troublesome if every time a poor man had occasion either[Pg 11] to buy or sell a farthing's worth of goods, he was obliged to weigh the farthing. The operation of assaying is still more difficult, still more tedious; and, unless part of the metal is fairly melted in the crucible, with proper dissolvents, any conclusion that can be drawn from it is extremely uncertain. Before the institution of coined money, however, unless they went through this tedious and difficult operation, people must always have been liable to the grossest frauds and impositions; and instead of a pound weight of pure silver, or pure copper, might receive, in exchange for their goods, an adulterated composition of the coarsest and cheapest materials, which had, however, in their outward appearance, been made to resemble these metals. To prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all sorts of industry and commerce, it has been found necessary, in all countries that have made any considerable advances towards improvement, to affix a public stamp upon certain quantities of such particular metals, as were in those countries commonly made use of to purchase goods. Hence the origin of coined money, and of those public offices called mints; institutions exactly of the same nature with these of the aulnagers and stamp-masters of woollen and linen cloth. All of them are equally meant to ascertain, by means of a public stamp, the quantity and uniform goodness of those different commodities when brought to market.

Using metals in their raw state had two major drawbacks: first, weighing them, and second, assaying them. In the case of precious metals, even a small difference in amount can lead to a significant difference in value, so weighing accurately demands precise weights and scales. Weighing gold, in particular, is quite delicate. With less valuable metals, a small error may not matter as much, so less precision might be sufficient. However, it would be extremely inconvenient if every time a poor person needed to buy or sell something worth a farthing, they had to weigh the farthing itself. Assaying is even more complicated and time-consuming; unless a portion of the metal is properly melted in a crucible with the right solvents, any conclusion drawn from it is highly uncertain. Before coins were invented, if people didn't go through this lengthy and challenging process, they were vulnerable to serious fraud and deception. Instead of receiving a pound of pure silver or pure copper in exchange for their goods, they could end up with a mixed material made to look like these metals. To prevent such cheating, make transactions easier, and promote various industries and commerce, it became necessary in all countries that progressed significantly to place a public stamp on specific quantities of metals commonly used for purchasing goods. This led to the creation of coined money and public institutions known as mints, similar to the roles of the aulnagers and stamp-masters for woolen and linen textiles. All of these are designed to certify, through a public stamp, the quantity and consistent quality of different goods when sold in the market.

The first public stamps of this kind that were affixed to the current metals, seem in many cases to have been intended to ascertain, what it was both most difficult and most important to ascertain, the goodness or fineness of the metal, and to have resembled the sterling mark which is at present affixed to plate and bars of silver, or the Spanish mark which is sometimes affixed to ingots of gold, and which, being struck only upon one side of the piece, and not covering the whole surface, ascertains the fineness, but not the weight of the metal. Abraham weighs to Ephron the four hundred shekels of silver which he had agreed to pay for the field of Machpelah. They are said, however, to be the current money of the merchant, and yet are received by weight, and not by tale, in the same manner as ingots of gold and bars of silver are at present. The revenues of the ancient Saxon kings of England are said to have been paid, not in money, but in kind, that is, in victuals and provisions of all sorts. William the Conqueror introduced the custom of paying them in money. This money, however, was for a long time, received at the exchequer, by weight, and not by tale.

The first public stamps of this kind that were attached to the current metals seem to have been meant to determine something that was both challenging and important to know: the quality or purity of the metal. They resembled the sterling mark that is currently placed on silver plates and bars, or the Spanish mark sometimes found on gold ingots. This mark is only struck on one side of the piece, confirming its purity but not its weight. Abraham pays Ephron the four hundred shekels of silver he agreed to for the field of Machpelah. These are said to be the standard currency of merchants, yet they are received by weight and not by count, just like gold ingots and silver bars today. It is said that the revenues of the ancient Saxon kings of England were paid not in money but in goods, specifically in food and various provisions. William the Conqueror established the practice of paying them in money. However, this money was received at the exchequer for a long time by weight, not by count.

The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals with exactness, gave occasion to the institution of coins, of which the stamp, covering entirely both sides of the piece, and sometimes the edges too, was supposed to ascertain not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal. Such coins, therefore, were received by tale, as at present, without the trouble of weighing.

The inconvenience and difficulty of weighing those metals accurately led to the creation of coins, which were stamped on both sides and sometimes the edges as well, to guarantee not just the quality but also the weight of the metal. Because of this, coins were accepted by count, just like today, eliminating the hassle of weighing.

The denominations of those coins seem originally to have expressed the weight or quantity of metal contained in them. In the time of Servius Tullius, who first coined money at Rome, the Roman as or pondo contained a Roman pound of good copper. It was divided, in the same manner as our Troyes pound, into twelve ounces, each of which contained a real ounce of good copper. The English pound sterling, in the time of Edward I. contained a pound, Tower weight, of silver of a known fineness. The Tower pound seems to have been something more than the Roman pound, and something less than the Troyes pound. This last was not introduced into the mint of England till the 18th of Henry the VIII. The French livre contained, in the time of Charlemagne, a pound, Troyes weight, of silver of a known fineness. The fair of Troyes in Champaign was at that time frequented by all the nations of Europe, and the weights and measures of so famous a market were generally know and esteemed. The Scots money pound contained, from the time of Alexander the First to that of Robert Bruce, a pound of silver of the same weight and fineness with the English pound sterling. English, French, and Scots pennies, too, contained all of them originally a real penny-weight of silver, the twentieth part of an ounce, and the two hundred-and-fortieth part of a pound. The shilling, too, seems originally to have been the denomination of a weight. When wheat is at twelve shillings the quarter, says an ancient statute of Henry III. then wastel bread of a farthing shall weigh eleven shillings and fourpence. The proportion, however, between the shilling, and either the penny on the one hand, or the pound on the other, seems not to have been so constant and uniform as that between the penny and the pound. During the first race of the kings of France, the French sou or shilling appears upon different occasions to have contained five, twelve, twenty, and forty pennies. Among the ancient Saxons, a shilling appears at one time to have contained only five pennies, and it is not improbable that it may have been as variable among them as among their neighbours, the ancient Franks. From the time of Charlemagne among the French, and from that of William the Conqueror among the English, the proportion between the pound, the shilling, and the penny, seems to have been uniformly the same as at present, though the value of each has been very different; for in every country of the world, I believe, the avarice and injustice of princes and sovereign states, abusing the confidence of their subjects, have by degrees diminished the real quantity[Pg 12] of metal, which had been originally contained in their coins. The Roman as, in the latter ages of the republic, was reduced to the twenty-fourth part of its original value, and, instead of weighing a pound, came to weigh only half an ounce. The English pound and penny contain at present about a third only; the Scots pound and penny about a thirty-sixth; and the French pound and penny about a sixty-sixth part of their original value. By means of those operations, the princes and sovereign states which performed them were enabled, in appearance, to pay their debts and fulfil their engagements with a smaller quantity of silver than would otherwise have been requisite. It was indeed in appearance only; for their creditors were really defrauded of a part of what was due to them. All other debtors in the state were allowed the same privilege, and might pay with the same nominal sum of the new and debased coin whatever they had borrowed in the old. Such operations, therefore, have always proved favourable to the debtor, and ruinous to the creditor, and have sometimes produced a greater and more universal revolution in the fortunes of private persons, than could have been occasioned by a very great public calamity.

The values of those coins originally reflected the weight or amount of metal in them. During the time of Servius Tullius, who first minted money in Rome, the Roman as or pondo contained a Roman pound of good copper. It was divided, just like our Troyes pound, into twelve ounces, each holding a real ounce of quality copper. The English pound sterling, during Edward I's reign, contained a pound, Tower weight, of silver of a known purity. The Tower pound seemed to be slightly more than the Roman pound and slightly less than the Troyes pound. The Troyes pound wasn’t introduced in England's mint until the 18th year of Henry VIII’s reign. The French livre, during Charlemagne’s time, represented a pound, Troyes weight, of silver of known fineness. The fair of Troyes in Champagne was a hub for all of Europe back then, and the weights and measures from such a renowned market were well-known and respected. The Scottish pound, from the time of Alexander I to Robert Bruce, contained a pound of silver with the same weight and quality as the English pound sterling. English, French, and Scottish pennies originally contained a real penny-weight of silver, which was one-twentieth of an ounce and one-two hundred-and-fortieth of a pound. The shilling also seems to have originally referred to a weight. When wheat is at twelve shillings the quarter, states an old law from Henry III. then wastel bread of a farthing shall weigh eleven shillings and fourpence. However, the relationship between the shilling and either the penny or the pound didn't seem as consistent as that between the penny and the pound. During the early French kings, the French sou or shilling appeared to contain five, twelve, twenty, and forty pennies at different times. Among the ancient Saxons, a shilling seemed to have at one point contained only five pennies, and it’s likely that it varied among them just as it did among their neighbors, the ancient Franks. After Charlemagne's time in France and William the Conqueror's in England, the ratios between the pound, shilling, and penny seemed to remain the same as today, although their values changed significantly; I believe in every country worldwide, the greed and unfairness of rulers and sovereign states, taking advantage of their people’s trust, gradually reduced the actual amount of metal that was originally in their coins. The Roman as, in the later years of the republic, dropped to a twenty-fourth of its original value, and rather than weighing a pound, came to weigh only half an ounce. Now, the English pound and penny contain about one-third of their original value; the Scottish pound and penny hold about one-thirty-sixth; and the French pound and penny about one-sixty-sixth. Through these actions, the rulers and states that undertook them could, at least on the surface, settle their debts and meet their obligations with a smaller amount of silver than would otherwise be necessary. It was indeed only an appearance; their creditors were genuinely cheated out of a part of what they were owed. All other debtors in the state were granted the same permission, able to repay with the same nominal sum of the new, degraded coin anything they had borrowed in the old. Thus, such practices have always favored the debtor while being detrimental to the creditor, sometimes leading to a more significant and widespread change in the fortunes of private individuals than could result from a severe public disaster.

It is in this manner that money has become, in all civilized nations, the universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold, or exchanged for one another.

It's in this way that money has become, in all civilized countries, the universal tool of trade, through which all kinds of goods are bought and sold or exchanged for one another.

What are the rules which men naturally observe, in exchanging them either for money, or for one another, I shall now proceed to examine. These rules determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable value of goods.

What are the rules that people naturally follow when trading them either for money or for each other? I will now examine these rules. They establish what can be considered the relative or exchangeable value of goods.

The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called 'value in use;' the other, 'value in exchange.' The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.

The word VALUE has two distinct meanings. Sometimes, it reflects the usefulness of a specific object, and other times, it indicates the purchasing power that owning that object gives you. The first can be called 'value in use,' while the second is 'value in exchange.' Things that are highly valuable in use often have little or no value in exchange, and vice versa; items that are highly valuable in exchange may have very little use. For example, nothing is more essential than water, yet it hardly buys anything in return. On the other hand, a diamond has little practical use, but you can often exchange it for a large amount of other goods.

In order to investigate the principles which regulate the exchangeable value of commodities, I shall endeavour to shew,

In order to explore the principles that determine the exchange value of goods, I will strive to show,

First, what is the real measure of this exchangeable value; or wherein consists the real price of all commodities.

First, what is the true measure of this exchangeable value, or what constitutes the actual price of all goods?

Secondly, what are the different parts of which this real price is composed or made up.

Secondly, what are the different components that make up this actual price?

And, lastly, what are the different circumstances which sometimes raise some or all of these different parts of price above, and sometimes sink them below, their natural or ordinary rate; or, what are the causes which sometimes hinder the market price, that is, the actual price of commodities, from coinciding exactly with what may be called their natural price.

And finally, what are the various circumstances that can sometimes push some or all of these different components of price higher or lower than their normal rate? In other words, what factors can occasionally prevent the market price, meaning the actual price of goods, from aligning perfectly with what we might consider their natural price?

I shall endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, those three subjects in the three following chapters, for which I must very earnestly entreat both the patience and attention of the reader: his patience, in order to examine a detail which may, perhaps, in some places, appear unnecessarily tedious; and his attention, in order to understand what may perhaps, after the fullest explication which I am capable of giving it, appear still in some degree obscure. I am always willing to run some hazard of being tedious, in order to be sure that I am perspicuous; and, after taking the utmost pains that I can to be perspicuous, some obscurity may still appear to remain upon a subject, in its own nature extremely abstracted.

I will try to explain, as clearly and thoroughly as I can, those three topics in the next three chapters. I ask for the reader's patience to go through details that might seem a bit tedious in places, and I ask for their attention to grasp concepts that might still seem somewhat unclear, even after my best efforts to clarify them. I'm willing to risk being boring to ensure that I'm clear, and despite my efforts to be understandable, some confusion may still linger due to the inherently complex nature of the subject.


CHAP. V.

OF THE REAL AND NOMINAL PRICE OF COMMODITIES, OR OF THEIR PRICE IN LABOUR, AND THEIR PRICE IN MONEY.

Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusements of human life. But after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man's own labour can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase. The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command. Labour therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.

Every person is considered rich or poor based on their ability to enjoy the necessities, comforts, and pleasures of life. However, once the division of labor is fully established, only a small portion of these can be provided by a person's own work. The majority must come from the labor of others, meaning one’s wealth or poverty depends on how much of that labor they can access or afford to buy. Thus, the value of any item to someone who owns it but doesn't intend to use or consume it themselves, and instead wants to trade it for something else, is determined by how much labor they can buy or command with it. Therefore, labor is the true measure of the exchangeable value of all goods.

The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it and who wants to dispose of it, or exchange it for something[Pg 13] else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money, or with goods, is purchased by labour, as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money, or those goods, indeed, save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labour, which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.

The true cost of everything, what it actually takes for someone to get it, is the effort and hassle involved in obtaining it. For someone who has it and wants to sell or trade it for something else, its real value lies in the effort it can save them, and the burden it may place on others. What we buy with money or goods is acquired through labor, just like what we gain through our own hard work. Money or goods essentially save us that effort. They represent the value of a certain amount of labor, which we trade for something believed at the time to have an equal worth. Labor was the first price, the original payment made for all things. All the world’s wealth was initially acquired through labor, not gold or silver; and its value, for those who own it and want to trade it for new products, is exactly equal to the amount of labor it allows them to buy or control.

Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both; but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing a certain command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this power, or to the quantity either of other men's labour, or, what is the same thing, of the produce of other men's labour, which it enables him to purchase or command. The exchangeable value of every thing must always be precisely equal to the extent of this power which it conveys to its owner.

Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes states, is power. However, a person who either gains or inherits a large fortune doesn't automatically gain any political power, whether it's civil or military. Their wealth might give them the means to obtain both, but simply having that wealth doesn't guarantee it. The immediate power that comes from that wealth is the ability to purchase a certain control over all the labor or the products of labor available in the market. Their fortune is larger or smaller depending on the extent of this power or the amount of other people's labor, or essentially, the products of other people's labor, that it allows them to buy or control. The exchangeable value of everything must always equate to the level of this power it provides to its owner.

But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is often difficult to ascertain the proportion between two different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different sorts of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and of ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account. There may be more labour in an hour's hard work, than in two hours easy business; or in an hour's application to a trade which it cost ten years labour to learn, than in a month's industry, at an ordinary and obvious employment. But it is not easy to find any accurate measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In exchanging, indeed, the different productions of different sorts of labour for one another, some allowance is commonly made for both. It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of common life.

But while labor is the true measure of the exchangeable value of all goods, it’s not typically how we evaluate their worth. It can be tricky to determine the relationship between two different amounts of labor. The time spent on two different types of work doesn’t always solely dictate this relationship. We also need to consider the varying levels of difficulty faced and creativity applied. There could be more effort in an hour of tough work than in two hours of easier tasks, or more dedication in an hour spent on a trade that took ten years to master than in a month’s work at a straightforward job. However, it's not easy to find a precise measure for either difficulty or creativity. When exchanging the different outputs of various kinds of labor, some consideration is usually given to both. Yet, this is settled not by a precise measurement, but through the bargaining and negotiating in the market, according to a rough balance that, although not exact, is good enough for everyday transactions.

Every commodity, besides, is more frequently exchanged for, and thereby compared with, other commodities, than with labour. It is more natural, therefore, to estimate its exchangeable value by the quantity of some other commodity, than by that of the labour which it can produce. The greater part of people, too, understand better what is meant by a quantity of a particular commodity, than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain palpable object; the other an abstract notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.

Every item is traded more often for, and thus compared with, other items than with labor. It makes more sense, therefore, to gauge its exchangeable value by the amount of some other item instead of by the amount of labor it can produce. Most people also understand what is meant by a quantity of a specific item better than by a quantity of labor. One is a clear, tangible object; the other is an abstract idea that, while it can be made clear enough, isn't quite as natural and straightforward.

But when barter ceases, and money has become the common instrument of commerce, every particular commodity is more frequently exchanged for money than for any other commodity. The butcher seldom carries his beef or his mutton to the baker or the brewer, in order to exchange them for bread or for beer; but he carries them to the market, where he exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges that money for bread and for beer. The quantity of money which he gets for them regulates, too, the quantity of bread and beer which he can afterwards purchase. It is more natural and obvious to him, therefore, to estimate their value by the quantity of money, the commodity for which he immediately exchanges them, than by that of bread and beer, the commodities for which he can exchange them only by the intervention of another commodity; and rather to say that his butcher's meat is worth threepence or fourpence a-pound, than that it is worth three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts of small beer. Hence it comes to pass, that the exchangeable value of every commodity is more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in exchange for it.

But when bartering stops and money becomes the standard tool for trade, people exchange a particular commodity for money more often than for anything else. The butcher rarely takes his beef or mutton to the baker or brewer to trade for bread or beer; instead, he takes them to the market, where he sells them for money, and then uses that money to buy bread and beer. The amount of money he gets for his meat also determines how much bread and beer he can buy later. So, it makes more sense and is clearer for him to value his goods based on the amount of money he receives, the item he directly exchanges them for, rather than by the value of bread and beer, which he can only get by exchanging them through another product. He’s more likely to say that his butcher's meat is worth three or four pence per pound than to say it’s worth three or four pounds of bread or three or four quarts of beer. This is why the exchangeable value of every commodity is usually assessed by the amount of money rather than the amount of labor or any other good that can be traded for it.

Gold and silver, however, like every other commodity, vary in their value; are sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier and sometimes of more difficult purchase. The quantity of labour which any particular quantity of them can purchase or command, or the quantity of other goods which it will exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made. The discovery of the abundant mines of America, reduced, in the sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been before. As it cost less labour to bring those metals from the mine to the market, so, when they were brought thither, they could purchase or command less labour; and this revolution in their value, though perhaps the greatest, is by no means the only one of which history gives some account. But as a measure of quantity, such as the natural foot, fathom, or handful, which is continually vary[Pg 14]ing in its own quantity, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity of other things; so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value, can never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities. Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength, and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and places, that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only.

Gold and silver, like any other commodity, change in value; sometimes they’re cheaper and sometimes they’re more expensive, sometimes easier to get and sometimes harder. The amount of labor that a certain quantity of gold or silver can buy or command, or the amount of other goods it can be exchanged for, always depends on how rich or poor the mines are around the time these exchanges happen. The discovery of abundant mines in America lowered the value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been in the sixteenth century. Since it took less labor to extract those metals from the mine to the market, they could buy or command less labor once they arrived there. This shift in their value, while perhaps the most significant, is by no means the only one noted in history. Just as a measure like a natural foot, fathom, or handful, which constantly changes in its own quantity, can never accurately measure the quantity of other things; a commodity that continually fluctuates in its own value can never accurately measure the value of other commodities. Equal amounts of labor, at all times and places, can be considered equal in value to the laborer. In his normal state of health, strength, and spirits, and at his usual level of skill and dexterity, he always has to give up the same portion of his comfort, freedom, and happiness. The cost he pays must always be the same, no matter how many goods he receives in exchange. Indeed, he might sometimes be able to buy a greater quantity of goods and sometimes a smaller one; but it’s their value that varies, not the value of the labor that buys them. At any time and place, things that are hard to get or require a lot of labor to acquire are considered expensive, while things that are easy to obtain or need very little labor are seen as cheap. Labor alone, which never changes in its own value, is the only true and ultimate standard by which the value of all commodities can be measured and compared at all times and places. It represents their real price; money is just their nominal price.

But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the labourer, yet to the person who employs him they appear sometimes to be of greater, and sometimes of smaller value. He purchases them sometimes with a greater, and sometimes with a smaller quantity of goods, and to him the price of labour seems to vary like that of all other things. It appears to him dear in the one case, and cheap in the other. In reality, however, it is the goods which are cheap in the one case, and dear in the other.

But while equal amounts of labor are always equally valuable to the worker, they can seem more or less valuable to the person hiring him. Sometimes they buy it with a larger amount of goods and at other times with a smaller amount, so the price of labor appears to them to fluctuate like the price of everything else. At one moment, it seems expensive, and at another, it seems cheap. In reality, though, it's the goods that are cheap in one situation and expensive in the other.

In this popular sense, therefore, labour, like commodities, may be said to have a real and a nominal price. Its real price may be said to consist in the quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which are given for it; its nominal price, in the quantity of money. The labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, in proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his labour.

In a popular sense, labor, like goods, can be said to have both a real and a nominal price. The real price consists of the amount of essentials and comforts of life that are exchanged for it; the nominal price is represented by the amount of money. The laborer is considered rich or poor, or well or poorly compensated, based on the real price of their labor, not the nominal price.

The distinction between the real and the nominal price of commodities and labour is not a matter of mere speculation, but may sometimes be of considerable use in practice. The same real price is always of the same value; but on account of the variations in the value of gold and silver, the same nominal price is sometimes of very different values. When a landed estate, therefore, is sold with a reservation of a perpetual rent, if it is intended that this rent should always be of the same value, it is of importance to the family in whose favour it is reserved, that it should not consist in a particular sum of money. Its value would in this case be liable to variations of two different kinds: first, to those which arise from the different quantities of gold and silver which are contained at different times in coin of the same denomination; and, secondly, to those which arise from the different values of equal quantities of gold and silver at different times.

The difference between the real and nominal prices of goods and labor isn't just theoretical; it can be quite useful in practice. The real price always retains the same value, but due to fluctuations in the value of gold and silver, the same nominal price can have very different values. So when a property is sold with a perpetual rent attached, if the intention is for this rent to maintain the same value, it’s important for the beneficiary family that it isn’t set as a specific amount of money. The value would then be subject to two types of changes: first, from variations in the amounts of gold and silver found in coins of the same denomination at different times; and second, from changes in the values of equal amounts of gold and silver at different times.

Princes and sovereign states have frequently fancied that they had a temporary interest to diminish the quantity of pure metal contained in their coins; but they seldom have fancied that they had any to augment it. The quantity of metal contained in the coins, I believe of all nations, has accordingly been almost continually diminishing, and hardly ever augmenting. Such variations, therefore, tend almost always to diminish the value of a money rent.

Princes and independent states have often thought they had a short-term reason to reduce the amount of pure metal in their coins; however, they rarely believed they had a reason to increase it. The amount of metal in the coins, I think for all nations, has almost constantly been going down and hardly ever going up. Therefore, such changes almost always tend to decrease the value of a money rent.

The discovery of the mines of America diminished the value of gold and silver in Europe. This diminution, it is commonly supposed, though I apprehend without any certain proof, is still going on gradually, and is likely to continue to do so for a long time. Upon this supposition, therefore, such variations are more likely to diminish than to augment the value of a money rent, even though it should be stipulated to be paid, not in such a quantity of coined money of such a denomination (in so many pounds sterling, for example), but in so many ounces, either of pure silver, or of silver of a certain standard.

The discovery of mines in America reduced the value of gold and silver in Europe. This decrease, as commonly believed—though I think without any solid proof—is still happening gradually and is likely to keep going for quite a while. Based on this assumption, such changes are more likely to decrease rather than increase the value of a money rent, even if it’s agreed to be paid, not in a specific amount of coined money with a certain denomination (like so many pounds sterling), but in a certain number of ounces, either of pure silver or silver of a specified standard.

The rents which have been reserved in corn, have preserved their value much better than those which have been reserved in money, even where the denomination of the coin has not been altered. By the 18th of Elizabeth, it was enacted, that a third of the rent of all college leases should be reserved in corn, to be paid either in kind, or according to the current prices at the nearest public market. The money arising from this corn rent, though originally but a third of the whole, is, in the present times, according to Dr. Blackstone, commonly near double of what arises from the other two-thirds. The old money rents of colleges must, according to this account, have sunk almost to a fourth part of their ancient value, or are worth little more than a fourth part of the corn which they were formerly worth. But since the reign of Philip and Mary, the denomination of the English coin has undergone little or no alteration, and the same number of pounds, shillings, and pence, have contained very nearly the same quantity of pure silver. This degradation, therefore, in the value of the money rents of colleges, has arisen altogether from the degradation in the price of silver.

The rents that were set in corn have held their value much better than those set in money, even when the type of coin hasn’t changed. By the 18th year of Elizabeth's reign, it was mandated that a third of the rent for all college leases should be in corn, to be paid either in actual corn or according to the current prices at the nearest public market. The money generated from this corn rent, although originally only a third of the total, is now, according to Dr. Blackstone, often nearly double what is made from the other two-thirds. Based on this, the old money rents of colleges must have decreased to about a fourth of their former value, or are worth just a little more than a fourth of what the corn used to be worth. However, since the reign of Philip and Mary, the denominations of English coinage have seen little to no change, and the same number of pounds, shillings, and pence have contained almost the same amount of pure silver. Therefore, the decline in the value of college money rents is entirely due to the drop in the price of silver.

When the degradation in the value of silver is combined with the diminution of the quantity of it contained in the coin of the same denomination, the loss is frequently still greater. In Scotland, where the denomination of the coin has undergone much greater alter[Pg 15]ations than it ever did in England, and in France, where it has undergone still greater than it ever did in Scotland, some ancient rents, originally of considerable value, have, in this manner, been reduced almost to nothing.

When the drop in the value of silver is combined with the decrease in the amount of it contained in coins of the same denomination, the loss is often even greater. In Scotland, where the denominations of coins have changed much more than they ever did in England, and in France, where the changes have been even more significant than in Scotland, some old rents that were once quite valuable have been reduced to almost nothing in this way.

Equal quantities of labour will, at distant times, be purchased more nearly with equal quantities of corn, the subsistence of the labourer, than with equal quantities of gold and silver, or, perhaps, of any other commodity. Equal quantities of corn, therefore, will, at distant times, be more nearly of the same real value, or enable the possessor to purchase or command more nearly the same quantity of the labour of other people. They will do this, I say, more nearly than equal quantities of almost any other commodity; for even equal quantities of corn will not do it exactly. The subsistence of the labourer, or the real price of labour, as I shall endeavour to shew hereafter, is very different upon different occasions; more liberal in a society advancing to opulence, than in one that is standing still, and in one that is standing still, than in one that is going backwards. Every other commodity, however, will, at any particular time, purchase a greater or smaller quantity of labour, in proportion to the quantity of subsistence which it can purchase at that time. A rent, therefore, reserved in corn, is liable only to the variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can purchase. But a rent reserved in any other commodity is liable, not only to the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn can purchase, but to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be purchased by any particular quantity of that commodity.

Equal amounts of labor will, over time, be exchanged more closely for equal amounts of corn, which is what the laborer needs to survive, than for equal amounts of gold and silver or probably any other commodity. Thus, equal amounts of corn will, over time, have a more consistent real value, allowing the holder to buy or command a more consistent amount of other people's labor. This will happen, I argue, more consistently than with almost any other commodity; even equal amounts of corn won't do it perfectly. The laborer's sustenance, or the real cost of labor, which I will explain later, varies significantly depending on the situation; it tends to be more generous in a society that's prospering compared to one that's stagnant, and in a stagnant society compared to one that's declining. Any other commodity, however, will be able to buy a greater or lesser quantity of labor at any given time, in relation to how much subsistence it can buy at that time. Therefore, a rent paid in corn is only subject to changes in the amount of labor that a certain amount of corn can buy. But a rent paid in any other commodity is affected not only by the changes in how much labor a particular amount of corn can buy, but also by the changes in how much corn can be bought with a particular amount of that commodity.

Though the real value of a corn rent, it is to be observed, however, varies much less from century to century than that of a money rent, it varies much more from year to year. The money price of labour, as I shall endeavour to shew hereafter, does not fluctuate from year to year with the money price of corn, but seems to be everywhere accommodated, not to the temporary or occasional, but to the average or ordinary price of that necessary of life. The average or ordinary price of corn, again is regulated, as I shall likewise endeavour to shew hereafter, by the value of silver, by the richness or barrenness of the mines which supply the market with that metal, or by the quantity of labour which must be employed, and consequently of corn which must be consumed, in order to bring any particular quantity of silver from the mine to the market. But the value of silver, though it sometimes varies greatly from century to century, seldom varies much from year to year, but frequently continues the same, or very nearly the same, for half a century or a century together. The ordinary or average money price of corn, therefore, may, during so long a period, continue the same, or very nearly the same, too, and along with it the money price of labour, provided, at least, the society continues, in other respects, in the same, or nearly in the same, condition. In the mean time, the temporary and occasional price of corn may frequently be double one year of what it had been the year before, or fluctuate, for example, from five-and-twenty to fifty shillings the quarter. But when corn is at the latter price, not only the nominal, but the real value of a corn rent, will be double of what it is when at the former, or will command double the quantity either of labour, or of the greater part of other commodities; the money price of labour, and along with it that of most other things, continuing the same during all these fluctuations.

Although the true value of a corn rent varies less from century to century than that of a money rent, it fluctuates much more from year to year. The wage for labor, as I will explain later, doesn’t change each year in line with the price of corn, but instead aligns more with the average or typical price of this essential food. The average or typical price of corn, in turn, is influenced—again, as I will explain later—by the value of silver, the richness or scarcity of the mines supplying that metal, or by the amount of labor needed, and thus the corn consumed, to extract a specific amount of silver from the mine to the market. However, while the value of silver can vary significantly from century to century, it usually does not change much from year to year, often remaining the same, or very close to the same, for decades or even a century. Therefore, the typical or average money price of corn may remain constant, or very nearly constant, over such periods, along with the money price of labor, provided that society remains, in other respects, in a similar condition. Meanwhile, the short-term and occasional price of corn can easily be double one year what it was the previous year, or fluctuate, for instance, from twenty-five to fifty shillings per quarter. But when corn is priced at the latter amount, not only does the nominal value, but the real value of a corn rent, become double what it is at the former price, commanding twice the amount of labor or most other goods; the money price of labor and, consequently, most other things, remains unchanged throughout these fluctuations.

Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the only accurate, measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare the values of different commodities, at all times, and at all places. We cannot estimate, it is allowed, the real value of different commodities from century to century by the quantities of silver which were given for them. We cannot estimate it from year to year by the quantities of corn. By the quantities of labour, we can, with the greatest accuracy, estimate it, both from century to century, and from year to year. From century to century, corn is a better measure than silver, because, from century to century, equal quantities of corn will command the same quantity of labour more nearly than equal quantities of silver. From year to year, on the contrary, silver is a better measure than corn, because equal quantities of it will more nearly command the same quantity of labour.

Labor, therefore, it is clear, is the only universal and precise measure of value, or the only standard we can use to compare the values of different goods, anytime and anywhere. It's true that we can't determine the true value of various goods from century to century just by looking at the amounts of silver paid for them. We also can't gauge it from year to year based on the amounts of grain. However, we can accurately assess it using the quantities of labor, both across centuries and years. From century to century, grain serves as a better measure than silver because equal amounts of grain will more consistently reflect the same amount of labor than equal amounts of silver. Year to year, on the other hand, silver is a better measure than grain because equal amounts of silver will more consistently align with the same quantity of labor.

But though, in establishing perpetual rents, or even in letting very long leases, it may be of use to distinguish between real and nominal price; it is of none in buying and selling, the more common and ordinary transactions of human life.

But even though it might be helpful to differentiate between real and nominal prices when setting up perpetual rents or in granting very long leases, it doesn't matter in buying and selling, which are the more common and everyday transactions of life.

At the same time and place, the real and the nominal price of all commodities are exactly in proportion to one another. The more or less money you get for any commodity, in the London market, for example, the more or less labour it will at that time and place enable you to purchase or command. At the same time and place, therefore, money is the exact measure of the real exchangeable value of all commodities. It is so, however, at the same time and place only.

At the same time and place, the actual and stated prices of all goods are exactly proportional to each other. The more or less money you receive for any item, say in the London market, the more or less labor you can buy or command at that time and place. Therefore, at that moment and location, money is the precise measure of the real exchange value of all goods. However, this is true only at that specific time and place.

Though at distant places there is no regular proportion between the real and the money price of commodities, yet the merchant who carries goods from the one to the other, has nothing to consider but the money price, or the difference between the quantity of silver for which he buys them, and that for which[Pg 16] he is likely to sell them. Half an ounce of silver at Canton in China may command a greater quantity both of labour and of the necessaries and conveniencies of life, than an ounce at London. A commodity, therefore, which sells for half an ounce of silver at Canton, may there be really dearer, of more real importance to the man who possesses it there, than a commodity which sells for an ounce at London is to the man who possesses it at London. If a London merchant, however, can buy at Canton, for half an ounce of silver, a commodity which he can afterwards sell at London for an ounce, he gains a hundred per cent. by the bargain, just as much as if an ounce of silver was at London exactly of the same value as at Canton. It is of no importance to him that half an ounce of silver at Canton would have given him the command of more labour, and of a greater quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than an ounce can do at London. An ounce at London will always give him the command of double the quantity of all these, which half an ounce could have done there, and this is precisely what he wants.

Though at different locations there isn't a consistent ratio between the actual and the monetary prices of goods, the merchant transporting items from one place to another only needs to focus on the cash price, or the difference between the amount of silver he spends to buy them and the amount he expects to sell them for. Half an ounce of silver in Canton, China, might buy more labor and the essentials and conveniences of life than an ounce in London. Therefore, a product that sells for half an ounce of silver in Canton could be more valuable and significant to the person who owns it there than a product selling for an ounce in London is to its owner in London. However, if a London merchant can purchase a product in Canton for half an ounce of silver and then sell it in London for an ounce, he realizes a hundred percent profit from that deal, just as if an ounce of silver in London held the same value as in Canton. It doesn’t matter to him that half an ounce of silver in Canton could procure more labor and provide greater access to the essentials and conveniences of life than an ounce can in London. An ounce in London will always allow him to command twice the amount of all these things that half an ounce could have acquired in Canton, and that is exactly what he needs.

As it is the nominal or money price of goods, therefore, which finally determines the prudence or imprudence of all purchases and sales, and thereby regulates almost the whole business of common life in which price is concerned, we cannot wonder that it should have been so much more attended to than the real price.

Since it is the stated or money price of goods that ultimately decides whether purchases and sales are wise or unwise, and thus manages nearly all aspects of everyday life related to pricing, it's no surprise that it has received much more attention than the actual price.

In such a work as this, however, it may sometimes be of use to compare the different real values of a particular commodity at different times and places, or the different degrees of power over the labour of other people which it may, upon different occasions, have given to those who possessed it. We must in this case compare, not so much the different quantities of silver for which it was commonly sold, as the different quantities of labour which those different quantities of silver could have purchased. But the current prices of labour, at distant times and places, can scarce ever be known with any degree of exactness. Those of corn, though they have in few places been regularly recorded, are in general better known, and have been more frequently taken notice of by historians and other writers. We must generally, therefore, content ourselves with them, not as being always exactly in the same proportion as the current prices of labour, but as being the nearest approximation which can commonly be had to that proportion. I shall hereafter have occasion to make several comparisons of this kind.

In a work like this, it can be helpful to compare the real values of a specific commodity at different times and places, or the varying levels of power over other people's labor that it may, at various times, have given to its owners. We should focus on comparing not just the different amounts of silver for which it was usually sold, but the different amounts of labor that those quantities of silver could buy. However, the current wages for labor at different times and places are rarely known with any accuracy. Prices for grain, although they're not always regularly recorded in many locations, tend to be better understood and have been discussed more often by historians and other writers. Therefore, we usually rely on those prices, not because they align perfectly with labor costs, but because they provide the closest estimate we can typically get to that relationship. I will need to make several comparisons like this later on.

In the progress of industry, commercial nations have found it convenient to coin several different metals into money; gold for larger payments, silver for purchases of moderate value, and copper, or some other coarse metal, for those of still smaller consideration. They have always, however, considered one of those metals as more peculiarly the measure of value than any of the other two; and this preference seems generally to have been given to the metal which they happen first to make use of as the instrument of commerce. Having once begun to use it as their standard, which they must have done when they had no other money, they have generally continued to do so even when the necessity was not the same.

In the development of industry, trading nations have found it useful to create various metals for money: gold for bigger transactions, silver for moderate purchases, and copper or some other basic metal for smaller ones. However, they've always considered one of these metals to be more specifically the standard of value compared to the other two; this preference usually goes to the metal they first used in commerce. Once they started using it as their standard, which must have happened when they had no other form of money, they have generally continued to use it even when that necessity faded.

The Romans are said to have had nothing but copper money till within five years before the first Punic war[7], when they first began to coin silver. Copper, therefore, appears to have continued always the measure of value in that republic. At Rome all accounts appear to have been kept, and the value of all estates to have been computed, either in asses or in sestertii. The as was always the denomination of a copper coin. The word sestertius signifies two asses and a half. Though the sestertius, therefore, was originally a silver coin, its value was estimated in copper. At Rome, one who owed a great deal of money was said to have a great deal of other people's copper.

The Romans are said to have only used copper money until about five years before the first Punic War[7], when they started to mint silver. Copper, therefore, seems to have always been the standard for value in that republic. In Rome, all accounts seem to have been kept, and the value of all estates was calculated, either in asses or in sestertii. The as was always the name for a copper coin. The term sestertius means two asses and a half. So even though the sestertius was initially a silver coin, its worth was assessed in copper. In Rome, someone who owed a lot of money was said to have a lot of other people's copper.

The northern nations who established themselves upon the ruins of the Roman empire, seem to have had silver money from the first beginning of their settlements, and not to have known either gold or copper coins for several ages thereafter. There were silver coins in England in the time of the Saxons; but there was little gold coined till the time of of Edward III. nor any copper till that of James I. of Great Britain. In England, therefore, and for the same reason, I believe, in all other modern nations of Europe, all accounts are kept, and the value of all goods and of all estates is generally computed, in silver: and when we mean to express the amount of a person's fortune, we seldom mention the number of guineas, but the number of pounds sterling which we suppose would be given for it.

The northern nations that settled on the remnants of the Roman Empire seemed to have started with silver coins right from the beginning of their settlements and didn’t really use gold or copper coins for many ages afterwards. There were silver coins in England during the Saxon period, but gold coins weren’t produced until the time of Edward III, and copper coins didn’t come into play until the reign of James I of Great Britain. In England, and for the same reason, I believe in all other modern European nations, accounts are kept in silver, and the value of goods and properties is generally calculated in silver as well. When we talk about someone's wealth, we rarely mention the number of guineas; instead, we refer to the amount in pounds sterling that we think it could fetch.

Originally, in all countries, I believe, a legal tender of payment could be made only in the coin of that metal which was peculiarly considered as the standard or measure of value. In England, gold was not considered as a legal tender for a long time after it was coined into money. The proportion between the values of gold and silver money was not fixed by any public law or proclamation, but was left to be settled by the market. If a debtor offered payment in gold, the creditor might either reject such payment altogether, or accept of it at such a valuation of the gold as he and his debtor could agree upon. Copper is not at present a legal tender, except in the change of the smaller silver coins. [Pg 17]In this state of things, the distinction between the metal which was the standard, and that which was not the standard, was something more than a nominal distinction.

Originally, in all countries, I believe, legal payment could only be made with the coin of that metal which was specifically regarded as the standard or measure of value. In England, gold wasn’t recognized as legal tender for quite a while after it was minted into money. The ratio between the values of gold and silver was not established by any public law or announcement but was determined by the market. If a debtor offered to pay in gold, the creditor could either refuse the payment entirely or accept it at a value that both the creditor and debtor could agree on. Copper is not currently considered legal tender, except for making change with smaller silver coins. [Pg 17] In this situation, the distinction between the metal that was the standard and the one that wasn’t was more than just a nominal difference.

In process of time, and as people became gradually more familiar with the use of the different metals in coin, and consequently better acquainted with the proportion between their respective values, it has, in most countries, I believe, been found convenient to ascertain this proportion, and to declare by a public law, that a guinea, for example, of such a weight and fineness, should exchange for one-and-twenty shillings, or be a legal tender for a debt of that amount. In this state of things, and during the continuance of any one regulated proportion of this kind, the distinction between the metal, which is the standard, and that which is not the standard, becomes little more than a nominal distinction.

Over time, as people became increasingly familiar with using different metals for coins and understood their relative values better, most countries found it useful to establish and publicly declare this value ratio through law. For instance, a guinea of a certain weight and purity was designated to be worth twenty-one shillings or accepted as legal payment for that amount. In this situation, as long as a specific proportion was maintained, the difference between the standard metal and the non-standard metal was mostly just a nominal distinction.

In consequence of any change, however, in this regulated proportion, this distinction becomes, or at least seems to become, something more than nominal again. If the regulated value of a guinea, for example, was either reduced to twenty, or raised to two-and-twenty shillings, all accounts being kept, and almost all obligations for debt being expressed, in silver money, the greater part of payments could in either case be made with the same quantity of silver money as before; but would require very different quantities of gold money; a greater in the one case, and a smaller in the other. Silver would appear to be more invariable in its value than gold. Silver would appear to measure the value of gold, and gold would not appear to measure the value of silver. The value of gold would seem to depend upon the quantity of silver which it would exchange for, and the value of silver would not seem to depend upon the quantity of gold which it would exchange for. This difference, however, would be altogether owing to the custom of keeping accounts, and of expressing the amount of all great and small sums rather in silver than in gold money. One of Mr Drummond's notes for five-and-twenty or fifty guineas would, after an alteration of this kind, be still payable with five-and-twenty or fifty guineas, in the same manner as before. It would, after such an alteration, be payable with the same quantity of gold as before, but with very different quantities of silver. In the payment of such a note, gold would appear to be more invariable in its value than silver. Gold would appear to measure the value of silver, and silver would not appear to measure the value of gold. If the custom of keeping accounts, and of expressing promissory-notes and other obligations for money, in this manner should ever become general, gold, and not silver, would be considered as the metal which was peculiarly the standard or measure of value.

As a result of any change in this regulated ratio, this distinction becomes, or at least seems to become, something more than just a name again. If the regulated value of a guinea, for example, were either reduced to twenty or increased to twenty-two shillings, while keeping all accounts and almost all debt obligations in silver money, most payments could in either case be made with the same amount of silver money as before; however, they would require very different amounts of gold money—more in one case and less in the other. Silver would seem to be more stable in its value than gold. Silver would seem to measure the value of gold, rather than gold measuring the value of silver. The value of gold would seem to depend on how much silver it could be exchanged for, while the value of silver would not seem to depend on how much gold it could be exchanged for. This difference would be entirely due to the custom of keeping accounts and expressing the amounts of both large and small sums in silver rather than in gold. One of Mr. Drummond's notes for twenty-five or fifty guineas would, after such a change, still be payable with twenty-five or fifty guineas, just like before. However, after such a change, it would be payable with the same amount of gold as before but would require very different amounts of silver. In the payment of such a note, gold would appear to be more stable in its value than silver. Gold would seem to measure the value of silver, while silver would not seem to measure the value of gold. If the custom of keeping accounts and expressing promissory notes and other monetary obligations in this way ever became widespread, gold, rather than silver, would be seen as the metal that uniquely serves as the standard or measure of value.

In reality, during the continuance of any one regulated proportion between the respective values of the different metals in coin, the value of the most precious metal regulates the value of the whole coin. Twelve copper pence contain half a pound avoirdupois of copper, of not the best quality, which, before it is coined, is seldom worth sevenpence in silver. But as, by the regulation, twelve such pence are ordered to exchange for a shilling, they are in the market considered as worth a shilling, and a shilling can at any time be had for them. Even before the late reformation of the gold coin of Great Britain, the gold, that part of it at least which circulated in London and its neighbourhood, was in general less degraded below its standard weight than the greater part of the silver. One-and-twenty worn and defaced shillings, however, were considered as equivalent to a guinea, which, perhaps, indeed, was worn and defaced too, but seldom so much so. The late regulations have brought the gold coin as near, perhaps, to its standard weight as it is possible to bring the current coin of any nation; and the order to receive no gold at the public offices but by weight, is likely to preserve it so, as long as that order is enforced. The silver coin still continues in the same worn and degraded state as before the reformation of the gold coin. In the market, however, one-and-twenty shillings of this degraded silver coin are still considered as worth a guinea of this excellent gold coin.

In reality, as long as there’s a consistent ratio between the values of different metals in coin, the value of the most precious metal sets the value of all the coins. Twelve copper pence contain half a pound of copper, which isn’t the best quality and is usually worth about sevenpence in silver before it’s coined. However, since these twelve pence are officially valued at a shilling, they are regarded as worth a shilling in the market, and you can get a shilling for them anytime. Even before the recent changes to gold coinage in Great Britain, the gold that circulated in London and nearby areas was generally less degraded compared to much of the silver. Nevertheless, twenty-one worn and damaged shillings were considered equal to a guinea, which might also have been worn and damaged, but typically not as badly. The recent regulations have brought the gold coin as close to its standard weight as possible for the current currency of any nation. The rule that only allows gold to be received at public offices by weight is likely to keep it that way as long as it’s enforced. The silver coins are still in the same worn and degraded condition as before the gold coin reform. However, in the market, twenty-one shillings of this worn silver are still viewed as worth a guinea of this excellent gold.

The reformation of the gold coin has evidently raised the value of the silver coin which can be exchanged for it.

The reform of the gold coin has clearly increased the value of the silver coin that can be exchanged for it.

In the English mint, a pound weight of gold is coined into forty-four guineas and a half, which at one-and-twenty shillings the guinea, is equal to forty-six pounds fourteen shillings and sixpence. An ounce of such gold coin, therefore, is worth L.3 : 17 : 10½ in silver. In England, no duty or seignorage is paid upon the coinage, and he who carries a pound weight or an ounce weight of standard gold bullion to the mint, gets back a pound weight or an ounce weight of gold in coin, without any deduction. Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny an ounce, therefore, is said to be the mint price of gold in England, or the quantity of gold coin which the mint gives in return for standard gold bullion.

In the English mint, a pound of gold is made into forty-four and a half guineas, which at twenty-one shillings per guinea is equal to forty-six pounds fourteen shillings and sixpence. An ounce of this gold coin, therefore, is worth £3 : 17 : 10½ in silver. In England, there are no taxes or fees on coinage, so anyone who takes a pound or an ounce of standard gold bullion to the mint receives the same amount back in gold coins, with no deductions. Therefore, three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny per ounce is known as the mint price of gold in England, or the amount of gold coin the mint gives in exchange for standard gold bullion.

Before the reformation of the gold coin, the price of standard gold bullion in the market had, for many years, been upwards of L.3 : 18s. sometimes L.3 : 19s. and very frequently L.4 an ounce; that sum, it is probable, in the worn and degraded gold coin, seldom containing more than an ounce of standard gold. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of standard gold bullion seldom exceeds L.3 : 17 : 7 an ounce. Before the reformation of the gold coin, the market price was always more or less above the[Pg 18] mint price. Since that reformation, the market price has been constantly below the mint price. But that market price is the same whether it is paid in gold or in silver coin. The late reformation of the gold coin, therefore, has raised not only the value of the gold coin, but likewise that of the silver coin in proportion to gold bullion, and probably, too, in proportion to all other commodities; though the price of the greater part of other commodities being influenced by so many other causes, the rise in the value of either gold or silver coin in proportion to them may not be so distinct and sensible.

Before the reform of the gold coin, the market price of standard gold bullion had been above £3 : 18s. for many years, sometimes reaching £3 : 19s. and often £4 per ounce; this amount was likely reflected in the worn and degraded gold coin, which rarely contained more than an ounce of standard gold. Since the reform of the gold coin, the market price of standard gold bullion rarely exceeds £3 : 17 : 7 per ounce. Before the reform, the market price was generally above the[Pg 18] mint price. Since the reform, the market price has consistently been below the mint price. However, this market price remains the same whether it's paid in gold or silver coin. The recent reform of the gold coin has therefore increased not only the value of the gold coin but also that of the silver coin in relation to gold bullion, and likely in relation to all other commodities as well; although the prices of most other commodities are affected by so many different factors that the increase in the value of gold or silver coin compared to them may not be as noticeable or clear.

In the English mint, a pound weight of standard silver bullion is coined into sixty-two shillings, containing, in the same manner, a pound weight of standard silver. Five shillings and twopence an ounce, therefore, is said to be the mint price of silver in England, or the quantity of silver coin which the mint gives in return for standard silver bullion. Before the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of standard silver bullion was, upon different occasions, five shillings and fourpence, five shillings and fivepence, five shillings and sixpence, five shillings and sevenpence, and very often five shillings and eightpence an ounce. Five shillings and sevenpence, however, seems to have been the most common price. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of standard silver bullion has fallen occasionally to five shillings and threepence, five shillings and fourpence, and five shillings and fivepence an ounce, which last price it has scarce ever exceeded. Though the market price of silver bullion has fallen considerably since the reformation of the gold coin, it has not fallen so low as the mint price.

In the English mint, one pound of standard silver bullion is turned into sixty-two shillings, which also contains a pound of standard silver. Therefore, five shillings and two pence per ounce is considered the mint price of silver in England, or the amount of silver coin that the mint provides in exchange for standard silver bullion. Before the gold coin reform, the market price of standard silver bullion varied at different times, being five shillings and four pence, five shillings and five pence, five shillings and six pence, five shillings and seven pence, and often five shillings and eight pence per ounce. However, five shillings and seven pence seems to have been the most common price. Since the gold coin reform, the market price of standard silver bullion has occasionally dropped to five shillings and three pence, five shillings and four pence, and five shillings and five pence per ounce, which the price has rarely exceeded. Although the market price of silver bullion has decreased significantly since the gold coin reform, it has not fallen as low as the mint price.

In the proportion between the different metals in the English coin, as copper is rated very much above its real value, so silver is rated somewhat below it. In the market of Europe, in the French coin and in the Dutch coin, an ounce of fine gold exchanges for about fourteen ounces of fine silver. In the English coin, it exchanges for about fifteen ounces, that is, for more silver than it is worth, according to the common estimation of Europe. But as the price of copper in bars is not, even in England, raised by the high price of copper in English coin, so the price of silver in bullion is not sunk by the low rate of silver in English coin. Silver in bullion still preserves its proper proportion to gold, for the same reason that copper in bars preserves its proper proportion to silver.

In the mix of different metals in English coins, copper is valued way higher than its actual worth, while silver is somewhat undervalued. In the European market, an ounce of fine gold trades for about fourteen ounces of fine silver in French and Dutch coins. In English coins, it trades for around fifteen ounces, meaning it gets more silver than it should based on the general European standards. However, just like the high price of copper in English coins doesn’t drive up the price of copper bars in England, the low value of silver in English coins doesn’t lower the price of silver bullion. Silver in bullion still holds its right ratio to gold, for the same reason that copper bars maintain their proper ratio to silver.

Upon the reformation of the silver coin, in the reign of William III., the price of silver bullion still continued to be somewhat above the mint price. Mr Locke imputed this high price to the permission of exporting silver bullion, and to the prohibition of exporting silver coin. This permission of exporting, he said, rendered the demand for silver bullion greater than the demand for silver coin. But the number of people who want silver coin for the common uses of buying and selling at home, is surely much greater than that of those who want silver bullion either for the use of exportation or for any other use. There subsists at present a like permission of exporting gold bullion, and a like prohibition of exporting gold coin; and yet the price of gold bullion has fallen below the mint price. But in the English coin, silver was then, in the same manner as now, under-rated in proportion to gold; and the gold coin (which at that time, too, was not supposed to require any reformation) regulated then, as well as now, the real value of the whole coin. As the reformation of the silver coin did not then reduce the price of silver bullion to the mint price, it is not very probable that a like reformation will do so now.

When the silver coin was reformed during William III's reign, the price of silver bullion remained somewhat above the mint price. Mr. Locke attributed this high price to the allowance of silver bullion exports and the ban on exporting silver coins. He argued that allowing exports increased the demand for silver bullion more than the demand for silver coins. However, the number of people needing silver coins for everyday transactions at home is certainly much larger than those seeking silver bullion for exportation or other uses. Currently, there is a similar allowance for exporting gold bullion and a similar ban on exporting gold coins, yet the price of gold bullion has fallen below the mint price. Back then, as now, silver was undervalued compared to gold in English coin, and the gold coin (which at that time was also not thought to need any reform) dictated the real value of all coins. Since the reform of the silver coin did not lower the price of silver bullion to the mint price back then, it seems unlikely that a similar reform will achieve that now.

Were the silver coin brought back as near to its standard weight as the gold, a guinea, it is probable, would, according to the present proportion, exchange for more silver in coin than it would purchase in bullion. The silver coin containing its full standard weight, there would in this case, be a profit in melting it down, in order, first to sell the bullion for gold coin, and afterwards to exchange this gold coin for silver coin, to be melted down in the same manner. Some alteration in the present proportion seems to be the only method of preventing this inconveniency.

If the silver coin were brought back to its standard weight like the gold guinea, it’s likely that, based on the current rates, it would trade for more silver in coin than it would buy in bullion. With the silver coin at full standard weight, there would be a profit in melting it down to first sell the bullion for gold coins, and then exchange those gold coins for silver coins, which could be melted down again in the same way. Changing the current rates seems to be the only way to avoid this problem.

The inconveniency, perhaps, would be less, if silver was rated in the coin as much above its proper proportion to gold as it is at present rated below it, provided it was at the same time enacted, that silver should not be a legal tender for more than the change of a guinea, in the same manner as copper is not a legal tender for more than the change of a shilling. No creditor could, in this case, be cheated in consequence of the high valuation of silver in coin; as no creditor can at present be cheated in consequence of the high valuation of copper. The bankers only would suffer by this regulation. When a run comes upon them, they sometimes endeavour to gain time, by paying in sixpences, and they would be precluded by this regulation from this discreditable method of evading immediate payment. They would be obliged, in consequence, to keep at all times in their coffers a greater quantity of cash than at present; and though this might, no doubt, be a considerable inconveniency to them, it would, at the same time, be a considerable security to their creditors.

The inconvenience might be less if silver were valued in coins significantly higher than its true worth in relation to gold, similar to how it's currently valued lower. This would work if there was also a rule stating that silver could only be legal tender for amounts up to the change of a guinea, just like copper isn’t legal tender for more than the change of a shilling. This way, no creditor could be cheated because of the inflated value of silver in coins, just as no creditor can currently be cheated due to the inflated value of copper. The only ones who would be affected by this rule would be the bankers. When faced with a withdrawal of funds, they sometimes try to buy time by paying with sixpences, but this rule would prevent them from that dishonest way of avoiding immediate payment. As a result, they would have to keep more cash on hand than they do now; while this might indeed be quite inconvenient for them, it would also provide significant security for their creditors.

Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny (the mint price of gold) certainly does not contain, even in our present excellent gold coin, more than an ounce of standard gold, and it may be thought, therefore, should not purchase more standard bullion. But gold in coin is more convenient [Pg 19]than gold in bullion; and though, in England, the coinage is free, yet the gold which is carried in bullion to the mint, can seldom be returned in coin to the owner till after a delay of several weeks. In the present hurry of the mint, it could not be returned till after a delay of several months. This delay is equivalent to a small duty, and renders gold in coin somewhat more valuable than an equal quantity of gold in bullion. If, in the English coin, silver was rated according to its proper proportion to gold, the price of silver bullion would probably fall below the mint price, even without any reformation of the silver coin; the value even of the present worn and defaced silver coin being regulated by the value of the excellent gold coin for which it can be changed.

Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny (the market price of gold) definitely does not contain, even in our current high-quality gold coins, more than an ounce of pure gold, and therefore it might be thought that it shouldn't buy more pure bullion. However, gold in coin form is more convenient than gold in bullion; and even though the coinage in England is free, the gold that's taken to the mint as bullion can rarely be returned as coin to the owner for several weeks. Given the current rush at the mint, it might not be returned for several months. This delay acts like a small tax, making gold in coin a bit more valuable than an equal amount of gold in bullion. If, in English coinage, silver were valued correctly in relation to gold, the price of silver bullion would likely drop below the market price, even without any reform of the silver coins; the value of even the current worn and damaged silver coins is determined by the value of the high-quality gold coins they can be exchanged for.

A small seignorage or duty upon the coinage of both gold and silver, would probably increase still more the superiority of those metals in coin above an equal quantity of either of them in bullion. The coinage would, in this case, increase the value of the metal coined in proportion to the extent of this small duty, for the same reason that the fashion increases the value of plate in proportion to the price of that fashion. The superiority of coin above bullion would prevent the melting down of the coin, and would discourage its exportation. If, upon any public exigency, it should become necessary to export the coin, the greater part of it would soon return again, of its own accord. Abroad, it would sell only for its weight in bullion. At home, it would buy more than that weight. There would be a profit, therefore, in bringing it home again. In France, a seignorage of about eight per cent. is imposed upon the coinage, and the French coin, when exported, is said to return home again, of its own accord.

A small fee or tax on the minting of both gold and silver would likely enhance the value of those metals in coin form compared to the same amount in bullion. Minting would increase the value of the metal based on the size of this small fee, similar to how fashion boosts the value of decorative items according to current trends. The added value of coins over bullion would discourage melting them down and exporting them. If, during a public emergency, it became necessary to export the coins, most of them would likely come back on their own. Overseas, they would only sell for their weight in bullion, but domestically, they would purchase more than that weight. So, there would be a profit in bringing them back home. In France, there’s a fee of about eight percent on minting, and it’s said that French coins, when exported, return home by themselves.

The occasional fluctuations in the market price of gold and silver bullion arise from the same causes as the like fluctuations in that of all other commodities. The frequent loss of those metals from various accidents by sea and land, the continual waste of them in gilding and plating, in lace and embroidery, in the wear and tear of coin, and in that of plate, require, in all countries which possess no mines of their own, a continual importation, in order to repair this lose and this waste. The merchant importers, like all other merchants, we may believe, endeavour, as well as they can, to suit their occasional importations to what they judge is likely to be the immediate demand. With all their attention, however, they sometimes overdo the business, and sometimes underdo it. When they import more bullion than is wanted, rather than incur the risk and trouble of exporting it again, they are sometimes willing to sell a part of it for something less than the ordinary or average price. When, on the other hand, they import less than is wanted, they get something more than this price. But when, under all those occasional fluctuations, the market price either of gold or silver bullion continues for several years together steadily and constantly, either more or less above, or more or less below the mint price, we may be assured that this steady and constant, either superiority or inferiority of price, is the effect of something in the state of the coin, which, at that time, renders a certain quantity of coin either of more value or of less value than precise quantity of bullion which it ought to contain. The constancy and steadiness of the effect supposes a proportionable constancy and steadiness in the cause.

The occasional changes in the market price of gold and silver bullion happen for the same reasons as fluctuations in all other commodities. Frequent losses of these metals from various accidents at sea and on land, constant use of them in gilding and plating, in lace and embroidery, and in the wear and tear of coins and silverware require ongoing imports in countries without their own mines, in order to replace the losses and waste. Merchant importers, like other merchants, try their best to match their occasional imports with what they think will be the immediate demand. Despite their efforts, they sometimes overestimate or underestimate the market. When they import more bullion than needed, rather than dealing with the risks and troubles of exporting it again, they may choose to sell part of it for less than the usual price. Conversely, when they import less than needed, they can sell it for more than the usual price. However, when the market price of gold or silver bullion remains steady, either above or below the mint price for several years, we can be sure that this consistent price difference is due to something in the state of the coin that makes a certain amount of coin either worth more or less than the exact quantity of bullion it should contain. The consistency of the effect implies a corresponding consistency in the cause.

The money of any particular country is, at any particular time and place, more or less an accurate measure or value, according as the current coin is more or less exactly agreeable to its standard, or contains more or less exactly the precise quantity of pure gold or silver which it ought to contain. If in England, for example, forty-four guineas and a half contained exactly a pound weight of standard gold, or eleven ounces of fine gold, and one ounce of alloy, the gold coin of England would be as accurate a measure of the actual goods at any particular time and place as the nature of the thing would admit. But if, by rubbing and wearing, forty-four guineas and a half generally contain less than a pound weight of standard gold, the diminution, however, being greater in some pieces than in others, the measure of value comes to be liable to the same sort of uncertainty to which all other weights and measures are commonly exposed. As it rarely happens that these are exactly agreeable to their standard, the merchant adjusts the price of his goods as well as he can, not to what those weights and measures ought to be, but to what, upon an average, he finds, by experience, they actually are. In consequence of a like disorder in the coin, the price of goods comes, in the same manner, to be adjusted, not to the quantity of pure gold or silver which the coin ought to contain, but to that which, upon an average, it is found, by experience, it actually does contain.

The currency of a specific country, at any given time and place, is generally a reasonably accurate measure of value, depending on how closely the current coins match their standard or how closely they contain the exact amount of pure gold or silver they should. For instance, if in England, forty-four and a half guineas contained exactly one pound of standard gold, or eleven ounces of pure gold and one ounce of alloy, then the gold coin in England would serve as a precise measure of actual goods at that time and place. However, if, due to wear and tear, forty-four and a half guineas typically contain less than a pound of standard gold—although some coins may lose more than others—the measure of value becomes subject to the same uncertainties that affect all other weights and measures. Since it's rare for these to be exactly in line with their standards, merchants set prices for their goods based on what those weights and measures actually are, rather than what they should be. As a result of similar discrepancies in currency, the prices of goods are adjusted not according to the amount of pure gold or silver the coins should contain, but based on what they are found to contain on average, according to experience.

By the money price of goods, it is to be observed, I understand always the quantity of pure gold or silver for which they are sold, without any regard to the denomination of the coin. Six shillings and eight pence, for example, in the time of Edward I., I consider as the same money price with a pound sterling in the present times, because it contained, as nearly as we can judge, the same quantity of pure silver.[Pg 20]

By the money price of goods, I always mean the amount of pure gold or silver they are sold for, regardless of the type of coin. For instance, six shillings and eight pence from the time of Edward I. is equivalent to a pound sterling today because, as far as we can tell, it contained about the same amount of pure silver.[Pg 20]


CHAP. VI.

OF THE COMPONENT PART OF THE PRICE OF COMMODITIES.

In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects, seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another. If among a nation of hunters, for example, it usually costs twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver should naturally exchange for or be worth two deer. It is natural that what is usually the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one day's or one hour's labour.

In that early, primitive phase of society before stockpiling resources and claiming land, the ratio of labor needed to acquire different items seems to be the only guideline for trading them. For example, if in a group of hunters it typically takes twice the effort to hunt a beaver compared to hunting a deer, then one beaver should naturally be worth two deer. It makes sense that what is usually produced through two days or two hours of labor would be valued at double what is produced through one day's or one hour's labor.

If the one species of labour should be more severe than the other, some allowance will naturally be made for this superior hardship; and the produce of one hour's labour in the one way may frequently exchange for that of two hour's labour in the other.

If one type of work is more demanding than the other, it's only fair that some consideration is given to this extra difficulty; as a result, the output from one hour of work in that more challenging field might often be worth what two hours of work would yield in the other field.

Or if the one species of labour requires an uncommon degree of dexterity and ingenuity, the esteem which men have for such talents, will naturally give a value to their produce, superior to what would be due to the time employed about it. Such talents can seldom be acquired but in consequence of long application, and the superior value of their produce may frequently be no more than a reasonable compensation for the time and labour which must be spent in acquiring them. In the advanced state of society, allowances of this kind, for superior hardship and superior skill, are commonly made in the wages of labour; and something of the same kind must probably have taken place in its earliest and rudest period.

Or if a certain type of work requires a high level of skill and creativity, the appreciation people have for these talents will naturally increase the value of what they produce, making it more valuable than the time spent on it would suggest. These skills are rarely learned without long-term effort, and the higher value of what they produce might often just be a fair payment for the time and effort needed to develop those skills. In a developed society, it's typical to see pay adjustments for greater challenges and advanced skills in labor. Something similar probably occurred during the earliest and most primitive stages of society.

In this state of things, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer; and the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any commodity, is the only circumstance which can regulate the quantity of labour which it ought commonly to purchase, command, or exchange for.

In this situation, all the output from work belongs to the worker; and the amount of work usually used to acquire or produce any item is the only factor that can determine how much work it should typically buy, command, or exchange for.

As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of them will naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people, whom they will supply with materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the sale of their work, or by what their labour adds to the value of the materials. In exchanging the complete manufacture either for money, for labour, or for other goods, over and above what may be sufficient to pay the price of the materials, and the wages of the workmen, something must be given for the profits of the undertaker of the work, who hazards his stock in this adventure. The value which the workmen add to the materials, therefore, resolves itself in this case into two parts of which the one pays their wages, the other the profits of their employer upon the whole stock of materials and wages which he advanced. He could have no interest to employ them, unless he expected from the sale of their work something more than what was sufficient to replace his stock to him; and he could have no interest to employ a great stock rather than a small one, unless his profits were to bear some proportion to the extent of his stock.

As soon as stock builds up in the hands of certain individuals, some will naturally use it to hire hardworking people, providing them with materials and support to make a profit from selling their work or the value they add to the materials. When exchanging the finished product for money, labor, or other goods, beyond what's needed to cover the cost of the materials and the workers' wages, there must be something set aside for the profit of the business owner, who risks their stock in the venture. The value added by the workers, therefore, breaks down into two parts: one pays their wages, while the other covers the employer's profits based on the total stock of materials and wages they advanced. The employer wouldn't have any incentive to hire them unless they expected that selling their work would bring in more than enough to replace their stock. They also wouldn’t have any reason to use a large stock instead of a small one unless their profits were proportionate to the size of their investment.

The profits of stock, it may perhaps be thought, are only a different name for the wages of a particular sort of labour, the labour of inspection and direction. They are, however, altogether different, are regulated by quite different principles, and bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or the ingenuity of this supposed labour of inspection and direction. They are regulated altogether by the value of the stock employed, and are greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of this stock. Let us suppose, for example, that in some particular place, where the common annual profits of manufacturing stock are ten per cent. there are two different manufactures, in each of which twenty workmen are employed, at the rate of fifteen pounds a year each, or at the expense of three hundred a-year in each manufactory. Let us suppose, too, that the coarse materials annually wrought up in the one cost only seven hundred pounds, while the finer materials in the other cost seven thousand. The capital annually employed in the one will, in this case, amount only to one thousand pounds; whereas that employed in the other will amount to seven thousand three hundred pounds. At the rate of ten per cent. therefore, the undertaker of the one will expect a yearly profit of about one hundred pounds only; while that of the other will expect about seven hundred and thirty pounds. But though their profits are so very different, their labour of inspection and direction may be either altogether or very nearly the same. In many great works, almost the whole labour of this kind is committed to some principal clerk. His wages properly express the value of this labour of inspection and direction. Though in settling them some regard is had commonly, not only to his labour and skill, but to the trust which is reposed in him, yet they never bear any regular proportion to the capital of which he oversees the management; and the owner of this capital, though he is thus discharged of almost all labour, still expects that his profit should bear a regular proportion to his capital. In the price of commodities, therefore, the profits of stock con[Pg 21]stitute a component part altogether different from the wages of labour, and regulated by quite different principles.

The profits from investments might be seen as just another term for the earnings from a specific type of labor—namely, the labor involved in oversight and management. However, they are entirely different, governed by distinct principles, and do not correlate with the amount, difficulty, or creativity of this supposed oversight and management work. Instead, they are determined entirely by the value of the invested capital, and they increase or decrease in relation to the size of this investment. For instance, let's consider a scenario where in a certain location, the average annual profit from manufacturing investments is ten percent. There are two different manufacturing operations, each employing twenty workers at a salary of fifteen pounds per year, costing three hundred pounds annually for each business. Additionally, let's say the raw materials used in one operation cost only seven hundred pounds a year, while the materials in the other operation cost seven thousand pounds. In this case, the total capital invested in the first operation would be one thousand pounds, whereas the second would amount to seven thousand three hundred pounds. At a profit rate of ten percent, the owner of the first operation can expect only about one hundred pounds a year in profit, while the owner of the second can expect around seven hundred and thirty pounds. Despite the significant difference in their profits, the effort involved in oversight and management may be nearly the same for both. In many large operations, most of this oversight is usually handled by a lead clerk. Their salary accurately represents the value of the management labor. Although factors like their experience and the trust placed in them influence their wages, those wages generally don’t directly reflect the capital they oversee. Consequently, even though the owner of the capital is relieved from most of the operational work, they still expect their profits to relate directly to their capital. Therefore, in the pricing of goods, the profits from investments are a completely separate component from labor wages, regulated by entirely different principles.

In this state of things, the whole produce of labour does not always belong to the labourer. He must in most cases share it with the owner of the stock which employs him. Neither is the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any commodity, the only circumstance which can regulate the quantity which it ought commonly to purchase, command or exchange for. An additional quantity, it is evident, must be due for the profits of the stock which advanced the wages and furnished the materials of that labour.

In this situation, the entire output of labor doesn’t always go to the worker. Usually, they have to share it with the owner of the resources that employ them. Also, the amount of labor typically used to acquire or produce a good isn’t the only factor that determines how much it should normally be bought, sold, or exchanged for. Clearly, an extra amount must be allocated for the profits of the capital that paid the wages and provided the materials for that labor.

As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them, and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land, and in the price of the greater part of commodities, makes a third component part.

Once all the land in a country becomes private property, landlords, like everyone else, want to profit from what they didn't create and start charging rent even for the land's natural output. The wood from the forest, the grass from the field, and all the fruits of the earth, which used to be free for laborers to gather when land was shared, now all come with an extra cost. The laborer has to pay for the right to collect these resources and must give a portion of what they gather or produce to the landlord. This portion, or the cost of it, makes up the rent for the land and is a key part of the price of most goods.

The real value of all the different component parts of price, it must be observed, is measured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of them, purchase or command. Labour measures the value, not only of that part of price which resolves itself into labour, but of that which resolves itself into rent, and of that which resolves itself into profit.

The true value of all the different parts of price is measured by the amount of labor that each of them can buy or command. Labor determines the value not only of the portion of price that is made up of labor but also of the parts that are made up of rent and profit.

In every society, the price of every commodity finally resolves itself into some one or other, or all of those three parts; and in every improved society, all the three enter, more or less, as component parts, into the price of the far greater part of commodities.

In every society, the price of every product ultimately breaks down into one, some, or all of those three parts; and in every advancing society, all three factors more or less contribute as components to the price of the majority of products.

In the price of corn, for example, one part pays the rent of the landlord, another pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle employed in producing it, and the third pays the profit of the farmer. These three parts seem either immediately or ultimately to make up the whole price of corn. A fourth part, it may perhaps be thought is necessary for replacing the stock of the farmer, or for compensating the wear and tear of his labouring cattle, and other instruments of husbandry. But it must be considered, that the price of any instrument of husbandry, such as a labouring horse, is itself made up of the same three parts; the rent of the land upon which he is reared, the labour of tending and rearing him, and the profits of the farmer, who advances both the rent of this land, and the wages of this labour. Though the price of the corn, therefore, may pay the price as well as the maintenance of the horse, the whole price still resolves itself, either immediately or ultimately, into the same three parts of rent, labour, and profit.

In the price of corn, for instance, part of it goes to the landlord’s rent, another part covers the wages or upkeep of the workers and working animals involved in its production, and the third part is the farmer’s profit. These three parts seem to either directly or indirectly make up the entire price of corn. Some might argue that a fourth part is needed to replace the farmer’s stock or to account for the wear and tear on his working animals and other farming tools. However, it's important to realize that the price of any farming tool, like a working horse, consists of those same three parts: the rent of the land where it’s raised, the labor involved in caring for and raising it, and the farmer’s profit who pays both the land rent and the labor wages. So, while the price of corn may cover both the price and care of the horse, the total price ultimately breaks down into the same three components of rent, labor, and profit.

In the price of flour or meal, we must add to the price of the corn, the profits of the miller, and the wages of his servants; in the price of bread, the profits of the baker, and the wages of his servants; and in the price of both, the labour of transporting the corn from the house of the farmer to that of the miller, and from that of the miller to that of the baker, together with the profits of those who advance the wages of that labour.

In the cost of flour or meal, we need to include the price of the corn, the miller's profits, and his workers' wages; in the cost of bread, the baker's profits and his workers' wages; and in the cost of both, the labor involved in transporting the corn from the farmer's place to the miller's, and from the miller's to the baker's, along with the profits of those who pay for that labor.

The price of flax resolves itself into the same three parts as that of corn. In the price of linen we must add to this price the wages of the flax-dresser, of the spinner, of the weaver, of the bleacher, &c. together with the profits of their respective employers.

The price of flax breaks down into the same three components as corn. For the price of linen, we need to add the wages of the flax-dresser, the spinner, the weaver, the bleacher, etc., along with the profits of their respective employers.

As any particular commodity comes to be more manufactured, that part of the price which resolves itself into wages and profit, comes to be greater in proportion to that which resolves itself into rent. In the progress of the manufacture, not only the number of profits increase, but every subsequent profit is greater than the foregoing; because the capital from which it is derived must always be greater. The capital which employs the weavers, for example, must be greater than that which employs the spinners; because it not only replaces that capital with its profits, but pays, besides, the wages of the weavers: and the profits must always bear some proportion to the capital.

As a specific product becomes more manufactured, the portion of its price that goes towards wages and profit increases compared to what goes towards rent. As manufacturing advances, not only does the total profit increase, but each subsequent profit is larger than the previous one because the capital that generates it must always be higher. For instance, the capital used for hiring weavers must be greater than that used for hiring spinners, since it not only replaces that capital along with its profits but also covers the wages of the weavers. Profits must always relate to the capital.

In the most improved societies, however, there are always a few commodities of which the price resolves itself into two parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and a still smaller number, in which it consists altogether in the wages of labour. In the price of sea-fish, for example, one part pays the labour of the fisherman, and the other the profits of the capital employed in the fishery. Rent very seldom makes any part of it, though it does sometimes, as I shall shew hereafter. It is otherwise, at least through the greater part of Europe, in river fisheries. A salmon fishery pays a rent; and rent, though it cannot well be called the rent of land, makes a part of the price of a salmon, as well as wages and profit. In some parts of Scotland, a few poor people make a trade of gathering, along the sea-shore, those little variegated stones commonly known by the name of Scotch pebbles. The price which is paid to them by the stone-cutter, is altogether the wages of their labour; neither rent nor profit makes any part of it.

In the most advanced societies, there are always a few products whose price breaks down into just two components: labor wages and stock profits. There are even fewer where the price consists entirely of labor wages. For instance, in the price of sea fish, one part goes to paying the fisherman’s labor, while the other part is the profit from the capital used in fishing. Rent rarely factors into this, although sometimes it does, as I will explain later. However, this is different, at least in most of Europe, when it comes to river fisheries. A salmon fishery pays rent; although it can't really be called land rent, it is part of the price of a salmon along with wages and profit. In some areas of Scotland, a few low-income people earn a living by collecting those small, colorful stones commonly known as Scotch pebbles along the shore. The price they receive from the stone-cutter is entirely made up of their labor wages; there’s no rent or profit included.

But the whole price of any commodity must still finally resolve itself into some one or other[Pg 22] or all of those three parts; as whatever part of it remains after paying the rent of the land, and the price of the whole labour employed in raising, manufacturing, and bringing it to market, must necessarily be profit to somebody.

But the total cost of any product ultimately comes down to one or more of those three components; whatever is left after covering the land's rent and the total cost of all the labor involved in producing, manufacturing, and delivering it to market must inevitably be profit for someone.

As the price or exchangeable value of every particular commodity, taken separately, resolves itself into some one or other, or all of those three parts; so that of all the commodities which compose the whole annual produce of the labour of every country, taken complexly, must resolve itself into the same three parts, and be parcelled out among different inhabitants of the country, either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their stock, or the rent of their land. The whole of what is annually either collected or produced by the labour of every society, or, what comes to the same thing, the whole price of it, is in this manner originally distributed among some of its different members. Wages, profit, and rent, are the three original sources of all revenue, as well as of all exchangeable value. All other revenue is ultimately derived from some one or other of these.

As the price or exchange value of each individual commodity breaks down into one or more of those three categories, the total value of all the goods produced by the labor of any country must also be divided into the same three parts. This value gets distributed among different people in the country as wages for their work, profits from their investments, or rent from their land. Everything that society produces or collects each year, or the total value of that output, is originally shared among its members in this way. Wages, profit, and rent are the three primary sources of all income and all exchangeable value. All other income ultimately comes from one of these sources.

Whoever derives his revenue from a fund which is his own, must draw it either from his labour, from his stock, or from his land. The revenue derived from labour is called wages; that derived from stock, by the person who manages or employs it, is called profit; that derived from it by the person who does not employ it himself, but lends it to another, is called the interest or the use of money. It is the compensation which the borrower pays to the lender, for the profit which he has an opportunity of making by the use of the money. Part of that profit naturally belongs to the borrower, who runs the risk and takes the trouble of employing it, and part to the lender, who affords him the opportunity of making this profit. The interest of money is always a derivative revenue, which, if it is not paid from the profit which is made by the use of the money, must be paid from some other source of revenue, unless perhaps the borrower is a spendthrift, who contracts a second debt in order to pay the interest of the first. The revenue which proceeds altogether from land, is called rent, and belongs to the landlord. The revenue of the farmer is derived partly from his labour, and partly from his stock. To him, land is only the instrument which enables him to earn the wages of this labour, and to make the profits of this stock. All taxes, and all the revenue which is founded upon them, all salaries, pensions, and annuities of every kind, are ultimately derived from some one or other of those three original sources of revenue, and are paid either immediately or mediately from the wages of labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land.

Whoever earns money from their own resources must get it from their work, their investments, or their property. Money earned from work is called wages; money earned from investments managed by someone is called profit; and money earned by lending those investments to someone else is referred to as interest or the use of money. It's the payment the borrower gives to the lender for the profit they can make by using the money. Part of that profit generally belongs to the borrower, who takes the risk and effort to use it, while part belongs to the lender, who provides the opportunity to make that profit. Interest on money is always a secondary income, which, if not paid from the profit made by using the money, must come from another income source, unless the borrower is reckless and takes out another loan to pay the interest of the first. Income generated entirely from land is called rent, which belongs to the landlord. The farmer's income comes partly from their work and partly from their investments. For the farmer, land is just a tool to earn wages from their work and generate profits from their investments. All taxes, along with all income based on them, along with all salaries, pensions, and annuities of any kind, ultimately come from one of those three original sources of income and are paid directly or indirectly from wages, investment profits, or land rent.

When those three different sorts of revenue belong to different persons, they are readily distinguished; but when they belong to the same, they are sometimes confounded with one another, at least in common language.

When those three different types of revenue belong to different people, they are easily distinguished; but when they belong to the same person, they can sometimes be confused with one another, at least in everyday language.

A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expense of cultivation, should gain both the rent of the landlord and the profit of the farmer. He is apt to denominate, however, his whole gain, profit, and thus confounds rent with profit, at least in common language. The greater part of our North American and West Indian planters are in this situation. They farm, the greater part of them, their own estates; and accordingly we seldom hear of the rent of a plantation, but frequently of its profit.

A gentleman who cultivates part of his own land, after covering the costs of farming, should benefit from both the landlord's rent and the farmer's profit. However, he often refers to his entire income as profit, mixing up rent and profit, at least in everyday conversation. Most of our North American and West Indian plantation owners are in this situation. Most of them farm their own land, so we rarely hear about the rent of a plantation, but we often hear about its profit.

Common farmers seldom employ any overseer to direct the general operations of the farm. They generally, too, work a good deal with their own hands, as ploughmen, harrowers, &c. What remains of the crop, after paying the rent, therefore, should not only replace to them their stock employed in cultivation, together with its ordinary profits, but pay them the wages which are due to them, both as labourers and overseers. Whatever remains, however, after paying the rent and keeping up the stock, is called profit. But wages evidently make a part of it. The farmer, by saving these wages, must necessarily gain them. Wages, therefore, are in this case confounded with profit.

Common farmers rarely hire anyone to manage the overall operations of the farm. They usually work quite a bit with their own hands, like plowing and harrowing, etc. What’s left of the crop after paying the rent should not only cover the costs of the resources they used in farming, along with its usual profits, but also pay them the wages they earned as laborers and managers. Anything that remains after paying the rent and maintaining the stock is considered profit. However, wages clearly make up part of that. By saving on these wages, the farmer essentially earns them. Therefore, in this case, wages are mixed up with profit.

An independent manufacturer, who has stock enough both to purchase materials, and to maintain himself till he can carry his work to market, should gain both the wages of a journeyman who works under a master, and the profit which that master makes by the sale of that journeyman's work. His whole gains, however, are commonly called profit, and wages are, in this case, too, confounded with profit.

An independent manufacturer who has enough resources to buy materials and support himself until he can sell his work should earn both the wages of a journeyman working for someone else and the profit that the master makes from selling that journeyman's work. However, all of his earnings are generally referred to as profit, and wages are often mixed up with profit in this situation.

A gardener who cultivates his own garden with his own hands, unites in his own person the three different characters, of landlord, farmer, and labourer. His produce, therefore, should pay him the rent of the first, the profit of the second, and the wages of the third. The whole, however, is commonly considered as the earnings of his labour. Both rent and profit are, in this case, confounded with wages.

A gardener who tends to his own garden with his own hands embodies the roles of landlord, farmer, and worker. So, the crops he grows should cover the rent of the landlord, the profit of the farmer, and the wages of the worker. However, all of this is usually seen as just the result of his labor. In this case, both rent and profit are mixed up with wages.

As in a civilized country there are but few commodities of which the exchangeable value arises from labour only, rent and profit contributing largely to that of the far greater part of them, so the annual produce of its labour will always be sufficient to purchase or command a much greater quantity of labour than what was employed in raising, preparing, and bringing that produce to market. If the society were annually to employ all the labour which it can annually purchase, as the quantity of labour would increase greatly every year, so the produce of every succeeding year[Pg 23] would be of vastly greater value than that of the foregoing. But there is no country in which the whole annual produce is employed in maintaining the industrious. The idle everywhere consume a great part of it; and, according to the different proportions in which it is annually divided between these two different orders of people, its ordinary or average value must either annually increase or diminish, or continue the same from one year to another.

In a developed country, only a few goods get their exchange value from labor alone; rent and profit play a big role in the value of most of them. This means that the total output from labor each year will always be enough to buy or command a lot more labor than what went into producing, preparing, and selling that output. If society were to use all the labor it can buy every year, then the amount of labor available would grow significantly each year, making the output of each following year[Pg 23] worth much more than the previous year's. However, there is no country where all the annual output is used to support the working population. The idle consume a significant portion of it, and depending on how it's divided each year between these two groups, its typical or average value must either go up, go down, or stay the same from year to year.


CHAP. VII.

OF THE NATURAL AND MARKET PRICE OF COMMODITIES.

There is in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate, both of wages and profit, in every different employment of labour and stock. This rate is naturally regulated, as I shall show hereafter, partly by the general circumstances of the society, their riches or poverty, their advancing, stationary, or declining condition, and partly by the particular nature of each employment.

In every society or neighborhood, there is a typical rate for both wages and profits across different jobs and investments. This rate is naturally adjusted, as I will explain later, partly by the overall conditions of the society—its wealth or poverty, whether it’s growing, stable, or declining—and partly by the specific characteristics of each job.

There is likewise in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate of rent, which is regulated, too, as I shall shew hereafter, partly by the general circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the land is situated, and partly by the natural improved fertility of the land.

There is also in every society or neighborhood an average rate of rent, which is influenced, as I will show later, partly by the overall conditions of the society or neighborhood where the land is located, and partly by the land’s natural improved fertility.

These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of wages, profit and rent, at the time and place in which they commonly prevail.

These typical rates can be referred to as the natural rates of wages, profit, and rent, at the time and place where they usually exist.

When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price.

When the price of any product is exactly what it takes to cover the land rent, labor wages, and profits from the investment used to grow, prepare, and sell it, based on their typical rates, the product is sold for what you could call its natural price.

The commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it really costs the person who brings it to market; for though, in common language, what is called the prime cost of any commodity does not comprehend the profit of the person who is sell it again, yet, if he sells it at a price which does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his neighbourhood, he is evidently a loser by the trade; since, by employing his stock in some other way, he might have made that profit. His profit, besides, is his revenue, the proper fund of his subsistence. As, while he is preparing and bringing the goods to market, he advances to his workmen their wages, or their subsistence, so he advances to himself, in the same manner, his own subsistence, which is generally suitable to the profit which he may reasonably expect from the sale of his goods. Unless they yield him this profit, therefore, they do not repay him what they may very properly be said to have really cost him.

The commodity is then sold exactly for what it’s worth, or for what it truly costs the person who brings it to market; because, in everyday language, what is known as the prime cost of any commodity doesn’t include the profit of the person selling it again. However, if he sells it at a price that doesn’t give him the usual rate of profit in his area, he is clearly losing money from the trade; since, by investing his resources in another way, he could have made that profit. His profit is also his income, the essential source for his living expenses. Just as he pays his workers their wages or keeps them alive while he is preparing and bringing the goods to market, he is also setting aside his own living expenses, which usually correspond to the profit he can reasonably expect from selling his goods. Unless they provide him with this profit, they don’t compensate him for what they realistically cost him.

Though the price, therefore, which leaves him this profit, is not always the lowest at which a dealer may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest at which he is likely to sell them for any considerable time; at least where there is perfect liberty, or where he may change his trade as often as he pleases.

Though the price that gives him this profit isn't always the lowest that a dealer might sometimes sell his goods for, it is the lowest at which he is likely to sell them for any significant amount of time; at least where there is complete freedom, or where he can switch his trade as often as he wants.

The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold, is called its market price. It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its natural price.

The price at which any product is typically sold is called its market price. It can be higher, lower, or exactly the same as its natural price.

The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole value of the rent, labour, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither, Such people may be called the effectual demanders, and their demand the effectual demand; since it may be sufficient to effectuate the bringing of the commodity to market. It is different from the absolute demand. A very poor man may be said, in some sense, to have a demand for a coach and six; he might like to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can never he brought to market in order to satisfy it.

The market price of each specific commodity is determined by the relationship between the quantity that is actually available in the market and the willingness of people to pay the natural price of that commodity, which includes the total value of rent, labor, and profit needed to get it there. These individuals can be referred to as effective demanders, and their demand as effective demand, since it can be enough to ensure the commodity reaches the market. This is different from absolute demand. A very poor person might have a desire for a luxury carriage and six horses; they might want it, but their demand is not effective demand, as the commodity can never be made available to meet it.

When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which must he paid in order to bring it thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than want it altogether, some of them will be willing to give more. A competition will immediately begin among them, and the market price will rise more or less above the natural price, according as either the greatness of the deficiency, or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate more or less the eagerness of the competition. Among competitors of equal wealth and luxury, the same deficiency will generally occasion a more or less eager competition, according as the acquisition of the commodity happens to be of more or less importance to them. Hence the exorbitant price of the necessaries of life during the blockade of a town, or in a famine.

When the amount of any product available in the market is less than the actual demand, those who are ready to pay the full cost of rent, wages, and profits needed to bring it there won’t get the quantity they want. Instead of going without it completely, some will be willing to pay more. Immediately, a competition will start among them, causing the market price to rise above the natural price, depending on how significant the shortage is or how wealthy and extravagant the competitors are, which influences their urgency in competing. Among competitors with similar wealth and lifestyle, the same shortage will usually lead to varying levels of competition based on how important obtaining the product is to them. This is why prices for essentials skyrocket during a town's blockade or during a famine.

When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it cannot be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which[Pg 24] they give for it must reduce the price of the whole. The market price will sink more or less below the natural price, according as the greatness of the excess increases more or less the competition of the sellers, or according as it happens to be more or less important to them to get immediately rid of the commodity. The same excess in the importation of perishable, will occasion a much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in the importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.

When the amount brought to market exceeds the effective demand, not everything can be sold to those willing to pay the full value of the rent, wages, and profit required to bring it there. Some of it must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the lower price they pay will bring down the overall price. The market price will drop more or less below the natural price depending on how much the excess increases the competition among sellers and how urgent it is for them to sell the product. The same excess in the importation of perishable goods will lead to much greater competition than for durable goods; for instance, there’s more competition in importing oranges than in importing old iron.

When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the effectual demand, and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. The whole quantity upon hand can be disposed of for this price, and cannot be disposed of for more. The competition of the different dealers obliges them all to accept of this price, but does not oblige them to accept of less.

When the amount available for sale is just enough to meet actual demand, and not more, the market price tends to match the natural price, or come as close to it as possible. All of that available quantity can be sold at this price, and it can't be sold for more. The competition among various sellers forces them to agree on this price, but it doesn’t force them to sell for less.

The quantity of every commodity brought to market naturally suits itself to the effectual demand. It is the interest of all those who employ their land, labour, or stock, in bringing any commodity to market, that the quantity never should exceed the effectual demand; and it is the interest of all other people that it never should fall short of that demand.

The amount of every product available in the market naturally aligns with the actual demand. It’s in the best interest of everyone who uses their land, labor, or resources to bring any product to market that the supply never exceeds the actual demand; and it’s also in the best interest of everyone else that it never falls short of that demand.

If at any time it exceeds the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must be paid below their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part of their land; and if it is wages or profit, the interest of the labourers in the one case, and of their employers in the other, will prompt them to withdraw a part of their labour or stock, from this employment. The quantity brought to market will soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will rise to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.

If, at any point, it goes beyond the effective demand, some of the components of its price will need to be sold for less than their natural rate. If it's rent, the landlords' interests will quickly lead them to withdraw some of their land. If it’s wages or profits, the interests of the workers in one case, and their employers in the other, will encourage them to pull back some of their labor or resources from this job. The amount available in the market will soon be just enough to meet the effective demand. All the different parts of its price will increase to their natural level, and the overall price will align with its natural price.

If, on the contrary, the quantity brought to market should at any time fall short of the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must rise above their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of all other landlords will naturally prompt them to prepare more land for the raising of this commodity; if it is wages or profit, the interest of all other labourers and dealers will soon prompt them to employ more labour and stock in preparing and bringing it to market. The quantity brought thither will soon be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will soon sink to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.

If, on the other hand, the amount available in the market falls short of the effective demand, some of the factors that determine its price must exceed their natural levels. If it's rent, the interests of other landlords will naturally motivate them to make more land available for producing this commodity; if it's wages or profits, the interests of other workers and businesses will quickly encourage them to employ more labor and resources to prepare and bring it to market. The amount available there will soon be enough to meet the effective demand. All the different parts of its price will soon drop to their natural levels, and the overall price will return to its natural price.

The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.

The natural price is, in a way, the central price that all commodity prices are always moving towards. Various factors may occasionally push prices significantly above it, or even pull them down a bit below it. However, despite any barriers that prevent them from settling at this stable point, they are consistently aiming for it.

The whole quantity of industry annually employed in order to bring any commodity to market, naturally suits itself in this manner to the effectual demand. It naturally aims at bringing always that precise quantity thither which may be sufficient to supply, and no more than supply, that demand.

The total amount of industry used each year to get a product to market adjusts itself to meet actual demand. It aims to deliver just the right amount needed to satisfy that demand, and no more.

But, in some employments, the same quantity of industry will, in different years, produce very different quantities of commodities; while, in others, it will produce always the same, or very nearly the same. The same number of labourers in husbandry will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, oil, hops, &c. But the same number of spinners or weavers will every year produce the same, or very nearly the same, quantity of linen and woollen cloth. It is only the average produce of the one species of industry which can be suited, in any respect, to the effectual demand; and as its actual produce is frequently much greater, and frequently much less, than its average produce, the quantity of the commodities brought to market will sometimes exceed a good deal, and sometimes fall short a good deal, of the effectual demand. Even though that demand, therefore, should continue always the same, their market price will be liable to great fluctuations, will sometimes fall a good deal below, and sometimes rise a good deal above, their natural price. In the other species of industry, the produce of equal quantities of labour being always the same, or very nearly the same, it can be more exactly suited to the effectual demand. While that demand continues the same, therefore, the market price of the commodities is likely to do so too, and to be either altogether, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. That the price of linen and woollen cloth is liable neither to such frequent, nor to such great variations, as the price of corn, every man's experience will inform him. The price of the one species of commodities varies only with the variations in the demand; that of the other varies not only with the variations in the demand, but with the much greater, and more frequent, variations in the quantity of what is brought to market, in order to supply that demand.

But in some jobs, the same amount of effort can lead to very different amounts of goods produced in different years, while in other jobs, it will produce roughly the same amount every year. For example, the same number of farm workers will produce varying amounts of corn, wine, oil, hops, etc., from year to year. However, the same number of spinners or weavers will produce about the same quantity of linen and woolen fabric each year. Only the average output of one type of industry can be adjusted to meet the actual demand; and since the actual output is often much higher or lower than the average, the amount of goods available in the market can sometimes exceed the actual demand by a lot or fall short by a lot. Even if that demand remains constant, the market price is still likely to fluctuate significantly, occasionally dropping well below or rising well above the natural price. In contrast, for the other type of industry, since the output from equal amounts of labor is always similar, it can be more closely aligned with the actual demand. Therefore, as long as that demand stays the same, the market prices of those goods are likely to align closely with the natural price. It's clear to everyone that the price of linen and woolen cloth doesn't change as frequently or by as much as the price of corn. The price of one type of commodity only varies with changes in demand, while the price of the other type fluctuates not only with demand but also with the much larger and more frequent changes in the supply available to meet that demand.

The occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of any commodity fall chiefly upon those parts of its price which resolve themselves into wages and profit. That part which resolves itself into rent is less affected by them. A rent certain in money is not in the least affected by them, either in its[Pg 25] rate or in its value. A rent which consists either in a certain proportion, or in a certain quantity, of the rude produce, is no doubt affected in its yearly value by all the occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of that rude produce; but it is seldom affected by them in its yearly rate. In settling the terms of the lease, the landlord and farmer endeavour, according to their best judgment, to adjust that rate, not to the temporary and occasional, but to the average and ordinary price of the produce.

The occasional and temporary changes in the market price of any commodity mainly impact the parts of its price that translate into wages and profit. The portion that accounts for rent is less influenced by these fluctuations. A fixed money rent is not affected at all, either in its rate or in its value. A rent that is based on a specific proportion or a set quantity of raw produce is certainly impacted in its yearly value by all the occasional and temporary changes in the market price of that raw produce; however, it is rarely affected in its yearly rate. When determining the lease terms, the landlord and farmer try, to the best of their ability, to set that rate based on the average and typical price of the produce, rather than on the temporary and occasional market prices.

Such fluctuations affect both the value and the rate, either of wages or of profit, according as the market happens to be either overstocked or understocked with commodities or with labour, with work done, or with work to be done. A public mourning raises the price of black cloth (with which the market is almost always understocked upon such occasions), and augments the profits of the merchants who possess any considerable quantity of it. It has no effect upon the wages of the weavers. The market is understocked with commodities, not with labour, with work done, not with work to be done. It raises the wages of journeymen tailors. The market is here understocked with labour. There is an effectual demand for more labour, for more work to be done, than can be had. It sinks the price of coloured silks and cloths, and thereby reduces the profits of the merchants who have any considerable quantity of them upon hand. It sinks, too, the wages of the workmen employed in preparing such commodities, for which all demand is stopped for six months, perhaps for a twelvemonth. The market is here overstocked both with commodities and with labour.

Such fluctuations impact both the value and the rate of wages or profits, depending on whether the market is overstocked or understocked with goods, labor, work completed, or work to be done. When there's public mourning, the price of black cloth—typically low in stock during these times—goes up, boosting the profits for merchants who have a significant amount of it. However, this does not affect the wages of the weavers. The market is short on goods, not on labor, with completed work available but not enough work to be done. This situation raises the wages of journeymen tailors since there’s a strong demand for more labor than is currently available. Conversely, it lowers the price of colored silks and textiles, reducing the profits for merchants holding large quantities of these items. It also decreases the wages of workers involved in making these goods, as demand stops for six months or even a year. In this case, the market is overstocked with both goods and labor.

But though the market price of every particular commodity is in this manner continually gravitating, if one may say so, towards the natural price; yet sometimes particular accidents, sometimes natural causes, and sometimes particular regulations of police, may, in many commodities, keep up the market price, for a long time together, a good deal above the natural price.

But even though the market price of each specific commodity is constantly moving towards its natural price, there are times when specific events, natural factors, or certain regulatory measures can keep the market price significantly above the natural price for an extended period.

When, by an increase in the effectual demand, the market price of some particular commodity happens to rise a good deal above the natural price, those who employ their stocks in supplying that market, are generally careful to conceal this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit would tempt so many new rivals to employ their stocks in the same way, that, the effectual demand being fully supplied, the market price would soon be reduced to the natural price, and, perhaps, for some time even below it. If the market is at a great distance from the residence of those who supply it, they may sometimes be able to keep the secret for several years together, and may so long enjoy their extraordinary profits without any new rivals. Secrets of this kind, however, it must be acknowledged, can seldom be long kept; and the extraordinary profit can last very little longer than they are kept.

When the effective demand increases and the market price of a specific commodity rises significantly above its natural price, those supplying the market usually try to hide this change. If it became widely known, the high profits would attract many new competitors to invest their resources in the same way, which would fully meet the effective demand, causing the market price to quickly drop back to the natural price, and possibly even below it for a while. If the market is far away from where the suppliers are based, they might manage to keep this information secret for several years, allowing them to enjoy their extraordinary profits without new competitors. However, it's important to acknowledge that such secrets are rarely kept for long, and the exceptional profits won’t last much longer than the secrecy.

Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept than secrets in trade. A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour with materials which cost only half the price of those commonly made use of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as long as he lives, and even leave it as a legacy to his posterity. His extraordinary gains arise from the high price which is paid for his private labour. They properly consist in the high wages of that labour. But as they are repeated upon every part of his stock, and as their whole amount bears, upon that account, a regular proportion to it, they are commonly considered as extraordinary profits of stock.

Secrets in manufacturing can be kept longer than secrets in trade. A dyer who discovers how to create a specific color using materials that cost only half as much as the usual ones can, with good management, benefit from his discovery for his entire life and even pass it down as a legacy to his descendants. His exceptional profits come from the high price paid for his specialized work. These profits mainly consist of the high wages for that work. However, since these profits apply to every part of his inventory, and their total amount is proportionate to it, they are often viewed as extraordinary profits from the overall investment.

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effects of particular accidents, of which, however, the operation may sometimes last for many years together.

Such increases in market price are clearly the result of specific events, although their impact can sometimes last for many years.

Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation, that all the land in a great country, which is fit for producing them, may not be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to market, therefore, may be disposed of to those who are willing to give more than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land which produced them, together with the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock which were employed in preparing and bringing them to market, according to their natural rates. Such commodities may continue for whole centuries together to be sold at this high price; and that part of it which resolves itself into the rent of land, is in this case the part which is generally paid above its natural rate. The rent of the land which affords such singular and esteemed productions, like the rent of some vineyards in France of a peculiarly happy soil and situation, bears no regular proportion to the rent of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land in its neighbourhood. The wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in bringing such commodities to market, on the contrary, are seldom out of their natural proportion to those of the other employments of labour and stock in their neighbourhood.

Some natural products require such a specific type of soil and location that all the land available in a large country suitable for producing them may not be enough to meet the effective demand. Therefore, the total quantity brought to market may be sold to those who are willing to pay more than what is enough to cover the rent of the land that produced them, plus the wages of the labor and the profits of the investment used in preparing and selling them, according to their natural rates. These commodities can be sold at this high price for whole centuries; the portion that translates into land rent is usually the part that is paid above its natural rate. The rent for land that produces these unique and desirable goods, similar to the rent of certain vineyards in France with especially favorable soil and location, does not have a regular proportion to the rent of other equally fertile and well-cultivated land nearby. In contrast, the wages of the labor and the profits from the investment used in bringing such commodities to market are rarely out of their natural proportion compared to those in other labor and investment sectors in the area.

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural causes, which may hinder the effectual demand from ever being fully supplied, and which may continue, therefore, to operate for ever.

Such increases in market price clearly stem from natural factors that can prevent the effective demand from ever being completely met, and these factors may therefore continue to influence the market indefinitely.

A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company, has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly understocked by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emo[Pg 26]luments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.

A monopoly given to either an individual or a trading company has the same impact as a trade or manufacturing secret. The monopolists, by always keeping the market understocked and never fully meeting the actual demand, sell their products at prices much higher than the natural price, and greatly increase their earnings, whether in wages or profit, well above their natural rate.

The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any considerable time together. The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which it is supposed they will consent to give; the other is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their business.

The price of monopoly is always the highest that can be charged. The natural price, or the price in a competitive market, on the other hand, is the lowest that can be accepted, not all the time, but over a significant period. The former is consistently the highest that can be extracted from buyers, or what it’s believed they will agree to pay; the latter is the lowest that sellers can typically accept and still keep their business going.

The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, and all those laws which restrain in particular employments, the competition to a smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain both wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them somewhat above their natural rate.

The exclusive privileges of corporations, apprenticeship laws, and all those rules that limit competition in certain jobs to fewer individuals than could actually fill them have a similar effect, even if it's less pronounced. They act like larger monopolies and can often, for long periods and across entire job categories, keep the market price of specific goods above their natural price, while also maintaining wages for labor and profits for invested capital slightly above their natural rate.

Such enhancements of the market price may last as long as the regulations of police which give occasion to them.

Such increases in the market price may last as long as the police regulations that create them.

The market price of any particular commodity, though it may continue long above, can seldom continue long below, its natural price. Whatever part of it was paid below the natural rate, the persons whose interest is affected would immediately feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw either so much land or so much labour, or so much stock, from being employed about it, that the quantity brought to market would soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. Its market price, therefore, would soon rise to the natural price; this at least would be the case where there was perfect liberty.

The market price of any specific commodity, although it may stay above it for a while, rarely stays below its natural price for long. Whenever the price is paid below the natural rate, those affected by it will quickly feel the impact and will pull back either some land, labor, or stock from being used for it, so that the amount available in the market will soon align with the actual demand. Consequently, the market price would quickly increase to match the natural price; this would definitely happen in a situation with complete freedom.

The same statutes of apprenticeship and other corporation laws, indeed, which, when a manufacture is in prosperity, enable the workman to raise his wages a good deal above their natural rate, sometimes oblige him, when it decays, to let them down a good deal below it. As in the one case they exclude many people from his employment, so in the other they exclude him from many employments. The effect of such regulations, however, is not near so durable in sinking the workman's wages below, as in raising them above their natural rate. Their operation in the one way may endure for many centuries, but in the other it can last no longer than the lives of some of the workmen who were bred to the business in the time of prosperity. When they are gone, the number of those who are afterwards educated to the trade will naturally suit itself to the effectual demand. The police must be as violent as that of Indostan or ancient Egypt (where every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation of his father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege if he changed it for another), which can in any particular employment, and for several generations together, sink either the wages of labour or the profits of stock below their natural rate.

The same apprenticeship laws and other corporate regulations that allow workers to significantly increase their wages when an industry is thriving can also force them to lower their wages substantially when it declines. In the former situation, these laws limit many people from getting hired, while in the latter, they prevent the worker from accessing various job opportunities. However, the impact of such regulations on driving down wages is not nearly as lasting as their effect on raising them above the natural rate. The downward pressure on wages can last for many centuries, but the upward impact only lasts as long as the lives of some workers who were trained during prosperous times. Once they are gone, the number of people who enter the profession will naturally align with actual demand. For any specific job, and over several generations, a level of enforcement as severe as that in India or ancient Egypt—where everyone had to follow their father's trade and changing occupations was considered a grave offense—would be necessary to keep wages or profits below their natural rates.

This is all that I think necessary to be observed at present concerning the deviations, whether occasional or permanent, of the market price of commodities from the natural price.

This is everything I believe needs to be noted right now regarding the deviations, whether they're temporary or permanent, of the market prices of goods from their natural prices.

The natural price itself varies with the natural rate of each of its component parts, or wages, profit, and rent; and in every society this rate varies according to their circumstances, according to their riches and poverty, their advancing, stationary, or declining condition. I shall, in the four following chapters, endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, the causes of those different variations.

The natural price itself changes with the natural rate of each of its parts, which are wages, profit, and rent; and in every society, this rate fluctuates based on their situation, wealth, and poverty, as well as whether they are advancing, stable, or declining. In the next four chapters, I will try to explain, as clearly and thoroughly as I can, the reasons for those different variations.

First, I shall endeavour to explain what are the circumstances which naturally determine the rate of wages, and in what manner those circumstances are affected by the riches or poverty, by the advancing, stationary, or declining state of the society.

First, I will try to explain what the circumstances are that naturally determine the wage rate, and how those circumstances are influenced by the society's wealth or poverty, as well as its progressing, stable, or declining condition.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew what are the circumstances which naturally determine the rate of profit; and in what manner, too, those circumstances are affected by the like variations in the state of the society.

Secondly, I will try to show what circumstances naturally set the rate of profit; and how those circumstances are influenced by similar changes in the state of society.

Though pecuniary wages and profit are very different in the different employments of labour and stock; yet a certain proportion seems commonly to take place between both the pecuniary wages in all the different employments of labour, and the pecuniary profits in all the different employments of stock. This proportion, it will appear hereafter, depends partly upon the nature of the different employments, and partly upon the different laws and policy of the society in which they are carried on. But though in many respects dependent upon the laws and policy, this proportion seems to be little affected by the riches or poverty of that society, by its advancing, stationary, or declining condition, but to remain the same, or very nearly the same, in all those different states. I shall, in the third place, endeavour to explain all the different circumstances which regulate this proportion.

Although monetary wages and profits vary significantly across different types of labor and investment, there seems to be a common ratio between the monetary wages in various labor sectors and the monetary profits in different investment areas. This ratio, as will be shown later, depends partly on the nature of the different jobs and partly on the laws and policies of the society where these activities occur. However, while this ratio is influenced by the laws and policies, it appears to be minimally affected by the wealth or poverty of that society, or by whether it is growing, stable, or declining; it tends to stay the same, or very close to it, across all these different conditions. In the third part, I will try to explain all the various factors that determine this ratio.

In the fourth and last place, I shall endeavour to shew what are the circumstances which regulate the rent of land, and which either raise or lower the price of all the different substances which it produces.[Pg 27]

In the fourth and final point, I will try to explain the factors that affect land rent and that either increase or decrease the price of all the various things it produces.[Pg 27]


CHAP. VIII.

OF THE WAGES OF LABOUR.

The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompence or wages of labour.

The results of work serve as the natural reward or payment for that work.

In that original state of things which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer. He has neither landlord nor master to share with him.

In that initial state of affairs before land ownership and the buildup of wealth, all the results of labor belong to the worker. He has no landlord or boss to divide it with.

Had this state continued, the wages of labour would have augmented with all those improvements in its productive powers, to which the division of labour gives occasion. All things would gradually have become cheaper. They would have been produced by a smaller quantity of labour; and as the commodities produced by equal quantities of labour would naturally in this state of things be exchanged for one another, they would have been purchased likewise with the produce of a smaller quantity.

If this situation had persisted, wages for workers would have increased alongside all the improvements in productivity brought about by the division of labor. Gradually, everything would have become cheaper. They would have been produced with less labor, and since goods produced with equal amounts of labor would naturally be exchanged for one another in this scenario, they would also be purchased with the output of less labor.

But though all things would have become cheaper in reality, in appearance many things might have become dearer, than before, or have been exchanged for a greater quantity of other goods. Let us suppose, for example, that in the greater part of employments the productive powers of labour had been improved to tenfold, or that a day's labour could produce ten times the quantity of work which it had done originally; but that in a particular employment they had been improved only to double, or that a day's labour could produce only twice the quantity of work which it had done before. In exchanging the produce of a day's labour in the greater part of employments for that of a day's labour in this particular one, ten times the original quantity of work in them would purchase only twice the original quantity of it. Any particular quantity in it, therefore, a pound weight, for example, would appear to be five times dearer than before. In reality, however, it would be twice as cheap. Though it required five times the quantity of other goods to purchase it, it would require only half the quantity of labour either to purchase or to produce it. The acquisition, therefore, would be twice as easy as before.

But even though everything would actually be cheaper, some things might seem more expensive than before or could be traded for a larger amount of other goods. For instance, let’s say the productivity of labor in most jobs improved tenfold, meaning a day’s work could produce ten times what it used to. However, in one specific job, productivity only improved to double, so a day’s work could only produce twice the amount as before. When exchanging the output from a day’s work in the majority of jobs for the output from that specific job, ten times the original work output from those jobs would only purchase twice the original output from that one job. Therefore, any specific amount, say a pound, would seem five times more expensive than before. In reality, though, it would be twice as cheap. Even though it would take five times as much of other goods to buy it, it would only require half the amount of labor to obtain or produce it. So, acquiring it would actually be twice as easy as it was before.

But this original state of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole produce of his own labour, could not last beyond the first introduction of the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock. It was at an end, therefore, long before the most considerable improvements were made in the productive powers of labour; and it would be to no purpose to trace further what might have been its effects upon the recompence or wages of labour.

But this initial state, where the worker received all the benefits of their own labor, couldn’t last once land was owned and resources were accumulated. So, it ended long before major advancements in labor productivity were achieved, and it would be useless to explore how it might have impacted the compensation or wages of labor.

As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a share of almost all the produce which the labourer can either raise or collect from it. His rent makes the first deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon land.

As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord asks for a share of almost all the produce that the worker can either grow or gather from it. His rent takes the first cut from the produce of the labor that is put into the land.

It seldom happens that the person who tills the ground has wherewithal to maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is generally advanced to him from the stock of a master, the farmer who employs him, and who would have no interest to employ him, unless he was to share in the produce of his labour, or unless his stock was to be replaced to him with a profit. This profit makes a second deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon land.

It rarely happens that the person who works the land has enough resources to support himself until he gathers the harvest. His sustenance is usually provided by the farmer who hires him, who wouldn’t have any incentive to employ him unless he gets a share of the benefits from his work, or unless the inputs are returned to him with a profit. This profit creates an additional reduction from the yield of the labor used on the land.

The produce of almost all other labour is liable to the like deduction of profit. In all arts and manufactures, the greater part of the workmen stand in need of a master, to advance them the materials of their work, and their wages and maintenance, till it be completed. He shares in the produce of their labour, or in the value which it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed; and in this share consists his profit.

The output of nearly all other types of work is subject to a similar deduction of profit. In all trades and industries, most workers need a supervisor to provide them with the materials for their work, as well as their pay and support, until the job is done. The supervisor takes a part of the results of their labor, or the value that it adds to the materials used, and this share makes up their profit.

It sometimes happens, indeed, that a single independent workman has stock sufficient both to purchase the materials of his work, and to maintain himself till it be completed. He is both master and workman, and enjoys the whole produce of his own labour, or the whole value which it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed. It includes what are usually two distinct revenues, belonging to two distinct persons, the profits of stock, and the wages of labour.

Sometimes, it happens that a single independent worker has enough resources to buy the materials for his work and support himself until it’s finished. He is both the boss and the worker, and he gets to keep all the earnings from his own labor, or the entire value he adds to the materials he uses. This combines what are typically two separate sources of income, which would usually go to two different people: the profits from investment and the wages from labor.

Such cases, however, are not very frequent; and in every part of Europe twenty workmen serve under a master for one that is independent, and the wages of labour are everywhere understood to be, what they usually are, when the labourer is one person, and the owner of the stock which employs him another.

Such cases, however, are not very common; and in every part of Europe, there are twenty workers serving under a master for every one that is independent. The wages for labor are generally understood to be what they usually are when the worker is one person, and the owner of the resources that employ him is another.

What are the common wages of labour, depends everywhere upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little, as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower, the wages of labour.

What the usual pay for labor is depends on the agreements typically made between the two parties, whose interests are definitely not the same. Workers want to earn as much as possible, while employers want to pay as little as they can. Workers tend to band together to push for higher wages, while employers try to work together to reduce them.

It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily: and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work, but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes, the masters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a[Pg 28] farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks, which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year, without employment. In the long run, the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate.

It’s not hard to predict which of the two sides will usually hold the upper hand in disputes and push the other to agree to their terms. The employers, being fewer in number, can unite much more easily. The law allows—or at least doesn’t prohibit—their collaboration, while it does prohibit workers from coming together. There are no laws against joining forces to lower wages, but there are many against raising them. In all such disputes, the employers can endure much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a factory owner, or a merchant, even if they didn’t hire a single worker, could typically survive a year or two on the resources they’ve already accumulated. Many workers couldn’t last a week, few could make it a month, and almost none could go a year without a job. In the long run, a worker may be as essential to their employer as the employer is to them, but that need isn’t as urgent.

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbors and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and, one may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy till the moment of execution; and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen, who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this kind, combine, of their own accord, to raise the price of their labour. Their usual pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions, sometimes the great profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands. The masters, upon these occasions, are just as clamorous upon the other side, and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity against the combination of servants, labourers, and journeymen. The workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interposition of the civil magistrate, partly from the superior steadiness of the masters, partly from the necessity which the greater part of the workmen are under of submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally end in nothing but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders.

We rarely hear about the unions of employers, but we often hear about those of workers. However, anyone who thinks that employers rarely band together is ignorant of both the world and the topic. Employers are always in a sort of silent, yet constant and uniform, agreement not to raise wages above the current level. Breaking this agreement is very unpopular and seen as disgraceful among other employers. We don’t hear much about this agreement because it’s the usual, even natural, state of things that goes unnoticed. Employers also sometimes form specific groups to lower wages even further. These are usually kept very quiet until they’re about to be enforced, and when workers go along with it—sometimes without resistance, even though it deeply affects them—they usually don’t talk about it. However, this kind of agreement is frequently challenged by opposing coalitions of the workers, who sometimes band together on their own to demand higher pay. Their usual reasons are the high cost of living or the large profits their employers make from their labor. Regardless of whether their actions are defensive or offensive, they are always loud and noticeable. To make their point quickly, they resort to shouting and sometimes to extreme violence. They act out of desperation, like people who feel they have nothing to lose—they either starve or intimidate their employers into giving in to their demands immediately. In response, employers are equally vocal and constantly call for help from law enforcement, urging the strict enforcement of laws that are severely designed against worker unions. As a result, workers rarely gain anything from these violent uprisings, which often end in punishment or ruin for the leaders due to the intervention of law enforcement, the steadiness of employers, and the necessity for most workers to submit for their basic survival.

But though, in disputes with their workmen, masters must generally have the advantage, there is, however, a certain rate, below which it seems impossible to reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages even of the lowest species of labour.

But even though, in conflicts with their workers, employers generally hold the upper hand, there is still a certain minimum rate below which it seems impossible to lower the regular wages, even for the most basic types of labor, for any significant duration.

A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon most occasions be somewhat more, otherwise it would be impossible for him to bring up a family, and the race of such workmen could not last beyond the first generation. Mr. Cantillon seems, upon this account, to suppose that the lowest species of common labourers must everywhere earn at least double their own maintenance, in order that, one with another, they may be enabled to bring up two children; the labour of the wife, on account of her necessary attendance on the children, being supposed no more than sufficient to provide for herself. But one half the children born, it is computed, die before the age of manhood. The poorest labourers, therefore, according to this account, must, one with another, attempt to rear at least four children, in order that two may have an equal chance of living to that age. But the necessary maintenance of four children, it is supposed, may be nearly equal to that of one man. The labour of an able-bodied slave, the same author adds, is computed to be worth double his maintenance; and that of the meanest labourer, he thinks, cannot be worth less than that of an able-bodied slave. Thus far at least seems certain, that, in order to bring up a family, the labour of the husband and wife together must, even in the lowest species of common labour, be able to earn something more than what in precisely necessary for their own maintenance; but in what proportion, whether in that above-mentioned, or in any other, I shall not take upon me to determine.

A man must always support himself through his work, and his pay should at least be enough to cover his needs. It usually needs to be a bit more, or else it would be impossible for him to raise a family, and the lineage of such workers wouldn't survive past the first generation. Mr. Cantillon suggests that even the lowest types of common laborers must earn at least double their own living expenses so that, collectively, they can manage to raise two children; the wife's work, given her necessary care for the children, is assumed to be just enough to support herself. However, it is estimated that half of the children born will die before reaching adulthood. Therefore, the poorest laborers, on average, must aim to raise at least four children so that two have a fair chance of reaching adulthood. But the cost of raising four children is thought to be roughly equal to that of one adult man. The same author notes that the work of a capable slave is valued at twice his maintenance costs, and he believes that the work of the lowest laborers cannot be worth less than that of a capable slave. It seems clear that, to raise a family, the combined income of the husband and wife must, even in the lowest types of common work, be able to earn a bit more than what is strictly necessary for their own upkeep; but I won't speculate on the exact proportion, whether it’s the ratio mentioned or another one.

There are certain circumstances, however, which sometimes give the labourers an advantage, and enable them to raise their wages considerably above this rate, evidently the lowest which is consistent with common humanity.

There are certain situations, however, that sometimes give workers an edge and allow them to increase their wages significantly above this rate, which is clearly the minimum necessary for basic human dignity.

When in any country the demand for those who live by wages, labourers, journeymen, servants of every kind, is continually increasing; when every year furnishes employment for a greater number than had been employed the year before, the workmen have no occasion to combine in order to raise their wages. The scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters, who bid against one another in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily break through the natural combination of master not to raise wages.

When in any country the demand for wage workers, laborers, tradespeople, and all kinds of servants is constantly growing; when each year creates jobs for more people than were employed the previous year, the workers don’t need to unite to demand higher wages. The shortage of workers leads to competition among employers, who compete against each other to attract workers, thus willingly breaking the usual agreement among employers not to increase wages.

The demand for those who live by wages, it is evident, cannot increase but in propor[Pg 29]tion to the increase of the funds which are destined to the payment of wages. These funds are of two kinds; first, the revenue which is over and above what is necessary for the maintenance; and, secondly, the stock which is over and above what is necessary for the employment of their masters.

The demand for wage earners, as we can see, can only grow in relation to the increase in the funds allocated for paying wages. There are two types of these funds: first, the revenue that exceeds what is needed for basic living expenses; and second, the capital that goes beyond what is necessary for the operations of their employers.

When the landlord, annuitant, or monied man, has a greater revenue than what he judges sufficient to maintain his own family, he employs either the whole or a part of the surplus in maintaining one or more menial servants. Increase this surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of those servants.

When the landlord, annuitant, or wealthy individual has more income than what he thinks is enough to support his own family, he uses all or part of the extra money to employ one or more household servants. If this surplus grows, he will naturally hire more of those servants.

When an independent workman, such as a weaver or shoemaker, has got more stock than what is sufficient to purchase the materials of his own work, and to maintain himself till he can dispose of it, he naturally employs one or more journeymen with the surplus, in order to make a profit by their work. Increase this surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of his journeymen.

When an independent worker, like a weaver or shoemaker, has more resources than needed to buy the materials for his own work and support himself until he sells it, he naturally hires one or more apprentices with the extra funds to make a profit from their labor. If he increases this surplus, he will naturally hire more apprentices.

The demand for those who live by wages, therefore, necessarily increases with the increase of the revenue and stock of every country, and cannot possibly increase without it. The increase of revenue and stock is the increase of national wealth. The demand for those who live by wages, therefore, naturally increases with the increase of national wealth, and cannot possibly increase without it.

The need for wage workers naturally grows as the revenue and resources of a country increase, and it can't rise without that growth. More revenue and resources mean more national wealth. So, the demand for wage earners grows with national wealth, and it can't increase without it.

It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase, which occasions a rise in the wages of labour. It is not, accordingly, in the richest countries, in the most thriving, or in those which are growing rich the fastest, that the wages of labour are highest. England is certainly, in the present times, a much richer country than any part of North America. The wages of labour, however, are much higher in North America than in any part of England. In the province of New York, common labourers earn[8] three shillings and sixpence currency, equal to two shillings sterling, a-day; ship-carpenters, ten shillings and sixpence currency, with a pint of rum, worth sixpence sterling, equal in all to six shillings and sixpence sterling; house-carpenters and bricklayers, eight shillings currency, equal to four shillings and sixpence sterling; journeymen tailors, five shillings currency, equal to about two shillings and tenpence sterling. These prices are all above the London price; and wages are said to be as high in the other colonies as in New York. The price of provisions is everywhere in North America much lower than in England. A dearth has never been known there. In the worst seasons they have always had a sufficiency for themselves, though less for exportation. If the money price of labour, therefore, be higher than it is anywhere in the mother-country, its real price, the real command of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which it conveys to the labourer, must be higher in a still greater proportion.

It’s not the total wealth of a nation that causes wages to rise, but the ongoing growth of that wealth. Therefore, it’s not necessarily in the richest or fastest-growing countries where labor wages are the highest. Right now, England is definitely wealthier than any part of North America. However, wages for labor are much higher in North America than in England. In New York, for example, common laborers earn three shillings and sixpence in currency, which is equivalent to two shillings in sterling, per day; ship carpenters make ten shillings and sixpence in currency, plus a pint of rum worth sixpence sterling, totaling six shillings and sixpence in sterling; house carpenters and bricklayers get eight shillings in currency, equal to four shillings and sixpence in sterling; and journeyman tailors earn five shillings in currency, roughly two shillings and tenpence in sterling. These wages are all higher than those in London, and reports suggest that wages in other colonies are similarly high compared to New York. The cost of food is significantly lower across North America than in England, and they’ve never experienced a shortage. Even during the worst seasons, they always have enough for themselves, though less for export. Therefore, if the monetary value of labor is higher than anywhere in the mother country, its real value—the actual ability to access essential goods and comforts that it provides to the worker—must be even more significantly higher.

But though North America is not yet so rich as England, it is much more thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the further acquisition of riches. The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants. In Great Britain, and most other European countries, they are not supposed to double in less than five hundred years. In the British colonies in North America, it has been found that they double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. Nor in the present times is this increase principally owing to the continual importation of new inhabitants, but to the great multiplication of the species. Those who live to old age, it is said, frequently see there from fifty to a hundred, and sometimes many more, descendants from their own body. Labour is there so well rewarded, that a numerous family of children, instead of being a burden, is a source of opulence and prosperity to the parents. The labour of each child, before it can leave their house, is computed to be worth a hundred pounds clear gain to them. A young widow with four or five young children, who, among the middling or inferior ranks of people in Europe, would have so little chance for a second husband, is there frequently courted as a sort of fortune. The value of children is the greatest of all encouragements to marriage. We cannot, therefore, wonder that the people in North America should generally marry very young. Notwithstanding the great increase occasioned by such early marriages, there is a continual complaint of the scarcity of hands in North America. The demand for labourers, the funds destined for maintaining them increase, it seems, still faster than they can find labourers to employ.

But even though North America isn't as wealthy as England yet, it's much more prosperous and is rapidly gaining wealth. The clearest sign of a country's prosperity is the growth of its population. In Great Britain and most other European countries, the population typically doesn’t double in less than five hundred years. In the British colonies in North America, it's been observed that the population doubles in twenty to twenty-five years. Nowadays, this growth is not mainly due to the constant arrival of new people, but rather to the significant increase in the birth rate. It’s reported that those who live to an old age often see between fifty to a hundred, and sometimes many more, descendants from their own family. Labor is so well compensated there that having many children is seen not as a burden, but as a source of wealth and success for the parents. The work each child contributes before leaving home is estimated to be worth a clear profit of a hundred pounds. A young widow with four or five small children, who would have little chance of remarrying among the middle or lower classes in Europe, is often pursued for marriage as a sort of asset. The value of children is the most significant encouragement for marriage. Therefore, it's no surprise that people in North America generally marry quite young. Despite the considerable population growth from these early marriages, there's a constant complaint about the shortage of workers in North America. It seems that the demand for laborers and the funds set aside to support them are still growing faster than they can find people to employ.

Though the wealth of a country should be very great, yet if it has been long stationary, we must not expect to find the wages of labour very high in it. The funds destined for the payment of wages, the revenue and stock of its inhabitants, may be of the greatest extent; but if they have continued for several centuries of the same, or very nearly of the same extent, the number of labourers employed every year could easily supply, and even more than supply, the number wanted the following year. There could seldom be any scarcity of hands, nor could the masters be obliged to bid against one another in order to get them. The hands, on the contrary, would, in this case, naturally multiply beyond their employment. There would be a constant scarcity of employment, and the labourers[Pg 30] would be obliged to bid against one another in order to get it. If in such a country the wages of labour had ever been more than sufficient to maintain the labourer, and to enable him to bring up a family, the competition of the labourers and the interest of the masters would soon reduce them to the lowest rate which is consistent with common humanity. China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous, countries in the world. It seems, however, to have been long stationary. Marco Polo, who visited it more than five hundred years ago, describes its cultivation, industry, and populousness, almost in the same terms in which they are described by travellers in the present times. It had, perhaps, even long before his time, acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of its laws and institutions permits it to acquire. The accounts of all travellers, inconsistent in many other respects, agree in the low wages of labour, and in the difficulty which a labourer finds in bringing up a family in China. If by digging the ground a whole day he can get what will purchase a small quantity of rice in the evening, he is contented. The condition of artificers is, if possible, still worse. Instead of waiting indolently in their work-houses for the calls of their customers, as in Europe, they are continually running about the streets with the tools of their respective trades, offering their services, and, as it were, begging employment. The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses that of the most beggarly nations in Europe. In the neighborhood of Canton, many hundred, it is commonly said, many thousand families have no habitation on the land, but live constantly in little fishing-boats upon the rivers and canals. The subsistence which they find there is so scanty, that they are eager to fish up the nastiest garbage thrown overboard from any European ship. Any carrion, the carcase of a dead dog or cat, for example, though half putrid and stinking, is as welcome to them as the most wholesome food to the people of other countries. Marriage is encouraged in China, not by the profitableness of children, but by the liberty of destroying them. In all great towns, several are every night exposed in the street, or drowned like puppies in the water. The performance of this horrid office is even said to be the avowed business by which some people earn their subsistence.

Even if a country is wealthy, if that wealth has been stagnant for a long time, we can’t expect high wages for laborers. The money set aside for wages, as well as the income and resources of its residents, could be substantial; however, if they have remained largely unchanged for centuries, the number of workers each year would easily meet or exceed the demand for the following year. There would rarely be a shortage of workers, and employers wouldn’t need to compete with each other to hire them. Instead, the number of workers would naturally grow beyond the available jobs. This would create a constant shortage of employment, forcing laborers to compete against each other for work. If in such a country, wages had ever been high enough to support a laborer and raise a family, the competition among laborers and the interests of employers would quickly drive wages down to the lowest level that is still humane. China has long been one of the richest, most fertile, well-cultivated, industrious, and populous countries in the world. Yet, it seems to have been stagnant for a long time. Marco Polo, who visited over five hundred years ago, described its agriculture, industry, and population in terms that travelers still use today. Perhaps it had already reached its maximum wealth long before his time due to its laws and institutions. Despite inconsistencies in other areas of travel accounts, they all agree on the low wages in China and the struggles laborers face to support their families. If a laborer can earn enough in one day’s work to buy a small amount of rice for dinner, he feels satisfied. The situation for artisans is even worse. Instead of waiting idly in their shops for customers, as they do in Europe, they constantly run around the streets with their tools, offering their services and essentially begging for work. The poverty among the lower classes in China is far worse than in the most impoverished countries in Europe. Near Canton, many hundreds—or often said to be thousands—of families have no homes and live entirely in small fishing boats on rivers and canals. The little food they find is so meager that they eagerly fish up the most disgusting refuse tossed overboard by European ships. Even rotten carcasses, like a dead dog or cat, are seen as welcome as the best meals by people in other countries. Marriage in China is encouraged not by the benefits of having children, but by the ability to dispose of them. In large cities, many babies are left in the streets or drowned like puppies every night. It is even said that some people make a living performing this dreadful task.

China, however, though it may, perhaps, stand still, does not seem to go backwards. Its towns are nowhere deserted by their inhabitants. The lands which had once been cultivated, are nowhere neglected. The same, or very nearly the same, annual labour, must, therefore, continue to be performed, and the funds destined for maintaining it must not, consequently, be sensibly diminished. The lowest class of labourers, therefore, notwithstanding their scanty subsistence, must some way or other make shift to continue their race so far as to keep up their usual numbers.

China, however, while it may seem to be standing still, doesn’t appear to be going backwards. Its towns aren’t deserted by their residents anywhere. The lands that were once farmed aren’t being ignored either. The same, or almost the same, amount of annual work has to keep happening, and the funds needed to support that work can’t be significantly reduced. The lowest class of laborers, despite their limited means, must somehow find a way to continue their lineage just enough to maintain their usual population.

But it would be otherwise in a country where the funds destined for the maintenance of labour were sensibly decaying. Every year the demand for servants and labourers would, in all the different classes of employments, be less than it had been the year before. Many who had been bred in the superior classes, not being able to find employment in their own business, would be glad to seek it in the lowest. The lowest class being not only overstocked with its own workmen, but with the overflowings of all the other classes, the competition for employment would be so great in it, as to reduce the wages of labour to the most miserable and scanty subsistence of the labourer. Many would not be able to find employment even upon these hard terms, but would either starve, or be driven to seek a subsistence, either by begging, or by the perpetration, perhaps, of the greatest enormities. Want, famine, and mortality, would immediately prevail in that class, and from thence extend themselves to all the superior classes, till the number of inhabitants in the country was reduced to what could easily be maintained by the revenue and stock which remained in it, and which had escaped either the tyranny or calamity which had destroyed the rest. This, perhaps, is nearly the present state of Bengal, and of some other of the English settlements in the East Indies. In a fertile country, which had before been much depopulated, where subsistence, consequently, should not be very difficult, and where, notwithstanding, three or four hundred thousand people die of hunger in one year, we may be assured that the funds destined for the maintenance of the labouring poor are fast decaying. The difference between the genius of the British constitution, which protects and governs North America, and that of the mercantile company which oppresses and domineers in the East Indies, cannot, perhaps, be better illustrated than by the different state of those countries.

But it would be different in a country where the funds meant for supporting labor were clearly diminishing. Every year, the demand for domestic workers and laborers across various jobs would be lower than it was the year before. Many individuals from higher social classes, unable to find work in their own fields, would be eager to take jobs in the lowest ranks. The lowest class would not only be saturated with its own workers but also overwhelmed by those from other classes, resulting in fierce competition for jobs that would drive down wages to barely enough for the laborer to survive. Many would struggle to find work even under these harsh conditions, leading them to either starve or resort to seeking a living through begging, or potentially engaging in serious offenses. Poverty, famine, and death would quickly spread within that class and eventually extend to higher classes until the population of the country was reduced to what could be easily supported by the remaining revenue and resources, which had survived either tyranny or disaster that had wiped out the rest. This situation may closely resemble the current state of Bengal and some other English settlements in the East Indies. In a fertile country that had previously experienced significant depopulation, where finding food should not be too challenging, and yet where three or four hundred thousand people starve in a single year, it is clear that the funds meant for supporting the working poor are rapidly declining. The contrast between the spirit of the British constitution, which protects and governs North America, and that of the trading company that oppresses and controls the East Indies, might be best illustrated by the differing conditions of these regions.

The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the necessary effect, so it is the natural symptom of increasing national wealth. The scanty maintenance of the labouring poor, on the other hand, is the natural symptom that things are at a stand, and their starving condition, that they are going fast backwards.

The generous reward for work, therefore, is both a necessary outcome and a natural sign of growing national wealth. In contrast, the meager support for the working poor is a clear indication that progress has stalled, and their desperate situations show that things are getting worse quickly.

In Great Britain, the wages of labour seem, in the present times, to be evidently more than what is precisely necessary to enable the labourer to bring up a family. In order to satisfy ourselves upon this point, it will not be necessary to enter into any tedious or doubtful calculation of what may be the lowest sum upon which it is possible to do this. There are many plain symptoms, that the wages of labour are nowhere in this country[Pg 31] regulated by this lowest rate, which is consistent with common humanity.

In Great Britain today, it is clear that labor wages are more than what is strictly necessary for a worker to support a family. To confirm this, we don’t need to go into complicated or questionable calculations about the minimum amount required for this. There are many obvious signs that labor wages are not set anywhere in this country[Pg 31] at this minimum level that aligns with basic human needs.

First, in almost every part of Great Britain there is a distinction, even in the lowest species of labour, between summer and winter wages. Summer wages are always highest. But, on account of the extraordinary expense of fuel, the maintenance of a family is most expensive in winter. Wages, therefore, being highest when this expense is lowest, it seems evident that they are not regulated by what is necessary for this expense, but by the quantity and supposed value of the work. A labourer, it may be said, indeed, ought to save part of his summer wages, in order to defray his winter expense; and that, through the whole year, they do not exceed what is necessary to maintain his family through the whole year. A slave, however, or one absolutely dependent on us for immediate subsistence, would not be treated in this manner. His daily subsistence would be proportioned to his daily necessities.

First, in almost every part of Great Britain, there's a clear difference, even in the most basic types of labor, between summer and winter wages. Summer wages are always higher. However, due to the high cost of fuel, taking care of a family is most expensive in winter. Therefore, since wages are highest when this expense is lowest, it’s clear that they are not determined by what's needed for this expense, but rather by the amount and perceived value of the work. One might argue that a laborer should save part of his summer wages to cover his winter expenses, and that overall, they don't exceed what's necessary to support his family throughout the year. On the other hand, a slave, or someone completely reliant on us for their basic needs, wouldn’t be treated this way. Their daily needs would dictate their daily support.

Secondly, the wages of labour do not, in Great Britain, fluctuate with the price of provisions. These vary everywhere from year to year, frequently from month to month. But in many places, the money price of labour remains uniformly the same, sometimes for half a century together. If, in these places, therefore, the labouring poor can maintain their families in dear years, they must be at their ease in times of moderate plenty, and in affluence in those of extraordinary cheapness. The high price of provisions during these ten years past, has not, in many parts of the kingdom, been accompanied with any sensible rise in the money price of labour. It has, indeed, in some; owing, probably, more to the increase of the demand for labour, than to that of the price of provisions.

Secondly, in Great Britain, wages don’t fluctuate with food prices. These prices change everywhere from year to year, often even from month to month. However, in many areas, the wage for labor stays consistently the same, sometimes for up to fifty years. Therefore, if the working poor can support their families during expensive years, they should be comfortable during years of moderate abundance and quite well off during exceptionally cheap times. In the past ten years, the high cost of food hasn’t resulted in a noticeable increase in labor wages in many parts of the country. In some areas, it has, but that’s likely due to a higher demand for labor rather than the increased cost of food.

Thirdly, as the price of provisions varies more from year to year than the wages of labour, so, on the other hand, the wages of labour vary more from place to place than the price of provisions. The prices of bread and butchers' meat are generally the same, or very nearly the same, through the greater part of the united kingdom. These, and most other things which are sold by retail, the way in which the labouring poor buy all things, are generally fully as cheap, or cheaper, in great towns than in the remoter parts of the country, for reasons which I shall have occasion to explain hereafter. But the wages of labour in a great town and its neighbourhood, are frequently a fourth or a fifth part, twenty or five-and-twenty per cent. higher than at a few miles distance. Eighteen pence a day may be reckoned the common price of labour in London and its neighborhood. At a few miles distance, it falls to fourteen and fifteen pence. Tenpence may be reckoned its price in Edinburgh and its neighbourhood. At a few miles distance, it falls to eightpence, the usual price of common labour through the greater part of the low country of Scotland, where it varies a good deal less than in England. Such a difference of prices, which, it seems, is not always sufficient to transport a man from one parish to another, would necessarily occasion so great a transportation of the most bulky commodities, not only from one parish to another, but from one end of the kingdom, almost from one end of the world to the other, as would soon reduce them more nearly to a level. After all that has been said of the levity and inconstancy of human nature, it appears evidently from experience, that man is, of all sorts of luggage, the most difficult to be transported. If the labouring poor, therefore, can maintain their families in those parts of the kingdom where the price of labour is lowest, they must be in affluence where it is highest.

Thirdly, while the cost of essentials changes more from year to year than labor wages do, on the flip side, labor wages change more from place to place than the price of essentials. The prices of bread and meat are usually the same, or very similar, across most of the United Kingdom. These, along with most other items sold directly to consumers, which is how the working poor buy everything, tend to be just as cheap, or even cheaper, in big cities than in more remote areas, for reasons I will explain later. However, wages for labor in a major city and its surrounding area are often a quarter or a fifth, or 20 to 25 percent, higher than just a few miles away. Eighteen pence a day is a common wage for labor in London and its area. A few miles away, it drops to fourteen or fifteen pence. Ten pence is the standard wage in Edinburgh and nearby areas. A few miles away, it falls to eight pence, which is the usual rate for common labor throughout most of lowland Scotland, where prices fluctuate much less than in England. Such a price disparity, which doesn't always convince someone to move from one parish to another, would naturally lead to significant transportation of large goods, not just between parishes but throughout the kingdom and even globally, which would soon align prices more closely. Despite all the talk about the fickleness and inconsistency of human nature, experience clearly shows that humans are the most challenging to relocate among all types of cargo. Therefore, if the working poor can support their families in parts of the kingdom where labor costs are lowest, they must be living well where labor costs are highest.

Fourthly, the variations in the price of labour not only do not correspond, either in place or time, with those in the price of provisions, but they are frequently quite opposite.

Fourthly, the changes in labor costs don't match up, either in location or time, with those in the cost of food, and they are often completely opposite.

Grain, the food of the common people, is dearer in Scotland than in England, whence Scotland receives almost every year very large supplies. But English corn must be sold dearer in Scotland, the country to which it is brought, than in England, the country from which it comes; and it proportion to its quality it cannot be sold dearer in Scotland than the Scotch corn that comes to the same market in competition with it. The quality of grain depends chiefly upon the quantity of flour or meal which it yields at the mill; and, in this respect, English grain is so much superior to the Scotch, that though often dearer in appearance, or in proportion to the measure of its bulk, it is generally cheaper in reality, or in proportion to its quality, or even to the measure of its weight. The price of labour, on the contrary, is dearer in England than in Scotland. If the labouring poor, therefore, can maintain their families in the one part of the united kingdom, they must be in affluence in the other. Oatmeal, indeed, supplies the common people in Scotland with the greatest and the best part of their food, which is, in general, much inferior to that of their neighbours of the same rank in England. This difference, however, in the mode of their subsistence, is not the cause, but the effect, of the difference in their wages; though, by a strange misapprehension, I have frequently heard it represented as the cause. It is not because one man keeps a coach, while his neighbour walks a-foot, that one is rich, and the other poor; but because the one is rich, he keeps a coach, and because the other is poor, he walks a-foot.

Grain, the staple food of everyday people, costs more in Scotland than in England, from which Scotland receives large shipments almost every year. However, English grain has to be sold at a higher price in Scotland than in England, where it originates; and, based on its quality, it can't be priced higher in Scotland than the local grain competing in the same market. The quality of grain mainly depends on how much flour or meal it produces at the mill, and in this regard, English grain is much better than Scottish grain. Although it may seem more expensive based on appearance or volume, it is generally cheaper when you consider its quality or weight. On the other hand, the cost of labor is higher in England than in Scotland. So, if the working poor can support their families in one part of the United Kingdom, they must be doing well in the other. Oatmeal does provide the common people in Scotland with a significant portion of their food, which is generally of lower quality than that of their counterparts in England. However, this difference in their diets isn’t the cause but rather the result of the disparity in their wages; oddly enough, I've often heard it mistakenly claimed as the cause. It's not that one person rides in a coach while his neighbor walks that makes one rich and the other poor; instead, the richer person drives a coach because he is wealthy, while the poorer person walks because he is not.

During the course of the last century, taking one year with another, grain was dearer in both parts of the united kingdom than during that of the present. This is a matter of[Pg 32] fact which cannot now admit of any reasonable doubt; and the proof of it is, if possible, still more decisive with regard to Scotland than with regard to England. It is in Scotland supported by the evidence of the public fiars, annual valuations made upon oath, according to the actual state of the markets, of all the different sorts of grain in every different county of Scotland. If such direct proof could require any collateral evidence to confirm it, I would observe, that this has likewise been the case in France, and probably in most other parts of Europe. With regard to France, there is the clearest proof. But though it is certain, that in both parts of the united kingdom grain was somewhat dearer in the last century than in the present, it is equally certain that labour was much cheaper. If the labouring poor, therefore, could bring up their families then, they must be much more at their ease now. In the last century, the most usual day-wages of common labour through the greater part of Scotland were sixpence in summer, and fivepence in winter. Three shillings a-week, the same price, very nearly still continues to be paid in some parts of the Highlands and Western islands. Through the greater part of the Low country, the most usual wages of common labour are now eightpence a-day; tenpence, sometimes a shilling, about Edinburgh, in the counties which border upon England, probably on account of that neighbourhood, and in a few other places where there has lately been a considerable rise in the demand for labour, about Glasgow, Carron, Ayrshire, &c. In England, the improvements of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, began much earlier than in Scotland. The demand for labour, and consequently its price, must necessarily have increased with those improvements. In the last century, accordingly, as well as in the present, the wages of labour were higher in England than in Scotland. They have risen, too, considerably since that time, though, on account of the greater variety of wages paid there in different places, it is more difficult to ascertain how much. In 1614, the pay of a foot soldier was the same as in the present times, eightpence a-day. When it was first established, it would naturally be regulated by the usual wages of common labourers, the rank of people from which foot soldiers are commonly drawn. Lord-chief-justice Hales, who wrote in the time of Charles II. computes the necessary expense of a labourer's family, consisting of six persons, the father and mother, two children able to do something, and two not able, at ten shillings a-week, or twenty-six pounds a-year. If they cannot earn this by their labour, they must make it up, he supposes, either by begging or stealing. He appears to have enquired very carefully into this subject[9]. In 1688, Mr Gregory King, whose skill in political arithmetic is so much extolled by Dr Davenant, computed the ordinary income of labourers and out-servants to be fifteen pounds a-year to a family, which he supposed to consist, one with another, of three and a half persons. His calculation, therefore, though different in appearance, corresponds very nearly at bottom with that of Judge Hales. Both suppose the weekly expense of such families to be about twenty-pence a-head. Both the pecuniary income and expense of such families have increased considerably since that time through the greater part of the kingdom, in some places more, and in some less, though perhaps scarce anywhere so much as some exaggerated accounts of the present wages of labour have lately represented them to the public. The price of labour, it must be observed, cannot be ascertained very accurately anywhere, different prices being often paid at the same place and for the same sort of labour, not only according to the different abilities of the workman, but according to the easiness or hardness of the masters. Where wages are not regulated by law, all that we can pretend to determine is, what are the most usual; and experience seems to shew that law can never regulate them properly, though it has often pretended to do so.

Over the past century, on average, grain was more expensive in both parts of the United Kingdom compared to now. This is a fact that is no longer open to reasonable doubt; and the evidence for it is, if anything, even stronger in Scotland than in England. In Scotland, this is backed by records from public fiars, which are annual valuations made under oath, reflecting the actual state of the markets for all types of grain in each county. If such direct evidence needed any supporting information, I would point out that this has also been the case in France, and likely in most other parts of Europe. In France, the proof is very clear. However, while it is certain that grain was somewhat more expensive in the last century than now, it is equally true that labor was much cheaper. Therefore, if the working poor were able to support their families back then, they must be in a much better position now. In the last century, the typical daily wage for common labor throughout most of Scotland was sixpence in summer and fivepence in winter. Three shillings a week, which is nearly the same amount, is still being paid in some areas of the Highlands and Western Islands. In most of the Lowlands, the typical wage for common labor is now eightpence a day; tenpence or sometimes a shilling can be found around Edinburgh in the counties near the English border, likely due to that proximity, and in a few other places where there has recently been a significant increase in labor demand, such as Glasgow, Carron, Ayrshire, etc. In England, developments in agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce started much earlier than in Scotland. Consequently, the demand for labor, and therefore its pay, would have naturally increased with those developments. As in the last century, labor wages were higher in England than in Scotland at that time. They have also risen substantially since then, although, due to the greater variety of wages paid in different locations, it is harder to pinpoint exactly how much. In 1614, a foot soldier was paid the same as today, eightpence a day. When this wage was first set, it would have naturally been determined by the usual pay of common laborers, who are the typical source of foot soldiers. Lord Chief Justice Hales, writing during the reign of Charles II, estimated the necessary cost of living for a laborer's family, consisting of six individuals (the parents, two children who can work, and two who cannot), at ten shillings a week, or twenty-six pounds a year. If they can’t earn that through their labor, he suggests they have to make up the difference by begging or stealing. He seems to have investigated this topic quite thoroughly. In 1688, Mr. Gregory King, whose expertise in political arithmetic is highly praised by Dr. Davenant, calculated that the average income for laborers and out-servants was fifteen pounds a year for a family, which he assumed to average three and a half individuals. His calculations, although they may appear different at first glance, closely align with those of Judge Hales. Both estimates suggest the weekly cost for such families is around twenty pence per person. Since that time, both the money earned and spent by these families have significantly increased in most parts of the kingdom, although some locations saw more change than others, and possibly not as much as some inflated reports of current labor wages have implied. It’s important to note that the price of labor can’t be precisely determined anywhere; different rates are often paid at the same location for the same work, based not only on the worker's abilities but also on the nature of the employers. Where wages aren't set by law, all we can really identify is what the most common rates are; and evidence suggests that laws have never effectively regulated wages, despite often trying to do so.

The real recompence of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which it can procure to the labourer, has, during the course of the present century, increased perhaps in a still greater proportion than its money price. Not only grain has become somewhat cheaper, but many other things, from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and wholesome variety of food, have become a great deal cheaper. Potatoes, for example, do not at present, through the greater part of the kingdom, cost half the price which they used to do thirty or forty years ago. The same thing may be said of turnips, carrots, cabbages; things which were formerly never raised but by the spade, but which are now commonly raised by the plough. All sort of garden stuff, too, has become cheaper. The greater part of the apples, and even of the onions, consumed in Great Britain, were, in the last century, imported from Flanders. The great improvements in the coarser manufactories of both linen and woollen cloth furnish the labourers with cheaper and better clothing; and those in the manufactories of the coarser metals, with cheaper and better instruments of trade, as well as with many agreeable and convenient pieces of household furniture. Soap, salt, candles, leather, and fermented liquors, have, indeed, become a[Pg 33] good deal dearer, chiefly from the taxes which have been laid upon them. The quantity of these, however, which the labouring poor are under any necessity of consuming, is so very small, that the increase in their price does not compensate the diminution in that of so many other things. The common complaint, that luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people, and that the labouring poor will not now be contented with the same food, clothing, and lodging, which satisfied them in former times, may convince us that it is not the money price of labour only, but its real recompence, which has augmented.

The true reward for hard work, the actual amount of necessities and comforts of life that it can provide for workers, has likely increased even more than its monetary value throughout this century. Not only has grain gotten somewhat cheaper, but many other items that the hardworking poor use to enjoy a variety of nutritious food have also significantly dropped in price. For instance, potatoes now cost less than half of what they did thirty or forty years ago in most parts of the country. The same can be said for turnips, carrots, and cabbages; these used to be grown only by hand, but are now commonly farmed with machinery. All kinds of garden produce have also become less expensive. Most of the apples, and even onions, consumed in Great Britain were imported from Flanders in the last century. Major advancements in the production of linen and woolen cloth have provided workers with cheaper and better clothing, while improvements in the manufacturing of rough metals have resulted in more affordable and improved tools for trade, as well as many useful and comfortable household items. Soap, salt, candles, leather, and alcoholic beverages have actually become quite a bit more expensive, mainly due to taxes applied to them. However, the quantity of these items that the working poor really need to use is so small that the rise in their prices doesn’t offset the drop in costs of many other products. The common claim that luxury has even reached the lowest levels of society, and that the working poor are no longer satisfied with the same food, clothing, and housing they accepted in the past, might suggest to us that it’s not just the money value of labor that has increased, but its actual reward has grown as well.

Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to be regarded as an advantage, or as an inconveniency, to the society? The answer seems at first abundantly plain. Servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part, can never be regarded as any inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged.

Is this improvement in the situation of the lower ranks of society considered a benefit or a drawback for the community? The answer seems pretty clear at first glance. Servants, laborers, and various types of workers make up the majority of any large political society. However, what benefits the majority can never truly be seen as a drawback for everyone. No society can possibly thrive and be happy if most of its members are poor and struggling. It’s only fair that those who feed, clothe, and house the entire population should receive a fair share of the rewards from their own labor, allowing them to be reasonably well-fed, clothed, and housed.

Poverty, though it no doubt discourages, does not always prevent, marriage. It seems even to be favourable to generation. A half-starved Highland woman frequently bears more than twenty children, while a pampered fine lady is often incapable of bearing any, and is generally exhausted by two or three. Barrenness, so frequent among women of fashion, is very rare among those of inferior station. Luxury, in the fair sex, while it inflames, perhaps, the passion for enjoyment, seems always to weaken, and frequently to destroy altogether, the powers of generation.

Poverty, though it can be discouraging, doesn’t always stop people from getting married. In fact, it might even promote having children. A woman from the Highlands who struggles to get enough food often has more than twenty kids, while a well-off lady often can’t have any and is usually worn out after having two or three. Infertility, which is common among fashionable women, is quite rare among those in lower social classes. Luxury, for women, while it may intensify the desire for pleasure, seems to always weaken and often completely undermine their ability to have children.

But poverty, though it does not prevent the generation, is extremely unfavourable to the rearing of children. The tender plant is produced; but in so cold a soil, and so severe a climate, soon withers and dies. It is not uncommon, I have been frequently told, in the Highlands of Scotland, for a mother who has born twenty children not to have two alive. Several officers of great experience have assured me, that, so far from recruiting their regiment, they have never been able to supply it with drums and fifes, from all the soldiers' children that were born in it. A greater number of fine children, however, is seldom seen anywhere than about a barrack of soldiers. Very few of them, it seems, arrive at the age of thirteen or fourteen. In some places, one half the children die before they are four years of age, in many places before they are seven, and in almost all places before they are nine or ten. This great mortality, however will everywhere be found chiefly among the children of the common people, who cannot afford to tend them with the same care as those of better station. Though their marriages are generally more fruitful than those of people of fashion, a smaller proportion of their children arrive at maturity. In foundling hospitals, and among the children brought up by parish charities, the mortality is still greater than among those of the common people.

But poverty, while it doesn’t stop people from having kids, makes it really tough to raise them. The delicate plant is born; but in such harsh soil and severe weather, it quickly wilts and dies. I've often heard that in the Highlands of Scotland, a mother who has given birth to twenty children may only have two survive. Many experienced officers have told me that instead of being able to recruit more soldiers, they’ve never been able to supply their regiment with drums and fifes from all the children born to the soldiers. However, you rarely see as many beautiful children as you do around a military barrack. Unfortunately, very few of them make it to the age of thirteen or fourteen. In some areas, half of the children die before they turn four, and in many places, before they are seven, with almost all passing away before reaching nine or ten. This high death rate is mostly found among the children of common people, who can’t care for them as well as wealthier families can. Although their marriages are usually more fruitful than those of the elite, fewer of their children survive to adulthood. In foundling hospitals and among kids raised by parish charities, the death rate is even higher than among the common folk.

Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it. But in civilized society, it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the human species; and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great part of the children which their fruitful marriages produce.

Every species of animals naturally reproduces in relation to the resources available to them, and no species can ever reproduce beyond that. However, in civilized society, it's primarily among the lower classes that the lack of resources can limit the growth of the human population; and it can only do this by causing a significant number of the children from their prolific marriages to die.

The liberal reward of labour, by enabling them to provide better for their children, and consequently to bring up a greater number, naturally tends to widen and extend those limits. It deserves to be remarked, too, that it necessarily does this as nearly as possible in the proportion which the demand for labour requires. If this demand is continually increasing, the reward of labour must necessarily encourage in such a manner the marriage and multiplication of labourers, as may enable them to supply that continually increasing demand by a continually increasing population. If the reward should at any time be less than what was requisite for this purpose, the deficiency of hands would soon raise it; and if it should at any time be more, their excessive multiplication would soon lower it to this necessary rate. The market would be so much understocked with labour in the one case, and so much overstocked in the other, as would soon force back its price to that proper rate which the circumstances of the society required. It is in this manner that the demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men, quickens it when it goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances too fast. It is this demand which regulates and determines the state of propagation in all the different countries of the world; in North America, in Europe, and in China; which renders it rapidly progressive in the first, slow and gradual in the second, and altogether stationary in the last.

The fair compensation for work allows people to provide better for their children and, as a result, raise a larger number of them, which naturally expands these limits. It's important to note that it does this as closely as possible in line with the demand for labor. If this demand keeps growing, the compensation for work will encourage more marriages and larger families among workers, enabling them to meet the steadily increasing demand with a growing population. If at any point the reward is less than what's needed for this purpose, the shortage of workers would quickly drive it up; and if it becomes too high, the surplus of workers would quickly bring it back down to the necessary level. The market would be understocked with labor in one scenario and overstocked in the other, which would soon push the price back to the rate that fits the society's needs. This is how the demand for people, just like that for any other good, regulates the production of people, speeds it up when it lags, and slows it down when it races ahead. This demand dictates and shapes the birth rate across different countries worldwide; in North America, it fosters rapid growth, in Europe, it progresses slowly, and in China, it remains completely stagnant.

The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expense of his master; but that of a free servant is at his own expense. The wear and tear of the latter, however, is, in reality, as much at the expense of his master as that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen and servants of every kind must be such as may enable them, one with another to continue the race of journeymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminish[Pg 34]ing, or stationary demand of the society, may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his master, it generally costs him much less than that of a slave. The fund destined for replacing or repairing, if I may say so, the wear and tear of the slave, is commonly managed by a negligent master or careless overseer. That destined for performing the same office with regard to the freeman is managed by the freeman himself. The disorders which generally prevail in the economy of the rich, naturally introduce themselves into the management of the former; the strict frugality and parsimonious attention of the poor as naturally establish themselves in that of the latter. Under such different management, the same purpose must require very different degrees of expense to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston, New-York, and Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are so very high.

The wear and tear of a slave, as it's often said, is paid for by his master; but for a free servant, it's at his own expense. However, the wear and tear of the latter is effectively just as much at the expense of his master as that of the former. The wages given to workers and servants of all types need to be enough to allow them to sustain the workforce of workers and servants, depending on the varying, declining, or stable demand in society. Yet, although the wear and tear of a free servant is just as much a cost for his master, it usually costs him significantly less than that of a slave. The funds designated for replacing or repairing, so to speak, the wear and tear of the slave are often overseen by a negligent master or careless supervisor. In contrast, the funds meant for the same purpose regarding the free person are managed by that person themselves. The disorganization that often occurs in the management of the wealthy tends to influence the handling of the former; meanwhile, the strict frugality and careful attention of the poor naturally apply to the latter. With such different management styles, the same goal can end up requiring very different amounts of money to achieve. It seems, based on experience from all eras and cultures, that work done by free people ultimately costs less than that done by slaves. This is even evident in cities like Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, where wages for labor are quite high.

The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the effect of increasing wealth, so it is the cause of increasing population. To complain of it, is to lament over the necessary cause and effect of the greatest public prosperity.

The generous reward for work, then, not only results from growing wealth but also leads to a growing population. Complaining about it is to grieve over the essential cause and effect of the greatest public prosperity.

It deserves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progressive state, while the society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining state. The progressive state is, in reality, the cheerful and the hearty state to all the different orders of the society; the stationary is dull; the declining melancholy.

It should be noted that it's during a period of growth, when society is moving towards greater wealth, that the situation of the working poor and the majority of people appears to be the happiest and most comfortable. Life is tough in a stagnant society and miserable in a declining one. The period of growth is, in fact, a lively and positive time for all different groups in society; the stagnant period is boring, and the declining period is gloomy.

The liberal reward of labour, as it encourages the propagation, so it increases the industry of the common people. The wages of labour are the encouragement of industry, which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A plentiful subsistence increases the bodily strength of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of bettering his condition, and of ending his days, perhaps, in ease and plenty, animates him to exert that strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are low; in England, for example, than in Scotland; in the neighbourhood of great towns, than in remote country places. Some workmen, indeed, when they can earn in four days what will maintain them through the week, will be idle the other three. This, however, is by no means the case with the greater part. Workmen, on the contrary, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years. A carpenter in London, and in some other places, is not supposed to last in his utmost vigour above eight years. Something of the same kind happens in many other trades, in which the workmen are paid by the piece; as they generally are in manufactures, and even in country labour, wherever wages are higher than ordinary. Almost every class of artificers is subject to some peculiar infirmity occasioned by excessive application to their peculiar species of work. Ramuzzini, an eminent Italian physician, has written a particular book concerning such diseases. We do not reckon our soldiers the most industrious set of people among us; yet when soldiers have been employed in some particular sorts of work, and liberally paid by the piece, their officers have frequently been obliged to stipulate with the undertaker, that they should not be allowed to earn above a certain sum every day, according to the rate at which they were paid. Till this stipulation was made, mutual emulation, and the desire of greater gain, frequently prompted them to overwork themselves, and to hurt their health by excessive labour. Excessive application, during four days of the week, is frequently the real cause of the idleness of the other three, so much and so loudly complained of. Great labour, either of mind or body, continued for several days together is, in most men, naturally followed by a great desire of relaxation, which, if not restrained by force, or by some strong necessity, is almost irresistible. It is the call of nature, which requires to be relieved by some indulgence, sometimes of ease only, but sometimes too of dissipation and diversion. If it is not complied with, the consequences are often dangerous and sometimes fatal, and such as almost always, sooner or later, bring on the peculiar infirmity of the trade. If masters would always listen to the dictates of reason and humanity, they have frequently occasion rather to moderate, than to animate the application of many of their workmen. It will be found, I believe, in every sort of trade, that the man who works so moderately, as to be able to work constantly, not only preserves his health the longest, but, in the course of the year, executes the greatest quantity of work.

The fair pay for labor not only encourages reproduction but also boosts the productivity of regular people. Wages are what motivate people to work, and like any other human trait, their work ethic improves with the support it receives. A decent living not only strengthens a worker's body but also gives them hope for a better future and possibly a life of comfort and abundance, which drives them to use their strength to the fullest. Where wages are higher, we’ll consistently find workers more active, diligent, and efficient compared to areas with lower wages; for example, in England compared to Scotland, or near major cities as opposed to rural areas. Some workers, in fact, may choose to work only four days a week if they can make enough to support themselves for the entire week, leaving them idle for the other three days. However, this is not the case for most. On the contrary, when workers are paid fairly by the piece, they tend to overwork themselves, ruining their health and well-being in just a few years. A carpenter in London, among other places, typically won't be able to do their best work for more than eight years. Similar issues arise in many trades where workers are paid based on output, as is common in manufacturing and even in agricultural work where wages are above average. Almost every type of craftsman faces some specific health issues caused by excessive focus on their work. Ramazzini, a well-known Italian doctor, has written a detailed book on such illnesses. While we don’t think of soldiers as the most industrious group among us, when they do specific types of work for good pay per piece, their officers have often had to negotiate limits on how much they could earn in a day. Before this limit, competition and the desire to earn more often drove soldiers to overwork themselves, harming their health through excessive effort. Working too hard for four days can lead to laziness on the other three days, which is often loudly criticized. Intense mental or physical labor over several days naturally leads to a strong need for rest, which, if not controlled by force or urgent necessity, can be nearly impossible to resist. It’s a natural urge that needs to be addressed with some downtime or sometimes even leisure and distraction. If ignored, the outcomes can be severe or even deadly and usually lead to the specific health issues associated with that type of work. If employers consistently adhered to reason and compassion, they would often need to slow down rather than encourage many of their workers. It can be concluded, I believe, that in any trade, the worker who takes a moderate approach, allowing them to work consistently, not only stays healthy the longest but also accomplishes the most work over the year.

In cheap years it is pretended, workmen are generally more idle, and in dear times more industrious than ordinary. A plentiful subsistence, therefore, it has been concluded, relaxes, and a scanty one quickens their industry. That a little more plenty than ordinary may render some workmen idle, cannot be well doubted; but that it should have this effect upon the greater part, or that men in general should work better when they are ill[Pg 35] fed, than when they are well fed, when they are disheartened than when they are in good spirits, when they are frequently sick than when they are generally in good health, seems not very probable. Years of dearth, it is to be observed, are generally among the common people years of sickness and mortality, which cannot fail to diminish the produce of their industry.

In tough years, people say that workers tend to be lazier, while in prosperous times, they’re usually more hardworking than normal. It’s been concluded that having enough to eat makes people less motivated, while having little drives them to work harder. It’s certainly true that a little extra abundance can make some workers lazy, but the idea that it affects most workers, or that people generally work better when they're poorly fed than when they're well-fed, when they’re discouraged instead of motivated, when they’re often sick rather than usually healthy, seems unlikely. It's worth noting that during times of scarcity, the common people often face sickness and higher death rates, which inevitably reduces their productivity.[Pg 35]

In years of plenty, servants frequently leave their masters, and trust their subsistence to what they can make by their own industry. But the same cheapness of provisions, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of servants, encourages masters, farmers especially, to employ a greater number. Farmers, upon such occasions, expect more profit from their corn by maintaining a few more labouring servants, than by selling it at a low price in the market. The demand for servants increases, while the number of those who offer to supply that demand diminishes. The price of labour, therefore, frequently rises in cheap years.

In times of abundance, servants often leave their employers and rely on what they can earn through their own efforts. However, the lower cost of food increases the funds available for paying servants, which encourages employers—especially farmers—to hire more workers. Farmers, in these situations, see more profit from their crops by keeping a few extra laborers instead of selling at lower prices in the market. The demand for servants goes up, while the number of people available to fill that demand goes down. As a result, wages often increase in years when things are cheap.

In years of scarcity, the difficulty and uncertainty of subsistence make all such people eager to return to service. But the high price of provisions, by diminishing the funds destined for the maintenance of servants, disposes masters rather to diminish than to increase the number of those they have. In dear years, too, poor independent workmen frequently consume the little stock with which they had used to supply themselves with the materials of their work, and are obliged to become journeymen for subsistence. More people want employment than easily get it; many are willing to take it upon lower terms than ordinary; and the wages of both servants and journeymen frequently sink in dear years.

In times of scarcity, the struggle and uncertainty of making ends meet make people eager to go back to work for others. However, the high cost of food reduces the money available for paying servants, leading employers to cut down rather than increase their staff. In tough years, many independent workers often use up the little supplies they had for their work and are forced to become hired workers just to get by. There are more people looking for jobs than there are positions available; many are willing to accept lower pay than usual, and the wages for both servants and hired workers often drop during tough times.

Masters of all sorts, therefore, frequently make better bargains with their servants in dear than in cheap years, and find them more humble and dependent in the former than in the latter. They naturally, therefore, commend the former as more favourable to industry. Landlords and farmers, besides, two of the largest classes of masters, have another reason for being pleased with dear years. The rents of the one, and the profits of the other, depend very much upon the price of provisions. Nothing can be more absurd, however, than to imagine that men in general should work less when they work for themselves, than when they work for other people. A poor independent workman will generally be more industrious than even a journeyman who works by the piece. The one enjoys the whole produce of his own industry, the other shares it with his master. The one, in his separate independent state, is less liable to the temptations of bad company, which, in large manufactories, so frequently ruin the morals of the other. The superiority of the independent workman over those servants who are hired by the month or by the year, and whose wages and maintenance are the same, whether they do much or do little, is likely to be still greater. Cheap years tend to increase the proportion of independent workmen to journeymen and servants of all kinds, and dear years to diminish it.

Masters of all kinds often make better deals with their workers in expensive years than in cheap ones, finding them to be more humble and dependent during the former. Naturally, they prefer the former as it seems more beneficial for productivity. Landlords and farmers, two of the largest groups of masters, also have another reason to favor expensive years. The rents of landlords and the profits of farmers are heavily influenced by the price of food. However, it's absurd to think that people would work less when they're working for themselves than when they're working for others. A poor independent worker is usually more industrious than even a journeyman who gets paid by the piece. The independent worker keeps all the fruits of their labor, while the journeyman has to share them with their boss. The independent worker, in their own state, is less prone to the negative influences of bad company, which often corrupts the morals of others in large factories. The advantage of independent workers over those who are hired by the month or year, and whose pay and support stay the same regardless of their output, is likely even greater. Cheap years tend to increase the number of independent workers compared to journeymen and all kinds of servants, while expensive years tend to reduce it.

A French author of great knowledge and ingenuity, Mr Messance, receiver of the tallies in the election of St Etienne, endeavours to shew that the poor do more work in cheap than in dear years, by comparing the quantity and value of the goods made upon those different occasions in three different manufactures; one of coarse woollens, carried on at Elbeuf; one of linen, and another of silk, both which extend through the whole generality of Rouen. It appears from his account, which is copied from the registers of the public offices, that the quantity and value of the goods made in all those three manufactories has generally been greater in cheap than in dear years, and that it has always been greatest in the cheapest, and least in the dearest years. All the three seem to be stationary manufactures, or which, though their produce may vary somewhat from year to year, are, upon the whole, neither going backwards nor forwards.

A knowledgeable and clever French author, Mr. Messance, who oversees the tally in the St. Etienne election, aims to demonstrate that the poor work more in years of low prices than in years of high prices. He does this by comparing the quantity and value of goods produced during these different times in three industries: coarse woolens produced in Elbeuf, linen, and silk, both of which are prevalent in the greater Rouen area. His account, taken from public office records, indicates that the quantity and value of goods produced in all three industries has generally been higher in cheap years than in dear years, with the highest production occurring in the cheapest years and the lowest in the dearest years. All three industries appear to be stable, meaning that while their output may fluctuate somewhat from year to year, overall, they are neither declining nor growing.

The manufacture of linen in Scotland, and that of coarse woollens in the West Riding of Yorkshire, are growing manufactures, of which the produce is generally, though with some variations, increasing both in quantity and value. Upon examining, however, the accounts which have been published of their annual produce, I have not been able to observe that its variations have had any sensible connection with the dearness or cheapness of the seasons. In 1740, a year of great scarcity, both manufactures, indeed, appear to have declined very considerably. But in 1756, another year of great scarcity, the Scotch manufactures made more than ordinary advances. The Yorkshire manufacture, indeed, declined, and its produce did not rise to what it had been in 1755, till 1766, after the repeal of the American stamp act. In that and the following year, it greatly exceeded what it had ever been before, and it has continued to advance ever since.

The production of linen in Scotland and the coarse wool textiles in West Yorkshire are growing industries, with their output generally increasing in both quantity and value, although there are some variations. However, when looking at the published accounts of their annual output, I haven’t been able to see any significant connection between these variations and the costliness or affordability of the seasons. In 1740, a year of great scarcity, both industries seem to have declined significantly. But in 1756, another year of serious scarcity, the Scottish industries made more-than-usual gains. The Yorkshire industry, on the other hand, saw a decline, and its output didn’t return to the levels of 1755 until 1766, after the repeal of the American Stamp Act. In that year and the next, it far surpassed any previous levels, and it has kept on growing ever since.

The produce of all great manufactures for distant sale must necessarily depend, not so much upon the dearness or cheapness of the seasons in the countries where they are carried on, as upon the circumstances which affect the demand in the countries where they are consumed; upon peace or war, upon the prosperity or declension of other rival manufactures, and upon the good or bad humour of their principal customers. A great part of the extraordinary work, besides, which is probably done in cheap years, never enters the public registers of manufactures. The men-servants, who leave their masters, become independent[Pg 36] labourers. The women return to their parents, and commonly spin, in order to make clothes for themselves and their families. Even the independent workmen do not always work for public sale, but are employed by some of their neighbours in manufactures for family use. The produce of their labour, therefore, frequently makes no figure in those public registers, of which the records are sometimes published with so much parade, and from which our merchants and manufacturers would often vainly pretend to announce the prosperity or declension of the greatest empires.

The output of all large-scale manufacturing meant for distant sales doesn't really rely on whether the seasons in the producing countries are good or bad, but rather on the factors that influence demand in the countries where the products are sold; including whether there’s peace or war, the economic success or decline of competing industries, and the moods of the primary customers. A significant amount of the exceptional work done in good years doesn't even get recorded in public manufacturing registers. The male workers who leave their jobs become independent laborers. The women often return to their parents and typically start spinning to make clothes for themselves and their families. Even independent workers don’t always produce for public sale but might work for their neighbors in making items for personal use. As a result, the output of their labor often goes unrecorded in those public registers, which are sometimes published with great fanfare, from which merchants and manufacturers might mistakenly try to claim they reflect the prosperity or decline of the largest empires.

Though the variations in the price of labour not only do not always correspond with those in the price of provisions, but are frequently quite opposite, we must not, upon this account, imagine that the price of provisions has no influence upon that of labour. The money price of labour is necessarily regulated by two circumstances; the demand for labour, and the price of the necessaries and conveniencies of life. The demand for labour, according as it happens to be increasing, stationary, or declining, or to require an increasing, stationary, or declining population, determines the quantities of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which must be given to the labourer; and the money price of labour is determined by what is requisite for purchasing this quantity. Though the money price of labour, therefore, is sometimes high where the price of provisions is low, it would be still higher, the demand continuing the same, if the price of provisions was high.

Although changes in labor prices don't always match changes in food prices, and are often quite the opposite, we shouldn't assume that food prices have no effect on labor prices. The monetary value of labor is influenced by two main factors: the demand for labor and the cost of essential and comfort items in life. The demand for labor, depending on whether it's increasing, stable, or decreasing, or whether it needs a growing, steady, or shrinking population, determines how much of these essentials and comforts needs to be provided to the laborer. Consequently, the monetary value of labor is set based on what's necessary to purchase this amount. Therefore, even if labor prices are high when food prices are low, they would be even higher—assuming demand stays the same—if food prices were high.

It is because the demand for labour increases in years of sudden and extraordinary plenty, and diminishes in those of sudden and extraordinary scarcity, that the money price of labour sometimes rises in the one, and sinks in the other.

It’s because the demand for labor goes up during years of unexpected abundance and decreases during years of sudden scarcity that the money price of labor sometimes increases in one situation and decreases in the other.

In a year of sudden and extraordinary plenty, there are funds in the hands of many of the employers of industry, sufficient to maintain and employ a greater number of industrious people than had been employed the year before; and this extraordinary number cannot always be had. Those masters, therefore, who want more workmen, bid against one another, in order to get them, which sometimes raises both the real and the money price of their labour.

In a year of unexpected and remarkable abundance, many employers in industry have enough resources to support and hire even more hardworking people than the previous year; however, this increased demand isn't always met. As a result, those employers who need more workers compete with each other to secure them, which can drive up both the actual and the monetary value of their labor.

The contrary of this happens in a year of sudden and extraordinary scarcity. The funds destined for employing industry are less than they had been the year before. A considerable number of people are thrown out of employment, who bid one against another, in order to get it, which sometimes lowers both the real and the money price of labour. In 1740, a year of extraordinary scarcity, many people were willing to work for bare subsistence. In the succeeding years of plenty, it was more difficult to get labourers and servants.

The opposite occurs during a year of sudden and extreme scarcity. The funds allocated for jobs are lower than they were the previous year. A significant number of people lose their jobs and compete against each other to secure new ones, which can sometimes decrease both the actual and monetary value of labor. In 1740, a year marked by severe scarcity, many were willing to work just for the basics. In the following years of abundance, it became harder to find workers and servants.

The scarcity of a dear year, by diminishing the demand for labour, tends to lower its price, as the high price of provisions tends to raise it. The plenty of a cheap year, on the contrary, by increasing the demand, tends to raise the price of labour, as the cheapness of provisions tends to lower it. In the ordinary variations of the prices of provisions, those two opposite causes seem to counterbalance one another, which is probably, in part, the reason why the wages of labour are everywhere so much more steady and permanent than the price of provisions.

The scarcity of a tough year, by reducing the demand for labor, tends to lower its price, just as the high price of food tends to raise it. On the other hand, the abundance of a good year, by increasing the demand, tends to raise the price of labor, while the low cost of food tends to lower it. In the normal ups and downs of food prices, these two opposing factors seem to balance each other out, which is likely part of why wages for labor are generally much more stable and consistent than food prices.

The increase in the wages of labour necessarily increases the price of many commodities, by increasing that part of it which resolves itself into wages, and so far tends to diminish their consumption, both at home and abroad. The same cause, however, which raises the wages of labour, the increase of stock, tends to increase its productive powers, and to make a smaller quantity of labour produce a greater quantity of work. The owner of the stock which employs a great number of labourers necessarily endeavours, for his own advantage, to make such a proper division and distribution of employment, that they may be enabled to produce the greatest quantity of work possible. For the same reason, he endeavours to supply them with the best machinery which either he or they can think of. What takes place among the labourers in a particular workhouse, takes place, for the same reason, among those of a great society. The greater their number, the more they naturally divide themselves into different classes and subdivisions of employments. More heads are occupied in inventing the most proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it is, therefore, more likely to be invented. There are many commodities, therefore, which, in consequence of these improvements, come to be produced by so much less labour than before, that the increase of its price is more than compensated by the diminution of its quantity.

The rise in labor wages inevitably raises the prices of many goods because it increases the portion that goes to wages, which in turn tends to reduce consumption both domestically and internationally. However, the same factor that boosts wages, the increase in capital, also enhances its productive capabilities, allowing less labor to produce more output. The owner of the capital who hires many workers naturally strives, for their own benefit, to effectively organize and distribute tasks so they can generate the maximum amount of work possible. For the same reason, they work to provide the best machinery they can think of, whether it's their idea or the workers' suggestions. What happens among workers in a specific workshop is similar to what occurs in a larger society. The larger the workforce, the more they tend to split into different classes and job roles. More minds are engaged in devising the best machinery for each task, making it more likely that such innovations will occur. Consequently, there are many products that, due to these advancements, require significantly less labor to produce than before, meaning that the rise in their price is more than offset by the reduction in the amount of labor needed.


CHAP. IX.

OF THE PROFITS OF STOCK.

The rise and fall in the profits of stock depend upon the same causes with the rise and fall in the wages of labour, the increasing or declining state of the wealth of the society; but those causes affect the one and the other very differently.

The rise and fall in stock profits depend on the same factors as the rise and fall in labor wages, which are influenced by the increasing or declining wealth of society; however, those factors impact each of them quite differently.

The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profit. When the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its profit; and when there is a like[Pg 37] increase of stock in all the different trades carried on in the same society, the same competition must produce the same effect in them all.

The increase in stock, which boosts wages, tends to reduce profit. When the stocks of many wealthy merchants are directed into the same trade, their competition naturally lowers its profit. Similarly, when there’s a corresponding increase in stock across all the different trades in a society, that same competition will have the same effect on each of them.

It is not easy, it has already been observed, to ascertain what are the average wages of labour, even in a particular place, and at a particular time. We can, even in this case, seldom determine more than what are the most usual wages. But even this can seldom be done with regard to the profits of stock. Profit is so very fluctuating, that the person who carries on a particular trade, cannot always tell you himself what is the average of his annual profit. It is affected, not only by every variation of price in the commodities which he deals in, but by the good or bad fortune both of his rivals and of his customers, and by a thousand other accidents, to which goods, when carried either by sea or by land, or even when stored in a warehouse, are liable. It varies, therefore, not only from year to year, but from day to day, and almost from hour to hour. To ascertain what is the average profit of all the different trades carried on in a great kingdom, must be much more difficult; and to judge of what it may have been formerly, or in remote periods of time, with any degree of precision, must be altogether impossible.

It's not easy, as we've noted, to determine the average wages of labor, even in a specific location and at a specific time. We can rarely figure out more than what the most common wages are. The same goes for stock profits. Profit fluctuates so much that someone involved in a particular trade can’t reliably tell you what their average annual profit is. It's influenced not just by price changes in the goods they deal with but also by the fortunes of their competitors and customers, along with countless other random factors that can affect goods transported by sea, land, or even stored in a warehouse. It changes not only from year to year but also from day to day and almost hour to hour. Figuring out the average profit across different trades in a large kingdom is likely much harder, and making an accurate judgment about what it may have been in the past or in distant times is likely impossible.

But though it may be impossible to determine, with any degree of precision, what are or were the average profits of stock, either in the present or in ancient times, some notion may be formed of them from the interest of money. It may be laid down as a maxim, that wherever a great deal can be made by the use of money, a great deal will commonly be given for the use of it; and that, wherever little can be made by it, less will commonly be given for it. Accordingly, therefore, as the usual market rate of interest varies in any country, we may be assured that the ordinary profits of stock must vary with it, must sink as it sinks, and rise as it rises. The progress of interest, therefore, may lead us to form some notion of the progress of profit.

But even though it might be impossible to accurately figure out the average profits from stocks, whether now or in the past, we can get some idea based on the interest rates. It can be said as a rule that when a lot can be earned from using money, a lot will usually be paid for using it; and when little can be made, less will typically be offered. So, as the standard market interest rate changes in any country, we can be sure that the usual profits from stocks must also change, decreasing as interest decreases and increasing as it increases. Therefore, looking at interest rates can help us understand how profits are evolving.

By the 37th of Henry VIII. all interest above ten per cent. was declared unlawful. More, it seems, had sometimes been taken before that. In the reign of Edward VI. religious zeal prohibited all interest. This prohibition, however, like all others of the same kind, is said to have produced no effect, and probably rather increased than diminished the evil of usury. The statute of Henry VIII. was revived by the 13th of Elizabeth, cap. 8. and ten per cent. continued to be the legal rate of interest till the 21st of James I. when it was restricted to eight per cent. It was reduced to six per cent. soon after the Restoration, and by the 12th of Queen Anne, to five per cent. All these different statutory regulations seem to have been made with great propriety. They seem to have followed, and not to have gone before, the market rate of interest, or the rate at which people of good credit usually borrowed. Since the time of Queen Anne, five per cent. seems to have been rather above than below the market rate. Before the late war, the government borrowed at three per cent.; and people of good credit in the capital, and in many other parts of the kingdom, at three and a-half, four, and four and a-half per cent.

By the 37th year of Henry VIII's reign, any interest over ten percent was declared illegal. It seems that more had sometimes been charged before that. During Edward VI's reign, religious fervor banned all interest. However, like many similar prohibitions, this one is said to have had no real effect and likely worsened the issue of usury instead of improving it. The statute instituted by Henry VIII was reinstated in the 13th year of Elizabeth, chapter 8, and ten percent remained the legal interest rate until the 21st year of James I, when it was lowered to eight percent. It was further reduced to six percent shortly after the Restoration and then to five percent by the 12th of Queen Anne. All of these various laws seem to have been made appropriately, following rather than leading the market interest rate or the rate at which reputable borrowers often secured loans. Since Queen Anne's time, a five percent rate appears to have been somewhat above the market rate. Before the recent war, the government borrowed at three percent, while reputable borrowers in the capital and other parts of the country borrowed at three and a half, four, and four and a half percent.

Since the time of Henry VIII. the wealth and revenue of the country have been continually advancing, and in the course of their progress, their pace seems rather to have been gradually accelerated than retarded. They seem not only to have been going on, but to have been going on faster and faster. The wages of labour have been continually increasing during the same period, and, in the greater part of the different branches of trade and manufactures, the profits of stock have been diminishing.

Since the time of Henry VIII, the country's wealth and revenue have been consistently growing, and as they've progressed, their rate of increase seems to have sped up rather than slowed down. They seem not only to have continued, but to have been moving faster and faster. Wages for labor have been steadily rising during the same period, while in most sectors of trade and manufacturing, the profits from investments have been declining.

It generally requires a greater stock to carry on any sort of trade in a great town than in a country village. The great stock employed in every branch of trade, and the number of rich competitors, generally reduce the rate of profit in the former below what it is in the latter. But the wages of labour are generally higher in a great town than in a country village. In a thriving town, the people who have great stocks to employ, frequently cannot get the number of workmen they want, and therefore bid against one another, in order to get as many as they can, which raises the wages of labour, and lowers the profits of stock. In the remote parts of the country, there is frequently not stock sufficient to employ all the people, who therefore bid against one another, in order to get employment, which lowers the wages of labour, and raises the profits of stock.

It usually takes more capital to run any kind of business in a big city than in a small village. The large amount of capital involved in every type of business and the number of wealthy competitors typically drive down the profit margins in cities compared to villages. However, wages are usually higher in a big city than in a small village. In a bustling city, people with large amounts of capital often struggle to find enough workers, so they compete with each other to hire as many as they can, which pushes up labor wages and reduces profits. In more isolated areas, there often isn't enough capital to employ all the available workers, leading them to compete for jobs, which drives wages down and increases profits.

In Scotland, though the legal rate of interest is the same as in England, the market rate is rather higher. People of the best credit there seldom borrow under five per cent. Even private bankers in Edinburgh give four per cent. upon their promissory-notes, of which payment, either in whole or in part may be demanded at pleasure. Private bankers in London give no interest for the money which is deposited with them. There are few trades which cannot be carried on with a smaller stock in Scotland than in England. The common rate of profit, therefore, must be somewhat greater. The wages of labour, it has already been observed, are lower in Scotland than in England. The country, too, is not only much poorer, but the steps by which it advances to a better condition, for it is evidently advancing, seem to be much slower and more tardy.

In Scotland, although the legal interest rate is the same as in England, the market rate is generally higher. People with good credit there usually don't borrow for less than five percent. Even private bankers in Edinburgh offer four percent on their promissory notes, which can be redeemed in full or in part at any time. Private bankers in London don’t pay interest on the money deposited with them. There are few industries that can be operated with a smaller capital in Scotland than in England. Therefore, the average profit rate must be somewhat higher. As previously noted, labor wages are lower in Scotland compared to England. Additionally, the country is not only significantly poorer, but its progress toward improvement—evident as it is—appears to be much slower and more gradual.

The legal rate of interest in France has not,[Pg 38] during the course of the present century, been always regulated by the market rate[10]. In 1720, interest was reduced from the twentieth to the fiftieth penny, or from five to two per cent. In 1724, it was raised to the thirtieth penny, or to three and a third per cent. In 1725, it was again raised to the twentieth penny, or to five per cent. In 1766, during the administration of Mr Laverdy, it was reduced to the twenty-fifth penny, or to four per cent. The Abbé Terray raised it afterwards to the old rate of five per cent. The supposed purpose of many of those violent reductions of interest was to prepare the way for reducing that of the public debts; a purpose which has sometimes been executed. France is, perhaps, in the present times, not so rich a country as England; and though the legal rate of interest has in France frequently been lower than in England, the market rate has generally been higher; for there, as in other countries, they have several very safe and easy methods of evading the law. The profits of trade, I have been assured by British merchants who had traded in both countries, are higher in France than in England; and it is no doubt upon this account, that many British subjects chuse rather to employ their capitals in a country where trade is in disgrace, than in one where it is highly respected. The wages of labour are lower in France than in England. When you go from Scotland to England, the difference which you may remark between the dress and countenance of the common people in the one country and in the other, sufficiently indicates the difference in their condition. The contrast is still greater when you return from France. France, though no doubt a richer country than Scotland, seems not to be going forward so fast. It is a common and even a popular opinion in the country, that it is going backwards; an opinion which I apprehend, is ill-founded, even with regard to France, but which nobody can possibly entertain with regard to Scotland, who sees the country now, and who saw it twenty or thirty years ago.

The legal interest rate in France has not,[Pg 38] throughout this century, always matched the market rate[10]. In 1720, interest was cut from five percent down to two percent. In 1724, it was increased to three and a third percent. In 1725, it was raised again to five percent. In 1766, during Mr. Laverdy's tenure, it was lowered to four percent. The Abbé Terray later raised it back to the original five percent. The supposed goal of many of these drastic interest rate cuts was to pave the way for reducing public debt interest; a goal that has sometimes been achieved. France is likely not as wealthy a country as England today, and although the legal interest rates have often been lower in France, the market rates have typically been higher. There, as in other places, there are several secure and easy ways to bypass the law. British merchants who have done business in both countries have assured me that trade profits are higher in France than in England; it's likely for this reason that many British nationals prefer to invest their money in a country where trade is frowned upon rather than in one where it is esteemed. Labor wages in France are lower than in England. When moving from Scotland to England, the differences you notice in the clothing and appearance of ordinary people in each country clearly reflect their varying conditions. The contrast is even more pronounced when returning from France. France, while undoubtedly wealthier than Scotland, seems to be progressing more slowly. There's a common and even popular belief in the country that it is moving backward; a belief that I think is misguided regarding France, but one that no one can hold regarding Scotland who sees the country now compared to twenty or thirty years ago.

The province of Holland, on the other hand, in proportion to the extent of its territory and the number of its people, is a richer country than England. The government there borrow at two per cent. and private people of good credit at three. The wages of labour are said to be higher in Holland than in England, and the Dutch, it is well known, trade upon lower profits than any people in Europe. The trade of Holland, it has been pretended by some people, is decaying, and it may perhaps be true that some particular branches of it are so; but these symptoms seem to indicate sufficiently that there is no general decay. When profit diminishes, merchants are very apt to complain that trade decays, though the diminution of profit is the natural effect of its prosperity, or of a greater stock being employed in it than before. During the late war, the Dutch gained the whole carrying trade of France, of which they still retain a very large share. The great property which they possess both in French and English funds, about forty millions, it is said in the latter (in which, I suspect, however, there is a considerable exaggeration), the great sums which they lend to private people, in countries where the rate of interest is higher than in their own, are circumstances which no doubt demonstrate the redundancy of their stock, or that it has increased beyond what they can employ with tolerable profit in the proper business of their own country; but they do not demonstrate that that business has decreased. As the capital of a private man, though acquired by a particular trade, may increase beyond what he can employ in it, and yet that trade continue to increase too, so may likewise the capital of a great nation.

The province of Holland, in comparison to its size and population, is a wealthier country than England. The government borrows at two percent, and individuals with good credit at three percent. It’s said that labor wages are higher in Holland than in England, and the Dutch are known for trading with lower profits than anyone else in Europe. Some people claim that Holland's trade is declining, and while it might be true for certain areas, these signs suggest that there isn’t a widespread decline. When profits drop, merchants often complain that business is failing, but a reduction in profit can be a natural result of prosperity or increased investment in trade. During the recent war, the Dutch took over the entire carrying trade of France, from which they still hold a significant share. Their considerable investments in both French and English funds, reportedly around forty million in the latter (although I suspect that number is inflated), along with the large amounts they lend to individuals in countries with higher interest rates than their own, clearly indicate that their capital has exceeded what they can effectively use for profitable business in their own nation. However, this doesn't prove that their trade has diminished. Just as a private individual’s capital can grow beyond what they can invest in their specific trade while that trade continues to thrive, the same can happen with the capital of a large nation.

In our North American and West Indian colonies, not only the wages of labour, but the interest of money, and consequently the profits of stock, are higher than in England. In the different colonies, both the legal and the market rate of interest run from six to eight per cent. High wages of labour and high profits of stock, however, are things, perhaps, which scarce ever go together, except in the peculiar circumstances of new colonies. A new colony must always, for some time, be more understocked in proportion to the extent of its territory, and more underpeopled in proportion to the extent of its stock, than the greater part of other countries. They have more land than they have stock to cultivate. What they have, therefore, is applied to the cultivation only of what is most fertile and most favourably situated, the land near the sea-shore and along the banks of navigable rivers. Such land, too, is frequently purchased at a price below the value even of its natural produce. Stock employed in the purchase and improvement of such lands, must yield a very large profit, and, consequently, afford to pay a very large interest. Its rapid accumulation in so profitable an employment enables the planter to increase the number of his hands faster than he can find them in a new settlement. Those whom he can find, therefore, are very liberally rewarded. As the colony increases, the profits of stock gradually diminish. When the most fertile and best situated lands have been all occupied, less profit can be made by the cultivation of what is inferior both in soil and situation, and less interest can be afforded for the stock which is so employed. In the greater part of our colonies, accordingly, both the legal and the market rate of interest have been considerably reduced during the course of the present[Pg 39] century. As riches, improvement, and population, have increased, interest has declined. The wages of labour do not sink with the profits of stock. The demand for labour increases with the increase of stock, whatever be its profits; and after these are diminished, stock may not only continue to increase, but to increase much faster than before. It is with industrious nations, who are advancing in the acquisition of riches, as with industrious individuals. A great stock, though with small profits, generally increases faster than a small stock with great profits. Money, says the proverb, makes money. When you have got a little, it is often easy to get more. The great difficulty is to get that little. The connection between the increase of stock and that of industry, or of the demand for useful labour, has partly been explained already, but will be explained more fully hereafter, in treating of the accumulation of stock.

In our North American and West Indian colonies, the wages of labor, the interest on money, and therefore the profits on investments are all higher than in England. In the different colonies, both the legal and market interest rates range from six to eight percent. However, high wages and high profits rarely coexist, except in the unique situation of new colonies. A new colony usually has more land than it has resources to cultivate, and it tends to be less populated relative to its resources compared to most other countries. Because of this, they focus on cultivating only the most fertile and better-located land, specifically near the coast and along navigable rivers. This type of land is often bought at a price lower than its potential natural yield. Resources invested in buying and improving such land generate substantial profits, which in turn allows for high interest payments. The quick growth from such profitable investments enables the planter to hire more laborers faster than they can be found in a new settlement. Those who can be hired are compensated well. As the colony grows, the profits from investments gradually decrease. Once the most fertile and well-placed lands are occupied, profits from cultivating less desirable land drop, and lower interest payments become feasible for the resources used in that cultivation. In most of our colonies, both the legal and market interest rates have significantly decreased over the course of this century. As wealth, development, and population have risen, interest has fallen. Wages, however, do not necessarily decline with stock profits. The demand for labor grows with the increase in resources, regardless of profit levels; and even after profits diminish, resources can still grow, often at an even faster rate than before. The situation is similar for industrious nations progressing in wealth as it is for hardworking individuals. Larger resources, even with small profits, usually grow quicker than smaller resources with high profits. As the saying goes, "money makes money." Once you've gained a little, it's often easier to acquire more. The challenge is initially obtaining that small amount. The link between increasing resources and the rise of industry, or the demand for useful labor, has been partially discussed already but will be explored in greater detail later when discussing the accumulation of resources.

The acquisition of new territory, or of new branches of trade, may sometimes raise the profits of stock, and with them the interest of money, even in a country which is fast advancing in the acquisition of riches. The stock of the country, not being sufficient for the whole accession of business which such acquisitions present to the different people among whom it is divided, is applied to those particular branches only which afford the greatest profit. Part of what had before been employed in other trades, is necessarily withdrawn from them, and turned into some of the new and more profitable ones. In all those old trades, therefore, the competition comes to be less than before. The market comes to be less fully supplied with many different sorts of goods. Their price necessarily rises more or less, and yields a greater profit to those who deal in them, who can, therefore, afford to borrow at a higher interest. For some time after the conclusion of the late war, not only private people of the best credit, but some of the greatest companies in London, commonly borrowed at five per cent. who, before that, had not been used to pay more than four, and four and a half per cent. The great accession both of territory and trade by our acquisitions in North America and the West Indies, will sufficiently account for this, without supposing any diminution in the capital stock of the society. So great an accession of new business to be carried on by the old stock, must necessarily have diminished the quantity employed in a great number of particular branches, in which the competition being less, the profits must have been greater. I shall hereafter have occasion to mention the reasons which dispose me to believe that the capital stock of Great Britain was not diminished, even by the enormous expense of the late war.

The acquisition of new territory or new trade opportunities can sometimes increase stock profits, and with that, the interest on money, even in a country that is rapidly gaining wealth. The country’s stock isn’t enough to cover the entire increase in business that these acquisitions bring to the various people among whom it is distributed; it's directed only to those specific areas that offer the highest profit. A portion of what used to be invested in other industries is inevitably pulled from them and redirected to some of the new, more profitable sectors. In all those older trades, competition consequently becomes less intense. The market ends up being less stocked with a variety of goods. Their prices naturally rise to some extent, yielding greater profits for those who deal in them, allowing them to afford to borrow at higher interest rates. For some time after the recent war ended, not only highly reputable individuals but also some of the largest companies in London commonly borrowed at five percent, compared to the four or four-and-a-half percent they had paid before. The significant increase in both territory and trade from our gains in North America and the West Indies explains this without suggesting any decrease in the society's capital stock. Such a large increase in new business handled by the existing stock must have reduced the amount used in many specific areas, where, due to decreased competition, profits increased. I will later discuss the reasons that lead me to believe that Great Britain’s capital stock was not reduced, even with the massive expense of the recent war.

The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds destined for the maintenance of industry, however, as it lowers the wages of labour, so it raises the profits of stock, and consequently the interest of money. By the wages of labour being lowered, the owners of what stock remains in the society can bring their goods at less expense to market than before; and less stock being employed in supplying the market than before, they can sell them dearer. Their goods cost them less, and they get more for them. Their profits, therefore, being augmented at both ends, can well afford a large interest. The great fortunes so suddenly and so easily acquired in Bengal and the other British settlements in the East Indies, may satisfy us, that as the wages of labour are very low, so the profits of stock are very high in those ruined countries. The interest of money is proportionably so. In Bengal, money is frequently lent to the farmers at forty, fifty, and sixty per cent. and the succeeding crop is mortgaged for the payment. As the profits which can afford such an interest must eat up almost the whole rent of the landlord, so such enormous usury must in its turn eat up the greater part of those profits. Before the fall of the Roman republic, a usury of the same kind seems to have been common in the provinces, under the ruinous administration of their proconsuls. The virtuous Brutus lent money in Cyprus at eight-and-forty per cent. as we learn from the letters of Cicero.

The decrease in the society's capital or the funds set aside for industrial maintenance lowers labor wages but increases stock profits, which in turn raises interest rates on money. With wages reduced, the owners of the remaining stock can market their goods for less expense than before. And with less stock available to supply the market, they can sell their goods at higher prices. Their costs are lower, and they earn more from sales. Thus, their profits grow from both sides, allowing them to offer high interest rates. The substantial fortunes quickly gained in Bengal and other British settlements in the East Indies show that low labor wages lead to high stock profits in those struggling regions. Consequently, the interest on money is also high. In Bengal, money is often lent to farmers at rates of forty, fifty, and sixty percent, with the next crop mortgaged for repayment. Since profits must cover such interest rates, they nearly consume the entire rent owed to landlords, making such excessive usury likely to take a big chunk out of those profits as well. Before the fall of the Roman Republic, a similar type of usury appeared common in the provinces, due to the disastrous governance of their proconsuls. The honorable Brutus lent money in Cyprus at forty-eight percent, as recorded in Cicero's letters.

In a country which had acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of its soil and climate, and its situation with respect to other countries, allowed it to acquire, which could, therefore, advance no further, and which was not going backwards, both the wages of labour and the profits of stock would probably be very low. In a country fully peopled in proportion to what either its territory could maintain, or its stock employ, the competition for employment would necessarily be so great as to reduce the wages of labour to what was barely sufficient to keep up the number of labourers, and the country being already fully peopled, that number could never be augmented. In a country fully stocked in proportion to all the business it had to transact, as great a quantity of stock would be employed in every particular branch as the nature and extent of the trade would admit. The competition, therefore, would everywhere be as great, and, consequently, the ordinary profit as low as possible.

In a country that has reached its full potential in terms of wealth based on its natural resources, climate, and location relative to other nations—and can't grow any further or decline—the wages for workers and the profits from investments would likely be very low. In a country that is completely populated in relation to what its land can support or what its resources can utilize, the competition for jobs would be so intense that wages would drop to the minimum needed just to maintain the number of workers, and since the country is already at full capacity, that number couldn't increase. In a country that has as much capital as it needs to conduct all its business, the amount of capital used in each specific area would be as much as the nature and scope of the trade would allow. Therefore, competition would be high everywhere, and as a result, the average profit would be as low as possible.

But, perhaps, no country has ever yet arrived at this degree of opulence. China seems to have been long stationary, and had, probably, long ago acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and situation, might admit of. A country which neglects or despises foreign commerce, and which admits the vessels of[Pg 40] foreign nations into one or two of its ports only, cannot transact the same quantity of business which it might do with different laws and institutions. In a country, too, where, though the rich, or the owners of large capitals, enjoy a good deal of security, the poor, or the owners of small capitals, enjoy scarce any, but are liable, under the pretence of justice, to be pillaged and plundered at any time by the inferior mandarins, the quantity of stock employed in all the different branches of business transacted within it, can never be equal to what the nature and extent of that business might admit. In every different branch, the oppression of the poor must establish the monopoly of the rich, who, by engrossing the whole trade to themselves, will be able to make very large profits. Twelve per cent. accordingly, is said to be the common interest of money in China, and the ordinary profits of stock must be sufficient to afford this large interest.

But maybe no country has ever reached this level of wealth. China seems to have been stagnant for a long time and probably already reached its full potential for riches based on its laws and systems. However, this potential might be much lower than what its soil, climate, and location could support with different laws and institutions. A country that ignores or looks down on foreign trade and only allows ships from foreign nations into one or two of its ports cannot conduct as much business as it could with different regulations. In a country where the wealthy or those with substantial assets feel relatively secure, but the poor or those with small investments have little protection and can be robbed at any time by lower-level officials under the guise of justice, the total capital used across various business sectors will never match what could be achieved given the nature and scope of those businesses. In each sector, the oppression of the poor leads to the rich monopolizing trade, allowing them to gather huge profits. Consequently, it’s said that the typical interest rate for money in China is around twelve percent, and the usual profits on investments must be enough to support this high interest.

A defect in the law may sometimes raise the rate of interest considerably above what the condition of the country, as to wealth or poverty, would require. When the law does not enforce the performance of contracts, it puts all borrowers nearly upon the same footing with bankrupts, or people of doubtful credit, in better regulated countries. The uncertainty of recovering his money makes the lender exact the same usurious interest which is usually required from bankrupts. Among the barbarous nations who overran the western provinces of the Roman empire, the performance of contracts was left for many ages to the faith of the contracting parties. The courts of justice of their kings seldom intermeddled in it. The high rate of interest which took place in those ancient times, may perhaps, be partly accounted for from this cause.

A flaw in the law can sometimes cause interest rates to rise significantly higher than what the country’s actual wealth or poverty would suggest. When the law fails to enforce contract fulfillment, it places all borrowers almost on the same level as bankrupt individuals or those with questionable credit in better-regulated countries. The uncertainty of getting their money back forces lenders to charge the same exorbitant interest typically demanded from bankrupts. Among the barbaric nations that invaded the western territories of the Roman Empire, contract fulfillment was largely left to the honesty of the parties involved for many years. The justice systems of their kings rarely intervened. The high interest rates of those ancient times might partly be attributed to this situation.

When the law prohibits interest altogether, it does not prevent it. Many people must borrow, and nobody will lend without such a consideration for the use of their money as is suitable, not only to what can be made by the use of it, but to the difficulty and danger of evading the law. The high rate of interest among all Mahometan nations is accounted for by M. Montesquieu, not from their poverty, but partly from this, and partly from the difficulty of recovering the money.

When the law completely bans interest, it doesn't stop it from happening. Many people need to borrow money, and no one will lend without some kind of compensation for using their funds that reflects what can be earned from it, as well as the challenges and risks of sidestepping the law. The high interest rates in all Muslim countries can be explained by Montesquieu, not because of their poverty, but partly due to this and partly because of the difficulty in getting the money back.

The lowest ordinary rate of profit must always be something more than what is sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which every employment of stock is exposed. It is this surplus only which is neat or clear profit. What is called gross profit, comprehends frequently not only this surplus, but what is retained for compensating such extraordinary losses. The interest which the borrower can afford to pay is in proportion to the clear profit only.

The lowest regular profit rate always has to be a bit more than what's needed to cover the occasional losses that every investment faces. It's only this extra amount that counts as net profit. What people refer to as gross profit often includes not just this surplus, but also what’s set aside to cover those rare losses. The interest that a borrower can pay is based only on the net profit.

The lowest ordinary rate of interest must, in the same manner, be something more than sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which lending, even with tolerable prudence, is exposed. Were it not, mere charity or friendship could be the only motives for lending.

The lowest typical interest rate must, similarly, be enough to cover the occasional losses that come with lending, even when done with reasonable care. If it weren't, the only reasons for lending would be charity or friendship.

In a country which had acquired its full complement of riches, where, in every particular branch of business, there was the greatest quantity of stock that could be employed in it, as the ordinary rate of clear profit would be very small, so the usual market rate of interest which could be afforded out of it would be so low as to render it impossible for any but the very wealthiest people to live upon the interest of their money. All people of small or middling fortunes would be obliged to superintend themselves the employment of their own stocks. It would be necessary that almost every man should be a man of business, or engage in some sort of trade. The province of Holland seems to be approaching near to this state. It is there unfashionable not to be a man of business. Necessity makes it usual for almost every man to be so, and custom everywhere regulates fashion. As it is ridiculous not to dress, so is it, in some measure, not to be employed like other people. As a man of a civil profession seems awkward in camp or a garrison, and is even in some danger of being despised there, so does an idle man among men of business.

In a country that has gained all its wealth, where each business sector is filled with the maximum amount of stock it can handle, the usual profit margins are quite low. As a result, the typical market interest rate that can be supported is also so low that only the wealthiest people can live off the interest from their money. Those with small or moderate fortunes have to personally manage their investments. Almost everyone needs to be involved in business or engage in some form of trade. It seems that the province of Holland is getting close to this situation. There, it's considered out of style not to be in business. Necessity makes it common for nearly everyone to be engaged, and customs establish societal norms. Just as it's absurd not to dress well, it's somewhat unacceptable not to be busy like everyone else. A professional man looks out of place in a military camp, and he risks being looked down upon there; likewise, an idle person stands out among those who are busy.

The highest ordinary rate of profit may be such as, in the price of the greater part of commodities, eats up the whole of what should go to the rent of the land, and leaves only what is sufficient to pay the labour of preparing and bringing them to market, according to the lowest rate at which labour can anywhere be paid, the bare subsistence of the labourer. The workman must always have been fed in some way or other while he was about the work, but the landlord may not always have been paid. The profits of the trade which the servants of the East India Company carry on in Bengal may not, perhaps, be very far from this rate.

The highest usual profit rate could be such that, in the pricing of most goods, it consumes all of what should go towards land rent, leaving only enough to pay for the labor required to prepare and deliver them to the market, based on the lowest wage that can be paid anywhere, which is just enough for the laborer's basic needs. The worker always needs to be fed in some way while they are working, but the landlord might not always receive payment. The profits from the trade that the employees of the East India Company conduct in Bengal might be close to this rate.

The proportion which the usual market rate of interest ought to bear to the ordinary rate of clear profit, necessarily varies as profit rises or falls. Double interest is in Great Britain reckoned what the merchants call a good, moderate, reasonable profit; terms which, I apprehend, mean no more than a common and usual profit. In a country where the ordinary rate of clear profit is eight or ten per cent. it may be reasonable that one half of it should go to interest, wherever business is carried on with borrowed money. The stock is at the risk of the borrower, who, as it were, insures it to the lender; and four or five per cent. may, in the greater part of trades, be both a sufficient profit upon the risk of this insurance, and a sufficient recompence for the trouble of employing the stock. But the [Pg 41]proportion between interest and clear profit might not be the same in countries where the ordinary rate of profit was either a good deal lower, or a good deal higher. If it were a good deal lower, one half of it, perhaps, could not be afforded for interest; and more might be afforded if it were a good deal higher.

The ratio that the typical market interest rate should have compared to the usual clear profit changes as profit increases or decreases. In Great Britain, double interest is considered what merchants refer to as a fair, moderate, or reasonable profit; these terms likely just mean a common and standard profit. In a country where the usual clear profit rate is eight or ten percent, it makes sense for half of that to go towards interest when business is conducted with borrowed money. The stock is at the borrower's risk, who essentially insures it for the lender; thus, four or five percent can often be a sufficient profit for the risk of this insurance and enough compensation for managing the stock. However, the ratio between interest and clear profit might differ in countries where the usual profit rate is significantly lower or higher. If it were much lower, perhaps half of it couldn’t be allocated for interest; and if it were much higher, more could be allocated.

In countries which are fast advancing to riches, the low rate of profit may, in the price of many commodities, compensate the high wages of labour, and enable those countries to sell as cheap as their less thriving neighbours, among whom the wages of labour may be lower.

In countries that are quickly becoming wealthy, the low profit margins can, in the pricing of many goods, balance out the high wages of workers, allowing these countries to sell at prices similar to their less prosperous neighbors, where labor wages might be lower.

In reality, high profits tend much more to raise the price of work than high wages. If, in the linen manufacture, for example, the wages of the different working people, the flax-dressers, the spinners, the weavers, &c. should all of them be advanced twopence a-day, it would be necessary to heighten the price of a piece of linen only by a number of twopences equal to the number of people that had been employed about it, multiplied by the number of days during which they had been so employed. That part of the price of the commodity which resolved itself into the wages, would, through all the different stages of the manufacture, rise only in arithmetical proportion to this rise of wages. But if the profits of all the different employers of those working people should be raised five per cent. that part of the price of the commodity which resolved itself into profit would, through all the different stages of the manufacture, rise in geometrical proportion to this rise of profit. The employer of the flax-dressers would, in selling his flax, require an additional five per cent. upon the whole value of the materials and wages which he advanced to his workmen. The employer of the spinners would require an additional five per cent. both upon the advanced price of the flax, and upon the wages of the spinners. And the employer of the weavers would require a like five per cent. both upon the advanced price of the linen-yarn, and upon the wages of the weavers. In raising the price of commodities, the rise of wages operates in the same manner as simple interest does in the accumulation of debt. The rise of profit operates like compound interest. Our merchants and master manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their goods, both at home and abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits; they are silent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains; they complain only of those of other people.

In reality, high profits tend to increase the price of goods much more than high wages do. For instance, if in linen production the wages for various workers—like flax-dressers, spinners, weavers, etc.—were raised by two pence a day, the price of a piece of linen would need to be increased only by a number of two pences equal to the number of workers involved, multiplied by the number of days they worked. The portion of the commodity's price that covers wages would increase in direct proportion to the wage rise throughout all stages of production. However, if the profits for all employers of those workers increase by five percent, the share of the commodity's price that represents profit would rise exponentially at every stage of production. The employer of the flax-dressers would need to charge an extra five percent on the total value of the materials and wages he paid his workers. Similarly, the employer of the spinners would require an additional five percent on both the purchase price of the flax and the spinners' wages. Likewise, the employer of the weavers would demand an additional five percent on both the price of the linen yarn and the wages of the weavers. When raising the price of goods, the increase in wages works like simple interest in debt accumulation, while the rise in profit acts like compound interest. Our merchants and factory owners often complain about the negative impact of high wages on increasing prices, which ultimately reduces sales of their products both domestically and internationally. They say nothing about the negative impact of high profits; they remain quiet about the harmful effects of their own earnings, only voicing concerns about others.


CHAP. X.

OF WAGES AND PROFIT IN THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF LABOUR AND STOCK.

The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal, or continually tending to equality. If, in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments. This, at least, would be the case in a society where things were left to follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper. Every man's interest would prompt him to seek the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous employment.

The advantages and disadvantages of different types of work and investment in the same area must either be perfectly equal or constantly moving toward equality. If, in the same area, there were any job that was clearly more or less beneficial than others, many people would flock to it in the former case and leave it in the latter, causing its benefits to quickly align with those of other jobs. This would especially be true in a society where things are allowed to take their natural course, where there is complete freedom, and where everyone is fully free to choose whatever job they believe is right and to change it whenever they want. Everyone's interests would push them to pursue the beneficial jobs and avoid the unbeneficial ones.

Pecuniary wages and profit, indeed, are everywhere in Europe extremely different, according to the different employments of labour and stock. But this difference arises, partly from certain circumstances in the employments themselves, which, either really, or at least in the imagination of men, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in others, and partly from the policy of Europe, which nowhere leaves things at perfect liberty.

Monetary wages and profits vary greatly across Europe, depending on the different types of labor and investment. This variation is partly due to specific factors related to the jobs themselves, which either actually or in people's perceptions compensate for lower financial returns in some cases, while balancing out higher returns in others. It's also influenced by European policies, which rarely allow things to operate completely freely.

The particular consideration of those circumstances, and of that policy, will divide this Chapter into two parts.

The specific consideration of those circumstances and that policy will split this Chapter into two parts.

Part I.Inequalities arising from the nature of the employments themselves.

The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have been able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbalance a great one in others. First, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly, the small or great trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them; and, fifthly, the probability or improbability of success in them.

The following five are the main factors that, as far as I can tell, make up for a small financial gain in some jobs and offset a large one in others. First, how enjoyable or unenjoyable the jobs themselves are; second, how easy and cheap, or difficult and expensive it is to learn them; third, the stability or instability of the work involved; fourth, the level of trust that needs to be placed in those performing them; and fifth, the likelihood or unlikelihood of success in those roles.

First, the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness, of the employment. Thus in most places, take the year round, a journeyman tailor earns less than a journeyman weaver. His work is much[Pg 42] easier. A journeyman weaver earns less than a journeyman smith. His work is not always easier, but it is much cleanlier. A journeyman blacksmith, though an artificer, seldom earns so much in twelve hours, as a collier, who is only a labourer, does in eight. His work is not quite so dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in day-light, and above ground. Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally under-recompensed, as I shall endeavour to shew by and by. Disgrace has the contrary effect. The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business; but it is in most places more profitable than the greater part of common trades. The most detestable of all employments, that of public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade whatever.

First, the pay for labor varies based on how easy or hard, clean or dirty, and honorable or dishonorable the job is. For example, throughout most of the year, a journeyman tailor makes less than a journeyman weaver because the tailor's work is generally easier. A journeyman weaver earns less than a journeyman blacksmith. While the weaver’s job isn’t always easier, it’s much cleaner. A journeyman blacksmith, despite being a skilled worker, often earns less in twelve hours than a coal miner, who is just a laborer, makes in eight. The miner's work is not quite as dirty, is less dangerous, and takes place in daylight above ground. Honor plays a significant role in the compensation of all honorable professions. Considering everything, they are usually underpaid, as I will explain later. On the other hand, dishonor has the opposite effect. Being a butcher is a brutal and disliked profession, yet in many places, it pays better than most common jobs. The most despised job of all, that of a public executioner, is, relative to the amount of work done, better paid than any common occupation.

Hunting and fishing, the most important employments of mankind in the rude state of society, become, in its advanced state, their most agreeable amusements, and they pursue for pleasure what they once followed from necessity. In the advanced state of society, therefore, they are all very poor people who follow as a trade, what other people pursue as a pastime. Fishermen have been so since the time of Theocritus[11]. A poacher is everywhere a very poor man in Great Britain. In countries where the rigour of the law suffers no poachers, the licensed hunter is not in a much better condition. The natural taste for those employments makes more people follow them, than can live comfortably by them; and the produce of their labour, in proportion to its quantity, comes always too cheap to market, to afford any thing but the most scanty subsistence to the labourers.

Hunting and fishing, the primary activities of early humans in a primitive society, transform into enjoyable hobbies in a more developed society. People now engage in these activities for fun instead of necessity. In this advanced society, those who pursue these trades tend to be quite poor, while others enjoy them as leisure activities. Fishermen have faced this reality since the days of Theocritus[11]. A poacher is always seen as a very poor person in Great Britain. In places where strict laws don’t tolerate poachers, licensed hunters often find themselves in a similar situation. The natural enthusiasm for these jobs attracts more people to them than can actually earn a decent living. Consequently, the output of their work, relative to its amount, is always sold too cheaply in the market, barely providing a minimal living for the workers.

Disagreeableness and disgrace affect the profits of stock in the same manner as the wages of labour. The keeper of an inn or tavern, who is never master of his own house, and who is exposed to the brutality of every drunkard, exercises neither a very agreeable nor a very creditable business. But there is scarce any common trade in which a small stock yields so great a profit.

Disagreeableness and disgrace influence stock profits just like labor wages do. The owner of an inn or tavern, who never really has control over their own establishment and faces the harshness of every drunk patron, runs a business that is neither very enjoyable nor very respectable. However, there are hardly any common trades where a small investment brings such high returns.

Secondly, the wages of labour vary with the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense, of learning the business.

Secondly, the wages of labor depend on how easy and affordable it is, or how difficult and costly, to learn the job.

When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It must do this too in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the machine.

When any expensive machine is set up, the remarkable work it’s expected to do before it wears out should at least bring in enough revenue to cover the initial investment along with standard profits. A person who has invested a lot of effort and time to train for jobs that require exceptional skills can be seen as similar to one of those costly machines. The work they learn to do should, beyond the typical wages of ordinary labor, allow them to recover their entire education costs, along with at least the normal profits of a comparably valuable investment. This should also happen within a reasonable timeframe, considering the uncertain length of human life, just like with the more predictable lifespan of the machine.

The difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common labour, is founded upon this principle.

The difference between the wages of skilled labor and those of unskilled labor is based on this principle.

The policy of Europe considers the labour of all mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, as skilled labour; and that of all country labourers as common labour. It seems to suppose that of the former to be of a more nice and delicate nature than that of the latter. It is so perhaps in some cases; but in the greater part it is quite otherwise, as I shall endeavour to shew by and by. The laws and customs of Europe, therefore, in order to qualify any person for exercising the one species of labour, impose the necessity of an apprenticeship, though with different degrees of rigour in different places. They leave the other free and open to every body. During the continuance of the apprenticeship, the whole labour of the apprentice belongs to the master. In the meantime he must, in many cases, be maintained by his parents or relations, and, in almost all cases, must be clothed by them. Some money, too, is commonly given to the master for teaching him his trade. They who cannot give money, give time, or become bound for more than the usual number of years; a consideration which, though it is not always advantageous to the master, on account of the usual idleness of apprentices, is always disadvantageous to the apprentice. In country labour, on the contrary, the labourer, while he is employed about the easier, learns the more difficult parts of his business, and his own labour maintains him through all the different stages of his employment. It is reasonable, therefore, that in Europe the wages of mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, should be somewhat higher than those of common labourers. They are so accordingly, and their superior gains make them, in most places, be considered as a superior rank of people. This superiority, however, is generally very small: the daily or weekly earnings of journeymen in the more common sorts of manufactures, such as those of plain linen and woollen cloth, computed at an average, are, in most places, very little more than the day-wages of common labourers. Their employment, indeed, is more steady and uniform, and the superiority of their earnings, taking the whole year together, may be somewhat greater. It seems evidently, however, to be no greater than what is sufficient to compensate the superior expense of their education.

The policy in Europe views the work of all skilled tradespeople, craftsmen, and manufacturers as skilled labor, while all agricultural laborers are seen as common laborers. It suggests that the former is more precise and delicate than the latter. This may be true in some cases, but for the most part, it's the opposite, as I will explain later. Therefore, the laws and customs in Europe require anyone wanting to engage in skilled labor to complete an apprenticeship, though the strictness of this requirement varies by location. Meanwhile, common labor is accessible to everyone. During the apprenticeship, all the apprentice's work belongs to the master, and often, the apprentice must be supported by their parents or relatives, who also typically provide their clothing. Additionally, some money is usually paid to the master for teaching the apprentice their trade. Those who can't provide money often contribute time or agree to a longer apprenticeship, which, while it may not always benefit the master due to the typical laziness of apprentices, is always a disadvantage for the apprentice. In contrast, in agricultural work, laborers learn the more challenging parts of their jobs as they tackle easier tasks, with their own labor supporting them throughout various stages of their employment. Thus, it's reasonable for mechanics, craftspeople, and manufacturers in Europe to earn somewhat higher wages than common laborers. This is indeed the case, and their higher earnings often lead to them being regarded as a higher social class. However, this distinction is usually quite minor: the daily or weekly earnings of journeymen in common manufacturing sectors, like plain linen and woolen cloth, average out to be only slightly more than the daily wages of common laborers. Their work is generally more stable and consistent, and when looking at the entire year, their earnings may be somewhat higher. It seems clear, however, that this difference is only enough to cover the additional costs of their education.

Education in the ingenious arts, and in the liberal professions, is still more tedious and[Pg 43] expensive. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of painters and sculptors, of lawyers and physicians, ought to be much more liberal; and it is so accordingly.

Education in the creative arts and liberal professions is still more demanding and expensive. Therefore, the financial rewards for painters, sculptors, lawyers, and doctors should be much greater; and they are indeed.

The profits of stock seem to be very little affected by the easiness or difficulty of learning the trade in which it is employed. All the different ways in which stock is commonly employed in great towns seem, in reality, to be almost equally easy and equally difficult to learn. One branch, either of foreign or domestic trade, cannot well be a much more intricate business than another.

The profits from stocks don't seem to be greatly influenced by how easy or hard it is to learn the trade involved. All the different ways stocks are generally used in big cities appear to be about equally easy and hard to understand. One sector, whether it's international or local trade, can't really be that much more complicated than another.

Thirdly, the wages of labour in different occupations vary with the constancy or inconstancy of employment.

Thirdly, the pay for workers in different jobs changes based on how steady or unstable their employment is.

Employment is much more constant in some trades than in others. In the greater part of manufactures, a journeyman may be pretty sure of employment almost every day in the year that he is able to work. A mason or bricklayer, on the contrary, can work neither in hard frost nor in foul weather, and his employment at all other times depends upon the occasional calls of his customers. He is liable, in consequence, to be frequently without any. What he earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain him while he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion. Where the computed earnings of the greater part of manufacturers, accordingly, are nearly upon a level with the day-wages of common labourers, those of masons and bricklayers are generally from one-half more to double those wages. Where common labourers earn four of five shillings a week, masons and bricklayers frequently earn seven and eight; where the former earn six, the latter often earn nine and ten; and where the former earn nine and ten, as in London, the latter commonly earn fifteen and eighteen. No species of skilled labour, however, seems more easy to learn than that of masons and bricklayers. Chairmen in London, during the summer season, are said sometimes to be employed as bricklayers. The high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much the recompence of their skill, as the compensation for the inconstancy of their employment.

Employment is much more stable in some trades than in others. For most manufacturing jobs, a worker can expect to find work almost every day of the year that they are able to. A mason or bricklayer, on the other hand, can’t work in freezing temperatures or bad weather, and their employment during other times relies on the occasional requests from customers. As a result, they often find themselves without work. What they earn while working must not only support them during their downtime but also compensate for the anxiety and discouragement that comes with such an unstable situation. Consequently, while the expected earnings of most manufacturers are roughly on par with the daily wages of common laborers, masons and bricklayers typically make between one-and-a-half to twice those wages. Where common laborers earn four or five shillings a week, masons and bricklayers often make seven or eight; where the former earn six, the latter frequently brings in nine or ten; and where the former earn nine or ten, as in London, the latter usually earns fifteen or eighteen. However, no type of skilled labor seems easier to learn than that of masons and bricklayers. During the summer in London, it’s said that chairmen sometimes work as bricklayers. Therefore, the high wages of these workers are less about the value of their skill and more about compensating for the unpredictability of their work.

A house-carpenter seems to exercise rather a nicer and a more ingenious trade than a mason. In most places, however, for it is not universally so, his day-wages are somewhat lower. His employment, though it depends much, does not depend so entirely upon the occasional calls of his customers; and it is not liable to be interrupted by the weather.

A carpenter seems to have a more refined and clever trade than a mason. However, in many places, although not everywhere, his daily wages are generally a bit lower. His work, while it does rely heavily on the occasional requests from clients, is not completely dependent on them; plus, it isn’t as affected by the weather.

When the trades which generally afford constant employment, happen in a particular place not to do so, the wages of the workmen always rise a good deal above their ordinary proportion to those of common labour. In London, almost all journeymen artificers are liable to be called upon and dismissed by their masters from day to day, and from week to week, in the same manner as day-labourers in other places. The lowest order of artificers, journeymen tailors, accordingly, earn their half-a-crown a-day, though eighteen pence may be reckoned the wages of common labour. In small towns and country villages, the wages of journeymen tailors frequently scarce equal those of common labour; but in London they are often many weeks without employment, particularly during the summer.

When trades that usually provide steady work don’t do so in a specific location, the wages for workers tend to increase significantly compared to those of regular labor. In London, nearly all journeyman artisans can be called on and dismissed by their employers on a daily or weekly basis, just like day laborers in other areas. The lowest tier of artisans, journeyman tailors, typically make half a crown a day, while common labor is usually paid around eighteen pence. In smaller towns and rural areas, the wages for journeyman tailors often barely match those of common labor; however, in London, they frequently go several weeks without work, especially during the summer.

When the inconstancy of employment is combined with the hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises the wages of the most common labour above those of the most skilful artificers. A collier working by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly about double, and, in many parts of Scotland, about three times, the wages of common labour. His high wages arise altogether from the hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of his work. His employment may, upon most occasions, be as constant as he pleases. The coal-heavers in London exercise a trade which, in hardship, dirtiness, and disagreeableness, almost equals that of colliers; and, from the unavoidable irregularity in the arrivals of coal-ships, the employment of the greater part of them is necessarily very inconstant. If colliers, therefore, commonly earn double and triple the wages of common labour, it ought not to seem unreasonable that coal-heavers should sometimes earn four and five times those wages. In the inquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was found that, at the rate at which they were paid, they could earn from six to ten shillings a-day. Six shillings are about four times the wages of common labour in London; and, in every particular trade, the lowest common earnings may always be considered as those of the far greater number. How extravagant soever those earnings may appear, if they were more than sufficient to compensate all the disagreeable circumstances of the business, there would soon be so great a number of competitors, as, in a a trade which has no exclusive privilege, would quickly reduce them to a lower rate.

When the unpredictability of jobs is mixed with the difficulty, unpleasantness, and messiness of the work, it can sometimes lead to higher wages for general laborers than for skilled workers. A coal miner in Newcastle typically earns about double what common laborers make, and in many parts of Scotland, they earn about three times that amount. Their high pay is entirely due to the tough, disagreeable, and messy nature of their work. Most of the time, they can work as consistently as they want. Coal loaders in London have a job that is almost as hard, dirty, and unpleasant as that of coal miners; however, because of the unpredictable arrivals of coal ships, most of them experience irregular employment. Given that coal miners commonly earn double or triple the wages of general laborers, it's not unreasonable for coal loaders to sometimes make four or five times that pay. In an investigation into their situation a few years ago, it was found that they could earn between six to ten shillings a day at their pay rate. Six shillings is about four times the typical wage for common labor in London, and in any specific trade, the lowest common earnings usually represent the vast majority. No matter how excessive those earnings might seem, if they were more than enough to offset all the unpleasant aspects of the job, there would soon be so many competitors that, in a trade without exclusive privileges, they would quickly drive wages down.

The constancy or inconstancy of employment cannot affect the ordinary profits of stock in any particular trade. Whether the stock is or is not constantly employed, depends, not upon the trade, but the trader.

The stability or instability of employment doesn’t impact the usual profits of capital in any specific trade. Whether the capital is consistently used or not depends not on the trade itself, but on the trader.

Fourthly, the wages of labour vary according to the small or great trust which must be reposed in the workmen.

Fourth, the wages of labor vary based on the level of trust placed in the workers.

The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are everywhere superior to those of many other workmen, not only of equal, but of much superior ingenuity, on account of the precious materials with which they are entrusted.

The pay for goldsmiths and jewelers is generally higher than that of many other workers, not just those of equal talent, but even those with greater skills, due to the valuable materials they work with.

We trust our health to the physician, our[Pg 44] fortune, and sometimes our life and reputation, to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so important a trust requires. The long time and the great expense which must be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their labour.

We rely on doctors for our health, and on lawyers for our fortune, and sometimes even our lives and reputations. We couldn't safely place that kind of trust in people of a low status. Their compensation needs to be sufficient to grant them the social standing that such an important responsibility demands. The extensive time and high costs involved in their education, along with this factor, inevitably increase the value of their work.

When a person employs only his own stock in trade, there is no trust; and the credit which he may get from other people, depends, not upon the nature of the trade, but upon their opinion of his fortune, probity and prudence. The different rates of profit, therefore, in the different branches of trade, cannot arise from the different degrees of trust reposed in the traders.

When someone uses only their own resources, there’s no trust involved; the credit they might receive from others depends not on the nature of the business, but on how others view their wealth, honesty, and judgment. So, the varying profit rates in different types of trade don’t come from the levels of trust placed in the traders.

Fifthly, the wages of labour in different employments vary according to the probability or improbability of success in them.

Fifthly, the pay for different jobs varies based on how likely or unlikely they are to succeed.

The probability that any particular person shall ever be qualified for the employments to which he is educated, is very different in different occupations. In the greatest part of mechanic trades, success is almost certain; but very uncertain in the liberal professions. Put your son apprentice to a shoemaker, there is little doubt of his learning to make a pair of shoes; but send him to study the law, it as at least twenty to one if he ever makes such proficiency as will enable him to live by the business. In a perfectly fair lottery, those who draw the prizes ought to gain all that is lost by those who draw the blanks. In a profession, where twenty fail for one that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have been gained by the unsuccessful twenty. The counsellor at law, who, perhaps, at near forty years of age, begins to make something by his profession, ought to receive the retribution, not only of his own so tedious and expensive education, but of that of more than twenty others, who are never likely to make any thing by it. How extravagant soever the fees of counsellors at law may sometimes appear, their real retribution is never equal to this. Compute, in any particular place, what is likely to be annually gained, and what is likely to be annually spent, by all the different workmen in any common trade, such as that of shoemakers or weavers, and you will find that the former sum will generally exceed the latter. But make the same computation with regard to all the counsellors and students of law, in all the different Inns of court, and you will find that their annual gains bear but a very small proportion to their annual expense, even though you rate the former as high, and the latter as low, as can well be done. The lottery of the law, therefore, is very far from being a perfectly fair lottery; and that, as well as many other liberal and honourable professions, is, in point of pecuniary gain, evidently under-recompensed.

The likelihood that any specific person will actually be qualified for the jobs for which they are educated varies greatly across different fields. In most skilled trades, success is almost guaranteed; however, it's much more uncertain in professional careers. If you apprentice your son to a shoemaker, he'll likely learn how to make a pair of shoes; but if you send him to study law, there's at least a twenty-to-one chance he won’t reach a level of skill that allows him to support himself through that profession. In a perfectly fair lottery, those who win prizes should cover the losses of those who don’t win anything. In a profession where twenty people fail for every one who succeeds, that one person should earn enough to compensate for what the twenty unsuccessful individuals would have made. A lawyer who, perhaps at nearly forty, finally starts to earn something should receive a reward not only for their lengthy and costly education but also for that of more than twenty others who are unlikely to earn anything. No matter how high the fees charged by lawyers may seem at times, their actual compensation never matches this expectation. If you calculate, in any given area, the likely annual earnings and expenses of various tradespeople, like shoemakers or weavers, you’ll find that the earnings usually surpass the expenses. But if you do the same calculation for all the lawyers and law students in different Inns of Court, you’ll see that their annual earnings are minimal compared to their annual expenses, even if you set the former as high and the latter as low as possible. Therefore, the lottery of the law is far from a fair lottery; and just like many other professional and honorable fields, it is clearly under-compensated in terms of financial gain.

Those professions keep their level, however, with other occupations; and, notwithstanding these discouragements, all the most generous and liberal spirits are eager to crowd into them. Two different causes contribute to recommend them. First, the desire of the reputation which attends upon superior excellence in any of them; and, secondly, the natural confidence which every man has, more or less, not only in his own abilities, but in his own good fortune.

Those professions maintain their status alongside other jobs, and despite the challenges, all the most generous and open-minded people are eager to join them. Two main reasons make these professions appealing. First, there’s the desire for the recognition that comes with being outstanding in any of them; and second, there’s the natural confidence that everyone has, to some extent, not just in their own abilities, but also in their own good luck.

To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, it is the most decisive mark of what is called genius, or superior talents. The public admiration which attends upon such distinguished abilities makes always a part of their reward; a greater of smaller, in proportion as it is higher or lower in degree. It makes a considerable part of that reward in the profession of physic; a still greater, perhaps, in that of law; in poetry and philosophy it makes almost the whole.

To succeed in any profession, where only a few even reach a mediocre level, is the clearest sign of what we call genius or exceptional talent. The public admiration that comes with such notable abilities is always part of their reward, with the amount varying depending on their excellence. It constitutes a significant part of the reward in medicine; possibly an even larger part in law; and in poetry and philosophy, it makes up almost the entire reward.

There are some very agreeable and beautiful talents, of which the possession commands a certain sort of admiration, but of which the exercise, for the sake of gain, is considered, whether from reason or prejudice, as a sort of public prostitution. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of those who exercise them in this manner, must be sufficient, not only to pay for the time, labour, and expense for acquiring the talents, but for the discredit which attends the employment of them as the means of subsistence. The exorbitant rewards of players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, &c. are founded upon those two principles; the rarity and beauty of the talent, and the discredit of employing them in this manner. It seems absurd at first sight, that we should despise their persons, and yet reward their talents with the most profuse liberality. While we do the one, however, we must of necessity do the other. Should the public opinion of prejudice ever alter with regard to such occupations, their pecuniary recompence would quickly diminish. More people would apply to them, and the competition would quickly reduce the price of their labour. Such talents, though far from being common, are by no means so rare as imagined. Many people possess them in great perfection, who disdain to make this use of them; and many more are capable of acquiring them, if any thing could be made honourably by them.

There are some really impressive and beautiful talents that earn a certain type of admiration, but using them for profit is often viewed, whether reasonably or out of bias, as a form of public prostitution. Therefore, the financial rewards for those who use these talents in this way must be enough not only to cover the time, effort, and cost of developing them but also to compensate for the stigma that comes with making a living from them. The huge paychecks for actors, opera singers, dancers, etc., are based on these two principles: the rarity and beauty of the talent and the shame associated with using it to earn a living. It seems strange at first that we can look down on the people but still reward their talents so generously. However, while we do one, we necessarily do the other. If public opinion ever shifts regarding these careers, their financial rewards would quickly drop. More people would pursue these paths, and the competition would rapidly drive down the value of their work. These talents, while not common, are not nearly as rare as people think. Many individuals possess them at a high level but choose not to use them in this way, and many more could develop them if there were a way to earn a respectable living.

The over-weening conceit which the great part of men have of their own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages. Their absurd presumption in their own good fortune has been less taken notice of. It is, however, if possible, still more universal. There is no man living, who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not some share of it. The chance of gain is[Pg 45] by every man more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued more than it is worth.

The excessive pride that most people have in their own abilities is an age-old problem noted by philosophers and moralists throughout history. Their ridiculous confidence in their own luck has received less attention, but it is arguably even more widespread. There’s no one alive, when feeling reasonably healthy and cheerful, who doesn’t share in this to some extent. The potential for profit is[Pg 45] overestimated by everyone to some degree, while the potential for loss is underestimated by most, and hardly anyone in decent health and spirits values it as much as it really deserves.

That the chance of gain is naturally over-valued, we may learn from the universal success of lotteries. The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see, a perfectly fair lottery, or one in which the whole gain compensated the whole loss; because the undertaker could make nothing by it. In the state lotteries, the tickets are really not worth the price which is paid by the original subscribers, and yet commonly sell in the market for twenty, thirty, and sometimes forty per cent. advance. The vain hopes of gaining some of the great prizes is the sole cause of this demand. The soberest people scarce look upon it as a folly to pay a small sum for the chance of gaining ten or twenty thousand pounds, though they know that even that small sum is perhaps twenty or thirty per cent. more than the chance is worth. In a lottery in which no prize exceeded twenty pounds, though in other respects it approached much nearer to a perfectly fair one than the common state lotteries, there would not be the same demand for tickets. In order to have a better chance for some of the great prizes, some people purchase several tickets; and others, small shares in a still greater number. There is not, however, a more certain proposition in mathematics, than that the more tickets you adventure upon, the more likely you are to be a loser. Adventure upon all the tickets in the lottery, and you lose for certain; and the greater the number of your tickets, the nearer your approach to this certainty.

The chance of winning is naturally overestimated, as we can see from the widespread popularity of lotteries. The world has never seen, nor will it ever see, a perfectly fair lottery, or one where the total winnings equal the total losses, because the organizers wouldn't make any money from it. In state lotteries, the tickets are really not worth the price the original buyers pay, yet they often sell in the market for a 20%, 30%, or sometimes 40% markup. The unrealistic hopes of winning some of the big prizes drive this demand. Even the most sensible people hardly see it as foolish to spend a small amount for the chance to win ten or twenty thousand pounds, even though they know that this small amount is probably 20% to 30% more than the chance is worth. In a lottery where no prize was more than twenty pounds, even if it was closer to being fair than the usual state lotteries, there wouldn’t be the same demand for tickets. To increase their chances of winning some of the big prizes, some people buy multiple tickets, while others invest in small shares of even more tickets. However, there’s no more certain principle in mathematics than that the more tickets you buy, the more likely you are to lose. If you buy every ticket in the lottery, you'll certainly lose; and the more tickets you have, the closer you get to that certainty.

That the chance of loss is frequently under-valued, and scarce ever valued more than it is worth, we may learn from the very moderate profit of insurers. In order to make insurance, either from fire or sea-risk, a trade at all, the common premium must be sufficient to compensate the common losses, to pay the expense of management, and to afford such a profit as might have been drawn from an equal capital employed in any common trade. The person who pays no more than this, evidently pays no more than the real value of the risk, or the lowest price at which he can reasonably expect to insure it. But though many people have made a little money by insurance, very few have made a great fortune; and, from this consideration alone, it seems evident enough that the ordinary balance of profit and loss is not more advantageous in this than in other common trades, by which so many people make fortunes. Moderate, however, as the premium of insurance commonly is, many people despise the risk too much to care to pay it. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, nineteen houses in twenty, or rather, perhaps, ninety-nine in a hundred, are not insured from fire. Sea-risk is more alarming to the greater part of people; and the proportion of ships insured to those not insured is much greater. Many sail, however, at all seasons, and even in time of war, without any insurance. This may sometimes, perhaps, be done without any imprudence. When a great company, or even a great merchant, has twenty or thirty ships at sea, they may, as it were, insure one another. The premium saved up on them all may more than compensate such losses as they are likely to meet with in the common course of chances. The neglect of insurance upon shipping, however, in the same manner as upon houses, is, in most cases, the effect of no such nice calculation, but of mere thoughtless rashness, and presumptuous contempt of the risk.

The likelihood of loss is often underestimated and rarely valued more than it's actually worth, which we can see in the modest profits of insurers. For insurance—whether against fire or sea risks—to be a viable business, the standard premium has to be enough to cover common losses, pay for management costs, and provide a profit similar to what could be earned from an equivalent capital invested in any typical trade. The person who pays only this amount is clearly paying just the actual value of the risk, or the lowest rate they can reasonably expect for insurance. However, while some people have made a little money from insurance, very few have struck it rich; and simply from this observation, it's quite clear that the typical balance of profit and loss is not any more favorable in this area than in other common trades where many people do become wealthy. Yet, even though the standard insurance premium is fairly low, many people underestimate the risk so much that they don't bother paying for it. If we look at the country as a whole, nineteen out of twenty houses—or probably even ninety-nine out of a hundred—are not insured against fire. Sea risks scare most people more, which is why a higher proportion of ships are insured compared to those that are not. Still, many set sail all year round, and even during wartime, without any insurance. This might sometimes be done without being reckless. When a big company or even a large merchant has twenty or thirty ships at sea, they can essentially insure each other's ships. The total premiums saved on all of them can cover the losses they might face under normal circumstances. However, the failure to insure ships, just like with houses, is usually not a result of careful calculations, but rather thoughtless rashness and an overconfident disregard for the risk.

The contempt of risk, and the presumptuous hope of success, are in no period of life more active than at the age at which young people choose their professions. How little the fear of misfortune is then capable of balancing the hope of good luck, appears still more evidently in the readiness of the common people to enlist as soldiers, or to go to sea, than in the eagerness of those of better fashion to enter into what are called the liberal professions.

The disregard for risk and the overconfidence in success are never more pronounced than when young people are deciding on their careers. The way the fear of failure seems so easily outweighed by the optimism of good fortune is even clearer in how eager everyday people are to join the military or go to sea than in the enthusiasm of those from higher social classes to pursue what are known as the prestigious professions.

What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough. Without regarding the danger, however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the beginning of a new war; and though they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur. These romantic hopes make the whole price of their blood. Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and, in actual service, their fatigues are much greater.

What a regular soldier might lose is pretty clear. Regardless of the risks, young volunteers are always eager to enlist at the start of a new war; and even though they have little chance of advancement, they imagine, in their youthful dreams, countless opportunities to gain honor and recognition that never happen. These unrealistic hopes cover the entire cost of their sacrifice. Their pay is lower than that of ordinary workers, and in actual service, their workload is much heavier.

The lottery of the sea is not altogether so disadvantageous as that of the army. The son of a creditable labourer or artificer may frequently go to sea with his father's consent; but if he enlists as a soldier, it is always without it. Other people see some chance of his making something by the one trade; nobody but himself sees any of his making any thing by the other. The great admiral is less the object of public admiration than the great general; and the highest success in the sea service promises a less brilliant fortune and reputation than equal success in the land. The same difference runs through all the inferior degrees of preferment in both. By the rules of precedency, a captain in the navy ranks with a colonel in the army; but he does not rank with him in the common estimation. As the great prizes in the lottery are less, the smaller ones must be more numerous. Common sailors, therefore, more frequently get some fortune and preferment than common soldiers; and the hope of those prizes is what principally recommends the trade. Though their skill and dexterity are much superior to[Pg 46] that of almost any artificers: and though their whole life is one continual scene of hardship and danger; yet for all this dexterity and skill, for all those hardships and dangers, while they remain in the condition of common sailors, they receive scarce any other recompence but the pleasure of exercising the one and of surmounting the other. Their wages are not greater than those of common labourers at the port which regulates the rate of seamen's wages. As they are continually going from port to port, the monthly pay of those who sail from all the different ports of Great Britain, is more nearly upon a level than that of any other workmen in those different places; and the rate of the port to and from which the greatest number sail, that is, the port of London, regulates that of all the rest. At London, the wages of the greater part of the different classes of workmen are about double those of the same classes at Edinburgh. But the sailors who sail from the port of London, seldom earn above three or four shillings a-month more than those who sail from the port of Leith, and the difference is frequently not so great. In time of peace, and in the merchant-service, the London price is from a guinea to about seven-and-twenty shillings the calendar month. A common labourer in London, at the rate of nine or ten shillings a-week, may earn in the calendar month from forty to five-and-forty shillings. The sailor, indeed, over and above his pay, is supplied with provisions. Their value, however, may not perhaps always exceed the difference between his pay and that of the common labourer; and though it sometimes should, the excess will not be clear gain to the sailor, because he cannot share it with his wife and family, whom he must maintain out of his wages at home.

The lottery of the sea isn’t as disadvantageous as the one in the army. A respectable laborer's or craftsman's son can often go to sea with his father’s permission, but if he joins the army, it’s always without it. People see a chance for him to accomplish something in one job; nobody but he sees any opportunity to achieve anything in the other. The great admiral is not admired by the public as much as the great general is; and being successful in the navy leads to a less impressive fortune and reputation than achieving the same success on land. This difference exists at all levels of rank in both fields. According to the rules of hierarchy, a navy captain ranks with an army colonel, but in terms of public perception, he doesn’t. Since the biggest rewards in this lottery are smaller, the smaller ones must be more numerous. Common sailors, therefore, often find some fortune and advancement more frequently than common soldiers do, and the hope of those rewards is what mainly attracts people to the job. Although their skill and ability are much greater than those of almost any craftsmen, and despite the fact that their entire lives are filled with hardship and danger, while they remain as common sailors, they receive hardly any reward other than the satisfaction of using their skills and overcoming challenges. Their wages are not higher than those of common laborers at the port that sets the rates for sailors’ pay. Since they constantly travel from port to port, the monthly earnings of sailors from various ports in Great Britain are more comparable than those of any other workers in those places; and the pay at the port with the highest traffic, which is London, sets the rates for all the others. In London, most types of workers earn about double what the same types earn in Edinburgh. However, sailors from London rarely make more than three or four shillings a month more than those from Leith, and the difference isn’t usually that significant. In peacetime and in the merchant service, the pay in London ranges from a guinea to about twenty-seven shillings a month. A common laborer in London, earning nine or ten shillings a week, can make between forty and forty-five shillings a month. Sailors, in addition to their pay, are provided with food. However, the value of this may not always exceed the difference between their pay and that of common laborers; and even if it sometimes does, the excess is not a clear benefit for the sailor because he can’t share it with his wife and family, whom he must support with his wages back home.

The dangers and hair-breadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of disheartening young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them. A tender mother, among the inferior ranks of people, is often afraid to send her son to school at a sea-port town, lest the sight of the ships, and the conversation and adventures of the sailors, should entice him to go to sea. The distant prospect of hazards, from which we can hope to extricate ourselves by courage and address, is not disagreeable to us, and does not raise the wages of labour in any employment. It is otherwise with those in which courage and address can be of no avail. In trades which are known to be very unwholesome, the wages of labour are always remarkably high. Unwholesomeness is a species of disagreeableness, and its effects upon the wages of labour are to be ranked under that general head.

The dangers and narrow escapes of an adventurous life, instead of discouraging young people, often attract them to a trade. A caring mother, among the lower classes, commonly worries about sending her son to school in a port city, fearing that the sight of ships and the tales and adventures of sailors might lure him to go to sea. The potential risks, which we believe we can navigate with courage and skill, don't actually deter us and don’t affect labor wages in any job. This is different for jobs where bravery and skill won't help. In trades known to be very unhealthy, labor wages are consistently quite high. Unhealthiness is a type of unpleasantness, and its effects on wage levels should be classified under that broader category.

In all the different employments of stock, the ordinary rate of profit varies more or less with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns. These are, in general, less uncertain in the inland than in the foreign trade, and in some branches of foreign trade than in others; in the trade to North America, for example, than in that to Jamaica. The ordinary rate of profit always rises more or less with the risk. It does not, however, seem to rise in proportion to it, or so as to compensate it completely. Bankruptcies are most frequent in the most hazardous trades. The most hazardous of all trades, that of a smuggler, though, when the adventure succeeds, it is likewise the most profitable, is the infallible road to bankruptcy. The presumptuous hope of success seems to act here as upon all other occasions, and to entice so many adventurers into those hazardous trades, that their competition reduces the profit below what is sufficient to compensate the risk. To compensate it completely, the common returns ought, over and above the ordinary profits of stock, not only to make up for all occasional losses, but to afford a surplus profit to the adventurers, of the same nature with the profit of insurers. But if the common returns were sufficient for all this, bankruptcies would not be more frequent in these than in other trades.

In all the various uses of capital, the typical profit rate changes more or less with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns. Generally, returns are more certain in domestic trade than in international trade, and some areas of international trade are less risky than others; for example, trade with North America is less uncertain than trade with Jamaica. The typical profit rate tends to increase with the amount of risk involved. However, it doesn’t seem to rise in proportion to the risk or fully compensate for it. Bankruptcies happen most often in the riskiest ventures. The most dangerous business of all, smuggling, while it can be the most lucrative if successful, almost guarantees bankruptcy. The overconfidence in achieving success seems to draw many people into these risky trades, and their competition drives profits down below what would be enough to make up for the risk. To fully compensate for the risk, the usual returns would need not only to cover all occasional losses but also to provide a surplus profit for the traders, similar to the profits of insurers. But if the usual returns were enough for all of this, bankruptcies wouldn’t occur more frequently in these trades than in others.

Of the five circumstances, therefore, which vary the wages of labour, two only affect the profits of stock; the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the business, and the risk or security with which it is attended. In point of agreeableness or disagreeableness, there is little or no difference in the far greater part of the different employments of stock, but a great deal in those of labour; and the ordinary profit of stock, though it rises with the risk, does not always seem to rise in proportion to it. It should follow from all this, that, in the same society or neighbourhood, the average and ordinary rates of profit in the different employments of stock should be more nearly upon a level than the pecuniary wages of the different sorts of labour.

Of the five factors that affect labor wages, only two influence stock profits: how enjoyable or unpleasant the work is and the level of risk or security involved. When it comes to how enjoyable or unpleasant work is, there's little to no difference across most types of stock investments, but there's a significant variance in labor. The typical profit from stock, while it increases with risk, doesn't always seem to rise in direct relation to it. This suggests that, within the same society or community, the average and typical profit rates from different stock investments should be more closely aligned compared to the monetary wages for various types of labor.

They are so accordingly. The difference between the earnings of a common labourer and those of a well employed lawyer or physician, is evidently much greater than that between the ordinary profits in any two different branches of trade. The apparent difference, besides, in the profits of different trades, is generally a deception arising from our not always distinguishing what ought to be considered as wages, from what ought to be considered as profit.

They are very much so. The gap between what a regular worker makes and what a well-paid lawyer or doctor earns is clearly much larger than the usual profits in any two different areas of business. Additionally, the visible differences in profits across various trades are often misleading because we don't always differentiate between what should be seen as wages and what should be seen as profit.

Apothecaries' profit is become a bye-word, denoting something uncommonly extravagant. This great apparent profit, however, is frequently no more than the reasonable wages of labour. The skill of an apothecary is a much nicer and more delicate matter than that of any artificer whatever; and the trust which is reposed in him is of much greater importance. He is the physician of the poor in all cases, and of the rich when the distress or danger is not very great. His reward, therefore, ought[Pg 47] to be suitable to his skill and his trust; and it arises generally from the price at which he sells his drugs. But the whole drugs which the best employed apothecary in a large market-town, will sell in a year, may not perhaps cost him above thirty or forty pounds. Though he should sell them, therefore, for three or four hundred, or at a thousand per cent, profit, this may frequently be no more than the reasonable wages of his labour, charged, in the only way in which he can charge them, upon the price of his drugs. The greater part of the apparent profit is real wages disguised in the garb of profit.

Apothecaries' profit has become a catchphrase, meaning something unusually extravagant. However, this large apparent profit is often just the fair wages for their work. An apothecary's skill is more intricate and delicate than that of any other tradesperson, and the trust placed in them is far more significant. They serve as the doctor for the poor in all situations and for the wealthy when the situation isn't too severe. Therefore, their compensation should reflect their skill and the trust they hold; it typically comes from the price they charge for their medications. Yet, the total amount of drugs that the most well-employed apothecary in a busy market town might sell in a year may only cost him around thirty or forty pounds. Even if he sells them for three or four hundred or at a thousand percent profit, this often translates to no more than the fair wages for his work, charged in the only way he can, through the price of his drugs. Much of the apparent profit is actually real wages disguised as profit.

In a small sea-port town, a little grocer will make forty or fifty per cent. upon a stock of a single hundred pounds, while a considerable wholesale merchant in the same place will scarce make eight or ten per cent. upon a stock of ten thousand. The trade of the grocer may be necessary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the narrowness of the market may not admit the employment of a larger capital in the business. The man, however, must not only live by his trade, but live by it suitably to the qualifications which it requires. Besides possessing a little capital, he must be able to read, write, and account, and must be a tolerable judge, too, of perhaps fifty or sixty different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the markets where they are to be had cheapest. He must have all the knowledge, in short, that is necessary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders him from becoming but the want of a sufficient capital. Thirty or forty pounds a-year cannot be considered as too great a recompence for the labour of a person so accomplished. Deduct this from the seemingly great profits of his capital, and little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary profits of stock. The greater part of the apparent profit is, in this case too, real wages.

In a small seaside town, a local grocer can make forty to fifty percent profit on a stock of just one hundred pounds, while a larger wholesale merchant in the same area might only see an eight to ten percent profit on a ten thousand-pound stock. The grocer's business is essential for the convenience of the residents, and the limited market might not support a larger capital investment. However, this person needs to not only make a living from their trade but also do so in accordance with the skills it demands. Besides having a small amount of capital, they must be able to read, write, and do math, and they should also have a good understanding of perhaps fifty or sixty different types of goods, along with their prices, qualities, and the best markets to find them at lower costs. In short, they must possess all the knowledge necessary for a major merchant, with the only barrier to becoming one being insufficient capital. Earning thirty to forty pounds a year is not too much compensation for someone with such qualifications. Subtract this from what seems to be high profits from their capital, and what's left may be just the usual profits of a business. The majority of the apparent profit, in this case, is actually real wages.

The difference between the apparent profit of the retail and that of the wholesale trade, is much less in the capital than in small towns and country villages. Where ten thousand pounds can be employed in the grocery trade, the wages of the grocer's labour must be a very trifling addition to the real profits of so great a stock. The apparent profits of the wealthy retailer, therefore, are there more nearly upon a level with these of the wholesale merchant. It is upon this account that goods sold by retail are generally and frequently much cheaper, in the capital than in small towns and country villages. Grocery goods, for example, are generally much cheaper; bread and butchers' meat frequently as cheap. It costs no more to bring grocery goods to the great town than to the country village; but it costs a great deal more to bring corn and cattle, as the greater part of them must be brought from a much greater distance. The prime cost of grocery goods, therefore, being the same in both places, they are cheapest where the least profit is charged upon them. The prime cost of bread and butchers' meat is greater in the great town than in the country village; and though the profit is less, therefore they are not always cheaper there, but often equally cheap. In such articles as bread and butchers' meat, the the same cause which diminishes apparent profit, increases prime cost. The extent of the market, by giving employment to greater stocks, diminishes apparent profit; but by requiring supplies from a greater distance, it increases prime cost. This diminution of the one and increase of the other, seem, in most cases, nearly to counterbalance one another, which is probably the reason that, though the prices of corn and cattle are commonly very different in different parts of the kingdom, those of bread and butchers' meat are generally very nearly the same through the greater part of it.

The difference between the apparent profit of retail and that of wholesale trade is much smaller in the capital than in small towns and rural villages. In places where you can invest ten thousand pounds in the grocery business, the wages of the grocer's labor add only a tiny bit to the actual profits from such a large stock. Therefore, the apparent profits of wealthy retailers are closer to those of wholesale merchants. This is why retail goods are often much cheaper in the capital than in smaller towns and villages. Grocery items, for instance, tend to be much cheaper; bread and meat are often just as cheap. It doesn't cost any more to bring grocery goods to the big city than to a country village, but it does cost significantly more to transport grain and livestock since most of them come from much farther away. Thus, the initial cost of grocery goods is the same in both locations, making them cheaper where the profit margin is lower. The initial cost of bread and meat is higher in the big city than in the country village; although the profit margin is smaller, that doesn't always make them cheaper there, but they are often equally priced. For items like bread and meat, the same factors that reduce apparent profit increase the initial cost. A larger market, by accommodating greater stock levels, reduces apparent profit, but needing supplies from farther away increases initial costs. This decrease in one and increase in the other seem to almost balance each other out. This is likely why, although prices for grain and livestock vary greatly across the country, prices for bread and meat are generally very similar in most areas.

Though the profits of stock, both in the wholesale and retail trade, are generally less in the capital than in small towns and country villages, yet great fortunes are frequently acquired from small beginnings in the former, and scarce ever in the latter. In small towns and country villages, on account of the narrowness of the market, trade cannot always be extended as stock extends. In such places, therefore, though the rate of a particular person's profits may be very high, the sum or amount of them can never be very great, nor consequently that of his annual accumulation. In great towns, on the contrary, trade can be extended as stock increases, and the credit of a frugal and thriving man increases much faster than his stock. His trade is extended in proportion to the amount of both; and the sum or amount of his profits is in proportion to the extent of his trade, and his annual accumulation in proportion to the amount of his profits. It seldom happens, however, that great fortunes are made, even in great towns, by any one regular, established, and well-known branch of business, but in consequence of a long life of industry, frugality, and attention. Sudden fortunes, indeed, are sometimes made in such places, by what is called the trade of speculation. The speculative merchant exercises no one regular, established, or well-known branch of business. He is a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the next, and a sugar, tobacco, or tea merchant the year after. He enters into every trade, when he foresees that it is likely to be more than commonly profitable, and he quits it when he foresees that its profits are likely to return to the level of other trades. His profits and losses, therefore, can bear no regular proportion to those of any one established and well-known branch of business. A bold adventurer may sometimes acquire a considerable fortune by two or three successful specu[Pg 48]lations, but is just as likely to lose one by two or three unsuccessful ones. This trade can be carried on nowhere but in great towns. It is only in places of the most extensive commerce and correspondence that the intelligence requisite for it can he had.

Although the profits from stocks in both wholesale and retail markets are usually lower in big cities than in small towns and rural areas, significant wealth can often be built from small beginnings in urban areas, while it's rare in smaller places. In small towns and rural areas, the limited market makes it hard to grow the business as the stock expands. Therefore, even though an individual's profit margin might be high, the total amount of profit will not be substantial, and consequently, their annual growth will also be limited. In contrast, in large cities, businesses can grow as the stock increases, and a diligent and successful person’s credit can grow much more rapidly than their stock. Their business expands in proportion to both, meaning their profits relate to the scale of their trade, and their annual growth aligns with the amount they earn. However, it's uncommon for someone to build significant wealth in major cities through any one established and well-known business type; it usually takes a long life of hard work, saving, and careful attention. While sudden wealth can sometimes be made in big cities through what is known as speculative trading, speculative traders don't stick to one established business. One year, they might be dealing in corn, the next in wine, and then in sugar, tobacco, or tea. They jump into any market when they see potential for unusually high profits and exit when they expect the profits to drop to normal levels. As a result, their profits and losses don’t have a regular relationship to any specific established business. A daring trader might occasionally amass a significant fortune from a few successful speculations, but they are just as likely to lose a lot from failed ones. This type of trading can only happen in large cities; it requires access to extensive commerce and communication networks so that the necessary information is available.

The five circumstances above mentioned, though they occasion considerable inequalities in the wages of labour and profits of stock, occasion none in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages, real or imaginary, of the different employments of either. The nature of those circumstances is such, that they make up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in others.

The five circumstances mentioned above, although they create significant differences in labor wages and investment profits, do not cause any overall advantages or disadvantages, whether real or perceived, in the various jobs for either. The nature of these circumstances is such that they offset a small financial gain in some areas and balance out a large one in others.

In order, however, that this equality may take place in the whole of their advantages or disadvantages, three things are requisite, even where there is the most perfect freedom. First, the employments must be well known and long established in the neighbourhood; secondly, they must be in their ordinary, or what may be called their natural state; and, thirdly, they must be the sole or principal employments of those who occupy them.

In order for this equality to exist in all their advantages or disadvantages, three things are necessary, even when there is complete freedom. First, the jobs must be well known and long established in the area; second, they must be in their usual, or what can be referred to as their natural state; and third, they must be the only or main jobs of the people who do them.

First, This equality can lake place only in those employments which are well known, and have been long established in the neighbourhood.

First, this equality can take place only in those jobs that are well-known and have been long established in the area.

Where all other circumstances are equal, wages are generally higher in new than in old trades. When a projector attempts to establish a new manufacture, he must at first entice his workmen from other employments, by higher wages than they can either earn in their own trades, or than the nature of his work would otherwise require; and a considerable time must pass away before he can venture to reduce them to the common level. Manufactures for which the demand arises altogether from fashion and fancy, are continually changing, and seldom last long enough to be considered as old established manufactures. Those, on the contrary, for which the demand arises chiefly from use or necessity, are less liable to change, and the same form of fabric may continue in demand for whole centuries together. The wages of labour, therefore, are likely to be higher in manufactures of the former, than in those of the latter kind. Birmingham deals chiefly in manufactures of the former kind; Sheffield in those of the latter; and the wages of labour in those two different places are said to be suitable to this difference in the nature of their manufactures.

When all other factors are equal, wages are usually higher in new trades compared to old ones. When someone tries to start a new manufacturing business, they first have to attract workers from other jobs by offering higher wages than those people can earn in their current roles, or more than what their work typically requires. It takes a significant amount of time before they can lower wages to the standard rate. Industries driven primarily by trends and preferences are constantly changing and rarely exist long enough to be considered established. In contrast, industries that are driven mainly by practical needs are less prone to change, and the same type of product can be in demand for centuries. Therefore, wages in labor are likely to be higher in industries based on trends rather than necessity. Birmingham mainly focuses on trend-driven industries, while Sheffield specializes in necessity-driven ones, leading to a wage difference that reflects the nature of their manufacturing.

The establishment of any new manufacture, of any new branch of commerce, or of any new practice in agriculture, is always a speculation from which the projector promises himself extraordinary profits. These profits sometimes are very great, and sometimes, more frequently, perhaps, they are quite otherwise; but, in general, they bear no regular proportion to those of other old trades in the neighbourhood. If the project succeeds, they are commonly at first very high. When the trade or practice becomes thoroughly established and well known, the competition reduces them to the level of other trades.

The creation of any new manufacturing process, any new area of commerce, or any new farming method is always seen as a gamble, where the creator expects to make significant profits. Sometimes these profits are substantial, but more often than not, they are not; however, they generally do not align with the profits from other established businesses in the area. If the venture is successful, profits are typically very high at first. As the trade or practice becomes fully established and recognized, competition drives those profits down to match those of other businesses.

Secondly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in the ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of those employments.

Secondly, this balance between the benefits and drawbacks of different ways of using labor and resources can only occur in the usual or what might be called the natural state of those jobs.

The demand for almost every different species of labour is sometimes greater, and sometimes less than usual. In the one case, the advantages of the employment rise above, in the other they fall below the common level. The demand for country labour is greater at hay-time and harvest than during the greater part of the year; and wages rise with the demand. In time of war, when forty or fifty thousand sailors are forced from the merchant service into that of the king, the demand for sailors to merchant ships necessarily rises with their scarcity; and their wages, upon such occasions, commonly rise from a guinea and seven-and-twenty shillings to forty shillings and three pounds a-month. In a decaying manufacture, on the contrary, many workmen, rather than quit their own trade, are contented with smaller wages than would be suitable to the nature of their employment.

The demand for almost every type of labor can sometimes be higher or lower than usual. When it's higher, the benefits of the job go up, and when it’s lower, they drop below the usual level. For example, the demand for farm labor is greater during hay season and harvest time than for most of the year, which causes wages to increase along with demand. During times of war, when around forty or fifty thousand sailors are pulled from merchant ships to serve the king, the need for sailors on merchant vessels naturally goes up due to their scarcity; as a result, their wages can rise from one guinea and twenty-seven shillings to forty shillings and three pounds a month. In contrast, in a declining industry, many workers would rather stick to their trade and accept lower wages than what would typically be appropriate for their work.

The profits of stock vary with the price of the commodities in which it is employed. As the price of any commodity rises above the ordinary or average rate, the profits of at least some part of the stock that is employed in bringing it to market, rise above their proper level, and as it falls they sink below it. All commodities are more or less liable to variations of price, but some are much more so than others. In all commodities which are produced by human industry, the quantity of industry annually employed is necessarily regulated by the annual demand, in such a manner that the average annual produce may, as nearly as possible, be equal to the average annual consumption. In some employments, it has already been observed, the same quantity of industry will always produce the same, or very nearly the same quantity of commodities. In the linen or woollen manufactures, for example, the same number of hands will annually work up very nearly the same quantity of linen and woollen cloth. The variations in the market price of such commodities, therefore, can arise only from some accidental variation in the demand. A public mourning raises the price of black cloth. But as the demand for most sorts of plain linen and woollen cloth is pretty uniform, so is likewise the price. But there are other employments in which the same quantity of industry will not always produce the same quantity of commodities. The same quantity of industry, for example, will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, hops, sugar,[Pg 49] tobacco, &c. The price of such commodities, therefore, varies not only with the variations of demand, but with the much greater and more frequent variations of quantity, and is consequently extremely fluctuating; but the profit of some of the dealers must necessarily fluctuate with the price of the commodities. The operations of the speculative merchant are principally employed about such commodities. He endeavours to buy them up when he foresees that their price is likely to rise, and to sell them when it is likely to fall.

The profits from stocks change with the prices of the goods they are used to produce. When the price of a commodity rises above the normal average, the profits from at least some portion of the stock that is used to bring it to market increase beyond their usual level, and when the price drops, those profits decrease below it. All commodities are subject to price fluctuations, but some are much more sensitive to these changes than others. For all goods made by human labor, the amount of work done each year is typically based on annual demand, so that the average annual output closely matches average annual consumption. In some industries, it has been noted that the same amount of labor will always yield about the same amount of product. For instance, in linen or wool manufacturing, the same number of workers will annually produce almost the same quantity of linen and woolen fabric. Therefore, variations in the market price of such goods can only result from unexpected changes in demand. For example, public mourning increases the price of black cloth. However, since demand for most types of plain linen and woolen fabrics is fairly stable, their prices tend to remain consistent as well. On the other hand, there are industries where the same amount of labor does not consistently produce the same quantity of goods. For instance, the same amount of labor may yield very different amounts of crops, wine, hops, sugar, tobacco, etc., from year to year. The prices of these commodities, therefore, fluctuate not only with changes in demand but also with much more significant and frequent changes in quantity, making them highly variable; thus, the profits of certain dealers must necessarily vary with the prices of these goods. Speculative merchants primarily focus on these types of commodities. They try to buy them when they expect prices to rise and sell them when they anticipate prices will drop.

Thirdly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in such as are the sole or principal employments of those who occupy them.

Thirdly, this balance in the overall advantages and disadvantages of various uses of labor and resources can only occur in those that are the only or main jobs of the people who engage in them.

When a person derives his subsistence from one employment, which does not occupy the greater part of his time, in the intervals of his leisure he is often willing to work at another for less wages than would otherwise suit the nature of the employment.

When someone earns their living from one job that doesn’t take up most of their time, they often feel willing to take on another job during their free time, even if it pays less than what would normally be appropriate for that work.

There still subsists, in many parts of Scotland, a set of people called cottars or cottagers, though they were more frequent some years ago than they are now. They are a sort of out-servants of the landlords and farmers. The usual reward which they receive from their master is a house, a small garden for pot-herbs, as much grass as will feed a cow, and, perhaps, an acre or two of bad arable land. When their master has occasion for their labour, he gives them, besides, two pecks of oatmeal a-week, worth about sixteen pence sterling. During a great part of the year, he has little or no occasion for their labour, and the cultivation of their own little possession is not sufficient to occupy the time which is left at their own disposal. When such occupiers were more numerous than they are at present, they are said to have been willing to give their spare time for a very small recompence to any body, and to have wrought for less wages than other labourers. In ancient times, they seem to have been common all over Europe. In countries ill cultivated, and worse inhabited, the greater part of landlords and farmers could not otherwise provide themselves with the extraordinary number of hands which country labour requires at certain seasons. The daily or weekly recompence which such labourers occasionally received from their masters, was evidently not the whole price of their labour. Their small tenement made a considerable part of it. This daily or weekly recompence, however, seems to have been considered as the whole of it, by many writers who have collected the prices of labour and provisions in ancient times, and who have taken pleasure in representing both as wonderfully low.

There are still people in many parts of Scotland called cottars or cottagers, although there were more of them a few years ago than there are now. They act as out-servants for landlords and farmers. The usual payment they receive from their employer includes a house, a small garden for vegetables, enough grass to feed a cow, and maybe an acre or two of poor farming land. When their employer needs their work, he also provides them with two pecks of oatmeal a week, worth about sixteen pence. For a large part of the year, he has little or no use for their labor, and managing their small piece of land isn't enough to keep them busy during the rest of their free time. In the past, when there were more of them than today, they were known to work for very low pay for anyone who needed help and were willing to accept lower wages than other workers. In ancient times, they appear to have been common throughout Europe. In poorly cultivated and sparsely populated areas, many landlords and farmers couldn't find enough workers for the heavy labor needed during certain times of the year. The daily or weekly pay these laborers received from their employers clearly wasn't the full value of their work. Their small landholding was a significant part of their compensation. However, this daily or weekly pay seems to have been regarded as the entirety of their compensation by many writers who have documented historical labor and food prices, who enjoyed portraying both as remarkably low.

The produce of such labour comes frequently cheaper to market than would otherwise be suitable to its nature. Stockings, in many parts of Scotland, are knit much cheaper than they can anywhere be wrought upon the loom. They are the work of servants and labourers, who derive the principal part of their subsistence from some other employment. More than a thousand pair of Shetland stockings are annually imported into Leith, of which the price is from fivepence to sevenpence a pair. At Lerwick, the small capital of the Shetland islands, tenpence a-day, I have been assured, is a common price of common labour. In the same islands, they knit worsted stockings to the value of a guinea a pair and upwards.

The output of such labor often ends up being cheaper in the market than what would normally be expected for its quality. In many areas of Scotland, stockings are knitted for much less than they can be made on a loom anywhere else. They are produced by servants and laborers who mainly support themselves through other jobs. Over a thousand pairs of Shetland stockings are imported into Leith each year, with prices ranging from five to seven pence a pair. In Lerwick, the small capital of the Shetland Islands, I’ve been told that the typical daily wage for common labor is around ten pence. In those islands, they also knit worsted stockings that can sell for a guinea a pair or more.

The spinning of linen yarn is carried on in Scotland nearly in the same way as the knitting of stockings, by servants, who are chiefly hired for other purposes. They earn but a very scanty subsistence, who endeavour to get their livelihood by either of those trades. In most parts of Scotland, she is a good spinner who can earn twentypence a-week.

The process of making linen yarn in Scotland is done in a way that's pretty similar to how stockings are knitted, usually by workers who are mostly employed for other tasks. Those trying to make a living from these jobs earn only a very minimal income. In most areas of Scotland, a skilled spinner can make about twenty pence a week.

In opulent countries, the market is generally so extensive, that any one trade is sufficient to employ the whole labour and stock of those who occupy it. Instances of people living by one employment, and, at the same time, deriving some little advantage from another, occur chiefly in poor countries. The following instance, however, of something of the same kind, is to be found in the capital of a very rich one. There is no city in Europe, I believe, in which house-rent is dearer than in London, and yet I know no capital in which a furnished apartment can be hired so cheap. Lodging is not only much cheaper in London than in Paris; it is much cheaper than in Edinburgh, of the same degree of goodness; and, what may seem extraordinary, the dearness of house-rent is the cause of the cheapness of lodging. The dearness of house-rent in London arises, not only from those causes which render it dear in all great capitals, the dearness of labour, the dearness of all the materials of building, which must generally be brought from a great distance, and, above all, the dearness of ground-rent, every landlord acting the part of a monopolist, and frequently exacting a higher rent for a single acre of bad land in a town, than can be had for a hundred of the best in the country, but it arises in part from the peculiar manners and customs of the people, which oblige every master of a family to hire a whole house from top to bottom. A dwelling-house in England means every thing that is contained under the same roof. In France, Scotland, and many other parts of Europe, it frequently means no more than a single storey. A tradesman in London is obliged to hire a whole house in that part of the town where his customers live. His shop is upon the ground floor, and he and his family sleep in the garret; and he endeavours to pay a part of his house-rent by letting the two middle storeys to lodgers. He expects to maintain his family by his trade,[Pg 50] and not by his lodgers. Whereas at Paris and Edinburgh, people who let lodgings have commonly no other means of subsistence; and the price of the lodging must pay, not only the rent of the house, but the whole expense of the family.

In wealthy countries, the market is usually so large that a single trade can employ all the labor and resources of those involved. People often rely on one job while also making some extra money from another in poorer countries. However, there’s a similar case in the capital of a very rich country. I believe there’s no city in Europe where house rent is higher than in London, yet you can find furnished apartments for rent at surprisingly low prices. Renting a room is not just cheaper in London than in Paris; it’s also less expensive than in Edinburgh for the same quality. What might seem surprising is that the high cost of housing actually leads to lower rental prices. The high rent in London is due not only to the usual reasons that make it expensive in all major capitals—like the high cost of labor and building materials, which often have to be transported from far away, and especially the high ground rent, with every landlord acting like a monopolist and often charging more for a poor-quality acre in the city than one hundred of the best in the countryside—but it also stems from the unique habits and customs of the people that require every household to rent an entire house from top to bottom. A dwelling in England refers to everything under one roof, while in France, Scotland, and other parts of Europe, it often means just a single floor. A tradesman in London must rent a whole house in the part of town where his customers are. His shop is on the ground floor, and he and his family sleep in the attic. He tries to cover part of his rent by renting out the two middle floors to lodgers. He expects to support his family through his trade, not from his lodgers. In contrast, in Paris and Edinburgh, people who rent out rooms typically have no other means of income, and the price of rent has to cover not just the house rent but all their living expenses.[Pg 50]

Part 2.Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe.

Such are the inequalities in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, which the defect of any of the three requisites above mentioned must occasion, even where there is the most perfect liberty. But the policy of Europe, by not leaving things at perfect liberty, occasions other inequalities of much greater importance.

Such are the inequalities in the overall advantages and disadvantages of different types of labor and investment, which the absence of any of the three necessary conditions mentioned above must create, even when there is complete freedom. However, the policies in Europe, by not allowing things to remain completely free, create other, much more significant inequalities.

It does this chiefly in the three following ways. First, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it in others beyond what it naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment, and from place to place.

It mainly does this in three ways. First, by limiting the competition in certain jobs to fewer people than would normally want to join; second, by increasing competition in other jobs beyond what it would naturally be; and third, by blocking the free movement of labor and resources, both between different jobs and across different locations.

First, The policy of Europe occasions a very important inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to enter into them.

First, the policy of Europe creates a significant imbalance in the overall benefits and drawbacks of various uses of labor and capital by limiting competition in certain fields to fewer participants than might otherwise be willing to engage in them.

The exclusive privileges of corporations are the principal means it makes use of for this purpose.

The special privileges of corporations are the main tools they use for this purpose.

The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade necessarily restrains the competition, in the town where it is established, to those who are free of the trade. To have served an apprenticeship in the town, under a master properly qualified, is commonly the necessary requisite for obtaining this freedom. The bye-laws of the corporation regulate sometimes the number of apprentices which any master is allowed to have, and almost always the number of years which each apprentice is obliged to serve. The intention of both regulations is to restrain the competition to a much smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to enter into the trade. The limitation of the number of apprentices restrains it directly. A long term of apprenticeship restrains it more indirectly, but as effectually, by increasing the expense of education.

The exclusive right of a registered trade limits competition in the town where it operates to those who are licensed to practice. Usually, completing an apprenticeship in the town under a qualified master is the main requirement for obtaining this license. The corporation's bylaws often determine how many apprentices any master can have, and almost always specify the number of years each apprentice must complete. Both regulations aim to reduce competition to a smaller group than would otherwise be willing to enter the trade. The restriction on the number of apprentices directly limits competition. A long apprenticeship period limits it more indirectly, but just as effectively, by raising the cost of training.

In Sheffield, no master cutler can have more than one apprentice at a time, by a bye-law of the corporation. In Norfolk and Norwich, no master weaver can have more than two apprentices, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a-month to the king. No master hatter can have more than two apprentices anywhere in England, or in the English plantations, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a-month, half to the king, and half to him who shall sue in any court of record. Both these regulations, though they have been confirmed by a public law of the kingdom, are evidently dictated by the same corporation-spirit which enacted the bye-law of Sheffield. The silk-weavers in London had scarce been incorporated a year, when they enacted a bye-law, restraining any master from having more than two apprentices at a time. It required a particular act of parliament to rescind this bye-law.

In Sheffield, no master cutler can have more than one apprentice at a time, according to a bylaw of the corporation. In Norfolk and Norwich, no master weaver can have more than two apprentices, or else they'll lose five pounds a month to the king. No master hatter can have more than two apprentices anywhere in England or in the English colonies, or they'll also lose five pounds a month, half going to the king and half to whoever sues in a court of record. Both these rules, even though they’ve been confirmed by public law, clearly come from the same corporate spirit that created the bylaw in Sheffield. The silk weavers in London had barely been incorporated for a year when they passed a bylaw to limit masters to two apprentices at a time. It took a specific act of parliament to overturn this bylaw.

Seven years seem anciently to have been, all over Europe, the usual term established for the duration of apprenticeships in the greater part of incorporated trades. All such incorporations were anciently called universities, which, indeed, is the proper Latin name for any incorporation whatever. The university of smiths, the university of tailors, &c. are expressions which we commonly meet with in the old charters of ancient towns. When those particular incorporations, which are now peculiarly called universities, were first established, the term of years which it was necessary to study, in order to obtain the degree of master of arts, appears evidently to have been copied from the term of apprenticeship in common trades, of which the incorporations were much more ancient. As to have wrought seven years under a master properly qualified, was necessary, in order to entitle any person to become a master, and to have himself apprentices in a common trade; so to have studied seven years under a master properly qualified, was necessary to entitle him to become a master, teacher, or doctor (words anciently synonymous), in the liberal arts, and to have scholars or apprentices (words likewise originally synonymous) to study under him.

Seven years used to be the standard length for apprenticeships in most professional trades across Europe. These groups were historically referred to as universities, which is actually the correct Latin term for any type of association. Phrases like the university of blacksmiths, the university of tailors, etc., are often found in the old charters of ancient towns. When those specific groups, which we now uniquely call universities, were first set up, the number of years needed to study for a master’s degree in arts seems to have been taken from the apprenticeship terms of regular trades, which were much older. Just as it took seven years of working under a qualified master to become a master tradesperson and to have apprentices in a common trade, it also took seven years of studying under a qualified master to become a master, teacher, or doctor (terms that were once synonymous) in the liberal arts and to have students or apprentices (words that were also originally synonymous) studying under him.

By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Apprenticeship, it was enacted, that no person should, for the future, exercise any trade, craft, or mystery, at that time exercised in England, unless he had previously served to it an apprenticeship of seven years at least; and what before had been the bye-law of many particular corporations, became in England the general and public law of all trades carried on in market towns. For though the words of the statute are very general, and seem plainly to include the whole kingdom, by interpretation its operation has been limited to market towns; it having been held that, in country villages, a person may exercise several different trades, though he has not served a seven years apprenticeship to each, they being necessary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the number of people frequently not being sufficient to supply each with a particular set of hands.

By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly referred to as the Statute of Apprenticeship, it was established that no one could practice any trade, craft, or skill that was being practiced in England at that time unless they had completed a minimum seven-year apprenticeship. What had previously been a rule for many specific corporations became the overall public law for all trades conducted in market towns. Although the statute's language is quite broad and seems to apply to the entire kingdom, its application has been narrowed down to market towns. It has been determined that in rural villages, a person can practice several different trades without needing to complete a seven-year apprenticeship for each one, as these trades are essential for the convenience of local residents, and the population is often not large enough to support specialized trades.

By a strict interpretation of the words, too, the operation of this statute has been limited[Pg 51] to those trades which were established in England before the 5th of Elizabeth, and has never been extended to such as have been introduced since that time. This limitation has given occasion to several distinctions, which, considered as rules of police, appear as foolish as can well be imagined. It has been adjudged, for example, that a coachmaker can neither himself make nor employ journeymen to make his coach-wheels, but must buy them of a master wheel-wright; this latter trade having been exercised in England before the 5th of Elizabeth. But a wheel-wright, though he has never served an apprenticeship to a coachmaker, may either himself make or employ journeymen to make coaches; the trade of a coachmaker not being within the statute, because not exercised in England at the time when it was made. The manufactures of Manchester, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, are many of them, upon this account, not within the statute, not having been exercised in England before the 5th of Elizabeth.

By a strict interpretation of the words, too, the operation of this statute has been limited[Pg 51] to those trades that were established in England before the 5th of Elizabeth and has never been expanded to those introduced since then. This limitation has led to several distinctions, which, considered as rules of conduct, seem as silly as one can imagine. It has been decided, for example, that a coachmaker cannot make his own coach-wheels or hire journeymen to make them; he must purchase them from a master wheelwright, as this latter trade was practiced in England before the 5th of Elizabeth. However, a wheelwright, even if he has never trained as a coachmaker, can either make coaches himself or hire journeymen to make them, since the trade of a coachmaker is not included in the statute, as it was not practiced in England at the time it was enacted. The manufacturing trades in Manchester, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton are, for this reason, not included in the statute, as they did not exist in England before the 5th of Elizabeth.

In France, the duration of apprenticeships is different in different towns and in different trades. In Paris, five years is the term required in a great number; but, before any person can be qualified to exercise the trade as a master, he must, in many of them, serve five years more as a journeyman. During this latter term, he is called the companion of his master, and the term itself is called his companionship.

In France, the length of apprenticeships varies by town and trade. In Paris, it often takes five years for many of them. However, before anyone can be recognized as a master in the trade, they typically need to work an additional five years as a journeyman. During this time, they are referred to as their master's companion, and this period is known as their companionship.

In Scotland, there is no general law which regulates universally the duration of apprenticeships. The term is different in different corporations. Where it is long, a part of it may generally be redeemed by paying a small fine. In most towns, too, a very small fine is sufficient to purchase the freedom of any corporation. The weavers of linen and hempen cloth, the principal manufactures of the country, as well as all other artificers subservient to them, wheel-makers, reel-makers, &c. may exercise their trades in any town-corporate, without paying any fine. In all towns-corporate, all persons are free to sell butchers' meat upon any lawful day of the week. Three years is, in Scotland, a common term of apprenticeship, even in some very nice trades; and, in general, I know of no country in Europe, in which corporation laws are so little oppressive.

In Scotland, there isn't a universal law that regulates the length of apprenticeships. The duration varies between different organizations. When the term is long, part of it can usually be shortened by paying a small fee. In most towns, a very small fee is enough to gain freedom from any corporation. The weavers of linen and hemp cloth, the main manufacturers in the country, along with all other workers who support them, like wheel-makers and reel-makers, can practice their trades in any corporate town without having to pay a fee. In all corporate towns, anyone can sell butchered meat on any legal day of the week. Three years is a common apprenticeship period in Scotland, even for some very specialized trades; overall, I don't know of any country in Europe where corporation laws are as non-restrictive.

The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty, both of the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers, whose interest it so much concerns. The affected anxiety of the lawgiver, lest they should employ an improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is oppressive.

The right that everyone has to their own labor is not only the foundation of all property but also the most sacred and untouchable. A poor person's wealth is in the strength and skill of their hands; stopping them from using that strength and skill however they see fit, as long as it doesn't harm others, is a clear violation of this sacred right. It is an obvious infringement on the personal freedom of both the worker and those who might want to hire them. By preventing one person from working in a way they choose, it also prevents others from hiring who they believe is suitable. Deciding if someone is fit for a job should definitely be left to the judgment of the employers, as it directly affects their interests. The lawmaker's undue concern that they might hire someone unsuitable is clearly as pointless as it is oppressive.

The institution of long apprenticeships can give no security that insufficient workmanship shall not frequently be exposed to public sale. When this is done, it is generally the effect of fraud, and not of inability; and the longest apprenticeship can give no security against fraud. Quite different regulations are necessary to prevent this abuse. The sterling mark upon plate, and the stamps upon linen and woollen cloth, give the purchaser much greater security than any statute of apprenticeship. He generally looks at these, but never thinks it worth while to enquire whether the workman had served a seven years apprenticeship.

The system of long apprenticeships doesn’t guarantee that poor workmanship won’t often be sold to the public. When this happens, it’s usually due to fraud, not just incompetence; and even the longest apprenticeship won’t protect against fraud. Different regulations are needed to stop this from happening. The quality mark on silver and the labels on fabric give buyers much more assurance than any apprenticeship law. Buyers usually pay attention to these marks but rarely think it’s important to check if the worker has completed a seven-year apprenticeship.

The institution of long apprenticeships has no tendency to form young people to industry. A journeyman who works by the piece is likely to be industrious, because he derives a benefit from every exertion of his industry. An apprentice is likely to be idle, and almost always is so, because he has no immediate interest to be otherwise. In the inferior employments, the sweets of labour consist altogether in the recompence of labour. They who are soonest in a condition to enjoy the sweets of it, are likely soonest to conceive a relish for it, and to acquire the early habit of industry. A young man naturally conceives an aversion to labour, when for a long time he receives no benefit from it. The boys who are put out apprentices from public charities are generally bound for more than the usual number of years, and they generally turn out very idle and worthless.

The system of long apprenticeships doesn’t really prepare young people for work. A journeyman, who gets paid by the piece, is likely to be hardworking because he benefits directly from his efforts. An apprentice, on the other hand, tends to be lazy—and usually is—because he has no immediate incentive to do otherwise. In lower-level jobs, the rewards of work come entirely from the pay. Those who get to enjoy these rewards sooner are likely to develop a taste for work and start building a habit of being industrious. A young man naturally grows to dislike work when he sees no benefit from it for a long time. The boys who are sent to be apprentices through public charities are often bound for longer than usual and typically end up being very lazy and unproductive.

Apprenticeships were altogether unknown to the ancients. The reciprocal duties of master and apprentice make a considerable article in every modern code. The Roman law is perfectly silent with regard to them. I know no Greek or Latin word (I might venture, I believe, to assert that there is none) which expresses the idea we now annex to the word apprentice, a servant bound to work at a particular trade for the benefit of a master, during a term of years, upon condition that the master shall teach him that trade.

Apprenticeships were completely unknown to ancient societies. The mutual responsibilities of master and apprentice are a significant part of every modern legal system. Roman law has nothing to say about them. I don’t know of any Greek or Latin word (I would dare to say there isn't one) that conveys the concept we associate today with the word apprentice, which refers to a worker obligated to train in a specific trade for the benefit of a master over a set period, as long as the master agrees to teach that trade.

Long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary. The arts, which are much superior to common trades, such as those of making clocks and watches, contain no such mystery as to require a long course of instruction. The first invention of such beautiful machines, indeed, and even that of some of the instruments employed in making them, must no[Pg 52] no doubt have been the work of deep thought and long time, and may justly be considered as among the happiest efforts of human ingenuity. But when both have been fairly invented, and are well understood, to explain to any young man, in the completest manner, how to apply the instruments, and how to construct the machines, cannot well require more than the lessons of a few weeks; perhaps those of a few days might be sufficient. In the common mechanic trades, those of a few days might certainly be sufficient. The dexterity of hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be acquired without much practice and experience. But a young man would practice with much more diligence and attention, if from the beginning he wrought as a journeyman, being paid in proportion to the little work which he could execute, and paying in his turn for the materials which he might sometimes spoil through awkwardness and inexperience. His education would generally in this way be more effectual, and always less tedious and expensive. The master, indeed, would be a loser. He would lose all the wages of the apprentice, which he now saves, for seven years together. In the end, perhaps, the apprentice himself would be a loser. In a trade so easily learnt he would have more competitors, and his wages, when he came to be a complete workman, would be much less than at present. The same increase of competition would reduce the profits of the masters, as well as the wages of workmen. The trades, the crafts, the mysteries, would all be losers. But the public would be a gainer, the work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to market.

Long apprenticeships are completely unnecessary. The arts, which are far superior to ordinary trades like clock and watchmaking, don't have any mystery that requires a lengthy education. The initial creation of such beautiful machines, and even some of the tools used to make them, was undoubtedly the result of deep thought and a lot of time, and can rightly be seen as some of humanity's best creative efforts. However, once these have been invented and understood, teaching a young person how to use the tools and build the machines in a thorough way shouldn’t take more than a few weeks; maybe even just a few days would be enough. In everyday mechanical trades, a few days would definitely suffice. Although skill with one’s hands, even in basic trades, requires a lot of practice and experience, a young person would put in much more effort and focus if they started working as a journeyman, earning money based on the little work they could do and paying for materials that they might ruin through clumsiness and inexperience. This way, their education would generally be more effective and always less boring and costly. The master would end up losing out, though. They would miss out on all the wages of the apprentice, which they currently save for seven years. In the end, the apprentice might also lose out. In a trade that's easy to learn, there would be more competition, and their pay as a qualified worker would likely be much lower than now. The same increase in competition would decrease both the profits for the masters and the wages for workers. The trades, crafts, and mysteries would all suffer. But the public would benefit, as the work of all craftsmen would be cheaper in the market.

It is to prevent this reduction of price, and consequently of wages and profit, by restraining that free competition which would most certainly occasion it, that all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws, have been established. In order to erect a corporation, no other authority in ancient times was requisite, in many parts of Europe, but that of the town-corporate in which it was established. In England, indeed, a charter from the king was likewise necessary. But this prerogative of the crown seems to have been reserved rather for extorting money from the subject, than for the defence of the common liberty against such oppressive monopolies. Upon paying a fine to the king, the charter seems generally to have been readily granted; and when any particular class of artificers or traders thought proper to act as a corporation, without a charter, such adulterine guilds, as they were called, were not always disfranchised upon that account, but obliged to fine annually to the king, for permission to exercise their usurped privileges[12]. The immediate inspection of all corporations, and of the bye-laws which they might think proper to enact for their own government, belonged to the town-corporate in which they were established; and whatever discipline was exercised over them, proceeded commonly, not from the king, but from that greater incorporation of which those subordinate ones were only parts or members.

To stop this drop in prices, and therefore wages and profits, by limiting free competition—which would definitely cause it—corporations and most of the laws around them were created. In the past, to set up a corporation in many parts of Europe, all you needed was the approval of the local town-corporate. In England, a charter from the king was also required. However, this royal privilege seemed more about extracting money from people than about protecting the common good from oppressive monopolies. After paying a fee to the king, charters were usually granted without much hassle; and when certain groups of workers or traders decided to operate as a corporation without a charter, these so-called “adulterine guilds” weren’t always stripped of their rights but were required to pay an annual fee to the king for permission to keep enjoying their unauthorized privileges[12]. The local town-corporate had direct oversight of all corporations and the rules they set for their own governance; and any discipline enforced over them typically came, not from the king, but from the larger corporation to which these smaller ones were simply members.

The government of towns-corporate was altogether in the hands of traders and artificers, and it was the manifest interest of every particular class of them, to prevent the market from being overstocked, as they commonly express it, with their own particular species of industry; which is in reality to keep it always understocked. Each class was eager to establish regulations proper for this purpose, and, provided it was allowed to do so, was willing to consent that every other class should do the same. In consequence of such regulations, indeed, each class was obliged to buy the goods they had occasion for from every other within the town, somewhat dearer than they otherwise might have done. But, in recompence, they were enabled to sell their own just as much dearer; so that, so far it was as broad as long, as they say; and in the dealings of the different classes within the town with one another, none of them were losers by these regulations. But in their dealings with the country they were all great gainers; and in these latter dealings consist the whole trade which supports and enriches every town.

The government of corporate towns was totally controlled by merchants and craftsmen, and it was in the clear interest of each group to keep the market from becoming overstocked, as they usually put it, with their own type of goods; which actually meant keeping it understocked. Each group was eager to establish rules to achieve this goal, and as long as they were allowed to do so, they were willing to agree that every other group could do the same. As a result of such rules, each group had to buy the goods they needed from the others in town at a higher price than they otherwise would have. However, in return, they were able to sell their own goods for a higher price too; so, in that sense, it was a wash, as they say. In their transactions with each other within the town, none of them lost out because of these rules. But in their trade with the countryside, they all made significant profits, and it was these latter transactions that comprised the entire trade that supports and enriches every town.

Every town draws its whole subsistence, and all the materials of its industry, from the country. It pays for these chiefly in two ways. First, by sending back to the country a part of those materials wrought up and manufactured; in which case, their price is augmented by the wages of the workmen, and the profits of their masters or immediate employers; secondly, by sending to it a part both of the rude and manufactured produce, either of other countries, or of distant parts of the same country, imported into the town; in which case, too, the original price of those goods is augmented by the wages of the carriers or sailors, and by the profits of the merchants who employ them. In what is gained upon the first of those branches of commerce, consists the advantage which the town makes by its manufactures; in what is gained upon the second, the advantage of its inland and foreign trade. The wages of the workmen, and the profits of their different employers, make up the whole of what is gained upon both. Whatever regulations, therefore, tend to increase those wages and profits beyond what they otherwise would be, tend to enable the town to purchase, with a smaller quantity of its labour, the produce of a greater quantity of the labour of the country. They give the traders and artificers in the town an advantage over the landlords, [Pg 53]farmers, and labourers, in the country, and break down that natural equality which would otherwise take place in the commerce which is carried on between them. The whole annual produce of the labour of the society is annually divided between these two different sets of people. By means of those regulations, a greater share of it is given to the inhabitants of the town than would otherwise fall to them, and a less to those of the country.

Every town gets all its resources and the materials for its industries from the surrounding areas. It pays for these mostly in two ways. First, it sends back to the countryside part of those materials after they’ve been processed and manufactured; in this case, the price goes up because of the wages paid to the workers and the profits taken by their employers. Second, it sends a portion of both raw and manufactured products, either from other countries or from distant parts of the same country that were brought into the town; again, the original price increases due to the wages of the transporters, like carriers or sailors, and the profits of the merchants who hire them. The profit gained from the first type of commerce represents the benefit the town receives from its manufacturing; the profit from the second type represents the benefit from its internal and foreign trade. The wages of the workers and the profits of their various employers make up the total gain from both. Therefore, any regulations that aim to raise those wages and profits beyond what they would normally be allow the town to buy more with less of its labor, getting a larger share of the fruits of the country’s labor. They give the town's traders and craftsmen an edge over the landlords, farmers, and laborers in the countryside, disrupting the natural balance that would otherwise exist in the commerce between them. The entire annual output of the society's labor is divided each year between these two distinct groups. Thanks to those regulations, a larger portion goes to the town's inhabitants than they would otherwise receive, while a smaller portion goes to those in the countryside.

The price which the town really pays for the provisions and materials annually imported into it, is the quantity of manufactures and other goods annually exported from it. The dearer the latter are sold, the cheaper the former are bought. The industry of the town becomes more, and that of the country less advantageous.

The actual cost that the town pays for the supplies and materials brought in each year is the amount of products and other goods sent out each year. The more expensive the latter are sold for, the cheaper the former can be bought. The town's industry becomes more beneficial, while that of the surrounding country becomes less profitable.

That the industry which is carried on in towns is, everywhere in Europe, more advantageous than that which is carried on in the country, without entering into any very nice computations, we may satisfy ourselves by one very simple and obvious observation. In every country of Europe, we find at least a hundred people who have acquired great fortunes, from small beginnings, by trade and manufactures, the industry which properly belongs to towns, for one who has done so by that which properly belongs to the country, the raising of rude produce by the improvement and cultivation of land. Industry, therefore, must be better rewarded, the wages of labour and the profits of stock must evidently be greater, in the one situation than in the other. But stock and labour naturally seek the most advantageous employment. They naturally, therefore, resort as much as they can to the town, and desert the country.

The industry that operates in towns is, across Europe, generally more profitable than that in the countryside. We can easily see this through a simple observation. In every European country, there are at least a hundred people who have built substantial wealth from humble beginnings through trade and manufacturing—industries that are typically associated with towns—compared to only a few who have succeeded through agricultural means, like improving and cultivating land. Therefore, it's clear that industry is better rewarded in towns; wages for labor and profits for investments are obviously higher there than in the countryside. Consequently, both capital and labor naturally gravitate towards the more profitable opportunities in towns and tend to leave the countryside behind.

The inhabitants of a town being collected into one place, can easily combine together. The most insignificant trades carried on in towns have, accordingly, in some place or other, been incorporated; and even where they have never been incorporated, yet the corporation-spirit, the jealousy of strangers, the aversion to take apprentices, or to communicate the secret of their trade, generally prevail in them, and often teach them, by voluntary associations and agreements, to prevent that free competition which they cannot prohibit by bye-laws. The trades which employ but a small number of hands, run most easily into such combinations. Half-a-dozen wool-combers, perhaps, are necessary to keep a thousand spinners and weavers at work. By combining not to take apprentices, they can not only engross the employment, but reduce the whole manufacture into a sort of slavery to themselves, and raise the price of their labour much above what is due to the nature of their work.

When the people of a town gather in one place, they can easily come together. Even the smallest businesses in towns have, in some way, formed groups; and even where they haven’t officially formed groups, the mindset of forming a corporation, the distrust of outsiders, the reluctance to take on apprentices, or to share trade secrets usually dominate. This often leads them, through voluntary partnerships and agreements, to restrict the free competition they can't stop through regulations. Trades that hire only a few workers tend to form such groups most easily. For example, a handful of wool combers may be needed to keep a thousand spinners and weavers busy. By agreeing not to take on apprentices, they can not only monopolize the work but also turn the entire industry into a kind of servitude for themselves while boosting their wages far beyond what is reasonable for the nature of the work.

The inhabitants of the country, dispersed in distant places, cannot easily combine together. They have not only never been incorporated, but the incorporation spirit never has prevailed among them. No apprenticeship has ever been thought necessary to qualify for husbandry, the great trade of the country. After what are called the fine arts, and the liberal professions, however, there is perhaps no trade which requires so great a variety of knowledge and experience. The innumerable volumes which have been written upon it in all languages, may satisfy us, that among the wisest and most learned nations, it has never been regarded as a matter very easily understood. And from all those volumes we shall in vain attempt to collect that knowledge of its various and complicated operations which is commonly possessed even by the common farmer; how contemptuously soever the very contemptible authors of some of them may sometimes affect to speak of him. There is scarce any common mechanic trade, on the contrary, of which all the operations may not be as completely and distinctly explained in a pamphlet of a very few pages, as it is possible for words illustrated by figures to explain them. In the history of the arts, now publishing by the French Academy of Sciences, several of them are actually explained in this manner. The direction of operations, besides, which must be varied with every change of the weather, as well as with many other accidents, requires much more judgment and discretion, than that of those which are always the same, or very nearly the same.

The people of the country, spread out in remote areas, struggle to come together easily. They've never really been united, and the spirit of unity has never truly existed among them. No training has ever been deemed necessary to prepare for farming, the main trade in the country. After what are called the fine arts and professional fields, there’s probably no trade that requires such a wide range of knowledge and experience. The countless books written about it in all languages show us that even among the wisest and most educated nations, it has never been seen as something easily understood. We will vainly try to gather the knowledge of its various and complex processes that even a regular farmer typically possesses; this is despite how scornfully some of the rather contemptible authors of those books might speak of him. In contrast, there’s hardly any common mechanical trade where all the processes can’t be completely and clearly explained in a small pamphlet, as effectively as words along with illustrations can. In the history of the arts currently being published by the French Academy of Sciences, several of them are actually explained this way. Additionally, the management of operations, which must adapt to every change in weather and many other circumstances, requires much more judgment and discretion than those that remain constant or nearly the same.

Not only the art of the farmer, the general direction of the operations of husbandry, but many inferior branches of country labour require much more skill and experience than the greater part of mechanic trades. The man who works upon brass and iron, works with instruments, and upon materials of which the temper is always the same, or very nearly the same. But the man who ploughs the ground with a team of horses or oxen, works with instruments of which the health, strength, and temper, are very different upon different occasions. The condition of the materials which he works upon, too, is as variable as that of the instruments which he works with, and both require to be managed with much judgment and discretion. The common ploughman, though generally regarded as the pattern of stupidity and ignorance, is seldom defective in this judgment and discretion. He is less accustomed, indeed, to social intercourse, than the mechanic who lives in a town. His voice and language are more uncouth, and more difficult to be understood by those who are not used to them. His understanding, however, being accustomed to consider a greater variety of objects, is generally much superior to that of the other, whose whole attention, from morning till night is commonly occupied in performing one or two very simple operations. How much the lower ranks of people in the country are really superior to those of the town, is well known to every man whom [Pg 54]either business or curiosity has led to converse much with both. In China and Indostan, accordingly, both the rank and the wages of country labourers are said to be superior to those of the greater part of artificers and manufacturers. They would probably be so everywhere, if corporation laws and the corporation spirit did not prevent it.

Not only does farming require skill and experience, but many lesser forms of rural labor demand much more talent than most mechanical trades. Someone working with brass and iron uses tools and materials that are generally uniform in quality. In contrast, a farmer who plows the land with a team of horses or oxen must deal with tools that can vary significantly in health, strength, and temperament depending on the day. The condition of the materials he works with is just as variable as that of the tools, both needing to be managed with careful judgment and discretion. The typical plowman, often seen as a symbol of ignorance, typically has good judgment and discretion. He may not socialize as much as a mechanic from the city, and his speech and language can seem rough and harder to understand for those not familiar with them. However, his understanding tends to be superior, as he considers a wider range of factors, while the mechanic often focuses on just one or two simple tasks throughout the day. Anyone who has spent time conversing with both rural and urban workers knows how much more capable the lower classes in the countryside can be compared to those in towns. In places like China and Indostan, it's noted that the status and pay of rural laborers are often higher than that of many artisans and factory workers. This would likely be the case everywhere if not for the restrictive corporation laws and corporate culture that maintain the divide.

The superiority which the industry of the towns has everywhere in Europe over that of the country, is not altogether owing to corporations and corporation laws. It is supported by many other regulations. The high duties upon foreign manufactures, and upon all goods imported by alien merchants, all tend to the same purpose. Corporation laws enable the inhabitants of towns to raise their prices, without fearing to be undersold by the free competition of their own countrymen. Those other regulations secure them equally against that of foreigners. The enhancement of price occasioned by both is everywhere finally paid by the landlords, farmers, and labourers, of the country, who have seldom opposed the establishment of such monopolies. They have commonly neither inclination nor fitness to enter into combinations; and the clamour and sophistry of merchants and manufacturers easily persuade them, that the private interest of a part, and of a subordinate part, of the society, is the general interest of the whole.

The advantage that urban industries have over rural ones throughout Europe isn't solely due to corporations and their laws. It's reinforced by many other regulations. High tariffs on foreign goods and on products imported by non-local merchants all contribute to the same goal. Corporation laws allow city residents to raise their prices without worrying about being undercut by competition from their fellow countrymen. These other regulations protect them just as effectively from foreign competition. The increased prices caused by both are ultimately paid by landlords, farmers, and laborers in the countryside, who rarely oppose such monopolies. They usually lack the desire or capability to form coalitions; and the loud arguments and misleading claims from merchants and manufacturers easily convince them that the private interests of a small, subordinate group benefit everyone.

In Great Britain, the superiority of the industry of the towns over that of the country seems to have been greater formerly than in the present times. The wages of country labour approach nearer to those of manufacturing labour, and the profits of stock employed in agriculture to those of trading and manufacturing stock, than they are said to have done in the last century, or in the beginning of the present. This change may be regarded as the necessary, though very late consequence of the extraordinary encouragement given to the industry of the towns. The stocks accumulated in them come in time to be so great, that it can no longer be employed with the ancient profit in that species of industry which in peculiar to them. That industry has its limits like every other; and the increase of stock, by increasing the competition, necessarily reduces the profit. The lowering of profit in the town forces out stock to the country, where, by creating a new demand for country labour, it necessarily raises its wages. It then spreads itself, if I may say so, over the face of the land, and, by being employed in agriculture, is in part restored to the country, at the expense of which, in a great measure, it had originally been accumulated in the town. That everywhere in Europe the greatest improvements of the country have been owing to such overflowings of the stock originally accumulated in the towns, I shall endeavour to shew hereafter, and at the same time to demonstrate, that though some countries have, by this course, attained to a considerable degree of opulence, it is in itself necessarily slow, uncertain, liable to be disturbed and interrupted by innumerable accidents, and, in every respect, contrary to the order of nature and reason. The interests, prejudices, laws, and customs, which have given occasion to it, I shall endeavour to explain as fully and distinctly as I can in the third and fourth books of this Inquiry.

In Great Britain, the superiority of urban industry over rural industry seems to have been greater in the past than it is today. The wages for rural labor are now closer to those for manufacturing labor, and the profits from agricultural investments are more comparable to those from trade and manufacturing than they were in the last century or at the start of this one. This shift can be seen as a necessary, albeit delayed, result of the significant support given to urban industry. The capital that accumulates in towns eventually becomes so substantial that it can no longer be used profitably in the types of industries unique to those areas. Like any industry, urban industry has its limits, and as capital increases and competition rises, profits inevitably decline. The decrease in profits in the city pushes capital into the countryside, which, by stimulating new demand for rural labor, boosts its wages. This capital then spreads out across the land and, by being put to use in agriculture, is partially returned to the countryside, from which it was largely accumulated in the city. I will show later that the most significant advancements in rural areas throughout Europe have resulted from such flows of capital initially gathered in cities. At the same time, I will demonstrate that while some countries have become quite wealthy through this process, it is inherently slow, uncertain, and subject to countless disruptions, and is fundamentally contrary to the natural order and reason. I will attempt to explain the interests, biases, laws, and customs that have led to this situation as thoroughly and clearly as I can in the third and fourth books of this Inquiry.

People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible, indeed, to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them necessary.

People in the same profession rarely get together, even for fun and enjoyment, without the conversation ending up as a plot against the public or some scheme to hike prices. It's actually impossible to stop these gatherings with any law that could be enforced or that would align with freedom and fairness. However, while the law can’t stop people in the same trade from occasionally meeting, it shouldn’t support these gatherings, let alone make them necessary.

A regulation which obliges all those of the same trade in a particular town to enter their names and places of abode in a public register, facilitates such assemblies. It connects individuals who might never otherwise be known to one another, and gives every man of the trade a direction where to find every other man of it.

A rule that requires everyone in the same trade in a specific town to register their names and addresses in a public register makes these gatherings easier. It links people who might never meet each other otherwise and provides each person in the trade a way to find every other person in it.

A regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves, in order to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage, renders such assemblies necessary.

A rule that allows people in the same trade to tax themselves to support their poor, sick, widows, and orphans, by creating a shared interest to manage, makes these gatherings essential.

An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but make the act of the majority binding upon the whole. In a free trade, an effectual combination cannot be established but by the unanimous consent of every single trader, and it cannot last longer than every single trader continues of the same mind. The majority of a corporation can enact a bye-law, with proper penalties, which will limit the competition more effectually and more durably than any voluntary combination whatever.

An incorporation not only makes them necessary, but also makes the decisions of the majority binding on everyone. In a free market, an effective cooperation can only be formed with the unanimous agreement of every single trader, and it can only last as long as every single trader stays on the same page. The majority of a corporation can create a bylaw, with appropriate penalties, that will restrict competition more effectively and more sustainably than any voluntary agreement.

The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better government of the trade, is without any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which is exercised over a workman, is not that of his corporation, but that of his customers. It is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclusive corporation necessarily weakens the force of this discipline. A particular set of workmen must then be employed, let them behave well or ill. It is upon this account that, in many large incorporated towns, no tolerable workmen are to be found, even in some of the most necessary trades. If you would have your work tolerably executed, it must be done in the[Pg 55] suburbs, where the workmen, having no exclusive privilege, have nothing but their character to depend upon, and you must then smuggle it into the town as well as you can.

The idea that corporations are essential for better managing trade is baseless. The real and effective control over a worker comes not from their corporation but from their customers. It's the fear of losing their job that keeps them honest and corrects their mistakes. An exclusive corporation weakens this control. A particular group of workers must be used, regardless of how they perform. This is why, in many large incorporated towns, you can’t find decent workers, even in the most important trades. If you want your work done well, it has to be done in the[Pg 55] suburbs, where workers have no exclusive privileges and rely solely on their reputation, and then you have to sneak it into the town as best you can.

It is in this manner that the policy of Europe, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them, occasions a very important inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock.

It’s like this: Europe’s policy, by limiting the competition for certain jobs to fewer people than would normally be interested, creates a significant imbalance in the overall benefits and drawbacks of different jobs and investments.

Secondly, The policy of Europe, by increasing the competition in some employments beyond what it naturally would be, occasions another inequality, of an opposite kind, in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock.

Secondly, the policy of Europe, by increasing competition in certain jobs beyond what would naturally occur, creates another type of inequality in the overall advantages and disadvantages of different forms of labor and investment.

It has been considered as of so much importance that a proper number of young people should be educated for certain professions, that sometimes the public, and sometimes the piety of private founders, have established many pensions, scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, &c. for this purpose, which draw many more people into those trades than could otherwise pretend to follow them. In all Christian countries, I believe, the education of the greater part of churchmen is paid for in this manner. Very few of them are educated altogether at their own expense. The long, tedious, and expensive education, therefore, of those who are, will not always procure them a suitable reward, the church being crowded with people, who, in order to get employment, are willing to accept of a much smaller recompence than what such an education would otherwise have entitled them to; and in this manner the competition of the poor takes away the reward of the rich. It would be indecent, no doubt, to compare either a curate or a chaplain with a journeyman in any common trade. The pay of a curate or chaplain, however, may very properly be considered as of the same nature with the wages of a journeyman. They are all three paid for their work according to the contract which they may happen to make with their respective superiors. Till after the middle of the fourteenth century, five merks, containing about as much silver as ten pounds of our present money, was in England the usual pay of a curate or a stipendiary parish priest, as we find it regulated by the decrees of several different national councils. At the same period, fourpence a-day, containing the same quantity of silver as a shilling of our present money, was declared to be the pay of a master mason; and threepence a-day, equal to ninepence of our present money, that of a journeyman mason[13]. The wages of both these labourers, therefore, supposing them to have been constantly employed, were much superior to those of the curate. The wages of the master mason, supposing him to have been without employment one-third of the year, would have fully equalled them. By the 12th of Queen Anne, c. 12. it is declared, 'That whereas, for want of sufficient maintenance and encouragement to curates, the cures have, in several places, been meanly supplied, the bishop is, therefore, empowered to appoint, by writing under his hand and seal, a sufficient certain stipend or allowance, not exceeding fifty, and not less than twenty pounds a-year.' Forty pounds a-year is reckoned at present very good pay for a curate; and, notwithstanding this act of parliament, there are many curacies under twenty pounds a-year. There are journeymen shoemakers in London who earn forty pounds a-year, and there is scarce an industrious workman of any kind in that metropolis who does not earn more than twenty. This last sum, indeed, does not exceed what is frequently earned by common labourers in many country parishes. Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it has always been rather to lower them than to raise them. But the law has, upon many occasions, attempted to raise the wages of curates, and, for the dignity of the church, to oblige the rectors of parishes to give them more than the wretched maintenance which they themselves might be willing to accept of. And, in both cases, the law seems to have been equally ineffectual, and has never either been able to raise the wages of curates, or to sink those of labourers to the degree that was intended; because it has never been able to hinder either the one from being willing to accept of less than the legal allowance, on account of the indigence of their situation and the multitude of their competitors, or the other from receiving more, on account of the contrary competition of those who expected to derive either profit or pleasure from employing them.

It has been seen as very important that a sufficient number of young people be educated for specific professions, which has led the public and private benefactors to established various grants, scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc., for this purpose, attracting many more individuals into these fields than would otherwise be able to pursue them. In all Christian countries, I believe, most church members are educated through this method. Very few pay for their education entirely out of their own pockets. Therefore, the lengthy, demanding, and costly education that those who do will not always guarantee them a fitting reward, as the church is filled with people willing to accept much lower pay than their education would typically merit in order to secure employment. This situation means that the competition among the less fortunate diminishes the rewards for those who are better off. It's obviously inappropriate to compare a curate or a chaplain to a laborer in any common trade. However, the pay for a curate or chaplain can rightly be viewed as similar to that of a laborer. All three are compensated for their work according to the agreements they make with their respective superiors. Until after the mid-14th century, five merks (equivalent to about ten pounds in today’s money) was the usual pay for a curate or a paid parish priest, as determined by the rulings of several national councils. During the same period, the daily wage of a master mason was set at fourpence (equal to one shilling in today’s currency), while a journeyman mason earned threepence a day (equivalent to ninepence today). Therefore, the wages of both types of laborers, assuming they had constant work, were significantly higher than those of the curate. If the master mason was unemployed for a third of the year, his earnings would still be comparable to that of the curate. According to the 12th of Queen Anne, c. 12, it is stated, "That since, due to insufficient support and incentives for curates, many churches have been poorly staffed, the bishop is therefore authorized to designate, in writing under his hand and seal, a definite stipend or allowance, not exceeding fifty pounds and not less than twenty pounds per year." Today, forty pounds a year is considered quite good pay for a curate, and despite this parliamentary act, many curacies offer less than twenty pounds a year. There are journeymen shoemakers in London earning forty pounds a year, and hardly any diligent worker in that city earns less than twenty. This last figure indeed matches what many ordinary laborers earn in various rural parishes. Whenever the law has tried to regulate worker wages, it has typically aimed to reduce them rather than increase them. Yet, on numerous occasions, the law has sought to raise the wages of curates and, for the sake of the church's dignity, to compel parish rectors to provide them more than the miserable support they might otherwise agree to. In both situations, the law has proven equally ineffective and has never managed to raise the wages of curates or lower those of laborers as intended. This is because it has never been able to stop either group from accepting less than the legal minimum due to their financial struggles and the high number of competitors, or prevent the other from earning more due to competing demands from those who stand to gain either profit or pleasure by employing them.

The great benefices and other ecclesiastical dignities support the honour of the church, notwithstanding the mean circumstances of some of its inferior members. The respect paid to the profession, too, makes some compensation even to them for the meanness of their pecuniary recompence. In England, and in all Roman catholic countries, the lottery of the church is in reality much more advantageous than is necessary. The example of the churches of Scotland, of Geneva, and of several other protestant churches, may satisfy us, that in so creditable a profession, in which education is so easily procured, the hopes of much more moderate benefices will draw a sufficient number of learned, decent, and respectable men into holy orders.

The significant benefits and other church positions uphold the dignity of the church, even with the modest circumstances of some of its lower-ranking members. The respect given to the profession also provides some compensation for the low financial rewards they receive. In England and all Roman Catholic countries, the prospects within the church are actually much better than necessary. The examples of the churches in Scotland, Geneva, and several other Protestant churches show us that in such a reputable profession, where education is easily accessible, the promise of more modest benefits will attract a sufficient number of knowledgeable, decent, and respectable individuals into the ministry.

In professions in which there are no benefices, such as law and physic, if an equal proportion of people were educated at the public expense, the competition would soon be so[Pg 56] great as to sink very much their pecuniary reward. It might then not be worth any man's while to educate his son to either of those professions at his own expense. They would be entirely abandoned to such as had been educated by those public charities, whose numbers and necessities would oblige them in general to content themselves with a very miserable recompence, to the entire degradation of the now respectable professions of law and physic.

In fields like law and medicine, if a similar number of people were educated at the public's expense, the competition would quickly become so[Pg 56] intense that it would significantly lower their financial rewards. It might not be worthwhile for anyone to pay for their son's education in these professions. They would be completely left to those who were educated through public assistance, whose large numbers and needs would force them to settle for very low pay, leading to the complete decline of what are now respected professions in law and medicine.

That unprosperous race of men, commonly called men of letters, are pretty much in the situation which lawyers and physicians probably would be in, upon the foregoing supposition. In every part of Europe, the greater part of them have been educated for the church, but have been hindered by different reasons from entering into holy orders. They have generally, therefore, been educated at the public expense; and their numbers are everywhere so great, as commonly to reduce the price of their labour to a very paltry recompence.

That struggling group of people, often referred to as intellectuals, is pretty much in the same position that lawyers and doctors would likely find themselves in under the circumstances mentioned earlier. Throughout Europe, most of them have been trained for the church but have been prevented from taking holy orders for various reasons. As a result, they have typically been educated at the public's expense, and their numbers are so large that they usually drive down the value of their work to a very low compensation.

Before the invention of the art of printing, the only employment by which a man of letters could make any thing by his talents, was that of a public or private teacher, or by communicating to other people the curious and useful knowledge which he had acquired himself; and this is still surely a more honourable, a more useful, and, in general, even a more profitable employment than that other of writing for a bookseller, to which the art of printing has given occasion. The time and study, the genius, knowledge, and application requisite to qualify an eminent teacher of the sciences, are at least equal to what is necessary for the greatest practitioners in law and physic. But the usual reward of the eminent teacher bears no proportion to that of the lawyer or physician, because the trade of the one is crowded with indigent people, who have been brought up to it at the public expense; whereas those of the other two are encumbered with very few who have not been educated at their own. The usual recompence, however, of public and private teachers, small as it may appear, would undoubtedly be less than it is, if the competition of those yet more indigent men of letters, who write for bread, was not taken out of the market. Before the invention of the art of printing, a scholar and a beggar seem to have been terms very nearly synonymous. The different governors of the universities, before that time, appear to have often granted licences to their scholars to beg.

Before the invention of printing, the only way a literate person could make a living from their talents was by being a public or private teacher, or by sharing the interesting and useful knowledge they had gained. Even today, this profession is certainly more honorable, more useful, and generally even more profitable than writing for a bookseller, which has become common due to the invention of printing. The time, effort, talent, knowledge, and dedication needed to become a great teacher in the sciences are at least equal to what is required for top professionals in law and medicine. However, the typical pay for an outstanding teacher is significantly less than that of a lawyer or doctor, because the teaching profession is filled with people who have been educated at public expense, while the other two fields have very few who haven't paid for their own education. The typical compensation for public and private teachers, though it may seem small, would likely be even lower if it weren't for the competition from even needier writers who write just to survive. Before printing was invented, being a scholar was almost synonymous with being a beggar. The various leaders of universities during that time often granted licenses to their students to beg.

In ancient times, before any charities of this kind had been established for the education of indigent people to the learned professions, the rewards of eminent teachers appear to have been much more considerable. Isocrates, in what is called his discourse against the sophists, reproaches the teachers of his own times with inconsistency. "They make the most magnificent promises to their scholars," says he, "and undertake to teach them to be wise, to be happy, and to be just; and, in return for so important a service, they stipulate the paltry reward of four or five minæ." "They who teach wisdom," continues he, "ought certainly to be wise themselves; but if any man were to sell such a bargain for such a price, he would be convicted of the most evident folly." He certainly does not mean here to exaggerate the reward, and we may be assured that it was not less than he represents it. Four minæ were equal to thirteen pounds six shillings and eightpence; five minæ to sixteen pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence.—Something not less than the largest of those two sums, therefore, must at that time have been usually paid to the most eminent teachers at Athens. Isocrates himself demanded ten minæ, or L.33 : 6 : 8 from each scholar. When he taught at Athens, he is said to have had a hundred scholars. I understand this to be the number whom he taught at one time, or who attended what we would call one course of lectures; a number which will not appear extraordinary from so great a city to so famous a teacher, who taught, too, what was at that time the most fashionable of all sciences, rhetoric. He must have made, therefore, by each course of lectures, a thousand minæ, or L.3333 : 6 : 8. A thousand minæ, accordingly, is said by Plutarch, in another place, to have been his didactron, or usual price of teaching. Many other eminent teachers in those times appear to have acquired great fortunes. Georgias made a present to the temple of Delphi of his own statue in solid gold. We must not, I presume, suppose that it was as large as the life. His way of living, as well as that of Hippias and Protagoras, two other eminent teachers of those times, is represented by Plato as splendid, even to ostentation. Plato himself is said to have lived with a good deal of magnificence. Aristotle, after having been tutor to Alexander, and most munificently rewarded, as it is universally agreed, both by him and his father, Philip, thought it worth while, notwithstanding, to return to Athens, in order to resume the teaching of his school. Teachers of the sciences were probably in those times less common than they came to be in an age or two afterwards, when the competition had probably somewhat reduced both the price of their labour and the admiration for their persons. The most eminent of them, however, appear always to have enjoyed a degree of consideration much superior to any of the like profession in the present times. The Athenians sent Carneades the academic, and Diogenes the stoic, upon a solemn embassy to Rome; and though their city had then declined from its former grandeur, it was still an independent and considerable republic.[Pg 57] Carneades, too, was a Babylonian by birth; and as there never was a people more jealous of admitting foreigners to public offices than the Athenians, their consideration for him must have been very great.

In ancient times, before any charities for educating underprivileged people for the learned professions were set up, the rewards for distinguished teachers seemed to be much greater. Isocrates, in his discourse against the sophists, criticizes the teachers of his day for being inconsistent. "They make the grandest promises to their students," he says, "and claim they will teach them to be wise, happy, and just; and in exchange for such an important service, they accept the meager reward of four or five minæ." "Those who teach wisdom," he continues, "should certainly be wise themselves; but if anyone were to offer such a deal for such a price, they would clearly be guilty of the greatest foolishness." He doesn't mean to exaggerate the reward, and we can be sure that it was at least as he describes. Four minæ were equal to thirteen pounds six shillings and eight pence; five minæ equaled sixteen pounds thirteen shillings and four pence. Therefore, something no less than the larger of those two amounts must have typically been paid to the most prominent teachers in Athens at that time. Isocrates himself demanded ten minæ, or £33 : 6 : 8 from each student. When he taught in Athens, it is said he had a hundred students. I understand this to mean the number he taught at one time, or those who attended what we would call one course of lectures; a figure that wouldn’t seem unusual for such a large city with such a famous teacher, who also taught what was the most popular field of study then, rhetoric. Therefore, he must have earned a thousand minæ, or £3,333 : 6 : 8 from each course of lectures. A thousand minæ, in fact, is said by Plutarch in another context to have been his usual teaching fee. Many other notable teachers at that time also seemed to amass great wealth. Georgias donated a solid gold statue of himself to the temple of Delphi. I assume it wasn’t life-sized. His lifestyle, along with that of Hippias and Protagoras, two other prominent teachers of the time, was depicted by Plato as extravagant, bordering on ostentatious. Plato himself reportedly lived quite lavishly. Aristotle, after being a tutor to Alexander and receiving generous compensation, as is widely acknowledged from both him and his father, Philip, still found it worthwhile to return to Athens to continue teaching his school. Teachers of the sciences were likely less common back then than they became a generation or two later, when competition likely reduced both the price of their services and the admiration for their roles. However, the most distinguished among them always seemed to enjoy a level of respect much higher than that of similar professionals today. The Athenians sent Carneades the Academic and Diogenes the Stoic on a formal mission to Rome; and although their city had diminished from its former glory, it remained an independent and significant republic. Carneades was also originally from Babylon, and since there has never been a people more protective about allowing foreigners into public offices than the Athenians, their esteem for him must have been very high.[Pg 57]

This inequality is, upon the whole, perhaps rather advantageous than hurtful to the public. It may somewhat degrade the profession of a public teacher; but the cheapness of literary education is surely an advantage which greatly overbalances this trifling inconveniency. The public, too, might derive still greater benefit from it, if the constitution of those schools and colleges, in which education is carried on, was more reasonable than it is at present through the greater part of Europe.

This inequality is, on the whole, maybe more beneficial than harmful to the public. It might lower the status of the teaching profession, but the affordability of education in the arts is definitely a benefit that outweighs this minor drawback. The public could also gain even more advantages if the structure of schools and colleges where education is provided were more sensible than it currently is in most of Europe.

Thirdly, the policy of Europe, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment, and from place to place, occasions, in some cases, a very inconvenient inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of their different employments.

Thirdly, Europe's policy, by blocking the free movement of labor and resources, both from job to job and from location to location, leads to a frustrating imbalance in the overall benefits and drawbacks of their various jobs.

The statute of apprenticeship obstructs the free circulation of labour from one employment to another, even in the same place. The exclusive privileges of corporations obstruct it from one place to another, even in the same employment.

The apprenticeship law hinders the free movement of workers from one job to another, even within the same location. The special privileges of corporations restrict this movement from one place to another, even within the same job.

It frequently happens, that while high wages are given to the workmen in one manufacture, those in another are obliged to content themselves with bare subsistence. The one is in an advancing state, and has therefore a continual demand for new hands; the other is in a declining state, and the superabundance of hands is continually increasing. Those two manufactures may sometimes be in the same town, and sometimes in the same neighbourhood, without being able to lend the least assistance to one another. The statute of apprenticeship may oppose it in the one case, and both that and an exclusive corporation in the other. In many different manufactures, however, the operations are so much alike, that the workmen could easily change trades with one another, if those absurd laws did not hinder them. The arts of weaving plain linen and plain silk, for example, are almost entirely the same. That of weaving plain woollen is somewhat different; but the difference is so insignificant, that either a linen or a silk weaver might become a tolerable workman in a very few days. If any of those three capital manufactures, therefore, were decaying, the workmen might find a resource in one of the other two which was in a more prosperous condition; and their wages would neither rise too high in the thriving, nor sink too low in the decaying manufacture. The linen manufacture, indeed, is in England, by a particular statute, open to every body; but as it is not much cultivated through the greater part of the country, it can afford no general resource to the workmen of other decaying manufactures, who, wherever the statute of apprenticeship takes place, have no other choice, but either to come upon the parish, or to work as common labourers; for which, by their habits, they are much worse qualified than for any sort of manufacture that bears any resemblance to their own. They generally, therefore, chuse to come upon the parish.

It often happens that while workers in one industry earn high wages, those in another have to settle for barely enough to live on. One industry is growing and constantly needs new workers, while the other is shrinking, leading to an ever-increasing surplus of labor. Sometimes these two industries are located in the same town or neighborhood, yet they can't help each other at all. In one case, restrictions like apprenticeship laws may prevent it, and in the other, exclusive rights granted to a corporation can block any assistance. However, many different industries have similar processes, so workers could easily switch trades if those ridiculous laws didn't get in the way. For example, weaving plain linen and plain silk is almost the same. Weaving plain wool is a bit different, but the difference is minor enough that a linen or silk weaver could become a decent wool weaver in just a few days. So, if any of these three major industries were declining, workers could seek opportunities in one of the other two that were doing better. Their wages wouldn't shoot too high in the successful industry or drop too low in the failing one. The linen industry in England is, due to a specific law, open to everyone; however, because it's not widely practiced across much of the country, it doesn’t provide a general fallback for workers from other failing industries. Those workers, where the apprenticeship law applies, have no other choice but to rely on public assistance or work as unskilled laborers, for which, due to their background, they are much less suited than for any type of job that resembles their own. Therefore, they typically choose to rely on public assistance.

Whatever obstructs the free circulation of labour from one employment to another, obstructs that of stock likewise; the quantity of stock which can be employed in any branch of business depending very much upon that of the labour which can be employed in it. Corporation laws, however, give less obstruction to the free circulation of stock from one place to another, than to that of labour. It is everywhere much easier for a wealthy merchant to obtain the privilege of trading in a town-corporate, than for a poor artificer to obtain that of working in it.

Anything that hinders the free movement of labor from one job to another also hinders the movement of capital. The amount of capital that can be used in any sector largely depends on the amount of labor that can be utilized in it. However, corporate laws create less of a barrier for the free movement of capital from one place to another than they do for labor. It’s generally much easier for a wealthy merchant to get permission to trade in a corporate town than for a struggling worker to get permission to work there.

The obstruction which corporation laws give to the free circulation of labour is common, I believe, to every part of Europe. That which is given to it by the poor laws is, so far as I know, peculiar to England. It consists in the difficulty which a poor man finds in obtaining a settlement, or even in being allowed to exercise his industry in any parish but that to which he belongs. It is the labour of artificers and manufacturers only of which the free circulation is obstructed by corporation laws. The difficulty of obtaining settlements obstructs even that of common labour. It may be worth while to give some account of the rise, progress, and present state of this disorder, the greatest, perhaps, of any in the police of England.

The restrictions imposed by corporation laws on the free movement of labor are, I believe, found throughout Europe. However, the limitations set by poor laws are, as far as I know, unique to England. These laws create challenges for a poor person trying to secure a settlement or even to work in any parish other than their own. It’s only the labor of skilled workers and manufacturers that faces these restrictions from corporation laws. The challenges of securing settlements also hinder even the most basic types of labor. It might be worthwhile to discuss the origins, development, and current state of this issue, which is perhaps the most significant problem in the administration of England.

When, by the destruction of monasteries, the poor had been deprived of the charity of those religious houses, after some other ineffectual attempts for their relief, it was enacted, by the 43d of Elizabeth, c. 2. that every parish should be bound to provide for its own poor, and that overseers of the poor should be annually appointed, who, with the church-wardens, should raise, by a parish rate, competent sums for this purpose.

When the destruction of monasteries cut off the poor from the charity of those religious houses, and after several unsuccessful attempts to help them, it was established by the 43rd of Elizabeth, c. 2, that each parish had to take care of its own poor. It mandated the annual appointment of overseers of the poor, who, along with the church wardens, would collect sufficient funds for this purpose through a parish rate.

By this statute, the necessity of providing for their own poor was indispensably imposed upon every parish. Who were to be considered as the poor of each parish became, therefore, a question of some importance. This question, after some variation, was at last determined by the 13th and 14th of Charles II. when it was enacted, that forty days undisturbed residence should gain any person a settlement in any parish; but that within that time it should be lawful for two justices of the peace, upon complaint made by the church-wardens or overseers of the poor, to remove any new inhabitant to the parish where he was last legally settled; unless he either rented a tenement of ten pounds[Pg 58] a-year, or could give such security for the discharge of the parish where he was then living, as those justices should judge sufficient.

By this law, every parish was required to take care of its own poor. Determining who counted as the poor in each parish became an important issue. This issue, after some changes, was finally settled by the 13th and 14th of Charles II, when it was established that anyone who lived in a parish undisturbed for forty days would gain a legal settlement there. However, during that time, two justices of the peace could, upon a complaint from the church wardens or overseers of the poor, remove any new resident back to the parish where they were last legally settled, unless that person either rented a property worth ten pounds a year or could provide sufficient security for the support of the parish where they were living, as determined by those justices.

Some frauds, it is said, were committed in consequence of this statute; parish officers sometimes bribing their own poor to go clandestinely to another parish, and, by keeping themselves concealed for forty days, to gain a settlement there, to the discharge of that to which they properly belonged. It was enacted, therefore, by the 1st of James II. that the forty days undisturbed residence of any person necessary to gain a settlement, should be accounted only from the time of his delivering notice, in writing, of the place of his abode and the number of his family, to one of the church-wardens or overseers of the parish where he came to dwell.

Some scams, it’s said, happened because of this law; local officials would sometimes pay their own poor people to secretly move to another parish and, by staying hidden for forty days, secure a settlement there, leaving behind the parish they actually belonged to. So, it was established by the 1st of James II that the forty days of uninterrupted residence required for someone to gain a settlement would only start counting from the moment they gave written notice of their address and the number of people in their household to one of the churchwardens or overseers of the parish where they were settling.

But parish officers, it seems, were not always more honest with regard to their own than they had been with regard to other parishes, and sometimes connived at such intrusions, receiving the notice, and taking no proper steps in consequence of it. As every person in a parish, therefore, was supposed to have an interest to prevent as much as possible their being burdened by such intruders, it was further enacted by the 3d of William III. that the forty days residence should be accounted only from the publication of such notice in writing on Sunday in the church, immediately after divine service.

But it seems that parish officers were not always more honest about their own parish than they were about others, and sometimes they looked the other way when it came to such intrusions, simply receiving the notice and not taking any proper action as a result. Since everyone in a parish was expected to have an interest in preventing as many intruders as possible, it was also enacted by the 3rd of William III that the forty-day residency would only be counted from the announcement of such notice in writing on Sunday in the church, right after the service.

"After all," says Doctor Burn, "this kind of settlement, by continuing forty days after publication of notice in writing, is very seldom obtained; and the design of the acts is not so much for gaining of settlements, as for the avoiding of them by persons coming into a parish clandestinely, for the giving of notice is only putting a force upon the parish to remove. But if a person's situation is such, that it is doubtful whether he is actually removable or not, he shall, by giving of notice, compel the parish either to allow him a settlement uncontested, by suffering him to continue forty days, or by removing him to try the right."

"After all," says Doctor Burn, "this type of settlement, which lasts for forty days after a written notice is published, is rarely achieved; the purpose of the laws is not so much to secure settlements as to prevent them for people who come into a parish secretly, since giving notice just forces the parish to act. However, if a person's situation is uncertain, making it unclear whether they can be removed or not, they can give notice to compel the parish to either grant them a settlement without contest by allowing them to stay for forty days, or to remove them to resolve the issue."

This statute, therefore, rendered it almost impracticable for a poor man to gain a new settlement in the old way, by forty days inhabitancy. But that it might not appear to preclude altogether the common people of one parish from ever establishing themselves with security in another, it appointed four other ways by which a settlement might be gained without any notice delivered or published. The first was, by being taxed to parish rates and paying them; the second, by being elected into an annual parish office, and serving in it a year; the third, by serving an apprenticeship in the parish; the fourth, by being hired into service there for a year, and continuing in the same service during the whole of it.

This law made it nearly impossible for a poor person to establish a new residence the traditional way, which required living there for forty days. However, to ensure that common people from one parish could still settle securely in another, the law specified four alternative ways to gain settlement without any notice being given or published. The first way was by being taxed for parish rates and actually paying them; the second was by being elected to an annual parish position and serving for a year; the third was by completing an apprenticeship in the parish; and the fourth was by being hired for a year of service and maintaining that service throughout the entire year.

Nobody can gain a settlement by either of the first two ways, but by the public deed of the whole parish, who are too well aware of the consequences to adopt any new-comer, who has nothing but his labour to support him, either by taxing him to parish rates, or by electing him into a parish office.

Nobody can get a settlement through either of the first two methods, but only through the public agreement of the entire parish, who are well aware of the consequences of accepting any newcomer who only has his labor to rely on, whether by taxing him for parish rates or by electing him to a parish position.

No married man can well gain any settlement in either of the two last ways. An apprentice is scarce ever married; and it is expressly enacted, that no married servant shall gain any settlement by being hired for a year. The principal effect of introducing settlement by service, has been to put out in a great measure the old fashion of hiring for a year; which before had been so customary in England, that even at this day, if no particular term is agreed upon, the law intends that every servant is hired for a year. But masters are not always willing to give their servants a settlement by hiring them in this manner; and servants are not always willing to be so hired, because, as every last settlement discharges all the foregoing, they might thereby lose their original settlement in the places of their nativity, the habitation of their parents and relations.

No married man can really gain any settlement through either of the last two ways. An apprentice is hardly ever married, and it's clearly stated that no married worker can gain any settlement by being hired for a year. The main effect of introducing settlement by service has been to largely replace the old practice of hiring for a year, which used to be so common in England that even today, if no specific term is agreed upon, the law assumes that every worker is hired for a year. But employers are not always willing to provide their workers a settlement by hiring them this way; and workers are not always willing to be hired like this because, since each new settlement cancels out all previous ones, they might end up losing their original settlement in their birthplace, where their parents and relatives live.

No independent workman, it is evident, whether labourer or artificer, is likely to gain any new settlement, either by apprenticeship or by service. When such a person, therefore, carried his industry to a new parish, he was liable to be removed, how healthy and industrious soever, at the caprice of any church-warden or overseer, unless he either rented a tenement of ten pounds a-year, a thing impossible for one who has nothing but his labour to live by, or could give such security for the discharge of the parish as two justices of the peace should judge sufficient.

No independent worker, whether a laborer or a craftsman, is likely to gain a new settlement, either through apprenticeship or employment. Therefore, when such a person moves to a new parish, they can be forced to leave, no matter how healthy and hard-working they are, based on the whims of any churchwarden or overseer. This is unless they could either rent a property costing ten pounds a year, which is impossible for someone who relies solely on their labor for income, or provide security for the parish's obligations that two justices of the peace would find adequate.

What security they shall require, indeed, is left altogether to their discretion; but they cannot well require less than thirty pounds, it having been enacted, that the purchase even of a freehold estate of less than thirty pounds value, shall not gain any person a settlement, as not being sufficient for the discharge of the parish. But this is a security which scarce any man who lives by labour can give; and much greater security is frequently demanded.

What security they will require is entirely up to them; however, they can't really ask for less than thirty pounds, since it has been established that buying even a freehold estate valued at less than thirty pounds won't give anyone a settlement, as it isn't enough to support the parish. But this is a security that hardly anyone who works for a living can provide; often, even more security is required.

In order to restore, in some measure, that free circulation of labour which those different statutes had almost entirely taken away, the invention of certificates was fallen upon. By the 8th and 9th of William III. it was enacted that if any person should bring a certificate from the parish where he was last legally settled, subscribed by the church-wardens and overseers of the poor, and allowed by two justices of the peace, that every other parish should be obliged to receive him; that he should not be removable merely upon account of his being likely to become chargeable, but only upon his becoming actually chargeable; and that then the parish which granted the certificate should be obliged to pay the expense both of his maintenance, and of his re[Pg 59]moval. And in order to give the most perfect security to the parish where such certificated man should come to reside, it was further enacted by the same statute, that he should gain no settlement there by any means whatever, except either by renting a tenement of ten pounds a-year, or by serving upon his account in an annual parish office for one whole year; and consequently neither by notice nor by service, nor by apprenticeship, nor by paying parish rates. By the 12th of Queen Anne, too, stat. 1, c. 18, it was further enacted, that neither the servants nor apprentices of such certificated man should gain any settlement in the parish where he resided under such certificate.

To help bring back some of the free movement of labor that those different laws had nearly eliminated, the idea of certificates was created. By the 8th and 9th of William III, it was established that if anyone presented a certificate from the parish where they had last been legally settled, signed by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor and approved by two justices of the peace, every other parish had to accept them. They could not be removed just because they might become a burden; only if they actually did become a burden could they be removed, in which case the parish that issued the certificate would have to cover both their maintenance and the cost of their removal. Additionally, to ensure complete security for the parish where the certificated person was living, the same law stated that they would not gain any settlement there through any means, except by renting a property worth ten pounds a year or by serving in a parish position for an entire year. This meant they could not gain a settlement through notice, service, apprenticeship, or paying parish rates. Moreover, by the 12th of Queen Anne, stat. 1, c. 18, it was also established that neither the servants nor apprentices of such a certificated person could gain any settlement in the parish where they lived under that certificate.

How far this invention has restored that free circulation of labour, which the preceding statutes had almost entirely taken away, we may learn from the following very judicious observation of Doctor Burn. "It is obvious," says he, "that there are divers good reasons for requiring certificates with persons coming to settle in any place; namely, that persons residing under them can gain no settlement, neither by apprenticeship, nor by service, nor by giving notice, nor by paying parish rates; that they can settle neither apprentices nor servants; that if they become chargeable, it is certainly known whither to remove them, and the parish shall be paid for the removal, and for their maintenance in the mean time; and that, if they fall sick, and cannot be removed, the parish which gave the certificate must maintain them, none of all which can be without a certificate. Which reasons will hold proportionably for parishes not granting certificates in ordinary cases; for it is far more than an equal chance, but that they will have the certificated persons again, and in a worse condition." The moral of this observation seems to be, that certificates ought always to be required by the parish where any poor man comes to reside, and that they ought very seldom to be granted by that which he purposes to leave. "There is somewhat of hardship in this matter of certificates," says the same very intelligent author, in his History of the Poor Laws, "by putting it in the power of a parish officer to imprison a man as it were for life, however inconvenient it may be for him to continue at that place where he has had the misfortune to acquire what is called a settlement, or whatever advantage he may propose to himself by living elsewhere."

How much this invention has restored the free movement of labor, which previous laws had nearly eliminated, can be seen in this insightful observation by Doctor Burn. "It's clear," he says, "that there are several good reasons for requiring certificates from people coming to settle in any area; specifically, that those living there cannot gain any legal rights to settle, whether by apprenticeship, service, giving notice, or paying taxes; they can't settle apprentices or employees either; if they become a financial burden, it's known exactly where to send them, and the parish will be reimbursed for the removal and their care in the meantime; and if they get sick and can't be moved, the parish that issued the certificate must take care of them—all of which requires a certificate. These reasons apply similarly to parishes that don’t issue certificates in regular cases; it’s a lot more than a fair chance that they’ll end up with the certified individuals again, likely in worse situations." The takeaway from this observation seems to be that parishes should always require certificates from any impoverished person looking to settle there, and they should rarely grant certificates to those leaving. "There is a certain unfairness in this certificate system," says the same insightful author in his History of the Poor Laws, "by allowing a parish official to essentially imprison a person for life, regardless of how difficult it may be for them to stay in the place where they've had the misfortune of becoming what’s called settled, or whatever benefits they might hope to gain by living elsewhere."

Though a certificate carries along with it no testimonial of good behaviour, and certifies nothing but that the person belongs to the parish to which he really does belong, it is altogether discretionary in the parish officers either to grant or to refuse it. A mandamus was once moved for, says Doctor Burn, to compel the church-wardens and overseers to sign a certificate; but the Court of King's Bench rejected the motion as a very strange attempt.

Although a certificate does not serve as proof of good behavior and only confirms that a person is part of the parish they actually belong to, it is entirely up to the parish officers whether to issue it or not. Doctor Burn recalls that a mandamus was once requested to force the church wardens and overseers to sign a certificate, but the Court of King's Bench dismissed the motion as a rather odd request.

The very unequal price of labour which we frequently find in England, in places at no great distance from one another, is probably owing to the obstruction which the law of settlements gives to a poor man who would carry his industry from one parish to another without a certificate. A single man, indeed, who is healthy and industrious, may sometimes reside by sufferance without one, but a man with a wife and family who should attempt to do so, would, in most parishes, be sure of being removed; and, if the single man should afterwards marry, he would generally be removed likewise. The scarcity of hands in one parish, therefore, cannot always be relieved by their superabundance in another, as it is constantly in Scotland, and, I believe, in all other countries where there is no difficulty of settlement. In such countries, though wages may sometimes rise a little in the neighbourhood of a great town, or wherever else there is an extraordinary demand for labour, and sink gradually as the distance from such places increases, till they fall back to the common rate of the country; yet we never meet with those sudden and unaccountable differences in the wages of neighbouring places which we sometimes find in England, where it is often more difficult for a poor man to pass the artificial boundary of a parish, than an arm of the sea, or a ridge of high mountains, natural boundaries which sometimes separate very distinctly different rates of wages in other countries.

The very unequal labor wages we often see in England, even in places that are close to each other, are likely due to the restrictions the law of settlements puts on poor individuals trying to move their work from one parish to another without a certificate. A healthy and hardworking single man might sometimes be able to stay in a parish without one, but a man with a wife and kids trying to do the same would usually get kicked out of most parishes. If the single man later decides to marry, he would typically be removed as well. Because of this, the lack of workers in one parish can't always be balanced out by the surplus in another, as it often is in Scotland and, I believe, in other countries where there are no settlement issues. In those countries, while wages might occasionally increase a bit near a big city or wherever there’s a high demand for labor, and gradually decrease as you move further away until they return to the average for the area; we don’t see those sudden and inexplicable differences in wages between nearby places that we sometimes find in England. There, it can often be more challenging for a poor person to cross the artificial boundary of a parish than to cross a stretch of sea or a range of high mountains, which naturally separate areas with very different wage rates in other countries.

To remove a man who has committed no misdemeanour, from the parish where he chooses to reside, is an evident violation of natural liberty and justice. The common people of England, however, so jealous of their liberty, but like the common people of most other countries, never rightly understanding wherein it consists, have now, for more than a century together, suffered themselves to be exposed to this oppression without a remedy. Though men of reflection, too, have sometimes complained of the law of settlements as a public grievance; yet it has never been the object of any general popular clamour, such as that against general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not likely to occasion any general oppression. There is scarce a poor man in England, of forty years of age, I will venture to say, who has not, in some part of his life, felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlements.

Removing a man who hasn’t done anything wrong from the area where he wants to live is a clear violation of natural freedom and justice. The everyday people of England, however, so protective of their freedom, much like common folks in many other countries, have never fully understood what that freedom really means. For over a century, they have allowed themselves to be subjected to this oppression without a solution. While thoughtful individuals have sometimes criticized the law of settlements as a public issue, it has never sparked widespread public outrage, unlike the issue with general warrants, which is definitely an abusive practice but not one likely to lead to mass oppression. I would bet that nearly every poor man in England who is forty or older has, at some point in his life, felt deeply wronged by this poorly designed law of settlements.

I shall conclude this long chapter with observing, that though anciently it was usual to rate wages, first by general laws extending over the whole kingdom, and afterwards by particular orders of the justices of peace in every particular county, both these practices have now gone entirely into disuse "By the experience of above four hundred years," says Doctor Burn, "it seems time to lay aside all[Pg 60] endeavours to bring under strict regulations, what in its own nature seems incapable of minute limitation; for if all persons in the same kind of work were to receive equal wages, there would be no emulation, and no room left for industry or ingenuity."

I’ll wrap up this long chapter by noting that while it used to be common to set wages first through general laws across the entire kingdom and then through specific orders from justices of the peace in each county, both of these practices are now completely outdated. "After over four hundred years of experience," says Doctor Burn, "it seems the time has come to abandon all[Pg 60] efforts to impose strict regulations on something that inherently resists detailed limitations; because if everyone doing the same kind of work earned the same wages, there would be no competition and no incentive for hard work or creativity."

Particular acts of parliament, however, still attempt sometimes to regulate wages in particular trades, and in particular places. Thus the 8th of George III. prohibits, under heavy penalties, all master tailors in London, and five miles round it, from giving, and their workmen from accepting, more than two shillings and sevenpence halfpenny a-day, except in the case of a general mourning. Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters. When the regulation, therefore, is in favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the masters. Thus the law which obliges the masters in several different trades to pay their workmen in money, and not in goods, is quite just and equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters. It only obliges them to pay that value in money, which they pretended to pay, but did not always really pay, in goods. This law is in favour of the workmen; but the 8th of George III. is in favour of the masters. When masters combine together, in order to reduce the wages of their workmen, they commonly enter into a private bond or agreement, not to give more than a certain wage, under a certain penalty. Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the same kind, not to accept of a certain wage, under a certain penalty, the law would punish them very severely, and, if it dealt impartially, it would treat the masters in the same manner. But the 8th of George III. enforces by law that very regulation which masters sometimes attempt to establish by such combinations. The complaint of the workmen, that it puts the ablest and most industrious upon the same footing with an ordinary workman, seems perfectly well founded.

Certain acts of parliament still try to control wages in specific trades and locations. For example, the 8th of George III. forbids all master tailors in London and a five-mile radius around it from paying, and their workers from accepting, more than two shillings and seven and a half pence a day, except during a period of general mourning. Whenever the government tries to regulate the relationship between employers and their workers, it always listens to the employers. Therefore, when the regulation benefits the workers, it is usually fair and just; however, this is not always the case when it favors the employers. For instance, the law that requires employers in various trades to pay their workers in money instead of goods is quite fair and just. It imposes no real burden on the employers. It merely requires them to pay in cash the value they claim to pay but don’t always actually provide in goods. This law favors the workers; however, the 8th of George III. favors the employers. When employers band together to lower the wages of their workers, they typically enter into a private agreement not to pay more than a certain wage, with penalties for non-compliance. If workers were to form a similar agreement not to accept a certain wage, with penalties for doing so, the law would punish them very harshly, and if it were fair, it would treat the employers the same way. But the 8th of George III. enforces, by law, the very regulation that employers sometimes try to establish through such agreements. The workers’ complaint that it levels the hardest-working and most skilled individuals with an ordinary worker seems completely valid.

In ancient times, too, it was usual to attempt to regulate the profits of merchants and other dealers, by regulating the price of provisions and other goods. The assize of bread is, so far as I know, the only remnant of this ancient usage. Where there is an exclusive corporation, it may, perhaps, he proper to regulate the price of the first necessary of life; but, where there is none, the competition will regulate it much better than any assize. The method of fixing the assize of bread, established by the 81st of George II. could not be put in practice in Scotland, on account of a defect in the law, its execution depending upon the office of clerk of the market, which does not exist there. This defect was not remedied till the third of George III. The want of an assize occasioned no sensible inconveniency; and the establishment of one in the few places where it has yet taken place has produced no sensible advantage. In the greater part of the towns in Scotland, however, there is an incorporation of bakers, who claim exclusive privileges, though they are not very strictly guarded.

In ancient times, it was common to try to control the profits of merchants and other sellers by regulating the prices of food and other goods. The regulation of bread prices is, as far as I know, the only remnant of this old practice. When there is a monopoly, it might make sense to set the price of essential goods; however, in other cases, competition will regulate prices much better than any system. The method for fixing bread prices, established by the 81st of George II, couldn't be implemented in Scotland due to a flaw in the law, as its execution depended on the position of clerk of the market, which doesn’t exist there. This issue wasn't fixed until the third of George III. The lack of a price regulation didn't cause any significant problems, and the introduction of one in the few places where it has occurred hasn't shown any real benefits. However, in most towns in Scotland, there is a bakers' association that claims exclusive rights, although these rights aren't very strictly enforced.

The proportion between the different rates, both of wages and profit, in the different employments of labour and stock, seems not to be much affected, as has already been observed, by the riches or poverty, the advancing, stationary, or declining state of the society. Such revolutions in the public welfare, though they affect the general rates both of wages and profit, must, in the end, affect them equally in all different employments. The proportion between them, therefore, must remain the same, and cannot well be altered, as least for any considerable time, by any such revolutions.

The ratio between different wage and profit rates across various jobs doesn't seem to change much, as noted before, regardless of whether society is wealthy or poor, or whether it's growing, stable, or declining. These significant shifts in public well-being may impact overall wage and profit rates, but ultimately, they affect them uniformly across all kinds of work. Therefore, the ratio between wages and profits should stay the same and isn't likely to be significantly altered by such changes for any extended period.


CHAP. XI.

OF THE RENT OF LAND.

Rent, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally the highest which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land. In adjusting the terms of the lease, the landlord endeavours to leave him no greater share of the produce than what is sufficient to keep up the stock from which he furnishes the seed, pays the labour, and purchases and maintains the cattle and other instruments of husbandry, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in the neighbourhood. This is evidently the smallest share with which the tenant can content himself, without being a loser, and the landlord seldom means to leave him any more. Whatever part of the produce, or, what is the same thing, whatever part of its price, is over and above this share, he naturally endeavours to reserve to himself as the rent of his land, which is evidently the highest the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land. Sometimes, indeed, the liberality, more frequently the ignorance, of the landlord, makes him accept of somewhat less than this portion; and sometimes, too, though more rarely, the ignorance of the tenant makes him undertake to pay somewhat more, or to content himself with somewhat less, than the ordinary profits of farming stock in the neighbourhood. This portion, however, may still be considered as the natural rent of land, or the rent at which it is naturally meant that land should, for the most part, be let.

Rent, defined as the price paid for using land, is essentially the highest amount that the tenant can pay given the current conditions of the land. When setting the lease terms, the landlord tries to ensure that the tenant keeps only enough of the produce to maintain the resources needed for planting seeds, paying workers, and buying and caring for livestock and farming tools, along with the average profits from farming in the area. This is clearly the minimum that the tenant can accept without losing money, and the landlord typically intends to leave no more than this. Any part of the produce, or the equivalent part of its value, beyond this share, the landlord naturally aims to keep as rent for the land, which is clearly the highest amount the tenant can afford under the current conditions. Occasionally, the landlord's generosity, more often their lack of knowledge, leads them to accept less than this portion; and sometimes, though less commonly, the tenant's lack of understanding results in them agreeing to pay slightly more or settling for less than what is typical for farming profits in the area. However, this portion can still be viewed as the natural rent of land, or the rent at which land is generally expected to be leased.

The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a reasonable profit or[Pg 61] interest for the stock laid out by the landlord upon its improvement. This, no doubt, may be partly the case upon some occasions; for it can scarce ever be more than partly the case. The landlord demands a rent even for unimproved land, and the supposed interest or profit upon the expense of improvement is generally an addition to this original rent. Those improvements, besides, are not always made by the stock of the landlord, but sometimes by that of the tenant. When the lease comes to be renewed, however, the landlord commonly demands the same augmentation of rent as if they had been all made by his own.

The rent for land is often seen as just a fair return or[Pg 61] interest on the money the landlord invested in improving it. While that might be true in some situations, it's rarely the full picture. Landlords charge rent even for land that hasn’t been improved, and any assumed interest or profit from improvements usually gets added to that base rent. Additionally, improvements aren't always funded by the landlord; sometimes, it’s the tenants who pay for them. When the lease is up for renewal, though, the landlord typically raises the rent as if all improvements were made by them.

He sometimes demands rent for what is altogether incapable of human improvements. Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline salt, useful for making glass, soup, and for several other purposes. It grows in several parts of Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon such rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice every day covered with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by human industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded by a kelp shore of this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn-fields.

He sometimes charges rent for land that can't be improved in any way. Kelp is a type of seaweed that, when burned, produces an alkaline salt, which is useful for making glass, soup, and various other things. It grows in several parts of Great Britain, especially in Scotland, on rocks that are only covered by the sea at high tide, meaning their yield has never been increased by human effort. However, the landlord, whose property is next to this type of kelp shore, charges rent for it just like he does for his cornfields.

The sea in the neighbourhood of the islands of Shetland is more than commonly abundant in fish, which makes a great part of the subsistence of their inhabitants. But, in order to profit by the produce of the water, they must have a habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord is in proportion, not to what the farmer can make by the land, but to what he can make both by the land and the water. It is partly paid in sea-fish; and one of the very few instances in which rent makes a part of the price of that commodity, is to be found in that country.

The sea around the Shetland Islands is really rich in fish, which is a big part of how the locals make a living. However, to take advantage of the fish, they need a home on the nearby land. The landlord's rent is based not just on what the farmer can earn from the land, but on what he can earn from both the land and the sea. Part of the rent is paid in fish, and it's one of the rare cases where rent is included in the price of that commodity in that area.

The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take, but to what the farmer can afford to give.

The rent for land, viewed as the payment for its use, is essentially a monopoly price. It doesn’t really reflect what the landlord has invested in improving the land or what he could reasonably charge, but rather what the farmer is willing to pay.

Such parts only of the produce of land can commonly be brought to market, of which the ordinary price is sufficient to replace the stock which must be employed in bringing them thither, together with its ordinary profits. If the ordinary price is more than this, the surplus part of it will naturally go to the rent of the land. If it is not more, though the commodity may be brought to market, it can afford no rent to the landlord. Whether the price is, or is not more, depends upon the demand.

Only certain portions of agricultural products can typically be brought to market, as long as their average price is enough to cover the costs of the resources used to produce them, along with the usual profits. If the average price exceeds this amount, the extra will naturally go to the landowner as rent. If it doesn’t, although the product can still be sold, it won’t generate any rent for the landlord. Whether the price is higher or lower depends on the demand.

There are some parts of the produce of land, for which the demand must always be such as to afford a greater price than what is sufficient to bring them to market, and there are others for which it either may or may not be such as to afford this greater price. The former must always afford a rent to the landlord. The latter sometimes may and sometimes may not, according to different circumstances.

Some crops from the land will always be in demand enough to sell for a higher price than what it costs to get them to market, while others may or may not have that demand to command a higher price. The first group will always provide rent to the landlord. The second group may or may not, depending on various circumstances.

Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition of the price of commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and profit are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the effect of it. It is because high or low wages and profit must be paid, in order to bring a particular commodity to market, that its price is high or low. But it is because its price is high or low, a great deal more, or very little more, or no more, than what is sufficient to pay those wages and profit, that it affords a high rent, or a low rent, or no rent at all.

Rent, as we observe, has a different role in determining the price of goods compared to wages and profit. High or low wages and profit drive the price up or down; high or low rent results from that price. Prices are higher or lower because high or low wages and profit need to be paid to get a specific product to market. However, the price being significantly higher, slightly higher, or not higher than what is needed to cover those wages and profit is what determines whether there is a high rent, low rent, or no rent at all.

The particular consideration, first, of those parts of the produce of land which always afford some rent; secondly, of those which sometimes may and sometimes may not afford rent; and, thirdly, of the variations which, in the different periods of improvement, naturally take place in the relative value of those two different sorts of rude produce, when compared both with one another and with manufactured commodities, will divide this chapter into three parts.

The specific focus of this chapter will be, first, on those types of agricultural products that consistently generate some rent; second, on those that may or may not produce rent at various times; and third, on the changes that occur over different periods of development regarding the relative value of these two distinct kinds of raw products, in relation to each other and to manufactured goods. This will break the chapter into three parts.

Part I.Of the Produce of Land which always affords Rent.

As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in proportion to the means of their subsistence, food is always more or less in demand. It can always purchase or command a greater or smaller quantity of labour, and somebody can always be found who is willing to do something in order to obtain it. The quantity of labour, indeed, which it can purchase, is not always equal to what it could maintain, if managed in the most economical manner, on account of the high wages which are sometimes given to labour; but it can always purchase such a quantity of labour as it can maintain, according to the rate at which that sort of labour is commonly maintained in the neighbourhood.

As humans, just like all other animals, naturally grow in number based on their resources for survival, food is constantly in demand. It can always buy or require a greater or lesser amount of labor, and there’s always someone willing to do something to get it. The amount of labor it can buy isn't always the same as what it could support if managed most efficiently, due to the high wages that are sometimes paid to workers; however, it can always purchase enough labor to support, based on the typical wages for that type of work in the area.

But land, in almost any situation, produces a greater quantity of food than what is sufficient to maintain all the labour necessary for bringing it to market, in the most liberal way in which that labour is ever maintained. The surplus, too, is always more than sufficient to replace the stock which employed that labour, together with its profit. Something, therefore, always remains for a rent to the landlord.

But land, in almost any situation, produces more food than is needed to support all the labor required to bring it to market, even under the most generous conditions for that labor. The surplus is also always enough to cover the costs and profits for the resources that support that labor. So, there’s always something left over as rent for the landlord.

The most desert moors in Norway and Scotland produce some sort of pasture for cattle, of which the milk and the increase are always more than sufficient, not only to maintain all the labour necessary for tending them, and to[Pg 62] pay the ordinary profit to the farmer or the owner of the herd or flock, but to afford some small rent to the landlord. The rent increases in proportion to the goodness of the pasture. The same extent of ground not only maintains a greater number of cattle, but as they are brought within a smaller compass, less labour becomes requisite to tend them, and to collect their produce. The landlord gains both ways; by the increase of the produce, and by the diminution of the labour which must be maintained out of it.

The most barren moors in Norway and Scotland provide some sort of pasture for cattle, whose milk and offspring are always more than enough, not only to cover all the work needed to care for them and to[Pg 62] provide the usual profit to the farmer or the owner of the herd or flock, but to also give some small rent to the landlord. The rent goes up with the quality of the pasture. The same area of land not only supports more cattle, but since they’re kept in a smaller space, less work is needed to look after them and gather their produce. The landlord benefits in both ways; from the increased produce and from the reduced labor costs needed to manage it.

The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce, but with its situation, whatever be its fertility. Land in the neighbourhood of a town gives a greater rent than land equally fertile in a distant part of the country. Though it may cost no more labour to cultivate the one than the other, it must always cost more to bring the produce of the distant land to market. A greater quantity of labour, therefore, must be maintained out of it; and the surplus, from which are drawn both the profit of the farmer and the rent of the landlord, must be diminished. But in remote parts of the country, the rate of profit, as has already been shewn, is generally higher than in the neighbourhood of a large town. A smaller proportion of this diminished surplus, therefore, must belong to the landlord.

The rent of land not only changes with its fertility, regardless of what it produces, but also with its location, regardless of its fertility. Land near a town rents for more than equally fertile land in a remote area. Even if it doesn’t take more labor to farm one compared to the other, it will always cost more to transport the produce from the distant land to the market. As a result, more labor must be supported from that, and the surplus, which provides the farmer's profit and the landlord's rent, will be lower. However, in remote areas, the rate of profit, as has been previously discussed, is usually higher than near a large town. Therefore, a smaller portion of this reduced surplus will go to the landlord.

Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of carriage, put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with those in the neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest of all improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which must always be the most extensive circle of the country. They are advantageous to the town by breaking down the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood. They are advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce some rival commodities into the old market, they open many new markets to its produce. Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which can never be universally established, but in consequence of that free and universal competition which forces every body to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence. It is not more than fifty years ago, that some of the counties in the neighbourhood of London petitioned the parliament against the extension of the turnpike roads into the remoter counties. Those remoter counties, they pretended, from the cheapness of labour, would be able to sell their grass and corn cheaper in the London market than themselves, and would thereby reduce their rents, and ruin their cultivation. Their rents, however, have risen, and their cultivation has been improved since that time.

Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers reduce transportation costs, bringing remote areas closer in accessibility to those near the town. Because of this, they are the most significant improvements. They promote the farming of distant lands, which is always the largest part of the country. They also benefit the town by breaking the local monopoly of surrounding areas. They help that part of the country as well. While they may introduce competing products into the established market, they also create many new markets for local goods. Monopoly is a major obstacle to good management, which can only flourish through free and open competition that everyone must adopt for self-protection. Just fifty years ago, some counties near London petitioned Parliament against expanding turnpike roads into the more distant counties. They argued that these remote counties, due to cheaper labor, would be able to sell their grass and grain at lower prices in the London market than they could, ultimately driving down rents and ruining local agriculture. However, since then, their rents have increased, and their farming has improved.

A corn field of moderate fertility produces a much greater quantity of food for man, than the best pasture of equal extent. Though its cultivation requires much more labour, yet the surplus which remains after replacing the seed and maintaining all that labour, is likewise much greater. If a pound of butcher's meat, therefore, was never supposed to be worth more than a pound of bread, this greater surplus would everywhere be of greater value and constitute a greater fund, both for the profit of the farmer and the rent of the landlord. It seems to have done so universally in the rude beginnings of agriculture.

A cornfield with moderate fertility produces a lot more food for people than the best pasture of the same size. Although it takes significantly more labor to cultivate, the surplus that remains after replacing the seed and covering labor costs is also much larger. If a pound of meat was never assumed to be worth more than a pound of bread, this greater surplus would be more valuable everywhere and provide a greater resource for both the farmer's profits and the landlord's rent. It appears to have worked this way universally in the early stages of agriculture.

But the relative values of those two different species of food, bread and butcher's meat, are very different in the different periods of agriculture. In its rude beginnings, the unimproved wilds, which then occupy the far greater part of the country, are all abandoned to cattle. There is more butcher's meat than bread; and bread, therefore, is the food for which there is the greatest competition, and and which consequently brings the greatest price. At Buenos Ayres, we are told by Ulloa, four reals, one-and-twenty pence halfpenny sterling, was, forty or fifty years ago, the ordinary price of an ox, chosen from a herd of two or three hundred. He says nothing of the price of bread, probably because he found nothing remarkable about it. An ox there, he says, costs little more than the labour of catching him. But corn can nowhere be raised without a great deal of labour; and in a country which lies upon the river Plate, at that time the direct road from Europe to the silver mines of Potosi, the money-price of labour could be very cheap. It is otherwise when cultivation is extended over the greater part of the country. There is then more bread than butcher's meat. The competition changes its direction, and the price of butcher's meat becomes greater than the price of bread.

But the relative values of those two types of food, bread and butcher's meat, vary quite a bit at different stages of agriculture. In the early days, the uncultivated land, which makes up most of the country, is all left for cattle. There’s more butcher’s meat than bread, so bread becomes the food everyone competes for the most, which drives its price up. In Buenos Ayres, Ulloa tells us that around forty or fifty years ago, the usual price for an ox from a herd of two or three hundred was four reals, or about one-and-twenty pence halfpenny in sterling. He doesn’t mention the price of bread, probably because he didn’t think it was noteworthy. He notes that catching an ox costs little more than the labor involved. But growing corn requires a lot of hard work; in a region like the river Plate, which was then the main route from Europe to the silver mines of Potosi, the cost of labor could be quite low. Things change when farming spreads over much of the country. Then there’s more bread than butcher's meat, the competition shifts, and the price of butcher's meat rises above the price of bread.

By the extension, besides, of cultivation, the unimproved wilds become insufficient to supply the demand for butcher's meat. A great part of the cultivated lands must be employed in rearing and fattening cattle; of which the price, therefore, must be sufficient to pay, not only the labour necessary for tending them, but the rent, which the landlord, and the profit which the farmer, could have drawn from such land employed in tillage. The cattle bred upon the most uncultivated moors, when brought to the same market, are, in proportion to their weight or goodness, sold at the same price as these which are reared upon the most improved land. The proprietors of those moors profit by it, and raise the rent of their land in proportion to the price of their cattle. It is not more than a century ago, that in many parts of the Highlands of Scotland, butcher's meat was as cheap or cheaper than even bread made of oatmeal. The Union opened the market of England to the Highland cattle. Their ordinary price, at present, is about three times greater than at the begin[Pg 63]ning of the century, and the rents of many Highland estates have been tripled and quadrupled in the same time. In almost every part of Great Britain, a pound of the best butcher's meat is, in the present times generally worth more than two pounds of the best white bread; and in plentiful years it is sometimes worth three or four pounds.

By expanding agriculture, the uncultivated lands can no longer meet the demand for meat. A significant portion of the cultivated lands needs to be used for raising and fattening cattle, so their price must be enough to cover not just the labor needed to care for them but also the rent the landlord could have earned and the profit the farmer could have made if that land was used for crops. Cattle raised on the most barren moors sell at the same price as those raised on the best land, relative to their weight or quality, when brought to market. The owners of those moors benefit from this and increase their land rent accordingly. Just a century ago, in many areas of the Scottish Highlands, meat was as cheap as or even cheaper than oatmeal bread. The Union opened up the English market to Highland cattle. Their average price today is about three times what it was at the start of the century, and the rents for many Highland estates have tripled or even quadrupled in that time. In almost every part of Great Britain, a pound of the best meat is generally worth more than two pounds of the best white bread nowadays, and in years of abundance, it can sometimes be worth three or four pounds.

It is thus that, in the progress of improvement, the rent and profit of unimproved pasture come to be regulated in some measure by the rent and profit of what is improved, and these again by the rent and profit of corn. Corn is an annual crop; butcher's meat, a crop which requires four or five years to grow. As an acre of land, therefore, will produce a much smaller quantity of the one species of food than of the other, the inferiority of the quantity must be compensated by the superiority of the price. If it was more than compensated, more corn-land would be turned into pasture; and if it was not compensated, part of what was in pasture would be brought back into corn.

In the process of improvement, the rent and profits from unimproved pasture become somewhat influenced by the rent and profits from improved land, which are, in turn, influenced by the rent and profits from corn. Corn is an annual crop, while meat takes four or five years to grow. Since an acre of land will yield a much smaller amount of one type of food compared to the other, the lower quantity needs to be balanced out by a higher price. If the price increase was more than enough to balance it out, more corn land would be converted to pasture. Conversely, if it wasn’t enough, some of the land currently used for pasture would be converted back to corn.

This equality, however, between the rent and profit of grass and those of corn; of the land of which the immediate produce is food for cattle, and of that of which the immediate produce is food for men, must be understood to take place only through the greater part of the improved lands of a great country. In some particular local situations it is quite otherwise, and the rent and profit of grass are much superior to what can be made by corn.

This balance, however, between the rent and profit from grass and those from corn; between land that directly produces food for cattle and land that directly produces food for humans, should be understood to occur mainly through most of the better-developed lands in a large country. In certain specific locations, it's quite different, and the rent and profit from grass can be much higher than what can be generated from corn.

Thus, in the neighbourhood of a great town, the demand for milk, and for forage to horses, frequently contribute, together with the high price of butcher's meat, to raise the value of grass above what may be called its natural proportion to that of corn. This local advantage, it is evident, cannot be communicated to the lands at a distance.

Thus, in the vicinity of a large city, the demand for milk and horse feed often, along with the high price of meat, increases the value of grass beyond what would be considered its natural ratio to that of grain. It's clear that this local benefit cannot be transferred to distant lands.

Particular circumstances have sometimes rendered some countries so populous, that the whole territory, like the lands in the neighbourhood of a great town, has not been sufficient to produce both the grass and the corn necessary for the subsistence of their inhabitants. Their lands, therefore, have been principally employed in the production of grass, the more bulky commodity, and which cannot be so easily brought from a great distance; and corn, the food of the great body of the people, has been chiefly imported from foreign countries. Holland is at present in this situation; and a considerable part of ancient Italy seems to have been so during the prosperity of the Romans. To feed well, old Cato said, as we are told by Cicero, was the first and most profitable thing in the management of a private estate; to feed tolerably well, the second; and to feed ill, the third. To plough, he ranked only in the fourth place of profit and advantage. Tillage, indeed, in that part of ancient Italy which lay in the neighbourhood of Rome, must have been very much discouraged by the distributions of corn which were frequently made to the people, either gratuitously, or at a very low price. This corn was brought from the conquered provinces, of which several, instead of taxes, were obliged to furnish a tenth part of their produce at a stated price, about sixpence a-peck, to the republic. The low price at which this corn was distributed to the people, must necessarily have sunk the price of what could be brought to the Roman market from Latium, or the ancient territory of Rome, and must have discouraged its cultivation in that country.

Certain situations have sometimes made some countries so crowded that the land, similar to areas around a large city, hasn’t been enough to produce both the grass and the grain needed for their residents’ survival. Therefore, their land has mostly been used for growing grass, the bulkier crop that can’t be easily transported from far away, while grain, which feeds the majority of the population, has primarily been imported from other countries. Holland is currently in this position, and a significant part of ancient Italy seems to have experienced this during the height of the Roman Empire. To feed well, old Cato said, as Cicero reported, was the first and most profitable aspect of managing a private estate; to feed reasonably well was second; and feeding poorly was third. Plowing was only considered the fourth in terms of profit and benefit. Indeed, in ancient Italy, particularly near Rome, farming must have been greatly discouraged by the frequent distribution of grain to the people, either for free or at a very low cost. This grain was sourced from conquered provinces, many of which, instead of paying taxes, were required to provide a tenth of their produce at a fixed rate, around sixpence per peck, to the republic. The low price at which this grain was distributed to the public would have inevitably decreased the price of what could be sold in the Roman market from Latium or the ancient territory of Rome, discouraging its farming in that region.

In an open country, too, of which the principal produce is corn, a well-inclosed piece of grass will frequently rent higher than any corn field in its neighbourhood. It is convenient for the maintenance of the cattle employed in the cultivation of the corn; and its high rent is, in this case, not so properly paid from the value of its own produce, as from that of the corn lands which are cultivated by means of it. It is likely to fall, if ever the neighbouring lands are completely inclosed. The present high rent of inclosed land in Scotland seems owing to the scarcity of inclosure, and will probably last no longer than that scarcity. The advantage of inclosure is greater for pasture than for corn. It saves the labour of guarding the cattle, which feed better, too, when they are not liable to be disturbed by their keeper or his dog.

In an open area where corn is the main crop, a well-fenced piece of grass often rents for more than any nearby cornfield. This grassland is useful for keeping the cattle that help grow the corn, and its high rent comes more from its role in supporting the corn production than from its own value. If the nearby land becomes fully enclosed, this rent is likely to decrease. The current high rent for enclosed land in Scotland seems to be due to its scarcity, and it probably won't last once that scarcity changes. Enclosure benefits pasture land more than corn fields. It reduces the need to keep a close watch on the cattle, which also feed better without the disturbance from their keeper or his dog.

But where these is no local advantage of this kind, the rent and profit of corn, or whatever else is the common vegetable food of the people, must naturally regulate upon the land which is fit for producing it, the rent and profit of pasture.

But where there isn't a local advantage like this, the rent and profit from corn, or whatever else is the staple food for the people, should naturally determine the rent and profit from pasture on the land that is suitable for producing it.

The use of the artificial grasses, of turnips, carrots, cabbages, and the other expedients which have been fallen upon to make an equal quantity of land feed a greater number of cattle than when in natural grass, should somewhat reduce, it might be expected, the superiority which, in an improved country, the price of butcher's meat naturally has over that of bread. It seems accordingly to have done so, and there is some reason for believing that, at least in the London market, the price of butcher's meat, in proportion to the price of bread, is a good deal lower in the present times than it was in the beginning of the last century.

The use of artificial grasses, turnips, carrots, cabbages, and other methods we've adopted to make the same amount of land support more cattle than when it was just natural grass should somewhat lessen the advantage that, in a developed country, the price of meat has over the price of bread. It seems to have done just that, and there’s reason to believe that, at least in the London market, the price of meat compared to the price of bread is considerably lower now than it was at the start of the last century.

In the Appendix to the life of Prince Henry, Doctor Birch has given us an account of the prices of butcher's meat as commonly paid by that prince. It is there said, that the four quarters of an ox, weighing six hundred pounds, usually cost him nine pounds ten shillings, or thereabouts; that is thirty-one shillings and eight-pence per hundred pounds weight. Prince Henry died on the 6th of November 1612, in the nineteenth year of his age.[Pg 64]

In the Appendix about Prince Henry's life, Doctor Birch provides details on the prices of butcher's meat that the prince typically paid. It says that four quarters of an ox, weighing six hundred pounds, usually cost him around nine pounds and ten shillings; that amounts to thirty-one shillings and eight pence per hundred pounds. Prince Henry died on November 6, 1612, at the age of nineteen.[Pg 64]

In March 1764, there was a parliamentary inquiry into the causes of the high price of provisions at that time. It was then, among other proof to the same purpose, given in evidence by a Virginia merchant, that in March 1763, he had victualled his ships for twenty-four or twenty-five shillings the hundred weight of beef, which he considered as the ordinary price; whereas, in that dear year, he had paid twenty-seven shillings for the same weight and sort. This high price in 1764 is, however, four shillings and eight-pence cheaper than the ordinary price paid by Prince Henry; and it is the best beef only, it must be observed, which is fit to be salted for those distant voyages.

In March 1764, there was a parliamentary investigation into why food prices were so high at the time. During this inquiry, a Virginia merchant provided evidence that in March 1763, he had stocked his ships with beef at a cost of twenty-four or twenty-five shillings per hundredweight, which he thought was the normal price. However, in that expensive year, he had to pay twenty-seven shillings for the same amount and type of beef. Notably, this high price in 1764 is actually four shillings and eight pence lower than what Prince Henry typically paid. It's important to note that only the best quality beef is suitable for salting for those long voyages.

The price paid by Prince Henry amounts to 3d. 4-5ths per pound weight of the whole carcase, coarse and choice pieces taken together; and at that rate the choice pieces could not have been sold by retail for less than 4½d. or 5d. the pound.

The price paid by Prince Henry is 3d. 4-5ths per pound of the entire carcass, including both coarse and choice cuts; at that rate, the choice cuts couldn't have been sold retail for less than 4½d. or 5d. per pound.

In the parliamentary inquiry in 1764, the witnesses stated the price of the choice pieces of the best beef to be to the consumer 4d. and 4½d. the pound; and the coarse pieces in general to be from seven farthings to 2½d. and 2¾d.; and this, they said, was in general one halfpenny dearer than the same sort of pieces had usually been sold in the month of March. But even this high price is still a good deal cheaper than what we can well suppose the ordinary retail price to have been in the time of Prince Henry.

In the parliamentary inquiry in 1764, the witnesses reported that the price of the best cuts of beef was 4d. to 4½d. per pound for consumers, while the tougher cuts generally ranged from seven farthings to 2½d. and 2¾d. They stated that this was typically one halfpenny more expensive than what those same cuts had usually sold for in March. However, even this elevated price is still significantly cheaper than what we might imagine the usual retail price was during the time of Prince Henry.

During the first twelve years of the last century, the average price of the best wheat at the Windsor market was L.1 : 18 : 3½d. the quarter of nine Winchester bushels.

During the first twelve years of the last century, the average price of the best wheat at the Windsor market was £1:18:3½d. per quarter of nine Winchester bushels.

But in the twelve years preceding 1764, including that year, the average price of the same measure of the best wheat at the same market was L.2 : 1 : 9½d.

But in the twelve years leading up to 1764, including that year, the average price of the same amount of the best wheat at that same market was £2 : 1 : 9½d.

In the first twelve years of the last century, therefore, wheat appears to have been a good deal cheaper, and butcher's meat a good deal dearer, than in the twelve years preceding 1764, including that year.

In the first twelve years of the last century, wheat seems to have been a lot cheaper, while butcher's meat was significantly more expensive than in the twelve years before 1764, including that year.

In all great countries, the greater part of the cultivated lands are employed in producing either food for men or food for cattle. The rent and profit of these regulate the rent and profit of all other cultivated land. If any particular produce afforded less, the land would soon be turned into corn or pasture; and if any afforded more, some part of the lands in corn or pasture would soon be turned to that produce.

In all major countries, most of the farmland is used to grow either food for people or feed for livestock. The rent and profits from these crops influence the rent and profits from all other types of farmland. If a specific crop yielded less, that land would quickly be converted to grow grain or be used for grazing; and if a crop yielded more, some of the land used for grain or grazing would soon switch to growing that crop.

Those productions, indeed, which require either a greater original expense of improvement, or a greater annual expense of cultivation in order to fit the land for them, appear commonly to afford, the one a greater rent, the other a greater profit, than corn pasture. This superiority, however, will seldom be found to amount to more than a reasonable interest or compensation for this superior expense.

Those productions that need either a higher initial investment for improvement or a greater yearly cost for maintenance to prepare the land for them generally provide either a higher rent or greater profit than corn pasture. However, this advantage is rarely found to exceed a reasonable return on investment or compensation for the additional costs.

In a hop garden, a fruit garden, a kitchen garden, both the rent of the landlord, and the profit of the farmer, are generally greater than in a corn or grass field. But to bring the ground into this condition requires more expense. Hence a greater rent becomes due to the landlord. It requires, too, a more attentive and skilful management. Hence a greater profit becomes due to the farmer. The crop, too, at least in the hop and fruit garden, is more precarious. Its price, therefore, besides compensating all occasional losses, must afford something like the profit of insurance. The circumstances of gardeners, generally mean, and always moderate, may satisfy us that their great ingenuity is not commonly over-recompensed. Their delightful art is practised by so many rich people for amusement, that little advantage is to be made by these who practise it for profit; because the persons who should naturally be their best customers, supply themselves with all their most precious productions.

In a hop garden, a fruit garden, or a kitchen garden, both the landlord's rent and the farmer's profit are usually higher than in a corn or grass field. However, getting the land into this state requires more investment. Consequently, a higher rent is paid to the landlord. It also needs more careful and skilled management, leading to a higher profit for the farmer. Additionally, the crop, especially in hop and fruit gardens, is more uncertain. Therefore, its price, aside from covering occasional losses, must provide something akin to insurance profits. The situation of gardeners, generally modest and always reasonable, suggests that their great skill is not typically over-rewarded. Their enjoyable craft is practiced by many wealthy individuals for leisure, leaving little profit for those who engage in it for income, since the people who would naturally be their best customers fulfill their needs for the most valuable produce themselves.

The advantage which the landlord derives from such improvements, seems at no time to have been greater than what was sufficient to compensate the original expense of making them. In the ancient husbandry, after the vineyard, a well-watered kitchen garden seems to have been the part of the farm which was supposed to yield the most valuable produce. But Democritus, who wrote upon husbandry about two thousand years ago, and who was regarded by the ancients as one of the fathers the of the art, thought they did not act wisely who inclosed a kitchen garden. The profit, he said, would not compensate the expense of a stone-wall: and bricks (he meant, I suppose, bricks baked in the sun) mouldered with the rain and the winter-storm, and required continual repairs. Columella, who reports this judgment of Democritus, does not controvert it, but proposes a very frugal method of inclosing with a hedge of brambles and briars, which he says he had found by experience to be both a lasting and an impenetrable fence; but which, it seems, was not commonly known in the time of Democritus. Palladius adopts the opinion of Columella, which had before been recommended by Varro. In the judgment of these ancient improvers, the produce of a kitchen garden had, it seems, been little more than sufficient to pay the extraordinary culture and the expense of watering; for in countries so near the sun, it was thought proper, in those times as in the present, to have the command of a stream of water, which could be conducted to every bed in the garden. Through the greater part of Europe, a kitchen garden is not at present supposed to deserve a better inclosure than that recommended by Columella. In Great Britain, and some other northern countries, the[Pg 65] finer fruits cannot be brought to perfection but by the assistance of a wall. Their price, therefore, in such countries, must be sufficient to pay the expense of building and maintaining what they cannot be had without. The fruit-wall frequently surrounds the kitchen garden, which thus enjoys the benefit of an inclosure which its own produce could seldom pay for.

The benefit that the landlord gets from these improvements seems to never have been more than enough to cover the original cost of making them. In ancient farming, after the vineyard, a well-watered kitchen garden was considered the section of the farm that would yield the most valuable produce. However, Democritus, who wrote about farming around two thousand years ago and was seen by the ancients as one of the founders of the field, believed that enclosing a kitchen garden was unwise. He argued that the profit wouldn't make up for the cost of a stone wall, and bricks (which he likely meant as sun-baked bricks) would decay from rain and winter storms, requiring constant repairs. Columella, who shared Democritus's opinion, didn't challenge it but suggested a more economical way to enclose the garden using a hedge of brambles and briars, which he claimed from experience to be both durable and impossible to breach; this method seems not to have been widely known during Democritus's time. Palladius supports Columella's view, which had previously been recommended by Varro. According to these ancient agronomists, the yield from a kitchen garden was barely enough to cover the extra care and watering costs, because in sun-drenched regions, just like today, it was necessary to have control over a water source that could flow to every bed in the garden. Throughout most of Europe, kitchens gardens are still not considered to require a better enclosure than the one suggested by Columella. In Great Britain and some other northern regions, finer fruits cannot be fully developed without a wall. Consequently, their prices in these regions must be enough to cover the costs of building and maintaining what they cannot exist without. The fruit wall often surrounds the kitchen garden, allowing it to gain the benefits of an enclosure that its own produce could rarely afford.

That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to perfection, was the most valuable part of the farm, seems to have been an undoubted maxim in the ancient agriculture, as it is in the modern, through all the wine countries. But whether it was advantageous to plant a new vineyard, was a matter of dispute among the ancient Italian husbandmen, as we learn from Columella. He decides, like a true lover of all curious cultivation, in favour of the vineyard; and endeavours to shew, by a comparison of the profit and expense, that it was a most advantageous improvement. Such comparisons, however, between the profit and expense of new projects are commonly very fallacious; and in nothing more so than in agriculture. Had the gain actually made by such plantations been commonly as great as he imagined it might have been, there could have been no dispute about it. The same point is frequently at this day a matter of controversy in the wine countries. Their writers on agriculture, indeed, the lovers and promoters of high cultivation, seem generally disposed to decide with Columella in favour of the vineyard. In France, the anxiety of the proprietors of the old vineyards to prevent the planting of any new ones, seems to favour their opinion, and to indicate a consciousness in those who must have the experience, that this species of cultivation is at present in that country more profitable than any other. It seems, at the same time, however, to indicate another opinion, that this superior profit can last no longer than the laws which at present restrain the free cultivation of the vine. In 1731, they obtained an order of council, prohibiting both the planting of new vineyards, and the renewal of these old ones, of which the cultivation had been interrupted for two years, without a particular permission from the king, to be granted only in consequence of an information from the intendant of the province, certifying that he had examined the land, and that it was incapable of any other culture. The pretence of this order was the scarcity of corn and pasture, and the superabundance of wine. But had this superabundance been real, it would, without any order of council, have effectually prevented the plantation of new vineyards, by reducing the profits of this species of cultivation below their natural proportion to those of corn and pasture. With regard to the supposed scarcity of corn occasioned by the multiplication of vineyards, corn is nowhere in France more carefully cultivated than in the wine provinces, where the land is fit for producing it: as in Burgundy, Guienne, and the Upper Languedoc. The numerous hands employed in the one species of cultivation necessarily encourage the other, by affording a ready market for its produce. To diminish the number of those who are capable of paying it, is surely a most unpromising expedient for encouraging the cultivation of corn. It is like the policy which would promote agriculture, by discouraging manufactures.

That the vineyard, when properly planted and well cared for, is the most valuable part of the farm seems to have been an undeniable principle in ancient agriculture, just as it is today in all wine-producing regions. However, whether it was beneficial to plant a new vineyard was a topic of debate among ancient Italian farmers, as we learn from Columella. He, being a true enthusiast of innovative farming, argues in favor of the vineyard and attempts to show, through a comparison of profit and costs, that it was a highly beneficial investment. Such comparisons between the profit and costs of new initiatives are often misleading, especially in agriculture. If the profits from such plantations had actually been as substantial as he believed, there wouldn’t have been any disagreement about it. This issue is still a subject of debate today in wine regions. Agricultural writers, who are generally advocates for advanced cultivation, tend to align with Columella in support of the vineyard. In France, old vineyard owners' eagerness to prevent the establishment of new vineyards seems to back this view, indicating that those with experience believe this type of farming is currently more profitable than any other. At the same time, it suggests another belief that this superior profit can only last as long as the laws that currently restrict free vine cultivation. In 1731, they received an order from the council prohibiting both the planting of new vineyards and the renewal of old ones that had been left uncultivated for two years, without specific permission from the king, which would only be granted based on an assessment from the provincial intendant certifying that the land was incapable of any other type of farming. The justification for this order was the shortage of grain and pastures, coupled with an overabundance of wine. But if this overabundance were genuine, it would have naturally stopped the planting of new vineyards by making the profits from this type of farming less favorable compared to those from grain and pastures. Regarding the alleged grain shortage caused by the expansion of vineyards, grain is cultivated more carefully in wine regions in France, where the land is suitable for it, such as in Burgundy, Guienne, and Upper Languedoc. The many workers involved in one form of farming naturally support the others by creating a demand for its products. Reducing the number of people who can afford it is surely not a promising way to boost grain farming. It’s similar to trying to promote agriculture by discouraging manufacturing.

The rent and profit of those productions, therefore, which require either a greater original expense of improvement in order to fit the land for them, or a greater annual expense of cultivation, though often much superior to those of corn and pasture, yet when they do no more than compensate such extraordinary expense, are in reality regulated by the rent and profit of those common crops.

The rent and profit from those productions that need either a higher initial investment to improve the land or a greater annual cost for cultivation, although often much higher than those of grains and pasture, are ultimately determined by the rent and profit of those standard crops when they merely cover those extra expenses.

It sometimes happens, indeed, that the quantity of land which can be fitted for some particular produce, is too small to supply the effectual demand. The whole produce can be disposed of to those who are willing to give somewhat more than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages, and profit, necessary for raising and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, or according to the rates at which they are paid in the greater part of other cultivated land. The surplus part of the price which remains after defraying the whole expense of improvement and cultivation, may commonly, in this case, and in this case only, bear no regular proportion to the like surplus in corn or pasture, but may exceed it in almost any degree; and the greater part of this excess naturally goes to the rent of the landlord.

Sometimes, it happens that the amount of land suitable for a specific type of crop is too small to meet the effective demand. All of the produce can be sold to those willing to pay a bit more than what covers the total rent, wages, and profits needed to grow and transport it to market, based on natural rates or rates typical for most other cultivated land. The extra price that remains after covering all improvement and cultivation costs may often, in this situation— and only in this situation— not have a consistent relationship to the extra price in grains or pastures, but could exceed it by a significant amount; and most of this excess typically goes to the landlord's rent.

The usual and natural proportion, for example, between the rent and profit of wine, and those of corn and pasture, must be understood to take place only with regard to those vineyards which produce nothing but good common wine, such as can be raised almost anywhere, upon any light, gravelly, or sandy soil, and which has nothing to recommend it but its strength and wholesomeness. It is with such vineyards only, that the common land of the country can be brought into competition; for with those of a peculiar quality it is evident that it cannot.

The typical and natural ratio, for example, between the rent and profit of wine, and those of grain and pasture, should be understood to apply only to vineyards that produce only good common wine, like what can be grown almost anywhere on light, gravelly, or sandy soil, and that only has its strength and wholesomeness to recommend it. It's only with these types of vineyards that the common land of the country can compete; with vineyards of a unique quality, it's clear that it cannot.

The vine is more affected by the difference of soils than any other fruit-tree. From some it derives a flavour which no culture or management can equal, it is supposed, upon any other. This flavour, real or imaginary, is sometimes peculiar to the produce of a few vineyards; sometimes it extends through the greater part of a small district, and sometimes through a considerable part of a large province. The whole quantity of such wines that is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, or the demand of those who[Pg 66] would be willing to pay the whole rent, profit, and wages, necessary for preparing and bringing them thither, according to the ordinary rate, or according to the rate at which they are paid in common vineyards. The whole quantity, therefore, can be disposed of to those who are willing to pay more, which necessarily raises their price above that of common wine. The difference is greater or less, according as the fashionableness and scarcity of the wine render the competition of the buyers more or less eager. Whatever it be, the greater part of it goes to the rent of the landlord. For though such vineyards are in general more carefully cultivated than most others, the high price of the wine seems to be, not so much the effect, as the cause of this careful cultivation. In so valuable a produce, the loss occasioned by negligence is so great, as to force even the most careless to attention. A small part of this high price, therefore, is sufficient to pay the wages of the extraordinary labour bestowed upon their cultivation, and the profits of the extraordinary stock which puts that labour into motion.

The grapevine is more influenced by soil differences than any other fruit tree. It gets a flavor from certain soils that no amount of cultivation or management can replicate on any other tree. This flavor, whether real or imagined, is sometimes unique to just a few vineyards, sometimes found throughout most of a small area, and at times across a significant portion of a large region. The total amount of such wines available on the market doesn’t meet the actual demand, or the demand from those who would be willing to cover all the rent, profit, and wages needed for production and transport based on the usual rates, or the rates common in regular vineyards. Consequently, the total quantity can only be sold to people willing to pay more, which naturally drives up their price compared to regular wine. The price difference varies depending on how fashionable and scarce the wine is, which influences how competitive buyers are. Regardless, a large portion of it goes to the landlord's rent. Even though these vineyards are generally cultivated more carefully than most others, the high price of the wine seems to be more a cause than an effect of this meticulous care. With such valuable output, the loss from negligence is so significant that it compels even the most careless to pay attention. Thus, a small portion of this high price is enough to cover the wages for the extra labor put into their cultivation and the profits from the additional resources that drive that labor.

The sugar colonies possessed by the European nations in the West Indies may be compared to those precious vineyards. Their whole produce falls short of the effectual demand of Europe, and can be disposed of to those who are willing to give more than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, profit, and wages, necessary for preparing and bringing it to market, according to the rate at which they are commonly paid by any other produce. In Cochin China, the finest white sugar generally sells for three piastres the quintal, about thirteen shillings and sixpence of our money, as we are told by Mr Poivre[14], a very careful observer of the agriculture of that country. What is there called the quintal, weighs from a hundred and fifty to two hundred Paris pounds, or a hundred and seventy-five Paris pounds at a medium, which reduces the price of the hundred weight English to about eight shillings sterling; not a fourth part of what is commonly paid for the brown or muscovada sugars imported from our colonies, and not a sixth part of what is paid for the finest white sugar. The greater part of the cultivated lands in Cochin China are employed in producing corn and rice, the food of the great body of the people. The respective prices of corn, rice, and sugar, are there probably in the natural proportion, or in that which naturally takes place in the different crops of the greater part of cultivated land, and which recompenses the landlord and farmer, as nearly as can be computed, according to what is usually the original expense of improvement, and the annual expense of cultivation. But in our sugar colonies, the price of sugar bears no such proportion to that of the produce of a rice or corn field either in Europe or America. It is commonly said that a sugar planter expects that the rum and the molasses should defray the whole expense of his cultivation, and that his sugar should be all clear profit. If this be true, for I pretend not to affirm it, it is as if a corn farmer expected to defray the expense of his cultivation with the chaff and the straw, and that the grain should be all clear profit. We see frequently societies of merchants in London, and other trading towns, purchase waste lands in our sugar colonies, which they expect to improve and cultivate with profit, by means of factors and agents, notwithstanding the great distance and the uncertain returns, from the defective administration of justice in those countries. Nobody will attempt to improve and cultivate in the same manner the most fertile lands of Scotland, Ireland, or the corn provinces of North America, though, from the more exact administration of justice in these countries, more regular returns might be expected.

The sugar plantations owned by European countries in the West Indies can be compared to valuable vineyards. Their entire output doesn't meet the effective demand in Europe, and it can only be sold to those willing to pay more than what’s needed to cover the rent, profits, and wages required for processing and getting it to market, based on the typical rates paid for other produce. In Cochin China, the best white sugar usually sells for three piastres per quintal, which is about thirteen shillings and sixpence in our currency, according to Mr. Poivre[14], a careful observer of agriculture in that region. The quintal there weighs between one hundred fifty to two hundred Paris pounds, or an average of one hundred seventy-five Paris pounds, which reduces the price per hundredweight in English terms to about eight shillings sterling; not even a quarter of what is generally paid for brown or muscovado sugars imported from our colonies, and not even a sixth of what is paid for the finest white sugar. Most of the cultivated land in Cochin China is used for growing grains and rice, which are the staple foods for the majority of the population. The prices of corn, rice, and sugar there are likely in their natural proportion, reflecting what generally occurs in the different crops of most cultivated land, and what compensates the landlord and farmer, as nearly as can be calculated, based on the typical original improvement costs and annual cultivation expenses. However, in our sugar colonies, the price of sugar does not reflect any similar proportion to that of crops from rice or corn fields in Europe or America. It's often said that a sugar planter expects that the profits from rum and molasses will cover all their cultivation expenses, and that their sugar will be pure profit. If this is indeed the case, then it’s akin to a corn farmer hoping to cover their cultivation costs with just the chaff and straw, while the grain would be all profit. We often see groups of merchants in London and other trading cities buying wasteland in our sugar colonies, expecting to develop and farm it profitably through factors and agents, despite the long distances and unpredictable returns due to poor justice systems in those regions. No one would try to develop and farm in the same way on the most fertile lands of Scotland, Ireland, or the grain-producing regions of North America, where, due to a more reliable justice system, more consistent returns could be anticipated.

In Virginia and Maryland, the cultivation of tobacco is preferred, as most profitable, to that of corn. Tobacco might be cultivated with advantage through the greater part of Europe; but, in almost every part of Europe, it has become a principal subject of taxation; and to collect a tax from every different farm in the country where this plant might happen to be cultivated, would be more difficult, it has been supposed, than to levy one upon its importation at the custom-house. The cultivation of tobacco has, upon this account, been most absurdly prohibited through the greater part of Europe, which necessarily gives a sort of monopoly to the countries where it is allowed; and as Virginia and Maryland produce the greatest quantity of it, they share largely, though with some competitors, in the advantage of this monopoly. The cultivation of tobacco, however, seems not to be so advantageous as that of sugar. I have never even heard of any tobacco plantation that was improved and cultivated by the capital of merchants who resided in Great Britain; and our tobacco colonies send us home no such wealthy planters as we see frequently arrive from our sugar islands. Though, from the preference given in those colonies to the cultivation of tobacco above that of corn, it would appear that the effectual demand of Europe for tobacco is not completely supplied, it probably is more nearly so than that for sugar; and though the present price of tobacco is probably more than sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages, and profit, necessary for preparing and bringing it to market, according to the rate at which they are commonly paid in corn land, it must not be so much more as the present price of sugar. Our tobacco planters, accordingly, have shewn the same fear of the superabundance of tobacco, which the proprietors of the old vineyards in France have of[Pg 67] the superabundance of wine. By act of assembly, they have restrained its cultivation to six thousand plants, supposed to yield a thousand weight of tobacco, for every negro between sixteen and sixty years of age. Such a negro, over and above this quantity of tobacco, can manage, they reckon, four acres of Indian corn. To prevent the market from being overstocked, too, they have sometimes, in plentiful years, we are told by Dr Douglas[15] (I suspect he has been ill informed), burnt a certain quantity of tobacco for every negro, in the same manner as the Dutch are said to do of spices. If such violent methods are necessary to keep up the present price of tobacco, the superior advantage of its culture over that of corn, if it still has any, will not probably be of long continuance.

In Virginia and Maryland, growing tobacco is preferred over corn because it's more profitable. Tobacco could be successfully grown in most of Europe; however, it has become a major source of taxation across almost all of Europe. It is believed that collecting taxes from every farm where tobacco is grown would be more challenging than taxing its importation at the customs house. For this reason, tobacco cultivation has been absurdly banned in most of Europe, which gives a monopoly to the countries where it's still allowed. Virginia and Maryland, producing the most tobacco, benefit significantly from this monopoly, albeit with some competition. Still, tobacco farming doesn’t seem to be as beneficial as sugar farming. I’ve never come across a tobacco plantation that was developed and funded by merchants from Great Britain; our tobacco colonies don’t produce wealthy planters like those frequently arriving from our sugar islands. While the preference for growing tobacco over corn in these colonies suggests that Europe’s demand for tobacco isn’t fully met, it’s likely closer to being satisfied than the demand for sugar. Although the current price of tobacco is likely enough to cover all costs—rent, wages, and profit—for preparing and selling it at the usual rates for corn land, it isn’t that much higher than the current price of sugar. Thus, our tobacco farmers have shown the same concerns about an excess of tobacco as the owners of old vineyards in France have about an excess of wine. By law, they have limited the cultivation to six thousand plants, which are expected to yield a thousand pounds of tobacco for every enslaved person between sixteen and sixty years old. They estimate that each person can also manage four acres of corn in addition to that amount of tobacco. To keep the market from being oversaturated, they have occasionally burned a certain amount of tobacco for every enslaved person during fruitful years, much like the Dutch are said to do with spices, though Dr. Douglas claims this (I suspect he’s misinformed). If such drastic measures are needed to maintain the current price of tobacco, any advantages of growing it over corn, if they still exist, probably won’t last long.

It is in this manner that the rent of the cultivated land, of which the produce is human food, regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land. No particular produce can long afford less, because the land would immediately be turned to another use; and if any particular produce commonly affords more, it is because the quantity of land which can be fitted for it is too small to supply the effectual demand.

It’s like this: the rent for farmland that produces food controls the rent for most other farmland. No specific crop can consistently provide a lower return, because the land would quickly be repurposed. And if a certain crop typically pays more, it’s because there isn’t enough land that can produce it to meet the actual demand.

In Europe, corn is the principal produce of land, which serves immediately for human food. Except in particular situations, therefore, the rent of corn land regulates in Europe that of all other cultivated land. Britain need envy neither the vineyards of France, nor the olive plantations of Italy. Except in particular situations, the value of these is regulated by that of corn, in which the fertility of Britain is not much inferior to that of either of those two countries.

In Europe, corn is the main crop that directly feeds people. So, generally speaking, the rent for corn land sets the standard for all other types of farmland. Britain doesn’t need to envy the vineyards in France or the olive groves in Italy. Typically, the value of these crops is influenced by corn, and Britain's land fertility is not far behind that of either of those countries.

If, in any country, the common and favourite vegetable food of the people should be drawn from a plant, of which the most common land, with the same, or nearly the same culture, produced a much greater quantity than the most fertile does of corn; the rent of the landlord, or the surplus quantity of food which would remain to him, after paying the labour, and replacing the stock of the farmer, together with its ordinary profits, would necessarily be much greater. Whatever was the rate at which labour was commonly maintained in that country, this greater surplus could always maintain a greater quantity of it, and, consequently, enable the landlord to purchase or command a greater quantity of it. The real value of his rent, his real power and authority, his command of the necessaries and conveniencies of life with which the labour of other people could supply him, would necessarily be much greater.

If in any country, the most common and preferred vegetable food of the people comes from a plant that yields much more than the best-producing corn in similar farming conditions, the landlord's rent, or the extra amount of food leftover after paying the labor costs and replenishing the farmer's stock, along with its usual profits, would definitely be much higher. Regardless of the standard wage for labor in that country, this larger surplus could always support more workers, allowing the landlord to buy or control more of them. The true value of his rent, his actual power and influence, and his ability to obtain the necessities and comforts of life that others’ labor could provide him would therefore be significantly greater.

A rice field produces a much greater quantity of food than the most fertile corn field. Two crops in the year, from thirty to sixty bushels each, are said to be the ordinary produce of an acre. Though its cultivation, therefore, requires more labour, a much greater surplus remains after maintaining all that labour. In those rice countries, therefore, where rice is the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, and where the cultivators are chiefly maintained with it, a greater share of this greater surplus should belong to the landlord than in corn countries. In Carolina, where the planters, as in other British colonies, are generally both farmers and landlords, and where rent, consequently, is confounded with profit, the cultivation of rice is found to be more profitable than that of corn, though their fields produce only one crop in the year, and though, from the prevalence of the customs of Europe, rice is not there the common and favourite vegetable food of the people.

A rice field produces a much larger amount of food than even the most fertile corn field. It's common to harvest two crops a year, with each yielding between thirty to sixty bushels per acre. Although growing rice requires more work, there’s a significantly larger surplus after accounting for the labor. In rice-growing regions, where rice is the main and preferred vegetable for the population and where farmers mostly rely on it for their livelihood, a larger portion of this surplus typically goes to the landlord compared to corn-growing regions. In Carolina, where planters usually act as both farmers and landlords, making rent and profit the same, growing rice turns out to be more profitable than growing corn. This is true even though rice fields there only produce one crop per year and, influenced by European customs, rice isn’t the usual and favored vegetable food for the locals.

A good rice field is a bog at all seasons, and at one season a bog covered with water. It is unfit either for corn, or pasture, or vineyard, or, indeed, for any other vegetable produce that is very useful to men; and the lands which are fit for those purposes are not fit for rice. Even in the rice countries, therefore, the rent of rice lands cannot regulate the rent of the other cultivated land which can never be turned to that produce.

A good rice field is a swamp all year round, and at one time of year, it's a swamp filled with water. It's unsuitable for corn, pasture, vineyards, or any other crops that are really beneficial to people. The land that's good for those purposes isn't suitable for rice. So even in rice-growing regions, the rent for rice fields can't determine the rent of other farmland that can never be used for rice production.

The food produced by a field of potatoes is not inferior in quantity to that produced by a field of rice, and much superior to what is produced by a field of wheat. Twelve thousand weight of potatoes from an acre of land is not a greater produce than two thousand weight of wheat. The food or solid nourishment, indeed, which can be drawn from each of those two plants, is not altogether in proportion to their weight, on account of the watery nature of potatoes. Allowing, however, half the weight of this root to go to water, a very large allowance, such an acre of potatoes will still produce six thousand weight of solid nourishment, three times the quantity produced by the acre of wheat. An acre of potatoes is cultivated with less expense than an acre of wheat; the fallow, which generally precedes the sowing of wheat, more than compensating the hoeing and other extraordinary culture which is always given to potatoes. Should this root ever become in any part of Europe, like rice in some rice countries, the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, so as to occupy the same proportion of the lands in tillage, which wheat and other sorts of grain for human food do at present, the same quantity of cultivated land would maintain a much greater number of people; and the labourers being generally fed with potatoes, a greater surplus would remain after replacing all the stock, and maintaining all the labour employed in cultivation. A greater share of this surplus, too, would belong to the landlord. Population would increase, and[Pg 68] rents would rise much beyond what they are at present.

The amount of food produced from a field of potatoes is not less than that from a field of rice and is significantly more than what's harvested from a field of wheat. Twelve thousand pounds of potatoes from an acre of land isn’t more than two thousand pounds of wheat. The actual food or solid nourishment we can get from each of these two crops isn’t directly proportional to their weight due to the high water content of potatoes. Even if we assume that half the weight of this root is water—which is a generous estimate—an acre of potatoes still yields six thousand pounds of solid nourishment, three times the amount produced by an acre of wheat. An acre of potatoes is also easier and cheaper to cultivate than an acre of wheat; the fallow period before planting wheat more than makes up for the extra labor and care that potatoes require. If potatoes ever became as common and popular as rice is in some rice-growing regions of Europe, taking up the same amount of farmland as wheat and other grains do now, then that same amount of land would support a much larger population. With laborers primarily eating potatoes, a greater surplus would be available after covering all the costs of raising livestock and supporting the workers involved in cultivation. A larger portion of this surplus would also go to the landlord. The population would grow, and rents would rise significantly higher than they are today.

The land which is fit for potatoes, is fit for almost every other useful vegetable. If they occupied the same proportion of cultivated land which corn does at present, they would regulate, in the same manner, the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land.

The land suitable for potatoes is suitable for almost every other useful vegetable. If they took up the same amount of cultivated land that corn does now, they would influence, in the same way, the rent for most of the other cultivated land.

In some parts of Lancashire, it is pretended, I have been told, that bread of oatmeal is a heartier food for labouring people than wheaten bread, and I have frequently heard the same doctrine held in Scotland. I am, however, somewhat doubtful of the truth of it. The common people in Scotland, who are fed with oatmeal, are in general neither so strong nor so handsome as the same rank of people in England, who are fed with wheaten bread. They neither work so well, nor look so well; and as there is not the same difference between the people of fashion in the two countries, experience would seem to shew, that the food of the common people in Scotland is not so suitable to the human constitution as that of their neighbours of the same rank in England. But it seems to be otherwise with potatoes. The chairmen, porters, and coal-heavers in London, and those unfortunate women who live by prostitution, the strongest men and the most beautiful women perhaps in the British dominions, are said to be, the greater part of them, from the lowest rank of people in Ireland, who are generally fed with this root. No food can afford a more decisive proof of its nourishing quality, or of its being peculiarly suitable to the health of the human constitution.

In some areas of Lancashire, it’s said, and I’ve been told, that oatmeal bread is a heartier food for working people than wheat bread, and I’ve often heard the same claim made in Scotland. However, I’m a bit skeptical about this. The average people in Scotland, who mostly eat oatmeal, generally aren’t as strong or as attractive as the same group in England, who eat wheat bread. They don’t work as well, nor do they look as good; and since there isn’t the same difference between the upper classes in both countries, experience suggests that the food of common people in Scotland isn’t as suitable for the human body as that of their peers in England. But it seems different when it comes to potatoes. The chairmen, porters, and coal workers in London, along with the unfortunate women who resort to prostitution, some of the strongest men and most beautiful women in Britain, are reportedly mostly from the lower class in Ireland, who typically rely on this root. No food provides a clearer indication of its nourishing quality or its particular suitability for human health.

It is difficult to preserve potatoes through the year, and impossible to store them like corn, for two or three years together. The fear of not being able to sell them before they rot, discourages their cultivation, and is, perhaps, the chief obstacle to their ever becoming in any great country, like bread, the principal vegetable food of all the different ranks of the people.

It’s tough to keep potatoes fresh throughout the year, and you can’t store them like corn for two or three years. The worry about not being able to sell them before they spoil discourages people from growing them and is probably the main reason they never become, in any major country, like bread, the main vegetable food for everyone.

Part II.Of the Produce of Land, which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent.

Human food seems to be the only produce of land, which always and necessarily affords some rent to the landlord. Other sorts of produce sometimes may, and sometimes may not, according to different circumstances.

Human food appears to be the only product of the land that consistently and inevitably provides some rent to the landlord. Other types of produce may sometimes do so, and sometimes may not, depending on various circumstances.

After food, clothing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind.

After food, clothing and shelter are the two basic needs of humanity.

Land, in its original rude state, can afford the materials of clothing and lodging to a much greater number of people than it can feed. In its improved state, it can sometimes feed a greater number of people than it can supply with those materials; at least in the way in which they require them, and are willing to pay for them. In the one state, therefore, there is always a superabundance of those materials, which are frequently, upon that account, of little or no value. In the other, there is often a scarcity, which necessarily augments their value. In the one state, a great part of them is thrown away as useless; and the price of what is used is considered as equal only to the labour and expense of fitting it for use, and can, therefore, afford no rent to the landlord. In the other, they are all made use of, and there is frequently a demand for more than can be had. Somebody is always willing to give more for every part of them, than what is sufficient to pay the expense of bringing them to market. Their price, therefore, can always afford some rent to the landlord.

Land, in its natural state, can provide the materials for clothing and shelter to far more people than it can feed. When improved, it can sometimes feed more people than it can provide those materials to, at least in the way they need them and are willing to pay for them. In the first state, there's usually an excess of those materials, which often makes them worth very little or nothing at all. In the second state, there's often a shortage, which increases their value. In the first scenario, a large portion ends up wasted as it's deemed useless; the price of what is used is thought to cover only the labor and costs of preparing it for use, so it can't provide any rent to the landlord. In the second scenario, everything is utilized, and there's often a demand for more than what's available. Someone is always ready to pay more for each part of it than what it costs to bring it to market. Thus, the price can consistently generate some rent for the landlord.

The skins of the larger animals were the original materials of clothing. Among nations of hunters and shepherds, therefore, whose food consists chiefly in the flesh of those animals, every man, by providing himself with food, provides himself with the materials of more clothing than he can wear. If there was no foreign commerce, the greater part of them would be thrown away as things of no value. This was probably the case among the hunting nations of North America, before their country was discovered by the Europeans, with whom they now exchange their surplus peltry, for blankets, fire-arms, and brandy, which gives it some value. In the present commercial state of the known world, the most barbarous nations, I believe, among whom land property is established, have some foreign commerce of this kind, and find among their wealthier neighbours such a demand for all the materials of clothing, which their land produces, and which can neither be wrought up nor consumed at home, as raises their price above what it costs to send them to those wealthier neighbors. It affords, therefore, some rent to the landlord. When the greater part of the Highland cattle were consumed on their own hills, the exportation of their hides made the most considerable article of the commerce of that country, and what they were exchanged for afforded some addition to the rent of the Highland estates. The wool of England, which in old times, could neither be consumed nor wrought up at home, found a market in the then wealthier and more industrious country of Flanders, and its price afforded something to the rent of the land which produced it. In countries not better cultivated than England was then, or than the Highlands of Scotland are now, and which had no foreign commerce, the materials of clothing would evidently be so superabundant, that a great part of them would be thrown away as useless, and no part could afford any rent to the landlord.

The hides of larger animals were the original materials for clothing. In societies of hunters and herders, where people's diets mainly consist of the meat from those animals, each person, by securing food, ends up with more materials for clothing than they can actually wear. Without trade with other countries, most of these materials would likely be discarded as worthless. This was probably true for the hunting nations of North America before Europeans discovered their land, with whom they now trade their excess furs for blankets, firearms, and alcohol, which gives these materials some value. In today’s commercial world, even the most primitive nations, where land ownership exists, have some form of trade like this and find that their wealthier neighbors have a demand for all the clothing materials that their land produces, which they can't process or use domestically, thus increasing their value beyond the cost of sending them to those neighbors. This provides some income for landowners. When most of the Highland cattle were used locally, the export of their hides became a major part of that country’s trade, and what they were traded for added to the income of Highland estates. The wool from England, which in the past couldn't be consumed or processed locally, found a market in the then wealthier and more industrious region of Flanders, and its price contributed to the land rent where it was produced. In countries that weren't better cultivated than England was back then, or than the Highlands of Scotland are now, and which lacked foreign trade, the materials for clothing would clearly be so abundant that a significant portion would be discarded as useless, and none would generate any revenue for landowners.

The materials of lodging cannot always be[Pg 69] transported to so great a distance as those of clothing, and do not so readily become an object of foreign commerce. When they are superabundant in the country which produces them, it frequently happens, even in the present commercial state of the world, that they are of no value to the landlord. A good stone quarry in the neighbourhood of London would afford a considerable rent. In many parts of Scotland and Wales it affords none. Barren timber for building is of great value in a populous and well-cultivated country, and the land which produces it affords a considerable rent. But in many parts of North America, the landlord would be much obliged to any body who would carry away the greater part of his large trees. In some parts of the Highlands of Scotland, the bark is the only part of the wood which, for want of roads and water-carriage, can be sent to market; the timber is left to rot upon the ground. When the materials of lodging are so superabundant, the part made use of is worth only the labour and expense of fitting it for that use. It affords no rent to the landlord, who generally grants the use of it to whoever takes the trouble of asking it. The demand of wealthier nations, however, sometimes enables him to get a rent for it. The paving of the streets of London has enabled the owners of some barren rocks on the coast of Scotland to draw a rent from what never afforded any before. The woods of Norway, and of the coasts of the Baltic, find a market in many parts of Great Britain, which they could not find at home, and thereby afford some rent to their proprietors.

The materials for building can't always be[Pg 69] transported as far as those used for clothing and aren't as easily traded internationally. When there's an oversupply in the country that produces them, it often happens that, even in today's global economy, they're worth little to the property owner. A good stone quarry near London could generate a significant rent, but in many areas of Scotland and Wales, it yields nothing. Waste timber for construction is highly valued in a densely populated and well-farmed area, and the land producing it can command a good rent. However, in many regions of North America, the property owner would be grateful to anyone willing to take away most of their large trees. In some parts of the Scottish Highlands, the bark is the only portion of the wood that, due to the lack of roads and transport options, can be sold; the rest of the timber is left to decay on the ground. When building materials are overly abundant, the portion that's used is only worth the effort and cost of preparing it for that purpose. It generates no rent for the landlord, who typically allows anyone to use it if they simply ask. However, the demand from wealthier nations sometimes allows him to charge rent for it. The paving of London streets has enabled the owners of some barren cliffs along the Scottish coast to receive rent from resources that previously yielded none. The forests in Norway and along the Baltic coast find a market in various parts of Great Britain, which they couldn't access at home, thus providing some income to their owners.

Countries are populous, not in proportion to the number of people whom their produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom it can feed. When food is provided, it is easy to find the necessary clothing and lodging. But though these are at hand, it may often be difficult to find food. In some parts of the British dominions, what is called a house may be built by one day's labour of one man. The simplest species of clothing, the skins of animals, require somewhat more labour to dress and prepare them for use. They do not, however, require a great deal. Among savage or barbarous nations, a hundredth, or little more than a hundredth part of the labour of the whole year, will be sufficient to provide them with such clothing and lodging as satisfy the greater part of the people. All the other ninety-nine parts are frequently no more than enough to provide them with food.

Countries are populous, not based on how many people their resources can clothe and house, but rather on how many they can feed. When food is available, it's easy to find the necessary clothing and shelter. However, even when these are available, finding food can often be challenging. In some areas of the British territories, what’s considered a house can be built in just one day's work by one person. The simplest form of clothing, which is animal skins, requires a bit more effort to prepare for use, but it doesn’t take much. Among primitive or barbaric societies, just over one percent of the total labor for the year is enough to provide them with the clothing and shelter that most of the population needs. The other ninety-nine percent of their labor often goes mainly towards securing food.

But when, by the improvement and cultivation of land, the labour of one family can provide food for two, the labour of half the society becomes sufficient to provide food for the whole. The other half, therefore, or at least the greater part of them, can be employed in providing other things, or in satisfying the other wants and fancies of mankind. Clothing and lodging, household furniture, and what is called equipage, are the principal objects of the greater part of those wants and fancies. The rich man consumes no more food than his poor neighbour. In quality it may be very different, and to select and prepare it may require more labour and art; but in quantity it is very nearly the same. But compare the spacious palace and great wardrobe of the one, with the hovel and the few rags of the other, and you will be sensible that the difference between their clothing, lodging, and household furniture, is almost as great in quantity as it is in quality. The desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach; but the desire of the conveniencies and ornaments of building, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems to have no limit or certain boundary. Those, therefore, who have the command of more food than they themselves can consume, are always willing to exchange the surplus, or, what is the same thing, the price of it, for gratifications of this other kind. What is over and above satisfying the limited desire, is given for the amusement of those desires which cannot be satisfied, but seem to be altogether endless. The poor, in order to obtain food, exert themselves to gratify those fancies of the rich; and to obtain it more certainly, they vie with one another in the cheapness and perfection of their work. The number of workmen increases with the increasing quantity of food, or with the growing improvement and cultivation of the lands; and as the nature of their business admits of the utmost subdivisions of labour, the quantity of materials which they can work up, increases in a much greater proportion than their numbers. Hence arises a demand for every sort of material which human invention can employ, either usefully or ornamentally, in building, dress, equipage, or household furniture; for the fossils and minerals contained in the bowels of the earth, the precious metals, and the precious stones.

But when, through improving and cultivating land, the work of one family can provide food for two, the labor of half the society becomes enough to feed everyone. The other half, or at least most of them, can then focus on creating other goods or fulfilling the additional needs and desires of people. Clothing, shelter, household items, and what’s called furnishings are the main focuses of those needs and desires. A wealthy person consumes no more food than their poorer neighbor. The quality might be very different, and preparing it may take more effort and skill; but in quantity, it's nearly the same. However, if you compare the spacious mansion and extensive wardrobe of one to the small shack and few rags of the other, you'll notice that the difference in their clothing, housing, and household items is almost as significant in quantity as it is in quality. The desire for food is limited for everyone by the small size of the human stomach, but the desire for comforts and decorations in housing, clothing, furnishings, and decor seems to have no limits or clear boundaries. Therefore, those who can access more food than they can eat are always willing to trade the excess, or basically the value of it, for these other types of satisfaction. Anything beyond what's needed to satisfy that limited desire is spent on indulging those desires that seem never-ending. The poor, in their quest for food, strive to satisfy the whims of the rich; and to ensure they get it, they compete with each other in the cost-effectiveness and quality of their work. The number of workers increases as the supply of food rises, or as land gets better cultivated. Since the nature of their tasks allows for great specialization, the amount of materials they can process increases at a much faster rate than their numbers. This creates a demand for every type of material that human creativity can use, either practically or decoratively, in building, clothing, furnishings, or household decor; for the minerals and gems buried deep in the earth, the precious metals, and the valuable stones.

Food is, in this manner, not only the original source of rent, but every other part of the produce of land which afterwards affords rent, derives that part of its value from the improvement of the powers of labour in producing food, by means of the improvement and cultivation of land.

Food is, in this way, not just the primary source of rent, but every other part of the produce from the land that later generates rent gets its value from the enhancement of labor's ability to produce food, thanks to the development and cultivation of the land.

Those other parts of the produce of land, however, which afterwards afford rent, do not afford it always. Even in improved and cultivated countries, the demand for them is not always such as to afford a greater price than what is sufficient to pay the labour, and replace, together with its ordinary profits, the stock which must be employed in bringing them to market. Whether it is or is not such, depends upon different circumstances.[Pg 70]

Those other parts of what the land produces, however, which later generate rent, don’t always do so. Even in improved and developed countries, the demand for them isn’t always enough to provide a higher price than what is needed to cover the labor costs and replace, along with its usual profits, the resources that need to be used to bring them to market. Whether it is or it isn’t depends on various circumstances.[Pg 70]

Whether a coal mine, for example, can afford any rent, depends partly upon its fertility, and partly upon its situation.

Whether a coal mine can afford any rent depends partly on its productivity and partly on its location.

A mine of any kind may be said to be either fertile or barren, according as the quantity of mineral which can be brought from it by a certain quantity of labour, as greater or less than what can be brought by an equal quantity from the greater part of other mines of the same kind.

A mine of any sort can be described as either productive or unproductive, depending on the amount of mineral that can be extracted from it with a specific amount of labor, compared to what can be extracted from most other mines of the same type using the same amount of labor.

Some coal mines, advantageously situated, cannot be wrought on account of their barrenness. The produce does not pay the expense. They can afford neither profit nor rent.

Some coal mines, which are well-located, can’t be worked because they’re unproductive. The output doesn’t cover the costs. They provide neither profit nor rent.

There are some, of which the produce is barely sufficient to pay the labour, and replace, together with its ordinary profits, the stock employed in working them. They afford some profit to the undertaker of the work, but no rent to the landlord. They can be wrought advantageously by nobody but the landlord, who, being himself the undertaker of the work, gets the ordinary profit of the capital which he employs in it. Many coal mines in Scotland are wrought in this manner, and can be wrought in no other. The landlord will allow nobody else to work them without paying some rent, and nobody can afford to pay any.

There are some that barely generate enough produce to cover the labor costs and replace the capital used in operating them, along with the usual profits. They provide some profit to the person managing the work, but no rent to the landlord. Only the landlord can profitably operate these, and since he is also the one managing the work, he earns the usual profit from the capital he invests. Many coal mines in Scotland are operated this way and cannot be worked any other way. The landlord won't let anyone else operate them without paying some rent, and no one can afford to pay anything.

Other coal mines in the same country, sufficiently fertile, cannot be wrought on account of their situation. A quantity of mineral, sufficient to defray the expense of working, could be brought from the mine by the ordinary, or even less than the ordinary quantity of labour: but in an inland country, thinly inhabited, and without either good roads or water-carriage, this quantity could not be sold.

Other coal mines in the same country, which are rich enough, can't be worked because of their location. A sufficient amount of minerals to cover the operating costs could be extracted from the mine with normal, or even less than normal, labor. But in a sparsely populated inland country without good roads or waterways, that amount couldn’t be sold.

Coals are a less agreeable fuel than wood: they are said too to be less wholesome. The expense of coals, therefore, at the place where they are consumed, must generally be somewhat less than that of wood.

Coals are a less desirable fuel than wood; they're also said to be less healthy. The cost of coals, therefore, at the location where they're used, should generally be a bit lower than that of wood.

The price of wood, again, varies with the state of agriculture, nearly in the same manner, and exactly for the same reason, as the price of cattle. In its rude beginnings, the greater part of every country is covered with wood, which is then a mere incumbrance, of no value to the landlord, who would gladly give it to any body for the cutting. As agriculture advances, the woods are partly cleared by the progress of tillage, and partly go to decay in consequence of the increased number of cattle. These, though they do not increase in the same proportion as corn, which is altogether the acquisition of human industry, yet multiply under the care and protection of men, who store up in the season of plenty what may maintain them in that of scarcity; who, through the whole year, furnish them with a greater quantity of food than uncultivated nature provides for them; and who, by destroying and extirpating their enemies, secure them in the free enjoyment of all that she provides. Numerous herds of cattle, when allowed to wander through the woods, though they do not destroy the old trees, hinder any young ones from coming up; so that, in the course of a century or two, the whole forest goes to ruin. The scarcity of wood then raises its price. It affords a good rent; and the landlord sometimes finds that he can scarce employ his best lands more advantageously than in growing barren timber, of which the greatness of the profit often compensates the lateness of the returns. This seems, in the present times, to be nearly the state of things in several parts of Great Britain, where the profit of planting is found to be equal to that of either corn or pasture. The advantage which the landlord derives from planting can nowhere exceed, at least for any considerable time, the rent which these could afford him; and in an inland country, which is highly cultivated, it will frequently not fall much short of this rent. Upon the sea-coast of a well-improved country, indeed, if coals can conveniently be had for fuel, it may sometimes be cheaper to bring barren timber for building from less cultivated foreign countries than to raise it at home. In the new town of Edinburgh, built within these few years, there is not, perhaps, a single stick of Scotch timber.

The price of wood varies again with the state of agriculture, much like the price of cattle, and for the same reasons. In its early stages, most of every country is covered with wood, which is seen as a burden of little value to the landowner, who would happily give it away to anyone willing to cut it down. As agriculture improves, some forests are cleared through farming, while others decay due to the rising number of cattle. Although cattle don’t increase as much as crops, which come entirely from human effort, they do multiply under human care, as people stock up during plentiful seasons to sustain them during shortages. Throughout the year, they provide more food than what untamed nature offers, and by eliminating threats, ensure that cattle can fully enjoy what’s available. Large herds of cattle, when roaming in forests, don’t destroy mature trees but prevent younger ones from growing, leading eventually to the forest's decline over a century or two. When wood becomes scarce, its price rises. It generates good rental income, and landowners often find they can’t use their best land more profitably than growing timber, as the high profit can often make up for the delayed returns. This seems to be the current situation in various parts of Great Britain, where the profit from planting is found to be on par with that from either crops or pasture. The benefit that landowners get from planting rarely exceeds, at least for any significant period, the rent that they would earn from these alternatives, and in a well-cultivated inland area, it often comes close. Along the coast of a well-developed country, if coal is easily accessible for fuel, it can sometimes be cheaper to import unprocessed timber for construction from less cultivated foreign countries than to grow it locally. In the newly built town of Edinburgh, there might not be a single piece of Scotch timber.

Whatever may be the price of wood, if that of coals is such that the expense of a coal fire is nearly equal to that of a wood one, we may be assured, that at that place, and in these circumstances, the price of coals is as high as it can be. It seems to be so in some of the inland parts of England, particularly in Oxfordshire, where it is usual, even in the fires of the common people, to mix coals and wood together, and where the difference in the expense of those two sorts of fuel cannot, therefore, be very great. Coals, in the coal countries, are everywhere much below this highest price. If they were not, they could not bear the expense of a distant carriage, either by land or by water. A small quantity only could be sold; and the coal masters and the coal proprietors find it more for their interest to sell a great quantity at a price somewhat above the lowest, than a small quantity at the highest. The most fertile coal mine, too, regulates the price of coals at all the other mines in its neighbourhood. Both the proprietor and the undertaker of the work find, the one that he can get a greater rent, the other that he can get a greater profit, by somewhat underselling all their neighbours. Their neighbours are soon obliged to sell at the same price, though they cannot so well afford it, and though it always diminishes, and sometimes takes away altogether, both their rent and their profit. Some works are abandoned altogether; others can afford no rent, and can be wrought only by the proprietor.

No matter what the price of wood is, if the cost of coal is such that using a coal fire is nearly the same as using a wood fire, we can assume that at that location and under those circumstances, the price of coal is as high as it gets. This seems to be the case in some inland areas of England, especially in Oxfordshire, where it's common, even among regular households, to mix coal and wood for their fires, meaning the cost difference between those two fuel types isn't very significant. In coal-producing regions, prices are generally much lower than this highest price. If they weren't, the costs of transporting them over long distances, by land or by water, would make it unfeasible. Only a small amount could be sold, and coal mine owners find it more beneficial to sell a large volume at a slightly higher price rather than a small amount at the highest price. The most productive coal mine also sets the price for coal at all the other mines in its vicinity. Both the owner and the operator of the mine find that the owner can charge a higher rent and the operator can earn a greater profit by slightly underpricing their competitors. Their competitors are quickly forced to sell at the same price, even though they can’t really afford it, which always reduces, and sometimes completely eliminates, both their rent and profit. Some operations are completely shut down; others can’t pay any rent and can only be worked by the owner.

The lowest price at which coals can be sold for any considerable time, is, like that of all[Pg 71] other commodities, the price which is barely sufficient to replace, together with its ordinary profits, the stock which must be employed in bringing them to market. At a coal mine for which the landlord can get no rent, but which he must either work himself or let it alone altogether, the price of coals must generally be nearly about this price.

The lowest price at which coal can be sold for any significant period is, like all other commodities, the price that just covers the cost of bringing it to market along with normal profits. For a coal mine where the landlord isn't receiving any rent and has to either work it himself or leave it completely, the price of coal usually hovers around this amount.

Rent, even where coals afford one, has generally a smaller share in their price than in that of most other parts of the rude produce of land. The rent of an estate above ground, commonly amounts to what is supposed to be a third of the gross produce; and it is generally a rent certain and independent of the occasional variations in the crop. In coal mines, a fifth of the gross produce is a very great rent, a tenth the common rent; and it is seldom a rent certain, but depends upon the occasional variations in the produce. These are so great, that in a country where thirty years purchase is considered as a moderate price for the property of a landed estate, ten years purchase is regarded as a good price for that of a coal mine.

Rent, even in places where coal is readily available, usually represents a smaller portion of its price compared to most other types of raw land produce. The rent for land above ground typically amounts to what is thought to be about a third of the gross yield; it’s usually a certain rent that doesn't fluctuate with occasional crop variations. In coal mines, a rent of one-fifth of the gross yield is substantial, while one-tenth is more common; and it’s rarely a certain rent, as it often hinges on the occasional fluctuations in production. These fluctuations are so significant that in a country where thirty years' worth of income is considered a reasonable price for land ownership, ten years' worth is seen as a good price for a coal mine.

The value of a coal mine to the proprietor, frequently depends as much upon its situation as upon its fertility. That of a metallic mine depends more upon its fertility, and less upon its situation. The coarse, and still more the precious metals, when separated from the ore, are so valuable, that they can generally bear the expense of a very long land, and of the most distant sea carriage. Their market is not confined to the countries in the neighbourhood of the mine, but extends to the whole world. The copper of Japan makes an article of commerce in Europe; the iron of Spain in that of Chili and Peru. The silver of Peru finds its way, not only to Europe, but from Europe to China.

The value of a coal mine to its owner often relies as much on its location as on its quality. In contrast, the value of a metal mine depends more on its quality and less on its location. Coarse metals and especially precious metals, once extracted from the ore, are so valuable that they can usually justify the costs of long land transport and distant sea shipping. Their market isn't just limited to the nearby countries but spans the entire globe. Japanese copper is traded in Europe; Spanish iron is found in Chile and Peru. Peruvian silver travels not only to Europe but also from Europe to China.

The price of coals in Westmoreland or Shropshire can have little effect on their price at Newcastle; and their price in the Lionnois can have none at all. The productions of such distant coal mines can never be brought into competition with one another. But the productions of the most distant metallic mines frequently may, and in fact commonly are.

The price of coal in Westmoreland or Shropshire has little impact on its price in Newcastle, and its price in the Lionnois has no impact at all. The output from such far-off coal mines can never compete with each other. However, the output from the most remote metal mines often can, and is usually in competition.

The price, therefore, of the coarse, and still more that of the precious metals, at the most fertile mines in the world, must necessarily more or less affect their price at every other in it. The price of copper in Japan must have some influence upon its price at the copper mines in Europe. The price of silver in Peru, or the quantity either of labour or of other goods which it will purchase there, must have some influence on its price, not only at the silver mines of Europe, but at those of China. After the discovery of the mines of Peru, the silver mines of Europe were, the greater part of them, abandoned. The value of silver was so much reduced, that their produce could no longer pay the expense of working them, or replace, with a profit, the food, clothes, lodging, and other necessaries which were consumed in that operation. This was the case, too, with the mines of Cuba and St. Domingo, and even with the ancient mines of Peru, after the discovery of those of Potosi.

The price of basic materials, and especially precious metals, at the most productive mines in the world, should affect their prices at every other mine. The price of copper in Japan likely influences its price in copper mines across Europe. The price of silver in Peru, or how much labor or other goods it can buy there, probably impacts its price not only at European silver mines but also at those in China. After the discovery of the mines in Peru, most of the silver mines in Europe were abandoned. The value of silver dropped so much that the output could no longer cover the costs of operating them or provide a profit to replace the food, clothing, shelter, and other necessities consumed during that process. This also happened with the mines in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, as well as with the ancient mines in Peru after the discovery of those in Potosi.

The price of every metal, at every mine, therefore, being regulated in some measure by its price at the most fertile mine in the world that is actually wrought, it can, at the greater part of mines, do very little more than pay the expense of working, and can seldom afford a very high rent to the landlord. Rent accordingly, seems at the greater part of mines to have but a small share in the price of the coarse, and a still smaller in that of the precious metals. Labour and profit make up the greater part of both.

The price of every metal at every mine is influenced to some extent by its price at the richest mine in the world that is currently operating. As a result, at most mines, the income generated can only cover the costs of production and rarely provides a significant rent for the landlord. Consequently, rent appears to play a minor role in the pricing of base metals and an even smaller one in the pricing of precious metals. Most of the value comes from labor and profit.

A sixth part of the gross produce may be reckoned the average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, the most fertile that are known in the world, as we are told by the Rev. Mr. Borlace, vice-warden of the stannaries. Some, he says, afford more, and some do not afford so much. A sixth part of the gross produce is the rent, too, of several very fertile lead mines in Scotland.

A sixth of the total output can be considered the average rent for the tin mines in Cornwall, the most productive known in the world, according to Rev. Mr. Borlace, the vice-warden of the stannaries. Some mines provide more, while others provide less. A sixth of the total output is also the rent for several very productive lead mines in Scotland.

In the silver mines of Peru, we are told by Frezier and Ulloa, the proprietor frequently exacts no other acknowledgment from the undertaker of the mine, but that he will grind the ore at his mill, paying him the ordinary multure or price of grinding. Till 1736, indeed, the tax of the king of Spain amounted to one fifth of the standard silver, which till then might be considered as the real rent of the greater part of the silver mines of Peru, the richest which have been known in the world. If there had been no tax, this fifth would naturally have belonged to the landlord, and many mines might have been wrought which could not then be wrought, because they could not afford this tax. The tax of the duke of Cornwall upon tin is supposed to amount to more than five per cent. or one twentieth part of the value; and whatever may be his proportion, it would naturally, too, belong to the proprietor of the mine, if tin was duty free. But if you add one twentieth to one sixth, you will find that the whole average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, was to the whole average rent of the silver mines of Peru, as thirteen to twelve. But the silver mines of Peru are not now able to pay even this low rent; and the tax upon silver was, in 1736, reduced from one fifth to one tenth. Even this tax upon silver, too, gives more temptation to smuggling than the tax of one twentieth upon tin; and smuggling must be much easier in the precious than in the bulky commodity. The tax of the king of Spain, accordingly, is said to be very ill paid, and that of the duke of Cornwall very well. Rent, therefore, it is probable,[Pg 72] makes a greater part of the price of tin at the must fertile tin mines than it does of silver at the most fertile silver mines in the world. After replacing the stock employed in working those different mines, together with its ordinary profits, the residue which remains to the proprietor is greater, it seems, in the coarse, than in the precious metal.

In the silver mines of Peru, as explained by Frezier and Ulloa, the owner often only requires the miner to process the ore at his mill, paying the standard grinding fee. Until 1736, the tax imposed by the king of Spain was one-fifth of the standard silver, which at that time could be seen as the actual rent for most of the silver mines in Peru, the wealthiest known to have existed in the world. If there had been no tax, this fifth would naturally have gone to the landlord, allowing many mines to be worked that otherwise couldn’t afford the tax. The tax that the Duke of Cornwall charges on tin is believed to be more than five percent, or one-twentieth of the value; whatever his rate may be, it would typically belong to the mine’s owner if there were no duty on tin. However, if you add one-twentieth to one-sixth, you find that the average rent of the tin mines in Cornwall is to the average rent of the silver mines in Peru as thirteen to twelve. But now, the silver mines of Peru cannot even afford this low rent; in 1736, the tax on silver was lowered from one-fifth to one-tenth. Even this reduced tax on silver encourages more smuggling than the one-twentieth tax on tin; and smuggling is generally easier with precious metals than with bulkier items. As a result, it’s said that the tax collected by the king of Spain is poorly enforced, while the Duke of Cornwall collects his much more effectively. Therefore, it’s likely that the rent constitutes a larger part of the price of tin from the richest tin mines than it does for silver from the richest silver mines in the world. After accounting for the investment used in operating these different mines, along with its typical profits, the remaining amount for the owner seems to be greater for tin than for precious metal.

Neither are the profits of the undertakers of silver mines commonly very great in Peru. The same most respectable and well-informed authors acquaint us, that when any person undertakes to work a new mine in Peru, he is universally looked upon as a man destined to bankruptcy and ruin, and is upon that account shunned and avoided by every body.—Mining, it seems, is considered there in the same light as here, as a lottery, in which the prizes do not compensate the blanks, though the greatness of some tempts many adventurers to throw away their fortunes in such unprosperous projects.

The profits for silver mine operators in Peru aren't usually that high. The most respected and knowledgeable authors tell us that when someone decides to start working a new mine in Peru, they're generally seen as someone meant for failure and financial disaster, which is why everyone tends to avoid them. Mining seems to be viewed there just like it is here, as a gamble where the rewards don't make up for the losses, even though the potential for big payoffs leads many hopefuls to risk their fortunes on these unlikely ventures.

As the sovereign, however, derives a considerable part of his revenue from the produce of silver mines, the law in Peru gives every possible encouragement to the discovery and working of new ones. Whoever discovers a new mine, is entitled to measure off two hundred and forty-six feet in length, according to what he supposes to be the direction of the vein, and half as much in breadth. He becomes proprietor of this portion of the mine, and can work it without paying any acknowledgment to the landlord. The interest of the duke of Cornwall has given occasion to a regulation nearly of the same kind in that ancient dutchy. In waste and uninclosed lands, any person who discovers a tin mine may mark out its limits to a certain extent, which is called bounding a mine. The bounder becomes the real proprietor of the mine, and may either work it himself, or give it in lease to another, without the consent of the owner of the land, to whom, however, a very small acknowledgment must be paid upon working it. In both regulations, the sacred rights of private property are sacrificed to the supposed interests of public revenue.

As the ruler, however, makes a significant part of his income from the silver mines, the law in Peru encourages the discovery and operation of new mines. Anyone who finds a new mine is allowed to claim two hundred and forty-six feet in length, based on what they think is the vein's direction, and half that in width. They become the owner of that part of the mine and can work it without paying any rent to the landowner. The interest of the Duke of Cornwall led to a similar rule in that ancient duchy. In undeveloped and uncultivated lands, anyone who discovers a tin mine can mark out its boundaries to a certain extent, known as bounding a mine. The person who marks it becomes the actual owner of the mine and can either work it themselves or lease it to someone else, without needing the landowner's consent; however, they must pay a very small fee to the landowner when they work it. In both cases, the fundamental rights of private property are compromised for what are believed to be the public revenue's interests.

The same encouragement is given in Peru to the discovery and working of new gold mines; and in gold the king's tax amounts only to a twentieth part of the standard rental. It was once a fifth, and afterwards a tenth, as in silver; but it was found that the work could not bear even the lowest of these two taxes. If it is rare, however, say the same authors, Frezier and Ulloa, to find a person who has made his fortune by a silver, it is still much rarer to find one who has done so by a gold mine. This twentieth part seems to be the whole rent which is paid by the greater part of the gold mines of Chili and Peru. Gold, too, is much more liable to be smuggled than even silver; not only on account of the superior value of the metal in proportion to its bulk, but on account of the peculiar way in which nature produces it. Silver is very seldom found virgin, but, like most other metals, is generally mineralized with some other body, from which it is impossible to separate it in such quantities as will pay for the expense, but by a very laborious and tedious operation, which cannot well be carried on but in work-houses erected for the purpose, and, therefore, exposed to the inspection of the king's officers. Gold, on the contrary, is almost always found virgin. It is sometimes found in pieces of some bulk; and, even when mixed, in small and almost insensible particles, with sand, earth, and other extraneous bodies, it can be separated from them by a very short and simple operation, which can be carried on in any private house by any body who is possessed of a small quantity of mercury. If the king's tax, therefore, is but ill paid upon silver, it is likely to be much worse paid upon gold; and rent must make a much smaller part of the price of gold than that of silver.

The same encouragement is given in Peru for discovering and developing new gold mines; and for gold, the king's tax amounts to only 5% of the standard rental. It used to be 20%, and later 10%, like with silver; but it was found that the work couldn't handle even the lower of those two taxes. However, as the same authors, Frezier and Ulloa, say, while it's rare to find someone who has made their fortune from silver, it's even rarer to find someone who has done so from a gold mine. This 5% seems to be the total rent paid by most gold mines in Chile and Peru. Gold is also much more likely to be smuggled than silver; not only because it has a higher value relative to its size, but also due to the unique way nature produces it. Silver is very rarely found in its pure form; like most other metals, it’s generally combined with other materials, from which it's impossible to extract enough to cover costs without a very labor-intensive and time-consuming process that can only be done in facilities set up for that purpose, and thus are subject to inspection by the king's officials. Gold, on the other hand, is almost always found in its pure form. It's sometimes discovered in larger pieces and even when mixed, is found in tiny, almost invisible particles with sand, dirt, and other materials, which can be separated through a very quick and simple process, doable in any private home by anyone who has a small amount of mercury. If the king's tax is poorly paid on silver, it's likely to be even worse on gold; and rent must make up a much smaller part of the price of gold than it does for silver.

The lowest price at which the precious metals can be sold, or the smallest quantity of other goods for which they can be exchanged, during any considerable time, is regulated by the same principles which fix the lowest ordinary price of all other goods. The stock which must commonly be employed, the food, clothes, and lodging, which must commonly be consumed in bringing them from the mine to the market, determine it. It must at least be sufficient to replace that stock, with the ordinary profits.

The lowest price at which precious metals can be sold, or the smallest amount of other goods they can be exchanged for, over a significant period, is determined by the same principles that set the lowest regular price of all other goods. The supply that is typically needed, along with the food, clothing, and housing that must usually be consumed to transport them from the mine to the market, dictates this. It must at least be enough to replace that supply, along with the usual profits.

Their highest price, however, seems not to be necessarily determined by any thing but the actual scarcity or plenty of these metals themselves. It is not determined by that of any other commodity, in the same manner as the price of coals is by that of wood, beyond which no scarcity can ever raise it. Increase the scarcity of gold to a certain degree, and the smallest bit of it may become more precious than a diamond, and exchange for a greater quantity of other goods.

Their highest price, however, doesn’t seem to be determined by anything other than the actual scarcity or abundance of these metals themselves. It isn’t influenced by the price of any other commodity, like how the price of coal is affected by the price of wood, which has a limit to how much scarcity can raise it. If the scarcity of gold increases to a certain point, even the tiniest amount of it could become more valuable than a diamond and could be exchanged for a larger quantity of other goods.

The demand for those metals arises partly from their utility, and partly from their beauty. If you except iron, they are more useful than, perhaps, any other metal. As they are less liable to rust and impurity, they can more easily be kept clean; and the utensils, either of the table or the kitchen, are often, upon that account, more agreeable when made of them. A silver boiler is more cleanly than a lead, copper, or tin one; and the same quality would render a gold boiler still better than a silver one. Their principal merit, however, arises from their beauty, which renders them peculiarly fit for the ornaments of dress and furniture. No paint or dye can give so splendid a colour as gilding. The merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their scarcity. With the greater part of rich people, the[Pg 73] chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches; which, in their eye, is never so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but themselves. In their eyes, the merit of an object, which is in any degree either useful or beautiful, is greatly enhanced by its scarcity, or by the great labour which it requires to collect any considerable quantity of it; a labour which nobody can afford to pay but themselves. Such objects they are willing to purchase at a higher price than things much more beautiful and useful, but more common. These qualities of utility, beauty, and scarcity, are the original foundation of the high price of those metals, or of the great quantity of other goods for which they can everywhere be exchanged. This value was antecedent to, and independent of their being employed as coin, and was the quality which fitted them for that employment. That employment, however, by occasioning a new demand, and by diminishing the quantity which could be employed in any other way, may have afterwards contributed to keep up or increase their value.

The demand for those metals comes partly from their usefulness and partly from their beauty. Except for iron, they are likely more useful than any other metal. Since they are less prone to rust and impurities, they can be kept cleaner more easily, making utensils—whether for the table or the kitchen—more appealing when made from them. A silver pot is cleaner than one made of lead, copper, or tin, and a gold pot would be even better because of the same quality. However, their main appeal lies in their beauty, which makes them especially suitable for decorating clothing and furniture. No paint or dye can provide a color as brilliant as gold. The value of their beauty is greatly increased by their scarcity. For many wealthy people, the main enjoyment of having money comes from showing it off; to them, this display is never complete unless they possess those distinguishing signs of wealth that only they can claim. They believe that the value of something, whether it's useful or beautiful, increases significantly with its rarity or the effort needed to gather a substantial amount of it—an effort that only they can afford. They are willing to pay more for these items than for things that are much more beautiful and useful but more common. These qualities of usefulness, beauty, and scarcity form the basis for the high price of these metals or the large amount of other goods they can be exchanged for everywhere. This value existed before and independently of their use as currency and was what made them suitable for that purpose. However, this use, by creating new demand and reducing the amount available for other uses, may have contributed to maintaining or increasing their value.

The demand for the precious stones arises altogether from their beauty. They are of no use but as ornaments; and the merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their scarcity, or by the difficulty and expense of getting them from the mine. Wages and profit accordingly make up, upon most occasions, almost the whole of the high price. Rent comes in but for a very small share, frequently for no share; and the most fertile mines only afford any considerable rent. When Tavernier, a jeweller, visited the diamond mines of Golconda and Visiapour, he was informed that the sovereign of the country, for whose benefit they were wrought, had ordered all of them to be shut up except those which yielded the largest and finest stones. The other, it seems, were to the proprietor not worth the working.

The demand for precious stones comes entirely from their beauty. They are only useful as ornaments; and their beauty is made even more valuable by how rare they are or how hard and expensive it is to extract them from the mine. Wages and profits usually account for most of the high price. Rent contributes only a small portion, often nothing at all; and only the richest mines provide any significant rent. When Tavernier, a jeweler, visited the diamond mines of Golconda and Visiapour, he learned that the ruler of the area, for whom the mines were worked, had ordered all of them to be closed except for the ones that produced the largest and finest stones. The others were deemed not worth working to the owner.

As the prices, both of the precious metals and of the precious stones, is regulated all over the world by their price at the most fertile mine in it, the rent which a mine of either can afford to its proprietor is in proportion, not to its absolute, but to what may be called its relative fertility, or to its superiority over other mines of the same kind. If new mines were discovered, as much superior to those of Potosi, as they were superior to those of Europe, the value of silver might be so much degraded as to render even the mines of Potosi not worth the working. Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, the most fertile mines in Europe may have afforded as great a rent to their proprietors as the richest mines in Peru do at present. Though the quantity of silver was much less, it might have exchanged for an equal quantity of other goods, and the proprietor's share might have enabled him to purchase or command an equal quantity either of labour or of commodities.

As the prices of both precious metals and gemstones are set worldwide based on the value of the most productive mine, the rent that any mine can provide to its owner depends not on its absolute output, but rather on what we can call its relative productivity, or its advantage over other mines of the same type. If new mines were found that were as much better than those in Potosi as those are compared to European mines, the value of silver could drop so much that even the Potosi mines wouldn’t be worth operating. Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, the most productive mines in Europe might have provided as much rent to their owners as the richest mines in Peru do today. Although the quantity of silver was much lower, it could have traded for an equivalent amount of other goods, and the owner's share might have allowed them to buy or control an equivalent amount of either labor or commodities.

The value, both of the product and of the rent, the real revenue which they afforded, both to the public and to the proprietor, might have been the same.

The value of both the product and the rent, and the actual revenue they generated for both the public and the owner, could have been the same.

The most abundant mines, either of the precious metals, or of the precious stones, could add little to the wealth of the world. A produce, of which the value is principally derived from its scarcity, is necessarily degraded by its abundance. A service of plate, and the other frivolous ornaments of dress and furniture, could be purchased for a smaller quantity of labour, or for a smaller quantity of commodities; and in this would consist the sole advantage which the world could derive from that abundance.

The richest mines of precious metals and gems can hardly increase the world's wealth. Anything valuable mainly because it’s rare loses its value if it becomes abundant. Decorative silverware and other trivial items for clothing and home decoration could be bought for less labor or fewer goods; this would be the only benefit the world could get from such abundance.

It is otherwise in estates above ground. The value, both of their produce and of their rent, is in proportion to their absolute, and not to their relative fertility. The land which produces certain quantity of food, clothes, and lodging, can always feed, clothe, and lodge, a certain number of people; and whatever may be the proportion of the landlord, it will always give him a proportionable command of the labour of those people, and of the commodities with which that labour can supply him. The value of the most barren land is not diminished by the neighbourhood of the most fertile. On the contrary, it is generally increased by it. The great number of people maintained by the fertile lands afford a market to many parts of the produce of the barren, which they could never have found among those whom their own produce could maintain.

It's different for above-ground properties. The value of both what they produce and their rent is based on their absolute fertility, not their relative fertility. Land that produces a certain amount of food, clothing, and shelter can always feed, clothe, and house a specific number of people; regardless of how much the landlord owns, it will still give him an appropriate influence over the labor of those people and the goods that labor can provide him. The value of the least productive land isn't reduced by the presence of the most productive land. In fact, it generally goes up because the large number of people supported by the fertile land create a market for many products from the less productive land, which wouldn’t have been possible with just those supported by its own production.

Whatever increases the fertility of land in producing food, increases not only the value of the lands upon which the improvement is bestowed, but contributes likewise to increase that or many other lands, by creating a new demand for their produce. That abundance of food, of which, in consequence of the improvement of land, many people have the disposal beyond what they themselves can consume, is the great cause of the demand, both for the precious metals and the precious stones, as well as for every other conveniency and ornament of dress, lodging, household furniture, and equipage. Food not only constitutes the principal part of the riches of the world, but it is the abundance of food which gives the principal part of their value to many other sorts of riches. The poor inhabitants of Cuba and St. Domingo, when they were first discovered by the Spaniards, used to wear little bits of gold as ornaments in their hair and other parts of their dress. They seemed to value them as we would do any little pebbles of somewhat more than ordinary beauty, and to consider them as just worth the picking up, but not worth the refusing to any body who asked them. They gave them to their new[Pg 74] guests at the first request, without seeming to think that they had made them any very valuable present. They were astonished to observe the rage of the Spaniards to obtain them; and had no notion that there could anywhere be a country in which many people had the disposal of so great a superfluity of food; so scanty always among themselves, that, for a very small quantity of those glittering baubles, they would willingly give as much as might maintain a whole family for many years. Could they have been made to understand this, the passion of the Spaniards would not have surprised them.

Whatever makes land more fertile and able to produce food increases not just the value of that land but also boosts the value of other lands by creating new demand for their crops. The surplus food, resulting from improved land, is what many people can access beyond their own consumption, and it drives demand for gold, silver, jewels, and other luxuries like clothes, housing, furniture, and personal items. Food is not just the main source of wealth in the world; it's also the abundance of food that adds significant value to many other types of wealth. When the Spaniards first discovered the poor inhabitants of Cuba and St. Domingo, these people wore small pieces of gold as decorations in their hair and clothing. They seemed to regard them as pretty pebbles rather than valuable items, just worth picking up but not worth refusing to anyone who asked for them. They handed them to their new guests at the first request, without realizing they were giving a valuable gift. They were amazed to see the Spaniards' eagerness to acquire these items and had no idea there could be a place where so many people had such surplus food—something they always struggled to find themselves. For just a few of those shiny trinkets, they would gladly trade enough to support an entire family for many years. If they had understood this, they wouldn't have been surprised by the Spaniards' obsession.

Part 3.Of the variations in the Proportion between the respective Values of that sort of Produce which always affords Rent, and of that which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent.

The increasing abundance of food, in consequence of the increasing improvement and cultivation, must necessarily increase the demand for every part of the produce of land which is not food, and which can be applied either to use or to ornament. In the whole progress of improvement, it might, therefore, be expected there should be only one variation in the comparative values of those two different sorts of produce. The value of that sort which sometimes does, and sometimes does not afford rent, should constantly rise in proportion to that which always affords some rent. As art and industry advance, the materials of clothing and lodging, the useful fossils and materials of the earth, the precious metals and the precious stones, should gradually come to be more and more in demand, should gradually exchange for a greater and a greater quantity of food; or, in other words, should gradually become dearer and dearer. This, accordingly, has been the case with most of these things upon most occasions, and would have been the case with all of them upon all occasions, if particular accidents had not, upon some occasions, increased the supply of some of them in a still greater proportion than the demand.

The growing availability of food, due to improvements in farming and cultivation, will inevitably boost the demand for every part of the land's produce that isn't food and can be used for other purposes or decoration. Throughout the entire process of improvement, we would expect to see only one change in the relative values of these two different types of produce. The value of the type that sometimes provides rent and sometimes does not should consistently increase in relation to the type that always generates some rent. As art and industry progress, the materials for clothing and shelter, the useful resources from the earth, precious metals, and gemstones should gradually become more sought after, exchanging for larger and larger quantities of food; in other words, they should become progressively more expensive. This has mostly been true for many of these items in most situations and would have been true for all of them in all situations if certain events hadn’t, at times, increased the supply of some items more than the demand.

The value of a free-stone quarry, for example, will necessarily increase with the increasing improvement and population of the country round about it, especially if it should be the only one in the neighbourhood. But the value of a silver mine, even though there should not be another within a thousand miles of it, will not necessarily increase with the improvement of the country in which it is situated. The market for the produce of a free-stone quarry can seldom extend more than a few miles round about it, and the demand must generally be in proportion to the improvement and population of that small district; but the market for the produce of a silver mine may extend over the whole known world. Unless the world in general, therefore, be advancing in improvement and population, the demand for silver might not be at all increased by the improvement even of a large country in the neighbourhood of the mine. Even though the world in general were improving, yet if, in the course of its improvements, new mines should be discovered, much more fertile than any which had been known before, though the demand for silver would necessarily increase, yet the supply might increase in so much a greater proportion, that the real price of that metal might gradually fall; that is, any given quantity, a pound weight of it, for example, might gradually purchase or command a smaller and a smaller quantity of labour, or exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity of corn, the principal part of the subsistence of the labourer.

The value of a stone quarry, for instance, will definitely rise as the surrounding area improves and grows in population, especially if it’s the only one nearby. However, the value of a silver mine, even if it's the only one within a thousand miles, won't automatically increase with the development of the area it’s in. The market for the output of a stone quarry rarely goes beyond a few miles around it, and demand usually depends on the growth and population of that small area. On the other hand, the market for the output of a silver mine can reach across the entire known world. So, unless the overall world is advancing in improvement and population, the demand for silver might not increase even with improvements in a large country near the mine. Even if the world is improving, if new mines are discovered during this progress that are much richer than those previously known, the demand for silver might rise, but the supply could increase even more significantly, causing the real price of that metal to gradually fall. This means that a given quantity, say a pound of silver, might increasingly buy less and less labor or exchange for a smaller and smaller amount of corn, which is the main part of the laborer’s sustenance.

The great market for silver is the commercial and civilized part of the world.

The major market for silver is the commercial and developed part of the world.

If, by the general progress of improvement, the demand of this market should increase, while, at the same time, the supply did not increase in the same proportion, the value of silver would gradually rise in proportion to that of corn. Any given quantity of silver would exchange for a greater and a greater quantity of corn; or, in other words, the average money price of corn would gradually become cheaper and cheaper.

If, with overall progress, the demand for this market increases, while the supply doesn’t rise at the same rate, the value of silver would gradually go up compared to corn. A specific amount of silver would be able to buy more and more corn; in other words, the average money price of corn would slowly become cheaper and cheaper.

If, on the contrary, the supply, by some accident, should increase, for many years together, in a greater proportion than the demand, that metal would gradually become cheaper and cheaper; or, in other words, the average money price of corn would, in spite of all improvements, gradually become dearer and dearer.

If, on the other hand, the supply, by some chance, increases for many years at a rate higher than the demand, that metal would slowly become cheaper and cheaper; or, in other words, the average price of corn in money would, despite all improvements, gradually become more and more expensive.

But if, on the other hand, the supply of that metal should increase nearly in the same proportion as the demand, it would continue to purchase or exchange for nearly the same quantity of corn; and the average money price of corn would, in spite of all improvements, continue very nearly the same.

But if, on the other hand, the supply of that metal increases almost in the same proportion as the demand, it would still buy or exchange for nearly the same amount of corn; and the average money price of corn would, despite all improvements, remain very close to the same.

These three seem to exhaust all the possible combinations of events which can happen in the progress of improvement; and during the course of the four centuries preceding the present, if we may judge by what has happened both in France and Great Britain, each of those three different combinations seems to have taken place in the European market, and nearly in the same order, too, in which I have here set them down.

These three seem to cover all the possible combinations of events that can occur during progress and improvement. Over the four centuries leading up to now, judging by what has happened in both France and Great Britain, it seems that each of these three different combinations has occurred in the European market, and almost in the same order that I've laid them out here.

Digression concerning the Variations in the value of Silver during the Course of the Four last Centuries.

First Period.—In 1350, and for some time before, the average price of the quarter of[Pg 75] wheat in England seems not to have been estimated lower than four ounces of silver, Tower weight, equal to about twenty shillings of our present money. From this price it seems to have fallen gradually to two ounces of silver, equal to about ten shillings of our present money, the price at which we find it estimated in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and at which it seems to have continued to be estimated till about 1570.

First Period.—In 1350, and for a while before that, the average price of a quarter of[Pg 75] wheat in England was generally not less than four ounces of silver, Tower weight, which is about twenty shillings in today's money. From this price, it gradually decreased to two ounces of silver, which is roughly equal to ten shillings in today's money. This is the price we see estimated at the start of the sixteenth century, and it seems to have remained at this level until around 1570.

In 1350, being the 25th of Edward III. was enacted what is called the Statute of Labourers. In the preamble, it complains much of the insolence of servants, who endeavoured to raise their wages upon their masters. It therefore ordains, that all servants and labourers should, for the future, be contented with the same wages and liveries (liveries in those times signified not only clothes, but provisions) which they had been accustomed to receive in the 20th year of the king, and the four preceding years; that, upon this account, their livery-wheat should nowhere be estimated higher than tenpence a-bushel, and that it should always be in the option of the master to deliver them either the wheat or the money. Tenpence a-bushel, therefore, had, in the 25th of Edward III. been reckoned a very moderate price of wheat, since it required a particular statute to oblige servants to accept of it in exchange for their usual livery of provisions; and it had been reckoned a reasonable price ten years before that, or in the 16th year of the king, the term to which the statute refers. But in the 16th year of Edward III. tenpence contained about half an ounce of silver, Tower weight, and was nearly equal to half-a-crown of our present money. Four ounces of silver, Tower weight, therefore, equal to six shillings and eightpence of the money of those times, and to near twenty shillings of that of the present, must have been reckoned a moderate price for the quarter of eight bushels.

In 1350, during the 25th year of Edward III's reign, the Statute of Labourers was enacted. The preamble expresses concern over the arrogance of servants who tried to increase their wages with their masters. It therefore states that all servants and laborers should, from now on, be satisfied with the same wages and provisions (which at the time referred not only to clothes but also to food) they had been receiving in the 20th year of the king and the four years prior. It also mandates that their livery wheat should not be valued at more than ten pence per bushel and that the master should always have the choice to provide either the wheat or the equivalent amount in cash. Thus, ten pence per bushel was considered a very reasonable price for wheat in the 25th year of Edward III, as a specific statute was necessary to force servants to accept it instead of their usual provisions. This price had also been viewed as reasonable ten years earlier, during the 16th year of the king, which the statute references. In the 16th year of Edward III, ten pence consisted of about half an ounce of silver by Tower weight, roughly equivalent to half a crown in today’s money. Therefore, four ounces of silver, by Tower weight, equated to six shillings and eight pence at that time, and nearly twenty shillings today, which must have seemed a fair price for a quarter of eight bushels.

This statute is surely a better evidence of what was reckoned, in those times, a moderate price of grain, than the prices of some particular years, which have generally been recorded by historians and other writers, on account of their extraordinary dearness or cheapness, and from which, therefore, it is difficult to form any judgment concerning what may have been the ordinary price. There are, besides, other reasons for believing that, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, and for some time before, the common price of wheat was not less than four ounces of silver the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion.

This law is definitely a better indicator of what was considered a reasonable grain price back then than the prices from certain specific years, which historians and other writers have typically noted because of their extreme highs or lows. It's hard to determine what the normal price was based on those records. Additionally, there are other reasons to believe that, at the start of the fourteenth century and for a while before that, the average price of wheat was no less than four ounces of silver per quarter, with other grains priced accordingly.

In 1309, Ralph de Born, prior of St. Augustine's, Canterbury, gave a feast upon his installation-day, of which William Thorn has preserved, not only the bill of fare, but the prices of many particulars. In that feast were consumed, 1st, fifty-three quarters of wheat, which cost nineteen pounds, or seven shillings and twopence a-quarter, equal to about one-and-twenty shillings and sixpence of our present money; 2dly, fifty-eight quarters of malt, which cost seventeen pounds ten shillings, or six shillings a-quarter, equal to about eighteen shillings of our present money; 3dly, twenty quarters of oats, which cost four pounds, or four shillings a-quarter, equal to about twelve shillings of our present money. The prices of malt and oats seem here to be higher than their ordinary proportion to the price of wheat.

In 1309, Ralph de Born, the prior of St. Augustine's in Canterbury, hosted a feast on his installation day. William Thorn has recorded not just the menu but also the prices of many items. During that feast, they consumed, first, fifty-three quarters of wheat, which cost nineteen pounds, or seven shillings and two pence per quarter, equivalent to about twenty-one shillings and six pence in today's money; second, fifty-eight quarters of malt, which cost seventeen pounds ten shillings, or six shillings per quarter, equal to about eighteen shillings today; third, twenty quarters of oats, which cost four pounds, or four shillings per quarter, equivalent to about twelve shillings today. The prices of malt and oats seem here to be higher than their usual ratio in relation to the price of wheat.

These prices are not recorded, on account of their extraordinary dearness or cheapness, but are mentioned accidentally, as the prices actually paid for large quantities of grain consumed at a feast, which was famous for its magnificence.

These prices aren't noted because of their unusual high or low value, but are mentioned casually, as the prices actually paid for the large amounts of grain used at a feast known for its splendor.

In 1262, being the 51st of Henry III. was revived an ancient statute, called the assize of bread and ale, which, the king says in the preamble, had been made in the times of his progenitors, some time kings of England. It is probably, therefore, as old at least as the time of his grandfather, Henry II. and may have been as old as the Conquest. It regulates the price of bread according as the prices of wheat may happen to be, from one shilling to twenty shillings the quarter of the money of those times. But statutes of this kind are generally presumed to provide with equal care for all deviations from the middle price, for those below it, as well as for those above it. Ten shillings, therefore, containing six ounces of silver, Tower weight, and equal to about thirty shillings of our present money, must, upon this supposition, have been reckoned the middle price of the quarter of wheat when this statute was first enacted, and must have continued to be so in the 51st of Henry III. We cannot, therefore, be very wrong in supposing that the middle price was not less than one-third of the highest price at which this statute regulates the price of bread, or than six shillings and eightpence of the money of those times, containing four ounces of silver, Tower weight.

In 1262, during the reign of Henry III, an old law called the assize of bread and ale was brought back. The king mentions in the introduction that this law was made during the time of his ancestors, who were once kings of England. This means it is likely at least as old as his grandfather, Henry II, and may date back to the time of the Conquest. The law sets the price of bread based on the price of wheat, ranging from one shilling to twenty shillings per quarter of currency from that period. However, laws like this are generally assumed to care equally about all variations from the average price, both below and above it. Therefore, ten shillings, which contains six ounces of silver (Tower weight) and equals about thirty shillings in today’s money, must have been considered the average price of a quarter of wheat when this law was first established, and it likely remained so during the 51st year of Henry III. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that the average price was not less than one-third of the highest price at which this law establishes the price of bread, or less than six shillings and eightpence from that time, which contains four ounces of silver (Tower weight).

From these different facts, therefore, we seem to have some reason to conclude that, about the middle of the fourteenth century, and for a considerable time before, the average or ordinary price of the quarter of wheat was not supposed to be less than four ounces of silver, Tower weight.

From these various facts, it seems we can conclude that, around the middle of the fourteenth century, and for a significant time before that, the average or typical price of a quarter of wheat was not thought to be less than four ounces of silver, Tower weight.

From about the middle of the fourteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth century, what was reckoned the reasonable and moderate, that is, the ordinary or average price of wheat, seems to have sunk gradually to about one half of this price; so as at last to have fallen to about two ounces of silver, Tower weight, equal to about ten shillings of our present money. It continued to be estimated at this price till about 1570.

From around the middle of the 14th century to the beginning of the 16th century, what was considered the reasonable and moderate, or the normal average price of wheat, seems to have gradually dropped to about half that price; eventually falling to around two ounces of silver, Tower weight, which is equal to about ten shillings in today's money. It remained valued at this price until about 1570.

In the household book of Henry, the fifth[Pg 76] earl of Northumberland, drawn up in 1512, there are two different estimations of wheat. In one of them it is computed at six shillings and eightpence the quarter, in the other at five shillings and eightpence only. In 1512, six shillings and eightpence contained only two ounces of silver, Tower weight, and were equal to about ten shillings of our present money.

In the household book of Henry, the fifth[Pg 76] earl of Northumberland, created in 1512, there are two different evaluations of wheat. One lists it at six shillings and eightpence per quarter, while the other lists it at just five shillings and eightpence. In 1512, six shillings and eightpence contained only two ounces of silver, in Tower weight, and were equivalent to about ten shillings in today’s currency.

From the 25th of Edward III. to the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, during the space of more than two hundred years, six shillings and eightpence, it appears from several different statutes, had continued to be considered as what is called the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price of wheat. The quantity of silver, however, contained in that nominal sum was, during the course of this period, continually diminishing, in consequence of some alterations which were made in the coin. But the increase of the value of silver had, it seems, so far compensated the diminution of the quantity of it contained in the same nominal sum, that the legislature did not think it worth while to attend to this circumstance.

From the 25th year of Edward III. to the start of Elizabeth's reign, over a span of more than two hundred years, six shillings and eightpence was considered a moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price of wheat, according to various statutes. However, the amount of silver in that nominal sum was continually decreasing during this period due to changes in the currency. Nonetheless, the rise in the value of silver seemed to balance out the decrease in the quantity in that same nominal sum, leading the lawmakers to not consider this issue significant enough to address.

Thus, in 1436, it was enacted, that wheat might be exported without a licence when the price was so low as six shillings and eightpence: and in 1463, it was enacted, that no wheat should be imported if the price was not above six shillings and eightpence the quarter. The legislature had imagined, that when the price was so low, there could be no inconveniency in exportation, but that when it rose higher, it became prudent to allow of importation. Six shillings and eightpence, therefore, containing about the same quantity of silver as thirteen shillings and fourpence of our present money (one-third part less than the same nominal sum contained in the time of Edward III.), had, in those times, been considered as what is called the moderate and reasonable price of wheat.

So, in 1436, it was decided that wheat could be exported without a license when the price dropped to six shillings and eightpence. Then in 1463, it was established that no wheat should be imported unless the price was above six shillings and eightpence per quarter. The lawmakers believed that when the price was that low, exporting wouldn’t cause any issues, but once it increased, it made sense to allow imports. Therefore, six shillings and eightpence, which was roughly equal to thirteen shillings and fourpence in today's money (about one-third less than that amount during the time of Edward III), was considered at that time a moderate and reasonable price for wheat.

In 1554, by the 1st and 2d of Philip and Mary, and in 1558, by the 1st of Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was in the same manner prohibited, whenever the price of the quarter should exceed six shillings and eightpence, which did not then contain two penny worth more silver than the same nominal sum does at present. But it had soon been found, that to restrain the exportation of wheat till the price was so very low, was, in reality, to prohibit it altogether. In 1562, therefore, by the 5th of Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was allowed from certain ports, whenever the price of the quarter should not exceed ten shillings, containing nearly the same quantity of silver as the like nominal sum does at present. This price had at this time, therefore, been considered as what is called the moderate and reasonable price of wheat. It agrees nearly with the estimation of the Northumberland book in 1512.

In 1554, during the reign of Philip and Mary, and again in 1558 under Elizabeth, the export of wheat was prohibited whenever the price per quarter exceeded six shillings and eightpence, which contained only slightly more silver than that same amount does today. However, it became clear that limiting wheat exports to such a low price effectively meant banning them entirely. So, in 1562, under Elizabeth's fifth year, exports of wheat were permitted from certain ports whenever the price per quarter was no more than ten shillings, which had a silver value similar to what that amount is today. At that time, this price was considered a moderate and reasonable price for wheat, aligning closely with the valuation in the Northumberland book from 1512.

That in France the average price of grain was, in the same manner, much lower in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century, than in the two centuries preceding, has been observed both by Mr Dupré de St Maur, and by the elegant author of the Essay on the Policy of Grain. Its price, during the same period, had probably sunk in the same manner through the greater part of Europe.

That in France the average price of grain was, similarly, much lower at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century than in the two centuries before, has been noted by both Mr. Dupré de St Maur and the insightful author of the Essay on the Policy of Grain. Its price during this period likely dropped in a similar way across much of Europe.

This rise in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn, may either have been owing altogether to the increase of the demand for that metal, in consequence of increasing improvement and cultivation, the supply, in the mean time, continuing the same as before; or, the demand continuing the same as before, it may have been owing altogether to the gradual diminution of the supply: the greater part of the mines which were then known in the world being much exhausted, and, consequently, the expense of working them much increased; or it may have been owing partly to the one, and partly to the other of those two circumstances. In the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, the greater part of Europe was approaching towards a more settled form of government than it had enjoyed for several ages before. The increase of security would naturally increase industry and improvement; and the demand for the precious metals, as well as for every other luxury and ornament, would naturally increase with the increase of riches. A greater annual produce would require a greater quantity of coin to circulate it; and a greater number of rich people would require a greater quantity of plate and other ornaments of silver. It is natural to suppose, too, that the greater part of the mines which then supplied the European market with silver might be a good deal exhausted, and have become more expensive in the working. They had been wrought, many of them, from the time of the Romans.

The increase in the value of silver compared to corn may have been due entirely to the rising demand for that metal because of growing improvements and agriculture, while the supply remained the same as before; or, if the demand stayed constant, it could have been due to a gradual decrease in supply: most of the known mines at that time were significantly depleted, making it more expensive to extract silver; or it could be due to a combination of both factors. At the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century, most of Europe was moving toward a more stable government than it had seen in many ages. Increased security would naturally boost industry and development; as wealth grew, so would the demand for precious metals and other luxuries and decorations. A larger annual output would need more coin to circulate it, and more wealthy individuals would require more silver for tableware and other decorative items. It’s reasonable to think that most of the silver mines supplying the European market at that time were quite depleted and had become more costly to operate. Many of them had been in use since Roman times.

It has been the opinion, however, of the greater part of those who have written upon the prices of commodities in ancient times, that, from the Conquest, perhaps from the invasion of Julius Cæsar, till the discovery of the mines of America, the value of silver was continually diminishing. This opinion they seem to have been led into, partly by the observations which they had occasion to make upon the prices both of corn and of some other parts of the rude produce of land, and partly by the popular notion, that as the quantity of silver naturally increases in every country with the increase of wealth, so its value diminishes as its quantity increases.

Most scholars who have written about the prices of goods in ancient times believe that from the Conquest, and maybe from Julius Caesar's invasion, until the discovery of the American mines, the value of silver was constantly decreasing. They seem to have reached this conclusion partly through their observations of corn prices and other basic agricultural products, and partly due to the common belief that as the amount of silver naturally grows in a country with rising wealth, its value decreases as its quantity increases.

In their observations upon the prices of corn, three different circumstances seem frequently to have misled them.

In their observations on corn prices, three different factors often seem to have confused them.

First, in ancient times, almost all rents were paid in kind; in a certain quantity of[Pg 77] corn, cattle, poultry, &c. It sometimes happened, however, that the landlord would stipulate, that he should be at liberty to demand of the tenant, either the annual payment in kind or a certain sum of money instead of it. The price at which the payment in kind was in this manner exchanged for a certain sum of money, is in Scotland called the conversion price. As the option is always in the landlord to take either the substance or the price, it is necessary, for the safety of the tenant, that the conversion price should rather be below than above the average market price. In many places, accordingly, it is not much above one half of this price. Through the greater part of Scotland this custom still continues with regard to poultry, and in some places with regard to cattle. It might probably have continued to take place, too, with regard to corn, had not the institution of the public fiars put an end to it. These are annual valuations, according to the judgment of an assize, of the average price of all the different sorts of grain, and of all the different qualities of each, according to the actual market price in every different county. This institution rendered it sufficiently safe for the tenant, and much more convenient for the landlord, to convert, as they call it, the corn rent, rather at what should happen to be the price of the fiars of each year, than at any certain fixed price. But the writers who have collected the prices of corn in ancient times seem frequently to have mistaken what is called in Scotland the conversion price for the actual market price. Fleetwood acknowledges, upon one occasion, that he had made this mistake. As he wrote his book, however, for a particular purpose, he does not think proper to make this acknowledgment till after transcribing this conversion price fifteen times. The price is eight shillings the quarter of wheat. This sum in 1423, the year at which he begins with it, contained the same quantity of silver as sixteen shillings of our present money. But in 1562, the year at which he ends with it, it contained no more than the same nominal sum does at present.

In ancient times, almost all rents were paid in goods, like a certain amount of[Pg 77] corn, cattle, poultry, etc. However, sometimes the landlord would specify that they could choose to receive either the annual payment in goods or a specific amount of money instead. The price at which the payment in goods was exchanged for money in this way is called the conversion price in Scotland. Since the landlord always has the option to take either the goods or the money, it’s important for the tenant's protection that the conversion price is generally lower than the average market price. In many places, this price is not much more than half of the market price. This practice still exists in much of Scotland concerning poultry and in some areas with cattle. It likely would have continued for corn as well, if the establishment of public fiars hadn’t changed that. The public fiars are annual assessments, based on a jury’s judgment, of the average price of various types of grain and their different qualities at the current market price in each county. This system made it safer for tenants and more convenient for landlords to convert the corn rent based on the fiars price for that year rather than a fixed price. However, writers who gathered ancient corn prices often confused what is known in Scotland as the conversion price with the actual market price. Fleetwood admitted to making this mistake once. Yet, since he wrote his book for a specific reason, he didn’t acknowledge this error until after mentioning the conversion price fifteen times. The price is eight shillings per quarter of wheat. In 1423, the year he starts his account, this amount contained the same quantity of silver as sixteen shillings of today’s money. But by 1562, the year he ends, it contained no more than the same nominal sum does now.

Secondly, they have been misled by the slovenly manner in which some ancient statutes of assize had been sometimes transcribed by lazy copiers, and sometimes, perhaps, actually composed by the legislature.

Secondly, they have been misled by the careless way in which some ancient laws related to assize were sometimes copied by lazy scribes, and sometimes, perhaps, actually created by the lawmakers.

The ancient statutes of assize seem to have begun always with determining what ought to be the price of bread and ale when the price of wheat and barley were at the lowest; and to have proceeded gradually to determine what it ought to be, according as the prices of those two sorts of grain should gradually rise above this lowest price. But the transcribers of those statutes seem frequently to have thought it sufficient to copy the regulation as far as the three or four first and lowest prices; saving in this manner their own labour, and judging, I suppose, that this was enough to show what proportion ought to be observed in all higher prices.

The old laws of assize appear to have always started by setting the price of bread and ale when the prices of wheat and barley were at their lowest. They then gradually determined what those prices should be as the costs of those two grains rose above that lowest point. However, the scribes of those laws often seemed to think it was enough to just copy the rules for the first three or four lowest prices, saving themselves some effort, and probably assuming that this was sufficient to indicate the proportion that should apply to all higher prices.

Thus, in the assize of bread and ale, of the 51st of Henry III. the price of bread was regulated according to the different prices of wheat, from one shilling to twenty shillings the quarter of the money of those times. But in the manuscripts from which all the different editions of the statutes, preceding that of Mr Ruffhead, were printed, the copiers had never transcribed this regulation beyond the price of twelve shillings. Several writers, therefore, being misled by this faulty transcription, very naturally conclude that the middle price, or six shillings the quarter, equal to about eighteen shillings of our present money, was the ordinary or average price of wheat at that time.

Thus, in the regulation of bread and ale from the 51st year of Henry III, the price of bread was set according to the varying costs of wheat, ranging from one shilling to twenty shillings for a quarter of the currency used then. However, in the manuscripts from which all the various editions of the statutes, prior to Mr. Ruffhead's version, were printed, the copyists had never recorded this regulation beyond the price of twelve shillings. Consequently, several writers, misled by this incorrect transcription, understandably concluded that the average price, or six shillings per quarter, equivalent to about eighteen shillings in today’s money, was the typical or average price of wheat at that time.

In the statute of Tumbrel and Pillory, enacted nearly about the same time, the price of ale is regulated according to every sixpence rise in the price of barley, from two shillings, to four shillings the quarter. That four shillings, however, was not considered as the highest price to which barley might frequently rise in those times and that these prices were only given as an example of the proportion which ought to be observed in all other prices, whether higher or lower, we may infer from the last words of the statute: "Et sic deinceps crescetur vel diminuetur per sex denarios." The expression is very slovenly, but the meaning is plain enough, "that the price of ale is in this manner to be increased or diminished according to every sixpence rise or fall in the price of barley." In the composition of this statute, the legislature itself seems to have been as negligent as the copiers were in the transcription of the other.

In the Tumbrel and Pillory statute, enacted around the same time, the price of ale is set according to every sixpence increase in the price of barley, ranging from two shillings to four shillings per quarter. However, that four shillings was not seen as the highest price that barley could frequently reach at that time, and these prices were only examples of the proportion that should be followed for all other prices, whether higher or lower. We can deduce this from the last words of the statute: "Et sic deinceps crescetur vel diminuetur per sex denarios." The phrasing is quite awkward, but the meaning is clear enough: "the price of ale should be adjusted up or down according to every sixpence increase or decrease in the price of barley." In crafting this statute, the legislature seems to have been as careless as the individuals who copied the other documents.

In an ancient manuscript of the Regiam Majestatem, an old Scotch law book, there is a statute of assize, in which the price of bread is regulated according to all the different prices of wheat, from tenpence to three shillings the Scotch boll, equal to about half an English quarter. Three shillings Scotch, at the time when this assize is supposed to have been enacted, were equal to about nine shillings sterling of our present money. Mr Ruddiman seems[16] to conclude from this, that three shillings was the highest price to which wheat ever rose in those times, and that tenpence, a shilling, or at most two shillings, were the ordinary prices. Upon consulting the manuscript, however, it appears evidently, that all these prices are only set down as examples of the proportion which ought to be observed between the respective prices of wheat and bread. The last words of the statute are "reliqua judicabis secundum præscripta, habendo respectum ad pretium bladi."—"You shall judge of the remaining cases, according[Pg 78] to what is above written, having respect to the price of corn."

In an old manuscript of the Regiam Majestatem, a historic Scottish law book, there's a statute of assize that regulates the price of bread based on the various prices of wheat, ranging from ten pence to three shillings per Scottish boll, which is about half an English quarter. Three shillings Scottish, at the time this assize was likely established, was roughly equal to nine shillings in today's sterling. Mr. Ruddiman seems[16] to conclude that three shillings was the highest price wheat ever reached back then, with ten pence, a shilling, or at most two shillings being the usual prices. However, upon checking the manuscript, it’s clear that these prices are just examples of the ratio that should be maintained between the prices of wheat and bread. The final words of the statute are "reliqua judicabis secundum præscripta, habendo respectum ad pretium bladi."—"You shall judge the remaining cases based on what is stated above, taking into account the price of corn."

Thirdly, they seem to have been misled too, by the very low price at which wheat was sometimes sold in very ancient times; and to have imagined, that as its lowest price was then much lower than in later times its ordinary price must likewise have been much lower. They might have found, however, that in those ancient times its highest price was fully as much above, as its lowest price was below any thing that had ever been known in later times. Thus, in 1270, Fleetwood gives us two prices of the quarter of wheat. The one is four pounds sixteen shillings of the money of those times, equal to fourteen pounds eight shillings of that of the present; the other is six pounds eight shillings, equal to nineteen pounds four shillings of our present money. No price can be found in the end of the fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century, which approaches to the extravagance of these. The price of corn, though at all times liable to variation, varies most in those turbulent and disorderly societies, in which the interruption of all commerce and communication hinders the plenty of one part of the country from relieving the scarcity of another. In the disorderly state of England under the Plantagenets, who governed it from about the middle of the twelfth till towards the end of the fifteenth century, one district might be in plenty, while another, at no great distance, by having its crop destroyed, either by some accident of the seasons, or by the incursion of some neighbouring baron, might be suffering all the horrors of a famine; and yet if the lands of some hostile lord were interposed between them, the one might not be able to give the least assistance to the other. Under the vigorous administration of the Tudors, who governed England during the latter part of the fifteenth, and through the whole of the sixteenth century, no baron was powerful enough to dare to disturb the public security.

Thirdly, they also seem to have been misled by the very low prices at which wheat was sometimes sold in ancient times. They imagined that since its lowest price was much lower back then than the usual price later on, its average price must have been much lower as well. However, they might have noticed that during those ancient times, its highest price was just as much above the average as its lowest price was below any price known in later times. For example, in 1270, Fleetwood lists two prices for a quarter of wheat. One is four pounds sixteen shillings in the currency of that time, which equals fourteen pounds eight shillings today; the other is six pounds eight shillings, equal to nineteen pounds four shillings in our current currency. No price can be found from the end of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the sixteenth century that comes close to these extremes. The price of grain, while always subject to change, varies the most in those chaotic and disordered societies where interruptions in trade and communication prevent the abundance in one area from helping to alleviate shortages in another. During the tumultuous times in England under the Plantagenets, who ruled from the mid-twelfth century to the late fifteenth century, one area might have plenty while another, not far away, could be facing famine due to bad weather or the attack of a neighboring lord. Yet, if there were hostile lands in between, the two areas couldn't help each other at all. Under the strong leadership of the Tudors, who ruled during the latter part of the fifteenth century and throughout the sixteenth century, no lord was powerful enough to disrupt public safety.

The reader will find at the end of this chapter all the prices of wheat which have been collected by Fleetwood, from 1202 to 1597, both inclusive, reduced to the money of the present times, and digested, according to the order of time, into seven divisions of twelve years each. At the end of each division, too, he will find the average price of the twelve years of which it consists. In that long period of time, Fleetwood has been able to collect the prices of no more than eighty years; so that four years are wanting to make out the last twelve years. I have added, therefore, from the accounts of Eton college, the prices of 1598, 1599, 1600, and 1601. It is the only addition which I have made. The reader will see, that from the beginning of the thirteenth till after the middle of the sixteenth century, the average price of each twelve years grows gradually lower and lower; and that towards the and of the sixteenth century it begins to rise again. The prices, indeed, which Fleetwood has been able to collect, seem to have been those chiefly which were remarkable for extraordinary dearness or cheapness; and I do not pretend that any very certain conclusion can be drawn from them. So far, however, as they prove any thing at all, they confirm the account which I have been endeavouring to give. Fleetwood himself, however, seems, with most other writers, to have believed, that, during all this period, the value of silver, in consequence of its increasing abundance, was continually diminishing. The prices of corn, which he himself has collected, certainly do not agree with this opinion. They agree perfectly with that of Mr Dupré de St Maur, and with that which I have been endeavouring to explain. Bishop Fleetwood and Mr Dupré de St Maur are the two authors who seem to have collected, with the greatest diligence and fidelity, the prices of things in ancient times. It is somewhat curious that, though their opinions are so very different, their facts, so far as they relate to the price of corn at least, should coincide so very exactly.

At the end of this chapter, the reader will find all the wheat prices collected by Fleetwood from 1202 to 1597, both years included, adjusted to today's currency and organized chronologically into seven sections of twelve years each. At the end of each section, there is also the average price for those twelve years. Over this long period, Fleetwood managed to gather prices for only eighty years, leaving four years short to complete the final twelve-year section. Therefore, I have added the prices for 1598, 1599, 1600, and 1601 from the records of Eton College. This is the only addition I've made. The reader will notice that from the early thirteenth century until well into the sixteenth century, the average price for each twelve-year period steadily decreases, and then it starts to rise again towards the end of the sixteenth century. The prices that Fleetwood was able to gather seem to focus mainly on those that were particularly high or low; hence, I can’t claim that any very definite conclusions can be drawn from them. However, to the extent that they do indicate anything, they support the account I'm trying to provide. Fleetwood himself, like many other writers, appears to have believed that throughout this period the value of silver was continuously dropping due to its increasing availability. Yet, the corn prices he collected don’t align with that viewpoint. They actually match perfectly with Mr. Dupré de St Maur's perspective and the one I have been trying to articulate. Bishop Fleetwood and Mr. Dupré de St Maur are the two authors who seem to have gathered the prices of goods in ancient times with the most care and accuracy. It’s rather interesting that, despite their differing opinions, their facts related to corn prices at least, align so closely.

It is not, however, so much from the low price of corn, as from that of some other parts of the rude produce of land, that the most judicious writers have inferred the great value of silver in those very ancient times. Corn, it has been said, being a sort of manufacture, was, in those rude ages, much dearer in proportion than the greater part of other commodities; it is meant, I suppose, than the greater part of unmanufactured commodities, such as cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, &c. That in those times of poverty and barbarism these were proportionably much cheaper than corn, is undoubtedly true. But this cheapness was not the effect of the high value of silver, but of the low value of those commodities. It was not because silver would in such time purchase or represent a greater quantity of labour, but because such commodities would purchase or represent a much smaller quantity than in times of more opulence and improvement. Silver must certainly be cheaper in Spanish America than in Europe; in the country where it is produced, than in the country to which it is brought, at the expense of a long carriage both by land and by sea, of a freight, and an insurance. One-and-twenty pence halfpenny sterling, however, we are told by Ulloa, was, not many years ago, at Buenos Ayres, the price of an ox chosen from a herd of three or four hundred. Sixteen shillings sterling, we are told by Mr Byron, was the price of a good horse in the capital of Chili. In a country naturally fertile, but of which the far greater part is altogether uncultivated, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, &c. as they can be acquired with a very small quantity of labour, so they will purchase or command but[Pg 79] a very small quantity. The low money price for which they may be sold, is no proof that the real value of silver is there very high, but that the real value of those commodities is very low.

It's not just the low price of corn, but also the low prices of some other basic products from the land that the most insightful writers have concluded indicates the great value of silver in ancient times. It has been suggested that corn, being a form of manufactured product, was much more expensive relative to other goods during those early times; this refers, I believe, to most unprocessed goods, like cattle, poultry, game, etc. It's undoubtedly true that during those times of poverty and barbarism, these goods were proportionately much cheaper than corn. However, this cheapness wasn't due to the high value of silver, but rather the low value of these commodities. It wasn't that silver could buy or represent a larger amount of labor, but that those commodities could buy or represent a much smaller amount than in times of more wealth and advancement. Silver is definitely cheaper in Spanish America than in Europe; it's cheaper in the country where it's mined than in the country to which it is shipped, incurring costs for transport both over land and sea, including freight and insurance. Ulloa tells us that not long ago, an ox selected from a herd of three or four hundred was priced at twenty-one and a half pence sterling in Buenos Aires. Mr. Byron mentions that a good horse in the capital of Chile cost sixteen shillings sterling. In a naturally fertile country where the majority of the land is uncultivated, cattle, poultry, game, etc., can be obtained with very little effort, so they will also buy or command very little in return. The low monetary price at which these goods can be sold doesn’t indicate that the real value of silver is very high there, but rather that the real value of those commodities is very low.

Labour, it must always be remembered, and not any particular commodity, or set of commodities, is the real measure of the value both of silver and of all other commodities.

Labor, it’s important to remember, and not any specific commodity or group of commodities, is the true measure of the value of silver and all other goods.

But in countries almost waste, or but thinly inhabited, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, &c. as they are the spontaneous productions of Nature, so she frequently produces them in much greater quantities than the consumption of the inhabitants requires. In such a state of things, the supply commonly exceeds the demand. In different states of society, in different states of improvement, therefore, such commodities will represent, or be equivalent, to very different quantities of labour.

But in countries that are nearly barren or only sparsely populated, livestock, poultry, and all kinds of game, since they are naturally occurring, are often produced in much greater amounts than what the local people can use. In these situations, supply usually surpasses demand. In various social conditions and levels of development, these goods will therefore equate to very different amounts of labor.

In every state of society, in every stage of improvement, corn is the production of human industry. But the average produce of every sort of industry is always suited, more or less exactly, to the average consumption; the average supply to the average demand. In every different stage of improvement, besides, the raising of equal quantities of corn in the same soil and climate, will, at an average, require nearly equal quantities of labour; or, what comes to the same thing, the price of nearly equal quantities; the continual increase of the productive powers of labour, in an improved state of cultivation, being more or less counterbalanced by the continual increasing price of cattle, the principal instruments of agriculture. Upon all these accounts, therefore, we may rest assured, that equal quantities of corn will, in every state of society, in every stage of improvement, more nearly represent, or be equivalent to, equal quantities of labour, than equal quantities of any other part of the rude produce of land. Corn, accordingly, it has already been observed, is, in all the different stages of wealth and improvement, a more accurate measure of value than any other commodity or set of commodities. In all those different stages, therefore, we can judge better of the real value of silver, by comparing it with corn, than by comparing it with any other commodity or set of commodities.

In every society and every stage of development, corn is the result of human effort. However, the average output of any industry generally matches, to some extent, the average consumption; the average supply aligns with the average demand. Additionally, in each stage of development, producing equal amounts of corn in the same soil and climate will, on average, require approximately equal amounts of labor; or, essentially, the cost of nearly equal quantities. The ongoing increase in labor's productivity due to improved farming methods is somewhat offset by the rising prices of livestock, which are the main tools of agriculture. For all these reasons, we can be confident that equal amounts of corn will, in any society and at any stage of improvement, more closely represent or be equivalent to equal amounts of labor than equal amounts of any other basic agricultural product. Thus, as noted previously, corn is, across various stages of wealth and development, a more precise measure of value than any other good or group of goods. Therefore, at all these different stages, we can better assess the true value of silver by comparing it with corn rather than with any other good or group of goods.

Corn, besides, or whatever else is the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, constitutes, in every civilized country, the principal part of the subsistence of the labourer. In consequence of the extension of agriculture, the land of every country produces a much greater quantity of vegetable than of animal food, and the labourer everywhere lives chiefly upon the wholesome food that is cheapest and most abundant. Butcher's meat, except in the most thriving countries, or where labour is most highly rewarded, makes but an insignificant part of his subsistence; poultry makes a still smaller part of it, and game no part of it. In France, and even in Scotland, where labour is somewhat better rewarded than in France, the labouring poor seldom eat butcher's meat, except upon holidays, and other extraordinary occasions. The money price of labour, therefore, depends much more upon the average money price of corn, the subsistence of the labourer, than upon that of butcher's meat, or of any other part of the rude produce of land. The real value of gold and silver, therefore, the real quantity of labour which they can purchase or command, depends much more upon the quantity of corn which they can purchase or command, than upon that of butcher's meat, or any other part of the rude produce of land.

Corn, along with whatever else is the common favorite vegetable food of the people, makes up the main part of the laborer’s diet in every developed country. Due to the growth of agriculture, every country produces a lot more plant-based food than animal food, and laborers everywhere primarily eat the healthy food that's cheapest and most plentiful. In most places, except for the most prosperous countries or where labor is well-paid, meat plays a very small role in their diet; poultry is even less common, and game is non-existent. In France, and even in Scotland, where labor is a bit better paid than in France, the working poor rarely eat meat except on holidays and special occasions. The money value of labor, therefore, is much more influenced by the average money price of corn, the staple food for laborers, than by that of meat or any other raw agricultural product. The actual value of gold and silver, and the real amount of labor they can buy or command, is much more connected to the amount of corn they can purchase than to the amount of meat or any other raw agricultural product.

Such slight observations, however, upon the prices either of corn or of other commodities, would not probably have misled so many intelligent authors, had they not been influenced at the same time by the popular notion, that as the quantity of silver naturally increases in every country with the increase of wealth, so its value diminishes as its quantity increases. This notion, however, seems to be altogether groundless.

Such minor observations about the prices of corn or other goods likely wouldn't have confused so many smart writers if they hadn't also been swayed by the common idea that as the amount of silver naturally rises in every country with growing wealth, its value decreases as its quantity increases. However, this idea seems to be completely unfounded.

The quantity of the precious metals may increase in any country from two different causes; either, first, from the increased abundance of the mines which supply it; or, secondly, from the increased wealth of the people, from the increased produce of their annual labour. The first of these causes is no doubt necessarily connected with the diminution of the value of the precious metals; but the second is not.

The amount of precious metals in any country can increase for two main reasons: first, due to a rise in the availability of the mines that provide them; or second, because of the growing wealth of the population, stemming from greater output from their annual work. The first reason is definitely linked to a decrease in the value of precious metals, but the second reason is not.

When more abundant mines are discovered, a greater quantity of the precious metals is brought to market; and the quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life for which they must be exchanged being the same as before, equal quantities of the metals must be exchanged for smaller quantities of commodities. So far, therefore, as the increase of the quantity of the precious metals in any country arises from the increased abundance of the mines, it is necessarily connected with some diminution of their value.

When richer mines are found, more of the precious metals enter the market; since the amount of basic needs and comforts that they are traded for stays the same as before, equal amounts of the metals must be traded for fewer commodities. Thus, as the increase in the amount of precious metals in any country comes from the greater abundance of the mines, it is inevitably linked to a decrease in their value.

When, on the contrary, the wealth of any country increases, when the annual produce of its labour becomes gradually greater and greater, a greater quantity of coin becomes necessary in order to circulate a greater quantity of commodities: and the people, as they can afford it, as they have more commodities to give for it, will naturally purchase a greater and a greater quantity of plate. The quantity of their coin will increase from necessity; the quantity of their plate from vanity and ostentation, or from the same reason that the quantity of fine statues, pictures, and of every other luxury and curiosity, is likely to increase among them. But as statuaries and painters are not likely to be worse rewarded in times of wealth and prosperity, than in[Pg 80] times of poverty and depression, so gold and silver are not likely to be worse paid for.

When, on the other hand, the wealth of any country grows, and the annual output of its labor steadily increases, more coins become necessary to circulate a larger amount of goods. As people can afford it and have more products to exchange for it, they will naturally buy more and more silverware. The amount of their coins will rise out of necessity, while the amount of their silverware will grow out of vanity and showiness, or for the same reasons that the number of fine statues, paintings, and other luxuries and curiosities is likely to rise among them. Just as sculptors and painters are likely to be better compensated in times of wealth and prosperity than in times of poverty and downturns, gold and silver are also unlikely to be less valued.

The price of gold and silver, when the accidental discovery of more abundant mines does not keep it down, as it naturally rises with the wealth of every country; so, whatever be the state of the mines, it is at all times naturally higher in a rich than in a poor country. Gold and silver, like all other commodities, naturally seek the market where the best price is given for them, and the best price is commonly given for every thing in the country which can best afford it. Labour, it must be remembered, is the ultimate price which is paid for every thing; and in countries where labour is equally well rewarded, the money price of labour will be in proportion to that of the subsistence of the labourer. But gold and silver will naturally exchange for a greater quantity of subsistence in a rich than in a poor country; in a country which abounds with subsistence, than in one which is but indifferently supplied with it. If the two countries are at a great distance, the difference may be very great; because, though the metals naturally fly from the worse to the better market, yet it may be difficult to transport them in such quantities as to bring their price nearly to a level in both. If the countries are near, the difference will be smaller, and may sometimes be scarce perceptible; because in this case the transportation will be easy. China is a much richer country than any part of Europe, and the difference between the price of subsistence in China and in Europe is very great. Rice in China is much cheaper than wheat is anywhere in Europe. England is a much richer country than Scotland, but the difference between the money price of corn in those two countries is much smaller, and is but just perceptible. In proportion to the quantity or measure, Scotch corn generally appears to be a good deal cheaper than English; but, in proportion to its quality, it is certainly somewhat dearer. Scotland receives almost every year very large supplies from England, and every commodity must commonly be somewhat dearer in the country to which it is brought than in that from which it comes. English corn, therefore, must be dearer in Scotland than in England; and yet in proportion to its quality, or to the quantity and goodness of the flour or meal which can be made from it, it cannot commonly be sold higher there than the Scotch corn which comes to market in competition with it.

The price of gold and silver, when new discoveries of larger mines don't keep it low, naturally rises with the wealth of each country. So, regardless of the state of the mines, gold and silver are always worth more in a rich country than in a poor one. Like all other goods, gold and silver tend to move towards the market that offers the best price, and the best price is usually found for items in countries that can afford it. It's important to remember that labor is the ultimate cost paid for everything, and in places where labor is equally compensated, the monetary value of labor will correlate with the cost of living for workers. However, gold and silver will naturally exchange for more food in a wealthy country than in a poor one; they'll fetch more in a nation abundant with resources than in one that's not well supplied. If the two countries are far apart, the price difference can be significant, because while the metals tend to move from less favorable to more favorable markets, transporting them in large quantities might be challenging enough to keep prices from balancing out. If the countries are closer together, the price difference will be less noticeable and can sometimes be barely recognizable, since transportation is easier. China has far more wealth than any part of Europe, and the cost of food there compared to Europe is substantial. Rice in China is way cheaper than wheat anywhere in Europe. England is a wealthier country than Scotland, but the price difference for grain between these two countries is much smaller and barely noticeable. When considering quantity or measure, Scottish grain often seems significantly cheaper than English grain; however, in terms of quality, it's typically a bit more expensive. Scotland almost always receives large shipments from England, and goods usually cost a bit more in the destination country than where they originated. Therefore, English grain must be pricier in Scotland than in England; yet, when you factor in its quality, or how much and how good the flour or meal made from it is, it typically cannot be sold for more there than the Scottish grain that competes with it.

The difference between the money price of labour in China and in Europe, is still greater than that between the money price of subsistence; because the real recompence of labour is higher in Europe than in China, the greater part of Europe being in an improving state, while China seems to be standing still. The money price of labour is lower in Scotland than in England, because the real recompence of labour is much lower: Scotland, though advancing to greater wealth, advances much more slowly than England. The frequency of emigration from Scotland, and the rarity of it from England, sufficiently prove that the demand for labour is very different in the two countries. The proportion between the real recompence of labour in different countries, it must be remembered, is naturally regulated, not by their actual wealth or poverty, but by their advancing, stationary, or declining condition.

The difference in labor wages between China and Europe is still bigger than the difference in the cost of living; this is because the actual compensation for labor is higher in Europe than in China, where much of the region is stagnant while Europe is improving. Labor wages in Scotland are lower than in England due to the significantly lower real compensation for labor; although Scotland is becoming wealthier, its progress is much slower than England's. The high rate of emigration from Scotland compared to the low rate from England clearly shows that the demand for labor varies greatly between the two countries. It's important to remember that the relationship between the real compensation for labor in different countries is regulated not by their current wealth or poverty, but by whether they are advancing, stagnant, or declining.

Gold and silver, as they are naturally of the greatest value among the richest, so they are naturally of the least value among the poorest nations. Among savages, the poorest of all nations, they are scarce of any value.

Gold and silver, being the most valuable among the wealthiest, are naturally the least valuable among the poorest nations. In savage tribes, the poorest of all nations, they hold little to no value.

In great towns, corn is always dearer than in remote parts of the country. This, however, is the effect, not of the real cheapness of silver, but of the real dearness of corn. It does not cost less labour to bring silver to the great town than to the remote parts of the country; but it costs a great deal more to bring corn.

In big cities, grain is always more expensive than in distant areas. This is not due to silver being cheaper, but because grain is actually more expensive. It doesn't take less work to transport silver to the big city compared to the remote areas; however, it takes a lot more effort to bring in grain.

In some very rich and commercial countries, such as Holland and the territory of Genoa, corn is dear for the same reason that it is dear in great towns. They do not produce enough to maintain their inhabitants. They are rich in the industry and skill of their artificers and manufacturers, in every sort of machinery which can facilitate and abridge labour; in shipping, and in all the other instruments and means of carriage and commerce: but they are poor in corn, which, as it must be brought to them from distant countries, must, by an addition to its price, pay for the carriage from these countries. It does not cost less labour to bring silver to Amsterdam than to Dantzic; but it costs a great deal more to bring corn. The real cast of silver must be nearly the same in both places; but that of corn must be very different. Diminish the real opulence either of Holland or of the territory of Genoa, while the number of their inhabitants remains the same; diminish their power of supplying themselves from distant countries; and the price of corn, instead of sinking with that diminution in the quantity of their silver, which must necessarily accompany this declension, either as its cause or as its effect, will rise to the price of a famine. When we are in want of necessaries, we must part with all superfluities, of which the value, as it rises in times of opulence and prosperity, so it sinks in times of poverty and distress. It is otherwise with necessaries. Their real price, the quantity of labour which they can purchase or command, rises in times of poverty and distress, and sinks in times of opulence and prosperity, which are always times of great abundance; for they could not otherwise be times of opulence and prosperity[Pg 81] Corn is a necessary, silver is only a superfluity.

In some very wealthy and commercial countries, like Holland and the Genoa region, the price of grain is high for the same reasons it is high in large cities. They don't produce enough to feed their populations. They thrive on the expertise and skill of their workers and manufacturers, in all kinds of machinery that can make labor easier and faster; in shipping; and in all other tools and means of transportation and trade. But they lack grain, which must be imported from far-off countries, leading to an increase in its price to cover transportation costs. It doesn't take less effort to bring silver to Amsterdam than to Danzig; however, it costs significantly more to transport grain. The actual value of silver is nearly the same in both locations, but the cost of grain varies widely. If you reduce the wealth of either Holland or the Genoa region while the population stays the same, and if their ability to import from abroad decreases, the price of grain won’t just drop along with the decrease in their silver quantity—which must happen either as a cause or effect—but will soar to famine levels. When we lack essentials, we have to give up all luxuries, whose value, as it increases during times of wealth and prosperity, decreases during times of poverty and hardship. Necessities work differently. Their actual cost, the amount of labor they can command or buy, rises in times of poverty and hardship and falls during times of wealth and prosperity, which are always times of great abundance; otherwise, they wouldn’t be considered periods of wealth and prosperity. Grain is a necessity, while silver is merely a luxury.

Whatever, therefore, may have been the increase in the quantity of the precious metals, which, during the period between the middle of the fourteenth and that of the sixteenth century, arose from the increase of wealth and improvement, it could have no tendency to diminish their value, either in Great Britain, or in any other part of Europe. If those who have collected the prices of things in ancient times, therefore, had, during this period, no reason to infer the diminution of the value of silver from any observations which they had made upon the prices either of corn, or of other commodities, they had still less reason to infer it from any supposed increase of wealth and improvement.

Whatever the increase in the amount of precious metals during the time from the mid-14th century to the 16th century due to rising wealth and progress, it couldn't have reduced their value in Great Britain or anywhere else in Europe. If those who recorded prices in ancient times had no reason to conclude that the value of silver decreased based on their observations of corn prices or other goods during this period, they had even less reason to believe it was due to any assumed increase in wealth and progress.

 

Second Period.—But how various soever may have been the opinions of the learned concerning the progress of the value of silver during the first period, they are unanimous concerning it during the second.

Second Period.—But no matter how different the views of scholars may have been about the value of silver during the first period, they all agree on it during the second.

From about 1570 to about 1640, during a period of about seventy years, the variation in the proportion between the value of silver and that of corn held a quite opposite course. Silver sunk in its real value, or would exchange for a smaller quantity of labour than before; and corn rose in its nominal price, and, instead of being commonly sold for about two ounces of silver the quarter, or about ten shillings of our present money, came to be sold for six and eight ounces of silver the quarter, or about thirty and forty shillings of our present money.

From around 1570 to about 1640, over a period of roughly seventy years, the change in the value ratio between silver and corn moved in completely opposite directions. Silver decreased in its real value, meaning it could be exchanged for less labor than before; meanwhile, corn increased in its nominal price. Instead of typically being sold for about two ounces of silver per quarter, or about ten shillings in today's currency, it began to sell for six to eight ounces of silver per quarter, or about thirty to forty shillings in our current money.

The discovery of the abundant mines of America seems to have been the sole cause of this diminution in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn. It is accounted for, accordingly, in the same manner by every body; and there never has been any dispute, either about the fact, or about the cause of it. The greater part of Europe was, during this period, advancing in industry and improvement, and the demand for silver must consequently have been increasing; but the increase of the supply had, it seems, so far exceeded that of the demand, that the value of that metal sunk considerably. The discovery of the mines of America, it is to be observed, does not seem to have had any very sensible effect upon the prices of things in England, till after 1570; even though the mines of Potosi had been discovered more than twenty years before.

The discovery of the plentiful mines in America seems to have been the main reason for the decrease in the value of silver compared to that of corn. This explanation is commonly accepted by everyone, and there has never been any disagreement about either the fact or the cause. During this time, much of Europe was advancing in industry and development, leading to an increased demand for silver; however, it appears that the rise in supply far outpaced the rise in demand, causing the value of silver to drop significantly. It's worth noting that the discovery of the American mines didn’t seem to have much of an impact on prices in England until after 1570, even though the Potosi mines were found more than twenty years earlier.

From 1595 to 1620, both inclusive, the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the accounts of Eton college, to have been L.2 : 1 : 6913. From which sum, neglecting the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 713d., the price of the quarter of eight bushels comes out to have been L.1 : 16 : 1023. And from this sum, neglecting likewise the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 119d., for the difference between the price of the best wheat and that of the middle wheat, the price of the middle wheat comes out to have been about L.1 : 12 : 889, or about six ounces and one-third of an ounce of silver.

From 1595 to 1620, inclusive, the average price for a quarter (nine bushels) of the best wheat at Windsor market, according to Eton College records, was £2: 1: 6913. If we ignore the fraction and subtract a ninth, or 4s. 713d., the price for a quarter of eight bushels comes to £1: 16: 1023. From this amount, also ignoring the fraction and subtracting a ninth, or 4s. 119d., which accounts for the price difference between the best wheat and the middle-quality wheat, the price of the middle-quality wheat comes out to approximately £1: 12: 889, or about six ounces and one-third of an ounce of silver.

From 1621 to 1636, both inclusive, the average price of the same measure of the best wheat, at the same market, appears, from the same accounts, to have been L.2 : 10s.; from which, making the like deductions as in the foregoing case, the average price of the quarter of eight bushels of middle wheat comes out to have been L.1 : 19 : 6, or about seven ounces and two-thirds of an ounce of silver.

From 1621 to 1636, both years included, the average price of the best wheat per measure at the same market was L.2 : 10s.; after making the same deductions as in the previous case, the average price of a quarter (eight bushels) of medium-quality wheat turned out to be L.1 : 19 : 6, or about seven and two-thirds ounces of silver.

 

Third Period.—Between 1630 and 1640, or about 1636, the effect of the discovery of the mines of America, is reducing the value of silver, appears to have been completed, and the value of that metal seems never to have sunk lower in proportion to that of corn than it was about that time. It seems to have risen somewhat in the course of the present century, and it had probably begun to do so, even some time before the end of the last.

Third Period.—Between 1630 and 1640, or around 1636, the impact of the discovery of the mines in America on reducing the value of silver appears to have reached its peak, and the value of that metal seems to have never dropped lower in relation to that of corn than it did around that time. It seems to have increased somewhat during this century, and it likely started to do so even before the end of the last century.

From 1637 to 1700, both inclusive, being the sixty-four last years of the last century, the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the same accounts, to have been L.2 : 11 : 013, which is only 1s. 013d. dearer than it had been during the sixteen years before. But, in the course of these sixty-four years, there happened two events, which must have produced a much greater scarcity of corn than what the course of the seasons would otherwise have occasioned, and which, therefore, without supposing any further reduction in the value of silver, will much more than account for this very small enhancement of price.

From 1637 to 1700, covering the last sixty-four years of the century, the average price for a quarter (nine bushels) of the best wheat at Windsor market was L.2 : 11 : 013. This is only 1s. 013d. higher than it had been during the previous sixteen years. However, during these sixty-four years, two significant events occurred that likely caused a greater scarcity of corn than the usual seasonal variations would have created. Therefore, even without considering any additional drop in the value of silver, these factors could easily explain this slight increase in price.

The first of these events was the civil war, which, by discouraging tillage and interrupting commerce, must have raised the price of corn much above what the course of the seasons would otherwise have occasioned. It must have had this effect, more or less, at all the different markets in the kingdom, but particularly at those in the neighborhood of London, which require to be supplied from the greatest distance. In 1648, accordingly, the price of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the same accounts, to have been L.4 : 5s., and, in 1649, to have been L.4, the quarter of nine bushels. The excess of those two years above L.2 10s. (the average price of the sixteen years preceding 1637) is L.3 5s., which, divided among the sixty-four last years of the last century, will alone very nearly account for that small enhancement of price which seems to have taken place in them. These, however, though the highest,[Pg 82] are by no means the only high prices which seem to have been occasioned by the civil wars.

The first of these events was the civil war, which, by discouraging farming and disrupting trade, must have driven up the price of grain much higher than what the weather patterns would have otherwise caused. This effect likely occurred to varying degrees in all the different markets across the country, especially in those near London, which had to be supplied from far away. In 1648, the price of the best wheat at Windsor market was reported to be £4: 5s., and in 1649, it was £4 for a quarter of nine bushels. The increase in those two years above £2 10s. (the average price for the sixteen years leading up to 1637) is £3 5s., which, when spread out over the sixty-four years of the last century, accounts for almost all of the slight price increase that seems to have occurred during that time. These prices, although the highest, are definitely not the only elevated prices that seem to have been caused by the civil wars.[Pg 82]

The second event was the bounty upon the exportation of corn, granted in 1688. The bounty, it has been thought by many people, by encouraging tillage, may, in a long course of years, have occasioned a greater abundance, and, consequently, a greater cheapness of corn in the home market, than what would otherwise have taken place there. How far the bounty could produce this effect at any time I shall examine hereafter: I shall only observe at present, that between 1688 and 1700, it had not time to produce any such effect. During this short period, its only effect must have been, by encouraging the exportation of the surplus produce of every year, and thereby hindering the abundance of one year from compensating the scarcity of another, to raise the price in the home market. The scarcity which prevailed in England, from 1693 to 1699, both inclusive, though no doubt principally owing to the badness of the seasons, and, therefore, extending through a considerable part of Europe, must have been somewhat enhanced by the bounty. In 1699, accordingly, the further exportation of corn was prohibited for nine months.

The second event was the bounty on corn exports, granted in 1688. Many people believe that this bounty, by promoting farming, could over many years have led to greater abundance and, as a result, lower prices for corn in the domestic market than would have occurred otherwise. I will examine how far the bounty could produce this effect later; for now, I’ll just note that between 1688 and 1700, it didn’t have enough time to make a significant impact. During this brief period, its only effect was likely to encourage the export of surplus production each year, which prevented the abundance of one year from offsetting the scarcity of another, ultimately driving up prices in the domestic market. The shortage that occurred in England from 1693 to 1699, both years included, was mainly due to poor weather conditions that affected much of Europe; however, the bounty probably made the situation a bit worse. Consequently, in 1699, further corn exports were banned for nine months.

There was a third event which occurred in the course of the same period, and which, though it could not occasion any scarcity of corn, nor, perhaps, any augmentation in the real quantity of silver which was usually paid for it, must necessarily have occasioned some augmentation in the nominal sum. This event was the great debasement of the silver coin, by clipping and wearing. This evil had begun in the reign of Charles II. and had gone on continually increasing till 1695; at which time, as we may learn from Mr Lowndes, the current silver coin was, at an average, near five-and-twenty per cent. below its standard value. But the nominal sum which constitutes the market price of every commodity is necessarily regulated, not so much by the quantity of silver, which, according to the standard, ought to be contained in it, as by that which, it is found by experience, actually is contained in it. This nominal sum, therefore, is necessarily higher when the coin is much debased by clipping and wearing, than when near to its standard value.

There was a third event that happened during the same time period, which, while it couldn't cause any shortage of grain, nor likely raise the actual amount of silver that was typically paid for it, must have resulted in an increase in the nominal amount. This event was the significant debasement of silver coins, due to clipping and wear. This issue started during the reign of Charles II and kept getting worse until 1695; at that time, as we can see from Mr. Lowndes, the silver coin in circulation was, on average, about twenty-five percent below its standard value. However, the nominal amount that sets the market price of any commodity is determined not so much by the amount of silver that should be in it according to standard value, but by what is actually found in it based on experience. Therefore, this nominal amount is usually higher when the coin is heavily debased by clipping and wear, compared to when it is closer to its standard value.

In the course of the present century, the silver coin has not at any time been more below its standard weight than it is at present. But though very much defaced, its value has been kept up by that of the gold coin, for which it is exchanged. For though, before the late recoinage, the gold coin was a good deal defaced too, it was less so than the silver. In 1695, on the contrary, the value of the silver coin was not kept up by the gold coin; a guinea then commonly exchanging for thirty shillings of the worn and clipt silver. Before the late recoinage of the gold, the price of silver bullion was seldom higher than five shillings and sevenpence an ounce, which is but fivepence above the mint price. But in 1695, the common price of silver bullion was six shillings and fivepence an ounce,[17] which is fifteen pence above the mint price. Even before the late recoinage of the gold, therefore, the coin, gold and silver together, when compared with silver bullion, was not supposed to be more than eight per cent below its standard value. In 1695, on the contrary, it had been supposed to be near five-and-twenty per cent. below that value. But in the beginning of the present century, that is, immediately after the great recoinage in King William's time, the greater part of the current silver coin must have been still nearer to its standard weight than it is at present. In the course of the present century, too, there has been no great public calamity, such as a civil war, which could rather discourage, or interrupt the interior commerce of the country. And though the bounty which has taken place through the greater part of this century, must always raise the price of corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the actual state of tillage; yet, as in the course of this century, the bounty has had full time to produce all the good effects commonly imputed to it to encourage tillage, and thereby to increase the quantity of corn in the home market, it may, open the principles of a system which I shall explain and examine hereafter, be supposed to have done something to lower the price of that commodity the one way, as well as to raise it the other. It is by many people supposed to have done more. In the sixty-four years of the present century, accordingly, the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, by the accounts of Eton college, to have been L.2 : 0 : 61032, which is about ten shillings and sixpence, or more than five-and-twenty per cent. cheaper than it had been during the sixty-four last years of the last century; and about nine shillings and sixpence cheaper than is had been during the sixteen years preceding 1636, when the discovery of the abundant mines of America may be supposed to have produced its full effect; and about one shilling cheaper than it had been in the twenty-six years preceding 1620, before that discovery can well be supposed to have produced its full effect. According to this account, the average price of middle wheat, during these sixty-four first years of the present century, comes out to have been about thirty-two shillings the quarter of eight bushels.

During this century, the silver coin has never been more below its standard weight than it is now. Despite being quite worn, its value has been maintained by the gold coin, which it can be exchanged for. Even though the gold coin was also pretty worn before the recent recoinage, it was in better condition than the silver. In 1695, however, the value of silver coin was not supported by gold; a guinea was generally exchanged for thirty shillings' worth of worn and clipped silver. Before the recent recoinage of gold, the price of silver bullion rarely exceeded five shillings and seven pence per ounce, which is only five pence above the mint price. But in 1695, the common price of silver bullion was six shillings and five pence per ounce, which is fifteen pence above the mint price. Even before the recent gold recoinage, the combined value of gold and silver coins, when compared to silver bullion, was not thought to be more than eight percent below its standard value. In contrast, in 1695, it was believed to be nearly twenty-five percent below that value. However, at the beginning of this century, right after the significant recoinage during King William's reign, most of the circulating silver coins were likely much closer to their standard weight than they are now. Throughout this century, there have not been any significant public disasters, like a civil war, which would disrupt or hinder the internal trade of the country. Although the subsidies provided throughout most of this century have raised corn prices somewhat higher than they would otherwise be given current farming conditions, the subsidies have had ample time to yield all the expected benefits of encouraging agriculture and increasing the supply of corn in the domestic market. It can be argued, based on the principles of a system that I will explain and examine later, that these subsidies have contributed both to lowering prices in one way and to raising them in another. Many people believe they have had an even greater impact. Over the last sixty-four years of this century, the average price of a quarter (nine bushels) of the best wheat at Windsor market, according to records from Eton College, has been £2 : 0 : 61032, which is about ten shillings and sixpence, or over twenty-five percent cheaper than it was during the last sixty-four years of the previous century. It is also about nine shillings and sixpence cheaper than it was in the sixteen years leading up to 1636, when the discovery of abundant American mines likely made its biggest impact, and about one shilling cheaper than in the twenty-six years before 1620, when that discovery can be considered to have fully impacted prices. According to this account, the average price of medium wheat during these first sixty-four years of this century has averaged around thirty-two shillings for a quarter of eight bushels.

The value of silver, therefore, seems to have risen somewhat in proportion to that of corn during the course of the present century, and it had probably begun to do so even some time before the end of the last.[Pg 83]

The value of silver, then, appears to have increased a bit relative to that of corn throughout this century, and it likely started rising even before the last century ended.[Pg 83]

In 1687, the price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, was L.1 : 5 : 2, the lowest price at which it had ever been from 1595.

In 1687, the price for a quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat at Windsor market was £1:5:2, the lowest it had ever been since 1595.

In 1688, Mr Gregory King, a man famous for his knowledge in matters of this kind, estimated the average price of wheat, in years of moderate plenty, to be to the grower 3s. 6d. the bushel, or eight-and-twenty shillings the quarter. The grower's price I understand to be the same with what is sometimes called the contract price, or the price at which a farmer contracts for a certain number of years to deliver a certain quantity of corn to a dealer. As a contract of this kind saves the farmer the expense and trouble of marketing, the contract price is generally lower than what is supposed to be the average market price. Mr King had judged eight-and-twenty shillings the quarter to be at that time the ordinary contract price in years of moderate plenty. Before the scarcity occasioned by the late extraordinary course of bad seasons, it was, I have been assured, the ordinary contract price in all common years.

In 1688, Mr. Gregory King, known for his expertise in these matters, estimated the average price of wheat in years of moderate abundance to be 3s. 6d. per bushel, or 28 shillings per quarter. The grower’s price is understood to be the same as what’s sometimes called the contract price, which is the price at which a farmer agrees to deliver a specific quantity of corn to a dealer for a certain number of years. Since this type of contract saves the farmer the hassle and cost of selling on the market, the contract price is usually lower than what’s considered the average market price. Mr. King determined that 28 shillings per quarter was the typical contract price during years of moderate abundance. Before the shortage caused by the recent series of bad seasons, I’ve been told this was the standard contract price in all normal years.

In 1688 was granted the parliamentary bounty upon the exportation of corn. The country gentlemen, who then composed a still greater proportion of the legislature than they do at present, had felt that the money price of corn was falling. The bounty was an expedient to raise it artificially to the high price at which it had frequently been sold in times of Charles I. and II. It was to take place, therefore, till wheat was so high as forty-eight shillings the quarter; that is, twenty shillings, or 5-7ths dearer than Mr King had, in that very year, estimated the grower's price to be in times of moderate plenty. If his calculations deserve any part of the reputation which they have obtained very universally, eight-and-forty shillings the quarter was a price which, without some such expedient as the bounty, could not at that time be expected, except in years of extraordinary scarcity. But the government of King William was not then fully settled. It was in no condition to refuse any thing to the country gentlemen, from whom it was, at that very time, soliciting the first establishment of the annual land-tax.

In 1688, the government approved a financial incentive for the export of corn. The country gentlemen, who made up an even larger part of the legislature back then than they do now, noticed that the price of corn was decreasing. The bounty was a way to artificially increase the price to the levels it had often reached during the reigns of Charles I and II. This would last until the price of wheat rose to forty-eight shillings per quarter; that is, twenty shillings, or 5-7ths more than what Mr. King had estimated as the grower's price during times of moderate abundance that very year. If his calculations have earned the reputation they currently hold, forty-eight shillings per quarter was a price that could not realistically be expected at that time without something like this bounty, except in years of extreme scarcity. However, King William's government was not yet fully established. It was in no position to deny anything to the country gentlemen, whom it was concurrently asking for support in establishing the annual land tax.

The value of silver, therefore, in proportion to that of corn, had probably risen somewhat before the end of the last century, and it seems to have continued to do so during the course of the greater part of the present, though the necessary operation of the bounty must have hindered that time from being so sensible as it otherwise would have been in the actual state of tillage.

The value of silver, therefore, compared to corn, had probably increased somewhat before the end of the last century, and it seems to have kept rising for most of the current century, although the required implementation of the bounty must have made that increase less noticeable than it would have been under normal farming conditions.

In plentiful years, the bounty, by occasioning an extraordinary exportation, necessarily raises the price of corn above what it otherwise would be in those years. To encourage tillage, by keeping up the price of corn, even in the most plentiful years, was the avowed end of the institution.

In good years, the abundant harvest leads to a huge export, which makes the price of grain rise higher than it normally would during those years. The goal of this system was to promote farming by maintaining high grain prices, even in the most abundant years.

In years of great scarcity, indeed, the bounty has generally been suspended. It must, however, have had some effect upon the prices of many of these years. By the extraordinary exportation which it occasions in years of plenty, it must frequently hinder the plenty of one year from compensating the scarcity of another.

In years of severe shortage, the abundance has usually been put on hold. However, it must have impacted the prices during many of these years. The unusual exportation it causes in good years often prevents the surplus of one year from making up for the lack of another.

Both in years of plenty and in years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty raises the price of corn above what it naturally would be in the actual state of tillage. If during the sixty-four first years of the present century, therefore, the average price has been lower than during the sixty-four last years of the last century, it must, in the same state of tillage, have been much more so, had it not been for this operation of the bounty.

Both in times of abundance and in times of hardship, the bounty increases the price of corn above what it would normally be given the current state of farming. If, during the first sixty-four years of this century, the average price has been lower than during the last sixty-four years of the previous century, it must have been even lower in the same farming conditions, if not for the impact of the bounty.

But, without the bounty, it maybe said the state of tillage would not have been the same. What may have been the effects of this institution upon the agriculture of the country, I shall endeavour to explain hereafter, when I come to treat particularly of bounties. I shall only observe at present, that this rise in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn, has not been peculiar to England. It has been observed to have taken place in France during the same period, and nearly in the same proportion, too, by three very faithful, diligent, and laborious collectors of the prices of corn, Mr Dupré de St Maur, Mr Messance, and the author of the Essay on the Police of Grain. But in France, till 1764, the exportation of grain was by law prohibited; and it is somewhat difficult to suppose, that nearly the same diminution of price which took place in one country, notwithstanding this prohibition, should, in another, be owing to the extraordinary encouragement given to exportation.

But without the bounty, it's likely that the state of farming wouldn’t have been the same. I’ll try to explain the impact of this system on the country’s agriculture later when I specifically discuss bounties. For now, I’ll just note that the increase in the value of silver compared to corn hasn’t just been an issue in England. It’s also been seen in France during the same time, and almost in the same amounts, according to three reliable and hardworking collectors of corn prices: Mr. Dupré de St Maur, Mr. Messance, and the author of the Essay on the Police of Grain. However, in France, until 1764, it was illegal to export grain, so it’s hard to believe that the same decline in price that occurred in one country—despite this ban—could be due to the significant encouragement for exportation in another country.

It would be more proper, perhaps, to consider this variation in the average money price of corn as the effect rather of some gradual rise in the real value of silver in the European market, than of any fall in the real average value of corn. Corn, it has already been observed, is, at distant periods of time, a more accurate measure of value than either silver or, perhaps, any other commodity. When, after the discovery of the abundant mines of America, corn rose to three and four times its former money price, this change was universally ascribed, not to any rise in the real value of corn, but to a fall in the real value of silver. If, during the sixty-four first years of the present century, therefore, the average money price of corn has fallen somewhat below what it had been during the greater part of the last century, we should, in the same manner, impute this change, not to any fall in the real value of corn, but to some rise in the real value of silver in the European market.[Pg 84]

It might be more fitting to view this change in the average money price of corn as a result of a gradual increase in the real value of silver in the European market, rather than a decrease in the real average value of corn. As noted before, corn, over long periods, serves as a more reliable measure of value than silver or potentially any other commodity. When the rich mines of America were discovered, and the price of corn rose to three or four times its previous money price, this shift was generally attributed, not to an increase in the real value of corn, but to a decrease in the real value of silver. Therefore, if in the first sixty-four years of this century, the average money price of corn has fallen a bit below what it was for most of the last century, we should similarly attribute this change not to a decrease in the real value of corn, but to an increase in the real value of silver in the European market.[Pg 84]

The high price of corn during these ten or twelve years past, indeed, has occasioned a suspicion that the real value of silver still continues to fall in the European market. This high price of corn, however, seems evidently to have been the effect of the extraordinary unfavourableness of the seasons, and ought, therefore, to be regarded, not as a permanent, but as a transitory and occasional event. The seasons, for these ten or twelve years past, have been unfavourable through the greater part of Europe; and the disorders of Poland have very much increased the scarcity in all those countries, which, in dear years, used to be supplied from that market. So long a course of bad seasons, though not a very common event, is by no means a singular one; and whoever has inquired much into the history of the prices of corn in former times, will be at no loss to recollect several other examples of the same kind. Ten years of extraordinary scarcity, besides, are not more wonderful than ten years of extraordinary plenty. The low price of corn, from 1741 to 1750, both inclusive, may very well be set in opposition to its high price during these last eight or ten years. From 1741 to 1750, the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, it appears from the accounts of Eton College, was only L.1 : 13 : 945, which is nearly 6s. 3d. below the average price of the sixty-four first years of the present century. The average price of the quarter of eight bushels of middle wheat comes out, according to this account, to have been, during these ten years, only L.1 : 6 : 8.

The high price of corn over the past ten or twelve years has raised the suspicion that the actual value of silver is still declining in the European market. However, this spike in corn prices clearly seems to be the result of unusually harsh weather conditions and should, therefore, be viewed not as a permanent situation but as a temporary occurrence. The weather has been unfavorable across most of Europe for these past ten or twelve years, and the unrest in Poland has significantly worsened the shortages in all those countries that used to rely on that market during expensive years. While a prolonged stretch of bad weather is not common, it's not unprecedented either; anyone who has looked into the history of corn prices will easily recall several similar instances. A decade of significant scarcity isn't any more surprising than a decade of abundant supply. The low corn prices from 1741 to 1750 can be directly compared to the high prices we've seen over the last eight to ten years. From 1741 to 1750, the average price for a quarter (nine bushels) of the best wheat at Windsor market, according to Eton College records, was just £1 : 13 : 945, which is nearly 6s. 3d. lower than the average price during the first sixty-four years of this century. The average price for a quarter (eight bushels) of middle-quality wheat during those ten years was only £1 : 6 : 8, according to this data.

Between 1741 and 1750, however, the bounty must have hindered the price of corn from falling so low in the home market as it naturally would have done. During these ten years, the quantity of all sorts of grain exported, it appears from the custom-house books, amounted to no less than 8,029,156 quarters, one bushel. The bounty paid for this amounted to L.1,514,962 : 17 : 4½. In 1749, accordingly, Mr Pelham, at that time prime minister, observed to the house of commons, that, for the three years preceding, a very extraordinary sum had been paid as bounty for the exportation of corn. He had good reason to make this observation, and in the following year he might have had still better. In that single year, the bounty paid amounted to no less than L.324,176 : 10 : 6.[18] It is unnecessary to observe how much this forced exportation must have raised the price of corn above what it otherwise would have been in the home market.

Between 1741 and 1750, the bounty likely prevented the price of corn from dropping as low in the domestic market as it naturally would have. During these ten years, the total quantity of all types of grain exported was recorded in the customs books at 8,029,156 quarters, one bushel. The total bounty paid for this was £1,514,962: 17: 4½. In 1749, Mr. Pelham, who was the prime minister at the time, pointed out to the House of Commons that an exceptionally large sum had been paid in bounty for exporting corn over the previous three years. He had good reason to make this statement, and the following year could have provided even stronger justification. In that single year, the bounty paid reached £324,176: 10: 6.[18] It’s clear that this forced exportation would have significantly increased the price of corn compared to what it would have been otherwise in the domestic market.

At the end of the accounts annexed to this chapter the reader will find the particular account of those ten years separated from the rest. He will find there, too, the particular account of the preceding ten years, of which the average is likewise below, though not so much below, the general average of the sixty-four first years of the century. The year 1740, however, was a year of extraordinary scarcity. These twenty years preceding 1750 may very well be set in opposition to the twenty preceding 1770. As the former were a good deal below the general average of the century, notwithstanding the intervention of one or two dear years; so the latter have been a good deal above it, notwithstanding the intervention of one or two cheap ones, of 1759, for example. If the former have not been as much below the general average as the latter have been above it, we ought probably to impute it to the bounty. The change has evidently been too sudden to be ascribed to any change in the value of silver, which is always slow and gradual. The suddenness of the effect can be accounted for only by a cause which can operate suddenly, the accidental variations of the seasons.

At the end of the accounts attached to this chapter, the reader will find the specific report on those ten years separated from the rest. It will also include the specific report on the previous ten years, which is also below average, though not as much as the overall average of the first sixty-four years of the century. The year 1740, however, was exceptionally scarce. These twenty years leading up to 1750 can be contrasted with the twenty years before 1770. While the former were significantly below the century's general average despite a couple of years with high prices, the latter were considerably above it, even with a few cheaper years, like that of 1759, for example. If the earlier years weren't as far below the general average as the later ones are above it, we should probably attribute this to the government assistance. The shift is clearly too abrupt to be explained by any change in the value of silver, which tends to change slowly and gradually. The suddenness of the impact can only be explained by a cause that can act quickly, such as the unpredictable variations in the seasons.

The money price of labour in Great Britain has, indeed, risen during the course of the present century. This, however, seems to be the effect, not so much of any diminution in the value of silver in the European market, as of an increase in the demand for labour in Great Britain, arising from the great, and almost universal prosperity of the country. In France, a country not altogether so prosperous, the money price of labour has, since the middle of the last century, been observed to sink gradually with the average money price of corn. Both in the last century and in the present, the day wages of common labour are there said to have been pretty uniformly about the twentieth part of the average price of the septier of wheat; a measure which contains a little more than four Winchester bushels. In Great Britain, the real recompence of labour, it has already been shewn, the real quantities of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which are given to the labourer, has increased considerably during the course of the present century. The rise in its money price seems to have been the effect, not of any diminution of the value of silver in the general market of Europe, but of a rise in the real price of labour, in the particular market of Great Britain, owing to the peculiarly happy circumstances of the country.

The money price of labor in Great Britain has, indeed, increased during this century. However, this seems to be due not so much to a decrease in the value of silver in the European market, but rather to a rise in the demand for labor in Great Britain, resulting from the country's significant and nearly universal prosperity. In France, a country that is not quite as prosperous, the money price of labor has gradually fallen since the middle of the last century, paralleling the average money price of grain. Both in the last century and now, the daily wages for common laborers have been consistently around one-twentieth of the average price of a septier of wheat, a measure that holds just over four Winchester bushels. In Great Britain, the actual compensation for labor—meaning the real amounts of necessities and conveniences given to the laborer—has increased significantly during this century. The increase in its money price seems to arise not from a decrease in the value of silver in the broader European market, but from a rise in the actual price of labor in the specific market of Great Britain, due to the uniquely favorable conditions in the country.

For some time after the first discovery of America, silver would continue to sell at its former, or not much below its former price. The profits of mining would for some time be very great, and much above their natural rate. Those who imported that metal into Europe, however, would soon find that the whole annual importation could not be disposed of at this high price. Silver would gradually exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity of goods. Its price would sink gradually lower and lower, till it fell to its natural price; or to what was just sufficient to pay, accord[Pg 85]ing to their natural rates, the wages of the labour, the profits of the stock, and the rent of the land, which must be paid in order to bring it from the mine to the market. In the greater part of the silver mines of Peru, the tax of the king of Spain, amounting to a tenth of the gross produce, eats up, it has already been observed, the whole rent of the land. This tax was originally a half; it soon afterwards fell to a third, then to a fifth, and at last to a tenth, at which rate it still continues. In the greater part of the silver mines of Peru, this, it seems, is all that remains, after replacing the stock of the undertaker of the work, together with its ordinary profits; and it seems to be universally acknowledged that these profits, which were once very high, are now as low as they can well be, consistently with carrying on the works.

For a while after the initial discovery of America, silver continued to sell at its previous price, or close to it. The profits from mining were quite significant for some time, exceeding what was considered normal. However, those who brought silver into Europe would soon realize that they couldn’t sell the entire annual import at this high price. Gradually, silver would be traded for less and less goods. Its price would slowly decline until it reached its natural level; meaning just enough to cover the wages of labor, the returns on investment, and the land rent necessary to transport it from the mine to the market. In most silver mines in Peru, the tax imposed by the king of Spain, which is one-tenth of the total yield, consumes what would be the entire rent of the land. This tax originally started at fifty percent; it later dropped to one-third, then to one-fifth, and finally settled at one-tenth, where it remains today. In most silver mines in Peru, this seems to be the only amount left after covering the initial investment and its standard profits; and it appears to be widely accepted that these profits, once very high, are now as low as possible while still allowing the operations to continue.

The tax of the king of Spain was reduced to a fifth of the registered silver in 1504[19], one-and-forty years before 1545, the date of the the discovery of the mines of Potosi. In the course of ninety years, or before 1636, these mines, the most fertile in all America, had time sufficient to produce their full effect, or to reduce the value of silver in the European market as low as it could well fall, while it continued to pay this tax to the king of Spain. Ninety years is time sufficient to reduce any commodity, of which there is no monopoly, to its natural price, or to the lowest price at which, while it pays a particular tax, it can continue to be sold for any considerable time together.

The tax from the king of Spain was lowered to one-fifth of the recorded silver in 1504[19], which was forty-one years before 1545, the year when the Potosi mines were discovered. Over the next ninety years, or by 1636, these mines, the richest in all of America, had enough time to maximize their output or to decrease the value of silver in the European market as much as possible, all while still paying this tax to the king of Spain. Ninety years is ample time to bring any commodity, assuming there’s no monopoly on it, to its natural price, or to the lowest price at which it can still be sold for a significant amount of time while paying a particular tax.

The price of silver in the European market might, perhaps, have fallen still lower, and it might have become necessary either to reduce the tax upon it, not only to one-tenth, as in 1736, but to one twentieth, in the same manner as that upon gold, or to give up working the greater part of the American mines which are now wrought. The gradual increase of the demand for silver, or the gradual enlargement of the market for the produce of the silver mines of America, is probably the cause which has prevented this from happening, and which has not only kept up the value of silver in the European market, but has perhaps even raised it somewhat higher than it was about the middle of the last century.

The price of silver in the European market might have dropped even lower, and it could have become necessary to either cut the tax on it, not just to one-tenth like in 1736, but down to one-twentieth, similar to the tax on gold, or to abandon mining most of the American mines that are currently operating. The gradual rise in the demand for silver, or the steady expansion of the market for the output from America's silver mines, is likely the reason this hasn't happened. This demand has not only maintained the value of silver in the European market, but it may have even pushed it a bit higher than it was around the middle of the last century.

Since the first discovery of America, the market for the produce of its silver mines has been growing gradually more and more extensive.

Since the first discovery of America, the market for silver from its mines has been gradually expanding more and more.

First, the market of Europe has become gradually more and more extensive. Since the discovery of America, the greater part of Europe has been much improved. England, Holland, France, and Germany; even Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, have all advanced considerably, both in agriculture and in manufactures. Italy seems not to have gone backwards. The fall of Italy preceded the conquest of Peru. Since that time it seems rather to have recovered a little. Spain and Portugal, indeed, are supposed to have gone backwards. Portugal, however, is but a very small part of Europe, and the declension of Spain is not, perhaps, so great as is commonly imagined. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, Spain was a very poor country, even in comparison with France, which has been so much improved since that time. It was the well known remark of the emperor Charles V. who had travelled so frequently through both countries, that every thing abounded in France, but that every thing was wanting in Spain. The increasing produce of the agriculture and manufactures of Europe must necessarily have required a gradual increase in the quantity of silver coin to circulate it; and the increasing number of wealthy individuals must have required the like increase in the quantity of their plate and other ornaments of silver.

First, the European market has gradually become more extensive. Since the discovery of America, much of Europe has significantly improved. England, Holland, France, and Germany; even Sweden, Denmark, and Russia have all advanced considerably in both agriculture and manufacturing. Italy doesn’t seem to have gone backwards. The decline of Italy came before the conquest of Peru. Since then, it appears to have made some recovery. Spain and Portugal, however, are believed to have regressed. Portugal is just a small part of Europe, and Spain’s decline might not be as significant as is often thought. At the start of the sixteenth century, Spain was quite poor, even compared to France, which has improved greatly since then. It was a well-known observation by Emperor Charles V, who traveled extensively through both countries, that everything was abundant in France, while everything was lacking in Spain. The growing output of agriculture and manufacturing in Europe would naturally require a gradual increase in the amount of silver coin needed to support it; and the rising number of wealthy individuals would similarly require an increase in their silver plate and other ornaments.

Secondly, America is itself a new market, for the produce of its own silver mines; and as its advances in agriculture, industry, and population, are much more rapid than those of the most thriving countries in Europe, its demand must increase much more rapidly. The English colonies are altogether a new market, which, partly for coin, and partly for plate, requires a continual augmenting supply of silver through a great continent where there never was any demand before. The greater part, too, of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, are altogether new markets. New Granada, the Yucatan, Paraguay, and the Brazils, were, before discovered by the Europeans, inhabited by savage nations, who had neither arts nor agriculture. A considerable degree of both has now been introduced into all of them. Even Mexico and Peru, though they cannot be considered as altogether new markets, are certainly much more extensive ones than they ever were before. After all the wonderful tales which have been published concerning the splendid state of those countries in ancient times, whoever reads, with any degree of sober judgment, the history of their first discovery and conquest, will evidently discern that, in arts, agriculture, and commerce, their inhabitants were much more ignorant than the Tartars of the Ukraine are at present. Even the Peruvians, the more civilized nation of the two, though they made use of gold and silver as ornaments, had no coined money of any kind. Their whole commerce was carried on by barter, and there was accordingly scarce any division of labour among them. Those who cultivated the ground, were obliged to build their own houses, to make their own household furniture, their own clothes, shoes, and instruments of agriculture. The few artificers among them are said to have been all main[Pg 86]tained by the sovereign, the nobles, and the priests, and were probably their servants or slaves. All the ancient arts of Mexico and Peru have never furnished one single manufacture to Europe. The Spanish armies, though they scarce ever exceeded five hundred men, and frequently did not amount to half that number, found almost everywhere great difficulty in procuring subsistence. The famines which they are said to have occasioned almost wherever they went, in countries, too, which at the same time are represented as very populous and well cultivated, sufficiently demonstrate that the story of this populousness and high cultivation is in a great measure fabulous. The Spanish colonies are under a government in many respects less favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that of the English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all those much more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy climate, the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance common to all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage, as to compensate many defects in civil government. Frezier, who visited Peru in 1713, represents Lima as containing between twenty-five and twenty-eight thousand inhabitants. Ulloa, who resided in the same country between 1740 and 1746, represents it as containing more than fifty thousand. The difference in their accounts of the populousness of several other principal towns of Chili and Peru is nearly the same; and as there seems to be no reason to doubt of the good information of either, it marks an increase which is scarce inferior to that of the English colonies. America, therefore, is a new market for the produce of its own silver mines, of which the demand must increase much more rapidly than that of the most thriving country in Europe.

Secondly, America is a new market for the output of its silver mines. Since its growth in agriculture, industry, and population is much faster than that of the most prosperous countries in Europe, its demand is also likely to grow more quickly. The English colonies represent a completely new market, which needs a constant increase in the supply of silver for both currency and silverware across a vast continent where there was previously no demand. Most of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies are also entirely new markets. New Granada, Yucatan, Paraguay, and Brazil were inhabited by indigenous peoples who had neither advanced skills nor agriculture before Europeans arrived. A significant amount of both has now been introduced to these areas. Even Mexico and Peru, while not completely new markets, are certainly much broader in scope than they used to be. Despite all the incredible stories told about those countries' glorious pasts, anyone reading a sober account of their initial discovery and conquest will realize that in terms of arts, agriculture, and trade, their inhabitants were much less knowledgeable than the current Tartars of Ukraine. Even the Peruvians, who were the more civilized of the two, did not use coined money, despite using gold and silver for decoration. Their trade was entirely based on bartering, leading to very little division of labor among them. Those who farmed had to construct their own homes, make their own furniture, clothing, shoes, and farming tools. The few craftsmen they had were reportedly maintained by the rulers, nobles, and priests, likely serving as their servants or slaves. The ancient arts of Mexico and Peru never produced a single manufactured item for Europe. The Spanish armies, which rarely exceeded five hundred men and often numbered less than half that, faced significant challenges in finding food almost everywhere they went. The famines they are said to have caused in regions that were simultaneously claimed to be very populated and well-cultivated clearly indicate that those claims are largely exaggerated. The Spanish colonies are governed in ways that are less conducive to agriculture, advancement, and population growth compared to the English colonies. However, they seem to be progressing in those areas much faster than any country in Europe. With fertile soil, a favorable climate, and the abundance and affordability of land—a benefit common to all new colonies—these advantages seem to outweigh many shortcomings in civil governance. Frezier, who visited Peru in 1713, estimated Lima's population at between twenty-five and twenty-eight thousand. Ulloa, who lived there from 1740 to 1746, claimed it had more than fifty thousand residents. The discrepancies in their accounts regarding the populations of several other major cities in Chile and Peru are similarly notable; and since there's no reason to doubt the accuracy of either, it reflects an increase that is nearly as strong as that of the English colonies. Therefore, America is indeed a new market for the output of its silver mines, with demand expected to grow much faster than that of the most prosperous countries in Europe.

Thirdly, the East Indies is another market for the produce of the silver mines of America, and a market which, from the time of the first discovery of those mines, has been continually taking off a greater and a greater quantity of silver. Since that time, the direct trade between America and the East Indies, which is carried on by means of the Acapulco ships, has been continually augmenting, and the indirect intercourse by the way of Europe has been augmenting in a still greater proportion. During the sixteenth century, the Portuguese were the only European nation who carried on any regular trade to the East Indies. In the last years of that century, the Dutch began to encroach upon this monopoly, and in a few years expelled them from their principal settlements in India. During the greater part of the last century, those two nations divided the most considerable part of the East India trade between them; the trade of the Dutch continually augmenting in a still greater proportion than that of the Portuguese declined. The English and French carried on some trade with India in the last century, but it has been greatly augmented in the course of the present. The East India trade of the Swedes and Danes began in the course of the present century. Even the Muscovites now trade regularly with China, by a sort of caravans which go over land through Siberia and Tartary to Pekin. The East India trade of all these nations, if we except that of the French, which the last war had well nigh annihilated, has been almost continually augmenting. The increasing consumptions of East India goods in Europe is, it seems, so great, as to afford a gradual increase of employment to them all. Tea, for example, was a drug very little used in Europe, before the middle of the last century. At present, the value of the tea annually imported by the English East India company, for the use of their own countrymen, amounts to more than a million and a half a year; and even this is not enough; a great deal more being constantly smuggled into the country from the ports of Holland, from Gottenburgh in Sweden, and from the coast of France, too, as long as the French East India company was in prosperity. The consumption of the porcelain of China, of the spiceries of the Moluccas, of the piece goods of Bengal, and of innumerable other articles, has increased very nearly in a like proportion. The tonnage, accordingly, of all the European shipping employed in the East India trade, at any one time during the last century, was not, perhaps, much greater than that of the English East India company before the late reduction of their shipping.

Third, the East Indies is another market for the silver produced by American mines, and it has been steadily increasing its demand for more and more silver since those mines were first discovered. Since then, the direct trade between America and the East Indies, facilitated by the Acapulco ships, has been growing continuously, and the indirect exchange through Europe has been increasing even more. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese were the only European nation engaged in a regular trade with the East Indies. Toward the end of that century, the Dutch began to challenge this monopoly and soon drove the Portuguese out of their main settlements in India. For most of the last century, these two nations shared the majority of the East India trade, with the Dutch trade expanding at a much greater rate while the Portuguese trade declined. The English and French started some trade with India in the last century, but it has significantly increased in the current one. The East India trade for the Swedes and Danes started in this century as well. Even the Russians now trade regularly with China through overland caravans that travel through Siberia and Tartary to Beijing. The East India trade of all these nations, except for the French—which almost vanished due to the last war—has been almost continuously growing. The rising consumption of East India goods in Europe appears to be so substantial that it provides a steady increase in employment for all of them. For instance, tea was a rarely used commodity in Europe before the mid-point of the last century. Nowadays, the value of the tea imported annually by the English East India Company for their fellow countrymen exceeds one and a half million a year, and even that isn’t enough, as a significant amount is continuously smuggled into the country from the ports of Holland, from Gothenburg in Sweden, and from the coast of France while the French East India Company was flourishing. The consumption of Chinese porcelain, spices from the Moluccas, textiles from Bengal, and countless other items has grown almost in the same proportion. Consequently, the tonnage of all European ships engaged in East India trade, at any one time during the last century, was likely not much more than that of the English East India Company before their shipping was recently reduced.

But in the East Indies, particularly in China and Indostan, the value of the precious metals, when the Europeans first began to trade to those countries, was much higher than in Europe; and it still continues to be so. In rice countries, which generally yield two, sometimes three crops in the year, each of them more plentiful than any common crop of corn, the abundance of food must be much greater than in any corn country of equal extent. Such countries are accordingly much more populous. In them, too, the rich, having a greater superabundance of food to dispose of beyond what they themselves can consume, have the means of purchasing a much greater quantity of the labour of other people. The retinue of a grandee in China or Indostan accordingly is, by all accounts, much more numerous and splendid than that of the richest subjects in Europe. The same superabundance of food, of which they have the disposal, enables them to give a greater quantity of it for all those singular and rare productions which nature furnishes but in very small quantities; such as the precious metals and the precious stones, the great objects of the competition of the rich. Though the mines,[Pg 87] therefore, which supplied the Indian market, had been as abundant as those which supplied the European, such commodities would naturally exchange for a greater quantity of food in India than in Europe. But the mines which supplied the Indian market with the precious metals seem to have been a good deal less abundant, and those which supplied it with the precious stones a good deal more so, than the mines which supplied the European. The precious metals, therefore, would naturally exchange in India for a somewhat greater quantity of the precious stones, and for a much greater quantity of food than in Europe. The money price of diamonds, the greatest of all superfluities, would be somewhat lower, and that of food, the first of all necessaries, a great deal lower in the one country than in the other. But the real price of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries of life which is given to the labourer, it has already been observed, is lower both in China and Indostan, the two great markets of India, than it is through the greater part of Europe. The wages of the labourer will there purchase a smaller quantity of food: and as the money price of food is much lower in India than in Europe, the money price of labour is there lower upon a double account; upon account both of the small quantity of food which it will purchase, and of the low price of that food. But in countries of equal art and industry, the money price of the greater part of manufactures will be in proportion to the money price of labour; and in manufacturing art and industry, China and Indostan, though inferior, seem not to be much inferior to any part of Europe. The money price of the the greater part of manufactures, therefore, will naturally be much lower in those great empires than it is anywhere in Europe. Through the greater part of Europe, too, the expense of land-carriage increases very much both the and real and nominal price of most manufactures. It costs more labour, and therefore more money, to bring first the materials, and afterwards the complete manufacture to market. In China and Indostan, the extent and variety of inland navigations save the greater part of this labour, and consequently of this money, and thereby reduce still lower both the real and the nominal price of the greater part of their manufactures. Upon all these accounts, the precious metals are a commodity which it always has been, and still continues to be, extremely advantageous to carry from Europe to India. There is scarce any commodity which brings a better price there; or which, in proportion to the quantity of labour and commodities which it costs in Europe, will purchase or command a greater quantity of labour and commodities in India. It is more advantageous, too, to carry silver thither than gold; because in China, and the greater part of the other markets of India, the proportion between fine silver and fine gold is but as ten, or at most as twelve to one; whereas in Europe it is as fourteen or fifteen to one. In China, and the greater part of the other markets of India, ten, or at most twelve ounces of silver, will purchase an ounce of gold; in Europe, it requires from fourteen to fifteen ounces. In the cargoes, therefore, of the greater part of European ships which sail to India, silver has generally been one of the most valuable articles. It is the most valuable article in the Acapulco ships which sail to Manilla. The silver of the new continent seems, in this manner, to be one of the principal commodities by which the commerce between the two extremities of the old one is carried on; and it is by means of it, in a great measure, that those distant parts of the world are connected with one another.

But in the East Indies, especially in China and India, the value of precious metals was much higher when Europeans first began trading there, and it still is today. In rice-producing regions, which typically yield two, sometimes three crops a year, each of which is more plentiful than any common grain crop, the food supply must be much greater than in any comparable grain-producing area. As a result, those countries are much more populated. Additionally, the wealthy, having a surplus of food beyond what they can consume, have the means to buy a much larger amount of labor from others. The entourage of a noble in China or India is, by all accounts, much larger and more impressive than that of the richest individuals in Europe. The same surplus of food they can dispose of allows them to offer more for those unique and rare resources that nature provides in limited quantities, such as precious metals and gemstones, which are highly sought after by the rich. Even if the mines supplying the Indian market were as abundant as those supplying Europe, these commodities would naturally trade for a greater amount of food in India than in Europe. However, the mines that supplied India with precious metals appear to be significantly less abundant, while those supplying precious stones seem to be much more plentiful compared to European mines. Therefore, precious metals would naturally trade in India for a greater amount of precious stones and food than in Europe. The market price of diamonds, the most luxurious item, would be somewhat lower, while that of food, the most essential necessity, would be much lower in India compared to Europe. However, the real price of labor, or the actual amount of necessities a laborer can obtain, is already lower in both China and India, the two major markets of the region, than in most of Europe. Wages in those countries will buy less food, and since the price of food is significantly lower in India, the money price of labor is lower for two reasons: because of the small amount of food it can buy and the low price of that food. But in countries with similar levels of skill and industry, the price of most manufactured goods will tend to correlate with the price of labor. In manufacturing skills, China and India, despite being slightly less advanced, are not significantly behind any part of Europe. Consequently, the prices of most manufactured goods will naturally be much lower in these vast empires than in Europe. Throughout much of Europe, the cost of land transport greatly raises both the actual and nominal price of most manufactured items. It requires more labor and thus more money to bring raw materials and finished goods to market. In China and India, extensive and diverse inland waterways save a lot of this labor and money, further decreasing the actual and nominal prices of many of their goods. For all these reasons, precious metals have always been, and continue to be, particularly advantageous to transport from Europe to India. There’s hardly any commodity that sells for a better price there or that, relative to the labor and goods it costs in Europe, will buy or command a greater amount of labor and goods in India. It’s also more beneficial to send silver there than gold, because in China and most other Indian markets, the ratio of fine silver to fine gold is around ten or at most twelve to one, while in Europe it’s about fourteen or fifteen to one. In China and most other Indian markets, ten or twelve ounces of silver can buy an ounce of gold; in Europe, it takes fourteen to fifteen ounces. Therefore, in the cargoes of most European ships going to India, silver has typically been one of the most valuable items. It is also the most valuable item in the Acapulco ships that sail to Manila. Silver from the New World appears to be one of the main commodities facilitating trade between the two ends of the Old World, and it significantly connects those distant parts of the globe.

In order to supply so very widely extended a market, the quantity of silver annually brought from the mines must not only be sufficient to support that continued increase, both of coin and of plate, which is required in all thriving countries; but to repair that continual waste and consumption of silver which takes place in all countries where that metal is used.

To serve such a vast market, the amount of silver mined each year needs to not only meet the ongoing demand for both coins and silverware that's necessary in prosperous countries, but also to replace the constant loss and use of silver that happens in every country where this metal is utilized.

The continual consumption of the precious metals in coin by wearing, and in plate both by wearing and cleaning, is very sensible; and in commodities of which the use is so very widely extended, would alone require a very great annual supply. The consumption of those metals in some particular manufactures, though it may not perhaps be greater upon the whole than this gradual consumption, is, however, much more sensible, as it is much more rapid. In the manufactures of Birmingham alone, the quantity of gold and silver annually employed in gilding and plating, and thereby disqualified from ever afterwards appearing in the shape of those metals, is said to amount to more than fifty thousand pounds sterling. We may from thence form some notion how great must be the annual consumption in all the different parts of the world, either in manufactures of the same kind with those of Birmingham, or in laces, embroideries, gold and silver stuffs, the gilding of books, furniture, &c. A considerable quantity, too, must be annually lost in transporting those metals from one place to another both by sea and by land. In the greater part of the governments of Asia, besides, the almost universal custom of concealing treasures in the bowels of the earth, of which the knowledge frequently dies with the person who makes the concealment, must occasion the loss of a still greater quantity.

The ongoing use of precious metals in coins through wearing them, and in plates both from wearing and cleaning, is quite significant; and in goods that are used so extensively, it alone would require a large annual supply. The use of these metals in certain specific manufacturing processes, while it may not be greater overall than this gradual consumption, is, however, much more noticeable because it happens much more quickly. In Birmingham alone, the amount of gold and silver used each year for gilding and plating, which means they can never again appear as those metals, is said to exceed fifty thousand pounds sterling. From this, we can get an idea of how substantial the annual consumption must be in various parts of the world, whether in similar manufacturing processes to those in Birmingham or in laces, embroideries, gold and silver fabrics, gilding for books, furniture, etc. A significant amount must also be lost each year during the transportation of these metals from one place to another, both by sea and land. Additionally, in many Asian countries, the almost universal practice of hiding treasures underground, often with the knowledge dying with the person who buried them, likely results in an even greater loss.

The quantity of gold and silver imported at both Cadiz and Lisbon (including not only what comes under register, but what may be[Pg 88] supposed to be smuggled) amounts, according to the best accounts, to about six millions sterling a-year.

The amount of gold and silver imported at both Cadiz and Lisbon (including not just what's officially registered, but also what might be[Pg 88] smuggled) is estimated to be around six million sterling a year.

According to Mr Meggens[20], the annual importation of the precious metals into Spain, at an average of six years, viz. from 1748 to 1753, both inclusive, and into Portugal, at an average of seven years, viz. from 1747 to 1753, both inclusive, amounted in silver to 1,101,107 pounds weight, and in gold to 49,940 pounds weight. The silver, at sixty-two shillings the pound troy, amounts to L.3,413,431 : 10s. sterling. The gold, at forty-four guineas and a half the pound troy, amounts to L.2,333,446 : 14s. sterling. Both together amount to L.5,746,878 : 4s. sterling. The account of what was imported under register, he assures us, is exact. He gives us the detail of the particular places from which the gold and silver were brought, and of the particular quantity of each metal, which, according to the register, each of them afforded. He makes an allowance, too, for the quantity of each metal which, he supposes, may have been smuggled. The great experience of this judicious merchant renders his opinion of considerable weight.

According to Mr. Meggens[20], the annual import of precious metals into Spain, averaged over six years from 1748 to 1753, and into Portugal, averaged over seven years from 1747 to 1753, totaled 1,101,107 pounds of silver and 49,940 pounds of gold. The silver, valued at sixty-two shillings per pound troy, equals £3,413,431: 10s. sterling. The gold, at forty-four and a half guineas per pound troy, equals £2,333,446: 14s. sterling. In total, that amounts to £5,746,878: 4s. sterling. He assures us that the records of what was imported are accurate. He provides details on the specific locations from which the gold and silver came, along with the exact quantities of each metal reported. He also takes into account the possible smuggling of each metal. The extensive experience of this knowledgeable merchant gives significant credibility to his opinion.

According to the eloquent, and sometimes well-informed, author of the Philosophical and Political History of the Establishment of the Europeans in the two Indies, the annual importation of registered gold and silver into Spain, at an average of eleven years, viz. from 1754 to 1764, both inclusive, amounted to 13,984,18535 piastres of ten reals. On account of what may have been smuggled, however, the whole annual importation, he supposes, may have amounted to seventeen millions of piastres, which, at 4s. 6d. the piastre, is equal to L.3,825,000 sterling. He gives the detail, too, of the particular places from which the gold and silver were brought, and of the particular quantities of each metal, which according to the register, each of them afforded. He informs us, too, that if we were to judge of the quantity of gold annually imported from the Brazils to Lisbon, by the amount of the tax paid to the king of Portugal, which it seems, is one-fifth of the standard metal, we might value it at eighteen millions of cruzadoes, or forty-five millions of French livres, equal to about twenty millions sterling. On account of what may have been smuggled, however, we may safely, he says, add to this sum an eighth more, or L.250,000 sterling, so that the whole will amount to L.2,250,000 sterling. According to this account, therefore, the whole annual importation of the precious metals into both Spain and Portugal, amounts to about L.6,075,000 sterling.

According to the articulate and sometimes well-informed author of the Philosophical and Political History of the Establishment of the Europeans in the two Indies, the annual import of registered gold and silver into Spain averaged 13,984,18535 piastres over a span of eleven years, from 1754 to 1764, inclusive. However, considering what might have been smuggled, he estimates that the total annual importation could reach seventeen million piastres, which, at 4s. 6d. per piastre, equals L.3,825,000 sterling. He also details the specific locations from which the gold and silver were sourced, along with the exact quantities of each metal recorded. He further informs us that if we assess the amount of gold imported annually from Brazil to Lisbon based on the tax paid to the king of Portugal, which appears to be one-fifth of the standard metal, we might estimate it at eighteen million cruzadoes, or forty-five million French livres, roughly equal to about twenty million sterling. However, due to potential smuggling, he suggests we can safely add an eighth more, or L.250,000 sterling, bringing the total to L.2,250,000 sterling. According to this account, the total annual importation of precious metals into both Spain and Portugal amounts to around L.6,075,000 sterling.

Several other very well authenticated, though manuscript accounts, I have been assured, agree in making this whole annual importation amount, at an average, to about six millions sterling; sometimes a little more, sometimes a little less.

Several other well-documented, though manuscript accounts, I have been told, agree that this entire annual import adds up, on average, to about six million pounds; sometimes a bit more, sometimes a bit less.

The annual importation of the precious metals into Cadiz and Lisbon, indeed, is not equal to the whole annual produce of the mines of America. Some part is sent annually by the Acapulco ships to Manilla; some part is employed in a contraband trade, which the Spanish colonies carry on with those of other European nations; and some part, no doubt, remains in the country. The mines of America, besides, are by no means the only gold and silver mines in the world. They, are, however, by far the most abundant. The produce of all the other mines which are known is insignificant, it is acknowledged, in comparison with their's; and the far greater part of their produce, it is likewise acknowledged, is annually imported into Cadiz and Lisbon. But the consumption of Birmingham alone, at the rate of fifty thousand pounds a-year, is equal to the hundred-and-twentieth part of this annual importation, at the rate of six millions a-year. The whole annual consumption of gold and silver, therefore, in all the different countries of the world where those metals are used, may, perhaps, be nearly equal to the whole annual produce. The remainder may be no more than sufficient to supply the increasing demand of all thriving countries. It may even have fallen so far short of this demand, as somewhat to raise the price of those metals in the European market.

The yearly import of precious metals into Cadiz and Lisbon doesn't match the total annual output of the mines in America. Part of it is sent every year by the Acapulco ships to Manila; another part is used in illicit trade that the Spanish colonies have with other European nations; and some, of course, stays in the country. Additionally, the mines in America aren’t the only gold and silver mines in the world. However, they are definitely the most plentiful. It’s widely accepted that the output from all other known mines is insignificant compared to theirs, and it’s also recognized that the majority of their output is imported annually into Cadiz and Lisbon. But the consumption in Birmingham alone, at around fifty thousand pounds a year, is equivalent to one-hundred-twentieth of this annual importation, totaling six million a year. Therefore, the total yearly consumption of gold and silver in all the countries that use these metals might be almost equal to the entire annual output. The remaining amount may just be enough to meet the growing demand of all prosperous countries. In fact, it might have fallen short of this demand, which has somewhat increased the price of these metals in the European market.

The quantity of brass and iron annually brought from the mine to the market, is out of all proportion greater than that of gold and silver. We do not, however, upon this account, imagine that those coarse metals are likely to multiply beyond the demand, or to become gradually cheaper and cheaper. Why should we imagine that the precious metals are likely to do so? The course metals, indeed, though harder, are put to much harder uses, and, as they are of less value, less care is employed in their preservation. The precious metals, however, are not necessarily immortal any more than they, but are liable, too, to be lost, wasted, and consumed, in a great variety of ways.

The amount of brass and iron brought from the mine to the market each year is far greater than that of gold and silver. However, we don’t assume that these common metals will multiply beyond demand or become gradually cheaper. Why should we think that the precious metals will do the same? While the common metals are tougher and used for much more demanding purposes, they also have less value, which means people take less care in preserving them. The precious metals aren’t guaranteed to last forever any more than the others; they can also be lost, wasted, or consumed in many different ways.

The price of all metals, though liable to slow and gradual variations, varies less from year to year than that of almost any other part of the rude produce of land: and the price of the precious metals is even less liable to sudden variations than that of the coarse ones. The durableness of metals is the foundation of this extraordinary steadiness of price. The corn which was brought to market last year will be all, or almost all, consumed, long before the end of this year. But some part of the iron which was brought from the mine[Pg 89] two or three hundred years ago, may be still in use, and, perhaps, some part of the gold which was brought from it two or three thousand years ago. The different masses of corn, which, in different years, must supply the consumption of the world, will always be nearly in proportion to the respective produce of those different years. But the proportion between the different masses of iron which may be in use in two different years, will be very little affected by any accidental difference in the produce of the iron mines of those two years; and the proportion between the masses of gold will be still less affected by any such difference in the produce of the gold mines. Though the produce of the greater part of metallic mines, therefore, varies, perhaps, still more from year to year than that of the greater part of corn fields, these variations have not the same effect upon the price of the species of commodities as upon that of the other.

The price of all metals, while subject to slow and gradual changes, fluctuates less from year to year than almost any other basic agricultural products. The price of precious metals is even less prone to sudden changes than that of non-precious ones. The durability of metals is the basis for this remarkable price stability. The grain that was sold last year will be mostly consumed long before the end of this year. However, some of the iron mined two or three hundred years ago may still be in use, and possibly some of the gold extracted two or three thousand years ago is still around. The different quantities of grain that must meet the world's needs each year will always be roughly proportional to the respective yields of those years. But the ratio of the different amounts of iron in use during two different years will be very little impacted by any accidental differences in iron production from those two years; similarly, the ratio of gold will be even less affected by differences in gold production. Although the output from most metal mines may vary even more from year to year than that of most cornfields, these variations do not influence the prices of these commodities in the same way.

Variations in the Proportion between the respective Values of Gold and Silver.

Before the discovery of the mines of America, the value of fine gold to fine silver was regulated in the different mines of Europe, between the proportions of one to ten and one to twelve; that is, an ounce of fine gold was supposed to be worth from ten to twelve ounces of fine silver. About the middle of the last century, it came to be regulated, between the proportions of one to fourteen and one to fifteen; that is, an ounce of fine gold came to be supposed worth between fourteen and fifteen ounces of fine silver. Gold rose in its nominal value, or in the quantity of silver which was given for it. Both metals sunk in their real value, or in the quantity of labour which they could purchase; but silver sunk more than gold. Though both the gold and silver mines of America exceeded in fertility all those which had ever been known before, the fertility of the silver mines had, it seems, been proportionally still greater than that of the gold ones.

Before the discovery of the mines in America, the value of fine gold compared to fine silver was set in various European mines at a ratio of between ten to one and twelve to one. This meant that one ounce of fine gold was considered to be worth between ten and twelve ounces of fine silver. Around the middle of the last century, this ratio changed to between fourteen to one and fifteen to one, meaning that one ounce of fine gold was thought to be worth between fourteen and fifteen ounces of fine silver. The value of gold increased, or the amount of silver exchanged for it rose. However, both metals decreased in real value, meaning their purchasing power in terms of labor diminished, with silver declining more than gold. Although both the gold and silver mines in America were more productive than any previously known, it appeared that the silver mines were even more bountiful relative to the gold mines.

The great quantities of silver carried annually from Europe to India, have, in some of of the English settlements, gradually reduced the value of that metal in proportion to gold. In the mint of Calcutta, an ounce of fine gold is supposed to be worth fifteen ounces of fine silver, in the same manner as in Europe. It is in the mint, perhaps, rated too high for the value which it bears in the market of Bengal. In China, the proportion of gold to silver still continues as one to ten, or one to twelve. In Japan, it is said to be as one to eight.

The large amounts of silver sent each year from Europe to India have gradually lowered the value of silver compared to gold in some of the English settlements. At the Calcutta mint, an ounce of fine gold is believed to be worth fifteen ounces of fine silver, just like in Europe. However, it might be rated too high at the mint compared to its actual value in the Bengal market. In China, the ratio of gold to silver remains at about one to ten or one to twelve. In Japan, that ratio is said to be around one to eight.

The proportion between the quantities of gold and silver annually imported into Europe, according to Mr Meggens' account, is as one to twenty-two nearly; that is, for one ounce of gold there are imported a little more than twenty-two ounces of silver. The great quantity of silver sent annually to the East Indies reduces, he supposes, the quantities of those metals which remain in Europe to the proportion of one to fourteen or fifteen, the proportion of their values. The proportion between their values, he seems to think, must necessarily be the same as that between their quantities, and would therefore be as one to twenty-two, were it not for this greater exportation of silver.

The ratio of the amounts of gold and silver imported into Europe each year, according to Mr. Meggens' account, is about one to twenty-two; that is, for every ounce of gold, just over twenty-two ounces of silver are imported. He believes that the large amount of silver sent to the East Indies each year lowers the quantities of these metals that stay in Europe to a ratio of one to fourteen or fifteen, which reflects their values. He seems to think that the ratio of their values should match the ratio of their quantities, and would be one to twenty-two if it weren't for the higher export of silver.

But the ordinary proportion between the respective values of two commodities is not necessarily the same as that between the quantities of them which are commonly in the market. The price of an ox, reckoned at ten guineas, is about three score times the price of a lamb, reckoned at 3s. 6d. It would be absurd, however, to infer from thence, that there are commonly in the market three score lambs for one ox; and it would be just as absurd to infer, because an ounce of gold will commonly purchase from fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver, that there are commonly in the market only fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver for one ounce of gold.

But the usual relationship between the values of two goods isn't always the same as that between the amounts of them typically available in the market. The price of an ox, valued at ten guineas, is about sixty times the price of a lamb, which is valued at 3s. 6d. However, it would be ridiculous to assume that there are usually sixty lambs for one ox in the market; and it would be equally ridiculous to conclude that just because an ounce of gold can typically buy about fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver, there are only fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver available for one ounce of gold.

The quantity of silver commonly in the market, it is probable, is much greater in proportion to that of gold, than the value of a certain quantity of gold is to that of an equal quantity of silver. The whole quantity of a cheap commodity brought to market is commonly not only greater, but of greater value, than the whole quantity of a dear one. The whole quantity of bread annually brought to market, is not only greater, but of greater value, than the whole quantity of butcher's meat; the whole quantity of butcher's meat, than the whole quantity of poultry; and the whole quantity of poultry, than the whole quantity of wild fowl. There are so many more purchasers for the cheap than for the dear commodity, that, not only a greater quantity of it, but a greater value can commonly be disposed of. The whole quantity, therefore, of the cheap commodity, must commonly be greater in proportion to the whole quantity of the dear one, than the value of a certain quantity of the dear one, is to the value of an equal quantity of the cheap one. When we compare the precious metals with one another, silver is a cheap, and gold a dear commodity. We ought naturally to expect, therefore, that there should always be in the market, not only a greater quantity, but a greater value of silver than of gold. Let any man, who has a little of both, compare his own silver with his gold plate, and he will probably find, that not only the quantity, but the value of the former, greatly exceeds that of the latter. Many people, besides, have a good deal of silver who have no gold plate, which, even with those who have it, is generally confined to watch-cases, snuff-boxes, and such like trinkets, of which the whole amount is seldom[Pg 90] of great value. In the British coin, indeed, the value of the gold preponderates greatly, but it is not so in that of all countries. In the coin of some countries, the value of the two metals is nearly equal. In the Scotch coin, before the union with England, the gold preponderated very little, though it did somewhat[21], as it appears by the accounts of the mint. In the coin of many countries the silver preponderates. In France, the largest sums are commonly paid in that metal, and it in there difficult to get more gold than what is necessary to carry about in your pocket. The superior value, however, of the silver plate above that of the gold, which takes place in all countries, will much more than compensate the preponderancy of the gold coin above the silver, which takes place only in some countries.

The amount of silver typically available in the market is likely much greater compared to gold, just as the value of a specific amount of gold is less than an equal amount of silver. Generally, the total quantity of a cheaper commodity on the market is not only larger but also more valuable than the total quantity of a more expensive one. For instance, the total quantity of bread sold each year is greater and more valuable than the total amount of butcher's meat; the total quantity of butcher's meat exceeds that of poultry; the total quantity of poultry is greater than that of wild fowl. There are far more buyers for cheaper items than for expensive ones, meaning that not only can a larger quantity be sold, but it also holds more value. Therefore, the overall amount of the cheap commodity is usually greater in comparison to the expensive one than the value of a specific amount of the expensive item is to that of an equal amount of the cheaper one. When we compare precious metals, silver is seen as cheap, while gold is expensive. Thus, we would naturally expect to find a larger quantity and greater value of silver than gold in the market. Anyone who has both silver and gold should find that the quantity and value of their silver greatly surpass that of their gold items. Many people own a significant amount of silver without having any gold, which usually consists of items like watch cases, snuff boxes, and similar trinkets, whose total value is rarely substantial. In British currency, the value of gold is indeed much higher, but this isn’t the case in all countries. In some places, the value of silver and gold is nearly equal. For example, before the union with England, Scottish coins showed that gold had only a slight advantage, as indicated by mint records. In several countries, silver is more valuable. In France, most transactions are done with silver, and it's hard to acquire more gold than needed for daily expenses. However, the overall higher value of silver items compared to gold, which occurs globally, more than balances out the dominance of gold coins over silver, which happens only in some regions.

Though, in one sense of the word, silver always has been, and probably always will be, much cheaper than gold; yet, in another sense, gold may perhaps, in the present state of the Spanish market, be said to be somewhat cheaper than silver. A commodity may be said to be dear or cheap not only according to the absolute greatness or smallness of its usual price, but according as that price is more or less above the lowest for which it is possible to bring it to market for any considerable time together. This lowest price is that which barely replaces, with a moderate profit, the stock which must be employed in bringing of the commodity thither. It is the price which affords nothing to the landlord, of which rent makes not any component part, but which resolves itself altogether into wages and profit. But, in the present state of the Spanish market, gold is certainly somewhat nearer to this lowest price than silver. The tax of the king of Spain upon gold is only one-twentieth part of the standard metal, or five per cent.; whereas his tax upon silver amounts to one-tenth part of it, or to ten per cent. In these taxes, too, it has already been observed, consists the whole rent of the greater part of the gold and silver mines of Spanish America; and that upon gold is still worse paid than that upon silver. The profits of the undertakers of gold mines, too, as they more rarely make a fortune, must, in general, be still more moderate than those of the undertakers of silver mines. The price of Spanish gold, therefore, as it affords both less rent and less profit, must, in the Spanish market, be somewhat nearer to the lowest price for which it is possible to bring it thither, than the price of Spanish silver. When all expenses are computed, the whole quantity of the one metal, it would seem, cannot, in the Spanish market, be disposed of so advantageously as the whole quantity of the other. The tax, indeed, of the king of Portugal upon the gold of the Brazils, is the same with the ancient tax of the king of Spain upon the silver of Mexico and Peru; or one-fifth part of the standard metal. It may therefore be uncertain, whether, to the general market of Europe, the whole mass of American gold comes at a price nearer to the lowest for which it is possible to bring it thither, than the whole mass of American silver.

Though in one sense silver has always been, and likely always will be, much cheaper than gold, in another sense, gold might currently be considered somewhat cheaper than silver in the Spanish market. The price of a commodity can be seen as dear or cheap not just based on its absolute price, but relative to how much that price exceeds the lowest price at which it can be sold in the market for an extended period. This lowest price barely covers the costs and provides a moderate profit for the stock needed to bring the commodity to market. It doesn’t provide anything for the landlord, and rent isn’t a factor at this level; rather, it breaks down entirely into wages and profit. However, in the current state of the Spanish market, gold is certainly closer to this lowest price than silver. The tax imposed by the King of Spain on gold is only one-twentieth of the standard metal, or five percent, while on silver it amounts to one-tenth, or ten percent. These taxes represent the entire rent for most gold and silver mines in Spanish America, and the tax on gold is even less effectively collected than that on silver. Furthermore, the profits made by operators of gold mines, who less frequently strike it rich, are generally more modest than those of silver mine operators. Therefore, the price of Spanish gold, since it yields both less rent and less profit, is likely closer to the lowest price for which it can be sold in the Spanish market than the price of Spanish silver. After accounting for all expenses, it appears that the total amount of one metal cannot be sold as profitably in the Spanish market as the total amount of the other. Indeed, the tax imposed by the King of Portugal on Brazilian gold is the same as the old tax imposed by the King of Spain on silver from Mexico and Peru; that is, one-fifth of the standard metal. Thus, it’s uncertain whether the total amount of American gold is offered to the general market in Europe at a price closer to the lowest possible, compared to the total amount of American silver.

The price of diamonds and other precious stones may, perhaps, be still nearer to the lowest price at which it is possible to bring them to market, than even the price of gold.

The price of diamonds and other precious stones may be even closer to the lowest price at which they can be sold in the market than the price of gold.

Though it is not very probable that any part of a tax, which is not only imposed upon one of the most proper subjects of taxation, a mere luxury and superfluity, but which affords so very important a revenue as the tax upon silver, will ever be given up us long as it is possible to pay it; yet the same impossibility of paying it, which, in 1736, made it necessary to reduce it from one-fifth to one-tenth, may in time make it necessary to reduce it still further; in the same manner as it made it necessary to reduce the tax upon gold to one-twentieth. That the silver mines of Spanish America, like all other mines, become gradually more expensive in the working, on account of the greater depths at which it is necessary to carry on the works, and of the greater expense of drawing out the water, and of supplying them with fresh air at those depths, is acknowledged by every body who has inquired into the state of those mines.

Although it’s not very likely that any part of a tax, which is not only imposed on something as suitable for taxation as a simple luxury or excess but also brings in important revenue like the tax on silver, will ever be eliminated as long as it can still be paid; the same inability to pay it, which led to its reduction from one-fifth to one-tenth in 1736, may eventually require further reductions. This is similar to how the tax on gold was reduced to one-twentieth. It’s widely recognized by anyone who has looked into the situation that the silver mines in Spanish America, like all other mines, are becoming increasingly expensive to operate due to the greater depths needed for mining, along with the rising costs of pumping out water and providing fresh air at those depths.

These causes, which are equivalent to a growing scarcity of silver (for a commodity may be said to grow scarcer when it becomes more difficult and expensive to collect a certain quantity of it), must, in time, produce one or other of the three following events: The increase of the expense must either, first, be compensated altogether by a proportionable increase in the price of the metal; or, secondly, it must be compensated altogether by a proportionable diminution of the tax upon silver; or thirdly, it must be compensated partly by the one and partly by the other of those two expedients. This third event is very possible. As gold rose in its price in proportion to silver, notwithstanding a great diminution of the tax upon gold, so silver might rise in its price in proportion to labour and commodities, notwithstanding an equal diminution of the tax upon silver.

These causes, which are essentially linked to a growing scarcity of silver (since a commodity is considered scarcer when it becomes harder and more costly to gather a certain amount of it), will eventually lead to one of three outcomes: First, the increase in costs must be fully offset by a corresponding rise in the price of the metal; or second, it must be fully compensated by a corresponding reduction in the tax on silver; or third, it could be balanced partially by one and partially by the other of those two solutions. This third scenario is quite possible. Just as gold increased in price relative to silver despite a significant reduction in the tax on gold, silver could also increase in price relative to labor and goods, even with a similar reduction in the tax on silver.

Such successive reductions of the tax, however, though they may not prevent altogether, must certainly retard, more or less, the rise of the value of silver in the European market. In consequence of such reductions, many mines may be wrought which could not be wrought before, because they could not afford to pay the old tax; and the quantity of silver annually brought to market, must always be somewhat greater, and, therefore, the value[Pg 91] of any given quantity somewhat less, than it otherwise would have been. In consequence of the reduction in 1736, the value of silver in the European market, though it may not at this day be lower than before that reduction, is, probably, at least ten per cent. lower than it would have been, had the court of Spain continued to exact the old tax.

Such successive tax reductions, while they might not completely stop the issue, will definitely slow down the increase in the value of silver in the European market. Because of these reductions, many mines can now be exploited that weren’t viable before due to the previous tax burden; this means that the amount of silver brought to market each year will likely be somewhat higher, and thus, the value of any given quantity will be a bit lower than it would have been otherwise. As a result of the reduction in 1736, the value of silver in the European market, while it might not currently be lower than it was before the reduction, is probably at least ten percent lower than it would have been if the Spanish court had kept the old tax in place.

That, notwithstanding this reduction, the value of silver has, during the course of the present century, begun to rise somewhat in the European market, the facts and arguments which have been alleged above, dispose me to believe, or more properly to suspect and conjecture; for the best opinion which I can form upon this subject, scarce, perhaps, deserves the name of belief. The rise, indeed, supposing there has been any, has hitherto been so very small, that after all that has been said, it may, perhaps, appear to many people uncertain, not only whether this event has actually taken place, but whether the contrary may not have taken place, or whether the value of silver may not still continue to fall in the European market.

That, despite this decrease, the value of silver has started to rise a bit in the European market during this century. However, the facts and arguments mentioned above lead me to believe, or rather to doubt and speculate; because my best opinion on this matter barely qualifies as a belief. The increase, assuming there has been one, has been so minor that, after all that's been said, it might seem uncertain to many whether this actually happened, whether the opposite might have occurred, or whether the value of silver might continue to decline in the European market.

It must be observed, however, that whatever may be the supposed annual importation of gold and silver, there must be a certain period at which the annual consumption of those metals will be equal to that annual importation. Their consumption must increase as their mass increases, or rather in a much greater proportion. As their mass increases, their value diminishes. They are more used, and less cared for, and their consumption consequently increases in a greater proportion than their mass. After a certain period, therefore, the annual consumption of these metals must, in this manner, become equal to their annual importation, provided that importation is not continually increasing; which, in the present times, is not supposed to be the case.

It should be noted, however, that regardless of the believed annual import of gold and silver, there comes a point when the annual consumption of these metals will match that annual import. Their consumption must rise as their quantity increases, or even more significantly. As their quantity grows, their value decreases. They are used more frequently and cared for less, leading to an increase in consumption that outpaces the increase in quantity. After a certain time, therefore, the annual consumption of these metals must equal their annual import, as long as that import isn't continuously rising; which, in today's context, is generally not expected to be the case.

If, when the annual consumption has become equal to the annual importation, the annual importation should gradually diminish, the annual consumption may, for some time, exceed the annual importation. The mass of those metals may gradually and insensibly diminish, and their value gradually and insensibly rise, till the annual importation becoming again stationary, the annual consumption will gradually and insensibly accommodate itself to what that annual importation can maintain.

If, when the yearly consumption matches the yearly imports, the yearly imports start to decrease gradually, the yearly consumption might, for a while, exceed the yearly imports. The supply of those metals may slowly and subtly decrease, and their value may slowly and subtly increase, until the yearly imports stabilize again, at which point the yearly consumption will gradually and subtly adjust to what those yearly imports can support.

Grounds of the suspicion that the Value of Silver still continues to decrease.

The increase of the wealth of Europe, and the popular action, that as the quantity of the precious metals naturally increases with the increase of wealth, so their value diminishes as their quantity increases, may, perhaps, dispose many people to believe that their value still continues to fall in the European market; and the still gradually increasing price of many parts of the rude produce of land may confirm them still farther in this opinion.

The rise in wealth in Europe, along with the general trend that as the amount of precious metals naturally grows with increasing wealth, their value decreases as their quantity goes up, may lead many people to think that their value keeps dropping in the European market. Additionally, the ongoing gradual rise in the prices of various basic agricultural products may further reinforce this belief.

That that increase in the quantity of the precious metals, which arises in any country from the increase of wealth, has no tendency to diminish their value, I have endeavoured to shew already. Gold and silver naturally resort to a rich country, for the same reason that all sorts of luxuries and curiosities resort to it; not because they are cheaper there than in poorer countries, but because they are dearer, or because a better price is given for them. It is the superiority of price which attracts them; and as soon as that superiority ceases, they necessarily cease to go thither.

That increase in the amount of precious metals that comes from a country’s growing wealth doesn’t lower their value, as I have already tried to explain. Gold and silver naturally flow to a wealthy country for the same reasons that all kinds of luxuries and unique items do; not because they are cheaper there than in poorer countries, but because they are more expensive, or because a better price is offered for them. It’s the higher prices that draw them in; and as soon as that price advantage disappears, they will stop coming.

If you except corn, and such other vegetables as are raised altogether by human industry, that all other sorts of rude produce, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, the useful fossils and minerals of the earth, &c. naturally grow dearer, as the society advances in wealth and improvement, I have endeavoured to shew already. Though such commodities, therefore, come to exchange for a greater quantity of silver than before, it will not from thence follow that silver has become really cheaper, or will purchase less labour than before; but that such commodities have become really dearer, or will purchase more labour than before. It is not their nominal price only, but their real price, which rises in the progress of improvement. The rise of their nominal price is the effect, not of any degradation of the value of silver, but of the rise in their real price.

If you exclude corn and other crops that are purely the result of human effort, you'll find that all other types of raw products—livestock, poultry, game of all kinds, useful fossils and minerals, etc.—naturally become more expensive as society grows in wealth and progress. I’ve attempted to explain this already. Therefore, even though these commodities now trade for more silver than before, it doesn’t mean that silver has actually become cheaper or that it buys less labor than it did before. Instead, it indicates that these commodities have truly become more expensive or that they can buy more labor than before. It’s not just their listed price that increases; it’s their actual value that rises as society improves. The increase in their listed price results not from a drop in the value of silver but rather from the rise in their real price.

Different Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon three different sorts of rude Produce.

These different sorts of rude produce may be divided into three classes. The first comprehends those which it is scarce in the power of human industry to multiply at all. The second, those which it can multiply in proportion to the demand. The third, those in which the efficacy of industry is either limited or uncertain. In the progress of wealth and improvement, the rent price of the first may rise to any degree of extravagance, and seems not to be limited by any certain boundary. That of the second, though it may rise greatly, has, however, a certain boundary, beyond which it cannot well pass for any considerable time together. That of the third, though its natural tendency is to rise in the progress of improvement, yet in the same degree of improvement it may sometimes happen even to fall, some times to continue the same, and sometimes to rise more or less, according as different accidents render the efforts of human industry, in multiplying this sort of rude produce, more or less successful.

These different types of raw materials can be divided into three categories. The first includes those that human effort can hardly increase at all. The second consists of those that can be increased in line with demand. The third includes those where the effectiveness of human effort is either restricted or unpredictable. As wealth and progress advance, the rental price of the first category may soar to any extreme and doesn't seem to have a specific limit. The price of the second category, while it can rise significantly, does have a certain cap beyond which it can't typically sustain itself for long. The third category, despite its natural trend to increase with progress, may sometimes fall, stay the same, or rise to varying degrees, depending on how successful human efforts are in increasing this type of raw material due to different circumstances.

 

First Sort.—The first sort of rude produce, of which the price rises in the progress of improvement, is that which it is scarce in the power of human industry to multiply at all. It consists in those things which nature produces only in certain quantities, and which being of a very perishable nature, it is impossible to accumulate together the produce of many different seasons. Such are the greater part of rare and singular birds and fishes, many different sorts of game, almost all wild-fowl, all birds of passage in particular, as well as many other things. When wealth, and the luxury which accompanies it, increase, the demand for these is likely to increase with them, and no effort of human industry may be able to increase the supply much beyond what it was before this increase of the demand. The quantity of such commodities, therefore, remaining the same, or nearly the same, while the competition to purchase them is continually increasing, their price may rise to any degree of extravagance, and seems not to be limited by any certain boundary. If woodcocks should become so fashionable as to sell for twenty guineas a-piece, no effort of human industry could increase the number of those brought to market, much beyond what it is at present. The high price paid by the Romans, in the time of their greatest grandeur, for rare birds and fishes, may in this manner easily be accounted for. These prices were not the effects of the low value of silver in those times, but of the high value of such rarities and curiosities as human industry could not multiply at pleasure. The real value of silver was higher at Rome, for some time before, and after the fall of the republic, than it is through the greater part of Europe at present. Three sestertii equal to about sixpence sterling, was the price which the republic paid for the modius or peck of the tithe wheat of Sicily. This price, however, was probably below the average market price, the obligation to deliver their wheat at this rate being considered as a tax upon the Sicilian farmers. When the Romans, therefore, had occasion to order more corn than the tithe of wheat amounted to, they were bound by capitulation to pay for the surplus at the rate of four sestertii, or eightpence sterling the peck; and this had probably been reckoned the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average contract price of those times; it is equal to about one-and-twenty shillings the quarter. Eight-and-twenty shillings the quarter was, before the late years of scarcity, the ordinary contract price of English wheat, which in quality is inferior to the Sicilian, and generally sells for a lower price in the European market. The value of silver, therefore, in those ancient times, must have been to its value in the present, as three to four inversely; that is, three ounces of silver would then have purchased the same quantity of labour and commodities which four ounces will do at present. When we read in Pliny, therefore, that Seius[22] bought a white nightingale, as a present for the empress Agrippina, at the price of six thousand sestertii, equal to about fifty pounds of our present money; and that Asinius Celer[23] purchased a surmullet at the price of eight thousand sestertii, equal to about sixty-six pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence of our present money; the extravagance of those prices, how much soever it may surprise us, is apt, notwithstanding, to appear to us about one third less than it really was. Their real price, the quantity of labour and subsistence which was given away for them, was about one-third more than their nominal price is apt to express to us in the present times. Seius gave for the nightingale the command of a quantity or labour and subsistence, equal to what L.66 : 13 : 4d. would purchase in the present times; and Asinius Celer gave for a surmullet the command of a quantity equal to what L.88 : 17 : 9d. would purchase. What occasioned the extravagance of those high prices was, not so much the abundance of silver, as the abundance of labour and subsistence, of which those Romans had the disposal, beyond what was necessary for their own use. The quantity of silver, of which they had the disposal, was a good deal less than what the command of the same quantity of labour and subsistence would have procured to them in the present times.

First Sort.—The first category of raw products, whose prices increase with improvement, includes those that human industry can hardly multiply at all. These are items that nature produces only in limited amounts, and since they are highly perishable, it’s impossible to accumulate the harvest from many different seasons. This includes most rare and unique birds and fish, various types of game, nearly all wildfowl, particularly migratory birds, along with many other things. As wealth and the luxury that comes with it grow, the demand for these items is likely to rise as well, and no amount of human effort may raise the supply significantly beyond what it was before the increase in demand. Therefore, when the quantity of such goods remains the same or nearly the same while competition to buy them keeps growing, their price can skyrocket to any extreme, seeming to have no real limit. If woodcocks were to become so trendy that they sold for twenty guineas each, no human effort could substantially increase the number available in the market beyond what it is now. The high prices the Romans paid during their peak for rare birds and fish can easily be explained this way. These prices were not due to silver’s low value at that time, but rather the high value of such rarities and curiosities that human industry couldn’t easily replicate. The actual value of silver in Rome, for a time before and after the fall of the republic, was higher than it is in most of Europe today. Three sestertii, which is about sixpence, was what the republic paid for a modius, or peck, of the tithe wheat from Sicily. However, this was likely below the average market price, as the obligation to deliver their wheat at this rate was seen as a tax on Sicilian farmers. Therefore, when the Romans needed to order more grain than the tithe amounted to, they were obliged by contract to pay for the extra at the rate of four sestertii, or eightpence per peck; this was probably considered the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average contract price of the time, which equates to about twenty-one shillings per quarter. Before the recent years of scarcity, twenty-eight shillings per quarter was the typical contract price for English wheat, which is of lower quality than Sicilian and usually sells for less in the European market. Thus, the value of silver in those ancient times must have been inversely as three to four compared to its value now; meaning, three ounces of silver could then buy the same quantity of labor and goods that four ounces can now. When we read in Pliny that Seius[22] bought a white nightingale as a gift for Empress Agrippina for six thousand sestertii, equal to about fifty pounds in today’s money; and that Asinius Celer[23] purchased a surmullet for eight thousand sestertii, around sixty-six pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence today; the extravagance of those prices, although it may astonish us, tends to seem about one-third less than it actually was. Their true price, reflecting the labor and sustenance that went into them, was about one-third more than what those nominal prices suggest today. Seius paid for the nightingale what L.66 : 13 : 4d. would buy today in terms of labor and sustenance; and Asinius Celer paid for the surmullet the equivalent of what L.88 : 17 : 9d. would buy today. The reason behind the extravagance of those high prices was not so much an abundance of silver, but rather an abundance of labor and subsistence that those Romans had access to, beyond what was needed for their own use. The actual quantity of silver they had access to was considerably less than what an equivalent amount of labor and sustenance would procure for them today.

 

Second sort.—The second sort of rude produce, of which the price rises in the progress of improvement, is that which human industry can multiply in proportion to the demand. It consists in those useful plants and animals, which, in uncultivated countries, nature produces with such profuse abundance, that they are of little or no value, and which, as cultivation advances, are therefore forced to give place to some more profitable produce. During a long period in the progress of improvement, the quantity of these is continually diminishing, while, at the same time, the demand for them is continually increasing. Their real value, therefore, the real quantity of labour which they will purchase or command, gradually rises, till at last it gets so high as to render them as profitable a produce as any thing else which human industry can raise upon the most fertile and best cultivated land. When it has got so high, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land and more industry would soon be employed to increase their quantity.

Second type.—The second type of raw resources, the price of which increases as improvements are made, is what human effort can ramp up according to demand. It includes those useful plants and animals that, in uncultivated areas, nature produces so abundantly that they hold little to no value. As cultivation progresses, these resources are pushed aside for more profitable alternatives. For a long time during this improvement phase, the quantity of these resources consistently decreases, even as demand for them keeps rising. Their actual value—the true amount of labor they can buy or command—gradually increases until it reaches a point where they become just as profitable as anything else that human effort can yield from the richest and most well-tended land. Once it reaches this point, it can't go much higher. If it did, more land and more labor would quickly be used to boost their supply.

When the price of cattle, for example, rises so high, that it is as profitable to cultivate land in order to raise food for them as in order to raise food for man, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more corn land would soon be turn[Pg 93]ed into pasture. The extension of tillage, by diminishing the quantity of wild pasture, diminishes the quantity of butcher's meat, which the country naturally produces without labour or cultivation; and, by increasing the number of those who have either corn, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of corn, to give in exchange for it, increases the demand. The price of butcher's meat, therefore, and, consequently, of cattle, must gradually rise, till it gets so high, that it becomes as profitable to employ the most fertile and best cultivated lands in raising food for them as in raising corn. But it must always be late in the progress of improvement before tillage can be so far extended as to raise the price of cattle to this height; and, till it has got to this height, if the country is advancing at all, their price must be continually rising. There are, perhaps, some parts of Europe in which the price of cattle has not yet got to this height. It had not got to this height in any part of Scotland before the Union. Had the Scotch cattle been always confined to the market of Scotland, in a country in which the quantity of land, which can be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, is so great in proportion to what can be applied to other purposes, it is scarce possible, perhaps, that their price could ever have risen so high as to render it profitable to cultivate land for the sake of feeding them. In England, the price of cattle, it has already been observed, seems, in the neighbourhood of London, to have got to this height about the beginning of the last century; but it was much later, probably, before it got through the greater part of the remoter counties, in some of which, perhaps, it may scarce yet have got to it. Of all the different substances, however, which compose this second sort of rude produce, cattle is, perhaps, that of which the price, in the progress of improvement, rises first to this height.

When the price of cattle, for example, becomes so high that it’s just as profitable to farm land to produce food for them as it is to grow food for people, it can't really go higher. If it did, more farmland would quickly be converted into pasture. Expanding farming reduces the amount of natural pasture available, which decreases the amount of meat the country can produce without effort or cultivation; and by increasing the number of people who have either corn or the price of corn to exchange for it, it raises demand. Therefore, the price of meat, and consequently cattle, must gradually rise until it reaches a point where it's just as profitable to use the most fertile and well-cultivated lands for raising food for them as for growing corn. However, this significant expansion of farming usually happens late in the process of development before cattle prices rise to that level; and until that point, if the country is making any progress at all, their prices must keep going up. There might be some areas in Europe where cattle prices haven’t reached this level yet. Before the Union, this level hadn’t been reached in any part of Scotland. If Scottish cattle had always been limited to the market in Scotland, where the amount of land that can be used solely for feeding cattle is quite large compared to what can be used for other purposes, it’s unlikely that their prices could have ever risen high enough to make it worthwhile to farm land to feed them. In England, as previously mentioned, it seems that cattle prices in the vicinity of London reached this height around the beginning of the last century; but it probably took much longer for this to happen in many of the more distant counties, some of which may not have reached it yet. Among all the different products that fall into this second category of raw produce, cattle is perhaps the one whose price rises first to this level as improvements are made.

Till the price of cattle, indeed, has got to this height, it seems scarce possible that the greater part, even of those lands which are capable of the highest cultivation, can be completely cultivated. In all farms too distant from any town to carry manure from it, that is, in the far greater part of those of every extensive country, the quantity of well cultivated land must be in proportion to the quantity of manure which the farm itself produces; and this, again, must be in proportion to the stock of cattle which are maintained upon it. The land is manured, either by pasturing the cattle upon it, or by feeding them in the stable, and from thence carrying out their dung to it. But unless the price of the cattle be sufficient to pay both the rent and profit of cultivated land, the farmer cannot afford to pasture them upon it; and he can still less afford to feed them in the stable. It is with the produce of improved and cultivated land only that cattle can be fed in the stable; because, to collect the scanty and scattered produce of waste and unimproved lands, would require too much labour, and be too expensive. If the price of the cattle, therefore, is not sufficient to pay for the produce of improved and cultivated land, when they are allowed to pasture it, that price will be still less sufficient to pay for that produce, when it must be collected with a good deal of additional labour, and brought into the stable to them. In these circumstances, therefore, no more cattle can with profit be fed in the stable than what are necessary for tillage. But these can never afford manure enough for keeping constantly in good condition all the lands which they are capable of cultivating. What they afford, being insufficient for the whole farm, will naturally be reserved for the lands to which it can be most advantageously or conveniently applied; the most fertile, or those, perhaps, in the neighbourhood of the farm-yard. These, therefore, will be kept constantly in good condition, and fit for tillage. The rest will, the greater part of them, be allowed to lie waste, producing scarce any thing but some miserable pasture, just sufficient to keep alive a few straggling, half-starved cattle; the farm, though much overstocked in proportion to what would be necessary for its complete cultivation, being very frequently overstocked in proportion to its actual produce. A portion of this waste land, however, after having been pastured in this wretched manner for six or seven years together, may be ploughed up, when it will yield, perhaps, a poor crop or two of bad oats, or of some other coarse grain; and then, being entirely exhausted, it must be rested and pastured again as before, and another portion ploughed up, to be in the same manner exhausted and rested again in its turn. Such, accordingly, was the general system of management all over the low country of Scotland before the Union. The lands which were kept constantly well manured and in good condition seldom exceeded a third or fourth part of the whole farm, and sometimes did not amount to a fifth or a sixth part of it. The rest were never manured, but a certain portion of them was in its turn, notwithstanding, regularly cultivated and exhausted. Under this system of management, it is evident, even that part of the lands of Scotland which is capable of good cultivation, could produce but little in comparison of what it may be capable of producing. But how disadvantageous soever this system may appear, yet, before the Union, the low price of cattle seems to have rendered it almost unavoidable. If, notwithstanding a great rise in the price, it still continues to prevail through a considerable part of the country, it is owing in many places, no doubt, to ignorance and attachment to old customs, but, in most places, to the unavoidable obstructions which the natural course of things op[Pg 94]poses to the immediate or speedy establishment of a better system: first, to the poverty of the tenants, to their not having yet had time to acquire a stock of cattle sufficient to cultivate their lands more completely, the same rise of price, which would render it advantageous for them to maintain a greater stock, rendering it more difficult for them to acquire it; and, secondly, to their not having yet had time to put their lands in condition to maintain this greater stock properly, supposing they were capable of acquiring it. The increase of stock and the improvement of land are two events which must go hand in hand, and of which the one can nowhere much outrun the other. Without some increase of stock, there can be scarce any improvement of land, but there can be no considerable increase of stock, but in consequence of a considerable improvement of land; because otherwise the land could not maintain it. These natural obstructions to the establishment of a better system, cannot be removed but by a long course of frugality and industry; and half a century or a century more, perhaps, must pass away before the old system, which is wearing out gradually, can be completely abolished through all the different parts of the country. Of all the commercial advantages, however, which Scotland has derived from the Union with England, this rise in the price of cattle is, perhaps, the greatest. It has not only raised the value of all highland estates, but it has, perhaps, been the principal cause of the improvement of the low country.

Until the price of cattle has reached this level, it seems almost impossible for most of the land that could be highly cultivated to be fully used. On farms too far from any town to transport manure, which is the case for most in expansive areas, the amount of well-cultivated land must match the manure produced by the farm itself; and this, in turn, depends on the number of cattle raised there. The land gets fertilized either by grazing cattle on it or by feeding them in the barn and then spreading their waste on it. However, unless the price of cattle is high enough to cover both the rent and profit from cultivated land, the farmer cannot afford to graze them there, and even less so to feed them in the barn. Only the produce from improved and cultivated land can be used for feeding cattle in the barn; collecting the sparse and scattered output from degraded and unimproved land would take too much labor and be too costly. So, if the price of cattle isn't enough to cover the produce from improved and cultivated land when they graze on it, it certainly won't be enough to cover that produce when it must be gathered with added labor and brought to the barn. Under these conditions, the only cattle that can be profitably fed in the barn are those needed for tillage. But these will never provide enough manure to keep all the land, which they could cultivate, in good condition all the time. The manure available will be insufficient for the entire farm and will be reserved for the fields where it can be most effectively used; the most fertile land or those near the farmhouse. These fields will be kept in good shape and ready for tillage, while the rest will mostly lay fallow, producing little more than some poor grass, just enough to sustain a few weak, starving cattle. The farm, despite being overstocked compared to what would be needed for full cultivation, often finds itself overstocked relative to its actual output. However, a portion of this neglected land, after being grazed in this poor condition for six or seven years, may be plowed, yielding perhaps a meager crop of bad oats or other rough grains; then, once exhausted, it must rest and be grazed again, while another piece is plowed to undergo the same cycle of exhaustion. This was the general management system throughout the lowlands of Scotland before the Union. The land kept well-fertilized and in good condition seldom accounted for more than a third or fourth of the entire farm, and sometimes less than a fifth or sixth. The rest was never fertilized, but a portion was regularly cultivated and exhausted in rotation. Under this management system, it’s clear that even the part of Scotland’s land capable of good cultivation could produce far less than it was capable of. Yet, however disadvantageous this system might seem, before the Union, the low price of cattle made it almost unavoidable. If, despite a significant price increase, this practice continues in many areas, it’s likely due to ignorance and a stubbornness towards old customs in some places, but in most, it stems from the natural barriers that prevent the immediate or quick establishment of a better system: first, the poverty of the tenants, who haven’t had enough time to build up a sufficient stock of cattle for more complete cultivation. The same rise in price that would make maintaining a larger stock beneficial also makes it harder to acquire. Secondly, they also haven't had the time to prepare their land to sustain that larger stock properly, assuming they could acquire it. The growth of livestock and land improvement must happen together, and one cannot greatly outpace the other. Without an increase in livestock, land improvement is nearly impossible, and there can be no significant rise in livestock without considerable land improvement, or else the land wouldn't be able to support it. These natural obstacles to establishing a better system can only be overcome through a long period of saving and hard work; it might take fifty or even a hundred more years before the old system, which is gradually fading, can be completely replaced throughout the country. Of all the economic benefits Scotland has gained from the Union with England, the rise in cattle prices is arguably the most significant. It has not only boosted the value of all highland estates but may also be the primary reason for the improvement of the lowlands.

In all new colonies, the great quantity of waste land, which can for many years be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, soon renders them extremely abundant; and in every thing great cheapness is the necessary consequence of great abundance. Though all the cattle of the European colonies in America were originally carried from Europe, they soon multiplied so much there, and became of so little value, that even horses were allowed to run wild in the woods, without any owner thinking it worth while to claim them. It must be a long time after the first establishment of such colonies, before it can become profitable to feed cattle upon the produce of cultivated land. The same causes, therefore, the want of manure, and the disproportion between the stock employed in cultivation and the land which it is destined to cultivate, are likely to introduce there a system of husbandry, not unlike that which still continues to take place in so many parts of Scotland. Mr Kalm, the Swedish traveller, when he gives an account of the husbandry of some of the English colonies in North America, as he found it in 1749, observes, accordingly, that he can with difficulty discover there the character of the English nation, so well skilled in all the different branches of agriculture. They make scarce any manure for their corn fields, he says; but when one piece of ground has been exhausted by continual cropping, they clear and cultivate another piece of fresh land; and when that is exhausted, proceed to a third. Their cattle are allowed to wander through the woods and other uncultivated grounds, where they are half-starved; having long ago extirpated almost all the annual grasses, by cropping them too early in the spring, before they had time to form their flowers, or to shed their seeds.[24] The annual grasses were, it seems, the best natural grasses in that part of North America; and when the Europeans first settled there, they used to grow very thick, and to rise three or four feet high. A piece of ground which, when he wrote, could not maintain one cow, would in former times, he was assured, have maintained four, each of which would have given four times the quantity of milk which that one was capable of giving. The poorness of the pasture had, in his opinion, occasioned the degradation of their cattle, which degenerated sensibly from one generation to another. They were probably not unlike that stunted breed which was common all over Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and which is now so much mended through the greater part of the low country, not so much by a change of the breed, though that expedient has been employed in some places, as by a more plentiful method of feeding them.

In all new colonies, the large amount of unused land, which can only be used for grazing cattle for many years, quickly makes them very plentiful; and with abundance comes great affordability. Even though all the cattle in the European colonies in America were originally brought from Europe, they multiplied so much there and lost so much value that even horses were allowed to roam free in the woods, with no owner bothering to claim them. It takes a long time after these colonies are first established before feeding cattle on cultivated land becomes profitable. The same factors, such as the lack of manure and the imbalance between the number of animals used for farming and the land that needs to be farmed, are likely to create a farming system similar to what still exists in many parts of Scotland. Mr. Kalm, a Swedish traveler, notes that when he described the farming practices in some of the English colonies in North America in 1749, he found it difficult to recognize the characteristics of the English nation, which is well-versed in various agricultural practices. He states that they hardly produce any manure for their fields; instead, once one piece of land has been depleted from constant cropping, they clear and cultivate a new piece of land, and when that one is exhausted, they move on to a third. Their cattle are allowed to roam through the woods and other uncultivated areas, where they are barely fed, having long ago wiped out almost all the annual grasses by grazing them too early in the spring before they had a chance to produce flowers or shed seeds.[24] The annual grasses were apparently the best natural grasses in that area of North America; when the Europeans first settled there, they grew very thick and could reach three or four feet in height. A piece of land that, at the time he wrote, could barely support one cow would have, in earlier times, supported four, each of which would have produced four times the amount of milk that one could produce. In his view, the poor quality of the pasture had led to the decline of their cattle, which noticeably degenerated from one generation to the next. They were probably similar to the small breed that was common throughout Scotland thirty or forty years ago, which has since improved in most of the lowlands, not so much due to changes in the breed—although that has been attempted in some areas—but because of better feeding methods.

Though it is late, therefore, in the progress of improvement, before cattle can bring such a price as to render it profitable to cultivate land for the sake of feeding them; yet of all the different parts which compose this second sort of rude produce, they are perhaps the first which bring this price; because, till they bring it, it seems impossible that improvement can be brought near even to that degree of perfection to which it has arrived in many parts of Europe.

Though it's late in the process of improvement, before cattle can sell for a price that makes it worthwhile to farm land just for feeding them, they are likely the first among all the different parts of this second type of raw product to reach that price. Until they do, it seems unlikely that progress can approach even the level of advancement seen in many parts of Europe.

As cattle are among the first, so perhaps venison is among the last parts of this sort of rude produce which bring this price. The price of venison in Great Britain, how extravagant soever it may appear, is not near sufficient to compensate the expense of a deer park, as is well known to all those who have had any experience in the feeding of deer. If it was otherwise, the feeding of deer would soon become an article of common farming, in the same manner as the feeding of those small birds, called turdi, was among the ancient Romans. Varro and Columella assure us, that it was a most profitable article. The fattening of ortolans, birds of passage which arrive lean in the country, is said to be so in some parts of France. If venison continues in fashion, and the wealth and luxury of[Pg 95] Great Britain increase as they have done for some time past, its price may very probably rise still higher than it is at present.

As cattle are among the first animals to be raised, venison might be one of the last types of basic produce that fetches a good price. The cost of venison in Great Britain, no matter how outrageous it seems, is not nearly enough to cover the expenses of maintaining a deer park, as anyone who has experience feeding deer knows. If it were any different, raising deer would quickly become a common practice in farming, just like raising those small birds called thrushes was for the ancient Romans. Varro and Columella tell us that it was highly profitable. Fattening ortolans, migratory birds that arrive in the country underweight, is said to be profitable in some areas of France. If venison remains popular and the wealth and luxury of[Pg 95] Great Britain continue to grow as they have been, its price may very well rise even higher than it is now.

Between that period in the progress of improvement, which brings to its height the price of so necessary an article as cattle, and that which brings to it the price of such a superfluity as venison, there is a very long interval, in the course of which many other sorts of rude produce gradually arrive at their highest price, some sooner and some later, according to different circumstances.

Between that time in the progress of improvement that raises the price of essential items like cattle, and the time that raises the price of luxuries like venison, there's a long gap. During this time, various other kinds of raw products gradually reach their peak prices, some sooner and some later, depending on different circumstances.

Thus, in every farm, the offals of the barn and stable will maintain a certain number of poultry. These, as they are fed with what would otherwise be lost, are a mere save-all; and as they cost the farmer scarce any thing, so he can afford to sell them for very little. Almost all that he gets is pure gain, and their price can scarce be so low as to discourage him from feeding this number. But in countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the poultry, which are thus raised without expense, are often fully sufficient to supply the whole demand. In this state of things, therefore, they are often as cheap as butcher's meat, or any other sort of animal food. But the whole quantity of poultry which the farm in this manner produces without expense, must always be much smaller than the whole quantity of butcher's meat which is reared upon it; and in times of wealth and luxury, what is rare, with only nearly equal merit, is always preferred to what is common. As wealth and luxury increase, therefore, in consequence of improvement and cultivation, the price of poultry gradually rises above that of butcher's meat, till at last it gets so high, that it becomes profitable to cultivate land for the sake of feeding them. When it has got to this height, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land would soon be turned to this purpose. In several provinces of France, the feeding of poultry is considered as a very important article in rural economy, and sufficiently profitable to encourage the farmer to raise a considerable quantity of Indian corn and buckwheat for this purpose. A middling farmer will there sometimes have four hundred fowls in his yard. The feeding of poultry seems scarce yet to be generally considered as a matter of so much importance in England. They are certainly, however, dearer in England than in France, as England receives considerable supplies from France. In the progress of improvements, the period at which every particular sort of animal food in dearest, must naturally be that which immediately precedes the general practice of cultivating land for the sake of raising it. For some time before this practice becomes general, the scarcity must necessarily raise the price. After it has become general, new methods of feeding are commonly fallen upon, which enable the farmer to raise upon the same quantity of ground a much greater quantity of that particular sort of animal food. The plenty not only obliges him to sell cheaper, but, in consequence of these improvements, he can afford to sell cheaper; for if he could not afford it, the plenty would not be of long continuance. It has been probably in this manner that the introduction of clover, turnips, carrots, cabbages, &c. has contributed to sink the common price of butcher's meat in the London market, somewhat below what it was about the beginning of the last century.

In every farm, the leftover feeds from the barn and stable keep a certain number of poultry. These birds, fed with what would otherwise go to waste, are basically a way to save resources; since they cost the farmer almost nothing, he can afford to sell them for very little. Almost all the money he makes from them is pure profit, and their price can hardly be so low that it discourages him from feeding them. In poorly cultivated and sparsely populated areas, the poultry raised with minimal expense can often meet the entire demand. In such situations, they can be as cheap as butcher's meat or any other type of animal food. However, the total amount of poultry produced on the farm in this cost-effective way will always be much less than the amount of butcher's meat raised there. During times of wealth and luxury, what is rare and nearly as good is always preferred to what is common. As wealth and luxury increase due to improvements and cultivation, the price of poultry gradually rises above that of butcher's meat until it eventually reaches a point where it's profitable to cultivate land specifically for feeding them. Once this price reaches that level, it’s unlikely to go higher; if it did, more land would soon be used for this purpose. In several regions of France, raising poultry is seen as an important part of rural economy and is profitable enough to encourage farmers to grow significant amounts of corn and buckwheat for this purpose. A typical farmer there might have around four hundred birds in his yard. However, raising poultry doesn’t seem to be regarded as highly in England. They are definitely pricier in England than in France, as England imports a significant amount from France. As improvements progress, the time when each type of animal food is most expensive is naturally just before the widespread practice of cultivating land specifically for that purpose. For a period before this practice becomes common, the scarcity will drive prices up. Once it becomes common, new feeding methods typically emerge, allowing farmers to raise a much greater quantity of that specific type of animal food on the same amount of land. The abundance not only forces them to sell for less, but thanks to these improvements, they can afford to sell for less; if they couldn’t, that abundance wouldn’t last long. It’s likely that the introduction of crops like clover, turnips, carrots, and cabbages has helped to lower the average price of butcher's meat in the London market compared to what it was at the start of the last century.

The hog, that finds his food among ordure, and greedily devours many things rejected by every other useful animal, is, like poultry, originally kept as a save-all. As long as the number of such animals, which can thus be reared at little or no expense, is fully sufficient to supply the demand, this sort of butcher's meat comes to market at a much lower price than any other. But when the demand rises beyond what this quantity can supply, when it becomes necessary to raise food on purpose for feeding and fattening hogs, in the same manner as for feeding and fattening other cattle, the price necessarily rises, and becomes proportionably either higher or lower than that of other butcher's meat, according as the nature of the country, and the state of its agriculture, happen to render the feeding of hogs more or less expensive than that of other cattle. In France, according to Mr Buffon, the price of pork is nearly equal to that of beef. In most parts of Great Britain it is at present somewhat higher.

The pig, which finds its food in waste and eagerly eats many things turned away by other useful animals, is, like poultry, originally kept as a way to utilize everything. As long as the number of these animals that can be raised with little or no cost is enough to meet demand, this type of meat is sold at a much lower price than others. But when demand exceeds what this supply can provide, and it becomes necessary to grow food specifically to feed and fatten pigs, just like for other livestock, the price will naturally rise. This price can be either higher or lower compared to other meats, depending on the country and the state of its agriculture, which affects the cost of feeding pigs relative to other cattle. In France, according to Mr. Buffon, the price of pork is nearly the same as beef. In most parts of Great Britain, it's currently a bit higher.

The great rise in the price both of hogs and poultry, has, in Great Britain, been frequently imputed to the diminution of the number of cottagers and other small occupiers of land; an event which has in every part of Europe been the immediate forerunner of improvement and better cultivation, but which at the same time may have contributed to raise the price of those articles, both somewhat sooner and somewhat faster than it would otherwise have risen. As the poorest family can often maintain a cat or a dog without any expense, so the poorest occupiers of land can commonly maintain a few poultry, or a sow and a few pigs, at very little. The little offals of their own table, their whey, skimmed milk, and butter milk, supply those animals with a part of their food, and they find the rest in the neighbouring fields, without doing any sensible damage to any body. By diminishing the number of those small occupiers, therefore, the quantity of this sort of provisions, which is thus produced at little or no expense, must certainly have been a good deal diminished, and their price must consequently have been raised both sooner and faster than it would otherwise have risen. Sooner or later, however, in the progress of improvement, it must at any rate have risen to the[Pg 96] utmost height to which it is capable of rising; or to the price which pays the labour and expense of cultivating the land which furnishes them with food, as well as these are paid upon the greater part of other cultivated land.

The significant increase in the prices of both hogs and poultry in Great Britain is often blamed on the decrease in the number of cottagers and other small landholders. This trend has been a common precursor to improvement and better farming practices throughout Europe, but it might have also contributed to raising the prices of these goods a bit sooner and more quickly than they otherwise would have. Just as the poorest family can typically keep a cat or a dog at little cost, the least affluent landholders can usually maintain a few chickens or a pig for minimal expense. Their leftover food, along with whey, skimmed milk, and buttermilk, provides some of the animals' diet, while the rest is typically foraged from nearby fields without causing significant harm to anyone. Therefore, by reducing the number of these small landholders, the amount of affordable provisions produced must have decreased significantly, leading to an earlier and sharper increase in prices than would have occurred otherwise. Nonetheless, eventually, during the process of improvement, prices would have risen to the[Pg 96]highest level they are capable of reaching, or to the price that covers the labor and costs of farming the land that supplies food, just like other cultivated lands.

The business of the dairy, like the feeding of hogs and poultry, is originally carried on as a save-all. The cattle necessarily kept upon the farm produce more milk than either the rearing of their own young, or the consumption of the farmer's family requires; and they produce most at one particular season. But of all the productions of land, milk is perhaps the most perishable. In the warm season, when it is most abundant, it will scarce keep four-and-twenty hours. The farmer, by making it into fresh butter, stores a small part of it for a week; by making it into salt butter, for a year; and by making it into cheese, he stores a much greater part of it for several years. Part of all these is reserved for the use of his own family, the rest goes to market, in order to find the best price which is to be had, and which can scarce be so low as to discourage him from sending thither whatever is over and above the use of his own family. If it is very low indeed, he will be likely to manage his dairy in a very slovenly and dirty manner, and will scarce, perhaps, think it worth while to have a particular room or building on purpose for it, but will suffer the business to be carried on amidst the smoke, filth, and nastiness of his own kitchen, as was the case of almost all the farmers' dairies in Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and as is the case of many of them still. The same causes which gradually raise the price of butcher's meat, the increase of the demand, and, in consequence of the improvement of the country, the diminution of the quantity which can be fed at little or no expense, raise, in the same manner, that of the produce of the dairy, of which the price naturally connects with that of butcher's meat, or with the expense of feeding cattle. The increase of price pays for more labour, care, and cleanliness. The dairy becomes more worthy of the farmer's attention, and the quality of its produce gradually improves. The price at last gets so high, that it become worth while to employ some of the most fertile and best cultivated lands in feeding cattle merely for the purpose of the dairy; and when it has got to this height, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land would soon be turned to this purpose. It seems to have got to this height through the greater part of England, where much good land is commonly employed in this manner. If you except the neighbourhood of a few considerable towns, it seems not yet to have got to this height anywhere in Scotland, where common farmers seldom employ much good land in raising food for cattle, merely for the purpose of the dairy. The price of the produce, though it has risen very considerably within these few years, is probably still too low to admit of it. The inferiority of the quality, indeed, compared with that of the produce of English dairies, is fully equal to that of the price. But this inferiority of quality is, perhaps, rather the effect of this lowness of price, than the cause of it. Though the quality was much better, the greater part of what is brought to market could not, I apprehend, in the present circumstances of the country, be disposed of at a much better price; and the present price, it is probable, would not pay the expense of the land and labour necessary for producing a much better quality. Through the greater part of England, notwithstanding the superiority of price, the dairy is not reckoned a more profitable employment of land than the raising of corn, or the fattening of cattle, the two great objects of agriculture. Through the greater part of Scotland, therefore, it cannot yet be even so profitable.

The dairy business, like feeding pigs and chickens, originally serves as a way to make the most of resources. The cattle kept on the farm produce more milk than what's needed for either raising their young or the farmer's family, and they produce the most at certain times of the year. However, milk is possibly the most perishable product from the land. In the warm season when it's most plentiful, it barely lasts twenty-four hours. The farmer can turn some of it into fresh butter to extend its shelf life for a week; making salt butter preserves it for a year; and by making cheese, he can keep a much larger quantity for several years. Some of these products are kept for his family, while the rest is taken to market to get the best possible price, which is rarely so low that it would discourage him from selling anything beyond what his family needs. If the price is really low, he might run his dairy carelessly and messily, maybe even forgoing a dedicated space for it, letting it be operated amid the smoke and grime of his kitchen, much like many farmers' dairies in Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and many still do today. The same factors that gradually raise the price of meat—like increased demand and improvements in the country that reduce the amount of land that can be fed at little or no cost—also raise the prices of dairy products, as their value is naturally tied to the price of meat and the costs of feeding cattle. When the prices go up, farmers can afford to put in more labor, care, and cleanliness. The dairy then becomes a focus for the farmer, and the quality of its products improves over time. Eventually, the price becomes so high that it's worth using some of the most fertile, well-maintained land for raising cattle just for the dairy; and once it reaches this point, it can’t easily go higher. If it did, more land would be devoted to this use. It seems this peak has been reached in much of England, where good land is commonly used for this purpose. In Scotland, aside from a few larger towns, it seems it hasn't been reached yet. Common farmers there typically don't use much good land solely for feeding cattle for the dairy. Although the prices have risen significantly in recent years, they are probably still too low to justify it. The lower quality of Scottish dairy products compared to English ones mirrors the lower prices. This lower quality seems to stem more from the low prices than the other way around. Even if the quality were better, I doubt that most of what’s available in the current market could fetch much better prices; and it’s likely that the current prices wouldn't cover the costs of the land and labor needed to produce a higher quality. In most of England, even with a better price, the dairy isn’t seen as a more profitable use of land than growing grains or fattening cattle—these two are the primary focuses of agriculture. Therefore, in most of Scotland, it’s not even that profitable yet.

The lands of no country, it is evident, can ever be completely cultivated and improved, till once the price of every produce, which human industry in obliged to raise upon them, has got so high as to pay for the expense of complete improvement and cultivation. In order to do this, the price of each particular produce must be sufficient, first, to pay the rent of good corn land, as it is that which regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land; and, secondly, to pay the labour and expense of the farmer, as well as they are commonly paid upon good corn land; or, in other words, to replace with the ordinary profits the stock which he employs about it. This rise in the price of each particular produce, must evidently be previous to the improvement and cultivation of the land which is destined for raising it. Gain is the end of all improvement; and nothing could deserve that name, of which loss was to be the necessary consequence. But loss must be the necessary consequence of improving land for the sake of a produce of which the price could never bring back the expense. If the complete improvement and cultivation of the country be, as it most certainly is, the greatest of all public advantages, this rise in the price of all those different sorts of rude produce, instead of being considered as a public calamity, ought to be regarded as the necessary forerunner and attendant of the greatest of all public advantages.

The land of no country can ever be fully cultivated and improved until the price of every product that human effort is required to produce is high enough to cover the costs of complete improvement and cultivation. To achieve this, the price of each specific product must be enough, first, to cover the rent of good farmland, since that rent typically sets the standard for most other cultivated land; and, second, to pay the labor and costs of the farmer, just as they are typically compensated on good farmland; or, in simpler terms, to provide the usual profits that replace the investment he makes in it. This increase in the price of each specific product must obviously occur before the improvement and cultivation of the land intended for growing it. Profit is the goal of all improvement; nothing can rightly be called an improvement if it results in a loss. However, loss must inevitably be the outcome of improving land for a product whose price will never recover the costs. If complete improvement and cultivation of the land is, as it very much is, the greatest public benefit, then this increase in the price of all those various types of raw products should not be seen as a public misfortune but rather as a necessary precursor and accompaniment to the greatest public good.

This rise, too, in the nominal or money price of all these different sorts of rude produce, has been the effect, not of any degradation in the value of silver, but of a rise in their real price. They have become worth, not only a greater quantity of silver, but a greater quantity of labour and subsistence than before. As it costs a greater quantity of labour and subsistence to bring them to market, so, when they are brought thither [Pg 97]they represent, or are equivalent to a greater quantity.

This increase in the nominal or money price of all these different kinds of raw goods has not been caused by a decline in the value of silver, but by an increase in their real price. They are now worth not just more silver, but also more labor and resources than before. Since it takes more labor and resources to produce them, when they reach the market, [Pg 97] they represent, or are equivalent to, a larger amount.

 

Third Sort.—The third and last sort of rude produce, of which the price naturally rises in the progress of improvement, is that in which the efficacy of human industry, in augmenting the quantity, is either limited or uncertain. Though the real price of this sort of rude produce, therefore, naturally tends to rise in the progress of improvement, yet, according as different accidents happen to render the efforts of human industry more or less successful in augmenting the quantity, it may happen sometimes even to fall, sometimes to continue the same, in very different periods of improvement, and sometimes to rise more or less in the same period.

Third Sort.—The third and final type of raw products, where the price tends to increase as things improve, is one where the effectiveness of human efforts to increase the amount is either limited or unpredictable. Although the real price of this type of raw product generally rises with improvements, it can sometimes fall, stay the same, or rise by varying amounts due to different circumstances affecting the success of human efforts to boost production during different times of improvement.

There are some sorts of rude produce which nature has rendered a kind of appendages to other sorts; so that the quantity of the one which any country can afford, is necessarily limited by that of the other. The quantity of wool or of raw hides, for example, which any country can afford, is necessarily limited by the number of great and small cattle that are kept in it. The state of its improvement, and the nature of its agriculture, again necessarily determine this number.

There are certain types of rude produce that nature has made into appendages to other types; therefore, the amount of one that any country can produce is limited by the amount of the other. For instance, the quantity of wool or raw hides that a country can produce is restricted by the number of livestock it has. The level of agricultural development and the type of farming also determine this number.

The same causes which, in the progress of improvement, gradually raise the price of butcher's meat, should have the same effect, it may be thought, upon the prices of wool and raw hides, and raise them, too, nearly in the same proportion. It probably would be so, if, in the rude beginnings of improvement, the market for the latter commodities was confined within as narrow bounds as that for the former. But the extent of their respective markets is commonly extremely different.

The same factors that gradually increase the price of meat as improvements are made should also affect the prices of wool and raw hides and raise them nearly proportionally. It might be true, but in the early stages of improvement, the market for these goods was much more limited compared to the market for meat. However, the size of their markets is usually very different.

The market for butcher's meat is almost everywhere confined to the country which produces it. Ireland, and some part of British America, indeed, carry on a considerable trade in salt provisions; but they are, I believe, the only countries in the commercial world which do so, or which export to other countries any considerable part of their butcher's meat.

The market for butcher's meat is mostly limited to the countries that produce it. Ireland and some parts of British America do engage in a significant trade in salted foods; however, I believe they are the only countries in the commercial world that do so or that export any substantial amount of their butcher's meat to other nations.

The market for wool and raw hides, on the contrary, is, in the rude beginnings of improvement, very seldom confined to the country which produces them. They can easily be transported to distant countries; wool without any preparation, and raw hides with very little; and as they are the materials of many manufactures, the industry of other countries may occasion a demand for them, though that of the country which produces them might not occasion any.

The market for wool and raw hides, on the other hand, is in the early stages of improvement and is rarely limited to the country that produces them. They can be easily transported to faraway countries; wool without any processing and raw hides with minimal effort. Since these are materials for various products, the industries in other countries might create a demand for them, even if the industry of the producing country does not.

In countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the price of the wool and the hide bears always a much greater proportion to that of the whole beast, than in countries where, improvement and population being further advanced, there is more demand for butcher's meat. Mr Hume observes, that in the Saxon times, the fleece was estimated at two-fifths of the value of the whole sheep, and that this was much above the proportion of its present estimation. In some provinces of Spain, I have been assured, the sheep is frequently killed merely for the sake of the fleece and the tallow. The carcase is often left to rot upon the ground, or to be devoured by beasts and birds of prey. If this sometimes happens even in Spain, it happens almost constantly in Chili, at Buenos Ayres, and in many other parts of Spanish America, where the horned cattle are almost constantly killed merely for the sake of the hide and the tallow. This, too, used to happen almost constantly in Hispaniola, while it was infested by the buccaneers, and before the settlement, improvement, and populousness of the French plantations (which now extend round the coast of almost the whole western half of the island) had given some value to the cattle of the Spaniards, who still continue to possess, not only the eastern part of the coast, but the whole inland mountainous part of the country.

In poorly cultivated countries, which are usually sparsely populated, the price of wool and hides is generally much higher relative to the overall value of the animal than in countries where agriculture and population are more developed, leading to a greater demand for meat. Mr. Hume notes that in Saxon times, the fleece was valued at two-fifths of the price of the entire sheep, which is significantly more than its current value. I've been told that in some regions of Spain, sheep are often killed just for their fleece and fat, with the carcass left to decay on the ground or eaten by scavengers. If this occurs sometimes in Spain, it's almost a routine practice in Chile, Buenos Aires, and many other areas of Spanish America, where cattle are frequently slaughtered primarily for their hides and fat. This was also common in Hispaniola when it was overrun by buccaneers, and before the development and population growth of the French plantations, which now cover almost the entire western coast of the island and have added some value to the Spaniards' cattle. The Spaniards still hold onto not only the eastern coastal areas but also the entire mountainous inland region.

Though, in the progress of improvement and population, the price of the whole beast necessarily rises, yet the price of the carcase is likely to be much more affected by this rise than that of the wool and the hide. The market for the carcase being in the rude state of society confined always to the country which produces it, must necessarily be extended in proportion to the improvement and population of that country. But the market for the wool and the hides, even of a barbarous country, often extending to the whole commercial world, it can very seldom be enlarged in the same proportion. The state of the whole commercial world can seldom be much affected by the improvement of any particular country; and the market for such commodities may remain the same, or very nearly the same, after such improvements, as before. It should, however, in the natural course of things, rather, upon the whole, be somewhat extended in consequence of them. If the manufactures, especially, of which those commodities are the materials, should ever come to flourish in the country, the market, though it might not be much enlarged, would at least be brought much nearer to the place of growth than before; and the price of those materials might at least be increased by what had usually been the expense of transporting them to distant countries. Though it might not rise, therefore, in the same proportion as that of butcher's meat, it ought naturally to rise somewhat, and it ought certainly not to fall.

As improvements and population grow, the price of the whole animal necessarily goes up, but the price of the carcass is likely to be affected by this increase much more than that of the wool and the hide. Since the market for the carcass, in a primitive society, is usually limited to the country that produces it, it must naturally expand in line with improvements and population growth in that country. However, the markets for wool and hides, even in a less developed country, often reach the entire commercial world and can rarely grow at the same rate. The overall state of the global market is seldom significantly influenced by advancements in any one country, so the market for these goods may stay pretty much the same before and after such advancements. However, in a natural progression, it should generally expand a bit as a result. If the manufacturing of products using those materials were to thrive in the country, the market might not expand significantly, but it would at least get much closer to where those materials are produced than it was before, and the price of those materials could at least rise based on what it typically costs to transport them to far-off places. So, while it might not increase at the same rate as butcher's meat, it should naturally see some rise and definitely shouldn't decrease.

In England, however, notwithstanding the flourishing state of its woollen manufacture, the price of English wool has fallen very considerably since the time of Edward III. There are many authentic records which demonstrate[Pg 98] that, during the reign of that prince (towards the middle of the fourteenth century, or about 1339), what was reckoned the moderate and reasonable price of the tod, or twenty-eight pounds of English wool, was not less than ten shillings of the money of those times[25], containing, at the rate of twenty-pence the ounce, six ounces of silver, Tower weight, equal to about thirty shillings of our present money. In the present times, one-and-twenty shillings the tod may be reckoned a good price for very good English wool. The money price of wool, therefore, in the time of Edward III. was to its money price in the present times as ten to seven. The superiority of its real price was still greater. At the rate of six shillings and eightpence the quarter, ten shillings was in those ancient times the price of twelve bushels of wheat. At the rate of twenty-eight shillings the quarter, one-and-twenty shillings is in the present times the price of six bushels only. The proportion between the real price of ancient and modern times, therefore, is as twelve to six, or as two to one. In those ancient times, a tod of wool would have purchased twice the quantity of subsistence which it will purchase at present, and consequently twice the quantity of labour, if the real recompence of labour had been the same in both periods.

In England, however, despite the booming wool industry, the price of English wool has dropped significantly since the time of Edward III. Many credible records show[Pg 98] that during his reign (around the middle of the 14th century, or about 1339), a fair and reasonable price for a tod, or twenty-eight pounds of English wool, was no less than ten shillings in the currency of that time[25], which, based on an ounce priced at twenty pence, contained six ounces of silver, Tower weight, equivalent to about thirty shillings today. Nowadays, twenty-one shillings per tod is considered a good price for very high-quality English wool. Thus, the price of wool during Edward III's time compared to its price today is like ten to seven. The difference in real value is even greater. Back then, at a rate of six shillings and eight pence per quarter, ten shillings could buy twelve bushels of wheat. At today's rate of twenty-eight shillings per quarter, twenty-one shillings buys only six bushels. Therefore, the ratio between the real prices of ancient and modern times is twelve to six, or two to one. In those times, a tod of wool could buy twice as much food as it can now, and therefore twice as much labor, assuming the real value of labor was the same in both eras.

This degradation, both in the real and nominal value of wool, could never have happened in consequence of the natural course of things. It has accordingly been the effect of violence and artifice. First, of the absolute prohibition of exporting wool from England: secondly, of the permission of importing it from Spain, duty free: thirdly, of the prohibition of exporting it from Ireland to any other country but England. In consequence of these regulations, the market for English wool, instead of being somewhat extended, in consequence of the improvement of England, has been confined to the home market, where the wool of several other countries is allowed to come into competition with it, and where that of Ireland is forced into competition with it. As the woollen manufactures, too, of Ireland, are fully as much discouraged as is consistent with justice and fair dealing, the Irish can work up but a smaller part of their own wool at home, and are therefore obliged to send a greater proportion of it to Great Britain, the only market they are allowed.

This decline, both in the actual and market value of wool, couldn't have occurred naturally. It is clearly the result of force and manipulation. First, there's the complete ban on exporting wool from England; second, the allowance of importing it from Spain without any duty; and third, the prohibition on exporting it from Ireland to any country other than England. Because of these regulations, the market for English wool, instead of expanding due to England's growth, has been limited to the domestic market, where wool from several other countries is allowed to compete and where Irish wool must also compete. Since Irish wool production is heavily discouraged, the Irish can only process a small portion of their own wool domestically, forcing them to send a larger share to Great Britain, which is the only market available to them.

I have not been able to find any such authentic records concerning the price of raw hides in ancient times. Wool was commonly paid as a subsidy to the king, and its valuation in that subsidy ascertains, at least in some degree, what was its ordinary price. But this seems not to have been the case with raw hides. Fleetwood, however, from an account in 1425, between the prior of Burcester Oxford and one of his canons, gives us their price, at least as it was stated upon that particular ocassion, viz. five ox hides at twelve shillings; five cow hides at seven shillings and threepence; thirty-six sheep skins of two years old at nine shillings; sixteen calf skins at two shillings. In 1425, twelve shillings contained about the same quantity of silver as four-and-twenty shillings of our present money. An ox hide, therefore, was in this account valued at the same quantity of silver as 4s. 45ths of our present money. Its nominal price was a good deal lower than at present. But at the rate of six shillings and eightpence the quarter, twelve shillings would in those times have purchased fourteen bushels and four-fifths of a bushel of wheat, which, at three and sixpence the bushel, would in the present times cost 51s. 4d. An ox hide, therefore, would in those times have purchased as much corn as ten shillings and threepence would purchase at present. Its real value was equal to ten shillings and threepence of our present money. In those ancient times, when the cattle were half starved during the greater part of the winter, we cannot suppose that they were of a very large size. An ox hide which weighs four stone of sixteen pounds of avoirdupois, is not in the present times reckoned a bad one; and in those ancient times would probably have been reckoned a very good one. But at half-a-crown the stone, which at this moment (February 1773) I understand to be the common price, such a hide would at present cost only ten shillings.—Though its nominal price, therefore, is higher in the present than it was in those ancient times, its real price, the real quantity of subsistence which it will purchase or command, is rather somewhat lower. The price of cow hides, as stated in the above account, is nearly in the common proportion to that of ox hides. That of sheep skins is a good deal above it. They had probably been sold with the wool. That of calves skins, on the contrary, is greatly below it. In countries where the price of cattle is very low, the calves, which are not intended to be reared in order to keep up the stock, are generally killed very young, as was the case in Scotland twenty or thirty years ago. It saves the milk, which their price would not pay for. Their skins, therefore, are commonly good for little.

I haven't been able to find any genuine records about the price of raw hides in ancient times. Wool was often paid as a tax to the king, and its value in that tax at least gives us some insight into its usual price. But this doesn’t seem to be true for raw hides. Fleetwood, however, cites an account from 1425 between the prior of Burcester Oxford and one of his canons, which shows their price as it was recorded on that specific occasion: five ox hides for twelve shillings; five cow hides for seven shillings and threepence; thirty-six sheep skins two years old for nine shillings; and sixteen calf skins for two shillings. In 1425, twelve shillings had roughly the same amount of silver as twenty-four shillings today. Thus, an ox hide in this account was valued at about 4s. 45ths of our current money. Its listed price was significantly lower than it is now. However, at six shillings and eightpence a quarter, twelve shillings back then would have bought fourteen bushels and four-fifths of a bushel of wheat, which would cost 51s. 4d. today at three and sixpence per bushel. So, an ox hide at that time would buy as much corn as ten shillings and threepence would buy today. Its real value was equal to ten shillings and threepence in current currency. In those ancient times, when cattle were often half-starved during most of the winter, we can’t assume they were very large. An ox hide weighing four stone (of sixteen pounds) is not considered bad today; back then, it would likely have been seen as very good. But at half-a-crown a stone, which I understand is the common price as of February 1773, such a hide would currently cost only ten shillings. So, while its nominal price is higher today than it was in those ancient times, its real price—the actual amount of subsistence it can buy or command—is somewhat lower. The price of cow hides in that account is almost in the usual proportion to that of ox hides. The price of sheep skins is quite a bit higher. They were probably sold along with the wool. On the other hand, the price of calf skins is much lower. In places where cattle prices are very low, calves that aren’t meant to be raised for breeding are often slaughtered very young, as happened in Scotland twenty or thirty years ago. It saves the milk, which their price wouldn’t cover. Therefore, their skins are usually not worth much.

The price of raw hides is a good deal lower at present than it was a few years ago; owing probably to the taking off the duty upon seal skins, and to the allowing, for a limited time, the importation of raw hides from Ireland, and from the plantations, duty free, which was done in 1769. Take the whole of the present century at an average, their real price has probably been somewhat higher than it was in those ancient times. The nature of the commodity renders it not quite so proper[Pg 99] for being transported to distant markets as wool. It suffers more by keeping. A salted hide is reckoned inferior to a fresh one, and sells for a lower price. This circumstance must necessarily have some tendency to sink the price of raw hides produced in a country which does not manufacture them, but is obliged to export them, and comparatively to raise that of those produced in a country which does manufacture them. It must have some tendency to sink their price in a barbarous, and to raise it in an improved and manufacturing country. It must have had some tendency, therefore, to sink it in ancient, and to raise it in modern times. Our tanners, besides, have not been quite so successful as our clothiers, in convincing the wisdom of the nation, that the safety of the commonwealth depends upon the prosperity of their particular manufacture. They have accordingly been much less favoured. The exportation of raw hides has, indeed, been prohibited, and declared a nuisance; but their importation from foreign countries has been subjected to a duty; and though this duty has been taken off from those of Ireland and the plantations (for the limited time of five years only), yet Ireland has not been confined to the market of Great Britain for the sale of its surplus hides, or of these which are not manufactured at home. The hides of common cattle have, but within these few years, been put among the enumerated commodities which the plantations can send nowhere but to the mother country; neither has the commerce of Ireland been in this case oppressed hitherto, in order to support the manufactures of Great Britain.

The price of raw hides is much lower now than it was a few years ago, probably due to the removal of the duty on seal skins and the temporary allowance for importing raw hides from Ireland and the colonies duty-free, which happened in 1769. Taking the entire current century as an average, their actual price has likely been a bit higher than it was back in those old times. The nature of this commodity makes it less suitable for transport to distant markets compared to wool. It deteriorates more quickly over time. A salted hide is considered inferior to a fresh one and sells for a lower price. This situation tends to lower the price of raw hides produced in countries that don’t manufacture them but need to export them, while raising the price of those produced in manufacturing countries. It tends to decrease prices in less developed areas and increase them in more advanced manufacturing nations. So, it probably lowered prices in ancient times and raised them in modern times. Additionally, our tanners haven’t been as successful as our cloth manufacturers in persuading the nation that the prosperity of their specific industry is crucial for the common good. As a result, they have received much less support. The export of raw hides has been banned and labeled a nuisance, while their import from foreign countries has been subject to a duty. Even though this duty has been lifted for those from Ireland and the colonies (but only for five years), Ireland isn't restricted to selling its surplus hides solely in Great Britain, nor has its trade been stifled to support British manufacturing. The hides of ordinary cattle have only recently been classified among the specified goods that the colonies can only send to the mother country; the trade of Ireland has not been weighed down in this instance to bolster British manufacturing.

Whatever regulations tend to sink the price, either of wool or of raw hides, below what it naturally would be, must, in an improved and cultivated country, have some tendency to raise the price of butcher's meat. The price both of the great and small cattle, which are fed on improved and cultivated land, must be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and the profit which the farmer, has reason to expect from improved and cultivated land. If it is not, they will soon cease to feed them. Whatever part of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the hide, must be paid by the carcase. The less there is paid for the one, the more must be paid for the other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the different parts of the beast, is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid to them. In an improved and more cultivated country, therefore, their interest as landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by such regulations, though their interest as consumers may, by the rise in the price of provisions. It would be quite otherwise, however, in an unimproved and uncultivated country, where the greater part of the lands could be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, and where the wool and the hide made the principal part of the value of those cattle. Their interest as landlords and farmers would in this case be very deeply affected by such regulations, and their interest as consumers very little. The fall in the price of the wool and the hide would not in this case raise the price of the carcase; because the greater part of the lands of the country being applicable to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, the same number would still continue to be fed. The same quantity of butcher's meat would still come to market. The demand for it would be no greater than before. Its price, therefore, would be the same as before. The whole price of cattle would fall, and along with it both the rent and the profit of all those lands of which cattle was the principal produce, that is, of the greater part of the lands of the country. The perpetual prohibition of the exportation of wool, which is commonly, but very falsely, ascribed to Edward III., would, in the then circumstances of the country, have been the most destructive regulation which could well have been thought of. It would not only have reduced the actual value of the greater part of the lands in the kingdom, but by reducing the price of the most important species of small cattle, it would have retarded very much its subsequent improvement.

Any regulations that cause the price of wool or raw hides to drop below what it naturally should will likely result in higher prices for butcher's meat in a developed and cultivated country. The prices for both large and small cattle, which are raised on better land, need to be enough to cover the rent that the landlord and the profit that the farmer expect from that land. If the prices aren't sufficient, they will stop raising the animals. Therefore, whatever part of the price isn’t covered by the wool and hides must come from the carcass. The less that is paid for one, the more must be paid for the other. How this price is divided among the different parts of the animal doesn't matter to landlords and farmers, as long as they receive all of it. In a more developed and cultivated country, their interests as landlords and farmers aren’t heavily impacted by such regulations, but their interests as consumers might be affected by the rising cost of food. However, it's a different story in an undeveloped and uncultivated country, where most land is used only for raising cattle, and where wool and hides make up the main value of those animals. In this case, landlords and farmers would be significantly affected by such regulations, while their interests as consumers would be minimally impacted. A drop in the price of wool and hides wouldn’t lead to a higher price for the carcass because much of the land is only suitable for feeding cattle; the same number would still be raised, and the same quantity of butcher's meat would reach the market. The demand wouldn’t increase, so prices would remain the same as before. Overall, the price of cattle would decline, dragging down both rent and profits for the majority of land that produces cattle, which is most of the land in the country. The ongoing prohibition against exporting wool, often but incorrectly attributed to Edward III, would have been the most damaging regulation imaginable under those circumstances. It would not only lower the actual value of a significant portion of land in the kingdom but also by decreasing the price of the most crucial type of small cattle, it would greatly hinder future improvements.

The wool of Scotland fell very considerably in its price in consequence of the union with England, by which it was excluded from the great market of Europe, and confined to the narrow one of Great Britain. The value of the greater part of the lands in the southern counties of Scotland, which are chiefly a sheep country, would have been very deeply affected by this event, had not the rise in the price of butcher's meat fully compensated the fall in the price of wool.

The price of Scottish wool dropped significantly because of the union with England, which cut it off from the larger European market and limited it to the smaller one in Great Britain. The value of most of the land in the southern counties of Scotland, which mainly relied on sheep farming, would have taken a big hit due to this situation, if not for the rise in the price of meat, which fully made up for the decline in wool prices.

As the efficacy of human industry, in increasing the quantity either of wool or of raw hides, is limited, so far as it depends upon the produce of the country where it is exerted; so it is uncertain so far as it depends upon the produce of other countries. It so far depends not so much upon the quantity which they produce, as upon that which they do not manufacture; and upon the restraints which they may or may not think proper to impose upon the exportation of this sort of rude produce. These circumstances, as they are altogether independent of domestic industry, so they necessarily render the efficiency of its efforts more or less uncertain. In multiplying this sort of rude produce, therefore, the efficacy of human industry is not only limited, but uncertain.

As the effectiveness of human effort in increasing the amount of either wool or raw hides is limited based on the resources available in the country where it’s applied, it is also unpredictable when it relies on the resources from other countries. Its success doesn’t depend so much on how much they produce, but rather on how much they don’t manufacture and on the restrictions they may choose to impose on exporting these basic products. These factors, being completely independent of local industry, make the success of its efforts uncertain. Therefore, in increasing this type of raw product, the effectiveness of human effort is both limited and unpredictable.

In multiplying another very important sort of rude produce, the quantity of fish that is brought to market, it is likewise both limited and uncertain. It is limited by the local situation of the country, by the proximity or distance of its different provinces from the[Pg 100] sea, by the number of its lakes and rivers, and by what may be called the fertility or barrenness of those seas, lakes, and rivers, as to this sort of rude produce. As population increases, as the annual produce of the land and labour of the country grows greater and greater, there come to be more buyers of fish; and those buyers, too, have a greater quantity and variety of other goods, or, what is the same thing, the price of a greater quantity and variety of other goods, to buy with. But it will generally be impossible to supply the great and extended market, without employing a quantity of labour greater than in proportion to what had been requisite for supplying the narrow and confined one. A market which, from requiring only one thousand, comes to require annually ten thousand ton of fish, can seldom be supplied, without employing more than ten times the quantity of labour which had before been sufficient to supply it. The fish must generally be sought for at a greater distance, larger vessels must be employed, and more expensive machinery of every kind made use of. The real price of this commodity, therefore, naturally rises in the progress of improvement. It has accordingly done so, I believe, more or less in every country.

In multiplying another important type of raw product, the amount of fish that is brought to market is also limited and uncertain. It’s limited by the local geography, the distance of various regions from the[Pg 100] sea, the number of lakes and rivers, and what can be described as the productivity or lack of productivity of those seas, lakes, and rivers regarding this type of raw product. As the population grows and the annual output of land and labor increases, there will be more buyers for fish, and those buyers will also have more quantity and variety of other goods—or, in other words, more value of different goods to trade. However, it will typically be impossible to meet the demands of a larger, more extensive market without employing a larger amount of labor than what was necessary for the smaller, more confined market. A market that goes from needing only one thousand tons to requiring ten thousand tons of fish annually can rarely be supplied without using more than ten times the amount of labor that was previously enough. Fish will generally need to be sourced from farther away, larger vessels will need to be used, and more expensive equipment of all kinds will be required. Therefore, the actual price of this commodity tends to rise as improvements progress. I believe this has occurred more or less in every country.

Though the success of a particular day's fishing may be a very uncertain matter, yet the local situation of the country being supposed, the general efficacy of industry in bringing a certain quantity of fish to market, taking the course of a year, or of several years together, it may, perhaps, be thought is certain enough; and it, no doubt, is so. As it depends more, however, upon the local situation of the country, than upon the state of its wealth and industry; as upon this account it may in different countries be the same in very different periods of improvement, and very different in the same period; its connection with the state of improvement is uncertain; and it is of this sort of uncertainty that I am here speaking.

Although the success of fishing on any given day can be quite unpredictable, considering the local geography, the overall effectiveness of hard work in delivering a certain amount of fish to market over the course of a year or multiple years might be seen as fairly reliable; and indeed, it usually is. However, since it relies more on the local geography than on the country’s wealth and industry, it can vary significantly between different countries at various points of development, and can differ greatly even within the same timeframe. The relationship with the level of development is uncertain; and it is this type of uncertainty that I am discussing here.

In increasing the quantity of the different minerals and metals which are drawn from the bowels of the earth, that of the more precious ones particularly, the efficacy of human industry seems not to be limited, but to be altogether uncertain.

In boosting the quantity of various minerals and metals extracted from the earth, especially the more precious ones, the effectiveness of human efforts appears limitless and quite unpredictable.

The quantity of the precious metals which is to be found in any country, is not limited by any thing in its local situation, such as the fertility or barrenness of its own mines. Those metals frequently abound in countries which possess no mines. Their quantity, in every particular country, seems to depend upon two different circumstances; first, upon its power of purchasing, upon the state of its industry, upon the annual produce of its land and labour, in consequence of which it can afford to employ a greater or a smaller quantity of labour and subsistence, in bringing or purchasing such superfluities as gold and silver, either from its own mines, or from those of other countries; and, secondly, upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which may happen at any particular time to supply the commercial world with those metals. The quantity of those metals in the countries most remote from the mines, must be more or less affected by this fertility or barrenness, on account of the easy and cheap transportation of those metals, of their small bulk and great value. Their quantity in China and Indostan must have been more or less affected by the abundance of the mines of America.

The amount of precious metals found in any country isn’t limited by local factors, like the productivity or lack of mines. These metals often exist in countries without any mines at all. The quantity in each country seems to depend on two main things: first, its ability to purchase, which is influenced by the state of its industry and the annual output of its land and labor. This determines how much labor and resources it can allocate to obtaining excess gold and silver, whether from its own mines or from abroad; and second, the productivity or unproductiveness of the mines that, at any given time, supply the global market with these metals. The quantity of these metals in countries far from mines is significantly influenced by the productivity of those mines, due to the ease and low cost of transporting these metals, which are small but highly valuable. The amount in China and India must have been affected by the richness of America’s mines.

So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the former of those two circumstances (the power of purchasing), their real price, like that of all other luxuries and superfluities, is likely to rise with the wealth and improvement of the country, and to fall with its poverty and depression. Countries which have a great quantity of labour and subsistence to spare, can afford to purchase any particular quantity of those metals at the expense of a greater quantity of labour and subsistence, than countries which have less to spare.

As far as the amount in any specific country depends on the first of those two factors (the ability to buy), their true price, similar to all other luxuries and extra goods, is expected to increase with the wealth and development of the country and decrease with its poverty and decline. Countries that have a large amount of labor and resources available can afford to buy a particular amount of those metals at the cost of a larger amount of labor and resources than countries that have less to spare.

So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the latter of those two circumstances (the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen to supply the commercial world), their real price, the real quantity of labour and subsistence which they will purchase or exchange for, will, no doubt, sink more or less in proportion to the fertility, and rise in proportion to the barrenness of those mines.

As far as the amount in any given country depends on the second of those two factors (the productivity or lack of productivity of the mines that supply the global market), their actual price—the real amount of labor and resources they can buy or be traded for—will definitely decrease to some extent based on how productive the mines are and increase based on how unproductive they are.

The fertility or barrenness of the mines, however, which may happen at any particular time to supply the commercial world, is a circumstance which, it is evident, may have no sort of connection with the state of industry in a particular country. It seems even to have no very necessary connection with that of the world in general. As arts and commerce, indeed, gradually spread themselves over a greater and a greater part of the earth, the search for new mines, being extended over a wider surface, may have somewhat a better chance for being successful than when confined within narrower bounds. The discovery of new mines, however, as the old ones come to be gradually exhausted, is a matter of the greatest uncertainty, and such as no human skill or industry can insure. All indications, it is acknowledged, are doubtful; and the actual discovery and successful working of a new mine can alone ascertain the reality of its value, or even of its existence. In this search there seem to be no certain limits, either to the possible success, or to the possible disappointment of human industry. In the course of a century or two, it is possible that new mines may be discovered, more fertile than any that have ever yet been known, and it is just equally possible, that the most fertile mine[Pg 101] then known may be more barren than any that was wrought before the discovery of the mines of America. Whether the one or the other of those two events may happen to take place, is of very little importance to the real wealth and prosperity of the world, to the real value of the annual produce of the land and labour of mankind. Its nominal value, the quantity of gold and silver by which this annual produce could be expressed or represented, would, no doubt, be very different; but its real value, the real quantity of labour which it could purchase or command, would be precisely the same. A shilling might, in the one case, represent no more labour than a penny does at present; and a penny, in the other, might represent as much as a shilling does now. But in the one case, he who had a shilling in his pocket would be no richer than he who has a penny at present; and in the other, he who had a penny would be just as rich as he who has a shilling now. The cheapness and abundance of gold and silver plate would be the sole advantage which the world could derive from the one event; and the dearness and scarcity of those trifling superfluities, the only inconveniency it could suffer from the other.

The fertility or barrenness of the mines, however, can change at any given time affecting the commercial world, and this situation clearly has no connection to the level of industry in any particular country. It also doesn't seem to have a necessary connection to the state of the world as a whole. As arts and commerce gradually spread across more and more of the earth, the search for new mines, being expanded over a larger area, may have a slightly better chance of success than when it’s limited to smaller regions. However, discovering new mines, as the old ones are slowly depleted, is highly unpredictable, and no amount of human skill or effort can guarantee it. All indicators are acknowledged to be uncertain, and only the actual discovery and successful operation of a new mine can confirm its true value or even its existence. In this search, there appear to be no clear limits to both the potential success and the possible disappointment of human endeavors. Over the course of a century or two, it’s possible that new mines may be found that are more productive than any previously known, and it’s equally possible that the most productive mine known then could be less fruitful than any before the discovery of the American mines. Whether one or the other of these two events happens is of little importance to the actual wealth and prosperity of the world, or to the true value of the annual output of land and human labor. Its nominal value, represented by the quantity of gold and silver that could express or represent this annual output, would undoubtedly be quite different; but its real value, in terms of the actual amount of labor it could buy or command, would remain exactly the same. A shilling might, in one case, represent no more labor than a penny does today; conversely, a penny in the other scenario might represent as much as a shilling does now. But in that case, someone with a shilling in their pocket would not be any richer than someone with a penny today; and in the other scenario, someone with a penny would be just as wealthy as someone who has a shilling now. The only benefit the world would gain from one scenario would be the cheapness and abundance of gold and silver goods; the only downside from the other scenario would be the expense and scarcity of those trivial luxuries.

Conclusion of the Digression concerning the Variations in the Value of Silver.

The greater part of the writers who have collected the money price of things in ancient times, seem to have considered the low money price of corn, and of goods in general, or, in other words, the high value of gold and silver, as a proof, not only of the scarcity of those metals, but of the poverty and barbarism of the country at the time when it took place. This notion is connected with the system of political economy, which represents national wealth as consisting in the abundance and national poverty in the scarcity, of gold and silver; a system which I shall endeavour to explain and examine at great length in the fourth book of this Inquiry. I shall only observe at present, that the high value of the precious metals can be no proof of the poverty or barbarism of any particular country at the time when it took place. It is a proof only of the barrenness of the mines which happened at that time to supply the commercial world. A poor country, as it cannot afford to buy more, so it can as little afford to pay dearer for gold and silver than a rich one; and the value of those metals, therefore, is not likely to be higher in the former than in the latter. In China, a country much richer than any part of Europe, the value of the precious metals is much higher than in any part of Europe. As the wealth of Europe, indeed, has increased greatly since the discovery of the mines of America, so the value of gold and silver has gradually diminished. This diminution of their value, however, has not been owing to the increase of the real wealth of Europe, of the annual produce of its land and labour, but to the accidental discovery of more abundant mines than any that were known before. The increase of the quantity of gold and silver in Europe, and the increase of its manufactures and agriculture, are two events which, though they have happened nearly about the same time, yet have arisen from very different causes, and have scarce any natural connection with one another. The one has arisen from a mere accident, in which neither prudence nor policy either had or could have any share; the other, from the fall of the feudal system, and from the establishment of a government which afforded to industry the only encouragement which it requires, some tolerable security that it shall enjoy the fruits of its own labour. Poland, where the feudal system still continues to take place, is at this day as beggarly a country as it was before the discovery of America. The money price of corn, however, has risen; the real value of the precious metals has fallen in Poland, in the same manner as in other parts of Europe. Their quantity, therefore, must have increased there as in other places, and nearly in the same proportion to the annual produce of its land and labour. This increase of the quantity of those metals, however, has not, it seems, increased that annual produce, has neither improved the manufactures and agriculture of the country, nor mended the circumstances of its inhabitants. Spain and Portugal, the countries which possess the mines, are, after Poland, perhaps the two most beggarly countries in Europe. The value of the precious metals, however, must be lower in Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe, as they come from those countries to all other parts of Europe, loaded, not only with a freight and an insurance, but with the expense of smuggling, their exportation being either prohibited or subjected to a duty. In proportion to the annual produce of the land and labour, therefore, their quantity must be greater in those countries than in any other part of Europe; those countries, however, are poorer than the greater part of Europe. Though the feudal system has been abolished in Spain and Portugal, it has not been succeeded by a much better.

Most of the writers who have looked at the money prices of things in ancient times seem to think that the low price of grain and goods, or in other words, the high value of gold and silver, shows both the scarcity of those metals and the poverty and backwardness of the country at that time. This idea is tied to the political economy that views national wealth as being based on the abundance of gold and silver and national poverty as due to their scarcity. I will try to explain and discuss this in detail in the fourth book of this Inquiry. For now, I will just point out that the high value of precious metals doesn't necessarily mean a country was poor or uncivilized at that time. It only indicates the limited supply from the mines that were available to the trading world. A poor country, being unable to buy more, can't afford to pay more for gold and silver than a rich one; therefore, the value of those metals is unlikely to be higher in the former than in the latter. In China, a country much wealthier than any part of Europe, the value of precious metals is much higher than in Europe. As Europe's wealth has greatly increased since the discovery of American mines, the value of gold and silver has gradually decreased. However, this decrease in their value hasn’t come from the increase in real wealth in Europe, measured by the annual production of its land and labor, but rather from the accidental discovery of richer mines than previously known. The rise in the quantity of gold and silver in Europe and the growth of its manufacturing and agriculture happened around the same time but are due to very different reasons and are hardly connected. One is the result of an accident, in which neither caution nor policy played a part; the other arises from the decline of the feudal system and the establishment of a government that provides the only encouragement that industry needs: a reasonable guarantee that it will reap the rewards of its efforts. Poland, where the feudal system still exists, is as impoverished today as it was before the discovery of America. However, the money price of grain has increased; the real value of precious metals has also fallen in Poland, just like in other parts of Europe. Therefore, the quantity of those metals must have increased there as well, likely in the same proportion to the annual output of its land and labor. Yet, this rise in the quantity of metals appears not to have increased that annual output, nor has it improved the country's manufacturing and agriculture, or the living conditions of its people. Spain and Portugal, the countries that have the mines, are probably among the poorest countries in Europe after Poland. The value of precious metals must be lower in Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe, since they export them to other regions with costs for freight, insurance, and smuggling due to export bans or tariffs. So, in proportion to the annual output of the land and labor, their quantity must be greater in those countries than elsewhere in Europe; however, those countries are poorer than most of Europe. Even though the feudal system has been abolished in Spain and Portugal, it has not been replaced by a significantly better system.

As the low value of gold and silver, therefore, is no proof of the wealth and flourishing state of the country where it takes place; so neither is their high value, or the low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, any proof of its poverty and barbarism.

As the low value of gold and silver doesn’t prove the wealth and prosperity of a country, neither does a high value of them, or low prices of goods in general, or corn in particular, prove its poverty and backwardness.

But though the low money price, either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, be no proof of the poverty or barbarism of the times, the low money price, of some particular sorts of goods, such as cattle, poultry[Pg 102] game of all kinds, &c. in proportion to that of corn, is a most decisive one. It clearly demonstrates, first, their great abundance in proportion to that of corn, and, consequently, the great extent of the land which they occupied in proportion to what was occupied by corn; and, secondly, the low value of this land in proportion to that of corn land, and, consequently, the uncultivated and unimproved state of the far greater part of the lands of the country. It clearly demonstrates, that the stock and population of the country did not bear the same proportion to the extent of its territory, which they commonly do in civilized countries; and that society was at that time, and in that country, but in its infancy. From the high or low money price, either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, we can infer only, that the mines, which at that time happened to supply the commercial world with gold and silver, were fertile or barren, not that the country was rich or poor. But from the high or low money price of some sorts of goods in proportion to that of others, we infer, with a degree of probability that approaches almost to certainty, that it was rich or poor, that the greater part of its lands were improved or unimproved, and that it was either in a more or less barbarous state, or in a more or less civilised one.

But while the low prices of goods in general, or corn specifically, don't necessarily indicate the poverty or backwardness of the times, the low prices of certain types of goods, like cattle, poultry[Pg 102], and all kinds of game, compared to corn, are a clear sign. This clearly shows, first, their high abundance relative to corn, and therefore, the large amount of land they occupied compared to the land used for corn; and second, the low value of this land compared to corn land, indicating the uncultivated and underdeveloped state of most of the land in the country. It illustrates that the livestock and population of the country didn't match the size of its territory, unlike what we typically see in developed countries; and that society at that time and in that country was still in its early stages. The high or low money price of goods in general, or of corn specifically, only suggests whether the mines supplying the commercial world with gold and silver were productive or not, not whether the country itself was wealthy or poor. However, by looking at the high or low prices of some types of goods in relation to others, we can reasonably conclude that the country was rich or poor, that most of its land was developed or undeveloped, and whether it was in a more primitive or more advanced state.

Any rise in the money price of goods which proceeded altogether from the degradation of the value of silver, would affect all sorts of goods equally, and raise their price universally, a third, or a fourth, or a fifth part higher, according as silver happened to lose a third, or a fourth, or a fifth part of its former value. But the rise in the price of provisions, which has been the subject of so much reasoning and conversation, does not affect all sorts of provisions equally. Taking the course of the present century at an average, the price of corn, it is acknowledged, even by those who account for this rise by the degradation of the value of silver, has risen much less than that of some other sorts of provisions. The rise in the price of those other sorts of provisions, therefore, cannot be owing altogether to the degradation of the value of silver. Some other causes must be taken into the account; and those which have been above assigned, will, perhaps, without having recourse to the supposed degradation of the value of silver, sufficiently explain this rise in those particular sorts of provisions, of which the price has actually risen in proportion to that of corn.

Any increase in the price of goods due entirely to the drop in the value of silver would impact all types of goods equally, raising their prices generally by a third, a fourth, or a fifth, depending on how much value silver lost. However, the increase in the price of food, which has been widely discussed and analyzed, does not affect all types of food equally. On average, this century, the price of grain, even by those who attribute this increase to the decline in silver's value, has risen much less than that of certain other food items. Thus, the increase in the price of those other food items can't be solely explained by the decline in silver's value. Other factors must be considered; the ones mentioned earlier may, without needing to rely on the presumed drop in silver's value, adequately clarify this rise in those specific food items whose prices have actually increased in relation to grain.

As to the price of corn itself, it has, during the sixty-four first years of the present century, and before the late extraordinary course of bad seasons, been somewhat lower than was during the sixty-four last years of the preceding century. This fact is attested, not only by the accounts of Windsor market, but by the public fiars of all the different counties of Scotland, and by the accounts of several different markets in France, which have been collected with great diligence and fidelity by Mr Messance, and by Mr Dupré de St Maur. The evidence is more complete than could well have been expected in a matter which is naturally so very difficult to be ascertained.

Regarding the price of corn, it has, over the first sixty-four years of this century, and before the recent series of bad seasons, been somewhat lower than during the last sixty-four years of the previous century. This is supported not only by the records from the Windsor market but also by the public fiars from various counties in Scotland and data from several different markets in France. These have been gathered with great care and accuracy by Mr. Messance and Mr. Dupré de St Maur. The evidence is more thorough than could have been anticipated in a matter that is inherently very challenging to determine.

As to the high price of corn during these last ten or twelve years, it can be sufficiently accounted for from the badness of the seasons, without supposing any degradation in the value of silver.

Regarding the high price of corn over the past ten or twelve years, it can be adequately explained by the poor weather conditions, without needing to assume any decline in the value of silver.

The opinion, therefore, that silver is continually sinking in its value, seems not to be founded upon any good observations, either upon the prices of corn, or upon those of other provisions.

The belief that silver is consistently losing its value doesn't seem to be based on any solid observations, whether regarding the prices of grain or those of other goods.

The same quantity of silver, it may perhaps be said, will, in the present times, even according to the account which has been here given, purchase a much smaller quantity of several sorts of provisions than it would have done during some part of the last century; and to ascertain whether this change be owing to a rise in the value of those goods, or to a fall in the value of silver, is only to establish a vain and useless distinction, which can be of no sort of service to the man who has only a certain quantity of silver to go to market with, or a certain fixed revenue in money. I certainly do not pretend that the knowledge of this distinction will enable him to buy cheaper. It may not, however, upon that account be altogether useless.

The same amount of silver, as mentioned here, will, in today's world, buy a much smaller quantity of various types of food compared to what it could during certain parts of the last century. Figuring out whether this change is due to an increase in the value of those goods or a decrease in the value of silver is just a pointless and unnecessary distinction, which won't help someone who has a fixed amount of silver to spend at the market or a set income in cash. I don't claim that knowing this distinction will let him shop for lower prices. However, that doesn’t mean it’s completely useless.

It may be of some use to the public, by affording an easy proof of the prosperous condition of the country. If the rise in the price of some sorts of provisions be owing altogether to a fall in the value of silver, it is owing to a circumstance, from which nothing can be inferred but the fertility of the American mines. The real wealth of the country, the annual produce of its land and labour, may, notwithstanding this circumstance, be either gradually declining, as in Portugal and Poland; or gradually advancing, as in most other parts of Europe. But if this rise in the price of some sorts of provisions be owing to a rise in the real value of the land which produces them, to its increased fertility, or, in consequence of more extended improvement and good cultivation, to its having been rendered fit for producing corn; it is owing to a circumstance which indicates, in the clearest manner, the prosperous and advancing state of the country. The land constitutes by far the greatest, the most important, and the most durable part of the wealth of every extensive country. It may surely be of some use, or, at least, it may give some satisfaction to the public, to have so decisive a proof of the increasing value of by far the greatest, the most important, and the most durable part of its wealth.

It might be helpful for the public as it provides an easy way to see how well the country is doing. If the increase in the price of certain types of food is entirely due to a decline in the value of silver, it only reflects the abundance of American mines. The actual wealth of the country, which comes from the annual output of its land and labor, could, despite this situation, be either slowly decreasing, like in Portugal and Poland, or gradually increasing, as seen in most other parts of Europe. However, if the rise in the price of certain kinds of food is due to an increase in the real value of the land that produces them, its greater fertility, or, because of better improvements and farming practices, making it suitable for growing crops, then that’s a clear sign of the country’s prosperity and growth. Land is by far the largest, most significant, and most lasting part of the wealth of any large country. It’s certainly valuable, or at least fulfilling for the public, to have such a clear indicator of the rising value of the most essential and lasting part of its wealth.

It may, too, be of some use to the public, in regulating the pecuniary reward of some of[Pg 103] its inferior servants. If this rise in the price of some sorts of provisions be owing to a fall in the value of silver, their pecuniary reward, provided it was not too large before, ought certainly to be augmented in proportion to the extent of this fall. If it is not augmented, their real recompence will evidently be so much diminished. But if this rise of price is owing in the increased value, in consequence of the improved fertility of the land which produces such provisions, it becomes a much nicer matter to judge, either in what proportion any pecuniary reward ought to be augmented, or whether it ought to be augmented at all. The extension of improvement and cultivation, as it necessarily raises more or less, in proportion to the price of corn, that of every sort of animal food, so it as necessarily lowers that of, I believe, every sort of vegetable food. It raises the price of animal food; because a great part of the land which produces it, being rendered fit for producing corn, must afford to the landlord and farmer the rent and profit of corn land. It lowers the price of vegetable food; because, by increasing the fertility of the land, it increases its abundance. The improvements of agriculture, too, introduce many sorts of vegetable food, which requiring less land, and not more labour than corn, come much cheaper to market. Such are potatoes and maize, or what is called Indian corn, the two most important improvements which the agriculture of Europe, perhaps, which Europe itself, has received from the great extension of its commerce and navigation. Many sorts of vegetable food, besides, which in the rude state of agriculture are confined to the kitchen-garden, and raised only by the spade, come, in its improved state, to be introduced into common fields, and to be raised by the plough; such as turnips, carrots, cabbages, &c. If, in the progress of improvement, therefore, the real price of one species of food necessarily rises, that of another as necessarily falls; and it becomes a matter of more nicety to judge how far the rise in the one may be compensated by the fall in the other. When the real price of butcher's meat has once got to its height (which, with regard to every sort, except perhaps that of hogs flesh, it seems to have done through a great part of England more than a century ago), any rise which can afterwards happen in that of any other sort of animal food, cannot much affect the circumstances of the inferior ranks of people. The circumstances of the poor, through a great part of England, cannot surely be so much distressed by any rise in the price of poultry, fish, wild-fowl, or venison, as they must he relieved by the fall in that of potatoes.

It may also be useful to the public in adjusting the financial compensation for some of its lower-level workers. If the increase in the price of certain food items is due to a decline in the value of silver, their pay should definitely be raised in proportion to the extent of that decline, assuming it wasn't too high before. If it's not increased, their actual compensation will clearly be reduced. However, if this price rise is due to increased value because of better land fertility producing those food items, it becomes more complicated to determine whether and to what extent any financial compensation should be raised. As improvements and cultivation occur, the price of corn and every type of meat tends to go up, while the price of, I believe, all types of vegetables tends to go down. The price of meat rises because a significant portion of the land used for producing it becomes suitable for growing corn, thus providing rent and profit for the landlord and farmer. The price of vegetables decreases because enhanced land fertility increases their availability. Agricultural improvements also introduce many kinds of vegetables that require less land and no more labor than corn, making them cheaper to sell. Examples include potatoes and maize, or what we call Indian corn, which are two major advancements that European agriculture—perhaps even Europe itself—has benefited from due to the expansion of trade and navigation. Many vegetable varieties that were previously limited to kitchen gardens and grown only through manual labor can now be cultivated in common fields using plows, such as turnips, carrots, and cabbages. Therefore, if the actual price of one type of food rises during this improvement process, the price of another type must fall as well, making it more complex to assess how much the rise in one can offset the fall in another. Once the actual price of meat reaches its peak (which, for most types except perhaps pork, seems to have occurred across much of England over a century ago), any subsequent increase in the price of other types of meat likely won't significantly impact the situation of lower-income individuals. The circumstances of the poor in much of England likely won’t be severely affected by rising prices for poultry, fish, game, or venison, compared to the relief they must feel from falling potato prices.

In the present season of scarcity, the high price of corn no doubt distresses the poor. But in times of moderate plenty, when corn is at its ordinary or average price, the natural rise in the price of any other sort of rude produce cannot much affect them. They suffer more, perhaps, by the artificial rise which has been occasioned by taxes in the price of some manufactured commodities, as of salt, soap, leather, candles, malt, beer, ale, &c.

In today's time of scarcity, the high price of corn definitely troubles the poor. However, during times of moderate abundance, when corn is at its usual or average price, the natural increase in the price of any other basic goods doesn't affect them much. They may suffer more from the artificial price increases caused by taxes on some manufactured items, like salt, soap, leather, candles, malt, beer, ale, etc.

Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon the real Price of Manufactures.

It is the natural effect of improvement, however, to diminish gradually the real price of almost all manufactures. That of the manufacturing workmanship diminishes, perhaps, in all of them without exception. In consequence of better machinery, of greater dexterity, and of a more proper division and distribution of work, all of which are the natural effects of improvement, a much smaller quantity of labour becomes requisite for executing any particular piece of work; and though, in consequence of the flourishing circumstances of the society, the real price of labour should rise very considerably, yet the great diminution of the quantity will generally much more than compensate the greatest rise which can happen in the price.

The natural result of progress is that it gradually lowers the actual price of almost all manufactured goods. The cost of manufacturing labor decreases, likely in every case. Because of better equipment, increased skills, and a more efficient division and distribution of tasks, all of which are natural outcomes of advancement, much less labor is needed to complete any specific task. Even if, due to a thriving society, the actual price of labor rises significantly, the considerable drop in the amount of labor required will usually more than make up for the largest increase in price.

There are, indeed, a few manufactures, in which the necessary rise in the real price of the rude materials will more than compensate all the advantages which improvement can introduce into the execution of the work. In carpenters' and joiners' work, and in the coarser sort of cabinet work, the necessary rise in the real price of barren timber, in consequence of the improvement of land, will more than compensate all the advantages which can be derived from the best machinery, the greatest dexterity, and the most proper division and distribution of work.

There are, of course, a few industries where the necessary increase in the actual cost of raw materials outweighs all the benefits that improvements can bring to the work process. In carpentry and joinery, as well as in basic cabinet making, the needed rise in the actual price of unprocessed timber, due to land improvements, will exceed all the advantages that come from the best machinery, the highest skill levels, and the most effective division and organization of labor.

But in all cases in which the real price of the rude material either does not rise at all, or does not rise very much, that of the manufactured commodity sinks very considerably.

But in all cases where the actual price of the raw material either doesn't increase at all or doesn't increase much, the price of the manufactured product drops significantly.

This diminution of price has, in the course of the present and preceding century, been most remarkable in these manufactures of which the materials are the coarser metals. A better movement of a watch, than about the middle of the last century could have been bought for twenty pounds, may now perhaps be had for twenty shillings. In the work of cutlers and locksmiths, in all the toys which are made of the coarser metals, and in all those goods which are commonly known by the name of Birmingham and Sheffield ware, there has been, during the same period, a very great reduction of price, though not altogether so great as in watch-work. It has, however, been sufficient to astonish the workmen of every other part of Europe, who in many cases acknowledge that they can produce no work of equal goodness for double[Pg 104] or even for triple the price. There are perhaps no manufactures, in which the division of labour can be carried further, or in which the machinery employed admits of a greater variety of improvements, than those of which the materials are the coarser metals.

The drop in prices has been quite remarkable over the past century and into the current one, particularly in industries using coarser metals. A watch with a better movement that could be purchased for twenty pounds around the middle of the last century might now be available for just twenty shillings. In the work of cutlers and locksmiths, in all the toys made from these coarser metals, and in goods commonly referred to as Birmingham and Sheffield ware, there has also been a significant price reduction during this time, though not quite as dramatic as in watch-making. Still, it has been enough to astonish craftsmen from other parts of Europe, who often admit that they can produce no work of equal quality for even double or triple the price. There are probably no industries where the division of labor can be taken further, or where the machinery used allows for more varied improvements, than those that involve coarser metals.

In the clothing manufacture there has, during the same period, been no such sensible reduction of price. The price of superfine cloth, I have been assured, on the contrary, has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty years, risen somewhat in proportion to its quality, owing, it was said, to a considerable rise in the price of the material, which consists altogether of Spanish wool. That of the Yorkshire cloth, which is made altogether of English wool, is said, indeed, during the course of the present century, to have fallen a good deal in proportion to its quality. Quality, however, is so very disputable a matter, that I look upon all information of this kind as somewhat uncertain. In the clothing manufacture, the division of labour is nearly the same now as it was a century ago, and the machinery employed is not very different. There may, however, have been some small improvements in both, which may have occasioned some reduction of price.

In clothing manufacturing, there hasn't been a noticeable drop in prices during the same period. The cost of high-quality cloth, I've been told, has actually increased somewhat over the last twenty-five to thirty years, allegedly due to a significant rise in the price of the material, which is entirely made from Spanish wool. The price of Yorkshire cloth, which is made purely from English wool, is said to have decreased considerably in relation to its quality during this century. However, since quality is a highly debatable topic, I consider all this information to be somewhat uncertain. In clothing manufacturing, the division of labor is nearly the same now as it was a century ago, and the machinery used isn't very different either. There may have been some minor improvements in both areas, which could have led to a slight reduction in prices.

But the reduction will appear much more sensible and undeniable, if we compare the price of this manufacture in the present times with what it was in a much remoter period, towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the labour was probably much less subdivided, and the machinery employed much more imperfect, than it is at present.

But the decrease will seem much more reasonable and undeniable when we compare the price of this product today with what it was in a much earlier time, toward the end of the fifteenth century, when labor was likely much less specialized and the machinery used was far more primitive than it is now.

In 1487, being the 4th of Henry VII., it was enacted, that "whosoever shall sell by retail a broad yard of the finest scarlet grained, or of other grained cloth of the finest making, above sixteen shillings, shall forfeit forty shillings for every yard so sold." Sixteen shillings, therefore, containing about the same quantity of silver as four-and-twenty shillings of our present money, was, at that time, reckoned not an unreasonable price for a yard of the finest cloth; and as this is a sumptuary law, such cloth, it is probable, had usually been sold somewhat dearer. A guinea may be reckoned the highest price in the present times. Even though the quality of the cloths, therefore, should be supposed equal, and that of the present times is most probably much superior, yet, even upon this supposition, the money price of the finest cloth appears to have been considerably reduced since the end of the fifteenth century. But its real price has been much more reduced. Six shillings and eightpence was then, and long afterwards, reckoned the average price of a quarter of wheat. Sixteen shillings, therefore, was the price of two quarters and more than three bushels of wheat. Valuing a quarter of wheat in the present times at eight-and-twenty shillings, the real price of a yard of fine cloth must, in those times, have been equal to at least three pounds six shillings and sixpence of our present money. The man who bought it must have parted with the command of a quantity of labour and subsistence equal to what that sum would purchase in the present times.

In 1487, during the reign of Henry VII, it was enacted that "anyone who sells a broad yard of the finest scarlet or other high-quality cloth for more than sixteen shillings will forfeit forty shillings for each yard sold." At that time, sixteen shillings was considered a reasonable price for a yard of the finest cloth, which today would be equivalent to about twenty-four shillings. This was a sumptuary law, meaning such cloth was likely sold at a higher price than this. Nowadays, a guinea might be considered the highest price. Even if we assume the quality of the cloth was similar, the cloth produced today is likely much better. Thus, the monetary value of the finest cloth seems to have dropped significantly since the late 15th century. However, its actual value has decreased even more. Six shillings and eight pence was regarded as the average price for a quarter of wheat at that time, so sixteen shillings was the price for more than two quarters and three bushels of wheat. If we value a quarter of wheat today at twenty-eight shillings, then the actual cost of a yard of fine cloth back then would have been at least three pounds six shillings and six pence in today’s money. The person who purchased it must have given up control of a quantity of labor and resources equal to what that amount would buy today.

The reduction in the real price of the coarse manufacture, though considerable, has not been so great as in that of the fine.

The decrease in the actual price of the rough product, while significant, hasn't been as substantial as that of the fine product.

In 1463, being the 3d of Edward IV. it was enacted, that "no servant in husbandry nor common labourer, nor servant to any artificer inhabiting out of a city or burgh, shall use or wear in their clothing any cloth above two shillings the broad yard." In the 3d of Edward IV., two shillings contained very nearly the same quantity of silver as four of our present money. But the Yorkshire cloth which is now sold at four shillings the yard, is probably much superior to any that was then made for the wearing of the very poorest order of common servants. Even the money price of their clothing, therefore, may, in proportion to the quality, be somewhat cheaper in the present than it was in those ancient times. The real price is certainly a good deal cheaper. Tenpence was then reckoned what is called the moderate and reasonable price of a bushel of wheat. Two shillings, therefore, was the price of two bushels and near two pecks of wheat, which in the present times, at three shillings and sixpence the bushel, would be worth eight shillings and ninepence. For a yard of this cloth the poor servant must have parted with the power of purchasing a quantity of subsistence equal to what eight shillings and ninepence would purchase in the present times. This is a sumptuary law, too, restraining the luxury and extravagance of the poor. Their clothing, therefore, had commonly been much more expensive.

In 1463, during the reign of Edward IV, it was enacted that "no farm worker, manual laborer, or servant of any tradesman living outside a city or town shall wear any fabric that costs more than two shillings per yard." In the 3rd year of Edward IV, two shillings was roughly equivalent to four of today's currency. However, the cloth from Yorkshire that now sells for four shillings per yard is probably of much higher quality than what was available for the very poorest common servants back then. Even the price of their clothing may actually be somewhat cheaper now relative to the quality. The real cost is definitely a lot lower. Ten pence was considered the moderate and fair price for a bushel of wheat at the time. Therefore, two shillings was the cost of two bushels and almost two pecks of wheat, which today, at three shillings and sixpence per bushel, would be worth eight shillings and nine pence. For a yard of this cloth, a poor servant had to give up the purchasing power of what eight shillings and nine pence would buy today. This is a sumptuary law, aimed at limiting the luxury and extravagance of the poor, suggesting that their clothing was often much more expensive.

The same order of people are, by the same law, prohibited from wearing hose, of which the price should exceed fourteen-pence the pair, equal to about eight-and-twenty pence of our present money. But fourteen-pence was in those times the price of a bushel and near two pecks of wheat; which in the present times, at three and sixpence the bushel, would cost five shillings and threepence. We should in the present times consider this a very high price for a pair of stockings to a servant of the poorest and lowest order. He must, however, in these times, have paid what was really equivalent to this price for them.

The same group of people is, by the same law, prohibited from wearing hose that costs more than fourteen pence per pair, which is about twenty-eight pence in today's money. Back then, fourteen pence was the price of a bushel and nearly two pecks of wheat; now, at three and sixpence per bushel, that would cost five shillings and threepence. Today, we would consider this a very high price for a pair of stockings for a servant of the poorest and lowest status. However, in those times, he would have had to pay what was actually equivalent to this price for them.

In the time of Edward IV. the art of knitting stockings was probably not known in any part of Europe. Their hose were made of common cloth, which may have been one of the causes of their dearness. The first person that wore stockings in England is said to have been Queen Elizabeth. She received them as a present from the Spanish ambassador.

In the time of Edward IV, the art of knitting stockings was probably unknown in any part of Europe. People wore hose made of common cloth, which might have been one reason they were so expensive. The first person to wear stockings in England is said to be Queen Elizabeth. She received them as a gift from the Spanish ambassador.

Both in the coarse and in the fine woollen[Pg 105] manufacture, the machinery employed was much more imperfect in those ancient, than it is in the present times. It has since received three very capital improvements, besides, probably, many smaller ones, of which it may be difficult to ascertain either the number or the importance. The three capital improvements are, first, the exchange of the rock and spindle for the spinning-wheel, which, with the same quantity of labour, will perform more than double the quantity of work. Secondly, the use of several very ingenious machines, which facilitate and abridge, in a still greater proportion, the winding of the worsted and woollen yarn, or the proper arrangement of the warp and woof before they are put into the loom, an operation which, previous to the invention of those machines, must have been extremely tedious and troublesome.—Thirdly, the employment of the fulling-mill for thickening the cloth, instead of treading it in water. Neither wind nor water mills of any kind were known in England so early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, nor, so far as I know, in any other part of Europe north of the Alps. They had been introduced into Italy some time before.

Both in the coarse and fine woolen[Pg 105] manufacturing, the machinery used was far less advanced in ancient times than it is today. Since then, there have been three major improvements, along with probably many smaller ones that might be hard to quantify or assess. The three main improvements are: first, the replacement of the rock and spindle with the spinning wheel, which can produce more than double the amount of work with the same effort. Second, the introduction of several clever machines that greatly simplify the winding of worsted and woolen yarn, or the proper setup of the warp and weft before being woven, a task that, before these machines, must have been very tedious and challenging. Third, the use of the fulling mill to thicken the cloth instead of treading it in water. Wind and water mills of any kind were not known in England as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, nor, as far as I know, in any other part of Europe north of the Alps. They had already been introduced into Italy sometime before.

The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure, explain to us why the real price both of the course and of the fine manufacture was so much higher in those ancient than it is in the present times. It cost a greater quantity of labour to bring the goods to market. When they were brought thither, therefore, they must have purchased, or exchanged for the price of, a greater quantity.

The consideration of these circumstances may help explain why the actual price of both the course and the high-quality goods was so much higher in ancient times than it is today. It took more labor to bring the products to market. Therefore, when they arrived, they must have been sold or traded for a higher price.

The coarse manufacture probably was, in these ancient times, carried on in England in the same manner as it always has been in countries where arts and manufactures are in their infancy. It was probably a household manufacture, in which every different part of the work was occasionally performed by all the different members of almost every private family, but so as to be their work only when they had nothing else to do, and not to be the principal business from which any of them derived the greater part of their subsistence. The work which is performed in this manner, it has already been observed, comes always much cheaper to market than that which is the principal or sole fund of the workman's subsistence. The fine manufacture, on the other hand, was not, in those times, carried on in England, but in the rich and commercial country of Flanders; and it was probably conducted then, in the same manner as now, by people who derived the whole, or the principal part of their subsistence from it. It was, besides, a foreign manufacture, and must have paid some duty, the ancient custom of tonnage and poundage at least, to the king. This duty, indeed, would not probably be very great. It was not then the policy of Europe to restrain, by high duties, the importation of foreign manufactures, but rather to encourage it, in order that merchants might be enabled to supply, at as easy a rate as possible, the great men with the conveniencies and luxuries which they wanted, and which the industry of their own country could not afford them.

The rough manufacturing at that time was likely done in England just like it has been in countries where arts and industries are just starting out. It was probably a home-based craft, with every family member taking turns doing different parts of the work, but only when they didn’t have anything else to do, and it wasn't their main source of income. Work done this way is usually much cheaper in the market than work that is the main source of a worker's income. On the other hand, high-quality manufacturing wasn’t happening in England back then; it was taking place in the wealthy, trade-driven region of Flanders. It was probably managed then, as it is now, by people who relied mostly on this work for their livelihood. Additionally, it was a foreign industry and likely had to pay some tax, at least the traditional duties on goods, to the king. This tax probably wasn’t very significant, as at the time, Europe’s strategy was to promote foreign imports with low duties, so merchants could provide wealthy individuals with the conveniences and luxuries they desired, which domestic producers couldn’t supply.

The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure explain to us why, in those ancient times, the real price of the coarse manufacture was, in proportion to that of the fine, so much lower than in the present times.

The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure explain to us why, in those ancient times, the real price of the coarse manufacture was, in proportion to that of the fine, so much lower than in the present times.

Conclusion of the Chapter.

I shall conclude this very long chapter with observing, that every improvement in the circumstances of the society tends, either directly or indirectly, to raise the real rent of land, to increase the real wealth of the landlord, his power of purchasing the labour, or the produce of the labour of other people.

I will wrap up this very long chapter by noting that every improvement in society's circumstances tends, either directly or indirectly, to raise the actual rent of land and increase the real wealth of the landlord, enhancing his ability to purchase labor or the products of other people's labor.

The extension of improvement and cultivations tends to raise it directly. The landlord's share of the produce necessarily increases with the increase of the produce.

The expansion of development and farming usually leads to a direct increase. The landlord's portion of the harvest naturally grows as the harvest increases.

That rise in the real price of these parts of the rude produce of land, which is first the effect of the extended improvement and cultivation, and afterwards the cause of their being still further extended, the rise in the price of cattle, for example, tends, too, to raise the rent of land directly, and in a still greater proportion. The real value of the landlord's share, his real command of the labour of other people, not only rises with the real value of the produce, but the proportion of his share to the whole produce rises with it.

The increase in the actual price of these basic agricultural products, which is initially a result of expanded improvement and cultivation, and then becomes a reason for further expansion, such as the rise in cattle prices, also tends to directly increase land rent, and even more so. The real value of the landlord's share, his actual ability to command the labor of others, not only increases with the real value of the produce but also grows in proportion to the entire output.

That produce, after the rise in its real price, requires no more labour to collect it than before. A smaller proportion of it will, therefore, be sufficient to replace, with the ordinary profit, the stock which employs that labour. A greater proportion of it must consequently belong to the landlord.

That produce, after its real price goes up, needs no more work to gather than it did before. A smaller share of it will, therefore, be enough to replace, with the usual profit, the capital that hires that labor. A larger share of it must, as a result, go to the landlord.

All those improvements in the productive powers of labour, which tend directly to reduce the rent price of manufactures, tend indirectly to raise the real rent of land. The landlord exchanges that part of his rude produce, which is over and above his own consumption, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of that part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever reduces the real price of the latter, raises that of the former. An equal quantity of the former becomes thereby equivalent to a greater quantity of the latter; and the landlord is enabled to purchase a greater quantity of the conveniencies, ornaments, or luxuries which he has occasion for.

All those improvements in productivity that directly lower the rent price of manufactured goods indirectly increase the real rent of land. The landlord trades the portion of their raw produce that exceeds their own needs, or essentially, the value of that portion, for manufactured goods. Anything that lowers the real price of these goods makes the price of raw produce go up. An equal amount of raw produce then becomes equivalent to a larger amount of manufactured goods; and the landlord can buy more conveniences, decorations, or luxuries that they need.

Every increase in the real wealth of the society, every increase in the quantity of useful[Pg 106] labour employed within it, tends indirectly to raise the real rent of land. A certain proportion of this labour naturally goes to the land. A greater number of men and cattle are employed in its cultivation, the produce increases with the increase of the stock which is thus employed in raising it, and the rent increases with the produce.

Every rise in the actual wealth of society, every growth in the amount of useful[Pg 106] labor utilized within it, tends to indirectly increase the actual rent of land. A certain portion of this labor naturally goes toward the land. More workers and livestock are involved in its cultivation, the output grows with the increase of the resources employed in producing it, and the rent goes up with the output.

The contrary circumstances, the neglect of cultivation and improvement, the fall in the real price of any part of the rude produce of land, the rise in the real price of manufactures from the decay of manufacturing art and industry, the declension of the real wealth of the society, all tend, on the other hand, to lower the real rent of land, to reduce the real wealth of the landlord, to diminish his power of purchasing either the labour, or the produce of the labour, of other people.

The opposing conditions, the lack of farming and development, the drop in the actual price of any raw agricultural products, the increase in the actual price of manufactured goods due to the decline of manufacturing skills and industry, and the decrease in the overall wealth of society all contribute to lowering the actual rent of land, reducing the landlord's wealth, and diminishing his ability to buy either labor or the products of others' labor.

The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, or, what comes to the same thing, the whole price of that annual produce, naturally divides itself, it has already been observed, into three parts; the rent of land, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and constitutes a revenue to three different orders of people; to those who live by rent, to these who live by wages, and to those who live by profit. These are the three great, original, and constituent, orders of every civilized society, from whose revenue that of every other order is ultimately derived.

The total yearly output of a country's land and labor, or essentially the total value of that annual output, naturally breaks down into three parts, as mentioned before: the rent from land, the wages for labor, and the profits from capital. This creates income for three different groups of people: those who earn through rent, those who earn through wages, and those who earn through profits. These are the three main foundational groups in every civilized society, and all other income groups ultimately derive their revenue from these three.

The interest of the first of those three great orders, it appears from what has been just now said, is strictly and inseparably connected with the general interest of the society. Whatever either promotes or obstructs the one, necessarily promotes or obstructs the other. When the public deliberates concerning any regulation of commerce or police, the proprietors of land never can mislead it, with a view to promote the interest of their own particular order; at least, if they have any tolerable knowledge of that interest. They are, indeed, too often defective in this tolerable knowledge. They are the only one of the three orders whose revenue costs them neither labour nor care, but comes to them, as it were, of its own accord, and independent of any plan or project of their own. That indolence which is the natural effect of the ease and security of their situation, renders them too often, not only ignorant, but incapable of that application of mind, which is necessary in order to foresee and understand the consequence of any public regulation.

The interest of the first of those three great groups is clearly and closely tied to the overall interest of society. Anything that either supports or hinders one will necessarily support or hinder the other. When the public discusses any regulation related to commerce or public order, landowners can never mislead it just to promote their own specific interests; at least, if they have a decent understanding of those interests. However, they are often lacking in that decent understanding. They are the only group among the three whose income doesn't require them to work or put in effort; it comes to them almost automatically, independent of any plans or projects they have. That laziness, which naturally results from the ease and security of their situation, often makes them not only ignorant but also incapable of the focus needed to anticipate and grasp the impact of any public regulation.

The interest of the second order, that of those who live by wages, is as strictly connected with the interest of the society as that of the first. The wages of the labourer, it has already been shewn, are never so high as when the demand for labour is continually rising, or when the quantity employed is every year increasing considerably. When this real wealth of the society becomes stationary, his wages are soon reduced to what is barely enough to enable him to bring up a family, or to continue the race of labourers. When the society declines, they fall even below this. The order of proprietors may perhaps gain more by the prosperity of the society than that of labourers; but there is no order that suffers so cruelly from its decline. But though the interest of the labourer is strictly connected with that of the society, he is incapable either of comprehending that interest, or of understanding its connexion with his own. His condition leaves him no time to receive the necessary information, and his education and habits are commonly such as to render him unfit to judge, even though he was fully informed. In the public deliberations, therefore, his voice is little heard, and less regarded; except upon particular occasions, when his clamour is animated, set on, and supported by his employers, not for him, but their own particular purposes.

The interests of those who work for wages are just as closely tied to society’s interests as those of the wealthy. As has been shown, workers’ wages are highest when demand for labor is consistently rising, or when the number of jobs available is significantly increasing each year. When real wealth in society becomes stagnant, wages quickly drop to a level that barely allows workers to support their families or continue the labor force. As society declines, wages fall even lower. While property owners may benefit more from society's prosperity than laborers do, no group suffers as much during a decline. However, even though the interests of laborers are closely linked to society’s, they struggle to understand that connection. Their situation leaves them little time to gain the necessary knowledge, and their education and habits often make it hard for them to make informed judgments, even if they had all the information. Thus, their voices are rarely heard in public discussions and are even less respected, except during specific moments when their outcry is stirred up, encouraged, and backed by their employers, not for their benefit, but for the employers' own interests.

His employers constitute the third order, that of those who live by profit. It is the stock that is employed for the sake of profit, which puts into motion the greater part of the useful labour of every society. The plans and projects of the employers of stock regulate and direct all the most important operations of labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans and projects. But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the prosperity, and fall with the declension of the society. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich, and high in poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this third order, therefore, has not the same connexion with the general interest of the society, as that of the other two. Merchants and master manufacturers are, in this order, the two classes of people who commonly employ the largest capitals, and who by their wealth draw to themselves the greatest share of the public consideration. As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding than the greater part of country gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are commonly exercised rather about the interest of their own particular branch of business than about that of the society, their judgment, even when given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion), is much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those two objects, than with regard to the latter. Their superiority over the country gentleman is, not so much in their knowledge of the public interest, as in their having a better knowledge of their own interest than he has of his. It is by this superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently imposed upon his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own interest and that of the public, from a[Pg 107] very simple but honest conviction, that their interest, and not his, was the interest of the public. The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market, and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and can only serve to enable the dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.[Pg 108]

His employers make up the third group, those who earn by profit. It’s the capital invested for profit that drives most of the productive work in any society. The plans and ideas of capital owners guide the most significant labor activities, and profit is the ultimate goal of all those plans and ideas. However, profit rates don’t rise with society’s prosperity or drop during its decline like rent and wages do. In fact, profit tends to be lower in wealthy areas and higher in poorer ones, and it’s often highest in places that are quickly headed for disaster. Therefore, the interests of this third group don’t align with the overall interests of society in the same way as the other two groups. Merchants and master manufacturers make up the two classes within this group that typically manage the largest investments and, through their wealth, gain significant public attention. Throughout their lives, they engage in various plans and projects and often possess sharper insights than most landowners. However, since their focus tends to be more about their specific business interests than the interests of society, their judgment, even when given genuinely (which isn’t always the case), is far more reliable concerning their own business than regarding broader societal concerns. Their advantage over landowners lies not in their understanding of public interest but in their better grasp of their own interests compared to the landowner’s understanding of his. It’s this superior understanding of their own interests that often leads them to take advantage of the landowner’s goodwill, convincing him to sacrifice both his interests and those of the public based on a misguided yet sincere belief that their interests represent the public good. However, the interests of merchants in any specific industry or trade are often different, and sometimes even contrary, to those of the public. They always aim to expand their market while limiting competition. Expanding the market can often benefit the public; however, limiting competition is detrimental and only allows merchants to artificially inflate their profits, essentially placing an unreasonable burden on their fellow citizens. Any proposal for a new law or trade regulation from this group should be approached with caution and should never be accepted without thorough, careful examination, marked by meticulous scrutiny and a healthy dose of skepticism. This group’s interests rarely coincide with those of the public; they often have a vested interest in misleading or even exploiting the public and, as history shows, have done so on numerous occasions.[Pg 108]

PRICES OF WHEAT.

Years
XII.
Price of the
Quarter of
Wheat each
Year.
Average of
the different
Prices of the
same Year.
The Average Price
of each Year
in Money of
the present times.
L. s. d. L. s. d. L. s. d.
1202 0 12 0 - - - 1 16 0
1205 0 12 0
0 13 4
0 15 0
0 13 5 2   0 3
1223 0 12 0 - - - 1 16 0
1237 0   3 4 - - - 0 10 0
1243 0   2 0 - - - 0   6 0
1244 0   2 0 - - - 0   6 0
1246 0 16 0 - - - 2   8 0
1247 0 13 5 - - - 2   0 0
1257 1   4 0 - - - 3 12 0
1258 1   0 0
0 15 0
0 16 0
0 17 0 2 11 0
12704 16 0
6   8 0
5 12 0 16 16 0
12860   2 8
0 16 0
0   9 4 1   8 0
Total, 35   9 3
Average price, 2 19 1¼
1287 0   3 4 - - - 0 10 0
12880   0 8
0   1 0
0   1 4
0   1 6
0   1 8
0   2 0
0   3 4
0   9 4
0  3 0¼ 0   9 1¾
12890 12 0
0   6 0
0   2 0
0 10 8
1   0 0
0 10 1½ 1 10 4½
1290 0 16 0 - - - 2   8 0
1294 0 16 0 - - - 2   8 0
1302 0   4 0 - - - 0 12 0
1309 0   7 2 - - - 1   1 6
1315 1   0 0 - - - 3   0 0
1316 1   0 0
1 10 0
1 12 0
2   0 0
1 10 6 4 11 6
1317 2   4 0
0 14 0
2 13 0
4   0 0
0   6 8
1 19 6 5 18 6
1336 0   2 0 - - - 0   6 0
1338 0   3 4 - - - 0 10 0
Total, 23   4 11¼
Average price, 1 18   8  
1339 0   9 0 - - - 1   7 0
1349 0   2 0 - - - 0   5 2
1359 1   6 8 - - - 3   2 2
1361 0   2 0 - - - 0   4 8
1363 0 15 0 - - - 1 15 0
1369 1   0 0
1   4 0
1   2 0 2   9 4
1379 0   4 0 - - - 0   9 4
1387 0   2 0 - - - 0   4 8
1390 0 13 4
0 14 0
0 16 0
0 14 5 1 13 7
1401 0 16 0 - - - 1 17 6
1407 0  4 4¾
0  3 4   
0   3 10 0   8 11
1416 0 16 0 - - - 1 12 0
Total, 15  9 4
Aver. price, 1  5 9½
1423 0 8 0 - - - 0 16 0
1425 0 4 0 - - - 0   8 0
1434 1 6 8 - - - 2 13 4
1435 0 5 4 - - - 0 10 8
1439 1 0 0
1 6 8
1 3 4 2   6 8
1440 1 4 0 - - - 2   8 0
1444 0 4 4
0 4 0
0 4 2 0   8 4
1445 0 4 6 - - - 0   9 0
1447 0 8 0 - - - 0 16 0
1448 0 6 8 - - - 0 13 4
1449 0 5 0 - - - 0 10 0
1451 0 8 0 - - - 0 16 0
Total, 12 15 4
Aver. price, 1  1 3⅓
1453 0   5 4 - - - 0 10 8
1455 0   1 2 - - - 0   2 4
1457 0   7 8 - - - 0 15 4
1459 0   5 0 - - - 0 10 0
1460 0   8 0 - - - 0 16 0
1463 0   2 0
0   1 8
0 1 10 0   3 8
1464 0   6 8 - - - 0 10 0
1486 1   4 0 - - - 1 17 0
1491 0 14 8 - - - 1   2 0
1494 0   4 0 - - - 0   6 0
1495 0   3 4 - - - 0   5 0
1497 1   0 0 - - - 1 11 0
Total, 8   9 0
Aver. price, 0 14 1
[Pg 109]
1499 0   4 0 - - - 0   6 0
1504 0   5 8 - - - 0   8 6
1521 1   0 0 - - - 1 10 0
1551 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1553 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1554 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1555 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1556 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1957 0   4 0
0   5 0
0   8 0
2 13 4
0 17 8½ 0 17 8½
1558 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1559 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1560 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
Total, 6   0 2½
Average price, 0 10 0512
1561 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1562 0   8 0 - - - 0   8 0
1574 2 16 0
1 4 0
2   0 0 2   0 0
1587 3   4 0 - - - 3   4 0
1594 2 16 0 - - - 2 16 0
1595 2 13 0 - - - 2 13 0
1596 4   0 0 - - - 4   0 0
1597 5   4 0
4   0 0
4 12 0 4 12 0
1598 2 16 8 - - - 2 16 8
1599 1 19 2 - - - 1 19 2
1600 1 17 8 - - - 1 17 8
1601 1 14 10 - - - 1 14 10
Total, 28   9 4
Average price, 2   7 5⅓

 

PRICES OF THE QUARTER OF NINE BUSHELS OF THE BEST OR HIGHEST PRICED WHEAT AT WINDSOR MARKET, ON LADY-DAY AND MICHAELMAS, FROM 1595 TO 1764, BOTH INCLUSIVE; THE PRICE OF EACH YEAR BEING THE MEDIUM BETWEEN THE HIGHEST PRICES OF THOSE TWO MARKET-DAYS.

Wheat per Quarter.
Years.L.s.d.
1595200
1596280
1597396
15982168
15991192
16001178
160111410
1602194
16031154
16041108
160511510
16061130
16071168
16082168
16092100
161011510
16111188
1612224
1613288
161421
16151188
1616204
1617288
1618268
16191154
16201104
————————
26)540
————————
216913

 

Wheat per Quarter.
Years.L.s.d.
16211104
16222188
16232120
1624280
16252120
1626294
16271160
1628180
1629220
16302158
1631380
16322134
16332180
16342160
16352160
16362168
————————
16)4000
————————
2100

 

Wheat per Quarter.
Years.L.s.d.
16372130
16382174
16392410
1640248
1641280
1642[26]000
1643[26]000
1644[26]000
1645[26]000
1646280
16473130
1648450
1649400
16503168
16513134
1652296
16531156
1654160
16551134
1656230
1657268
1658350
1659360
16602166
16613100
16623140
16632170
1664206
1665294
16661160
16671160
1668200
1669244
1670218
1671220
1672210
1673268
1674388
1675348
16761180
1677220
16782190
1679300
1680250
1681268
1682240
1683200
1684240
1685268
16861140
1687152
1688260
16891100
16901148
16911140
1692268
1693378
1694340
16952130
16963110
1697300
1698384
1699340
1700200
————————
60)15318
————————
211

 

Wheat per Quarter.
Years.L.s.d.
17011178
1702196
17031160
1704266
17051100
1706160
1707186
1708216
17093186
17103180
17112140
1712264
17132110
17142104
1715230
1716280
1717258
171811810
17191150
17201170
17211176
17221160
17231148
17241170
1725286
1726260
1727220
17282146
17292610
17301166
173111210
1732168
1733184
173411810
1735230
1736204
17371180
17381156
17391186
17402108
1741268
17421140
17431410
17441410
1745176
17461190
174711410
17481170
17491170
17501126
17511186
17522110
1753248
17541148
175511310
1756253
1757300
17582100
175911910
17601166
17611103
17621190
1763209
1764269
————————
64)129136
————————
2061864

 

Wheat per Quarter.
Years.L.s.d.
173111210
1732168
1733184
173411810
1735230
1736204
17371180
17381156
17391186
17402108
————————
10)18128
————————
117315

Wheat per Quarter.
Years.L.s.d.
1741268
17421140
17431410
17441410
1745176
17461190
174711410
17481170
17491170
17501126
————————
10)16182
————————
113945

BOOK II.

OF THE NATURE, ACCUMULATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF STOCK.


INTRODUCTION.

In that rude state of society, in which there is no division of labour, in which exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides every thing for himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be accumulated, or stored up before-hand, in order to carry on the business of the society. Every man endeavours to supply, by his own industry, his own occasional wants, as they occur. When he is hungry, he goes to the forest to hunt; when his coat is worn out, he clothes himself with the skin of the first large animal he kills; and when his hut begins to go to ruin, he repairs it, as well as he can, with the trees and the turf that are nearest it.

In that basic stage of society, where there's no division of labor, exchanges rarely happen, and each person provides everything for themselves, it's unnecessary to accumulate or store resources in advance to sustain the community. Each person tries to meet their immediate needs through their own efforts as they arise. When they're hungry, they head to the forest to hunt; when their coat wears out, they use the skin of the first large animal they kill to make new clothes; and when their hut starts falling apart, they fix it as best as they can with the trees and grass nearby.

But when the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the produce of a man's own labour can supply but a very small part of his occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce of other men's labour, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the same thing, with the price of the produce, of his own. But this purchase cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own labour has not only been completed, but sold. A stock of goods of different kinds, therefore, must be stored up somewhere, sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, till such time at least as both these events can be brought about. A weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his peculiar business, unless there is before-hand stored up somewhere, either in his own possession, or in that of some other person, a stock sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, till he has not only completed, but sold his web. This accumulation must evidently be previous to his applying his industry for so long a time to such a peculiar business.

But once the division of labor is fully established, the output of a person's own work can only cover a small portion of their occasional needs. Most of these needs are met by the output of others, which they buy with the output—or, in other words, the earnings—of their own work. However, this purchase can’t happen until their own labor has not only been finished but also sold. Therefore, a stock of various goods needs to be stored somewhere, enough to support them and provide the materials and tools necessary for their work, at least until these conditions are met. A weaver cannot fully dedicate himself to his specific trade unless there’s a stock readily available, either in his own possession or that of someone else, that can sustain him and supply him with the materials and tools needed for his work until he has not only completed but also sold his fabric. This accumulation must clearly happen before he can devote himself to such a specialized task for an extended period.

As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated. The quantity of materials which the same number of people can work up, increases in a great proportion as labour comes to be more and more subdivided; and as the operations of each workman are gradually reduced to a greater degree of simplicity, a variety of new machines come to be invented for facilitating and abridging these operations. As the division of labour advances, therefore, in order to give constant employment to an equal number of workman, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock of materials and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state of things, must be accumulated before-hand. But the number of workmen in every branch of business generally increases with the division of labour in that branch; or rather it is the increase of their number which enables them to class and subdivide themselves in this manner.

As the accumulation of resources must, by nature, happen before the division of labor, labor can only be subdivided further as resources are gathered more and more. The amount of materials that the same number of people can process increases significantly as labor becomes increasingly specialized; and as each worker's tasks get simpler, various new machines are invented to make these tasks easier and quicker. Therefore, as the division of labor progresses, to keep a consistent number of workers busy, a sufficient supply of food, along with more materials and tools than would be needed in a less advanced setting, must be gathered in advance. However, the number of workers in each area typically grows with the division of labor in that area; in fact, it’s this increase in their numbers that allows them to categorize and specialize in this way.

As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this great improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumulation naturally leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in maintaining labour, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to produce as great a quantity of work as possible. He endeavours, therefore, both to make among his workmen the most proper distribution of employment, and to furnish them with the best machines which he can either invent or afford to purchase. His abilities, in both these respects, are generally in proportion to the extent of his stock, or to the number of people whom it can employ. The quantity of industry, therefore, not only increases in every country with the increase of the stock which employs it, but, in consequence of that increase, the same quantity of industry produces a much greater quantity of work.

As the accumulation of resources is essential for advancing this significant improvement in the productivity of labor, that accumulation naturally leads to this enhancement. The person who invests their resources in sustaining labor wants to do so in a way that generates as much work as possible. They strive to achieve the best distribution of tasks among their workers and to provide them with the best machines they can either create or afford. Their skills in both areas typically correspond to the size of their resources or the number of people they can employ. Therefore, the level of industry not only grows in every country with the increase of the resources that support it, but as a result of that growth, the same amount of industry yields a much greater volume of work.

Such are in general the effects of the increase of stock upon industry and its productive powers.[Pg 112]

These are generally the effects of an increase in stock on industry and its productivity.[Pg 112]

In the following book, I have endeavoured to explain the nature of stock, the effects of its accumulation into capital of different kinds, and the effects of the different employments of those capitals. This book is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, I have endeavoured to shew what are the different parts or branches into which the stock, either of an individual, or of a great society, naturally divides itself. In the second, I have endeavoured to explain the nature and operation of money, considered as a particular branch of the general stock of the society. The stock which is accumulated into a capital, may either be employed by the person to whom it belongs, or it may be lent to some other person. In the third and fourth chapters, I have endeavoured to examine the manner in which it operates in both these situations. The fifth and last chapter treats of the different effects which the different employments of capital immediately produce upon the quantity, both of national industry, and of the annual produce of land and labour.

In this book, I've tried to explain the nature of stock, how it accumulates into different types of capital, and the impacts of those various types of capital. This book is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, I aim to show the different parts or branches into which the stock, whether of an individual or a large society, naturally divides. In the second chapter, I explain the nature and function of money as a specific part of society's overall stock. The stock that is accumulated into capital can either be used by the owner or lent to someone else. In the third and fourth chapters, I examine how it operates in both situations. The fifth and final chapter discusses the different effects that various uses of capital have on the quantity of national industry and the annual output of land and labor.


CHAP. I.

OF THE DIVISION OF STOCK.

When the stock which a man possesses is no more than sufficient to maintain him for a few days or a few weeks, he seldom thinks of deriving any revenue from it. He consumes it as sparingly as he can, and endeavours, by his labour, to acquire something which may supply its place before it be consumed altogether. His revenue is, in this case, derived from his labour only. This is the state of the greater part of the labouring poor in all countries.

When a person has just enough resources to last them a few days or weeks, they rarely consider making any money from it. They use it as carefully as they can and try to earn something through their work to replace what they consume before it runs out completely. In this situation, their income comes solely from their labor. This is the reality for most of the working poor in every country.

But when he possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for months or years, he naturally endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of it, reserving only so much for his immediate consumption as may maintain him till this revenue begins to come in. His whole stock, therefore, is distinguished into two parts. That part which he expects is to afford him this revenue is called his capital. The other is that which supplies his immediate consumption, and which consists either, first, in that portion of his whole stock which was originally reserved for this purpose; or, secondly, in his revenue, from whatever source derived, as it gradually comes in; or, thirdly, in such things as had been purchased by either of these in former years, and which are not yet entirely consumed, such as a stock of clothes, household furniture, and the like. In one or other, or all of these three articles, consists the stock which men commonly reserve for their own immediate consumption.

But when he has enough resources to support himself for months or years, he naturally seeks to earn an income from most of it, keeping just enough for his immediate needs until that income starts coming in. His entire stock is therefore divided into two parts. The portion he expects will generate this income is called his capital. The other part covers his immediate consumption, which can consist of either, first, the portion of his total stock that was originally set aside for this purpose; or, second, his income, from whatever source, as it arrives over time; or, third, items he bought with either of these in previous years that he hasn't fully consumed yet, like clothes, furniture, and similar things. People generally keep their stock for immediate consumption in one or more of these three categories.

There are two different ways in which a capital may be employed so as to yield a revenue or profit to its employer.

There are two different ways that capital can be used to generate income or profit for its owner.

First, it may be employed in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and selling them again with a profit. The capital employed in this manner yields no revenue or profit to its employer, while it either remains in his possession, or continues in the same shape. The goods of the merchant yield him no revenue or profit till he sells them for money, and the money yields him as little till it is again exchanged for goods. His capital is continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another; and it is only by means of such circulation, or successive changes, that it can yield him any profit. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called circulating capitals.

First, it can be used for raising, manufacturing, or buying goods, and selling them again for a profit. The capital used this way doesn't generate any revenue or profit for its owner while it either stays in their possession or remains in the same form. A merchant's goods don’t produce any revenue or profit until they’re sold for money, and the money doesn’t yield much either until it's exchanged again for goods. His capital is always leaving him in one form and coming back in another; it’s only through this kind of circulation or series of changes that it can generate any profit for him. Therefore, this kind of capital can rightly be called circulating capital.

Secondly, it may be employed in the improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments of trade, or in such like things as yield a revenue or profit without changing masters, or circulating any further. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called fixed capitals.

Secondly, it can be used to improve land, buy useful machines and tools for trade, or for similar things that generate income or profit without needing to change ownership or circulate further. Therefore, such funds can rightly be referred to as fixed capital.

Different occupations require very different proportions between the fixed and circulating capitals employed in them.

Different jobs require varying amounts of fixed and circulating capital.

The capital of a merchant, for example, is altogether a circulating capital. He has occasion for no machines or instruments of trade, unless his shop or warehouse be considered as such.

The capital of a merchant, for example, is completely a circulating capital. He doesn’t need any machines or tools for trading, unless his shop or warehouse is seen as one.

Some part of the capital of every master artificer or manufacturer must be fixed in the instruments of his trade. This part, however, is very small in some, and very great in others. A master tailor requires no other instruments of trade but a parcel of needles. Those of the master shoemaker are a little, though but a very little, more expensive. Those of the weaver rise a good deal above those of the shoemaker. The far greater part of the capital of all such master artificers, however, is circulated either in the wages of their workmen, or in the price of their materials, and repaid, with a profit, by the price of the work.

A portion of the capital for every skilled craftsman or manufacturer needs to be invested in the tools of their trade. However, this amount varies greatly among different trades. A master tailor only needs a few needles as their tools. The tools for a master shoemaker are slightly more costly, but still not too expensive. The tools for a weaver are significantly more expensive than those for a shoemaker. Nevertheless, the majority of the capital for all these master craftsmen is circulated in the wages of their workers or in the cost of their materials, and is recouped, with a profit, through the price of the finished work.

In other works a much greater fixed capital is required. In a great iron-work, for example, the furnace for melting the ore, the forge, the slit-mill, are instruments of trade which cannot be erected without a very great expense. In coal works, and mines of every kind, the machinery necessary, both for drawing out the water, and for other purposes, is frequently still more expensive.

In other industries, a lot more fixed capital is needed. In a large ironworks, for instance, the furnace for melting ore, the forge, and the slit-mill are essential tools that can’t be set up without significant costs. In coal operations and various types of mines, the machinery required for pumping out water and for other tasks is often even more costly.

That part of the capital of the farmer which is employed in the instruments of agriculture is a fixed, that which is employed in the wages and maintenance of his labouring servants is a circulating capital. He makes a profit of the one by keeping it in his own possession, and of the other by parting with it. The price or value of his labouring cattle is a fixed[Pg 113] capital, in the same manner as that of the instruments of husbandry; their maintenance is a circulating capital, in the same manner as that of the labouring servants. The farmer makes his profit by keeping the labouring cattle, and by parting with their maintenance. Both the price and the maintenance of the cattle which are bought in and fattened, not for labour, but for sale, are a circulating capital. The farmer makes his profit by parting with them. A flock of sheep or a herd of cattle, that, in a breeding country, is brought in neither for labour nor for sale, but in order to make a profit by their wool, by their milk, and by their increase, is a fixed capital. The profit is made by keeping them. Their maintenance is a circulating capital. The profit is made by parting with it; and it comes back with both its own profit and the profit upon the whole price of the cattle, in the price of the wool, the milk, and the increase. The whole value of the seed, too, is properly a fixed capital. Though it goes backwards and forwards between the ground and the granary, it never changes masters, and therefore does not properly circulate. The farmer makes his profit, not by its sale, but by its increase.

The part of a farmer's capital that's used for farming tools is considered fixed capital, while the part used for paying and supporting his workers is circulating capital. He profits from the fixed capital by keeping it, and from the circulating capital by spending it. The value of his work animals is fixed capital, just like the farming tools, while their upkeep is circulating capital, similar to the workers' wages. The farmer profits by keeping the work animals and by managing their upkeep. The price and maintenance of animals that are bought and fattened for sale, rather than for work, are considered circulating capital. The farmer profits from selling them. A flock of sheep or a herd of cattle that is raised not for work or sale, but to earn income from their wool, milk, and offspring, is considered fixed capital. Profit is generated by keeping them, while their maintenance is circulating capital—profit is made by spending it, and it returns with profit on both the maintenance and the total price of the animals, reflected in the price of wool, milk, and offspring. The entire value of the seeds is also fixed capital. Even though it moves between the field and the granary, it doesn’t change ownership and thus doesn’t really circulate. The farmer profits not from selling it, but from its growth.

The general stock of any country or society is the same with that of all its inhabitants or members; and, therefore, naturally divides itself into the same three portions, each of which has a distinct function or office.

The overall wealth of any country or society is the same as that of all its people or members; and, as a result, it naturally divides into the same three parts, each of which has a unique role or purpose.

The first is that portion which is reserved for immediate consumption, and of which the characteristic is, that it affords no revenue or profit. It consists in the stock of food, clothes, household furniture, &c. which have been purchased by their proper consumers, but which are not yet entirely consumed. The whole stock of mere dwelling-houses, too, subsisting at any one time in the country, make a part of this first portion. The stock that is laid out in a house, if it is to be the dwelling-house of the proprietor, ceases from that moment to serve in the function of a capital, or to afford any revenue to its owner. A dwelling-house, as such, contributes nothing to the revenue of its inhabitant; and though it is, no doubt, extremely useful to him, it is as his clothes and household furniture are useful to him, which, however, make a part of his expense, and not of his revenue. If it is to be let to a tenant for rent, as the house itself can produce nothing, the tenant must always pay the rent out of some other revenue, which he derives, either from labour, or stock, or land. Though a house, therefore, may yield a revenue to its proprietor, and thereby serve in the function of a capital to him, it cannot yield any to the public, nor serve in the function of a capital to it, and the revenue of the whole body of the people can never be in the smallest degree increased by it. Clothes and household furniture, in the same manner, sometimes yield a revenue, and thereby serve in the function of a capital to particular persons. In countries where masquerades are common, it is a trade to let out masquerade dresses for a night. Upholsterers frequently let furniture by the month or by the year. Undertakers let the furniture of funerals by the day and by the week. Many people let furnished houses, and get a rent, not only for the use of the house, but for that of the furniture. The revenue, however, which is derived from such things, must always be ultimately drawn from some other source of revenue. Of all parts of the stock, either of an individual or of a society, reserved for immediate consumption, what is laid out in houses is most slowly consumed. A stock of clothes may last several years; a stock of furniture half a century or a century; but a stock of houses, well built and properly taken care of, may last many centuries. Though the period of their total consumption, however, is more distant, they are still as really a stock reserved for immediate consumption as either clothes or household furniture.

The first part is the portion set aside for immediate use, which is characterized by not generating any revenue or profit. It includes the food, clothing, household furniture, etc., that have been bought by their intended users but have not yet been fully consumed. The entire stock of residential houses that exist in the country at any given time also falls into this first category. If a house is to be the owner’s residence, the investment in it stops functioning as capital or generating any revenue for its owner from that point on. A house, in and of itself, does not contribute to the income of its occupant; even though it is undoubtedly very useful, it serves a purpose similar to clothing and furniture, which are part of a person's expenses, not their income. If the house is rented out to a tenant for rent, since the house itself generates nothing, the tenant must always pay the rent from some other income that comes from either labor, assets, or land. Therefore, while a house can provide income to its owner and function as capital for them, it cannot generate any income for the public or serve as capital for society; the overall revenue of the population cannot be increased in any way by it. Similarly, clothing and furniture can sometimes generate income, thereby serving as capital for specific individuals. In places where masquerade parties are common, there's a business of renting masquerade costumes for a night. Furniture makers often rent out furniture monthly or yearly. Funeral directors also rent funeral furniture by the day or week. Many individuals rent out furnished homes, charging for both the use of the house and the furniture. However, the income gained from such items must always be ultimately sourced from other forms of revenue. Among all types of assets reserved for immediate consumption, the investments made in houses are consumed the most slowly. A collection of clothes may last several years; furniture can last half a century or even a century; but a well-constructed and properly maintained house can last for many centuries. Although the time frame for their complete consumption is longer, they are still genuinely an asset reserved for immediate consumption, just like clothes or household furniture.

The second of the three portions into which the general stock of the society divides itself, is the fixed capital; of which the characteristic is, that it affords a revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters. It consists chiefly of the four following articles.

The second of the three sections that the overall resources of the society are divided into is the fixed capital. Its main feature is that it generates income or profit without being exchanged or transferred between owners. It mainly consists of the following four items.

First, of all useful machines and instruments of trade, which facilitate and abridge labour.

First, of all useful machines and tools of trade that simplify and reduce labor.

Secondly, of all those profitable buildings which are the means of procuring a revenue, not only to the proprietor who lets them for a rent, but to the person who possesses them, and pays that rent for them; such as shops, warehouses, workhouses, farm-houses, with all their necessary buildings, stables, granaries, &c. These are very different from mere dwelling-houses. They are a sort of instruments of trade, and may be considered in the same light.

Secondly, among all those profitable buildings that generate income, not just for the owner who rents them out, but also for the person who owns them and pays rent for them, like shops, warehouses, factories, and farmhouses, along with all their essential structures, stables, granaries, etc. These are quite different from just regular homes. They function as tools for business and can be viewed in that context.

Thirdly, of the improvements of land, of what has been profitably laid out in clearing, draining, inclosing, manuring, and reducing it into the condition most proper for tillage and culture. An improved farm may very justly be regarded in the same light as those useful machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and by means of which an equal circulating capital can afford a much greater revenue to its employer. An improved farm is equally advantageous and more durable than any of those machines, frequently requiring no other repairs than the most profitable application of the farmer's capital employed in cultivating it.

Thirdly, when it comes to land improvements, we should consider what has been effectively invested in clearing, draining, fencing, fertilizing, and preparing it for farming and cultivation. A well-improved farm can be seen similarly to those useful machines that make work easier and cut down on labor, allowing an equal amount of capital to generate a much higher return for its owner. An improved farm is just as beneficial and more long-lasting than those machines, often needing no more upkeep than the smart investment of the farmer's resources used in its cultivation.

Fourthly, of the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants and members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his[Pg 114] education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realised, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise that of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit.

Fourthly, regarding the useful skills acquired by all the members of society. Gaining these skills requires investment to support the learner during their education, study, or apprenticeship. This investment represents a fixed cost that becomes part of the individual. These skills contribute not only to the person’s wealth but also to the wealth of the society they are part of. The enhanced skills of a worker can be viewed similarly to a machine or tool that makes work easier and quicker, and while it entails a cost, it also generates a return on that investment.

The third and last of the three portions into which the general stock of the society naturally divides itself, is the circulating capital, of which the characteristic is, that it affords a revenue only by circulating or changing masters. It is composed likewise of four parts.

The third and final part of the general stock of the society naturally divides itself into is the circulating capital, which is defined by the fact that it generates revenue only by being circulated or changing owners. It is also made up of four components.

First, of the money, by means of which all the other three are circulated and distributed to their proper consumers.

First, of the money that is used to circulate and distribute all the other three to their proper consumers.

Secondly, of the stock of provisions which are in the possession of the butcher, the grazier, the farmer, the corn-merchant, the brewer, &c. and from the sale of which they expect to derive a profit.

Secondly, of the supply of goods held by the butcher, the grazier, the farmer, the grain merchant, the brewer, etc., from which they anticipate making a profit.

Thirdly, of the materials, whether altogether rude, or more or less manufactured, of clothes, furniture, and building which are not yet made up into any of those three shapes, but which remain in the hands of the growers, the manufacturers, the mercers, and drapers, the timber-merchants, the carpenters and joiners, the brick-makers, &c.

Thirdly, regarding the materials, whether completely raw or somewhat processed, for clothing, furniture, and building that haven't yet been made into those three forms but are still in the possession of growers, manufacturers, fabric sellers, and cloth merchants, timber merchants, carpenters and joiners, brick makers, etc.

Fourthly, and lastly, of the work which is made up and completed, but which is still in the hands of the merchant and manufacturer, and not yet disposed of or distributed to the proper consumers; such as the finished work which we frequently find ready made in the shops of the smith, the cabinet-maker, the goldsmith, the jeweller, the china-merchant, &c. The circulating capital consists, in this manner, of the provisions, materials, and finished work of all kinds that are in the hands of their respective dealers, and of the money that is necessary for circulating and distributing them to those who are finally to use or to consume them.

Fourthly and finally, there's the work that is made and completed but is still with the merchant and manufacturer, not yet sold or distributed to the right consumers. This includes the finished products we often see ready-made in the shops of blacksmiths, cabinet-makers, goldsmiths, jewelers, china merchants, etc. The circulating capital consists of the supplies, materials, and all kinds of finished goods that are with their respective sellers, along with the money needed to circulate and distribute them to those who will ultimately use or consume them.

Of these four parts, three—provisions, materials, and finished work, are either annually or in a longer or shorter period, regularly withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital, or in the stock reserved for immediate consumption.

Of these four parts, three—supplies, materials, and completed work—are either taken out regularly every year or over a shorter or longer period and are placed either in fixed assets or in the stock set aside for immediate use.

Every fixed capital is both originally derived from, and requires to be continually supported by, a circulating capital. All useful machines and instruments of trade are originally derived from a circulating capital, which furnishes the materials of which they are made, and the maintenance of the workmen who make them. They require, too, a capital of the same kind to keep them in constant repair.

Every fixed capital comes from, and needs ongoing support from, circulating capital. All useful machines and trade tools are originally created using circulating capital, which provides the materials they’re made of and pays for the workers who create them. They also need the same type of capital to keep them in good working order.

No fixed capital can yield any revenue but by means of a circulating capital. The most useful machines and instruments of trade will produce nothing, without the circulating capital, which affords the materials they are employed upon, and the maintenance of the workmen who employ them. Land, however improved, will yield no revenue without a circulating capital, which maintains the labourers who cultivate and collect its produce.

No fixed capital can generate any income without circulating capital. The most effective machines and tools for trade won’t produce anything without the circulating capital that provides the materials they work with and supports the workers who operate them. Even land, no matter how well-developed, won’t generate any revenue without circulating capital that maintains the laborers who farm it and gather its yield.

To maintain and augment the stock which may be reserved for immediate consumption, is the sole end and purpose both of the fixed and circulating capitals. It is this stock which feeds, clothes, and lodges the people. Their riches or poverty depend upon the abundant or sparing supplies which those two capitals can afford to the stock reserved for immediate consumption.

To maintain and increase the resources set aside for immediate use is the primary goal of both fixed and circulating capitals. This resource is what provides food, clothing, and shelter for the people. Their wealth or poverty relies on the plentiful or limited supplies that these two types of capital can offer for immediate consumption.

So great a part of the circulating capital being continually withdrawn from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the general stock of the society, it must in its turn require continual supplies without which it would soon cease to exist. These supplies are principally drawn from three sources; the produce of land, of mines, and of fisheries. These afford continual supplies of provisions and materials, of which part is afterwards wrought up into finished work and by which are replaced the provisions, materials, and finished work, continually withdrawn from the circulating capital. From mines, too, is drawn what is necessary for maintaining and augmenting that part of it which consists in money. For though, in the ordinary course of business, this part is not, like the other three, necessarily withdrawn from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the stock of the society, it must, however, like all other things, be wasted and worn out at last, and sometimes, too, be either lost or sent abroad, and must, therefore, require continual, though no doubt much smaller, supplies.

With such a large portion of the circulating capital being constantly taken out to support the other two branches of the society's general stock, it too needs ongoing supplies, without which it would quickly disappear. These supplies mainly come from three sources: agricultural produce, mining, and fishing. These sources provide a steady flow of food and materials, part of which is later transformed into finished products, replenishing the provisions, materials, and finished goods that are continually drawn from the circulating capital. Additionally, mining supplies what is necessary to maintain and increase the portion of the capital that is in the form of money. Although this money isn’t as frequently withdrawn as the other three types, like everything else, it will eventually be depleted, lost, or sent abroad, and therefore, it also requires ongoing, albeit much smaller, supplies.

Lands, mines, and fisheries, require all both a fixed and circulating capital to cultivate them; and their produce replaces, with a profit not only those capitals, but all the others in the society. Thus the farmer annually replaces to the manufacturer the provisions which he had consumed, and the materials which he had wrought up the year before; and the manufacturer replaces to the farmer the finished work which he had wasted and worn out in the same time. This is the real exchange that is annually made between those two orders of people, though it seldom happens that the rude produce of the one, and the manufactured produce of the other, are directly bartered for one another; because it seldom happens that the farmer sells his corn and his cattle, his flax and his wool, to the very same person of whom he chuses to purchase the clothes, furniture, and instruments[Pg 115] of trade, which he wants. He sells, therefore, his rude produce for money, with which he can purchase, wherever it is to be had, the manufactured produce he has occasion for. Land even replaces, in part at least, the capitals with which fisheries and mines are cultivated. It is the produce of land which draws the fish from the waters; and it is the produce of the surface of the earth which extracts the minerals from its bowels.

Lands, mines, and fisheries all need both fixed and circulating capital to develop; their output not only replaces those capitals but also benefits all other sectors in society. Each year, the farmer replenishes the manufacturer with the food he has consumed and the raw materials he processed the previous year; in return, the manufacturer provides the farmer with the finished goods he has used up during that time. This is the true exchange that takes place annually between these two groups of people, although it rarely happens that the raw products of one are directly traded for the manufactured products of the other. This is because it is uncommon for the farmer to sell his grain, livestock, flax, and wool to the exact person from whom he wants to buy clothing, furniture, and tools needed for his trade. Instead, he sells his raw products for money, which he can then use to buy the manufactured goods he needs, wherever they are available. Land also, at least in part, replenishes the capital used to operate fisheries and mines. It is the output from the land that attracts fish from the waters, and it is the resources from the earth’s surface that yield the minerals from below.

The produce of land, mines, and fisheries, when their natural fertility is equal, is in proportion to the extent and proper application of the capitals employed about them. When the capitals are equal, and equally well applied, it is in proportion to their natural fertility.

The output of land, mines, and fisheries, when their natural productivity is the same, depends on the size and effective use of the capital invested in them. When the capital is equal and used effectively, it depends on their natural productivity.

In all countries where there is a tolerable security, every man of common understanding will endeavour to employ whatever stock he can command, in procuring either present enjoyment or future profit. If it is employed in procuring present enjoyment, it is a stock reserved for immediate consumption. If it is employed in procuring future profit, it must procure this profit either by staying with him, or by going from him. In the one case it is a fixed, in the other it is a circulating capital. A man must be perfectly crazy, who, where there is a tolerable security, does not employ all the stock which he commands, whether it be his own, or borrowed of other people, in some one or other of those three ways.

In all countries where there's decent security, anyone with common sense will try to use whatever resources they have to either enjoy right now or make a profit later. If it's used for immediate enjoyment, it's reserved for consumption. If it's aimed at future profit, it needs to either stay with the person or go elsewhere. In one case, it's fixed capital, and in the other, it's circulating capital. A person would have to be completely out of their mind not to use all the resources they have, whether it's their own or borrowed, in one of those three ways where there's decent security.

In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid of the violence of their superiors, they frequently bury or conceal a great part of their stock, in order to have it always at hand to carry with them to some place of safety, in case of their being threatened with any of those disasters to which they consider themselves at all times exposed. This is said to be a common practice in Turkey, in Indostan, and, I believe, in most other governments of Asia. It seems to have been a common practice among our ancestors during the violence of the feudal government. Treasure-trove was, in these times, considered as no contemptible part of the revenue of the greatest sovereigns in Europe. It consisted in such treasure as was found concealed in the earth, and to which no particular person could prove any right. This was regarded, in those times, as so important an object, that it was always considered as belonging to the sovereign, and neither to the finder nor to the proprietor of the land, unless the right to it had been conveyed to the latter by an express clause in his charter. It was put upon the same footing with gold and silver mines, which, without a special clause in the charter, were never supposed to be comprehended in the general grant of the lands, though mines of lead, copper, tin, and coal were, as things of smaller consequence.

In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where people are constantly afraid of the violence from those in power, they often bury or hide a significant portion of their belongings to have it readily available for escape to a safer place if they face any threats. This practice is said to be common in Turkey, India, and, I believe, in most other Asian governments. It appears to have been a widespread practice among our ancestors during the violent feudal era. Finding hidden treasure was considered a significant source of income for many of the greatest rulers in Europe at that time. This treasure was defined as any valuables discovered buried in the ground that no one could definitively claim. It was so important back then that it was always thought to belong to the sovereign, rather than to the finder or the landowner, unless the right to it had been explicitly stated in the latter's charter. It was treated similarly to gold and silver mines, which, without a specific clause in the charter, were not assumed to be included in the general land grant, while mines of lead, copper, tin, and coal were viewed as less significant.


CHAP II.

OF MONEY, CONSIDERED AS A PARTICULAR BRANCH OF THE GENERAL STOCK OF THE SOCIETY, OR OF THE EXPENSE OF MAINTAINING THE NATIONAL CAPITAL.

It has been shown in the First Book, that the price of the greater part of commodities resolves itself into three parts, of which one pays the wages of the labour, another the profits of the stock, and a third the rent of the land which had been employed in producing and bringing them to market: that there are, indeed, some commodities of which the price is made up of two of those parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and a very few in which it consists altogether in one, the wages of labour; but that the price of every commodity necessarily resolves itself into some one or other, or all, of those three parts; every part of it which goes neither to rent nor to wages, being necessarily profit to somebody.

It has been shown in the First Book that the price of most goods breaks down into three parts: one part covers wages for labor, another part accounts for profits from the investment, and a third part is the rent for the land used to produce and deliver them to market. In fact, there are some goods where the price consists of only two of these parts—wages and profits; and there are a few where the price is entirely made up of one part, which is the wages of labor. However, the price of every commodity ultimately breaks down into one or more of these three parts, with any portion that isn’t allocated to rent or wages necessarily being profit for someone.

Since this is the case, it has been observed, with regard to every particular commodity, taken separately, it must be so with regard to all the commodities which compose the whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, taken complexly. The whole price or exchangeable value of that annual produce must resolve itself into the same three parts, and be parcelled out among the different inhabitants of the country, either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their their stock, or the rent of their land.

Since this is the case, it has been observed that for each individual commodity, it must also apply to all the commodities that make up the total annual output of the land and labor of each country, taken as a whole. The total price or exchangeable value of that annual output must break down into the same three parts and be distributed among the various inhabitants of the country, either as wages for their labor, profits from their investment, or rent from their land.

But though the whole value of the annual produce of the land and labour of every country, is thus divided among, and constitutes a revenue to, its different inhabitants; yet, as in the rent of a private estate, we distinguish between the gross rent and the neat rent, so may we likewise in the revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country.

But even though the total value of the yearly output from the land and labor of each country is distributed among and serves as income for its various residents, just like we differentiate between gross rent and net rent for a private estate, we can also make a similar distinction in the income of all the residents of a large country.

The gross rent of a private estate comprehends whatever is paid by the farmer; the neat rent, what remains free to the landlord, after deducting the expense of management, of repairs, and all other necessary charges; or what, without hurting his estate, he can afford to place in his stock reserved for immediate consumption, or to spend upon his table, equipage, the ornaments of his house and furniture, his private enjoyments and amusements. His real wealth is in proportion, not to his gross, but to his neat rent.

The total rent of a private estate includes everything the farmer pays; the net rent is what's left for the landlord after subtracting management costs, repairs, and all other necessary expenses. It's what, without damaging his estate, he can afford to invest in supplies for immediate use or spend on his meals, travel, home decor, furniture, personal enjoyment, and entertainment. His true wealth is based not on his total rent but on his net rent.

The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country comprehends the whole annual produce of their land and labour; the neat revenue, what remains free to them, after deducting the expense of maintaining, first, their fixed, and, secondly, their circulating capital, or what, without encroaching up[Pg 116]on their capital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate consumption, or spend upon their subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements. Their real wealth, too, is in proportion, not to their gross, but to their neat revenue.

The total income of all the people in a big country includes the entire yearly output of their land and labor; the net income is what they have left after covering the costs of maintaining, first, their fixed assets, and second, their circulating capital. This is what they can put into their stock for immediate use or spend on their living expenses, comforts, and entertainment without dipping into their capital. Their true wealth is also measured not by their total income but by their net income.

The whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital must evidently be excluded from the neat revenue of the society. Neither the materials necessary for supporting their useful machines and instruments of trade, their profitable buildings, &c. nor the produce of the labour necessary for fashioning those materials into the proper form, can ever make any part of it. The price of that labour may indeed make a part of it; as the workmen so employed may place the whole value of their wages in their stock reserved for immediate consumption. But in other sorts of labour, both the price and the produce go to this stock; the price to that of the workmen, the produce to that of other people, whose subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements, are augmented by the labour of those workmen.

The entire cost of maintaining fixed capital must clearly be excluded from the society's net revenue. Neither the materials needed for supporting their useful machines and tools, their profitable buildings, etc., nor the output from the labor required to shape those materials into the right form can ever be included. The price of that labor could indeed be part of it; after all, the workers involved could allocate the full value of their wages to their stock set aside for immediate use. However, in other types of labor, both the price and the output contribute to this stock; the price goes to the workers, while the output benefits others whose living standards, conveniences, and enjoyment are enhanced by the labor of those workers.

The intention of the fixed capital is to increase the productive powers of labour, or to enable the same number of labourers to perform a much greater quantity of work. In a farm where all the necessary buildings, fences, drains, communications, &c. are in the most perfect good order, the same number of labourers and labouring cattle will raise a much greater produce, than in one of equal extent and equally good ground, but not furnished with equal conveniencies. In manufactures, the same number of hands, assisted with the best machinery, will work up a much greater quantity of goods than with more imperfect instruments of trade. The expense which is properly laid out upon a fixed capital of any kind, is always repaid with great profit, and increases the annual produce by a much greater value than that of the support which such improvements require. This support, however, still requires a certain portion of that produce. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain number of workmen, both of which might have been immediately employed to augment the food, clothing, and lodging, the subsistence and conveniencies of the society, are thus diverted to another employment, highly advantageous indeed, but still different from this one. It is upon this account that all such improvements in mechanics, as enable the same number of workmen to perform an equal quantity of work with cheaper and simpler machinery than had been usual before, are always regarded as advantageous to every society. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain number of workmen, which had before been employed in supporting a more complex and expensive machinery, can afterwards be applied to augment the quantity of work which that or any other machinery is useful only for performing. The undertaker of some great manufactory, who employs a thousand a-year in the maintenance of his machinery, if he can reduce this expense to five hundred, will naturally employ the other five hundred in purchasing an additional quantity of materials, to be wrought up by an additional number of workmen. The quantity of that work, therefore, which his machinery was useful only for performing, will naturally be augmented, and with it all the advantage and conveniency which the society can derive from that work.

The purpose of fixed capital is to enhance the productivity of labor, enabling the same number of workers to produce a lot more output. In a farm where all the necessary buildings, fences, drains, roads, etc., are in excellent condition, the same number of laborers and working animals will yield significantly more produce than in a similarly sized farm with equally good soil but lacking those conveniences. In manufacturing, the same number of workers, using the best machinery, will create a lot more goods compared to using less effective tools. The money spent on fixed capital of any kind is always returned with substantial profit and boosts the annual output by a far greater value than what is needed to support those improvements. However, this support still requires a portion of that output. A certain amount of materials and the labor of a specific number of workers, which could have been used directly to increase the food, clothing, and housing—that is, the livelihood and comfort of society—are redirected to another purpose, which is indeed highly beneficial, but still different from the original intent. This is why improvements in mechanics that allow the same number of workers to accomplish the same amount of work with cheaper and simpler machines than were previously used are always seen as beneficial to society. The materials and the labor of those workers, which were once used to maintain more complex and expensive machinery, can then be redirected to increase the amount of work that either that or any other machinery is designed to do. If the owner of a large factory spends a thousand a year to maintain his machinery but can reduce this cost to five hundred, he will naturally spend the remaining five hundred on purchasing more materials to be processed by additional workers. Consequently, the amount of work that the machinery can do will increase, along with all the benefits and conveniences that society can gain from that work.

The expense of maintaining the fixed capital in a great country, may very properly be compared to that of repairs in a private estate. The expense of repairs may frequently be necessary for supporting the produce of the estate, and consequently both the gross and the neat rent of the landlord. When by a more proper direction, however, it can be diminished without occasioning any diminution of produce, the gross rent remains at least the same as before, and the neat rent is necessarily augmented.

The cost of maintaining fixed capital in a large country can be compared to the expenses of repairs on a private property. Repairs are often needed to support the property's output, which in turn affects both the total and the net income of the owner. However, if repairs can be managed more efficiently without reducing output, the total income stays at least the same, and the net income increases.

But though the whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital is thus necessarily excluded from the neat revenue of the society, it is not the same case with that of maintaining the circulating capital. Of the four parts of which this latter capital is composed, money, provisions, materials, and finished work, the three last, it has already been observed, are regularly withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital of the society, or in their stock reserved for immediate consumption. Whatever portion of those consumable goods is not employed in maintaining the former, goes all to the latter, and makes a part of the neat revenue of the society. The maintenance of those three parts of the circulating capital, therefore, withdraws no portion of the annual produce from the neat revenue of the society, besides what is necessary for maintaining the fixed capital.

But even though the entire cost of maintaining the fixed capital is excluded from the net revenue of society, the same isn’t true for maintaining the circulating capital. This circulating capital consists of four components: money, provisions, materials, and finished goods. As noted earlier, the last three are regularly taken out and either added to the society’s fixed capital or kept in stock for immediate use. Any portion of these consumable goods that isn’t used to maintain the fixed capital contributes to the circulating capital and counts as part of the net revenue of society. Therefore, maintaining those three components of the circulating capital doesn’t take away from the annual output of the society's net revenue, apart from what is needed to sustain the fixed capital.

The circulating capital of a society is in this respect different from that of an individual. That of an individual is totally excluded from making any part of his neat revenue, which must consist altogether in his profits. But though the circulating capital of every individual makes a part of that of the society to which he belongs, it is not upon that account totally excluded from making a part likewise of their neat revenue. Though the whole goods in a merchant's shop must by no means be placed in his own stock reserved for immediate consumption, they may in that of other people, who, from a revenue derived from other funds, may regularly replace their value to him, together with its profits, without occasioning any diminution either of his capital or of theirs.

The circulating capital of a society is, in this way, different from that of an individual. An individual's capital can't contribute to their net income, which must come entirely from their profits. However, while each person's circulating capital is part of the society they belong to, it doesn't mean it can't also contribute to the society's net income. Although a merchant's entire inventory shouldn't be considered part of his own stock meant for immediate use, it can be part of what others have, who can regularly replace its value to him, along with any profits, without reducing either his capital or theirs.

Money, therefore, is the only part of the circulating capital of a society, of which the maintenance can occasion any diminution in their neat revenue.[Pg 117]

Money, then, is the only aspect of a society's circulating capital whose upkeep can lead to a decline in their overall income.[Pg 117]

The fixed capital, and that part of the circulating capital which consists in money, so far as they affect the revenue of the society, bear a very great resemblance to one another.

The fixed capital and the part of the circulating capital that is made up of money, in terms of how they impact the society's revenue, are very similar to each other.

First, as those machines and instruments of trade, &c. require a certain expense, first to erect them, and afterwards to support them, both which expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are deductions from the neat revenue of the society; so the stock of money which circulates in any country must require a certain expense, first to collect it, and afterwards to support it; both which expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are, in the same manner, deductions from the neat revenue of the society. A certain quantity of very valuable materials, gold and silver, and of very curious labour, instead of augmenting the stock reserved for immediate consumption, the subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements of individuals, is employed in supporting that great but expensive instrument of commerce, by means of which every individual in the society has his subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements, regularly distributed to him in their proper proportions.

First, just like those machines and tools used for trade, etc., require a certain amount of money to set them up and maintain them, which, although part of the total costs, are deductions from the actual revenue of society; the money circulating in any country also needs a certain amount of money to gather it and keep it in circulation. These expenses, while part of the total, are similarly subtracted from the actual revenue of the society. A certain amount of valuable materials, like gold and silver, along with a lot of intricate labor, instead of increasing the resources set aside for immediate consumption, the necessities, comforts, and entertainment of individuals, is used to support that large but costly tool of commerce, which ensures that everyone in society receives their necessities, comforts, and entertainment in the right amounts.

Secondly, as the machines and instruments of trade, &c. which compose the fixed capital either of an individual or of a society, make no part either of the gross or of the neat revenue of either; so money, by means of which the whole revenue of the society is regularly distributed among all its different members, makes itself no part of that revenue. The great wheel of circulation is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by means of it. The revenue of the society consists altogether in those goods, and not in the wheel which circulates them. In computing either the gross or the neat revenue of any society, we must always, from the whole annual circulation of money and goods, deduct the whole value of the money, of which not a single farthing can ever make any part of either.

Secondly, the machines and tools used for trade, etc., that make up the fixed capital of an individual or society, are not part of either the gross or net revenue. Likewise, money, which serves to distribute the entire revenue of society among its members, is also not part of that revenue. The major flow of circulation is completely separate from the goods that are moved through it. The revenue of society consists entirely of those goods, not the system that circulates them. When calculating the gross or net revenue of any society, we must always subtract the total value of money from the overall annual circulation of money and goods, as not a single penny of it contributes to either.

It is the ambiguity of language only which can make this proposition appear either doubtful or paradoxical. When properly explained and understood, it is almost self-evident.

It's just the unclear nature of language that can make this statement seem either questionable or contradictory. Once it's clearly explained and understood, it’s nearly obvious.

When we talk of any particular sum of money, we sometimes mean nothing but the metal pieces of which it is composed, and sometimes we include in our meaning some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for it, or to the power of purchasing which the possession of it conveys. Thus, when we say that the circulating money of England has been computed at eighteen millions, we mean only to express the amount of the metal pieces, which some writers have computed, or rather have supposed, to circulate in that country. But when we say that a man is worth fifty or a hundred pounds a-year, we mean commonly to express, not only the amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, but the value of the goods which he can annually purchase or consume; we mean commonly to assertain what is or ought to be his way of living, or the quantity and quality of the necessaries and conveniencies of life in which he can with propriety indulge himself.

When we talk about a specific amount of money, sometimes we're just referring to the actual coins it consists of, and other times we’re hinting at the things that can be bought with it, or the purchasing power it provides. So, when we say that the circulating money in England is estimated to be eighteen million, we’re just talking about the quantity of coins that some writers have calculated, or rather assumed, to be in circulation in that country. But when we say a person earns fifty or a hundred pounds a year, we usually mean not just how much cash he gets each year, but also the worth of the goods he can buy or use. We’re generally trying to figure out what kind of lifestyle he can have, or the amount and quality of the essentials and comforts he can reasonably afford.

When, by any particular sum of money, we mean not only to express the amount of the metal pieces of which it is composed, but to include in its signification some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for them, the wealth or revenue which it in this case denotes, is equal only to one of the two values which are thus intimated somewhat ambiguously by the same word, and to the latter more properly than to the former, to the money's worth more properly than to the money.

When we refer to a specific amount of money, we aren't just talking about the quantity of metal coins it represents; we are also suggesting some vague idea of the goods we can get in exchange for it. The wealth or income that this term implies is actually equal to just one of the two values that are hinted at somewhat ambiguously by the same word, and it's more closely tied to the latter rather than the former—more about what the money can buy than the money itself.

Thus, if a guinea be the weekly pension of a particular person, he can in the course of the week purchase with it a certain quantity of subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements. In proportion as this quantity is great or small, so are his real riches, his real weekly revenue. His weekly revenue is certainly not equal both to the guinea and to what can be purchased with it, but only to one or other of those two equal values, and to the latter more properly than to the former, to the guinea's worth rather than to the guinea.

So, if someone's weekly income is a guinea, they can buy a certain amount of food, necessities, and entertainment with it over the week. The more they can purchase, the richer they are in reality; their true weekly income is based on that quantity. Their income isn't exactly equal to the guinea and what it can buy, but it's more accurately aligned with what can be purchased rather than the guinea itself.

If the pension of such a person was paid to him, not in gold, but in a weekly bill for a guinea, his revenue surely would not so properly consist in the piece of paper, as in what he could get for it. A guinea may be considered as a bill for a certain quantity of necessaries and conveniencies upon all the tradesmen in the neighbourhood. The revenue of the person to whom it is paid, does not so properly consist in the piece of gold, as in what he can get for it, or in what he can exchange it for. If it could be exchanged for nothing, it would, like a bill upon a bankrupt, be of no more value than the most useless piece of paper.

If someone's pension was given to them, not in gold, but in a weekly bill worth a guinea, their income wouldn't really be the paper itself, but rather what they could get for it. A guinea can be seen as a bill for a certain amount of goods and services from local tradespeople. The income for the person receiving it doesn't actually come from the gold coin, but from what they can obtain with it, or what they can trade it for. If it couldn't be traded for anything, it would, like a bill from a bankrupt, be worth no more than a worthless piece of paper.

Though the weekly or yearly revenue of all the different inhabitants of any country, in the same manner, may be, and in reality frequently is, paid to them in money, their real riches, however, the real weekly or yearly revenue of all of them taken together, must always be great or small, in proportion to the quantity of consumable goods which they can all of them purchase with this money. The whole revenue of all of them taken together is evidently not equal to both the money and the consumable goods, but only to one or other of those two values, and to the latter more properly than to the former.

Even though the weekly or yearly income of all the different people in any country is often paid out in cash, their true wealth, or the actual weekly or yearly income of everyone combined, will always depend on how much consumable goods they can purchase with that money. The total income of everyone together is clearly not the same as both the cash and the consumable goods, but rather relates to one or the other of those two values, and more accurately to the latter than the former.

Though we frequently, therefore, express a person's revenue by the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, it is because the amount of those pieces regulates the extent of his power of purchasing, or the value of the goods which he can annually afford to consume. We still consider his revenue as consisting in[Pg 118] this power of purchasing or consuming, and not in the pieces which convey it.

Though we often express a person's income in terms of the money he receives each year, it's because that amount determines how much he can buy, or the value of the things he can afford to consume annually. We still think of his income as being made up of this purchasing power, not just the actual money that represents it.[Pg 118]

But if this is sufficiently evident, even with regard to an individual, it is still more so with regard to a society. The amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to an individual, is often precisely equal to his revenue, and is upon that account the shortest and best expression of its value. But the amount of the metal pieces which circulate in a society, can never be equal to the revenue of all its members. As the same guinea which pays the weekly pension of one man to-day, may pay that of another to-morrow, and that of a third the day thereafter, the amount of the metal pieces which annually circulate in any country, must always be of much less value than the whole money pensions annually paid with them. But the power of purchasing, or the goods which can successively be bought with the whole of those money pensions, as they are successively paid, must always be precisely of the same value with those pensions; as must likewise be the revenue of the different persons to whom they are paid. That revenue, therefore, cannot consist in those metal pieces, of which the amount is so much inferior to its value, but in the power of purchasing, in the goods which can successively be bought with them as they circulate from hand to hand.

But if this is clear for an individual, it’s even more obvious for a society. The amount of money that is paid to one person each year often matches their income exactly, making it the simplest and most accurate measure of its value. However, the total amount of money circulating in a society can never equal the combined income of all its members. For example, the same gold coin that covers one person's weekly pension today could pay for another person’s pension tomorrow, and a third person’s the day after that. Therefore, the total amount of money that circulates in any country each year will always be significantly less than the total pensions paid out. Yet, the purchasing power or the goods that can be bought over time with all those pension payments must always hold the same value as the actual pensions. This applies to the income of the various individuals receiving those pensions as well. Thus, that income cannot simply consist of those coins, which are worth much less than the income itself, but rather in the purchasing power - the goods that can be bought with them as they move from one person to another.

Money, therefore, the great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part, and a very valuable part, of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the society to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in the course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man the revenue which properly belongs to him, they make themselves no part of that revenue.

Money, then, is the main driving force of circulation, the key tool of commerce. Like all other trading tools, even though it is a crucial and valuable part of capital, it does not contribute to the revenue of the society it belongs to. While the coins it’s made from, over the course of a year, provide everyone with the income that rightfully belongs to them, they do not make up any part of that income themselves.

Thirdly, and lastly, the machines and instruments of trade, &c. which compose the fixed capital, bear this further resemblance to that part of the circulating capital which consists in money; that as every saving in the expense of erecting and supporting those machines, which does not diminish the introductive powers of labour, is an improvement of the neat revenue of the society; so every saving in the expense of collecting and supporting that part of the circulating capital which consists in money is an improvement of exactly the same kind.

Thirdly and finally, the machines and tools used in trade, etc., which make up the fixed capital, have this additional similarity to the portion of circulating capital that is made up of money: just as any savings in the costs of building and maintaining those machines, without reducing their ability to facilitate work, enhance the net revenue of society, so too do any savings in the costs of collecting and maintaining that part of the circulating capital that consists of money represent the same kind of improvement.

It is sufficiently obvious, and it has partly, too, been explained already, in what manner every saving in the expense of supporting the fixed capital is an improvement of the neat revenue of the society. The whole capital of the undertaker of every work is necessarily divided between his fixed and his circulating capital. While his whole capital remains the same, the smaller the one part, the greater must necessarily be the other. It is the circulating capital which furnishes the materials and wages of labour, and puts industry into motion. Every saving, therefore, in the expense of maintaining the fixed capital, which does not diminish the productive powers of labour, must increase the fund which puts industry into motion, and consequently the annual produce of land and labour, the real revenue of every society.

It's pretty clear, and it's partly been explained already, how every cost-saving in maintaining fixed capital improves the net revenue of society. The total capital of anyone running a business is divided between fixed and circulating capital. As total capital stays the same, the smaller one part must mean the other is larger. Circulating capital provides the materials and wages for labor and drives industry forward. Therefore, any savings in maintaining fixed capital that don't reduce the productivity of labor will boost the funds that stimulate industry and, as a result, increase the annual output of land and labor—the real revenue of every society.

The substitution of paper in the room of gold and silver money, replaces a very expensive instrument of commerce with one much less costly, and sometimes equally convenient. Circulation comes to be carried on by a new wheel, which it costs less both to erect and to maintain than the old one. But in what manner this operation is performed, and in what manner it tends to increase either the gross or the neat revenue of the society, is not altogether so obvious, and may therefore require some further explication.

The replacement of paper for gold and silver money swaps a highly expensive tool of trade for something far more affordable, and sometimes just as convenient. Transactions are now conducted using a new system that is cheaper to set up and run than the old one. However, how this process works and how it helps boost either the total or net revenue of society isn't completely clear and might need a bit more explanation.

There are several different sorts of paper money; but the circulating notes of banks and bankers are the species which is best known, and which seems best adapted for this purpose.

There are several different types of paper money, but the banknotes from banks and bankers are the most familiar and seem to be the most suitable for this purpose.

When the people of any particular country have such confidence in the fortune, probity and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that he is always ready to pay upon demand such of his promissory notes as are likely to be at any time presented to him, those notes come to have the same currency as gold and silver money, from the confidence that such money can at any time be had for them.

When the people of a certain country have so much trust in the luck, honesty, and good judgment of a specific banker that they believe he will always pay out on demand for any of his promissory notes that might be presented to him, those notes start to carry the same value as gold and silver money, due to the belief that they can always be exchanged for that money.

A particular banker lends among his customers his own promissory notes, to the extent, we shall suppose, of a hundred thousand pounds. As those notes serve all the purposes of money, his debtors pay him the same interest as if he had lent them so much money. This interest is the source of his gain. Though some of those notes are continually coming back upon him for payment, part of them continue to circulate for months and years together. Though he has generally in circulation, therefore, notes to the extent of a hundred thousand pounds, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver may, frequently, be a sufficient provision for answering occasional demands. By this operation, therefore, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver perform all the functions which a hundred thousand could otherwise have performed. The same exchanges may be made, the same quantity of consumable goods may be circulated and distributed to their proper consumers, by means of his promissory notes, to the value of a hundred thousand pounds, as by an equal value of gold and silver money. Eighty thousand pounds of gold and silver, therefore, can in this manner be spared from the circulation of the country; and if different operations of the same kind should, at the same time, be carried on by many different banks and bank[Pg 119]ers, the whole circulation may thus be conducted with a fifth part only of the gold and silver which would otherwise have been requisite.

A specific banker lends his own promissory notes to his customers, let’s say, up to a hundred thousand pounds. Since these notes function just like money, his borrowers pay him the same interest as if he had lent real cash. This interest is where he makes his profit. Even though some of these notes frequently come back to him for payment, many of them remain in circulation for months or even years. Therefore, while he generally has notes totaling a hundred thousand pounds in circulation, having twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver is often enough to cover occasional demands. As a result, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver can perform all the functions that a hundred thousand pounds could have otherwise handled. The same transactions can be made, and the same amount of goods can be circulated and distributed to the right consumers using his promissory notes worth a hundred thousand pounds, just like they would with an equivalent amount of gold and silver. Thus, eighty thousand pounds of gold and silver can be saved from the country’s circulation. If various banks and bankers engage in similar operations at the same time, the entire circulation can be managed with only one-fifth of the gold and silver that would otherwise be needed.

Let us suppose, for example, that the whole circulating money of some particular country amounted, at a particular time, to one million sterling, that sum being then sufficient for circulating the whole annual produce of their land and labour; let us suppose, too, that some time thereafter, different banks and bankers issued promissory notes payable to the bearer, to the extent of one million, reserving in their different coffers two hundred thousand pounds for answering occasional demands; there would remain, therefore, in circulation, eight hundred thousand pounds in gold and silver, and a million of bank notes, or eighteen hundred thousand pounds of paper and money together. But the annual produce of the land and labour of the country had before required only one million to circulate and distribute it to its proper consumers, and that annual produce cannot be immediately augmented by those operations of banking. One million, therefore, will be sufficient to circulate it after them. The goods to be bought and sold being precisely the same as before, the same quantity of money will be sufficient for buying and selling them. The channel of circulation, if I may be allowed such an expression, will remain precisely the same as before. One million we have supposed sufficient to fill that channel. Whatever, therefore, is poured into it beyond this sum, cannot run into it, but must overflow. One million eight hundred thousand pounds are poured into it. Eight hundred thousand pounds, therefore, must overflow, that sum being over and above what can be employed in the circulation of the country. But though this sum cannot be employed at home, it is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle. It will, therefore, be sent abroad, in order to seek that profitable employment which it cannot find at home. But the paper cannot go abroad; because at a distance from the banks which issue it, and from the country in which payment of it can be exacted by law, it will not be received in common payments. Gold and silver, therefore, to the amount of eight hundred thousand pounds, will be sent abroad, and the channel of home circulation will remain filled with a million of paper instead of a million of those metals which filled it before.

Let’s say that the total amount of money in a certain country came to one million pounds at a specific time, which was enough to circulate the entire annual output from their land and labor. Now, let’s also say that some time later, various banks issued promissory notes payable to the bearer, totaling one million, while keeping two hundred thousand pounds in reserve for occasional withdrawals. This would mean that eight hundred thousand pounds in gold and silver would be circulating alongside a million in bank notes, resulting in a total of one million eight hundred thousand pounds in paper and money combined. However, the annual output of the country only needed one million to circulate and reach its consumers, and banking operations can’t immediately increase that annual output. So, one million will still be enough to circulate it after those banking activities. Since the goods being bought and sold are exactly the same as before, the same amount of money will still be necessary to buy and sell them. The flow of circulation—if I may put it that way—will remain exactly as it was. We’ve assumed that one million is enough to fill that flow. Whatever goes beyond this amount will overflow and cannot fit into it. If one million eight hundred thousand pounds are added, then eight hundred thousand pounds will overflow, because that amount exceeds what can be used for circulation in the country. But even though this excess cannot be used domestically, it’s too valuable to just sit there. Therefore, it will be sent abroad to find profitable opportunities that it can't find at home. However, the paper money can’t be sent abroad; far from the banks that issue it and from the country where it can be legally redeemed, it won’t be accepted for regular payments. So, gold and silver totaling eight hundred thousand pounds will be sent overseas, leaving the domestic circulation filled with a million in paper instead of a million in those metals that filled it previously.

But though so great a quantity of gold and silver is thus sent abroad, we must not imagine that it is sent abroad for nothing, or that its proprietors make a present of it to foreign nations. They will exchange it for foreign goods of some kind or another, in order to supply the consumption either of some other foreign country, or of their own.

But even though such a large amount of gold and silver is sent overseas, we shouldn't think that it's being sent for free or that the owners are just giving it away to other countries. They will trade it for some kind of foreign goods to meet the needs of either another country or their own.

If they employ it in purchasing goods in one foreign country, in order to supply the consumption of another, or in what is called the carrying trade, whatever profit they make will be in addition to the neat revenue of their own country. It is like a new fund, created for carrying on a new trade; domestic business being now transacted by paper, and the gold and silver being converted into a fund for this new trade.

If they use it to buy goods in one foreign country to meet the needs of another, or in what’s known as the carrying trade, any profit they make will add to the overall revenue of their own country. It’s like a new source of funding created for a new kind of trade; domestic business is now conducted through paper, and the gold and silver are turned into a resource for this new trade.

If they employ it in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, they may either, first, purchase such goods as are likely to be consumed by idle people, who produce nothing, such as foreign wines, foreign silks, &c.; or, secondly, they may purchase an additional stock of materials, tools, and provisions, in order to maintain and employ an additional number of industrious people, who reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual consumption.

If they use it to buy foreign goods for local use, they can either, first, buy products that are likely to be consumed by people who aren't working, like foreign wines, foreign silks, etc.; or, secondly, they can buy extra supplies of materials, tools, and food to hire and support more hardworking people who can produce goods worth more than their yearly consumption.

So far as it is employed in the first way, is promotes prodigality, increases expense and consumption, without increasing production, or establishing any permanent fund for supporting that expense, and is in every respect hurtful to the society.

As it's used in this way, it encourages wastefulness, drives up costs and consumption, without boosting production or creating any lasting resources to cover those costs, and is damaging to society in every way.

So far as it is employed in the second way, it promotes industry; and though it increases the consumption of the society, it provides a permanent fund for supporting that consumption; the people who consume reproducing, with a profit, the whole value of their annual consumption. The gross revenue of the society, the annual produce of their land and labour, is increased by the whole value which the labour of these workmen adds to the materials upon which they are employed, and their neat revenue by what remains of this value, after deducting what is necessary for supporting the tools and instruments of their trade.

As it's used in this way, it encourages work; and while it boosts society's consumption, it also creates a steady source of funds to support that consumption. The people who consume generate, with a profit, the full value of what they consume each year. The total revenue of society, the annual output of their land and labor, grows by the entire value that these workers add to the materials they use, and their net revenue is what’s left of this value after deducting what’s needed to maintain their tools and instruments for their trade.

That the greater part of the gold and silver which being forced abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, is, and must be, employed in purchasing those of this second kind, seems not only probable, but almost unavoidable. Though some particular men may sometimes increase their expense very considerably, though their revenue does not increase at all, we may be assured that no class or order of men ever does so; because, though the principles of common prudence do not always govern the conduct of every individual, they always influence that of the majority of every class or order. But the revenue of idle people, considered as a class or order, cannot, in the smallest degree, be increased by those operations of banking. Their expense in general, therefore, cannot be much increased by them, though that of a few individuals among them may, and in reality sometimes is. The demand of idle people, therefore, for foreign goods, being the same, or very nearly the same as before, a[Pg 120] very small part of the money which, being forced abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, is likely to be employed in purchasing those for their use. The greater part of it will naturally be destined for the employment of industry, and not for the maintenance of idleness.

Most of the gold and silver that is pushed abroad by banking operations is used to buy foreign goods for home consumption. This is not just likely but almost inevitable. While some individuals may significantly increase their spending without an increase in their income, we can be sure that no social class or group does this consistently. Even though personal prudence doesn't always guide individual behavior, it usually influences the majority in any class. However, the income of idle people as a group cannot be increased at all by these banking operations. Therefore, their overall spending can't be much increased by them, although a few individuals might experience that occasionally. The demand for foreign goods among idle people remains about the same as before, so a[Pg 120] very small portion of the money that is sent abroad through banking operations is likely to be used to buy goods for their use. Most of it will naturally be used for productive purposes, not for supporting idleness.

When we compute the quantity of industry which the circulating capital of any society can employ, we must always have regard to those parts of it only which consist in provisions, materials, and finished work; the other, which consists in money, and which serves only to circulate those three, must always be deducted. In order to put industry into motion, three things are requisite; materials to work upon, tools to work with, and the wages or recompence for the sake of which the work is done. Money is neither a material to work upon, nor a tool to work with; and though the wages of the workman are commonly paid to him in money, his real revenue, like that of all other men, consists, not in the money, but in the money's worth; not in the metal pieces, but in what can be got for them.

When we calculate how much industry the circulating capital of any society can employ, we must focus only on the parts that include provisions, materials, and finished products; we should always exclude the portion that consists of money, which only serves to facilitate the exchange of those three. To start industry, three things are necessary: materials to work with, tools to work with, and wages or compensation for doing the work. Money is neither a material to work with nor a tool to work with; although workers are usually paid in money, their actual earnings, like those of everyone else, are not in the money itself but in what that money can buy; not in the coins, but in the value they represent.

The quantity of industry which any capital can employ, must evidently be equal to the number of workmen whom it can supply with materials, tools, and a maintenance suitable to the nature of the work. Money may be requisite for purchasing the materials and tools of the work, as well as the maintenance of the workmen; but the quantity of industry which the whole capital can employ, is certainly not equal both to the money which purchases, and to the materials, tools, and maintenance, which are purchased with it, but only to one or other of those two values, and to the latter more properly than to the former.

The amount of industry that any capital can utilize must clearly be equal to the number of workers it can provide with the necessary materials, tools, and support suitable for the job. While money is needed to buy the materials and tools, as well as to support the workers, the total amount of industry that all capital can employ is not equal to both the money spent and the materials, tools, and support acquired with it. Instead, it corresponds to just one of those two values, and more accurately to the latter than the former.

When paper is substituted in the room of gold and silver money, the quantity of the materials, tools, and maintenance, which the whole circulating capital can supply, may be increased by the whole value of gold and silver which used to be employed in purchasing them. The whole value of the great wheel of circulation and distribution is added to the goods which are circulated and distributed by means of it. The operation, in some measure, resembles that of the undertaker of some great work, who, in consequence of some improvement in mechanics, takes down his old machinery, and adds the difference between its price and that of the new to his circulating capital, to the fund from which he furnishes materials and wages to his workmen.

When paper replaces gold and silver money, the amount of materials, tools, and maintenance that the total circulating capital can provide can increase by the total value of gold and silver that was previously used to buy them. The entire value of the large system of circulation and distribution is added to the goods that are circulated and distributed through it. This process somewhat resembles that of a contractor working on a large project, who, due to some advancements in mechanics, removes his old machinery and adds the difference between its cost and that of the new equipment to his circulating capital, which he uses to pay for materials and wages for his workers.

What is the proportion which the circulating money of any country bears to the whole value of the annual produce circulated by means of it, it is perhaps impossible to determine. It has been computed by different authors at a fifth, at a tenth, at a twentieth, and at a thirtieth, part of that value. But how small soever the proportion which the circulating money may bear to the whole value of the annual produce, as but a part, and frequently but a small part, of that produce, is ever destined for the maintenance of industry, it must always bear a very considerable proportion to that part. When, therefore, by the substitution of paper, the gold and silver necessary for circulation is reduced to, perhaps, a fifth part of the former quantity, if the value of only the greater part of the other four-fifths be added to the funds which are destined for the maintenance of industry, it must make a very considerable addition to the quantity of that industry, and, consequently, to the value of the annual produce of land and labour.

It's probably impossible to determine the ratio of a country's circulating money to the total value of its annual output. Some authors have estimated it to be a fifth, a tenth, a twentieth, or even a thirtieth of that value. However small the proportion of circulating money is compared to the total annual output, since only a portion—and often a small one—is meant for sustaining industry, it will always represent a significant share of that portion. So, when gold and silver needed for circulation is reduced to perhaps a fifth of its previous amount due to the use of paper currency, if the value of the majority of the remaining four-fifths is added to the funds allocated for maintaining industry, it will greatly increase the overall capacity of that industry and, as a result, the value of the annual output from land and labor.

An operation of this kind has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty years, been performed in Scotland, by the erection of new banking companies in almost every considerable town, and even in some country villages. The effects of it have been precisely those above described. The business of the country is almost entirely carried on by means of the paper of those different banking companies, with which purchases and payments of all kinds are commonly made. Silver very seldom appears, except in the change of a twenty shilling bank note, and gold still seldomer. But though the conduct of all those different companies has not been unexceptionable, and has accordingly required an act of parliament to regulate it, the country, notwithstanding, has evidently derived great benefit from their trade. I have heard it asserted, that the trade of the city of Glasgow doubled in about fifteen years after the first erection of the banks there; and that the trade of Scotland has more than quadrupled since the first erection of the two public banks at Edinburgh; of which the one, called the Bank of Scotland, was established by act of parliament in 1695, and the other, called the Royal Bank, by royal charter in 1727. Whether the trade, either of Scotland in general, or of the city of Glasgow in particular, has really increased in so great a proportion, during so short a period, I do not pretend to know. If either of them has increased in this proportion, it seems to be an effect too great to be accounted for by the sole operation of this cause. That the trade and industry of Scotland, however, have increased very considerably during this period, and that the banks have contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot be doubted.

An operation like this has been carried out in Scotland over the past twenty-five to thirty years with the establishment of new banking companies in almost every significant town and even in some rural villages. The results have been exactly as described above. The business in the country is largely conducted through the paper issued by these various banking companies, which is commonly used for making purchases and payments of all kinds. Silver rarely appears, except when making change for a twenty-shilling bank note, and gold is even less common. Although the conduct of these banking companies hasn't always been flawless and has required an act of parliament to regulate it, the country has clearly benefitted greatly from their operations. I've heard that the trade in Glasgow doubled in about fifteen years after the first banks were set up there, and that Scotland's overall trade has more than quadrupled since the establishment of the two public banks in Edinburgh; one, known as the Bank of Scotland, was established by an act of parliament in 1695, and the other, called the Royal Bank, was started through a royal charter in 1727. Whether the trade of Scotland as a whole, or of Glasgow specifically, has indeed increased by such a large margin in such a short time, I can't say. If either has grown at that rate, it seems too significant to be explained solely by this one factor. However, it is undeniable that the trade and industry in Scotland have increased quite a bit during this time, and that the banks have played a significant role in that growth.

The value of the silver money which circulated in Scotland before the Union in 1707, and which, immediately after it, was brought into the Bank of Scotland, in order to be recoined, amounted to £411,117 : 10 : 9 sterling. No account has been got of the gold coin; but it appears from the ancient accounts of the mint of Scotland, that the value of the gold annually coined somewhat exceeded that of the sil[Pg 121]ver[27]. There were a good many people, too, upon this occasion, who, from a diffidence of repayment, did not bring their silver into the Bank of Scotland; and there was, besides, some English coin, which was not called in. The whole value of the gold and silver, therefore, which circulated in Scotland before the Union, cannot be estimated at less than a million sterling. It seems to have constituted almost the whole circulation of that country; for though the circulation of the Bank of Scotland, which had then no rival, was considerable, it seems to have made but a very small part of the whole. In the present times, the whole circulation of Scotland cannot be estimated at less than two millions, of which that part which consists in gold and silver, most probably, does not amount to half a million. But though the circulating gold and silver of Scotland have suffered so great a diminution during this period, its real riches and prosperity do not appear to have suffered any. Its agriculture, manufactures, and trade, on the contrary, the annual produce of its land and labour, have evidently been augmented.

The value of the silver money that was in circulation in Scotland before the Union in 1707, and which was later brought into the Bank of Scotland to be recoined, totaled £411,117 : 10 : 9 sterling. There isn’t a record of the gold coin, but old records from the Scottish mint show that the value of the gold minted each year was slightly more than that of the silver. A number of people, however, chose not to bring their silver to the Bank of Scotland out of fear of repayment, and there was also some English coin that was not collected. Therefore, the total value of the gold and silver in circulation in Scotland before the Union must be at least a million sterling. This seems to have made up almost the entire circulation in the country; even though the circulation of the Bank of Scotland, which had no competition at the time, was significant, it appeared to constitute only a small portion of the total. Nowadays, Scotland's entire circulation is estimated to be at least two million, of which the gold and silver probably don’t make up more than half a million. Despite this sharp decline in circulating gold and silver during this period, Scotland's actual wealth and prosperity don’t seem to have been affected. In fact, its agriculture, manufacturing, and trade, along with the annual output of its land and labor, appear to have clearly increased.

It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by advancing money upon them before they are due, that the greater part of banks and bankers issue their promissory notes. They deduct always, upon whatever sum they advance, the legal interest till the bill shall become due. The payment of the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what had been advanced, together with a clear profit of the interest. The banker, who advances to the merchant whose bill he discounts, not gold and silver, but his own promissory notes, has the advantage of being able to discount to a greater amount by the whole value of his promissory notes, which he finds, by experience, are commonly in circulation. He is thereby enabled to make his clear gain of interest on so much a larger sum.

Banks primarily issue their promissory notes by discounting bills of exchange, which means they provide money for these bills before they're due. They always deduct the legal interest on any amount they advance until the bill matures. When the bill is paid on its due date, the bank receives the amount that was advanced plus a profit from the interest. The banker who lends money to a merchant by discounting their bill doesn’t provide gold or silver; instead, he uses his own promissory notes. This allows him to discount a larger amount based on the total value of his promissory notes, which he has learned are usually accepted in circulation. As a result, he can earn interest on a significantly larger sum.

The commerce of Scotland, which at present is not very great, was still more inconsiderable when the two first banking companies were established; and those companies would have had but little trade, had they confined their business to the discounting of bills of exchange. They invented, therefore, another method of issuing their promissory notes; by granting what they called cash accounts, that is, by giving credit, to the extent of a certain sum (two or three thousand pounds for example), to any individual who could procure two persons of undoubted credit and good landed estate to become surety for him, that whatever money should be advanced to him, within the sum for which the credit had been given, should be repaid upon demand, together with the legal interest. Credits of this kind are, I believe, commonly granted by banks and bankers in all different parts of the world. But the easy terms upon which the Scotch banking companies accept of repayment are, so far as I know, peculiar to them, and have, perhaps, been the principal cause, both of the great trade of those companies, and of the benefit which the country has received from it.

The commerce of Scotland, which isn't very significant today, was even less significant when the first two banking companies were established. Those companies would have had little business if they had only focused on discounting bills of exchange. So, they came up with another way to issue their promissory notes by providing what they called cash accounts. This meant giving credit, up to a certain amount (like two or three thousand pounds, for example), to anyone who could find two people with solid credit and good land ownership to guarantee them. This agreement stated that any money advanced to them, within the credit limit, would need to be paid back on demand, along with the legal interest. I believe that similar credits are commonly offered by banks and bankers all around the world. However, the favorable repayment terms that Scottish banking companies offer seem to be unique to them and have likely contributed significantly to their substantial trade and the benefits that have come to the country from it.

Whoever has a credit of this kind with one of those companies, and borrows a thousand pounds upon it, for example, may repay this sum piece-meal, by twenty and thirty pounds at a time, the company discounting a proportionable part of the interest of the great sum, from the day on which each of those small sums is paid in, till the whole be in this manner repaid. All merchants, therefore, and almost all men of business, find it convenient to keep such cash accounts with them, and are thereby interested to promote the trade of those companies, by readily receiving their notes in all payments, and by encouraging all those with whom they have any influence to do the same. The banks, when their customers apply to them for money, generally advance it to them in their own promissory notes. These the merchants pay away to the manufacturers for goods, the manufacturers to the farmers for materials and provisions, the farmers to their landlords for rent; the landlords repay them to the merchants for the conveniencies and luxuries with which they supply them, and the merchants again return them to the banks in order to balance their cash accounts, or to replace what they may have borrowed of them; and thus almost the whole money business of the country is transacted by means of them. Hence the great trade of those companies.

Anyone who has a credit of this sort with one of those companies, and borrows a thousand pounds on it, for instance, can pay back this amount in smaller installments, like twenty or thirty pounds at a time. The company will discount a proportional part of the interest on the total amount from the day each of those smaller payments is made until the full amount is paid back this way. Therefore, all merchants and nearly all business people find it helpful to maintain such cash accounts with them, and they are motivated to support the trade of these companies by accepting their notes for all payments and encouraging anyone they can influence to do the same. When customers ask banks for money, they typically advance it in their own promissory notes. Merchants then use these notes to pay manufacturers for goods, manufacturers pay farmers for materials and food, farmers pay their landlords for rent; landlords pay them back to the merchants for the amenities and luxuries they provide, and merchants return them to the banks to settle their cash accounts or replace what they might have borrowed. This is how most of the financial transactions in the country are carried out through these companies. Hence, the significant trade of those companies.

By means of those cash accounts, every merchant can, without imprudence, carry on a greater trade than he otherwise could do. If there are two merchants, one in London and the other in Edinburgh, who employ equal stocks in the same branch of trade, the Edinburgh merchant can, without imprudence, carry on a greater trade, and give employment to a greater number of people, than the London merchant. The London merchant must always keep by him a considerable sum of money, either in his own coffers, or in those of his banker, who gives him no interest for it, in order to answer the demands continually coming upon him for payment of the goods which he purchases upon credit. Let the ordinary amount of this sum be supposed five hundred pounds; the value of the goods in his warehouse must always be less, by five hundred pounds, than it would have been, had he not been obliged to keep such a sum unemployed. Let us suppose that he generally disposes of his whole stock upon hand, or of goods to the value of his whole stock upon hand, once in the year. By being obliged to keep so great a sum unemployed, he must sell in a year five hundred pounds worth less goods[Pg 122] than he might otherwise have done. His annual profits must be less by all that he could have made by the sale of five hundred pounds worth more goods; and the number of people employed in preparing his goods for the market must be less by all those that five hundred pounds more stock could have employed. The merchant in Edinburgh, on the other hand, keeps no money unemployed for answering such occasional demands. When they actually come upon him, he satisfies them from his cash account with the bank, and gradually replaces the sum borrowed with the money or paper which comes in from the occasional sales of his goods. With the same stock, therefore, he can, without imprudence, have at all times in his warehouse a larger quantity of goods than the London merchant; and can thereby both make a greater profit himself, and give constant employment to a greater number of industrious people who prepare those goods for the market. Hence the great benefit which the country has derived from this trade.

Through cash accounts, every merchant can safely conduct a larger business than they otherwise could. If there are two merchants, one in London and the other in Edinburgh, with equal investments in the same trade, the Edinburgh merchant can, without risk, operate a larger business and employ more people than the London merchant. The London merchant must always keep a significant amount of money on hand, either in their own possession or with their banker, who doesn't pay interest on it, to meet the constant demands for payment of the goods they purchase on credit. Let’s assume this amount is five hundred pounds; the value of the goods in their warehouse will always be five hundred pounds less than it could have been if they didn't have to keep that amount idle. If we assume they typically sell their entire stock once a year, having to keep such a large sum idle means they will sell five hundred pounds less in goods than they otherwise could. Their annual profits will be lower by whatever they could have earned from selling that additional five hundred pounds worth of goods, and the number of people involved in preparing their goods for sale will be fewer because that extra stock could have employed more workers. In contrast, the Edinburgh merchant does not keep money idle to meet such occasional demands. When those demands arise, they pay from their bank cash account and gradually replenish the borrowed amount with the money or receipts generated from occasional sales of their goods. With the same stock, then, they can always maintain a larger inventory than the London merchant without any risk, allowing them to earn greater profits and continuously provide work for more industrious people who prepare those goods for the market. This illustrates the significant advantage that the country has gained from this trade.

The facility of discounting bills of exchange, it may be thought, indeed, gives the English merchants a conveniency equivalent to the cash accounts of the Scotch merchants. But the Scotch merchants, it must be remembered, can discount their bills of exchange as easily as the English merchants; and have, besides, the additional conveniency of their cash accounts.

The option to discount bills of exchange might seem to provide English merchants with an advantage similar to the cash accounts of Scottish merchants. However, it's important to note that Scottish merchants can discount their bills of exchange just as easily as English merchants can, and they also have the added benefit of their cash accounts.

The whole paper money of every kind which can easily circulate in any country, never can exceed the value of the gold and silver, of which it supplies the place, or which (the commerce being supposed the same) would circulate there, if there was no paper money. If twenty shilling notes, for example, are the lowest paper money current in Scotland, the whole of that currency which can easily circulate there, cannot exceed the sum of gold and silver which would be necessary for transacting the annual exchanges of twenty shillings value and upwards usually transacted within that country. Should the circulating paper at any time exceed that sum, as the excess could neither be sent abroad nor be employed in the circulation of the country, it must immediately return upon the banks, to be exchanged for gold and silver. Many people would immediately perceive that they had more of this paper than was necessary for transacting their business at home; and as they could not send it abroad, they would immediately demand payment for it from the banks. When this superfluous paper was converted into gold and silver, they could easily find a use for it, by sending it abroad; but they could find none while it remained in the shape of paper. There would immediately, therefore, be a run upon the banks to the whole extent of this superfluous paper, and if they showed any difficulty or backwardness in payment, to a much greater extent; the alarm which this would occasion necessarily increasing the run.

The total amount of paper money in any country that can easily circulate will never exceed the value of the gold and silver it replaces, or the gold and silver that would circulate if there were no paper money. For instance, if twenty-shilling notes are the smallest paper currency used in Scotland, then the total amount of paper currency that can circulate there cannot be more than the sum of gold and silver needed to handle the annual transactions worth twenty shillings or more that usually occur in that country. If the amount of circulating paper ever exceeds that total, since the excess can't be sent abroad or used in the domestic economy, it will quickly flow back to the banks to be exchanged for gold and silver. Many people would realize they have more paper money than needed for their business transactions at home, and since they cannot send it out of the country, they would demand payment from the banks. Once this extra paper is exchanged for gold and silver, they could easily use it by sending it abroad; but as long as it remains paper, they find no use for it. Consequently, there would be a rush to the banks to redeem all this extra paper, and if the banks show any hesitation in processing payments, the demand would grow even larger, causing alarm that would further amplify the rush.

Over and above the expenses which are common to every branch of trade, such as the expense of house-rent, the wages of servants, clerks, accountants, &c. the expenses peculiar to a bank consist chiefly in two articles: first, in the expense of keeping at all times in its coffers, for answering the occasional demands of the holders of its notes, a large sum of money, of which it loses the interest; and, secondly, in the expense of replenishing those coffers as fast as they are emptied by answering such occasional demands.

Besides the expenses that are common to all types of businesses, like rent, salaries of staff, clerks, accountants, etc., a bank has two main unique costs: first, the need to always keep a significant amount of cash on hand to meet the occasional requests from note holders, which means it loses out on interest; and second, the cost of replenishing that cash as quickly as it gets withdrawn to meet those requests.

A banking company which issues more paper than can be employed in the circulation of the country, and of which the excess is continually returning upon them for payment, ought to increase the quantity of gold and silver which they keep at all times in their coffers, not only in proportion to this excessive increase of their circulation, but in a much greater proportion; their notes returning upon them much faster than in proportion to the excess of their quantity. Such a company, therefore, ought to increase the first article of their expense, not only in proportion to this forced increase of their business, but in a much greater proportion.

A bank that issues more paper money than can be used in the country’s economy, and where the excess keeps coming back for payment, should increase the amount of gold and silver they hold at all times. This increase should not only match the excessive growth of their money supply but be significantly greater; their notes are coming back to them much faster than the proportion of the excess. Therefore, this bank should raise its initial expenses, not just in line with this forced increase in their operations, but by an even larger amount.

The coffers of such a company, too, though they ought to be filled much fuller, yet must empty themselves much faster than if their business was confined within more reasonable bounds, and must require not only a more violent, but a more constant and uninterrupted exertion of expense, in order to replenish them. The coin, too, which is thus continually drawn in such large quantities from their coffers, cannot be employed in the circulation of the country. It comes in place of a paper which is over and above what can be employed in that circulation, and is, therefore, over and above what can be employed in it too. But as that coin will not be allowed to lie idle, it must, in one shape or another, be sent abroad, in order to find that profitable employment which it cannot find at home; and this continual exportation of gold and silver, by enhancing the difficulty, must necessarily enhance still farther the expense of the bank, in finding new gold and silver in order to replenish those coffers, which empty themselves so very rapidly. Such a company, therefore, must in proportion to this forced increase of their business, increase the second article of their expense still more than the first.

The funds of such a company, while they should be much fuller, end up depleting much faster than if their operations were kept within more reasonable limits. They require not only a more intense but also a more continuous and uninterrupted level of spending to refill them. The coins that are constantly taken out in large amounts can't be used in the country's circulation. They replace paper money that exceeds what can actually be used in that circulation, and, therefore, is also more than can be utilized. However, since those coins can't be left idle, they must be sent elsewhere to find profitable use that they can't achieve locally. This constant export of gold and silver, by raising the challenge, must also further increase the costs for the bank in acquiring new gold and silver to refill those coffers that empty so quickly. Consequently, such a company must increase the second component of their expenses even more than the first, in relation to this forced expansion of their business.

Let us suppose that all the paper of a particular bank, which the circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ, amounts exactly to forty thousand pounds, and that, for answering occasional demands, this bank is obliged to keep at all times in its coffers ten thousand pounds in gold and silver. Should this bank attempt to circulate forty-four thous[Pg 123]and pounds, the four thousand pounds which are over and above what the circulation can easily absorb and employ, will return upon it almost as fast as they are issued. For answering occasional demands, therefore, this bank ought to keep at all times in its coffers, not eleven thousand pounds only, but fourteen thousand pounds. It will thus gain nothing by the interest of the four thousand pounds excessive circulation; and it will lose the whole expense of continually collecting four thousand pounds in gold and silver, which will be continually going out of its coffers as fast as they are brought into them.

Let’s say that all the currency from a certain bank, which the country can easily absorb and use, totals exactly forty thousand pounds, and that this bank needs to keep at least ten thousand pounds in gold and silver on hand to meet occasional demands. If this bank tries to circulate forty-four thousand pounds, the four thousand pounds over what can be easily absorbed will come back to it almost as quickly as it issues them. Therefore, to meet occasional demands, this bank should keep not just eleven thousand pounds, but fourteen thousand pounds in its reserves. It won’t benefit from the interest on the extra four thousand pounds in circulation, and it will lose all the costs associated with constantly collecting that four thousand pounds in gold and silver, which will be going out as quickly as it comes in.

Had every particular banking company always understood and attended to its own particular interest, the circulation never could have been overstocked with paper money. But every particular banking company has not always understood or attended to its own particular interest, and the circulation has frequently been overstocked with paper money.

If every individual bank had always understood and taken care of its own interests, the market would never have been flooded with paper money. However, not every bank has consistently recognized or prioritized its own interests, and as a result, the market has often been overwhelmed with paper money.

By issuing too great a quantity of paper, of which the excess was continually returning, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, the Bank of England was for many years together obliged to coin gold to the extent of between eight hundred thousand pounds and a million a-year; or, at an average, about eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds. For this great coinage, the bank (in consequence of the worn and degraded state into which the gold coin had fallen a few years ago) was frequently obliged to purchase gold bullion at the high price of four pounds an ounce, which it soon after issued in coin at L.3 : 17 : 10½ an ounce, losing in this manner between two and a half and three per cent. upon the coinage of so very large a sum. Though the bank, therefore, paid no seignorage, though the government was properly at the expense of this coinage, this liberality of government did not prevent altogether the expense of the bank.

By issuing too much paper money, which kept coming back to be exchanged for gold and silver, the Bank of England had to mint gold coins for many years, producing between eight hundred thousand and a million pounds each year, averaging about eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds. Due to the worn-down condition of the gold coins from a few years back, the bank often had to buy gold bullion at the high price of four pounds an ounce, which it would then issue as coins at £3 : 17 : 10½ an ounce, resulting in a loss of between two and a half and three percent on such a large amount. So, while the bank didn't pay any seignorage and the government covered the cost of this coinage, the government's generosity didn't completely eliminate the bank's expenses.

The Scotch banks, in consequence of an excess of the same kind, were all obliged to employ constantly agents at London to collect money for them, at an expense which was seldom below one and a half or two per cent. This money was sent down by the waggon, and insured by the carriers at an additional expense of three quarters per cent. or fifteen shillings on the hundred pounds. Those agents were not always able to replenish the coffers of their employers so fast as they were emptied. In this case, the resource of the banks was, to draw upon their correspondents in London bills of exchange, to the extent of the sum which they wanted. When those correspondents afterwards drew upon them for the payment of this sum, together with the interest and commission, some of those banks, from the distress into which their excessive circulation had thrown them, had sometimes no other means of satisfying this draught, but by drawing a second set of bills, either upon the same, or upon some other correspondents in London; and the same sum, or rather bills for the same sum, would in this manner make sometimes more than two or three journeys; the debtor bank paying always the interest and commission upon the whole accumulated sum. Even those Scotch banks which never distinguished themselves by their extreme imprudence, were sometimes obliged to employ this ruinous resource.

The Scottish banks, due to a similar issue, were forced to constantly hire agents in London to collect money for them, at a cost that was rarely less than one and a half to two percent. This money was transported by wagon and insured by the carriers at an additional cost of three quarters of a percent, or fifteen shillings on every hundred pounds. Those agents weren't always able to refill their employers' coffers quickly enough. In this situation, the banks would draw on their contacts in London through bills of exchange for the amount they needed. When those contacts later requested payment for this amount, plus the interest and commission, some banks, struggling due to their excessive circulation, had no choice but to issue a second set of bills, either to the same contacts or to different ones in London. This way, the same amount, or rather bills for the same amount, would sometimes make two or three trips; the borrowing bank would always pay the interest and commission on the total accumulated amount. Even the Scottish banks that weren’t particularly known for their extreme recklessness occasionally had to resort to this destructive practice.

The gold coin which was paid out, either by the Bank of England or by the Scotch banks, in exchange for that part of their paper which was over and above what could be employed in the circulation of the country, being likewise over and above what could be employed in that circulation, was sometimes sent abroad in the shape of coin, sometimes melted down and sent abroad in the shape of bullion, and sometimes melted down and sold to the Bank of England at the high price of four pounds an ounce. It was the newest, the heaviest, and the best pieces only, which were carefully picked out of the whole coin, and either sent abroad or melted down. At home, and while they remained in the shape of coin, these heavy pieces were of no more value than the light; but they were of more value abroad, or when melted down into bullion at home. The Bank of England, notwithstanding their great annual coinage, found, to their astonishment, that there was every year the same scarcity of coin as there had been the year before; and that, notwithstanding the great quantity of good and new coin which was every year issued from the bank, the state of the coin, instead of growing better and better, became every year worse and worse. Every year they found themselves under the necessity of coining nearly the same quantity of gold as they had coined the year before; and from the continual rise in the price of gold bullion, in consequence of the continual wearing and clipping of the coin, the expense of this great annual coinage became, every year, greater and greater. The Bank of England, it is to be observed, by supplying its own coffers with coin, is indirectly obliged to supply the whole kingdom, into which coin is continually flowing from those coffers in a great variety of ways. Whatever coin, therefore, was wanted to support this excessive circulation both of Scotch and English paper money, whatever vacuities this excessive circulation occasioned in the necessary coin of the kingdom, the Bank of England was obliged to supply them. The Scotch banks, no doubt, paid all of them very dearly for their own imprudence and inattention: but the Bank of England paid very dearly, not only for its own imprudence, but for the much greater imprudence of almost all the Scotch banks.

The gold coin that was distributed, either by the Bank of England or the Scottish banks, in exchange for the excess of their paper currency that couldn’t be used in the nation’s circulation, was often sent overseas as coins, melted down and shipped out as bullion, or melted and sold to the Bank of England at a hefty price of four pounds an ounce. Only the newest, heaviest, and best coins were carefully selected from the entire collection, either sent abroad or melted down. At home, while they remained as coins, these heavy pieces were worth no more than the lighter ones; however, they had a higher value abroad or when melted down into bullion at home. The Bank of England, despite its significant annual coin minting, found it surprising that year after year, there continued to be the same shortage of coins as the previous year. Even with the large amount of fresh, quality coins issued from the bank every year, the coin situation didn’t improve but instead got worse. Each year, they had to mint nearly the same amount of gold as the year before, and due to the constant rise in gold bullion prices because of ongoing wear and tear on the coins, the cost of this annual minting grew higher each year. It’s important to note that by keeping its own coffers filled with coin, the Bank of England indirectly had to supply the entire country, as coin continuously flowed out from those coffers in various ways. Therefore, whatever coin was needed to support the excessive circulation of both Scottish and English paper money — whatever gaps this excessive circulation created in the necessary coins of the kingdom — the Bank of England had to provide. The Scottish banks surely paid a steep price for their own recklessness and negligence; however, the Bank of England paid dearly not only for its own missteps but also for the much greater irresponsibility of nearly all the Scottish banks.

The over-trading of some bold projectors in both parts of the united kingdom, was the[Pg 124] original cause of this excessive circulation of paper money.

The over-trading of some ambitious investors in both regions of the United Kingdom was the[Pg 124] original cause of this excessive circulation of paper money.

What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker of any kind, is not either the whole capital with which he trades, or even any considerable part of that capital; but that part of it only which he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. If the paper money which the bank advances never exceeds this value, it can never exceed the value of the gold and silver which would necessarily circulate in the country if there was no paper money; it can never exceed the quantity which the circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ.

What a bank can properly lend to a merchant or any kind of business is not the entire capital they use for trading, nor even a significant portion of that capital; it’s only the part that they would otherwise have to keep on hand as cash to meet unexpected expenses. If the paper money that the bank lends never goes beyond this amount, it can't exceed the value of the gold and silver that would have to be in circulation in the country if there were no paper money; it can't exceed the amount that the country's economy can easily handle and utilize.

When a bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange, drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and which, as soon as it becomes due, is really paid by that debtor; it only advances to him a part of the value which he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. The payment of the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what it had advanced, together with the interest. The coffers of the bank, so far as its dealings are confined to such customers, resemble a water-pond, from which, though a stream is continually running out, yet another is continually running in, fully equal to that which runs out; so that, without any further care or attention, the pond keeps always equally, or very near equally full. Little or no expense can ever be necessary for replenishing the coffers of such a bank.

When a bank discounts a real bill of exchange for a merchant, which is issued by a legitimate creditor to a genuine debtor, and which is actually paid by that debtor when it’s due; it’s essentially loaning the merchant part of the money that he would otherwise have to keep on hand as cash to cover unexpected expenses. When the bill is paid upon maturity, it replaces the value the bank initially advanced, plus interest. The bank's funds, as long as it deals with such clients, are like a pond of water, where, even though some water is always flowing out, there’s also a steady inflow that matches what’s flowing out; therefore, without any extra effort or attention, the pond remains consistently full, or very close to it. There’s hardly any cost associated with keeping the bank's funds replenished.

A merchant, without over-trading, may frequently have occasion for a sum of ready money, even when he has no bills to discount. When a bank, besides discounting his bills, advances him likewise, upon such occasions, such sums upon his cash account, and accepts of a piece-meal repayment, as the money comes in from the occasional sale of his goods, upon the easy terms of the banking companies of Scotland; it dispenses him entirely from the necessity of keeping any part of his stock by him unemployed and in ready money for answering occasional demands. When such demands actually come upon him, he can answer them sufficiently from his cash account. The bank, however, in dealing with such customers, ought to observe with great attention, whether, in the course of some short period (of four, five, six, or eight months, for example), the sum of the repayments which it commonly receives from them, is, or is not, fully equal to that of the advances which it commonly makes to them. If, within the course of such short periods, the sum of the repayments from certain customers is, upon most occasions, fully equal to that of the advances, it may safely continue to deal with such customers. Though the stream which is in this case continually running out from its coffers may be very large, that which is continually running into them must be at least equally large: so that, without any further care or attention, those coffers are likely to be always equally or very near equally full, and scarce ever to require any extraordinary expense to replenish them. If, on the contrary, the sum of the repayments from certain other customers, falls commonly very much short of the advances which it makes to them, it cannot with any safety continue to deal with such customers, at least if they continue to deal with it in this manner. The stream which is in this case continually running out from its coffers, is necessarily much larger than that which is continually running in; so that, unless they are replenished by some great and continual effort of expense, those coffers must soon be exhausted altogether.

A merchant, without taking on too much business, might often need cash, even when he doesn't have any bills to cash in. When a bank, in addition to cashing his bills, also provides him with money for his cash account during these times, and allows him to pay it back in small amounts as he sells his goods, under the easy terms of the banks in Scotland, it completely frees him from needing to keep part of his stock unused and in cash to meet occasional demands. When those demands arise, he can cover them easily from his cash account. However, when the bank works with such clients, it should carefully monitor whether, over a short period (like four, five, six, or eight months), the total repayments it usually gets from them equals the total advances it typically makes. If, during these shorter periods, the repayments from certain customers are generally equal to the advances, the bank can safely continue to work with them. Even if a lot of money is continuously flowing out of the bank, as long as an equal amount is coming back in, the bank's funds will likely remain stable, needing little extra effort to keep them replenished. On the other hand, if the repayments from some other customers regularly fall short of the advances, the bank cannot safely keep dealing with those customers, especially if they continue in that way. In this case, the amount continuously flowing out of the bank is much greater than what is coming in; therefore, unless those funds are replaced by significant and ongoing expenses, the bank will quickly run out of money.

The banking companies of Scotland, accordingly, were for a long time very careful to require frequent and regular repayments from all their customers, and did not care to deal with any person, whatever might be his fortune or credit, who did not make, what they called, frequent and regular operations with them. By this attention, besides saving almost entirely the extraordinary expense of replenishing their coffers, they gained two other very considerable advantages.

The banking companies in Scotland were very cautious for a long time about requiring their customers to make frequent and regular repayments. They didn’t want to work with anyone, no matter their wealth or reputation, who didn’t engage in what they referred to as frequent and regular transactions with them. This approach not only helped them avoid the extra costs of refilling their coffers but also brought them two other significant benefits.

First, by this attention they were enabled to make some tolerable judgment concerning the thriving or declining circumstances of their debtors, without being obliged to look out for any other evidence besides what their own books afforded them; men being, for the most part, either regular or irregular in their repayments, according as their circumstances are either thriving or declining. A private man who lends out his money to perhaps half a dozen or a dozen of debtors, may, either by himself or his agents, observe and inquire both constantly and carefully into the conduct and situation of each of them. But a banking company, which lends money to perhaps five hundred different people, and of which the attention is continually occupied by objects of a very different kind, can have no regular information concerning the conduct and circumstances of the greater part of its debtors, beyond what its own books afford it. In requiring frequent and regular repayments from all their customers, the banking companies of Scotland had probably this advantage in view.

First, by paying attention, they were able to make a reasonable judgment about whether their debtors were doing well or struggling, without needing to look for any other proof beyond what their own records showed them; people typically either pay regularly or irregularly depending on whether their situation is improving or declining. A private individual who lends money to maybe six or twelve debtors can either by himself or through his agents closely observe and inquire about the behavior and circumstances of each borrower. But a bank, which lends money to perhaps five hundred different people and is constantly focused on a variety of other issues, can't keep regular track of the behavior and situation of most of its debtors, aside from what its own records provide. By requiring frequent and regular repayments from all their customers, the banks in Scotland likely had this advantage in mind.

Secondly, by this attention they secured themselves from the possibility of issuing more paper money than what the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ. When they observed, that within moderate periods of time, the repayments of a particular customer were, upon most occasions, fully equal to the advances which they had made to him, they might he assured that the paper money[Pg 125] which they had advanced to him had not, at any time, exceeded the quantity of gold and silver which he would otherwise have been obliged to keep by him for answering occasional demands; and that, consequently, the paper money, which they had circulated by his means, had not at any time exceeded the quantity of gold and silver which would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money. The frequency, regularity, and amount of his repayments, would sufficiently demonstrate that the amount of their advances had at no time exceeded that part of his capital which he would otherwise have been obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands; that is, for the purpose of keeping the rest of his capital in constant employment. It is this part of his capital only which, within moderate periods of time, is continually returning in every dealer in the shape of money, whether paper or coin, and continually going from him in the same shape. If the advances of the bank had commonly exceeded this part of his capital, the ordinary amount of his repayments could not, within moderate periods of time, have equalled the ordinary amount of its advances. The stream which, by means of his dealings, was continually running into the coffers of the bank, could not have been equal to the stream which, by means of the same dealings was continually running out. The advances of the bank paper, by exceeding the quantity of gold and silver which, had there been no such advances, he would have been obliged to keep by him for answering occasional demands, might soon come to exceed the whole quantity of gold and silver which (the commerce being supposed the same) would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money; and, consequently, to exceed the quantity which the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ; and the excess of this paper money would immediately have returned upon the bank, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver. This second advantage, though equally real, was not, perhaps, so well understood by all the different banking companies in Scotland as the first.

Secondly, by paying close attention, they protected themselves from the risk of issuing more paper money than the country could comfortably absorb and use. When they noticed that within reasonable timeframes, the repayments from a particular customer were usually fully equal to the advances they had made to him, they could be confident that the paper money[Pg 125] they had lent to him never exceeded the amount of gold and silver he would otherwise have needed to hold for occasional expenses. Therefore, the paper money they had put into circulation through him never surpassed the amount of gold and silver that would have existed in the country if there had been no paper money. The frequency, consistency, and total of his repayments would clearly show that their advances never exceeded the portion of his capital that he would have had to keep unused and in cash for occasional expenses; in other words, to keep the rest of his capital actively working. This part of his capital is the only amount that, within moderate timeframes, continually comes back to every dealer in the form of money, whether paper or coin, and continually flows out from him in the same way. If the bank’s advances consistently exceeded this part of his capital, the typical amount he repaid could not, within reasonable timeframes, equal the usual amount of their advances. The flow of money, generated through his dealings, going into the bank's coffers could not match the flow going out. If the bank's paper advances exceeded the amount of gold and silver that he would have had to keep on hand for occasional expenses, it could soon surpass the total quantity of gold and silver that would have circulated in the country, assuming the same level of commerce, had there been no paper money. Consequently, it might exceed the amount that the country's circulation could readily absorb and use; and any surplus of this paper money would quickly return to the bank to be exchanged for gold and silver. This second benefit, while equally valid, may not have been as well understood by all the different banks in Scotland as the first.

When, partly by the conveniency of discounting bills, and partly by that of cash accounts, the creditable traders of any country can be dispensed from the necessity of keeping any part of their stock by them unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands, they can reasonably expect no farther assistance from banks and bankers, who, when they have gone thus far, cannot, consistently with their own interest and safety, go farther. A bank cannot, consistently with its own interest, advance to a trader the whole, or even the greater part of the circulating capital with which he trades; because, though that capital is continually returning to him in the shape of money, and going from him in the same shape, yet the whole of the returns is too distant from the whole of the outgoings, and the sum of his the repayments could not equal the sum of his advances within much moderate periods of time as suit the conveniency of a bank. Still less could a bank afford to advance him any considerable part of his fixed capital; of the capital which the undertaker of an iron forge, for example, employs in erecting his forge and smelting-houses, his work-houses, and warehouses, the dwelling-houses of his workmen, &c.; of the capital which the undertaker of a mine employs in sinking his shafts, in erecting engines for drawing out the water, in making roads and waggon-ways, &c.; of the capital which the person who undertakes to improve land employs in clearing, draining, inclosing, manuring, and ploughing waste and uncultivated fields; in building farm-houses, with all their necessary appendages of stables, granaries, &c. The returns of the fixed capital are, in almost all cases, much slower than those of the circulating capital: and such expenses, even when laid out with the greatest prudence and judgment, mean very seldom return to the undertaker till after period of many years, a period by far too distant to suit the conveniency of a bank. Traders and other undertakers may, no doubt with great propriety, carry on a very considerable part of their projects with borrowed money. In justice to their creditors, however, their own capital ought in this case to be sufficient to insure, if I may say so, the capital of those creditors; or to render it extremely improbable that those creditors should incur any loss, even though the success of the project should fall very much short of the expectation of the projectors. Even with this precaution, too, the money which is borrowed, and which it is meant should not be repaid till after a period of several years, ought not to be borrowed of a bank, but ought to be borrowed upon bond or mortgage, of such private people as propose to live upon the interest of their money, without taking the trouble themselves to employ the capital, and who are, upon that account, willing to lend that capital to such people of good credit as are likely lo keep it for several years. A bank, indeed, which lends its money without the expense of stamped paper, or of attorneys' fees for drawing bonds and mortgages, and which accepts of repayment upon the easy terms of the banking companies of Scotland, would, no doubt, be a very convenient creditor to such traders and undertakers. But such traders and undertakers would surely be most inconvenient debtors to such a bank.

When, partly due to the convenience of discounting bills and partly because of cash accounts, reliable traders in any country can avoid keeping some of their stock idle and in cash for unexpected expenses, they can reasonably expect no further help from banks and bankers. Once they have reached this point, banks cannot, in their own interest and safety, go any further. A bank cannot reasonably advance a trader the entire capital or even the larger part of the working capital they use for trading. Although this capital continuously comes back to the trader in the form of money and goes out in the same way, the timing of the returns is too far off from the timing of the outgoings, and the total amount of repayments cannot equal the total of the advances within a time frame that would suit a bank’s convenience. Even less could a bank afford to lend any significant part of a trader’s fixed capital; for instance, the capital an iron forge owner uses to set up their forge, smelting houses, workshops, warehouses, and workers' housing; or the capital a mine operator invests in sinking shafts, putting up water-drawing engines, building roads and tracks; or the capital someone improving land uses for clearing, draining, fencing, manuring, and plowing barren fields, as well as constructing farmhouses and all their necessary extensions like stables and granaries. Returns from fixed capital, in almost all cases, take much longer than those from circulating capital. Even when such expenses are managed with utmost prudence and judgment, they usually don't yield returns for the owner until many years later, a timeframe much too lengthy for a bank's convenience. Traders and other entrepreneurs may, of course, rightfully carry out a significant portion of their projects with borrowed money. However, to be fair to their creditors, their own capital should be adequate to protect, for lack of a better term, their creditors’ capital; or to make it very unlikely that those creditors will suffer any loss, even if the project's outcome falls far short of the expectations of its initiators. Even with this safeguard, money borrowed to be repaid after several years should not come from a bank, but rather from private individuals offering bonds or mortgages, who intend to live off the interest of their money without the need to actively manage the capital themselves, and who are willing to lend to credible individuals likely to retain the capital for several years. A bank, indeed, which lends its money without the costs of stamped paper or attorney fees for drafting bonds and mortgages, and which allows repayment under the easy terms familiar to the banking firms in Scotland, would undoubtedly be a very convenient lender for such traders and entrepreneurs. However, those traders and entrepreneurs would certainly be the most challenging borrowers for such a bank.

It is now more than five and twenty years since the paper money issued by the different banking companies of Scotland was fully equal, or rather was somewhat more than fully[Pg 126] equal, to what the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ. Those companies, therefore, had so long ago given all the assistance to the traders and other undertakers of Scotland which it is possible for banks and bankers, consistently with their own interest, to give. They had even done somewhat more. They had over-traded a little, and had brought upon themselves that loss, or at least that diminution of profit, which, in this particular business, never fails to attend the smallest degree of over-trading. Those traders and other undertakers, having got so much assistance from banks and bankers, wished to get still more. The banks, they seem to have thought, could extend their credits to whatever sum might be wanted, without incurring any other expense besides that of a few reams of paper. They complained of the contracted views and dastardly spirit of the directors of those banks, which did not, they said, extend their credits in proportion to the extension of the trade of the country; meaning, no doubt, by the extension of that trade, the extension of their own projects beyond what they could carry on either with their own capital, or with what they had credit to borrow of private people in the usual way of bond or mortgage. The banks, they seem to have thought, were in honour bound to supply the deficiency, and to provide them with all the capital which they wanted to trade with. The banks, however, were of a different opinion and upon their refusing to extend their credits, some of those traders had recourse to an expedient which, for a time, served their purpose, though at a much greater expense, yet as effectually as the utmost extension of bank credits could have done. This expedient was no other than the well known shift of drawing and redrawing; the shift to which unfortunate traders have sometimes recourse, when they are upon the brink of bankruptcy. The practice of raising money in this manner had been long known in England; and, during the course of the late war, when the high profits of trade afforded a great temptation to over-trading, is said to have been carried on to a very great extent. From England it was brought into Scotland, where, in proportion to the very limited commerce, and to the very moderate capital of the country, it was soon carried on to a much greater extent than it ever had been in England.

It's now been more than twenty-five years since the paper money issued by various banking companies in Scotland was fully equal, or even slightly more than fully equal, to what the country's circulation could easily absorb and use. Those companies had provided all the support possible to traders and entrepreneurs in Scotland, consistent with their own interests. They had even done a bit more than that. They had slightly over-traded, which led to losses, or at least a drop in profits, that inevitably comes with even a small amount of over-trading in this field. The traders and entrepreneurs, having received so much help from banks, wanted even more. It seemed they thought the banks could extend their credit to any amount needed without any other costs apart from a few reams of paper. They criticized the narrow-mindedness and timid approach of the bank directors, claiming they didn't extend credit in line with the expansion of the country's trade; by "expansion of trade," they likely meant expanding their own projects beyond what they could manage with their own capital or with what they could typically borrow from private individuals through bonds or mortgages. They appeared to believe the banks were honor-bound to fill the gap and provide all the capital they needed for trading. However, the banks had a different view, and when they refused to extend credit, some traders turned to a temporary solution that, while more costly, served their purpose as effectively as extending bank credits could have. This solution was the familiar tactic of drawing and redrawing; a tactic that desperate traders sometimes resort to when they're on the verge of bankruptcy. The practice of raising money in this way had long been known in England, and during the recent war, when high trade profits tempted over-trading, it reportedly became widespread. It was brought to Scotland, where, in relation to the very limited commerce and moderate capital available, it quickly escalated to a level much greater than it had ever reached in England.

The practice of drawing and redrawing is so well known to all men of business, that it may, perhaps, be thought unnecessary to give any account of it. But as this book may come into the hands of many people who are not men of business, and as the effects of this practice upon the banking trade are not, perhaps, generally understood, even by men of business themselves, I shall endeavour to explain it as distinctly as I can.

The practice of drawing and redrawing is so well known to everyone in business that it might seem unnecessary to explain it. However, since this book may reach many people who aren’t in the business world, and because the impact of this practice on banking isn’t always clear, even to those in business, I’ll try to explain it as clearly as I can.

The customs of merchants, which were established when the barbarous laws of Europe did not enforce the performance of their contracts, and which, during the course of the two last centuries, have been adopted into the laws of all European nations, have given such extraordinary privileges to bills of exchange, that money is more readily advanced upon them than upon any other species of obligation; especially when they are made payable within so short a period as two or three months after their date. If, when the bill becomes due, the acceptor does not pay it as soon as it is presented, he becomes from that moment a bankrupt. The bill is protested, and returns upon the drawer, who, if he does not immediately pay it, becomes likewise a bankrupt. If, before it came to the person who presents it to the acceptor for payment, it had passed through the hands of several other persons, who had successively advanced to one another the contents of it, either in money or goods, and who, to express that each of them had in his turn received those contents, had all of them in their order indorsed, that is, written their names upon the back of the bill; each indorser becomes in his turn liable to the owner of the bill for those contents, and, if he fails to pay, he becomes too, from that moment, a bankrupt. Though the drawer, acceptor, and indorsers of the bill, should all of them be persons of doubtful credit; yet, still the shortness of the date gives some security to the owner of the bill. Though all of them may be very likely to become bankrupts, it is a chance if they all become so in so short a time. The house is crazy, says a weary traveller to himself, and will not stand very long; but it is a chance if it falls to-night, and I will venture, therefore, to sleep in it to-night.

The practices of merchants, which started when the harsh laws of Europe didn’t enforce contracts, and which have been incorporated into the laws of all European countries over the last two centuries, have given remarkable advantages to bills of exchange. Money is more easily lent against them than any other type of obligation, especially when they are due within a short time, like two or three months from the date. If the acceptor doesn’t pay the bill as soon as it’s presented when it’s due, they instantly become a bankrupt. The bill is protested and goes back to the drawer, who must also pay it immediately or they too become a bankrupt. If the bill has passed through several hands before reaching the person presenting it for payment, with each person having lent each other the value of it in cash or goods, and each of them endorsed it by signing their names on the back, each endorser is then liable to the bill’s owner for that amount. If they fail to pay, they also become bankrupt at that moment. Even if the drawer, acceptor, and endorsers are all questionable credit risks, the short time frame still offers some security to the bill’s owner. While it’s possible that they might all go bankrupt, it’s unlikely that it would happen all at once in such a short time. The house is unstable, thinks a tired traveler, and won’t last very long; but it's a chance it won’t collapse tonight, so I’ll take the risk and sleep here.

The trader A in Edinburgh, we shall suppose, draws a bill upon B in London, payable two months after date. In reality B in London owes nothing to A in Edinburgh; but he agrees to accept of A's bill, upon condition, that before the term of payment he shall redraw upon A in Edinburgh for the same sum, together with the interest and a commission, another bill, payable likewise two months after date. B accordingly, before the expiration of the first two months, redraws this bill upon A in Edinburgh; who, again before the expiration of the second two months, draws a second bill upon B in London, payable likewise two months after date; and before the expiration of the third two months, B in London redraws upon A in Edinburgh another bill payable also two months after date. This practice has sometimes gone on, not only for several months, but for several years together, the bill always returning upon A in Edinburgh with the accumulated interest and commission of all the former bills. The interest was five per cent. in the year, and the commission was never less than one half per cent. on each[Pg 127] draught. This commission being repeated more than six times in the year, whatever money A might raise by this expedient might necessarily have cost him something more than eight per cent in the year and sometimes a great deal more, when either the price of the commission happened to rise, or when he was obliged to pay compound interest upon the interest and commission of former bills. This practice was called raising money by circulation.

Let's imagine a trader, A, in Edinburgh, who draws up a bill to B in London, due two months later. Actually, B doesn't owe A anything, but he agrees to take A's bill on the condition that before the payment is due, he will draw another bill on A for the same amount, plus interest and a commission, also due in two months. So, before the first two months are over, B draws this new bill on A in Edinburgh. A then, before the second two-month period is up, draws another bill on B in London, which is again due in two months. Before the third two-month term ends, B in London draws yet another bill on A in Edinburgh, also due in two months. This back-and-forth can continue for not just months, but even years, with the bill coming back to A in Edinburgh with all the accumulated interest and commissions from previous bills. The interest rate was five percent per year, and the commission was at least half a percent for every draft. Since this commission was charged multiple times a year, any money A could raise through this method ended up costing him more than eight percent annually, and often much more, especially if the commission rates went up or if he had to pay compound interest on the previous interest and commissions. This method was known as raising money by circulation.

In a country where the ordinary profits of stock, in the greater part of mercantile projects, are supposed to run between six and ten per cent. it must have been a very fortunate speculation, of which the returns could not only repay the enormous expense at which the money was thus borrowed for carrying it on, but afford, besides, a good surplus profit to the projector. Many vast and extensive projects, however, were undertaken, and for several years carried on, without any other fund to support them besides what was raised at this enormous expense. The projectors, no doubt, had in their golden dreams the most distinct vision of this great profit. Upon their awakening, however, either at the end of their projects, or when they were no longer able to carry them on, they very seldom, I believe, had the good fortune to find it.[28]

In a country where the typical returns on investments in most business ventures are thought to be between six and ten percent, it must have been a really lucky investment if the profits could not only cover the huge costs of borrowing the money to get it started, but also provide a nice surplus for the investor. However, many large and ambitious projects were undertaken and were carried out for several years without any funding to support them except what was raised at this high expense. The investors, without a doubt, envisioned these great profits in their dreams. Yet, upon waking—either at the end of their projects or when they could no longer continue them—they rarely, I believe, had the luck to find it.[28]

The bills which A in Edinburgh drew upon B in London, he regularly discounted two months before they were due, with some bank or banker in Edinburgh; and the bills which B in London redrew upon A in Edinburgh, he as regularly discounted, either with the Bank of England, or with some other banker in London. Whatever was advanced upon such circulating bills was in Edinburgh advanced in the paper of the Scotch banks; and in London, when they were discounted at the Bank of England in the paper of that bank. Though the bills upon which this paper had been advanced were all of them repaid in their turn as soon as they became due, yet the value which had been really advanced upon the last bill was never really returned to the banks which advanced it, because, before each bill became due, another bill was always drawn to somewhat a greater amount than the bill which was soon to be paid: and the discounting of this other bill was essentially necessary towards the payment of that which was soon to be due. This payment, therefore, was altogether fictitious. The stream which, by means of those circulating bills of exchange, had once been made to run out from the coffers of the banks, was never replaced by any stream which really run into them.

The bills that A in Edinburgh drew on B in London were regularly discounted two months before they were due, with some bank or banker in Edinburgh. Similarly, the bills that B in London redrew on A in Edinburgh were also regularly discounted, either with the Bank of England or with some other banker in London. The money advanced on these circulating bills was provided in Edinburgh through the paper of the Scottish banks, and in London, when they were discounted at the Bank of England, it was through that bank's paper. Although the bills for which this paper was advanced were all repaid in due course, the amount that had actually been advanced on the last bill was never really returned to the banks that provided it. This was because, before each bill was due, another bill was always drawn for an amount slightly greater than the one that was about to be paid, and the discounting of this new bill was essential for covering the payment of the one due soon. As a result, this payment was entirely imaginary. The funds that, through those circulating bills of exchange, had once flowed out of the banks' coffers were never replaced by any actual funds flowing back into them.

The paper which was issued upon those circulating bills of exchange amounted, upon many occasions, to the whole fund destined for carrying on some vast and extensive project of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures; and not merely to that part of it which, had there been no paper money, the projector would have been obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. The greater part of this paper was, consequently, over and above the value of the gold and silver which would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money. It was over and above, therefore, what the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ, and upon that account, immediately returned upon the banks, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, which they were to find as they could. It was a capital which those projectors had very artfully contrived to draw from those banks, not only without their knowledge or deliberate consent, but for some time, perhaps, without their having the most distant suspicion that they had really advanced it.

The paper that was issued against those circulating bills of exchange frequently amounted to the entire fund set aside for carrying out large-scale projects in agriculture, commerce, or manufacturing. This was not just the portion that, without paper money, the project leader would have had to keep on hand as cash for unexpected needs. Most of this paper was, therefore, beyond the value of the gold and silver that would have circulated in the country had there been no paper money. It exceeded what the country's economy could easily absorb and utilize, which is why it quickly bounced back to the banks to be exchanged for gold and silver, which they had to source as best they could. It was a kind of capital that these project leaders cunningly managed to extract from the banks, not only without the banks' knowledge or consent but possibly for some time even without the slightest suspicion that they had actually given it.

When two people, who are continually drawing and redrawing upon one another, discount their bills always with the same banker, he must immediately discover what they are about, and see clearly that they are trading, not with any capital of their own, but with the capital which he advances to them. But this discovery is not altogether so easy when they discount their bills sometimes with one banker, and sometimes with another, and when the two same persons do not constantly draw and redraw upon one another, but occasionally run the round of a great circle of projectors, who find it for their interest to assist one another in this method of raising money[Pg 128] and to render it, upon that account, as difficult as possible to distinguish between a real and a fictitious bill of exchange, between a bill drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and a bill for which there was properly no real creditor but the bank which discounted it, nor any real debtor but the projector who made use of the money. When a banker had even made this discovery, he might sometimes make it too late, and might find that he had already discounted the bills of those projectors to so great an extent, that, by refusing to discount any more, he would necessarily make them all bankrupts; and thus by ruining them, might perhaps ruin himself. For his own interest and safety, therefore, he might find it necessary, in this very perilous situation, to go on for some time, endeavouring, however, to withdraw gradually, and, upon that account, making every day greater and greater difficulties about discounting, in order to force these projectors by degrees to have recourse, either to other bankers, or to other methods of raising money: so as that he himself might, as soon as possible, get out of the circle. The difficulties, accordingly, which the Bank of England, which the principal bankers in London, and which even the more prudent Scotch banks began, after a certain time, and when all of them had already gone too far, to make about discounting, not only alarmed, but enraged, in the highest degree, those projectors. Their own distress, of which this prudent and necessary reserve of the banks was, no doubt, the immediate occasion, they called the distress of the country; and this distress of the country, they said, was altogether owing to the ignorance, pusillanimity, and bad conduct of the banks, which did not give a sufficiently-liberal aid to the spirited undertakings of those who exerted themselves in order to beautify, improve, and enrich the country. It was the duty of the banks, they seemed to think, to lend for as long a time, and to as great an extent, as they might wish to borrow. The banks, however, by refusing in this manner to give more credit to those to whom they had already given a great deal too much, took the only method by which it was now possible to save either their own credit, or the public credit of the country.

When two people keep relying on each other for loans and regularly cash their checks with the same bank, the banker quickly figures out what’s happening. He realizes they’re not using their own money, but the bank's funds. However, this becomes harder to recognize when they sometimes go to different banks, and when those two don’t always depend on each other, but instead trade money with a larger network of investors who help each other out in raising funds. This can make it tough to tell the difference between a legitimate and a phony bill of exchange, between a bill from a real creditor to a real debtor, and a bill that has no real creditor except the bank that discounted it, and no true debtor other than the investor using the money. Even if a banker does figure this out, he might realize it too late, having already discounted so many bills that refusing to do more would lead to bankruptcy for those investors, potentially ruining himself in the process. To protect his own interests and safety, he might need to continue for a while, trying to pull back gradually, making it increasingly harder to get discounts each day, nudging these investors to seek other banks or methods to raise funds so he can exit the situation. The challenges that the Bank of England, major banks in London, and even the more cautious Scottish banks started to create around discounting not only alarmed but also infuriated those investors. They blamed their distress, which was due to the prudent and necessary measures taken by the banks, claiming it was the country’s distress. They insisted this was entirely because of the banks’ ignorance, cowardice, and poor management, thinking the banks should lend them as much and for as long as they wanted. However, the banks, by refusing to extend more credit to those they had already overextended, took the only route left to protect both their own reputation and the public credit of the nation.

In the midst of this clamour and distress, a new bank was established in Scotland, for the express purpose of relieving the distress of the country. The design was generous; but the execution was imprudent, and the nature and causes of the distress which it meant to relieve, were not, perhaps, well understood. This bank was more liberal then any other had ever been, both in granting cash-accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange. With regard to the latter, it seems to have made scarce any distinction between real and circulating bills, but to have discounted all equally. It was the avowed principle of this bank to advance upon any reasonable security, the whole capita, which was to be employed in those improvements of which the returns are the most slow and distant, such as the improvements of land. To promote such improvements was even said to be the chief or the public-spirited purposes for which it was instituted. By its liberality in granting cash-accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange, it, no doubt, issued great quantities of its bank notes. But those bank notes being, the greater part of them, over and above what the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ, returned upon it, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as they were issued. Its coffers were never well filled. The capital which had been subscribed to this bank, at two different subscriptions, amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand pounds, of which eighty per cent. only was paid up. This sum ought to have been paid in at several different instalments. A great part of the proprietors, when they paid in their first instalment, opened a cash-account with the bank; and the directors, thinking themselves obliged to treat their own proprietors with the same liberality with which they treated all other man, allowed many of them to borrow upon this cash-account what they paid in upon all their subsequent instalments. Such payments, therefore, only put into one coffer what had the moment before been taken out of another. But had the coffers of this bank been filled ever so well, its excessive circulation must have emptied them faster than they could have been replenished by any other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing upon London; and when the bill became due, paying it, together with interest and commission, by another draught upon the same place. Its coffers having been filled so very ill, it is said to have been driven to this resource within a very few months after it began to do business. The estates of the proprietors of this bank were worth several millions, and, by their subscription to the original bond or contract of the bank, were really pledged for answering all its engagements. By means of the great credit which so great a pledge necessarily gave it, it was, notwithstanding its too liberal conduct, enabled to entry on business for more than two years. When it was obliged to stop, it had in the circulation about two hundred thousand pounds in bank notes. In order to support the circulation of those notes, which were continually returning upon it as fast as they were issued, it had been constantly in the practice of drawing bills of exchange upon London, of which the number and value were continually increasing, and, when it stopt, amounted to upwards of six hundred thousand pounds. This bank, therefore, had, in little more than the course of two years, advanced to different people upwards of eight hundred thousand pounds at five per cent. Upon the two hundred thousand pounds[Pg 129] which it circulated in bank notes, this five per cent. might perhaps be considered as a clear gain, without any other deduction besides the expense of management. But upon upwards of six hundred thousand pounds, for which it was continually drawing bills of exchange upon London, it was paying, in the way of interest and commission, upwards of eight per cent. and was consequently losing more than three per cent. upon more than three-fourths of all its dealings.

In the midst of all this noise and suffering, a new bank was set up in Scotland to specifically help alleviate the country’s distress. The intention was noble; however, the implementation was reckless, and the nature and causes of the distress it aimed to address were not entirely clear. This bank was more generous than any other had ever been, both in providing cash accounts and in discounting bills of exchange. It appeared to make little distinction between real and circulating bills, discounting all of them equally. The bank’s stated goal was to lend against any reasonable collateral the full amount needed for projects with slow and long-term returns, like land improvements. It was even said that promoting such improvements was one of the main public-minded reasons for its establishment. Through its generosity in offering cash accounts and discounting bills, it undoubtedly issued a large amount of its banknotes. However, since most of those banknotes were more than what the country’s economy could easily absorb, they quickly returned to the bank to be exchanged for gold and silver as soon as they were issued. The bank's coffers were never adequately filled. The total capital subscribed to the bank from two separate fundraising rounds was one hundred sixty thousand pounds, but only eighty percent of that was paid in. This amount was supposed to be paid in several installments. Many of the shareholders, when they made their first payment, opened cash accounts with the bank. The directors, feeling they had to treat their own shareholders with the same generosity they showed others, allowed many of them to borrow against their cash accounts the amount they had put in for the subsequent installments. Thus, those payments simply transferred money from one coffer to another. Even if the bank’s coffers had been full, its excessive circulation would have drained them faster than they could be replenished by any method other than the disastrous strategy of drawing on London; when the bill came due, they would pay it along with interest and fees by making another draft on the same place. With its coffers poorly filled, it is said that the bank resorted to this method within just a few months after starting operations. The estates of the bank’s shareholders were worth several million, and through their subscription to the initial contract, they were essentially pledged to cover all its debts. This significant collateral gave it considerable credit, allowing it to operate for over two years despite its overly generous practices. When it eventually had to shut down, it had around two hundred thousand pounds in banknotes circulating. To maintain the circulation of these notes, which were consistently being returned to it as quickly as they were issued, it was continually drawing bills of exchange on London, which were rapidly increasing in number and value, totaling over six hundred thousand pounds when it ceased operations. Therefore, in just over two years, this bank had lent out more than eight hundred thousand pounds at five percent interest. On the two hundred thousand pounds it circulated in banknotes, this five percent might be seen as a net gain, barring only management costs. However, on the over six hundred thousand pounds it was perpetually drawing bills of exchange against London, it was paying more than eight percent in interest and fees, thereby losing over three percent on more than three-fourths of its transactions.

The operations of this bank seem to have produced effects quite opposite to those which were intended by the particular persons who planned and directed it. They seem to have intended to support the spirited undertakings, for as such they considered them, which were at that time carrying on in different parts of the country; and, at the some time, by drawing the whole banking business to themselves, to supplant all the other Scotch banks, particularly those established at Edinburgh, whose backwardness in discounting bills of exchange had given some offence. This bank, no doubt, gave some temporary relief to those projectors, and enabled them to carry on their projects for about two years longer than they could otherwise have done. But it thereby only enabled them to get so much deeper into debt; so that, when rain came, it fell so much the heavier both upon them and upon their their creditors. The operations of this bank, therefore, instead of relieving, in reality aggravated in the long-run the distress which those projectors had brought both upon themselves and upon their country. It would have been much better for themselves, their creditors, and their country, had the greater part of them been obliged to stop two years sooner than they actually did. The temporary relief, however, which this bank afforded to those projectors, proved a real and permanent relief to the other Scotch banks. All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, which those other banks had become so backward in discounting, had recourse to this new bank, where they were received with open arms. Those other banks, therefore, were enabled to get very easily out of that fatal circle, from which they could not otherwise have disengaged themselves without incurring a considerable loss, and perhaps, too, even some degree of discredit.

The operations of this bank seem to have had effects that were completely opposite to what the people who planned and ran it intended. They aimed to support the ambitious projects happening across the country at that time, while also trying to draw all banking business to themselves in order to replace other Scottish banks, especially those in Edinburgh, which had been slow to discount bills of exchange and had caused some frustration. This bank definitely provided some temporary relief to those projectors, allowing them to pursue their projects for about two additional years longer than they would have otherwise. However, this only deepened their debt, so when trouble hit, it hit them and their creditors even harder. Therefore, the bank's operations, instead of alleviating the situation, actually worsened the long-term distress that those projectors had brought upon themselves and their country. It would have been much better for them, their creditors, and the country if most of them had been forced to stop two years earlier than they actually did. Nevertheless, the temporary relief that this bank provided to those projectors ended up being a real and lasting benefit to the other Scottish banks. All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, whom the other banks had been hesitant to discount, turned to this new bank, where they were welcomed with open arms. As a result, the other banks were able to escape that dangerous cycle, which they wouldn't have managed to do without incurring significant losses, and perhaps even some degree of discredit.

In the long-run, therefore, the operations of this bank increased the real distress of the country, which it meant to relieve; and effectually relieved, from a very great distress, those rivals whom it meant to supplant.

In the long run, the actions of this bank actually worsened the real suffering in the country that it aimed to help; and it effectively relieved, from significant distress, those competitors it intended to replace.

At the first setting out of this bank, it was the opinion of some people, that how fast soever its coffers might be emptied, it might easily replenish them, by raising money upon the securities of those to whom it had advanced its paper. Experience, I believe, soon convinced them that this method of raising money was by much too slow to answer their purpose; and that coffers which originally were so ill filled, and which emptied themselves so very fast, could be replenished by no other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing bills upon London, and when they became due, paying them by other draughts on the same place, with accumulated interest and commission. But though they had been able by this method to raise money as fast as they wanted it, yet, instead of making a profit, they must have suffered a loss of every such operation; so that in the long-run they must have ruined themselves as a mercantile company, though perhaps not so soon as by the more expensive practice of drawing and redrawing. They could still have made nothing by the interest of the paper, which, being over and above what the circulation of the country could absorb and employ, returned upon them in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as they issued it; and for the payment of which they were themselves continually obliged to borrow money. On the contrary, the whole expense of this borrowing, of employing agents to look out for people who had money to lend, of negotiating with those people, and of drawing the proper bond or assignment, must have fallen upon them, and have been so much clear loss upon the balance of their accounts. The project of replenishing their coffers in this manner may be compared to that of a man who had a water-pond from which a stream was continually running out, and into which no stream was continually running, but who proposed to keep it always equally full, by employing a number of people to go continually with buckets to a well at some miles distance, in order to bring water to replenish it.

When this bank first started, some people believed that no matter how quickly its funds were used up, it could easily refill them by borrowing money against the securities of those to whom it had lent its notes. However, experience soon showed them that this way of raising funds was far too slow to meet their needs; the poorly filled coffers that drained so rapidly could only be refilled through the costly method of drawing bills on London, and when those bills were due, paying them off with other drafts on the same city, along with extra interest and fees. Even if they managed to raise money quickly this way, they would incur losses from every transaction, ultimately leading to their downfall as a trading company, although perhaps not as quickly as through the more expensive method of drawing and redrawing bills. They would still gain nothing from the interest on the notes because the amount issued exceeded what the country's economy could absorb and put to use, forcing them to exchange it for gold and silver just as fast as they printed it. They constantly had to borrow money to pay for this. Additionally, all the costs associated with borrowing—hiring agents to find lenders, negotiating deals, and drafting proper contracts—would have added to their expenses, creating a clear loss on their accounts. The idea of replenishing their funds in this way is like a person trying to keep a pond full while water continuously drains out, but without a steady supply coming in, and instead hiring people to carry buckets from a distant well to refill it.

But though this operation had proved not only practicable, but profitable to the bank, as a mercantile company; yet the country could have derived no benefit from it, but, on the contrary, must have suffered a very considerable loss by it. This operation could not augment, in the smallest degree, the quantity of money to be lent. It could only have erected this bank into a sort of general loan office for the whole country. Those who wanted to borrow must have applied to this bank, instead of applying to the private persons who had lent it their money. But a bank which lends money, perhaps to five hundred different people, the greater part of whom its directors can know very little about, is not likely to be more judicious in the choice of its debtors than a private person who lends out his money among a few people whom he knows, and in whose sober and frugal conduct he thinks he has good reason to confide. The debtors of such a bank as that whose conduct I have been giving some account of were likely, the greater part of them, to be chimerical projectors, the drawers and re[Pg 130]drawers of circulating bills of exchange, who would employ the money in extravagant undertakings, which, with all the assistance that could be given them, they would probably never be able to complete, and which, if they should be completed, would never repay the expense which they had really cost, would never afford a fund capable of maintaining a quantity of labour equal to that which had been employed about them. The sober and frugal debtors of private persons, on the contrary, would be more likely to employ the money borrowed in sober undertakings which were proportioned to their capitals, and which, though they might have less of the grand and the marvellous, would have more of the solid and the profitable; which would repay with a large profit whatever had been laid out upon them, and which would thus afford a fund capable of maintaining a much greater quantity of labour than that which had been employed about them. The success of this operation, therefore, without increasing in the smallest degree the capital of the country, would only have transferred a great part of it from prudent and profitable to imprudent and unprofitable undertakings.

But even though this operation turned out to be not only doable but also profitable for the bank as a business, the country wouldn’t have gained any benefit from it. In fact, it would have suffered a significant loss. This operation couldn’t have increased the amount of money available for loans at all. It could only have turned this bank into a sort of general loan agency for the entire country. Those in need of a loan would have had to go to this bank instead of borrowing from private individuals who had lent their money to it. However, a bank that lends money to perhaps five hundred different people, most of whom its directors may know very little about, is unlikely to make better choices about its borrowers than a private individual who lends money to a few people they are familiar with and trust to be responsible and careful. The borrowers of such a bank, like the one I've been discussing, were likely to be mostly unrealistic dreamers, those who create and recycle bills of exchange, using the money for extravagant projects that, even with all the help they could get, would probably never be completed. And if they were completed, they would never make back the money spent on them, nor create enough jobs to match the labor that went into them. In contrast, the responsible and frugal borrowers from private individuals would be more inclined to use borrowed money for practical projects that matched their financial resources, which, while perhaps lacking in grandeur, would be more sound and profitable. These would yield a substantial profit on the investment and provide a basis for supporting a far greater number of jobs than what went into them. Therefore, the success of this operation, without increasing the country's capital in any way, would have merely shifted a significant portion of it from wise, profitable ventures to foolish and unproductive ones.

That the industry of Scotland languished for want of money to employ it, was the opinion of the famous Mr Law. By establishing a bank of a particular kind, which he seems to have imagined might issue paper to the amount of the whole value of all the lands in the country, he proposed to remedy this want of money. The parliament of Scotland, when he first proposed his project, did not think proper to adopt it. It was afterwards adopted, with some variations, by the Duke of Orleans, at that time regent of France. The idea of the possibility of multiplying paper money to almost any extent was the real foundation of what is called the Mississippi scheme, the most extravagant project, both of banking and stock-jobbing, that perhaps the world ever saw. The different operations of this scheme are explained so fully, so clearly, and with so much order and distinctness, by Mr Du Verney, in his Examination of the Political Reflections upon commerce and finances of Mr Du Tot, that I shall not give any account of them. The principles upon which it was founded are explained by Mr Law himself, in a discourse concerning money and trade, which he published in Scotland when he first proposed his project. The splendid but visionary ideas which are set forth in that and some other works upon the same principles, still continue to make an impression upon many people, and have, perhaps, in part, contributed to that excess of banking, which has of late been complained of, both in Scotland and in other places.

That the industry in Scotland was struggling because it lacked money was the view of the well-known Mr. Law. He proposed to solve this money shortage by setting up a specific type of bank that he believed could issue paper currency equal to the total value of all the land in the country. Initially, the Scottish parliament rejected his proposal. Later on, it was accepted, with some changes, by the Duke of Orleans, who was the regent of France at the time. The idea of being able to create paper money in almost unlimited amounts was the true basis of what became known as the Mississippi scheme, perhaps the most outrageous banking and stock-trading project the world has ever seen. Mr. Du Verney explains the various operations of this scheme in detail and with great clarity in his Examination of the Political Reflections on Commerce and Finances of Mr. Du Tot, so I won’t go into those details. The principles behind it are outlined by Mr. Law himself in a discourse on money and trade that he published in Scotland when he first proposed his project. The grand but unrealistic ideas presented in that and other related works continue to influence many people and may have partly contributed to the excessive banking that has recently been criticized both in Scotland and elsewhere.

The Bank of England is the greatest bank of circulation in Europe. It was incorporated, in pursuance of an act of parliament, by a charter under the great seal, dated the 27th of July 1694. It at that time advanced to government the sum of L.1,200,000 for an annuity of L.100,000, or for L.96,000 a-year, interest at the rate of eight per cent. and L.4,000 a-year for the expense of management. The credit of the new government, established by the Revolution, we may believe, must have been very low, when it was obliged to borrow at so high an interest.

The Bank of England is the largest bank in Europe. It was established by an act of parliament through a charter under the great seal, dated July 27, 1694. At that time, it lent the government £1,200,000 for an annuity of £100,000, or for £96,000 a year, with an interest rate of eight percent, plus £4,000 a year for management costs. The credit of the new government set up by the Revolution must have been quite low if it had to borrow at such a high interest rate.

In 1697, the bank was allowed to enlarge its capital stock, by an ingraftment of L.1,001,171 : 10s. Its whole capital stock, therefore, amounted at this time to L.2,201,171 : 10s. This ingraftment is said to have been for the support of public credit. In 1696, tallies had been at forty, and fifty, and sixty per cent. discount, and bank notes at twenty per cent.[29] During the great re-coinage of the silver, which was going on at this time, the bank had thought proper to discontinue the payment of its notes, which necessarily occasioned their discredit.

In 1697, the bank was allowed to increase its capital stock by adding L.1,001,171: 10s. So, its total capital stock at that time was L.2,201,171: 10s. This increase was supposedly intended to support public credit. In 1696, tallies were trading at discounts of forty, fifty, and sixty percent, while bank notes had a twenty percent discount.[29] During the major re-coinage of silver happening at that time, the bank decided to stop paying out its notes, which naturally led to their loss of credibility.

In pursuance of the 7th Anne, c. 7, the bank advanced and paid into the exchequer the sum of L.400,000; making in all the sum of L.1,600,000, which it had advanced upon its original annuity of L.96,000 interest, and L.4,000 for expense of management. In 1708, therefore, the credit of government was as good as that of private persons, since it could borrow at six per cent. interest, the common legal and market rate of those times. In pursuance of the same act, the bank cancelled exchequer bills to the amount of L.1,775,027 17s. 10½d. at six per cent. interest, and was at the same time allowed to take in subscriptions for doubling its capital. In 1708, therefore, the capital of the bank amounted to L.4,402,343; and it had advanced to government the sum of L.3,375,027 : 17 : 10½.

In line with the 7th Anne, c. 7, the bank provided and deposited £400,000 into the treasury; making a total of £1,600,000 that it had advanced based on its original annuity of £96,000 interest, and £4,000 for management fees. By 1708, the government's credit was as strong as that of private individuals since it could borrow at a six percent interest rate, which was the typical legal and market rate of the time. Following the same act, the bank canceled treasury bills totaling £1,775,027 17s. 10½d. at six percent interest, and was simultaneously permitted to accept subscriptions for doubling its capital. Therefore, in 1708, the bank's capital reached £4,402,343, and it had loaned the government a total of £3,375,027 : 17 : 10½.

By a call of fifteen per cent. in 1709, there was paid in, and made stock, L.656,204 : 1 : 9d.; and by another of ten per cent. in 1710, L.501,448 : 12 : 11. In consequence of those two calls, therefore, the bank capital amounted to L.5,559,995 : 14 : 8.

By a call of fifteen percent in 1709, L.656,204 : 1 : 9d. was paid in and turned into stock; and by another call of ten percent in 1710, L.501,448 : 12 : 11. As a result of those two calls, the bank's capital totaled L.5,559,995 : 14 : 8.

In pursuance of the 3d George I. c. 8, the bank delivered up two millions of exchequer bills to be cancelled. It had at this time, therefore, advanced to government L.5,375,027 : 17 : 10d. In pursuance of the 8th George I. c. 21, the bank purchased of the South-sea company, stock to the amount of L.4,000,000; and in 1722, in consequence of the subscriptions which it had taken in for enabling it to make this purchase, its capital stock was increased by L.3,400,000. At this time, therefore, the bank had advanced to the public L.9,375,027 17s. 10½d.; and its capital stock amounted only to L.8,959,995 : 14 : 8. It was upon this occasion that the sum which the bank had[Pg 131] advanced to the public, and for which it received interest, began first to exceed its capital stock, or the sum for which it paid a dividend to the proprietors of bank stock; or, in other words, that the bank began to have an undivided capital, over and above its divided one. It has continued to have an undivided capital of the same kind ever since. In 1746, the bank had, upon different occasions, advanced to the public L.11,686,800, and its divided capital had been raised by different calls and subscriptions to L.10,780,000. The state of those two sums has continued to be the same ever since. In pursuance of the 4th of George III. c. 25, the bank agreed to pay to government for the renewal of its charter L.110,000, without interest or re-payment. This sum, therefore did not increase either of these two other sums.

In line with the 3rd George I. c. 8, the bank handed over two million exchequer bills to be canceled. At this point, it had lent the government £5,375,027 : 17 : 10d. Following the 8th George I. c. 21, the bank bought stock from the South Sea Company totaling £4,000,000; and in 1722, because of the subscriptions it collected to facilitate this purchase, its capital stock increased by £3,400,000. Thus, the bank had lent the public £9,375,027 : 17s. : 10½d.; while its capital stock was only £8,959,995 : 14 : 8. This was the moment when the amount the bank had lent to the public, which it earned interest on, first exceeded its capital stock, or the sum it paid dividends on to bank stockholders. In other words, the bank started having an undivided capital in addition to its divided capital. It has maintained an undivided capital of this nature ever since. By 1746, the bank had lent the public £11,686,800 on various occasions, and its divided capital had been increased through various calls and subscriptions to £10,780,000. The statuses of these two amounts have remained unchanged since then. According to the 4th of George III. c. 25, the bank agreed to pay the government £110,000 for the renewal of its charter, with no interest or repayment. Therefore, this amount did not add to either of the other two totals.

The dividend of the bank has varied according to the variations in the rate of the interest which it has, at different times, received for the money it had advanced to the public, as well as according to other circumstances. This rate of interest has gradually been reduced from eight to three per cent. For some years past, the bank dividend has been at five and a half per cent.

The bank's dividend has changed based on the fluctuations in the interest rate it has received at different times for the money it loaned to the public, as well as other factors. This interest rate has gradually gone down from eight to three percent. For the past few years, the bank's dividend has been at five and a half percent.

The stability of the bank of England is equal to that of the British government. All that it has advanced to the public must be lost before its creditors can sustain any loss. No other banking company in England can be established by act of parliament, or can consist of more than six members. It acts, not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of state. It receives and pays the greater part of the annuities which are due to the creditors of the public; it circulates exchequer bills; and it advances to government the annual amount of the land and malt taxes, which are frequently not paid up till some years thereafter. In these different operations, its duty to the public may sometimes have obliged it, without any fault of its directors, to overstock the circulation with paper money. It likewise discounts merchants' bills, and has upon several different occasions, supported the credit of the principal houses, not only of England, but of Hamburgh and Holland. Upon one occasion, in 1768, it is said to have advanced for this purpose, in one week, about L.1,600,000, a great part of it in bullion. I do not, however, pretend to warrant either the greatness of the sum, or the shortness of the time. Upon other occasions, this great company has been reduced to the necessity of paying in sixpences.

The stability of the Bank of England is tied to that of the British government. Everything it has loaned to the public must be lost before its creditors face any loss. No other banking company in England can be formed by an act of Parliament, nor can it have more than six members. It serves not only as a regular bank but also as a substantial tool of the state. It handles most of the annuities owed to public creditors, circulates exchequer bills, and advances the government the yearly amount of land and malt taxes, which are often not paid for several years. In these various operations, its responsibility to the public may sometimes require it, without any fault of its directors, to flood the market with paper money. It also discounts merchants' bills and has, on various occasions, supported the credibility of major firms both in England and in Hamburg and Holland. One time, in 1768, it reportedly advanced about £1,600,000 for this purpose in just one week, a large portion of which was in bullion. However, I can't guarantee the accuracy of either the size of the sum or the brevity of the time. On other occasions, this significant institution has been forced to make payments in sixpences.

It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a greater part of that capital active and productive than would otherwise be so, that the must judicious operations of banking can increase the industry of the country. That part of his capital which a dealer is obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money, for answering occasional demands, is so much dead stock, which, so long as it remains in this situation, produces nothing, either to him or to his country. The judicious operations of banking enable him to convert this dead stock into active and productive stock; into materials to work upon; into tools to work with and into provisions and subsistence to work for; into stock which produces something both to himself and to his country. The gold and silver money which circulates in any country, and by means of which, the produce of its land and labour is annually circulated and distributed to the proper consumers, is, in the same manner as the ready money of the dealer, all dead stock. It is a very valuable part of the capital of the country, which produces nothing to the country. The judicious operations of banking, by substituting paper in the room of a great part of this gold and silver, enable the country to convert a great part of this dead stock into active and productive stock; into stock which produces something to the country. The gold and silver money which circulates in any country may very properly be compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grass and corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either. The judicious operations of banking, by providing, if I may be allowed so violent a metaphor, a sort of waggon-way through the air, enable the country to convert, as it were, a great part of its highways into good pastures, and corn fields, and thereby to increase, very considerably, the annual produce of its land and labour. The commerce and industry of the country, however, it must be acknowledged, though they may be somewhat augmented, cannot be altogether so secure, when they are thus, as it were, suspended upon the Dædalian wings of paper money, as when they travel about upon the solid ground of gold and silver. Over and above the accidents to which they are exposed from the unskilfulness of the conductors of this paper money, they are liable to several others, from which no prudence or skill of those conductors can guard them.

It's not just about increasing the country's capital, but about making a larger portion of that capital active and productive than it would otherwise be, that the best banking practices can boost the nation's industry. The part of a dealer's capital that they must keep on hand as cash to meet occasional demands is just dead stock, which, as long as it stays in that state, produces nothing for them or their country. Smart banking operations allow them to turn this dead stock into active and productive assets; into raw materials to work on, tools to work with, and food to sustain their work; into stock that generates something for both themselves and their country. The gold and silver currency circulating in any country, through which the products of its land and labor are annually exchanged and distributed to the right consumers, is just like a dealer's cash, all dead stock. It's a valuable part of the country's capital that produces nothing for the nation. Effective banking operations, by replacing a large part of this gold and silver with paper, help the country turn a substantial portion of this dead stock into active and productive stock; stock that provides something for the nation. The gold and silver currency circulating in any country can be accurately compared to a highway, which while it carries all the grass and grain of the country to market, does not produce a single stack of either. Efficient banking works, using, if I may say so, a kind of aerial wagon road, allow the country to convert, so to speak, a large portion of its highways into fertile pastures and cornfields, thereby significantly increasing the annual yield of its land and labor. However, it must be acknowledged that the commerce and industry of the country, while they may be somewhat enhanced, cannot be entirely secure when they are, in a sense, suspended on the fragile wings of paper money, as opposed to traveling on the solid ground of gold and silver. Besides the risks they face from poor management of this paper currency, they are also vulnerable to several other dangers that no amount of prudence or skill from those managing it can protect them from.

An unsuccessful war, for example, in which the enemy got possession of the capital, and consequently of that treasure which supported the credit of the paper money, would occasion much greater confusion in a country where the whole circulation was carried on by paper, than in one where the greater part of it was carried on by gold and silver. The usual instrument of commerce having lost its value, no exchanges could be made but either by barter or upon credit. All taxes having been usually paid in paper money, the prince would not have wherewithal either to pay his troops, or to furnish his magazines; and the state of the country would be much more irretrievable than if the greater part of its circulation had[Pg 132] consisted in gold and silver. A prince, anxious to maintain his dominions at all times in the state in which he can most easily defend them, ought upon this account to guard not only against that excessive multiplication of paper money which ruins the very banks which issue it, but even against that multiplication of it which enables them to fill the greater part of the circulation of the country with it.

An unsuccessful war, for instance, where the enemy takes control of the capital and, as a result, the treasure that backs the value of paper money, would create far more chaos in a country that relies entirely on paper currency than in one that primarily uses gold and silver. With the usual medium of exchange losing its value, transactions would only be possible through barter or credit. Since taxes are usually paid in paper money, the ruler would struggle to pay his soldiers or supply his stores; the country’s situation would be much more hopeless than if most of its currency were in gold and silver. A ruler, eager to keep his territory in a state that is easiest to defend, should therefore be cautious not only of the excessive creation of paper money that damages the banks issuing it but also of its increase that allows it to dominate the country's circulation.

The circulation of every country may be considered as divided into two different branches; the circulation of the dealers with one another, and the circulation between the dealers and the consumers. Though the same pieces of money, whether paper or metal, may be employed sometimes in the one circulation and sometimes in the other; yet as both are constantly going on at the same time, each requires a certain stock of money, of one kind or another, to carry it on. The value of the goods circulated between the different dealers never can exceed the value of those circulated between the dealers and the consumers; whatever is bought by the dealers being ultimately destined to be sold to the consumers. The circulation between the dealers, as it is carried on by wholesale, requires generally a pretty large sum for every particular transaction. That between the dealers and the consumers, on the contrary, as it is generally carried on by retail, frequently requires but very small ones, a shilling, or even a halfpenny, being often sufficient. But small sums circulate much faster than large ones. A shilling changes masters more frequently than a guinea, and a halfpenny more frequently than a shilling. Though the annual purchases of all the consumers, therefore, are at least equal in value to those of all the dealers, they can generally be transacted with a much smaller quantity of money; the same pieces, by a more rapid circulation, serving as the instrument of many more purchases of the one kind than of the other.

The money flow in every country can be seen as split into two main parts: the transactions between dealers and the transactions between dealers and consumers. Although the same money—whether it's paper or coins—can be used in both contexts, both types of transactions happen simultaneously and each needs a certain amount of money to operate. The total value of goods exchanged among dealers can never surpass the value of those exchanged with consumers, since whatever dealers buy is ultimately meant to be sold to consumers. The transactions among dealers, which usually happen in bulk, typically require a larger amount of money for each deal. In contrast, transactions between dealers and consumers usually happen on a smaller scale and often involve small amounts, with a shilling or even a halfpenny being enough in many cases. However, smaller amounts of money move around much more quickly than larger ones. A shilling changes hands more often than a guinea, and a halfpenny changes hands more often than a shilling. So, while the total annual spending of all consumers is at least equal to that of all dealers, it generally requires much less money to complete these transactions; the same coins can facilitate many more purchases in the consumer market than in the dealer market.

Paper money may be so regulated as either to confine itself very much to the circulation between the different dealers, or to extend itself likewise to a great part of that between the dealers and the consumers. Where no bank notes are circulated under £10 value, as in London, paper money confines itself very much to the circulation between the dealers. When a ten pound bank note comes into the hands of a consumer, he is generally obliged to change it at the first shop where he has occasion to purchase five shillings worth of goods; so that it often returns into the hands of a dealer before the consumer has spent the fortieth part of the money. Where bank notes are issued for so small sums as 20s. as in Scotland, paper money extends itself to considerable part of the circulation between dealers and consumers. Before the act of parliament which put a stop to the circulation of ten and five shilling notes, it filled a still greater part of that circulation. In the currencies of North America, paper was commonly issued for so small a sum as a shilling, and filled almost the whole of that circulation. In some paper currencies of Yorkshire, it was issued even for so small a sum as a sixpence.

Paper money can be regulated in a way that either limits its use mostly to transactions between different dealers, or expands its use to include a significant amount of spending between dealers and consumers. In London, for example, where no banknotes are smaller than £10, paper money largely stays within the dealer community. When a consumer comes into possession of a ten-pound banknote, they usually need to exchange it at the first shop where they want to buy something worth five shillings, meaning the note often goes back to a dealer before the consumer has even spent a small fraction of it. In Scotland, where banknotes are issued for denominations as low as 20 shillings, paper money plays a larger role in transactions between dealers and consumers. Prior to the parliamentary act that stopped the circulation of ten- and five-shilling notes, it was even more prevalent in those transactions. In North America, paper money was often issued for as little as a shilling, dominating the currency circulation. In some areas of Yorkshire, banknotes were even issued for as little as sixpence.

Where the issuing of bank notes for such very small sums is allowed, and commonly practised, many mean people are both enabled and encouraged to become bankers. A person whose promissory note for £5, or even for 20s. would be rejected by everybody, will get it to be received without scruple when it is issued for so small a sum as a sixpence. But the frequent bankruptcies to which such beggarly bankers must be liable, may occasion a very considerable inconveniency, and sometimes even a very great calamity, to many poor people who had received their notes in payment.

Where the issuance of banknotes for such very small amounts is allowed and commonly practiced, many petty individuals are both enabled and encouraged to become bankers. Someone whose promissory note for £5, or even for 20s, would be rejected by everyone, can have it accepted without hesitation when it’s issued for as little as a sixpence. However, the frequent bankruptcies that these insignificant bankers face can lead to significant inconvenience, and sometimes even a serious disaster, for many poor people who have received their notes as payment.

It were better, perhaps, that no bank notes were issued in any part of the kingdom for a smaller sum than £5. Paper money would then, probably, confine itself, in every part of the kingdom, to the circulation between the different dealers, as much as it does at present in London, where no bank notes are issued under L.10 value; L.5 being, in most part of the kingdom, a sum which, though it will purchase, perhaps, little more than half the quantity of goods, is as much considered, and is as seldom spent all at once, as L.10 are amidst the profuse expense of London.

It might be better, perhaps, if no banknotes were issued anywhere in the kingdom for less than £5. Paper money would then likely be limited, throughout the kingdom, to transactions between different merchants, just like it is now in London, where no banknotes are issued below £10. In most of the kingdom, £5 is an amount that, although it may only buy about half of what it used to, is regarded just as highly and is just as rarely spent all at once as £10 is in the lavish spending of London.

Where paper money, it is to be observed, is pretty much confined to the circulation between dealers and dealers, as at London, there is always plenty of gold and silver. Where it extends itself to a considerable part of the circulation between dealers and consumers, as in Scotland, and still more in North America, it banishes gold and silver almost entirely from the country; almost all the ordinary transactions of its interior commerce being thus carried on by paper. The suppression of ten and five shilling bank notes, somewhat relieved the scarcity of gold and silver in Scotland; and the suppression of twenty shilling notes will probably relieve it still more. Those metals are said to have become more abundant in America, since the suppression or some of their paper currencies. They are said, likewise, to have been more abundant before the institution of those currencies.

Where paper money is mostly used for transactions between dealers, like in London, there's always a good supply of gold and silver. However, when it becomes a significant part of transactions between dealers and consumers, as seen in Scotland and even more so in North America, it nearly eliminates gold and silver from the economy, with most everyday transactions being done using paper money. The removal of ten and five shilling banknotes helped ease the shortage of gold and silver in Scotland, and eliminating twenty shilling notes will likely improve the situation even more. It's said that gold and silver have become more plentiful in America since some of the paper currencies were removed. They've also been reported to have been more abundant before those currencies were introduced.

Though paper money should be pretty much confined to the circulation between dealers and dealers, yet banks and bankers might still be able to give nearly the same assistance to the industry and commerce of the country, as they had done when paper money filled almost the whole circulation. The ready money which a dealer is obliged to keep by him, for answering occasional demands, is destined altogether for the circulation between himself[Pg 133] and other dealers of whom he buys goods. He has no occasion to keep any by him for the circulation between himself and the consumers, who are his customers, and who bring ready money to him, instead of taking any from him. Though no paper money, therefore, was allowed to be issued, but for such sums as would confine it pretty much to the circulation between dealers and dealers; yet partly by discounting real bills of exchange, and partly by lending upon cash-accounts, banks and bankers might still be able to relieve the greater part of those dealers from the necessity of keeping any considerable part of their stock by them unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. They might still be able to give the utmost assistance which banks and bankers can with propriety give to traders of every kind.

Although paper money should mainly be limited to transactions between dealers, banks and bankers could still provide nearly the same support to the country's industry and commerce as they did when paper money was widely used. The cash that a dealer needs to keep on hand for occasional demands is meant solely for transactions with other dealers from whom he purchases goods. He doesn’t need to hold any cash for the transactions with consumers, his customers, who pay him directly with cash rather than taking money from him. Therefore, even if no paper money is issued except for amounts that would mostly keep it circulating between dealers, banks could still help by discounting genuine bills of exchange and lending against cash accounts, relieving most dealers from the need to hold a significant amount of their stock in cash just to meet occasional demands. They could continue to provide all the appropriate support that banks can offer to all types of traders.

To restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving in payment the promissory notes of a banker for any sum, whether great or small, when they themselves are willing to receive them; or, to restrain a banker from issuing such notes, when all his neighbours are willing to accept of them, is a manifest violation of that natural liberty, which it is the proper business of law not to infringe, but to support. Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respect a violation of natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of the most free, as well as of the most despotical. The obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the banking trade which are here proposed.

To limit private individuals from accepting promissory notes from a bank for any amount, whether large or small, when they themselves are willing to accept them; or to prevent a bank from issuing such notes when all its neighbors are willing to accept them, is a clear infringement on the natural freedom that the law should protect and uphold. These regulations can certainly be seen as a type of violation of natural liberty. However, the exercise of natural liberty by a few individuals that could jeopardize the safety of the entire society should, and must, be restricted by the laws of all governments, whether they are the most free or the most authoritarian. The requirement to build party walls to prevent the spread of fire is a violation of natural liberty, which is exactly the same as the proposed regulations of the banking industry.

A paper money, consisting in bank notes, issued by people of undoubted credit, payable upon demand, without any condition, and, in fact, always readily paid as soon as presented, is, in every respect, equal in value to gold and silver money, since gold and silver money can at any time be had for it. Whatever is either bought or sold for such paper, must necessarily be bought or sold as cheap as it could have been for gold and silver.

Paper money, made up of banknotes, issued by people with solid credibility, is payable on demand without any conditions and is always paid promptly when presented. It is fully equal in value to gold and silver money, since you can exchange it for gold and silver at any time. Anything bought or sold with this paper must be at the same price as if it were done with gold and silver.

The increase of paper money, it has been said, by augmenting the quantity, and consequently diminishing the value, of the whole currency, necessarily augments the money price of commodities. But as the quantity of gold and silver, which is taken from the currency, is always equal to the quantity of paper which is added to it, paper money does not necessarily increase the quantity of the whole currency. From the beginning of the last century to the present time, provisions never were cheaper in Scotland than in 1759, though, from the circulation of ten and five shilling bank notes, there was then more paper money in the country than at present. The proportion between the price of provisions in Scotland and that in England is the same now as before the great multiplication of banking companies in Scotland. Corn is, upon most occasions, fully as cheap in England as in France, though there is a great deal of paper money in England, and scarce any in France. In 1751 and 1752, when Mr Hume published his Political Discourses, and soon after the great multiplication of paper money in Scotland, there was a very sensible rise in the price of provisions, owing, probably, to the badness of the seasons, and not to the multiplication of paper money.

The increase in paper money, it has been said, by raising the amount and thus lowering the value of the entire currency, inevitably raises the money price of goods. However, since the amount of gold and silver taken out of circulation is always equal to the amount of paper money added, paper money doesn’t necessarily increase the total currency supply. From the start of the last century until now, food has never been cheaper in Scotland than in 1759, even though there were more ten and five shilling banknotes in circulation back then than there are now. The price comparison between food in Scotland and in England is the same now as it was before the large increase in banking companies in Scotland. Grain is often just as cheap in England as it is in France, despite the large amount of paper money in England and very little in France. In 1751 and 1752, when Mr. Hume published his Political Discourses, and shortly after the significant increase of paper money in Scotland, there was a noticeable rise in food prices, likely due to poor harvests rather than the increase in paper money.

It would be otherwise, indeed, with a paper money, consisting in promissory notes, of which the immediate payment depended, in any respect, either upon the good will of those who issued them, or upon a condition which the holder of the notes might not always have it in his power to fulfil, or of which the payment was not exigible till after a certain number of years, and which, in the meantime, bore no interest. Such a paper money would, no doubt, fall more or less below the value of gold and silver, according as the difficulty or uncertainty of obtaining immediate payment was supposed to be greater or less, or according to the greater or less distance of time at which payment was exigible.

It would be different with paper money made up of promissory notes, where the immediate payment relied on either the willingness of those who issued them or on a condition that the holder of the notes might not always be able to meet, or where payment wasn’t due until a certain number of years later, and in the meantime, it earned no interest. Such paper money would likely have a value that was less than gold and silver, depending on how difficult or uncertain it was to get immediate payment, or based on the longer or shorter wait time for that payment to become due.

Some years ago the different banking companies of Scotland were in the practice of inserting into their bank notes, what they called an optional clause; by which they promised payment to the bearer, either as soon as the note should be presented, or, in the option of the directors, six months after such presentment, together with the legal interest for the said six months. The directors of some of those banks sometimes took advantage of this optional clause, and sometimes threatened those who demanded gold and silver in exchange for a considerable number of their notes, that they would take advantage of it, unless such demanders would content themselves with a part of what they demanded. The promissory notes of those banking companies constituted, at that time, the far greater part of the currency of Scotland, which this uncertainty of payment necessarily degraded below the value of gold and silver money. During the continuance of this abuse (which prevailed chiefly in 1762, 1763, and 1764), while the exchange between London and Carlisle was at par, that between London and Dumfries would sometimes be four per cent. against Dumfries, though this town is not thirty miles distant from Carlisle. But at Carlisle, bills were paid in gold and silver; whereas at Dumfries they were paid in Scotch bank notes; and the uncertainty of getting those bank notes exchanged for gold and silver coin, had thus degraded them four per cent. below the value of[Pg 134] that coin. The same act of parliament which suppressed ten and five shilling bank notes, suppressed likewise this optional clause, and thereby restored the exchange between England and Scotland to its natural rate, or to what the course of trade and remittances might happen to make it.

A few years ago, the various banks in Scotland used to include what they called an optional clause in their banknotes. This clause promised to pay the bearer either immediately upon presenting the note or, at the directors' discretion, six months later along with the legal interest for that period. Some bank directors took advantage of this clause and sometimes warned those who requested gold or silver in exchange for a large number of their notes that they would invoke it unless the requesters agreed to accept less than what they asked for. At that time, the promissory notes from these banks made up most of Scotland's currency, and this uncertainty of payment caused their value to drop compared to gold and silver. During this period of abuse, mainly in 1762, 1763, and 1764, the exchange rate between London and Carlisle was stable, but the rate between London and Dumfries could be four percent less favorable for Dumfries, even though it was less than thirty miles from Carlisle. In Carlisle, bills were settled in gold and silver, while in Dumfries, they were settled in Scottish banknotes. The uncertainty of converting these banknotes into gold and silver had thus devalued them by four percent compared to that coin. The same act of parliament that abolished ten and five-shilling banknotes also removed this optional clause, restoring the exchange rate between England and Scotland to its natural level or whatever the trade and remittances dictated.

In the paper currencies of Yorkshire, the payment of so small a sum as 6d. sometimes depended upon the condition, that the holder of the note should bring the change of a guinea to the person who issued it; a condition which the holders of such notes might frequently find it very difficult to fulfil, and which must have degraded this currency below the value of gold and silver money. An act of parliament, accordingly, declared all such clauses unlawful, and suppressed, in the same manner as in Scotland, all promissory notes, payable to the bearer, under 20s. value.

In the paper currency of Yorkshire, getting change for a small amount like 6d. sometimes required that the note holder bring a guinea to the person who issued it. This often made it really hard for people to comply, which likely caused this currency to be valued less than gold and silver money. As a result, an act of parliament made all such requirements illegal and, similarly to Scotland, eliminated all promissory notes that were payable to the bearer and worth less than 20s.

The paper currencies of North America consisted, not in bank notes payable to the bearer on demand, but in a government paper, of which the payment was not exigible till several years after it was issued; and though the colony governments paid no interest to the holders of this paper, they declared it to be, and in fact rendered it, a legal tender of payment for the full value for which it was issued. But allowing the colony security to be perfectly good, L.100, payable fifteen years hence, for example, in a country where interest is at six per cent., is worth little more than L.40 ready money. To oblige a creditor, therefore, to accept of this as full payment for a debt of L.100, actually paid down in ready money, was an act of such violent injustice, as has scarce, perhaps, been attempted by the government of any other country which pretended to be free. It bears the evident marks of having originally been, what the honest and downright Doctor Douglas assures us it was, a scheme of fraudulent debtors to cheat their creditors. The government of Pennsylvania, indeed, pretended, upon their first emission of paper money, in 1722, to render their paper of equal value with gold and silver, by enacting penalties against all those who made any difference in the price of their goods when they sold them for a colony paper, and when they sold them for gold and silver; a regulation equally tyrannical, but much less effectual, than that which it was meant to support. A positive law may render a shilling a legal tender for a guinea, because it may direct the courts of justice to discharge the debtor who has made that tender; but no positive law can oblige a person who sells goods, and who is at liberty to sell or not to sell as he pleases, to accept of a shilling as equivalent to a guinea in the price of them. Notwithstanding any regulation of this kind, it appeared, by the course of exchange with Great Britain, that L.100 sterling was occasionally considered an equivalent, in some of the colonies, to L.130, and in others to so great a sum as L.1100 currency; this difference in the value arising from the difference in the quantity of paper emitted in the different colonies, and in the distance and probability of the term of its final discharge and redemption.

The paper money in North America wasn't made up of banknotes that you could cash in anytime. Instead, it was government-issued paper whose payment was not due for several years after it was created. Although the colonial governments didn't pay interest to those holding this paper, they declared it to be and effectively made it a legal form of payment for its full value. However, even if the colony's credit was perfectly sound, a £100 note payable fifteen years later in a country with a 6% interest rate is only worth about £40 in cash today. Forcing a creditor to accept this as full payment for a £100 debt that was actually settled in cash was an incredibly unjust act, one that hardly any other government claiming to be free would dare to commit. It clearly shows that it was originally, as the honest Doctor Douglas points out, a scheme by dishonest debtors to swindle their creditors. The Pennsylvania government even claimed that when they first issued paper money in 1722, they would make it equal in value to gold and silver by imposing penalties on anyone who charged different prices when selling goods for colony paper compared to gold and silver. This regulation was equally tyrannical but far less effective than it was intended to be. A law can make a shilling a legal substitute for a guinea by instructing the courts to release a debtor who offers that payment; however, no law can force someone selling goods, who has the choice to sell or not, to accept a shilling instead of a guinea as the price. Despite these types of regulations, it became evident from the exchange rates with Great Britain that in some colonies, £100 sterling was sometimes treated as equivalent to £130, and in others, as high as £1100 in currency. This variation in value came from differing amounts of paper money issued in the various colonies, as well as the timeframes and likelihood of when it would finally be paid off and redeemed.

No law, therefore, could be more equitable than the act of parliament, so unjustly complained of in the colonies, which declared, that no paper currency to be emitted there in time coming, should be a legal tender of payment.

No law could be more fair than the parliamentary act that was so unfairly criticized in the colonies, which stated that no paper currency could be issued there in the future as a legal form of payment.

Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emissions of paper money than any other of our colonies. Its paper currency, accordingly, is said never to have sunk below the value of the gold and silver which was current in the colony before the first emission of its paper money. Before that emission, the colony had raised the denomination of its coin, and had, by act of assembly, ordered 5s. sterling to pass in the colonies for 6s. 3d., and afterwards for 6s. 8d. A pound, colony currency, therefore, even when that currency was gold and silver, was more than thirty per cent. below the value of L.1 sterling; and when that currency was turned into paper, it was seldom much more than thirty per cent. below that value. The pretence for raising the denomination of the coin was to prevent the exportation of gold and silver, by making equal quantities of those metals pass for greater sums in the colony than they did in the mother country. It was found, however, that the price of all goods from the mother country rose exactly in proportion as they raised the denomination of their coin, so that their gold and silver were exported as fast as ever.

Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its issuance of paper money than any other colony. As a result, its paper currency is said to have never fallen below the value of the gold and silver that was in circulation in the colony before the first issuance of its paper money. Before that issuance, the colony had increased the denomination of its coins and had, by an act of assembly, ordered 5s. sterling to be accepted in the colonies for 6s. 3d., and later for 6s. 8d. A pound in colony currency, therefore, even when that currency consisted of gold and silver, was more than thirty percent lower in value than £1 sterling; and when that currency was converted to paper, it was rarely much more than thirty percent below that value. The rationale for increasing the denomination of the coins was to prevent the export of gold and silver by allowing equal amounts of those metals to be worth more in the colony than they were in the mother country. However, it was found that the prices of all goods from the mother country rose exactly in proportion to the increase in the denomination of their coins, so their gold and silver were exported just as quickly as before.

The paper of each colony being received in the payment of the provincial taxes, for the full value for which it had been issued, it necessarily derived from this use some additional value, over and above what it would have had, from the real or supposed distance of the term of its final discharge and redemption. This additional value was greater or less, according as the quantity of paper issued was more or less above what could be employed in the payment of the taxes of the particular colony which issued it. It was in all the colonies very much above what could be employed in this manner.

The paper from each colony being accepted as payment for provincial taxes, at the full value for which it was issued, naturally gained some extra value from this use, beyond what it would have had based on the actual or assumed time before it could be finally settled and redeemed. This extra value varied depending on how much paper was issued above what could actually be used to pay the taxes of the specific colony that issued it. In all the colonies, this amount was significantly more than what could be used this way.

A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should be paid in a paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to this paper money, even though the term of its final discharge and redemption should depend altogether upon the will of the prince. If the bank which issued this paper was careful to keep the quantity of it always somewhat below what could easily be employed in this manner, the demand for it might be such as to make it even bear a[Pg 135] premium, or sell for somewhat more in the market than the quantity of gold or silver currency for which it was issued. Some people account in this manner for what is called the agio of the bank of Amsterdam, or for the superiority of bank money over current money, though this bank money, as they pretend, cannot be taken out of the bank at the will of the owner. The greater part of foreign bills of exchange must be paid in bank money, that is, by a transfer in the books of the bank, and the directors of the bank, they allege, are careful to keep the whole quantity of bank money always below what this use occasions a demand for. It is upon this account, they say, the bank money sells for a premium, or bears an agio of four or five per cent. above the same nominal sum of the gold and silver currency of the country. This account of the bank of Amsterdam, however, it will appear hereafter, is in a great measure chimerical.

A prince who decides that a portion of his taxes should be paid using a specific type of paper money might create a certain value for that paper, even if its ultimate repayment and redemption rely entirely on the prince's discretion. If the bank that issued this paper keeps the quantity slightly below what could be easily used, the demand for it could be high enough that it sells at a premium, or for more in the market than the equivalent amount in gold or silver currency it represents. Some people explain the so-called agio of the Bank of Amsterdam or the preference for bank money over circulating money in this way, despite claims that this bank money cannot be withdrawn at the owner's will. Most foreign bills of exchange must be settled in bank money, meaning a transfer in the bank's records, and bank directors are said to ensure that the total amount of bank money remains below the demand created by this usage. For this reason, they claim, bank money commands a premium, or has an agio of four or five percent over the same nominal amount in the country’s gold and silver currency. However, this explanation regarding the Bank of Amsterdam will be shown to be largely illusory later on.

A paper currency which falls below the value of gold and silver coin, does not thereby sink the value of those metals, or occasion equal quantities of them to exchange for a smaller quantity of goods of any other kind. The proportion between the value of gold and silver and that of goods of any other kind, depends in all cases, not upon the nature and quantity of any particular paper money, which may be current in any particular country, but upon the richness or poverty of the mines, which happen at any particular time to supply the great market of the commercial world with those metals. It depends upon the proportion between the quantity of labour which is necessary in order to bring a certain quantity of gold and silver to market, and that which is necessary in order to bring thither a certain quantity of any other sort of goods.

A paper currency that is valued less than gold and silver coins doesn't lower the value of those metals or lead to equal amounts of them being exchanged for a smaller amount of any other goods. The relationship between the value of gold and silver and other goods relies, in all cases, not on the type and amount of any specific paper money circulating in a given country, but on the wealth or scarcity of the mines that are supplying the global market with those metals at any given time. It is determined by the ratio between the amount of labor required to extract a certain quantity of gold and silver and the amount needed to produce a certain quantity of any other type of goods.

If bankers are restrained from issuing any circulating bank notes, or notes payable to the bearer, for less than a certain sum; and if they are subjected to the obligation of an immediate and unconditional payment of such bank notes as soon as presented, their trade may, with safety to the public, be rendered in all other respects perfectly free. The late multiplication of banking companies in both parts of the united kingdom, an event by which many people have been much alarmed, instead of diminishing, increases the security of the public. It obliges all of them to be more circumspect in their conduct, and, by not extending their currency beyond its due proportion to their cash, to guard themselves against those malicious runs, which the rivalship of so many competitors is always ready to bring upon them. It restrains the circulation of each particular company within a narrower circle, and reduces their circulating notes to a smaller number. By dividing the whole circulation into a greater number of parts, the failure of any one company, an accident which, in the course of things, must sometimes happen, becomes of less consequence to the public. This free competition, too, obliges all bankers to be more liberal in their dealings with their customers, lest their rivals should carry them away. In general, if any branch of trade, or any division of labour, be advantageous to the public, the freer and more general the competition, it will always be the more so.

If banks are limited in their ability to issue any circulating banknotes or bearer notes for less than a certain amount, and if they are required to make immediate and unconditional payments on those notes when they are presented, their operations can be made completely free in other respects without risking public safety. The recent increase in banking companies across the United Kingdom, which has worried many people, actually enhances public security rather than diminishes it. It forces all banks to be more careful in their practices and prevents them from expanding their currency beyond what is appropriate for their cash reserves. This helps protect them from sudden runs that can arise from competition among so many rivals. Each bank's circulation is confined to a smaller area, resulting in fewer circulating notes. By spreading the total circulation across more banks, the failure of any single bank—which is bound to happen at times—becomes less significant for the public. This competitive environment also encourages banks to be more generous in their dealings with customers, so as not to lose them to competitors. In general, when any sector of trade or area of labor benefits the public, increased and broader competition leads to even greater advantages.


CHAP. III.

OF THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL, OR OF PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE LABOUR.

There is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed; there is another which has no such effect. The former as it produces a value, may be called productive, the latter, unproductive[30] labour. Thus the labour of a manufacturer adds generally to the value of the materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his master's profit. The labour of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing. Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he in reality costs him no expense, the value of those wages being generally restored, together with a profit, in the improved value of the subject upon which his labour is bestowed. But the maintenance of a menial servant never is restored. A man grows rich by employing a multitude of manufacturers; he grows poor by maintaining a multitude of menial servants. The labour of the latter, however, has its value, and deserves its reward as well as that of the former. But the labour of the manufacturer fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or vendible commodity, which lasts for some time at least after that labour is past. It is, as it were, a certain quantity of labour stocked and stored up, to be employed, if necessary, upon some other occasion. That subject, or, what is the same thing, the price of that subject, can afterwards, if necessary, put into motion a quantity of labour equal to that which had originally produced it. The labour of the menial servant, on the contrary, does not fix or realize itself in any particular subject or vendible commodity. His services generally perish in the very instant of their performance, and seldom leave any trace of value behind them, for which an equal quantity of service could afterwards be procured.

There are two types of labor: one that increases the value of whatever it’s applied to, and another that doesn’t have that effect. The former, which creates value, can be called productive labor, while the latter is unproductive labor. The work of a manufacturer usually enhances the value of the materials he uses, contributes to his own upkeep, and boosts his employer’s profit. In contrast, the work of a domestic servant doesn’t add value to anything. Even though the manufacturer receives wages from his employer, he essentially costs him nothing, as the value of those wages is generally recouped, along with a profit, through the increased value of the product he works on. However, the expenses for a domestic servant are never regained. A person becomes wealthy by hiring many manufacturers but becomes poorer by employing many domestic servants. Nevertheless, the work of the latter has its own value and deserves compensation just like that of the former. The labor of the manufacturer is embodied in a specific product or sellable item that remains at least for some time after his work is completed. It’s like a certain amount of labor that’s saved and stored, ready to be used again when needed. That product, or its price, can later generate an amount of labor equal to what was originally used to create it. In contrast, the labor of the domestic servant doesn’t manifest in any specific product or sellable item. Their work typically disappears the moment it's done and rarely leaves behind any measurable value for which an equivalent amount of service could be obtained later.

The labour of some of the most respectable[Pg 136] orders in the society is, like that of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or realize itself in any permanent subject, or vendible commodity, which endures after that labour is past, and for which an equal quantity of labour could afterwards be procured. The sovereign, for example, with all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive labourers. They are the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other people. Their service, how honourable, how useful, or how necessary soever, produces nothing for which an equal quantity of service can afterwards be procured. The protection, security, and defence, of the commonwealth, the effect of their labour this year, will not purchase its protection, security, and defence, for the year to come. In the same class must be ranked, some both of the gravest and most important, and some of the most frivolous professions; churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers, &c. The labour of the meanest of these has a certain value, regulated by the very same principles which regulate that of every other sort of labour; and that of the noblest and most useful produces nothing which could afterwards purchase or procure an equal quantity of labour. Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production.

The work of some of the most respected groups in society, like that of janitors and other service workers, doesn’t create any lasting value. It doesn’t turn into anything permanent or sellable that exists after the work is done, and an equal amount of labor could later be obtained for it. For instance, the sovereign, along with all the officers of justice and military under him, the entire army and navy, are considered unproductive laborers. They serve the public and are supported by a portion of the annual output from other people’s work. Their service, no matter how honorable or necessary it may be, doesn’t yield anything that could later be exchanged for an equal amount of service. The protection, security, and defense they provide this year won’t buy those same protections for next year. In the same category are some of the most serious and important professions along with some of the most trivial; clergy, lawyers, doctors, writers of all sorts; actors, comedians, musicians, opera singers, dancers, etc. The work of even the least of these has a certain value, determined by the same principles that apply to all types of labor; yet the work of the most noble and useful professions produces nothing that can later buy or procure an equal amount of labor. Just like the performance of an actor, the speech of an orator, or the song of a musician, the work of all of them disappears the moment it is created.

Both productive and unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour at all, are all equally maintained by the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. This produce, how great soever, can never be infinite, but must have certain limits. According, therefore, as a smaller or greater proportion of it is in any one year employed in maintaining unproductive hands, the more in the one case, and the less in the other, will remain for the productive, and the next year's produce will be greater or smaller accordingly; the whole annual produce, if we except the spontaneous productions of the earth, being the effect of productive labour.

Both productive and unproductive workers, as well as those who don't work at all, are all equally supported by the annual output of the land and labor of the country. This output, no matter how large, can never be infinite and must have certain limits. Consequently, depending on the proportion of it that is used in any given year to support unproductive workers, more or less will be left for the productive workers, and therefore the output for the following year will increase or decrease accordingly; the entire annual output, excluding what the earth produces spontaneously, is the result of productive labor.

Though the whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country is no doubt ultimately destined for supplying the consumption of its inhabitants, and for procuring a revenue to them; yet when it first comes either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, it naturally divides itself into two parts. One of them, and frequently the largest, is, in the first place, destined for replacing a capital, or for renewing the provisions, materials, and finished work, which had been withdrawn from a capital; the other for constituting a revenue either to the owner of this capital, as the profit of his stock, or to some other person, as the rent of his land. Thus, of the produce of land, one part replaces the capital of the farmer; the other pays his profit and the rent of the landlord; and thus constitutes a revenue both to the owner of this capital, as the profits of his stock, and to some other person as the rent of his land. Of the produce of a great manufactory, in the same manner, one part, and that always the largest, replaces the capital of the undertaker of the work; the other pays his profit, and thus constitutes a revenue to the owner of this capital.

Although the total annual output from the land and labor of every country is ultimately meant to meet the consumption needs of its people and generate income for them, when it first emerges either from the soil or from the hands of productive workers, it naturally splits into two parts. One part, often the larger portion, is primarily set aside to replenish capital or to renew the supplies, materials, and finished goods that have been used from that capital. The other part is meant to provide income either to the owner of that capital, as profit from their investment, or to someone else, as rent from their land. So, from the agricultural output, one part replaces the farmer's capital, while the other pays for their profit and the landlord's rent, hence generating income for both the capital owner as stock profits and for another individual as land rent. Similarly, in a large factory operation, one part, which is always the larger share, replenishes the owner’s capital investment, while the other provides their profit, thereby generating income for the capital owner.

That part of the annual produce of the land and labour of any country which replaces a capital, never is immediately employed to maintain any but productive hands. It pays the wages of productive labour only. That which is immediately destined for constituting a revenue, either as profit or as rent, may maintain indifferently either productive or unproductive hands.

That portion of a country's yearly output from land and labor that replenishes capital is only used to support productive workers. It covers the wages of those engaged in productive work. In contrast, what is intended to generate revenue, whether as profit or rent, can support either productive or unproductive workers.

Whatever part of his stock a man employs as a capital, he always expects it to be replaced to him with a profit. He employs it, therefore, in maintaining productive hands only; and after having served in the function of a capital to him, it constitutes a revenue to them. Whenever he employs any part of it in maintaining unproductive hands of any kind, that part is from that moment withdrawn from his capital, and placed in his stock reserved for immediate consumption.

Whatever portion of his assets a person uses as capital, he always expects it to be returned to him with a profit. Therefore, he invests it in productive labor only; and after it has served as his capital, it becomes income for them. Whenever he uses any part of it to support unproductive labor of any kind, that part is, from that moment, removed from his capital and placed into his stock set aside for immediate use.

Unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour at all, are all maintained by revenue; either, first, by that part of the annual produce which is originally destined for constituting a revenue to some particular persons, either as the rent of land, or as the profits of stock; or, secondly, by that part which, though originally destined for replacing a capital, and for maintaining productive labourers only, yet when it comes into their hands, whatever part of it is over and above their necessary subsistence, may be employed in maintaining indifferently either productive or unproductive hands. Thus, not only the great landlord or the rich merchant, but even the common workman, if his wages are considerable, may maintain a menial servant; or he may sometimes go to a play or a puppet-show, and so contribute his share towards maintaining one set of unproductive labourers; or he may pay some taxes, and thus help to maintain another set, more honourable and useful, indeed, but equally unproductive. No part of the annual produce, however, which had been originally destined to replace a capital, is ever directed towards maintaining unproductive hands, till after it has put into motion its full complement of productive labour, or all that it could put into motion in the way in which it was employed. The workman must have earned his wages by work done, before he can employ any part of them in this man[Pg 137]ner. That part, too, is generally but a small one. It is his spare revenue only, of which productive labourers have seldom a great deal. They generally have some, however; and in the payment of taxes, the greatness of their number may compensate, in some measure, the smallness of their contribution. The rent of land and the profits of stock are everywhere, therefore, the principal sources from which unproductive hands derive their subsistence. These are the two sorts of revenue of which the owners have generally most to spare. They might both maintain indifferently, either productive or unproductive hands. They seem, however, to have some predilection for the latter. The expense of a great lord feeds generally more idle than industrious people. The rich merchant, though with his capital he maintains industrious people only, yet by his expense, that is, by the employment of his revenue, he feeds commonly the very same sort as the great lord.

Unproductive workers, and those who don’t work at all, are all supported by income; either, first, by the portion of the annual output that's meant to provide income to certain individuals, either as land rent or as profits from investments; or, second, by the portion that, although initially intended to replace capital and support productive workers only, may, when it comes into their hands, be used to support both productive and unproductive workers if it exceeds their basic living expenses. Therefore, not just wealthy landlords or rich merchants, but even the average worker, if their wages are decent, can afford to hire a servant. They might also go to a show or a puppet performance and thus contribute to the support of a group of unproductive workers; or they might pay taxes, which helps maintain another group, more respectable and useful, but still unproductive. However, no part of the annual output that was originally meant to replace capital is ever used to support unproductive workers until it has fully activated its entire workforce of productive laborers, or all that it is capable of in the manner it was utilized. The worker must earn their wages through work done before they can spend any of it this way. That portion is usually quite small. It's just their extra income, which productive workers typically don’t have in abundance. However, they usually have some, and the sheer number of them can somewhat balance out the small size of their contributions when it comes to tax payments. Therefore, rent from land and profits from investments are primarily the main sources from which unproductive workers get their support everywhere. These are the two types of income that owners generally have the most of to spare. They could both easily support either productive or unproductive workers. They do, however, seem to prefer the latter. The spending of a wealthy lord typically supports more idle people than industrious ones. The rich merchant, though he only employs industrious workers with his capital, still tends to spend his income in a way that generally supports the same kind of people as the wealthy lord.

The proportion, therefore, between the productive and unproductive hands, depends very much in every country upon the proportion between that part of the annual produce, which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined for replacing a capital, and that which is destined for constituting a revenue, either as rent or as profit. This proportion is very different in rich from what it is in poor countries.

The ratio between productive and unproductive workers varies significantly in each country, depending largely on the proportion of the annual output that, as soon as it is harvested or produced by laborers, is allocated for replacing capital versus what is set aside for generating income, either as rent or profit. This ratio differs greatly between wealthy and poor countries.

Thus, at present, in the opulent countries of Europe, every large, frequently the largest, portion of the produce of the land, is destined for replacing the capital of the rich and independent farmer; the other for paying his profits, and the rent of the landlord. But anciently, during the prevalency of the feudal government, a very small portion of the produce was sufficient to replace the capital employed in cultivation. It consisted commonly in a few wretched cattle, maintained altogether by the spontaneous produce of uncultivated land, and which might, therefore, be considered as a part of that spontaneous produce. It generally, too, belonged to the landlord, and was by him advanced to the occupiers of the land. All the rest of the produce properly belonged to him too, either as rent for his land, or as profit upon this paltry capital. The occupiers of land were generally bondmen, whose persons and effects were equally his property. Those who were not bondmen were tenants at will; and though the rent which they paid was often nominally little more than a quit-rent, it really amounted to the whole produce of the land. Their lord could at all times command their labour in peace and their service in war. Though they lived at a distance from his house, they were equally dependent upon him as his retainers who lived in it. But the whole produce of the land undoubtedly belongs to him, who can dispose of the labour and service of all those whom it maintains. In the present state of Europe, the share of the landlord seldom exceeds a third, sometimes not a fourth part of the whole produce of the land. The rent of land, however, in all the improved parts of the country, has been tripled and quadrupled since those ancient times; and this third or fourth part of the annual produce is, it seems, three or four times greater than the whole had been before. In the progress of improvement, rent, though it increases in proportion to the extent, diminishes in proportion to the produce of the land.

So, right now, in the wealthy countries of Europe, a large portion—often the largest—of the land's output goes to replace the capital of rich and independent farmers, while the rest is used to pay for their profits and the landlord's rent. In the past, during the height of feudal government, only a small amount of the output was enough to replace the capital used for farming. It usually included a few miserable cattle, sustained entirely by the natural produce of uncultivated land, which could therefore be seen as part of that natural yield. This livestock usually belonged to the landlord, who provided it to the land occupiers. Almost all the rest of the produce also belonged to him, either as rent for his land or as profit from this meager capital. The land occupiers were generally serfs, who were regarded as his property, both in body and possessions. Those who weren’t serfs were tenants without long-term agreements, and while the rent they paid often seemed nominally like just a quit-rent, it effectively accounted for the entire output of the land. Their lord could always claim their labor in times of peace and their service in times of war. Even if they lived far from his estate, they were just as reliant on him as those who lived nearby. Ultimately, the entire output of the land rightfully belongs to him who can utilize the labor and services of those it supports. In today’s Europe, the landlord's share generally doesn’t exceed a third, and sometimes not even a fourth of the total land output. However, rent in all the developed areas of the country has tripled and quadrupled since those ancient times, and this third or fourth of the annual output is now, evidently, three or four times more than it used to be. As development progresses, although rent increases in relation to the area, it decreases in relation to the overall output of the land.

In the opulent countries of Europe, great capitals are at present employed in trade and manufactures. In the ancient state, the little trade that was stirring, and the few homely and coarse manufactures that were carried on, required but very small capitals. These, however, must have yielded very large profits. The rate of interest was nowhere less than ten per cent. and their profits must have been sufficient to afford this great interest. At present, the rate of interest, in the improved parts of Europe, is nowhere higher than six per cent.; and in some of the most improved, it is so low as four, three, and two per cent. Though that part of the revenue of the inhabitants which is derived from the profits of stock, is always much greater in rich than in poor countries, it is because the stock is much greater; in proportion to the stock, the profits are generally much less.

In the wealthy countries of Europe, major cities are currently engaged in trade and manufacturing. In the past, the minimal trade that existed and the few basic and rough products being made required only small investments. However, these investments likely generated very high profits. The interest rate was never lower than ten percent, and their profits must have been enough to cover this high interest. Currently, the interest rate in the more developed parts of Europe is at most six percent; in some of the most advanced areas, it drops to four, three, or even two percent. While the income from stock profits is always significantly higher in rich countries than in poor ones, this is because the amount of stock is much larger; proportionally, profits are usually much smaller.

That part of the annual produce, therefore, which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined for replacing a capital, is not only much greater in rich than in poor countries, but bears a much greater proportion to that which is immediately destined for constituting a revenue either as rent or as profit. The funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour are not only much greater in the former than in the latter, but bear a much greater proportion to those which, though they may be employed to maintain either productive or unproductive hands, have generally a predilection for the latter.

That part of the annual output, therefore, which is intended to replace capital as soon as it comes from the ground or the hands of workers, is not only much larger in wealthy countries than in poor ones, but makes up a much larger share of what is directly meant for generating revenue, either as rent or profit. The resources allocated for supporting productive work are not only significantly larger in the wealthy nations, but they also represent a much larger portion of those resources that, even though they can be used to support either productive or unproductive people, usually favor the latter.

The proportion between those different funds necessarily determines in every country the general character of the inhabitants as to industry or idleness. We are more industrious than our forefathers, because, in the present times, the funds destined for the maintenance of industry are much greater in proportion to those which are likely to be employed in the maintenance of idleness, than they were two or three centuries ago. Our ancestors were idle for want of a sufficient encouragement to industry. It is better, says the proverb, to play for nothing, than to work for nothing. In mercantile and manufacturing towns, where the inferior ranks of people are chiefly maintained by the employment of ca[Pg 138]pital, they are in general industrious, sober, and thriving; as in many English, and in most Dutch towns. In those towns which are principally supported by the constant or occasional residence of a court, and in which the inferior ranks of people are chiefly maintained by the spending of revenue, they are in general idle, dissolute, and poor; as at Rome, Versailles, Compeigne, and Fontainbleau. If you except Rouen and Bourdeaux, there is little trade or industry in any of the parliament towns of France; and the inferior ranks of people, being chiefly maintained by the expense of the members of the courts of justice, and of those who come to plead before them, are in general idle and poor. The great trade of Rouen and Bourdeaux seems to be altogether the effect of their situation. Rouen is necessarily the entrepot of almost all the goods which are brought either from foreign countries, or from the maritime provinces of France, for the consumption of the great city of Paris. Bourdeaux is, in the same manner, the entrepot of the wines which grow upon the banks of the Garronne, and of the rivers which run into it, one of the richest wine countries in the world, and which seems to produce the wine fittest for exportation, or best suited to the taste of foreign nations. Such advantageous situations necessarily attract a great capital by the great employment which they afford it; and the employment of this capital is the cause of the industry of those two cities. In the other parliament towns of France, very little more capital seems to be employed than what is necessary for supplying their own consumption; that is, little more than the smallest capital which can be employed in them. The same thing may be said of Paris, Madrid, and Vienna. Of those three cities, Paris is by far the most industrious, but Paris itself is the principal market of all the manufactures established at Paris, and its own consumption is the principal object of all the trade which it carries on. London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen, are, perhaps, the only three cities in Europe, which are both the constant residence of a court, and can at the same time be considered as trading cities, or as cities which trade not only for their own consumption, but for that of other cities and countries. The situation of all the three is extremely advantageous, and naturally fits them to be the entrepots of a great part of the goods destined for the consumption of distant places. In a city where a great revenue is spent, to employ with advantage a capital for any other purpose than for supplying the consumption of that city, is probably more difficult than in one in which the inferior ranks of people have no other maintenance but what they derive from the employment of such a capital. The idleness of the greater part of the people who are maintained by the expense of revenue, corrupts, it is probable, the industry of those who ought to be maintained by the employment of capital, and renders it less advantageous to employ a capital there than in other places. There was little trade or industry in Edinburgh before the Union. When the Scotch parliament was no longer to be assembled in it, when it ceased to be the necessary residence of the principal nobility and gentry of Scotland, it became a city of some trade and industry. It still continues, however, to be the residence of the principal courts of justice in Scotland, of the boards of customs and excise, &c. A considerable revenue, therefore, still continues to be spent in it. In trade and industry, it is much inferior to Glasgow, of which the inhabitants are chiefly maintained by the employment of capital. The inhabitants of a large village, it has sometimes been observed, after having made considerable progress in manufactures, have become idle and poor, in consequence of a great lord's having taken up his residence in their neighbourhood.

The balance between different types of funds shapes the overall nature of the people in every country regarding work ethic or laziness. We work harder than our ancestors did because, nowadays, the funds allocated for supporting work are much larger compared to those for promoting idleness than they were two or three centuries ago. Our forebears were unproductive due to a lack of sufficient incentive to work. There’s a saying: it’s better to play for free than to work for free. In commercial and industrial towns, where lower-income people primarily rely on capital employment, they tend to be hardworking, responsible, and prosperous, like many English and most Dutch towns. Conversely, in towns mainly supported by a royal court, where lower-income people depend largely on spending from revenue, they tend to be lazy, unruly, and poor, such as in Rome, Versailles, Compiègne, and Fontainebleau. Apart from Rouen and Bordeaux, there’s hardly any trade or industry in the parliamentary towns of France; the lower classes there generally rely on the expenses of court members and those who come to plead before them, leading to a predominantly idle and poor population. The thriving trade in Rouen and Bordeaux appears to stem entirely from their strategic locations. Rouen inevitably serves as the hub for almost all goods brought in from abroad or the coastal regions of France for the vast consumption of Paris. Bordeaux similarly acts as the center for wines produced along the banks of the Garonne and its tributaries, recognized as one of the richest winemaking regions globally, producing wines best suited for export or favored by foreign markets. Such advantageous locations inevitably draw significant capital due to the extensive employment opportunities they offer, and this capital's use fosters the industriousness of these two cities. In other parliamentary towns in France, only minimal capital appears to be utilized, barely enough to cover local consumption; essentially, just enough for basic needs. The same can be said for Paris, Madrid, and Vienna. Among these three, Paris is the most industrious, but it primarily serves as the main market for its own industries, with local consumption being the main focus of its trade. London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen might be the only three cities in Europe that are both royal residences and can also be viewed as trading cities, engaging not just in their own consumption but also that of other cities and countries. The positions of all three offer significant advantages, making them natural hubs for goods intended for consumption in far-off locations. In cities where a large amount of revenue is spent, effectively using capital for any purpose other than meeting the city’s consumption needs is likely more challenging than in places where lower-income people depend solely on capital employment. The idleness of many people funded by revenue spending likely undermines the productivity of those who should be supported through capital employment, making it less beneficial to invest there compared to other areas. Before the Union, Edinburgh had little to no trade or industry. Once the Scottish parliament stopped meeting there and it was no longer the necessary residence for the leading nobility and gentry of Scotland, it gradually developed into a city with some trade and industry. Nevertheless, it remains the main location for Scotland's key courts, customs, excise boards, etc. Consequently, a significant revenue still flows into the city. In terms of trade and industry, it lags far behind Glasgow, where the residents primarily depend on capital employment. It has been noted that residents of a large village, after achieving significant progress in manufacturing, may become lazy and poor if a major lord moves into the area.

The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems everywhere to regulate the proportion between industry and idleness. Wherever capital predominates, industry prevails; wherever revenue, idleness. Every increase or diminution of capital, therefore, naturally tends to increase or diminish the real quantity of industry, the number of productive hands, and consequently the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, the real wealth and revenue of all its inhabitants.

The relationship between capital and revenue seems to govern the balance between work and leisure everywhere. When capital is dominant, work thrives; when revenue is dominant, leisure takes over. Any increase or decrease in capital naturally influences the actual level of work, the number of productive workers, and therefore the market value of the annual output produced by the land and labor of the country, reflecting the real wealth and income of all its people.

Capitals are increased by parsimony, and diminished by prodigality and misconduct.

Capitals grow through saving money and shrink due to wastefulness and poor management.

Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of productive hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it to him for an interest, that is, for a share of the profits. As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual gains, so the capital of a society, which is the same with that of all the individuals who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner.

Whatever a person saves from their income they add to their capital, and either uses it themselves to support more productive workers or allows someone else to use it by lending it for interest, which is a share of the profits. Just as an individual's capital can only grow by what they save from their yearly income or profits, the capital of a society, which is the same as that of all the individuals in it, can only grow in the same way.

Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital. Industry, indeed, provides the subject which parsimony accumulates; but whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater.

Parsimony, not hard work, is the direct reason for the increase in capital. Hard work does provide the resources that parsimony accumulates; however, no matter what hard work may gain, if parsimony doesn’t save and set aside, the capital would never grow.

Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of productive hands, tends to increase the number of those hands whose labour adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. It tends, therefore, to increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour[Pg 139] of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of industry, which gives an additional value to the annual produce.

Being frugal, by boosting the resources set aside for supporting productive workers, aims to increase the number of people whose labor enhances the value of what they work on. It therefore tends to raise the market value of the yearly output of the land and labor[Pg 139] of the country. It activates more industry, which adds extra value to the yearly production.

What is annually saved, is as regularly consumed as what is annually spent, and nearly in the same time too; but it is consumed by a different set of people. That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends, is, in most cases, consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave nothing behind them in return for their consumption. That portion which he annually saves, as, for the sake of the profit, it is immediately employed as a capital, is consumed in the same manner, and nearly in the same time too, but by a different set of people: by labourers, manufacturers, and artificers, who re-produce, with a profit, the value of their annual consumption. His revenue, we shall suppose, is paid him in money. Had he spent the whole, the food, clothing, and lodging, which the whole could have purchased, would have been distributed among the former set of people. By saving a part of it, as that part is, for the sake of the profit, immediately employed as a capital, either by himself or by some other person, the food, clothing, and lodging, which may be purchased with it, are necessarily reserved for the latter. The consumption is the same, but the consumers are different.

What gets saved each year is used just as regularly as what gets spent, and almost in the same timeframe; however, it's consumed by different groups of people. The money a wealthy person spends every year is, in most cases, enjoyed by idle guests and household staff who don’t give anything back in return. The money he saves, which is quickly put to work for profit, is consumed in a similar way and around the same time, but by a different group: workers, manufacturers, and craftsmen, who generate a profit from the value of what they consume annually. Let’s say his income comes to him in cash. If he had spent it all, the food, clothing, and housing that the total could buy would have gone to that first group of people. By saving some of it, and using that saved portion for profit, either by himself or someone else, the food, clothing, and housing that can be bought with it are then reserved for the second group. The consumption is the same, but the consumers are different.

By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords maintenance to an additional number of productive hands, for that of the ensuing year, but like the founder of a public work-house he establishes, as it were, a perpetual fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come. The perpetual allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always guarded by any positive law, by any trust-right or deed of mortmain. It is always guarded, however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and evident interest of every individual to whom any share of it shall ever belong. No part of it can ever afterwards be employed to maintain any but productive hands, without an evident loss to the person who thus perverts it from its proper destination.

A frugal person saves each year, allowing them to support more workers for the following year. In a way, they create a permanent fund to support that same number of workers for the future. While this fund isn’t always secured by strict laws or legal agreements, it is strongly protected by a clear interest from everyone involved. Any portion of the fund cannot be used to support unproductive workers without causing a clear loss to whoever misuses it.

The prodigal perverts it in this manner: By not confining his expense within his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts the revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes, he pays the wages of idleness with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers had, as it were, consecrated to the maintenance of industry. By diminishing the funds destined for the employment of productive labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as it depends upon him, the quantity of that labour which adds a value to the subject upon which it is bestowed, and, consequently, the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of some was not compensated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by feeding the idle with the bread of the industrious, tends not only to beggar himself, but to impoverish his country.

The wasteful person twists things like this: By spending more than he earns, he chips away at his savings. Just like someone who misuses the funds of a charitable foundation for selfish reasons, he uses money meant for important things to pay for laziness. By reducing the money intended for productive work, he inevitably decreases the amount of labor that adds value to what it's put into, and, as a result, the overall output of the land and labor of the entire country, which is the true wealth and income of its people. If the extravagance of some isn’t balanced by the saving habits of others, every extravagant spender, by using resources from the hard-working, will not only run himself dry but also weaken his country.

Though the expense of the prodigal should be altogether in home made, and no part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive funds of the society would still be the same. Every year there would still be a certain quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained productive, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Every year, therefore, there would still be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

Though the spending of the extravagant person should be entirely from local sources and not involve any foreign goods, its impact on the society's productive resources would still be the same. Each year, there would still be a certain amount of food and clothing that should have supported productive workers but is instead used to sustain unproductive individuals. As a result, every year there would be a reduction in what would otherwise have been the value of the country's overall agricultural and labor output.

This expense, it may be said, indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not occasioning any exportation of gold and silver, the same quantity of money would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and clothing, which were thus consumed by unproductive, had been distributed among productive hands, they would have reproduced, together with a profit, the full value of their consumption. The same quantity of money would, in this case, equally have remained in the country, and there would, besides, have been a reproduction of an equal value of consumable goods. There would have been two values instead of one.

This expense, you could say, doesn’t involve foreign goods and doesn’t lead to exporting gold and silver, so the same amount of money would stay in the country as before. However, if the food and clothing that were consumed unproductively had been given to productive workers, they would have created enough value, plus a profit, to cover their consumption. In this situation, the same amount of money would still remain in the country, but there would also have been a production of an equal value of goods. That would mean there are two values instead of just one.

The same quantity of money, besides, cannot long remain in any country in which the value of the annual produce diminishes. The sole use of money is to circulate consumable goods. By means of it, provisions, materials, and finished work, are bought and sold, and distributed to their proper consumers. The quantity of money, therefore, which can be annually employed in any country, must be determined by the value of the consumable goods annually circulated within it. These must consist, either in the immediate produce of the land and labour of the country itself, or in something which had been purchased with some part of that produce. Their value, therefore, must diminish as the value of that produce diminishes, and along with it the quantity of money which can be employed in circulating them. But the money which, by this annual diminution of produce, is annually thrown out of domestic circulation, will not be allowed to lie idle. The interest of whoever possesses it requires that it should be employed; but having no employment at home, it will, in spite of all laws and prohibitions, be sent abroad, and employed in purchasing consumable goods, which may be of some use at home. Its annual exportation will, in this manner, continue for some time to add something to the annual consumption of the country beyond the value of its own annual produce. What in the days of its prosperity had been saved from that annual produce, and employed in purchasing gold and silver will[Pg 140] contribute, for some little time, to support its consumption in adversity. The exportation of gold and silver is, in this case, not the cause, but the effect of its declension, and may even, for some little time, alleviate the misery of that declension.

The same amount of money can't stay in a country for long if the value of what it produces each year is going down. Money's main purpose is to help circulate goods that people can use. It's used to buy and sell food, materials, and finished products, distributing them to the right consumers. So, the amount of money that can be used in a country each year must depend on the value of the goods that are circulated. These goods need to come from the country's own land and labor or be something bought with part of that production. Their value will go down as the value of the production goes down, and so will the amount of money available to circulate them. However, the money that is lost from domestic circulation due to the drop in production won't just sit around. The owner of that money will want to use it; if there’s no use for it at home, it will be sent abroad regardless of any laws against it, to buy consumable goods that might be helpful at home. This export of money will temporarily boost the annual consumption of the country beyond what it produces each year. What was saved from the annual production in better times and used to buy gold and silver will, for a short while, help sustain consumption during tough times. In this situation, exporting gold and silver isn't the cause of the decline but rather a result of it and can even temporarily ease the pain of that decline.

The quantity of money, on the contrary, must in every country naturally increase as the value of the annual produce increases. The value of the consumable goods annually circulated within the society being greater, will require a greater quantity of money to circulate them. A part of the increased produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchasing, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of gold and silver necessary for circulating the rest. The increase of those metals will, in this case, be the effect, not the cause, of the public prosperity. Gold and silver are purchased everywhere in the same manner. The food, clothing, and lodging, the revenue and maintenance, of all those whose labour or stock is employed in bringing them from the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in Peru as well as in England. The country which has this price to pay, will never be long without the quantity of those metals which it has occasion for; and no country will ever long retain a quantity which it has no occasion for.

The amount of money, on the other hand, must naturally increase in every country as the value of annual production rises. Since the value of consumable goods circulated in society becomes greater, a larger amount of money will be needed to facilitate their circulation. Therefore, part of the increased production will naturally be used to purchase the extra gold and silver needed to circulate the rest. In this situation, the rise in these metals will be a result, not a cause, of public prosperity. Gold and silver are bought everywhere in the same way. The cost for food, clothing, shelter, and the wages and support of everyone involved in getting these metals from the mines to the market is the same in Peru as it is in England. The country that can afford to pay this cost will not be without the amount of these metals it needs for long, and no country will hold on to an amount of these metals it doesn't need for very long.

Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a country to consist in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land and labour, as plain reason seems to dictate, or in the quantity of the precious metals which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices suppose; in either view of the matter, every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor.

Whatever we might think the true wealth and income of a country is—whether it's the value of the yearly output from its land and labor, as common sense suggests, or the amount of precious metals circulating within it, as popular misconceptions believe—either way, every spendthrift seems to be a public foe, while every saver appears to be a public benefactor.

The effects of misconduct are often the same as those of prodigality. Every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, fisheries, trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour. In every such project, though the capital is consumed by productive hands only, yet as, by the injudicious manner in which they are employed, they do not reproduce the full value of their consumption, there must always be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the productive funds of the society.

The effects of misbehavior are often the same as those of wastefulness. Every unwise and failed project in agriculture, mining, fishing, trade, or manufacturing reduces the funds set aside for supporting productive labor in the same way. In each of these projects, even though the capital is used by productive workers, the careless way in which it is utilized means they don’t generate back the full value of what was spent. As a result, there will always be a decrease in what would otherwise have been the productive funds for society.

It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great nation can be much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of individuals; the profusion or imprudence of some being always more than compensated by the frugality and good conduct of others.

It rarely happens that the situation of a great nation is significantly impacted by the spending or misbehavior of a few individuals; the excess or recklessness of some is usually more than balanced out by the thriftiness and good behavior of others.

With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expense is the passion for present enjoyment; which, though sometimes violent and very difficult to be restrained, is in general only momentary occasional. But the principle which prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our condition; a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce, perhaps, a single instance, in which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation, as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their condition. It is the means the most vulgar and the most obvious; and the most likely way of augmenting their fortune, is to save and accumulate some part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually, or upon some extraordinary occasion. Though the principle of expense, therefore, prevails in almost all men upon some occasions, and in some men upon almost all occasions; yet in the greater part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly.

When it comes to spending, the driving force is the desire for immediate pleasure. This desire can be intense and tough to control, but it's usually just a fleeting feeling. On the other hand, the motivation to save stems from the wish to improve our situation—a feeling that is typically calm and rational, and one that stays with us from birth until death. Throughout the time between these two moments, there’s rarely a person who feels completely content with their circumstances, free from any desire to change or improve things. Most people believe that increasing their wealth is how they can enhance their lives. This approach is common and straightforward, and the most effective way to increase wealth is by saving and accumulating part of what they earn, either regularly each year or during special circumstances. Even though the urge to spend is strong in many people at times, and for some, it’s constant, over the course of their lives, the inclination to be frugal appears to be much more dominant for most people.

With regard to misconduct, the number of prudent and successful undertakings is everywhere much greater than that of injudicious and unsuccessful ones. After all our complaints of the frequency of bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune, make but a very small part of the whole number engaged in trade, and all other sorts of business; not much more, perhaps, than one in a thousand. Bankruptcy is, perhaps, the greatest and most humiliating calamity which can befal an innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are sufficiently careful to avoid it. Some, indeed, do not avoid it; as some do not avoid the gallows.

When it comes to misconduct, the number of smart and successful ventures is far greater than the number of foolish and unsuccessful ones. Despite our complaints about how often bankruptcies happen, the unfortunate people who experience this fate make up only a tiny fraction of all those involved in trade and other kinds of business—probably no more than one in a thousand. Bankruptcy is probably the worst and most embarrassing disaster that can happen to an innocent person. Most people, therefore, take enough precautions to steer clear of it. However, some do end up facing it, just as some end up facing the gallows.

Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes are by public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole public revenue is, in most countries, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Such are the people who compose a numerous and splendid court, a great ecclesiastical establishment, great fleets and armies, who in time of peace produce nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can compensate the expense of maintaining them, even while the war lasts. Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of other men's labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an unnecessary number, they may in a particular year consume so great a share of this produce, as not to leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive labourers, who should reproduce it next year. The next year's produce, therefore, will be less than that of the foregoing; and if the same disorder should continue, that of the third year will be still less than that of the second. Those unproductive hands who should be maintained by a part only of the[Pg 141] spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a share of their whole revenue, and thereby oblige so great a number to encroach upon their capitals, upon the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour, that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not be able to compensate the waste and degradation of produce occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment.

Great nations are never harmed by private wealth, but they can be damaged by public wastefulness and mismanagement. In most countries, almost all public revenue is spent on maintaining unproductive sectors. This includes people in a lavish court, a large religious establishment, and big fleets and armies, which produce nothing in peacetime and gain nothing in wartime to justify their costs, even while the conflict is ongoing. Since these individuals don't contribute to production, they're sustained entirely by the labor of others. When they increase to an excessive number, they can consume such a large portion of the produce in a given year that there isn't enough left to support the productive workers who need to generate it for the following year. As a result, next year's production will be less than this year's, and if the same issues persist, the third year's output will continue to decrease. Those unproductive people, who should only be supported by a portion of the community’s surplus revenue, may consume such a significant part of the overall revenue that it forces many to draw from their savings and the funds meant to support productive work, making it impossible for individuals' savings and good management to offset the losses and degradation of produce caused by this forced overconsumption.

This frugality and good conduct, however, is upon most occasions, it appears from experience, sufficient to compensate, not only the private prodigality and misconduct of individuals, but the public extravagance of government. The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things towards improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of administration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor.

This frugality and good behavior, however, is usually enough to make up for the personal wastefulness and misconduct of individuals, as well as the public overspending of the government. The steady, ongoing effort of everyone to improve their situation, which is the foundation of both public and private wealth, is often strong enough to keep things moving toward progress, despite the government's extravagance and the biggest administrative mistakes. Like the mysterious principle of life in animals, it often brings health and strength back to the system, despite not only the illness but also the ridiculous advice of the doctor.

The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increasing in its value by no other means, but by increasing either the number of its productive labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers who had before been employed. The number of its productive labourers, it is evident, can never be much increased, but in consequence of an increase of capital, or of the funds destined for maintaining them. The productive powers of the same number of labourers cannot be increased, but in consequence either of some addition and improvement to those machines and instruments which facilitate and abridge labour, or of more proper division and distribution of employment. In either case, an additional capital is almost always required. It is by means of an additional capital only, that the undertaker of any work can either provide his workmen with better machinery, or make a more proper distribution of employment among them. When the work to be done consists of a number of parts, to keep every man constantly employed in one way, requires a much greater capital than where every man is occasionally employed in every different part of the work. When we compare, therefore, the state of a nation at two different periods, and find that the annual produce of its land and labour is evidently greater at the latter than at the former, that its lands are better cultivated, its manufactures more numerous and more flourishing, and its trade more extensive; we may be assured that its capital must have increased during the interval between those two periods, and that more must have been added to it by the good conduct of some, than had been taken from it either by the private misconduct of others, or by the public extravagance of government. But we shall find this to have been the case of almost all nations, in all tolerably quiet and peaceable times, even of those who have not enjoyed the most prudent and parsimonious governments. To form a right judgment of it, indeed, we must compare the state of the country at periods somewhat distant from one another. The progress is frequently so gradual, that, at near periods, the improvement is not only not sensible, but, from the declension either of certain branches of industry, or of certain districts of the country, things which sometimes happen, though the country in general is in great prosperity, there frequently arises a suspicion, that the riches and industry of the whole are decaying.

The yearly output from the land and labor of any country can only increase in value by either boosting the number of productive workers or enhancing the productivity of those already employed. Clearly, the number of productive workers can only rise significantly with an increase in capital or funds set aside to support them. The productivity of the same number of workers can only improve through better machines and tools that make work easier and quicker, or through a more efficient division of tasks. In either case, additional capital is almost always necessary. It is only with extra capital that anyone running a project can provide workers with better machinery or a more effective distribution of tasks. When a job involves multiple parts, ensuring that each person is consistently busy with one task requires much more capital than when each person handles various tasks at different times. Therefore, when we look at a nation’s condition at two different times and see that the yearly output of its land and labor is higher at the later time—its lands are better cultivated, its industries are more abundant and thriving, and its trade is wider—we can conclude that its capital must have increased during the time between those two points, and that more was added through the effective management of some than was lost through the poor actions of others or through governmental overspending. However, this has been true for almost all nations during relatively peaceful times, even those that have not had particularly wise or frugal governments. To truly evaluate the situation, we need to compare the country’s state across periods that are somewhat far apart. Progress is often so slow that, within shorter time frames, improvements might not be noticeable. Sometimes, specific industries or regions may decline, leading to suspicions that the overall wealth and industriousness of the country are waning, even when the nation as a whole is doing well.

The annual produce of the land and labour of England, for example, is certainly much greater than it was a little more than a century ago, at the restoration of Charles II. Though at present few people, I believe, doubt of this, yet during this period five years have seldom passed away, in which some book or pamphlet has not been published, written, too, with such abilities as to gain some authority with the public, and pretending to demonstrate that the wealth of the nation was fast declining; that the country was depopulated, agriculture neglected, manufactures decaying, and trade undone. Nor have these publications been all party pamphlets, the wretched offspring of falsehood and venality. Many of them have been written by very candid and very intelligent people, who wrote nothing but what they believed, and for no other reason but because they believed it.

The yearly output of England's land and labor, for instance, is definitely much higher than it was just over a hundred years ago, during the restoration of Charles II. Although I think it's safe to say that few people doubt this today, there have rarely been five years in this time when a book or pamphlet hasn’t been published, often written with enough skill to gain some credibility with the public, claiming to show that the nation's wealth was rapidly declining; that the country was losing population, agriculture was being ignored, manufacturing was on the decline, and trade was failing. Furthermore, not all of these publications have been biased party pieces, the unfortunate product of dishonesty and greed. Many have been authored by very honest and intelligent individuals, who wrote only what they truly believed and for no other reason than that belief.

The annual produce of the land and labour of England, again, was certainly much greater at the Restoration than we can suppose it to have been about a hundred years before, at the accession of Elizabeth. At this period, too, we have all reason to believe, the country was much more advanced in improvement, than it had been about a century before, towards the close of the dissensions between the houses of York and Lancaster. Even then it was, probably, in a better condition than it had been at the Norman conquest: and at the Norman conquest, than during the confusion of the Saxon heptarchy. Even at this early period, it was certainly a more improved country than at the invasion of Julius Cæsar, when its inhabitants were nearly in the same state with the savages in North America.

The yearly output of England’s land and labor was definitely much higher at the Restoration than we can imagine it was about a hundred years earlier, at the start of Elizabeth’s reign. During this time, we have every reason to believe that the country was significantly more developed than it had been a century before, at the end of the conflicts between the York and Lancaster families. It was likely in a better state than it had been at the Norman conquest, and the Norman conquest was an improvement over the chaos of the Saxon heptarchy. Even in this early period, it was clearly a more advanced country than it was during Julius Caesar’s invasion, when its people were almost at the same level as the Native Americans.

In each of those periods, however, there was not only much private and public profusion, many expensive and unnecessary wars, great perversion of the annual produce from maintaining productive to maintain unproductive hands; but sometimes, in the confusion of civil discord, such absolute waste and destruction of stock, as might he supposed, not only to retard, as it certainly did, the natural[Pg 142] accumulation of riches, but to have left the country, at the end of the period, poorer than at the beginning, Thus, in the happiest and most fortunate period of them all, that which has passed since the Restoration, how many disorders and misfortunes have occurred, which, could they have been foreseen, not only the impoverishment, but the total ruin of the country would have been expected from them? The fire and the plague of London, the two Dutch wars, the disorders of the revolution, the war in Ireland, the four expensive French wars of 1688, 1701, 1742, and 1756, together with the two rebellions of 1715 and 1745. In the course of the four French wars, the nation has contracted more than L.145,000,000 of debt, over and above all the other extraordinary annual expense which they occasioned; so that the whole cannot be computed at less than L.200,000,000. So great a share of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, has, since the Revolution, been employed upon different occasions, in maintaining an extraordinary number of unproductive hands. But had not those wars given this particular direction to so large a capital, the greater part of it would naturally have been employed in maintaining productive hands, whose labour would have replaced, with a profit, the whole value of their consumption. The value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country would have been considerably increased by it every year, and every year's increase would have augmented still more that of the following year. More houses would have been built, more lands would have been improved, and those which had been improved before would have been better cultivated; more manufactures would have been established, and those which had been established before would have been more extended; and to what height the real wealth and revenue of the country might by this time have been raised, it is not perhaps very easy even to imagine.

In each of those periods, there was not only a lot of private and public excess, many costly and unnecessary wars, and a significant misallocation of annual resources from supporting productive jobs to maintaining unproductive ones. Sometimes, amid the chaos of civil unrest, there was such absolute waste and destruction of resources that it could be assumed, not only to slow down, as it certainly did, the natural accumulation of wealth, but to have left the country poorer at the end of the period than at the beginning. Thus, in the most fortunate period of them all, since the Restoration, how many troubles and misfortunes have occurred that, if they could have been foreseen, would have predicted not just impoverishment but the complete ruin of the country? The Great Fire and the plague of London, the two Dutch wars, the turmoil of the revolution, the war in Ireland, and the four costly French wars of 1688, 1701, 1742, and 1756, along with the two rebellions of 1715 and 1745. Throughout the four French wars, the nation incurred more than £145,000,000 in debt, in addition to all the other extraordinary annual expenses they caused; so the total cannot be calculated at less than £200,000,000. A significant portion of the annual output from the land and labor of the country has, since the Revolution, been used at various times to support a huge number of unproductive jobs. However, if those wars hadn't diverted such a large amount of capital in this way, most of it would have naturally gone to supporting productive jobs, whose labor would have returned the entire value of their consumption with profit. The annual output from the land and labor of the country would have increased significantly each year, and every year's growth would have added even more to the following year’s increase. More houses would have been built, more land would have been improved, and those that had already been improved would have been cultivated better; more manufacturing jobs would have been created, and those that existed before would have been expanded. It’s hard to imagine just how high the actual wealth and income of the country could have been raised by now.

But though the profusion of government must undoubtedly have retarded the natural progress of England towards wealth and improvement, it has not been able to stop it. The annual produce of its land and labour is undoubtedly much greater at present than it was either at the Restoration or at the Revolution. The capital, therefore, annually employed in cultivating this land, and in maintaining this labour, must likewise be much greater. In the midst of all the exactions of government, this capital has been silently and gradually accumulated by the private frugality and good conduct of individuals, by their universal, continual, and uninterrupted effort to better their own condition. It is this effort, protected by law, and allowed by liberty to exert itself in the manner that is most advantageous, which has maintained the progress of England towards opulence and improvement in almost all former times, and which, it is to be hoped, will do so in all future times. England, however, as it has never been blessed with a very parsimonious government, so parsimony has at no time been the characteristic virtue of its inhabitants. It is the highest impertinence and presumption, therefore, in kings and ministers to pretend to watch over the economy of private people, and to restrain their expense, either by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries. They are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts in the society. Let them look well after their own expense, and they may safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not ruin the state, that of the subject never will.

But even though the growth of government must have slowed down England's natural journey towards wealth and progress, it hasn’t been able to stop it. The yearly output of its land and labor is definitely much greater now than it was at the Restoration or the Revolution. So, the capital that is employed each year in farming this land and supporting this labor must also be much greater. Despite all the demands from the government, this capital has been quietly and gradually built up by the saving habits and good behavior of individuals, through their ongoing and persistent efforts to improve their own situations. It is this effort, protected by law and allowed by freedom to act in the most beneficial ways, that has kept England moving towards wealth and progress throughout much of its history, and hopefully, it will continue to do so in the future. However, England has never had a very frugal government, nor has frugality ever been a defining trait of its people. It is the height of arrogance and presumption for kings and ministers to act as if they need to oversee the spending habits of individuals and to limit their expenses, either with laws on spending or by banning the import of foreign luxuries. They are always, without exception, the biggest wasteful spenders in society. They should take care of their own spending, and they can safely trust individuals with theirs. If their own extravagance doesn’t ruin the state, then that of the citizens certainly won’t.

As frugality increases, and prodigality diminishes, the public capital, so the conduct of those whose expense just equals their revenue, without either accumulating or encroaching, neither increases nor diminishes it. Some modes of expense, however, seem to contribute more to the growth of public opulence than others.

As frugality increases and extravagance decreases, the public capital, as well as the behavior of those whose spending matches their income—without either saving or depleting it—neither grows nor shrinks. However, certain ways of spending appear to contribute more to the growth of public wealth than others.

The revenue of an individual may be spent, either in things which are consumed immediately, and in which one day's expense can neither alleviate nor support that of another; or it may be spent in things more durable, which can therefore be accumulated, and in which every every day's expense may, as he chooses, either alleviate, or support and heighten, the effect of that of the following day. A man of fortune, for example, may either spend his revenue in a profuse and sumptuous table, and in maintaining a great number of menial servants, and a multitude of dogs and horses; or, contenting himself with a frugal table, and few attendants, he may lay out the greater part of it in adorning his house or his country villa, in useful or ornamental buildings, in useful or ornamental furniture, in collecting books, statues, pictures; or in things more frivolous, jewels, baubles, ingenious trinkets of different kinds; or, what is must trifling of all, in amassing a great wardrobe of fine clothes, like the favourite and minister of a great prince who died a few years ago. Were two men of equal fortune to spend their revenue, the one chiefly in the one way, the other in the other, the magnificence of the person whose expense had been chiefly in durable commodities, would be continually increasing, every day's expense contributing something to support and heighten the effect of that of the following day; that of the other, on the contrary, would be no greater at the end of the period than at the beginning. The former too would, at the end of the period, be the richer man of the two. He would have a stock of goods of some kind or other, which, though it might not be worth all that it cost, would always be worth something. No trace[Pg 143] or vestige of the expense of the latter would remain, and the effects of ten or twenty years' profusion would be as completely annihilated as if they had never existed.

The income of an individual can be spent in two ways: on items that are used up immediately, where one day's spending doesn't help or support another day's expenses; or on more durable items that can be saved up, where each day's spending can, at one's discretion, either ease or enhance the impact of the next day's expenses. For example, a wealthy person may choose to spend their income on extravagant meals and maintaining numerous servants, along with many dogs and horses; or, satisfied with simpler meals and fewer staff, they could invest most of their money in decorating their home or country villa, in useful or decorative buildings, useful or stylish furniture, or in collecting books, statues, and paintings. They might also spend on less serious items like jewelry, trinkets, or even build an extensive wardrobe of fine clothes, much like the favorite and minister of a great prince who passed away a few years ago. If two men of equal wealth were to spend their income, one mainly on durable goods and the other on immediate consumption, the one investing in durable items would see their wealth grow over time, with daily expenses adding to and enhancing the impact of the following day’s expenses. In contrast, the other person's wealth would remain unchanged at the end of the period as it was at the beginning. At the end of the period, the former would also be the wealthier of the two. They would have accumulated goods of some kind that, while they might not be worth what was spent on them, would always have some value. No evidence of the latter's spending would remain, and the results of ten or twenty years of excess would be completely erased as if they had never existed.

As the one mode of expense is more favourable than the other to the opulence of an individual, so is it likewise to that of a nation. The houses, the furniture, the clothing of the rich, in a little time, become useful to the inferior and middling ranks of people. They are able to purchase them when their superiors grow weary of them; and the general accommodation of the whole people is thus gradually improved, when this mode of expense becomes universal among men of fortune. In countries which have long been rich, you will frequently find the inferior ranks of people in possession both of houses and furniture perfectly good and entire, but of which neither the one could have been built, nor the other have been made for their use. What was formerly a seat of the family of Seymour, is now an inn upon the Bath road. The marriage-bed of James I. of Great Britain, which his queen brought with her from Denmark, as a present fit for a sovereign to make to a sovereign, was, a few years ago, the ornament of an alehouse at Dunfermline. In some ancient cities, which either have been long stationary, or have gone somewhat to decay, you will sometimes scarce find a single house which could have been built for its present inhabitants. If you go into those houses, too, you will frequently find many excellent, though antiquated pieces of furniture, which are still very fit for use, and which could as little have been made for them. Noble palaces, magnificent villas, great collections of books, statues, pictures, and other curiosities, are frequently both an ornament and an honour, not only to the neighbourhood, but to the whole country to which they belong. Versailles is an ornament and an honour to France, Stowe and Wilton to England. Italy still continues to command some sort of veneration, by the number of monuments of this kind which it possesses, though the wealth which produced them has decayed, and though the genius which planned them seems to be extinguished, perhaps from not having the same employment.

As one way of spending is more beneficial for an individual's wealth, it is also true for a nation's wealth. The homes, furniture, and clothing of the rich eventually become valuable to lower and middle-class people. They can buy these items when their wealthier owners grow tired of them, and this widespread way of spending gradually improves the overall living standards of everyone when it becomes common among wealthy individuals. In countries that have been wealthy for a long time, you often find lower-class people owning perfectly good houses and furniture that were never made for them. For example, what was once the home of the Seymour family is now an inn on the Bath road. The marriage bed of James I of Great Britain, which his queen brought from Denmark as a gift appropriate for a sovereign, was recently the centerpiece of an alehouse in Dunfermline. In some ancient cities that have either remained stagnant or have somewhat declined, it's rare to find a single house that was built for its current inhabitants. Moreover, if you enter these houses, you often discover many fine, though outdated, pieces of furniture that are still very usable and that were also not made for them. Grand palaces, beautiful villas, extensive collections of books, statues, paintings, and other curiosities often serve as both decoration and a point of pride, not just for the local area but for the entire country they are part of. Versailles is a point of pride and beauty for France, while Stowe and Wilton are for England. Italy still garners some respect due to the number of monuments it has, even though the wealth that created them has diminished and the creativity that designed them seems to have faded, possibly because it no longer has the same opportunities.

The expense, too, which is laid out in durable commodities, is favourable not only to accumulation, but to frugality. If a person should at any time exceed in it, he can easily reform without exposing himself to the censure of the public. To reduce very much the number of his servants, to reform his table from great profusion to great frugality, to lay down his equipage after he has once set it up, are changes which cannot escape the observation of his neighbours, and which are supposed to imply some acknowledgment of preceding bad conduct. Few, therefore, of those who have once been so unfortunate as to launch out too far into this sort of expense, have afterwards the courage to reform, till ruin and bankruptcy oblige them. But if a person has, at any time, been at too great an expense in building, in furniture, in books, or pictures, no imprudence can be inferred from his changing his conduct. These are things in which further expense is frequently rendered unnecessary by former expense; and when a person stops short, he appears to do so, not because he has exceeded his fortune, but because he has satisfied his fancy.

The money spent on durable goods is beneficial not just for saving but also for being frugal. If someone ever overspends in this area, they can easily change their ways without facing public judgment. Cutting back on servants, transforming lavish meals into simple ones, or getting rid of their fancy vehicles after initially acquiring them are changes that neighbors will notice, and they’re often seen as acknowledgments of past poor choices. As a result, few people who have regrettably overspent tend to have the confidence to change until they are forced to by financial ruin or bankruptcy. However, if someone has previously overspent on building, furniture, books, or art, there's no negative judgment associated with changing their spending habits. These are areas where previous spending can often eliminate the need for additional expenses, and when someone decides to stop, it looks like a personal choice rather than a sign of financial trouble—it's seen as a fulfillment of their desires.

The expense, besides, that is laid out in durable commodities, gives maintenance, commonly, to a greater number of people than that which is employed in the most profuse hospitality. Of two or three hundred weight of provisions, which may sometimes be served up at a great festival, one half, perhaps, is thrown to the dunghill, and there is always a great deal wasted and abused. But if the expense of this entertainment had been employed in setting to work masons, carpenters, upholsterers, mechanics, &c. a quantity of provisions of equal value would have been distributed among a still greater number of people, who would have bought them in pennyworths and pound weights, and not have lost or thrown away a single ounce of them. In the one way, besides, this expense maintains productive, in the other unproductive hands. In the one way, therefore, it increases, in the other it does not increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

The money spent on durable goods typically supports more people than what goes into extravagant parties. At a large celebration, for instance, if two or three hundred pounds of food are served, half of it might end up in the trash, and a lot more gets wasted. But if the money spent on the party had gone towards hiring masons, carpenters, upholsterers, mechanics, etc., an equal amount of food could have been distributed among an even larger number of people, who would buy it in small quantities and wouldn't waste a single ounce. So, in one scenario, this spending supports productive work, while in the other it supports unproductive activities. As a result, one approach increases, while the other doesn't affect the overall value of the country's annual output from land and labor.

I would not, however, by all this, be understood to mean, that the one species of expense always betokens a more liberal or generous spirit than the other. When a man of fortune spends his revenue chiefly in hospitality, he shares the greater part of it with his friends and companions; but when he employs it in purchasing such durable commodities, he often spends the whole upon his own person, and gives nothing to any body without an equivalent. The latter species of expense, therefore, especially when directed towards frivolous objects, the little ornaments of dress and furniture, jewels, trinkets, gewgaws, frequently indicates, not only a trifling, but a base and selfish disposition. All that I mean is, that the one sort of expense, as it always occasions some accumulation of valuable commodities, as it is more favourable to private frugality, and, consequently, to the increase of the public capital, and as it maintains productive rather than unproductive hands, conduces more than the other to the growth of public opulence.[Pg 144]

I don’t want to imply that one type of spending always shows a more generous spirit than the other. When a wealthy person spends their money mostly on hospitality, they are sharing most of it with their friends and companions. But when they use it to buy durable goods, they often spend all of it on themselves and don’t give anything to anyone without expecting something in return. This latter type of spending, especially when focused on trivial items like fancy clothes, furniture, jewelry, and trinkets, often shows a petty and selfish nature. What I mean is that one type of expense, since it often leads to the accumulation of valuable goods and encourages personal savings which, in turn, increases public wealth and supports productive labor over unproductive, contributes more to the overall prosperity of the community.[Pg 144]


CHAP. IV.

OF STOCK LENT AT INTEREST.

The stock which is lent at interest is always considered as a capital by the lender. He expects that in due time it is to be restored to him, and that, in the mean time, the borrower is to pay him a certain annual rent for the use of it. The borrower may use it either as a capital, or as a stock reserved for immediate consumption. If he uses it as a capital, he employs it in the maintenance of productive labourers, who reproduce the value, with a profit. He can, in this case, both restore the capital, and pay the interest, without alienating or encroaching upon any other source of revenue. If he uses it as a stock reserved for immediate consumption, he acts the part of a prodigal, and dissipates, in the maintenance of the idle, what was destined for the support of the industrious. He can, in this case, neither restore the capital nor pay the interest, without either alienating or encroaching upon some other source of revenues such as the property or the rent of land.

The stock that is loaned at interest is always seen as capital by the lender. They expect it to be returned to them in due time, and, in the meantime, the borrower is supposed to pay a certain annual interest for using it. The borrower can use it either as capital or as a stock set aside for immediate use. If they use it as capital, they invest it in supporting productive workers who generate value and profit. In this case, they can both return the capital and pay the interest without taking from any other income source. However, if they use it as a stock for immediate consumption, they act recklessly, wasting resources that were meant to support the hardworking. In this situation, they can't return the capital or pay the interest without giving up or diminishing some other income source, like property or rental income.

The stock which is lent at interest is, no doubt, occasionally employed in both these ways, but in the former much more frequently than in the latter. The man who borrows in order to spend will soon be ruined, and he who lends to him will generally have occasion to repent of his folly. To borrow or to lend for such a purpose, therefore, is, in all cases, where gross usury is out of the question, contrary to the interest of both parties; and though it no doubt happens sometimes, that people do both the one and the other, yet, from the regard that all men have for their own interest, we may be assured, that it cannot happen so very frequently as we are sometimes apt to imagine. Ask any rich man of common prudence, to which of the two sorts of people he has lent the greater part of his stock, to those who he thinks will employ it profitably, or to those who will spend it idly, and he will laugh at you for proposing the question. Even among borrowers, therefore, not the people in the world most famous for frugality, the number of the frugal and industrious surpasses considerably that of the prodigal and idle.

The money that is lent with interest is definitely sometimes used in both ways, but it’s used in the first way much more often than the second. A person who borrows to spend will quickly find themselves in trouble, and the lender will usually regret their poor decision. So borrowing or lending for that purpose, at least when blatant usury isn’t involved, goes against the interests of both parties. While it does happen occasionally that people do both, we can be sure that because everyone cares about their own interests, it doesn’t happen as often as we might think. If you ask any wealthy, sensible person where they’ve lent most of their money—either to those who will invest it wisely or to those who will waste it—they’ll laugh at the question. Even among borrowers, the number of frugal and hardworking people far exceeds those who are wasteful and lazy.

The only people to whom stock is commonly lent, without their being expected to make any very profitable use of it, are country gentlemen, who borrow upon mortgage. Even they scarce ever borrow merely to spend. What they borrow, one may say, is commonly spent before they borrow it. They have generally consumed so great a quantity of goods, advanced to them upon credit by shop-keepers and tradesmen, that they find it necessary to borrow at interest, in order to pay the debt. The capital borrowed replaces the capitals of those shop-keepers and tradesmen which the country gentlemen could not have replaced from the rents of their estates. It is not properly borrowed in order to be spent, but in order to replace a capital which had been spent before.

The only people who usually get loans without being expected to use the money in a really profitable way are country gentlemen who borrow against their property. Even they rarely borrow just to spend. One could argue that what they borrow is often already spent before they actually take out the loan. They usually have consumed a significant amount of goods, which were provided to them on credit by shopkeepers and tradespeople, making it necessary for them to borrow with interest to pay off their debts. The borrowed money helps replace the money of those shopkeepers and tradespeople, which the country gentlemen couldn't replace from the income of their estates. It's not truly borrowed to be used up, but rather to replace money that had already been spent.

Almost all loans at interest are made in money, either of paper, or of gold and silver; but what the borrower really wants, and what the lender readily supplies him with, is not the money, but the money's worth, or the goods which it can purchase. If he wants it as a stock for immediate consumption, it is those goods only which he can place in that stock. If he wants it as a capital for employing industry, it is from those goods only that the industrious can be furnished with the tools, materials, and maintenance necessary for carrying on their work. By means of the loan, the lender, as it were, assigns to the borrower his right to a certain portion of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, to be employed as the borrower pleases.

Almost all loans that charge interest are given in money, either in the form of paper currency or in gold and silver. However, what the borrower truly seeks, and what the lender willingly provides, isn't just the money itself but the value of that money—essentially, the goods it can buy. If the borrower needs it for immediate use, they can only stock up on those goods. If they're looking to use it as capital to support their work, it's from those goods that workers can get the tools, materials, and support they need to do their jobs. Through the loan, the lender essentially grants the borrower the right to a share of the annual output from the country's land and labor, which the borrower can use as they wish.

The quantity of stock, therefore, or, as it is commonly expressed, of money, which can be lent at interest in any country, is not regulated by the value of the money, whether paper or coin, which serves as the instrument of the different loans made in that country, but by the value of that part of the annual produce, which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined, not only for replacing a capital, but such a capital as the owner does not care to be at the trouble of employing himself. As such capitals are commonly lent out and paid back in money, they constitute what is called the monied interest. It is distinct, not only from the landed, but from the trading and manufacturing interests, as in these last the owners themselves employ their own capitals. Even in the monied interest, however, the money is, as it were, but the deed or assignment, which conveys from one hand to another those capitals which the owners do not care to employ themselves. Those capitals may be greater, in almost any proportion, than the amount of the money which serves as the instrument of their conveyance; the same pieces of money successively serving for many different loans, as well as for many different purchases. A, for example, lends to W L.1000, with which W immediately purchases of B L.1000 worth of goods. B having no occasion for the money himself, lends the identical pieces to X, with which X immediately purchases of C another L.1000 worth of goods. C, in the same manner, and for the same reason, lends them to Y, who again purchases goods with them of D. In this manner, the same pieces, either of coin or of paper, may, in the course of a[Pg 145] few days, serve as the instrument of three different loans, and of three different purchases, each of which is, in value, equal to the whole amount of those pieces. What the three monied men, A, B, and C, assigned to the three borrowers, W, X, and Y, is the power of making those purchases. In this power consist both the value and the use of the loans. The stock lent by the three monied men is equal to the value of the goods which can be purchased with it, and is three times greater than that of the money with which the purchases are made. Those loans, however, may be all perfectly well secured, the goods purchased by the different debtors being so employed as, in due time, to bring back, with a profit, an equal value either of coin or of paper. And as the same pieces of money can thus serve as the instrument of different loans to three, or, for the same reason, to thirty times their value, so they may likewise successively serve as the instrument of repayment.

The amount of money, or stock, that can be lent at interest in any country isn't determined by the value of the money itself, whether it's paper or coin, that is used for loans, but rather by the value of that part of the annual output that, as soon as it comes from the ground or from laborers, is intended not only for replacing capital but for capital that the owner doesn’t want to manage personally. Since such capitals are usually lent out and repaid in money, they make up what is known as the monied interest. This interest is different not only from landed interest but also from the interests in trading and manufacturing, where the owners take charge of their own capitals. Even within the monied interest, money acts almost like a contract or assignment, transferring from one person to another those capitals that the owners prefer not to use themselves. These capitals can be significantly larger than the amount of money used to transfer them; the same coins can facilitate many different loans and purchases. For example, A lends W £1000, and W immediately buys £1000 worth of goods from B. Since B doesn't need the money, he lends the same coins to X, who then buys another £1000 worth of goods from C. Following the same pattern, C lends to Y, who buys goods from D. In this way, the same coins, whether they are coins or paper, can be used in just a few days for three different loans and three different purchases, each valued at the total of those coins. What A, B, and C provided to W, X, and Y is the ability to make those purchases. This ability represents both the value and the purpose of the loans. The stock lent by the three money lenders is equivalent to the value of the goods that can be bought with it, which is three times greater than the money used for the purchases. However, these loans can be completely secure because the goods bought by the various borrowers are utilized in such a way that, in due course, they will bring back an equal value of either coins or paper, along with a profit. And just as the same pieces of money can provide for different loans amounting to three times, or even thirty times, their value, they can also be used successively for repayment.

A capital lent at interest may, in this manner, be considered as an assignment, from the lender to the borrower, of a certain considerable portion of the annual produce, upon condition that the borrower in return shall, during the continuation of the loan, annually assign to the lender a small portion, called the interest; and, at the end of it, a portion equally considerable with that which had originally been assigned to him, called the repayment. Though money, either coin or paper, serves generally as the deed of assignment, both to the smaller and to the more considerable portion, it is itself altogether different from what is assigned by it.

A loan with interest can be seen as a transfer, from the lender to the borrower, of a significant part of the yearly returns, with the understanding that the borrower will, during the life of the loan, annually give a small part back to the lender, known as the interest; and at the end of the loan term, return a portion equal to what was originally transferred, called the repayment. Although money, whether in coins or notes, usually acts as the document of transfer for both the smaller and larger portions, it is entirely different from what is being transferred.

In proportion as that share of the annual produce which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined for replacing a capital, increases in any country, what is called the monied interest naturally increases with it. The increase of those particular capitals from which the owners wish to derive a revenue, without being at the trouble of employing them themselves, naturally accompanies the general increase of capitals; or, in other words, as stock increases, the quantity of stock to be lent at interest grows gradually greater and greater.

As the portion of the annual output that is set aside to replace capital increases in any country—whether it comes from the land or the work of laborers—the so-called monetary interest naturally rises as well. The growth of those specific capitals from which owners want to earn income without having to manage them directly typically goes hand in hand with the overall increase in capital. In other words, as the stock of capital grows, the amount of stock available to be lent at interest steadily increases.

As the quantity of stock to be lent at interest increases, the interest, or the price which must be paid for the use of that stock, necessarily diminishes, not only from those general causes which make the market price of things commonly diminish as their quantity increases, but from other causes which are peculiar to this particular case. As capitals increase in any country, the profits which can be made by employing them necessarily diminish. It becomes gradually more and more difficult to find within the country a profitable method of employing any new capital. There arises, in consequence, a competition between different capitals, the owner of one endeavouring to get possession of that employment which is occupied by another; but, upon most occasions, he can hope to justle that other out of this employment by no other means but by dealing upon more reasonable terms. He must not only sell what he deals in somewhat cheaper, but, in order to get it to sell, he must sometimes, too, buy it dearer. The demand for productive labour, by the increase of the funds which are destined for maintaining it, grows every day greater and greater. Labourers easily find employment; but the owners of capitals find it difficult to get labourers to employ. Their competition raises the wages of labour, and sinks the profits of stock. But when the profits which can be made by the use of a capital are in this manner diminished, as it were, at both ends, the price which can be paid for the use of it, that is, the rate of interest, must necessarily be diminished with them.

As the amount of stock available for lending at interest increases, the interest—essentially the price for using that stock—naturally goes down. This happens not only due to the general reasons that cause market prices to drop as supply goes up but also due to specific factors related to this situation. As capital grows in any country, the potential profits from investing that capital tend to decrease. It becomes increasingly harder to find a profitable way to invest any new capital within the country. This leads to competition among different capital owners, each trying to acquire the work that another one is currently handling; however, most of the time, they can only hope to outbid each other by offering better terms. They need to sell their goods a bit cheaper, and to sell them at all, they sometimes have to buy them at higher prices. The demand for productive labor increases daily as the funds earmarked for maintaining it grow. Workers can easily find jobs, but capital owners struggle to find workers to hire. This competition boosts wages while reducing profit margins for capital. When profits from using capital drop at both ends, the rate they can offer for its use, which is the interest rate, must also decrease accordingly.

Mr Locke, Mr Lawe, and Mr Montesquieu, as well as many other writers, seem to have imagined that the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, in consequence of the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, was the real cause of the lowering of the rate of interest through the greater part of Europe. Those metals, they say, having become of less value themselves, the use of any particular portion of them necessarily became of less value too, and, consequently, the price which could be paid for it. This notion, which at first sight seems so plausible, has been so fully exposed by Mr Hume, that it is, perhaps, unnecessary to say any thing more about it. The following very short and plain argument, however, may serve to explain more distinctly the fallacy which seems to have misled those gentlemen.

Mr. Locke, Mr. Lawe, and Mr. Montesquieu, along with many other writers, appear to believe that the increase in gold and silver due to the discovery of the Spanish West Indies was the main reason for the decline in interest rates across much of Europe. They argue that as these metals became less valuable, the use of any specific amount of them also became less valuable, which in turn lowered the price that could be paid for it. This idea, which initially seems reasonable, has been thoroughly challenged by Mr. Hume, so it might be unnecessary to discuss it further. However, the following very brief and straightforward argument may help clarify the fallacy that seems to have misled those thinkers.

Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, ten per cent. seems to have been the common rate of interest through the greater part of Europe. It has since that time, in different countries, sunk to six, five, four, and three per cent. Let us suppose, that in every particular country the value of silver has sunk precisely in the same proportion as the rate of interest; and that in those countries, for example, where interest has been reduced from ten to five per cent. the same quantity of silver can now purchase just half the quantity of goods which it could have purchased before. This supposition will not, I believe, be found anywhere agreeable to the truth; but it is the most favourable to the opinion which we are going to examine; and, even upon this supposition, it is utterly impossible that the lowering of the value of silver could have the smallest tendency to lower the rate of interest. If £100 are in those countries now of no more value than £50 were then, £10 must now be of no more value than £5 were then.[Pg 146] Whatever were the causes which lowered the value of the capital, the same must necessarily have lowered that of the interest, and exactly in the same proportion. The proportion between the value of the capital and that of the interest must have remained the same, though the rate had never been altered. By altering the rate, on the contrary, the proportion between those two values is necessarily altered. If L.100 now are worth no more than L.50 were then, L.5 now can be worth no more than L.2, 10s. were then. By reducing the rate of interest, therefore, from ten to five per cent. we give for the use of a capital, which is supposed to be equal to one half of its former value, an interest which is equal to one fourth only of the value of the former interest.

Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, a 10% interest rate was common throughout most of Europe. Since then, it has dropped in various countries to 6%, 5%, 4%, and even 3%. Let’s say that in every country, the value of silver has decreased exactly in line with the interest rate. In those countries, for example, where the rate has gone from 10% to 5%, the same amount of silver can now buy just half the amount of goods it could before. This assumption probably doesn't match reality, but it's the most favorable to the idea we're about to discuss. Even with this assumption, it’s completely impossible that the decline in the value of silver would have any effect on lowering the interest rate. If £100 in those countries is now worth no more than £50 was back then, then £10 must now be worth no more than £5 was then. Whatever the reasons that reduced the value of capital, the same must have reduced the value of interest, and in exactly the same proportion. The relationship between the value of capital and interest must have stayed the same, even if the rate never changed. On the other hand, if we change the rate, the relationship between those two values is necessarily changed. If £100 now has the same value as £50 did then, £5 now can’t be worth more than £2.10. By lowering the interest rate from 10% to 5%, we offer an interest for capital that is supposed to be equal to half its previous value, which is only one-fourth of the previous interest's value. [Pg 146]

An increase in the quantity of silver, while that of the commodities circulated by means of it remained the same, could have no other effect than to diminish the value of that metal. The nominal value of all sorts of goods would be greater, but their real value would be precisely the same as before. They would be exchanged for a greater number of pieces of silver; but the quantity of labour which they could command, the number of people whom they could maintain and employ, would be precisely the same. The capital of the country would be the same, though a greater number of pieces might be requisite for conveying any equal portion of it from one hand to another. The deeds of assignment, like the conveyances of a verbose attorney, would be more cumbersome; but the thing assigned would be precisely the same as before, and could produce only the same effects. The funds for maintaining productive labour being the same, the demand for it would be the same. Its price or wages, therefore, though nominally greater, would really be the same. They would be paid in a greater number of pieces of silver, but they would purchase only the same quantity of goods. The profits of stock would be the same, both nominally and really. The wages of labour are commonly computed by the quantity of silver which is paid to the labourer. When that is increased, therefore, his wages appear to be increased, though they may sometimes be no greater than before. But the profits of stock are not computed by the number of pieces of silver with which they are paid, but by the proportion which those pieces bear to the whole capital employed. Thus, in a particular country, 5s. a-week are said to be the common wages of labour, and ten per cent. the common profits of stock; but the whole capital of the country being the same as before, the competition between the different capitals of individuals into which it was divided would likewise be the same. They would all trade with the same advantages and disadvantages. The common proportion between capital and profit, therefore, would be the same, and consequently the common interest of money; what can commonly be given for the use of money being necessarily regulated by what can commonly be made by the use of it.

An increase in the amount of silver, while the quantity of goods exchanged with it stays the same, would only lower the value of that metal. The listed price of all types of goods would go up, but their actual value would remain the same as before. They would be traded for more pieces of silver, but the amount of labor they could command and the number of people they could support and employ would be unchanged. The country's total capital would not change, although more silver pieces might be needed to transfer the same portion from one person to another. The paperwork would be more cumbersome, much like the lengthy documents of an overzealous lawyer, but the actual goods involved would be the same and could yield the same results. Since the funds for maintaining productive labor wouldn't change, the demand for labor wouldn't change either. Therefore, while wages might look higher nominally, the real amount would stay the same. Workers would receive more pieces of silver, but they would only buy the same quantity of goods as before. The profits from investments would remain the same, both in name and in reality. Wages are typically calculated based on how much silver is paid to workers. So when that amount increases, it might seem like their wages have gone up, even if they haven't changed much. However, investment profits are not calculated by the number of silver pieces paid but by how those pieces compare to the total capital used. So, in a given country, if labor is typically paid 5 shillings a week and investment profits are around ten percent, but the total capital remains unchanged, the competition among the different investors would remain the same. They would all operate with the same advantages and disadvantages. Thus, the general ratio of capital to profit would stay constant, and as a result, the general interest rate for borrowing money would also stabilize, since what one can typically earn from using money determines how much can be charged for its use.

Any increase in the quantity of commodities annually circulated within the country, while that of the money which circulated them remained the same, would, on the contrary, produce many other important effects, besides that of raising the value of the money. The capital of the country, though it might nominally be the same, would really be augmented. It might continue to be expressed by the same quantity of money, but it would command a greater quantity of labour. The quantity of productive labour which it could maintain and employ would be increased, and consequently the demand for that labour. Its wages would naturally rise with the demand, and yet might appear to sink. They might be paid with a smaller quantity of money, but that smaller quantity might purchase a greater quantity of goods than a greater had done before. The profits of stock would be diminished, both really and in appearance. The whole capital of the country being augmented, the competition between the different capitals of which it was composed would naturally be augmented along with it. The owners of those particular capitals would be obliged to content themselves with a smaller proportion of the produce of that labour which their respective capitals employed. The interest of money, keeping pace always with the profits of stock, might, in this manner, be greatly diminished, though the value of money, or the quantity of goods which any particular sum could purchase, was greatly augmented.

Any increase in the number of goods circulated within the country each year, while the amount of money circulating them stayed the same, would actually lead to many other significant effects, in addition to increasing the value of the money. The overall capital of the country, while it might seem unchanged, would actually be higher. It could still be represented by the same amount of money, but it would be able to purchase more labor. The amount of productive labor it could sustain and utilize would grow, which in turn would increase the demand for that labor. Its wages would naturally rise with the demand, yet they might seem to fall. Workers might be paid with a smaller amount of money, but that smaller amount could buy more goods than a larger amount could before. The profits from investments would decrease, both genuinely and superficially. With the total capital of the country increasing, the competition among the various capitals would naturally rise as well. Owners of those specific capitals would have to settle for a smaller share of the output from the labor their respective capitals utilized. The interest on money, always matching the profits from investments, could be significantly reduced in this way, even though the value of money, or the amount of goods that a specific sum could buy, was greatly increased.

In some countries the interest of money has been prohibited by law. But as something can everywhere be made by the use of money, something ought everywhere to be paid for the use of it. This regulation, instead of preventing, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury. The debtor being obliged to pay, not only for the use of the money, but for the risk which his creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use, he is obliged, if one may say so, to insure his creditor from the penalties of usury.

In some countries, charging interest on money has been made illegal. However, since money can be used everywhere for various purposes, there should be some form of payment for its use. This law, instead of stopping usury, has actually been shown to make it worse. The borrower has to pay not only for using the money but also for the risk that the lender takes by agreeing to that payment; in a way, the borrower has to protect the lender from the penalties associated with usury.

In countries where interest is permitted, the law in order to prevent the extortion of usury, generally fixes the highest rate which can be taken without incurring a penalty. This rate ought always to be somewhat above the lowest market price, or the price which is commonly paid for the use of money by those who can give the most undoubted security. If this legal rate should be fixed below the lowest market rate, the effects of this fixation must be nearly the same as those of a total prohibition of interest. The creditor will not lend his money for less than the use of it is worth, and the debtor must pay him for the risk which he runs by accepting the full va[Pg 147]lue of that use. If it is fixed precisely at the lowest market price, it ruins, with honest people who respect the laws of their country, the credit of all those who cannot give the very best security, and obliges them to have recourse to exorbitant usurers. In a country such as Great Britain, where money is lent to government at three per cent. and to private people, upon good security, at four and four and a-half, the present legal rate, five per cent. is perhaps as proper as any.

In countries where interest is allowed, the law generally sets a maximum interest rate to prevent the exploitation of usury. This rate should always be a bit higher than the lowest market rate, or the rate commonly paid for borrowing money by those who can provide solid security. If this legal rate is set below the lowest market rate, the impact will be nearly the same as completely banning interest. The lender won't lend their money for less than it's worth, and the borrower must compensate them for the risk they take by accepting the full value of that loan. If the rate is set exactly at the lowest market price, it undermines the credit of honest individuals who follow the law and harms those who can't provide the best security, forcing them to turn to outrageous usurers. In a country like Great Britain, where the government borrows money at three percent and private individuals with good security at four to four and a half percent, the current legal rate of five percent is probably as reasonable as it gets.

The legal rate, it is to be observed, though it ought to be somewhat above, ought not to be much above the lowest market rate. If the legal rate of interest in Great Britain, for example, was fixed so high as eight or ten per cent. the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it. Where the legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is fixed but a very little above the lowest market rate, sober people are universally preferred, as borrowers, to prodigals and projectors. The person who lends money gets nearly as much interest from the former as he dares to take from the latter, and his money is much safer in the hands of the one set of people than in those of the other. A great part of the capital of the country is thus thrown into the hands in which it is most likely to be employed with advantage.

The legal interest rate should be somewhat above the lowest market rate, but not by much. For instance, if the legal interest rate in Great Britain were set at eight or ten percent, most of the money available for loans would go to spendthrifts and risky projects, as they would be the only ones willing to pay that high interest. Responsible borrowers, who would only pay a fraction of what they expect to earn from the money, would shy away from competing. This would mean that a significant amount of the country’s capital would be kept away from those who could use it most effectively and instead handed over to those likely to waste it. Conversely, when the legal interest rate is set just slightly above the lowest market rate, responsible individuals become the preferred borrowers over spendthrifts and risky projectors. Lenders earn nearly as much interest from these responsible borrowers as they could from the others, and their money is far safer with them. As a result, a large portion of the country’s capital ends up in the hands of those most likely to use it effectively.

No law can reduce the common rate of interest below the lowest ordinary market rate at the time when that law is made. Notwithstanding the edict of 1766, by which the French king attempted to reduce the rate of interest from five to four per cent. money continued to be lent in France at five per cent. the law being evaded in several different ways.

No law can lower the general interest rate below the lowest typical market rate when that law is enacted. Despite the decree of 1766, in which the French king tried to cut the interest rate from five to four percent, money was still lent in France at five percent, as people found various ways to get around the law.

The ordinary market price of land, it is to be observed, depends everywhere upon the ordinary market rate of interest. The person who has a capital from which he wishes to derive a revenue, without taking the trouble to employ it himself, deliberates whether he should buy land with it, or lend it out at interest. The superior security of land, together with some other advantages which almost everywhere attend upon this species of property, will generally dispose him to content himself with a smaller revenue from land, than what he might have by lending out his money at interest. These advantages are sufficient to compensate a certain difference of revenue; but they will compensate a certain difference only; and if the rent of land should fall short of the interest of money by a greater difference, nobody would buy land, which would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the contrary, if the advantages should much more than compensate the difference, everybody would buy land, which again would soon raise its ordinary price. When interest was at ten per cent. land was commonly sold for ten or twelve years purchase. As interest sunk to six, five, and four per cent. the price of land rose to twenty, five-and-twenty, and thirty years purchase. The market rate of interest is higher in France than in England, and the common price of land is lower. In England it commonly sells at thirty, in France at twenty years purchase.

The typical market price of land, it should be noted, depends on the usual market interest rate everywhere. A person who has capital and wants to earn income without the hassle of managing it themselves considers whether to buy land or lend it out at interest. The greater security of land, along with other benefits that usually come with this type of property, often leads them to settle for a lower income from land than they could earn by lending their money at interest. These benefits are enough to make up for a certain difference in revenue, but they will only compensate for a specific amount. If the rent from land is significantly lower than the interest on money, no one would buy land, which would quickly lower its average price. Conversely, if the benefits greatly outweigh the difference, everyone would buy land, which would soon increase its average price. When interest was at ten percent, land was typically sold for ten or twelve years' worth of purchases. As interest rates dropped to six, five, and four percent, the price of land increased to twenty, twenty-five, and thirty years' worth of purchases. The market interest rate is higher in France than in England, and the typical price of land is lower. In England, it usually sells for thirty years' worth of purchases, while in France, it is at twenty years' worth.


CHAP. V.

OF THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF CAPITALS.

Though all capitals are destined for the maintenance of productive labour only, yet the quantity of that labour which equal capitals are capable of putting into motion, varies extremely according to the diversity of their employment; as does likewise the value which that employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

Though all capitals are meant for supporting productive work only, the amount of work that equal capitals can generate varies greatly depending on how they're used; the value that this use adds to the yearly output of the land and labor in the country also differs significantly.

A capital may be employed in four different ways; either, first, in procuring the rude produce annually required for the use and consumption of the society; or, secondly, in manufacturing and preparing that rude produce for immediate use and consumption; or, thirdly in transporting either the rude or manufactured produce from the places where they abound to those where they are wanted; or, lastly, in dividing particular portions of either into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who want them. In the first way are employed the capitals of all those who undertake improvement or cultivation of lands, mines, or fisheries; in the second, those of all master manufacturers; in the third, those of all wholesale merchants; and in the fourth, those of all retailers. It is difficult to conceive that a capital should be employed in any way which may not be classed under some one or other of these four.

A capital can be used in four different ways: first, to obtain the raw materials needed for society’s use and consumption; second, to manufacture and prepare those raw materials for immediate use; third, to transport either the raw or finished goods from locations where they are plentiful to areas where they are needed; or finally, to break down specific amounts of either into smaller portions that meet the occasional needs of buyers. The first category includes the capital of anyone engaged in improving or cultivating land, mines, or fisheries; the second includes the capital of all master manufacturers; the third pertains to the capital of all wholesale merchants; and the fourth relates to the capital of all retailers. It’s hard to imagine that capital could be used in a way that doesn’t fit into one of these four categories.

Each of those four methods of employing a capital is essentially necessary, either to the existence or extension of the other three, or to the general conveniency of the society.

Each of those four ways to use capital is basically essential, either for the existence or expansion of the other three, or for the overall convenience of society.

Unless a capital was employed in furnishing rude produce to a certain degree of abundance, neither manufactures nor trade of any kind could exist.

Unless capital was used to provide a certain amount of raw materials, neither manufacturing nor any type of trade could exist.

Unless a capital was employed in manufac[Pg 148]turing that part of the rude produce which requires a good deal of preparation before it can be fit for use and consumption, it either would never he produced, because there could be no demand for it; or if it was produced spontaneously, it would be of no value in exchange, and could add nothing to the wealth of the society.

Unless capital was invested in manufacturing that part of the raw materials which needs a lot of preparation before it can be used and consumed, it either wouldn't be produced because there would be no demand for it; or if it was produced naturally, it wouldn’t have any value in exchange and wouldn't contribute anything to the society's wealth.

Unless a capital was employed in transporting either the rude or manufactured produce from the places where it abounds to those where it is wanted, no more of either could be produced than was necessary for the consumption of the neighbourhood. The capital of the merchant exchanges the surplus produce of one place for that of another, and thus encourages the industry, and increases the enjoyments of both.

Unless capital is used to transport either raw or manufactured goods from areas where they are plentiful to where they are needed, no more of either can be produced than what is necessary for local consumption. The merchant's capital exchanges surplus goods from one location for those from another, promoting industry and enhancing the enjoyment for both.

Unless a capital was employed in breaking and dividing certain portions either of the rude or manufactured produce into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who want them, every man would be obliged to purchase a greater quantity of the goods he wanted than his immediate occasions required. If there was no such trade as a butcher, for example, every man would be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole sheep at a time. This would generally be inconvenient to the rich, and much more so to the poor. If a poor workman was obliged to purchase a month's or six months' provisions at a time, a great part of the stock which he employs as a capital in the instruments of his trade, or in the furniture of his shop, and which yields him a revenue, he would be forced to place in that part of his stock which is reserved for immediate consumption, and which yields him no revenue. Nothing can be more convenient for such a person than to be able to purchase his subsistence from day to day, or even from hour to hour, as he wants it. He is thereby enabled to employ almost his whole stock as a capital. He is thus enabled to furnish work to a greater value; and the profit which he makes by it in this way much more than compensates the additional price which the profit of the retailer imposes upon the goods. The prejudices of some political writers against shopkeepers and tradesmen are altogether without foundation. So far is it from being necessary either to tax them, or to restrict their numbers, that they can never be multiplied so as to hurt the public, though they may so as to hurt one another. The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can be sold in a particular town, is limited by the demand of that town and its neighbourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the grocery trade, cannot exceed what is sufficient to purchase that quantity. If this capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will tend to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one only; and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to raise the price, just so much the less. Their competition might, perhaps, ruin some of themselves; but to take care of this, is the business of the parties concerned, and it may safely be trusted to their discretion. It can never hurt either the consumer or the producer; on the contrary, it must tend to make the retailers both sell cheaper and buy dearer, than if the whole trade was monopolized by one or two persons. Some of them, perhaps, may sometimes decoy a weak customer to buy what he has no occasion for. This evil, however, is of too little importance to deserve the public attention, nor would it necessarily be prevented by restricting their numbers. It is not the multitude of alehouses, to give the most suspicious example, that occasions a general disposition to drunkenness among the common people; but that disposition, arising from other causes, necessarily gives employment to a multitude of alehouses.

Unless capital is used to break down and separate certain amounts of either raw or manufactured goods into smaller portions that meet the occasional needs of buyers, every person would have to buy more goods than they actually require at the moment. For instance, if there were no butchers, each person would have to buy an entire ox or sheep at once, which would usually be impractical for both the wealthy and especially the poor. If a poor worker had to buy enough food for a month or six months at a time, a significant part of their capital used for tools or shop furniture—things that generate income—would have to be allocated to immediate consumption instead, which doesn’t provide any return. It is much more beneficial for such an individual to purchase their necessities daily or even hourly as needed. This allows them to use nearly all of their stock as capital, enabling them to provide more valuable work, and the profits from this greatly outweigh the added cost brought on by a retailer's markup. The biases some political writers hold against shopkeepers and tradespeople are entirely unfounded. It's not necessary to tax or limit their numbers; they can’t grow to the point of harming the public, although they may compete with each other harmfully. The volume of grocery items that can be sold in a particular town is restricted by local demand. Therefore, the capital invested in the grocery business can't exceed what's needed to purchase that quantity. If this capital is split between two grocers, their competition will push them both to sell at lower prices than if only one held the business. If it were divided among twenty, the competition would increase even further, reducing the likelihood of them colluding to raise prices. Their competition might potentially put some of them out of business, but that’s a matter for them to manage, and it can be left to their judgment. It will never disadvantage either consumers or producers; on the contrary, it should make retailers sell for less and buy for more compared to a monopoly by one or two individuals. Some of them might occasionally lure a naive customer into buying something unnecessary, but that concern is minor and doesn’t warrant public scrutiny, nor would reducing their numbers solve it. It's not the abundance of bars, which is often cited as an example, that creates a general tendency towards drunkenness among the public; rather, that tendency arises from other sources and naturally leads to a high number of bars.

The persons whose capitals are employed in any of those four ways, are themselves productive labourers. Their labour, when properly directed, fixes and realizes itself in the subject or vendible commodity upon which it is bestowed, and generally adds to its price the value at least of their own maintenance and consumption. The profits of the farmer, of the manufacturer, of the merchant, and retailer, are all drawn from the price of the goods which the two first produce, and the two last buy and sell. Equal capitals, however, employed in each of those four different ways, will immediately put into motion very different quantities of productive labour; and augment, too, in very different proportions, the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the society to which they belong.

People whose investments are used in any of those four ways are themselves productive workers. Their work, when properly focused, is embedded in the item or sellable product on which it is applied and usually increases its price by at least the value of their own upkeep and consumption. The profits of farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and retailers all come from the price of the goods produced by the first two and bought and sold by the last two. However, equal investments used in each of those four different ways will immediately activate very different amounts of productive labor and will also increase the value of the annual output of the land and labor of the society they belong to in very different proportions.

The capital of the retailer replaces, together with its profits, that of the merchant of whom he purchases goods, and thereby enables him to continue his business. The retailer himself is the only productive labourer whom it immediately employs. In his profit consists the whole value which its employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society.

The retailer's capital, along with its profits, takes the place of the merchant from whom he buys goods, allowing the merchant to keep running his business. The retailer is the only productive worker that it directly employs. The entire value added to the annual output of the land and labor of society is found in his profit.

The capital of the wholesale merchant replaces, together with their profits, the capitals of the farmers and manufacturers of whom he purchases the rude and manufactured produce which he deals in, and thereby enables them to continue their respective trades. It is by this service chiefly that he contributes indirectly to support the productive labour of the society, and to increase the value of its annual produce. His capital employs, too, the sailors and carriers who transport his goods from one place to another; and it augments[Pg 149] the price of those goods by the value, not only of his profits, but of their wages. This is all the productive labour which it immediately puts into motion, and all the value which it immediately adds to the annual produce. Its operation in both these respects is a good deal superior to that of the capital of the retailer.

The capital of the wholesale merchant replaces, along with their profits, the capital of the farmers and manufacturers from whom he buys the raw and finished products he sells, enabling them to keep running their businesses. It is mainly through this service that he indirectly supports the productive labor of society and increases the value of its annual output. His capital also employs the sailors and carriers who move his goods from one place to another, and it raises the price of those goods by the value of not just his profits, but also their wages. This is the full extent of the productive labor it directly activates and all the value it immediately adds to the annual output. In both of these ways, it operates significantly better than the capital of the retailer.

Part of the capital of the master manufacturer is employed as a fixed capital in the instruments of his trade, and replaces, together with its profits, that of some other artificer of whom he purchases them. Part of his circulating capital is employed in purchasing materials, and replaces, with their profits, the capitals of the farmers and miners of whom he purchases them. But a great part of it is always, either annually, or in a much shorter period, distributed among the different workmen whom he employs. It augments the value of these materials by their wages, and by their masters' profits upon the whole stock of wages, materials, and instruments of trade employed in the business. It puts immediately into motion, therefore, a much greater quantity of productive labour, and adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society, than an equal capital in the hands of any wholesale merchant.

Part of the capital of the master manufacturer is used as fixed capital in the tools of his trade, and it replaces, along with its profits, that of other craftsmen from whom he buys them. Part of his circulating capital is used to purchase materials and replaces, with their profits, the capital of the farmers and miners from whom he buys them. However, a significant portion of it is always distributed among the various workers he employs, either annually or even more frequently. It increases the value of these materials through their wages, and through the profits of their employers on the overall stock of wages, materials, and trade tools used in the business. This, therefore, immediately activates a much larger quantity of productive labor and adds significantly greater value to the annual output of the land and labor of society than an equivalent capital in the hands of any wholesaler.

No equal capital puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour than that of the farmer. Not only his labouring servants, but his labouring cattle, are productive labourers. In agriculture, too, Nature labours along with man; and though her labour cost no expense, its produce has its value, as well as that of the must expensive workmen. The most important operations of agriculture seem intended, not so much to increase, though they do that too, as to direct the fertility of Nature towards the production of the plants must profitable to man. A field overgrown with briars and brambles, may frequently produce as great a quantity of vegetables as the best cultivated vineyard or corn field. Planting and tillage frequently regulate more than they animate the active fertility of Nature; and after all their labour, a great part of the work always remains to be done by her. The labourers and labouring cattle, therefore, employed in agriculture, not only occasion, like the workmen in manufactures, the reproduction of a value equal to their own consumption, or to the capital which employs them, together with its owner's profits, but of a much greater value. Over and above the capital of the farmer, and all its profits, they regularly occasion the reproduction of the rent of the landlord. This rent may be considered as the produce of those powers of Nature, the use of which the landlord lends to the farmer. It is greater or smaller, according to the supposed extent of those powers, or, in other words, according to the supposed natural or improved fertility of the land. It is the work of Nature which remains, after deducting or compensating every thing which can be regarded as the work of man. It is seldom less than a fourth, and frequently more than a third, of the whole produce. No equal quantity of productive labour employed in manufactures, can ever occasion so great reproduction. In them Nature does nothing; man does all; and the reproduction must always be in proportion to the strength of the agents that occasion it. The capital employed in agriculture, therefore, not only puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour than any equal capital employed in manufactures; but in proportion, too, to the quantity of productive labour which it employs, it adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways in which a capital can be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to society.

No capital generates a greater amount of productive labor than that of the farmer. Not only his hired workers but also his working animals contribute to productive labor. In agriculture, nature works alongside humans; and while her labor requires no cost, its output has value just like that of the most expensive workers. The main tasks in agriculture seem designed not just to boost yields—though they do that too—but to channel nature's fertility towards producing the plants that are most profitable for people. A field choked with weeds can often yield as much produce as a well-tended vineyard or grain field. Planting and cultivation often control more than they enhance nature's active fertility; and despite all their efforts, a significant portion of the work still relies on her. Thus, the workers and working animals employed in agriculture not only reproduce a value equal to their own consumption, or the capital that employs them, along with the owner's profits, but they create a value that is much greater. Beyond the farmer's capital and its profits, they consistently generate the landlord's rent. This rent can be viewed as the output of those natural resources that the landlord allows the farmer to use. It varies depending on the perceived extent of those resources, or in other words, the perceived natural or improved fertility of the land. It represents the work of nature after accounting for everything that can be considered as human labor. It is seldom less than a quarter and often more than a third of the total output. No equivalent amount of productive labor employed in manufacturing can ever produce such significant returns. In manufacturing, nature contributes nothing; humans do everything; and the output must always correlate with the strength of the agents driving it. Therefore, the capital used in agriculture not only mobilizes a larger quantity of productive labor than any equivalent capital in manufacturing but also, in proportion to the productive labor it employs, adds a much greater value to the annual output of the land and labor of the country, enhancing the real wealth and income of its people. Of all the ways in which capital can be utilized, it is by far the most beneficial to society.

The capitals employed in the agriculture and in the retail trade of any society, must always reside within that society. Their employment is confined almost to a precise spot, to the farm, and to the shop of the retailer. They must generally, too, though there are some exceptions to this, belong to resident members of the society.

The capital used in agriculture and retail trade in any society must always stay within that society. Its use is typically limited to specific locations, like farms and retail shops. Generally, these capitals should belong to local residents of the society, although there are some exceptions to this rule.

The capital of a wholesale merchant, on the contrary, seems to have no fixed or necessary residence anywhere, but may wander about from place to place, according as it can either buy cheap or sell dear.

The capital of a wholesale merchant, on the other hand, doesn't seem to have a fixed or required location but can move around from place to place, depending on where it can buy low or sell high.

The capital of the manufacturer must, no doubt, reside where the manufacture is carried on; but where this shall be, is not always necessarily determined. It may frequently be at a great distance, both from the place where the materials grow, and from that where the complete manufacture is consumed. Lyons is very distant, both from the places which afford the materials of its manufactures, and from those which consume them. The people of fashion in Sicily are clothed in silks made in other countries, from the materials which their own produces. Part of the wool of Spain is manufactured in Great Britain, and some part of that cloth is afterwards sent back to Spain.

The manufacturer's capital definitely needs to be located where production happens, but where that actually is isn't always clear. It can often be far away from both the source of the raw materials and the places where the finished products are used. For instance, Lyons is quite far from the areas that provide the raw materials for its products and from where those products are consumed. Fashionable people in Sicily wear silks made in other countries using raw materials from their own region. Part of Spain's wool is processed in Great Britain, and some of that fabric is later shipped back to Spain.

Whether the merchant whose capital exports the surplus produce of any society, be a native or a foreigner, is of very little importance. If he is a foreigner, the number of their productive labourers is necessarily less than if he had been a native, by one man only; and the value of their annual produce, by the profits of that one man. The sailors or carriers whom he employs, may still belong indifferently either to his country, or to their country, or to some third country, in the same manner as if he had been a native. The capital of a foreigner gives a value to their surplus produce equally with that of a native, by exchanging[Pg 150] it for something for which there is a demand at home. It as effectually replaces the capital of the person who produces that surplus, and as effectually enables him to continue his business, the service by which the capital of a wholesale merchant chiefly contributes to support the productive labour, and to augment the value of the annual produce of the society to which he belongs.

Whether the merchant who exports the extra produce of any society is a local or a foreigner doesn't really matter. If he is a foreigner, the number of local productive workers is just one less than if he were a local, along with the annual value of what that one worker produces. The sailors or transporters he hires can belong to his country, the local country, or any other country, just like if he were local. A foreigner’s capital provides value to the surplus produce just as effectively as a local’s does by exchanging it for something that is in demand at home. It equally replaces the capital of the person who produces that surplus and allows him to keep his business running, which is how the capital of a wholesale merchant mainly helps support productive labor and increase the overall value of the annual produce of the society he is part of.

It is of more consequence that the capital of the manufacturer should reside within the country. It necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour, and adds a greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. It may, however, be very useful to the country, though it should not reside within it. The capitals of the British manufacturers who work up the flax and hemp annually imported from the coasts of the Baltic, are surely very useful to the countries which produce them. Those materials are a part of the surplus produce of those countries, which, unless it was annually exchanged for something which is in demand there, would be of no value, and would soon cease to be produced. The merchants who export it, replace the capitals of the people who produce it, and thereby encourage them to continue the production; and the British manufacturers replace the capitals of those merchants.

It’s more important for a manufacturer’s capital to be within the country. This naturally activates more productive labor and adds greater value to the annual output of the society's land and labor. However, it can still be very beneficial for the country even if that capital isn’t located there. The capital of British manufacturers who process the flax and hemp that’s imported annually from the Baltic Sea coasts is definitely valuable to the countries that produce those materials. Those materials are part of the surplus goods from those countries, which, if not exchanged annually for something in demand there, would lose their value and eventually stop being produced. The merchants who export these goods replace the capital of the producers, encouraging them to keep producing, and the British manufacturers are replacing the capital of those merchants.

A particular country, in the same manner as a particular person, may frequently not have capital sufficient both to improve cultivate all its lands, to manufacture and prepare their whole rude produce for immediate use and consumption, and to transport the surplus part either of the rude or manufactured produce to those distant markets, where it can be exchanged for something for which there is a demand at home. The inhabitants of many different parts of Great Britain have not capital sufficient to improve and cultivate all their lands. The wool of the southern counties of Scotland is, a great part of it, after a long land carriage through very bad roads, manufactured in Yorkshire, for want of a capital to manufacture it at home. There are many little manufacturing towns in Great Britain, of which the inhabitants have not capital sufficient to transport the produce of their own industry to those distant markets where there is demand and consumption for it. If there are any merchants among them, they are, properly, only the agents of wealthier merchants who reside in some of the great commercial cities.

A specific country, just like a specific person, often doesn't have enough capital to improve and cultivate all its land, to process and prepare all their raw products for immediate use and consumption, and to transport the surplus of either raw or manufactured goods to distant markets where they can be exchanged for things that are in demand at home. The people in various regions of Great Britain lack sufficient capital to improve and cultivate all their land. Much of the wool from the southern counties of Scotland is transported over long distances on very poor roads to be processed in Yorkshire, simply because there isn't enough capital to process it locally. There are many small manufacturing towns in Great Britain whose residents can't afford to transport the products of their own industry to distant markets where there is demand for them. If there are any merchants among them, they are typically just agents for wealthier merchants who live in larger commercial cities.

When the capital of any country is not sufficient for all those three purposes, in proportion as a greater share of it is employed in agriculture, the greater will be the quantity of productive labour which it puts into motion within the country; as will likewise be the value which its employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. After agriculture, the capital employed in manufactures puts into motion the greatest quantity of productive labour, and adds the greatest value to the annual produce. That which is employed in the trade of exportation has the least effect of any of the three.

When a country's capital isn't enough for all three purposes, the more that capital is used in agriculture, the more productive labor it generates within the country. This also increases the value added to the annual output of the land and labor of society. After agriculture, capital used in manufacturing stimulates the most productive labor and adds the most value to the annual output. Capital used in export trade has the least impact of the three.

The country, indeed, which has not capital sufficient for all those three purposes, has not arrived at that degree of opulence for which it seems naturally destined. To attempt, however, prematurely, and with an insufficient capital, to do all the three, is certainly not the shortest way for a society, no more than it would be for an individual, to acquire a sufficient one. The capital of all the individuals of a nation has its limits, in the same manner as that of a single individual, and is capable of executing only certain purposes. The capital of all the individuals of a nation is increased in the same manner as that of a single individual, by their continually accumulating and adding to it whatever they save out of their revenue. It is likely to increase the fastest, therefore, when it is employed in the way that affords the greatest revenue to all the inhabitants of the country, as they will thus be enabled to make the greatest savings. But the revenue of all the inhabitants of the country is necessarily in proportion to the value of the annual produce of their land and labour.

A country that doesn't have enough capital for all three purposes hasn't reached the level of wealth it seems meant to achieve. However, trying to do all three too early with insufficient capital is definitely not the quickest way for a society, just as it wouldn’t be for an individual, to acquire enough capital. The combined capital of all individuals in a nation has its limits, just like that of a single person, and can only be used for certain purposes. The capital of all individuals in a nation grows in the same way as an individual’s capital does, by continually saving and adding what they can from their income. Therefore, it is likely to grow fastest when used in ways that generate the highest income for all the people in the country, enabling them to save more. However, the income of all the inhabitants is necessarily linked to the value of the annual output of their land and labor.

It has been the principal cause of the rapid progress of our American colonies towards wealth and greatness, that almost their whole capitals have hitherto been employed in agriculture. They have no manufactures, those household and coarser manufactures excepted, which necessarily accompany the progress of agriculture, and which are the work of the women and children in every private family. The greater part, both of the exportation and coasting trade of America, is carried on by the capitals of merchants who reside in Great Britain. Even the stores and warehouses from which goods are retailed in some provinces, particularly in Virginia and Maryland, belong many of them to merchants who reside in the mother country, and afford one of the few instances of the retail trade of a society being carried on by the capitals of those who are not resident members of it. Were the Americans, either by combination, or by any other sort of violence, to stop the importation of European manufactures, and, by thus giving a monopoly to such of their own countrymen as could manufacture the like goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into this employment, they would retard, instead of accelerating, the further increase in the value of their annual produce, and would obstruct, instead of promoting, the progress of their country towards real wealth and greatness. This would be still more the case, were they to attempt, in the same manner, to monopolize to themselves their whole exportation trade.[Pg 151]

The main reason for the quick growth of our American colonies into wealth and greatness is that nearly all their investments have been focused on agriculture. They don’t have manufacturing industries, aside from some basic household goods that typically develop alongside agriculture, made by women and children in each family. Most of the export and coastwise trade in America is run by merchants based in Great Britain. Even the stores and warehouses where goods are sold in some regions, especially Virginia and Maryland, are often owned by merchants living in the mother country, highlighting one of the few cases where retail trade is driven by the investments of non-residents. If the Americans were to unite or use any other means to halt the importation of European goods and give a monopoly to their fellow countrymen who could make similar products, diverting significant capital into this area, it would actually slow down the increase in the value of their annual output and hinder their country's growth towards genuine wealth and greatness. This would be even truer if they tried to monopolize their entire export trade in the same way.[Pg 151]

The course of human prosperity, indeed, seems scarce ever to have been of so long continuance as to enable any great country to acquire capital sufficient for all those three purposes; unless, perhaps, we give credit to the wonderful accounts of the wealth and cultivation of China, of those of ancient Egypt, and of the ancient state of Indostan. Even those three countries, the wealthiest, according to all accounts, that ever were in the world, are chiefly renowned for their superiority in agriculture and manufactures. They do not appear to have been eminent for foreign trade. The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious antipathy to the sea; a superstition nearly of the same kind prevails among the Indians; and the Chinese have never excelled in foreign commerce. The greater part of the surplus produce of all those three countries seems to have been always exported by foreigners, who gave in exchange for it something else, for which they found a demand there, frequently gold and silver.

The history of human prosperity really doesn’t seem to last long enough for any major country to gather enough resources for all three purposes; unless, of course, we take into account the impressive stories about the wealth and agriculture of China, ancient Egypt, and the old Indian states. Even those three countries, considered the richest ever in the world, are mainly known for their strengths in farming and manufacturing. They don’t seem to have stood out in foreign trade. The ancient Egyptians had a deep-seated fear of the sea; a similar belief exists among Indians, and the Chinese have never been great in international commerce. Most of the surplus products from all three countries appear to have always been exported by foreigners who traded something else in return, often gold and silver, that was in demand there.

It is thus that the same capital will in any country put into motion a greater or smaller quantity of productive labour, and add a greater or smaller value to the annual produce of its land and labour, according to the different proportions in which it is employed in agriculture, manufactures, and wholesale trade. The difference, too, is very great, according to the different sorts of wholesale trade in which any part of it is employed.

The same capital in any country will drive a greater or smaller amount of productive labor and contribute a greater or smaller value to the annual output of its land and labor, depending on how it is used in agriculture, manufacturing, and wholesale trade. The variation is also significant based on the different types of wholesale trade in which any part of it is utilized.

All wholesale trade, all buying in order to sell again by wholesale, may be reduced to three different sorts: the home trade, the foreign trade of consumption, and the carrying trade. The home trade is employed in purchasing in one part of the same country, and selling in another, the produce of the industry of that country. It comprehends both the inland and the coasting trade. The foreign trade of consumption is employed in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption. The carrying trade is employed in transacting the commerce of foreign countries, or in carrying the surplus produce of one to another.

All wholesale trade, or buying to sell again wholesale, can be divided into three different types: domestic trade, foreign trade for consumption, and transportation trade. Domestic trade involves buying products from one part of the country and selling them in another, using goods produced within that country. This includes both inland and coastal trade. Foreign trade for consumption involves buying foreign goods for use within the home country. Transportation trade involves handling the commerce of other countries or transporting surplus goods from one place to another.

The capital which is employed in purchasing in one part of the country, in order to sell in another, the produce of the industry of that country, generally replaces, by every such operation, two distinct capitals, that had both been employed in the agriculture or manufactures of that country, and thereby enables them to continue that employment. When it sends out from the residence of the merchant a certain value of commodities, it generally brings back in return at least an equal value of other commodities. When both are the produce of domestic industry, it necessarily replaces, by every such operation, two distinct capitals, which had both been employed in supporting productive labour, and thereby enables them to continue that support. The capital which sends Scotch manufactures to London, and brings back English corn and manufactures to Edinburgh, necessarily replaces, by every such operation, two British capitals, which had both been employed in the agriculture or manufactures of Great Britain.

The capital used to buy goods in one part of the country to sell in another, based on the country's industry, typically replaces two different capitals that were also used in the country's agriculture or manufacturing with every transaction, allowing those sectors to keep functioning. When a merchant ships a certain value of goods, they usually receive back at least an equal value of different goods in return. If both items come from domestic industry, each transaction replaces two distinct capitals, both of which support productive labor, enabling continued support. The capital that sends Scottish products to London and brings back English grain and goods to Edinburgh effectively replaces two British capitals that were used in the agriculture or manufacturing sectors of Great Britain.

The capital employed in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, when this purchase is made with the produce of domestic industry, replaces, too, by every such operation, two distinct capitals; but one of them only is employed in supporting domestic industry. The capital which sends British goods to Portugal, and brings back Portuguese goods to Great Britain, replaces, by every such operation, only one British capital. The other is a Portuguese one. Though the returns, therefore, of the foreign trade of consumption, should be as quick as those of the home trade, the capital employed in it will give but one half the encouragement to the industry or productive labour of the country.

The money spent on buying foreign goods for local use, when sourced from domestic production, essentially replaces two different types of capital with each transaction; however, only one of these supports domestic industry. The capital that sends British goods to Portugal and brings back Portuguese goods to Great Britain only replaces one British capital with each transaction. The other one is Portuguese. So, even if the returns from foreign trade of consumption are as fast as those from local trade, the capital used in it will provide only half the support to the industry or productive labor of the country.

But the returns of the foreign trade of consumption are very seldom so quick as those of the home trade. The returns of the home trade generally come in before the end of the year, and sometimes three or four times in the year. The returns of the foreign trade of consumption seldom come in before the end of the year, and sometimes not till after two or three years. A capital, therefore, employed in the home trade, will sometimes make twelve operations, or be sent out and returned twelve times, before a capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption has made one. If the capitals are equal, therefore, the one will give four-and-twenty times more encouragement and support to the industry of the country than the other.

But the returns from foreign trade are rarely as quick as those from domestic trade. The returns from domestic trade usually come in before the end of the year, and sometimes three or four times a year. The returns from foreign trade often don’t arrive until after the year ends, and sometimes not for two or three years. Therefore, capital invested in domestic trade can sometimes cycle through twelve transactions, or be sent out and returned twelve times, before a capital invested in foreign trade has completed just one. If the capitals are equal, then domestic trade will provide twenty-four times more support and encouragement to the country’s economy than foreign trade.

The foreign goods for home consumption may sometimes be purchased, not with the produce of domestic industry, but with some other foreign goods. These last, however, must have been purchased, either immediately with the produce of domestic industry, or with something else that had been purchased with it; for, the case of war and conquest excepted, foreign goods can never be acquired, but in exchange for something that had been produced at home, either immediately, or after two or more different exchanges. The effects, therefore, of a capital employed in such a round-about foreign trade of consumption, are, in every respect, the same as those of one employed in the most direct trade of the same kind, except that the final returns are likely to be still more distant, as they must depend upon the returns of two or three distinct foreign trades. If the hemp and flax of Riga are purchased with the tobacco of Virginia, which had been purchased with British manufactures, the merchant must wait for the returns of two distinct foreign trades, before he can employ the same capital in repurchasing a like quantity of British manufactures.[Pg 152] If the tobacco of Virginia had been purchased, not with British manufactures, but with the sugar and rum of Jamaica, which had been purchased with those manufactures, he must wait for the returns of three. If those two or three distinct foreign trades should happen to be carried on by two or three distinct merchants, of whom the second buys the goods imported by the first, and the third buys those imported by the second, in order to export them again, each merchant, indeed, will, in this case, receive the returns of his own capital more quickly; but the final returns of the whole capital employed in the trade will be just as slow as ever. Whether the whole capital employed in such a round-about trade belong to one merchant or to three, can make no difference with regard to the country, though it may with regard to the particular merchants. Three times a greater capital must in both cases be employed, in order to exchange a certain value of British manufactures for a certain quantity of flax and hemp, than would have been necessary, had the manufactures and the flax and hemp been directly exchanged for one another. The whole capital employed, therefore, in such a round-about foreign trade of consumption, will generally give less encouragement and support to the productive labour of the country, than an equal capital employed in a more direct trade of the same kind.

Foreign goods for domestic use can sometimes be bought not with products from local industries, but with other foreign goods. However, those goods must have been purchased either directly with local products or with something else that was bought with them. Except in cases of war and conquest, foreign goods can only be acquired in exchange for something that was produced domestically, either directly or through multiple exchanges. Therefore, the effect of capital used in such an indirect foreign trade of consumption is essentially the same as that used in the most straightforward trade of the same kind, except the final returns may be even more delayed, as they depend on the returns from two or three separate foreign trades. If the hemp and flax from Riga are bought with tobacco from Virginia, which was purchased with British goods, the merchant has to wait for returns from two different foreign trades before using the same capital to buy a similar amount of British goods. If the tobacco from Virginia was bought not with British goods, but with sugar and rum from Jamaica (which were bought with those goods), he'd need to wait for returns from three trades. If those two or three distinct foreign trades are handled by different merchants, where the second buys from the first and the third buys from the second before exporting again, each merchant will receive returns on their own capital more quickly; however, the overall returns on the total capital used in the trade will still be just as slow. Whether the entire capital employed in such an indirect trade belongs to one merchant or three makes no difference to the country, though it may affect the individual merchants. Three times the capital must be used in both cases to exchange a certain value of British goods for a specified amount of flax and hemp than would have been needed had the goods been directly exchanged for one another. Consequently, the total capital used in such an indirect foreign trade of consumption typically provides less support to the productive labor of the country than an equal amount of capital used in a more direct trade of the same type.[Pg 152]

Whatever be the foreign commodity with which the foreign goods for home consumption are purchased, it can occasion no essential difference, either in the nature of the trade, or in the encouragement and support which it can give to the productive labour of the country from which it is carried on. If they are purchased with the gold of Brazil, for example, or with the silver of Peru, this gold and silver, like the tobacco of Virginia, must have been purchased with something that either was the produce of the industry of the country, or that had been purchased with something else that was so. So far, therefore, as the productive labour of the country is concerned, the foreign trade of consumption, which is carried on by means of gold and silver, has all the advantages and all the inconveniences of any other equally round-about foreign trade of consumption; and will replace, just as fast, or just as slow, the capital which is immediately employed in supporting that productive labour. It seems even to have one advantage over any other equally round-about foreign trade. The transportation of those metals from one place to another, on account of their small bulk and great value, is less expensive than that of almost any other foreign goods of equal value. Their freight is much less, and their insurance not greater; and no goods, besides, are less liable to suffer by the carriage. An equal quantity of foreign goods, therefore, may frequently be purchased with a smaller quantity of the produce of domestic industry, by the intervention of gold and silver, than by that of any other foreign goods. The demand of the country may frequently, in this manner, be supplied more completely, and at a smaller expense, than in any other. Whether, by the continual exportation of those metals, a trade of this kind is likely to impoverish the country from which it is carried on in any other way, I shall have occasion to examine at great length hereafter.

Whatever foreign item is used to buy goods for home use, it doesn't create any significant difference in the nature of trade or in how much it supports the productive labor of the country involved. For instance, if these goods are bought with Brazil's gold or Peru's silver, that gold and silver, like Virginia's tobacco, must have been obtained by something that was either produced by the country's labor or was purchased using something that was produced. So, in terms of the country's productive labor, foreign trade conducted with gold and silver has the same advantages and disadvantages as any other similar type of foreign trade and will replenish, as quickly or as slowly, the capital that supports that productive labor. In fact, it seems to have one advantage over other equally indirect foreign trades. Since those metals are small yet valuable, transporting them is less expensive than moving almost any other foreign goods of the same value. Their shipping costs are lower, and their insurance costs are not higher; plus, these metals are less likely to be damaged during transport. Therefore, it’s often possible to buy a larger quantity of foreign goods with a smaller amount of domestic industry output through the use of gold and silver than through any other foreign goods. This means the country’s needs can often be met more completely and at a lower cost than through other means. Whether the ongoing export of these metals could harm the country that trades them in any other way is something I will examine in detail later on.

That part of the capital of any country which is employed in the carrying trade, is altogether withdrawn from supporting the productive labour of that particular country, to support that of some foreign countries. Though it may replace, by every operation, two distinct capitals, yet neither of them belongs to that particular country. The capital of the Dutch merchant, which carries the corn of Poland to Portugal, and brings back the fruits and wines of Portugal to Poland, replaces by every such operation two capitals, neither of which had been employed in supporting the productive labour of Holland; but one of them in supporting that of Poland, and the other that of Portugal. The profits only return regularly to Holland, and constitute the whole addition which this trade necessarily makes to the annual produce of the land and labour of that country. When, indeed, the carrying trade of any particular country is carried on with the ships and sailors of that country, that part of the capital employed in it which pays the freight is distributed among, and puts into motion, a certain number of productive labourers of that country. Almost all nations that have had any considerable share of the carrying trade have, in fact, carried it on in this manner. The trade itself has probably derived its name from it, the people of such countries being the carriers to other countries. It does not, however, seem essential to the nature of the trade that it should be so. A Dutch merchant may, for example, employ his capital in transacting the commerce of Poland and Portugal, by carrying part of the surplus produce of the one to the other, not in Dutch, but in British bottoms. It may be presumed, that he actually does so upon some particular occasions. It is upon this account, however, that the carrying trade has been supposed peculiarly advantageous to such a country as Great Britain, of which the defence and security depend upon the number of its sailors and shipping. But the same capital may employ as many sailors and shipping, either in the foreign trade of consumption, or even in the home trade, when carried on by coasting vessels, as it could in the carrying trade. The number of sailors and shipping which any particular capital can employ, does not depend upon the nature of the trade, but partly upon the bulk of the goods, in proportion to their value, and[Pg 153] partly upon the distance of the ports between which they are to be carried; chiefly upon the former of those two circumstances. The coal trade from Newcastle to London, for example, employs more shipping than all the carrying trade of England, though the ports are at no great distance. To force, therefore, by extraordinary encouragements, a larger share of the capital of any country into the carrying trade, than what would naturally go to it, will not always necessarily increase the shipping of that country.

That part of a country's capital used in shipping trade is entirely taken away from supporting the productive work of that country to support that of other countries. Even though every operation may replace two different capitals, neither belongs to that country. For example, the capital of a Dutch merchant who transports grain from Poland to Portugal and brings back fruits and wine to Poland replaces two capitals, neither of which has contributed to the productive work of Holland; one supports Poland's economy, and the other supports Portugal's. The profits only return to Holland and are the only increase this trade adds to that country's yearly output of land and labor. However, when a country’s shipping trade is operated with its own ships and sailors, the capital spent on freight is distributed among and activates a number of productive workers from that country. Most nations that have played a significant role in shipping trade have done it this way. The trade likely got its name from this, since the people of those countries act as carriers for others. However, it's not essential for the trade to operate this way. A Dutch merchant might, for instance, use his capital to do business between Poland and Portugal by shipping some of Poland's surplus to Portugal, not in Dutch ships, but in British ones. It can be assumed that he does this on certain occasions. For this reason, some believe the shipping trade is especially beneficial for a country like Great Britain, where defense and security rely on the number of sailors and ships. But the same capital can employ just as many sailors and ships in foreign trade or even in domestic trade when carried out by coastal vessels as it could in the shipping trade. The number of sailors and ships any specific capital can employ doesn’t depend on the nature of the trade, but partially on the volume of goods relative to their value, and partly on the distance between the ports involved; mostly on the first factor. For instance, the coal trade from Newcastle to London uses more shipping than all of England’s shipping trade, even though the ports are not far apart. Therefore, trying to push an unnatural amount of capital into the shipping trade through extra incentives won’t always increase the number of ships in that country.

The capital, therefore, employed in the home trade of any country, will generally give encouragement and support to a greater quantity of productive labour in that country, and increase the value of its annual produce, more than an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption; and the capital employed in this latter trade has, in both these respects, a still greater advantage over an equal capital employed in the carrying trade. The riches, and so far as power depends upon riches, the power of every country must always be in proportion to the value of its annual produce, the fund from which all taxes must ultimately be paid. But the great object of the political economy of every country, is to increase the riches and power of that country. It ought, therefore, to give no preference nor superior encouragement to the foreign trade of consumption above the home trade, nor to the carrying trade above either of the other two. It ought neither to force nor to allure into either of those two channels a greater share of the capital of the country, than what would naturally flow into them of its own accord.

The capital invested in the domestic trade of any country usually boosts a higher level of productive labor within that country and increases the value of its annual output more than an equivalent amount of capital in the foreign trade of consumption. Additionally, capital put into this latter type of trade has an even bigger advantage over the same amount used in the carrying trade. The wealth—and, to the extent that power is tied to wealth—the power of every country must always relate to the value of its annual output, which is the source from which all taxes will eventually be paid. However, the main goal of a country’s political economy is to increase its wealth and power. Therefore, it shouldn't favor or provide more support to foreign consumption trade over domestic trade, nor to the carrying trade over either of the other two. It shouldn't force or entice a larger share of the country’s capital into either of those two areas than what would naturally flow there on its own.

Each of those different branches of trade, however, is not only advantageous, but necessary and unavoidable, when the course of things, without any constraint or violence, naturally introduces it.

Each of those different branches of trade, however, is not just beneficial but also essential and inevitable when circumstances naturally bring it about without any force or pressure.

When the produce of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the demand of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad, and exchanged for something for which there is a demand at home. Without such exportation, a part of the productive labour of the country must cease, and the value of its annual produce diminish. The land and labour of Great Britain produce generally more corn, woollens, and hardware, than the demand of the home market requires. The surplus part of them, therefore, must be sent abroad, and exchanged for something for which there is a demand at home. It is only by means of such exportation, that this surplus can acquire a value sufficient to compensate the labour and expense of producing it. The neighbourhood of the sea-coast, and the banks of all navigable rivers, are advantageous situations for industry, only because they facilitate the exportation and exchange of such surplus produce for something else which is more in demand there.

When a specific industry produces more than the country needs, the excess has to be sent overseas and traded for items that are in demand locally. Without this export, some of the country's productive work would stop, and the overall value of what it produces each year would go down. Generally, the land and labor in Great Britain create more grain, textiles, and metal goods than the domestic market can use. So, that extra production has to be exported and traded for goods that are needed at home. It's only through this export process that the surplus can gain enough value to cover the labor and costs of making it. Areas near the coast and along navigable rivers are key locations for industries because they make it easier to export and trade this surplus for items that are more sought after there.

When the foreign goods which are thus purchased with the surplus produce of domestic industry exceed the demand of the home market, the surplus part of them must be sent abroad again, and exchanged for something more in demand at home. About 96,000 hogsheads of tobacco are annually purchased in Virginia and Maryland with a part of the surplus produce of British industry. But the demand of Great Britain does not require, perhaps, more than 14,000. If the remaining 82,000, therefore, could not be sent abroad, and exchanged for something more in demand at home, the importation of them must cease immediately, and with it the productive labour of all those inhabitants of Great Britain who are at present employed in preparing the goods with which these 82,000 hogsheads are annually purchased. Those goods, which are part of the produce of the land and labour of Great Britain, having no market at home, and being deprived of that which they had abroad, must cease to be produced. The most round-about foreign trade of consumption, therefore, may, upon some occasions, be as necessary for supporting the productive labour of the country, and the value of its annual produce, as the most direct.

When foreign goods purchased with the surplus output of local industry exceed the demand in the home market, the excess must be sent abroad again and traded for something more sought after at home. About 96,000 hogsheads of tobacco are bought each year in Virginia and Maryland with part of the surplus output of British industry. However, Great Britain probably only needs around 14,000. If the remaining 82,000 cannot be exported and traded for goods in demand at home, their import will have to stop immediately, along with the productive work of all those in Great Britain currently employed in preparing the goods with which these 82,000 hogsheads are purchased annually. Those goods, which are produced from the land and labor of Great Britain, will have no market at home and lose their outlet abroad, leading to a halt in their production. Therefore, even the most indirect foreign trade can sometimes be as crucial for supporting the country's productive labor and the overall value of its annual output as the most direct trade.

When the capital stock of any country is increased to such a degree that it cannot be all employed in supplying the consumption, and supporting the productive labour of that particular country, the surplus part of it naturally disgorges itself into the carrying trade, and is employed in performing the same offices to other countries. The carrying trade is the natural effect and symptom of great national wealth; but it does not seem to be the natural cause of it. Those statesmen who have been disposed to favour it with particular encouragement, seem to have mistaken the effect and symptom for the cause. Holland, in proportion to the extent of the land and the number of its inhabitants, by far the richest country in Europe, has accordingly the greatest share of the carrying trade of Europe. England, perhaps the second richest country of Europe, is likewise supposed to have a considerable share in it; though what commonly passes for the carrying trade of England will frequently, perhaps, be found to be no more than a round-about foreign trade of consumption. Such are, in a great measure, the trades which carry the goods of the East and West Indies and of America to the different European markets. Those goods are generally purchased, either immediately with the produce of British industry, or with something else which had been purchased with that produce, and the final returns of those trades are generally used or consumed in Great Britain. The trade which is carried on in British bottoms between the dif[Pg 154]ferent ports of the Mediterranean, and some trade of the same kind carried on by British merchants between the different parts of India, make, perhaps, the principal branches of what is properly the carrying trade of Great Britain.

When the capital stock of any country grows to the point where it can't all be used to meet local needs or support the country's productive labor, the excess naturally flows into the shipping trade and is used to serve other countries. The shipping trade is a natural result and indicator of significant national wealth; however, it doesn’t seem to be the primary cause of it. Some politicians who have pushed for special support for the shipping trade seem to have confused the result and indicator for the cause. Holland, being by far the richest country in Europe relative to its land size and population, also holds the largest share of Europe's shipping trade. England, which may be the second richest country in Europe, is believed to have a substantial share as well; however, what is commonly considered England's shipping trade often turns out to be simply a roundabout foreign trade of consumption. This mainly includes trades that transport goods from the East and West Indies and from America to various European markets. These goods are usually bought either directly with the output of British industry or with something else that was purchased with that output, and the final returns from these trades are typically used or consumed in Great Britain. The trade conducted on British ships between different ports in the Mediterranean, along with similar trade managed by British merchants across various parts of India, likely represents the main branches of what can be considered the real shipping trade of Great Britain.

The extent of the home trade, and of the capital which can be employed in it, is necessarily limited by the value of the surplus produce of all those distant places within the country which have occasion to exchange their respective productions with one another; that of the foreign trade of consumption, by the value of the surplus produce of the whole country, and of what can be purchased with it; that of the carrying trade, by the value of the surplus produce of all the different countries in the world. Its possible extent, therefore, is in a manner infinite in comparison of that of the other two, and is capable of absorbing the greatest capitals.

The scale of domestic trade, and the capital that can be invested in it, is inherently limited by the value of the excess products from all those remote areas in the country that need to exchange their respective goods with each other. The scope of foreign trade for consumption is limited by the value of the excess products of the entire country and what can be bought with it. The scale of the carrying trade is limited by the value of the excess products from all the various countries in the world. Its potential scope is virtually infinite compared to the other two and can take in the largest amounts of capital.

The consideration of his own private profit is the sole motive which determines the owner of any capital to employ it either in agriculture, in manufactures, or in some particular branch of the wholesale or retail trade. The different quantities of productive labour which it may put into motion, and the different values which it may add to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society, according as it is employed in one or other of those different ways, never enter into his thoughts. In countries, therefore, where agriculture is the most profitable of all employments, and farming and improving the most direct roads to a splendid fortune, the capitals of individuals will naturally be employed in the manner most advantageous to the whole society. The profits of agriculture, however, seem to have no superiority over those of other employments in any part of Europe. Projectors, indeed, in every corner of it, have, within these few years, amused the public with most magnificent accounts of the profits to be made by the cultivation and improvement of land. Without entering into any particular discussion of their calculations, a very simple observation may satisfy us that the result of them must be false. We see, every day, the most splendid fortunes, that have been acquired in the course of a single life, by trade and manufactures, frequently from a very small capital, sometimes from no capital. A single instance of such a fortune, acquired by agriculture in the same time, and from such a capital, has not, perhaps, occurred in Europe, during the course of the present century. In all the great countries of Europe, however, much good land still remains uncultivated; and the greater part of what is cultivated, is far from being improved to the degree of which it is capable. Agriculture, therefore, is almost everywhere capable of absorbing a much greater capital than has ever yet been employed in it. What circumstances in the policy of Europe have given the trades which are carried on in towns so great an advantage over that which is carried on in the country, that private persons frequently find it more for their advantage to employ their capitals in the most distant carrying trades of Asia and America, than in the improvement and cultivation of the most fertile fields in their own neighbourhood, I shall endeavour to explain at full length in the two following books.

The desire for personal profit is the only reason that drives a capital owner to invest in agriculture, manufacturing, or specific areas of wholesale or retail trade. The varying amounts of productive labor it can motivate and the different values it can add to the annual output of society’s land and labor, depending on how it is used, never cross his mind. Therefore, in countries where agriculture offers the highest profits and farming alongside developing direct routes leads to great wealth, individuals’ capitals will naturally be used in ways that benefit society as a whole. However, the profits from agriculture do not seem to exceed those of other ventures anywhere in Europe. Entrepreneurs across Europe have recently entertained the public with grand claims about the profits from cultivating and improving land. Without delving into their specific calculations, a straightforward observation makes it clear that their outcomes must be inaccurate. Every day, we see extraordinary fortunes made in a single lifetime through trade and manufacturing, often starting from a very small investment or sometimes none at all. There hasn’t been a single instance of a fortune made through agriculture in the same timeframe and with such an investment in Europe during this century. In all of Europe’s major countries, however, much good land remains uncultivated, and most of what is farmed is far from being developed to its full potential. Agriculture, therefore, nearly everywhere has the capacity to engage a much larger capital than what has ever been invested in it. I will attempt to explain the factors in Europe’s policies that have given trades operated in towns such a significant advantage over those in rural areas, causing private individuals to often find it more profitable to invest in distant trade with Asia and America than in enhancing and cultivating the most fertile fields nearby, in the following two books.


BOOK III.

OF THE DIFFERENT PROGRESS OF OPULENCE IN DIFFERENT NATIONS


CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF OPULENCE.

The great commerce of every civilized society is that carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of the country. It consists in the exchange of rude for manufactured produce, either immediately, or by the intervention of money, or of some sort of paper which represents money. The country supplies the town with the means of subsistence and the materials of manufacture. The town repays this supply, by sending back a part of the manufactured produce to the inhabitants of the country. The town, in which there neither is nor can be any reproduction of substances, may very properly be said to gain its whole wealth and subsistence from the country. We must not, however, upon this account, imagine that the gain of the town is the loss of the country. The gains of both are mutual and reciprocal, and the division of labour is in this, as in all other cases, advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various occupations into which it is subdivided. The inhabitants of the country purchase of the town a greater quantity of manufactured goods with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour, than they must have employed had they attempted to prepare them themselves. The town affords a market for the surplus produce of the country, or what is over and above the maintenance of the cultivators; and it is there that the inhabitants of the country exchange it for something else which is in demand among them. The greater the number and revenue of the inhabitants of the town, the more extensive is the market which it affords to those of the country; and the more extensive that market, it is always the more advantageous to a great number. The corn which grows within a mile of the town, sells there for the same price with that which comes from twenty miles distance. But the price of the latter must, generally, not only pay the expense of raising it and bringing it to market, but afford, too, the ordinary profits of agriculture to the farmer. The proprietors and cultivators of the country, therefore, which lies in the neighbourhood of the town, over and above the ordinary profits of agriculture, gain, in the price of what they sell, the whole value of the carriage of the like produce that is brought from more distant parts; and they save, besides, the whole value of this carriage in the price of what they buy. Compare the cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any considerable town, with that of those which lie at some distance from it, and you will easily satisfy yourself how much the country is benefited by the commerce of the town. Among all the absurd speculations that have been propagated concerning the balance of trade, it has never been pretended that either the country loses by its commerce with the town, or the town by that with the country which maintains it.

The main trade in any civilized society happens between the people in the town and those in the country. It's about exchanging raw materials for manufactured goods, either directly, through money, or through some paper that represents money. The country provides the town with food and materials needed for production. In return, the town sends back some of the manufactured goods to the country people. Since the town cannot produce raw materials itself, it essentially gets all its wealth and necessities from the country. However, we shouldn't think that the town's gain means a loss for the country. Both benefit from each other, and the division of labor is beneficial for everyone involved in the different jobs that come out of it. People in the country can buy more manufactured goods from the town with less of their own labor than if they tried to make those goods themselves. The town creates a market for the extra produce from the country, which is above what the farmers need to support themselves, allowing country people to trade it for items they want. The larger and wealthier the town's population, the bigger the market it provides for the country, and a bigger market is always better for many. Corn grown just a mile from the town sells at the same price as corn brought in from twenty miles away. However, the price of the latter has to cover not just the cost of growing it and transporting it to market, but also provide the farmer with a profit. Therefore, farmers near the town, in addition to the usual farming profits, get the full value of transporting produce from farther away in the prices they sell and save on transport costs for what they buy. If you compare farming close to a significant town with farming that’s farther away, you’ll see clearly how much the country benefits from the town's commerce. Among all the ridiculous theories about trade balances, no one has ever argued that the country loses from trading with the town, or that the town loses from trading with the country that supports it.

As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency and luxury, so the industry which procures the former, must necessarily be prior to that which ministers to the latter. The cultivation and improvement of the country, therefore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to the increase of the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency and luxury. It is the surplus produce of the country only, or what is over and above the maintenance of the cultivators, that constitutes the subsistence of the town, which can therefore increase only with the increase of the surplus produce. The town, indeed, may not always derive its whole subsistence from the country in its neighbourhood, or even from the territory to which it belongs, but from very distant countries; and this, though it forms no exception from the general rule, has occasioned considerable variations in the progress of opulence in different ages and nations.

Since basic needs come before convenience and luxury, the work that supplies those basic needs must come before the work that provides the latter. Therefore, the development and improvement of the land, which supports basic needs, must come before the growth of the town, which only offers convenience and luxury. The town's subsistence is made up solely of the excess produce from the land, or what is left after taking care of the needs of the farmers, meaning it can only grow as the surplus produce increases. The town may not always get all its subsistence from the nearby land or even from its own territory, but rather from far-off places; this, while not an exception to the general rule, has led to significant differences in wealth over various times and cultures.

That order of things which necessity imposes, in general, though not in every particu[Pg 156]lar country, is in every particular country promoted by the natural inclinations of man. If human institutions had never thwarted those natural inclinations, the towns could nowhere have increased beyond what the improvement and cultivation of the territory in which they were situated could support; till such time, at least, as the whole of that territory was completely cultivated and improved. Upon equal, or nearly equal profits, most men will choose to employ their capitals, rather in the improvement and cultivation of land, than either in manufactures or in foreign trade. The man who employs his capital in land, has it more under his view and command; and his fortune is much less liable to accidents than that of the trader, who is obliged frequently to commit it, not only to the winds and the waves, but to the more uncertain elements of human folly and injustice, by giving great credits, in distant countries, to men with whose character and situation he can seldom be thoroughly acquainted. The capital of the landlord, on the contrary, which is fixed in the improvement of his land, seems to be as well secured as the nature of human affairs can admit of. The beauty of the country, besides, the pleasure of a country life, the tranquillity of mind which it promises, and, wherever the injustice of human laws does not disturb it, the independency which it really affords, have charms that, more or less, attract everybody; and as to cultivate the ground was the original destination of man, so, in every stage of his existence, he seems to retain a predilection for this primitive employment.

The order of things that necessity creates, in general, though not in every specific country, is supported in each country by the natural inclinations of people. If human systems had never interfered with these natural inclinations, towns couldn't have grown beyond what the development and farming of the land they were on could sustain; at least, not until the entire land was fully developed and cultivated. When the profits are equal or nearly equal, most people prefer to invest their money in improving and farming land rather than in manufacturing or foreign trade. A person who invests in land has more control and oversight over it, and their wealth is much less at risk than that of a trader, who often has to trust not only the unpredictable forces of nature but also the less reliable aspects of human behavior and injustice, by extending large credits in distant locations to people whose character and circumstances he can rarely know well. In contrast, the landlord’s capital, which is tied to the improvement of the land, seems to be as secure as can be in the nature of human affairs. The beauty of the countryside, the enjoyment of rural life, the peace of mind it offers, and, where human laws don’t cause issues, the independence it truly provides, all have a charm that appeals to everyone to some degree; and just as farming was humanity's original purpose, people seem to maintain a preference for this fundamental activity in every stage of their lives.

Without the assistance of some artificers, indeed, the cultivation of land cannot be carried on, but with great inconveniency and continual interruption. Smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights and ploughwrights, masons and bricklayers, tanners, shoemakers, and tailors, are people whose service the farmer has frequent occasion for. Such artificers, too, stand occasionally in need of the assistance of one another; and as their residence is not, like that of the farmer, necessarily tied down to a precise spot, they naturally settle in the neighbourhood of one another, and thus form a small town or village. The butcher, the brewer, and the baker, soon join them, together with many other artificers and retailers, necessary or useful for supplying their occasional wants, and who contribute still further to augment the town. The inhabitants of the town, and those of the country, are mutually the servants of one another. The town is a continual fair or market, to which the inhabitants of the country resort, in order to exchange their rude for manufactured produce. It is this commerce which supplies the inhabitants of the town, both with the materials of their work, and the means of their subsistence. The quantity of the finished work which they sell to the inhabitants of the country, necessarily regulates the quantity of the materials and provisions which they buy. Neither their employment nor subsistence, therefore, can augment, but in proportion to the augmentation of the demand from the country for finished work; and this demand can augment only in proportion to the extension of improvement and cultivation. Had human institutions, therefore, never disturbed the natural course of things, the progressive wealth and increase of the towns would, in every political society, be consequential, and in proportion to the improvement and cultivation of the territory or country.

Without the help of some skilled workers, farming can’t really happen without serious hassle and constant interruptions. Blacksmiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, plow makers, masons, bricklayers, tanners, shoemakers, and tailors are all people that farmers rely on frequently. These skilled workers also need each other's help now and then; because they aren't tied to a specific location like farmers, they tend to settle close to each other, forming a small town or village. Soon, butchers, brewers, bakers, and many other skilled workers and retailers join them, providing essential or useful items for their occasional needs, which helps the town grow even more. The town's residents and the farmers are essentially each other’s helpers. The town functions like a constant market where country folks come to trade their raw goods for manufactured products. This trade provides town residents with both materials for their work and a way to make a living. The amount of finished goods they sell to country residents naturally determines how much material and food they need to buy. So, neither their work nor their income can grow unless there’s an increased demand from the countryside for finished products, and this demand can only increase in line with the expansion of improvement and farming. If human systems had never disrupted the natural flow of things, the growth in wealth and size of towns would naturally follow and correlate with the improvement and cultivation of the surrounding land.

In our North American colonies, where uncultivated land is still to be had upon easy terms, no manufactures for distant sale have ever yet been established in any of their towns. When an artificer has acquired a little more stock than is necessary for carrying on his own business in supplying the neighbouring country, he does not, in North America, attempt to establish with it a manufacture for more distant sale, but employs it in the purchase and improvement of uncultivated land. From artificer he becomes planter; and neither the large wages nor the easy subsistence which that country affords to artificers, can bribe him rather to work for other people than for himself. He feels that an artificer is the servant of his customers, from whom he derives his subsistence; but that a planter who cultivates his own land, and derives his necessary subsistence from the labour of his own family, is really a master, and independent of all the world.

In our North American colonies, where there's still uncultivated land available at low prices, no manufacturing for distant sales has ever been set up in any of the towns. When a craftsman has saved up a bit more than what’s needed for his own business to serve the local area, he doesn’t try to create a manufacturing business for wider sales; instead, he invests it in buying and developing uncultivated land. He transitions from being a craftsman to a farmer, and neither the high wages nor the easy living that the country offers to craftsmen can convince him to work for others instead of himself. He understands that a craftsman is reliant on his customers for income, while a farmer who works his own land and supports his family through their labor is truly in charge and independent of everyone else.

In countries, on the contrary, where there is either no uncultivated land, or none that can be had upon easy terms, every artificer who has acquired more stock than he can employ in the occasional jobs of the neighbourhood, endeavours to prepare work for more distant sale. The smith erects some sort of iron, the weaver some sort of linen or woollen manufactory. Those different manufactures come, in process of time, to be gradually subdivided, and thereby improved and refined in a great variety of ways, which may easily be conceived, and which it is therefore unnecessary to explain any further.

In countries where there’s either no uncultivated land or where it’s hard to get, every craftsman who has more resources than he can use for local jobs tries to create products for sale in more distant markets. The blacksmith sets up some kind of ironworks, and the weaver establishes a linen or wool factory. Over time, these different industries become more specialized, leading to improvements and refinements in many ways that are easy to imagine, so there’s no need to explain any further.

In seeking for employment to a capital, manufactures are, upon equal or nearly equal profits, naturally preferred to foreign commerce, for the same reason that agriculture is naturally preferred to manufactures. As the capital of the landlord or farmer is more secure than that of the manufacturer, so the capital of the manufacturer, being at all times more within his view and command, is more secure than that of the foreign merchant. In every period, indeed, of every society, the surplus part both of the rude and manufactured produce, or that for which there is no demand at home, must be sent abroad, in order to be[Pg 157] exchanged for something for which there is some demand at home. But whether the capital which carries this surplus produce abroad be a foreign or a domestic one, is of very little importance. If the society has not acquired sufficient capital, both to cultivate all its lands, and to manufacture in the completest manner the whole of its rude produce, there is even a considerable advantage that the rude produce should be exported by a foreign capital, in order that the whole stock of the society may be employed in more useful purposes. The wealth of ancient Egypt, that of China and Indostan, sufficiently demonstrate that a nation may attain a very high degree of opulence, though the greater part of its exportation trade be carried on by foreigners. The progress of our North American and West Indian colonies, would have been much less rapid, had no capital but what belonged to themselves been employed in exporting their surplus produce.

In looking for investment opportunities, manufacturing is generally preferred over foreign trade when profits are roughly equal, just as agriculture is typically favored over manufacturing. The capital invested by landlords or farmers is considered more secure than that of manufacturers, and in turn, the manufacturer’s capital, which is always more visible and manageable, is safer than that of foreign merchants. Throughout every period of society, any surplus of raw or manufactured goods, or anything that isn’t in demand locally, must be exported to be exchanged for goods that are in demand at home. However, it doesn’t matter much whether the capital used to export this surplus comes from foreign sources or domestic ones. If a society hasn’t accumulated enough capital to fully utilize all its land and refine its raw products, it can actually be beneficial for foreign capital to handle the export of raw goods so that the domestic capital can be used for more productive purposes. The wealth of ancient Egypt, China, and India clearly shows that a nation can achieve significant prosperity, even if a large portion of its export trade is managed by foreign investors. The growth of our North American and West Indian colonies would have been much slower if only their own capital had been used to export their surplus goods.

According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and, last of all, to foreign commerce. This order of things is so very natural, that in every society that had any territory, it has always, I believe, been in some degree observed. Some of their lands must have been cultivated before any considerable towns could be established, and some sort of coarse industry of the manufacturing kind must have been carried on in those towns, before they could well think of employing themselves in foreign commerce.

According to the natural progression of things, most of the capital in any developing society is initially focused on agriculture, then on manufacturing, and finally on foreign trade. This sequence is so natural that, in every society with territory, it has always, I believe, been somewhat evident. Some of their land must have been cultivated before any significant towns could be established, and some basic manufacturing must have taken place in those towns before they could reasonably consider engaging in foreign commerce.

But though this natural order of things must have taken place in some degree in every such society, it has, in all the modern states of Europe, been in many respects entirely inverted. The foreign commerce of some of their cities has introduced all their finer manufactures, or such as were fit for distant sale; and manufactures and foreign commerce together have given birth to the principal improvements of agriculture. The manners and customs which the nature of their original government introduced, and which remained after that government was greatly altered, necessarily forced them into this unnatural and retrograde order.

But even though this natural order of things must have occurred to some extent in every society, it has been largely flipped in many ways in all the modern states of Europe. The foreign trade of some of their cities has brought in all their finer products, or those suitable for long-distance sale, and these industries combined with foreign trade have led to the main advancements in agriculture. The behaviors and traditions that the original government established, which persisted even after that government changed significantly, inevitably pushed them into this unnatural and backward order.


CHAP. II.

OF THE DISCOURAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ANCIENT STATE OF EUROPE, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

When the German and Scythian nations overran the western provinces of the Roman empire, the confusions which followed so great a revolution lasted for several centuries. The rapine and violence which the barbarians exercised against the ancient inhabitants, interrupted the commerce between the towns and the country. The towns were deserted, and the country was left uncultivated; and the western provinces of Europe, which had enjoyed a considerable degree of opulence under the Roman empire, sunk into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism. During the continuance of those confusions, the chiefs and principal leaders of those nations acquired, or usurped to themselves, the greater part of the lands of those countries. A great part of them was uncultivated; but no part of them, whether cultivated or uncultivated, was left without a proprietor. All of them were engrossed, and the greater part by a few great proprietors.

When the Germanic and Scythian tribes took over the western provinces of the Roman Empire, the chaos that followed this massive upheaval lasted for several centuries. The looting and violence inflicted by the barbarians on the local inhabitants disrupted trade between towns and the countryside. Towns became abandoned, and farmland was left untended, causing the western provinces of Europe, which had thrived during the Roman Empire, to descend into extreme poverty and barbarism. Throughout this period of turmoil, the leaders and chiefs of these tribes took over or claimed most of the land in those regions. Much of it was uncultivated, but none of it, whether farmed or not, remained without an owner. Every piece was claimed, mainly by a few large landowners.

This original engrossing of uncultivated lands, though a great, might have been but a transitory evil. They might soon have been divided again, and broke into small parcels, either by succession or by alienation. The law of primogeniture hindered them from being divided by succession; the introduction of entails prevented their being broke into small parcels by alienation.

This initial grabbing of uncultivated land, while significant, could have been just a temporary issue. They might have been divided up again and broken into smaller pieces, either through inheritance or selling. The law of primogeniture stopped them from being divided through inheritance; the introduction of entails prevented them from being split into smaller pieces through selling.

When land, like moveables, is considered as the means only of subsistence and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence and enjoyment may be supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law of succession, accordingly, took place among the Romans, who made no more distinction between elder and younger, between male and female, in the inheritance of lands, than we do in the distribution of moveables. But when land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one. In those disorderly times, every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace and their leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies, though not always at their first institution. That the power, and consequently the security of the monarchy, may not be weakened by division, it must descend entire to one of the[Pg 158] children. To which of them so important a preference shall be given, must be determined by some general rule, founded not upon the doubtful distinctions of personal merit, but upon some plain and evident difference which can admit of no dispute. Among the children of the same family there can be no indisputable differences but that of sex, and that of age. The male sex is universally preferred to the female; and when all other things are equal, the elder everywhere takes place of the younger. Hence the origin of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal succession.

When land is seen, like personal belongings, simply as a means of living and enjoyment, natural law divides it among all the children in the family, since each child's well-being is equally valued by the father. This natural law of inheritance was also applied by the Romans, who did not distinguish between older and younger, or between male and female, in the inheritance of land, just as we do not in the distribution of personal belongings. However, when land was viewed as not only a means of subsistence but also of power and protection, it was thought better for it to be passed down undivided to one person. In chaotic times, each major landowner acted like a small prince, with their tenants as subjects. They were the judge, and in some ways, the lawmaker for their tenants during peacetime, as well as their leader in war. They waged wars at their discretion, often against neighbors and sometimes against their own king. The safety of a landholding, and the protection its owner could provide to those living on it, depended on its size. Dividing it would lead to its ruin and make it vulnerable to being overrun by neighboring incursions. Thus, the principle of primogeniture developed over time in the inheritance of land, for the same reason it often appears in monarchies, although not always from the start. To maintain the power and security of a monarchy, it must be passed down intact to one of the children. Which child receives this significant advantage must be decided by a clear rule, based not on uncertain distinctions of personal merit, but on some obvious and indisputable difference. Among the children of the same family, the only indisputable differences are gender and age. Males are generally preferred over females; and when all else is equal, the older child takes precedence over the younger. This established the right of primogeniture and what is known as lineal succession.

Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more. In the present state of Europe, the proprietor of a single acre of land is as perfectly secure in his possession as the proprietor of 100,000. The right of primogeniture, however, still continues to be respected; and as of all institutions it is the fittest to support the pride of family distinctions, it is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing can be more contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children.

Laws often stay in place long after the situations that originally justified them are gone. Right now in Europe, owning just one acre of land is as secure as owning 100,000 acres. However, the right of primogeniture is still honored, and since it best supports the pride in family status, it's likely to last for many more centuries. In every other way, nothing is more harmful to a large family than a right that enriches one child while leaving all the others with nothing.

Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They were introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the law of primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original estate from being carried out of the proposed line, either by gift, or device, or alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its successive owners. They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their substitutions, nor fidei-commisses, bear any resemblance to entails, though some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the modern institution in the language and garb of those ancient ones.

Entails are the natural outcomes of the law of primogeniture. They were created to maintain a specific line of inheritance, which the law of primogeniture first introduced, and to prevent any part of the original estate from being taken out of the intended line, whether by gift, will, or sale; due to the mistakes or misfortunes of any of its successive owners. They were completely unknown to the Romans. Neither their substitutions nor fidei-commissis resemble entails, although some French lawyers have chosen to frame the modern concept in the terminology and style of those ancient practices.

When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not be unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the present state of Europe, when small as well as great estates derive their security from the laws of their country, nothing can be more completely absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it possesses; but that the property of the present generation should be restrained and regulated according to the the fancy of those who died, perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are still respected, through the greater part of Europe; in those countries, particularly, in which noble birth is a necessary qualification for the enjoyment either of civil or military honours. Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of their country; and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of their fellow-citizens, lest their poverty should render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have another. The common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them. In Scotland, more than one fifth, perhaps more one third part of the whole lands in the country, are at present supposed to be under strict entail.

When large land estates were like small kingdoms, it made sense to have entails. Similar to the fundamental laws of some monarchies, they often prevented the security of thousands from being jeopardized by the whims or recklessness of one person. But now in Europe, where both small and large estates find their security in the laws of the country, this idea is completely ridiculous. It rests on the most absurd assumption: that every generation doesn't have an equal right to the land and everything it holds, and that the property of the current generation should be limited by the wishes of those who died, maybe five hundred years ago. Nonetheless, entails are still recognized in much of Europe, especially in countries where noble birth is a requirement for holding civil or military honors. They are considered necessary to maintain this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the highest offices and honors in their country; and since this class has already taken one unfair advantage over their fellow citizens, it seems fair that they should have another, to prevent their poverty from being embarrassing. English common law is said to reject perpetuities, so they are more limited there than in any other European monarchy, although even England has them to some extent. In Scotland, more than one-fifth, possibly more than one-third, of all land is currently believed to be under strict entail.

Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner not only engrossed by particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again was as much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however, that a great proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times which gave birth to those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor was sufficiently employed in defending his own territories, or in extending his jurisdiction and authority over those of his neighbours. He had no leisure to attend to the cultivation and improvement of land. When the establishment of law and order afforded this leisure, he often wanted the inclination, and almost always the requisite abilities. If the expense of his house and person either equalled or exceeded his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no stock to employ in this manner. If he was an economist, he generally found it more profitable to employ his annual savings in new purchases than in the improvement of his old estate. To improve land with profit, like all other commercial projects, requires an exact attention to small savings and small gains, of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is very seldom capable. The situation of such a person naturally disposes him to attend rather to ornament, which pleases his fancy, than to profit, for which he has so little occasion. The elegance of his dress, of his equipage, of his house and household furniture, are objects which, from his infancy, he has been accustomed to have some anxiety about. The turn of mind which this habit naturally forms, follows him when he comes to think of the improvement of land. He embellishes, perhaps, four or five hundred acres in the neighbourhood of his house, at ten times the expense which the land is worth after all his improvements; and finds, that if he was to improve his whole estate in the same manner, and he has little taste for any other, he would be a bankrupt before he had finished the tenth part of it. There still remain, in both parts of the united kingdom, some great estates which have[Pg 159] continued, without interruption, in the hands of the same family since the times of feudal anarchy. Compare the present condition of those estates with the possessions of the small proprietors in their neighbourhood, and you will require no other argument to convince you how unfavourable such extensive property is to improvement.

Large areas of uncultivated land were not only taken over by specific families, but also the chance of dividing them up again was effectively eliminated forever. However, it's rare that a large landowner is also a significant developer. During the chaotic times that created those harsh institutions, the large landowner was busy defending his own lands or expanding his power and authority over his neighbors. He had no time to focus on cultivating and improving the land. When the establishment of law and order allowed for this free time, he often lacked the desire and almost always the necessary skills. If the costs of maintaining his household and lifestyle were equal to or greater than his income, which was often the case, he had no funds to invest in such improvements. If he was financially cautious, he generally found it more profitable to reinvest his annual savings into new acquisitions rather than into upgrading his existing estate. Improving land profitably, like any other business endeavor, requires careful attention to small savings and small profits, which someone born into wealth, even if naturally thrifty, rarely manages. The lifestyle of such an individual usually leads him to focus more on aesthetics, which please his tastes, rather than on profitability, which he has little need for. The style of his clothing, his vehicles, his home, and furnishings are matters that he has been concerned with since childhood. The mindset developed by this habit follows him when he considers land improvement. He might enhance, say, four or five hundred acres around his home, spending ten times what the land is worth even after all his enhancements, and realizes that if he attempted to improve his entire estate in the same way, he would be bankrupt before finishing even a small portion of it. There are still some large estates in both parts of the United Kingdom that have remained, without interruption, in the hands of the same family since the days of feudal disorder. Compare the current state of those estates with the possessions of smaller landowners nearby, and you won't need any other argument to see how detrimental such extensive property is to improvement.

If little improvement was to be expected from such great proprietors, still less was to be hoped for from those who occupied the land under them. In the ancient state of Europe, the occupiers of land were all tenants at will. They were all, or almost all, slaves, but their slavery was of a milder kind than that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our West Indian colonies. They were supposed to belong more directly to the land than to their master. They could, therefore, be sold with it, but not separately. They could marry, provided it was with the consent of their master; and he could not afterwards dissolve the marriage by selling the man and wife to different persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, he was liable to some penalty, though generally but to a small one. They were not, however, capable of acquiring property. Whatever they acquired was acquired to their master, and he could take it from them at pleasure. Whatever cultivation and improvement could be carried on by means of such slaves, was properly carried on by their master. It was at his expense. The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry, were all his. It was for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing but their daily maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself, therefore, that in this case occupied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own bondmen. This species of slavery still subsists in Russia, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, and other parts of Germany. It is only in the western and south-western provinces of Europe that it has gradually been abolished altogether.

If little improvement was expected from such large landowners, even less could be hoped for from those who worked the land beneath them. In the early state of Europe, land workers were all tenants at will. They were mostly slaves, but their slavery was a milder form than what was experienced in ancient Greece and Rome, or even in our West Indian colonies. They were seen as belonging more to the land than to their master. As a result, they could be sold with the land, but not separately. They could marry, as long as their master approved; and he couldn’t break them up by selling them to different people afterward. If he hurt or killed any of them, he could face some punishment, though usually just a small one. However, they weren't allowed to own property. Anything they obtained belonged to their master, who could take it from them anytime. Any farming or improvements done by these slaves were ultimately for their master’s benefit. The seeds, cattle, and farming tools all belonged to him. They could only earn enough to cover their daily needs. Therefore, it was really the landowner himself who occupied his own land, farming it with his own bonded workers. This type of slavery still exists in Russia, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, and other parts of Germany. It has only been gradually abolished in the western and southwestern regions of Europe.

But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great proprietors, they are least of all to be expected when they employ slaves for their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person who can acquire no property can have no other interest but to eat as much and to labour as little as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In ancient Italy, how much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable it became to the master, when is fell under the management of slaves, is remarked both by Pliny and Columella. In the time of Aristotle, it had not been much better in ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal republic described in the laws of Plato, to maintain 5000 idle men (the number of warriors supposed necessary for its defence), together with their women and servants, would require, he says, a territory of boundless extent and fertility, like the plains of Babylon.

But if we don’t expect significant improvements from large landowners, we definitely won’t see them when they use slaves as their workforce. History shows that while the labor of slaves seems cheap since it only requires their upkeep, in reality, it ends up being the most expensive. Someone who can’t own property has no motivation other than to eat as much as possible and work as little as they can. Any additional work they do just to cover their own needs can only be forced out of them through violence, not through any personal interest. In ancient Italy, both Pliny and Columella noted how the farming of grains declined and became unprofitable for the landowner when it was managed by slaves. During Aristotle’s time, it wasn’t much better in ancient Greece. When discussing the ideal republic in Plato's laws, he noted that to support 5,000 idle men (the number of soldiers imagined to be necessary for its defense), along with their women and servants, would require an incredibly vast and fertile land, like the plains of Babylon.

The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him to much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. The planting of sugar and tobacco can afford the expense of slave cultivation. The raising of corn, it seems, in the present times, cannot. In the English colonies, of which the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is done by freemen. The late resolution of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, to set at liberty all their negro slaves, may satisfy us that their number cannot be very great. Had they made any considerable part of their property, such a resolution could never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies, on the contrary, the whole work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a very great part of it. The profits of a sugar plantation in any of our West Indian colonies, are generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America; and the profits of a tobacco plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are superior to those of corn, as has already been observed. Both can afford the expense of slave cultivation, but sugar can afford it still better than tobacco. The number of negroes, accordingly, is much greater, in proportion to that of whites, in our sugar than in our tobacco colonies.

The pride of man makes him love to be in control, and nothing frustrates him more than having to lower himself to persuade those he sees as beneath him. Wherever the law allows and the nature of the work permits, he usually prefers to use slaves instead of free workers. Growing sugar and tobacco can cover the costs of using slaves, but apparently, corn cannot in today's economy. In the English colonies, where corn is the main product, most of the labor is done by free workers. The recent decision by the Quakers in Pennsylvania to free all their black slaves suggests that their numbers can’t be very large. If they were a significant part of their wealth, such a decision would never have been made. In our sugar colonies, however, all the labor is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies, a significant portion is as well. The profits from a sugar plantation in any of our West Indian colonies are generally much higher than those from any other type of farming known in either Europe or America; while the profits from a tobacco plantation, though less than those from sugar, are greater than those from corn, as previously mentioned. Both can sustain the costs of slave labor, but sugar is even more capable of doing so than tobacco. Consequently, the number of blacks is much higher in relation to the number of whites in our sugar colonies compared to our tobacco colonies.

To the slave cultivators of ancient times, gradually succeeded a species of farmers, known at present in France by the name of metayers. They are called in Latin Coloni Partiarii. They have been so long in disuse in England, that at present I know no English name for them. The proprietor furnished them with the seed, cattle, and instruments of husbandry, the whole stock, in short, necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce was divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after setting aside what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, which was restored to the proprietor, when the farmer either quitted or was turned out of the farm.

To the slave farmers of ancient times, a type of farmer emerged known today in France as metayers. In Latin, they are called Coloni Partiarii. They've been so rarely used in England that I currently don't know an English name for them. The owner provided them with seeds, animals, and farming tools—the entire setup needed for running the farm. The harvest was split evenly between the owner and the farmer, after allocating what was deemed necessary for maintaining the stock, which was returned to the owner when the farmer either left or was removed from the farm.

Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the expense of the proprietors, as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however, one very essential difference between them. Such tenants being freemen, are capable of acquiring property; and having a certain proportion of the produce of the land, they have a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order that their own proportion may be so. A slave,[Pg 160] on the contrary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance, consults his own ease, by making the land produce as little as possible over and above that maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account of this advantage, and partly upon account of the encroachments which the sovereigns, always jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their villains to make upon their authority, and which seem, at least, to have been such as rendered this species of servitude altogether inconvenient, that tenure in villanage gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. The time and manner, however, in which so important a revolution was brought about, is one of the most obscure points in modern history. The church of Rome claims great merit in it; and it is certain, that so early as the twelfth century, Alexander III. published a bull for the general emancipation of slaves. It seems, however, to have been rather a pious exhortation, than a law to which exact obedience was required from the faithful. Slavery continued to take place almost universally for several centuries afterwards, till it was gradually abolished by the joint operation of the two interests above mentioned; that of the proprietor on the one hand, and that of the sovereign on the other. A villain, enfranchised, and at the same time allowed to continue in possession of the land, having no stock of his own, could cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to him, and must therefore have been what the French call a metayer.

Land occupied by these tenants is properly cultivated at the expense of the owners, just like the land occupied by slaves. However, there’s one significant difference between them. These tenants, being free individuals, can acquire property, and since they receive a share of the land's produce, they have a direct interest in maximizing the overall yield to increase their own share. A slave, on the other hand, who can only secure his basic needs, has an incentive to minimize production beyond what is necessary for his sustenance. This advantage, along with the encroachments encouraged by rulers who were always wary of the powerful lords, seems to have made this form of servitude increasingly unworkable, leading to the gradual decline of serfdom across much of Europe. The precise timing and manner of this significant shift are among the more obscure aspects of modern history. The Roman Church claims considerable credit for it, and it is true that as early as the twelfth century, Pope Alexander III issued a decree advocating for the general emancipation of slaves. However, it appears to have been more of a pious appeal than a law to which strict compliance was expected from the faithful. Slavery persisted almost universally for several centuries afterward, until it was slowly abolished through the combined influence of the two interests mentioned earlier: that of the landowner on one side and that of the ruler on the other. An emancipated serf, who was allowed to keep the land but had no resources of his own, could only cultivate it with what the landlord provided, and would therefore have had to act as what the French call a metayer.

It could never, however, be the interest even of this last species of cultivators, to lay out, in the further improvement of the land, any part of the little stock which they might save from their own share of the produce; because the landlord, who laid out nothing, was to get one half of whatever it produced. The tithe, which is but a tenth of the produce, is found to be a very great hindrance to improvement. A tax, therefore, which amounted to one half, must have been an effectual bar to it. It might be the interest of a metayer to make the land produce as much as could be brought out of it by means of the stock furnished by the proprietor; but it could never be his interest to mix any part of his own with it. In France, where five parts out of six of the whole kingdom are said to be still occupied by this species of cultivators, the proprietors complain, that their metayers take every opportunity of employing their master's cattle rather in carriage than in cultivation; because, in the one case, they get the whole profits to themselves, in the other they share them with their landlord. This species of tenants still subsists in some parts of Scotland. They are called steel-bow tenants. Those ancient English tenants, who are said by Chief-Baron Gilbert and Dr Blackstone to have been rather bailiffs of the landlord than farmers, properly so called, were probably of the same kind.

However, it could never be in the best interest of even this last type of farmers to invest any portion of the little savings they might have from their share of the harvest into further improving the land. This is because the landlord, who invested nothing, would take half of whatever it produced. The tithe, which is only a tenth of the produce, is found to be a significant barrier to improvement. Therefore, a tax that took half of the earnings would have effectively stopped it. It might be in the interest of a metayer to maximize the land's productivity with the stock provided by the owner, but it could never be in his interest to invest any of his own resources. In France, where it's said that five out of six parts of the entire kingdom are still occupied by this type of farmer, the property owners complain that their metayers seize every opportunity to use their master's cattle for transport rather than for cultivation; in the former case, they keep all the profits for themselves, whereas in the latter, they have to share them with the landlord. This type of tenant still exists in some parts of Scotland, known as steel-bow tenants. Those ancient English tenants, described by Chief-Baron Gilbert and Dr. Blackstone as more like stewards for the landlord than true farmers, were probably of the same type.

To this species of tenantry succeeded, though by very slow degrees, farmers, properly so called, who cultivated the land with their own stock, paying a rent certain to the landlord. When such farmers have a lease for a term of years, they may sometimes find it for their interest to lay out part of their capital in the further improvement of the farm; because they may sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before the expiration of the lease. The possession, even of such farmers, however, was long extremely precarious, and still is so in many parts of Europe. They could, before the expiration of their term, be legally ousted of their leases by a new purchaser; in England, even, by the fictitious action of a common recovery. If they were turned out illegally by the violence of their master, the action by which they obtained redress was extremely imperfect. It did not always reinstate them in the possession of the land, but gave them damages, which never amounted to a real loss. Even in England, the country, perhaps of Europe, where the yeomanry has always been most respected, it was not till about the 14th of Henry VII. that the action of ejectment was invented, by which the tenant recovers, not damages only, but possession, and in which his claim is not necessarily concluded by the uncertain decision of a single assize. This action has been found so effectual a remedy, that, in the modern practice, when the landlord has occasion to sue for the possession of the land, he seldom makes use of the actions which properly belong to him as a landlord, the writ of right or the writ of entry, but sues in the name of his tenant, by the writ of ejectment. In England, therefore the security of the tenant is equal to that of the proprietor. In England, besides, a lease for life of forty shillings a-year value is a freehold, and entitles the lessee to a vote for a member of parliament; and as a great part of the yeomanry have freeholds of this kind, the whole order becomes respectable to their landlords, on account of the political consideration which this gives them. There is, I believe, nowhere in Europe, except in England, any instance of the tenant building upon the land of which he had no lease, and trusting that the honour of his landlord would take no advantage of so important an improvement. Those laws and customs, so favourable to the yeomanry, have perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England, than all their boasted regulations of commerce taken together.

To this type of tenancy gradually gave way to actual farmers who worked the land with their own livestock, paying a set rent to the landlord. When these farmers have a lease for a number of years, they might find it beneficial to invest some of their capital into further improving the farm, because they could expect to recoup that investment with a significant profit before the lease ends. However, the security of even these farmers was long very uncertain, and it still is in many parts of Europe. They could be legally kicked out of their leases by a new buyer before their term ended; even in England, this could happen through the artificial action of a common recovery. If they were removed illegally by their master’s force, the legal recourse to fix this was very inadequate. It didn’t always get them back on the land but instead awarded them damages that never truly compensated for their loss. Even in England, which is perhaps the country in Europe where farmers have always been most respected, it wasn’t until around the 14th year of Henry VII that the action of ejectment was created, allowing the tenant to recover not just damages but also possession, without their claim being inevitably decided by the uncertain judgment of a single court session. This action has proven to be such an effective remedy that nowadays, when landlords need to sue for the land, they rarely use the actions that truly belong to them, like the writ of right or the writ of entry; instead, they sue in the name of their tenant through the writ of ejectment. Therefore, in England, tenant security is on par with that of the owner. Additionally, a lease for life valued at forty shillings a year is considered a freehold, granting the lessee the right to vote for a member of parliament. Since many farmers hold freeholds of this nature, the entire class gains respect from their landlords due to the political significance this confers. I believe there is nowhere else in Europe, apart from England, where a tenant would build on land they don't have a lease for, trusting that their landlord wouldn’t exploit such a major improvement. The laws and customs that favor farmers may have contributed more to England's current greatness than all their praised commercial regulations combined.

The law which secures the longest leases against successors of every kind, is, so far as I know, peculiar to Great Britain. It was introduced into Scotland so early as 1449, by a law of James II. Its beneficial influence,[Pg 161] however, has been much obstructed by entails; the heirs of entail being generally restrained from letting leases for any long term of years, frequently for more than one year. A late act of parliament has, in this respect, somewhat slackened their fetters, though they are still by much too strait. In Scotland, besides, as no leasehold gives a vote for a member of parliament, the yeomanry are upon this account less respectable to their landlords than in England.

The law that secures the longest leases against all types of successors is, as far as I know, unique to Great Britain. It was introduced in Scotland as early as 1449 by a law from James II. However, its positive impact has been significantly hindered by entails; heirs of entail are usually restricted from granting leases for many years, often only for one year at a time. A recent act of parliament has somewhat eased these restrictions, though they are still quite tight. Additionally, in Scotland, since no leasehold grants a vote for a member of parliament, yeomen are consequently seen as less respectable to their landlords than in England.

In other parts of Europe, after it was found convenient to secure tenants both against heirs and purchasers, the term of their security was still limited to a very short period; in France, for example, to nine years from the commencement of the lease. It has in that country, indeed, been lately extended to twenty-seven, a period still too short to encourage the tenant to make the most important improvements. The proprietors of land were anciently the legislators of every part of Europe. The laws relating to land, therefore, were all calculated for what they supposed the interest of the proprietor. It was for his interest, they had imagined, that no lease granted by any of his predecessors should hinder him from enjoying, during a long term of years, the full value of his land. Avarice and injustice are always short-sighted, and they did not foresee how much this regulation must obstruct improvement, and thereby hurt, in the long-run, the real interest of the landlord.

In other parts of Europe, after it became convenient to protect tenants from heirs and buyers, the duration of that protection was still limited to a very short time; in France, for instance, it was set at nine years from the start of the lease. Recently, in that country, it has been extended to twenty-seven years, which is still too short to motivate tenants to make significant improvements. Historically, landowners were the lawmakers throughout Europe. Consequently, laws related to land were designed based on what they believed served the landowner's interests. They thought it was in his best interest that no lease granted by any of his predecessors would prevent him from enjoying the full value of his land for many years. Greed and injustice are often shortsighted, and they didn't realize how much this regulation would hinder improvement and ultimately harm the landowner’s true interests in the long run.

The farmers, too, besides paying the rent, were anciently, it was supposed, bound to perform a great number of services to the landlord, which were seldom either specified in the lease, or regulated by any precise rule, but by the use and wont of the manor or barony. These services, therefore, being almost entirely arbitrary, subjected the tenant to many vexations. In Scotland the abolition of all services not precisely stipulated in the lease, has, in the course of a few years, very much altered for the better the condition of the yeomanry of that country.

The farmers, in addition to paying rent, were believed to be required to provide a variety of services to the landlord, which were rarely outlined in the lease or governed by any clear rules, but rather by the customs of the estate or region. As a result, these services were mostly arbitrary, causing the tenants many frustrations. In Scotland, the elimination of all services that weren't clearly stated in the lease has significantly improved the situation for the farming community in recent years.

The public services to which the yeomanry were bound, were not less arbitrary than the private ones. To make and maintain the high roads, a servitude which still subsists, I believe, everywhere, though with different degrees of oppression in different countries, was not the only one. When the king's troops, when his household, or his officers of any kind, passed through any part of the country, the yeomanry were bound to provide them with horses, carriages, and provisions, at a price regulated by the purveyor. Great Britain is, I believe, the only monarchy in Europe where the oppression of purveyance has been entirely abolished. It still subsists in France and Germany.

The public services that the yeomanry were required to provide were just as arbitrary as the private ones. Keeping and maintaining the major roads, a duty that I believe still exists everywhere, though with varying levels of burden in different countries, was not the only obligation. When the king's troops, his household, or any of his officers passed through any part of the country, the yeomanry had to supply them with horses, carriages, and food, at prices set by the purveyor. Great Britain is, I believe, the only monarchy in Europe where the burden of purveyance has been completely eliminated. It still exists in France and Germany.

The public taxes, to which they were subject, were as irregular and oppressive as the services. The ancient lords, though extremely unwilling to grant, themselves, any pecuniary aid to their sovereign, easily allowed him to tallage, as they called it, their tenants, and had not knowledge enough to foresee how much this must, in the end, affect their own revenue. The taille, as it still subsists in France, may serve as an example of those ancient tallages. It is a tax upon the supposed profits of the farmer, which they estimate by the stock that he has upon the farm. It is his interest, therefore, to appear to have as little as possible, and consequently to employ as little as possible in its cultivation, and none in its improvement. Should any stock happen to accumulate in the hands of a French farmer, the taille is almost equal to a prohibition of its ever being employed upon the land. This tax, besides, is supposed to dishonour whoever is subject to it, and to degrade him below, not only the rank of a gentleman, but that of a burgher; and whoever rents the lands of another becomes subject to it. No gentleman, nor even any burgher, who has stock, will submit to this degradation. This tax, therefore, not only hinders the stock which accumulates upon the land from being employed in its improvement, but drives away all other stock from it. The ancient tenths and fifteenths, so usual in England in former times, seem, so far as they affected the land, to have been taxes of the same nature with the taille.

The public taxes they had to pay were just as unpredictable and burdensome as the services they provided. The old lords, although very reluctant to give any financial support to their ruler, readily allowed him to impose what they called tallage on their tenants, and they didn’t realize how much this would ultimately impact their own income. The taille, which still exists in France, serves as an example of those ancient tallages. It’s a tax based on the presumed profits of farmers, estimated by the livestock they have on their farms. Therefore, it's in a farmer's best interest to show as little as possible, leading to minimal investment in farming and none in improving the land. If a French farmer happens to accumulate any livestock, the taille effectively discourages him from using it on the land. Additionally, this tax is seen as dishonorable, lowering a person’s status below that of a gentleman and even a townsman; anyone who rents land from someone else becomes subject to it. No gentleman or even townsman with livestock will accept this degradation. Thus, this tax not only prevents the livestock from being used to improve the land, but it also drives away all other resources from it. The ancient tenths and fifteenths, common in England in earlier times, seem to have been similar in nature to the taille as far as their effect on the land.

Under all these discouragements, little improvement could be expected from the occupiers of land. That order of people, with all the liberty and security which law can give, must always improve under great disadvantage. The farmer, compared with the proprietor, is as a merchant who trades with borrowed money, compared with one who trades with his own. The stock of both may improve; but that of the one, with only equal good conduct, must always improve more slowly than that of the other, on account of the large share of the profits which is consumed by the interest of the loan. The lands cultivated by the farmer must, in the same manner, with only equal good conduct, be improved more slowly than those cultivated by the proprietor, on account of the large share of the produce which is consumed in the rent, and which, had the farmer been proprietor, he might have employed in the further improvement of the land. The station of a farmer, besides, is, from the nature of things, inferior to that of a proprietor. Through the greater part of Europe, the yeomanry are regarded as an inferior rank of people, even to the better sort of tradesmen and mechanics, and in all parts of Europe to the great merchants and master manufacturers. It can seldom happen, therefore, that a man of any considerable stock should quit the superior, in order to place himself in an inferior station. Even in the present state of Europe, therefore, little[Pg 162] stock is likely to go from any other profession to the improvement of land in the way of farming. More does, perhaps, in Great Britain than in any other country, though even there the great stocks which are in some places employed in farming, have generally been acquired by farming, the trade, perhaps, in which, of all others, stock is commonly acquired most slowly. After small proprietors, however, rich and great farmers are in every country the principal improvers. There are more such, perhaps, in England than in any other European monarchy. In the republican governments of Holland, and of Berne in Switzerland, the farmers are said to be not inferior to those of England.

Despite all these discouragements, little improvement could be expected from landowners. That group of people, with all the freedom and security that the law can provide, will always improve under significant disadvantages. A farmer, compared to a landowner, is like a merchant who operates with borrowed money, as opposed to one who uses their own. Both may see their resources grow; however, the former, with the same level of management, will always improve more slowly than the latter because a large portion of their profits is consumed by interest on the loan. Similarly, the land cultivated by the farmer will, under equal management, experience slower improvement than that cultivated by the landowner because a significant portion of the produce goes toward rent, which, had the farmer been the owner, could have been invested back into enhancing the land. Additionally, the farmer's status is inherently lower than that of a landowner. Across much of Europe, yeoman farmers are seen as a lower class, even compared to skilled tradespeople, and certainly compared to wealthy merchants and leading manufacturers. Therefore, it is rare for a person with substantial resources to leave a superior position to take on an inferior one. Even in today's Europe, little[Pg 162] capital is likely to be redirected from other professions to land improvement through farming. Although perhaps more happens in Great Britain than in any other country, even there, the significant investments in farming generally come from those who have acquired wealth through farming itself, which is, arguably, one of the slowest ways to accumulate capital. After small landowners, however, wealthy and successful farmers play a key role as primary contributors to land improvement. There are probably more of them in England than in any other European monarchy. In the republican governments of Holland and Berne in Switzerland, farmers are reported to be on par with those in England.

The ancient policy of Europe was, over and above all this, unfavourable to the improvement and cultivation of land, whether carried on by the proprietor or by the farmer; first, by the general prohibition of the exportation of corn, without a special licence, which seems to have been a very universal regulation; and, secondly, by the restraints which were laid upon the inland commerce, not only of corn, but of almost every other part of the produce of the farm, by the absurd laws against engrossers, regraters, and forestallers, and by the privileges of fairs and markets. It has already been observed in what manner the prohibition of the exportation of corn, together with some encouragement given to the importation of foreign corn, obstructed the cultivation of ancient Italy, naturally the most fertile country in Europe, and at that time the seat of the greatest empire in the world. To what degree such restraints upon the inland commerce of this commodity, joined to the general prohibition of exportation, must have discouraged the cultivation of countries less fertile, and less favourably circumstanced, it is not, perhaps, very easy to imagine.

The old policies in Europe were, above all, not supportive of improving and farming the land, whether done by the landowner or the farmer. First, there was a general ban on exporting grain without a special license, which seemed to be a widespread rule. Second, there were restrictions on domestic trade, not only for grain but for almost all other farm products, due to ridiculous laws against hoarders, resellers, and middlemen, as well as the privileges granted to fairs and markets. It has already been noted how the export ban on grain, along with encouragement for importing foreign grain, hindered farming in ancient Italy, which was naturally the most fertile country in Europe and at that time the center of the greatest empire in the world. It’s perhaps hard to imagine just how much these restrictions on domestic trade for this commodity, combined with the overall export ban, would have discouraged farming in less fertile and less well-situated countries.


CHAP. III.

OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF CITIES AND TOWNS, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

The inhabitants of cities and towns were, after the fall of the Roman empire, not more favoured than those of the country. They consisted, indeed, of a very different order of people from the first inhabitants of the ancient republics of Greece and Italy. These last were composed chiefly of the proprietors of lands, among whom the public territory was originally divided, and who found it convenient to build their houses in the neighbourhood of one another, and to surround them with a wall, for the sake of common defence. After the fall of the Roman empire, on the contrary, the proprietors of land seem generally to have lived in fortified castles on their own estates, and in the midst of their own tenants and dependents. The towns were chiefly inhabited by tradesmen and mechanics, who seem, in those days, to have been of servile, or very nearly of servile condition. The privileges which we find granted by ancient charters to the inhabitants of some of the principal towns in Europe, sufficiently show what they were before those grants. The people to whom it is granted as a privilege, that they might give away their own daughters in marriage without the consent of their lord, that upon their death their own children, and not their lord, should succeed to their goods, and that they might dispose of their own effects by will, must, before those grants, have been either altogether, or very nearly, in the same state of villanage with the occupiers of land in the country.

The people living in cities and towns, after the fall of the Roman Empire, were no better off than those in the countryside. They were generally a different group from the original inhabitants of the ancient republics in Greece and Italy. The latter were mostly landowners, among whom public land was initially divided, and found it useful to build their homes close to each other, surrounding them with walls for mutual protection. In contrast, after the fall of the Roman Empire, landowners typically lived in fortified castles on their own properties, surrounded by their tenants and dependents. The towns were primarily populated by tradespeople and craftsmen, who seemed to be in a servile or nearly servile position during that time. The privileges granted by ancient charters to residents of some major towns in Europe clearly indicate their status before those grants. The people who were given the privilege to marry off their own daughters without their lord's consent, that upon their death their children, not their lord, would inherit their possessions, and that they could bequeath their belongings through a will, must have been either entirely or very close to being in the same situation of servitude as the tenant farmers in the countryside.

They seem, indeed, to have been a very poor, mean set of people, who seemed to travel about with their goods from place to place and from fair to fair, like the hawkers and pedlars of the present times. In all the different countries of Europe then, in the same manner as in several of the Tartar governments of Asia at present, taxes used to be levied upon the persons and goods of travellers, when they passed through certain manors, when they went over certain bridges, when they carried about their goods from place to place in a fair, when they erected in it a booth or stall to sell them in. These different taxes were known in England by the names of passage, pontage, lastage, and stallage. Sometimes the king, sometimes a great lord, who had, it seems, upon some occasions, authority to do this, would grant to particular traders, to such particularly as lived in their own demesnes, a general exemption from such taxes. Such traders, though in other respects of servile, or very nearly of servile condition, were upon this account called free traders. They, in return, usually paid to their protector a sort of annual poll-tax. In those days protection was seldom granted without a valuable consideration, and this tax might perhaps be considered as compensation for what their patrons might lose by their exemption from other taxes. At first, both those poll-taxes and those exemptions seem to have been altogether personal, and to have affected only particular individuals, during either their lives, or the pleasure of their protectors. In the very imperfect accounts which have been published from Doomsday-book, of several of the towns of England, mention is frequently made, sometimes of the tax which particular burghers paid, each of them, either to the king, or to some other great lord, for this sort of protec[Pg 163]tion, and sometimes of the general amount only of all those taxes.[31]

They really seem to have been a very poor, lowly group of people who traveled with their goods from place to place and from fair to fair, similar to the hawkers and peddlers of today. Back then, in various countries across Europe, just like in several Tartar governments in Asia today, taxes were collected on the people and goods of travelers when they passed through certain manors, crossed specific bridges, carried their goods at fairs, or set up booths or stalls to sell them. In England, these different taxes were known as passage, pontage, lastage, and stallage. Sometimes, the king or a powerful lord, who apparently had the authority to do so on occasion, would grant specific traders—especially those living in their own lands—a general exemption from these taxes. These traders, while otherwise in a servile, or nearly servile, state, were referred to as free traders because of this exemption. In return, they typically paid an annual poll tax to their protector. Back then, protection was rarely given without something valuable in return, and this tax might have been seen as compensation for what their patrons would lose due to their exemption from other taxes. Initially, both these poll taxes and exemptions seemed to have been entirely personal, affecting only specific individuals during their lives or at the discretion of their protectors. In the rather incomplete records published from the Doomsday Book regarding several towns in England, there's frequent mention of the taxes that individual burghers paid, either to the king or to another powerful lord, for this type of protection, as well as the total amount of all those taxes.

But how servile soever may have been originally the condition of the inhabitants of the towns, it appears evidently, that they arrived at liberty and independency much earlier than the occupiers of land in the country. That part of the king's revenue which arose from such poll-taxes in any particular town, used commonly to be let in farm, during a term of years, for a rent certain, sometimes to the sheriff of the county, and sometimes to other persons. The burghers themselves frequently got credit enough to be admitted to farm the revenues of this sort which arose out of their own town, they becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent.[32] To let a farm in this manner, was quite agreeable to the usual economy of, I believe, the sovereigns of all the different countries of Europe, who used frequently to let whole manors to all the tenants of those manors, they becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent; but in return being allowed to collect it in their own way, and to pay it into the king's exchequer by the hands of their own bailiff, and being thus altogether freed from the insolence of the king's officers; a circumstance in those days regarded as of the greatest importance.

But no matter how servile their initial situation may have been, it’s clear that the residents of the towns achieved freedom and independence much sooner than the landowners in the countryside. The king's revenue that came from poll taxes in any given town was usually leased for a set period at a fixed rent, sometimes to the county sheriff and sometimes to others. The townspeople often managed to get enough credit to lease the revenues from their own town, becoming collectively responsible for the entire rent. To lease in this way was quite typical among the rulers of various European countries, who often leased entire estates to the tenants of those estates, who were also collectively responsible for the full rent. In return, they could collect the payments in their own way and submit them to the king’s treasury through their own bailiff, freeing themselves from the insolence of the king’s officials—a situation that was considered very significant back then.

At first, the farm of the town was probably let to the burghers, in the same manner as it had been to other farmers, for a term of years only. In process of time, however, it seems to have become the general practice to grant it to them in fee, that is for ever, reserving a rent certain, never afterwards to be augmented. The payment having thus became perpetual, the exemptions, in return, for which it was made, naturally became perpetual too. Those exemptions, therefore, ceased to be personal, and could not afterwards be considered as belonging to individuals, as individuals, but as burghers of a particular burgh, which, upon this account, was called a free burgh, for the same reason that they had been called free burghers or free traders.

At first, the town's farm was likely rented to the townspeople in the same way it had been to other farmers, just for a set number of years. Over time, though, it seems to have become common to grant it to them in perpetuity, meaning forever, while reserving a fixed rent that would never increase. Since the payment became permanent, the exemptions offered in return also naturally became permanent. Those exemptions, therefore, stopped being personal and couldn’t be seen as belonging to individuals anymore, but rather as belonging to the townspeople of a specific town, which, for this reason, was called a free town, just like they had been called free townspeople or free traders.

Along with this grant, the important privileges, above mentioned, that they might give away their own daughters in marriage, that their children should succeed to them, and that they might dispose of their own effects by will, were generally bestowed upon the burghers of the town to whom it was given. Whether such privileges had before been usually granted, along with the freedom of trade, to particular burghers, as individuals, I know not. I reckon it not improbable that they were, though I cannot produce any direct evidence of it. But however this may have been, the principal attributes of villanage and slavery being thus taken away from them, they now at least became really free, in our present sense of the word freedom.

Along with this grant, the important rights mentioned earlier, such as the ability to marry off their own daughters, that their children could inherit from them, and that they could decide how to distribute their belongings in their wills, were generally granted to the townspeople it was given to. I don’t know if such privileges had previously been commonly granted, along with trading rights, to individual townspeople. I think it’s not unlikely that they were, even though I can’t provide any direct proof. Regardless, with the main features of serfdom and slavery taken away from them, they now at least became genuinely free, in the way we understand freedom today.

Nor was this all. They were generally at the same time erected into a commonalty or corporation, with the privilege of having magistrates and a town-council of their own, of making bye-laws for their own government, of building walls for their own defence, and of reducing all their inhabitants under a sort of military discipline, by obliging them to watch and ward; that is, as anciently understood, to guard and defend those walls against all attacks and surprises, by night as well as by day. In England they were generally exempted from suit to the hundred and county courts; and all such pleas as should arise among them, the pleas of the crown excepted, were left to the decision of their own magistrates. In other countries, much greater and more extensive jurisdictions were frequently granted to them.[33]

Nor was this all. They were often established as a community or corporation, with the right to have their own magistrates and town council, to create their own bylaws for governance, to build walls for their defense, and to put all their residents under a kind of military discipline by requiring them to watch and guard; that is, as it was understood in the past, to protect and defend those walls against any attacks and surprises, both at night and during the day. In England, they were generally exempt from appearing in local and county courts; all issues that arose among them, except for those concerning the crown, were left to the judgment of their own magistrates. In other countries, they were often granted much broader and more extensive authorities.[33]

It might, probably, be necessary to grant to such towns as were admitted to farm their own revenues, some sort of compulsive jurisdiction to oblige their own citizens to make payment. In those disorderly times, it might have been extremely inconvenient to have left them to seek this sort of justice from any other tribunal. But it must seem extraordinary, that the sovereigns of all the different countries of Europe should have exchanged in this manner for a rent certain, never more to be augmented, that branch of their revenue, which was, perhaps, of all others, the most likely to be improved by the natural course of things, without either expense or attention of their own; and that they should, besides, have in this manner voluntarily erected a sort of independent republics in the heart of their own dominions.

It may be necessary to give towns that were allowed to manage their own revenues some kind of authority to compel their residents to pay. During those chaotic times, it could have been very inconvenient to make them seek this sort of justice from any other court. However, it seems remarkable that the rulers of various European countries would trade, in this way, for a fixed rent—never to be increased—that part of their income which was probably the most likely to grow naturally over time, without any effort or cost on their part; and that they would also voluntarily establish a sort of independent republics in the middle of their own territories.

In order to understand this, it must be remembered, that, in those days, the sovereign of perhaps no country in Europe was able to protect, through the whole extent of his dominions, the weaker part of his subjects from the oppression of the great lords. Those whom the law could not protect, and who were not strong enough to defend themselves, were obliged either to have recourse to the protection of some great lord, and in order to obtain it, to become either his slaves or vassals; or to enter into a league of mutual defence for the common protection of one another. The inhabitants of cities and burghs, considered as single individuals, had no power to defend themselves; but by entering into a league of mutual defence with their neighbours, they were capable of making no contemptible resistance. The lords despised the burghers, whom they considered not only as a different order, but as a parcel of emancipated slaves,[Pg 164] almost of a different species from themselves. The wealth of the burghers never failed to provoke their envy and indignation, and they plundered them upon every occasion without mercy or remorse. The burghers naturally hated and feared the lords. The king hated and feared them too; but though, perhaps, he might despise, he had no reason either to hate or fear the burghers. Mutual interest, therefore, disposed them to support the king, and the king to support them against the lords. They were the enemies of his enemies, and it was his interest to render them as secure and independent of those enemies as he could. By granting them magistrates of their own, the privilege of making bye-laws for their own government, that of building walls for their own defence, and that of reducing all their inhabitants under a sort of military discipline, he gave them all the means of security and independency of the barons which it was in his power to bestow. Without the establishment of some regular government of this kind, without some authority to compel their inhabitants to act according to some certain plan or system, no voluntary league of mutual defence could either have afforded them any permanent security, or have enabled them to give the king any considerable support. By granting them the farm of their own town in fee, he took away from those whom he wished to have for his friends, and, if one may say so, for his allies, all ground of jealousy and suspicion, that he was ever afterwards to oppress them, either by raising the farm-rent of their town, or by granting it to some other farmer.

To understand this, it's important to remember that back then, no ruler in Europe could completely protect the weaker subjects across their territories from the oppression of powerful lords. Those who the law couldn't protect and who were too weak to defend themselves had to either seek protection from a powerful lord, which meant becoming his servant or vassal, or band together for mutual defense to protect each other. Individual residents of cities and towns had no real power to defend themselves, but by forming alliances with their neighbors, they could put up a significant fight. The lords looked down on the townspeople, seeing them not just as a different class, but as a group of freed slaves, almost a different species. The wealth of the townspeople often stirred the lords' jealousy and anger, leading to relentless plundering whenever possible. The townspeople naturally despised and feared the lords. The king shared this disdain and fear, but probably had no reason to hate or fear the townspeople. Mutual interests made them want to support the king, and the king wanted to reciprocate, backing them against the lords. They were the foes of his foes, and it benefited him to make them as safe and independent from those foes as possible. By allowing them to have their own magistrates, the ability to create their own laws, the right to build defensive walls, and a military-style governance among their residents, he provided them with the means to be secure and independent from the barons. Without establishing some regular government like this, and lacking authority to enforce a specific plan or system, no voluntary alliance for mutual defense could offer them lasting security or enable them to provide substantial support to the king. By granting them ownership of their town, he eliminated any reason for jealousy or suspicion from those he wanted as friends and allies, ensuring they wouldn't fear oppression either through increased taxes or transfer of their town to another owner.

The princes who lived upon the worst terms with their barons, seem accordingly to have been the most liberal in grants of this kind to their burghs. King John of England, for example, appears to have been a most munificent benefactor to his towns.[34] Philip I. of France lost all authority over his barons. Towards the end of his reign, his son Lewis, known afterwards by the name of Lewis the Fat, consulted, according to Father Daniel, with the bishops of the royal demesnes, concerning the most proper means of restraining the violence of the great lords. Their advice consisted of two different proposals. One was to erect a new order of jurisdiction, by establishing magistrates and a town-council in every considerable town of his demesnes. The other was to form a new militia, by making the inhabitants of those towns, under the command of their own magistrates, march out upon proper occasions to the assistance of the king. It is from this period, according to the French antiquarians, that we are to date the institution of the magistrates and councils of cities in France. It was during the unprosperous reigns of the princes of the house of Suabia, that the greater part of the free towns of Germany received the first grants of their privileges, and that the famous Hanseatic league first became formidable.[35]

The princes who had the worst relationships with their barons tended to be the most generous in granting privileges to their towns. For instance, King John of England was a very generous supporter of his towns.[34] Philip I of France lost all control over his barons. Towards the end of his rule, his son Lewis, later known as Lewis the Fat, consulted with the bishops of the royal lands, as noted by Father Daniel, about the best ways to curb the power of the great lords. Their advice included two main proposals. One was to create a new system of governance by establishing magistrates and a town council in every significant town within his lands. The other was to form a new militia, where the residents of those towns, under their own magistrates, would be called upon to assist the king when necessary. According to French historians, this is when the establishment of city magistrates and councils in France began. It was during the difficult reigns of the princes from the house of Suabia that most of the free towns in Germany first received their privileges, and the famous Hanseatic league began to gain power.[35]

The militia of the cities seems, in those times, not to have been inferior to that of the country; and as they could be more readily assembled upon any sudden occasion, they frequently had the advantage in their disputes with the neighbouring lords. In countries such as Italy or Switzerland, in which, on account either of their distance from the principal seat of government, of the natural strength of the country itself, or of some other reason, the sovereign came to lose the whole of his authority; the cities generally became independent republics, and conquered all the nobility in their neighbourhood; obliging them to pull down their castles in the country, and to live, like other peaceable inhabitants, in the city. This is the short history of the republic of Berne, as well as of several other cities in Switzerland. If you except Venice, for of that city the history is somewhat different, it is the history of all the considerable Italian republics, of which so great a number arose and perished between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.

The militias of the cities back then were often just as strong as those of the countryside. Since they could be gathered quickly in urgent situations, they often had the upper hand in conflicts with local lords. In places like Italy or Switzerland, where the distance from the main government, the natural defenses of the land, or other factors caused the ruler to lose control, cities typically became independent republics and defeated the nearby nobility. They forced noble families to tear down their country castles and live, like everyone else, in the city. This is a brief history of the republic of Berne and other cities in Switzerland. With the exception of Venice, which has a different story, this reflects the history of all the significant Italian republics that emerged and fell between the late twelfth and early sixteenth centuries.

In countries such as France and England, where the authority of the sovereign, though frequently very low, never was destroyed altogether, the cities had no opportunity of becoming entirely independent. They became, however, so considerable, that the sovereign could impose no tax upon them, besides the stated farm-rent of the town, without their own consent. They were, therefore, called upon to send deputies to the general assembly of the states of the kingdom, where they might join with the clergy and the barons in granting, upon urgent occasions, some extraordinary aid to the king. Being generally, too, more favourable to his power, their deputies seem sometimes to have been employed by him as a counterbalance in these assemblies to the authority of the great lords. Hence the origin of the representation of burghs in the states-general of all great monarchies in Europe.

In countries like France and England, where the power of the ruler, although often quite weak, was never completely eliminated, cities didn't have the chance to become fully independent. However, they grew significant enough that the ruler could impose no tax on them, aside from the agreed-upon town rent, without their approval. As a result, they were called to send representatives to the general assembly of the kingdom's states, where they could work with the clergy and the barons to provide, in urgent situations, some extraordinary support to the king. Generally, since they tended to be more supportive of his power, their representatives seemed to be used by him as a counterbalance to the influence of the major lords in these assemblies. This is how the representation of towns in the estates-general of all the major monarchies in Europe came about.

Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of individuals, were in this manner established in cities, at a time when the occupiers of land in the country, were exposed to every sort of violence. But men in this defenceless state naturally content themselves with their necessary subsistence; because, to acquire more, might only tempt the injustice of their oppressors. On the contrary, when they are secure of enjoying the fruits of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their condition, and to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniencies and elegancies of life. That industry, therefore, which aims at something[Pg 165] more than necessary subsistence, was established in cities long before it was commonly practised by the occupiers of land in the country. If, in the hands of a poor cultivator, oppressed with the servitude of villanage, some little stock should accumulate, he would naturally conceal it with great care from his master, to whom it would otherwise have belonged, and take the first opportunity of running away to a town. The law was at that time so indulgent to the inhabitants of towns, and so desirous of diminishing the authority of the lords over those of the country, that if he could conceal himself there from the pursuit of his lord for a year, he was free for ever. Whatever stock, therefore, accumulated in the hands of the industrious part of the inhabitants of the country, naturally took refuge in cities, as the only sanctuaries in which it could be secure to the person that acquired it.

Order and good governance, along with the freedom and safety of individuals, were established in cities at a time when landowners in the countryside faced all kinds of violence. In this vulnerable state, people were content with just what they needed to survive because trying to gain more could invite the oppression of their oppressors. However, when they felt secure in enjoying the fruits of their labor, they naturally worked to improve their situation, seeking not just the essentials but also the comforts and luxuries of life. Therefore, the pursuit of gain beyond mere survival began in cities long before it became common among landowners in the countryside. If a poor farmer, burdened by the condition of serfdom, managed to save up a little wealth, he would carefully hide it from his lord, to whom it would otherwise belong, and seize the first chance to escape to a town. At that time, the law was quite lenient toward city dwellers and eager to reduce the power of the lords over those in the countryside, so if he could stay hidden there from his lord’s pursuit for a year, he would be free for good. Consequently, any wealth that accumulated among the industrious people in the countryside sought refuge in cities, as these became the only safe havens for those who had acquired it.

The inhabitants of a city, it is true, must always ultimately derive their subsistence, and the whole materials and means of their industry, from the country. But those of a city, situated near either the sea-coast or the banks of a navigable river, are not necessarily confined to derive them from the country in their neighbourhood. They have a much wider range, and may draw them from the most remote corners of the world, either in exchange for the manufactured produce of their own industry, or by performing the office of carriers between distant countries, and exchanging the produce of one for that of another. A city might, in this manner, grow up to great wealth and splendour, while not only the country in its neighbourhood, but all those to which it traded, were in poverty and wretchedness. Each of those countries, perhaps, taken singly, could afford it but a small part, either of its subsistence or of its employment; but all of them taken together, could afford it both a great subsistence and a great employment. There were, however, within the narrow circle of the commerce of those times, some countries that were opulent and industrious. Such was the Greek empire as long as it subsisted, and that of the Saracens during the reigns of the Abassides. Such, too, was Egypt till it was conquered by the Turks, some part of the coast of Barbary, and all those provinces of Spain which were under the government of the Moors.

The people living in a city do ultimately rely on the countryside for their food and the entire resources and means for their businesses. However, those in a city located near the coast or along a navigable river aren't limited to sourcing everything from the nearby countryside. They have a much broader scope and can obtain resources from the farthest corners of the globe, either by trading their own manufactured goods or by acting as middlemen between distant countries, exchanging one country's products for another's. In this way, a city can accumulate great wealth and prestige even if the surrounding countryside and all its trading partners are struggling and poor. Individually, those countries might contribute only a small amount to the city's food supply or employment, but collectively, they can provide a substantial amount of both. However, within the limited trade sphere of that era, there were some countries that were wealthy and industrious. This included the Greek empire while it lasted, along with the Saracens during the reigns of the Abbasids. Egypt, too, was prosperous until it fell to the Turks, along with parts of the Barbary coast and all the provinces of Spain that were under Moorish rule.

The cities of Italy seem to have been the first in Europe which were raised by commerce to any considerable degree of opulence. Italy lay in the centre of what was at that time the improved and civilized part of the world. The crusades, too, though, by the great waste of stock and destruction of inhabitants which they occasioned, they must necessarily have retarded the progress of the greater part of Europe, were extremely favourable to that of some Italian cities. The great armies which marched from all parts to the conquest of the Holy Land, gave extraordinary encouragement to the shipping of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, sometimes in transporting them thither, and always in supplying them with provisions. They were the commissaries, if one may say so, of those armies; and the most destructive frenzy that ever befel the European nations, was a source of opulence to those republics.

The cities of Italy were among the first in Europe to achieve significant wealth through commerce. Italy was at the center of what was then the most developed and civilized part of the world. While the crusades caused massive loss of resources and destruction of populations, which likely slowed progress for much of Europe, they actually benefited several Italian cities. The large armies that gathered from all over to conquer the Holy Land provided remarkable opportunities for the shipping industries of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, both by transporting them there and by always supplying them with provisions. In a way, they acted as the supply coordinators for those armies; and the most devastating crisis that ever struck European nations became a source of wealth for those republics.

The inhabitants of trading cities, by importing the improved manufactures and expensive luxuries of richer countries, afforded some food to the vanity of the great proprietors, who eagerly purchased them with great quantities of the rude produce of their own lands. The commerce of a great part of Europe in those times, accordingly, consisted chiefly in the exchange of their own rude, for the manufactured produce of more civilized nations. Thus the wool of England used to be exchanged for the wines of France, and the fine cloths of Flanders, in the same manner as the corn in Poland is at this day, exchanged for the wines and brandies of France, and for the silks and velvets of France and Italy.

The people living in trading cities, by bringing in the improved goods and luxury items from wealthier countries, fed the vanity of the wealthy landowners, who eagerly bought these items with large amounts of raw products from their own lands. The trade in much of Europe during that time mainly involved swapping their raw materials for the manufactured goods of more advanced nations. For example, English wool was traded for French wines and fine fabrics from Flanders, just like how Polish grain is exchanged today for French wines and brandies, as well as silks and velvets from France and Italy.

A taste for the finer and more improved manufactures was, in this manner, introduced by foreign commerce into countries where no such works were carried on. But when this taste became so general as to occasion a considerable demand, the merchants, in order to save the expense of carriage, naturally endeavoured to establish some manufactures of the same kind in their own country. Hence the origin of the first manufactures for distant sale, that seem to have been established in the western provinces of Europe, after the fall of the Roman empire.

A preference for higher quality and more refined products was introduced by international trade into countries that didn't have such industries. However, when this preference became widespread and led to significant demand, merchants, wanting to reduce shipping costs, naturally sought to set up similar industries in their own countries. This is how the first manufacturing operations for distant sales seemed to emerge in the western regions of Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire.

No large country, it must be observed, ever did or could subsist without some sort of manufactures being carried on in it; and when it is said of any such country that it has no manufactures, it must always be understood of the finer and more improved, or of such as are fit for distant sale. In every large country, both the clothing and household furniture of the far greater part of the people, are the produce of their own industry. This is even more universally the case in those poor countries which are commonly said to have no manufactures, than in those rich ones that are said to abound in them. In the latter you will generally find, both in the clothes and household furniture of the lowest rank of people, a much greater proportion of foreign productions than in the former.

No large country, it should be noted, has ever survived or could survive without some kind of manufacturing happening within it; and when it's said that a country has no manufacturing, it usually refers to the more refined and improved goods or those suitable for long-distance sale. In every large country, the majority of people's clothing and home furniture are produced by their own labor. This is even more true in poorer countries, which are often said to have no manufacturing, than in wealthier countries that are said to be full of it. In the latter, you’ll typically find a much larger share of foreign products in the clothing and home furnishings of the lower class than in the former.

Those manufactures which are fit for distant sale, seem to have been introduced into different countries in two different ways.

Those products that are suitable for remote sales appear to have been introduced into different countries in two distinct ways.

Sometimes they have been introduced in the manner above mentioned, by the violent operation, if one may say so, of the stocks of particular merchants and undertakers, who established them in imitation of some foreign ma[Pg 166]nufactures of the same kind. Such manufactures, therefore, are the offspring of foreign commerce; and such seem to have been the ancient manufactures of silks, velvets, and brocades, which flourished in Lucca during the thirteenth century. They were banished from thence by the tyranny of one of Machiavel's heroes, Castruccio Castracani. In 1810, nine hundred families were driven out of Lucca, of whom thirty-one retired to Venice, and offered to introduce there the silk manufacture.[36] Their offer was accepted, many privileges were conferred upon them, and they began the manufacture with three hundred workmen. Such, too, seem to have been the manufactures of fine cloths that anciently flourished in Flanders, and which were introduced into England in the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, and such are the present silk manufactures of Lyons and Spitalfields. Manufactures introduced in this manner are generally employed upon foreign materials, being imitations of foreign manufactures. When the Venetian manufacture was first established, the materials were all brought from Sicily and the Levant. The more ancient manufacture of Lucca was likewise carried on with foreign materials. The cultivation of mulberry trees, and the breeding of silk-worms, seem not to have been common in the northern parts of Italy before the sixteenth century. Those arts were not introduced into France till the reign of Charles IX. The manufactures of Flanders were carried on chiefly with Spanish and English wool. Spanish wool was the material, not of the first woollen manufacture of England, but of the first that was fit for distant sale. More than one half the materials of the Lyons manufacture is at this day foreign silk; when it was first established, the whole, or very nearly the whole, was so. No part of the materials of the Spitalfields manufacture is ever likely to be the produce of England. The seat of such manufactures, as they are generally introduced by the scheme and project of a few individuals, is sometimes established in a maritime city, and sometimes in an inland town, according as their interest, judgment, or caprice, happen to determine.

Sometimes they are introduced in the way mentioned above, through the intense actions of certain merchants and entrepreneurs, who set them up in imitation of some foreign products of the same type. Therefore, these products are the result of foreign trade; this seems to have been the case with the traditional silk, velvet, and brocade industries that thrived in Lucca during the thirteenth century. They were driven out by the tyranny of Castruccio Castracani, one of Machiavelli's heroes. In 1810, nine hundred families were expelled from Lucca, thirty-one of whom moved to Venice, where they offered to start a silk industry.[36] Their proposal was accepted, they were granted many privileges, and they began their operations with three hundred workers. This also seems to relate to the fine cloth industries that once thrived in Flanders and were brought to England at the start of Queen Elizabeth's reign, as well as the current silk industries in Lyons and Spitalfields. Industries introduced this way typically work with foreign materials, being imitations of foreign products. When the Venetian industry was first established, all materials were sourced from Sicily and the Levant. Similarly, the earlier Lucca industry also relied on foreign materials. The cultivation of mulberry trees and the breeding of silkworms didn’t seem to be common in northern Italy before the sixteenth century. These practices weren't introduced to France until the reign of Charles IX. The industries in Flanders primarily used Spanish and English wool. Spanish wool was the material—not of England’s first woollen industry, but of the first one suitable for long-distance trade. Today, more than half of the materials for the Lyons industry consist of foreign silk; when it was first set up, nearly all the materials were foreign. No part of the materials for the Spitalfields industry is likely to come from England. The location of such industries, often initiated by the plans and efforts of a few individuals, can sometimes be a coastal city and other times an inland town, depending on their interests, judgment, or whims.

At other times, manufactures for distant sale grow up naturally, and as it were of their own accord, by the gradual refinement of those household and coarser manufactures which must at all times be carried on even in the poorest and rudest countries. Such manufactures are generally employed upon the materials which the country produces, and they seem frequently to have been first refined and improved in such inland countries as were not, indeed, at a very great, but at a considerable distance from the sea-coast, and sometimes even from all water carriage. An inland country, naturally fertile and easily cultivated, produces a great surplus of provisions beyond what is necessary for maintaining the cultivators; and on account of the expense of land carriage, and inconveniency of river navigation, it may frequently be difficult to send this surplus abroad. Abundance, therefore, renders provisions cheap, and encourages a great number of workmen to settle in the neighbourhood, who find that their industry can there procure them more of the necessaries and conveniences of life than in other places. They work up the materials of manufacture which the land produces, and exchange their finished work, or, what is the same thing, the price of it, for more materials and provisions. They give a new value to the surplus part of the rude produce, by saving the expense of carrying it to the water-side, or to some distant market; and they furnish the cultivators with something in exchange for it, that is either useful or agreeable to them, upon easier terms than they could have obtained it before. The cultivators get a better price for their surplus produce, and can purchase cheaper other conveniences which they have occasion for. They are thus both encouraged and enabled to increase this surplus produce by a further improvement and better cultivation of the land; and as the fertility of the land had given birth to the manufacture, so the progress of the manufacture re-acts upon the land, and increases still further its fertility. The manufacturers first supply the neighbourhood, and afterwards, as their work improves and refines, more distant markets. For though neither the rude produce, nor even the coarse manufacture, could, without the greatest difficulty, support the expense of a considerable land-carriage, the refined and improved manufacture easily may. In a small bulk it frequently contains the price of a great quantity of rude produce. A piece of fine cloth, for example which weighs only eighty pounds, contains in it the price, not only of eighty pounds weight of wool, but sometimes of several thousand weight of corn, the maintenance of the different working people, and of their immediate employers. The corn which could with difficulty have been carried abroad in its own shape, is in this manner virtually exported in that of the complete manufacture, and may easily be sent to the remotest corners of the world. In this manner have grown up naturally, and, as it were, of their own accord, the manufactures of Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton. Such manufactures are the offspring of agriculture. In the modern history of Europe, their extension and improvement have generally been posterior to those which were the offspring of foreign commerce. England was noted for the manufacture of fine cloths made of Spanish wool, more than a century before any of those which now flourish in the places above men[Pg 167]tioned were fit for foreign sale. The extension and improvement of these last could not take place but in consequence of the extension and improvement of agriculture, the last and greatest effect of foreign commerce, and of the manufactures immediately introduced by it, and which I shall now proceed to explain.

At other times, industries for distant sales develop naturally, almost on their own, through the gradual enhancement of household and basic products that must always be handled, even in the poorest and most basic countries. These industries usually focus on the materials available in the country, and they often seem to first evolve and improve in inland areas that are not extremely far but still at a significant distance from the coast, and sometimes even far from any navigable water. A fertile and easily cultivated inland area produces a large surplus of food beyond what the farmers need to sustain themselves; however, due to the cost of land transport and the challenges of river navigation, it can be quite difficult to send this surplus elsewhere. Abundance, therefore, makes food cheap, attracting many workers to settle nearby, as they find their labor can get them more essentials and comforts than in other areas. They process the materials available from the land and trade their finished products, or the value of those products, for more materials and food. They add new value to the surplus raw materials by saving the costs of transporting them to the nearest waterways or distant markets, and they provide the farmers with something in exchange that is either useful or enjoyable, and at easier terms than they could access before. The farmers receive better prices for their surplus and can buy the other goods they need at lower costs. This situation encourages and enables them to boost their surplus even further through improved farming practices and better land management; and just as the land’s fertility gave rise to the industry, the growth of this industry reciprocally enhances the land’s fertility. The manufacturers initially serve the local market and later, as their products get better, target more distant markets. While neither the raw materials nor the basic products could easily cover the costs of moving significant amounts by land, the refined and improved products can. A small quantity often has the value of a larger amount of raw goods. For example, a piece of fine cloth that weighs only eighty pounds incorporates the value not just of eighty pounds of wool, but sometimes several thousand pounds of grain, covering the sustenance of various workers and their employers. The grain that would have been hard to transport in its raw state is thus effectively exported in the form of finished goods, easily sent to the farthest reaches of the world. In this way, the industries of Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton have developed naturally, almost on their own. These industries are the results of agriculture. In modern European history, their growth and improvement generally followed those related to foreign trade. England was known for producing fine cloth from Spanish wool more than a century before any of the products that currently thrive in the aforementioned places were ready for international sales. The expansion and enhancement of these latter products could only happen as a result of the growth and development of agriculture, which is the final and greatest outcome of foreign trade and the industries it introduced, and I will now proceed to explain this.


CHAP. IV.

HOW THE COMMERCE OF TOWNS CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY.

The increase and riches of commercial and manufacturing towns contributed to the improvement and cultivation of the countries to which they belonged, in three different ways:

The growth and wealth of trading and manufacturing towns helped improve and develop the regions they were part of in three distinct ways:

First, by affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the country, they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further improvement. This benefit was not even confined to the countries in which they were situated, but extended more or less to all those with which they had any dealings. To all of them they afforded a market for some part either of their rude or manufactured produce, and, consequently, gave some encouragement to the industry and improvement of all. Their own country, however, on account of its neighbourhood, necessarily derived the greatest benefit from this market. Its rude produce being charged with less carriage, the traders could pay the growers a better price for it, and yet afford it as cheap to the consumers as that of more distant countries.

First, by providing a large and accessible market for the raw products of the country, they encouraged its cultivation and further improvement. This benefit wasn't limited to the countries where they were located but extended to all those they interacted with. They offered a market for some of their raw or manufactured goods, which in turn encouraged the industry and progress of everyone involved. However, their own country, due to its proximity, gained the most from this market. The raw products had lower transportation costs, so traders could pay growers a better price while still selling it to consumers at prices comparable to those from more distant countries.

Secondly, the wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently employed in purchasing such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming country gentlemen, and, when they do, they are generally the best of all improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly in expense. The one often sees his money go from him, and return to him again with a profit; the other, when once he parts with it, very seldom expects to see any more of it. Those different habits naturally affect their temper and disposition in every sort of business. The merchant is commonly a bold, a country gentleman a timid undertaker. The one is not afraid to lay out at once a large capital upon the improvement of his land, when he has a probable prospect of raising the value of it in proportion to the expense; the other, if he has any capital, which is not always the case, seldom ventures to employ it in this manner. If he improves at all, it is commonly not with a capital, but with what he can save out of his annual revenue. Whoever has had the fortune to live in a mercantile town, situated in an unimproved country, must have frequently observed how much more spirited the operations of merchants were in this way, than those of mere country gentlemen. The habits, besides, of order, economy, and attention, to which mercantile business naturally forms a merchant, render him much fitter to execute, with profit and success, any project of improvement.

Secondly, the wealth gained by city dwellers was often used to buy land that was up for sale, much of which was usually uncultivated. Merchants tend to aspire to become landowners, and when they do, they often make the best improvements. A merchant is used to investing his money mainly in profitable ventures, while a typical landowner is more likely to spend it. The former usually sees his money go out and come back with a profit; the latter, once he spends it, rarely expects to get it back. These different habits naturally influence their attitudes and approaches in all kinds of business. Merchants are generally more daring, while landowners are more cautious. The former isn't afraid to invest a large sum into land improvement when there’s a good chance of increasing its value in relation to the expense; the latter, if he has any funds—which isn’t always the case—rarely risks using it this way. If he does improve his land, it's usually not with significant investment but with what he can save from his annual income. Anyone who has had the luck to live in a trading town located in an underdeveloped area must have often noticed how much more dynamic the activities of merchants were compared to those of typical landowners. Additionally, the habits of organization, frugality, and focus that come with mercantile work make a merchant much better equipped to successfully and profitably carry out any improvement projects.

Thirdly, and lastly, commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. Mr Hume is the only writer who, so far as I know, has hitherto taken notice of it.

Thirdly, and finally, trade and manufacturing gradually brought about order and good governance, along with the freedom and safety of individuals, among the people of the country, who had previously lived in a nearly constant state of conflict with their neighbors and under the control of their superiors. Although this has been the least noticed, it is by far the most significant of all their effects. Mr. Hume is the only writer, to my knowledge, who has acknowledged this.

In a country which has neither foreign commerce nor any of the finer manufactures, a great proprietor, having nothing for which he can exchange the greater part of the produce of his lands which is over and above the maintenance of the cultivators, consumes the whole in rustic hospitality at home. If this surplus produce is sufficient to maintain a hundred or a thousand men, he can make use of it in no other way than by maintaining a hundred or a thousand men. He is at all times, therefore, surrounded with a multitude of retainers and dependents, who, having no equivalent to give in return for their maintenance, but being fed entirely by his bounty, must obey him, for the same reason that soldiers obey the prince who pays them. Before the extension of commerce and manufactures in Europe, the hospitality of the rich and the great, from the sovereign down to the smallest baron, exceeded every thing which, in the present times, we can easily form a notion of. Westminster-hall was the dining-room of William Rufus, and might frequently, perhaps, not be too large for his company. It was reckoned a piece of magnificence in Thomas Becket, that he strewed the floor of his hall with clean hay or rushes in the season, in order that the knights and squires, who could not get seats, might not spoil their fine clothes when they sat down on the floor to eat their dinner. The great Earl of Warwick is said to have entertained every day, at his different manors, 30,000 people; and though the number here may have been exaggerated, it must, however, have been very great to admit of such exaggeration. A hospitality nearly of the same kind was exercised not many years ago in many different parts of the Highlands of Scotland. It seems to be common in all nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known. I have seen, says Doctor[Pg 168] Pocock, an Arabian chief dine in the streets of a town where he had come to sell his cattle, and invited all passengers, even common beggars, to sit down with him and partake of his banquet.

In a country that has no foreign trade or advanced manufacturing, a wealthy landowner, having nothing to trade for the majority of the excess produce from his land beyond what is needed for his workers' sustenance, consumes it all in generous hospitality at home. If this surplus produce is enough to support a hundred or a thousand people, he can only use it by providing for a hundred or a thousand people. Therefore, he is always surrounded by a crowd of retainers and dependents, who, having nothing to offer in return for their upkeep and being entirely supported by his generosity, must obey him, just like soldiers obey the prince who pays them. Before commerce and industry expanded in Europe, the hospitality of the wealthy and powerful, from kings to the smallest lords, surpassed anything we can easily imagine today. Westminster Hall served as the dining room for William Rufus and may often have been too small for his guests. It was considered extravagant of Thomas Becket to cover the floor of his hall with clean hay or rushes in season so that the knights and squires who couldn’t find seats wouldn’t ruin their fine clothes when they sat on the floor to have their meals. The great Earl of Warwick is said to have hosted 30,000 people daily at his various estates, and while this number might have been exaggerated, it must have been substantial to support such exaggeration. A similar kind of hospitality was practiced not long ago in various parts of the Scottish Highlands. It seems to be common in nations that are largely unfamiliar with trade and manufacturing. Dr. Pocock noted that he witnessed an Arabian chief dine in the streets of a town where he came to sell his cattle, inviting all passersby, even common beggars, to sit down with him and share in his feast.

The occupiers of land were in every respect as dependent upon the great proprietor as his retainers. Even such of them as were not in a state of villanage, were tenants at will, who paid a rent in no respect equivalent to the subsistence which the land afforded them. A crown, half a crown, a sheep, a lamb, was some years ago, in the Highlands of Scotland, a common rent for lands which maintained a family. In some places it is so at this day; nor will money at present purchase a greater quantity of commodities there than in other places. In a country where the surplus produce of a large estate must be consumed upon the estate itself, it will frequently be more convenient for the proprietor, that part of it be consumed at a distance from his own house, provided they who consume it are as dependent upon him as either his retainers or his menial servants. He in thereby saved from the embarrassment of either too large a company, or too large a family. A tenant at will, who possesses land sufficient to maintain his family for little more than a quit-rent, is as dependent upon the proprietor as any servant or retainer whatever, and must obey him with as little reserve. Such a proprietor, as he feeds his servants and retainers at his own house, so he feeds his tenants at their houses. The subsistence of both is derived from his bounty, and its continuance depends upon his good pleasure.

The people living on the land were just as dependent on the landowner as his servants. Even those who weren't serfs were tenants who could be kicked out at any time and paid rent that was nowhere near enough to cover what the land provided for them. A crown, half a crown, a sheep, or a lamb used to be common rent in the Highlands of Scotland for land that supported a family. In some areas, this is still true today, and you can't buy more goods there with money than you can elsewhere. In a place where the extra output of a large estate has to be used on the estate itself, it often makes more sense for the owner to have some of it consumed away from his home, as long as those who consume it are just as dependent on him as his servants. This way, he can avoid the hassle of having too many guests or too large a household. A tenant who has just enough land to support his family for little more than a nominal rent is just as dependent on the landowner as any servant, and he must follow his orders without question. Just as the landowner feeds his servants and staff at his own home, he also provides for his tenants at theirs. The subsistence of both groups comes from his generosity, and its continuation relies on his goodwill.

Upon the authority which the great proprietors necessarily had, in such a state of things, over their tenants and retainers, was founded the power of the ancient barons. They necessarily became the judges in peace, and the leaders in war, of all who dwelt upon their estates. They could maintain order, and execute the law, within their respective demesnes, because each of them could there turn the whole force of all the inhabitants against the injustice of any one. No other person had sufficient authority to do this. The king, in particular, had not. In those ancient times, he was little more than the greatest proprietor in his dominions, to whom, for the sake of common defence against their common enemies, the other great proprietors paid certain respects. To have enforced payment of a small debt within the lands of a great proprietor, where all the inhabitants were armed, and accustomed to stand by one another, would have cost the king, had he attempted it by his own authority, almost the same effort as to extinguish a civil war. He was, therefore, obliged to abandon the administration of justice, through the greater part of the country, to those who were capable of administering it; and, for the same reason, to leave the command of the country militia to those whom that militia would obey.

The authority that the major landowners held over their tenants and followers was the basis for the power of the ancient barons. They inevitably became the judges in times of peace and the leaders in times of war for everyone living on their land. They had the ability to maintain order and enforce the law within their territories because they could rally all the residents against any form of injustice. No one else had enough authority to do this. Even the king lacked that authority. Back then, he was merely the largest landowner in his realm, to whom other powerful landowners showed a level of respect for the sake of mutual defense against common threats. Enforcing the payment of a small debt on a major landowner's property, where all the residents were armed and used to supporting each other, would have required the king nearly as much effort as quelling a civil war if he tried to do it on his own. As a result, he had to leave the administration of justice for most of the country to those who could handle it, and for the same reason, he had to let those whom the local militia would follow take command of the militia.

It is a mistake to imagine that those territorial jurisdictions took their origin from the feudal law. Not only the highest jurisdictions, both civil and criminal, but the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that of making bye-laws for the government of their own people, were all rights possessed allodially by the great proprietors of land, several centuries before even the name of the feudal law was known in Europe. The authority and jurisdiction of the Saxon lords in England appear to have been as great before the Conquest as that of any of the Norman lords after it. But the feudal law is not supposed to have become the common law of England till after the Conquest. That the most extensive authority and jurisdictions were possessed by the great lords in France allodially, long before the feudal law was introduced into that country, is a matter of fact that admits of no doubt. That authority, and those jurisdictions, all necessarily flowed from the state of property and manners just now described. Without remounting to the remote antiquities of either the French or English monarchies, we may find, in much later times, many proofs that such effects must always flow from such causes. It is not thirty years ago since Mr Cameron of Lochiel, a gentleman of Lochaber in Scotland, without any legal warrant whatever, not being what was then called a lord of regality, nor even a tenant in chief, but a vassal of the Duke of Argyll, and without being so much as a justice of peace, used, notwithstanding, to exercise the highest criminal jurisdictions over his own people. He is said to have done so with great equity, though without any of the formalities of justice; and it is not improbable that the state of that part of the country at that time made it necessary for him to assume this authority, in order to maintain the public peace. That gentleman, whose rent never exceeded L.500 a-year, carried, in 1745, 800 of his own people into the rebellion with him.

It's a mistake to think that those territorial jurisdictions originated from feudal law. Not only the highest civil and criminal courts, but also the power to raise troops, mint money, and even create local laws for governing their own people, were all rights held by the major landowners, long before the term "feudal law" was even known in Europe. The authority and jurisdiction of the Saxon lords in England seem to have been as significant before the Conquest as those of any Norman lords afterward. However, feudal law is thought to have only become the common law of England after the Conquest. It's a well-established fact that the great lords in France held extensive rights and jurisdictions allodially long before feudal law was introduced there. These authorities and jurisdictions naturally arose from the state of property and societal norms previously described. Without going back to the distant past of either French or English monarchies, we can find many later examples that show such outcomes inevitably stem from those causes. It hasn’t been thirty years since Mr. Cameron of Lochiel, a gentleman from Lochaber in Scotland, exercised the highest levels of criminal jurisdiction over his own people without any legal authority. He wasn't a lord of regality, nor even a tenant in chief, but just a vassal of the Duke of Argyll, and not even a justice of the peace. Yet, he did so with great fairness, despite lacking formal legal processes; it’s likely that the condition of the area at that time necessitated him assuming this authority to keep the public peace. This gentleman, whose income never exceeded £500 a year, took 800 of his own people with him into the rebellion in 1745.

The introduction of the feudal law, so far from extending, may be regarded as an attempt to moderate, the authority of the great allodial lords. It established a regular subordination, accompanied with a long train of services and duties, from the king down to the smallest proprietor. During the minority of the proprietor, the rent, together with the management of his lands, fell into the hands of his immediate superior; and, consequently, those of all great proprietors into the hands of the king, who was charged with the maintenance and education of the pupil, and who, from his authority as guardian, was supposed to have a right of disposing of him in marriage, provided it was in a manner not unsuitable to his rank. But though this institution necessarily tended to strengthen the autho[Pg 169]rity of the king, and to weaken that of the great proprietors, it could not do either sufficiently for establishing order and good government among the inhabitants of the country; because it could not alter sufficiently that state of property and manners from which the disorders arose. The authority of government still continued to be, as before, too weak in the head, and too strong in the inferior members; and the excessive strength of the inferior members was the cause of the weakness of the head. After the institution of feudal subordination, the king was as incapable of restraining the violence of the great lords as before. They still continued to make war according to their own discretion, almost continually upon one another, and very frequently upon the king; and the open country still continued to be a scene of violence, rapine, and disorder.

The introduction of feudal law, rather than expanding it, can be seen as an effort to moderate the power of the large landowners. It created a clear hierarchy, complete with a long list of services and responsibilities, from the king down to the smallest landholder. During a landowner's minority, the rent and management of their lands went to their immediate superior; thus, all major landowners' properties fell under the king's control, who was responsible for the guardian’s upbringing and education. As guardian, the king also had the right to arrange their marriage, as long as it was appropriate for their rank. However, while this system aimed to boost the king’s authority and diminish the power of the big landowners, it wasn’t enough to create order and good governance among the people. It couldn’t sufficiently change the property and social conditions that caused the disturbances. The government’s authority remained, as before, too weak at the top and too strong at the bottom; this imbalance was why the top was weak. After establishing feudal subordination, the king was just as unable as before to control the aggression of the powerful lords. They continued to wage war as they pleased, frequently against one another and often against the king himself. The countryside remained a place of violence, looting, and chaos.

But what all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have effected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and manufactures gradually brought about. These gradually furnished the great proprietors with something for which they could exchange the whole surplus produce of their lands, and which they could consume themselves, without sharing it either with tenants or retainers. All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could find a method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they had no disposition to share them with any other persons. For a pair of diamond buckles, perhaps, or for something as frivolous and useless, they exchanged the maintenance, or, what in the same thing, the price of the maintenance of 1000 men for a year, and with it the whole weight and authority which it could give them. The buckles, however, were to be all their own, and no other human creature was to have any share of them; whereas, in the more ancient method of expense, they must have shared with at least 1000 people. With the judges that were to determine the preference, this difference was perfectly decisive; and thus, for the gratification of the most childish, the meanest, and the most sordid of all vanities they gradually bartered their whole power and authority.

But what all the violence of the feudal systems could never achieve, the quiet and unnoticed impact of foreign trade and manufacturing slowly accomplished. This gradually provided the wealthy landowners with something they could exchange for the entire surplus of their land’s produce, which they could enjoy alone without sharing with tenants or servants. The idea of “everything for ourselves and nothing for others” seems to have been a ruthless principle followed by the powerful throughout history. As soon as they figured out how to keep the full value of their rents for themselves, they had no desire to share it with anyone else. For a pair of diamond buckles, or something equally trivial and unnecessary, they traded away the sustenance, or essentially the funds for the support, of 1,000 men for a year, along with all the influence and authority that came with it. However, those buckles were all for them, and no one else would get any part of them; in contrast, with the older way of spending, they would have had to share with at least 1,000 people. For the judges who decided these preferences, this difference was a clear deciding factor; thus, for the sake of satisfying the most childish, petty, and crass of all vanities, they gradually exchanged their entire power and authority.

In a country where there is no foreign commerce, nor any of the finer manufactures, a man of L.10,000 a-year cannot well employ his revenue in any other way than in maintaining, perhaps, 1000 families, who are all of them necessarily at his command. In the present state of Europe, a man of L.10,000 a-year can spend his whole revenue, and he generally does so, without directly maintaining twenty people, or being able to command more than ten footmen, not worth the commanding. Indirectly, perhaps, he maintains as great, or even a greater number of people, than he could have done by the ancient method of expense. For though the quantity of precious productions for which he exchanges his whole revenue be very small, the number of workmen employed in collecting and preparing it must necessarily have been very great. Its great price generally arises from the wages of their labour, and the profits of all their immediate employers. By paying that price, he indirectly pays all those wages and profits, and thus indirectly contributes to the maintenance of all the workmen and their employers. He generally contributes, however, but a very small proportion to that of each; to a very few, perhaps, not a tenth, to many not a hundredth, and to some not a thousandth, or even a ten thousandth part of their whole annual maintenance. Though he contributes, therefore, to the maintenance of them all, they are all more or less independent of him, because generally they can all be maintained without him.

In a country without foreign trade or finer manufacturing, a person earning £10,000 a year can't really spend his income in any way other than supporting about 1,000 families, all of whom are essentially at his service. In today's Europe, someone with £10,000 a year can blow through their entire income without directly supporting more than twenty people or having control over more than ten servants, who aren't even worth commanding. Indirectly, though, he might be supporting just as many, if not more, people than before through traditional spending. Although the amount of luxury goods he gets in return for his income is quite small, the number of workers involved in gathering and preparing them is likely very high. The high cost usually reflects the wages of those workers and the profits of their immediate employers. By paying that price, he indirectly covers all those wages and profits, contributing to the support of all the workers and their employers. However, his contribution is generally just a small fraction of each individual’s support; for a few, it might be less than a tenth, for many, less than a hundredth, and for some, even less than a thousandth or ten-thousandth of their total annual support. So, while he does help support them all, they are all relatively independent of him since they can generally sustain themselves without his help.

When the great proprietors of land spend their rents in maintaining their tenants and retainers, each of them maintains entirely all his own tenants and all his own retainers. But when they spend them in maintaining tradesmen and artificers, they may, all of them taken together, perhaps maintain as great, or, on account of the waste which attends rustic hospitality, a greater number of people than before. Each of them, however, taken singly, contributes often but a very small share to the maintenance of any individual of this greater number. Each tradesman or artificer derives his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon any one of them.

When the wealthy landowners spend their rental income on taking care of their tenants and workers, each one fully supports his own tenants and workers. However, when they use that income to support tradespeople and craftsmen, they may collectively support as many, or even more people due to the waste that comes with country hospitality. Yet, each landowner individually contributes only a tiny amount to the support of any one person within this larger group. Each tradesperson or craftsman earns their living not from one customer, but from hundreds or thousands. So, while they are somewhat reliant on all of them, they are not completely dependent on any single one.

The personal expense of the great proprietors having in this manner gradually increased, it was impossible that the number of their retainers should not as gradually diminish, till they were at last dismissed altogether. The same cause gradually led them to dismiss the unnecessary part of their tenants. Farms were enlarged, and the occupiers of land, notwithstanding the complaints of depopulation, reduced to the number necessary for cultivating it, according to the imperfect state of cultivation and improvement in those times. By the removal of the unnecessary mouths, and by exacting from the farmer the full value of the farm, a greater surplus, or, what is the same thing, the price of a greater surplus, was obtained for the proprietor, which the merchants and manufacturers soon furnished him with a method of spending upon his own person, in the same manner as he had done the rest. The cause continuing to operate, he was desirous to raise his rents above what his lands, in the actual state of their improvement, could afford. His tenants could agree[Pg 170] to this upon one condition only, that they should be secured in their possession for such a term of years as might give them time to recover, with profit, whatever they should lay out in the further improvement of the land. The expensive vanity of the landlord made him willing to accept of this condition; and hence the origin of long leases.

The personal expenses of the large landowners gradually increased, making it inevitable that the number of their retainers would also decrease until they were eventually let go entirely. This same issue also led them to dismiss many of their tenants. Farms were expanded, and the farmers, despite the complaints about depopulation, were reduced to only the number needed to cultivate the land, based on the limited agricultural techniques and improvements of that time. By getting rid of unnecessary dependents and demanding full value from the farmers, the landowners generated a greater surplus, or essentially, a higher price for that surplus, which merchants and manufacturers quickly provided ways for them to spend on themselves, just as they had with their other resources. As this trend continued, they sought to increase their rents beyond what their lands could realistically support given their current condition. Their tenants would agree to this only if they were guaranteed possession for a number of years long enough to recoup, with profit, any investments they made in further improving the land. The costly vanity of the landlord made him willing to accept this condition; thus, long leases came into existence.

Even a tenant at will, who pays the full value of the land, is not altogether dependent upon the landlord. The pecuniary advantages which they receive from one another are mutual and equal, and such a tenant will expose neither his life nor his fortune in the service of the proprietor. But if he has a lease for a long term of years, he is altogether independent; and his landlord must not expect from him even the most trifling service, beyond what is either expressly stipulated in the lease, or imposed upon him by the common and known law of the country.

Even a tenant who pays the full value of the land isn’t completely dependent on the landlord. The financial benefits they provide each other are mutual and equal, and such a tenant won't put his life or fortune at risk for the owner. However, if he has a long-term lease, he is entirely independent; the landlord shouldn’t expect even the slightest service from him beyond what’s specifically agreed upon in the lease or required by common law.

The tenants having in this manner become independent, and the retainers being dismissed, the great proprietors were no longer capable of interrupting the regular execution of justice, or of disturbing the peace of the country. Having sold their birth-right, not like Esau, for a mess of pottage in time of hunger and necessity, but, in the wantonness of plenty, for trinkets and baubles, fitter to be the playthings of children than the serious pursuits of men, they became as insignificant as any substantial burgher or tradesmen in a city. A regular government was established in the country as well as in the city, nobody having sufficient power to disturb its operations in the one, any more than in the other.

The tenants became independent, and the retainers were let go, so the wealthy landowners could no longer disrupt the fair administration of justice or disturb the peace in the country. They sold their birthright, not like Esau did for a bowl of stew during a time of hunger and need, but out of sheer excess for trinkets and toys more suited for children than serious pursuits of grown-ups, making them as insignificant as any regular citizen or tradesperson in a city. A reliable government was set up in both the country and the city, with no one having enough power to interfere with its functioning in either place.

It does not, perhaps, relate to the present subject, but I cannot help remarking it, that very old families, such as have possessed some considerable estate from father to son for many successive generations, are very rare in commercial countries. In countries which have little commerce, on the contrary, such as Wales, or the Highlands of Scotland, they are very common. The Arabian histories seem to be all full of genealogies; and there is a history written by a Tartar Khan, which has been translated into several European languages, and which contains scarce any thing else; a proof that ancient families are very common among those nations. In countries where a rich man can spend his revenue in no other way than by maintaining as many people as it can maintain, he is apt to run out, and his benevolence, it seems, is seldom so violent as to attempt to maintain more than he can afford. But where he can spend the greatest revenue upon his own person, he frequently has no bounds to his expense, because he frequently has no bounds to his vanity, or to his affection for his own person. In commercial countries, therefore, riches, in spite of the most violent regulations of law to prevent their dissipation, very seldom remain long in the same family. Among simple nations, on the contrary, they frequently do, without any regulations of law; for among nations of shepherds, such as the Tartars and Arabs, the consumable nature of their property necessarily renders all such regulations impossible.

It might not be directly related to the current topic, but I can’t help pointing out that very old families, ones that have passed down significant estates from generation to generation, are quite rare in commercial countries. On the other hand, in countries with little commerce, like Wales or the Highlands of Scotland, these families are quite common. Arabian histories seem to be filled with genealogies; there's also a history written by a Tartar Khan that has been translated into several European languages, which mainly contains genealogies—showing that ancient families are quite common in those cultures. In countries where a wealthy person can only spend their income on supporting as many people as possible, they tend to run out of funds, and their generosity usually doesn't stretch to supporting more than they can afford. But where they can spend a large amount of money on themselves, they often have no limits to their spending because their vanity or self-love knows no bounds. So, in commercial countries, wealth rarely stays in the same family for long, despite strict laws meant to prevent its dissipation. In simpler societies, however, it often does, without any legal restrictions; among nomadic cultures like the Tartars and Arabs, the temporary nature of their wealth makes such regulations impossible.

A revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness, was in this manner brought about by two different orders of people, who had not the least intention to serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity was the sole motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much less ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in pursuit of their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got. Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of that great revolution which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually bringing about.

A major revolution that significantly impacted public happiness was brought about by two different groups of people, who had no intention of serving the public. The main goal of the wealthy landowners was to satisfy their own childish vanity. The merchants and craftsmen, who were much less absurd, acted purely out of self-interest, looking to make money wherever they could. Neither group had any understanding or foresight of the huge revolution that was slowly taking shape due to the foolishness of one and the hard work of the other.

It was thus, that, through the greater part of Europe, the commerce and manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country.

It was in this way that, for the most part of Europe, the trade and industries of cities, instead of being a result, have been the reason and driving force behind the improvement and development of the countryside.

This order, however, being contrary to the natural course of things, is necessarily both slow and uncertain. Compare the slow progress of those European countries of which the wealth depends very much upon their commerce and manufactures, with the rapid advances of our North American colonies, of which the wealth is founded altogether in agriculture. Through the greater part of Europe, the number of inhabitants is not supposed to double in less than five hundred years. In several of our North American colonies, it is found to double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. In Europe, the law of primogeniture, and perpetuities of different kinds, prevent the division of great estates, and thereby hinder the multiplication of small proprietors. A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of his little territory, views it with all the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who upon that account takes pleasure, not only in cultivating, but in adorning it, is generally of all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful. The same regulations, besides, keep so much land out of the market, that there are always more capitals to buy than there is land to sell, so that what is sold always sells at a monopoly price. The rent never pays the interest of the purchase money, and is, besides, burdened with repairs and other occasional charges, to which the interest of money is not liable. To purchase land, is, everywhere in Europe, a most unprofitable employment of a small capital. For the sake of the superior security, indeed, a man of moderate circumstances, when he retires from business,[Pg 171] will sometimes choose to lay out his little capital in land. A man of profession, too, whose revenue is derived from another source, often loves to secure his savings in the same way. But a young man, who, instead of applying to trade or to some profession, should employ a capital of two or three thousand pounds in the purchase and cultivation of a small piece of land, might indeed expect to live very happily and very independently, but must bid adieu for ever to all hope of either great fortune or great illustration, which, by a different employment of his stock, he might have had the same chance of acquiring with other people. Such a person, too, though he cannot aspire at being a proprietor, will often disdain to be a farmer. The small quantity of land, therefore, which is brought to market, and the high price of what is brought thither, prevents a great number of capitals from being employed in its cultivation and improvement, which would otherwise have taken that direction. In North America, on the contrary, fifty or sixty pounds is often found a sufficient stock to begin a plantation with. The purchase and improvement of uncultivated land is there the most profitable employment of the smallest as well as of the greatest capitals, and the most direct road to all the fortune and illustration which can be acquired in that country. Such land, indeed, is in North America to be had almost for nothing, or at a price much below the value of the natural produce; a thing impossible in Europe, or indeed in any country where all lands have long been private property. If landed estates, however, were divided equally among all the children, upon the death of any proprietor who left a numerous family, the estate would generally be sold. So much land would come to market, that it could no longer sell at a monopoly price. The free rent of the land would go no nearer to pay the interest of the purchase-money, and a small capital might be employed in purchasing land as profitable as in any other way.

This order, however, goes against the natural flow of things, making it both slow and uncertain. Compare the slow progress of those European countries whose wealth relies heavily on their trade and manufacturing with the rapid growth of our North American colonies, whose wealth is entirely based on farming. In most of Europe, the population isn't expected to double in less than five hundred years. In many of our North American colonies, the population can double in twenty to twenty-five years. In Europe, laws like primogeniture and various forms of perpetuity prevent the division of large estates, which hinders the growth of small landowners. A small landowner, who knows every inch of his little piece of land and feels a deep affection for it—which small property naturally inspires—takes pleasure not only in farming but also in beautifying it. Such individuals are often the most hardworking, knowledgeable, and successful in making improvements. Additionally, these regulations keep so much land off the market that there are always more investors looking to buy than there is land available to sell, meaning what does get sold usually fetches a monopoly price. The rent never covers the interest on the purchase price and is also burdened with repairs and unexpected costs not associated with borrowed money. Buying land is, in Europe, a poor investment for a small amount of capital. For the sake of greater security, a reasonably well-off person approaching retirement may choose to invest their small capital in land. Additionally, professionals whose income comes from other sources often like to secure their savings in this way. However, a young person who chooses to use two or three thousand pounds to buy and farm a small plot of land, instead of pursuing a trade or career, might expect to live a pretty happy and independent life, but will have to give up any hope of achieving significant wealth or recognition that he may have been able to achieve by investing his capital differently. Such individuals might not aspire to be landowners but often turn their noses up at being farmers. Thus, the limited amount of land available for sale and the high prices of what is on the market prevents many investments from being made in its farming and improvement that could otherwise happen. In contrast, in North America, a starting capital of fifty or sixty pounds is often enough to launch a small farming operation. The purchase and development of uncultivated land is the most profitable option for both small and large investments, and the best route to acquiring wealth and recognition in that country. Land there is often available for little to nothing or at a price significantly below its natural value—something impossible in Europe or any other country where land has long been privately owned. However, if land was equally divided among all the children of an owner who had a large family, the estate would likely be sold. So much land would come onto the market that it would no longer command monopoly prices. The overall rent would not get any closer to covering the interest on the purchase price, and a small investment in land could be as profitable as any other investment option.

England, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the great extent of the sea-coast in proportion to that of the whole country, and of the many navigable rivers which run through it, and afford the conveniency of water carriage to some of the most inland parts of it, is perhaps as well fitted by nature as any large country in Europe to be the seat of foreign commerce, of manufactures for distant sale, and of all the improvements which these can occasion. From the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, too, the English legislature has been peculiarly attentive to the interest of commerce and manufactures, and in reality there is no country in Europe, Holland itself not excepted, of which the law is, upon the whole, more favourable to this sort of industry. Commerce and manufactures have accordingly been continually advancing during all this period. The cultivation and improvement of the country has, no doubt, been gradually advancing too; but it seems to have followed slowly, and at a distance, the more rapid progress of commerce and manufactures. The greater part of the country must probably have been cultivated before the reign of Elizabeth; and a very great part of it still remains uncultivated, and the cultivation of the far greater part much inferior to what it might be. The law of England, however, favours agriculture, not only indirectly, by the protection of commerce, but by several direct encouragements. Except in times of scarcity, the exportation of corn is not only free, but encouraged by a bounty. In times of moderate plenty, the importation of foreign corn is loaded with duties that amount to a prohibition. The importation of live cattle, except from Ireland, is prohibited at all times; and it is but of late that it was permitted from thence. Those who cultivate the land, therefore, have a monopoly against their countrymen for the two greatest and most important articles of land produce, bread and butcher's meat. These encouragements, though at bottom, perhaps, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter, altogether illusory, sufficiently demonstrate at least the good intention of the legislature to favour agriculture. But what is of much more importance than all of them, the yeomanry of England are rendered as secure, as independent, and as respectable, as law can make them. No country, therefore, in which the right of primogeniture takes place, which pays tithes, and where perpetuities, though contrary to the spirit of the law, are admitted in some cases, can give more encouragement to agriculture than England. Such, however, notwithstanding, is the state of its cultivation. What would it have been, had the law given no direct encouragement to agriculture besides what arises indirectly from the progress of commerce, and had left the yeomanry in the same condition as in most other countries of Europe? It is now more than two hundred years since the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, a period as long as the course of human prosperity usually endures.

England, because of its naturally fertile soil, extensive coastline relative to its size, and numerous navigable rivers, is likely one of the best-suited countries in Europe for foreign trade, manufacturing for distant sales, and all the advancements these activities can bring. Since the start of Elizabeth's reign, the English government has paid special attention to the interests of commerce and manufacturing. In reality, there is no other country in Europe, not even Holland, where the laws are generally more supportive of these industries. As a result, both commerce and manufacturing have been steadily improving throughout this time. While the cultivation and enhancement of the countryside have also progressed, they seem to have lagged behind the faster growth of commerce and manufacturing. Most of the land was likely being farmed before Elizabeth's reign, and a significant portion remains uncultivated, with much of the active farming being far less productive than it could be. However, English law supports agriculture not just indirectly through the protection of commerce but also with various direct incentives. Except during times of scarcity, exporting grain is not only allowed but also supported with financial rewards. During times of moderate abundance, importing foreign grain is heavily taxed, essentially making it prohibitive. Importing live cattle is banned except for those from Ireland, which has only recently been allowed. Therefore, local farmers have a monopoly on the two most important agricultural products: bread and meat. Though these incentives may ultimately be somewhat misleading, as I will demonstrate later, they clearly show the government’s good intentions towards agriculture. More importantly, the farmers in England are made as secure, independent, and respected as the law allows. Thus, no country that practices primogeniture, imposes tithes, and allows certain perpetual estates, despite conflicting with the law's spirit, can support agriculture better than England. Nonetheless, this is the current state of its agricultural development. How much different would it be if the law provided no direct support for agriculture beyond what is indirectly gained from commerce, and if farmers were left in the same situation as in most other European countries? It has been over two hundred years since Elizabeth’s reign began, a span of time that typically reflects the cycle of human prosperity.

France seems to have had a considerable share of foreign commerce, near a century before England was distinguished as a commercial country. The marine of France was considerable, according to the notions of the times, before the expedition of Charles VIII. to Naples. The cultivation and improvement of France, however, is, upon the whole, inferior to that of England. The law of the country has never given the same direct encouragement to agriculture.

France appears to have had a significant amount of foreign trade almost a century before England emerged as a commercial nation. The French navy was quite substantial, by the standards of the time, prior to Charles VIII's expedition to Naples. However, France's overall development and advancement are, on the whole, less impressive than England's. The country's laws have never provided the same direct support for agriculture.

The foreign commerce of Spain and Portugal to the other parts of Europe, though chiefly carried on in foreign ships, is very considerable. That to their colonies is carried[Pg 172] on in their own, and is much greater, on account of the great riches and extent of those colonies. But it has never introduced any considerable manufactures for distant sale into either of those countries, and the greater part of both still remains uncultivated. The foreign commerce of Portugal is of older standing than that of any great country in Europe, except Italy.

The international trade of Spain and Portugal with other parts of Europe, although mainly conducted through foreign ships, is quite significant. Their trade with their colonies, which is done using their own ships, is much larger due to the vast wealth and size of those colonies. However, it has not led to the establishment of any major industries for long-distance sales in either country, and a large portion of both still remains undeveloped. Portugal's foreign trade has a longer history than that of any major country in Europe, except Italy.

Italy is the only great country of Europe which seems to have been cultivated and improved in every part, by means of foreign commerce and manufactures for distant sale. Before the invasion of Charles VIII., Italy, according to Guicciardini, was cultivated not less in the most mountainous and barren parts of the country, than in the plainest and most fertile. The advantageous situation of the country, and the great number of independent states which at that time subsisted in it, probably contributed not a little to this general cultivation. It is not impossible, too, notwithstanding this general expression of one of the most judicious and reserved of modern historians, that Italy was not at that time better cultivated than England is at present.

Italy is the only major country in Europe that seems to have been developed and enhanced in every area through international trade and manufacturing for faraway markets. Before Charles VIII.'s invasion, Italy, according to Guicciardini, was cultivated just as much in the most mountainous and barren regions as in the flattest and most fertile ones. The country's favorable location and the many independent states that existed at that time likely played a significant role in this widespread development. It's also possible, despite this general claim from one of the most insightful and cautious modern historians, that Italy was not any better cultivated back then than England is today.

The capital, however, that is acquired to any country by commerce and manufactures, is always a very precarious and uncertain possession, till some part of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and improvement of its lands. A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and, together with it, all the industry which it supports, from one country to another. No part of it can be said to belong to any particular country, till it has been spread, as it were, over the face of that country, either in buildings, or in the lasting improvement of lands. No vestige now remains of the great wealth said to have been possessed by the greater part of the Hanse Towns, except in the obscure histories of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is even uncertain where some of them were situated, or to what towns in Europe the Latin names given to some of them belong. But though the misfortunes of Italy, in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, greatly diminished the commerce and manufactures of the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany, those countries still continue to be among the most populous and best cultivated in Europe. The civil wars of Flanders, and the Spanish government which succeeded them, chased away the great commerce of Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges. But Flanders still continues to be one of the richest, best cultivated, and most populous provinces of Europe. The ordinary revolutions of war and government easily dry up the sources of that wealth which arises from commerce only. That which arises from the more solid improvements of agriculture is much more durable, and cannot be destroyed but by those more violent convulsions occasioned by the depredations of hostile and barbarous nations continued for a century or two together; such as those that happened for some time before and after the fall of the Roman empire in the western provinces of Europe.

The capital that any country gains from trade and industry is always a shaky and uncertain asset until part of it is secured and invested in the development of its land. A merchant, as has been rightly pointed out, isn't necessarily tied to any specific country. It's largely irrelevant to him where he conducts his business; even a small annoyance can prompt him to move his capital—and all the jobs it supports—from one country to another. No part of that capital can be said to belong to any specific nation until it has been spread across the land, either through buildings or lasting improvements to agriculture. Today, no trace remains of the enormous wealth once held by most of the Hanse Towns, aside from the obscure histories of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It's even unclear where some of them were located or which towns in Europe the Latin names refer to. However, despite the decline of commerce and industry in Lombardy and Tuscany due to Italy's troubles at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, those regions are still among the most populated and well-cultivated in Europe. The civil wars in Flanders and the subsequent Spanish rule drove away the booming trade in Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges. Nonetheless, Flanders remains one of the wealthiest, most cultivated, and densely populated areas in Europe. The typical changes brought on by wars and politics can easily deplete the wealth generated by trade alone. In contrast, the wealth created by solid agricultural improvements is much more resilient and can only be destroyed by severe upheavals caused by invasions from hostile and barbaric nations over centuries, such as those that occurred before and after the fall of the Roman Empire in Western Europe.


BOOK IV.

OF SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.


INTRODUCTION.

Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or, more properly, to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.

Political economy, seen as a part of the science of a statesman or legislator, aims at two main objectives: first, to ensure a plentiful income or means of living for the people, or more accurately, to help them create that income or living for themselves; and second, to provide the state or nation with enough revenue for public services. Its goal is to enrich both the people and the government.

The different progress of opulence in different ages and nations, has given occasion to two different systems of political economy, with regard to enriching the people. The one may be called the system of commerce, the other that of agriculture. I shall endeavour to explain both as fully and distinctly as I can, and shall begin with the system of commerce. It is the modern system, and is best understood in our own country and in our own times.

The varying levels of wealth in different eras and countries have led to two distinct approaches to political economy focused on enriching the people. One is called the commerce system, and the other is the agriculture system. I will try to explain both as clearly and thoroughly as possible, starting with the commerce system. It is the contemporary approach and is most clearly understood in our own nation and time.


CHAP. I.

OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMERCIAL OR MERCANTILE SYSTEM.

That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion which naturally arises from the double function of money, as the instrument of commerce, and as the measure of value. In consequence of its being the instrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain whatever else we have occasion for, than by means of any other commodity. The great affair, we always find, is to get money. When that is obtained, there is no difficulty in making any subsequent purchase. In consequence of its being the measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by the quantity of money which they will exchange for. We say of a rich man, that he is worth a great deal, and of a poor man, that he is worth very little money. A frugal man, or a man eager to be rich, is said to love money; and a careless, a generous, or a profuse man, is said to be indifferent about it. To grow rich is to get money; and wealth and money, in short, are, in common language, considered as in every respect synonymous.

The idea that wealth is made up of money, or gold and silver, is a common belief that comes from the way money works as both a tool for trade and a way to measure value. Because money is a tool for commerce, having it allows us to easily get whatever else we need compared to using any other product. We often find that the main goal is to acquire money. Once we have it, buying anything else becomes much easier. Since money is also a measure of value, we judge all other goods based on how much money they can be exchanged for. We say that a wealthy person is worth a lot, while a poor person is worth very little. A careful person, or someone who wants to be rich, is called a money lover, while a careless, generous, or extravagant person is said to not care much about it. To become rich means to acquire money; in everyday terms, wealth and money are basically considered the same thing.

A rich country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a country abounding in money; and to heap up gold and silver in any country is supposed to be the readiest way to enrich it. For some time after the discovery of America, the first inquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived upon any unknown coast, used to be, if there was any gold or silver to be found in the neighbourhood? By the information which they received, they judged whether it was worth while to make a settlement there, or if the country was worth the conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk sent ambassador from the king of France to one of the sons of the famous Gengis Khan, says, that the Tartars used frequently to ask him, if there was plenty of sheep and oxen in the kingdom of France? Their inquiry had the same object with that of the Spaniards. They wanted to know if the country was rich enough to be worth the conquering. Among the Tartars, as among all other nations of shepherds, who are generally ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the instruments of commerce and the measures of value. Wealth, therefore, according to them, consisted in cattle, as, according to the Spaniards, it consisted in gold and silver. Of the two, the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the nearest to the truth.

A wealthy country, like a wealthy person, is expected to be one that has a lot of money; and collecting gold and silver in any country is seen as the easiest way to make it wealthy. For a while after America was discovered, the first question the Spaniards asked when they arrived at any unfamiliar coast was whether there was any gold or silver in the area. Based on the information they received, they decided whether it was worth settling there or if the country was worth conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk sent as an ambassador from the king of France to one of the sons of the famous Genghis Khan, mentions that the Tartars often asked him if there were plenty of sheep and cattle in France. Their question served the same purpose as that of the Spaniards. They wanted to find out if the country was rich enough to be worth conquering. Among the Tartars, just like in other nations of shepherds, who are generally unfamiliar with money, livestock is used for trade and as a measure of value. Wealth, for them, was defined by the number of cattle, while for the Spaniards, it was measured in gold and silver. Of the two views, the Tartar perspective might have been closer to the truth.

Mr Locke remarks a distinction between money and other moveable goods. All other moveable goods, he says, are of so consumable a nature, that the wealth which consists in them cannot be much depended on; and a nation which abounds in them one year may,[Pg 174] without any exportation, but merely by their own waste and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a steady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be wasted and consumed. Gold and silver, therefore, are, according to him, the most solid and substantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation; and to multiply those metals ought, he thinks, upon that account, to be the great object of its political economy.

Mr. Locke points out a difference between money and other movable goods. He says that all other movable goods are so consumable in nature that the wealth made up of them isn’t very reliable; a nation that has plenty of them one year may, [Pg 174] without any exports, end up in great need of them the next year due to their own wastefulness and extravagance. Money, on the other hand, is a reliable asset that, even though it may change hands frequently, isn’t likely to be wasted and used up if it can be kept within the country. So, according to him, gold and silver are the most solid and substantial parts of a nation’s movable wealth, and increasing these metals should, in his opinion, be a primary goal of its political economy.

Others admit, that if a nation could be separated from all the world, it would be of no consequence how much or how little money circulated in it. The consumable goods, which were circulated by means of this money, would only be exchanged for a greater or a smaller number of pieces; but the real wealth or poverty of the country, they allow, would depend altogether upon the abundance or scarcity of those consumable goods. But it is otherwise, they think, with countries which have connections with foreign nations, and which are obliged to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. This, they say, cannot be done, but by sending abroad money to pay them with; and a nation cannot send much money abroad, unless it has a good deal at home. Every such nation, therefore, must endeavour, in time of peace, to accumulate gold and silver, that when occasion requires, it may have wherewithal to carry on foreign wars.

Others acknowledge that if a nation could be cut off from the rest of the world, it wouldn't really matter how much or how little money was in circulation. The goods that were exchanged using this money would simply trade for a larger or smaller number of coins; however, they agree that the true wealth or poverty of the nation would entirely rely on the availability or lack of those goods. But they believe it works differently for nations that are connected to other countries, which have to engage in foreign wars and maintain fleets and armies in far-off lands. They argue that this can only be done by sending money abroad to pay for these efforts; and a nation can't send a lot of money overseas unless it has plenty at home. Therefore, every such nation must strive, in times of peace, to gather gold and silver so that when the need arises, it has the means to conduct foreign wars.

In consequence of these popular notions, all the different nations of Europe have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries. Spain and Portugal, the proprietors of the principal mines which supply Europe with those metals, have either prohibited their exportation under the severest penalties, or subjected it to a considerable duty. The like prohibition seems anciently to have made a part of the policy of most other European nations. It is even to be found, where we should least of all expect to find it, in some old Scotch acts of Parliament, which forbid, under heavy penalties, the carrying gold or silver forth of the kingdom. The like policy anciently took place both in France and England.

As a result of these popular beliefs, all the different nations of Europe have tried, though with little success, every possible way to gather gold and silver in their own countries. Spain and Portugal, which own the main mines supplying Europe with these metals, have either banned their export with severe penalties or imposed a significant tax on it. Similar bans seem to have been part of the policies of most other European nations in the past. Surprisingly, we can even find this in some old Scottish acts of Parliament, which prohibited taking gold or silver out of the kingdom under heavy penalties. This approach was also present historically in both France and England.

When those countries became commercial, the merchants found this prohibition, upon many occasions, extremely inconvenient. They could frequently buy more advantageously with gold and silver, than with any other commodity, the foreign goods which they wanted, either to import into their own, or to carry to some other foreign country. They remonstrated, therefore, against this prohibition as hurtful to trade.

When those countries became commercial, the merchants often found this restriction really inconvenient. They could frequently buy foreign goods they wanted—either to import into their own country or take to another foreign country—more advantageously with gold and silver than with any other commodity. They complained about this restriction, saying it was damaging to trade.

They represented, first, that the exportation of gold and silver, in order to purchase foreign goods, did not always diminish the quantity of those metals in the kingdom; that, on the contrary, it might frequently increase the quantity; because, if the consumption of foreign goods was not thereby increased in the country, those goods might be re-exported to foreign countries, and being there sold for a large profit, might bring back much more treasure than was originally sent out to purchase them. Mr Mun compares this operation of foreign trade to the seed-time and harvest of agriculture. 'If we only behold,' says he, 'the actions of the husbandman in the seed-time, when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we shall account him rather a madman than a husbandman. But when we consider his labours in the harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we shall find the worth and plentiful increase of his actions.'

They pointed out, first, that exporting gold and silver to buy foreign goods doesn't necessarily reduce the amount of those metals in the kingdom; in fact, it can often increase it. This is because if the consumption of foreign goods doesn't go up in the country, those goods can be sent back to other countries and sold at a much higher price, bringing back a lot more treasure than what was originally spent to buy them. Mr. Mun compares this process of foreign trade to the planting and harvest in agriculture. "If we only look," he says, "at the farmer's actions during planting time, when he throws away a lot of good seeds into the ground, we might think he’s crazy rather than a farmer. But when we see his efforts during harvest time, which is the goal of his work, we will understand the value and abundant results of his actions."

They represented, secondly, that this prohibition could not hinder the exportation of gold and silver, which, on account of the smallness of their bulk in proportion to their value, could easily be smuggled abroad. That this exportation could only be prevented by a proper attention to what they called the balance of trade. That when the country exported to a greater value than it imported, a balance became due to it from foreign nations, which was necessarily paid to it in gold and silver, and thereby increased the quantity of those metals in the kingdom. But that when it imported to a greater value than it exported, a contrary balance became due to foreign nations, which was necessarily paid to them in the same manner, and thereby diminished that quantity: that in this case, to prohibit the exportation of those metals, could not prevent it, but only, by making it more dangerous, render it more expensive: that the exchange was thereby turned more against the country which owed the balance, than it otherwise might have been; the merchant who purchased a bill upon the foreign country being obliged to pay the banker who sold it, not only for the natural risk, trouble, and expense of sending the money thither, but for the extraordinary risk arising from the prohibition; but that the more the exchange was against any country, the more the balance of trade became necessarily against it; the money of that country becoming necessarily of so much less value, in comparison with that of the country to which the balance was due. That if the exchange between England and Holland, for example, was five per cent. against England, it would require 105 ounces of silver in England to purchase a bill for 100 ounces of silver in Holland: that 105 ounces of silver in England, therefore, would be worth only 100 ounces of silver in Holland, and would purchase only a proportionable quantity of Dutch goods; but that 100 ounces of silver in Holland, on the contrary, would be worth 105 ounces in England, and would purchase a proportionable quantity of English goods;[Pg 175] that the English goods which were sold to Holland would be sold so much cheaper, and the Dutch goods which were sold to England so much dearer, by the difference of the exchange: that the one would draw so much less Dutch money to England, and the other so much more English money to Holland, as this difference amounted to: and that the balance of trade, therefore, would necessarily be so much more against England, and would require a greater balance of gold and silver be exported to Holland.

They argued, second, that this ban wouldn’t stop the export of gold and silver, which, due to their small size relative to their value, could easily be smuggled out of the country. They said that preventing this export could only happen through careful consideration of what they called the balance of trade. When a country exports more value than it imports, it generates a balance owed to it from other nations, which is typically paid in gold and silver, thus increasing the amount of those metals in the country. However, when it imports more value than it exports, a negative balance becomes owed to foreign nations, which is paid in the same way, decreasing that quantity. In this situation, prohibiting the export of those metals doesn't stop it but instead makes it riskier and more expensive: the exchange rate turns more unfavorable for the country that owes the balance than it otherwise would be; the merchant who buys a bill against the foreign country has to pay the banker not only for the usual risk, hassle, and cost of sending the money there but also for the extra risk from the ban. The more the exchange shifts against any country, the more the balance of trade moves against it; the money of that country inevitably becomes less valuable compared to that of the country to which it owes the balance. For example, if the exchange rate between England and Holland was 5 percent against England, it would take 105 ounces of silver in England to buy a bill for 100 ounces of silver in Holland: thus, 105 ounces of silver in England would only be worth 100 ounces in Holland, purchasing only a proportionate amount of Dutch goods. On the flip side, 100 ounces of silver in Holland would be worth 105 ounces in England, allowing for a proportionate amount of English goods. The English goods sold to Holland would then be cheaper, while the Dutch goods sold to England would be more expensive, due to the exchange rate difference. This disparity would draw less Dutch money to England and more English money to Holland, corresponding to that difference. Consequently, the balance of trade would necessarily be more unfavorable for England, requiring a greater amount of gold and silver to be exported to Holland.[Pg 175]

Those arguments were partly solid and some partly sophistical. They were solid, so far as they asserted that the exportation of gold and silver in trade might frequently be advantageous to the country. They were solid, too, in asserting that no prohibition could prevent their exportation, when private people found any advantage in exporting them. But they were sophistical, in supposing, that either to preserve or to augment the quantity of those metals required more the attention of government, than to preserve or to augment the quantity of any other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade, without any such attention, never fails to supply in the proper quantity. They were sophistical, too, perhaps, in asserting that the high price of exchange necessarily increased what they called the unfavourable balance of trade, or occasioned the exportation of a greater quantity of gold and silver. That high price, indeed, was extremely disadvantageous to the merchants who had any money to pay in foreign countries. They paid so much dearer for the bills which their bankers granted them upon those countries. But though the risk arising from the prohibition might occasion some extraordinary expense to the bankers, it would not necessarily carry any more money out of the country. This expense would generally be all laid out in the country, in smuggling the money out of it, and could seldom occasion the exportation of a single sixpence beyond the precise sum drawn for. The high price of exchange, too, would naturally dispose the merchants to endeavour to make their exports nearly balance their imports, in order that they might have this high exchange to pay upon as small a sum as possible. The high price of exchange, besides, must necessarily have operated as a tax, in raising the price of foreign goods, and thereby diminishing their consumption. It would tend, therefore, not to increase, but to diminish, what they called the unfavourable balance of trade, and consequently the exportation of gold and silver.

Those arguments were partly strong and partly misleading. They were strong in saying that exporting gold and silver through trade could often benefit the country. They were also strong in claiming that no ban could stop their exportation if people found it beneficial to export them. However, they were misleading in thinking that managing the amount of these metals required more attention from the government than managing the supply of any other useful goods, which free trade can always provide in the right amounts without such oversight. They were also possibly misleading in suggesting that a high exchange rate automatically worsened what they called the unfavorable balance of trade or led to more gold and silver being exported. That high exchange rate was definitely a disadvantage for merchants who needed to pay in foreign countries because it made their bills more expensive. But while the risks from the ban might create extra costs for bankers, it wouldn’t necessarily lead to more money leaving the country. Most of those costs would likely be spent within the country on smuggling the money out and rarely would result in exporting a single coin beyond the exact amount drawn for. Furthermore, the high exchange rate would naturally encourage merchants to try to make their exports nearly equal their imports, so they could minimize the higher exchange costs on a smaller amount. Additionally, the high exchange rate would effectively act as a tax, raising the price of foreign goods and reducing their consumption. Therefore, it would likely decrease rather than increase what they called the unfavorable balance of trade and, as a result, the exportation of gold and silver.

Such as they were, however, those arguments convinced the people to whom they were addressed. They were addressed by merchants to parliaments and to the councils of princes, to nobles, and to country gentlemen; by those who were supposed to understand trade, to those who were conscious to themselves that they knew nothing about the matter. That foreign trade enriched the country, experience demonstrated to the nobles and country gentlemen, as well as to the merchants; but how, or in what manner, none of them well knew. The merchants knew perfectly in what manner it enriched themselves, it was their business to know it. But to know in what manner it enriched the country, was no part of their business. The subject never came into their consideration, but when they had occasion to apply to their country for some change in the laws relating to foreign trade. It then became necessary to say something about the beneficial effects of foreign trade, and the manner in which those effects were obstructed by the laws as they then stood. To the judges who were to decide the business, it appeared a most satisfactory account of the matter, when they were told that foreign trade brought money into the country, but that the laws in question hindered it from bringing so much as it otherwise would do. Those arguments, therefore, produced the wished-for effect. The prohibition of exporting gold and silver was, in France and England, confined to the coin of those respective countries. The exportation of foreign coin and of bullion was made free. In Holland, and in some other places, this liberty was extended even to the coin of the country. The attention of government was turned away from guarding against the exportation of gold and silver, to watch over the balance of trade, as the only cause which could occasion any augmentation or diminution of these metals. From one fruitless care, it was turned away to another care much more intricate, much more embarrassing, and just equally fruitless. The title of Mun's book, England's Treasure in Foreign Trade, became a fundamental maxim in the political economy, not of England only, but of all other commercial countries. The inland or home trade, the most important of all, the trade in which an equal capital affords the greatest revenue, and creates the greatest employment to the people of the country, was considered as subsidiary only to foreign trade. It neither brought money into the country, it was said, nor carried any out of it. The country, therefore, could never become either richer or poorer by means of it, except so far as its prosperity or decay might indirectly influence the state of foreign trade.

However, those arguments did convince the people they were directed at. They were presented by merchants to parliaments and the councils of princes, nobles, and local gentlemen; from those who were supposed to understand trade to those who were aware they knew little about the topic. Experience showed the nobles and country gentlemen, as well as the merchants, that foreign trade enriched the country, but they didn’t fully understand how or why. The merchants were well aware of how it enriched themselves; that was their job to know. But understanding how it benefited the country wasn’t part of their focus. They only thought about it when they needed to petition their country for changes to laws concerning foreign trade. At that point, it was necessary to mention the positive effects of foreign trade and how those effects were obstructed by the existing laws. To the judges who were to decide the case, it seemed like a convincing explanation when they were told that foreign trade brought money into the country, but that the laws in question prevented it from bringing in as much as it could. Consequently, those arguments achieved the desired result. The ban on exporting gold and silver in France and England was limited to the coins of those respective nations. The export of foreign coin and bullion was permitted. In Holland and some other places, this freedom even extended to the country’s own coins. The government shifted its focus from monitoring the export of gold and silver to overseeing the balance of trade as the sole reason for any increase or decrease in these metals. This shift moved attention from one unproductive concern to another, much more complex, troublesome, and equally unproductive. The title of Mun’s book, England’s Treasure in Foreign Trade, became a key principle in political economy, not just in England but also in other trading nations. The domestic trade, which was the most significant of all, where equal capital generates the highest revenue and provides the most jobs for the country’s people, was viewed as secondary to foreign trade. It was said that it neither brought money into the country nor took any out. Therefore, the country could never become richer or poorer because of it, except to the extent that its success or decline might indirectly affect the status of foreign trade.

A country that has no mines of its own, must undoubtedly draw its gold and silver from foreign countries, in the same manner as one that has no vineyards of its own must draw its wines. It does not seem necessary, however, that the attention of government should be more turned towards the one than towards the other object. A country that has wherewithal to buy wine, will always get the wine which it has occasion for; and a country that[Pg 176] has wherewithal to buy gold and silver, will never be in want of those metals. They are to be bought for a certain price, like all commodities; and as they are the price of all other commodities, so all other commodities are the price of those metals. We trust, with perfect security, that the freedom of trade, without any attention of government, will always supply us with the wine which we have occasion for; and we may trust, with equal security, that it will always supply us with all the gold and silver which we can afford to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our commodities or in other uses.

A country without its own mines must get its gold and silver from abroad, just like a country without its own vineyards must import wine. However, it doesn't seem necessary for the government to focus more on one than the other. A country that can afford to buy wine will always be able to obtain it, and a country that can afford to buy gold and silver will never lack these metals. They can be purchased for a set price, just like all other goods; and because they serve as the price for all other goods, all other goods are the price for those metals. We confidently believe that the freedom of trade, without any government intervention, will always provide us with the wine we need; and we can equally trust that it will always give us all the gold and silver we can afford to buy or use, whether for trading our goods or for other purposes.

The quantity of every commodity which human industry can either purchase or produce, naturally regulates itself in every country according to the effectual demand, or according to the demand of those who are willing to pay the whole rent, labour, and profits, which must be paid in order to prepare and bring it to market. But no commodities regulate themselves more easily or more exactly, according to this effectual demand, than gold and silver; because, on account of the small bulk and great value of those metals, no commodities can be more easily transported from one place to another; from the places where they are cheap, to those where they are dear; from the places where they exceed, to those where they fall short of this effectual demand. If there were in England, for example, an effectual demand for an additional quantity of gold, a packet-boat could bring from Lisbon, or from wherever else it was to be had, fifty tons of gold, which could be coined into more than five millions of guineas. But if there were an effectual demand for grain to the same value, to import it would require, at five guineas a-ton, a million of tons of shipping, or a thousand ships of a thousand tons each. The navy of England would not be sufficient.

The amount of every product that people can either buy or make naturally adjusts itself in each country based on effective demand, or according to the willingness of those who can afford to cover all the costs like rent, labor, and profits needed to produce and deliver it to the market. However, no products adjust to this effective demand more easily or accurately than gold and silver. Because these metals are both lightweight and highly valuable, they can be transported more easily from one location to another; from areas where they're cheap to areas where they're expensive; from places with a surplus to places with a shortfall in this effective demand. For example, if there were a strong demand for more gold in England, a packet boat could carry fifty tons from Lisbon or wherever it’s available, which could be minted into over five million guineas. In contrast, if there were an equivalent effective demand for grain, importing it would need a million tons of shipping at five guineas per ton, which would require a thousand ships each able to carry a thousand tons. England's navy wouldn’t be enough.

When the quantity of gold and silver imported into any country exceeds the effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent their exportation. All the sanguinary laws of Spain and Portugal are not able to keep their gold and silver at home. The continual importations from Peru and Brazil exceed the effectual demand of those countries, and sink the price of those metals there below that in the neighbouring countries. If, on the contrary, in any particular country, their quantity fell short of the effectual demand, so as to raise their price above that of the neighbouring countries, the government would have no occasion to take any pains to import them. If it were even to take pains to prevent their importation, it would not be able to effectuate it. Those metals, when the Spartans had got wherewithal to purchase them, broke through all the barriers which the laws of Lycurgus opposed to their entrance into Lacedæmon. All the sanguinary laws of the customs are not able to prevent the importation of the teas of the Dutch and Gottenburg East India companies; because somewhat cheaper than those of the British company. A pound of tea, however, is about a hundred times the bulk of one of the highest prices, sixteen shillings, that is commonly paid for it in silver, and more than two thousand times the bulk of the same price in gold, and, consequently, just so many times more difficult to smuggle.

When the amount of gold and silver coming into a country is greater than what people actually want, no amount of government oversight can stop them from being exported. All the harsh laws in Spain and Portugal can't keep their gold and silver at home. The constant influx from Peru and Brazil surpasses the actual demand in those countries, driving the prices of those metals down compared to nearby countries. On the other hand, if a specific country has less gold and silver than what people want, causing the prices to rise above those in neighboring countries, the government wouldn't need to do anything to bring them in. Even if it tried to stop their importation, it wouldn't succeed. When the Spartans had the means to buy gold and silver, they overcome all the obstacles that Lycurgus' laws placed in the way of their entry into Lacedæmon. All the strict customs laws can't prevent the importation of tea from the Dutch and Gottenburg East India companies because it's somewhat cheaper than that from the British company. A pound of tea, however, is roughly a hundred times the volume of the most expensive tea, costing sixteen shillings in silver, and more than two thousand times the volume at the same price in gold, making it that many times more difficult to smuggle.

It is partly owing to the easy transportation of gold and silver, from the places where they abound to those where they are wanted, that the price of those metals does not fluctuate continually, like that of the greater part of other commodities, which are hindered by their bulk from shifting their situation, when the market happens to be either over or understocked with them. The price of those metals, indeed, is not altogether exempted from variation; but the changes to which it is liable are generally slow, gradual, and uniform. In Europe, for example, it is supposed, without much foundation, perhaps, that during the course of the present and preceding century, they have been constantly, but gradually, sinking in their value, on account of the continual importations from the Spanish West Indies. But to make any sudden change in the price of gold and silver, so as to raise or lower at once, sensibly and remarkably, the money price of all other commodities, requires such a revolution in commerce as that occasioned by the discovery of America.

It's partly because gold and silver can be easily transported from places where they're plentiful to places where they're needed that their prices don't fluctuate constantly like most other goods, which can't easily change location due to their bulk when the market is either over or understocked. The prices of these metals aren't completely immune to changes; however, the variations tend to be slow, gradual, and consistent. For instance, in Europe, it's often believed—though maybe without much evidence—that over the last century and the one before, their value has been steadily decreasing due to ongoing imports from the Spanish West Indies. But for there to be a sudden shift in the prices of gold and silver that would significantly and noticeably affect the prices of all other goods requires a major change in commerce, like the one brought about by the discovery of America.

If, notwithstanding all this, gold and silver should at any time fall short in a country which has wherewithal to purchase them, there are more expedients for supplying their place, than that of almost any other commodity. If the materials of manufacture are wanted, industry must stop. If provisions are wanted, the people must starve. But if money is wanted, barter will supply its place, though with a good deal of inconveniency. Buying and selling upon credit, and the different dealers compensating their credits with one another, once a-month, or once a-year, will supply it with less inconveniency. A well-regulated paper-money will supply it not only without any inconveniency, but, in some cases, with some advantage. Upon every account, therefore, the attention of government never was so unnecessarily employed, as when directed to watch over the preservation or increase of the quantity of money in any country.

If, despite all this, gold and silver ever run short in a country that has the means to buy them, there are more ways to substitute them than with almost any other commodity. If the materials needed for manufacturing are lacking, production must halt. If food is scarce, people will starve. But if money is needed, bartering can replace it, even though it tends to be inconvenient. Buying and selling on credit, along with different merchants settling their credits with one another monthly or yearly, can provide a smoother solution. A well-regulated paper currency can replace it not only without inconvenience but, in some cases, with some benefits. Overall, the government's focus has never been more misplaced than when it has been aimed at overseeing the preservation or increase of the amount of money in any country.

No complaint, however, is more common than that of a scarcity of money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce with those who have neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it. Those who have either, will seldom be in want either of the money, or of the wine which they have occasion for. This complaint, however, of the scarcity of money, is not always confined to improvident spendthrifts. It is sometimes general through a[Pg 177] whole mercantile town and the country in its neighbourhood. Over-trading is the common cause of it. Sober men, whose projects have been disproportioned to their capitals, are as likely to have neither wherewithal to buy money, nor credit to borrow it, as prodigals, whose expense has been disproportioned to their revenue. Before their projects can be brought to bear, their stock is gone, and credit with it. They run about everywhere to borrow money, and everybody tells them that they have none to lend. Even such general complaints of the scarcity of money do not always prove that the usual number of gold and silver pieces are not circulating in the country, but that many people want those pieces who have nothing to give for them. When the profits of trade happen to be greater than ordinary over-trading becomes a general error, both among great and small dealers. They do not always send more money abroad than usual, but they buy upon credit, both at home and abroad, an unusual quantity of goods, which they send to some distant market, in hopes that the returns will come in before the demand for payment. The demand comes before the returns, and they have nothing at hand with which they can either purchase money or give solid security for borrowing. It is not any scarcity of gold and silver, but the difficulty which such people find in borrowing, and which their creditor find in getting payment, that occasions the general complaint of the scarcity of money.

No complaint is more common than the lack of money. Money, like wine, always seems to be in short supply for those who can't afford to buy it or don't have credit to borrow it. Those who have either seldom find themselves lacking money or the wine they need. However, this complaint about money scarcity isn't only heard from reckless spenders. It can be widespread throughout an entire mercantile town and its surrounding areas. Over-trading is often the root cause. Even responsible individuals whose plans are out of sync with their financial capacity can find themselves without the means to buy money or the credit to borrow it, just like those who overspend beyond their incomes. Before their plans can come to fruition, their resources are depleted, along with their credit. They rush around trying to borrow money, only to be told by everyone that nobody has any to lend. These general complaints about money scarcity don't always mean that the average amount of gold and silver isn't circulating; instead, it shows that many people want those coins but have nothing to offer in exchange. When trade profits are unusually high, over-trading becomes a widespread issue among both large and small retailers. They might not send out more money than usual, but they buy an excessive amount of goods on credit, both locally and internationally, hoping that returns will arrive before payment is due. Unfortunately, the demand for payment often arrives before the returns, leaving them without means to purchase money or provide enough security to borrow it. It's not a lack of gold and silver that causes the general complaint about money scarcity, but rather the difficulties people face when trying to borrow and the challenges creditors encounter when attempting to collect payments.

It would be too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove, that wealth does not consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases, and is valuable only for purchasing. Money, no doubt, makes always a part of the national capital; but it has already been shown that it generally makes but a small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it.

It would be absurd to seriously argue that wealth is not about money or gold and silver; rather, it’s about what money buys, and it’s only valuable for that purchasing power. Money is certainly a part of the national capital, but it has already been demonstrated that it usually constitutes only a small portion and is often the least profitable part of it.

It is not because wealth consists more essentially in money than in goods, that the merchant finds it generally more easy to buy goods with money, than to buy money with goods; but because money is the known and established instrument of commerce, for which every thing is readily given in exchange, but which is not always with equal readiness to be got in exchange for every thing. The greater part of goods, besides, are more perishable than money, and he may frequently sustain a much greater loss by keeping them. When his goods are upon hand, too, he is more liable to such demands for money as he may not be able to answer, than when he has got their price in his coffers. Over and above all this, his profit arises more directly from selling than from buying; and he is, upon all these accounts, generally much more anxious to exchange his goods for money than his money for goods. But though a particular merchant, with abundance of goods in his warehouse, may sometimes be ruined by not being able to sell them in time, a nation or country is not liable to the same accident. The whole capital of a merchant frequently consists in perishable goods destined for purchasing money. But it is but a very small part of the annual produce of the land and labour of a country, which can ever be destined for purchasing gold and silver from their neighbours. The far greater part is circulated and consumed among themselves; and even of the surplus which is sent abroad, the greater part is generally destined for the purchase of other foreign goods. Though gold and silver, therefore, could not be had in exchange for the goods destined to purchase them, the nation would not be ruined. It might, indeed, suffer some loss and inconveniency, and be forced upon some of those expedients which are necessary for supplying the place of money. The annual produce of its land and labour, however, would be the same, or very nearly the same as usual; because the same, or very nearly the same consumable capital would be employed in maintaining it. And though goods do not always draw money so readily as money draws goods, in the long-run they draw it more necessarily than even it draws them. Goods can serve many other purposes besides purchasing money, but money can serve no other purpose besides purchasing goods. Money, therefore, necessarily runs after goods, but goods do not always necessarily run after money. The man who buys, does not always mean to sell again, but frequently to use or to consume; whereas he who sells always means to buy again. The one may frequently have done the whole, but the other can never have done more than the one half of his business. It is not for its own sake that men desire money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it.

It's not that wealth is more about money than goods that makes it easier for merchants to buy goods with money than to buy money with goods. It's because money is the recognized and established tool of trade, for which everything can be easily exchanged, but it's not always easy to get money in exchange for everything. Most goods, besides, spoil faster than money, and merchants can often take a bigger hit by holding onto them. When they have goods on hand, they’re more vulnerable to demands for money that they can’t meet than when they've got cash stored away. Additionally, their profits come more from selling than from buying, so generally, they're more eager to trade their goods for money than the other way around. However, although a specific merchant with a lot of goods in stock may sometimes go bankrupt if they can’t sell them in time, a nation doesn’t face the same risk. A merchant's entire capital can often be in perishable goods meant to buy money. But only a small portion of what a country produces each year can be used to buy gold and silver from their neighbors. Most of it is circulated and consumed internally; even the surplus sent abroad is usually for buying other goods. So, if a country couldn’t get gold and silver in exchange for the goods meant to purchase them, it wouldn’t be ruined. It might face some losses and difficulties and have to come up with some alternatives to replace money, but the annual output of its land and labor would remain about the same. The same or nearly the same capital would still be used to support it. And while goods don’t always fetch money as quickly as money gets goods, in the long run, they are more likely to bring in money than vice versa. Goods can be used for many things besides just buying money, but money has no other purpose than to buy goods. Therefore, money will always chase after goods, but goods don’t always chase after money. The person who buys doesn’t always plan to sell again; often, they intend to use or consume. On the other hand, the seller always plans to buy again. The buyer often completes their transaction, while the seller can never finish more than half of their business. People don’t desire money for its own sake, but for what they can buy with it.

Consumable commodities, it is said, are soon destroyed; whereas gold and silver are of a the more durable nature, and were it not for this continual exportation, might be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the real wealth of the country. Nothing, therefore, it is pretended, can be more disadvantageous to any country, than the trade which consists in the exchange of such lasting for such perishable commodities. We do not, however, reckon that trade disadvantageous, which consists in the exchange of the hardware of England for the wines of France, and yet hardware is a very durable commodity, and were it not for this continual exportation, might too be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the pots and pans of the country. But it readily occurs, that the number of such utensils is in every country necessarily limited by the use which there is for them; that it would be absurd to have more pots and pans than were necessary for cooking the victuals usually con[Pg 178]sumed there; and that, if the quantity of victuals were to increase, the number of pots and pans would readily increase along with it; a part of the increased quantity of victuals being employed in purchasing them, or in maintaining an additional number of workmen whose business it was to make them. It should as readily occur, that the quantity of gold and silver is in every country limited by the use which there is for those metals; that their use consists in circulating commodities, as coin, and in affording a species of household furniture, as plate; that the quantity of coin in every country is regulated by the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it; increase that value, and immediately a part of it will be sent abroad to purchase, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of coin requisite for circulating them: that the quantity of plate is regulated by the number and wealth of those private families who choose to indulge themselves in that sort of magnificence; increase the number and wealth of such families, and a part of this increased wealth will most probably be employed in purchasing, wherever it is to be found, an additional quantity of plate; that to attempt to increase the wealth of any country, either by introducing or by detaining in it an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver, is as absurd as it would be to attempt to increase the good cheer of private families, by obliging them to keep an unnecessary number of kitchen utensils. As the expense of purchasing those unnecessary utensils would diminish, instead of increasing, either the quantity or goodness of the family provisions; so the expense of purchasing an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver must, in every country, as necessarily diminish the wealth which feeds, clothes, and lodges, which maintains and employs the people. Gold and silver, whether in the shape of coin or of plate, are utensils, it must be remembered, as much as the furniture of the kitchen. Increase the use of them, increase the consumable commodities which are to be circulated, managed, and prepared by means of them, and you will infallibly increase the quantity; but if you attempt by extraordinary means to increase the quantity, you will as infallibly diminish the use, and even the quantity too, which in these metals can never he greater than what the use requires. Were they ever to be accumulated beyond this quantity, their transportation is so easy, and the loss which attends their lying idle and unemployed so great, that no law could prevent their being immediately sent out of the country.

Consumable goods are said to be quickly used up, while gold and silver last longer. If it weren't for the constant export, they could be stored for ages, greatly boosting the actual wealth of the country. So, people argue, nothing could be more harmful to a country than trading lasting goods for perishable ones. However, we don't consider the trade of England's hardware for France's wine as disadvantageous, even though hardware is also a durable commodity that could be stockpiled for a long time, increasing the quantity of pots and pans in the country. But it's clear that the number of these utensils in any country is limited by how much is needed. Having more pots and pans than necessary for cooking the typical meals would be unreasonable; if the amount of food increased, the number of pots and pans would also likely increase, funded by part of this extra food being used to buy them or to support more workers making them. Similarly, the amount of gold and silver in a country is limited by how those metals are used. Their purpose is to circulate goods as currency and serve as household items like silverware. The amount of currency in any country is determined by the value of the things it needs to buy. If that value goes up, some of the gold and silver will likely be sent abroad to obtain the extra coin needed for trade. The amount of silverware is determined by the number and wealth of families that choose to have such luxury. If these families increase in number and wealth, a portion of that extra wealth will probably be spent on buying more silverware. Trying to boost a country's wealth by bringing in or keeping an unneeded amount of gold and silver is just as ridiculous as trying to make families more festive by forcing them to keep more kitchen utensils than they need. Spending on unnecessary utensils would reduce, not enhance, the quality or amount of food they can enjoy; likewise, spending on an excessive amount of gold and silver will inevitably decrease the wealth that actually feeds, clothes, and houses people. Gold and silver, whether as currency or silverware, are tools just like kitchen furniture. If you increase their use, you will also increase the consumable goods that need to be circulated, managed, and prepared with them, hence increasing the quantity. However, if you try to artificially inflate the quantity, you will certainly reduce its utility, and the amount can never exceed the needs. If they were ever hoarded beyond this required amount, their easy transportation and the significant loss from them sitting idle would mean that no law could stop them from being sent out of the country immediately.

It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver, in order to enable a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, and labour, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.

It isn't always essential to gather gold and silver to allow a country to engage in foreign wars or to support fleets and armies in faraway places. Fleets and armies are sustained not by gold and silver but by consumable goods. A nation that can use the yearly output of its domestic industries, the annual income from its land, labor, and consumable resources to buy those consumable goods from other countries can sustain foreign wars there.

A nation may purchase the pay and provisions of an army in a distant country three different ways; by sending abroad either, first, some part of its accumulated gold and silver; or, secondly, some part of the annual produce of its manufactures; or, last of all, some part of its annual rude produce.

A nation can fund the pay and supplies of an army in a foreign country in three different ways: first, by sending a portion of its accumulated gold and silver; second, by sending a portion of the annual output of its manufacturing; or, lastly, by sending a portion of its annual raw produce.

The gold and silver which can properly be considered as accumulated, or stored up in any country, may be distinguished into three parts; first, the circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and, last of all, the money which may have been collected by many years parsimony, and laid up in the treasury of the prince.

The gold and silver that can truly be regarded as accumulated or saved in any country can be divided into three parts: first, the circulating money; second, the valuables owned by individual families; and finally, the wealth that has been gathered through many years of saving and is kept in the prince's treasury.

It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money of the country; because in that there can seldom be much redundancy. The value of goods annually bought and sold in any country requires a certain quantity of money to circulate and distribute them to their proper consumers, and can give employment to no more.

It rarely happens that there's a lot of extra money in circulation within the country because there's usually not much surplus. The value of goods bought and sold each year in any country needs a specific amount of money to move and distribute them to the right consumers, and it can't support more than that.

The channel of circulation necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never admits any more. Something, however, is generally withdrawn from this channel in the case of foreign war. By the great number of people who are maintained abroad, fewer are maintained at home. Fewer goods are circulated there, and less money becomes necessary to circulate them. An extraordinary quantity of paper money of some sort or other, too, such as exchequer notes, navy bills, and bank bills, in England, is generally issued upon such occasions, and, by supplying the place of circulating gold and silver, gives an opportunity of sending a greater quantity of it abroad. All this, however, could afford but a poor resource for maintaining a foreign war, of great expense, and several years duration.

The flow of money naturally attracts enough funds to fill it and never accepts more. However, something is usually taken out of this flow during foreign wars. With a large number of people supported overseas, fewer are supported at home. This results in fewer goods being circulated, which means less money is needed to circulate them. During these times, an unusual amount of various types of paper money—like treasury notes, navy bills, and bank notes in England—is typically issued. This paper money takes the place of circulating gold and silver, allowing for a greater amount of that currency to be sent abroad. Still, this could only provide a limited resource for funding a foreign war that is costly and lasts several years.

The melting down of the plate of private families has, upon every occasion, been found a still more insignificant one. The French, in the beginning of the last war, did not derive so much advantage from this expedient as to compensate the loss of the fashion.

The breaking up of private families has, every time, been seen as even less significant. The French, at the start of the last war, didn't gain enough from this approach to make up for losing the trend.

The accumulated treasures of the prince have in former times afforded a much greater and more lasting resource. In the present times, if you except the king of Prussia, to accumulate treasure seems to be no part of the policy of European princes.

The prince's collected treasures used to provide a much greater and more enduring resource. Nowadays, aside from the king of Prussia, it seems that accumulating wealth is not part of the strategy for European princes.

The funds which maintained the foreign wars of the present century, the most expensive perhaps which history records, seem to have had little dependency upon the exportation either of the circulating money, or of the[Pg 179] plate of private families, or of the treasure of the prince. The last French war cost Great Britain upwards of £90,000,000, including not only the £75,000,000 of new debt that was contracted, but the additional 2s. in the pound land-tax, and what was annually borrowed of the sinking fund. More than two-thirds of this expense were laid out in distant countries; in Germany, Portugal, America, in the ports of the Mediterranean, in the East and West Indies. The kings of England had no accumulated treasure. We never heard of any extraordinary quantity of plate being melted down. The circulating gold and silver of the country had not been supposed to exceed L.18,000,000. Since the late recoinage of the gold, however, it is believed to have been a good deal under-rated. Let us suppose, therefore, according to the most exaggerated computation which I remember to have either seen or heard of, that, gold and silver together, it amounted to L.30,000,000. Had the war been carried on by means of our money, the whole of it must, even according to this computation, have been sent out and returned again, at least twice in a period of between six and seven years. Should this be supposed, it would afford the most decisive argument, to demonstrate how unnecessary it is for government to watch over the preservation of money, since, upon this supposition, the whole money of the country must have gone from it, and returned to it again, two different times in so short a period, without any body's knowing any thing of the matter. The channel of circulation, however, never appeared more empty than usual during any part of this period. Few people wanted money who had wherewithal to pay for it. The profits of foreign trade, indeed, were greater than usual during the whole war, but especially towards the end of it. This occasioned, what it always occasions, a general over-trading in all the ports of Great Britain; and this again occasioned the usual complaint of the scarcity of money, which always follows over-trading. Many people wanted it, who had neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it; and because the debtors found it difficult to borrow, the creditors found it difficult to get payment. Gold and silver, however, were generally to be had for their value, by those who had that value to give for them.

The funds that supported the foreign wars of this century, possibly the most expensive in history, seem to have relied little on the export of either circulating cash, the silverware of private families, or the prince's treasury. The last French war cost Great Britain over £90,000,000, which included not only £75,000,000 of new debt incurred but also the extra 2s. in the pound land tax and what was borrowed annually from the sinking fund. More than two-thirds of this expense was spent in distant places: in Germany, Portugal, America, at Mediterranean ports, and in the East and West Indies. The English kings had no accumulated treasure. We never heard of any significant amount of silver being melted down. The circulating gold and silver in the country was believed not to exceed £18,000,000. However, since the recent gold recoinage, it is thought to have been significantly underestimated. Let’s assume, according to the most extreme estimates I've seen or heard, that the total of gold and silver was around £30,000,000. If the war had been funded by our money, then all of it must have been sent out and returned, at least twice in a span of six to seven years. If we accept this, it provides a clear argument demonstrating how unnecessary it is for the government to monitor the preservation of money since, under this assumption, the entire money supply would have left the country and returned twice in such a short time without anyone noticing. The flow of money, however, never seemed emptier than usual during this time. Few people needed money if they could pay for it. Indeed, the profits from foreign trade were higher than normal throughout the war, especially toward the end. This led to the usual problem of over-trading in all the ports of Great Britain, which in turn sparked the typical complaint about the scarcity of money that always follows over-trading. Many people needed money but lacked the means to buy it or the credit to borrow it; and as debtors struggled to borrow, creditors found it hard to get repaid. However, gold and silver were generally available at their value for those who had something of value to exchange for them.

The enormous expense of the late war, therefore, must have been chiefly defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and silver, but by that of British commodities of some kind or other. When the government, or those who acted under them, contracted with a merchant for a remittance to some foreign country, he would naturally endeavour to pay his foreign correspondent, upon whom he granted a bill, by sending abroad rather commodities than gold and silver. If the commodities of Great Britain were not in demand in that country, he would endeavour to send them to some other country in which he could purchase a bill upon that country. The transportation of commodities, when properly suited to the market, is always attended with a considerable profit; whereas that of gold and silver is scarce ever attended with any. When those metals are sent abroad in order to purchase foreign commodities, the merchant's profit arises, not from the purchase, but from the sale of the returns. But when they are sent abroad merely to pay a debt, he gets no returns, and consequently no profit. He naturally, therefore, exerts his invention to find out a way of paying his foreign debts, rather by the exportation of commodities, than by that of gold and silver. The great quantity of British goods, exported during the course of the late war, without bringing back any returns, is accordingly remarked by the author of the Present State of the Nation.

The huge costs of the recent war must have mainly been covered, not by exporting gold and silver, but by shipping out British goods instead. When the government, or those acting on its behalf, made a deal with a merchant for sending money to a foreign country, that merchant would naturally try to pay his foreign contact, to whom he issued a bill, by sending goods rather than gold and silver. If British products weren't in demand in that country, he would look to send them to another country where he could purchase a bill against his original destination. Transporting goods, when they fit the market well, usually brings in a decent profit, while sending gold and silver rarely does. When those metals are sent abroad just to buy foreign goods, the merchant's profit comes not from the purchase itself but from selling the returns. But when they're sent solely to pay a debt, there are no returns, and therefore no profit. So, he naturally tries to come up with a way to settle his foreign debts through commodity exports instead of gold and silver. The large amount of British goods sent out during the recent war, without bringing anything back, is noted by the author of the Present State of the Nation.

Besides the three sorts of gold and silver above mentioned, there is in all great commercial countries a good deal of bullion alternately imported and exported, for the purposes of foreign trade. This bullion, as it circulates among different commercial countries, in the same manner as the national coin circulates in every country, may be considered as the money of the great mercantile republic. The national coin receives its movement and direction from the commodities circulated within the precincts of each particular country; the money in the mercantile republic, from those circulated between different countries. Both are employed in facilitating exchanges, the one between different individuals of the same, the other between those of different nations. Part of this money of the great mercantile republic may have been, and probably was, employed in carrying on the late war. In time of a general war, it is natural to suppose that a movement and direction should be impressed upon it, different from what it usually follows in profound peace, that it should circulate more about the seat of the war, and be more employed in purchasing there, and in the neighbouring countries, the pay and provisions of the different armies. But whatever part of this money of the mercantile republic Great Britain may have annually employed in this manner, it must have been annually purchased, either with British commodities, or with something else that had been purchased with them; which still brings us back to commodities, to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, as the ultimate resources which enabled us to carry on the war. It is natural, indeed, to suppose, that so great an annual expense must have been defrayed from a great annual produce. The expense of 1761, for example, amounted to more than £19,000,000. No accumulation could have supported so great an annual profusion. There is no annual produce, even of gold and silver, which[Pg 180] could have supported it. The whole gold and silver annually imported into both Spain and Portugal, according to the best accounts, does not commonly much exceed £6,000,000 sterling, which, in some years, would scarce have paid four months expense of the late war.

Besides the three types of gold and silver mentioned above, there is a significant amount of bullion that is frequently imported and exported in all major trading countries for foreign trade purposes. This bullion, as it moves between different commercial nations, functions similarly to how national coin does within each country, and can be seen as the currency of the global trading community. National coins are influenced by the goods traded within the borders of each specific country, while the money in the trading community is driven by goods exchanged between different countries. Both types of currency help facilitate transactions: one among individuals in the same nation, and the other among people from different nations. Part of this global trading currency may have been, and likely was, used to fund the recent war. During widespread conflict, it’s reasonable to expect that the flow and direction of this money would be different from what it usually is in times of peace, circulating more heavily near the war’s location and being used more for purchasing the salaries and supplies of the various armies involved. However, whatever portion of this trading currency Great Britain may have utilized annually for this purpose must have been acquired either through British goods or through other means linked to those goods; which ultimately brings us back to commodities, highlighting the annual output of the land and labor in the country as the essential resources that allowed us to sustain the war effort. It’s logical to assume that such a substantial yearly expense must have been covered by considerable annual production. For instance, the cost in 1761 totaled over £19,000,000. No accumulation could have supported such a large annual expenditure. There is no annual output, even of gold and silver, that could have sustained it. The total gold and silver imported annually into both Spain and Portugal, according to the best estimates, usually does not exceed £6,000,000, which in some years would barely cover four months' expenses of the recent war.

The commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries, in order to purchase there either the pay and provisions of an army, or some part of the money of the mercantile republic to be employed in purchasing them, seem to be the finer and more improved manufactures; such as contain a great value in a small bulk, and can therefore be exported to a great distance at little expense. A country whose industry produces a great annual surplus of such manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign countries, may carry on for many years a very expensive foreign war, without either exporting any considerable quantity of gold and silver, or even having any such quantity to export. A considerable part of the annual surplus of its manufactures must, indeed, in this case, be exported without bringing back any returns to the country, though it does to the merchant; the government purchasing of the merchant his bills upon foreign countries, in order to purchase there the pay and provisions of an army. Some part of this surplus, however, may still continue to bring back a return. The manufacturers during the war will have a double demand upon them, and be called upon first to work up goods to be sent abroad, for paying the bills drawn upon foreign countries for the pay and provisions of the army; and, secondly, to work up such as are necessary for purchasing the common returns that had usually been consumed in the country. In the midst of the most destructive foreign war, therefore, the greater part of manufactures may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary, they may decline on the return of peace. They may flourish amidst the ruin of their country, and begin to decay upon the return of its prosperity. The different state of many different branches of the British manufactures during the late war, and for some time after the peace, may serve as an illustration of what has been just now said.

The products best suited for being shipped to far-off countries, either to pay for an army's wages and supplies or to acquire some of the trading republic's funds for that purpose, tend to be high-quality and advanced manufactured goods. These items have a high value in a small size, making them cheaper to export over long distances. A nation that produces a significant annual surplus of such goods, which are typically sent abroad, can sustain a very costly overseas war for many years without exporting much gold and silver, or even having any to export. A substantial portion of that annual surplus will need to be sent abroad without any returns to the country, although it does benefit the merchant; the government buys the merchant's bills to pay for the army’s wages and supplies in foreign lands. However, some of this surplus may still yield returns. During the war, manufacturers will face double demand, first needing to produce goods for overseas that pay the bills for the army's wages and supplies, and second, to create goods necessary for purchasing the usual imports that had been consumed domestically. Thus, even in the midst of devastating foreign conflict, a majority of manufacturing may thrive, while conversely, it may decline with the return of peace. These industries can flourish amid their country's ruin and begin to deteriorate when prosperity returns. The varying conditions of different sectors of British manufacturing during the recent war, and for a while after peace, exemplify this point.

No foreign war, of great expense or duration, could conveniently be carried on by the exportation of the rude produce of the soil. The expense of sending such a quantity of it into a foreign country as might purchase the pay and provisions of an army would be too great. Few countries, too, produce much more rude produce than what is sufficient for the subsistence of their own inhabitants. To send abroad any great quantity of it, therefore, would be to send abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of the people. It is otherwise with the exportation of manufactures. The maintenance of the people employed in them is kept at home, and only the surplus part of their work is exported. Mr Hume frequently takes notice of the inability of the ancient kings of England to carry on, without interruption, any foreign war of long duration. The English in those days had nothing wherewithal to purchase the pay and provisions of their armies in foreign countries, but either the rude produce of the soil, of which no considerable part could be spared from the home consumption, or a few manufactures of the coarsest kind, of which, as well as of the rude produce, the transportation was too expensive. This inability did not arise from the want of money, but of the finer and more improved manufactures. Buying and selling was transacted by means of money in England then as well as now. The quantity of circulating money must have borne the same proportion to the number and value of purchases and sales usually transacted at that time, which it does to those transacted at present; or, rather, it must have borne a greater proportion, because there was then no paper, which now occupies a great part of the employment of gold and silver. Among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known, the sovereign, upon extraordinary occasions, can seldom draw any considerable aid from his subjects, for reasons which shall be explained hereafter. It is in such countries, therefore, that he generally endeavours to accumulate a treasure, as the only resource against such emergencies. Independent of this necessity, he is, in such a situation, naturally disposed to the parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that simple state, the expense even of a sovereign is not directed by the vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court, but is employed in bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always does. Every Tartar chief, accordingly, has a treasure. The treasures of Mazepa, chief of the Cossacks in the Ukraine, the famous ally of Charles XII., are said to have been very great. The French kings of the Merovingian race had all treasures. When they divided their kingdom among their different children, they divided their treasure too. The Saxon princes, and the first kings after the Conquest, seem likewise to have accumulated treasures. The first exploit of every new reign was commonly to seize the treasure of the preceding king, as the most essential measure for securing the succession. The sovereigns of improved and commercial countries are not under the same necessity of accumulating treasures, because they can generally draw from their subjects extraordinary aids upon extraordinary occasions. They are likewise less disposed to do so. They naturally, perhaps necessarily, follow the mode of the times; and their expense comes to be regulated by the same extravagant[Pg 181] vanity which directs that of all the other great proprietors in their dominions. The insignificant pageantry of their court becomes every day more brilliant; and the expense of it not only prevents accumulation, but frequently encroaches upon the funds destined for more necessary expenses. What Dercyllidas said of the court of Persia, may be applied to that of several European princes, that he saw there much splendour, but little strength, and many servants, but few soldiers.

No foreign war, no matter how costly or lengthy, could be effectively waged just by exporting raw agricultural products. The expense of sending enough of it to a foreign country to cover the pay and provisions for an army would be too high. Additionally, few countries produce much more raw goods than what is needed to sustain their own populations. Thus, exporting a large amount would mean sending abroad part of what is necessary for the people’s survival. In contrast, exporting manufactured goods works differently. The wages of the people who make them stay home, and only the surplus of their work gets sent out. Mr. Hume often points out that ancient English kings struggled to consistently finance any long foreign wars. Back then, the English had almost nothing to buy the pay and provisions for their armies abroad, relying only on raw agricultural goods—most of which couldn’t be spared for export—or a handful of very basic manufactured goods, which, like the raw produce, were too costly to transport. This struggle wasn’t due to a lack of money, but rather to a shortage of more refined and advanced products. Trade was conducted using money in England then just as it is now. The amount of money in circulation must have had a similar relation to the number and value of transactions at that time as it does today; in fact, it likely had an even greater relationship because back then, paper money didn’t exist to take up much of the role of gold and silver. In nations where commerce and manufacturing are not well established, the ruler can rarely rely on significant support from their subjects during emergencies, for reasons that will be discussed later. In such countries, rulers usually try to gather treasure as a resource for such situations. Beyond this necessity, they are naturally inclined to save. In simpler societies, even a ruler’s expenses are not driven by the desire for the flashy indulgences of a court; rather, they are spent on generosity toward their tenants and hospitality for their followers. Generosity and hospitality rarely lead to extravagance; vanity, however, almost always does. Consequently, every Tartar chief has their own treasure. It’s said that Mazepa, the Cossack chief in Ukraine and famous ally of Charles XII, had a significant amount of wealth. The French kings of the Merovingian dynasty also had treasures. When they divided their kingdom among their children, they split up their treasures as well. The Saxon princes and the early kings after the Conquest appeared to have accumulated wealth too. The first act of every new reign was often to seize the treasure of the previous king, which was seen as essential for securing the throne. In contrast, rulers of more advanced and commercial societies do not feel the same need to stockpile treasures, as they can typically call on their subjects for extra support during emergencies. They are also less inclined to do so. They naturally, or perhaps necessarily, adopt the trends of the time; their spending tends to align with the same extravagant vanity that guides other wealthy property owners in their realm. The lavishness of their court becomes increasingly extravagant, and this spending not only hinders their ability to save but often encroaches upon funds meant for more essential expenses. What Dercyllidas observed about the Persian court can also be said of several European monarchies: he noticed much splendor, but little strength, and many attendants, but few soldiers.

The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole benefit, which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants and increase their enjoyments. By means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive power, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of the society. These great and important services foreign trade is continually occupied in performing to all the different countries between which it is carried on. They all derive great benefit from it, though that in which the merchant resides generally derives the greatest, as he is generally more employed in supplying the wants, and carrying out the superfluities of his own, than of any other particular country. To import the gold and silver which may be wanted into the countries which have no mines, is, no doubt, a part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most insignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon this account, could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.

The import of gold and silver is not the main, let alone the only, advantage that a nation gets from its foreign trade. Between any two places that engage in foreign trade, they both gain two distinct benefits from it. It exports the surplus of their land and labor that doesn’t have demand locally and brings back something else that is wanted in return. It gives value to their excess by exchanging it for something that meets some of their needs and enhances their enjoyment. Because of this, the limitations of the local market don’t prevent the specialization in any field of art or manufacturing from reaching its highest level of excellence. By creating a broader market for any part of their production that exceeds local consumption, it encourages them to boost their productivity and maximize their annual output, thus increasing the real wealth and resources of society. Foreign trade consistently provides these significant benefits to all the different countries it connects. They all reap considerable rewards from it, although the country where the merchant resides usually benefits the most, as they are typically more focused on meeting local needs and managing their own excess than on those of any other specific country. Importing gold and silver needed by countries without mines is certainly one aspect of foreign trade. However, it is a very minor part of it. A country engaging in foreign trade solely for this reason would hardly have a reason to charter a ship in an entire century.

It is not by the importation of gold and silver that the discovery of America has enriched Europe. By the abundance of the American mines, those metals have become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased for about a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it would have cost in the fifteenth century. With the same annual expense of labour and commodities, Europe can annually purchase about three times the quantity of plate which it could have purchased at that time. But when a commodity comes to be sold for a third part of what had been its usual price, not only those who purchased it before can purchase three times their former quantity, but it is brought down to the level of a much greater number of purchasers, perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more than twenty times the former number. So that there may be in Europe at present, not only more than three times, but more than twenty or thirty times the quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its present state of improvement, had the discovery of the American mines never been made. So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency, though surely a very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and silver renders those metals rather less fit for the purposes of money than they were before. In order to make the same purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater quantity of them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket, where a groat would have done before. It is difficult to say which is most trifling, this inconveniency, or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one nor the other could have made any very essential change in the state of Europe. The discovery of America, however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which in the narrow circle of the ancient commerce could never have taken place, for want of a market to take off the greater part of their produce. The productive powers of labour were improved, and its produce increased in all the different countries of Europe, and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the inhabitants. The commodities of Europe were almost all new to America, and many of those of America were new to Europe. A new set of exchanges, therefore, began to take place, which had never been thought of before, and which should naturally have proved as advantageous to the new, as it certainly did to the old continent. The savage injustice of the Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all, ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate countries.

It's not the import of gold and silver that has made Europe richer due to the discovery of America. Because of the abundance of American mines, these metals have become cheaper. Now, you can buy a silver item for about a third of what it would have cost in the 15th century in terms of corn or labor. With the same annual spending on labor and goods, Europe can buy about three times as much silver as it could back then. When a product is sold for a third of its usual price, not only can previous buyers purchase three times their old amount, but a lot more people can also afford it, possibly more than ten or even twenty times the number of buyers before. This means there might be more than three, possibly even twenty or thirty times, the amount of silver in Europe than there would have been, even considering its current level of advancement, if the American mines had never been discovered. Europe has undoubtedly gained some real convenience, though a rather minor one. The low cost of gold and silver makes them less suitable as money than before. To make the same purchases, we have to carry a larger amount, so now we need to carry a shilling in our pocket where a groat would have sufficed before. It's hard to determine which is more trivial, this inconvenience or the opposite benefit. Neither has significantly changed Europe's situation. However, the discovery of America surely made a huge difference. By opening up a new and endless market for all of Europe's goods, it led to new divisions of labor and advancements in technology that couldn't have happened in the limited scope of ancient trade due to a lack of demand for most of their products. The productivity of labor improved, and its output increased in various European countries, along with the actual wealth and revenue of their people. Almost all European goods were new to America, and many American products were new to Europe. This created a new exchange system that had never been considered before, benefiting both the new continent and the old. Unfortunately, the cruel injustices of Europeans caused what should have been a beneficial event for all to become destructive and damaging for many unfortunate countries.

The discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, which happened much about the same time, opened perhaps a still more extensive range to foreign commerce, than even that of America, notwithstanding the greater distance. There were but two nations in America, in any respect, superior to the savages, and these were destroyed almost as soon as discovered. The rest were mere savages. But the empires of China, Indostan, Japan, as well as several others in the East Indies, without having richer mines of gold or silver, were, in every other respect, much richer, better cultivated, and more advanced in all arts and manufactures, than either Mexico or Peru, even though we should credit, what plainly deserves no[Pg 182] credit, the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish writers concerning the ancient state of those empires. But rich and civilized nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one another, than with savages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto derived much less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies, than from that with America. The Portuguese monopolized the East India trade to themselves for about a century; and it was only indirectly, and through them, that the other nations of Europe could either send out or receive any goods from that country. When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last century, began to encroach upon them, they vested their whole East India commerce in an exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes, have all followed their example; so that no great nation of Europe has ever yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies. No other reason need be assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the trade to America, which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies, is free to all its subjects. The exclusive privileges of those East India companies, their great riches, the great favour and protection which these have procured them from their respective governments, have excited much envy against them. This envy has frequently represented their trade as altogether pernicious, on account of the great quantities of silver which it every year exports from the countries from which it is carried on. The parties concerned have replied, that their trade by this continual exportation of silver, might indeed tend to impoverish Europe in general, but not the particular country from which it was carried on; because, by the exportation of a part of the returns to other European countries, it annually brought home a much greater quantity of that metal than it carried out. Both the objection and the reply are founded in the popular notion which I have been just now examining. It is therefore unnecessary to say any thing further about either. By the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies, plate is probably somewhat dearer in Europe than it otherwise might have been; and coined silver probably purchases a larger quantity both of labour and commodities. The former of these two effects is a very small loss, the latter a very small advantage; both too insignificant to deserve any part of the public attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the commodities of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing, to the gold and silver which is purchased with those commodities, must necessarily tend to increase the annual production of European commodities, and consequently the real wealth and revenue of Europe. That it has hitherto increased them so little, is probably owing to the restraints which it everywhere labours under.

The discovery of a route to the East Indies via the Cape of Good Hope, which occurred around the same time, opened up an even broader scope for foreign trade than that of America, despite the greater distance. There were only two nations in America that were, in any way, superior to the natives, and they were destroyed almost immediately after being discovered. The rest were just simple tribes. However, the empires of China, India, Japan, and several others in the East Indies, while lacking richer gold or silver mines, were much wealthier, better developed, and more advanced in all arts and crafts than either Mexico or Peru, even if we were to consider the exaggerated claims of the Spanish writers about the ancient state of those empires. Wealthy and civilized nations can always trade at a much higher value with each other than with savages and barbarians. However, Europe has gained much less from its trade with the East Indies than from its trade with America. The Portuguese monopolized the East India trade for about a century, and it was only indirectly, through them, that other European nations could send or receive goods from that region. When the Dutch started to encroach upon them at the beginning of the last century, they put their entire East India trade into an exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes all followed suit, meaning that no major European nation has ever truly benefited from a free trade with the East Indies. There’s no other reason why trading with the East Indies has never been as profitable as trade with America, which is open to all subjects between almost every European nation and its own colonies. The exclusive privileges granted to those East India companies, their vast wealth, and the support and protection received from their governments have led to much envy against them. This envy often claimed that their trade was entirely harmful due to the large amounts of silver exported from the countries involved. Those involved have responded that while this constant outflow of silver might impoverish Europe as a whole, it does not harm the specific country engaged in the trade; because by exporting part of their returns to other European countries, they actually brought back a much larger quantity of silver than they took out. Both the criticism and the response are based on the common misconception I just examined, so there's no need to discuss them further. The yearly export of silver to the East Indies may make silverware slightly more expensive in Europe than it otherwise would be, and coined silver likely buys more labor and goods. The first effect is a minor loss and the latter a small gain, both too insignificant to warrant public attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening up a market for European goods, or essentially for the gold and silver purchased with those goods, should naturally boost the annual production of European commodities and, therefore, the true wealth and income of Europe. The reason it has so far increased them very little is likely due to the restrictions it faces everywhere.

I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedious, to examine at full length this popular notion, that wealth consists in money or in gold and silver. Money, in common language, as I have already observed, frequently signifies wealth; and this ambiguity of expression has rendered this popular notion so familiar to us, that even they who are convinced of its absurdity, are very apt to forget their own principles, and, in the course of their reasonings, to take it for granted as a certain and undeniable truth. Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out with observing, that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its lands, houses, and consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course of their reasonings, however, the lands, houses, and consumable goods, seem to slip out of their memory; and the strain of their argument frequently supposes that all wealth consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the great object of national industry and commerce.

I felt it was necessary, even at the risk of being boring, to thoroughly examine this widespread belief that wealth is just about money or gold and silver. Money, as I've pointed out before, often means wealth in everyday language; this confusing use of words has made this belief so ingrained that even those who know it's ridiculous often forget their own beliefs and end up treating it as a certain and undeniable truth in their reasoning. Some of the best English authors on commerce start by saying that the wealth of a country isn't only about its gold and silver but also includes its land, buildings, and various consumable goods. However, as their arguments go on, they seem to forget about land, buildings, and consumable goods; their reasoning often assumes that all wealth is just about gold and silver, and that increasing the amount of those metals is the main goal of national industry and commerce.

The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which had no mines, only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it imported; it necessarily became the great object of political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic industry. Its two great engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encouragement to exportation.

The two principles being established, however, are that wealth consists of gold and silver, and that those metals can only be brought into a country without mines by having a favorable balance of trade—exporting more value than is imported. Therefore, the main goal of political economy became to reduce as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for local use, and to maximize the exportation of products from domestic industries. Its two main strategies for enriching the country, then, were restrictions on imports and incentives for exports.

The restraints upon importation were of two kinds.

The restrictions on imports were of two types.

First, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they were imported.

First, there were restrictions on importing foreign goods for local use that could be made domestically, regardless of where they came from.

Secondly, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds, from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was supposed to be disadvantageous.

Secondly, restrictions on importing goods of nearly all types were placed on those specific countries where the trade balance was believed to be unfavorable.

Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and sometimes in absolute prohibitions.

Those various restrictions included high taxes at times and outright bans at others.

Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign states, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries.

Exportation was sometimes encouraged by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties, sometimes by favorable trade treaties with foreign countries, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant lands.

Drawbacks were given upon two different occasions. When the home manufactures were subject to any duty or excise, either the whole or a part of it was frequently drawn back upon their exportation; and when foreign goods liable to a duty were imported, in order to be[Pg 183] exported again, either the whole or a part of this duty was sometimes given back upon such exportation.

Drawbacks were provided on two different occasions. When domestic manufacturers faced any duty or excise, either the entire amount or a portion of it was often refunded upon their exportation; and when imported foreign goods that were subject to a duty were brought in with the intent to be[Pg 183] exported again, either the whole amount or a part of this duty was sometimes refunded upon such exportation.

Bounties were given for the encouragement, either of some beginning manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of other kinds as were supposed to deserve particular favour.

Bounties were offered to promote either new manufacturing ventures or specific types of industries that were believed to deserve special support.

By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privileges were procured in some foreign state for the goods and merchants of the country, beyond what were granted to those of other countries.

Through beneficial trade agreements, specific advantages were secured in a foreign country for the goods and merchants of this nation, beyond what was given to those from other countries.

By the establishment of colonies in distant countries, not only particular privileges, but a monopoly was frequently procured for the goods and merchants of the country which established them.

By setting up colonies in far-off countries, not only specific advantages but also a monopoly was often gained for the goods and merchants of the country that established them.

The two sorts of restraints upon importation above mentioned, together with these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six principal means by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver in any country, by turning the balance of trade in its favour. I shall consider each of them in a particular chapter, and, without taking much farther notice of their supposed tendency to bring money into the country, I shall examine chiefly what are likely to be the effects of each of them upon the annual produce of its industry. According as they tend either to increase or diminish the value of this annual produce, they must evidently tend either to increase or diminish the real wealth and revenue of the country.

The two types of restrictions on imports mentioned earlier, along with these four incentives for exports, make up the six main ways the commercial system aims to boost the amount of gold and silver in any country by shifting the trade balance in its favor. I will look at each of these in a separate chapter, and rather than focusing too much on their supposed ability to bring money into the country, I will mainly examine what impact each is likely to have on the annual output of its industries. Depending on whether they increase or decrease the value of this annual output, they will clearly either promote or reduce the actual wealth and revenue of the country.


CHAP. II.

OF RESTRAINTS UPON IMPORTATION FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OF SUCH GOODS AS CAN BE PRODUCED AT HOME.

By restraining, either by high duties, or by absolute prohibitions, the importation of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at home, the monopoly of the home market is more or less secured to the domestic industry employed in producing them. Thus the prohibition of importing either live cattle or salt provisions from foreign countries, secures to the graziers of Great Britain the monopoly of the home market for butcher's meat. The high duties upon the importation of corn, which, in times of moderate plenty, amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage to the growers of that commodity. The prohibition of the importation of foreign woollens is equally favourable to the woollen manufacturers. The silk manufacture, though altogether employed upon foreign materials, has lately obtained the same advantage. The linen manufacture has not yet obtained it, but is making great strides towards it. Many other sorts of manufactures have, in the same manner obtained in Great Britain, either altogether, or very nearly, a monopoly against their countrymen. The variety of goods, of which the importation into Great Britain is prohibited, either absolutely, or under certain circumstances, greatly exceeds what can easily be suspected by those who are not well acquainted with the laws of the customs.

By imposing high tariffs or outright bans on importing goods from other countries that can be made locally, the government ensures that domestic industries have a strong hold on the local market. For example, the ban on importing live cattle or preserved meat protects British farmers by giving them exclusive rights to the domestic market for meat. Similarly, the high tariffs on imported grain, which can act as a ban during times of good harvest, provide the same benefit to grain producers. The prohibition on importing foreign woolen products also supports wool manufacturers. Although the silk industry relies entirely on imported materials, it has recently gained similar protections. The linen industry hasn't fully achieved this yet but is progressing quickly. Many other manufacturing sectors in Great Britain have also established a near monopoly over their products against competitors. The range of goods that cannot be imported into Great Britain, either completely or under specific conditions, is much broader than many might realize if they're not familiar with customs laws.

That this monopoly of the home market frequently gives great encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and frequently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident.

That this monopoly of the home market often boosts the specific type of industry that has it, and often directs a larger portion of both the labor and resources of society toward it than would otherwise be the case, is undeniable. However, whether it actually increases the overall industry of society or provides the best direction for it is not necessarily clear.

The general industry of the society can never exceed what the capital of the society can employ. As the number of workmen that can be kept in employment by any particular person must bear a certain proportion to his capital, so the number of those that can be continually employed by all the members of a great society must bear a certain proportion to the whole capital of the society, and never can exceed that proportion. No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society, than that into which it would have gone of its own accord.

The overall industry of society can never be more than what the society's capital can support. Just as the number of workers that any individual can employ must be in proportion to their capital, the number of workers that can consistently be employed by all members of a large society must also be in proportion to the total capital of that society and can never exceed that ratio. No commercial regulation can boost the level of industry in any society beyond what its capital can sustain. It can only redirect some of it to a path it wouldn’t have taken otherwise, and there's no guarantee that this artificial direction will be more beneficial for the society than the direction it would have naturally taken.

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.

Every person is always working to find the best use for whatever resources they have. They are primarily looking out for their own benefit, not that of society. However, focusing on their own gain often leads them to choose the opportunities that are most beneficial for society as well.

First, every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can, and consequently as much as he can in the support of domestic industry, provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a great deal less than the ordinary profits of stock.

First, every person tries to invest their money as close to home as possible, and as much as they can in supporting local businesses, as long as they can still earn regular profits, or close to regular profits, from their investments.

Thus, upon equal, or nearly equal profits, every wholesale merchant naturally prefers the home trade to the foreign trade of consumption, and the foreign trade of consumption to the carrying trade. In the home trade, his capital is never so long out of his sight as it frequently is in the foreign trade of consumption. He can know better the character and situation of the persons whom he trusts; and[Pg 184] if he should happen to be deceived, he knows better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress. In the carrying trade, the capital of the merchant is, as it were, divided between two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necessarily brought home, or placed under his own immediate view and command. The capital which an Amsterdam merchant employs in carrying corn from Koningsberg to Lisbon, and fruit and wine from Lisbon to Koningsberg, must generally be the one half of it at Koningsberg, and the other half at Lisbon. No part of it need ever come to Amsterdam. The natural residence of such a merchant should either be at Koningsberg or Lisbon; and it can only be some very particular circumstances which can make him prefer the residence of Amsterdam. The uneasiness, however, which he feels at being separated so far from his capital, generally determines him to bring part both of the Koningsberg goods which he destines for the market of Lisbon, and of the Lisbon goods which he destines for that of Koningsberg, to Amsterdam; and though this necessarily subjects him to a double charge of loading and unloading as well as to the payment of some duties and customs, yet, for the sake of having some part of his capital always under his own view and command, he willingly submits to this extraordinary charge; and it is in this manner that every country which has any considerable share of the carrying trade, becomes always the emporium, or general market, for the goods of all the different countries whose trade it carries on. The merchant, in order to save a second loading and unloading, endeavours always to sell in the home market, as much of the goods of all those different countries as he can; and thus, so far as he can, to convert his carrying trade into a foreign trade of consumption. A merchant, in the same manner, who is engaged in the foreign trade of consumption, when he collects goods for foreign markets, will always be glad, upon equal or nearly equal profits, to sell as great a part of them at home as he can. He saves himself the risk and trouble of exportation, when, so far as he can, he thus converts his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. Home is in this manner the centre, if I may say so, round which the capitals of the inhabitants of every country are continually circulating, and towards which they are always tending, though, by particular causes, they may sometimes be driven off and repelled from it towards more distant employments. But a capital employed in the home trade, it has already been shown, necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity of domestic industry, and gives revenue and employment to a greater number of the inhabitants of the country, than an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption; and one employed in the foreign trade of consumption has the same advantage over an equal capital employed in the carrying trade. Upon equal, or only nearly equal profits, therefore, every individual naturally inclines to employ his capital in the manner in which it is likely to afford the greatest support to domestic industry, and to give revenue and employment to the greatest number of people of his own country.

Thus, when profits are equal or nearly equal, every wholesale merchant naturally prefers local trade over foreign consumer trade, and foreign consumer trade over the carrying trade. In local trade, their capital is not out of sight for as long as it often is in foreign consumer trade. They have a better understanding of the character and situation of the people they trust; and if they happen to be deceived, they know the laws of their own country to seek justice. In the carrying trade, the merchant's capital is essentially split between two foreign countries, and no part of it ever necessarily comes back home or is under their direct control. The capital that an Amsterdam merchant uses to carry grain from Koningsberg to Lisbon and fruit and wine from Lisbon to Koningsberg is generally half at Koningsberg and the other half at Lisbon. None of it needs to come to Amsterdam. Such a merchant would ideally reside in either Koningsberg or Lisbon; only very particular circumstances would make them prefer Amsterdam. However, the discomfort of being so far from their capital usually drives them to bring some of the goods from Koningsberg meant for the Lisbon market and some Lisbon goods meant for Koningsberg to Amsterdam. Although this incurs double loading and unloading costs along with duties and customs, for the sake of having some of their capital always in sight and within reach, they willingly accept this extra expense. This is how countries involved in significant carrying trade become the central market for goods from all the various countries whose trade they handle. To avoid the second loading and unloading, merchants always try to sell as much of those goods in the home market as they can; thus, they convert their carrying trade into foreign consumer trade as much as possible. Similarly, a merchant engaged in foreign consumer trade will always prefer to sell as much of their collected goods at home as possible, given equal or nearly equal profits, saving themselves the risks and troubles of exportation. This way, they convert their foreign consumer trade into local trade. Home, in this sense, is the center that the capitals of the inhabitants of every country continuously circulate around, always tending towards it, even if particular reasons may sometimes push them away towards more distant opportunities. However, it has already been shown that capital used in local trade generates more domestic industry and offers wages and jobs to more people than an equal amount of capital used in foreign consumer trade; and capital used in foreign consumer trade has the same benefit over an equal amount in carrying trade. Therefore, when profits are equal or nearly equal, individuals tend to allocate their capital in ways that most effectively support domestic industry and provide the most jobs and income to people in their own country.

Secondly, every individual who employs his capital in the support of domestic industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry, that its produce may be of the greatest possible value.

Secondly, everyone who invests their money in supporting local industry naturally tries to direct that industry in a way that maximizes its output value.

The produce of industry is what it adds to the subject or materials upon which it is employed. In proportion as the value of this produce is great or small, so will likewise be the profits of the employer. But it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods.

The output of industry is what it contributes to the subject or materials it's used on. The greater or smaller the value of this output, the higher or lower the profits for the employer. However, a person only invests capital in industry for the sake of making a profit; therefore, they will always try to invest it in industries where the output is likely to be the most valuable or can be exchanged for the most money or other goods.

But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can, both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.

But the annual revenue of every society is always exactly equal to the exchangeable value of the entire annual output of its industry, or in fact, it's essentially the same as that exchangeable value. Since each individual tries as hard as they can to invest their capital in supporting domestic industry and to direct that industry so its output has the highest value, every person unwittingly works to maximize the annual revenue of society. Generally, they don’t aim to promote the public good or even realize how much they’re doing it. By supporting domestic over foreign industry, they're mainly looking out for their own interests; and by directing that industry in ways that maximize output value, they're only thinking about their own profit. Yet, in doing so, they are often guided by an invisible hand to achieve an outcome that wasn't part of their original plan. It doesn't always hurt society that it wasn’t their intention. By pursuing their own interests, they often end up benefiting society more effectively than if they had set out to help it. I've never seen much good come from those who claim to work for the public good. It’s a pose that's not very common among merchants, and it doesn’t take much effort to convince them against it.

What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can in his local situation judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman, who should attempt to direct pri[Pg 185]vate people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be as dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.

What type of local industry can his capital support, and which products are likely to be most valuable, is something that each person can judge better in their own situation than any politician or lawmaker could for them. A politician who tries to tell individuals how to invest their capital would not only take on an unnecessary burden but also claim an authority that should never be trusted to any one person, or even to any council or senate, and which would be most dangerous in the hands of someone foolish and arrogant enough to believe they are capable of wielding that power.

To give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must in almost all cases be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the produce of domestic can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful. It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers. All of them find it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or, what is the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion for.

Granting a monopoly of the home market to domestic products in any specific trade or manufacturing is, to some extent, telling individuals how they should invest their money, and it usually ends up being either pointless or detrimental. If domestic products can be offered at the same price as foreign ones, the regulation is clearly pointless. If they can't, it's likely to be harmful. A sensible head of a household knows never to try to make something at home if it costs more than buying it. The tailor doesn’t try to make his own shoes; he buys them from a shoemaker. The shoemaker doesn’t try to make his own clothes; he hires a tailor. The farmer doesn’t try to make either; he works with both. They all find it beneficial to focus their efforts on what they do best compared to others and to buy the rest of what they need with part of what they produce.

What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of the country being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, no more than that of the above-mentioned artificers; but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage, when it is thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished, when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home; it could therefore have been purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus turned away from a more to a less advantageous employment; and the exchangeable value of its annual produce, instead of being increased, according to the intention of the lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished by every such regulation.

What is sensible for a private family is hardly foolish for a large kingdom. If another country can provide us with a product at a lower cost than we can create it ourselves, it's better to buy from them using some of the output from our own labor, which we can use more efficiently. The total output of the country will not decrease; instead, it will simply seek out the most effective ways to be utilized. It’s definitely not being used in the most efficient way when it’s focused on something that can be bought cheaper than it can be produced. The overall value of its yearly output is certainly reduced when it shifts away from creating goods that are clearly worth more than what it's currently trying to produce. Given that this product could be obtained from other countries at a cheaper rate than we can produce it here, it could have been purchased using only part of the goods—or, similarly, a part of the price of the goods—that an equal investment in local production would have created if it had been allowed to operate naturally. Therefore, the country’s labor is redirected from a more beneficial use to a less beneficial one, and the value of its yearly output, rather than increasing as intended by the lawmakers, must inevitably decrease with each such regulation.

By means of such regulations, indeed, a particular manufacture may sometimes be acquired sooner than it could have been otherwise, and after a certain time may be made at home as cheap, or cheaper, than in the foreign country. But though the industry of the society may be thus carried with advantage into a particular channel sooner than it could have been otherwise, it will by no means follow that the sum-total, either of its industry, or of its revenue, can ever be augmented by any such regulation. The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of every such regulation is to diminish its revenue; and what diminishes its revenue is certainly not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have augmented of its own accord, had both capital and industry been left to find out their natural employments.

Through such regulations, a specific industry can sometimes be developed faster than it would have been otherwise, and after a certain period, it can be produced domestically at a price that is the same or even cheaper than in the foreign country. However, just because the industry of the society is steered into a specific direction sooner than it could have been otherwise, it doesn't mean that the total amount of its industry or revenue can be increased by such regulations. The society's industry can only grow in relation to the growth of its capital, and its capital can only grow in relation to what can be gradually saved from its revenue. However, the immediate effect of any such regulation is to reduce its revenue; and anything that decreases revenue is not very likely to increase capital faster than it would have naturally increased on its own if both capital and industry had been allowed to find their natural roles.

Though, for want of such regulations, the society should never acquire the proposed manufacture, it would not upon that account necessarily be the poorer in any one period of its duration. In every period of its duration its whole capital and industry might still have been employed, though upon different objects, in the manner that was most advantageous at the time. In every period its revenue might have been the greatest which its capital could afford, and both capital and revenue might have been augmented with the greatest possible rapidity.

Though, without such regulations, the society might never achieve the proposed manufacturing, it wouldn’t necessarily be worse off during any phase of its existence. At any point, its entire capital and labor could still have been utilized, though directed toward different goals that were most beneficial at the time. In each phase, its revenue could have been the highest that its capital could support, and both capital and revenue could have grown as quickly as possible.

The natural advantages which one country has over another, in producing particular commodities, are sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by all the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By means of glasses, hot-beds, and hot-walls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very good wine, too, be made of them, at about thirty times the expense for which at least equally good can be brought from foreign countries. Would it be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines, merely to encourage the making of claret and Burgundy in Scotland? But if there would be a manifest absurdity in turning towards any employment thirty times more of the capital and industry of the country than would be necessary to purchase from foreign countries an equal quantity of the commodities wanted, there must be an absurdity, though not altogether so glaring, yet exactly of the same kind, in turning towards any such employment a thirtieth, or even a three hundredth part more of either. Whether the[Pg 186] advantages which one country has over another be natural or acquired, is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one country has those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more advantageous for the latter rather to buy of the former than to make. It is an acquired advantage only, which one artificer has over his neighbour, who exercises another trade; and yet they both find it more advantageous to buy of one another, than to make what does not belong to their particular trades.

The natural benefits that one country has over another in producing specific goods can be so significant that it's widely recognized as pointless to compete against them. With the use of greenhouses, hotbeds, and hot walls, good grapes can be grown in Scotland, and decent wine can be made from them, but at around thirty times the cost of what equally good wine can be imported from abroad. Would it make sense to ban all imported wines just to promote the production of claret and Burgundy in Scotland? It would be clearly ridiculous to invest thirty times more of the country's resources and labor into an industry than it would take to simply buy the desired goods from foreign sources. There is, however, a similar kind of absurdity, although less obvious, in directing even thirty or three hundred times more resources into such an industry. Whether the advantages one country has over another are natural or gained doesn’t matter in this regard. As long as one country has those advantages and the other does not, it will always be better for the latter to purchase from the former rather than produce it themselves. The advantage one skilled worker has over another in a different trade is also an acquired one, yet they both find it more beneficial to buy from each other than to create what’s outside their own trades.

Merchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest advantage from this monopoly of the home market. The prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle and of salt provisions, together with the high duties upon foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, are not near so advantageous to the graziers and farmers of Great Britain, as other regulations of the same kind are to its merchants and manufacturers. Manufactures, those of the finer kind especially, are more easily transported from one country to another than corn or cattle. It is in the fetching and carrying manufactures, accordingly, that foreign trade is chiefly employed. In manufactures, a very small advantage will enable foreigners to undersell our own workmen, even in the home market. It will require a very great one to enable them to do so in the rude produce of the soil. If the free importation of foreign manufactures were permitted, several of the home manufactures would probably suffer, and some of them perhaps go to ruin altogether, and a considerable part of the stock and industry at present employed in them, would be forced to find out some other employment. But the freest importation of the rude produce of the soil could have no such effect upon the agriculture of the country.

Merchants and manufacturers are the ones who benefit the most from this monopoly on the domestic market. Banning the import of foreign cattle and salt provisions, along with high tariffs on foreign grain—which, during times of moderate abundance, effectively act as a ban—doesn't benefit British graziers and farmers nearly as much as similar regulations do for merchants and manufacturers. Manufactured goods, especially the finer types, are much easier to transport between countries compared to grain or cattle. Therefore, foreign trade primarily revolves around the transportation of manufactured goods. Even a slight advantage in manufacturing allows foreigners to undercut our workers, even in the domestic market. However, it would take a substantial advantage for them to compete with crude agricultural products. If foreign manufactured goods were allowed in freely, many domestic manufacturers could struggle, and some might even go out of business altogether, forcing a significant portion of the resources and labor currently invested in them to seek other jobs. But unrestricted import of raw agricultural products wouldn't have such an impact on the country's agriculture.

If the importation of foreign cattle, for example, were made ever so free, so few could be imported, that the grazing trade of Great Britain could be little affected by it. Live cattle are, perhaps, the only commodity of which the transportation is more expensive by sea than by land. By land they carry themselves to market. By sea, not only the cattle, but their food and their water too, must be carried at no small expense and inconveniency. The short sea between Ireland and Great Britain, indeed, renders the importation of Irish cattle more easy. But though the free importation of them, which was lately permitted only for a limited time, were rendered perpetual, it could have no considerable effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain. Those parts of Great Britain which border upon the Irish sea are all grazing countries. Irish cattle could never be imported for their use, but must be drove through those very extensive countries, at no small expense and inconveniency, before they could arrive at their proper market. Fat cattle could not be drove so far. Lean cattle, therefore, could only be imported; and such importation could interfere not with the interest of the feeding or fattening countries, to which, by reducing the price of lean cattle it would rather be advantageous, but with that of the breeding countries only. The small number of Irish cattle imported since their importation was permitted, together with the good price at which lean cattle still continue to sell, seem to demonstrate, that even the breeding countries of Great Britain are never likely to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle. The common people of Ireland, indeed, are said to have sometimes opposed with violence the exportation of their cattle. But if the exporters had found any great advantage in continuing the trade, they could easily, when the law was on their side, have conquered this mobbish opposition.

If the import of foreign cattle, for example, were made completely free, so few could be imported that it wouldn't significantly impact the grazing trade in Great Britain. Live cattle are probably the only product where transportation by sea is costlier than by land. On land, they can make their own way to market. By sea, not only do the cattle need to be transported, but their food and water must also be brought along at considerable expense and inconvenience. The short distance between Ireland and Great Britain makes importing Irish cattle easier. However, even if the recent temporary allowance for free importation were made permanent, it wouldn't have a significant effect on the interests of British graziers. The areas of Great Britain that border the Irish Sea are all grazing regions. Irish cattle couldn't be imported for their use directly; they would have to be driven through extensive land before reaching their desired market, which would involve considerable expense and inconvenience. Fat cattle wouldn't be driven such long distances. Therefore, only lean cattle could be imported, and this would not interfere with the interests of the feeding or fattening regions, as it would likely benefit them by lowering the price of lean cattle, but would impact only the breeding regions. The small number of Irish cattle imported since they were allowed, along with the good prices that lean cattle still fetch, suggest that even the breeding regions of Great Britain aren't likely to be significantly affected by the free import of Irish cattle. The common people of Ireland have reportedly sometimes violently opposed the export of their cattle. But if exporters had found substantial benefits in continuing the trade, they could have easily overcome this mob opposition when the law was on their side.

Feeding and fattening countries, besides, must always be highly improved, whereas breeding countries are generally uncultivated. The high price of lean cattle, by augmenting the value of uncultivated land, is like a bounty against improvement. To any country which was highly improved throughout, it would be more advantageous to import its lean cattle than to breed them. The province of Holland, accordingly, is said to follow this maxim at present. The mountains of Scotland, Wales, and Northumberland, indeed, are countries not capable of much improvement, and seem destined by nature to be the breeding countries of Great Britain. The freest importation of foreign cattle could have no other effect than to hinder those breeding countries from taking advantage of the increasing population and improvement of the rest of the kingdom, from raising their price to an exorbitant height, and from laying a real tax upon all the more improved and cultivated parts of the country.

Feeding and fattening countries, on the other hand, must always be highly developed, while breeding countries are usually underdeveloped. The high price of lean cattle, by increasing the value of undeveloped land, acts like a deterrent to improvement. For any country that is fully developed, it would make more sense to import lean cattle than to breed them. The province of Holland, for instance, is said to follow this principle currently. The mountains of Scotland, Wales, and Northumberland are indeed regions that can't be greatly improved and seem naturally suited to be the breeding grounds of Great Britain. Allowing unrestricted importation of foreign cattle would only prevent those breeding regions from benefiting from the growing population and progress in the rest of the kingdom, causing their prices to skyrocket and effectively imposing a real tax on all the more developed and cultivated areas of the country.

The freest importation of salt provisions, in the same manner, could have as little effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain as that of live cattle. Salt provisions are not only a very bulky commodity, but when compared with fresh meat they are a commodity both of worse quality, and, as they cost more labour and expense, of higher price. They could never, therefore, come into competition with the fresh meat, though they might with the salt provisions of the country. They might be used for victualling ships for distant voyages, and such like uses, but could never make any considerable part of the food of the people. The small quantity of salt provisions imported from Ireland since their importation was rendered free, is an experimental proof that our graziers have nothing to apprehend from it. It does not appear that the price of butcher's meat has ever been sensibly affected by it.[Pg 187]

The unrestricted import of salted food would have just as little impact on the interests of British cattle farmers as importing live animals would. Salted food is not only very heavy, but it is also lower in quality compared to fresh meat, and because it requires more labor and costs more, it's priced higher. Therefore, it could never compete with fresh meat, although it might compete with local salted food. It could be used for supplying ships on long journeys and similar purposes, but it could never make up a significant part of the population’s diet. The small amount of salted food imported from Ireland since it became freely importable is clear evidence that our cattle farmers have nothing to worry about. It doesn't seem that the price of fresh meat has ever been significantly affected by it.[Pg 187]

Even the free importation of foreign corn could very little affect the interest of the farmers of Great Britain. Corn is a much more bulky commodity than butcher's meat. A pound of wheat at a penny is as dear as a pound of butcher's meat at fourpence. The small quantity of foreign corn imported even in times of the greatest scarcity, may satisfy our farmers that they can have nothing to fear from the freest importation. The average quantity imported, one year with another, amounts only, according to the very well informed author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, to 23,728 quarters of all sorts of grain, and does not exceed the five hundredth and seventy-one part of the annual consumption. But as the bounty upon corn occasions a greater exportation in years of plenty, so it must, of consequence, occasion a greater importation in years of scarcity, than in the actual state of tillage would otherwise take place. By means of it, the plenty of one year does not compensate the scarcity of another; and as the average quantity exported is necessarily augmented by it, so must likewise, in the actual state of tillage, the average quantity imported. If there were no bounty, as less corn would be exported, so it is probable that, one year with another, less would be imported than at present. The corn-merchants, the fetchers and carriers of corn between Great Britain and foreign countries, would have much less employment, and might suffer considerably; but the country gentlemen and farmers could suffer very little. It is in the corn-merchants, accordingly, rather than the country gentlemen and farmers, that I have observed the greatest anxiety for the renewal and continuation of the bounty.

Even the unrestricted importation of foreign corn wouldn't significantly impact the interests of farmers in Great Britain. Corn takes up much more space than butcher's meat. A pound of wheat at a penny costs the same as a pound of butcher's meat at fourpence. The small amount of foreign corn imported, even during times of severe scarcity, should reassure our farmers that they have nothing to fear from open importation. The average amount imported each year is about 23,728 quarters of all types of grain, according to the well-informed author of the Tracts on the Corn Trade, and this doesn't even reach one five-hundred seventy-first of the annual consumption. However, because the bounty on corn leads to increased exports in years of abundance, it inevitably results in greater imports during years of scarcity than would occur based on the current level of farming. This means that the abundance of one year doesn't make up for the shortage of another; as the average quantity exported rises due to the bounty, the average quantity imported must also rise under the current farming practices. If there were no bounty, less corn would be exported, and it's likely that, on average, even less would be imported than now. Corn merchants, who transport and carry corn between Great Britain and foreign countries, would have much less work and could face significant losses, but the country gentlemen and farmers would hardly be affected. I've noticed that the greatest concern for the renewal and continuation of the bounty lies more with the corn merchants than with the country gentlemen and farmers.

Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all people, the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly. The undertaker of a great manufactory is sometimes alarmed if another work of the same kind is established within twenty miles of him; the Dutch undertaker of the woollen manufacture at Abbeville, stipulated that no work of the same kind should be established within thirty leagues of that city. Farmers and country gentlemen, on the contrary, are generally disposed rather to promote, than to obstruct, the cultivation and improvement of their neighbours farms and estates. They have no secrets, such as those of the greater part of manufacturers, but are generally rather fond of communicating to their neighbours, and of extending as far as possible any new practice which they may have found to be advantageous. Pius quæstus, says old Cato, stabilissimusque, minimeque invidiosus; minimeque male cogitantes sunt, qui in eo studio occupati sunt. Country gentlemen and farmers, dispersed in different parts of the country, cannot so easily combine as merchants and manufacturers, who being collected into towns, and accustomed to that exclusive corporation spirit which prevails in them, naturally endeavour to obtain, against all their countrymen, the same exclusive privilege which they generally possess against the inhabitants of their respective towns. They accordingly seem to have been the original inventors of those restraints upon the importation of foreign goods, which secure to them the monopoly of the home market. It was probably in imitation of them, and to put themselves upon a level with those who, they found, were disposed to oppress them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain so far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station, as to demand the exclusive privilege of supplying their countrymen with corn and butcher's meat. They did not, perhaps, take time to consider how much less their interest could be affected by the freedom of trade, than that of the people whose example they followed.

Country gentlemen and farmers, to their great credit, are among the least affected by the awful spirit of monopoly. The owner of a large factory might get anxious if another business of the same type opens within twenty miles; for instance, the Dutch owner of the wool factory in Abbeville insisted that no similar business should be established within thirty leagues of the city. In contrast, farmers and country gentlemen usually prefer to encourage rather than hinder the cultivation and improvement of their neighbors' farms and properties. They don’t keep secrets like many manufacturers do; instead, they are often quite eager to share with their neighbors and spread any new practices they find beneficial. Pius quæstus, says old Cato, stabilissimusque, minimeque invidiosus; minimeque male cogitantes sunt, qui in eo studio occupati sunt. Country gentlemen and farmers, spread out across the countryside, can’t easily come together as merchants and manufacturers do, who are gathered in towns and used to the exclusive corporation mentality that dominates them. Consequently, they naturally strive to gain the same exclusive privilege against their fellow countrymen that they usually enjoy over the residents of their respective towns. It appears they were the original creators of those restrictions on importing foreign goods, which secure them a monopoly in the domestic market. Probably, to match those who they felt were inclined to oppress them, the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain forgot their typical generosity and asked for the exclusive right to supply their fellow citizens with grain and meat. They may not have taken the time to consider how much less their interests could be impacted by free trade than those of the people whose example they followed.

To prohibit, by a perpetual law, the importation of foreign corn and cattle, is in reality to enact, that the population and industry of the country shall, at no time, exceed what the rude produce of its own soil can maintain.

To ban, through a permanent law, the importation of foreign grain and livestock essentially means deciding that the country's population and industry will never exceed what the basic resources of its own land can support.

There seem, however, to be two cases, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestic industry.

There seem to be two situations where it’s usually beneficial to impose some burden on foreign goods to encourage domestic industry.

The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some cases, by absolute prohibitions, and in others, by heavy burdens upon the shipping of foreign countries. The following are the principal dispositions of this act.

The first reason is when a specific type of industry is essential for defending the country. For instance, the defense of Great Britain relies heavily on the number of its sailors and ships. Therefore, the navigation laws appropriately aim to give British sailors and shipping a monopoly on their country's trade, sometimes through outright bans, and other times by imposing heavy burdens on foreign shipping. Here are the main provisions of this act.

First, All ships, of which the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners, are not British subjects, are prohibited, upon pain of forfeiting ship and cargo, from trading to the British settlements and plantations, or from being employed in the coasting trade of Great Britain.

First, all ships whose owners, captains, and three-quarters of the crew are not British citizens are banned from trading with British settlements and plantations, or from participating in the coastal trade of Great Britain, under penalty of losing the ship and cargo.

Secondly, A great variety of the most bulky articles of importation can be brought into Great Britain only, either in such ships as are above described, or in ships of the country where those goods are produced, and of which the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners, are of that particular country; and when imported even in ships of this latter kind, they are subject to double aliens duty. If imported in ships of any other country, the penalty is forfeiture of ship and goods. When this act was made, the Dutch were, what they still are, the great carriers of Europe; and by this regulation they were entirely excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, or[Pg 188] from importing to us the goods of any other European country.

Secondly, a wide range of large imported goods can only be brought into Great Britain on ships that fit the description above, or on vessels from the country where those goods are made, with the owners, captains, and three-quarters of the crew being from that specific nation. Even when imported on these types of ships, they incur double the alien duty. If brought in on ships from any other country, the penalty is the confiscation of the ship and goods. When this law was established, the Dutch were, as they still are, the main carriers in Europe; this regulation completely barred them from being the carriers to Great Britain, or [Pg 188] from bringing us goods from any other European country.

Thirdly, A great variety of the most bulky articles of importation are prohibited from being imported, even in British ships, from any country but that in which they are produced, under pain of forfeiting ship and cargo. This regulation, too, was probably intended against the Dutch. Holland was then, as now, the great emporium for all European goods; and by this regulation, British ships were hindered from loading in Holland the goods of any other European country.

Thirdly, a wide range of bulky imported items is banned from entering the country, even on British ships, unless they come from the country where they were made, with severe penalties for ship and cargo loss. This rule was likely aimed at the Dutch. At that time, just like today, Holland was the main hub for all European goods; this regulation prevented British ships from picking up goods from other European countries in Holland.

Fourthly, Salt fish of all kinds, whale-fins, whalebone, oil, and blubber, not caught by and cured on board British vessels, when imported into Great Britain, are subject to double aliens duty. The Dutch, as they are still the principal, were then the only fishers in Europe that attempted to supply foreign nations with fish. By this regulation, a very heavy burden was laid upon their supplying Great Britain.

Fourthly, all types of salt fish, whale fins, whalebone, oil, and blubber that aren't caught and processed on British ships are subject to double alien duty when imported into Great Britain. The Dutch, who are still the main players, were at that time the only fishermen in Europe trying to sell fish to foreign countries. This regulation placed a significant burden on their ability to supply Great Britain.

When the act of navigation was made, though England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two nations. It had begun during the government of the long parliament, which first framed this act, and it broke out soon after in the Dutch wars, during that of the Protector and of Charles II. It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animosity. They are as wise, however, as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity, at that particular time, aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England.

When the navigation act was enacted, even though England and Holland weren't technically at war, there was intense hostility between the two countries. This animosity started during the long parliament's administration, which first introduced this act, and escalated shortly afterward during the Dutch wars under the Protector and Charles II. It's quite possible that some of the rules in this famous act were influenced by national resentment. Nonetheless, they are just as wise as if they had come from the most careful thought. At that time, national animosity was focused on the same goal that careful consideration would have suggested: reducing the naval power of Holland, the only naval force that could threaten England's security.

The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it. The interest of a nation, in its commercial relations to foreign nations, is, like that of a merchant with regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap, and to sell as dear as possible. But it will be most likely to buy cheap, when, by the most perfect freedom of trade, it encourages all nations to bring to it the goods which it has occasion to purchase; and, for the same reason, it will be most likely to sell dear, when its markets are thus filled with the greatest number of buyers. The act of navigation, it is true, lays no burden upon foreign ships that come to export the produce of British industry. Even the ancient aliens duty, which used to be paid upon all goods, exported as well as imported, has, by several subsequent acts, been taken off from the greater part of the articles of exportation. But if foreigners, either by prohibitions or high duties, are hindered from coming to sell, they cannot always afford to come to buy; because, coming without a cargo, they must lose the freight from their own country to Great Britain. By diminishing the number of sellers, therefore, we necessarily diminish that of buyers, and are thus likely not only to buy foreign goods dearer, but to sell our own cheaper, than if there was a more perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.

The navigation act isn’t good for international trade or for building the wealth that can come from it. A nation’s interests in commercial dealings with other countries are similar to a merchant’s interests with the various people they trade with: they want to buy as cheaply and sell as expensively as possible. However, a nation is most likely to buy cheaply when it promotes complete freedom of trade, attracting all countries to bring the goods it needs to purchase. For the same reason, it will be more likely to sell for a high price when its markets are full of many buyers. The navigation act doesn’t place any burden on foreign ships that want to export British-made products. Even the old aliens duty, which was paid on all goods imported and exported, has been eliminated for most export items through several later acts. However, if foreigners are prevented from coming to sell due to prohibitions or high duties, they won’t always be able to afford to come buy, because arriving without goods means they lose the freight cost from their own country to Britain. By reducing the number of sellers, we also reduce the number of buyers, which means we are likely to pay more for foreign goods and sell our own for less than we would if there were more freedom in trade. While the act of navigation may impact wealth, defense is much more important, making it perhaps the most prudent of all England's trade regulations.

The second case, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, is when some tax is imposed at home upon the produce of the latter. In this case, it seems reasonable that an equal tax should be imposed upon the like produce of the former. This would not give the monopoly of the home market to domestic industry, nor turn towards a particular employment a greater share of the stock and labour of the country, than what would naturally go to it. It would only hinder any part of what would naturally go to it from being turned away by the tax into a less natural direction, and would leave the competition between foreign and domestic industry, after the tax, as nearly as possible upon the same footing as before it. In Great Britain, when any such tax is laid upon the produce of domestic industry, it is usual, at the same time, in order to stop the clamorous complaints of our merchants and manufacturers, that they will be undersold at home, to lay a much heavier duty upon the importation of all foreign goods of the same kind.

The second situation where it generally makes sense to place some burden on foreign goods to encourage local industry is when a tax is imposed at home on the products from that industry. In this case, it seems fair that an equivalent tax should be applied to similar products from abroad. This wouldn’t give domestic industry a monopoly on the local market, nor would it direct a larger share of the country's resources and labor toward a specific job than what would naturally occur. It would merely prevent some of what would normally go to domestic industry from being shifted by the tax to a less natural option, and would keep the competition between foreign and domestic industries, after the tax, as balanced as possible compared to before. In Great Britain, when such a tax is placed on domestic products, it’s common at the same time, to quiet the loud complaints from our merchants and manufacturers about being undersold locally, to impose a much heavier duty on the importation of all foreign goods of the same type.

This second limitation of the freedom of trade, according to some people, should, upon most occasions, be extended much farther than to the precise foreign commodities which could come into competition with those which had been taxed at home. When the necessaries of life have been taxed in any country, it becomes proper, they pretend, to tax not only the like necessaries of life imported from other countries, but all sorts of foreign goods which can come into competition with any thing that is the produce of domestic industry. Subsistence, they say, becomes necessarily dearer in consequence of such taxes; and the price of labour must always rise with the price of the labourer's subsistence. Every commodity, therefore, which is the produce of domestic industry, though not immediately taxed itself, becomes dearer in consequence of such taxes, because the labour which produces it becomes so. Such taxes, therefore, are really equivalent, they say, to a tax upon every particular commodity produced at home. In order to put domestic upon the same footing with foreign industry, therefore, it becomes necessary, they think, to lay some duty[Pg 189] upon every foreign commodity, equal to this enhancement of the price of the home commodities with which it can come into competition.

This second limitation on trade freedom, according to some, should often be extended beyond just the specific foreign goods that compete with those taxed at home. When essential goods are taxed in any country, they argue that it's appropriate to tax not only similar necessities imported from abroad but also all kinds of foreign products that could compete with anything produced domestically. They claim that the cost of living increases because of these taxes; thus, labor costs must rise alongside the cost of living for workers. As a result, every product of domestic industry, even if not directly taxed, becomes more expensive due to these taxes, since the labor required to produce it becomes more costly. Therefore, these taxes are effectively equivalent to a tax on every specific locally produced good. To level the playing field between domestic and foreign industry, they believe it’s necessary to impose some duty[Pg 189] on every foreign product, matching the increase in price of those domestically produced goods that it can compete with.

Whether taxes upon the necessaries of life, such as those in Great Britain upon soap, salt, leather, candles, &c. necessarily raise the price of labour, and consequently that of all other commodities, I shall consider hereafter, when I come to treat of taxes. Supposing, however, in the mean time, that they have this effect, and they have it undoubtedly, this general enhancement of the price of all commodities, in consequence of that labour, is a case which differs in the two following respects from that of a particular commodity, of which the price was enhanced by a particular tax immediately imposed upon it.

Whether taxes on basic necessities, like those in Great Britain on soap, salt, leather, candles, etc., inevitably increase the price of labor, and consequently that of all other goods, I will discuss later when I address taxes. However, assuming in the meantime that they do have this effect—and they undoubtedly do—this overall increase in the prices of all goods due to that labor is different in two key ways from the situation where a specific tax is directly imposed on a particular commodity, leading to an increase in its price.

First, It might always be known with great exactness, how far the price of such a commodity could be enhanced by such a tax, but how far the general enhancement of the price of labour might affect that of every different commodity about which labour was employed, could never be known with any tolerable exactness. It would be impossible, therefore, to proportion, with any tolerable exactness, the tax of every foreign, to the enhancement of the price of every home commodity.

First, it might always be clear how much the price of a certain commodity could increase because of a tax, but how much the overall increase in labor costs would impact the prices of every different commodity that labor was used for could never be known with any reasonable accuracy. It would therefore be impossible to proportion, with any reasonable accuracy, the tax on every foreign product to the increase in the price of every domestic product.

Secondly, Taxes upon the necessaries of life have nearly the same effect upon the circumstances of the people as a poor soil and a bad climate. Provisions are thereby rendered dearer, in the same manner as if it required extraordinary labour and expense to raise them. As, in the natural scarcity arising from soil and climate, it would be absurd to direct the people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals and industry, so is it likewise in the artificial scarcity arising from such taxes. To be left to accommodate, as well as they could, their industry to their situation, and to find out those employments in which, notwithstanding their unfavourable circumstances, they might have some advantage either in the home or in the foreign market, is what, in both cases, would evidently be most for their advantage. To lay a new tax upon them, because they are already overburdened with taxes, and because they already pay too dear for the necessaries of life, to make them likewise pay too dear for the greater part of other commodities, is certainly a most absurd way of making amends.

Secondly, taxes on essential goods have nearly the same impact on people's lives as poor soil and a bad climate. This makes necessities more expensive, just as if it took extra effort and cost to produce them. Just as it would be unreasonable to tell people how to use their resources and labor in response to natural scarcity caused by soil and climate, it's equally unreasonable in the case of the artificial scarcity created by such taxes. It's best to allow people to adapt their work to their circumstances and find jobs where they might have some advantage, despite their challenges, in either local or international markets. Imposing a new tax on them, when they are already burdened by existing taxes and paying too much for basic needs, and then making them pay too much for most other goods as well, is certainly a ridiculous way to try to make things better.

Such taxes, when they have grown up to a certain height, are a curse equal to the barrenness of the earth, and the inclemency of the heavens, and yet it is in the richest and most industrious countries that they have been most generally imposed. No other countries could support so great a disorder. As the strongest bodies only can live and enjoy health under an unwholesome regimen, so the nations only, that in every sort of industry have the greatest natural and acquired advantages, can subsist and prosper under such taxes. Holland is the country in Europe in which they abound most, and which, from peculiar circumstances, continues to prosper, not by means of them, as has been most absurdly supposed, but in spite of them.

Such taxes, when they reach a certain level, are as damaging as a barren land or harsh weather. Yet, it’s in the wealthiest and most hardworking countries that these taxes are most often imposed. Other countries wouldn’t be able to handle such a burden. Just like only the strongest bodies can survive and thrive under an unhealthy diet, only nations with the greatest natural and developed advantages in various industries can endure and succeed under such taxes. Holland is the European country where these taxes are most prevalent, and it continues to thrive not because of them, as has been mistakenly believed, but despite them.

As there are two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, so there are two others in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, in the one, how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods; and, in the other, how far, or in what manner, it may be proper to restore that free importation, after it has been for some time interrupted.

As there are two situations where it can be beneficial to impose some restrictions on foreign goods to support domestic industry, there are also two other situations where it's worth considering how far we should keep allowing the free import of certain foreign products, and how or to what extent we might properly resume that free importation after it has been paused for a while.

The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods, is when some foreign nation restrains, by high duties or prohibitions, the importation of some of our manufactures into their country. Revenge, in this case, naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into ours. Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner. The French have been particularly forward to favour their own manufactures, by restraining the importation of such foreign goods as could come into competition with them. In this consisted a great part of the policy of Mr. Colbert, who, notwithstanding his great abilities, seems in this case to have been imposed upon by the sophistry of merchants and manufacturers, who are always demanding a monopoly against their countrymen. It is at present the opinion of the most intelligent men in France, that his operations of this kind have not been beneficial to his country. That minister, by the tariff of 1667, imposed very high duties upon a great number of foreign manufactures. Upon his refusing to moderate them in favour of the Dutch, they, in 1671, prohibited the importation of the wines, brandies, and manufactures of France. The war of 1672 seems to have been in part occasioned by this commercial dispute. The peace of Nimeguen put an end to it in 1678, by moderating some of those duties in favour of the Dutch, who in consequence took off their prohibition. It was about the same time that the French and English began mutually to oppress each other's industry, by the like duties and prohibitions, of which the French, however, seem to have set the first example. The spirit of hostility which has subsisted between the two nations ever since, has hitherto hindered them from being moderated on either side. In 1697, the English prohibited the importation of bone lace, the manufacture of Flanders. The government of that country, at that time under the domination of Spain,[Pg 190] prohibited, in return, the importation of English woollens. In 1700, the prohibition of importing bone lace into England was taken off, upon condition that the importation of English woollens into Flanders should be put on the same footing as before.

The situation where it might be up for debate whether to continue allowing the free import of certain foreign goods comes into play when another country imposes high tariffs or bans on our products entering their market. In this case, it’s only natural to respond in kind and impose similar tariffs and bans on their goods coming into our market. Countries usually retaliate this way. The French have been especially proactive in supporting their own products by limiting the import of foreign goods that could compete with them. This formed a significant part of Mr. Colbert's policies, who, despite his considerable skills, seemed to have been swayed by the arguments of merchants and manufacturers clamoring for a monopoly against their fellow citizens. Many intelligent people in France now believe that his initiatives in this area have not benefited the country. This minister, through the tariff of 1667, imposed very high duties on many foreign products. When he refused to reduce these tariffs for the Dutch, they responded in 1671 by banning the import of French wines, brandies, and other goods. The conflict of 1672 was partly sparked by this trade dispute. The Peace of Nijmegen ended this in 1678 by easing some of those tariffs for the Dutch, who then lifted their ban. Around this time, the French and English began to mutually hinder each other's industries through similar tariffs and bans, with the French seemingly leading the way. The ongoing animosity between the two nations has since prevented any easing of tensions on either side. In 1697, the English banned the import of bone lace made in Flanders. In response, at that time under Spanish control, the government of Flanders prohibited the import of English woolen products. In 1700, the ban on importing bone lace into England was lifted on the condition that the import of English woolen goods into Flanders be restored to its previous status.

There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will generally more than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying dearer during a short time for some sorts of goods. To judge whether such retaliations are likely to produce such an effect, does not, perhaps, belong so much to the science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be governed by general principles, which are always the same, as to the skill of that insidious and crafty animal vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs. When there is no probability that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the other classes of them. When our neighbours prohibit some manufacture of ours, we generally prohibit, not only the same, for that alone would seldom affect them considerably, but some other manufacture of theirs. This may, no doubt, give encouragement to some particular class of workmen among ourselves, and, by excluding some of their rivals, may enable them to raise their price in the home market. Those workmen however, who suffered by our neighbours prohibition, will not be benefited by ours. On the contrary, they, and almost all the other classes of our citizens, will thereby be obliged to pay dearer than before for certain goods. Every such law, therefore, imposes a real tax upon the whole country, not in favour of that particular class of workmen who were injured by our neighbours prohibitions, but of some other class.

There might be good reasoning behind retaliation like this, especially if there's a chance it could lead to lifting the high tariffs or bans that we’re complaining about. Regaining a large foreign market will usually outweigh the temporary inconvenience of paying higher prices for some goods for a little while. Deciding if these retaliations might actually achieve that effect probably doesn't fall so much under the expertise of a legislator, whose decisions should be based on consistent general principles, but rather on the skills of that sly and crafty individual commonly known as a statesman or politician, whose decisions are guided by the ever-changing dynamics of the situation. If there's no chance that such a repeal can happen, then it seems misguided to try to make up for the harm done to certain groups in our society by inflicting another injury on them and almost all other groups. When our neighbors ban one of our industries, we usually retaliate by banning not just the same industry, which wouldn't significantly impact them, but other industries of theirs as well. This might encourage some specific group of workers in our country and help them raise their prices by pushing out some of their competitors. However, those workers who suffered because of our neighbors' ban won’t benefit from ours. In fact, they and nearly all other groups in our society will have to pay more than before for certain goods. So, every such law really ends up being a tax on the entire country, not benefiting that specific group of workers who were harmed by our neighbors’ bans, but rather helping a different group.

The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, how far, or in what manner, it is proper to restore the free importation of foreign goods, after it has been for some time interrupted, is when particular manufactures, by means of high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign goods which can come into competition with them, have been so far extended as to employ a great multitude of hands. Humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection. Were those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market, as to deprive all at once many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and means of subsistence. The disorder which this would occasion might no doubt be very considerable. It would in all probability, however, be much less than is commonly imagined, for the two following reasons.

The situation where we need to think about how and when to restore free importation of foreign goods after it's been closed off for a while is when certain industries, through high tariffs or bans on all foreign goods that compete with them, have grown enough to employ a large number of people. In this case, it may be necessary for us to reinstate trade gradually and carefully. If those high tariffs and bans were removed all at once, cheaper foreign goods could flood the domestic market, leading to the sudden loss of jobs and livelihoods for thousands of our people. The chaos this would create could be significant. However, it's likely that it would be less severe than commonly thought, for two main reasons.

First, All those manufactures of which any part is commonly exported to other European countries without a bounty, could be very little affected by the freest importation of foreign goods. Such manufactures must be sold as cheap abroad as any other foreign goods of the same quality and kind, and consequently must be sold cheaper at home. They would still, therefore, keep possession of the home market; and though a capricious man of fashion might sometimes prefer foreign wares, merely because they were foreign, to cheaper and better goods of the same kind that were made at home, this folly could, from the nature of things, extend to so few, that it could make no sensible impression upon the general employment of the people. But a great part of all the different branches of our woollen manufacture, of our tanned leather, and of our hardware, are annually exported to other European countries without any bounty, and these are the manufactures which employ the greatest number of hands. The silk, perhaps, is the manufacture which would suffer the most by this freedom of trade, and after it the linen, though the latter much less than the former.

First, all those products that are commonly exported to other European countries without a government subsidy wouldn't be significantly impacted by the unrestricted importation of foreign goods. These products have to be sold abroad at prices comparable to other foreign goods of similar quality, which means they would need to be sold for less at home. Therefore, they would still dominate the domestic market; even though a trendy individual might occasionally choose foreign products simply because they are foreign, rather than cheaper and better local goods, this mindset would only affect a small number of people and would not meaningfully influence the overall employment of the workforce. A large portion of our various wool products, tanned leather, and hardware are exported annually to other European countries without any subsidy, and these are the industries that employ the most workers. The silk industry would likely suffer the most from this open trade, followed by the linen industry, though to a lesser extent.

Secondly, Though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment and common method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they would thereby be deprived either of employment or subsistence. By the reduction of the army and navy at the end of the late war, more than 100,000 soldiers and seamen, a number equal to what is employed in the greatest manufactures, were all at once thrown out of their ordinary employment: but though they no doubt suffered some inconveniency, they were not thereby deprived of all employment and subsistence. The greater part of the seamen, it is probable, gradually betook themselves to the merchant service as they could find occasion, and in the mean time both they and the soldiers were absorbed in the great mass of the people, and employed in a great variety of occupations. Not only no great convulsion, but no sensible disorder, arose from so great a change in the situation of more than 100,000 men, all accustomed to the use of arms, and many of them to rapine and plunder. The number of vagrants was scarce anywhere sensibly increased by it; even the wages of labour were not reduced by it in any occupation, so far as I have been able to learn, except in that of seamen in the merchant service. But if we compare together the habits of a soldier and of any sort of manufacturer, we shall find that those of the latter do[Pg 191] not tend so much to disqualify him from being employed in a new trade, as those of the former from being employed in any. The manufacturer has always been accustomed to look for his subsistence from his labour only; the soldier to expect it from his pay. Application and industry have been familiar to the one; idleness and dissipation to the other. But it is surely much easier to change the direction of industry from one sort of labour to another, than to turn idleness and dissipation to any. To the greater part of manufactures, besides, it has already been observed, there are other collateral manufactures of so similar a nature, that a workman can easily transfer his industry from one of them to another. The greater part of such workmen, too, are occasionally employed in country labour. The stock which employed them in a particular manufacture before, will still remain in the country, to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The capital of the country remaining the same, the demand for labour will likewise be the same, or very nearly the same, though it may be exerted in different places, and for different occupations. Soldiers and seamen, indeed, when discharged from the king's service, are at liberty to exercise any trade within any town or place of Great Britain or Ireland. Let the same natural liberty of exercising what species of industry they please, be restored to all his Majesty's subjects, in the same manner as to soldiers and seamen; that is, break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute of apprenticeship, both which are really encroachments upon natural liberty, and add to those the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out of employment, either in one trade or in one place, may seek for it in another trade or in another place, without the fear either of a prosecution or of a removal; and neither the public nor the individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding some particular classes of manufacturers, than from that of the soldiers. Our manufacturers have no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot have more than those who defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be treated with more delicacy.

Secondly, even though a lot of people would suddenly lose their usual jobs and means of support by restoring the freedom of trade, it doesn't mean they would be completely deprived of work or a way to make a living. When the army and navy were reduced at the end of the recent war, over 100,000 soldiers and sailors were thrown out of their regular jobs all at once. While they certainly faced some challenges, they were not left without work or means of support. Most of the sailors likely transitioned to the merchant service as opportunities arose, and in the meantime, both they and the soldiers blended back into the larger population, taking on many different types of jobs. There wasn’t a major upheaval or any noticeable disorder from such a significant change affecting more than 100,000 men, many of whom were trained in arms and some accustomed to violence and looting. The number of homeless people didn’t noticeably increase because of it; even labor wages didn’t drop in any job, as far as I know, except for sailors in the merchant service. If we compare the habits of a soldier with those of any manufacturer, we’ll see that the latter is less likely to be disqualified from taking on a new trade than the former is from working at all. The manufacturer is used to depending on their labor for survival; the soldier, on their pay. The former is familiar with hard work and dedication, the latter with idleness and excess. It’s certainly much easier to redirect someone’s efforts from one type of work to another than to transform idleness into productivity. Additionally, many industries are related in ways that make it easy for workers to switch from one to another. Most of these workers are also sometimes involved in agricultural labor. The resources that previously employed them in a specific industry will still be in the country, ready to engage the same number of people elsewhere. As long as the country’s capital stays the same, the demand for labor will also remain roughly the same, even if it’s applied in different areas and for different jobs. Soldiers and sailors, when released from the king's service, are free to pursue any trade in any town or location in Great Britain or Ireland. Let the same natural right to engage in whichever industry they choose be granted to all of the king's subjects, just as it is for soldiers and sailors; that is, dismantle the exclusive privileges of corporations and repeal the apprenticeship law, both of which seriously infringe on natural freedom. Additionally, we should repeal settlement laws, so that a struggling worker, when out of work in one trade or location, can look for jobs in another trade or area without fear of prosecution or relocation. The public and individuals won’t suffer significantly more from occasionally disbanding certain manufacturing classes than they would from disbanding soldiers. Our manufacturers undoubtedly do an important service for their country, but they shouldn’t be valued more than those who protect it with their lives, nor should they be treated with more sensitivity.

To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but, what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it. Were the officers of the army to oppose, with the same zeal and unanimity, any reduction in the number of forces, with which master manufacturers set themselves against every law that is likely to increase the number of their rivals in the home market; were the former to animate their soldiers, in the same manner as the latter inflame their workmen, to attack with violence and outrage the proposers of any such regulation; to attempt to reduce the army would be as dangerous as it has now become to attempt to diminish, in any respect, the monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained against us. This monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular tribes of them, that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the government, and, upon many occasions, intimidate the legislature. The member of parliament who supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly, is sure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of great importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more, if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public services, can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.

To expect that free trade will ever be fully restored in Great Britain is as ridiculous as hoping for a Utopia or some perfect society. Not only do public prejudices stand in the way, but even more daunting are the personal interests of many individuals that strongly resist it. If army officials were to show the same zeal and unity in opposing any cutbacks to their forces as leading manufacturers do against any laws aimed at increasing competition in the domestic market, it would be as risky to try and reduce the army as it has become to challenge the monopoly that our manufacturers have established against us. This monopoly has grown so powerful among certain groups that they've become as intimidating to the government as a large standing army, often scaring lawmakers. A Member of Parliament who backs every effort to strengthen this monopoly is sure to gain not only a reputation for understanding trade but also significant popularity and influence among a group whose wealth and numbers make them very important. On the other hand, if he stands against them, especially if he has the power to thwart their plans, no amount of integrity, high status, or past public service can shield him from severe criticism, personal attacks, or sometimes even real danger from the angry and frustrated monopolists.

The undertaker of a great manufacture, who, by the home markets being suddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to abandon his trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. That part of his capital which had usually been employed in purchasing materials, and in paying his workmen, might, without much difficulty, perhaps, find another employment; but that part of it which was fixed in workhouses, and in the instruments of trade, could scarce be disposed of without considerable loss. The equitable regard, therefore, to his interest, requires that changes of this kind should never be introduced suddenly, but slowly, gradually, and after a very long warning. The legislature, were it possible that its deliberations could be always directed, not by the clamorous importunity of partial interests, but by an extensive view of the general good, ought, upon this very account, perhaps, to be particularly careful, neither to establish any new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those which are already established. Every such regulation introduces some degree of real disorder into the constitution of the state, which it will be difficult afterwards to cure without occasioning another disorder.

The owner of a large manufacturing business, who suddenly has to deal with foreign competition in local markets and ends up having to close down, would definitely face significant hardship. While part of his capital that he usually spends on buying materials and paying his workers might be used elsewhere without too much trouble, the portion tied up in factories and in equipment would be hard to sell without a major loss. So, it’s fair to say that changes like this should never happen abruptly, but rather slowly, gradually, and with plenty of advance notice. If the government could ensure that its decisions were guided not by loud demands from individual interests but by a broader perspective focused on the overall good, it might be especially wise to avoid creating new monopolies or expanding existing ones. Each regulation of this kind introduces some level of real disruption into the structure of the state, which will be tough to fix later without causing another problem.

How far it may be proper to impose taxes upon the importation of foreign goods, in order not to prevent their importation, but to raise a revenue for government, I shall consider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Taxes imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish importation, are evidently as destructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of trade.[Pg 192]

How much it’s appropriate to tax the importation of foreign goods, not to stop them from coming in but to generate revenue for the government, I will discuss later when I talk about taxes. Taxes aimed at preventing or even reducing imports clearly harm the customs revenue as much as they harm the freedom of trade.[Pg 192]


CHAP. III.

OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINTS UPON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS OF ALMOST ALL KINDS, FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE BALANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE DISADVANTAGEOUS.

Part I.Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints, even upon the Principles of the Commercial System.

To lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds, from these particular countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous, is the second expedient by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver. Thus, in Great Britain, Silesia lawns may be imported for home consumption, upon paying certain duties; but French cambrics and lawns are prohibited to be imported, except into the port of London, there to be warehoused for exportation. Higher duties are imposed upon the wines of France than upon those of Portugal, or indeed of any other country. By what is called the impost 1692, a duty of five-and-twenty per cent. of the rate or value, was laid upon all French goods; while the goods of other nations were, the greater part of them, subjected to much lighter duties, seldom exceeding five per cent. The wine, brandy, salt, and vinegar of France, were indeed excepted; these commodities being subjected to other heavy duties, either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the same law. In 1696, a second duty of twenty-five per cent. the first not having been thought a sufficient discouragement, was imposed upon all French goods, except brandy; together with a new duty of five-and-twenty pounds upon the ton of French wine, and another of fifteen pounds upon the ton of French vinegar. French goods have never been omitted in any of those general subsidies or duties of five per cent. which have been imposed upon all, or the greater part, of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If we count the one-third and two-third subsidies as making a complete subsidy between them, there have been five of these general subsidies; so that, before the commencement of the present war, seventy-five per cent. may be considered as the lowest duty to which the greater part of the goods of the growth, produce, or manufacture of France, were liable. But upon the greater part of goods, those duties are equivalent to a prohibition. The French, in their turn, have, I believe, treated our goods and manufactures just as hardly; though I am not so well acquainted with the particular hardships which they have imposed upon them. Those mutual restraints have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two nations; and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British goods into France, or of French goods into Great Britain. The principles which I have been examining, in the foregoing chapter, took their origin from private interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am going to examine in this, from national prejudice and animosity. They are, accordingly, as might well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are so, even upon the principles of the commercial system.

To impose strict limits on the importation of almost all types of goods from countries where the trade balance is thought to be unfavorable is the second method the commercial system uses to boost the amount of gold and silver. In Great Britain, for example, Silesia lawns can be imported for local use after paying certain duties, but French cambrics and lawns are banned from being imported except to the port of London, where they must be stored for export. France faces higher duties on its wines compared to Portugal or any other country. According to the impost of 1692, a 25% duty was imposed on all French goods, while most goods from other nations faced much lighter duties, rarely exceeding 5%. However, French wine, brandy, salt, and vinegar were excluded from this as they were subject to different heavy duties through other laws or specific clauses of the same law. In 1696, a second 25% duty was added on all French goods, excluding brandy, along with a new charge of £25 per ton for French wine and another of £15 per ton for French vinegar. French goods have always been included in the general subsidies or duties of 5% imposed on most items listed in the rate book. If we consider the one-third and two-thirds subsidies as one complete subsidy, there have been five of these general subsidies. Therefore, before the current war began, a duty of 75% can be seen as the minimum for most goods from France. For most items, these duties are effectively a ban. The French have likely treated our goods and manufactures just as poorly, though I'm not as familiar with the specific challenges they have faced. This mutual restriction has nearly eliminated fair trade between the two nations, with smugglers now being the main importers of British goods into France and French goods into Great Britain. The principles I discussed in the previous chapter stemmed from private interests and monopolistic tendencies; those I'm about to discuss here arise from national bias and hostility. As expected, they are even more unreasonable. They are so, even based on the principles of the commercial system.

First, Though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, it would by no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than these of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occasion for of France, than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the same quality were cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case, even upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be consumed in Great Britain.

First, even if it's clear that a free trade agreement between France and England would benefit France, it doesn't mean that such a trade would be bad for England or that England's overall trade balance would worsen. If French wines are better and cheaper than those from Portugal, or if its linens are superior to those from Germany, it would make more sense for Great Britain to buy both the wine and the foreign linen it needs from France instead of Portugal and Germany. While the value of the annual imports from France would significantly increase, the total value of all annual imports would decrease in proportion to how much cheaper the French goods are compared to those from the other two countries. This would hold true even if we assume that all the French goods imported would be consumed in Great Britain.

But, Secondly, A great part of them might be re-exported to other countries, where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return, equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods imported. What has frequently been said of the East India trade, might possibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of East India goods were bought with gold and silver, the re-exportation of a part of them to other countries brought back more gold and silver to that which carried on the trade, than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most important branches of the Dutch trade at present, consists in the carriage of French goods to other European countries. Some part even of the French wine drank in Great Britain, is clandestinely imported from Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if French goods could be imported upon paying only the same duties as those of other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England might have some share of a trade which is found so advantageous to Holland.

But, Secondly, a big portion of those goods could be re-exported to other countries, where they could be sold at a profit, potentially bringing back a return that equals the original cost of all the French goods imported. What has often been said about the East India trade might also apply to the French trade: although most East India goods were purchased with gold and silver, re-exporting some of them to other countries brought back more gold and silver to those involved in the trade than the initial cost of the goods. One of the key aspects of Dutch trade right now is transporting French goods to other European countries. Some of the French wine consumed in Great Britain is secretly imported from Holland and Zealand. If there were a free trade agreement between France and England, or if French goods could be imported by only paying the same duties as other European nations—refundable upon export—England could benefit from a trade that has proven so profitable for Holland.

Thirdly, and lastly, There is no certain criterion by which we can determine on which side what is called the balance between any[Pg 193] two countries lies, or which of them exports to the greatest value. National prejudice and animosity, prompted always by the private interest of particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgment upon all questions concerning it. There are two criterions, however, which have frequently been appealed to upon such occasions, the custom-house books and the course of exchange. The custom-house books, I think, it is now generally acknowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps, almost equally so.

Thirdly and lastly, there isn’t a clear standard to determine which side holds the balance between any[Pg 193] two countries or which one exports more in value. National bias and hostility, usually driven by the self-interest of specific traders, often shape our judgments on these matters. There are two benchmarks that are often referenced in these cases: customs records and exchange rates. The customs records are widely seen as an unreliable measure because the valuations of most goods are often inaccurate. The exchange rates are, perhaps, similarly unreliable.

When the exchange between two places, such as London and Paris, is at par, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are compensated by those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are not compensated by those due from Paris to London, but that a balance in money must be sent out from the latter place; for the risk, trouble, and expense, of exporting which, the premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary state of debt and credit between those two cities must necessarily be regulated, it is said, by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another. When neither of them imports from the other to a greater amount than it exports to that other, the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when one of them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to that other, the former necessarily becomes indebted to the latter in a greater sum than the latter becomes indebted to it: the debts and credits of each do not compensate one another, and money must be sent out from that place of which the debts overbalance the credits. The ordinary course of exchange, therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between two places, must likewise be an indication of the ordinary course of their exports and imports, as these necessarily regulate that state.

When the exchange rate between two places, like London and Paris, is even, it means that the debts owed from London to Paris are balanced out by those owed from Paris to London. Conversely, when a surcharge is applied in London for a bill to Paris, it indicates that the debts from London to Paris are not balanced by those from Paris to London, suggesting that money needs to be sent from Paris; the premium reflects the risk, hassle, and cost of sending that money. However, it's said that the usual state of debt and credit between these two cities is governed by the normal flow of trade between them. When neither city imports more from the other than it exports, their debts and credits can offset each other. But when one city imports more from the other than it exports, the importing city ends up owing more than it is owed; in this case, the debts and credits don't balance, and money must be sent from the city that has more debts than credits. Thus, the usual exchange rates can indicate the typical state of debt and credit between the two places, which are also influenced by their export and import activities.

But though the ordinary course of exchange shall be allowed to be a sufficient indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places, it would not from thence follow, that the balance of trade was in favour of that place which had the ordinary state of debt and credit in its favour. The ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places is not always entirely regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another, but is often influenced by that of the dealings of either with many other places. If it is usual, for example, for the merchants of England to pay for the goods which they buy of Hamburg, Dantzic, Riga, &c. by bills upon Holland, the ordinary state of debt and credit between England and Holland will not be regulated entirely by the ordinary course of the dealings of those two countries with one another, but will be influenced by that of the dealings in England with those other places. England may he obliged to send out every year money to Holland, though its annual exports to that country may exceed very much the annual value of its imports from thence, and though what is called the balance of trade may be very much in favour of England.

But while the typical flow of trade can indicate the usual state of debt and credit between two places, it doesn't mean that the balance of trade favors the location with a positive debt and credit situation. The usual state of debt and credit between any two places isn't always solely determined by their direct dealings with one another. It's often affected by how either interacts with many other locations. For instance, if merchants in England typically pay for goods from Hamburg, Dantzic, Riga, etc., using bills drawn on Holland, the usual state of debt and credit between England and Holland won’t be completely dictated by their direct transactions. Instead, it will be influenced by England’s dealings with those other places. England might need to send money to Holland every year, even if its annual exports to Holland far exceed the value of its imports from there, and even if the so-called balance of trade appears to favor England significantly.

In the way, besides, in which the par of exchange has hitherto been computed, the ordinary course of exchange can afford no sufficient indication that the ordinary state of debt and credit is in favour of that country which seems to have, or which is supposed to have, the ordinary course of exchange in its favour; or, in other words, the real exchange may be, and in fact often is, so very different from the computed one, that, from the course of the latter, no certain conclusion can, upon many occasions, be drawn concerning that of the former.

In the way that the exchange rate has been calculated so far, the usual exchange patterns don’t provide a reliable indication that the typical state of debt and credit is favorable to the country that appears to have or is believed to have a favorable exchange rate. In other words, the actual exchange can often be very different from the calculated one, so you can't always draw definite conclusions about the real exchange just by looking at the calculated rates.

When for a sum of money paid in England, containing, according to the standard of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver, you receive a bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing, according to the standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of pure silver, exchange is said to be at par between England and France. When you pay more, you are supposed to given premium, and exchange is said to be against England, and in favour of France. When you pay less, you are supposed to get a premium, and exchange is said to be against France, and in favour of England.

When you pay a certain amount of money in England, which is equivalent to a specific number of ounces of pure silver according to the English mint's standard, and you receive a bill for a similar amount to be paid in France, with the same number of ounces of pure silver according to the French mint's standard, the exchange is considered to be equal between England and France. If you pay more, it's thought that you're giving a premium, and the exchange is considered unfavorable for England and favorable for France. If you pay less, it's thought that you're receiving a premium, and the exchange is considered unfavorable for France and favorable for England.

But, first, We cannot always judge of the value of the current money of different countries by the standard of their respective mints. In some it is more, in others it in less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from that standard. But the value of the current coin of every country, compared with that of any other country, is in proportion, not to the quantity of pure silver which it ought to contain, but to that which it actually does contain. Before the reformation of the silver coin in King William's time, exchange between England and Holland, computed in the usual manner, according to the standard of their respective mints, was five-and-twenty per cent. against England. But the value of the current coin of England, as we learn from Mr Lowndes, was at that time rather more than five-and-twenty per cent. below its standard value. The real exchange, therefore, may even at that time have been in favour of England, notwithstanding the computed exchange so much against it; a smaller number of ounces of pure silver, actually paid in England, may have purchased a bill for a greater[Pg 194] number of ounces of pure silver to be paid in Holland, and the man who was supposed to give, may in reality have got the premium. The French coin was, before the late reformation of the English gold coin, much less wore than the English, and was perhaps two or three per cent. nearer its standard. If the computed exchange with France, therefore, was not more than two or three per cent. against England, the real exchange might have been in its favour. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the exchange has been constantly in favour of England, and against France.

But, first, we can’t always judge the value of current money in different countries by the standards set by their mints. In some places, it’s more worn, clipped, and otherwise degraded from that standard; in others, it’s less so. The value of the current coin in each country, compared to that of any other country, depends not on the amount of pure silver it should contain, but on the amount it actually contains. Before the silver coin reform during King William's reign, the exchange rate between England and Holland, calculated in the usual way according to their mints, was 25% against England. However, the value of England’s current coin, as noted by Mr. Lowndes, was actually more than 25% below its standard value at that time. Therefore, the real exchange might even have favored England, despite the computed exchange being so unfavorable; fewer ounces of pure silver paid in England could have bought a bill for a greater number of ounces to be paid in Holland, meaning that the person who appeared to be paying may have actually benefited from a premium. Before the recent reform of English gold coin, the French coin was significantly less worn than the English coin and was possibly 2% or 3% closer to its standard. So, if the computed exchange with France was only 2% or 3% against England, then the real exchange could have favored England. Since the reform of the gold coin, the exchange has consistently favored England over France.

Secondly, In some countries the expense of coinage is defrayed by the government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people, who carry their bullion to the mint, and the government even derives some revenue from the coinage. In England it is defrayed by the government; and if you carry a pound weight of standard silver to the mint, you get back sixty-two shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard silver. In France a duty of eight per cent. is deducted for the coinage, which not only defrays the expense of it, but affords a small revenue to the government. In England, as the coinage costs nothing, the current coin can never be much more valuable than the quantity of bullion which it actually contains. In France, the workmanship, as you pay for it, adds to the value, in the same manner as to that of wrought plate. A sum of French money, therefore, containing an equal weight of pure silver, is more valuable than a sum of English money containing an equal weight of pure silver, and must require more bullion, or other commodities, to purchase it. Though the current coin of the two countries, therefore, were equally near the standards of their respective mints, a sum of English money could not well purchase a sum of French money containing an equal number of ounces of pure silver, nor consequently, a bill upon France for such a sum. If, for such a bill, no more additional money was paid than what was sufficient to compensate the expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at par between the two countries; their debts and credits might mutually compensate one another, while the computed exchange was considerably in favour of France. If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of England, while the computed was in favour of France.

Secondly, in some countries, the cost of producing coins is covered by the government; in others, it’s covered by private individuals who bring their metal to the mint, with the government even earning some revenue from the coinage. In England, it's covered by the government, and if you bring a pound of standard silver to the mint, you receive back sixty-two shillings, which is equivalent to a pound of the same standard silver. In France, an eight percent fee is deducted for minting, which not only covers the costs but also provides a small revenue for the government. In England, since minting costs nothing, the value of currency can’t be much more than the actual amount of metal it contains. In France, however, the craftsmanship you pay for adds to the value, similar to finished silverware. Therefore, a sum of French money that has the same weight in pure silver is worth more than a sum of English money with the same weight in pure silver, requiring more metal or other goods to buy it. Even if the current coins in both countries are close in quality to their respective mint standards, a sum of English money wouldn’t easily purchase a sum of French money with an equal number of ounces of pure silver, nor could it easily settle a bill in France for that amount. If, for such a bill, the only extra money paid was to cover the cost of French coinage, the actual exchange rate could be equal between the two countries; their debts and credits could balance each other out, while the calculated exchange rate significantly favored France. If less than that was paid, the real exchange rate might favor England, even while the calculated one favored France.

Thirdly, and lastly, In some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, &c. foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money; while in others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, &c. they are paid in the common currency of the country. What is called bank money, is always of more value than the same nominal sum of common currency. A thousand guilders in the bank of Amsterdam, for example, are of more value than a thousand guilders of Amsterdam currency. The difference between them is called the agio of the bank, which at Amsterdam is generally about five per cent. Supposing the current money of the two countries equally near to the standard of their respective mints, and that the one pays foreign bills in this common currency, while the other pays them in bank money, it is evident that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in bank money, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in current money; for the same reason that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in better money, or in money nearer to its own standard, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in worse. The computed exchange, before the late reformation of the gold coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what is called bank money. It will by no means follow, however, that the real exchange was against it. Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has been in favour of London, even with those places. The computed exchange has generally been in favour of London with Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, if you except France, I believe with most other parts of Europe that pay in common currency; and it is not improbable that the real exchange was so too.

Thirdly, and lastly, in some places, like Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, etc., foreign bills of exchange are settled in what they refer to as bank money; while in others, such as London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, etc., they're settled in the local currency. Bank money is always worth more than the same nominal amount in local currency. For instance, a thousand guilders in the Amsterdam bank is worth more than a thousand guilders in Amsterdam’s common currency. The difference is known as the bank agio, which in Amsterdam is usually around five percent. Assuming that the current money of both countries is equally close to their mints' standards, and one pays foreign bills in local currency while the other pays in bank money, it's clear that the computed exchange might favor the one paying in bank money, even though the actual exchange might favor the one using local currency. This is similar to the case where the computed exchange favors the one using higher-quality money or money closer to its own standard, while the real exchange could favor the one using lower-quality money. Before the recent reform of the gold coin, the computed exchange was generally against London compared to Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, and, I believe, all other places that use what they call bank money. However, that doesn't necessarily mean the real exchange was against it. Since the gold coin reform, it has been favorable for London, even with those places. The computed exchange has generally been favorable for London compared to Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, unless you count France, I believe with most other parts of Europe that use local currency; and it is quite possible that the real exchange was favorable as well.

Digression concerning Banks of Deposit, particularly concerning that of Amsterdam.

The currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore, be at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard value, the state, by a reformation of its coin, can effectually re-establish its currency. But the currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom consist altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure, of the coins of all the neighbouring states with which its inhabitants have a continual intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not always be able to reform its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid in this currency, the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature so uncertain, must render the exchange always very much against such a state, its currency being in all foreign states necessarily valued even below what it is worth.

The currency of a big country, like France or England, usually consists almost entirely of its own coins. If this currency is worn, clipped, or otherwise reduced below its standard value, the government can effectively restore its currency by reforming the coinage. However, a small country, such as Genoa or Hamburg, often doesn’t rely entirely on its own coins and must largely use coins from neighboring countries because of constant interactions with them. Therefore, simply reforming its coin won’t always improve its overall currency situation. If foreign bills of exchange are paid with this currency, the uncertain value of any amount that is inherently unstable will likely put the exchange at a disadvantage for such a state, as its currency will be valued lower than its actual worth in foreign countries.

In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous exchange must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they began to attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted, that[Pg 195] foreign bills of exchange of a certain value should be paid, not in common currency, but by an order upon, or by a transfer in the books of a certain bank, established upon the credit, and under the protection of the state, this bank being always obliged to pay, in good and true money, exactly according to the standard of the state. The banks of Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Nuremberg, seem to have been all originally established with this view, though some of them may have afterwards been made subservient to other purposes. The money of such banks, being better than the common currency of the country, necessarily bore an agio, which was greater or smaller, according as the currency was supposed to be more or less degraded below the standard of the state. The agio of the bank of Hamburg, for example, which is said to be commonly about fourteen per cent. is the supposed difference between the good standard money of the state, and the clipt, worn, and diminished currency, poured into it from all the neighbouring states.

To address the problems that this unfavorable exchange created for their merchants, smaller states, when they started to focus on trade interests, often established laws stating that[Pg 195] foreign bills of exchange of a certain value should be paid not in regular currency but through an order or a transfer in the books of a specific bank, set up on the state’s credit and protection. This bank was always required to pay in real money, exactly according to the state’s standard. The banks of Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Nuremberg were all initially created with this intention, although some may have later been used for other purposes. The money from these banks, being more reliable than the regular currency of the country, necessarily had an agio, which varied depending on how much the currency was considered degraded compared to the state’s standard. For instance, the agio of the Hamburg bank, which is commonly around fourteen percent, reflects the perceived difference between the good standard money of the state and the clipped, worn, and diminished currency flowing in from neighboring regions.

Before 1609, the great quantity of clipt and worn foreign coin which the extensive trade of Amsterdam brought from all parts of Europe, reduced the value of its currency about nine per cent. below that of good money fresh from the mint. Such money no sooner appeared, than it was melted down or carried away, as it always is in such circumstances. The merchants, with plenty of currency, could not always find a sufficient quantity of good money to pay their bills of exchange; and the value of those bills, in spite of several regulations which were made to prevent it, became in a great measure uncertain.

Before 1609, the large amount of clipped and worn foreign coins brought to Amsterdam from all over Europe due to extensive trade decreased the value of its currency by about nine percent compared to fresh mint money. As soon as good money appeared, it was melted down or taken away, as often happens in such situations. Merchants had plenty of currency but couldn’t always find enough good money to pay their bills of exchange; as a result, the value of those bills became quite uncertain despite various regulations put in place to prevent it.

In order to remedy these inconveniences, a bank was established in 1609, under the guarantee of the city. This bank received both foreign coin, and the light and worn coin of the country, at its real intrinsic value in the good standard money of the country, deducting only so much as was necessary for defraying the expense of coinage and the other necessary expense of management. For the value which remained after this small deduction was made, it gave a credit in its books. This credit was called bank money, which, as it represented money exactly according to the standard of the mint, was always of the same real value, and intrinsically worth more than current money. It was at the same time enacted, that all bills drawn upon or negociated at Amsterdam, of the value of 600 guilders and upwards, should be paid in bank money, which at once took away all uncertainty in the value of those bills. Every merchant, in consequence of this regulation, was obliged to keep an account with the bank, in order to pay his foreign bills of exchange, which necessarily occasioned a certain demand for bank money.

To address these issues, a bank was founded in 1609, backed by the city. This bank accepted both foreign currency and the worn domestic coins at their actual intrinsic value in the country's standard money, only subtracting what's necessary to cover the cost of coinage and other management expenses. The remaining value after this small deduction was recorded as credit in its books. This credit was referred to as bank money, which, since it accurately represented money according to the mint's standard, always maintained the same real value and was intrinsically worth more than current money. It was also mandated that all bills drawn on or negotiated in Amsterdam, worth 600 guilders or more, should be paid in bank money, instantly eliminating any uncertainty regarding the value of those bills. As a result of this regulation, every merchant had to maintain an account with the bank to pay their foreign bills of exchange, which naturally created a demand for bank money.

Bank money, over and above both its intrinsic superiority to currency, and the additional value which this demand necessarily gives it, has likewise some other advantages. It is secure from fire, robbery, and other accidents; the city of Amsterdam is bound for it; it can be paid away by a simple transfer, without the trouble of counting, or the risk of transporting it from one place to another. In consequence of those different advantages, it seems from the beginning to have borne an agio; and it is generally believed that all the money originally deposited in the bank, was allowed to remain there, nobody caring to demand payment of a debt which he could sell for a premium in the market. By demanding payment of the bank, the owner of a bank credit would lose this premium. As a shilling fresh from the mint will buy no more goods in the market than one of our common worn shillings, so the good and true money which might be brought from the coffers of the bank into those of a private person, being mixed and confounded with the common currency of the country, would be of no more value than that currency, from which it could no longer be readily distinguished. While it remained in the coffers of the bank, its superiority was known and ascertained. When it had come into those of a private person, its superiority could not well be ascertained without more trouble than perhaps the difference was worth. By being brought from the coffers of the bank, besides, it lost all the other advantages of bank money; its security, its easy and safe transferability, its use in paying foreign bills of exchange. Over and above all this, it could not be brought from those coffers, as will appear by and by, without previously paying for the keeping.

Bank money, besides being better than regular currency and the extra value that demand adds to it, has some other benefits. It's protected from fire, theft, and other accidents; the city of Amsterdam guarantees it; it can be transferred easily without having to count it or risk moving it from one place to another. Because of these advantages, it seems to have had a premium from the start, and it’s widely believed that all the money initially deposited in the bank was left there, as no one wanted to ask for payment on a debt they could sell at a higher price in the market. If the owner of a bank credit asked for payment, they would lose that premium. Just like a brand-new shilling doesn’t buy more goods than a regular worn shilling, the good and genuine money that could be taken from the bank would have no more value than the ordinary currency it would mix with and become indistinguishable from. While it stayed in the bank, its value was clear and recognized. Once it was in the hands of a private individual, its value was harder to determine, and the trouble of figuring it out might not be worth it. Furthermore, taking it from the bank meant losing all the other benefits of bank money: its security, the ease and safety of transferring it, and its utility for paying foreign exchange bills. On top of all this, as will be shown later, you couldn’t take it out of the bank without first paying for its storage.

Those deposits of coin, or those deposits which the bank was bound to restore in coin, constituted the original capital of the bank, or the whole value of what was represented by what is called bank money. At present they are supposed to constitute but a very small part of it. In order to facilitate the trade in bullion, the bank has been for these many years in the practice of giving credit in its books, upon deposits of gold and silver bullion. This credit is generally about five per cent. below the mint price of such bullion. The bank grants at the same time what is called a recipice or receipt, entitling the person who makes the deposit, or the bearer, to take out the bullion again at any time within six months, upon transferring to the bank a quantity of bank money equal to that for which credit had been given in its books when the deposit was made, and upon paying one-fourth per cent. for the keeping, if the deposit was in silver; and one-half per cent. if it was in gold; but at the same time declaring, that in default of such payment, and upon the expiration of this term, the deposit should belong to the bank, at the price at which it had been received, or[Pg 196] for which credit had been given in the transfer books. What is thus paid for the keeping of the deposit may be considered as a sort of warehouse rent; and why this warehouse rent should be so much dearer for gold than for silver, several different reasons have been assigned. The fineness of gold, it has been said, is more difficult to be ascertained than that of silver. Frauds are more easily practised, and occasion a greater loss in the most precious metal. Silver, besides, being the standard metal, the state, it has been said, wishes to encourage more the making of deposits of silver than those of gold.

Those deposits of coins, or those deposits that the bank was obligated to return in coins, made up the original capital of the bank, or the total value of what is represented by what is called bank money. Nowadays, they are thought to constitute only a very small part of it. To make trading in bullion easier, the bank has for many years been allowing credit in its records based on deposits of gold and silver bullion. This credit is typically about five percent below the market price of such bullion. The bank also provides what is called a receipt, giving the person who makes the deposit, or the bearer, the right to withdraw the bullion at any time within six months, as long as they transfer to the bank an amount of bank money equal to what credit was given in its records when the deposit was made, and pay a quarter percent for storage if the deposit was in silver, or half a percent if it was in gold. However, it is declared that if payment is not made, and this period expires, the deposit will belong to the bank at the price it was accepted for, or for which credit was issued in the transfer records. The fee paid for the storage of the deposit can be seen as a type of warehouse rent; and there are several reasons given for why this warehouse rent is higher for gold than for silver. It is said that the purity of gold is harder to determine than that of silver. Fraud is easier to commit, resulting in greater losses concerning the more valuable metal. Additionally, since silver is the standard metal, it has been argued that the government prefers to encourage more deposits of silver than gold.

Deposits of bullion are most commonly made when the price is somewhat lower than ordinary, and they are taken out again when it happens to rise. In Holland the market price of bullion is generally above the mint price, for the same reason that it was so in England before the late reformation of the gold coin. The difference is said to be commonly from about six to sixteen stivers upon the mark, or eight ounces of silver, of eleven parts of fine and one part alloy. The bank price, or the credit which the bank gives for the deposits of such silver (when made in foreign coin, of which the fineness is well known and ascertained, such as Mexico dollars), is twenty-two guilders the mark; the mint price is about twenty-three guilders, and the market price is from twenty-three guilders six, to twenty-three guilders sixteen stivers, or from two to three per cent. above the mint price.[37] The proportions between the bank price, the mint price, and the market price of gold bullion, are nearly the same. A person can generally sell his receipt for the difference between the mint price of bullion and the market price. A receipt for bullion is almost always worth something, and it very seldom happens, therefore, that anybody suffers his receipts to expire, or allows his bullion to fall to the bank at the price at which it had been received, either by not taking it out before the end of the six months, or by neglecting to pay one fourth or one half per cent. in order to obtain a new receipt for another six months. This, however, though it happens seldom, is said to happen sometimes, and more frequently with regard to gold than with regard to silver, on account of the higher warehouse rent which is paid for the keeping of the more precious metal.

Deposits of bullion are usually made when the price is a bit lower than usual, and they're taken out again when it rises. In Holland, the market price of bullion is generally higher than the mint price, just like it was in England before the recent changes to the gold coin. The difference is said to be typically between six to sixteen stivers on the mark, or eight ounces of silver, made up of eleven parts fine and one part alloy. The bank price, or the credit the bank gives for deposits of such silver (when made in foreign coins, like Mexican dollars, whose fineness is well-known), is twenty-two guilders per mark; the mint price is about twenty-three guilders, and the market price ranges from twenty-three guilders six to twenty-three guilders sixteen stivers, or about two to three percent above the mint price.[37] The proportions between the bank price, the mint price, and the market price of gold bullion are nearly the same. Generally, a person can sell their receipt for the difference between the mint price of bullion and the market price. A receipt for bullion is almost always worth something, so it's rare for anyone to let their receipts expire or allow their bullion to be sold at the bank for the price it was received at, whether by not withdrawing it before the six-month period ends or by neglecting to pay a quarter or half percent to get a new receipt for another six months. However, although it rarely happens, this is said to occur sometimes, and more often with gold than with silver, due to the higher storage fees for keeping the more valuable metal.

The person who, by making a deposit of bullion, obtains both a bank credit and a receipt, pays his bills of exchange as they become due, with his bank credit; and either sells or keeps his receipt, according as he judges that the price of bullion is likely to rise or to fall. The receipt and the bank credit seldom keep long together, and there is no occasion that they should. The person who has a receipt, and who wants to take out bullion, finds always plenty of bank credits, or bank money, to buy at the ordinary price, and the person who has bank money, and wants to take out bullion, finds receipts always in equal abundance.

The person who deposits bullion gets both bank credit and a receipt. They use their bank credit to pay bills as they come due and either sells or keeps the receipt, depending on whether they think the price of bullion will go up or down. The receipt and the bank credit usually don’t stay together for long, and there’s no reason for them to. Someone with a receipt who wants to withdraw bullion will always find plenty of bank credits or bank money available to purchase at the normal price, and someone with bank money who wants to withdraw bullion will always find receipts in the same abundance.

The owners of bank credits, and the holders of receipts, constitute two different sorts of creditors against the bank. The holder of a receipt cannot draw out the bullion for which it is granted, without re-assigning to the bank a sum of bank money equal to the price at which the bullion had been received. If he has no bank money of his own, he must purchase it of those who have it. The owner of bank money cannot draw out bullion, without producing to the bank receipts for the quantity which he wants. If he has none of his own, he must buy them of those who have them. The holder of a receipt, when he purchases bank money, purchases the power of taking out a quantity of bullion, of which the mint price is five per cent. above the bank price. The agio of five per cent. therefore, which he commonly pays for it, is paid, not for an imaginary, but for a real value. The owner of bank money, when he purchases a receipt, purchases the power of taking out a quantity of bullion, of which the market price is commonly from two to three per cent. above the mint price. The price which he pays for it, therefore, is paid likewise for a real value. The price of the receipt, and the price of the bank money, compound or make up between them the full value or price of the bullion.

The owners of bank credits and the holders of receipts are two different types of creditors of the bank. The holder of a receipt can’t withdraw the gold or silver for which it was issued without giving the bank a sum of bank money equal to the price of the bullion received. If they don’t have any bank money themselves, they must buy it from those who do. The owner of bank money can’t withdraw bullion without providing the bank with receipts for the amount they want. If they don’t have any receipts, they must buy them from those who do. When the holder of a receipt buys bank money, they are essentially buying the right to withdraw a specific amount of bullion, which has a mint price that is five percent higher than the bank price. Therefore, the five percent premium they typically pay is for a real value, not an imaginary one. Similarly, when the owner of bank money buys a receipt, they are purchasing the right to withdraw a quantity of bullion, where the market price is usually two to three percent above the mint price. Thus, the amount they pay is also for a real value. Together, the cost of the receipt and the cost of the bank money add up to the total value or price of the bullion.

Upon deposits of the coin current in the country, the bank grant receipts likewise, as well as bank credits; but those receipts are frequently of no value and will bring no price in the market. Upon ducatoons, for example, which in the currency pass for three guilders three stivers each, the bank gives a credit of three guilders only, or five per cent. below their current value. It grants a receipt likewise, entitling the bearer to take out a number of ducatoons depos[Pg 197]ited at any time within six months, upon paying one fourth per cent. for the keeping. This receipt will frequently bring no price in the market. Three guilders, bank money, generally sell in the market for three guilders three stivers, the full value of the ducatoons, if they were taken out of the bank; and before they can be taken out, one-fourth per cent. must be paid for the keeping, which would be mere loss to the holder of the receipt. If the agio of the bank, however, should at any time fall to three per cent. such receipts might bring some price in the market, and might sell for one and three-fourths per cent. But the agio of the bank being now generally about five per cent. such receipts are frequently allowed to expire, or, as they express it, to fall to the bank. The receipts which are given for deposits of gold ducats fall to it yet more frequently, because a higher warehouse rent, or one half per cent. must be paid for the keeping of them, before they can be taken out again. The five per cent. which the bank gains, when deposits either of coin or bullion are allowed to fall to it, may be considered as the warehouse rent for the perpetual keeping of such deposits.

When people deposit coins that are currently in circulation, the bank issues receipts and bank credits. However, these receipts often hold no value and won’t sell for anything in the market. For instance, on ducatoons, which are valued at three guilders and three stivers each, the bank only gives a credit of three guilders, which is five percent less than their actual value. It also issues a receipt allowing the bearer to withdraw a number of ducatoons deposited at any time within six months, but with a fee of one-fourth percent for storage. This receipt often fetches no price in the market. Three guilders in bank money typically sell for three guilders and three stivers, the full value of the ducatoons if they had been withdrawn from the bank; however, before they can be withdrawn, the one-fourth percent storage fee must be paid, resulting in a loss for the receipt holder. If the bank's exchange rate happens to drop to three percent, those receipts might have some market value and could sell for one and three-fourths percent. But since the bank's exchange rate is usually around five percent, many receipts end up expiring or, as they say, ‘falling back to the bank.’ Receipts for gold ducat deposits fall back to the bank even more often because a higher storage fee of one-half percent must be paid before they can be withdrawn again. The five percent profit that the bank earns when deposits of coins or bullion are allowed to revert to it can be seen as a storage fee for the perpetual keeping of such deposits.

The sum of bank money, for which the receipts are expired, must be very considerable. It must comprehend the whole original capital of the bank, which, it is generally supposed, has been allowed to remain there from the time it was first deposited, nobody caring either to renew his receipt, or to take out his deposit, as, for the reasons already assigned, neither the one nor the other could be done without loss. But whatever may be the amount of this sum, the proportion which it bears to the whole mass of bank money is supposed to be very small. The bank of Amsterdam has, for these many years past, been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for which the receipts are very seldom allowed to expire, or, as they express it, to fall to the bank. The far greater part of the bank money, or of the credits upon the books of the bank, is supposed to have been created, for these many years past, by such deposits, which the dealers in bullion are continually both making and withdrawing.

The total amount of unclaimed bank money must be substantial. It likely includes the entire original capital of the bank, which is generally thought to have stayed there since it was first deposited, with no one bothering to renew their receipt or withdraw their deposit. As mentioned before, neither option can be done without incurring a loss. However, whatever this amount is, it’s believed to be a small fraction of the total bank money available. For many years, the Bank of Amsterdam has served as Europe's main storage facility for bullion, where receipts rarely expire or, as they say, fall to the bank. Most of the bank money, or credits recorded in the bank's books, is thought to have been generated over the years from these deposits, which bullion traders continuously make and withdraw.

No demand can be made upon the bank, but by means of a recipice or receipt. The smaller mass of bank money, for which the receipts are expired, is mixed and confounded with the much greater mass for which they are still in force; so that, though there may be a considerable sum of bank money, for which there are no receipts, there is no specific sum or portion of it which may not at any time be demanded by one. The bank cannot be debtor to two persons for the same thing; and the owner of bank money who has no receipt, cannot demand payment of the bank till he buys one. In ordinary and quiet times, he can find no difficulty in getting one to buy at the market price, which generally corresponds with the price at which he can sell the coin or bullion it entitles him to take out of the bank.

No demand can be made on the bank without a receipt. The smaller amount of bank money for which the receipts have expired is mixed up with the much larger amount for which they are still valid; so, even though there may be a significant amount of bank money without receipts, there isn't a specific sum or portion of it that can be demanded at any time by someone. The bank can't owe two people for the same thing; and the owner of bank money without a receipt can't request payment from the bank until they purchase one. In regular and calm times, they usually have no trouble finding one to buy at the market price, which typically matches the price at which they can sell the coin or bullion they are entitled to take out of the bank.

It might be otherwise during a public calamity; an invasion, for example, such as that of the French in 1672. The owners of bank money being then all eager to draw it out of the bank, in order to have it in their own keeping, the demand for receipts might raise their price to an exorbitant height. The holders of them might form extravagant expectations, and, instead of two or three per cent. demand half the bank money for which credit had been given upon the deposits that the receipts had respectively been granted for. The enemy, informed of the constitution of the bank, might even buy them up, in order to prevent the carrying away of the treasure. In such emergencies, the bank, it is supposed, would break through its ordinary rule of making payment only to the holders of receipts. The holders of receipts, who had no bank money, must have received within two or three per cent. of the value of the deposit for which their respective receipts had been granted. The bank, therefore, it is said, would in this case make no scruple of paying, either with money or bullion, the full value of what the owners of bank money, who could get no receipts, were credited for in its books; paying, at the same time, two or three per cent. to such holders of receipts as had no bank money, that being the whole value which, in this state of things, could justly be supposed due to them.

It might be different during a public disaster; an invasion, for instance, like that of the French in 1672. The owners of bank deposits would be eager to withdraw their money to keep it safe, leading to a surge in demand for receipts that might drive their prices up to unreasonable levels. The holders of these receipts could have unrealistic expectations, and instead of asking for two or three percent, they might demand half of the bank deposits that the receipts were issued for. The enemy, aware of how the bank operated, might even buy them up to prevent the treasure from being taken away. In such situations, it's believed that the bank would break its usual policy of only paying the holders of receipts. Those who held receipts but had no bank money would have received no more than two or three percent of the value of the deposits associated with their receipts. Therefore, the bank would supposedly have no hesitation in paying, either in cash or bullion, the full value for what the bank deposit owners, who couldn't get receipts, were credited with in its records; simultaneously, paying two or three percent to the holders of receipts who had no bank money, which would be the only value that could justly be considered owed to them in that scenario.

Even in ordinary and quiet times, it is the interest of the holders of receipts to depress the agio, in order either to buy bank money (and consequently the bullion which their receipts would then enable them to take out of the bank) so much cheaper, or to sell their receipts to these who have bank money, and who want to take out bullion, so much dearer; the price of a receipt being generally equal to the difference between the market price of bank money and that of the coin or bullion for which the receipt had been granted. It is the interest of the owners of bank money, on the contrary, to raise the agio, in order either to sell their bank money so much dearer, or to buy a receipt so much cheaper. To prevent the stock-jobbing tricks which those opposite interests might sometimes occasion, the bank has of late years come to the resolution, to sell at all times bank money for currency at five per cent. agio, and to buy it in again at four per cent. agio. In consequence of this resolution, the agio can never either rise above five, or sink below four per cent.; and the proportion between the market price of bank and that of current money is kept at all times very near the proportion between their intrinsic values. Before this resolution was taken, the market price of bank money[Pg 198] used sometimes to rise so high as nine per cent. agio, and sometimes to sink so low as par, according as opposite interests happened to influence the market.

Even during normal, quiet times, those holding receipts have an incentive to lower the premium, either to buy bank money (and consequently the gold or silver that the receipts would allow them to withdraw from the bank) at a cheaper price, or to sell their receipts to those who have bank money and want to exchange it for bullion, at a higher price. The price of a receipt is generally equal to the difference between the market price of bank money and that of the coins or bullion for which the receipt was issued. Conversely, those who own bank money want to raise the premium so they can either sell their bank money at a higher price or buy a receipt at a lower price. To prevent stock market manipulation that could arise from these conflicting interests, the bank has recently decided to consistently sell bank money for currency at a five percent premium, and to buy it back at a four percent premium. As a result of this decision, the premium can never rise above five percent or fall below four percent; this keeps the relationship between the market price of bank money and that of current currency very close to the relationship between their actual values. Before this decision was made, the market price of bank money[Pg 198]would sometimes rise as high as nine percent premium and sometimes drop as low as parity, depending on how conflicting interests affected the market.

The bank of Amsterdam professes to lend out no part of what is deposited with it, but, for every guilder for which it gives credit in its books, to keep in its repositories the value of a guilder either in money or bullion. That it keeps in its repositories all the money or bullion for which there are receipts in force, for which it is at all times liable to be called upon, and which in reality is continually going from it, and returning to it again, cannot well be doubted. But whether it does so likewise with regard to that part of its capital for which the receipts are long ago expired, for which, in ordinary and quiet times, it cannot be called upon, and which, in reality, is very likely to remain with it for ever, or as long as the states of the United Provinces subsist, may perhaps appear more uncertain. At Amsterdam, however, no point of faith is better established than that, for every guilder circulated as bank money, there is a correspondent guilder in gold or silver to be found in the treasures of the bank. The city is guarantee that it should be so. The bank is under the direction of the four reigning burgomasters, who are changed every year. Each new set of burgomasters visits the treasure, compares it with the books, receives it upon oath, and delivers it over, with the same awful solemnity, to the set which succeeds; and in that sober and religious country, oaths are not yet disregarded. A rotation of this kind seems alone a sufficient security against any practices which cannot be avowed. Amidst all the revolutions which faction has ever occasioned in the government of Amsterdam, the prevailing party has at no time accused their predecessors of infidelity in the administration of the bank. No accusation could have affected more deeply the reputation and fortune of the disgraced party; and if such an accusation could have been supported, we may be assured that it would have been brought. In 1672, when the French king was at Utrecht, the bank of Amsterdam paid so readily, as left no doubt of the fidelity with which it had observed its engagements. Some of the pieces which were then brought from its repositories, appeared to have been scorched with the fire which happened in the town-house soon after the bank was established. Those pieces, therefore, must have lain there from that time.

The bank of Amsterdam claims it doesn’t lend out any of the money deposited with it. For every guilder it credits in its records, it keeps an equivalent amount in cash or bullion. It’s clear that it maintains enough money or bullion for all the receipts currently in effect, since it is always ready to pay up and the funds are constantly flowing in and out. However, it’s less certain whether the same is true for the capital associated with receipts that have long expired, which it cannot be called upon to pay in normal, quiet times, and likely remains with the bank indefinitely, or as long as the United Provinces exists. In Amsterdam, though, a core belief is that for every guilder in circulation as bank money, there’s an equivalent guilder in gold or silver stored at the bank. The city guarantees this. The bank is managed by four elected burgomasters, who change every year. Each new group of burgomasters checks the vault, matches it against the records, takes an oath to uphold their findings, and hands it over with great solemnity to the incoming group. In this serious and devout country, oaths still hold weight. This rotating system seems to provide strong protection against any underhanded practices. Despite the political turmoil that factions have caused in Amsterdam's government, no ruling party has ever accused the previous one of dishonesty in managing the bank. Such an accusation would have severely damaged the reputation and fortunes of the accused party, and if it could have been substantiated, it would certainly have been made. In 1672, when the French king was at Utrecht, the bank of Amsterdam paid out so smoothly that it left no doubt about its commitment to its obligations. Some of the coins that were taken from its vaults at that time showed signs of having been scorched in the fire that occurred in the town hall shortly after the bank was established, indicating they had been there since then.

What may be the amount of the treasure in the bank, is a question which has long employed the speculations of the curious. Nothing but conjecture can be offered concerning it. It is generally reckoned, that there are about 2000 people who keep accounts with the bank; and allowing them to have, one with another, the value of L.1500 sterling lying upon their respective accounts (a very large allowance), the whole quantity of bank money, and consequently of treasure in the bank, will amount to about L.3,000,000 sterling, or, at eleven guilders the pound sterling, 33,000,000 of guilders; a great sum, and sufficient to carry on a very extensive circulation, but vastly below the extravagant ideas which some people have formed of this treasure.

What the amount of treasure in the bank might be is a question that has intrigued many for a long time. Only guesses can be made about it. It’s generally estimated that around 2000 people have accounts with the bank; and if we assume that each has an average of £1500 in their accounts (which is a generous estimate), the total amount of money in the bank would be about £3,000,000, or at eleven guilders per pound, 33,000,000 guilders. That’s a large sum and enough for extensive circulation, but still far below the wild estimates some people have of this treasure.

The city of Amsterdam derives a considerable revenue from the bank. Besides what may be called the warehouse rent above mentioned, each person, upon first opening an account with the bank, pays a fee of ten guilders; and for every new account, three guilders three stivers; for every transfer, two stivers; and if the transfer is for less than 300 guilders, six stivers, in order to discourage the multiplicity of small transactions. The person who neglects to balance his account twice in the year, forfeits twenty-five guilders. The person who orders a transfer for more than is upon his account, is obliged to pay three per cent. for the sum overdrawn, and his order is set aside into the bargain. The bank is supposed, too, to make a considerable profit by the sale of the foreign coin or bullion which sometimes falls to it by the expiring of receipts, and which is always kept till it can be sold with advantage. It makes a profit, likewise, by selling bank money at five per cent. agio, and buying it in at four. These different emoluments amount to a good deal more than what is necessary for paying the salaries of officers, and defraying the expense of management. What is paid for the keeping of bullion upon receipts, is alone supposed to amount to a neat annual revenue of between 150,000 and 200,000 guilders. Public utility, however, and not revenue, was the original object of this institution. Its object was to relieve the merchants from the inconvenience of a disadvantageous exchange. The revenue which has arisen from it was unforeseen, and may be considered as accidental. But it is now time to return from this long digression, into which I have been insensibly led, in endeavouring to explain the reasons why the exchange between the countries which pay in what is called bank money, and those which pay in common currency, should generally appear to be in favour of the former, and against the latter. The former pay in a species of money, of which the intrinsic value is always the same, and exactly agreeable to the standard of their respective mints; the latter is a species of money, of which the intrinsic value is continually varying, and is almost always more or less below that standard.

The city of Amsterdam earns a significant income from the bank. In addition to the previously mentioned warehouse rent, each person pays a fee of ten guilders when they first open an account with the bank; for each new account, the fee is three guilders and three stivers; for each transfer, it's two stivers; and if the transfer is for less than 300 guilders, it's six stivers, to discourage small transactions. If someone fails to balance their account twice a year, they lose twenty-five guilders. If someone requests a transfer for more than what is in their account, they must pay three percent on the amount overdrawn, and their order will be rejected. The bank is also believed to make a significant profit from selling foreign coins or bullion that it occasionally receives when receipts expire, which is stored until it can be sold at a good price. It also profits by selling bank money at a five percent markup and buying it back at four. These various income sources far exceed what is necessary to cover employee salaries and management costs. The fees for holding bullion against receipts alone are estimated to generate an annual revenue of between 150,000 and 200,000 guilders. However, the main purpose of this institution was public benefit, not profit. Its goal was to relieve merchants from the troubles of unfavorable exchange rates. The revenue resulted from it was unexpected and can be seen as a bonus. But now, it’s time to return from this lengthy digression, which I was unintentionally led into while trying to explain why the exchange between countries that use what is called bank money and those that use regular currency generally seems to favor the former and disadvantage the latter. The former uses a type of currency whose intrinsic value is always consistent and aligns with their respective mints' standards; the latter uses a type of currency whose intrinsic value is constantly fluctuating and is almost always somewhat below that standard.

Part II.Of the Unreasonableness of those extraordinary Restraints, upon other Principles.

In the foregoing part of this chapter, I have endeavoured to show, even upon the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous.

In the earlier part of this chapter, I've tried to demonstrate, even based on the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to impose strict restrictions on importing goods from countries where the balance of trade is thought to be unfavorable.

Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the other regulations of commerce, are founded. When two places trade with one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of them loses, and the other gains, in proportion to its declension from the exact equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade, which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies, may be, and commonly is, disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to be established, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter. But that trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places, is always advantageous, though not always equally so, to both.

Nothing, however, is more ridiculous than the entire idea of the balance of trade, which is the basis for not just these restrictions but almost all other trade regulations. When two places engage in trade with each other, this idea suggests that if the balance is even, neither side loses or gains; but if it tips even slightly to one side, that side loses while the other gains, based on how much it deviates from perfect balance. Both ideas are wrong. Trade that is enforced through subsidies and monopolies can, and often does, harm the country it's supposed to benefit, as I will discuss later. However, trade that takes place naturally and consistently between two places, without any force or pressure, is always beneficial, although not necessarily equally so for both parties.

By advantage or gain, I understand, not the increase of the quantity of gold or silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual revenue of its inhabitants.

By advantage or gain, I mean not the increase in the amount of gold or silver, but the increase in the exchangeable value of the annual output of the land and labor of the country, or the rise in the annual revenue of its residents.

If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places consist altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon most occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very nearly equally; each will, in this case, afford a market for a part of the surplus produce of the other; each will replace a capital which had been employed in raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus produce of the other, and which had been distributed among, and given revenue and maintenance to, a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part of the inhabitants of each, therefore, will directly derive their revenue and maintenance from the other. As the commodities exchanged, too, are supposed to be of equal value, so the two capitals employed in the trade will, upon most occasions, be equal or very nearly equal; and both being employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries, the revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford to the inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue and maintenance, this mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller, in proportion to the extent of their dealings. If these should annually amount to L.100,000, for example, or to L.1,000,000, on each side, each of them will afford an annual revenue, in the one case, of L.100,000, and, in the other, of L.1,000,000, to the inhabitants of the other.

If the balance is even, and if the trade between the two places is entirely based on exchanging their native products, they will often both benefit, and they will gain equally, or very close to equally; each will, in this scenario, provide a market for part of the surplus products of the other; each will replace the investment that was used to produce and prepare for the market this part of their surplus, which had been distributed among and provided income and support to a certain number of their residents. Consequently, some of the residents in each place will directly earn their income and support from the other. Since the exchanged products are assumed to be of equal value, the two investments used in the trade will, in most cases, be equal or nearly equal; and since both are used to produce the native products of the two countries, the income and support their distribution provides to the residents of each will also be equal, or nearly equal. This income and support will be greater or smaller, depending on the scale of their trade. If this trade amounts to £100,000 annually, for example, or £1,000,000 on each side, each will provide an annual income of £100,000 in the first case and £1,000,000 in the second case to the residents of the other.

If their trade should be of such a nature, that one of them exported to the other nothing but native commodities, while the returns of that other consisted altogether in foreign goods; the balance, in this case, would still be supposed even, commodities being paid for with commodities. They would, in this case too, both gain, but they would not gain equally; and the inhabitants of the country which exported nothing but native commodities, would derive the greatest revenue from the trade. If England, for example, should import from France nothing but the native commodities of that country, and not having such commodities of its own as were in demand there, should annually repay them by sending thither a large quantity of foreign goods, tobacco, we shall suppose, and East India goods; this trade, though it would give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries, would give more to those of France than to those of England. The whole French capital annually employed in it would annually be distributed among the people of France; but that part of the English capital only, which was employed in producing the English commodities with which those foreign goods were purchased, would be annually distributed among the people of England. The greater part of it would replace the capitals which had been employed in Virginia, Indostan, and China, and which had given revenue and maintenance to the inhabitants of those distant countries. If the capitals were equal, or nearly equal, therefore, this employment of the French capital would augment much more the revenue of the people of France, than that of the English capital would the revenue of the people of England. France would, in this case, carry on a direct foreign trade of consumption with England; whereas England would carry on a round-about trade of the same kind with France. The different effects of a capital employed in the direct, and of one employed in the round-about foreign trade of consumption, have already been fully explained.

If their trade were set up so that one country exported only local products, while the other country sent back only foreign goods, the balance would still be considered even, since goods are exchanged for goods. In this scenario, both would benefit, but not equally; the country exporting solely local products would gain the most revenue from the trade. For example, if England imported from France only that country's local products and, lacking similar goods in demand there, sent a large amount of foreign goods like tobacco and East Indian products in return each year, this trade would generate some revenue for both countries, but France would benefit more than England. The total capital used annually in France would be spread out among its people, while only the part of England's capital used to produce the local goods bought with the foreign goods would be distributed among the English. Most of it would go back to replace the capitals invested in Virginia, India, and China, which had already provided income and support to those foreign populations. If the capitals were equal or nearly equal, then the use of French capital would significantly increase the French people’s revenue compared to the impact of English capital on the English people's revenue. In this situation, France would be engaged in a direct trade of consumption with England, while England would be involved in an indirect form of the same trade with France. The different effects of capital used in direct versus indirect foreign trade of consumption have already been thoroughly explained.

There is not, probably, between any two countries, a trade which consists altogether in the exchange, either of native commodities on both sides, or of native commodities on one side, and of foreign goods on the other. Almost all countries exchange with one another, partly native and partly foreign goods. That country, however, in whose cargoes there is the greatest proportion of native, and the least of foreign goods, will always be the principal gainer.

There probably isn't a trade relationship between any two countries that consists entirely of exchanging either native goods on both sides or native goods on one side and foreign goods on the other. Almost all countries trade with each other by mixing native and foreign goods. However, the country that has the highest proportion of native goods and the lowest of foreign goods in its cargoes will always be the one that gains the most.

If it was not with tobacco and East India[Pg 200] goods, but with gold and silver, that England paid for the commodities annually imported from France, the balance, in this case, would be supposed uneven, commodities not being paid for with commodities, but with gold and silver. The trade, however, would in this case, as in the foregoing, give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries, but more to those of France than to those of England. It would give some revenue to those of England. The capital which had been employed in producing the English goods that purchased this gold and silver, the capital which had been distributed among, and given revenue to, certain inhabitants of England, would thereby be replaced, and enabled to continue that employment. The whole capital of England would no more be diminished by this exportation of gold and silver, than by the exportation of an equal value of any other goods. On the contrary, it would, in most cases, be augmented. No goods are sent abroad but those for which the demand is supposed to be greater abroad than at home, and of which the returns, consequently, it is expected, will be of more value at home than the commodities exported. If the tobacco which in England is worth only L.100,000, when sent to France, will purchase wine which is in England worth L.110,000, the exchange will equally augment the capital of England by L.10,000. If L.100,000 of English gold, in the same manner, purchase French wine, which in England is worth L.110,000, this exchange will equally augment the capital of England by L.10,000. As a merchant, who has L.110,000 worth of wine in his cellar, is a richer man than he who has only L.100,000 worth of tobacco in his warehouse, so is he likewise a richer man than he who has only L.100,000 worth of gold in his coffers. He can put into motion a greater quantity of industry, and give revenue, maintenance, and employment, to a greater number of people, than either of the other two. But the capital of the country is equal to the capital of all its different inhabitants; and the quantity of industry which can be annually maintained in it is equal to what all those different capitals can maintain. Both the capital of the country, therefore, and the quantity of industry which can be annually maintained in it, must generally be augmented by this exchange. It would, indeed, be more advantageous for England that it could purchase the wines of France with its own hardware and broad cloth, than with either the tobacco of Virginia, or the gold and silver of Brazil and Peru. A direct foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous than a round-about one. But a round-about foreign trade of consumption, which is carried on with gold and silver, does not seem to be less advantageous than any other equally round-about one. Neither is a country which has no mines, more likely to be exhausted of gold and silver by this annual exportation of those metals, than one which does not grow tobacco by the like annual exportation of that plant. As a country which has wherewithal to buy tobacco will never be long in want of it, so neither will one be long in want of gold and silver which has wherewithal to purchase those metals.

If England didn't pay for the goods it imported from France with tobacco and East India[Pg 200] products, but instead with gold and silver, the balance would seem uneven because commodities wouldn't be paid for with other commodities but with gold and silver. Still, this trade would generate some income for both countries, but more for France than for England. It would provide some revenue to England as well. The capital that was used to produce the English goods that bought this gold and silver would be restored and able to keep working. The overall capital of England wouldn't decrease due to exporting gold and silver any more than it would by exporting an equivalent value of other goods. In fact, it would likely increase in most cases. Goods are only sent abroad when there's a higher demand for them outside than at home, and it's expected that the returns will be worth more back at home than the goods that were exported. For example, if tobacco worth £100,000 in England is sent to France and buys wine worth £110,000 in England, this exchange would increase England's capital by £10,000. Similarly, if £100,000 of English gold buys French wine that's worth £110,000 in England, the capital would also increase by £10,000. Just as a merchant with £110,000 worth of wine in his cellar is wealthier than one with only £100,000 worth of tobacco in his warehouse, he is also richer than someone with £100,000 worth of gold in his coffers. He can stimulate more industry and provide income, support, and jobs for more people than either of the other two. However, the country’s capital equals the combined capital of all its residents, and the level of industry maintained each year matches what all these different capitals can sustain. Therefore, both the country’s capital and the amount of industry sustained annually should generally increase through this exchange. It would be better for England if it could buy French wines with its own hardware and woolen fabric rather than using tobacco from Virginia or gold and silver from Brazil and Peru. A direct foreign trade for consumer goods is always more beneficial than an indirect one. However, an indirect trade involving gold and silver seems just as advantageous as any other indirect trade. Also, a country without mines is no more likely to deplete its gold and silver from yearly exports than a country that doesn’t grow tobacco is by exporting that plant each year. Just as a country that can afford to buy tobacco will never be short of it, a country that can purchase gold and silver will not remain long without those metals.

It is a losing trade, it is said, which a workman carries on with the alehouse; and the trade which a manufacturing nation would naturally carry on with a wine country, may be considered as a trade of the same nature. I answer, that the trade with the alehouse is not necessarily a losing trade. In its own nature it is just as advantageous as any other, though, perhaps, somewhat more liable to be abused. The employment of a brewer, and even that of a retailer of fermented liquors, are as necessary divisions of labour as any other. It will generally be more advantageous for a workman to buy of the brewer the quantity he has occasion for, than to brew it himself; and if he is a poor workman, it will generally be more advantageous for him to buy it by little and little of the retailer, than a large quantity of the brewer. He may no doubt buy too much of either, as he may of any other dealers in his neighbourhood; of the butcher, if he is a glutton; or of the draper, if he affects to be a beau among his companions. It is advantageous to the great body of workmen, notwithstanding, that all these trades should be free, though this freedom may be abused in all of them, and is more likely to be so, perhaps, in some than in others. Though individuals, besides, may sometimes ruin their fortunes by an excessive consumption of fermented liquors, there seems to be no risk that a nation should do so. Though in every country there are many people who spend upon such liquors more than they can afford, there are always many more who spend less. It deserves to be remarked, too, that if we consult experience, the cheapness of wine seems to be a cause, not of drunkenness, but of sobriety. The inhabitants of the wine countries are in general the soberest people of Europe; witness the Spaniards, the Italians, and the inhabitants of the southern provinces of France. People are seldom guilty of excess in what is their daily fare. Nobody affects the character of liberality and good fellowship, by being profuse of a liquor which is as cheap as small beer. On the contrary, in the countries which, either from excessive heat or cold, produce no grapes, and where wine consequently is dear and a rarity, drunkenness is a common vice, as among the northern nations, and all those who live between the tropics, the negroes, for example, on the coast of Guinea. When a French regiment comes from some of the northern provinces of France, where wine is somewhat dear, to be quartered in the southern, where it is very cheap, the[Pg 201] soldiers, I have frequently heard it observed, are at first debauched by the cheapness and novelty of good wine; but after a few months residence, the greater part of them become as sober as the rest of the inhabitants. Were the duties upon foreign wines, and the excises upon malt, beer, and ale, to be taken away all at once, it might, in the same manner, occasion in Great Britain a pretty general and temporary drunkenness among the middling and inferior ranks of people, which would probably be soon followed by a permanent and almost universal sobriety. At present, drunkenness is by no means the vice of people of fashion, or of those who can easily afford the most expensive liquors. A gentleman drunk with ale has scarce ever been seen among us. The restraints upon the wine trade in Great Britain, besides, do not so much seem calculated to hinder the people from going, if I may say so, to the alehouse, as from going where they can buy the best and cheapest liquor. They favour the wine trade of Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portuguese, it is said, indeed, are better customers for our manufactures than the French, and should therefore be encouraged in preference to them. As they give us their custom, it is pretended we should give them ours. The sneaking arts of underling tradesman are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire; for it is the most underling tradesmen only who make it a rule to employ chiefly their own customers. A great trader purchases his goods always where they are cheapest and best, without regard to any little interest of this kind.

It’s often said that dealing with the tavern is a losing game for a worker, similar to the trade that a manufacturing country would typically engage in with a wine-producing country. I argue that trading with the tavern doesn’t have to be a losing proposition. By its very nature, it can be just as beneficial as any other trade, although it’s perhaps a bit more prone to misuse. The jobs of a brewer and even a seller of alcoholic drinks are just as essential as any other professions. Generally, it’s better for a worker to buy the amount of alcohol they need from the brewer rather than brewing it themselves. If they’re not a skilled worker, it’s often more advantageous for them to buy smaller amounts from the retailer instead of a large quantity from the brewer. Of course, they can buy too much from either, just as they might from any other local merchants like the butcher if they indulge too much, or from the clothier if they want to impress their friends. Still, it benefits the majority of workers that all these trades are open and free, even if that freedom can be misused, and some might be more susceptible to that misuse than others. While individuals can ruin themselves by drinking too much alcohol, it doesn’t seem likely for an entire nation to do so. In every country, there are many who spend more on alcohol than they should, but there are usually many more who spend less. It’s also worth noting that, based on experience, the affordability of wine tends to promote moderation rather than drunkenness. The people in wine-producing areas are generally the most temperate in Europe—just look at the Spaniards, Italians, and those from the southern parts of France. People rarely overindulge in what they have every day. Nobody tries to show off their generosity and friendliness by wasting a cheap drink like it’s nothing. In contrast, in regions that can’t grow grapes due to extreme heat or cold, where wine is expensive and rare, drunkenness is a frequent problem, especially among northern nations and those living in tropical areas, like some people on the coast of Guinea. When a French regiment moves from the northern provinces of France, where wine is somewhat pricey, to the southern areas, where it’s very cheap, it’s often noted that the soldiers initially indulge too much in the novelty and affordability of good wine, but after a few months, most become just as sober as the locals. If the taxes on foreign wines and the duties on malt, beer, and ale were suddenly lifted in Great Britain, it might temporarily lead to widespread drinking among middle and lower-class people, likely followed by a lasting state of sobriety. Currently, drunkenness isn’t really a problem among the upper classes or those who can easily afford the most expensive drinks. It’s rare to see a gentleman drunk on ale around here. The restrictions on the wine trade in Great Britain don’t seem designed to stop people from going to the tavern, but rather from purchasing the best and cheapest drinks. They promote the Portuguese wine trade while discouraging the French one. It’s said that the Portuguese are better customers for our goods than the French and should thus be favored over them. Since they buy our products, it’s claimed we should reciprocate. The petty tactics of lowly tradesmen are thus turned into political principles for running a vast empire; it’s only the least important tradesmen who feel they must primarily support their own customers. A significant trader will always seek the best and cheapest goods, disregarding any minor interests like that.

By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy: but the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit, of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot, perhaps, be corrected, may very easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of anybody but themselves.

By such principles as these, nations have learned that their self-interest lies in impoverishing all their neighbors. Each nation has come to view the success of all the countries they trade with with envy, seeing their gain as its own loss. Trade, which should naturally serve as a bond of unity and friendship among nations just as it does among individuals, has turned into a major source of conflict and hostility. The reckless ambition of kings and ministers has not brought more harm to the peace of Europe in this and the previous century than the foolish jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the world’s rulers is an age-old problem, for which, I’m afraid, the nature of human affairs offers few solutions: but the petty greed and monopolistic mindset of merchants and manufacturers, who are neither suited to be nor should be the rulers of humanity, while perhaps not easily corrected, can certainly be prevented from disrupting the peace of anyone but themselves.

That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and propagated this doctrine, cannot be doubted: and they who first taught it, were by no means such fools as they who believed it. In every country it always is, and must be, the interest of the great body of the people, to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question, had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. Their interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the people. As it is the interest of the freemen of a corporation to hinder the rest of the inhabitants from employing any workmen but themselves; so it is the interest of the merchants and manufacturers of every country to secure to themselves the monopoly of the home market. Hence, in Great Britain, and in most other European countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost all goods imported by alien merchants. Hence the high duties and prohibitions upon all those foreign manufactures which can come into competition with our own. Hence, too, the extraordinary restraints upon the importation of almost all sorts of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous; that is, from those against whom national animosity happens to be most violently inflamed.

It's clear that the spirit of monopoly was what originally created and spread this idea: there’s no doubt about it. The people who first promoted it were not nearly as foolish as those who accepted it. In every country, it's always in the best interest of the majority to buy what they want from whoever offers it at the lowest price. This idea is so obvious that it seems silly to have to prove it; it would never have been questioned if not for the self-serving arguments from merchants and manufacturers that confused the common sense of people. Their interests directly go against those of the general population. Just like how the members of a corporation benefit from preventing others in the area from hiring any workers except themselves, merchants and manufacturers in every country seek to keep the home market to themselves. This is why, in Great Britain and many other European countries, there are heavy taxes on nearly all goods brought in by foreign merchants. This is also why there are high taxes and bans on foreign products that could compete with our own. Additionally, there are strict limitations on importing various goods from countries where the trade balance is seen as unfavorable; in other words, from those places where national resentment is most intense.

The wealth of neighbouring nations, however, though dangerous in war and politics, is certainly advantageous in trade. In a state of hostility, it may enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in a state of peace and commerce, it must likewise enable them to exchange with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with that produce. As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the industrious people in his neighbourhood, than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation. A rich man, indeed, who is himself a manufacturer, is a very dangerous neighbour to all those who deal in the same way. All the rest of the neighbourhood, however, by far the greatest number, profit by the good market which his expense affords them. They even profit by his underselling the poorer workmen who deal in the same way with him. The manufacturers of a rich nation, in the same manner, may no doubt be very dangerous rivals to those of their neighbours. This very competition, however, is advantageous to the great body of the people, who profit greatly, besides, by the good market which the great expense of such a nation affords them in every other way. Private people, who want to make a fortune, never think of retiring to the remote and poor provinces of the country, but resort either to the capital, or to some of the great commercial towns. They know, that where little wealth[Pg 202] circulates, there is little to be got; but that where a great deal is in motion, some share of it may fall to them. The same maxim which would in this manner direct the common sense of one, or ten, or twenty individuals, should regulate the judgment of one, or ten, or twenty millions, and should make a whole nation regard the riches of its neighbours, as a probable cause and occasion for itself to acquire riches. A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade, is certainly most likely to do so, when its neighbours are all rich, industrious and commercial nations. A great nation, surrounded on all sides by wandering savages and poor barbarians, might, no doubt, acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. It seems to have been in this manner that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquired their great wealth. The ancient Egyptians, it is said, neglected foreign commerce, and the modern Chinese, it is known, hold it in the utmost contempt, and scarce deign to afford it the decent protection of the laws. The modern maxims of foreign commerce, by aiming at the impoverishment of all our neighbours, so far as they are capable of producing their intended effect, tend to render that very commerce insignificant and contemptible.

The wealth of neighboring countries, while risky in war and politics, is definitely beneficial in trade. In times of conflict, it can allow our enemies to maintain stronger fleets and armies than ours; but in times of peace and commerce, it enables them to trade with us for more valuable goods and provides a better market for both our own production and for anything we buy with that production. Just as a wealthy person is usually a better customer for the hardworking people around them than a poor one, so is a wealthy nation. A rich individual who is also a manufacturer can be a tough competitor for others in the same line of work. However, the rest of the community—by far the majority—benefits from the good market that their spending creates. They even gain from the fact that he underprices the poorer workers who compete with him. Manufacturers in a wealthy country can similarly pose serious competition for those in neighboring areas. Still, this competition benefits the broader population, who gain a lot from the good market created by the significant spending of such a nation in various ways. Individuals looking to get rich typically don’t choose to move to remote and poor areas; instead, they flock to the capital or major commercial cities. They understand that where there's little wealth circulating, there's little to earn; but where there's a lot of activity, there’s a chance for them to gain some of it. The same principle that guides the common sense of a few individuals should also guide the judgment of millions, making an entire nation see the wealth of its neighbors as a promising opportunity for acquiring its own riches. A nation looking to grow wealthy through foreign trade is most likely to succeed when its neighbors are all rich, hardworking, and trade-oriented nations. A large nation surrounded by wandering tribes and impoverished people might, of course, gain wealth by cultivating its own land and engaging in internal trade, but not through foreign trade. It appears that this is how ancient Egyptians and modern Chinese built their great wealth—the Egyptians reportedly ignored foreign trade, while modern Chinese disdainfully regard it and hardly even grant it the basic protection of the law. The current principles of foreign trade, by aiming to impoverish all our neighbors to the extent that they can achieve their intended results, tend to make that very trade seem trivial and unworthy.

It is in consequence of these maxims, that the commerce between France and England has, in both countries, been subjected to so many discouragements and restraints. If those two countries, however, were to consider their real interest, without either mercantile jealousy or national animosity, the commerce of France might be more advantageous to Great Britain than that of any other country, and, for the same reason, that of Great Britain to France. France is the nearest neighbour to Great Britain. In the trade between the southern coast of England and the northern and north-western coast of France, the returns might be expected, in the same manner as in the inland trade, four, five, or six times in the year. The capital, therefore, employed in this trade could, in each of the two countries, keep in motion four, five, or six times the quantity of industry, and afford employment and subsistence to four, five, or six times the number of people, which an equal capital could do in the greater part of the other branches of foreign trade. Between the parts of France and Great Britain most remote from one another, the returns might be expected, at least, once in the year; and even this trade would so far be at least equally advantageous, as the greater part of the other branches of our foreign European trade. It would be, at least, three times more advantageous than the boasted trade with our North American colonies, in which the returns were seldom made in less than three years, frequently not in less than four or five years. France, besides, is supposed to contain 24,000,000 of inhabitants. Our North American colonies were never supposed to contain more than 3,000,000; and France is a much richer country than North America; though, on account of the more unequal distribution of riches, there is much more poverty and beggary in the one country than in the other. France, therefore, could afford a market at least eight times more extensive, and, on account of the superior frequency of the returns, four-and-twenty times more advantageous than that which our North American colonies ever afforded. The trade of Great Britain would be just as advantageous to France, and, in proportion to the wealth, population, and proximity of the respective countries, would have the same superiority over that which France carries on with her own colonies. Such is the very great difference between that trade which the wisdom of both nations has thought proper to discourage, and that which it has favoured the most.

Because of these principles, trade between France and England has faced numerous discouragements and restrictions in both countries. However, if these two nations were to focus on their real interests, free from mercantile jealousy or national hostility, France's trade could be more beneficial to Great Britain than that of any other nation, and vice versa. France is the closest neighbor to Great Britain. In the trade between the southern coast of England and the northern and northwestern coast of France, deliveries could be expected four, five, or six times a year, similar to how it works in domestic trade. Therefore, the capital invested in this trade could generate four, five, or six times the amount of industry in each country and provide jobs and livelihoods for four, five, or six times as many people compared to what the same capital could achieve in most other areas of foreign trade. For the farthest regions of France and Great Britain, deliveries could be expected at least once a year, and even this trade would be at least as beneficial as most other aspects of our foreign European trade. It would be at least three times more advantageous than the much-praised trade with our North American colonies, where returns often took at least three years and frequently took four or five years. France, furthermore, is believed to have 24 million inhabitants. Our North American colonies were never thought to have more than 3 million, and France is a considerably wealthier country than North America; although, due to a more uneven wealth distribution, there is much more poverty and begging in one country than in the other. Therefore, France could offer a market at least eight times larger and, due to more frequent returns, twenty-four times more advantageous than what our North American colonies could ever provide. Great Britain's trade would be just as beneficial to France and, in relation to the wealth, population, and proximity of the two nations, would be comparably superior to what France engages in with its own colonies. This highlights the significant difference between the trade that the leaders of both nations have chosen to discourage and the trade they have chosen to support the most.

But the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open and free commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both, have occasioned the principal obstructions to that commerce. Being neighbours, they are necessarily enemies, and the wealth and power of each becomes, upon that account, more formidable to the other; and what would increase the advantage of national friendship, serves only to inflame the violence of national animosity. They are both rich and industrious nations; and the merchants and manufacturers of each dread the competition of the skill and activity of those of the other. Mercantile jealousy is excited, and both inflames, and is itself inflamed, by the violence of national animosity, and the traders of both countries have announced, with all the passionate confidence of interested falsehood, the certain ruin of each, in consequence of that unfavourable balance of trade, which, they pretend, would be the infallible effect of an unrestrained commerce with the other.

But the same circumstances that would make open and free trade between the two countries beneficial for both have also created the main obstacles to that trade. Being neighbors, they are inevitably rivals, and the wealth and power of each become more threatening to the other; what could strengthen the benefits of national friendship only serves to heighten the intensity of national hostility. Both nations are wealthy and hardworking, and the merchants and manufacturers in each fear the competition from the skills and energy of the other. Trade rivalry arises, fueled by the heightened national animosity, and traders in both countries have declared, with all the passionate certainty of biased falsehood, the inevitable downfall of each due to the unfavorable trade balance, which they claim would be the unavoidable result of unrestricted trade with the other.

There is no commercial country in Europe, of which the approaching ruin has not frequently been foretold by the pretended doctors of this system, from an unfavourable balance of trade. After all the anxiety, however, which they have excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost all trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour, and against their neighbours, it does not appear that any one nation in Europe has been, in any respect, impoverished by this cause. Every town and country, on the contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all nations, instead of being ruined by this free trade, as the principles of the commercial system would lead us to expect, have been enriched by it. Though there are in Europe, indeed, a few towns which, in some respects, deserve the name of free ports, there is no[Pg 203] country which does so. Holland, perhaps, approaches the nearest to this character of any, though still very remote from it; and Holland, it is acknowledged, not only derives its whole wealth, but a great part of its necessary subsistence, from foreign trade.

No commercial country in Europe has escaped warnings about its impending ruin from the so-called experts of this system, mainly due to an unfavorable trade balance. Despite all the anxiety they've stirred up and the countless attempts by almost all trading nations to manipulate that balance in their favor at the expense of their neighbors, no single nation in Europe seems to have been actually impoverished by this issue. In fact, every town and country that has opened its ports to all nations has become richer, rather than suffering from this free trade, which is what the principles of the commercial system would lead us to expect. While there are indeed a few towns in Europe that somewhat deserve the title of free ports, no country does. Holland might come closest to fitting this description, though it is still quite far from it; and it is recognized that Holland not only gains its entire wealth but also a significant portion of its essential sustenance from foreign trade.

There is another balance, indeed, which has already been explained, very different from the balance of trade, and which, according as it happens to be either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or decay of every nation. This is the balance of the annual produce and consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, it has already been observed, exceeds that of the annual consumption, the capital of the society must annually increase in proportion to this excess. The society in this case lives within its revenue; and what is annually saved out of its revenue, is naturally added to its capital, and employed so as to increase still further the annual produce. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, on the contrary, fall short of the annual consumption, the capital of the society must annually decay in proportion to this deficiency. The expense of the society, in this case, exceeds its revenue, and necessarily encroaches upon its capital. Its capital, therefore, must necessarily decay, and, together with it, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its industry.

There’s another balance, which has already been discussed, that is very different from the balance of trade and, depending on whether it’s positive or negative, directly impacts the prosperity or decline of every nation. This is the balance of annual production and consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual production, as noted earlier, is greater than that of the annual consumption, the society's capital must grow each year in proportion to this surplus. In this case, the society lives within its means, and what is saved from its revenue each year naturally adds to its capital and is used to further increase the annual production. On the other hand, if the exchangeable value of the annual production falls short of the annual consumption, the society's capital must decline each year based on this shortfall. In this scenario, the society’s expenses exceed its revenue, which inevitably reduces its capital. Therefore, the capital must decline, along with the exchangeable value of the annual production from its industry.

This balance of produce and consumption is entirely different from what is called the balance of trade. It might take place in a nation which had no foreign trade, but which was entirely separated from all the world. It may take place in the whole globe of the earth, of which the wealth, population, and improvement, may be either gradually increasing or gradually decaying.

This balance of production and consumption is completely different from what’s known as the balance of trade. It could happen in a nation that has no foreign trade and is completely isolated from the rest of the world. It can also occur across the entire planet, where the wealth, population, and progress can be either slowly increasing or slowly declining.

The balance of produce and consumption may be constantly in favour of a nation, though what is called the balance of trade be generally against it. A nation may import to a greater value than it exports for half a century, perhaps, together; the gold and silver which comes into it during all this time, may be all immediately sent out of it; its circulating coin may gradually decay, different sorts of paper money being substituted in its place, and even the debts, too, which it contracts in the principal nations with whom it deals, may be gradually increasing; and yet its real wealth, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its lands and labour, may, during the same period, have been increasing in a much greater proportion. The state of our North American colonies, and of the trade which they carried on with Great Britain, before the commencement of the present disturbances,[38] may serve as a proof that this is by no means an impossible supposition.

The balance of production and consumption might constantly favor a nation, even if the balance of trade is generally against it. A nation could import more than it exports for decades, and during that time, any gold and silver coming in may all be sent right back out. Its circulating currency may gradually decline, with various forms of paper money taking its place, and even the debts it accrues with the major countries it trades with might be steadily rising. Yet, its true wealth, which is the exchangeable value of the annual output of its land and labor, could be increasing at a much faster rate during the same period. The situation of our North American colonies and their trade with Great Britain before the onset of current conflicts may demonstrate that this is not an impossible scenario.


CHAP. IV.

OF DRAWBACKS.

Merchants and manufacturers are not contented with the monopoly of the home market, but desire likewise the most extensive foreign sale for their goods. Their country has no jurisdiction in foreign nations, and therefore can seldom procure them any monopoly there. They are generally obliged, therefore, to content themselves with petitioning for certain encouragements to exportation.

Merchants and manufacturers aren't satisfied with just having a monopoly on the domestic market; they also want to maximize their sales overseas. Their country doesn't have authority in foreign nations, so it's rare that they can secure a monopoly there. As a result, they usually have to settle for requesting specific incentives to boost exports.

Of these encouragements, what are called drawbacks seem to be the most reasonable. To allow the merchant to draw back upon exportation, either the whole, or a part of whatever excise or inland duty is imposed upon domestic industry, can never occasion the exportation of a greater quantity of goods than what would have been exported had no duty been imposed. Such encouragements do not tend to turn towards any particular employment a greater share of the capital of the country, than what would go to that employment of its own accord, but only to hinder the duty from driving away any part of that share to other employments. They tend not to overturn that balance which naturally establishes itself among all the various employments of the society, but to hinder it from being overturned by the duty. They tend not to destroy, but to preserve, what it is in most cases advantageous to preserve, the natural division and distribution of labour in the society.

Of these incentives, what are called drawbacks seem to be the most reasonable. Allowing merchants to reclaim either the entire or part of any excise or domestic tax imposed on local industries when exporting will never lead to the export of more goods than would have been exported if no tax had been charged. These incentives don’t really direct a larger share of the country’s capital towards any specific industry than what would naturally go there; they just prevent the tax from pushing some of that capital into other sectors. They don’t disrupt the balance that naturally exists among the various sectors of society; instead, they help keep that balance from being upset by the tax. They aim to preserve, not destroy, what is often beneficial to maintain: the natural division and distribution of labor within society.

The same thing may be said of the drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods imported, which, in Great Britain, generally amount to by much the largest part of the duty upon importation. By the second of the rules, annexed to the act of parliament, which imposed what is now called the old subsidy, every merchant, whether English or alien, was allowed to draw back half that duty upon exportation; the English merchant, provided the exportation took place within twelve months; the alien, provided it took place within nine months. Wines, currants, and wrought silks, were the only goods which did not fall within this rule, having other and more advantageous allowances. The duties imposed by this act of parliament were, at that time, the only duties upon the importation of foreign goods. The term within which this, and all other drawbacks could be claimed, was afterwards (by 7 Geo. I. chap. 21. sect. 10.) extended to three years.

The same can be said about the restrictions on re-exporting foreign goods that were imported, which, in Great Britain, usually make up a significant portion of the duty on import. According to the second rule attached to the act of parliament that set the old subsidy, every merchant, whether English or foreign, was allowed to claim back half of that duty upon export. The English merchant had to export within twelve months, while the foreign merchant had to do it within nine months. Wines, currants, and manufactured silks were the only products that didn’t fall under this rule, as they had different and better allowances. At that time, the duties imposed by this act of parliament were the only duties on the import of foreign goods. The timeframe for claiming this and all other drawbacks was later extended to three years by 7 Geo. I. chap. 21. sect. 10.

The duties which have been imposed since the old subsidy, are, the greater part of them, wholly drawn back upon exportation. This general rule, however, is liable to a great [Pg 204]number of exceptions; and the doctrine of drawbacks has become a much less simple matter than it was at their first institution.

The duties that were established since the old subsidy are mostly refunded upon exportation. However, this general rule has many exceptions, and the idea of refunds has become a lot more complicated than it was when it was first introduced.

Upon the exportation of some foreign goods, of which it was expected that the importation would greatly exceed what was necessary for the home consumption, the whole duties are drawn back, without retaining even half the old subsidy. Before the revolt of our North American colonies, we had the monopoly of the tobacco of Maryland and Virginia. We imported about ninety-six thousand hogsheads, and the home consumption was not supposed to extend fourteen thousand. To facilitate the great exportation which was necessary, in order to rid us of the rest, the whole duties were drawn back, provided the exportation took place within three years.

When certain foreign goods are exported, and it's anticipated that the imports will far exceed what’s needed for local use, all duties are refunded, without keeping even half of the previous subsidy. Before the uprising of our North American colonies, we held the monopoly on tobacco from Maryland and Virginia. We imported around ninety-six thousand hogsheads, while the local consumption was estimated at only fourteen thousand. To support the large-scale export needed to clear out the excess, all duties were refunded, as long as the export occurred within three years.

We still have, though not altogether, yet very nearly, the monopoly of the sugars of our West Indian islands. If sugars are exported within a year, therefore, all the duties, upon importation are drawn back; and if exported within three years, all the duties, except half the old subsidy, which still continues to be retained upon the exportation of the greater part of goods. Though the importation of sugar exceeds a good deal what is necessary for the home consumption, the excess is inconsiderable, in comparison of what it used to be in tobacco.

We still have, although not completely, very close to the monopoly on the sugars from our Caribbean islands. If sugars are exported within a year, all the import duties are refunded; and if exported within three years, all the duties are refunded except for half of the old subsidy, which still applies to the export of most goods. Even though the amount of sugar imported is significantly more than what's needed for domestic use, the extra amount is minor compared to what it used to be with tobacco.

Some goods, the particular objects of the jealousy of our own manufacturers, are prohibited to be imported for home consumption. They may, however, upon paying certain duties, be imported and warehoused for exportation. But upon such exportation no part of these duties is drawn back. Our manufacturers are unwilling, it seems, that even this restricted importation should be encouraged, and are afraid lest some part of these goods should be stolen out of the warehouse, and thus came into competition with their own. It is under these regulations only that we can import wrought silks, French cambrics and lawns, calicoes, painted, printed, stained, or dyed, &c.

Some products, which our own manufacturers are particularly jealous of, are banned from being imported for domestic use. However, they can be imported and stored for export after paying certain duties. But no part of these duties is refunded upon export. It seems our manufacturers are not in favor of even this limited importation being supported, as they worry that some of these goods might be stolen from the warehouse and compete with their own. It is only under these regulations that we can import items like woven silks, French cambrics and lawns, calicoes—whether painted, printed, stained, or dyed, etc.

We are unwilling even to be the carriers of French goods, and choose rather to forego a profit to ourselves than to suffer those whom we consider as our enemies to make any profit by our means. Not only half the old subsidy, but the second twenty-five per cent. is retained upon the exportation of all French goods.

We refuse to even carry French goods, choosing to give up our own profit rather than let those we see as our enemies benefit from us. Not only is half of the old subsidy kept, but the second twenty-five percent is also withheld on the export of all French goods.

By the fourth of the rules annexed to the old subsidy, the drawback allowed upon the exportation of all wines amounted to a great deal more than half the duties which were at that time paid upon their importation; and it seems at that time to have been the object of the legislature to give somewhat more than ordinary encouragement to the carrying trade in wine. Several of the other duties, too, which were imposed either at the same time or subsequent to the old subsidy, what is called the additional duty, the new subsidy, the one-third and two-thirds subsidies, the impost 1692, the tonnage on wine, were allowed to be wholly drawn back upon exportation. All those duties, however, except the additional duty and impost 1692, being paid down in ready money upon importation, the interest of so large a sum occasioned an expense, which made it unreasonable to expect any profitable carrying trade in this article. Only a part, therefore of the duty called the impost on wine, and no part of the twenty-five pounds the ton upon French wines, or of the duties imposed in 1745, in 1763, and in 1778, were allowed to be drawn back upon exportation. The two imposts of five per cent. imposed in 1779 and 1781, upon all the former duties of customs, being allowed to be wholly drawn back upon the exportation of all other goods, were likewise allowed to be drawn back upon that of wine. The last duty that has been particularly imposed upon wine, that of 1780, is allowed to be wholly drawn back; an indulgence which, when so many heavy duties are retained, most probably could never occasion the exportation of a single ton of wine. These rules took place with regard to all places of lawful exportation, except the British colonies in America.

By the fourth of the rules added to the old subsidy, the drawback on exporting all wines was significantly more than half the duties paid on their importation at that time; it seems the legislature intended to provide extra encouragement for the wine trade. Several other duties, which were either imposed at the same time or after the old subsidy, like the additional duty, the new subsidy, the one-third and two-thirds subsidies, the impost of 1692, and the tonnage on wine, were fully refundable upon exportation. However, except for the additional duty and the impost of 1692, these duties were paid upfront in cash upon importation, which incurred significant interest expenses, making it unrealistic to expect a profitable trade in this product. Therefore, only a portion of the duty called the impost on wine, and none of the twenty-five pounds per ton on French wines, or the duties imposed in 1745, 1763, and 1778, could be refunded upon exportation. The two imposts of five percent from 1779 and 1781, applied to all previous customs duties, were also fully refundable on the export of wine. The last specific duty placed on wine, that of 1780, is fully refundable; a concession that, given the many heavy duties retained, likely wouldn’t lead to the export of even one ton of wine. These rules applied to all lawful export locations, except for the British colonies in America.

The 15th Charles II, chap. 7, called an act for the encouragement of trade, had given Great Britain the monopoly of supplying the colonies with all the commodities of the growth or manufacture of Europe, and consequently with wines. In a country of so extensive a coast as our North American and West Indian colonies, where our authority was always so very slender, and where the inhabitants were allowed to carry out in their own ships their non-enumerated commodities, at first to all parts of Europe, and afterwards to all parts of Europe south of Cape Finisterre, it is not very probable that this monopoly could ever be much respected; and they probably at all times found means of bringing back some cargo from the countries to which they were allowed to carry out one. They seem, however, to have found some difficulty in importing European wines from the places of their growth; and they could not well import them from Great Britain, where they were loaded with many heavy duties, of which a considerable part was not drawn back upon exportation. Madeira wine, not being an European commodity, could be imported directly into America and the West Indies, countries which, in all their non-enumerated commodities, enjoyed a free trade to the island of Madeira. These circumstances had probably introduced that general taste for Madeira wine, which our officers found established in all our colonies at the commence[Pg 205]ment of the war which began in 1755, and which they brought back with them to the mother country, where that wine had not been much in fashion before. Upon the conclusion of that war, in 1763 (by the 4th Geo. III, chap. 15, sect. 12), all the duties except L.3, 10s. were allowed to be drawn back upon the exportation to the colonies of all wines, except French wines, to the commerce and consumption of which national prejudice would allow no sort of encouragement. The period between the granting of this indulgence and the revolt of our North American colonies, was probably too short to admit of any considerable change in the customs of those countries.

The 15th Charles II, chap. 7, known as an act for the encouragement of trade, had granted Great Britain the monopoly on supplying the colonies with all goods grown or made in Europe, including wines. In a country with such a vast coastline like our North American and West Indian colonies, where our control was always quite limited, and where the people were allowed to ship out their non-enumerated goods in their own vessels, initially to all parts of Europe, and later to all parts of Europe south of Cape Finisterre, it’s unlikely that this monopoly was ever truly respected; they probably always found ways to bring back some cargo from the countries to which they were allowed to export. However, they seemed to have some difficulty importing European wines from their places of origin; they couldn’t really import them from Great Britain due to heavy taxes, many of which were not refunded upon export. Madeira wine, not being a European commodity, could be imported directly into America and the West Indies, which, for all their non-enumerated goods, had a free trade arrangement with the island of Madeira. These circumstances likely led to a widespread liking for Madeira wine, which our officials found established in all our colonies at the start of the war in 1755, and they brought that preference back home, where that wine hadn’t been very popular before. Following the end of that war in 1763 (by the 4th Geo. III, chap. 15, sect. 12), all taxes except L.3, 10s. were allowed to be refunded on wines exported to the colonies, except for French wines, which national bias wouldn’t permit any encouragement for. The time between allowing this concession and the uprising of our North American colonies was likely too brief to bring about any significant changes in the habits of those regions.

The same act which, in the drawbacks upon all wines, except French wines, thus favoured the colonies so much more than other countries, in those upon the greater part of other commodities, favoured them much less. Upon the exportation of the greater part of commodities to other countries, half the old subsidy was drawn back. But this law enacted, that no part of that duty should be drawn back upon the exportation to the colonies of any commodities of the growth or manufacture either of Europe or the East Indies, except wines, white calicoes, and muslins.

The same law that heavily favored the colonies over other countries regarding taxes on all wines except French wines, didn’t offer them the same advantages for most other goods. For exporting most goods to other countries, half of the old subsidy was refunded. However, this law stated that no part of that duty would be refunded for exporting any goods produced or manufactured in Europe or the East Indies to the colonies, except for wines, white calicoes, and muslins.

Drawbacks were, perhaps, originally granted for the encouragement of the carrying trade, which, as the freight of the ship is frequently paid by foreigners in money, was supposed to be peculiarly fitted for bringing gold and silver into the country. But though the carrying trade certainly deserves no peculiar encouragement, though the motive of the institution was, perhaps, abundantly foolish, the institution itself seems reasonable enough. Such drawbacks cannot force into this trade a greater share of the capital of the country than what would have gone to it of its own accord, had there been no duties upon importation; they only prevent its being excluded altogether by those duties. The carrying trade, though it deserves no preference, ought not to be precluded, but to be left free, like all other trades. It is a necessary resource to those capitals which cannot find employment, either in the agriculture or in the manufactures of the country, either in its home trade, or in its foreign trade of consumption.

Drawbacks were probably initially offered to promote the carrying trade, which, since the freight of the ship is often paid by foreigners in cash, was thought to be especially good for bringing gold and silver into the country. However, even though the carrying trade definitely doesn't merit special encouragement and the reasoning behind the policy may have been quite misguided, the policy itself seems reasonable enough. These drawbacks can't force a greater share of the country's capital into this trade than would have naturally flowed into it without import duties; they just prevent it from being completely shut out by those duties. The carrying trade, while it doesn't need to be prioritized, shouldn't be blocked either, but should be allowed to operate freely like all other trades. It serves as a crucial outlet for capital that can't find opportunities in the country's agriculture, manufacturing, domestic trade, or international consumption trade.

The revenue of the customs, instead of suffering, profits from such drawbacks, by that part of the duty which is retained. If the whole duties had been retained, the foreign goods upon which they are paid could seldom have been exported, nor consequently imported, for want of a market. The duties, therefore, of which a part is retained, would never have been paid.

The revenue from customs doesn’t suffer but benefits from these drawbacks, thanks to the portion of the duty that is kept. If all the duties had been kept, the foreign goods on which they are paid would rarely have been exported or, as a result, imported due to a lack of market. Therefore, the duties, of which part is kept, would never have been paid at all.

These reasons seem sufficiently to justify drawbacks, and would justify them, though the whole duties, whether upon the produce of domestic industry or upon foreign goods, were always drawn back upon exportation. The revenue of excise would, in this case indeed, suffer a little, and that of the customs a good deal more; but the natural balance of industry, the natural division and distribution of labour, which is always more or less disturbed by such duties, would be more nearly re-established by such a regulation.

These reasons seem strong enough to justify the drawbacks, and would justify them, even if all duties, whether on the output of local industry or on imported goods, were fully refunded upon export. The revenue from excise would indeed take a small hit, and customs would be affected much more; however, the natural balance of industry, along with the natural division and distribution of labor, which is always somewhat disrupted by such duties, would be closer to being restored by this regulation.

These reasons, however, will justify drawbacks only upon exporting goods to those countries which are altogether foreign and independent, not to those in which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy a monopoly. A drawback, for example, upon the exportation of European goods to our American colonies, will not always occasion a greater exportation than what would have taken place without it. By means of the monopoly which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy there, the same quantity might frequently, perhaps, be sent thither, though the whole duties were retained. The drawback, therefore, may frequently be pure loss to the revenue of excise and customs, without altering the state of the trade, or rendering it in any respect more extensive. How far such drawbacks can be justified as a proper encouragement to the industry of our colonies, or how far it is advantageous to the mother country that they should be exempted from taxes which are paid by all the rest of their fellow-subjects, will appear hereafter, when I come to treat of colonies.

These reasons, however, only justify drawbacks when exporting goods to countries that are completely foreign and independent, not to those where our merchants and manufacturers have a monopoly. A drawback, for instance, on the export of European goods to our American colonies won't necessarily lead to a higher level of exports than would have happened without it. Because of the monopoly that our merchants and manufacturers have there, the same amount might often be sent there even if all the duties were kept. Therefore, the drawback could frequently represent a complete loss to the revenue from excise and customs, without changing the state of trade or making it any more extensive. How much such drawbacks can be justified as a proper incentive for the industry of our colonies, or how much it benefits the mother country for them to be exempt from taxes that all other subjects pay, will be discussed later when I address the topic of colonies.

Drawbacks, however, it must always be understood, are useful only in those cases in which the goods, for the exportation of which they are given, are really exported to some foreign country, and not clandestinely re-imported into our own. That some drawbacks, particularly those upon tobacco, have frequently been abused in this manner, and have given occasion to many frauds, equally hurtful both to the revenue and to the fair trader, is well known.

Drawbacks, however, should always be understood as useful only when the goods for which they are provided are actually exported to a foreign country, and not secretly brought back into our own. It's well known that some drawbacks, especially those on tobacco, have often been misused this way, leading to numerous frauds that are damaging to both the government revenue and honest traders.


CHAP. V.

OF BOUNTIES.

Bounties upon exportation are, in Great Britain, frequently petitioned for, and sometimes granted, to the produce of particular branches of domestic industry. By means of them, our merchants and manufacturers, it is pretended, will be enabled to sell their goods as cheap or cheaper than their rivals in the foreign market. A greater quantity, it is said, will thus be exported, and the balance of trade consequently turned more in favour of our own country. We cannot give our workmen a monopoly in the foreign, as we have done in the[Pg 206] home market. We cannot force foreigners to buy their goods as we have done our own countrymen. The next best expedient, it has been thought, therefore, is to pay them for buying. It is in this manner that the mercantile system proposes to enrich the whole country, and to put money into all our pockets by means of the balance of trade.

Bounties on exports are often requested in Great Britain and sometimes granted to specific sectors of domestic industry. It's claimed that these incentives will help our merchants and manufacturers sell their products at similar or lower prices compared to their foreign competitors. This, it is said, will lead to a higher volume of exports and a more favorable trade balance for our country. We can't give our workers a monopoly in international markets like we have in the [Pg 206] domestic market. We can't force foreigners to buy their goods like we do with our own citizens. So, the next best solution is to incentivize them to make purchases. This is how the mercantile system aims to enrich the entire country and fill our pockets through a better trade balance.

Bounties, it is allowed, ought to be given to those branches of trade only which cannot be carried on without them. But every branch of trade in which the merchant can sell his goods for a price which replaces to him, with the ordinary profits of stock, the whole capital employed in preparing and sending them to market, can be carried on without a bounty. Every such branch is evidently upon a level with all the other branches of trade which are carried on without bounties, and cannot, therefore, require one more than they. Those trades only require bounties in which the merchant is obliged to sell his goods for a price which does not replace to him his capital, together with the ordinary profit, or in which he is obliged to sell them for less than it really costs him to send them to market. The bounty is given in order to make up this loss, and to encourage him to continue, or, perhaps, to begin a trade, of which the expense is supposed to be greater than the returns, of which every operation eats up a part of the capital employed in it, and which is of such a nature, that if all other trades resembled it, there would soon be no capital left in the country.

Bounties should only be given to those industries that can’t operate without them. However, any industry where a merchant can sell their goods at a price that covers their costs and provides the usual profit can function without a bounty. Every such industry is clearly on the same level as other businesses that operate without bounties and, therefore, shouldn’t need one more than they do. Only those industries that require bounties are the ones where merchants are forced to sell their goods for a price that doesn’t cover their capital along with the regular profit, or where they have to sell at a loss compared to the actual cost of bringing the goods to market. The bounty compensates for this loss and encourages the merchant to keep going or maybe even start a business that is expected to cost more than it makes, where each transaction eats into the capital involved. If all other industries were like this, there would soon be no capital left in the country.

The trades, it is to be observed, which are carried on by means of bounties, are the only ones which can be carried on between two nations for any considerable time together, in such a manner as that one of them shall always and regularly lose, or sell its goods for less than it really costs to send them to market. But if the bounty did not repay to the merchant what he would otherwise lose upon the price of his goods, his own interest would soon oblige him to employ his stock in another way, or to find out a trade in which the price of the goods would replace to him, with the ordinary profit, the capital employment in sending them to market. The effect of bounties, like that of all the other expedients of the mercantile system, can only be to force the trade of a country into a channel much less advantageous than that in which it would naturally run of its own accord.

The trades supported by bounties are the only ones that can continue between two nations for a significant amount of time in a way that one of them consistently loses or sells its goods for less than the actual cost to bring them to market. However, if the bounty didn’t compensate the merchant for the loss he would otherwise face on his goods' prices, his own interests would soon push him to invest his resources elsewhere or to find a trade where the goods would return to him, along with the usual profit, the investment he made in delivering them to market. The impact of bounties, like all the other strategies of the mercantile system, is merely to redirect a country's trade into a path much less beneficial than the one it would naturally follow on its own.

The ingenious and well-informed author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade has shown very clearly, that since the bounty upon the exportation of corn was first established, the price of the corn exported, valued moderately enough, has exceeded that of the corn imported, valued very high, by a much greater sum than the amount of the whole bounties which have been paid during that period. This, he imagines, upon the true principles of the mercantile system, is a clear proof that this forced corn trade is beneficial to the nation, the value of the exportation exceeding that of the importation by a much greater sum than the whole extraordinary expense which the public has been at in order to get it exported. He does not consider that this extraordinary expense, or the bounty, is the smallest part of the expense which the exportation of corn really costs the society. The capital which the farmer employed in raising it must likewise be taken into the account. Unless the price of the corn, when sold in the foreign markets replaces, not only the bounty, but this capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, the society is a loser by the difference, or the national stock is so much diminished. But the very reason for which it has been thought necessary to grant a bounty, is the supposed insufficiency of the price to do this.

The smart and knowledgeable author of the Tracts on the Corn Trade has clearly demonstrated that since the bounty on corn exports was first established, the price of exported corn, priced reasonably enough, has been much higher than that of imported corn, which is priced very high, by a larger sum than the total of all the bounties paid during that time. He believes that, according to the true principles of the mercantile system, this forced corn trade is beneficial to the nation, with the value of exports exceeding that of imports by a much larger amount than the total extra cost the public incurred to facilitate the exports. He doesn't consider that this extra cost, or the bounty, is just a small part of the total expense that exporting corn actually imposes on society. The capital that the farmer invested in growing the corn also needs to be factored in. Unless the selling price of corn in foreign markets covers not just the bounty, but also this capital along with the regular profits, society ends up losing the difference, or the national stock decreases by that amount. However, the very reason a bounty was deemed necessary is the belief that the price is not sufficient to cover these costs.

The average price of corn, it has been said, has fallen considerably since the establishment of the bounty. That the average price of corn began to fall somewhat towards the end of the last century, and has continued to do so during the course of the sixty-four first years of the present, I have already endeavoured to show. But this event, supposing it to be real, as I believe it to be, must have happened in spite of the bounty, and cannot possibly have happened in consequence of it. It has happened in France, as well as in England, though in France there was not only no bounty, but, till 1764, the exportation of corn was subjected to a general prohibition. This gradual fall in the average price of grain, it is probable, therefore, is ultimately owing neither to the one regulation nor to the other, but to that gradual and insensible rise in the real value of silver, which, in the first book of this discourse, I have endeavoured to show, has taken place in the general market of Europe during the course of the present century. It seems to be altogether impossible that the bounty could ever contribute to lower the price of grain.

The average price of corn, it has been said, has dropped significantly since the bounty was established. I've already tried to show that the average price of corn started to decline towards the end of the last century and has continued to do so during the first sixty-four years of this century. But this decline, assuming it is real—as I believe it is—must have happened despite the bounty and cannot possibly be a result of it. This has happened in France as well as in England, even though in France there was not only no bounty but, until 1764, there was a general ban on exporting corn. Therefore, this gradual decline in the average price of grain is probably due neither to one regulation nor the other, but to a steady and unnoticed increase in the real value of silver, which I have attempted to show in the first book of this discussion, has occurred in the general market of Europe during this century. It seems entirely improbable that the bounty could ever help reduce the price of grain.

In years of plenty, it has already been observed, the bounty, by occasioning an extraordinary exportation, necessarily keeps up the price of corn in the home market above what it would naturally fall to. To do so was the avowed purpose of the institution. In years of scarcity, though the bounty is frequently suspended, yet the great exportation which it occasions in years of plenty, must frequently hinder, more or less, the plenty of one year from relieving the scarcity of another. Both in years of plenty and in years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty necessarily tends to raise the money price of corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the home market.

In times of plenty, it's been noted that the bounty, by encouraging significant exports, keeps corn prices in the local market higher than they would naturally be. This was the stated goal of the program. In years of scarcity, even though the bounty is often paused, the large exports it causes during plentiful years can still limit how much one year's abundance can help alleviate the shortages of another. So, in both prosperous and lean years, the bounty tends to push the money price of corn a bit higher than it would be otherwise in the local market.

That, in the actual state of tillage, the bounty must necessarily have this tendency, will not[Pg 207] I apprehend, be disputed by any reasonable person. But it has been thought by many people, that it tends to encourage tillage, and that in two different ways; first, by opening a more extensive foreign market to the corn of the farmer, it tends, they imagine, to increase the demand for, and consequently the production of, that commodity; and, secondly, by securing to him a better price than he could otherwise expect in the actual state of tillage, it tends, they suppose, to encourage tillage. This double encouragement must, they imagine, in a long period of years, occasion such an increase in the production of corn, as may lower its price in the home market, much more than the bounty can raise it, in the actual state which tillage may, at the end of that period, happen to be in.

That, given the current state of farming, the bounty is likely to have this effect, I doubt anyone reasonable will argue against it. However, many people believe it encourages farming in two main ways: first, by providing a larger foreign market for the farmer's corn, which they think increases demand and, as a result, production of that crop; and second, by guaranteeing the farmer a better price than he could expect in the current farming conditions, which they believe promotes farming. This dual encouragement is thought to eventually lead to a significant increase in corn production over many years, which could lower its price in the local market, much more than the bounty could raise it, based on what farming conditions might be at the end of that period.

I answer, that whatever extension of the foreign market can be occasioned by the bounty must, in every particular year, be altogether at the expense of the home market; as every bushel of corn, which is exported by means of the bounty, and which would not have been exported without the bounty, would have remained in the home market to increase the consumption, and to lower the price of that commodity. The corn bounty, it is to be observed, as well as every other bounty upon exportation, imposes two different taxes upon the people; first, the tax which they are obliged to contribute, in order to pay the bounty; and, secondly, the tax which arises from the advanced price of the commodity in the home market, and which, as the whole body of the people are purchasers of corn, must, in this particular commodity, be paid by the whole body of the people. In this particular commodity, therefore, this second tax is by much the heaviest of the two. Let us suppose that, taking one year with another, the bounty of 5s. upon the exportation of the quarter of wheat raises the price of that commodity in the home market only 6d. the bushel, or 4s. the quarter higher than it otherwise would have been in the actual state of the crop. Even upon this very moderate supposition, the great body of the people, over and above contributing the tax which pays the bounty of 5s. upon every quarter of wheat exported, must pay another of 4s. upon every quarter which they themselves consume. But according to the very well informed author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, the average proportion of the corn exported to that consumed at home, is not more than that of one to thirty-one. For every 5s. therefore, which they contribute to the payment of the first tax, they must contribute L.6, 4s. to the payment of the second. So very heavy a tax upon the first necessary of life must either reduce the subsistence of the labouring poor, or it must occasion some augmentation in their pecuniary wages, proportionable to that in the pecuniary price of their subsistence. So far as it operates in the one way, it must reduce the ability of the labouring poor to educate and bring up their children, and must, so far, tend to restrain the population of the country. So far as it operates in the other, it must reduce the ability of the employers of the poor, to employ so great a number as they otherwise might do, and must so far tend to restrain the industry of the country. The extraordinary exportation of corn, therefore, occasioned by the bounty, not only in every particular year diminishes the home, just as much as it extends the foreign market and consumption, but, by restraining the population and industry of the country, its final tendency is to stint and restrain the gradual extension of the home market; and thereby, in the long-run, rather to diminish than to augment the whole market and consumption of corn.

I respond that any increase in the foreign market caused by the subsidy must, in any given year, come entirely at the cost of the domestic market. Every bushel of corn exported thanks to the subsidy, which wouldn’t have been exported without it, would have stayed in the domestic market to boost consumption and lower the price of that commodity. It's important to note that the corn subsidy, like any other export subsidy, imposes two separate taxes on the people; first, the tax they need to pay to fund the subsidy, and second, the tax that results from the increased price of the commodity in the domestic market. Since everyone buys corn, this tax must be borne by everyone. Thus, for this commodity, the second tax is significantly heavier than the first. Let’s assume that, on average, the subsidy of 5s. on the export of a quarter of wheat raises the home price of that commodity by only 6d. per bushel, or 4s. per quarter higher than it would be given the current crop status. Even with this very modest assumption, the general public, beyond paying the 5s. subsidy for each quarter of exported wheat, has to pay an additional 4s. for each quarter they consume. However, according to a knowledgeable author of the "Tracts on the Corn Trade," the average ratio of corn exported to that consumed domestically is only one to thirty-one. Thus, for every 5s. they pay toward the first tax, they must pay £6, 4s. for the second. This heavy tax on a basic necessity will either lower the living standards of the working poor or cause a corresponding increase in their wages to match the rising cost of living. If it drives down their living standards, it will reduce their ability to educate and raise their children, which will, in turn, slow the country’s population growth. If, however, it leads to higher wages, it will limit employers' capacity to hire as many workers as they otherwise could, which will restrict the country's overall productivity. Therefore, the significant exportation of corn caused by the subsidy not only reduces the domestic market in every specific year, just as it expands the foreign market and consumption, but it also restricts population growth and productivity; ultimately, its long-term effect is to stifle, rather than enhance, the gradual growth of the domestic market, thereby reducing the overall market and consumption of corn.

This enhancement of the money price of corn, however, it has been thought, by rendering that commodity more profitable to the farmer, must necessarily encourage its production.

This increase in the price of corn, however, is believed to make it more profitable for farmers, which should naturally boost its production.

I answer, that this might be the case, if the effect of the bounty was to raise the real price of corn, or to enable the farmer, with an equal quantity of it, to maintain a greater number of labourers in the same manner, whether liberal, moderate, or scanty, than other labourers are commonly maintained in his neighbourhood. But neither the bounty, it is evident, nor any other human institution, can have any such effect. It is not the real, but the nominal price of corn, which can in any considerable degree be affected by the bounty. And though the tax, which that institution imposes upon the whole body of the people, may be very burdensome to those who pay it, it is of very little advantage to those who receive it.

I would say that this could be true if the bounty actually increased the real price of corn, or allowed the farmer to support more workers with the same amount of corn, whether generously, moderately, or minimally, compared to how other workers are typically supported in his area. However, it's clear that neither the bounty nor any other human system can do that. It’s the nominal price of corn that can be affected by the bounty, not the real price. Even though the tax imposed by this system can be a heavy burden for those who pay it, it offers very little benefit to those who receive it.

The real effect of the bounty is not so much to raise the real value of corn, as to degrade the real value of silver; or to make an equal quantity of it exchange for a smaller quantity, not only of corn, but of all other home made commodities; for the money price of corn regulates that of all other home made commodities.

The actual impact of the bounty isn't so much to increase the real value of corn, but rather to lower the real value of silver; or to have the same amount of silver exchange for a smaller amount, not just of corn but of all other domestically produced goods; because the price of corn in money sets the price for all other locally made products.

It regulates the money price of labour, which must always be such as to enable the labourer to purchase a quantity of corn sufficient to maintain him and his family, either in the liberal, moderate, or scanty manner, in which the advancing, stationary, or declining circumstances of the society, oblige his employers to maintain him.

It controls the monetary value of labor, which must always be set so that workers can buy enough corn to support themselves and their families, whether in a generous, reasonable, or minimal way, depending on the changing, stable, or deteriorating conditions of society that require their employers to provide for them.

It regulates the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of land, which, in every period of improvement, must bear a certain proportion to that of corn, though this proportion is different in different periods. It regulates, for example, the money price of grass and hay, of butcher's meat, of[Pg 208] horses, and the maintenance of horses, of land carriage consequently, or of the greater part of the inland commerce of the country.

It controls the monetary value of all the other basic agricultural products, which, during each phase of development, must maintain a specific ratio to that of corn, although this ratio varies at different times. It determines, for example, the money price of grass and hay, of meat, of[Pg 208]horses, and the care of horses, as well as land transportation, and therefore, influences much of the domestic trade in the country.

By regulating the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of land, it regulates that of the materials of almost all manufactures; by regulating the money price of labour, it regulates that of manufacturing art and industry; and by regulating both, it regulates that of the complete manufacture. The money price of labour, and of every thing that is the produce, either of land or labour, must necessarily either rise or fall in proportion to the money price of corn.

By controlling the money price of all the different outputs from land, it influences the cost of materials for nearly all products. By controlling the money price of labor, it impacts the costs of manufacturing and industry. By managing both, it affects the total cost of the finished goods. The money price of labor and everything produced, either from land or labor, must either increase or decrease in relation to the money price of corn.

Though in consequence of the bounty, therefore, the farmer should be enabled to sell his corn for 4s. the bushel, instead of 3s 6d. and to pay his landlord a money rent proportionable to this rise in the money price of his produce; yet if, in consequence of this rise in the price of corn, 4s. will purchase no more home made goods of any other kind than 3s. 6d. would have done before, neither the circumstances of the farmer, nor those of the landlord, will be much mended by this change. The farmer will not be able to cultivate much better; the landlord will not be able to live much better. In the purchase of foreign commodities, this enhancement in the price of corn may give them some little advantage. In that of home made commodities, it can give them none at all. And almost the whole expense of the farmer, and the far greater part even of that of the landlord, is in home made commodities.

Even though the bounty allows the farmer to sell his corn for 4s. per bushel instead of 3s. 6d., and to pay his landlord a rent that reflects this increase in the price of his produce, if 4s. now buys no more local goods than 3s. 6d. did before, then neither the farmer's nor the landlord's situation will improve much. The farmer won't be able to farm much better, and the landlord won't be able to live much better either. While this increase in corn prices might give them a slight advantage when buying foreign goods, it won't help at all with local goods. Most of the farmer's expenses, and a significant portion of the landlord's, go towards local products.

That degradation in the value of silver, which is the effect of the fertility of the mines, and which operates equally, or very nearly equally, through the greater part of the commercial world, is a matter of very little consequence to any particular country. The consequent rise of all money prices, though it does not make those who receive them really richer, does not make them really poorer. A service of plate becomes really cheaper, and every thing else remains precisely of the same real value as before.

That drop in the value of silver, caused by how abundant the mines are, affects most of the commercial world pretty much the same way and doesn’t really matter much to any specific country. The resulting increase in all money prices doesn't actually make people any richer or poorer. A set of silverware becomes genuinely cheaper, while everything else stays exactly as valuable as it was before.

But that degradation in the value of silver, which, being the effect either of the peculiar situation or of the political institutions of a particular country, takes place only in that country, is a matter of very great consequence, which, far from tending to make any body really richer, tends to make every body really poorer. The rise in the money price of all commodities, which is in this case peculiar to that country, tends to discourage more or less every sort of industry which is carried on within it, and to enable foreign nations, by furnishing almost all sorts of goods for a smaller quantity of silver than its own workmen can afford to do, to undersell them, not only in the foreign, but even in the home market.

But the drop in the value of silver, which happens because of the unique circumstances or political systems of a certain country, only occurs in that country and is very significant. Rather than making anyone genuinely richer, it tends to make everyone genuinely poorer. The increase in the money price of all goods, which is specific to that country, discourages nearly all types of local industries and allows foreign nations to provide almost all kinds of products for less silver than local workers can afford, enabling them to sell for less not only in foreign markets but also in the domestic market.

It is the peculiar situation of Spain and Portugal, as proprietors of the mines, to be the distributers of gold and silver to all the other countries of Europe. Those metals ought naturally, therefore, to be somewhat cheaper in Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe. The difference, however, should be no more than the amount of the freight and insurance; and, on account of the great value and small bulk of those metals, their freight is no great matter, and their insurance is the same as that of any other goods of equal value. Spain and Portugal, therefore, could suffer very little from their peculiar situation, if they did not aggravate its disadvantages by their political institutions.

Spain and Portugal have a unique situation as the owners of the mines, making them the distributors of gold and silver to the rest of Europe. These metals should naturally be a bit cheaper in Spain and Portugal than anywhere else in Europe. However, the price difference should only reflect the cost of freight and insurance; given the high value and small size of these metals, freight costs are minimal, and their insurance is similar to that of other goods of equal value. Thus, Spain and Portugal shouldn't be significantly affected by their unique situation unless they make things worse with their political systems.

Spain by taxing, and Portugal by prohibiting, the exportation of gold and silver, load that exportation with the expense of smuggling, and raise the value of those metals in other countries so much more above what it is in their own, by the whole amount of this expense. When you dam up a stream of water, as soon as the dam is full, as much water must run over the dam-head as if there was no dam at all. The prohibition of exportation cannot detain a greater quantity of gold and silver in Spain and Portugal, than what they can afford to employ, than what the annual produce of their land and labour will allow them to employ, in coin, plate, gilding, and other ornaments of gold and silver. When they have got this quantity, the dam is full, and the whole stream which flows in afterwards must run over. The annual exportation of gold and silver from Spain and Portugal, accordingly, is, by all accounts, notwithstanding these restraints, very near equal to the whole annual importation. As the water, however, must always be deeper behind the dam-head than before it, so the quantity of gold and silver which these restraints detain in Spain and Portugal, must, in proportion to the annual produce of their land and labour, be greater than what is to be found in other countries. The higher and stronger the dam-head, the greater must be the difference in the depth of water behind and before it. The higher the tax, the higher the penalties with which the prohibition is guarded, the more vigilant and severe the police which looks after the execution of the law, the greater must be the difference in the proportion of gold and silver to the annual produce of the land and labour of Spain and Portugal, and to that of other countries. It is said, accordingly, to be very considerable, and that you frequently find there a profusion of plate in houses, where there is nothing else which would in other countries be thought suitable or correspondent to this sort of magnificence. The cheapness of gold and silver, or, what is the same thing, the dearness of all commodities, which is the necessary effect of this redundancy of the precious metals, discourages both the agriculture and manufactures of Spain and Portugal, and enables foreign nations to supply them with many sorts[Pg 209] of rude, and with almost all sorts of manufactured produce, for a smaller quantity of gold and silver than what they themselves can either raise or make them for at home. The tax and prohibition operate in two different ways. They not only lower very much the value of the precious metals in Spain and Portugal, but by detaining there a certain quantity of those metals which would otherwise flow over other countries, they keep up their value in those other countries somewhat above what it otherwise would be, and thereby give those countries a double advantage in their commerce with Spain and Portugal. Open the flood-gates, and there will presently be less water above, and more below the dam-head, and it will soon come to a level in both places. Remove the tax and the prohibition, and as the quantity of gold and silver will diminish considerably in Spain and Portugal, so it will increase somewhat in other countries; and the value of those metals, their proportion to the annual produce of land and labour, will soon come to a level, or very near to a level, in all. The loss which Spain and Portugal could sustain by this exportation of their gold and silver, would be altogether nominal and imaginary. The nominal value of their goods, and of the annual produce of their land and labour, would fall, and would be expressed or represented by a smaller quantity of silver than before; but their real value would be the same as before, and would be sufficient to maintain, command, and employ the same quantity of labour. As the nominal value of their goods would fall, the real value of what remained of their gold and silver would rise, and a smaller quantity of those metals would answer all the same purposes of commerce and circulation which had employed a greater quantity before. The gold and silver which would go abroad would not go abroad for nothing, but would bring back an equal value of goods of some kind or other. Those goods, too, would not be all matters of mere luxury and expense, to be consumed by idle people, who produce nothing in return for their consumption. As the real wealth and revenue of idle people would not be augmented by this extraordinary exportation of gold and silver, so neither would their consumption be much augmented by it. Those goods would probably, the greater part of them, and certainly some part of them, consist in materials, tools, and provisions, for the employment and maintenance of industrious people, who would reproduce, with a profit, the full value of their consumption. A part of the dead stock of the society would thus be turned into active stock, and would put into motion a greater quantity of industry than had been employed before. The annual produce of their land and labour would immediately be augmented a little, and in a few years would probably be augmented a great deal; their industry being thus relieved from one of the most oppressive burdens which it at present labours under.

Spain is taxing and Portugal is banning the export of gold and silver, which makes that export more expensive due to smuggling and increases the value of these metals in other countries, much higher than what they are worth in Spain and Portugal. When you block a stream of water, once the barrier is full, the same amount of water must flow over it as if there were no barrier at all. Prohibiting export cannot hold back more gold and silver in Spain and Portugal than they can actually use, which is the amount they can afford based on the annual yield of their land and labor for coins, silverware, decoration, and other gold and silver items. Once they have this amount, the barrier is full, and any extra must overflow. The annual export of gold and silver from Spain and Portugal is nearly equal to their total annual import, despite these restrictions. However, just like water is always deeper behind a dam than in front of it, the amount of gold and silver that these restrictions keep in Spain and Portugal must be proportionally greater compared to the annual output of their land and labor than in other countries. The higher and stronger the dam, the greater the difference in water levels on each side. The higher the tax and penalties for breaking the prohibition, and the more vigilant the enforcement of the law, the greater the difference in the ratio of gold and silver to the annual output of land and labor in Spain and Portugal compared to other countries. It is said to be quite significant, and you often find a lot of silver in homes where there is not much else that would be considered fitting for that level of luxury in other countries. The low cost of gold and silver, or the high cost of all goods—which is a direct result of the excess of precious metals—discourages agriculture and manufacturing in Spain and Portugal and allows foreign countries to supply them with various raw materials and almost all types of manufactured goods for less gold and silver than they could produce or create at home. The tax and prohibition work in two different ways. They significantly reduce the value of precious metals in Spain and Portugal, but by holding a certain amount of these metals that would otherwise flow to other countries, they help maintain their value in those other nations somewhat above where it would be otherwise, thus giving those countries a dual advantage in trading with Spain and Portugal. If you open the floodgates, there will soon be less water above the dam and more below it, leveling out both sides. Remove the tax and prohibition, and while the amount of gold and silver will significantly decrease in Spain and Portugal, it will increase somewhat in other countries; the value of these metals, and their ratio to the annual output of land and labor, will soon balance out, or get very close to balancing out, everywhere. The loss that Spain and Portugal might suffer from exporting their gold and silver would be largely nominal and imaginary. The stated value of their goods and the annual yield of their land and labor would decrease and be represented by a smaller quantity of silver than before; however, their real value would stay the same and would still be enough to sustain, command, and utilize the same amount of labor. As the nominal value of their goods would fall, the real value of what remains of their gold and silver would rise, and a smaller quantity of these metals would satisfy all the same commercial and circulation needs that required a greater amount before. The gold and silver exported wouldn't leave for nothing but would instead return an equivalent value in goods of some kind. These goods wouldn’t just be luxury items consumed by idle people offering nothing in return. Since the real wealth and income of the idle wouldn’t increase due to this increased export of gold and silver, neither would their consumption rise significantly. Most of these goods, or at least a portion of them, would likely be materials, tools, and provisions for the work and support of industrious people, who could reproduce the full value of their consumption with profit. Part of society’s idle assets would thus be converted into active assets, stimulating a greater level of industry than was previously engaged. The annual output of land and labor would immediately increase slightly and in a few years could rise significantly; thus, relieving their industry from one of the heaviest burdens it currently faces.

The bounty upon the exportation of corn necessarily operates exactly in the same way as this absurd policy of Spain and Portugal. Whatever be the actual state of tillage, it renders our corn somewhat dearer in the home market than it otherwise would be in that state, and somewhat cheaper in the foreign; and as the average money price of corn regulates, more or less, that of all other commodities, it lowers the value of silver considerably in the one, and tends to raise it a little in the other. It enables foreigners, the Dutch in particular, not only to eat our corn cheaper than they otherwise could do, but sometimes to eat it cheaper than even our own people can do upon the same occasions; as we are assured by an excellent authority, that of Sir Matthew Decker. It hinders our own workmen from furnishing their goods for so small a quantity of silver as they otherwise might do, and enables the Dutch to furnish theirs for a smaller. It tends to render our manufactures somewhat dearer in every market, and theirs somewhat cheaper, than they otherwise would be, and consequently to give their industry a double advantage over our own.

The bounty on exporting corn works exactly like the unreasonable policies of Spain and Portugal. No matter the current state of farming, it makes our corn somewhat pricier in the local market than it would be otherwise and somewhat cheaper in foreign markets. Since the average price of corn largely affects the prices of other goods, it significantly lowers the value of silver in the local market while slightly raising it in foreign markets. It allows foreigners, especially the Dutch, to buy our corn for less than they would normally pay, and sometimes even cheaper than our own people can on similar occasions, as noted by Sir Matthew Decker. It prevents our workers from selling their goods for as little silver as they could otherwise and allows the Dutch to sell theirs for less. This results in our manufactured goods being slightly more expensive in every market, while theirs are somewhat cheaper, giving their industry a significant advantage over ours.

The bounty, as it raises in the home market, not so much the real, as the nominal price of our corn; as it augments, not the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can maintain and employ, but only the quantity of silver which it will exchange for; it discourages our manufactures, without rendering any considerable service, either to our farmers or country gentlemen. It puts, indeed, a little more money into the pockets of both, and it will perhaps be somewhat difficult to persuade the greater part of them that this is not rendering them a very considerable service. But if this money sinks in its value, in the quantity of labour, provisions, and home-made commodities of all different kinds which it is capable of purchasing, as much as it rises in its quantity, the service will be little more than nominal and imaginary.

The increase in price at home doesn’t really raise the actual value of our corn; it boosts the nominal price instead. It doesn’t increase the amount of labor that a certain amount of corn can support and employ, but only the amount of silver it can be traded for. This situation hurts our manufacturing without offering any significant benefit to our farmers or landowners. Sure, it puts a bit more money in their pockets, and it might be hard to convince most of them that this isn’t a significant benefit. However, if that money loses value in terms of the amount of labor, food, and homemade goods it can buy, as much as it increases in volume, then the benefit will be mostly just a façade.

There is, perhaps, but one set of men in the whole commonwealth to whom the bounty either was or could be essentially serviceable. These were the corn merchants, the exporters and importers of corn. In years of plenty, the bounty necessarily occasioned a greater exportation than would otherwise have taken place; and by hindering the plenty of the one year from relieving the scarcity of another, it occasioned in years of scarcity a greater importation than would otherwise have been necessary. It increased the business of the corn merchant in both; and in the years of scarcity, it not only enabled him to import a greater quantity, but to sell it for a better price, and consequently with a greater profit, than he could otherwise have made, if the plenty[Pg 210] of one year had not been more or less hindered from relieving the scarcity of another. It is in this set of men, accordingly, that I have observed the greatest zeal for the continuance or renewal of the bounty.

There is probably only one group of people in the entire commonwealth for whom the bounty was or could be truly beneficial. These are the corn merchants, the exporters and importers of corn. In years of abundance, the bounty inevitably led to more exports than would have otherwise occurred; and by preventing the surplus of one year from addressing the shortages of another, it resulted in a greater need for imports during scarce years than would have been necessary otherwise. It boosted the business of corn merchants in both scenarios; and in years of scarcity, it not only allowed them to import more but also to sell it at a higher price, thereby making a larger profit than they could have if the surplus of one year had effectively alleviated the shortages of another. It's among this group that I've noticed the strongest desire for the continuation or renewal of the bounty.

Our country gentlemen, when they imposed the high duties upon the exportation of corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, and when they established the bounty, seem to have imitated the conduct of our manufacturers. By the one institution, they secured to themselves the monopoly of the home market, and by the other they endeavoured to prevent that market from ever being overstocked with their commodity. By both they endeavoured to raise its real value, in the same manner as our manufacturers had, by the like institutions, raised the real value of many different sorts of manufactured goods. They did not, perhaps, attend to the great and essential difference which nature has established between corn and almost every other sort of goods. When, either by the monopoly of the home market, or by a bounty upon exportation, you enable our woollen or linen manufacturers to sell their goods for somewhat a better price than they otherwise could get for them, you raise, not only the nominal, but the real price of those goods; you render them equivalent to a greater quantity of labour and subsistence; you increase not only the nominal, but the real profit, the real wealth and revenue of these manufacturers; and you enable them, either to live better themselves, or to employ a greater quantity of labour in those particular manufactures. You really encourage those manufactures, and direct towards them a greater quantity of the industry of the country than what would properly go to them of its own accord. But when, by the like institutions, you raise the nominal or money price of corn, you do not raise its real value; you do not increase the real wealth, the real revenue, either of our farmers or country gentlemen; you do not encourage the growth of corn, because you do not enable them to maintain and employ more labourers in raising it. The nature of things has stamped upon corn a real value, which cannot be altered by merely altering its money price. No bounty upon exportation, no monopoly of the home market, can raise that value. The freest competition cannot lower it. Through the world in general, that value is equal to the quantity of labour which it can maintain, and in every particular place it is equal to the quantity of labour which it can maintain in the way, whether liberal, moderate, or scanty, in which labour is commonly maintained in that place. Woollen or linen cloth are not the regulating commodities by which the real value of all other commodities must be finally measured and determined; corn is. The real value of every other commodity is finally measured and determined by the proportion which its average money price bears to the average money price of corn. The real value of corn does not vary with those variations in its average money price, which sometimes occur from one century to another; it is the real value of silver which varies with them.

Our country landowners, when they placed high duties on exporting corn, which during times of moderate abundance effectively acts as a ban, and when they established the bounty, seemed to imitate the behavior of our manufacturers. With one measure, they secured a monopoly on the domestic market, and with the other, they tried to prevent that market from ever becoming oversaturated with their product. Through both, they aimed to increase its real value, similar to how our manufacturers had raised the real value of various manufactured goods through like measures. They might not have considered the significant and essential difference that nature has set between corn and almost every other kind of goods. When you either allow our wool or linen manufacturers to sell their products at a slightly better price than they otherwise could, through the monopoly of the domestic market or through an export bounty, you raise not just the nominal price but the real price of those goods; you make them equivalent to a larger amount of labor and basic needs; you boost not just the nominal but the real profit, real wealth, and revenue of these manufacturers; and you enable them to either live better themselves or employ more labor for those specific products. You genuinely promote those industries and channel more of the country’s effort towards them than would occur naturally. However, when you raise the nominal or money price of corn through similar measures, you do not increase its real value; you do not enhance the real wealth or revenue of our farmers or landowners; you do not promote corn production because you do not enable them to sustain and employ more laborers in its cultivation. The intrinsic nature of corn has assigned it a real value that cannot be changed by simply altering its monetary price. No export bounty or domestic market monopoly can elevate that value. The freest competition cannot decrease it. Globally, that value is equal to the amount of labor it can support, and in any given location, it equals the amount of labor it can maintain in the way—be it generous, moderate, or minimal—in which labor is typically sustained there. Woolen or linen cloth are not the measuring commodities for determining the real value of all other goods; corn is. The real value of every other commodity is ultimately measured and determined by how its average money price compares to the average money price of corn. The real value of corn does not fluctuate with the changes in its average money price that sometimes happen from one century to the next; it is the real value of silver that changes with those variations.

Bounties upon the exportation of any home-made commodity are liable, first, to that general objection which may be made to all the different expedients of the mercantile system; the objection of forcing some part of the industry of the country into a channel less advantageous than that in which it would run of its own accord; and, secondly, to the particular objection of forcing it not only into a channel that is less advantageous, but into one that is actually disadvantageous; the trade which cannot be carried on but by means of a bounty being necessarily a losing trade. The bounty upon the exportation of corn is liable to this further objection, that it can in no respect promote the raising of that particular commodity of which it was meant to encourage the production. When our country gentlemen, therefore, demanded the establishment of the bounty, though they acted in imitation of our merchants and manufacturers, they did not act with that complete comprehension of their own interest, which commonly directs the conduct of those two other orders of people. They loaded the public revenue with a very considerable expense: they imposed a very heavy tax upon the whole body of the people; but they did not, in any sensible degree, increase the real value of their own commodity; and by lowering somewhat the real value of silver, they discouraged, in some degree, the general industry of the country, and, instead of advancing, retarded more or less the improvement of their own lands, which necessarily depend upon the general industry of the country.

Bounties on the export of any locally produced goods face a couple of major issues. First, there's the general criticism that applies to all methods of the mercantile system: the concern that they force some of the country's industry into a less beneficial direction than it would choose on its own. Second, there’s the specific problem of pushing it into a path that’s actually harmful; a trade that can only continue with a bounty is inevitably a losing trade. The bounty on corn has an additional flaw: it doesn’t really encourage the production of that specific product at all. When our landowners pushed for the bounty, even though they were mimicking our merchants and manufacturers, they didn't fully understand their own interests like those two groups typically do. They burdened the public revenue with a significant expense and imposed a heavy tax on everyone, but they didn’t noticeably increase the true value of their own product. By somewhat decreasing the real value of silver, they also discouraged the overall industry of the country and, instead of fostering growth, they somewhat hindered the improvement of their own lands, which depend on the country's overall industry.

To encourage the production of any commodity, a bounty upon production, one should imagine, would have a more direct operation than one upon exportation. It would, besides, impose only one tax upon the people, that which they must contribute in order to pay the bounty. Instead of raising, it would tend to lower the price of the commodity in the home market; and thereby, instead of imposing a second tax upon the people, it might, at least in part, repay them for what they had contributed to the first. Bounties upon production, however, have been very rarely granted. The prejudices established by the commercial system have taught us to believe, that national wealth arises more immediately from exportation than from production. It has been more favoured, accordingly, as the more immediate means of bringing money into the country. Bounties upon production, it has been said too, have been found by experience more liable to frauds than those upon exportation. How far this is true, I know not.[Pg 211] That bounties upon exportation have been abused, to many fraudulent purposes, is very well known. But it is not the interest of merchants and manufacturers, the great inventors of all these expedients, that the home market should be overstocked with their goods; an event which a bounty upon production might sometimes occasion. A bounty upon exportation, by enabling them to send abroad their surplus part, and to keep up the price of what remains in the home market, effectually prevents this. Of all the expedients of the mercantile system, accordingly, it is the one of which they are the fondest. I have known the different undertakers of some particular works agree privately among themselves to give a bounty out of their own pockets upon the exportation of a certain proportion of goods which they dealt in. This expedient succeeded so well, that it more than doubled the price of their goods in the home market, notwithstanding a very considerable increase in the produce. The operation of the bounty upon corn must have been wonderfully different, if it has lowered the money price of that commodity.

To boost the production of any product, a subsidy on production would likely have a more direct effect than one on exports. Additionally, it would only place one tax on the people, the amount they need to contribute to fund the subsidy. Instead of increasing, it would likely reduce the price of the product in the domestic market; and thus, rather than imposing a second tax on the people, it might, at least partially, reimburse them for their initial contribution. However, production subsidies have been granted very rarely. The biases created by the commercial system have led us to believe that national wealth comes more directly from exports than from production. Consequently, exports have been preferred as the more immediate way to bring money into the country. It has also been said that, based on experience, production subsidies are more susceptible to fraud than export subsidies. How true this is, I cannot say.[Pg 211] It is well known that export subsidies have been misused for many fraudulent purposes. However, it’s not in the best interest of merchants and manufacturers, who are the main creators of these schemes, for the domestic market to be flooded with their goods; a situation that a production subsidy might sometimes cause. An export subsidy, by allowing them to send their surplus overseas and maintain the price of what remains in the domestic market, effectively prevents this. Out of all the strategies within the mercantile system, it is the one they favor the most. I have seen different operators in certain industries agree among themselves to give a subsidy from their own funds for exporting a specific proportion of the goods they traded. This strategy worked so well that it more than doubled the price of their goods in the domestic market, despite a significant increase in supply. The effect of the subsidy on grain must have been incredibly different, if it actually lowered the monetary price of that commodity.

Something like a bounty upon production, however, has been granted upon some particular occasions. The tonnage bounties given to the white herring and whale fisheries may, perhaps, be considered as somewhat of this nature. They tend directly, it may be supposed, to render the goods cheaper in the home market than they otherwise would be. In other respects, their effects, it must be acknowledged, are the same as those of bounties upon exportation. By means of them, a part of the capital of the country is employed in bringing goods to market, of which the price does not repay the cost, together with the ordinary profits of stock.

Something like a reward for production, however, has been given on certain occasions. The tonnage rewards provided to the white herring and whale fisheries can, perhaps, be seen as somewhat similar to this. They likely aim to make goods cheaper in the domestic market than they would be otherwise. In other ways, their effects are the same as those of rewards for exportation. Through these, part of the country’s capital is used to bring goods to market, where the selling price does not cover the costs, along with the usual profits from investment.

But though the tonnage bounties to those fisheries do not contribute to the opulence of the nation, it may, perhaps, be thought that they contribute to its defence, by augmenting the number of its sailors and shipping. This, it may be alleged, may sometimes be done by means of such bounties, at a much smaller expense than by keeping up a great standing navy, if I may use such an expression, in the same way as a standing army.

But even though the tonnage bounties for those fisheries don't add to the country's wealth, some might argue that they help with its defense by increasing the number of sailors and ships. It could be claimed that these bounties might do this at a lower cost than maintaining a large standing navy, similar to how we discuss a standing army.

Notwithstanding these favourable allegations, however, the following considerations dispose me to believe, that in granting at least one of these bounties, the legislature has been very grossly imposed upon:

Despite these positive claims, the following points lead me to believe that by awarding at least one of these bounties, the legislature has been seriously misled:

First. The herring-buss bounty seems too large.

First. The herring-buss reward seems too big.

From the commencement of the winter fishing 1771, to the end of the winter fishing 1781, the tonnage bounty upon the herring-buss fishery has been at thirty shillings the ton. During these eleven years, the whole number of barrels caught by the herring-buss fishery of Scotland amounted to 378,347. The herrings caught and cured at sea are called sea-sticks. In order to render them what are called merchantable herrings, it is necessary to repack them with an additional quantity of salt; and in this case, it is reckoned, that three barrels of sea-sticks are usually repacked into two barrels of merchantable herrings. The number of barrels of merchantable herrings, therefore, caught during these eleven years, will amount only, according to this account, to 252,231¼. During these eleven years, the tonnage bounties paid amounted to L.155,463 : 11s. or 8s. 2¼d. upon every barrel of sea-sticks, and to 12s. 3¾d. upon every barrel of merchantable herrings.

From the start of winter fishing in 1771 until the end of winter fishing in 1781, the tonnage bounty for the herring-fishing boats has been thirty shillings per ton. Over these eleven years, the total number of barrels caught by the herring fishery in Scotland was 378,347. The herrings caught and processed at sea are referred to as sea-sticks. To turn them into what are known as merchantable herrings, they need to be repacked with extra salt; typically, three barrels of sea-sticks are repacked into two barrels of merchantable herrings. Therefore, the number of barrels of merchantable herrings caught during these eleven years amounts to only 252,231¼, according to this account. During these eleven years, the total tonnage bounties paid were £155,463 : 11s., which is 8s. 2¼d. for each barrel of sea-sticks and 12s. 3¾d. for each barrel of merchantable herrings.

The salt with which these herrings are cured is sometimes Scotch, and sometimes foreign salt; both which are delivered, free of all excise duty, to the fish-curers. The excise duty upon Scotch salt is at present 1s. 6d., that upon foreign salt 10s. the bushel. A barrel of herrings is supposed to require about one bushel and one-fourth of a bushel foreign salt. Two bushels are the supposed average of Scotch salt. If the herrings are entered for exportation, no part of this duty is paid up; if entered for home consumption, whether the herrings were cured with foreign or with Scotch salt, only one shilling the barrel is paid up. It was the old Scotch duty upon a bushel of salt, the quantity which, at a low estimation, had been supposed necessary for curing a barrel of herrings. In Scotland, foreign salt is very little used for any other purpose but the curing of fish. But from the 5th April 1771 to the 5th April 1782, the quantity of foreign salt imported amounted to 936,974 bushels, at eighty-four pounds the bushel; the quantity of Scotch salt delivered from the works to the fish-curers, to no more than 168,226, at fifty-six pounds the bushel only. It would appear, therefore, that it is principally foreign salt that is used in the fisheries. Upon every barrel of herrings exported, there is, besides, a bounty of 2s. 8d. and more than two-thirds of the buss-caught herrings are exported. Put all these things together, and you will find that, during these eleven years, every barrel of buss-caught herrings, cured with Scotch salt, when exported, has cost government 17s. 11¾d.; and, when entered for home consumption, 14s. 3¾d.; and that every barrel cured with foreign salt, when exported, has cost government L.1 : 7 : 5¾d.; and, when entered for home consumption, L.1 : 3 : 9¾d. The price of a barrel of good merchantable herrings runs from seventeen and eighteen to four and five-and-twenty shillings; about a guinea at an average.[39]

The salt used to cure these herrings is sometimes Scottish and sometimes foreign; both are delivered to the fish curers without any excise duty. Currently, the excise duty on Scottish salt is 1s. 6d., while the duty on foreign salt is 10s. per bushel. A barrel of herrings typically requires about one and a quarter bushels of foreign salt. The average for Scottish salt is around two bushels. If the herrings are intended for export, no part of this duty is paid; if they are for domestic use, regardless of whether they were cured with foreign or Scottish salt, only one shilling per barrel is paid. This was the old Scottish duty on a bushel of salt, which was estimated to be necessary for curing a barrel of herrings. In Scotland, foreign salt is mainly used for curing fish. However, from April 5, 1771, to April 5, 1782, the amount of foreign salt imported reached 936,974 bushels, at eighty-four pounds per bushel; whereas the amount of Scottish salt delivered to the fish curers was only 168,226 bushels, at fifty-six pounds per bushel. Therefore, it seems that foreign salt is primarily used in the fisheries. For every barrel of herrings exported, there is also a bounty of 2s. 8d., and more than two-thirds of the herrings caught by the buss are exported. Considering all these factors, you can see that during these eleven years, each barrel of buss-caught herrings cured with Scottish salt, when exported, has cost the government 17s. 11¾d., and for home consumption, 14s. 3¾d.; while each barrel cured with foreign salt, when exported, has cost the government L.1 : 7 : 5¾d., and for home consumption, L.1 : 3 : 9¾d. The price of a barrel of good marketable herrings ranges from seventeen to eighteen shillings, up to four or five-and-twenty shillings; averaging around a guinea. [39]

Secondly, The bounty to the white-herring fishery is a tonnage bounty, and is proportioned to the burden of the ship, not to her diligence or success in the fishery; and it has, I[Pg 212] am afraid, been too common for the vessels to fit out for the sole purpose of catching, not the fish, but the bounty. In the year 1759, when the bounty was at fifty shillings the ton, the whole buss fishery of Scotland brought in only four barrels of sea-sticks. In that year, each barrel of sea-sticks cost government, in bounties alone, L.113 : 15s.; each barrel of merchantable herrings L.159 : 7 : 6.

Secondly, the bounty for the white-herring fishery is based on the ship's tonnage, not on how hard the crew works or how successful they are at fishing. Unfortunately, it's become quite common for vessels to set out just to collect the bounty instead of actually catching fish. In 1759, when the bounty was fifty shillings per ton, the entire buss fishery of Scotland only brought in four barrels of sea-sticks. That year, each barrel of sea-sticks cost the government L.113 : 15s. in bounties alone, while each barrel of marketable herrings cost L.159 : 7 : 6.

Thirdly, The mode of fishing, for which this tonnage bounty in the white herring fishery has been given (by busses or decked vessels from twenty to eighty tons burden), seems not so well adapted to the situation of Scotland, as to that of Holland, from the practice of which country it appears to have been borrowed. Holland lies at a great distance from the seas to which herrings are known principally to resort, and can, therefore, carry on that fishery only in decked vessels, which can carry water and provisions sufficient for a voyage to a distant sea; but the Hebrides, or Western Islands, the islands of Shetland, and the northern and north-western coasts of Scotland, the countries in whose neighborhood the herring fishery is principally carried on, are everywhere intersected by arms of the sea, which run up a considerable way into the land, and which, in the language of the country, are called sea-lochs. It is to these sea-lochs that the herrings principally resort during the seasons in which they visit those seas; for the visits of this, and, I am assured, of many other sorts of fish, are not quite regular and constant. A boat-fishery, therefore, seems to be the mode of fishing best adapted to the peculiar situation of Scotland, the fishers carrying the herrings on shore as fast as they are taken, to be either cured or consumed fresh. But the great encouragement which a bounty of 30s. the ton gives to the buss-fishery, is necessarily a discouragement to the boat-fishery, which, having no such bounty, cannot bring its cured fish to market upon the same terms as the buss-fishery. The boat-fishery, accordingly, which, before the establishment of the buss-bounty, was very considerable, and is said to have employed a number of seamen, not inferior to what the buss-fishery employs at present, is now gone almost entirely to decay. Of the former extent, however, of this now ruined and abandoned fishery, I must acknowledge that I cannot pretend to speak with much precision. As no bounty was paid upon the outfit of the boat-fishery, no account was taken of it by the officers of the customs or salt duties.

Thirdly, the way of fishing that has received this tonnage bounty in the white herring fishery (from busses or decked vessels ranging from twenty to eighty tons) doesn't seem to fit Scotland's situation as well as it does for Holland, from which it seems to have been copied. Holland is located far from the seas where herrings are mostly found, so it can only fish using decked vessels that can carry enough water and food for a long trip. In contrast, the Hebrides, the Shetland Islands, and the northern and north-western coasts of Scotland—where the herring fishery mainly takes place—are all crisscrossed by sea arms called sea-lochs. These sea-lochs are where herrings mainly gather during the times they visit those seas, as their visits, along with many other fish species, are not entirely regular. Thus, a boat-fishery seems to be the best option for Scotland, allowing fishers to bring herrings ashore as quickly as they catch them to either cure or sell them fresh. However, the significant incentive of a 30s. per ton bounty for the buss-fishery discourages the boat-fishery, which, lacking such support, cannot compete in the market with the same conditions as the buss-fishery. Consequently, the boat-fishery, which was quite substantial before the buss bounty was established and supposedly employed just as many seamen, is now nearly extinct. I must admit, though, that I cannot speak precisely about the former extent of this now ruined fishery, as no bounty was given for the boat-fishery's outfitting, and thus, it was not recorded by customs or salt duty officers.

Fourthly, In many parts of Scotland, during certain seasons of the year, herrings make no inconsiderable part of the food of the common people. A bounty which tended to lower their price in the home market, might contribute a good deal to the relief of a great number of our fellow-subjects, whose circumstances are by no means affluent. But the herring-buss bounty contributes to no such good purpose. It has ruined the boat-fishery, which is by far the best adapted for the supply of the home market; and the additional bounty of 2s. 8d. the barrel upon exportation, carries the greater part, more than two-thirds, of the produce of the buss-fishery abroad. Between thirty and forty years ago, before the establishment of the buss-bounty, 16s. the barrel, I have been assured, was the common price of white herrings. Between ten and fifteen years ago, before the boat-fishery was entirely ruined, the price was said to have run from seventeen to twenty shillings the barrel. For these last five years, it has, at an average, been at twenty-five shillings the barrel. This high price, however, may have been owing to the real scarcity of the herrings upon the coast of Scotland. I must observe, too, that the cask or barrel, which is usually sold with the herrings, and of which the price is included in all the foregoing prices, has, since the commencement of the American war, risen to about double its former price, or from about 3s. to about 6s. I must likewise observe, that the accounts I have received of the prices of former times, have been by no means quite uniform and consistent, and an old man of great accuracy and experience has assured me, that, more than fifty years ago, a guinea was the usual price of a barrel of good merchantable herrings; and this, I imagine, may still be looked upon as the average price. All accounts, however, I think, agree that the price has not been lowered in the home market in consequence of the buss-bounty.

Fourthly, in many areas of Scotland, at certain times of the year, herrings make up a significant part of the common people's diet. A financial incentive aimed at reducing their price in the domestic market could greatly benefit many of our fellow citizens who are not well-off. However, the herring-buss bounty doesn't serve that purpose. It has destroyed the boat-fishery, which is much better suited for supplying the domestic market; and the additional bounty of 2s. 8d. per barrel for exports sends the majority, over two-thirds, of the herring catch abroad. About thirty to forty years ago, before the buss-bounty was introduced, the typical price for white herrings was 16s. per barrel, as I have been informed. Ten to fifteen years ago, before the boat-fishery was completely devastated, the price was reported to be between seventeen and twenty shillings per barrel. For the past five years, the average price has been around twenty-five shillings per barrel. This high price, however, might be due to the genuine shortage of herrings off the Scottish coast. I should also point out that the cask or barrel, which is generally sold with the herrings and included in all the aforementioned prices, has approximately doubled in cost since the start of the American war, rising from about 3s. to about 6s. Additionally, I've noticed that the reports I've received about past prices have not been entirely consistent, and an elderly man with considerable accuracy and experience has told me that, more than fifty years ago, a guinea was the standard price for a barrel of good merchantable herrings; and I believe this may still be considered the average price. However, I think all accounts agree that the price hasn't decreased in the domestic market due to the buss-bounty.

When the undertakers of fisheries, after such liberal bounties have been bestowed upon them, continue to sell their commodity at the same, or even at a higher price than they were accustomed to do before, it might be expected that their profits should be very great; and it is not improbable that those of some individuals may have been so. In general, however, I have every reason to believe they have been quite otherwise. The usual effect of such bounties is, to encourage rash undertakers to adventure in a business which they do not understand; and what they lose by their own negligence and ignorance, more than compensates all that they can gain by the utmost liberality of government. In 1750, by the same act which first gave the bounty of 30s. the ton for the encouragement of the white herring fishery (the 23d Geo. II. chap. 24), a joint stock company was erected, with a capital of L.500,000, to which the subscribers (over and above all other encouragements, the tonnage bounty just now mentioned, the the exportation bounty of 2s. 8d. the barrel, the delivery of both British and foreign salt duty free) were, during the space of fourteen years, for every hundred pounds which they subscribed and paid into the stock of the society, entitled to three pounds a-year, to be paid by[Pg 213] the receiver-general of the customs in equal half-yearly payments. Besides this great company, the residence of whose governor and directors was to be in London, it was declared lawful to erect different fishing chambers in all the different out-ports of the kingdom, provided a sum not less than L.10,000 was subscribed into the capital of each, to be managed at its own risk, and for its own profit and loss. The same annuity, and the same encouragements of all kinds, were given to the trade of those inferior chambers as to that of the great company. The subscription of the great company was soon filled up, and several different fishing chambers were erected in the different out-ports of the kingdom. In spite of all these encouragements, almost all those different companies, both great and small, lost either the whole or the greater part of their capitals; scarce a vestige now remains of any of them, and the white-herring fishery is now entirely, or almost entirely, carried on by private adventurers.

When the operators of fisheries, after receiving such generous subsidies, continue to sell their product at the same price or even at a higher price than they usually did before, one might expect their profits to be substantial; and it’s likely that some individuals did experience significant gains. However, in general, I have every reason to believe the reality has been quite different. The usual outcome of such subsidies is that they encourage inexperienced operators to venture into a business they don’t fully understand; the losses they incur due to their own carelessness and lack of knowledge often outweigh whatever profits they might gain from government generosity. In 1750, by the same act that first introduced the 30s bounty per ton to encourage the white herring fishery (the 23d Geo. II. chap. 24), a joint stock company was established with a capital of £500,000, which allowed subscribers—in addition to all other incentives, including the tonnage bounty just mentioned and the export bounty of 2s. 8d. per barrel—to receive £3 a year for every £100 they subscribed and paid into the company's funds, to be disbursed by the receiver-general of customs in equal half-yearly payments. Besides this large company, whose governor and directors were based in London, it was declared legal to set up different fishing chambers in the various outports of the kingdom, as long as at least £10,000 was subscribed for each chamber, which would be managed at its own risk and for its own profit and loss. The same annuities and various incentives were given to the trade of those smaller chambers as were given to the larger company. The subscription for the large company was quickly filled, and several different fishing chambers were established in the various outports. Despite all these incentives, nearly all those different companies, both large and small, lost either their entire capital or most of it; hardly any trace of them remains now, and the white herring fishery is now entirely, or almost entirely, conducted by private individuals.

If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the defence of the society, it might not always be prudent to depend upon our neighbours for the supply; and if such manufacture could not otherwise be supported at home, it might not be unreasonable that all the other branches of industry should be taxed in order to support it. The bounties upon the exportation of British made sail-cloth, and British made gunpowder, may, perhaps, both be vindicated upon this principle.

If any specific production was essential for the protection of society, it might not always be wise to rely on our neighbors for supplies; and if that production couldn't be maintained locally, it might not be unreasonable to tax all other areas of industry to support it. The incentives for exporting British-made sailcloth and British-made gunpowder could possibly be justified on this basis.

But though it can very seldom be reasonable to tax the industry of the great body of the people, in order to support that of some particular class of manufacturers; yet, in the wantonness of great prosperity, when the public enjoys a greater revenue than it knows well what to do with, to give such bounties to favourite manufactures, may, perhaps, be as natural as to incur any other idle expense. In public, as well as in private expenses, great wealth, may, perhaps, frequently be admitted as an apology for great folly. But there must surely be something more than ordinary absurdity in continuing such profusion in times of general difficulty and distress.

But even though it’s rarely reasonable to tax the hard work of most people just to support a specific group of manufacturers, during times of excessive prosperity—when the public has more revenue than it knows what to do with—giving financial support to favored industries can seem as natural as making any other unnecessary expense. Both in public and private spending, having great wealth can often excuse foolish choices. However, there must definitely be something beyond ordinary foolishness in persisting with such wastefulness during times of widespread hardship and struggle.

What is called a bounty, is sometimes no more than a drawback, and, consequently, is not liable to the same objections as what is properly a bounty. The bounty, for example, upon refined sugar exported, may be considered as a drawback of the duties upon the brown and Muscovado sugars, from which it is made; the bounty upon wrought silk exported, a drawback of the duties upon raw and thrown silk imported; the bounty upon gunpowder exported, a drawback of the duties upon brimstone and saltpetre imported. In the language of the customs, those allowances only are called drawbacks which are given upon goods exported in the same form in which they are imported. When that form has been so altered by manufacture of any kind as to come under a new denomination, they are called bounties.

What’s referred to as a bounty is sometimes just a drawback and isn’t subject to the same criticisms as what’s actually a bounty. For instance, the bounty on exported refined sugar can be seen as a drawback of the taxes on the brown and Muscovado sugars it’s made from; the bounty on exported wrought silk is a drawback of the taxes on imported raw and thrown silk; and the bounty on exported gunpowder is a drawback of the taxes on imported brimstone and saltpetre. In customs terminology, those allowances are only called drawbacks if they’re given on goods exported in the same form they were imported. If that form has been changed through any kind of manufacturing to the point it fits a new category, they’re called bounties.

Premiums given by the public to artists and manufacturers, who excel in their particular occupations, are not liable to the same objections as bounties. By encouraging extraordinary dexterity and ingenuity, they serve to keep up the emulation of the workmen actually employed in those respective occupations, and are not considerable enough to turn towards any one of them a greater share of the capital of the country than what would go to it of its own accord. Their tendency is not to overturn the natural balance of employments, but to render the work which is done in each as perfect and complete as possible. The expense of premiums, besides, is very trifling, that of bounties very great. The bounty upon corn alone has sometimes cost the public, in one year, more than L.300,000.

Premiums given by the public to artists and manufacturers who excel in their fields don't have the same issues as bounties. By promoting exceptional skill and creativity, they help maintain the motivation of workers in those jobs and aren’t large enough to skew the distribution of the country’s capital towards any one of them more than what would happen naturally. Their purpose isn’t to disrupt the natural balance of jobs but to make the work done in each area as perfect and complete as possible. Additionally, the cost of premiums is quite small, while bounties are very large. For example, the bounty on corn alone has sometimes cost the public over £300,000 in a single year.

Bounties are sometimes called premiums, as drawbacks are sometimes called bounties. But we must, in all cases, attend to the nature of the thing, without paying any regard to the word.

Bounties are sometimes referred to as premiums, just as drawbacks are sometimes called bounties. But we must, in every case, focus on the nature of the matter, without paying any attention to the terminology.

Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws.

I cannot conclude this chapter concerning bounties, without observing, that the praises which have been bestowed upon the law which establishes the bounty upon the exportation of corn, and upon that system of regulations which is connected with it, are altogether unmerited. A particular examination of the nature of the corn trade, and of the principal British laws which relate to it, will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this assertion. The great importance of this subject must justify the length of the digression.

I can't wrap up this chapter about bounties without noting that the praise given to the law establishing the bounty on corn exports and the regulatory system connected to it is entirely undeserved. A closer look at the corn trade and the main British laws related to it will clearly prove this claim. The significance of this topic justifies the length of this digression.

The trade of the corn merchant is composed of four different branches, which, though they may sometimes be all carried on by the same person, are, in their own nature, four separate and distinct trades. These are, first, the trade of the inland dealer; secondly, that of the merchant-importer for home consumption; thirdly, that of the merchant-exporter of home produce for foreign consumption; and, fourthly, that of the merchant-carrier, or of the importer of corn, in order to export it again.

The business of a corn merchant consists of four different branches, which, although they may sometimes be managed by the same person, are fundamentally four separate and distinct trades. These are, first, the business of the inland dealer; second, that of the merchant-importer for domestic use; third, that of the merchant-exporter of domestic products for foreign markets; and fourth, that of the merchant-carrier, or the importer of corn with the intention to export it again.

I. The interest of the inland dealer, and that of the great body of the people, how opposite soever they may at first appear, are, even in years of the greatest scarcity, exactly the same. It is his interest to raise the price of his corn as high as the real scarcity of the season requires, and it can never be his interest to raise it higher. By raising the price, he discourages the consumption, and puts every body more or less, but particularly the inferior ranks of people, upon thrift and good[Pg 214] management. If, by raising it too high, he discourages the consumption so much that the supply of the season is likely to go beyond the consumption of the season, and to last for some time after the next crop begins to come in, he runs the hazard, not only of losing a considerable part of his corn by natural causes, but of being obliged to sell what remains of it for much less than what he might have had for it several months before. If, by not raising the price high enough, he discourages the consumption so little, that the supply of the season is likely to fall short of the consumption of the season, he not only loses a part of the profit which he might otherwise have made, but he exposes the people to suffer before the end of the season, instead of the hardships of a dearth, the dreadful horrors of a famine. It is the interest of the people that their daily, weekly, and monthly consumption should be proportioned as exactly as possible to the supply of the season. The interest of the inland corn dealer is the same. By supplying them, as nearly as he can judge, in this proportion, he is likely to sell all his corn for the highest price, and with the greatest profit; and his knowledge of the state of the crop, and of his daily, weekly, and monthly sales, enables him to judge, with more or less accuracy, how far they really are supplied in this manner. Without intending the interest of the people, he is necessarily led, by a regard to his own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty much in the same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew. When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short allowance. Though from excess of caution he should sometimes do this without any real necessity, yet all the inconveniencies which his crew can thereby suffer are inconsiderable, in comparison of the danger, misery, and ruin, to which they might sometimes be exposed by a less provident conduct. Though, from excess of avarice, in the same manner, the inland corn merchant should sometimes raise the price of his corn somewhat higher than the scarcity of the season requires, yet all the inconveniencies which the people can suffer from this conduct, which effectually secures them from a famine in the end of the season, are inconsiderable, in comparison of what they might have been exposed to by a more liberal way of dealing in the beginning of it. The corn merchant himself is likely to suffer the most by this excess of avarice; not only from the indignation which it generally excites against him, but, though he should escape the effects of this indignation, from the quantity of corn which it necessarily leaves upon his hands in the end of the season, and which, if the next season happens to prove favourable, he must always sell for a much lower price than he might otherwise have had.

I. The interests of the inland dealer and the general public, no matter how opposite they may seem at first, are actually the same, even during times of great scarcity. The dealer wants to raise the price of corn as high as the real shortage requires, and it’s never in his best interest to raise it higher. By increasing the price, he reduces consumption and encourages everyone, especially those with lower incomes, to be frugal and manage their resources well. If he raises the price too much and discourages consumption to the point that the supply exceeds the demand for the season, leading it to last longer than expected before the next crop comes in, he risks losing a significant portion of his corn due to spoilage and will have to sell what’s left for much less than what he could have earlier. On the other hand, if he doesn’t raise the price enough and consumption remains too high, the supply may fall short and he loses potential profit while exposing people to the hardships of a shortage instead of the severe struggles of famine. It’s in the public's interest for their daily, weekly, and monthly consumption to match the seasonal supply as closely as possible. The inland corn dealer shares this interest. By supplying corn in this way, he has a good chance of selling all his corn at the highest price and making the most profit. His understanding of crop conditions and his sales trends helps him gauge how well the supply meets demand. Without directly aiming to benefit the public, his self-interest leads him to treat them similarly to how a cautious ship captain would manage his crew. When he anticipates a shortage, he might limit their rations. While he may sometimes act out of caution without real need, any inconveniences his crew faces are minor compared to the dangers and sufferings they could encounter if he was less careful. Similarly, if the inland corn merchant raises corn prices a bit too high due to greed, the inconveniences to the people, who are ultimately protected from famine by this measure, are relatively small compared to what they could have faced had he been more generous at the start. The merchant himself likely suffers the most from this greed, as it often leads to public anger towards him. Even if he avoids this backlash, the leftover corn he cannot sell at the end of the season, especially if the next season is good, will need to be sold for much less than he would have made otherwise.

Were it possible, indeed, for one great company of merchants to possess themselves of the whole crop of an extensive country, it might perhaps be their interest to deal with it, as the Dutch are said to do with the spiceries of the Moluccas, to destroy or throw away a considerable part of it, in order to keep up the price of the rest. But it is scarce possible, even by the violence of law, to establish such an extensive monopoly with regard to corn; and wherever the law leaves the trade free, it is of all commodities the least liable to be engrossed or monopolized by the force of a few large capitals, which buy up the greater part of it. Not only its value far exceeds what the capitals of a few private men are capable of purchasing; but, supposing they were capable of purchasing it, the manner in which it is produced renders this purchase altogether impracticable. As, in every civilized country, it is the commodity of which the annual consumption is the greatest; so a greater quantity of industry is annually employed in producing corn than in producing any other commodity. When it first comes from the ground, too, it is necessarily divided among a greater number of owners than any other commodity; and these owners can never be collected into one place, like a number of independent manufacturers, but are necessarily scattered through all the different corners of the country. These first owners either immediately supply the consumers in their own neighbourhood, or they supply other inland dealers, who supply those consumers. The inland dealers in corn, therefore, including both the farmer and the baker, are necessarily more numerous than the dealers in any other commodity; and their dispersed situation renders it altogether impossible for them to enter into any general combination. If, in a year of scarcity, therefore, any of them should find that he had a good deal more corn upon hand than, at the current price, he could hope to dispose of before the end of the season, he would never think of keeping up this price to his own loss, and to the sole benefit of his rivals and competitors, but would immediately lower it, in order to get rid of his corn before the new crop began to come in. The same motives, the same interests, which would thus regulate the conduct of any one dealer, would regulate that of every other, and oblige them all in general to sell their corn at the price which, according to the best of their judgment, was most suitable to the scarcity or plenty of the season.

If it were possible for a single large group of merchants to control the entire harvest of a vast country, they might find it beneficial to handle it as the Dutch are said to do with spices from the Moluccas: by destroying or discarding a significant portion to maintain the price of the rest. However, it's nearly impossible, even through legal force, to create such a large monopoly on grain; and wherever the law allows trade to be free, grain is the least likely commodity to be monopolized by a few large capitalists buying up most of it. Not only does its value far exceed what a few individuals can afford, but even if they could purchase it, the way it is produced makes such a purchase impractical. In every developed country, grain is the commodity with the highest annual consumption, so more labor is invested in producing it than any other product. When it is harvested, it is also split among more owners than other commodities; these owners can’t be gathered in one place like independent manufacturers, but are instead spread out across various regions of the country. These initial owners either directly sell to local consumers or supply other dealers who serve those consumers. Consequently, inland grain dealers, including farmers and bakers, are necessarily more numerous than dealers of any other goods, and their scattered locations make it impossible for them to form any widespread alliance. Therefore, if, in a year of scarcity, one dealer finds he has significantly more grain than he can sell at the going price before the season ends, he won’t consider keeping the price high at his own expense to benefit his competitors; instead, he will lower it to sell his grain before the new harvest arrives. The same motivations and interests that guide one dealer's actions would similarly influence all others, compelling them collectively to sell their grain at a price they judge to be appropriate for the season's scarcity or abundance.

Whoever examines, with attention, the history of the dearths and famines which have afflicted any part of Europe during either the course of the present or that of the two preceding centuries, of several of which we have pretty exact accounts, will find, I believe, that a dearth never has arisen from any combination among the inland dealers in corn, nor[Pg 215] from any other cause but a real scarcity, occasioned sometimes, perhaps, and in some particular places, by the waste of war, but in by far the greatest number of cases by the fault of the seasons; and that a famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence of government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the inconveniencies of a dearth.

Whoever closely looks at the history of the shortages and famines that have affected various parts of Europe over the past two centuries—or even just the recent times—will find, I believe, that a shortage has never resulted from any collusion among local grain traders, nor[Pg 215] from any other reason except for a genuine scarcity. This scarcity is sometimes caused, perhaps, in certain areas, by the devastation of war, but in most cases, it is due to the unpredictability of the seasons. Furthermore, a famine has never been caused by anything other than government actions that attempt to address the problems of a shortage through misguided means.

In an extensive corn country, between all the different parts of which there is a free commerce and communication, the scarcity occasioned by the most unfavourable seasons can never be so great as to produce a famine; and the scantiest crop, if managed with frugality and economy, will maintain, through the year, the same number of people that are commonly fed in a more affluent manner by one of moderate plenty. The seasons most unfavourable to the crop are those of excessive drought or excessive rain. But as corn grows equally upon high and low lands, upon grounds that are disposed to be too wet, and upon those that are disposed to be too dry, either the drought or the rain, which is hurtful to one part of the country, is favourable to another; and though, both in the wet and in the dry season, the crop is a good deal less than in one more properly tempered; yet, in both, what is lost in one part of the country is in some measure compensated by what is gained in the other. In rice countries, where the crop not only requires a very moist soil, but where, in a certain period of its growing, it must be laid under water, the effects of a drought are much more dismal. Even in such countries, however, the drought is, perhaps, scarce ever so universal as necessarily to occasion a famine, if the government would allow a free trade. The drought in Bengal, a few years ago, might probably have occasioned a very great dearth. Some improper regulations, some injudicious restraints, imposed by the servants of the East India Company upon the rice trade, contributed, perhaps, to turn that dearth into a famine.

In a vast corn-producing region, where there’s free trade and communication among different areas, the shortage caused by the worst seasons can never be so severe that it leads to famine. Even the smallest harvest, if handled with care and budgeting, can support the same number of people throughout the year as a moderate harvest would that typically provides more. The seasons that are hardest on crops are those with either extreme drought or excessive rainfall. However, since corn can grow well in both high and low areas, and in soils that are too wet or too dry, the drought or rain that negatively impacts one part of the area often benefits another. Although the yield during both wet and dry seasons is significantly lower than in more favorable conditions, what's lost in one part is somewhat balanced out by what’s gained in another. In regions where rice is grown, the crop not only needs very moist soil but must also be submerged in water for part of its growth, so the consequences of drought are much more severe. Still, even in those regions, droughts are rarely so widespread that they result in famine, assuming the government permits free trade. The drought in Bengal a few years back could have led to significant food shortages. However, some poor regulations and misguided restrictions imposed by the East India Company on the rice trade possibly turned that shortage into a famine.

When the government, in order to remedy the inconveniencies of a dearth, orders all the dealers to sell their corn at what it supposes a reasonable price, it either hinders them from bringing it to market, which may sometimes produce a famine even in the beginning of the season; or, if they bring it thither, it enables the people, and thereby encourages them to consume it so fast as must necessarily produce a famine before the end of the season. The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is the only effectual preventive of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best palliative of the inconveniencies of a dearth; for the inconveniencies of a real scarcity cannot be remedied; they can only be palliated. No trade deserves more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires it so much; because no trade is so much exposed to popular odium.

When the government tries to fix the problems caused by a shortage by telling all sellers to sell their grain at what it thinks is a fair price, it either stops them from bringing it to market, which could lead to a famine even early in the season, or if they do bring it, it encourages people to buy it so quickly that a famine is guaranteed before the season ends. The unrestricted freedom of the grain trade not only effectively prevents the suffering caused by famine but also serves as the best way to soften the discomforts of a shortage; the problems caused by a true scarcity can't be fully solved—they can only be eased. No trade deserves the full legal protection more, and none needs it as much, because no trade is as vulnerable to public backlash.

In years of scarcity, the inferior ranks of people impute their distress to the avarice of the corn merchant, who becomes the object of their hatred and indignation. Instead of making profit upon such occasions, therefore, he is often in danger of being utterly ruined, and of having his magazines plundered and destroyed by their violence. It is in years of scarcity, however, when prices are high, that the corn merchant expects to make his principal profit. He is generally in contract with some farmers to furnish him, for a certain number of years, with a certain quantity of corn, at a certain price. This contract price is settled according to what is supposed to be the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price, which, before the late years of scarcity, was commonly about 28s. for the quarter of wheat, and for that of other grain in proportion. In years of scarcity, therefore, the corn merchant buys a great part of his corn for the ordinary price, and sells it for a much higher. That this extraordinary profit, however, is no more them sufficient to put his trade upon a fair level with other trades, and to compensate the many losses which be sustains upon other occasions, both from the perishable nature of the commodity itself, and from the frequent and unforeseen fluctuations of its price, seems evident enough, from this single circumstance, that great fortunes are as seldom made in this as in any other trade. The popular odium, however, which attends it in years of scarcity, the only years in which it can be very profitable, renders people of character and fortune averse to enter into it. It is abandoned to an inferior set of dealers; and millers, bakers, meal-men, and meal-factors, together with a number of wretched hucksters, arr almost the only middle people that, in the home market, come between the grower and the consumer.

In times of shortage, the lower classes blame their suffering on the greed of the grain merchant, who becomes the target of their anger and resentment. Instead of profiting during these times, he often risks total ruin, facing the threat of his stock being looted and destroyed by their rage. However, it’s during these scarcity years, when prices soar, that the grain merchant hopes to earn his biggest profits. He usually has contracts with some farmers to supply him, for a number of years, a specific quantity of grain at a certain price. This contract price is set based on what is considered moderate and reasonable—essentially, the ordinary or average price, which, before the recent years of scarcity, was typically around 28 shillings per quarter of wheat, with other grains priced accordingly. Thus, in years of scarcity, the grain merchant buys a large portion of his grain at the ordinary price and sells it at a much higher price. However, this extraordinary profit is still not enough to bring his business to a level comparable to other trades or to compensate for the numerous losses he suffers from the perishable nature of the product and the frequent, unpredictable price fluctuations. It’s clear enough from the simple fact that substantial fortunes are as rarely made in this trade as in any other. The negative public perception that surrounds it during scarcity years—the only time it can be quite profitable—makes people of good reputation and means reluctant to get involved. It ends up being left to a lesser group of merchants; millers, bakers, grain dealers, and various struggling vendors become almost the only middlemen connecting the producers and the consumers in the local market.

The ancient policy of Europe, instead of discountenancing this popular odium against a trade so beneficial to the public, seems, on the contrary, to have authorised and encouraged it.

The old approach in Europe, instead of discouraging this widespread dislike for a trade that benefits the public, seems to have, on the contrary, approved and promoted it.

By the 5th and 6th of Edward VI. cap. 14, it was enacted, that whoever should buy any corn or grain, with intent to sell it again, should be reputed an unlawful engrosser, and should, for the first fault, suffer two months imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the second, suffer six months imprisonment, and forfeit double the value; and, for the third, be set in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the king's pleasure, and forfeit all his goods and chattels. The ancient policy of most other parts of Europe was no better than that of England.

By the 5th and 6th years of Edward VI, chapter 14, it was established that anyone who bought corn or grain with the intention of selling it again would be considered an unlawful buyer. For the first offense, they would face two months in prison and lose the value of the grain; for the second offense, six months in prison and double the loss; and for the third offense, they would be publicly shamed, face imprisonment for an indefinite time, and lose all their property. The old policies in most other parts of Europe were just as strict as those in England.

Our ancestors seem to have imagined, that the people would buy their corn cheaper of the farmer than of the corn merchant, who, they were afraid, would require, over and above, the price which he paid to the farmer[Pg 216], an exorbitant profit to himself. They endeavoured, therefore, to annihilate his trade altogether. They even endeavoured to hinder, as much as possible, any middle man of any kind from coming in between the grower and the consumer; and this was the meaning of the many restraints which they imposed upon the trade of those whom they called kidders, or carriers of corn; a trade which nobody was allowed to exercise without a licence, ascertaining his qualifications as a man of probity and fair dealing. The authority of three justices of the peace was, by the statute of Edward VI. necessary in order to grant this licence. But even this restraint was afterwards thought insufficient, and, by a statute of Elizabeth, the privilege of granting it was confined to the quarter-sessions.

Our ancestors seemed to believe that people would buy their corn cheaper directly from the farmer than from the corn merchant, who they feared would add an excessive profit on top of what he paid the farmer[Pg 216]. They therefore tried to completely eliminate his trade. They even attempted to block any middleman from getting between the grower and the consumer as much as possible; and this was the purpose behind the many restrictions they placed on those they called kidders, or carriers of corn—a trade that no one was allowed to pursue without a license verifying their integrity and fair practices. According to the statute of Edward VI, the authority of three justices of the peace was required to grant this license. However, even this restriction was later considered inadequate, and by a statute of Elizabeth, the power to grant it was limited to the quarter-sessions.

The ancient policy of Europe endeavoured, in this manner, to regulate agriculture, the great trade of the country, by maxims quite different from those which it established with regard to manufactures, the great trade of the towns. By leaving a farmer no other customers but either the consumers or their immediate factors, the kidders and carriers of corn, it endeavoured to force him to exercise the trade, not only of a farmer, but of a corn merchant, or corn retailer. On the contrary, it, in many cases, prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the trade of a shopkeeper, or from selling his own goods by retail. It meant, by the one law, to promote the general interest of the country, or to render corn cheap, without, perhaps, its being well understood how this was to be done. By the other, it meant to promote that of a particular order of men, the shopkeepers, who would be so much undersold by the manufacturer, it was supposed, that their trade would be ruined, if he was allowed to retail at all.

The old policies of Europe aimed to control agriculture, the main industry of the countryside, using principles that were quite different from those applied to manufacturing, the main industry of the towns. By limiting a farmer to customers like consumers or their immediate suppliers, the handlers and transporters of grain, it tried to push him to function as not just a farmer but also as a grain merchant or retailer. On the flip side, in many cases, it forbade manufacturers from acting as shopkeepers or selling their own goods directly to consumers. With one set of laws, it intended to support the overall benefit of the country or to make grain affordable, though it may not have been fully understood how this would be achieved. With the other, it aimed to protect a specific group of people, the shopkeepers, who were believed to be at risk of being undercut by manufacturers, potentially destroying their business if manufacturers were allowed to sell directly to consumers.

The manufacturer, however, though he had been allowed to keep a shop, and to sell his own goods by retail, could not have undersold the common shopkeeper. Whatever part of his capital he might have placed in his shop, he must have withdrawn it from his manufacture. In order to carry on his business on a level with that of other people, as he must have had the profit of a manufacturer on the one part, so he must have had that of a shopkeeper upon the other. Let us suppose, for example, that in the particular town where he lived, ten per cent. was the ordinary profit both of manufacturing and shopkeeping stock; he must in this case have charged upon every piece of his own goods, which he sold in his shop, a profit of twenty per cent. When he carried them from his workhouse to his shop, he must have valued them at the price for which he could have sold them to a dealer or shopkeeper, who would have bought them by wholesale. If he valued them lower, he lost a part of the profit of his manufacturing capital. When, again, he sold them from his shop, unless he got the same price at which a shopkeeper would have sold them, he lost a part of the profit of his shopkeeping capital. Though he might appear, therefore, to make a double profit upon the same piece of goods, yet, as these goods made successively a part of two distinct capitals, he made but a single profit upon the whole capital employed about them; and if he made less than his profit, he was a loser, and did not employ his whole capital with the same advantage as the greater of part of his neighbours.

The manufacturer, even though he was allowed to run a shop and sell his own goods directly to customers, couldn't compete with the local shopkeeper on price. Regardless of how much money he invested in his shop, he had to take that money out of his manufacturing. To keep his business competitive with others, he needed to earn the manufacturer’s profit on one side and the shopkeeper’s profit on the other. For instance, let’s say the average profit in his town for both manufacturing and retail was ten percent; in that case, he would have to mark up every item he sold in his shop by twenty percent. When he moved goods from his factory to his shop, he had to price them based on what he could get from a dealer or a shopkeeper buying in bulk. If he priced them lower, he'd lose some of the profit from his manufacturing. Similarly, when he sold them in his shop, if he didn’t get the same price a shopkeeper would charge, he would lose part of the profit from his retail operations. So, although it might look like he was earning a double profit on the same product, since those products were part of two different investments, he actually made a single profit on the total capital he put into them. If he earned less than his expected profit, he would end up losing money and wasn't using his capital as efficiently as the majority of his neighbors.

What the manufacturer was prohibited to do, the farmer was in some measure enjoined to do; to divide his capital between two different employments; to keep one part of it in his granaries and stack-yard, for supplying the occasional demands of the market, and to employ the other in the cultivation of his land. But as he could not afford to employ the latter for less than the ordinary profits of farming stock, so he could as little afford to employ the former for less than the ordinary profits of mercantile stock. Whether the stock which really carried on the business of a corn merchant belonged to the person who was called a farmer, or to the person who was called a corn merchant, an equal profit was in both cases requisite, in order to indemnify its owner for employing it in this manner, in order to put his business on a level with other trades, and in order to hinder him from having an interest to change it as soon as possible for some other. The farmer, therefore, who was thus forced to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, could not afford to sell his corn cheaper than any other corn merchant would have been obliged to do in the case a free competition.

What the manufacturer was forbidden to do, the farmer was somewhat required to do; to split his capital between two different uses; to keep part of it in his storage and stockyard for meeting occasional market demands, and to use the other part for cultivating his land. However, since he couldn't afford to use the latter for less than the usual profits of farming, he also couldn't afford to use the former for less than the typical profits of trading. Whether the stock used for running the business as a corn merchant belonged to the person called a farmer or to the one called a corn merchant, an equal profit was necessary in both situations to compensate its owner for using it this way, to keep his business competitive with other trades, and to prevent him from wanting to swap it out for something else as quickly as possible. Therefore, the farmer, who was forced to operate as a corn merchant, couldn't afford to sell his corn for less than any other corn merchant would have to in a free competition scenario.

The dealer who can employ his whole stock in one single branch of business, has an advantage of the same kind with the workman who can employ his whole labour in one single operation. As the latter acquires a dexterity which enables him, with the same two hands, to perform a much greater quantity of work, so the former acquires so easy and ready a method of transacting his business, of buying and disposing of his goods, that, with the same capital he can transact a much greater quantity of business. As the one can commonly afford his work a good deal cheaper, so the other can commonly afford his goods somewhat cheaper, than if his stock and attention were both employed about a greater variety of objects. The greater part of manufacturers could not afford to retail their own goods so cheap as a vigilant and active shopkeeper, whose sole business it was to buy them by wholesale and to retail them again. The greater part of farmers could still less afford to retail their own corn, to supply the inhabitants of a town, at perhaps four or five miles distance from the greater part of them, so cheap as a vigilant and active corn merchant,[Pg 217] whose sole business it was to purchase corn by wholesale, to collect it into a great magazine, and to retail it again.

The dealer who focuses all his inventory on one type of business has an advantage similar to the worker who dedicates all his effort to one specific task. Just as the worker becomes skilled enough to accomplish a lot more with the same two hands, the dealer develops a straightforward and efficient way to conduct his business, allowing him to handle a much larger volume of transactions with the same amount of capital. Since the worker can usually offer his services at a significantly lower cost, the dealer can typically offer his products at a lower price as well than if his inventory and focus were spread across a wider range of items. Most manufacturers wouldn't be able to sell their own goods as cheaply as an attentive and proactive shopkeeper, whose primary job is to purchase in bulk and sell them at retail. Similarly, most farmers would find it even harder to sell their own grain to meet the needs of townspeople, perhaps four or five miles away, as affordably as a vigilant and efficient grain merchant, whose sole job is to buy grain in bulk, store it in a large warehouse, and sell it at retail. [Pg 217]

The law which prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the trade of a shopkeeper, endeavoured to force this division in the employment of stock to go on faster than it might otherwise have done. The law which obliged the farmer to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, endeavoured to hinder it from going on so fast. Both laws were evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore unjust; and they were both, too, as impolitic as they were unjust. It is the interest of every society, that things of this kind should never either be forced or obstructed. The man who employs either his labour or his stock in a greater variety of ways than his situation renders necessary, can never hurt his neighbour by underselling him. He may hurt himself, and he generally does so. Jack-of-all-trades will never be rich, says the proverb. But the law ought always to trust people with the care of their own interest, as in their local situations they must generally be able to judge better of it than the legislature can do. The law, however, which obliged the farmer to exercise the trade of a corn merchant was by far the most pernicious of the two.

The law that prevented manufacturers from operating as shopkeepers aimed to speed up the separation of stock management more than it might have otherwise. Meanwhile, the law that forced farmers to act as corn merchants tried to slow that process down. Both laws clearly violated natural freedom, making them unjust; they were also as unwise as they were unfair. It's in the best interest of any society that things like this should never be forced or blocked. A person who uses their labor or resources in more ways than necessary for their situation can't really harm their neighbor by undercutting prices. They might harm themselves, which often happens. "Jack-of-all-trades will never be rich," as the saying goes. But the law should always trust people to manage their own interests, as they usually understand their local context better than lawmakers do. That said, the law that forced farmers to act as corn merchants was by far the most harmful of the two.

It obstructed not only that division in the employment of stock which is so advantageous to every society, but it obstructed likewise the improvement and cultivation of the land. By obliging the farmer to carry on two trades instead of one, it forced him to divide his capital into two parts, of which one only could be employed in cultivation. But if he had been at liberty to sell his whole crop to a corn merchant as fast as he could thresh it out, his whole capital might have returned immediately to the land, and have been employed in buying more cattle, and hiring more servants, in order to improve and cultivate it better. But by being obliged to sell his corn by retail, he was obliged to keep a great part of his capital in his granaries and stack-yard through the year, and could not therefore cultivate so well as with the same capital he might otherwise have done. This law, therefore, necessarily obstructed the improvement of the land, and, instead of tending to render corn cheaper, must have tended to render it scarcer, and therefore dearer, than it would otherwise have been.

It not only hindered the division of labor in agriculture, which benefits society, but it also slowed down the improvement and farming of the land. By forcing farmers to do two jobs instead of one, it made them split their capital into two parts, with only one part being used for farming. If farmers could sell their entire harvest to a grain merchant right after they harvested it, they could have reinvested all their capital back into the land, allowing them to purchase more livestock and hire more workers to enhance and farm the land more effectively. However, because they had to sell their grain in smaller quantities, they had to keep a significant part of their capital stored in granaries and stack-yards throughout the year, which limited their ability to farm as effectively as they could have with the same amount of capital. Therefore, this law inevitably hindered the improvement of the land, and instead of making grain more affordable, it likely made it scarcer and thus more expensive than it would have been otherwise.

After the business of the farmer, that of the corn merchant is in reality the trade which, if properly protected and encouraged, would contribute the most to the raising of corn. It would support the trade of the farmer, in the same manner as the trade of the wholesale dealer supports that of the manufacturer.

After the farmer's business, the corn merchant's trade is really the one that, if properly supported and encouraged, would do the most to increase corn production. It would help the farmer's trade in the same way that the wholesale dealer supports the manufacturer.

The wholesale dealer, by affording a ready market to the manufacturer, by taking his goods off his hand as fast as he can make them, and by sometimes even advancing their price to him before he has made them, enables him to keep his whole capital, and sometimes even more than his whole capital, constantly employed in manufacturing, and consequently to manufacture a much greater quantity of goods than if he was obliged to dispose of them himself to the immediate consumers, or even to the retailers. As the capital of the wholesale merchant, too, is generally sufficient to replace that of many manufacturers, this intercourse between him and them interests the owner of a large capital to support the owners of a great number of small ones, and to assist them in those losses and misfortunes which might otherwise prove ruinous to them.

The wholesale dealer provides a quick market for the manufacturer by buying up products as fast as they can be produced, and sometimes even paying for them before they’re made. This allows the manufacturer to keep all of their capital—and often even more—fully engaged in production, enabling them to create a much larger quantity of goods than if they had to sell directly to consumers or retailers. Since the wholesale merchant typically has enough capital to support many manufacturers, this relationship benefits the larger capital owner by helping numerous smaller ones, offering assistance during losses and hardships that could otherwise be devastating for them.

An intercourse of the same kind universally established between the farmers and the corn merchants, would be attended with effects equally beneficial to the farmers. They would be enabled to keep their whole capitals, and even more than their whole capitals constantly employed in cultivation. In case of any of those accidents to which no trade is more liable than theirs, they would find in their ordinary customer, the wealthy corn merchant, a person who had both an interest to support them, and the ability to do it; and they would not, as at present, be entirely dependent upon the forbearance of their landlord, or the mercy of his steward. Were it possible, as perhaps it is not, to establish this intercourse universally, and all at once; were it possible to turn all at once the whole farming stock of the kingdom to its proper business, the cultivation of land, withdrawing it from every other employment into which any part of it may be at present diverted; and were it possible, in order to support and assist, upon occasion, the operations of this great stock, to provide all at once another stock almost equally great; it is not, perhaps, very easy to imagine how great, how extensive, and how sudden, would be the improvement which this change of circumstances would alone produce upon the whole face of the country.

A consistent relationship established between farmers and corn merchants would have equally positive effects for the farmers. They would be able to keep all their capital—and even more—invested in farming. If any of the accidents that often affect their trade occurred, they would find their regular customer, the wealthy corn merchant, as someone who had both the interest and the ability to support them. They wouldn’t, as they do now, be entirely reliant on the leniency of their landlord or the goodwill of his steward. If it were possible, though it might not be, to create this relationship universally and all at once; if we could suddenly direct all of the farming resources in the kingdom to their rightful purpose—cultivating the land—by pulling them away from any other activities they may currently be engaged in; and if we could, to support and aid the efforts of this significant resource, provide another nearly equal resource all at once; it’s not too difficult to imagine how substantial, extensive, and rapid the improvements from this change in circumstances would be across the entire country.

The statute of Edward VI. therefore, by prohibiting as much as possible any middle man from coming in between the grower and the consumer, endeavoured to annihilate a trade, of which the free exercise is not only the best palliative of the inconveniencies of a dearth, but the best preventive of that calamity; after the trade of the farmer, no trade contributing so much to the growing of corn as that of the corn merchant.

The statute of Edward VI aimed to limit the involvement of middlemen between the grower and the consumer as much as possible. It sought to eliminate a trade that not only serves as the best remedy for the challenges of scarcity but also as the best way to prevent that crisis. After farming, no other trade contributes as much to the production of grain as that of the grain merchant.

The rigour of this law was afterwards softened by several subsequent statutes, which successively permitted the engrossing of corn when the prices of wheat should not exceed 20s. and 24s. 32s. and 40s. the quarter. At last, by the 15th of Charles II. c. 7, the engrossing or buying of corn, in order to sell it again, as long as the price of wheat did not exceed 48s. the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion, was declared lawful to all[Pg 218] persons not being forestallers, that is, not selling again in the same market within three months. All the freedom which the trade of the inland corn dealer has ever yet enjoyed was bestowed upon it by this statute. The statute of the twelfth of the present king, which repeals almost all the other ancient laws against engrossers and forestallers, does not repeal the restrictions of this particular statute, which therefore still continue in force.

The strictness of this law was later eased by several following statutes, which gradually allowed the buying up of corn when the prices of wheat did not exceed 20s, 24s, 32s, and 40s per quarter. Eventually, with the 15th of Charles II. c. 7, buying corn to resell was declared legal for everyone, as long as the price of wheat didn’t go over 48s per quarter, and for other grains proportionately, provided they weren’t forestallers, meaning they didn’t resell in the same market within three months. This statute granted all the freedom that inland corn dealers have enjoyed until now. The statute from the twelfth of the current king, which cancels almost all the previous laws against those who buy up and forestall, does not remove the limitations of this specific statute, so those restrictions remain in effect.

This statute, however, authorises in some measure two very absurd popular prejudices.

This law, however, allows for some degree of two very ridiculous popular biases.

First, It supposes, that when the price of wheat has risen so high as 48s. the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion, corn is likely to be so engrossed as to hurt the people. But, from what has been already said, it seems evident enough, that corn can at no price be so engrossed by the inland dealers as to hurt the people; and 48s. the quarter, besides, though it may be considered as a very high price, yet, in years of scarcity, it is a price which frequently takes place immediately after harvest, when scarce any part of the new crop can be sold off, and when it is impossible even for ignorance to suppose that any part of it can be so engrossed as to hurt the people.

First, it assumes that when the price of wheat rises to 48s. per quarter, and other grains follow suit, corn is likely to become so hoarded that it harms the people. However, based on what has already been discussed, it’s quite clear that corn cannot be hoarded by the inland dealers to the extent that it harms the public. And while 48s. per quarter may be considered a very high price, in years of scarcity, it’s a price that often occurs right after harvest when barely any of the new crop can be sold, making it impossible, even for those uninformed, to believe that any part of it can be hoarded to the point of hurting the people.

Secondly, It supposes that there is a certain price at which corn is likely to be forestalled, that is, bought up in order to be sold again soon after in the same market, so as to hurt the people. But if a merchant ever buys up corn, either going to a particular market, or in a particular market, in order to sell it again soon after in the same market, it must be because he judges that the market cannot be so liberally supplied through the whole season as upon that particular occasion, and that the price, therefore, must rise. If he judges wrong in this, and if the price does not rise, he not only loses the whole profit of the stock which he employs in this manner, but a part of the stock itself, by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the storing and keeping of corn. He hurts himself, therefore, much more essentially than he can hurt even the particular people whom he may hinder from supplying themselves upon that particular market day, because they may afterwards supply themselves just as cheap upon any other market day. If he judges right, instead of hurting the great body of the people, he renders them a most important service. By making them feel the inconveniencies of a dearth somewhat earlier than they otherwise might do, he prevents their feeling them afterwards so severely as they certainly would do, if the cheapness of price encouraged them to consume faster than suited the real scarcity of the season. When the scarcity is real, the best thing that can be done for people is, to divide the inconvenience of it as equally as possible, through all the different months and weeks and days of the year. The interest of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as exactly as he can; and as no other person can have either the same interest, or the same knowledge, or the same abilities, to do it so exactly as he, this most important operation of commerce ought to be trusted entirely to him; or, in other words, the corn trade, so far at least as concerns the supply of the home market, ought to be left perfectly free.

Secondly, it assumes that there’s a certain price at which corn is likely to be hoarded, meaning bought up to be sold again soon after in the same market, which is detrimental to the people. However, if a merchant buys corn, either for a specific market or in a specific market, intending to sell it again soon after in the same place, it must be because they believe that the market won't be as well supplied throughout the season as it is at that moment, and therefore, the price will go up. If they're wrong about this, and the price doesn’t rise, they not only lose the entire profit from the stock they invested but also part of the stock itself due to the costs and losses that come with storing and maintaining corn. So, they end up harming themselves much more significantly than they could harm the particular individuals they may prevent from buying on that specific market day since those individuals can still supply themselves just as cheaply on another market day. If they judge correctly, instead of hurting the larger population, they actually provide them with a crucial service. By making them experience the difficulties of a shortage a bit earlier than they might otherwise, they help prevent those difficulties from being felt even more severely later on, especially if the low prices lead them to consume faster than what the actual scarcity of the season allows. When the scarcity is real, the best approach is to spread the burden as evenly as possible across all the different months, weeks, and days of the year. The corn merchant’s interests push them to do this as accurately as they can; and since no one else has the same interests, knowledge, or ability to do this as precisely as they do, this vital process of commerce should be fully entrusted to them. In other words, the corn trade, at least concerning the supply of the domestic market, should be completely unregulated.

The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be compared to the popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft. The unfortunate wretches accused of this latter crime were not more innocent of the misfortunes imputed to them, than those who have been accused of the former. The law which put an end to all prosecutions against witchcraft, which put it out of any man's power to gratify his own malice by accusing his neighbour of that imaginary crime, seems effectually to have put an end to those fears and suspicions, by taking away the great cause which encouraged and supported them. The law which would restore entire freedom to the inland trade of corn, would probably prove as effectual to put an end to the popular fears of engrossing and forestalling.

The widespread fear of monopolizing and manipulating the market can be compared to the public fears and suspicions surrounding witchcraft. The unfortunate individuals accused of witchcraft were no more guilty of the misfortunes attributed to them than those accused of monopolizing. The law that ended all prosecutions for witchcraft, which prevented anyone from satisfying their own spite by accusing their neighbor of that fictional crime, seems to have effectively dispelled those fears and suspicions by removing the main reason that fueled them. A law that would fully restore freedom to the inland corn trade would likely do just as much to eliminate the public fears of monopolizing and market manipulation.

The 15th of Charles II. c. 7, however, with all its imperfections, has, perhaps, contributed more, both to the plentiful supply of the home market, and to the increase of tillage, than any other law in the statute book. It is from this law that the inland corn trade has derived all the liberty and protection which it has ever yet enjoyed; and both the supply of the home market and the interest of tillage are much more effectually promoted by the inland, than either by the importation or exportation trade.

The 15th of Charles II. c. 7, despite its flaws, has likely contributed more to ensuring a steady supply in the domestic market and boosting farming than any other law on the books. This law has provided the inland grain trade with the freedom and support it has ever had, and both the domestic supply and the interests of farming are much better served by the inland trade than by imports or exports.

The proportion of the average quantity of all sorts of grain imported into Great Britain to that of all sorts of grain consumed, it has been computed by the author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, does not exceed that of one to five hundred and seventy. For supplying the home market, therefore, the importance of the inland trade must be to that of the importation trade as five hundred and seventy to one.

The ratio of the average amount of all types of grain imported into Great Britain to the total amount of grain consumed has been calculated by the author of the Tracts on the Corn Trade to be no more than one to five hundred and seventy. Therefore, in order to meet domestic demand, the significance of the domestic trade is five hundred and seventy times greater than that of the import trade.

The average quantity of all sorts of grain exported from Great Britain does not, according to the same author, exceed the one-and-thirtieth part of the annual produce. For the encouragement of tillage, therefore, by providing a market for the home produce, the importance of the inland trade must be to that of the exportation trade as thirty to one.

The average amount of all types of grain exported from Great Britain, according to the same author, doesn’t exceed one-thirtieth of the annual production. Therefore, to encourage farming by creating a market for domestic products, the significance of the inland trade must be thirty times greater than that of the export trade.

I have no great faith in political arithmetic, and I mean not to warrant the exactness of either of these computations. I mention them only in order to show of how much less consequence, in the opinion of the most judicious and experienced persons, the foreign trade of corn is than the home trade. The great cheapness of corn in the years immediately preced[Pg 219]ing the establishment of the bounty may, perhaps with reason, be ascribed in some measure to the operation of this statute of Charles II. which had been enacted about five-and-twenty years before, and which had, therefore, full time to produce its effect.

I don't have much faith in political calculations, and I don't intend to guarantee the accuracy of either of these figures. I bring them up just to illustrate how much less important, in the view of the most knowledgeable and experienced people, the foreign corn trade is compared to the domestic trade. The significant drop in corn prices in the years right before the bounty was established might reasonably be attributed, at least in part, to the law enacted by Charles II about twenty-five years earlier, which had ample time to take effect.

A very few words will sufficiently explain all that I have to say concerning the other three branches of the corn trade.

A few words will be enough to explain everything I have to say about the other three parts of the corn trade.

II. The trade of the merchant-importer of foreign corn for home consumption, evidently contributes to the immediate supply of the home market, and must so far be immediately beneficial to the great body of the people. It tends, indeed, to lower somewhat the average money price of corn, but not to diminish its real value, or the quantity of labour which it is capable of maintaining. If importation was at all times free, our farmers and country gentlemen would probably, one year with another, get less money for their corn than they do at present, when importation is at most times in effect prohibited; but the money which they got would be of more value, would buy more goods of all other kinds, and would employ more labour. Their real wealth, their real revenue, therefore, would be the same as at present, though it might be expressed by a smaller quantity of silver, and they would neither be disabled nor discouraged from cultivating corn as much as they do at present. On the contrary, as the rise in the real value of silver, in consequence of lowering the money price of corn, lowers somewhat the money price of all other commodities, it gives the industry of the country where it takes place some advantage in all foreign markets, and thereby tends to encourage and increase that industry. But the extent of the home market for corn must be in proportion to the general industry of the country where it grows, or to the number of those who produce something else, and, therefore, have something else, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of something else, to give in exchange for corn. But in every country, the home market, as it is the nearest and most convenient, so is it likewise the greatest and most important market for corn. That rise in the real value of silver, therefore, which is the effect of lowering the average money price of corn, tends to enlarge the greatest and most important market for corn, and thereby to encourage, instead of discouraging its growth.

II. The trade of merchant-importers bringing in foreign corn for local use clearly helps meet the immediate needs of the home market and thus benefits the majority of people. It does tend to lower the average money price of corn a bit, but it doesn’t actually decrease its real value or the amount of labor it can support. If imports were always unrestricted, our farmers and local landowners would likely earn less money for their corn over the years compared to right now when imports are mostly banned. However, the money they receive would be more valuable, allowing them to buy more goods and employ more workers. Their real wealth and revenue would remain the same as it is now, even if it's represented by a smaller amount of silver, and they would continue to be able and motivated to grow as much corn as they do now. On the other hand, as the real value of silver rises due to the decrease in the money price of corn, it slightly lowers the money price of other goods, giving the country a competitive edge in foreign markets and encouraging growth in various industries. But the size of the local market for corn depends on the overall productivity of the country where it’s grown, or on the number of people producing other goods, giving them something to trade for corn. Still, in every country, the local market—being the closest and most convenient—is also the largest and most significant market for corn. Therefore, the increase in the real value of silver, which results from the drop in the average money price of corn, tends to expand the largest and most important market for corn, thus promoting rather than hindering its production.

By the 22nd of Charles II. c. 13, the importation of wheat, whenever the price in the home market did not exceed 53s. 4d. the quarter, was subjected to a duty of 16s. the quarter; and to a duty of 8s. whenever the price did not exceed L.4. The former of these two prices has, for more than a century past, taken place only in times of very great scarcity; and the latter has, so far as I know, not taken place at all. Yet, till wheat had risen above this latter price, it was, by this statute, subjected to a very high duty; and, till it had risen above the former, to a duty which amounted to a prohibition. The importation of other sorts of grain was restrained at rates and by duties, in proportion to the value of the grain, almost equally high.[40] Subsequent laws still further increased those duties.

By the 22nd of Charles II. c. 13, importing wheat was charged a duty of 16s. per quarter if the home market price didn't exceed 53s. 4d. per quarter, and a duty of 8s. if the price didn't exceed L.4. The first price has only been seen in times of extreme scarcity for over a century, and to my knowledge, the second price hasn’t been relevant at all. Still, until wheat prices climbed above that second price, it faced a very high duty according to this law, and until it went above the first price, it faced a duty that was essentially a ban. The import of other types of grain was also limited by similarly high rates and duties based on their value.[40] Later laws raised these duties even more.

The distress which, in years of scarcity, the strict execution of those laws might have brought upon the people, would probably have been very great; but, upon such occasions, its execution was generally suspended by temporary statutes, which permitted, for a limited time, the importation of foreign corn. The necessity of these temporary statutes sufficiently demonstrates the impropriety of this general one.

The suffering that the strict enforcement of those laws could have caused the people during years of scarcity would likely have been significant; however, in such circumstances, enforcement was usually put on hold by temporary laws that allowed, for a limited time, the importation of foreign grain. The need for these temporary laws clearly shows the inappropriateness of the general law.

These restraints upon importation, though prior to the establishment of the bounty, were dictated by the same spirit, by the same principles, which afterwards enacted that regulation. How hurtful soever in themselves, these, or some other restraints upon importation, became necessary in consequence of that regulation. If, when wheat was either below 48s. the quarter, or not much above it, foreign corn could have been imported, either duty free, or upon paying only a small duty, it might have been exported again, with the benefit of the bounty, to the great loss of the public revenue, and to the entire perversion of the institution, of which the object was to extend the market for the home growth, not that for the growth of foreign countries.

These restrictions on imports, even before the bounty was established, were driven by the same spirit and principles that later created that regulation. No matter how harmful they were on their own, these or other import restrictions became necessary because of that regulation. If, when wheat was priced at or below 48 shillings per quarter, foreign grain could have been imported either tax-free or with just a small tax, it could have been exported again, taking advantage of the bounty. This would have resulted in significant losses for public revenue and completely undermined the purpose of the institution, which was to expand the market for domestic products, not for those from foreign countries.

III. The trade of the merchant-exporter of corn for foreign consumption, certainly does not contribute directly to the plentiful supply of the home market. It does so, however, indirectly. From whatever source this supply may be usually drawn, whether from home growth, or from foreign importation, unless more corn is either usually grown, or usually imported into the country, than what is usually[Pg 220] consumed in it, the supply of the home market can never be very plentiful. But unless the surplus can, in all ordinary cases, be exported, the growers will be careful never to grow more, and the importers never to import more, than what the bare consumption of the home market requires. That market will very seldom be overstocked; but it will generally be understocked; the people, whose business it is to supply it, being generally afraid lest their goods should be left upon their hands. The prohibition of exportation limits the improvement and cultivation of the country to what the supply of its own inhabitants require. The freedom of exportation enables it to extend cultivation for the supply of foreign nations.

III. The trade of the merchant-exporter of corn for foreign markets doesn't directly boost the supply in the local market. However, it does help indirectly. No matter where the local supply usually comes from, whether from domestic production or foreign imports, unless more corn is typically grown or imported than what is usually consumed within the country, the local market supply can never be very abundant. But if there isn’t an option to export the surplus, growers will be cautious about producing more, and importers will be hesitant to bring in more than what the local market needs. This market is rarely overstocked; in fact, it often has too little supply because those responsible for providing it are generally worried about being left with unsold goods. The ban on exports limits the country's agricultural development to meet only the needs of its own people. On the other hand, allowing exports makes it possible to expand cultivation to also supply foreign nations.

By the 12th of Charles II. c. 4, the exportation of corn was permitted whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 40s. the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion. By the 15th of the same prince, this liberty was extended till the price of wheat exceeded 48s. the quarter, and by the 22d, to all higher prices. A poundage, indeed, was to be paid to the king upon such exportation; but all grain was rated so low in the book of rates, that this poundage amounted only, upon wheat to 1s. upon oats to 4d. and upon all other grain to 6d. the quarter. By the 1st of William and Mary, the act which established this bounty, this small duty was virtually taken off whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 48s. the quarter; and by the 11th and 12th of William III. c. 20, it was expressly taken off at all higher prices.

By the 12th year of Charles II, chapter 4, exporting corn was allowed as long as the price of wheat didn’t go over 40 shillings per quarter, with other grains following a similar rule. By the 15th of the same king, this allowance was extended until the price of wheat exceeded 48 shillings per quarter, and by the 22nd, it applied to all higher prices. A fee was required to be paid to the king for such exports, but all grain was listed so cheaply in the pricing schedule that this fee was only 1 shilling for wheat, 4 pence for oats, and 6 pence for all other grains per quarter. By the 1st of William and Mary, the act that set up this bounty effectively removed this small fee whenever the price of wheat stayed below 48 shillings per quarter; and by the 11th and 12th of William III, chapter 20, the fee was explicitly eliminated for all higher prices.

The trade of the merchant-exporter was, in this manner, not only encouraged by a bounty, but rendered much more free than that of the inland dealer. By the last of these statutes, corn could be engrossed at any price for exportation; but it could not be engrossed for inland sale, except when the price did not exceed 48s. the quarter. The interest of the inland dealer, however, it has already been shown, can never be opposite to that of the great body of the people. That of the merchant-exporter may, and in fact sometimes is. If, while his own country labours under a dearth, a neighbouring country should be afflicted with a famine, it might be his interest to carry corn to the latter country, in such quantities as might very much aggravate the calamities of the dearth. The plentiful supply of the home market was not the direct object of those statutes; but, under the pretence of encouraging agriculture, to raise the money price of corn as high as possible, and thereby to occasion, as much as possible, a constant dearth in the home market. By the discouragement of importation, the supply of that market, even in times of great scarcity, was confined to the home growth; and by the encouragement of exportation, when the price was so high as 48s. the quarter, that market was not, even in times of considerable scarcity, allowed to enjoy the whole of that growth. The temporary laws, prohibiting, for a limited time, the exportation of corn, and taking off, for a limited time, the duties upon its importation, expedients to which Great Britain has been obliged so frequently to have recourse, sufficiently demonstrate the impropriety of her general system. Had that system been good, she would not so frequently have been reduced to the necessity of departing from it.

The trade of merchant-exporters was not only supported by a bounty but also made significantly freer than that of inland sellers. According to the latest statutes, corn could be bought at any price for export, but it couldn't be purchased for inland sale if the price exceeded 48s. per quarter. However, it has already been shown that the inland dealer's interests can never conflict with those of the majority of the population. The concerns of the merchant-exporter, on the other hand, may, and sometimes do, clash. If his own country is facing a shortage while a nearby country is experiencing a famine, it might benefit him to send corn to the latter in such quantities that could worsen the hardships of the shortage. The laws in question weren't primarily focused on ensuring a plentiful supply in the local market. Instead, under the guise of supporting agriculture, they aimed to raise the market price of corn as much as possible, thus creating a constant shortage at home. By discouraging imports, the supply in that market, even during significant scarcity, was limited to local production; and by promoting exports, especially when prices were high at 48s. per quarter, that market was denied full access to the local harvest, even in times of considerable need. The temporary laws that ban corn exports for a limited time and remove import duties for a limited period—measures that Great Britain has often had to resort to—clearly show the flaws in her overall system. If that system had been sound, she wouldn't have repeatedly been forced to abandon it.

Were all nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free importation, the different states into which a great continent was divided, would so far resemble the different provinces of a great empire. As among the different provinces of a great empire, the freedom of the inland trade appears, both from reason and experience, not only the best palliative of a dearth, but the most effectual preventive of a famine; so would the freedom of the exportation and importation trade be among the different states into which a great continent was divided. The larger the continent, the easier the communication through all the different parts of it, both by land and by water, the less would any one particular part of it ever he exposed to either of these calamities, the scarcity of any one country being more likely to be relieved by the plenty of some other. But very few countries have entirely adopted this liberal system. The freedom of the corn trade is almost everywhere more or less restrained, and in many countries is confined by such absurd regulations, as frequently aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth into the dreadful calamity of a famine. The demand of such countries for corn may frequently become so great and so urgent, that a small state in their neighbourhood, which happened at the same time to be labouring under some degree of dearth, could not venture to supply them without exposing itself to the like dreadful calamity. The very bad policy of one country may thus render it, in some measure, dangerous and imprudent to establish what would otherwise be the best policy in another. The unlimited freedom of exportation, however, would be much less dangerous in great states, in which the growth being much greater, the supply could seldom be much affected by any quantity of corn that was likely to be exported. In a Swiss canton, or in some of the little states in Italy, it may, perhaps, sometimes be necessary to restrain the exportation of corn. In such great countries as France or England, it scarce ever can. To hinder, besides, the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market, is evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, to a sort of reasons of state; an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be pardoned only, in cases of the most urgent necessity. The price[Pg 221] at which exportation of corn is prohibited, if it is ever to be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price.

If all countries adopted the liberal system of free exports and imports, the various states on a large continent would resemble the different provinces of a vast empire. Just as the free trade among the provinces of an empire is proven by both logic and experience to be the best way to mitigate shortages and effectively prevent famines, so too would the free trade of exports and imports be among the states of a continent. The larger the continent, the easier it is to communicate across its different regions, both over land and by sea, meaning that no one area would face these calamities alone; the scarcity in one country could be alleviated by the abundance in another. However, very few nations have fully embraced this liberal approach. The trade of grain is often restricted in many places, and many countries enforce ridiculous regulations that often worsen the inevitable hardships of a shortage into the severe crisis of famine. The demand in such countries for grain can become so urgent that a neighboring small state, also facing some level of shortage, might hesitate to supply them for fear of suffering the same terrible fate. The poor policy of one nation can make it risky and unwise for another nation to implement what would otherwise be a beneficial policy. However, allowing unrestricted exports is generally much less dangerous in larger countries, where the abundance of production means that the supply is unlikely to be significantly impacted by the quantity of grain exported. In a Swiss canton or some small states in Italy, it may be necessary at times to limit grain exports. In larger countries like France or England, it rarely becomes necessary. Additionally, preventing farmers from selling their goods at the best prices available is clearly sacrificing standard principles of justice for the sake of public good—an action justified only in cases of urgent need. If exports of grain are ever to be restricted, the price at which this occurs should always be set very high.

The laws concerning corn may everywhere be compared to the laws concerning religion. The people feel themselves so much interested in what relates either to their subsistence in this life, or to their happiness in a life to come, that government must yield to their prejudices, and, in order to preserve the public tranquillity, establish that system which they approve of. It is upon this account, perhaps, that we so seldom find a reasonable system established with regard to either of those two capital objects.

The rules about corn can be compared to the rules about religion everywhere. People are deeply interested in their basic needs in this life and their happiness in the next, so the government must respect their beliefs and, to maintain public peace, adopt the system they support. This is probably why we rarely see a sensible system set up for either of these two important issues.

IV. The trade of the merchant-carrier, or of the importer of foreign corn, in order to export it again, contributes to the plentiful supply of the home market. It is not, indeed, the direct purpose of his trade to sell his corn there; but he will generally be willing to do so, and even for a good deal less money than he might expect in a foreign market; because he saves in this manner the expense of loading and unloading, of freight and insurance. The inhabitants of the country which, by means of the carrying trade, becomes the magazine and storehouse for the supply of other countries, can very seldom be in want themselves. Though the carrying trade must thus contribute to reduce the average money price of corn in the home market, it would not thereby lower its real value; it would only raise somewhat the real value of silver.

IV. The business of the merchant-carrier, or the importer of foreign grain, who plans to export it again, helps ensure a steady supply in the local market. It's not his main goal to sell the grain there, but he is usually open to doing so, often for much less than he could get in another country; this way, he saves on costs for loading and unloading, freight, and insurance. People in the country that becomes a hub for supply through this trade rarely face shortages themselves. While the carrying trade does help lower the average price of grain in the local market, it doesn’t actually decrease its real value; it merely increases the real value of silver a bit.

The carrying trade was in effect prohibited in Great Britain, upon all ordinary occasions, by the high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, of the greater part of which there was no drawback; and upon extraordinary occasions, when a scarcity made it necessary to suspend those duties by temporary statutes, exportation was always prohibited. By this system of laws, therefore, the carrying trade was in effect prohibited.

The carrying trade was effectively banned in Great Britain on most occasions due to the high duties on importing foreign corn, most of which had no rebate. On rare occasions, when a shortage required the temporary suspension of these duties, exporting was always prohibited. Thus, this system of laws effectively banned the carrying trade.

That system of laws, therefore, which is connected with the establishment of the bounty, seems to deserve no part of the praise which has been bestowed upon it. The improvement and prosperity of Great Britain, which has been so often ascribed to those laws, may very easily be accounted for by other causes. That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man, that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour, is alone sufficient to make any country flourish, notwithstanding these and twenty other absurd regulations of commerce; and this security was perfected by the Revolution, much about the same time that the bounty was established. The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions, with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations: though the effect of those obstructions is always, more or less, either to encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its security. In Great Britain industry is perfectly secure; and though it is far from being perfectly free, it is as free or freer than in any other part of Europe.

That system of laws connected to the establishment of the bounty doesn't deserve any of the praise that's been given to it. The improvement and prosperity of Great Britain, which has often been attributed to those laws, can easily be explained by other factors. The security that the laws in Great Britain provide, ensuring that everyone gets to enjoy the fruits of their own labor, is enough to make any country thrive, despite these and many other ridiculous trade regulations; and this security was solidified by the Revolution, around the same time the bounty was established. The natural drive of each individual to improve their own situation, when allowed to operate with freedom and security, is such a strong principle that it can not only propel society toward wealth and prosperity on its own but also overcome countless unnecessary obstacles imposed by the misguided nature of human laws. However, these obstacles always have the effect of either infringing on freedom or reducing security. In Great Britain, industry is completely secure; and while it may not be perfectly free, it's as free or freer than in any other part of Europe.

Though the period of the greatest prosperity and improvement of Great Britain has been posterior to that system of laws which is connected with the bounty, we must not upon that account, impute it to those laws. It has been posterior likewise to the national debt; but the national debt has most assuredly not been the cause of it.

Though the time of greatest prosperity and improvement in Great Britain has come after the system of laws linked to the bounty, we shouldn’t blame those laws for it. This period has also followed the national debt, but the national debt has definitely not been the cause of it.

Though the system of laws which is connected with the bounty, has exactly the same tendency with the practice of Spain and Portugal, to lower somewhat the value of the precious metals in the country where it takes place; yet Great Britain is certainly one of the richest countries in Europe, while Spain and Portugal are perhaps amongst the most beggarly. This difference of situation, however, may easily be accounted for from two different causes. First, the tax in Spain, the prohibition in Portugal of exporting gold and silver, and the vigilant police which watches over the execution of those laws, must, in two very poor countries, which between them import annually upwards of six millions sterling, operate not only more directly, but much more forcibly, in reducing the value of those metals there, than the corn laws can do in Great Britain. And, secondly, this bad policy is not in these countries counterbalanced by the general liberty and security of the people. Industry is there neither free nor secure; and the civil and ecclesiastical governments of both Spain and Portugal are such as would alone be sufficient to perpetuate their present state of poverty, even though their regulations of commerce were as wise as the greatest part of them are absurd and foolish.

Although the legal system connected to the bounty has the same effect as the practices of Spain and Portugal in slightly reducing the value of precious metals in the country where it occurs, Great Britain is definitely one of the richest countries in Europe, while Spain and Portugal are among the poorest. This difference can easily be explained by two main factors. First, the taxes in Spain, the ban on exporting gold and silver in Portugal, and the strict enforcement of those laws work much more directly and forcefully to lower the value of those metals in two very poor countries that together import over six million pounds annually, compared to what the corn laws can do in Great Britain. Secondly, this poor policy is not balanced by the overall freedom and safety of the people in those countries. Industry is neither free nor secure; and the civil and religious governments in both Spain and Portugal are such that they would alone be enough to maintain their current state of poverty, even if their trade regulations were as sensible as most of them are absurd and foolish.

The 13th of the present king, c. 43, seems to have established a new system with regard to the corn laws, in many respects better than the ancient one, but in one or two respects perhaps not quite so good.

The 13th of the current king, c. 43, appears to have set up a new system for the corn laws, which is better in many ways than the old one, but in one or two aspects, it might not be as good.

By this statute, the high duties upon importation for home consumption are taken off, so soon as the price of middling wheat rises to 48s. the quarter; that of middling rye, pease, or beans, to 32s.; that of barley to 24s.; and that of oats to 16s.; and instead of them, a small duty is imposed of only 6d. upon the quarter of wheat, and upon that of other grain in proportion. With regard to all those different sorts of grain, but particu[Pg 222]larly with regard to wheat, the home market is thus opened to foreign supplies, at prices considerably lower than before.

By this law, the high import duties for domestic consumption are removed as soon as the price of average wheat goes up to 48 shillings per quarter; average rye, peas, or beans to 32 shillings; barley to 24 shillings; and oats to 16 shillings. Instead, a small duty of only 6 pence per quarter of wheat is imposed, with other grains taxed proportionately. This way, the home market is opened to foreign supplies at prices that are significantly lower than they were before, especially for wheat.

By the same statute, the old bounty of 5s. upon the exportation of wheat, ceases so soon as the price rises to 44s. the quarter, instead of 48s. the price at which it ceased before; that of 2s. 6d. upon the exportation of barley, ceases so soon as the price rises to 22s. instead of 24s. the price at which it ceased before; that of 2s. 6d. upon the exportation of oatmeal, ceases so soon as the price rises to 14s. instead of 15s. the price at which it ceased before. The bounty upon rye is reduced from 3s. 6d. to 3s. and it ceases so soon as the price rises to 28s. instead of 32s. the price at which it ceased before. If bounties are as improper as I have endeavoured to prove them to be, the sooner they cease, and the lower they are, so much the better.

By the same law, the old bounty of 5s. for exporting wheat ends as soon as the price goes up to 44s. per quarter, instead of 48s. like it did before; the 2s. 6d. bounty for exporting barley ends as soon as the price rises to 22s., instead of 24s. like it did before; and the 2s. 6d. bounty for exporting oatmeal ends as soon as the price rises to 14s., instead of 15s. like it did before. The bounty on rye is reduced from 3s. 6d. to 3s., and it stops when the price rises to 28s., instead of 32s. like it did before. If bounties are as harmful as I’ve tried to show, the sooner they go away and the lower they are, the better.

The same statute permits, at the lowest prices, the importation of corn in order to be exported again, duty free, provided it is in the mean time lodged in a warehouse under the joint locks of the king and the importer. This liberty, indeed, extends to no more than twenty-five of the different parts of Great Britain. They are, however, the principal ones; and there may not, perhaps, be warehouses proper for this purpose in the greater part of the others.

The same law allows for the importation of corn at the lowest prices to be exported again, duty-free, as long as it's stored in a warehouse secured with locks from both the king and the importer. This allowance is limited to only twenty-five specific areas of Great Britain. However, these are the main ones, and there might not be suitable warehouses for this purpose in most of the others.

So far this law seems evidently an improvement upon the ancient system.

So far, this law clearly seems like an improvement over the old system.

But by the same law, a bounty of 2s. the quarter is given for the exportation of oats, whenever the price does not exceed fourteen shillings. No bounty had ever been given before for the exportation of this grain, no more than for that of pease or beans.

But by the same rule, a reward of 2 shillings per quarter is provided for the export of oats, whenever the price doesn't go over fourteen shillings. There had never been a reward given before for the export of this grain, just like there wasn't for peas or beans.

By the same law, too, the exportation of wheat is prohibited so soon as the price rises to forty-four shillings the quarter; that of rye so soon as it rises to twenty-eight shillings; that of barley so soon as it rises to twenty-two shillings; and that of oats so soon as they rise to fourteen shillings. Those several prices seem all of them a good deal too low; and there seems to be an impropriety, besides, in prohibiting exportation altogether at those precise prices at which that bounty, which was given in order to force it, is withdrawn. The bounty ought certainly either to have been withdrawn at a much lower price, or exportation ought to have been allowed at a much higher.

By the same law, the export of wheat is banned as soon as the price hits forty-four shillings per quarter; rye as soon as it reaches twenty-eight shillings; barley as soon as it gets to twenty-two shillings; and oats as soon as they go up to fourteen shillings. All those prices seem pretty low; plus, it seems inappropriate to completely ban exportation at those exact prices at which the subsidy, meant to encourage it, is taken away. The subsidy should definitely have been removed at a much lower price, or exportation should have been allowed at a much higher price.

So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior to the ancient system. With all its imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of it what was said of the laws of Solon, that though not the best in itself, it is the best which the interest, prejudices, and temper of the times, would admit of. It may perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better.

So far, this law seems to be worse than the old system. Even with all its flaws, we might say about it what was said about Solon's laws: that while it's not the best overall, it's the best that the interests, biases, and attitudes of the time would allow. It might eventually pave the way for something better.


CHAP. VI.

OF TREATIES OF COMMERCE.

When a nation binds itself by treaty, either to permit the entry of certain goods from one foreign country which it prohibits from all others, or to exempt the goods of one country from duties to which it subjects those of all others, the country, or at least the merchants and manufacturers of the country, whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily derive great advantage from the treaty. Those merchants and manufacturers enjoy a sort of monopoly in the country which is so indulgent to them. That country becomes a market, both more extensive and more advantageous for their goods: more extensive, because the goods of other nations being either excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it takes off a greater quantity of theirs; more advantageous, because the merchants of the favoured country, enjoying a sort of monopoly there, will often sell their goods for a better price than if exposed to the free competition of all other nations.

When a country commits to a treaty, either allowing certain goods from one foreign nation while blocking them from all others, or exempting that nation’s goods from tariffs that it imposes on goods from everywhere else, the nation, or at least the businesses and producers benefiting from this arrangement, gains a significant advantage from the treaty. Those businesses and producers have a kind of monopoly in the country that favors them. That country becomes a market that is both larger and more profitable for their products: larger, because the goods from other nations are either banned or face higher tariffs, resulting in a larger demand for their goods; more profitable, because the merchants from the favored country, having this monopoly, can often charge higher prices than they would if faced with open competition from other countries.

Such treaties, however, though they may be advantageous to the merchants and manufacturers of the favoured, are necessarily disadvantageous to those of the favouring country. A monopoly is thus granted against them to a foreign nation; and they must frequently buy the foreign goods they have occasion for, dearer than if the free competition of other nations was admitted. That part of its own produce with which such a nation purchases foreign goods, must consequently be sold cheaper; because, when two things are exchanged for one another, the cheapness of the one is a necessary consequence, or rather is the same thing, with the dearness of the other. The exchangeable value of its annual produce, therefore, is likely to be diminished by every such treaty. This diminution, however, can scarce amount to any positive loss, but only to a lessening of the gain which it might otherwise make. Though it sells its goods cheaper than it otherwise might do, it will not probably sell them for less than they cost; nor, as in the case of bounties, for a price which will not replace the capital employed in bringing them to market, together with the ordinary profits of stock. The trade could not go on long if it did. Even the favouring country, therefore, may still gain by the trade, though less than if there was a free competition.

Such treaties, while beneficial for the merchants and manufacturers of the favored country, are typically disadvantageous for those in the country offering the favor. This creates a monopoly in favor of a foreign nation, forcing domestic businesses to buy foreign goods at higher prices than if there was free competition from other nations. Consequently, the domestic products used to purchase foreign goods must be sold at lower prices because, when two items are exchanged, the cheapness of one naturally leads to the higher cost of the other. As a result, the exchangeable value of the annual output is likely to decrease with every such treaty. However, this decrease is unlikely to result in a direct loss, only a reduction in the profit that could have been made. While it may have to sell its goods for less than it could in a free market, it probably won't sell them for less than their cost; nor, as in the case of subsidies, at a price that won’t cover the investment made to bring them to market, along with standard profits. The trade couldn't sustain itself long under those conditions. Therefore, even the country giving the favor can still benefit from trade, although not as much as it would under free competition.

Some treaties of commerce, however, have been supposed advantageous, upon principles very different from these; and a commercial country has sometimes granted a monopoly of[Pg 223] this kind, against itself, to certain goods of a foreign nation, because it expected, that in the whole commerce between them, it would annually sell more than it would buy, and that a balance in gold and silver would be annually returned to it. It is upon this principle that the treaty of commerce between England and Portugal, concluded in 1703 by Mr Methuen, has been so much commended. The following is a literal translation of that treaty, which consists of three articles only.

Some trade agreements, however, are thought to be beneficial based on very different principles. A trading nation has sometimes given a monopoly of[Pg 223] this kind to certain goods from a foreign country, believing that in the overall trade between them, it would sell more than it would purchase each year, resulting in a balance of gold and silver being sent back to it annually. This principle is why the trade agreement between England and Portugal, finalized in 1703 by Mr. Methuen, has received so much praise. Below is a direct translation of that treaty, which consists of only three articles.

ART. I.

His sacred royal majesty of Portugal promises, both in his own name and that of his successors, to admit for ever hereafter, into Portugal, the woollen cloths, and the rest of the woollen manufactures of the British, as was accustomed, till they were prohibited by the law; nevertheless upon this condition:

His royal highness of Portugal promises, both in his own name and on behalf of his successors, to always allow the woolen fabrics and other woolen goods from Britain to be brought into Portugal, just as it was done before they were banned by law; however, this is subject to the following condition:

ART. II.

That is to say, that her sacred royal majesty of Great Britain shall, in her own name, and that of her successors, be obliged, for ever hereafter, to admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into Britain; so that at no time, whether there shall be peace or war between the kingdoms of Britain and France, any thing more shall be demanded for these wines by the name of custom or duty, or by whatsoever other title, directly or indirectly, whether they shall be imported into Great Britain in pipes or hogsheads, or other casks, than what shall be demanded for the like quantity or measure of French wine, deducting or abating a third part of the custom or duty. But if, at any time, this deduction or abatement of customs, which is to be made as aforesaid, shall in any manner be attempted and prejudiced, it shall be just and lawful for his sacred royal majesty of Portugal, again to prohibit the woollen cloths, and the rest of the British woollen manufactures.

In other words, her sacred royal majesty of Great Britain will, in her own name and on behalf of her successors, be required forever to allow Portuguese wines into Britain. At no time, whether there is peace or war between Britain and France, will anything more be charged for these wines in terms of customs or duties, or by any other name, directly or indirectly, whether they are imported into Great Britain in pipes, hogsheads, or other barrels, than what is charged for an equivalent quantity of French wine, minus a third of the customs or duties. However, if this deduction or reduction of customs, as mentioned, is ever challenged or undermined in any way, it will be completely fair and legal for his sacred royal majesty of Portugal to once again prohibit the importation of woolen cloths and other British woolen products.

ART. III.

The most excellent lords the plenipotentiaries promise and take upon themselves, that their above named masters shall ratify this treaty; and within the space of two months the ratification shall be exchanged.

The esteemed lords the representatives promise and commit that their mentioned leaders will approve this treaty; and within two months, the ratification will be exchanged.

By this treaty, the crown of Portugal becomes bound to admit the English woollens upon the same footing as before the prohibition; that is, not to raise the duties which had been paid before that time. But it does not become bound to admit them upon any better terms than those of any other nation, of France or Holland, for example. The crown of Great Britain, on the contrary, becomes bound to admit the wines of Portugal, upon paying only two-thirds of the duty which is paid for those of France, the wines most likely to come into competition with them. So far this treaty, therefore, is evidently advantageous to Portugal, and disadvantageous to Great Britain.

By this treaty, the crown of Portugal agrees to allow English wool imports just like before the ban; that is, they won't increase the duties that were paid previously. However, they are not obligated to provide better terms than any other country, such as France or Holland. On the other hand, the crown of Great Britain agrees to allow Portuguese wines in by paying only two-thirds of the duty charged on French wines, which are the most likely to compete with them. So, this treaty is clearly beneficial for Portugal and not so much for Great Britain.

It has been celebrated, however, as a masterpiece of the commercial policy of England. Portugal receives annually from the Brazils a greater quantity of gold than can be employed in its domestic commerce, whether in the shape of coin or of plate. The surplus is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle and locked up in coffers; and as it can find no advantageous market at home, it must, notwithstanding any prohibition, be sent abroad, and exchanged for something for which there is a more advantageous market at home. A large share of it comes annually to England, in return either for English goods, or for those of other European nations that receive their returns through England. Mr Barretti was informed, that the weekly packet-boat from Lisbon brings, one week with another, more than L.50,000 in gold to England. The sum had probably been exaggerated. It would amount to more than L.2,600,000 a-year, which is more than the Brazils are supposed to afford.

It has been recognized, however, as a remarkable example of England's commercial strategy. Portugal receives every year more gold from Brazil than it can use in its own trade, whether as coins or as bullion. The excess is too valuable to just sit unused in storage; since there's no profitable market for it at home, it inevitably has to be sent abroad, regardless of any bans, and exchanged for goods that have a better market value domestically. A significant portion of this gold comes to England each year, either in exchange for British products or those from other European countries that route their transactions through England. Mr. Barretti was told that the weekly packet boat from Lisbon brings, week after week, more than £50,000 in gold to England. This figure may have been inflated. It would total over £2,600,000 a year, which is more than Brazil is believed to be able to provide.

Our merchants were, some years ago, out of humour with the crown of Portugal. Some privileges which had been granted them, not by treaty, but by the free grace of that crown, at the solicitation, indeed, it is probable, and in return for much greater favours, defence and protection from the crown of Great Britain, had been either infringed or revoked. The people, therefore, usually most interested in celebrating the Portugal trade, were then rather disposed to represent it as less advantageous than it had commonly been imagined. The far greater part, almost the whole, they pretended, of this annual importation of gold, was not on account of Great Britain, but of other European nations; the fruits and wines of Portugal annually imported into Great Britain nearly compensating the value of the British goods sent thither.

Our merchants, a few years back, were really unhappy with the crown of Portugal. Some privileges they had received—not through a treaty, but by the kindness of that crown—probably in exchange for much greater favors, like defense and protection from Great Britain, had either been violated or taken away. As a result, the people who were usually most invested in the Portugal trade began to claim that it was less beneficial than it had been thought to be. They argued that the vast majority, if not all, of the annual gold imports weren't for the benefit of Great Britain, but rather for other European countries; the fruits and wines from Portugal that were imported into Great Britain nearly balanced out the value of the British goods sent there.

Let us suppose, however, that the whole was on account of Great Britain, and that it amounted to a still greater sum than Mr Barretti seems to imagine; this trade would not, upon that account, be more advantageous than any other, in which, for the same value sent out, we received an equal value of consumable goods in return.

Let’s assume, though, that the total was due to Great Britain and that it was actually even greater than Mr. Barretti thinks; this trade wouldn’t be any more beneficial than any other trade where, for the same amount sent out, we received an equal amount of consumable goods in return.

It is but a very small part of this importation which, it can be supposed, is employed as an annual addition, either to the plate or to the coin of the kingdom. The rest must all be sent abroad, and exchanged for con[Pg 224]sumable goods of some kind or other. But if those consumable goods were purchased directly with the produce of English industry, it would be more for the advantage of England, than first to purchase with that produce the gold of Portugal, and afterwards to purchase with that gold those consumable goods. A direct foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous than a round-about one; and to bring the same value of foreign goods to the home market, requires a much smaller capital in the one way than in the other. If a smaller share of its industry, therefore, had been employed in producing goods fit for the Portugal market, and a greater in producing those fit for the other markets, where those consumable goods for which there is a demand in Great Britain are to be had, it would have been more for the advantage of England. To procure both the gold which it wants for its own use, and the consumable goods, would, in this way, employ a much smaller capital than at present. There would be a spare capital, therefore, to be employed for other purposes, in exciting an additional quantity of industry, and in raising a greater annual produce.

Only a small portion of this import is likely used as an annual addition to either the silver or the currency of the kingdom. The rest is probably sent abroad to be exchanged for consumable goods of some sort. However, if those consumable goods were bought directly with the output of English industry, it would benefit England more than first purchasing gold from Portugal and then using that gold to buy the consumable goods. A direct trade for consumables is always more beneficial than an indirect one; bringing the same value of foreign goods to the local market requires much less capital in one method than the other. If a smaller share of its industry had been used to produce goods suitable for the Portuguese market and a larger share for those that are in demand in other markets supplying consumable goods for Great Britain, it would have been more advantageous for England. Acquiring both the gold needed for its own use and the consumable goods this way would use much less capital than it does now. Therefore, there would be extra capital available to invest in other purposes, which could stimulate more industry and increase overall production.

Though Britain were entirely excluded from the Portugal trade, it could find very little difficulty in procuring all the annual supplies of gold which it wants, either for the purposes of plate, or of coin, or of foreign trade. Gold, like every other commodity, is always somewhere or another to be got for its value by those who have that value to give for it. The annual surplus of gold in Portugal, besides, would still be sent abroad, and though not carried away by Great Britain, would be carried away by some other nation, which would be glad to sell it again for its price, in the same manner as Great Britain does at present. In buying gold of Portugal, indeed, we buy it at the first hand; whereas, in buying it of any other nation, except Spain, we should buy it at the second, and might pay somewhat dearer. This difference, however, would surely be too insignificant to deserve the public attention.

Even if Britain were completely shut out of the Portugal trade, it wouldn't have much trouble getting all the gold it needs each year, whether for jewelry, coins, or international trade. Gold, like anything else, is always available for its value to those willing to pay for it. Moreover, Portugal's annual surplus of gold would still be exported, and even if Great Britain didn't take it, another country would gladly purchase it and resell it for a profit, just like Great Britain does now. When we buy gold from Portugal, we are buying it directly; however, if we buy it from another country, except Spain, we would be buying it indirectly and might end up paying a bit more. Still, this difference would likely be too minor to warrant public concern.

Almost all our gold, it is said, comes from Portugal. With other nations, the balance of trade is either against us, or not much in our favour. But we should remember, that the more gold we import from one country, the less we must necessarily import from all others. The effectual demand for gold, like that for every other commodity, is in every country limited to a certain quantity. If nine-tenths of this quantity are imported from one country, there remains a tenth only to be imported from all others. The more gold, besides, that is annually imported from some particular countries, over and above what is requisite for plate and for coin, the more must necessarily be exported to some others: and the more that most insignificant object of modern policy, the balance of trade, appears to be in our favour with some particular countries, the more it must necessarily appear to be against us with many others.

Almost all our gold, it’s said, comes from Portugal. With other countries, the balance of trade is either against us or not much in our favor. But we should remember that the more gold we import from one country, the less we need to import from all others. The effective demand for gold, like for any other commodity, is limited to a certain quantity in every country. If nine-tenths of this quantity comes from one country, only a tenth is left to be imported from others. Additionally, the more gold we import annually from certain countries, beyond what’s needed for jewelry and coins, the more we have to export to others: and the more the often insignificant concern of modern policy, the balance of trade, seems to be in our favor with some specific countries, the more it must necessarily look against us with many others.

It was upon this silly notion, however, that England could not subsist without the Portugal trade, that, towards the end of the late war, France and Spain, without pretending either offence or provocation, required the king of Portugal to exclude all British ships from his ports, and, for the security of this exclusion, to receive into them French or Spanish garrisons. Had the king of Portugal submitted to those ignominious terms which his brother-in-law the king of Spain proposed to him, Britain would have been freed from a much greater inconveniency than the loss of the Portugal trade, the burden of supporting a very weak ally, so unprovided of every thing for his own defence, that the whole power of England, had it been directed to that single purpose, could scarce, perhaps, have defended him for another campaign. The loss of the Portugal trade would, no doubt, have occasioned a considerable embarrassment to the merchants at that time engaged in it, who might not, perhaps, have found out, for a year or two, any other equally advantageous method of employing their capitals; and in this would probably have consisted all the inconveniency which England could have suffered from this notable piece of commercial policy.

It was based on this silly idea that England couldn't survive without the Portugal trade that, towards the end of the last war, France and Spain, without claiming any offense or provocation, asked the king of Portugal to ban all British ships from his ports and, to ensure this ban, to allow French or Spanish troops into them. If the king of Portugal had accepted those shameful terms proposed by his brother-in-law, the king of Spain, Britain would have been rid of a much bigger problem than just losing the Portugal trade: it would have also been relieved of the burden of supporting a very weak ally, who was so ill-prepared for his own defense that even the full power of England, if focused solely on that goal, might not have been able to protect him for another campaign. Losing the Portugal trade would have definitely caused significant trouble for the merchants involved at that time, who might not have easily found another equally profitable way to invest their money for a year or two. This would likely have been the extent of the issues England would have faced from this notable commercial strategy.

The great annual importation of gold and silver is neither for the purpose of plate nor of coin, but of foreign trade. A round-about foreign trade of consumption can be carried on more advantageously by means of these metals than of almost any other goods. As they are the universal instruments of commerce, they are more readily received in return for all commodities than any other goods; and, on account of their small bulk and great value, it costs less to transport them backward and forward from one place to another than almost any other sort of merchandize, and they lose less of their value by being so transported. Of all the commodities, therefore, which are bought in one foreign country, for no other purpose but to be sold or exchanged again for some other goods in another, there are none so convenient as gold and silver. In facilitating all the different round-about foreign trades of consumption which are carried on in Great Britain, consists the principal advantage of the Portugal trade; and though it is not a capital advantage, it is, no doubt, a considerable one.

The large yearly import of gold and silver isn't for making jewelry or coins, but for international trade. Indirect trade for consumption can be done more effectively using these metals than almost any other goods. Since they are the universal tools of commerce, they are accepted in exchange for all kinds of products more easily than other goods. Additionally, due to their small size and high value, it's cheaper to transport them back and forth than almost any other type of merchandise, and they lose less value during transportation. Therefore, of all the items bought in one foreign country only to be sold or exchanged for other goods in another, none are as convenient as gold and silver. The main advantage of the Portugal trade lies in facilitating all the different indirect foreign trades for consumption carried out in Great Britain; while it may not be a fundamental advantage, it is certainly a significant one.

That any annual addition which, it can reasonably be supposed, is made either to the plate or to the coin of the kingdom, could require but a very small annual importation of gold and silver, seems evident enough; and[Pg 225] though we had no direct trade with Portugal, this small quantity could always, somewhere or another, be very easily got.

That any yearly increase that can reasonably be assumed to be added to the plate or coin of the kingdom would only need a very small annual import of gold and silver seems pretty clear; and[Pg 225] even though we didn't have direct trade with Portugal, this small amount could always be obtained quite easily from somewhere.

Though the goldsmiths trade be very considerable in Great Britain, the far greater part of the new plate which they annually sell, is made from other old plate melted down; so that the addition annually made to the whole plate of the kingdom cannot be very great, and could require but a very small annual importation.

Although the goldsmiths' trade is quite significant in Great Britain, most of the new silverware they sell each year is created from old silverware that’s been melted down. As a result, the overall increase in the kingdom's silverware each year can't be very substantial, and only a small amount of yearly imports would be necessary.

It is the same case with the coin. Nobody imagines, I believe, that even the greater part of the annual coinage, amounting, for ten years together, before the late reformation of the gold coin, to upwards of L.800,000 a-year in gold, was an annual addition to the money before current in the kingdom. In a country where the expense of the coinage is defrayed by the government, the value of the coin, even when it contains its full standard weight of gold and silver, can never be much greater than that of an equal quantity of those metals uncoined, because it requires only the trouble of going to the mint, and the delay, perhaps, of a few weeks, to procure for any quantity of uncoined gold and silver an equal quantity of those metals in coin; but in every country the greater part of the current coin is almost always more or less worn, or otherwise degenerated from its standard. In Great Britain it was, before the late reformation, a good deal so, the gold being more than two per cent., and the silver more than eight per cent. below its standard weight. But if forty-four guineas and a-half, containing their full standard weight, a pound weight of gold, could purchase very little more than a pound weight of uncoined gold; forty-four guineas and a-half, wanting a part of their weight, could not purchase a pound weight, and something was to be added, in order to make up the deficiency. The current price of gold bullion at market, therefore, instead of being the same with the mint price, or L.46 : 14 : 6, was then about L.47 : 14s., and sometimes about L.48. When the greater part of the coin, however, was in this degenerate condition, forty-four guineas and a-half, fresh from the mint, would purchase no more goods in the market than any other ordinary guineas; because, when they came into the coffers of the merchant, being confounded with other money, they could not afterwards be distinguished without more trouble than the difference was worth. Like other guineas, they were worth no more than L.46 : 14 : 6. If thrown into the melting pot, however, they produced, without any sensible loss, a pound weight of standard gold, which could be sold at any time for between L.47 : 14s. and L.48, either in gold or silver, as fit for all the purposes of coin as that which had been melted down. There was an evident profit, therefore, in melting down new-coined money; and it was done so instantaneously, that no precaution of government could prevent it. The operations of the mint were, upon this account, somewhat like the web of Penelopé; the work that was done in the day was undone in the night. The mint was employed, not so much in making daily additions to the coin, as in replacing the very best part of it, which was daily melted down.

It’s the same with coins. I don’t think anyone believes that even the majority of the annual coin production, which added up to over £800,000 a year in gold for ten years before the recent gold coin reform, was an actual increase in the money circulating in the kingdom. In a country where the government covers the cost of minting, the value of coins, even when they have their full standard weight of gold and silver, can never be much higher than an equivalent amount of those metals uncoined, because it only takes the effort of going to the mint and maybe a few weeks of waiting to exchange any amount of uncoined gold and silver for an equal amount of coins. But in every country, the majority of the coins in circulation are usually somewhat worn or diminished from their standard quality. In Great Britain, before the recent reform, this was quite common, with gold being more than two percent, and silver more than eight percent, below its standard weight. If forty-four and a half guineas, with their full standard weight of one pound of gold, could buy very little more than a pound of uncoined gold, then forty-four and a half guineas that were missing some weight wouldn’t be able to buy a full pound, and something extra would need to be added to make up the difference. The current market price of gold bullion, therefore, instead of matching the mint price of £46:14:6, was around £47:14, and sometimes even about £48. However, when most of the coins were in this degraded state, forty-four and a half guineas fresh from the mint would not buy any more goods in the market than any other ordinary guineas; once they entered the merchant's coffers, they got mixed with other money and could hardly be distinguished without more effort than the difference was worth. Just like other guineas, they were worth no more than £46:14:6. If melted down, they produced, with no noticeable loss, a pound of standard gold, which could be sold at any time for between £47:14 and £48, either in gold or silver, just as suitable for all the uses of coins as that which had been melted down before. There was clearly a profit in melting down newly minted money; and it happened so quickly that no government measures could prevent it. The mint's operations resembled Penelope's web; the work completed during the day was undone at night. The mint wasn’t so much focused on producing daily increases in coin but rather on replacing the best part of it, which was constantly being melted down.

Were the private people who carry their gold and silver to the mint to pay themselves for the coinage, it would add to the value of those metals, in the same manner as the fashion does to that of plate. Coined gold and silver would be more valuable than uncoined. The seignorage, if it was not exorbitant, would add to the bullion the whole value of the duty; because, the government having everywhere the exclusive privilege of coining, no coin can come to market cheaper than they think proper to afford it. If the duty was exorbitant, indeed, that is, if it was very much above the real value of the labour and expense requisite for coinage, false coiners, both at home and abroad, might be encouraged, by the great difference between the value of bullion and that of coin, to pour in so great a quantity of counterfeit money as might reduce the value of the government money. In France, however, though the seignorage is eight per cent., no sensible inconveniency of this kind is found to arise from it. The dangers to which a false coiner is everywhere exposed, if he lives in the country of which he counterfeits the coin, and to which his agents or correspondents are exposed, if he lives in a foreign country, are by far too great to be incurred for the sake of a profit of six or seven per cent.

If private individuals took their gold and silver to the mint to get coins made for themselves, it would increase the value of those metals, just like fashion boosts the value of silverware. Coined gold and silver would be worth more than uncoined. The minting fee, if it wasn't excessive, would add the full value of the fee to the bullion; since the government has the sole right to coin money, no coin can be sold for less than they decide. If the fee was too high, meaning much more than the actual cost of labor and materials for minting, it could encourage counterfeiters, both at home and abroad, to flood the market with fake money, lowering the value of government-issued coins. However, in France, even though the minting fee is eight percent, there aren't any significant issues arising from it. The risks faced by counterfeiters in their own country, or by their associates in a foreign country, are far too great for them to take on for a profit of six or seven percent.

The seignorage in France raises the value of the coin higher than in proportion to the quantity of pure gold which it contains. Thus, by the edict of January 1726, the[41] mint price of fine gold of twenty-four carats was fixed at seven hundred and forty livres nine sous and one denier one-eleventh the mark of eight Paris ounces. The gold coin of France, making an allowance for the remedy of the mint, contains twenty-one carats and three-fourths of fine gold, and two carats one-fourth of alloy. The mark of standard gold, therefore, is worth no more than about six hundred and seventy-one livres ten deniers. But in France this mark of standard gold is coined into thirty louis d'ors of twenty-four livres each, or into seven hundred and twenty livres. The coinage, therefore, increases the value of a mark of standard gold bullion, by the difference between six hundred and seventy-one livres ten deniers and seven hundred and twenty livres, or by forty-eight livres nineteen sous and two deniers.

The seigniorage in France increases the value of the coin more than the amount of pure gold it actually contains. According to the edict of January 1726, the mint price of fine gold at twenty-four carats was set at seven hundred and forty livres, nine sous, and one denier one-eleventh for the mark of eight Paris ounces. The gold coin in France, after accounting for the mint's adjustments, includes twenty-one carats and three-fourths of fine gold, with two carats one-fourth of alloy. Therefore, a mark of standard gold is worth about six hundred and seventy-one livres and ten deniers. However, in France, this mark of standard gold is minted into thirty louis d'or, each worth twenty-four livres, totaling seven hundred and twenty livres. As a result, the coinage increases the value of a mark of standard gold bullion by the difference between six hundred and seventy-one livres ten deniers and seven hundred and twenty livres, which amounts to forty-eight livres nineteen sous and two deniers.

A seignorage will, in many cases, take away altogether, and will in all cases diminish, the profit of melting down the new coin. This profit always arises from the difference between the quantity of bullion which the common currency ought to contain and that which it actually does contain. If this difference is less than the seignorage, there will be loss instead of profit. If it is equal to the seignorage, there will be neither profit nor loss. If it is greater than the seignorage, there will, indeed, be some profit, but less than if there was no seignorage. If, before the late reformation of the gold coin, for example, there had been a seignorage of five per cent. upon the coinage, there would have been a loss of three per cent. upon the melting down of the gold coin. If the seignorage had been two per cent, there would have been neither profit nor loss. If the seignorage had been one per cent., there would have been a profit but of one per cent. only, instead of two per cent. Wherever money is received by tale, therefore, and not by weight, a seignorage is the most effectual preventive of the melting down of the coin, and, for the same reason, of its exportation. It is the best and heaviest pieces that are commonly either melted down or exported, because it is upon such that the largest profits are made.

A seignorage will, in many cases, completely eliminate, and in all cases reduce, the profit from melting down new coins. This profit comes from the difference between the amount of bullion that the common currency should contain and the amount it actually does. If this difference is less than the seignorage, there will be a loss instead of a profit. If it equals the seignorage, there will be neither profit nor loss. If it is greater than the seignorage, there will be some profit, but less than if there were no seignorage. For example, if there had been a seignorage of five percent on the coinage before the recent reform of the gold coin, there would have been a loss of three percent from melting down the gold coin. If the seignorage had been two percent, there would have been no profit or loss. If the seignorage had been one percent, there would have been a profit, but only of one percent instead of two percent. Therefore, wherever money is received by count and not by weight, a seignorage is the most effective deterrent against melting down the coin and, for the same reason, its exportation. It's the best and heaviest pieces that are usually melted down or exported, because that's where the largest profits are made.

The law for the encouragement of the coinage, by rendering it duty-free, was first enacted during the reign of Charles II. for a limited time, and afterwards continued, by different prolongations, till 1769, when it was rendered perpetual. The bank of England, in order to replenish their coffers with money, are frequently obliged to carry bullion to the mint; and it was more for their interest, they probably imagined, that the coinage should be at the expense of the government than at their own. It was probably out of complaisance to this great company, that the government agreed to render this law perpetual. Should the custom of weighing gold, however, come to be disused, as it is very likely to be on account of its inconveniency; should the gold coin of England come to be received by tale, as it was before the late recoinage, this great company may, perhaps, find that they have, upon this, as upon some other occasions, mistaken their own interest not a little.

The law promoting coinage by making it duty-free was first passed during Charles II's reign for a limited time and later extended in various ways until 1769, when it became permanent. The Bank of England, looking to boost its funds, often needs to bring bullion to the mint. They probably thought it was more beneficial for the government to cover the costs of coinage rather than themselves. It’s likely this was done out of goodwill towards the bank that the government agreed to make the law permanent. However, if the practice of weighing gold were to stop, which seems likely due to its inconvenience, and if English gold coins were accepted by quantity again, like before the recent recoinage, this major bank might realize that they have, as in some other instances, misjudged their own interests quite a bit.

Before the late recoinage, when the gold currency of England was two per cent. below its standard weight, as there was no seignorage, it was two per cent. below the value of that quantity of standard gold bullion which it ought to have contained. When this great company, therefore, bought gold bullion in order to have it coined, they were obliged to pay for it two per cent. more than it was worth after the coinage. But if there had been a seignorage of two per cent upon the coinage, the common gold currency, though two per cent. below its standard weight, would, notwithstanding, have been equal in value to the quantity of standard gold which it ought to have contained; the value of the fashion compensating in this case the diminuation of the weight. They would, indeed, have had the seignorage to pay, which being two per cent., their loss upon the whole transaction would have been two per cent., exactly the same, but no greater than it actually was.

Before the late recoinage, when the gold currency of England was two percent below its standard weight, and there was no seignorage, it was also two percent below the value of the amount of standard gold bullion it should have contained. Therefore, when this large company bought gold bullion to have it coined, they had to pay two percent more than its worth after the coinage. However, if there had been a two percent seignorage on the coinage, the common gold currency, even though two percent below its standard weight, would have been equal in value to the amount of standard gold it should have contained; the value of appearance would have balanced out the reduction in weight. They would, in fact, have had to pay the seignorage, which being two percent, would mean their overall loss on the entire transaction would still be two percent, exactly the same as it actually was, but no greater.

If the seignorage had been five per cent., and the gold currency only two per cent. below its standard weight, the bank would, in this case, have gained three per cent. upon the price of the bullion; but as they would have had a seignorage of five per cent. to pay upon the coinage, their loss upon the whole transaction would, in the same manner, have been exactly two per cent.

If the seignorage had been five percent, and the gold currency was only two percent below its standard weight, the bank would have gained three percent on the price of the bullion. However, since they would have had to pay a seignorage of five percent on the coinage, their overall loss on the whole transaction would have been exactly two percent.

If the seignorage had been only one per cent., and the gold currency two per cent. below its standard weight, the bank would, in this case, have lost only one per cent. upon the price of the bullion; but as they would likewise have had a seignorage of one per cent. to pay, their loss upon the whole transaction would have been exactly two per cent., in the same manner as in all other cases.

If the seignorage had only been one percent, and the gold currency was two percent below its standard weight, the bank would have lost just one percent on the price of the bullion. However, since they would also have to pay a seignorage of one percent, their total loss on the whole transaction would have been exactly two percent, just like in all other cases.

If there was a reasonable seignorage, while at the same time the coin contained its full standard weight, as it has done very nearly since the late recoinage, whatever the bank might lose by the seignorage, they would gain upon the price of the bullion; and whatever they might gain upon the price of the bullion, they would lose by the seignorage. They would neither lose nor gain, therefore, upon the whole transaction, and they would, in this, as in all the foregoing cases, be exactly in the same situation as if there was no seignorage.

If there was a reasonable seignorage, and the coin still had its full standard weight, as it has almost always done since the last recoinage, any losses the bank faced from the seignorage would be compensated by gains from the price of the bullion. Conversely, any gains from the bullion price would result in losses from the seignorage. Overall, they would break even in the entire transaction, just as they would in all the previous examples, putting them in the same position as if there was no seignorage at all.

When the tax upon a commodity is so moderate as not to encourage smuggling, the merchant who deals in it, though he advances, does not properly pay the tax, as he gets it back in the price of the commodity. The tax is finally paid by the last purchaser or consumer. But money is a commodity, with regard to which every man is a merchant. Nobody buys it but in order to sell it again; and with regard to it there is, in ordinary cases, no last purchaser or consumer. When the tax upon coinage, therefore, is so moderate as not to encourage false coining, though every body advances the tax, nobody finally pays it; because every body gets it back in the advanced value of the coin.

When the tax on a product is low enough to avoid encouraging smuggling, the merchant who sells it does not actually pay the tax, since he recoups it in the selling price. Ultimately, the tax is paid by the final buyer or consumer. However, money itself is like a product where everyone is a seller. No one buys it without intending to sell it again; and typically, there isn’t a final buyer or consumer for it. Therefore, when the tax on coinage is low enough to prevent counterfeiting, even though everyone pays the tax initially, no one ends up paying it in the end because everyone gets it back through the increased value of the coin.

A moderate seignorage, therefore, would not, in any case, augment the expense of the bank, or of any other private persons who carry their bullion to the mint in order to be coined; and the want of a moderate seignorage does not in any case diminish it. Whether there is or is not a seignorage, if the cur[Pg 227]rency contains its full standard weight, the coinage costs nothing to any body; and if it is short of that weight, the coinage must always cost the difference between the quantity of bullion which ought to be contained in it, and that which actually is contained in it.

A moderate seigniorage, therefore, would not, in any case, increase the cost for the bank or for any private individuals who take their bullion to the mint to be coining; and the lack of a moderate seigniorage does not reduce that cost either. Whether there is a seigniorage or not, if the currency has its full standard weight, coining costs nothing for anyone; and if it falls short of that weight, coining will always cost the difference between the amount of bullion it should contain and what it actually contains.

The government, therefore, when it defrays the expense of coinage, not only incurs some small expense, but loses some small revenue which it might get by a proper duty; and neither the bank, nor any other private persons, are in the smallest degree benefited by this useless piece of public generosity.

The government, therefore, when it covers the cost of coinage, not only takes on a small expense but also misses out on some small revenue it could gain from a proper tax; and neither the bank nor any private individuals benefit at all from this pointless act of public generosity.

The directors of the bank, however, would probably be unwilling to agree to the imposition of a seignorage upon the authority of a speculation which promises them no gain, but only pretends to insure them from any loss. In the present state of the gold coin, and as long as it continues to be received by weight, they certainly would gain nothing by such a change. But if the custom of weighing the gold coin should ever go into disuse, as it is very likely to do, and if the gold coin should ever fall into the same state of degradation in which it was before the late recoinage, the gain, or more properly the savings, of the bank, in consequence of the imposition of a seignorage, would probably be very considerable. The bank of England is the only company which sends any considerable quantity of bullion to the mint, and the burden of the annual coinage falls entirely, or almost entirely, upon it. If this annual coinage had nothing to do but to repair the unavoidable losses and necessary wear and tear of the coin, it could seldom exceed fifty thousand, or at most a hundred thousand pounds. But when the coin is degraded below its standard weight, the annual coinage must, besides this, fill up the large vacuities which exportation and the melting pot are continually making in the current coin. It was upon this account, that during the ten or twelve years immediately preceding the late reformation of the gold coin, the annual coinage amounted, at an average, to more than L.850,000. But if there had been a seignorage of four or five per cent. upon the gold coin, it would probably, even in the state in which things then were, have put an effectual stop to the business both of exportation and of the melting pot. The bank, instead of losing every year about two and a half per cent. upon the bullion which was to be coined into more than eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds, or incurring an annual loss of more than twenty-one thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, would not probably have incurred the tenth part of that loss.

The bank's directors would likely be reluctant to agree to a seignorage based on a speculation that offers them no profit and merely claims to protect them from any loss. As long as gold coins are still accepted by weight, they certainly wouldn't benefit from such a change. However, if the practice of weighing gold coins ever fell out of favor—and it’s quite possible that it will—and if gold coins were to degrade to the same state they were in before the recent recoinage, then the bank's savings from implementing a seignorage could be substantial. The Bank of England is the only institution that sends a significant amount of bullion to the mint, and the responsibility for annual coinage largely falls on it. If the annual coinage only had to address inevitable losses and normal wear and tear, it would usually not exceed fifty thousand to a maximum of a hundred thousand pounds. But when coins drop below their standard weight, the annual coinage also has to replace the large gaps created by exports and melting. This is why, in the ten to twelve years leading up to the recent reform of gold coins, the annual coinage averaged over £850,000. If there had been a seignorage of four to five percent on gold coins back then, it would likely have effectively stopped both exportation and melting. Instead of losing about two and a half percent on the bullion meant to be coined into more than £850,000 each year, or facing an annual loss of over £21,250, the bank probably wouldn't have lost even a tenth of that amount.

The revenue allotted by parliament for defraying the expense of the coinage is but fourteen thousand pounds a-year; and the real expense which it costs the government, or the fees of the officers of the mint, do not, upon ordinary occasions, I am assured, exceed the half of that sum. The saving of so very small a sum, or even the gaining of another, which could not well be much larger, are objects too inconsiderable, it may be thought, to deserve the serious attention of government. But the saving of eighteen or twenty thousand pounds a-year, in case of an event which is not improbable, which has frequently happened before, and which in very likely to happen again, is surely an object which well deserves the serious attention, even of so great a company as the bank of England.

The funding provided by parliament to cover the cost of producing coins is only fourteen thousand pounds a year; and the actual expenses incurred by the government, or the fees paid to the mint officials, usually don’t exceed half that amount, I’m told. The savings from such a small amount, or even the potential to gain a slightly larger sum, might seem too trivial to warrant serious attention from the government. However, saving eighteen or twenty thousand pounds a year, in the event of a situation that isn’t unlikely, has happened before, and is quite likely to occur again, is definitely an issue that deserves the serious attention of an important institution like the Bank of England.

Some of the foregoing reasonings and observations might, perhaps, have been more properly placed in those chapters of the first book which treat of the origin and use of money, and of the difference between the real and the nominal price of commodities. But as the law for the encouragement of coinage derives its origin from these vulgar prejudices which have been introduced by the mercantile system, I judged it more proper to reserve them for this chapter. Nothing could be more agreeable to the spirit of that system than a sort of bounty upon the production of money, the very thing which, it supposes, constitutes the wealth of every nation. It is one of its many admirable expedients for enriching the country.

Some of the previous thoughts and observations might have made more sense in the chapters of the first book that discuss the origin and use of money, and the difference between the real and nominal prices of goods. However, since the law designed to encourage coinage comes from these common misconceptions introduced by the mercantile system, I felt it was more appropriate to include them in this chapter. Nothing aligns better with the spirit of that system than a sort of reward for producing money, which it assumes is the basis of every nation’s wealth. It’s one of its many clever strategies for enriching the country.


CHAP. VII.

OF COLONIES.

PART I.

Of the Motives for Establishing New Colonies.

The interest which occasioned the first settlement of the different European colonies in America and the West Indies, was not altogether so plain and distinct as that which directed the establishment of those of ancient Greece and Rome.

The interest that led to the first settlements of various European colonies in America and the West Indies was not as clear-cut and obvious as the reasons behind the founding of those in ancient Greece and Rome.

All the different states of ancient Greece possessed, each of them, but a very small territory; and when the people in any one of them multiplied beyond what that territory could easily maintain, a part of them were sent in quest of a new habitation, in some remote and distant part of the world; the war-like neighbours who surrounded them on all sides, rendering it difficult for any of them to enlarge very much its territory at home. The colonies of the Dorians resorted chiefly to Italy and Sicily, which, in the times preceding the foundation of Rome, were inhabited by barbarous and uncivilized nations; those of the Ionians and Æolians, the two other great tribes of the Greeks, to Asia Minor and[Pg 228] the islands of the Ægean sea, of which the inhabitants seem at that time to have been pretty much in the same state as those of Sicily and Italy. The mother city, though she considered the colony as a child, at all times entitled to great favour and assistance, and owing in return much gratitude and respect, yet considered it as an emancipated child, over whom she pretended to claim no direct authority or jurisdiction. The colony settled its own form of government, enacted its own laws, elected its own magistrates, and made peace or war with its neighbours, as an independent state, which had no occasion to wait for the approbation or consent of the mother city. Nothing can be more plain and distinct than the interest which directed every such establishment.

All the different states of ancient Greece each had very small territories. When the population in any one of them grew beyond what that area could easily support, some people would be sent to find a new place to live in some far-off part of the world. Their war-like neighbors surrounded them on all sides, making it tough for any of them to significantly expand their territory at home. The Dorian colonies mainly settled in Italy and Sicily, which, before the founding of Rome, were inhabited by barbaric and uncivilized people. The Ionians and Aeolians, the other two major tribes of Greeks, moved to Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean Sea, where the inhabitants were likely in a similar state to those in Sicily and Italy at that time. The mother city viewed the colony as a child, always deserving of support and aid, and in return, the colony owed a lot of gratitude and respect. However, the mother city treated it as an independent child, claiming no direct authority or jurisdiction over it. The colony set up its own government, made its own laws, elected its own officials, and engaged in peace or war with its neighbors as an independent state, without needing to wait for approval or consent from the mother city. The interests guiding each establishment couldn't be clearer.

Rome, like most of the other ancient republics, was originally founded upon an agrarian law, which divided the public territory, in a certain proportion, among the different citizens who composed the state. The course of human affairs, by marriage, by succession, and by alienation, necessarily deranged this original division, and frequently threw the lands which had been allotted for the maintenance of many different families, into the possession of a single person. To remedy this disorder, for such it was supposed to be, a law was made, restricting the quantity of land which any citizen could possess to five hundred jugera, about 350 English acres. This law, however, though we read of its having been executed upon one or two occasions, was either neglected or evaded, and the inequality of fortunes went on continually increasing. The greater part of the citizens had no land; and without it the manners and customs of those times rendered it difficult for a freeman to maintain his independency. In the present times, though a poor man has no land of his own, if he has a little stock, he may either farm the lands of another, or he may carry on some little retail trade; and if he has no stock, he may find employment either as a country labourer, or as an artificer. But among the ancient Romans, the lands of the rich were all cultivated by slaves, who wrought under an overseer, who was likewise a slave; so that a poor freeman had little chance of being employed either as a farmer or as a labourer. All trades and manufactures, too, even the retail trade, were carried on by the slaves of the rich for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, authority, and protection, made it difficult for a poor freeman to maintain the competition against them. The citizens, therefore, who had no land, had scarce any other means of subsistence but the bounties of the candidates at the annual elections. The tribunes, when they had a mind to animate the people against the rich and the great, put them in mind of the ancient divisions of lands, and represented that law which restricted this sort of private property as the fundamental law of the republic. The people became clamorous to get land, and the rich and the great, we may believe, were perfectly determined not to give them any part of theirs. To satisfy them in some measure, therefore, they frequently proposed to send out a new colony. But conquering Rome was, even upon such occasions, under no necessity of turning out her citizens to seek their fortune, if one may so, through the wide world, without knowing where they were to settle. She assigned them lands generally in the conquered provinces of Italy, where, being within the dominions of the republic, they could never form any independent state, but were at best but a sort of corporation, which, though it had the power of enacting bye-laws for its own government, was at all times subject to the correction, jurisdiction, and legislative authority of the mother city. The sending out a colony of this kind not only gave some satisfaction to the people, but often established a sort of garrison, too, in a newly conquered province, of which the obedience might otherwise have been doubtful. A Roman colony, therefore, whether we consider the nature of the establishment itself, or the motives for making it, was altogether different from a Greek one. The words, accordingly, which in the original languages denote those different establishments, have very different meanings. The Latin word (colonia) signifies simply a plantation. The Greek word (αποικια), on the contrary, signifies a separation of dwelling, a departure from home, a going out of the house. But though the Roman colonies were, in many respects, different from the Greek ones, the interest which prompted to establish them was equally plain and distinct. Both institutions derived their origin, either from irresistible necessity, or from clear and evident utility.

Rome, like most other ancient republics, was originally based on an agrarian law that divided public land among the citizens of the state in a specific proportion. Over time, due to marriage, inheritance, and transfer, this initial distribution became chaotic, often resulting in lands that were meant for several families ending up in the hands of a single individual. To address this disorder, which was seen as a problem, a law was enacted that limited the land any citizen could own to five hundred jugera, roughly 350 English acres. However, this law, while reported to be enforced a couple of times, was mostly ignored or avoided, leading to increasing inequality in wealth. Most citizens ended up with no land, and during those times, it was challenging for a free person to maintain independence without land. Nowadays, even if a poor person doesn't own land, they can either farm someone else's land or engage in some small retail trade; and if they have no resources at all, they can find work as a laborer or skilled worker. But in ancient Rome, the lands of the wealthy were tended by slaves, overseen by another slave, leaving free poor individuals with little chance to work as farmers or laborers. All trades, including retail, were conducted by the slaves of the rich for their masters' benefit, making it hard for a poor free person to compete against them. Therefore, citizens who had no land relied heavily on the handouts from candidates during the annual elections. When tribunes wanted to rally the people against the wealthy, they reminded them of the original land distributions and presented the law limiting private property as the cornerstone of the republic. This stirred the people to demand land, while the wealthy were determined not to part with theirs. To appease them somewhat, the wealthy often proposed sending out a new colony. However, Rome, even in those situations, wasn't compelled to send out its citizens to seek their fortunes in the unknown; instead, it typically allocated lands in the conquered provinces of Italy, where they remained under the republic's rule and couldn't form an independent state, merely existing as a type of corporation with the power to create its own regulations, yet still subject to the oversight and legislative power of the mother city. Establishing such a colony not only somewhat satisfied the populace but also served as a military outpost in newly conquered regions where loyalty might have otherwise been uncertain. Therefore, a Roman colony was fundamentally different from a Greek one, both in the nature of its establishment and its motivations. The terms in their respective languages reflect this distinction: the Latin word (colonia) simply means a settlement or plantation, while the Greek word (αποικια) implies separation, leaving home, or moving away. Though Roman colonies differed in many ways from Greek ones, the motives behind their establishment were equally clear and straightforward. Both originated from a necessity that could not be ignored or a utility that was evident.

The establishment of the European colonies in America and the West Indies arose from no necessity; and though the utility which has resulted from them has been very great, it is not altogether so clear and evident. It was not understood at their first establishment, and was not the motive, either of that establishment, or of the discoveries which gave occasion to it; and the nature, extent, and limits of that utility, are not, perhaps, well understood at this day.

The creation of European colonies in America and the West Indies wasn't driven by necessity; while the benefits that have come from them have been significant, they aren't completely obvious or straightforward. At the time these colonies were first established, their value wasn't recognized, and it wasn't the motivation behind their creation or the discoveries that led to them. Today, the nature, scope, and boundaries of those benefits might still not be fully understood.

The Venetians, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, carried on a very advantageous commerce in spiceries and other East India goods, which they distributed among the other nations of Europe. They purchased them chiefly in Egypt, at that time under the dominion of the Mamelukes, the enemies of the Turks, of whom the Venetians were the enemies: and this union of interest, assisted by[Pg 229] the money of Venice, formed such a connexion as gave the Venetians almost a monopoly of the trade.

The Venetians, during the 14th and 15th centuries, conducted a highly profitable trade in spices and other East India goods, which they distributed among the various nations of Europe. They mainly bought these goods in Egypt, which at the time was controlled by the Mamelukes, who were opponents of the Turks, with whom the Venetians also had a rivalry. This shared interest, backed by Venice's wealth, created a connection that nearly gave the Venetians a monopoly on the trade.

The great profits of the Venetians tempted the avidity of the Portuguese. They had been endeavouring, during the course of the fifteenth century, to find out by sea a way to the countries from which the Moors brought them ivory and gold dust across the desert. They discovered the Madeiras, the Canaries, the Azores, the Cape de Verd islands, the coast of Guinea, that of Loango, Congo, Angola, and Benguela, and, finally, the Cape of Good Hope. They had long wished to share in the profitable traffic of the Venetians, and this last discovery opened to them a probable prospect of doing so. In 1497, Vasco de Gamo sailed from the port of Lisbon with a fleet of four ships, and, after a navigation of eleven months, arrived upon the coast of Indostan; and thus completed a course of discoveries which had been pursued with great steadiness, and with very little interruption, for near a century together.

The huge profits of the Venetians drew the attention of the eager Portuguese. Throughout the 15th century, they had been trying to find a sea route to the countries where the Moors brought them ivory and gold dust through the desert. They discovered the Madeiras, the Canaries, the Azores, the Cape Verde islands, the coast of Guinea, Loango, Congo, Angola, Benguela, and finally, the Cape of Good Hope. They had long wanted to participate in the lucrative trade of the Venetians, and this last discovery gave them a promising chance to do so. In 1497, Vasco de Gama set sail from the port of Lisbon with a fleet of four ships, and after eleven months at sea, he reached the coast of India; thus completing a series of discoveries that had been pursued steadily, with very few interruptions, for nearly a century.

Some years before this, while the expectations of Europe were in suspense about the projects of the Portuguese, of which the success appeared yet to be doubtful, a Genoese pilot formed the yet more daring project of sailing to the East Indies by the west. The situation of those countries was at that time very imperfectly known in Europe. The few European travellers who had been there, had magnified the distance, perhaps through simplicity and ignorance; what was really very great, appearing almost infinite to those who could not measure it; or, perhaps, in order to increase somewhat more the marvellous of their own adventures in visiting regions so immensely remote from Europe. The longer the way was by the east, Columbus very justly concluded, the shorter it would be by the west. He proposed, therefore, to take that way, as both the shortest and the surest, and he had the good fortune to convince Isabella of Castile of the probability of his project. He sailed from the port of Palos in August 1492, near five years before the expedition of Vasco de Gamo set out from Portugal; and, after a voyage of between two and three months, discovered first some of the small Bahama or Lucyan islands, and afterwards the great island of St. Domingo.

Some years earlier, while Europe was uncertain about the plans of the Portuguese, which seemed doubtful, a Genoese pilot came up with an even bolder idea of sailing to the East Indies by heading west. At that time, Europe had very little accurate information about those countries. The few European travelers who had been there had exaggerated the distance, possibly out of naivety and ignorance; what was truly vast seemed almost infinite to those who couldn't measure it, or perhaps to make their own adventures in such remote regions sound more extraordinary. Columbus rightly concluded that the longer route to the East was the eastward path, so the shorter and more reliable route would be westward. He decided to take that route, believing it to be both the quickest and the safest, and he was fortunate enough to persuade Isabella of Castile of the likelihood of his plan. He set sail from the port of Palos in August 1492, nearly five years before Vasco de Gama's expedition left Portugal; and after a journey of about two to three months, he first discovered some of the small Bahama or Lucayan islands, and later the large island of St. Domingo.

But the countries which Columbus discovered, either in this or in any of his subsequent voyages, had no resemblance to those which he had gone in quest of. Instead of the wealth, cultivation, and populousness of China and Indostan, he found, in St. Domingo, and in all the other parts of the new world which he ever visited, nothing but a country quite covered with wood, uncultivated, and inhabited only by some tribes of naked and miserable savages. He was not very willing, however, to believe that they were not the same with some of the countries described by Marco Polo, the first European who had visited, or at least had left behind him any description of China or the East Indies; and a very slight resemblance, such as that which he found between the name of Cibao, a mountain in St. Domingo, and that of Cipange, mentioned by Marco Polo, was frequently sufficient to make him return to this favourite prepossession, though contrary to the clearest evidence. In his letters to Ferdinand and Isabella, he called the countries which he had discovered the Indies. He entertained no doubt but that they were the extremity of those which had been described by Marco Polo, and that they were not very distant from the Ganges, or from the countries which had been conquered by Alexander. Even when at last convinced that they were different, he still flattered himself that those rich countries were at no great distance; and in a subsequent voyage, accordingly, went in quest of them along the coast of Terra Firma, and towards the Isthmus of Darien.

But the countries Columbus discovered, whether on this journey or any of his later ones, looked nothing like what he had set out to find. Instead of the wealth, agriculture, and large populations of China and India, he found, in St. Domingo and all the other parts of the New World he visited, a land covered in woods, undeveloped, and inhabited only by a few tribes of naked and miserable natives. However, he was reluctant to accept that these places were not the same as those described by Marco Polo, the first European to visit, or at least leave a description of, China or the East Indies. A very slight similarity, like the connection he saw between Cibao, a mountain in St. Domingo, and Cipange mentioned by Marco Polo, was often enough to lead him back to this cherished belief, even in the face of clear evidence. In his letters to Ferdinand and Isabella, he referred to the lands he had found as the Indies. He had no doubt that they were at the edge of those identified by Marco Polo, and that they weren’t far from the Ganges or from the territories conquered by Alexander. Even when he was finally convinced that they were different, he still kept telling himself that those wealthy lands were not far away; and on a later voyage, he set out to find them along the coast of Terra Firma and toward the Isthmus of Darien.

In consequence of this mistake of Columbus, the name of the Indies has stuck to those unfortunate countries ever since; and when it was at last clearly discovered that the new were altogether different from the old Indies, the former were called the West, in contradistinction to the latter, which were called the East Indies.

As a result of Columbus's mistake, the name of the Indies has been attached to those unfortunate countries ever since; and when it was eventually discovered that the new lands were completely different from the old Indies, the former were referred to as the West, in contrast to the latter, which were called the East Indies.

It was of importance to Columbus, however, that the countries which he had discovered, whatever they were, should be represented to the court of Spain as of very great consequence; and, in what constitutes the real riches of every country, the animal and vegetable productions of the soil, there was at that time nothing which could well justify such a representation of them.

It was important to Columbus, however, that the countries he had discovered, no matter what they were, be presented to the court of Spain as highly significant; and when it comes to the true wealth of any country, the animal and plant resources of the land, there wasn't much at that time that could really support such an assertion about them.

The cori, something between a rat and a rabbit, and supposed by Mr Buffon to be the same with the aperea of Brazil, was the largest viviparous quadruped in St. Domingo. This species seems never to have been very numerous; and the dogs and cats of the Spaniards are said to have long ago almost entirely extirpated it, as well as some other tribes of a still smaller size. These, however, together with a pretty large lizard, called the ivana or iguana, constituted the principal part of the animal food which the land afforded.

The cori, which is a mix between a rat and a rabbit, and believed by Mr. Buffon to be the same as the aperea found in Brazil, was the largest land mammal in St. Domingo. This species doesn't seem to have been very common; it’s said that the dogs and cats brought by the Spaniards nearly wiped it out a long time ago, along with some smaller species. However, these animals, along with a fairly large lizard known as the ivana or iguana, made up the majority of the animal food available on the land.

The vegetable food of the inhabitants, though, from their want of industry, not very abundant, was not altogether so scanty. It consisted in Indian corn, yams, potatoes, bananas, &c., plants which were then altogether unknown in Europe, and which have never since been very much esteemed in it, or supposed to yield a sustenance equal to what is drawn from the common sorts of grain and pulse, which have been cultivated in this part of the world time out of mind.

The plant-based diet of the locals, although limited due to their lack of effort, was not completely insufficient. It included corn, yams, potatoes, bananas, and other plants that were unknown in Europe at the time and have never really gained much respect there, nor were they seen as providing the same kind of nourishment as the standard grains and legumes that have been grown in this part of the world for ages.

The cotton plant, indeed, afforded the ma[Pg 230]terial of a very important manufacture, and was at that time, to Europeans, undoubtedly the most valuable of all the vegetable productions of those islands. But though, in the end of the fifteenth century, the muslins and other cotton goods of the East Indies were much esteemed in every part of Europe, the cotton manufacture itself was not cultivated in any part of it. Even this production, therefore, could not at that time appear in the eyes of Europeans to be of very great consequence.

The cotton plant provided the material for a very important industry and was, at that time, undoubtedly the most valuable of all the plant products from those islands to Europeans. However, by the end of the fifteenth century, while muslins and other cotton goods from the East Indies were highly regarded across Europe, the actual production of cotton goods was not developed anywhere in Europe. As a result, this particular product didn’t seem very significant to Europeans at that time.

Finding nothing, either in the animals or vegetables of the newly discovered countries which could justify a very advantageous representation of them, Columbus turned his view towards their minerals; and in the richness of their productions of this third kingdom, he flattered himself he had found a full compensation for the insignificancy of those of the other two. The little bits of gold with which the inhabitants ornamented their dress, and which, he was informed, they frequently found in the rivulets and torrents which fell from the mountains, were sufficient to satisfy him that those mountains abounded with the richest gold mines. St. Domingo, therefore, was represented as a country abounding with gold, and upon that account (according to the prejudices not only of the present times, but of those times), an inexhaustible source of real wealth to the crown and kingdom of Spain. When Columbus, upon his return from his first voyage, was introduced with a sort of triumphal honours to the sovereigns of Castile and Arragon, the principal productions of the countries which he had discovered were carried in solemn procession before him. The only valuable part of them consisted in some little fillets, bracelets, and other ornaments of gold, and in some bales of cotton. The rest were mere objects of vulgar wonder and curiosity; some reeds of an extraordinary size, some birds of a very beautiful plumage, and some stuffed skins of the huge alligator and manati; all of which were preceded by six or seven of the wretched natives, whose singular colour and appearance added greatly to the novelty of the show.

Finding nothing in the animals or plants of the newly discovered lands that could justify an impressive portrayal, Columbus shifted his focus to their minerals. He convinced himself that the richness of these resources would more than make up for the lack of value in the other two categories. The small pieces of gold that the locals adorned themselves with, along with reports that they often found gold in the streams flowing from the mountains, led him to believe that those mountains were home to the richest gold mines. Therefore, St. Domingo was depicted as a land rich in gold and, due to this (according to the biases not only of the time but also of later periods), an endless source of true wealth for the crown and kingdom of Spain. When Columbus returned from his first voyage, he was welcomed with a sort of triumphant honors by the monarchs of Castile and Aragon, and the main products of the lands he had discovered were paraded before him. The only valuable items among them were a few gold fillets, bracelets, and other ornaments, as well as some bales of cotton. The rest were simply objects of common curiosity: some unusually large reeds, some beautifully plumaged birds, and some stuffed skins of the massive alligator and manatee; all of which were preceded by six or seven of the unfortunate natives, whose unique color and appearance added significantly to the spectacle.

In consequence of the representations of Columbus, the council of Castile determined to take possession of the countries of which the inhabitants were plainly incapable of defending themselves. The pious purpose of converting them to Christianity sanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of finding treasures of gold there was the sole motive which prompted to undertake it; and to give this motive the greater weight, it was proposed by Columbus, that the half of all the gold and silver that should be found there, should belong to the crown. This proposal was approved of by the council.

As a result of Columbus's representations, the council of Castile decided to take control of the lands whose inhabitants clearly couldn't defend themselves. The noble aim of converting them to Christianity justified the wrongdoing of the plan. However, the real motivation behind the expedition was the hope of discovering gold treasures. To strengthen this motive, Columbus suggested that half of all the gold and silver found would go to the crown. The council approved this proposal.

As long as the whole, or the greater part of the gold which the first adventurers imported into Europe was got by so very easy a method as the plundering of the defenceless natives, it was not perhaps very difficult to pay even this heavy tax; but when the natives were once fairly stript of all that they had, which, in St. Domingo, and in all the other countries discovered by Columbus, was done completely in six or eight years, and when, in order to find more, it had become necessary to dig for it in the mines, there was no longer any possibility of paying this tax. The rigorous exaction of it, accordingly, first occasioned, it is said, the total abandoning of the mines of St. Domingo, which have never been wrought since. It was soon reduced, therefore, to a third; then to a fifth; afterwards to a tenth; and at last to a twentieth part of the gross produce of the gold mines. The tax upon silver continued for a long time to be a fifth of the gross produce. It was reduced to a tenth only in the course of the present century. But the first adventurers do not appear to have been much interested about silver. Nothing less precious than gold seemed worthy of their attention.

As long as most of the gold that the first explorers brought to Europe was obtained through the easy method of robbing defenseless natives, paying even this hefty tax wasn't too hard. However, once the natives had been stripped of everything they owned—which happened completely in six or eight years in places like St. Domingo and other countries discovered by Columbus—and it became necessary to search for gold in mines to find more, paying this tax was no longer possible. The strict collection of it, it is said, led to the complete abandonment of the mines in St. Domingo, which have never been worked since. The tax was soon reduced to a third, then to a fifth, later to a tenth, and finally to a twentieth of the total output from the gold mines. The tax on silver remained a fifth of the total output for a long time and was only reduced to a tenth in this century. However, the first explorers didn't seem to care much about silver; only something as valuable as gold caught their interest.

All the other enterprizes of the Spaniards in the New World, subsequent to those of Columbus, seem to have been prompted by the same motive. It was the sacred thirst of gold that carried Ovieda, Nicuessa, and Vasco Nugnes de Balboa, to the Isthmus of Darien; that carried Cortes to Mexico, Almagro and Pizarro to Chili and Peru. When those adventurers arrived upon any unknown coast, their first inquiry was always if there was any gold to be found there; and according to the information which they received concerning this particular, they determined either to quit the country or to settle in it.

All the other ventures of the Spaniards in the New World, following those of Columbus, seem to have been driven by the same desire. It was the intense craving for gold that led Oviedo, Nicuessa, and Vasco Núñez de Balboa to the Isthmus of Darien; that took Cortés to Mexico, Almagro and Pizarro to Chile and Peru. When those adventurers arrived at any unknown shore, their first question was always whether there was any gold to be found there; and based on the information they received about this, they decided either to leave the country or to establish themselves there.

Of all those expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring bankruptcy up on the greater part of the people who engage in them, there is none, perhaps, more perfectly ruinous than the search after new silver and gold mines. It is, perhaps, the most disadvantageous lottery in the world, or the one in which the gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least proportion to the loss of those who draw the blanks; for though the prizes are few, and the blanks many, the common price of a ticket is the whole fortune of a very rich man. Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in them, together with the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and profit. They are the projects, therefore, to which, of all others, a prudent lawgiver, who desired to increase the capital of his nation, would least choose to give any extraordinary encouragement, or to turn towards them a greater share of that capital than what would go to them of its own accord. Such, in reality, is the absurd confidence which almost all men have in their own good fortune, that wherever there is the least probability of success, too great[Pg 231] a share of it is apt to go to them of its own accord.

Of all those costly and uncertain ventures that lead to financial ruin for most people who get involved, none is perhaps more devastating than the hunt for new silver and gold mines. It may be the most disadvantageous lottery in existence, where the winnings for those who hit the jackpot are vastly overshadowed by the losses of those who don't. Although there are few prizes and many losses, the typical cost of a ticket can be the entire fortune of a very wealthy individual. Mining projects usually fail to recover the initial investment and the regular returns from the capital, often consuming both the capital and any profits instead. Therefore, these are the projects that a thoughtful lawmaker, who wants to boost their nation's wealth, would be least likely to encourage or direct extra funds toward beyond what would naturally flow to them anyway. Such is the irrational belief that nearly everyone has in their own luck, that whenever there's even a slight chance of success, an excessive portion of investment tends to gravitate towards them on its own.

But though the judgment of sober reason and experience concerning such projects has always been extremely unfavourable, that of human avidity has commonly been quite otherwise. The same passion which has suggested to so many people the absurd idea of the philosopher's stone, has suggested to others the equally absurd one of immense rich mines of gold and silver. They did not consider that the value of those metals has, in all ages and nations, arisen chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen from the very small quantities of them which nature has anywhere deposited in one place, from the hard and intractable substances with which she has almost everywhere surrounded those small quantities, and consequently from the labour and expense which are everywhere necessary in order to penetrate, and get at them. They flattered themselves that veins of those metals might in many places be found, as large and as abundant as those which are commonly found of lead, or copper, or tin, or iron. The dream of Sir Walter Raleigh, concerning the golden city and country of El Dorado, may satisfy us, that even wise men are not always exempt from such strange delusions. More than a hundred years after the death of that great man, the Jesuit Gumila was still convinced of the reality of that wonderful country, and expressed, with great warmth, and, I dare say, with great sincerity, how happy he should be to carry the light of the gospel to a people who could so well reward the pious labours of their missionary.

But even though the judgment of clear-headed reason and experience regarding such projects has always been extremely negative, the perspective of human greed has often been quite the opposite. The same desire that led so many people to the ridiculous idea of the philosopher's stone has led others to the equally ridiculous notion of vast riches in gold and silver mines. They didn’t consider that the value of those metals has, throughout history and across cultures, primarily come from their scarcity, and that this scarcity arises from the very small quantities of them that nature has placed together, from the hard and difficult materials surrounding those small amounts, and consequently from the labor and cost needed to extract them. They convinced themselves that veins of these metals might be found in many places as large and plentiful as those commonly found of lead, copper, tin, or iron. The dream of Sir Walter Raleigh about the golden city and country of El Dorado shows us that even wise men are not always free from such strange delusions. More than a hundred years after the death of that remarkable man, the Jesuit Gumila was still convinced of the existence of that incredible country and passionately expressed, with great warmth, and I dare say with great sincerity, how happy he would be to bring the light of the gospel to a people who could so generously reward the efforts of their missionary.

In the countries first discovered by the Spaniards, no gold or silver mines are at present known which are supposed to be worth the working. The quantities of those metals which the first adventurers are said to have found there, had probably been very much magnified, as well as the fertility of the mines which were wrought immediately after the first discovery. What those adventurers were reported to have found, however, was sufficient to inflame the avidity of all their countrymen. Every Spaniard who sailed to America expected to find an El Dorado. Fortune, too, did upon this what she has done upon very few other occasions. She realized in some measure the extravagant hopes of her votaries; and in the discovery and conquest of Mexico and Peru (of which the one happened about thirty, and the other about forty, years after the first expedition of Columbus), she presented them with something not very unlike that profusion of the precious metals which they sought for.

In the countries first discovered by the Spaniards, there are currently no known gold or silver mines that are considered worthwhile to exploit. The amounts of these metals that the first explorers are said to have found were probably greatly exaggerated, as were the richness of the mines that were worked right after the initial discovery. However, what those adventurers were reported to have discovered was enough to spark the greed of all their countrymen. Every Spaniard who sailed to America expected to find an El Dorado. Luck, too, did something similar to this that she has done very few other times. She somewhat fulfilled the excessive hopes of her followers; in the discovery and conquest of Mexico and Peru (which occurred about thirty and forty years after Columbus's first expedition, respectively), she offered them something not too different from the abundance of precious metals they were seeking.

A project of commerce to the East Indies, therefore, gave occasion to the first discovery of the West. A project of conquest gave occasion to all the establishments of the Spaniards in those newly discovered countries. The motive which excited them to this conquest was a project of gold and silver mines; and a course of accidents which no human wisdom could foresee, rendered this project much more successful than the undertakers had any reasonable grounds for expecting.

A trade venture to the East Indies, therefore, led to the initial discovery of the West. A conquest initiative spurred all the Spanish settlements in those newly discovered lands. The driving force behind their conquest was the idea of finding gold and silver mines; a series of unforeseen events made this endeavor far more successful than those involved had any logical reason to anticipate.

The first adventurers of all the other nations of Europe who attempted to make settlements in America, were animated by the like chimerical views; but they were not equally successful. It was more than a hundred years after the first settlement of the Brazils, before any silver, gold, or diamond mines, were discovered there. In the English, French, Dutch, and Danish colonies, none have ever yet been discovered, at least none that are at present supposed to be worth the working. The first English settlers in North America, however, offered a fifth of all the gold and silver which should be found there to the king, as a motive for granting them their patents. In the patents of Sir Walter Raleigh, to the London and Plymouth companies, to the council of Plymouth, &c. this fifth was accordingly reserved to the crown. To the expectation of finding gold and silver mines, those first settlers, too, joined that of discovering a north-west passage to the East Indies. They have hitherto been disappointed in both.

The first adventurers from various European nations who tried to settle in America were driven by similar unrealistic hopes; however, they weren’t all equally successful. It took more than a hundred years after the initial settlement in Brazil before any silver, gold, or diamond mines were discovered there. In the English, French, Dutch, and Danish colonies, none have ever been discovered, at least none that are currently thought to be worth the effort. The first English settlers in North America, however, promised a fifth of all the gold and silver found there to the king as an incentive for getting their patents. In Sir Walter Raleigh's patents for the London and Plymouth companies and the council of Plymouth, this fifth was reserved for the crown. In their hopes of finding gold and silver mines, those first settlers also included the quest for a northwest passage to the East Indies. So far, they have been disappointed in both pursuits.

PART II.

Causes of the Prosperity of New Colonies.

The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession either of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society.

The colony of a civilized nation that takes control of an uninhabited area, or one that is so sparsely populated that the locals can easily make way for the new settlers, develops faster towards prosperity and greatness than any other human society.

The colonies carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful arts, superior to what can grow up of its own accord, in the course of many centuries, among savage and barbarous nations. They carry out with them, too, the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular government which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws which support it, and of a regular administration of justice; and they naturally establish something of the same kind in the new settlement. But among savage and barbarous nations, the natural progress of law and government is still slower than the natural progress of arts, after law and government have been so far established as is necessary for their protection. Every colonist gets more land than he can possibly cultivate. He has no rent, and scarce any taxes, to pay. No landlord shares with him in its produce, and, the share of the sovereign is commonly but a trifle. He has every motive to render as great as possible a produce which is thus to be almost entirely his own. But his land is commonly so[Pg 232] extensive, that, with all his own industry, and with all the industry of other people whom he can get to employ, he can seldom make it produce the tenth part of what it is capable of producing. He is eager, therefore, to collect labourers from all quarters, and to reward them with the most liberal wages. But those liberal wages, joined to the plenty and cheapness of land, soon make those labourers leave him, in order to become landlords themselves, and to reward with equal liberality other labourers, who soon leave them for the same reason that they left their first master. The liberal reward of labour encourages marriage. The children, during the tender years of infancy, are well fed and properly taken care of; and when they are grown up, the value of their labour greatly overpays their maintenance. When arrived at maturity, the high price of labour, and the low price of land, enable them to establish themselves in the same manner as their fathers did before them.

The colonies bring with them knowledge of farming and other useful skills that are way better than what could develop on its own over many centuries among savage and uncivilized peoples. They also bring a sense of hierarchy, some understanding of the organized government from their home country, the legal system that supports it, and a structured way of delivering justice; they naturally set up something similar in the new settlement. However, among savage and uncivilized nations, the natural development of law and government is still much slower than the development of skills, once law and government have progressed enough for their protection. Every colonist ends up with more land than they can possibly farm. They pay no rent and hardly any taxes. No landlord takes a cut of what they produce, and the share that the government takes is usually just a small amount. They have every reason to maximize the output, which will be mostly their own. But their land is usually so[Pg 232] vast that, despite all their hard work and the work of any others they can hire, they rarely manage to produce even a fraction of its full potential. Therefore, they are eager to recruit workers from all around and offer them very generous wages. However, these generous wages, along with the abundance and affordability of land, soon lead these workers to leave to become landowners themselves, rewarding other laborers to do the same, who will eventually leave them for the same reasons they left their first employer. The attractiveness of labor pay encourages marriage. The children, during their early years, are well-fed and properly cared for; when they grow up, the value of their labor far exceeds the cost of their upbringing. Once they reach adulthood, the high wages and low land prices allow them to settle down just like their fathers did before them.

In other countries, rent and profit eat up wages, and the two superior orders of people oppress the inferior one; but in new colonies, the interest of the two superior orders obliges them to treat the inferior one with more generosity and humanity, at least where that inferior one is not in a state of slavery. Waste lands, of the greatest natural fertility, are to be had for a trifle. The increase of revenue which the proprietor, who is always the undertaker, expects from their improvement, constitutes his profit, which, in these circumstances, is commonly very great; but this great profit cannot be made, without employing the labour of other people in clearing and cultivating the land; and the disproportion between the great extent of the land and the small number of the people, which commonly takes place in new colonies, makes it difficult for him to get this labour. He does not, therefore, dispute about wages, but is willing to employ labour at any price. The high wages of labour encourage population. The cheapness and plenty of good land encourage improvement, and enable the proprietor to pay those high wages. In those wages consists almost the whole price of the land; and though they are high, considered as the wages of labour, they are low, considered as the price of what is so very valuable. What encourages the progress of population and improvement, encourages that of real wealth and greatness.

In other countries, rent and profit consume wages, and the two higher classes of people oppress the lower one; but in new colonies, the interests of the two higher classes require them to treat the lower one with more generosity and humanity, at least when that lower class is not enslaved. Fertile wastelands are available for a minimal cost. The increase in revenue that the owner, who is always the entrepreneur, expects from improving these lands constitutes his profit, which, in these situations, is often significant; however, this substantial profit cannot be realized without employing the labor of others to clear and cultivate the land. The imbalance between the vastness of the land and the small population common in new colonies makes it difficult for him to obtain this labor. Therefore, he doesn't haggle over wages but is willing to hire laborers at any cost. The high wages for labor attract more people. The affordability and abundance of quality land promote development and enable the owner to pay those high wages. The wages make up almost the entire price of the land; and while they are high when viewed as labor wages, they are low when considered as the price for something so valuable. What drives the growth of population and development also drives true wealth and greatness.

The progress of many of the ancient Greek colonies towards wealth and greatness seems accordingly to have been very rapid. In the course of a century or two, several of them appear to have rivalled, and even to have surpassed, their mother cities. Syracuse and Agrigentum in Sicily, Tarentum and Locri in Italy, Ephesus and Miletus in Lesser Asia, appear, by all accounts, to have been at least equal to any of the cities of ancient Greece. Though posterior in their establishment, yet all the arts of refinement, philosophy, poetry, and eloquence, seem to have been cultivated as early, and to have been improved as highly in them as in any part of the mother country. The schools of the two oldest Greek philosophers, those of Thales and Pythagoras, were established, it is remarkable, not in ancient Greece, but the one in an Asiatic, the other in an Italian colony. All those colonies had established themselves in countries inhabited by savage and barbarous nations, who easily gave place to the new settlers. They had plenty of good land; and as they were altogether independent of the mother city, they were at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged was most suitable to their own interest.

The progress of many ancient Greek colonies toward wealth and greatness seems to have been quite rapid. Over a century or two, several of them appeared to rival, and even surpass, their mother cities. Syracuse and Agrigentum in Sicily, Tarentum and Locri in Italy, Ephesus and Miletus in Asia Minor seemed, by all accounts, to be at least equal to any city in ancient Greece. Although they were established later, all the arts of refinement, philosophy, poetry, and eloquence seem to have been developed as early, and improved as highly, in these colonies as in any part of the mother country. It's noteworthy that the schools of the two oldest Greek philosophers, Thales and Pythagoras, were founded not in ancient Greece, but in an Asian and an Italian colony, respectively. All those colonies had settled in areas inhabited by savage and barbaric peoples, who easily made way for the new settlers. They had access to plenty of fertile land; and since they were entirely independent of the mother city, they were free to manage their own affairs in whatever way they felt was best for their interests.

The history of the Roman colonies is by no means so brilliant. Some of them, indeed, such as Florence, have, in the course of many ages, and after the fall of the mother city, grown up to be considerable states. But the progress of no one of them seems ever to have been very rapid. They were all established in conquered provinces, which in most cases had been fully inhabited before. The quantity of land assigned to each colonist was seldom very considerable, and, as the colony was not independent, they were not always at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged was most suitable to their own interest.

The history of Roman colonies isn't exactly impressive. Some of them, like Florence, have, over the centuries and after the fall of the original city, developed into significant states. However, none of them seem to have advanced very quickly. They were all set up in conquered territories that were mostly already populated. The amount of land given to each settler was rarely substantial, and since the colony wasn't independent, they often didn't have the freedom to manage their own affairs in the way they thought was best for their interests.

In the plenty of good land, the European colonies established in America and the West Indies resemble, and even greatly surpass, those of ancient Greece. In their dependency upon the mother state, they resemble those of ancient Rome; but their great distance from Europe has in all of them alleviated more or less the effects of this dependency. Their situation has placed them less in the view, and less in the power of their mother country. In pursuing their interest their own way, their conduct has upon many occasions been overlooked, either because not known or not understood in Europe; and upon some occasions it has been fairly suffered and submitted to, because their distance rendered it difficult to restrain it. Even the violent and arbitrary government of Spain has, upon many occasion, been obliged to recall or soften the orders which had been given for the government of her colonies, for fear of a general insurrection. The progress of all the European colonies in wealth, population, and improvement, has accordingly been very great.

In the abundance of fertile land, the European colonies established in America and the West Indies resemble, and even far exceed, those of ancient Greece. In their reliance on the mother country, they are similar to those of ancient Rome; however, their significant distance from Europe has somewhat lessened the impact of this reliance. Their location has kept them out of sight and reduced the influence of their mother country. In pursuing their own interests, they have often acted independently and their actions have been overlooked, either because they were unknown or not understood in Europe. In some cases, they were tolerated simply because their distance made it hard to control them. Even the harsh and arbitrary rule of Spain has, on many occasions, had to retract or modify orders given for the governance of its colonies, out of fear of a widespread uprising. The growth of all the European colonies in wealth, population, and development has thus been quite substantial.

The crown of Spain, by its share of the gold and silver, derived some revenue from its colonies from the moment of their first establishment. It was a revenue, too, of a nature to excite in human avidity the most extravagant expectation of still greater riches. The Spanish colonies, therefore, from the moment of their first establishment, attracted very much the attention of their mother country; while[Pg 233] those of the other European nations were for a long time in a great measure neglected. The former did not, perhaps, thrive the better in consequence of this attention, nor the latter the worse in consequence of this neglect. In proportion to the extent of the country which they in some measure possess, the Spanish colonies are considered as less populous and thriving than those of almost any other European nation. The progress even of the Spanish colonies, however, in population and improvement, has certainly been very rapid and very great. The city of Lima, founded since the conquest, is represented by Ulloa as containing fifty thousand inhabitants near thirty years ago. Quito, which had been but a miserable hamlet of Indians, is represented by the same author as in his time equally populous. Gemel i Carreri, a pretended traveller, it is said, indeed, but who seems everywhere to have written upon extreme good information, represents the city of Mexico as containing a hundred thousand inhabitants; a number which, in spite of all the exaggerations of the Spanish writers, is probably more than five times greater than what it contained in the time of Montezuma. These numbers exceed greatly these of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, the three greatest cities of the English colonies. Before the conquest of the Spaniards, there were no cattle fit for draught, either in Mexico or Peru. The lama was their only beast of burden, and its strength seems to have been a good deal inferior to that of a common ass. The plough was unknown among them. They were ignorant of the use of iron. They had no coined money, nor any established instrument of commerce of any kind. Their commerce was carried on by barter. A sort of wooden spade was their principal instrument of agriculture. Sharp stones served them for knives and hatchets to cut with; fish bones, and the hard sinews of certain animals, served them with needles to sew with; and these seem to have been their principal instruments of trade. In this state of things, it seems impossible that either of those empires could have been so much improved or so well cultivated as at present, when they are plentifully furnished with all sorts of European cattle, and when the use of iron, of the plough, and of many of the arts of Europe, have been introduced among them. But the populousness of every country must be in proportion to the degree of its improvement and cultivation. In spite of the cruel destruction of the natives which followed the conquest, these two great empires are probably more populous now than they ever were before; and the people are surely very different; for we must acknowledge, I apprehend, that the Spanish creoles are in many respects superior to the ancient Indians.

The Spanish crown started earning revenue from its colonies right after they were established, thanks to its share of gold and silver. This revenue sparked immense greed and unrealistic expectations for even more wealth. Consequently, the Spanish colonies captured a lot of attention from Spain, while those of other European nations were largely overlooked for a long time. However, this focus on the Spanish colonies didn't necessarily make them thrive better, nor did the neglect of the others harm them as much as expected. Relative to their size, Spanish colonies are viewed as less populated and prosperous than those of other European countries. Nonetheless, the growth in population and development of the Spanish colonies has been significant and swift. Lima, founded after the conquest, was described by Ulloa as having around fifty thousand inhabitants nearly thirty years ago. Quito, once a small Indian settlement, is also mentioned by Ulloa as being equally populated at that time. A supposed traveler, Gemel i Carreri, who appears to have based his writings on reliable information, claimed that Mexico City had a hundred thousand residents—likely more than five times what it had during Montezuma's era, despite the often exaggerated figures from Spanish sources. These figures far surpass the populations of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, the three largest cities in the English colonies. Before the Spanish conquest, neither Mexico nor Peru had any draft animals; the llama was their only beast of burden, and its strength was significantly weaker than that of a common donkey. They didn’t use plows or iron and lacked any form of coined money or a standardized trading instrument. Their trade was based on bartering. A type of wooden spade was their main agricultural tool, while sharp stones were used as knives and hatchets, and fish bones along with tough sinews from certain animals acted as needles. Given this situation, it seems unlikely that those empires could have been as developed or cultivated as they are today, now that they’re well supplied with all kinds of European livestock and have adopted iron tools, plowing, and many European arts. However, the population of each country must relate to its level of development and cultivation. Despite the severe loss of native life that followed the conquest, these two vast empires are likely more populous now than ever before; and the people themselves are surely quite different, as it must be recognized that the Spanish creoles are superior to the indigenous people in many aspects.

After the settlements of the Spaniards, that of the Portuguese in Brazil is the oldest of any European nation in America. But as for a long time after the first discovery neither gold nor silver mines were found in it, and as it afforded upon that account little or no revenue to the crown, it was for a long time in a great measure neglected; and during this state of neglect, it grew up to be a great and powerful colony. While Portugal was under the dominion of Spain, Brazil was attacked by the Dutch, who got possession of seven of the fourteen provinces into which it is divided. They expected soon to conquer the other seven, when Portugal recovered its independency by the elevation of the family of Braganza to the throne. The Dutch, then, as enemies to the Spaniards, became friends to the Portuguese, who were likewise the enemies of the Spaniards. They agreed, therefore, to leave that part of Brazil which they had not conquered to the king of Portugal, who agreed to leave that part which they had conquered to them, as a matter not worth disputing about, with such good allies. But the Dutch government soon began to oppress the Portuguese colonists, who, instead of amusing themselves with complaints, took arms against their new masters, and by their own valour and resolution, with the connivance, indeed, but without any avowed assistance from the mother country, drove them out of Brazil. The Dutch, therefore, finding it impossible to keep any part of the country to themselves, were contented that it should be entirely restored to the crown of Portugal. In this colony there are said to be more than six hundred thousand people, either Portuguese or descended from Portuguese, creoles, mulattoes, and a mixed race between Portuguese and Brazilians. No one colony in America is supposed to contain so great a number of people of European extraction.

After the Spanish settlements, the Portuguese presence in Brazil is the oldest of any European nation in America. However, for a long time after the initial discovery, no gold or silver mines were found there, which resulted in little to no revenue for the crown. This led to it being largely overlooked for a significant period, during which it grew into a powerful colony. When Portugal was under Spanish rule, the Dutch attacked Brazil and took control of seven out of the fourteen provinces it was divided into. They believed they would quickly conquer the other seven, but Portugal regained its independence when the Braganza family took the throne. The Dutch, now enemies of the Spaniards, became allies with the Portuguese, who were also opposed to Spanish rule. They agreed to leave the part of Brazil that the Dutch hadn't conquered to the king of Portugal, who in turn agreed to let the Dutch keep the provinces they had taken, considering it not worth arguing with such valuable allies. However, the Dutch government soon began to mistreat the Portuguese colonists. Instead of merely complaining, the colonists took up arms against their new rulers and, through their own bravery and determination, and with some passive support from their home country, managed to drive the Dutch out of Brazil. Facing the impossibility of holding onto any part of the territory, the Dutch consented to fully restore it to the crown of Portugal. This colony is said to have more than six hundred thousand people, consisting of Portuguese, those descended from Portuguese, creoles, mulattoes, and a mixed race of Portuguese and Brazilians. No other colony in America is believed to have such a large population of European descent.

Towards the end of the fifteenth, and during the greater part of the sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal were the two great naval powers upon the ocean; for though the commerce of Venice extended to every part of Europe, its fleet had scarce ever sailed beyond the Mediterranean. The Spaniards, in virtue of the first discovery, claimed all America as their own; and though they could not hinder so great a naval power as that of Portugal from settling in Brazil, such was at that time the terror of their name, that the greater part of the other nations of Europe were afraid to establish themselves in any other part of that great continent. The French, who attempted to settle in Florida, were all murdered by the Spaniards. But the declension of the naval power of this latter nation, in consequence of the defeat or miscarriage of what they called their invincible armada, which happened towards the end of the sixteenth century, put it out of their power to obstruct any longer the settlements of the other European nations. In the course of the seventeenth century, there[Pg 234]fore, the English, French, Dutch, Danes, and Swedes, all the great nations who had any ports upon the ocean, attempted to make some settlements in the new world.

Towards the end of the fifteenth century and throughout most of the sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal were the dominant naval powers on the ocean. While Venice's trade reached every part of Europe, its fleet rarely ventured beyond the Mediterranean. The Spaniards, due to their initial discoveries, claimed all of America as their territory. Although they couldn't stop the powerful Portuguese from establishing themselves in Brazil, their reputation was so intimidating that most other European nations were hesitant to settle anywhere else on that vast continent. The French, who tried to establish a presence in Florida, were all killed by the Spaniards. However, the decline of Spain's naval power, following the defeat of what they called their invincible armada towards the end of the sixteenth century, meant they could no longer prevent other European nations from establishing settlements. Throughout the seventeenth century, therefore, the English, French, Dutch, Danes, and Swedes—all the major nations with ports on the ocean—sought to create settlements in the New World.

The Swedes established themselves in New Jersey; and the number of Swedish families still to be found there sufficiently demonstrates, that this colony was very likely to prosper, had it been protected by the mother country. But being neglected by Sweden, it was soon swallowed up by the Dutch colony of New York, which again, in 1674, fell under the dominion of the English.

The Swedes set up their community in New Jersey, and the presence of Swedish families still there clearly shows that this colony had a strong chance of thriving if it had received support from the mother country. However, because it was overlooked by Sweden, it was quickly absorbed by the Dutch colony of New York, which, in 1674, came under English control.

The small islands of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz, are the only countries in the new world that have been possessed by the Danes. These little settlements, too, were under the government of an exclusive company, which had the sole right, both of purchasing the surplus produce of the colonies, and of supplying them with such goods of other countries as they wanted, and which, therefore, both in its purchases and sales, had not only the power of oppressing them, but the greatest temptation to do so. The government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all governments for any country whatever. It was not, however, able to stop altogether the progress of these colonies, though it rendered it more slow and languid. The late king of Denmark dissolved this company, and since that time the prosperity of these colonies has been very great.

The small islands of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz are the only places in the New World that have been owned by the Danes. These small settlements were also governed by an exclusive company, which had the only rights to purchase the surplus products of the colonies and supply them with goods from other countries that they needed. Because of this, the company had the power to exploit the colonies in both buying and selling, and there was a strong temptation to do so. A government run by an exclusive group of merchants is probably the worst kind of government for any country. However, it couldn't completely halt the growth of these colonies, although it did make their progress slow and weak. The former king of Denmark dissolved this company, and since then, the prosperity of these colonies has greatly increased.

The Dutch settlements in the West, as well as those in the East Indies, were originally put under the government of an exclusive company. The progress of some of them, therefore, though it has been considerable in comparison with that of almost any country that has been long peopled and established, has been languid and slow in comparison with that of the greater part of new colonies. The colony of Surinam, though very considerable, is still inferior to the greater part of the sugar colonies of the other European nations. The colony of Nova Belgia, now divided into the two provinces of New York and New Jersey, would probably have soon become considerable too, even though it had remained under the government of the Dutch. The plenty and cheapness of good land are such powerful causes of prosperity, that the very worst government is scarce capable of checking altogether the efficacy of their operation. The great distance, too, from the mother country, would enable the colonists to evade more or less, by smuggling, the monopoly which the company enjoyed against them. At present, the company allows all Dutch ships to trade to Surinam, upon paying two and a-half per cent. upon the value of their cargo for a license; and only reserves to itself exclusively, the direct trade from Africa to America, which consists almost entirely in the slave trade. This relaxation in the exclusive privileges of the company, is probably the principal cause of that degree of prosperity which that colony at present enjoys. Curaçoa and Eustatia, the two principal islands belonging to the Dutch, are free ports, open to the ships of all nations; and this freedom, in the midst of better colonies, whose ports are open to those of one nation only, has been the great cause of the prosperity of those two barren islands.

The Dutch settlements in the West and the East Indies were initially governed by an exclusive company. The development of some of these areas, while significant compared to almost any long-established country, has been slow compared to most new colonies. The colony of Surinam, although considerable, is still less developed than many sugar colonies owned by other European nations. The colony of Nova Belgia, which is now divided into New York and New Jersey, would likely have become significant as well, even if it had stayed under Dutch control. The abundance and affordability of good land are such strong drivers of prosperity that even the worst government struggles to fully hinder their impact. Additionally, the long distance from the homeland allows colonists to somewhat evade the company's monopoly through smuggling. Currently, the company permits all Dutch ships to trade in Surinam by paying 2.5% of their cargo's value for a license, while it retains exclusive control over direct trade from Africa to America, which mainly involves the slave trade. This relaxation of the company’s exclusive privileges is likely the main reason for the prosperity currently seen in that colony. Curaçao and Eustatia, the two primary islands owned by the Dutch, are free ports that welcome ships from all nations; this openness, especially compared to better colonies restricted to ships from only one nation, has greatly contributed to the prosperity of these two barren islands.

The French colony of Canada was, during the greater part of the last century, and some part of the present, under the government of an exclusive company. Under so unfavourable administration, its progress was necessarily very slow, in comparison with that of other new colonies; but it became much more rapid when this company was dissolved, after the fall of what is called the Mississippi scheme. When the English got possession of this country, they found in it near double the number of inhabitants which father Charlevoix had assigned to it between twenty and thirty years before. That jesuit had travelled over the whole country, and had no inclination to represent it as less inconsiderable than it really was.

The French colony of Canada, for most of the last century and part of the present one, was governed by an exclusive company. Due to this unfavorable management, its growth was much slower compared to other new colonies. However, it picked up speed significantly after this company was dissolved following the collapse of what is known as the Mississippi scheme. When the English took control of this region, they discovered nearly double the number of inhabitants that Father Charlevoix had counted around twenty to thirty years earlier. That Jesuit had traveled throughout the entire area and had no reason to downplay its significance.

The French colony of St. Domingo was established by pirates and freebooters, who, for a long time, neither required the protection, nor acknowledged the authority of France; and when that race of banditti became so far citizens as to acknowledge this authority, it was for a long time necessary to exercise it with very great gentleness. During this period, the population and improvement of this colony increased very fast. Even the oppression of the exclusive company, to which it was for some time subjected with all the other colonies of France, though it no doubt retarded, had not been able to stop its progress altogether. The course of its prosperity returned as soon as it was relieved from that oppression. It is now the most important of the sugar colonies of the West Indies, and its produce is said to be greater than that of all the English sugar colonies put together. The other sugar colonies of France are in general all very thriving.

The French colony of St. Domingo was founded by pirates and freebooters who, for a long time, didn’t need protection or recognize France’s authority. When these outlaws finally accepted this authority, it was necessary to enforce it very gently for a long while. During this time, the population and development of the colony grew rapidly. Even the burden of the exclusive company, which it, along with all of France’s other colonies, was subjected to for a while—though it undoubtedly slowed growth—couldn’t completely halt its progress. Prosperity returned as soon as the colony was freed from that burden. It is now the most significant sugar colony in the West Indies, and its production is reported to be greater than that of all the English sugar colonies combined. The other sugar colonies of France are generally thriving as well.

But there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than that of the English in North America.

But there are no colonies whose progress has been faster than that of the English in North America.

Plenty of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, seem to be the two great causes of the prosperity of all new colonies.

There’s a lot of good land, and the freedom to handle their own matters in their own way, seem to be the two main reasons for the success of all new colonies.

In the plenty of good land, the English colonies of North America, though no doubt very abundantly provided, are, however, inferior to those of the Spaniards and Portuguese, and not superior to some of those possessed by the French before the last war. But the political institutions of the English colonies have been more favourable to the improvement and cultivation of this land, than those of the other three nations.[Pg 235]

In the fertile land of the English colonies in North America, although they are certainly well-supplied, they are still not as rich as those owned by the Spaniards and Portuguese, and they aren't better than some that the French had before the last war. However, the political systems in the English colonies have been more supportive of the development and farming of this land compared to those of the other three countries.[Pg 235]

First, The engrossing of uncultivated land, though it has by no means been prevented altogether, has been more restrained in the English colonies than in any other. The colony law, which imposes upon every proprietor the obligation of improving and cultivating, within a limited time, a certain proportion of his lands, and which, in case of failure, declares those neglected lands grantable to any other person; though it has not perhaps been very strictly executed, has, however, had some effect.

First, the taking over of uncultivated land, while not completely stopped, has been more controlled in the English colonies than anywhere else. The colonial law requires each landowner to improve and cultivate a certain portion of their land within a set timeframe, and if they fail to do so, those neglected lands can be granted to someone else. Although this law may not have been enforced very strictly, it has had some impact.

Secondly, In Pennsylvania there is no right of primogeniture, and lands, like moveables, are divided equally among all the children of the family. In three of the provinces of New England, the oldest has only a double share, as in the Mosaical law. Though in those provinces, therefore, too great a quantity of land should sometimes be engrossed by a particular individual, it is likely, in the course of a generation or two, to be sufficiently divided again. In the other English colonies, indeed, the right of primogeniture takes place, as in the law of England: But in all the English colonies, the tenure of the lands, which are all held by free soccage, facilitates alienation; and the grantee of an extensive tract of land generally finds it for his interest to alienate, as fast as he can, the greater part of it, reserving only a small quit-rent. In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, what is called the right of majorazzo takes place in the succession of all those great estates to which any title of honour is annexed. Such estates go all to one person, and are in effect entailed and unalienable. The French colonies, indeed, are subject to the custom of Paris, which, in the inheritance of land, is much more favourable to the younger children than the law of England. But, in the French colonies, if any part of an estate, held by the noble tenure of chivalry and homage, is alienated, it is, for a limited time, subject to the right of redemption, either by the heir of the superior, or by the heir of the family; and all the largest estates of the country are held by such noble tenures, which necessarily embarrass alienation. But, in a new colony, a great uncultivated estate is likely to be much more speedily divided by alienation than by succession. The plenty and cheapness of good land, it has already been observed, are the principal causes of the rapid prosperity of new colonies. The engrossing of land, in effect, destroys this plenty and cheapness. The engrossing of uncultivated land, besides, is the greatest obstruction to its improvement; but the labour that is employed in the improvement and cultivation of land affords the greatest and most valuable produce to the society. The produce of labour, in this case, pays not only its own wages and the profit of the stock which employs it, but the rent of the land too upon which it is employed. The labour of the English colonies, therefore, being more employed in the improvement and cultivation of land, is likely to afford a greater and more valuable produce than that of any of the other three nations, which, by the engrossing of land, is more or less diverted towards other employments.

Secondly, in Pennsylvania, there is no right of primogeniture, and land, like personal property, is divided equally among all the children in the family. In three of the New England provinces, the oldest child only receives a double share, as per Mosaic law. Although in those provinces it’s possible for one person to accumulate too much land, over a generation or two, it’s likely to be properly divided again. In the other English colonies, the right of primogeniture applies, just like in English law. However, in all English colonies, land is held under free soccage, which makes it easy to transfer ownership. The person who holds a large tract of land usually finds it beneficial to sell off most of it quickly while keeping just a small quit-rent. In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, what's known as the right of majorazzo applies to the inheritance of large estates linked to any title of honor. Such estates go to one individual and are effectively entailed and not up for sale. French colonies, on the other hand, follow the custom of Paris, which is much more favorable to younger children in terms of land inheritance than English law. But in French colonies, if any portion of an estate held under noble tenures of chivalry and homage is sold, it is temporarily subject to a right of redemption by either the heir of the superior or the family. All the largest estates in the country are typically held under such noble tenures, which complicate the selling process. However, in a new colony, a large uncultivated estate is likely to be divided more quickly through sales than through inheritance. The abundance and affordability of good land are key reasons for the fast prosperity of new colonies. When land is concentrated in a few hands, it reduces this abundance and affordability. Moreover, hoarding uncultivated land greatly hinders its improvement; yet, the labor invested in enhancing and cultivating land generates the most valuable returns for society. The output from this labor covers not only its wages and the profits for the investment but also the rent for the land it occupies. Therefore, the labor force in English colonies, being more focused on improving and cultivating land, is likely to produce greater and more valuable yields than that in any of the other three nations, which, due to land concentration, is diverted toward various other activities.

Thirdly, The labour of the English colonists is not only likely to afford a greater and more valuable produce, but, in consequence of the moderation of their taxes, a greater proportion of this produce belongs to themselves, which they may store up and employ in putting into motion a still greater quantity of labour. The English colonists have never yet contributed any thing towards the defence of the mother country, or towards the support of its civil government. They themselves, on the contrary, have hitherto been defended almost entirely at the expense of the mother country; but the expense of fleets and armies is out of all proportion greater than the necessary expense of civil government. The expense of their own civil government has always been very moderate. It has generally been confined to what was necessary for paying competent salaries to the governor, to the judges, and to some other officers of police, and for maintaining a few of the must useful public works. The expense of the civil establishment of Massachusetts Bay, before the commencement of the present disturbances, used to be but about L.18,000 a-year; that of New Hampshire and Rhode Island, L.3500 each; that of Connecticut, L.4000; that of New York and Pennsylvania, L.4500 each; that of New Jersey, L.1200; that of Virginia and South Carolina, L.8000 each. The civil establishments of Nova Scotia and Georgia are partly supported by an annual grant of parliament; but Nova Scotia pays, besides, about L.7000 a-year towards the public expenses of the colony, and Georgia about L.2500 a-year. All the different civil establishments in North America, in short, exclusive of those of Maryland and North Carolina, of which no exact account has been got, did not, before the commencement of the present disturbances, cost the inhabitants above L.64,700 a-year; an ever memorable example, at how small an expense three millions of people may not only be governed but well governed. The must important part of the expense of government, indeed, that of defence and protection, has constantly fallen upon the mother country. The ceremonial, too, of the civil government in the colonies, upon the reception of a new governor, upon the opening of a new assembly, &c. though sufficiently decent, is not accompanied with any expensive pomp or parade. Their ecclesiastical government is conducted upon a plan equally frugal. Tithes are unknown among them; and their clergy, who are far from being numerous, are maintained either by moderate stipends, or by the voluntary contributions of[Pg 236] the people. The power of Spain and Portugal, on the contrary, derives some support from the taxes levied upon their colonies. France, indeed, has never drawn any considerable revenue from its colonies, the taxes which it levies upon them being generally spent among them. But the colony government of all these three nations is conducted upon a much more extensive plan, and is accompanied with a much more expensive ceremonial. The sums spent upon the reception of a new viceroy of Peru, for example, have frequently been enormous. Such ceremonials are not only real taxes paid by the rich colonists upon those particular occasions, but they serve to introduce among them the habit of vanity and expense upon all other occasions. They are not only very grievous occasional taxes, but they contribute to establish perpetual taxes, of the same kind, still more grievous; the ruinous taxes of private luxury and extravagance. In the colonies of all those three nations, too, the ecclesiastical government is extremely oppressive. Tithes take place in all of them, and are levied with the utmost rigour in those of Spain and Portugal. All of them, besides, are oppressed with numerous race of mendicant friars, whose beggary being not only licensed but consecrated by religion, is a most grievous tax upon the poor people, who are most carefully taught that it is a duty to give, and a very great sin to refuse them their charity. Over and above all this, the clergy are, in all of them, the greatest engrossers of land.

Thirdly, The labor of the English colonists is not only likely to yield a greater and more valuable produce, but due to the low taxes they pay, a larger share of this produce belongs to them. They can save it and use it to generate even more labor. The English colonists haven't contributed anything towards the defense of the mother country or the support of its civil government. Instead, they have been mostly defended at the mother country’s expense; however, the spending on fleets and armies vastly exceeds the costs of civil government. Their own civil government expenses have always been quite reasonable. Typically, they cover what’s necessary for paying decent salaries to the governor, judges, and some other police officers, as well as maintaining a few of the most useful public works. Before the current disturbances began, the civil expenditures of Massachusetts Bay were only about £18,000 a year; New Hampshire and Rhode Island, £3,500 each; Connecticut, £4,000; New York and Pennsylvania, £4,500 each; New Jersey, £1,200; and Virginia and South Carolina, £8,000 each. The civil establishments of Nova Scotia and Georgia are partially funded by an annual parliamentary grant; additionally, Nova Scotia contributes around £7,000 a year towards the colony's public expenses, while Georgia contributes about £2,500 a year. Overall, before the current disturbances, the total cost of all civil establishments in North America, excluding those of Maryland and North Carolina for which no accurate account has been obtained, did not exceed £64,700 a year; an unforgettable example of how such a small expense can govern and even govern well for three million people. The most significant part of government expense, indeed, defense and protection, has consistently fallen on the mother country. The ceremonies of civil government in the colonies, like welcoming a new governor or opening a new assembly, although sufficiently decent, lack any extravagant pomp or show. Their church governance is similarly frugal. Tithes are not part of their practices; their clergy, not very numerous, are supported either by moderate salaries or by voluntary contributions from the people. In contrast, Spain and Portugal derive some support from taxes collected from their colonies. France, in fact, has never gained significant revenue from its colonies, as the taxes it imposes are mainly spent there. However, the colonial government of all three nations operates on a much larger scale and comes with a more expensive ceremonial. For instance, the amounts spent to welcome a new viceroy of Peru are often enormous. These ceremonies not only represent real taxes paid by wealthy colonists on specific occasions but also foster a culture of vanity and extravagance on all other occasions. They are not just significant but burdensome occasional taxes, contributing to establish ongoing taxes of the same kind, even more oppressive; the crippling taxes of personal luxury and extravagance. In all three nations' colonies, ecclesiastical governance is quite oppressive. Tithes are enforced in all of them, collected very rigorously in those of Spain and Portugal. Furthermore, they are burdened with numerous mendicant friars, whose begging is not only tolerated but sanctioned by religion, creating a substantial tax on the poor, who are taught to see it as their duty to give and a serious sin to refuse charity. On top of all this, the clergy in all of them are the biggest landowners.

Fourthly, In the disposal of their surplus produce, or of what is over and above their own consumption, the English colonies have been more favoured, and have been allowed a more extensive market, than those of any other European nation. Every European nation has endeavoured, more or less, to monopolize to itself the commerce of its colonies, and, upon that account, has prohibited the ships of foreign nations from trading to them, and has prohibited them from importing European goods from any foreign nation. But the manner in which this monopoly has been exercised in different nations, has been very different.

Fourthly, when it comes to selling their extra produce, or what goes beyond their own needs, the English colonies have had more advantages and access to a larger market than any other European nation. Every European country has tried, to varying degrees, to control the trade of its colonies, which is why they've banned foreign ships from trading with them and restricted importing European goods from other nations. However, the way this monopoly has been enforced by different countries has varied significantly.

Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their colonies to an exclusive company, of whom the colonists were obliged to buy all such European goods as they wanted, and to whom they were obliged to sell the whole of their surplus produce. It was the interest of the company, therefore, not only to sell the former as dear, and to buy the latter as cheap as possible, but to buy no more of the latter, even at this low price, than what they could dispose of for a very high price in Europe. It was their interest not only to degrade in all cases the value of the surplus produce of the colony, but in many cases to discourage and keep down the natural increase of its quantity. Of all the expedients that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new colony, that of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual. This, however, has been the policy of Holland, though their company, in the course of the present century, has given up in many respects the exertion of their exclusive privilege. This, too, was the policy of Denmark, till the reign of the late king. It has occasionally been the policy of France; and of late, since 1755, after it had been abandoned by all other nations on account of its absurdity, it has become the policy of Portugal, with regard at least to two of the principal provinces of Brazil, Pernambucco, and Marannon.

Some countries have handed over all trade from their colonies to an exclusive company, forcing colonists to buy all the European goods they needed from this company and sell all their excess produce to them. The company’s interest was to sell the goods at the highest possible price and buy the produce at the lowest price, but they also wouldn’t buy more than what they could sell at a high price in Europe. Their goal was not only to lower the value of the colony's excess produce, but also, in many instances, to discourage and limit the natural increase of its quantity. Among all the methods that could be used to hinder the natural growth of a new colony, having an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effective. This has been the strategy of Holland, although their company has in many ways relaxed its exclusive power over the course of this century. It was also Denmark’s strategy until the last king’s reign. At times, it has been France’s strategy, and recently, since 1755, after all other nations abandoned it for its foolishness, it has become Portugal’s strategy, at least regarding two key provinces in Brazil, Pernambuco and Maranham.

Other nations, without establishing an exclusive company, have confined the whole commerce of their colonies to a particular port of the mother country, from whence no ship was allowed to sail, but either in a fleet and at a particular season, or, if single, in consequence of a particular license, which in most cases was very well paid for. This policy opened, indeed, the trade of the colonies to all the natives of the mother country, provided they traded from the proper port, at the proper season, and in the proper vessels. But as all the different merchants, who joined their stocks in order to fit out those licensed vessels, would find it for their interest to act in concert, the trade which was carried on in this manner would necessarily be conducted very nearly upon the same principles as that of an exclusive company. The profit of those merchants would be almost equally exorbitant and oppressive. The colonies would be ill supplied, and would be obliged both to buy very dear, and to sell very cheap. This, however, till within these few years, had always been the policy of Spain; and the price of all European goods, accordingly, is said to have been enormous in the Spanish West Indies. At Quito, we are told by Ulloa, a pound of iron sold for about 4s. 6d., and a pound of steel for about 6s. 9d. sterling. But it is chiefly in order to purchase European goods that the colonies part with their own produce. The more, therefore, they pay for the one, the less they really get for the other, and the dearness of the one is the same thing with the cheapness of the other. The policy of Portugal is, in this respect, the same as the ancient policy of Spain, with regard to all its colonies, except Pernambucco and Marannon; and with regard to these it has lately adopted a still worse.

Other nations, without setting up an exclusive company, have limited all the trade of their colonies to a specific port in the mother country, from which no ship was permitted to sail, unless it was in a fleet at a certain time or, if it was an individual ship, due to a special license that usually came at a high cost. This approach technically opened up the colony's trade to all the citizens of the mother country, as long as they traded from the right port, at the right time, and in the right ships. However, since all the different merchants who pooled their resources to outfit these licensed ships would have a strong incentive to work together, the trade conducted this way would end up functioning very much like that of an exclusive company. The profits for those merchants would be extremely high and burdensome. The colonies would suffer from poor supply, being forced to pay high prices to buy goods and sell their own goods for low prices. Until recently, this had always been Spain's strategy, leading to astronomically high prices for European goods in the Spanish West Indies. For example, in Quito, Ulloa reports that a pound of iron sold for about 4s. 6d. and a pound of steel for around 6s. 9d. sterling. However, the colonies mainly trade away their own products to buy European goods. Therefore, the more they spend on European goods, the less they receive for their own products, meaning high prices for one equate to low prices for the other. Portugal's strategy is similar to Spain's past policy concerning all its colonies, except for Pernambucco and Marannon; and for these, Portugal has recently adopted an even worse approach.

Other nations leave the trade of their colonies free to all their subjects, who may carry it on from all the different ports of the mother country, and who have occasion for no other license than the common despatches of the custom-house. In this case the number and dispersed situation of the different traders renders it impossible for them to enter into any general combination, and their competition is[Pg 237] sufficient to hinder them from making very exorbitant profits. Under so liberal a policy, the colonies are enabled both to sell their own produce, and to buy the goods of Europe at a reasonable price; but since the dissolution of the Plymouth company, when our colonies were but in their infancy, this has always been the policy of England. It has generally, too, been that of France, and has been uniformly so since the dissolution of what in England is commonly called their Mississippi company. The profits of the trade, therefore, which France and England carry on with their colonies, though no doubt somewhat higher than if the competition were free to all other nations, are, however, by no means exorbitant; and the price of European goods, accordingly, is not extravagantly high in the greater part of the colonies of either of those nations.

Other countries allow their subjects to freely trade in their colonies from various ports in the mother country, needing only the usual customs clearances. In this situation, the sheer number and spread of different traders make it impossible for them to form any general alliances, and their competition is[Pg 237] enough to prevent them from making excessively high profits. With such a open approach, colonies can sell their own products and purchase European goods at a fair price; however, since the end of the Plymouth company, when our colonies were still young, this has been the policy of England. It has usually been France’s policy too, consistently since the end of what is commonly known in England as their Mississippi company. Therefore, while the profits from trade that France and England conduct with their colonies are certainly a bit higher than they would be if competition were open to all nations, they are by no means excessive; as a result, the price of European goods is not overly high in most colonies of either country.

In the exportation of their own surplus produce, too, it is only with regard to certain commodities that the colonies of Great Britain are confined to the market of the mother country. These commodities having been enumerated in the act of navigation, and in some other subsequent acts, have upon that account been called enumerated commodities. The rest are called non-enumerated, and may be exported directly to other countries, provided it is in British or plantation ships, of which the owners and three fourths of the mariners are British subjects.

In exporting their surplus products, the colonies of Great Britain are limited to selling only certain goods in the mother country’s market. These goods have been listed in the navigation acts and some other later laws, which is why they are called enumerated commodities. The rest are known as non-enumerated and can be exported directly to other countries, as long as it’s done on British or plantation ships, where the owners and at least three-quarters of the crew are British subjects.

Among the non-enumerated commodities are some of the most important productions of America and the West Indies, grain of all sorts, lumber, salt provisions, fish, sugar, and rum.

Among the non-enumerated commodities are some of the most important products of America and the West Indies: all kinds of grain, lumber, preserved foods, fish, sugar, and rum.

Grain is naturally the first and principal object of the culture of all new colonies. By allowing them a very extensive market for it, the law encourages them to extend this culture much beyond the consumption of a thinly inhabited country, and thus to provide beforehand an ample subsistence for a continually increasing population.

Grain is naturally the main focus of farming in all new colonies. By providing them with a large market for it, the law motivates them to grow more than what is needed for a sparsely populated area, ensuring a sufficient food supply for a steadily growing population.

In a country quite covered with wood, where timber consequently is of little or no value, the expense of clearing the ground is the principal obstacle to improvement. By allowing the colonies a very extensive market for their lumber, the law endeavours to facilitate improvement by raising the price of a commodity which would otherwise be of little value, and thereby enabling them to make some profit of what would otherwise be mere expense.

In a country that's mostly covered with forests, where timber is therefore not worth much, the main barrier to progress is the cost of clearing the land. By giving the colonies a large market for their lumber, the law aims to encourage development by increasing the price of a resource that would otherwise have little value, allowing them to earn some profit from what would otherwise just be an expense.

In a country neither half peopled nor half cultivated, cattle naturally multiply beyond the consumption of the inhabitants, and are often, upon that account, of little or no value. But it is necessary, it has already been shown, that the price of cattle should bear a certain proportion to that of corn, before the greater part of the lands of any country can be improved. By allowing to American cattle, in all shapes, dead and alive, a very extensive market, the law endeavours to raise the value of a commodity, of which the high price is so very essential to improvement. The good effects of this liberty, however, must be somewhat diminished by the 4th of Geo. III. c. 15, which puts hides and skins among the enumerated commodities and thereby tends to reduce the value of American cattle.

In a country that isn't fully populated or fully developed, livestock tends to multiply more than the local population can consume, making them often low in value. However, it’s already been demonstrated that the price of livestock needs to correlate with the price of grain before the majority of the land in any country can be improved. By providing American livestock, both in all forms, dead and alive, with a broad market, the law aims to increase the value of this important commodity, which is crucial for growth. Nonetheless, the benefits of this freedom are somewhat lessened by the 4th of Geo. III. c. 15, which categorizes hides and skins as listed commodities and thus lowers the value of American livestock.

To increase the shipping and naval power of Great Britain by the extension of the fisheries of our colonies, is an object which the legislature seems to have had almost constantly in view. Those fisheries, upon this account, have had all the encouragement which freedom can give them, and they have flourished accordingly. The New England fishery, in particular, was, before the late disturbances, one of the most important, perhaps, in the world. The whale fishery which, notwithstanding an extravagant bounty, is in Great Britain carried on to so little purpose, that in the opinion of many people (which I do not, however, pretend to warrant), the whole produce does not much exceed the value of the bounties which are annually paid for it, is in New England carried on, without any bounty, to a very great extent. Fish is one of the principal articles with which the North Americans trade to Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean.

To boost the shipping and naval strength of Great Britain by expanding the fisheries of our colonies is a goal that the legislature seems to have consistently prioritized. Because of this, those fisheries have received all the support that freedom can provide, and they have thrived as a result. The New England fishery, in particular, was one of the most significant in the world before the recent troubles. The whale fishery, which, despite a large subsidy, is only minimally effective in Great Britain—many believe (though I don't necessarily agree) that its total output barely exceeds the value of the subsidies paid each year—is carried out very successfully in New England without any financial aid. Fish is one of the main products North Americans export to Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean.

Sugar was originally an enumerated commodity, which could only be exported to Great Britain; but in 1731, upon a representation of the sugar-planters, its exportation was permitted to all parts of the world. The restrictions, however, with which this liberty was granted, joined to the high price of sugar in Great Britain, have rendered it in a great measure ineffectual. Great Britain and her colonies still continue to be almost the sole market for all sugar produced in the British plantations. Their consumption increases so fast, that, though in consequence of the increasing improvement of Jamaica, as well as of the ceded islands, the importation of sugar has increased very greatly within these twenty years, the exportation to foreign countries is said to be not much greater than before.

Sugar was originally a listed product, which could only be exported to Great Britain; but in 1731, following a request from the sugar planters, its export was allowed to all parts of the world. However, the restrictions that came with this freedom, combined with the high price of sugar in Great Britain, have made it largely ineffective. Great Britain and her colonies still remain almost the only market for all sugar produced in the British plantations. Their consumption is growing so rapidly that, even though the import of sugar has significantly increased in the last twenty years due to the ongoing development in Jamaica and the newly acquired islands, the export to foreign countries is reportedly not much higher than it was before.

Rum is a very important article in the trade which the Americans carry on to the coast of Africa, from which they bring back negro slaves in return.

Rum is a significant commodity in the trade that Americans conduct with the coast of Africa, from which they return with black slaves as payment.

If the whole surplus produce of America, in grain of all sorts, in salt provisions, and in fish, had been put into the enumeration, and thereby forced into the market of Great Britain, it would have interfered too much with the produce of the industry of our own people. It was probably not so much from any regard to the interest of America, as from a jealousy of this interference, that those important commodities have not only been kept out of the enumeration, but that the importation into Great Britain of all grain, except[Pg 238] rice, and of all salt provisions, has, in the ordinary state of the law, been prohibited.

If all the surplus produce from America, including all types of grain, salted goods, and fish, had been included in the listing, it would have disrupted the market for our own people’s products in Great Britain. It’s likely that the decision to exclude these significant items wasn’t solely about protecting American interests, but rather out of a concern over this competition. That’s why these important commodities have not just been excluded from the listing, but importing any grain into Great Britain, except for rice, and all salted goods has been generally banned under the law.

The non-enumerated commodities could originally be exported to all parts of the world. Lumber and rice having been once put into the enumeration, when they were afterwards taken out of it, were confined, as to the European market, to the countries that lie south of Cape Finisterre. By the 6th of George III. c. 52, all non-enumerated commodities were subjected to the like restriction. The parts of Europe which lie south of Cape Finisterre are not manufacturing countries, and we are less jealous of the colony ships carrying home from them any manufactures which could interfere with our own.

The non-enumerated goods could originally be exported to all over the world. Lumber and rice were once included in the enumeration, but when they were removed, their export to the European market was limited to countries south of Cape Finisterre. According to the 6th of George III. c. 52, all non-enumerated goods faced the same restriction. The regions of Europe south of Cape Finisterre are not manufacturing countries, so we are less concerned about colonial ships bringing back any goods from there that could compete with our own.

The enumerated commodities are of two sorts; first, such as are either the peculiar produce of America, or as cannot be produced, or at least are not produced in the mother country. Of this kind are molasses, coffee, cocoa-nuts, tobacco, pimento, ginger, whale-fins, raw silk, cotton, wool, beaver, and other peltry of America, indigo, fustick, and other dyeing woods; secondly, such as are not the peculiar produce of America, but which are, and may be produced in the mother country, though not in such quantities as to supply the greater part of her demand, which is principally supplied from foreign countries. Of this kind are all naval stores, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, pig and bar iron, copper ore, hides and skins, pot and pearl ashes. The largest importation of commodities of the first kind could not discourage the growth, or interfere with the sale, of any part of the produce of the mother country. By confining them to the home market, our merchants, it was expected, would not only be enabled to buy them cheaper in the plantations, and consequently to sell them with a better profit at home, but to establish between the plantations and foreign countries an advantageous carrying trade, of which Great Britain was necessarily to be the centre or emporium, as the European country into which those commodities were first to be imported. The importation of commodities of the second kind might be so managed too, it was supposed, as to interfere, not with the sale of those of the same kind which were produced at home, but with that of those which were imported from foreign countries; because, by means of proper duties, they might be rendered always somewhat dearer than the former, and yet a good deal cheaper than the latter. By confining such commodities to the home market, therefore, it was proposed to discourage the produce, not of Great Britain, but of some foreign countries with which the balance of trade was believed to be unfavourable to Great Britain.

The listed goods fall into two categories: first, those that are unique to America or can't be produced, or at least are not produced, in the mother country. This includes molasses, coffee, coconuts, tobacco, allspice, ginger, whale fins, raw silk, cotton, wool, beaver, and other furs from America, as well as indigo, fustic, and other dye woods. Second, there are goods not unique to America, but which can be produced in the mother country, although not in sufficient quantities to meet most of the demand, which is largely met through imports. This category includes all naval supplies, masts, yards, bowsprits, tar, pitch, turpentine, pig iron, bar iron, copper ore, hides, skins, and pot and pearl ashes. The largest import of the first type of goods wouldn’t hinder the growth or sale of any products from the mother country. By limiting them to the domestic market, it was expected that our merchants would not only be able to purchase them at lower prices in the colonies, enabling them to sell at a better profit back home, but would also establish a profitable trade between the colonies and foreign nations, with Great Britain as the central hub for importing these goods into Europe. The importation of the second type of goods could also be managed to ensure it wouldn’t compete with home-produced items of the same kind but would instead compete with those imported from other countries; through appropriate duties, they could be made slightly more expensive than the domestic goods but still cheaper than foreign imports. By restricting these goods to the home market, the goal was to discourage the production, not in Great Britain, but in certain foreign nations where the trade balance was thought to be unfavorable to Great Britain.

The prohibition of exporting from the colonies to any other country but Great Britain, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, naturally tended to lower the price of timber in the colonies, and consequently to increase the expense of clearing their lands, the principal obstacle to their improvement. But about the beginning of the present century, in 1703, the pitch and tar company of Sweden endeavoured to raise the price of their commodities to Great Britain, by prohibiting their exportation, except in their own ships, at their own price, and in such quantities as they thought proper. In order to counteract this notable piece of mercantile policy, and to render herself as much as possible independent, not only of Sweden, but of all the other northern powers, Great Britain gave a bounty upon the importation of naval stores from America; and the effect of this bounty was to raise the price of timber in America much more than the confinement to the home market could lower it; and as both regulations were enacted at the same time, their joint effect was rather to encourage than to discourage the clearing of land in America.

The ban on exporting masts, yards, bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine from the colonies to any country other than Great Britain naturally drove down timber prices in the colonies. This, in turn, increased the cost of clearing land, which was the main barrier to their development. However, around the start of the 18th century, in 1703, Sweden's pitch and tar company tried to increase their prices to Great Britain by restricting exports to only their own ships, at prices they set, and in quantities they deemed appropriate. To counteract this significant mercantile strategy and to become as independent as possible from Sweden and other northern powers, Great Britain provided a subsidy for importing naval stores from America. The result of this subsidy was that timber prices in America rose much more than they fell due to the restriction to the home market. Since both regulations were put in place simultaneously, their combined effect was actually to encourage rather than discourage land clearing in America.

Though pig and bar iron, too, have been put among the enumerated commodities, yet as, when imported from America, they are exempted from considerable duties to which they are subject when imported from any other country, the one part of the regulation contributes more to encourage the erection of furnaces in America than the other to discourage it. There is no manufacture which occasions so great a consumption of wood as a furnace, or which can contribute so much to the clearing of a country overgrown with it.

Though pig iron and bar iron have been listed among the identified goods, when imported from America, they are exempt from the significant duties that apply to imports from other countries. This part of the regulation does more to promote the establishment of furnaces in America than to hinder it. No other manufacturing process consumes as much wood as a furnace, nor does any other contribute as much to clearing land that is overgrown.

The tendency of some of these regulations to raise the value of timber in America, and thereby to facilitate the clearing of the land, was neither, perhaps, intended nor understood by the legislature. Though their beneficial effects, however, have been in this respect accidental, they have not upon that account been less real.

The way some of these regulations increase the value of timber in America, making it easier to clear the land, was likely neither intended nor understood by the lawmakers. Although the positive effects have been somewhat accidental, they are no less significant because of that.

The most perfect freedom of trade is permitted between the British colonies of America and the West Indies, both in the enumerated and in the non-enumerated commodities. Those colonies are now become so populous and thriving, that each of them finds in some of the others a great and extensive market for every part of its produce. All of them taken together, they make a great internal market for the produce of one another.

The fullest freedom of trade is allowed between the British colonies in America and the West Indies, covering both listed and unlisted goods. These colonies have become so populous and successful that each one finds a large and diverse market for its products in the others. Together, they create a substantial internal market for each other’s goods.

The liberality of England, however, towards the trade of her colonies, has been confined chiefly to what concerns the market for their produce, either in its rude state, or in what may be called the very first stage of manufacture. The more advanced or more refined manufactures, even of the colony produce, the merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain chuse to reserve to themselves, and have prevailed upon the legislature to prevent their[Pg 239] establishment in the colonies, sometimes by high duties, and sometimes by absolute prohibitions.

The generosity of England towards the trade of its colonies has mainly focused on the market for their raw materials or basic manufactured goods. The more complex or refined products, even those made from colonial resources, are reserved for merchants and manufacturers in Great Britain. They have managed to persuade the government to block the development of these industries in the colonies, sometimes through high taxes and other times through outright bans.

While, for example, Muscovado sugars from the British plantations pay, upon importation, only 6s. 4d. the hundred weight, white sugars pay L.1 : 1 : 1; and refined, either double or single, in loaves, L.4 : 2 : 5820ths. When those high duties were imposed, Great Britain was the sole, and she still continues to be, the principal market, to which the sugars of the British colonies could be exported. They amounted, therefore, to a prohibition, at first of claying or refining sugar for any foreign market, and at present of claying or refining it for the market which takes off, perhaps, more than nine-tenths of the whole produce. The manufacture of claying or refining sugar, accordingly, though it has flourished in all the sugar colonies of France, has been little cultivated in any of those of England, except for the market of the colonies themselves. While Grenada was in the hands of the French, there was a refinery of sugar, by claying, at least upon almost every plantation. Since it fell into those of the English, almost all works of this kind have been given up; and there are at present (October 1773), I am assured, not above two or three remaining in the island. At present, however, by an indulgence of the custom-house, clayed or refined sugar, if reduced from loaves into powder, is commonly imported as Muscovado.

While, for example, Muscovado sugars from the British plantations are imported at only 6s. 4d. per hundredweight, white sugars cost £1: 1: 1; and refined sugars, whether double or single, in loaves, cost £4: 2: 5820ths. When these high duties were implemented, Great Britain was the only, and still remains the primary market for the sugars from the British colonies. This essentially prohibited the processing or refining of sugar for any foreign market initially, and now for the market that absorbs perhaps over ninety percent of the total production. The production of claying or refining sugar, therefore, has thrived in all the sugar colonies of France but has seen little development in those of England, except for the local market. When Grenada was under French control, there was a sugar refinery by claying on nearly every plantation. Since it came under English ownership, nearly all such operations have ceased; I have been informed that as of now (October 1773), there are only about two or three left on the island. Currently, however, due to a leniency from customs, clayed or refined sugar, when ground into powder, is generally imported as Muscovado.

While Great Britain encourages in America the manufacturing of pig and bar iron, by exempting them from duties to which the like commodities are subject when imported from any other country, she imposes an absolute prohibition upon the erection of steel furnaces and slit-mills in any of her American plantations. She will not suffer her colonies to work in those more refined manufactures, even for their own consumption; but insists upon their purchasing of her merchants and manufacturers all goods of this kind which they have occasion for.

While Great Britain promotes the production of pig and bar iron in America by exempting these goods from duties that similar items face when imported from other countries, she completely forbids the establishment of steel furnaces and slit mills in any of her American colonies. She does not allow her colonies to engage in these more advanced manufacturing processes, even for their own use; instead, she demands that they buy all such goods from her merchants and manufacturers as needed.

She prohibits the exportation from one province to another by water, and even the carriage by land upon horseback, or in a cart, of hats, of wools, and woollen goods, of the produce of America; a regulation which effectually prevents the establishment of any manufacture of such commodities for distant sale, and confines the industry of her colonists in this way to such coarse and household manufactures as a private family commonly makes for its own use, or for that of some of its neighbours in the same province.

She bans the export of goods from one province to another by water, and even the transport by land on horseback or in a cart of hats, wool, and woolen products made in America. This rule effectively stops any manufacturing of these items for long-distance sales and limits the work of her colonists to basic and household production that a typical family would make for its own use or for some neighbors in the same province.

To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind. Unjust, however, as such prohibitions may be, they have not hitherto been very hurtful to the colonies. Land is still so cheap, and, consequently, labour so dear among them, that they can import from the mother country almost all the more refined or more advanced manufactures cheaper than they could make them for themselves. Though they had not, therefore, been prohibited from establishing such manufactures, yet, in their present state of improvement, a regard to their own interest would probably have prevented them from doing so. In their present state of improvement, those prohibitions, perhaps, without cramping their industry, or restraining it from any employment to which it would have gone of its own accord, are only impertinent badges of slavery imposed upon them, without any sufficient reason, by the groundless jealousy of the merchants and manufacturers of the mother country. In a more advanced state, they might be really oppressive and insupportable.

To stop a great people from making the most of their own resources or from using their skills and effort in ways they think are best for themselves is a clear violation of the most important human rights. Although these prohibitions are unfair, they haven’t been very damaging to the colonies so far. Land is still quite inexpensive, making labor expensive for them, which allows them to import almost all the more sophisticated or advanced products from the mother country at a lower cost than if they produced them themselves. So, even if they weren't banned from starting such production, their current level of development would likely have led them to avoid doing so out of self-interest. Given their current state of progress, these restrictions may be more about imposing unnecessary symbols of oppression on them, driven by the unfounded jealousy of the merchants and manufacturers in the mother country. In a more advanced state, these restrictions could become truly burdensome and unbearable.

Great Britain, too, as she confines to her own market some of the most important productions of the colonies, so, in compensation, she gives to some of them an advantage in that market, sometimes by imposing higher duties upon the like productions when imported from other countries, and sometimes by giving bounties upon their importation from the colonies. In the first way, she gives an advantage in the home market to the sugar, tobacco, and iron of her own colonies; and, in the second, to their raw silk, to their hemp and flax, to their indigo, to their naval stores, and to their building timber. This second way of encouraging the colony produce, by bounties upon importation, is, so far as I have been able to learn, peculiar to Great Britain: the first is not. Portugal does not content herself with imposing higher duties upon the importation of tobacco from any other country, but prohibits it under the severest penalties.

Great Britain also restricts some of the most important products from the colonies to her own market. In return, she offers certain advantages in that market, sometimes by setting higher tariffs on similar products imported from other countries and sometimes by providing incentives for their importation from the colonies. Through the first method, she gives an advantage in the domestic market to the sugar, tobacco, and iron from her own colonies; and through the second method, she supports their raw silk, hemp and flax, indigo, naval stores, and building timber. This second way of promoting colonial products through import bounties seems to be unique to Great Britain, while the first method is not. Portugal doesn't just impose higher tariffs on tobacco imports from other countries; she outright bans it with strict penalties.

With regard to the importation of goods from Europe, England has likewise dealt more liberally with her colonies than any other nation.

When it comes to importing goods from Europe, England has offered more favorable treatment to her colonies than any other nation.

Great Britain allows a part, almost always the half, generally a larger portion, and sometimes the whole, of the duty which is paid upon the importation of foreign goods, to be drawn back upon their exportation to any foreign country. No independent foreign country, it was easy to foresee, would receive them, if they came to it loaded with the heavy duties to which almost all foreign goods are subjected on their importation into Great Britain. Unless, therefore, some part of those duties was drawn back upon exportation, there was an end of the carrying trade; a trade so much favoured by the mercantile system.

Great Britain allows a portion, usually about half, often a larger share, and sometimes even the entire amount, of the duty paid on imported foreign goods to be refunded when those goods are exported to another country. It was easy to predict that no independent foreign country would accept those goods if they came with the high duties that almost all foreign items face when entering Great Britain. Therefore, unless some part of those duties was refunded upon export, the carrying trade would come to a halt—a trade that the mercantile system strongly supports.

Our colonies, however, are by no means independent foreign countries; and Great[Pg 240] Britain having assumed to herself the exclusive right of supplying them with all goods from Europe, might have forced them (in the same manner as other countries have done their colonies) to receive such goods loaded with all the same duties which they paid in the mother country. But, on the contrary, till 1763, the same drawbacks were paid upon the exportation of the greater part of foreign goods to our colonies, as to any independent foreign country. In 1763, indeed, by the 4th of Geo. III. c. 15, this indulgence was a good deal abated, and it was enacted, "That no part of the duty called the old subsidy should be drawn back for any goods of the growth, production, or manufacture of Europe or the East Indies, which should be exported from this kingdom to any British colony or plantation in America; wines, white calicoes, and muslins, excepted." Before this law, many different sorts of foreign goods might have been bought cheaper in the plantations than in the mother country, and some may still.

Our colonies, however, are not independent foreign nations; and Great Britain has claimed the exclusive right to supply them with all goods from Europe, which could have forced them (just like other countries have done with their colonies) to accept those goods with all the same duties they pay in the mother country. But, on the contrary, until 1763, the same rebates were applied to the export of most foreign goods to our colonies as to any independent foreign country. In 1763, however, by the 4th of Geo. III. c. 15, this privilege was significantly reduced, and it was enacted, "That no part of the duty called the old subsidy should be refunded for any goods produced or made in Europe or the East Indies that were exported from this kingdom to any British colony or plantation in America; wines, white calicoes, and muslins, excepted." Before this law, many different kinds of foreign goods could have been bought cheaper in the colonies than in the mother country, and some may still be.

Of the greater part of the regulations concerning the colony trade, the merchants who carry it on, it must be observed, have been the principal advisers. We must not wonder, therefore, if, in a great part of them, their interest has been more considered than either that of the colonies or that of the mother country. In their exclusive privilege of supplying the colonies with all the goods which they wanted from Europe, and of purchasing all such parts of their surplus produce as could not interfere with any of the trades which they themselves carried on at home, the interest of the colonies was sacrificed to the interest of those merchants. In allowing the same drawbacks upon the re-exportation of the greater part of European and East India goods to the colonies, as upon their re-exportation to any independent country, the interest of the mother country was sacrificed to it, even according to the mercantile ideas of that interest. It was for the interest of the merchants to pay as little as possible for the foreign goods which they sent to the colonies, and, consequently, to get back as much as possible of the duties which they advanced upon their importation into Great Britain. They might thereby be enabled to sell in the colonies, either the some quantity of goods with a greater profit, or a greater quantity with the same profit, and, consequently, to gain something either in the one way or the other. It was likewise for the interest of the colonies to get all such goods as cheap, and in as great abundance as possible. But this might not always be for the interest of the mother country. She might frequently suffer, both in her revenue, by giving back a great part of the duties which had been paid upon the importation of such goods; and in her manufactures, by being undersold in the colony market in consequence of the easy terms upon which foreign manufactures could be carried thither by means of those drawbacks. The progress of the linen manufacture of Great Britain, it is commonly said, has been a good deal retarded by the drawbacks upon the re-exportation of German linen to the American colonies.

Most of the rules regarding colonial trade have largely been shaped by the merchants involved. It’s not surprising, then, that in many cases, their interests have taken precedence over those of the colonies or the homeland. By having the exclusive right to supply the colonies with all the goods they needed from Europe and to purchase surplus produce that didn’t conflict with their own trades back home, the interests of the colonies were sacrificed for the benefit of these merchants. By allowing the same tax refunds on the export of most European and East Indian goods to the colonies as on their export to independent countries, the interests of the homeland were also compromised, even by the merchants' own standards. The merchants aimed to pay as little as possible for the foreign goods they sent to the colonies, and therefore sought to reclaim as much of the duties they paid when importing those goods into Great Britain. This would allow them to either sell the same quantity of goods in the colonies for a higher profit or sell a larger quantity for the same profit, ensuring they gained in either scenario. It was also in the colonies' interest to obtain goods as cheaply and abundantly as possible. However, this wasn't always advantageous for the homeland, which could suffer in revenue by refunding a large portion of the duties paid on these goods, and in its manufacturing sector by being undercut in the colonial market due to the favorable terms offered for foreign products because of these refunds. It is often said that the growth of the linen industry in Great Britain has been significantly hindered by the tax refunds on the re-export of German linen to the American colonies.

But though the policy of Great Britain, with regard to the trade of her colonies, has been dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other nations, it has, however, upon the whole, been less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of them.

But even though Great Britain's policy regarding the trade of its colonies has been driven by the same commercial spirit as that of other nations, it has generally been less selfish and oppressive than theirs.

In every thing except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists to manage their own affairs their own way, is complete. It is in every respect equal to that of their fellow-citizens at home, and is secured in the same manner, by an assembly of the representatives of the people, who claim the sole right of imposing taxes for the support of the colony government. The authority of this assembly overawes the executive power; and neither the meanest nor the most obnoxious colonist, as long as he obeys the law, has any thing to fear from the resentment, either of the governor, or of any other civil or military officer in the province. The colony assemblies, though, like the house of commons in England, they are not always a very equal representation of the people, yet they approach more nearly to that character; and as the executive power either has not the means to corrupt them, or, on account of the support which it receives from the mother country, is not under the necessity of doing so, they are, perhaps, in general more influenced by the inclinations of their constituents. The councils, which, in the colony legislatures, correspond to the house of lords in Great Britain, are not composed of a hereditary nobility. In some of the colonies, as in three of the governments of New England, those councils are not appointed by the king, but chosen by the representatives of the people. In none of the English colonies is there any hereditary nobility. In all of them, indeed, as in all other free countries, the descendant of an old colony family is more respected than an upstart of equal merit and fortune; but he is only more respected, and he has no privileges by which he can be troublesome to his neighbours. Before the commencement of the present disturbances, the colony assemblies had not only the legislative, but a part of the executive power. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, they elected the governor. In the other colonies, they appointed the revenue officers, who collected the taxes imposed by those respective assemblies, to whom those officers were immediately responsible. There is more equality, therefore, among the English colonists than among the inhabitants of the mother country. Their manners are more re[Pg 241]publican; and their governments, those of three of the provinces of New England in particular, have hitherto been more republican too.

In everything except their foreign trade, the English colonists have complete freedom to run their own affairs as they see fit. This freedom is in every way equal to that of their fellow citizens back home and is guaranteed by an assembly of representatives who claim the exclusive right to impose taxes for the colony's government. The authority of this assembly keeps the executive power in check; and as long as even the lowest or most disliked colonist follows the law, he has nothing to fear from the governor or any civil or military officer in the province. While the colony assemblies, similar to the House of Commons in England, may not always fairly represent the people, they come closer to that ideal. Since the executive power either lacks the means to corrupt them or, due to the support it receives from the mother country, doesn't need to, these assemblies are generally more swayed by the views of their constituents. The councils in colony legislatures, which correspond to the House of Lords in Great Britain, are not made up of hereditary nobles. In some colonies, like three of the New England governments, these councils are not appointed by the king but chosen by the people's representatives. There is no hereditary nobility in any of the English colonies. In all of them, just like in other free countries, descendants of old colonial families are more respected than self-made individuals of equal ability and wealth, but they only have more respect and hold no privileges that could make them a burden to their neighbors. Before the current disturbances began, the colony assemblies held not only legislative power but also part of the executive power. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, they elected their governors. In the other colonies, they appointed tax officers who collected the taxes set by those assemblies and were directly accountable to them. Thus, there is more equality among the English colonists than among the people in the mother country. Their customs are more republican, and the governments, especially in three of the New England provinces, have also been more republican until now.

The absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the contrary, take place in their colonies; and the discretionary powers which such governments commonly delegate to all their inferior officers are, on account of the great distance, naturally exercised there with more than ordinary violence. Under all absolute governments, there is more liberty in the capital than in any other part of the country. The sovereign himself can never have either interest or inclination to pervert the order of justice, or to oppress the great body of the people. In the capital, his presence overawes, more or less, all his inferior officers, who, in the remoter provinces, from whence the complaints of the people are less likely to reach him, can exercise their tyranny with much more safety. But the European colonies in America are more remote than the most distant provinces of the greatest empires which had ever been known before. The government of the English colonies is, perhaps, the only one which, since the world began, could give perfect security to the inhabitants of so very distant a province. The administration of the French colonies, however, has always been conducted with much more gentleness and moderation than that of the Spanish and Portuguese. This superiority of conduct is suitable both to the character of the French nation, and to what forms the character of every nation, the nature of their government, which, though arbitrary and violent in comparison with that of Great Britain, is legal and free in comparison with those of Spain and Portugal.

The absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the other hand, operate in their colonies, and the discretionary powers usually given to their lower officials are often exercised there with greater intensity due to the significant distance. Under absolute governments, there's typically more freedom in the capital than in other parts of the country. The ruler usually has no personal interest or desire to corrupt justice or oppress the general population. In the capital, his presence tends to intimidate his lower officials, who, in the more remote provinces—where people's complaints are less likely to reach him—can act tyrannically with much more impunity. However, the European colonies in America are farther away than the most distant provinces of the largest empires ever known. The governance of the English colonies might be the only one, since the dawn of time, that can provide complete security to the residents of such a distant territory. The administration in the French colonies, on the other hand, has always been managed with much more kindness and moderation than that of the Spanish and Portuguese. This better approach aligns not only with the character of the French nation but also reflects the nature of their government, which, while arbitrary and harsh compared to that of Great Britain, is legal and freer compared to those of Spain and Portugal.

It is in the progress of the North American colonies, however, that the superiority of the English policy chiefly appears. The progress of the sugar colonies of France has been at least equal, perhaps superior, to that of the greater part of those of England; and yet the sugar colonies of England enjoy a free government, nearly of the same kind with that which takes place in her colonies of North America. But the sugar colonies of France are not discouraged, like those of England, from refining their own sugar; and what is still of greater importance, the genius of their government naturally introduces a better management of their negro slaves.

However, it is in the development of the North American colonies that the advantages of the English policy become most clear. The growth of France's sugar colonies has been at least comparable, if not superior, to that of many of England's colonies; yet, the sugar colonies of England enjoy a free government similar to that found in its North American colonies. In contrast, France's sugar colonies are not restricted, like those in England, from refining their own sugar. Even more importantly, the nature of their government encourages better management of their enslaved people.

In all European colonies, the culture of the sugar-cane is carried on by negro slaves. The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate climate of Europe could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the sugar-cane, as it is managed at present, is all hand labour; though, in the opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great advantage. But, as the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of those cattle; so the profit and success of that which is carried on by slaves must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves; and in the good management of their slaves the French planters, I think it is generally allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives some weak protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country where the unfortunate law of slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the management of the private property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is, perhaps, either a member of the colony assembly, or an elector of such a member, he dares not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for him to protect the slave. But in a country where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the magistrate to intermeddle even in the management of the private property of individuals, and to send them, perhaps, a lettre de cachet, if they do not manage it according to his liking, it is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave; and common humanity naturally disposes him to do so. The protection of the magistrate renders the slave less contemptible in the eyes of his master, who is thereby induced to consider him with more regard, and to treat him with more gentleness. Gentle usage renders the slave not only more faithful, but more intelligent, and, therefore, upon a double account, more useful. He approaches more to the condition of a free servant, and may possess some degree of integrity and attachment to his master's interest; virtues which frequently belong to free servants, but which never can belong to a slave, who is treated as slaves commonly are in countries where the master is perfectly free and secure.

In all European colonies, the culture of sugarcane is carried out by Black slaves. It is thought that people born in the temperate climate of Europe couldn’t handle the labor of digging in the scorching sun of the West Indies; the current method of sugarcane cultivation relies entirely on manual labor. Many believe that using a drill plow could greatly benefit the process. However, just as the profits and success of cattle cultivation depend heavily on how well those cattle are managed, the profits and success of slave cultivation also depend on the effective management of the slaves. Generally, it is accepted that French planters are better at managing their slaves than English planters. The law, which provides some minimal protection for slaves against their masters' violence, is likely to be enforced more effectively in a colony with an arbitrary government than in one that is purely free. In any country where the unfortunate institution of slavery exists, a magistrate who protects a slave is somewhat interfering in the master's private property management. In a free country, where the master may be part of the colonial assembly or an elector of such a member, the magistrate must act with extreme caution. The respect he has to show the master makes it harder for him to protect the slave. But in a country with a largely arbitrary government, where magistrates often interfere in the management of individuals' private property, and may send a lettre de cachet if it’s not managed to their liking, it’s much easier for them to offer protection to slaves; common human decency leads them to do so. The magistrate's protection makes the slave less contemptible in the eyes of the master, encouraging the master to treat him with more respect and kindness. Kind treatment not only makes the slave more loyal but also more intelligent, making him doubly valuable. He begins to resemble a free servant and may develop some level of integrity and commitment to his master's interests—qualities often seen in free servants but rarely found in slaves treated as such in countries where the master is completely free and secure.

That the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than under a free government, is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations. In the Roman history, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to protect the slave from the violence of his master, is under the emperors. When Vidius Pollio, in the presence of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves, who had committed a slight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his fish-pond, in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the others that belonged to him. Under the republic no magistrate could have[Pg 242] had authority enough to protect the slave, much less to punish the master.

I believe that a slave's life is better under an authoritarian government than under a free one, as shown by history across all ages and nations. In Roman history, the first time we see a magistrate stepping in to protect a slave from his master's abuse was during the imperial era. When Vidius Pollio, in front of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves, who had made a minor mistake, to be cut into pieces and dumped in his fish pond to feed the fish, the emperor, filled with outrage, ordered him to free not just that slave, but all of his slaves immediately. During the Republic, no magistrate had enough authority to protect the slave, let alone punish the master.

The stock, it is to be observed, which has improved the sugar colonies of France, particularly the great colony of St Domingo, has been raised almost entirely from the gradual improvement and cultivation of those colonies. It has been almost altogether the produce of the soil and of the industry of the colonists, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of that produce, gradually accumulated by good management, and employed in raising a still greater produce. But the stock which has improved and cultivated the sugar colonies of England, has, a great part of it, been sent out from England, and has by no means been altogether the produce of the soil and industry of the colonists. The prosperity of the English sugar colonies has been in a great measure owing to the great riches of England, of which a part has overflowed, if one may say so, upon these colonies. But the prosperity of the sugar colonies of France has been entirely owing to the good conduct of the colonists, which must therefore have had some superiority over that of the English; and this superiority has been remarked in nothing so much as in the good management of their slaves.

The stock that has improved the sugar colonies of France, especially the large colony of St. Domingo, has mostly been built up from the gradual enhancement and cultivation of those colonies. It has nearly all come from the soil and the hard work of the colonists, or, in other words, the value of that produce, steadily accumulated through effective management and used to generate even more output. However, the stock that has improved and cultivated the sugar colonies of England has largely been sent from England, and it certainly hasn’t all been derived from the land and labor of the colonists. The success of the English sugar colonies has greatly benefited from the wealth of England, part of which has spilled over into these colonies. In contrast, the success of the sugar colonies of France has completely stemmed from the effective management of the colonists, which must therefore have been superior to that of the English; this superiority is especially evident in how well they managed their slaves.

Such have been the general outlines of the policy of the different European nations with regard to their colonies.

This has been the general approach of various European countries toward their colonies.

The policy of Europe, therefore, has very little to boast of, either in the original establishment, or, so far as concerns their internal government, in the subsequent prosperity of the colonies of America.

The policy of Europe, therefore, has very little to take pride in, whether in its initial setup or, regarding their internal governance, in the later success of the American colonies.

Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over and directed the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice of coveting the possession of a country whose harmless natives, far from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality.

Foolishness and wrongdoing appear to have been the guiding forces behind the initial plan to establish those colonies; the foolish quest for gold and silver mines, and the wrongdoing of wanting to take over a land whose peaceful natives, who had never harmed the people of Europe, welcomed the first explorers with open arms and hospitality.

The adventurers, indeed, who formed some of the latter establishments, joined to the chimerical project of finding gold and silver mines, other motives more reasonable and more laudable; but even these motives do very little honour to the policy of Europe.

The adventurers who helped establish some of the later settlements, along with their unrealistic goal of discovering gold and silver mines, had other motives that were more rational and commendable; however, even these motives don’t reflect very well on Europe’s policies.

The English puritans, restrained at home, fled for freedom to America, and established there the four governments of New England. The English catholics, treated with much greater injustice, established that of Maryland; the quakers, that of Pennsylvania. The Portuguese Jews, persecuted by the inquisition, stript of their fortunes, and banished to Brazil, introduced, by their example, some sort of order and industry among the transported felons and strumpets by whom that colony was originally peopled, and taught them the culture of the sugar-cane. Upon all these different occasions, it was not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice of the European governments, which peopled and cultivated America.

The English Puritans, feeling restricted at home, escaped to America seeking freedom and set up the four governments of New England. The English Catholics, who faced much harsher treatment, established the government of Maryland; the Quakers founded Pennsylvania. The Portuguese Jews, persecuted by the Inquisition, stripped of their wealth, and exiled to Brazil, brought some level of order and industry among the transported criminals and women of ill-repute who initially populated that colony, and taught them how to grow sugarcane. In all these cases, it wasn't the wisdom and strategy of the European governments but rather their chaos and injustice that filled and cultivated America.

In effectuating some of the most important of these establishments, the different governments of Europe had as little merit as in projecting them. The conquest of Mexico was the project, not of the council of Spain, but of a governor of Cuba; and it was effectuated by the spirit of the bold adventurer to whom it was entrusted, in spite of every thing which that governor, who soon repented of having trusted such a person, could do to thwart it. The conquerors of Chili and Peru, and of almost all the other Spanish settlements upon the continent of America, carried out with them no other public encouragement, but a general permission to make settlements and conquests in the name of the king of Spain. Those adventures were all at the private risk and expense of the adventurers. The government of Spain contributed scarce any thing to any of them. That of England contributed as little towards effectuating the establishment of some of its most important colonies in North America.

In carrying out some of the most significant of these initiatives, the various governments of Europe were just as uninvolved as in planning them. The conquest of Mexico was driven not by the council of Spain, but by a governor of Cuba; it was accomplished through the determination of the daring adventurer to whom it was assigned, despite all the efforts that governor, who quickly regretted trusting such a person, made to sabotage it. The conquerors of Chile and Peru, as well as nearly all the other Spanish colonies in the Americas, moved forward with no other official support than a general permission to establish settlements and conquests in the name of the king of Spain. These ventures were taken at the personal risk and expense of the adventurers. The Spanish government contributed almost nothing to any of them. Similarly, the English government provided very little toward establishing some of its most significant colonies in North America.

When those establishments were effectuated, and had become so considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first regulations which she made with regard to them, had always in view to secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expense, and, consequently, rather to damp and discourage, than to quicken and forward the course of their prosperity. In the different ways in which this monopoly has been exercised, consists one of the most essential differences in the policy of the different European nations with regard to their colonies. The best of them all, that of England, is only somewhat less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of the rest.

When those establishments were established and became significant enough to grab the attention of the mother country, the first regulations she put in place were aimed at securing a monopoly on their trade. She intended to restrict their market and expand her own at their expense, which ultimately stifled and discouraged, rather than encouraged and promoted, their prosperity. The various ways this monopoly has been enforced highlight one of the key differences in the policies of different European nations toward their colonies. The best among them, that of England, is only slightly less unfair and oppressive than that of the others.

In what way, therefore, has the policy of Europe contributed either to the first establishment, or to the present grandeur of the colonies of America? In one way, and in one way only, it has contributed a good deal. Magna virûm mater! It bred and formed the men who were capable of achieving such great actions, and of laying the foundation of so great an empire; and there is no other quarter of the world, of which the policy is capable of forming, or has ever actually, and in fact, formed such men. The colonies owe to the policy of Europe the education and great views of their active and enterprising founders; and some of the greatest and most important of them, so far as concerns their internal government, owe to it scarce any thing else.

In what way has Europe's policies contributed to the initial establishment or the current greatness of the American colonies? In one way, and only one way, it has had a significant impact. Magna virûm mater! It produced and shaped the individuals capable of achieving such remarkable feats and laying the foundations of such a vast empire; no other part of the world has the capability to produce, or has ever actually produced, such people. The colonies owe their education and ambitious visions to Europe's policies, and many of the most important founders, especially regarding their internal governance, owe almost everything to it.

PART III.

Of the Advantages which Europe has derived from the Discovery of America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope.

Such are the advantages which the colonies of America have derived from the policy of Europe.

Such are the benefits that the American colonies have gained from Europe's policies.

What are these which Europe has derived from the discovery and colonization of America?

What are these things that Europe has gained from the discovery and colonization of America?

Those advantages may be divided, first, into the general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from those great events; and, secondly, into the particular advantages which each colonizing country has derived from the colonies which particularly belong to it, in consequence of the authority or dominion which it exercises over them.

Those advantages can be divided into, first, the general benefits that Europe, viewed as a single large country, has gained from those significant events; and, second, the specific benefits that each colonizing country has gained from the colonies it specifically controls due to the authority or power it holds over them.

The general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from the discovery and colonization of America, consist, first, in the increase of its enjoyments; and, secondly, in the augmentation of its industry.

The overall benefits that Europe, viewed as a single large country, has gained from the discovery and colonization of America are, first, in the increase of its pleasures; and, secondly, in the growth of its industry.

The surplus produce of America imported into Europe, furnishes the inhabitants of this great continent with a variety of commodities which they could not otherwise have possessed; some for conveniency and use, some for pleasure, and some for ornament; and thereby contributes to increase their enjoyments.

The excess goods from America brought into Europe provide the people of this vast continent with a range of products they wouldn't have had otherwise; some for convenience and practicality, some for enjoyment, and some for decoration; thus enhancing their overall enjoyment.

The discovery and colonization of America, it will readily be allowed, have contributed to augment the industry, first, of all the countries which trade to it directly, such as Spain, Portugal, France, and England; and, secondly, of all those which, without trading to it directly, send, through the medium of other countries, goods to it of their own produce, such as Austrian Flanders, and some provinces of Germany, which, through the medium of the countries before mentioned, send to it a considerable quantity of linen and other goods. All such countries have evidently gained a more extensive market for their surplus produce, and must consequently have been encouraged to increase its quantity.

The discovery and colonization of America, as is widely recognized, have helped boost the economy of all countries that trade directly with it, like Spain, Portugal, France, and England; and also of those that, while not trading directly, send their goods through other countries, such as Austrian Flanders and some provinces of Germany, which, via the previously mentioned countries, supply a significant amount of linen and other products. All these countries have clearly gained a larger market for their excess produce and have therefore been motivated to increase their output.

But that those great events should likewise have contributed to encourage the industry of countries such as Hungary and Poland, which may never, perhaps, have sent a single commodity of their own produce to America, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident. That those events have done so, however, cannot be doubted. Some part of the produce of America is consumed in Hungary and Poland, and there in some demand there for the sugar, chocolate, and tobacco, of that new quarter of the world. But those commodities must be purchased with something which is either the produce of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or with something which had been purchased with some part of that produce. Those commodities of America are new values, new equivalents, introduced into Hungary and Poland, to be exchanged there for the surplus produce of these countries. By being carried thither, they create a new and more extensive market for that surplus produce. They raise its value, and thereby contribute to encourage its increase. Though no part of it may ever be carried to America, it may be carried to other countries, which purchase it with a part of their share of the surplus produce of America, and it may find a market by means of the circulation of that trade which was originally put into motion by the surplus produce of America.

But it's not entirely clear that those major events also helped boost the industries of countries like Hungary and Poland, which might not have ever sent a single product of their own to America. However, it's undeniable that those events have had that effect. Some of America's products are consumed in Hungary and Poland, where there is a demand for sugar, chocolate, and tobacco from that new part of the world. But those products have to be bought with something that's either the result of Hungary and Poland's own industries or something that was bought with a part of that produce. The American products represent new values, new equivalents, that are introduced into Hungary and Poland to be exchanged for their surplus products. By being transported there, they create a new and larger market for that surplus. They increase its value and help encourage its growth. Even if none of it ever goes to America, it might be sent to other countries that buy it with some of their share of America's surplus products, and it can find a market through the trade that was initially driven by America's surplus.

Those great events may even have contributed to increase the enjoyments, and to augment the industry, of countries which not only never sent any commodities to America, but never received any from it. Even such countries may have received a greater abundance of other commodities from countries, of which the surplus produce had been augmented by means of the American trade. This greater abundance, as it must necessarily have increased their enjoyments, so it must likewise have augmented their industry. A greater number of new equivalents, of some kind or other, must have been presented to them to be exchanged for the surplus produce of that industry. A more extensive market must have been created for that surplus produce, so as to raise its value, and thereby encourage its increase. The mass of commodities annually thrown into the great circle of European commerce, and by its various revolutions annually distributed among all the different nations comprehended within it, must have been augmented by the whole surplus produce of America. A greater share of this greater mass, therefore, is likely to have fallen to each of those nations, to have increased their enjoyments, and augmented their industry.

Those significant events may have even helped boost the enjoyment and productivity of countries that not only never sent any goods to America but also never received anything from it. Even those countries might have gotten a larger supply of other goods from countries whose surplus production had increased due to American trade. This larger supply must have increased their enjoyment and also boosted their productivity. A greater variety of new exchangeable goods must have been made available to them for trading with the surplus produce of that productivity. A wider market must have been created for that surplus, raising its value and encouraging its growth. The total amount of goods entering the European commerce circle each year, and getting distributed among all the different nations involved, must have increased due to all the surplus from America. As a result, a larger share of this increased total likely went to each of those nations, enhancing their enjoyment and raising their productivity.

The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish, or at least to keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and industry of all those nations in general, and of the American colonies in particular. It is a dead weight upon the action of one of the great springs which puts into motion a great part of the business of mankind. By rendering the colony produce dearer in all other countries, it lessens its consumption, and thereby cramps the industry of the colonies, and both the enjoyments and the industry or all other countries, which both enjoy less when they pay more for what they enjoy, and produce less when they get less for what they produce. By rendering the pro[Pg 244]duce of all other countries dearer in the colonies, it cramps in the same manner the industry of all other colonies, and both the enjoyments and the industry of the colonies. It is a clog which, for the supposed benefit of some particular countries, embarrasses the pleasures and encumbers the industry of all other countries, but of the colonies more than of any other. It not only excludes as much as possible all other countries from one particular market, but it confines as much as possible the colonies to one particular market; and the difference is very great between being excluded from one particular market when all others are open, and being confined to one particular market when all others are shut up. The surplus produce of the colonies, however, is the original source of all that increase of enjoyments and industry which Europe derives from the discovery and colonization of America, and the exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to render this source much less abundant than it otherwise would be.

The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to reduce, or at least limit, the enjoyment and productivity of all nations in general, and the American colonies in particular. It acts as a dead weight on one of the key engines that drives much of human activity. By making colonial products more expensive in all other countries, it decreases their consumption, which stifles the productivity of the colonies, impacting both their enjoyment and the productivity of other nations. These nations enjoy less when they have to pay more for what they consume and produce less when they receive less for what they create. By making the products from all other countries more expensive in the colonies, it similarly constrains the productivity and enjoyment of the colonies themselves. It is a hindrance that, for the supposed benefit of some specific countries, complicates the pleasures and burdens the productivity of all other nations, particularly the colonies. It not only tries to exclude as much as possible all other nations from one specific market but also limits the colonies to one particular market. There’s a big difference between being excluded from one specific market when all others are available and being confined to one specific market when all others are closed off. However, the surplus products from the colonies are the primary source of the increased enjoyment and productivity that Europe gains from the discovery and colonization of America, and the exclusive trade of the mother countries serves to significantly limit that source.

The particular advantages which each colonizing country derives from the colonies which particularly belong to it, are of two different kinds; first, those common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces subject to its dominion; and, secondly, those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of America.

The specific benefits that each colonizing country gets from its colonies fall into two categories: first, the general advantages that all empires gain from the regions under their control; and second, the unique benefits believed to come from regions that are distinctly different, like the European colonies in America.

The common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces subject to its dominion consist, first, in the military force which they furnish for its defence; and, secondly, in the revenue which they furnish for the support of its civil government. The Roman colonies furnished occasionally both the one and the other. The Greek colonies sometimes furnished a military force, but seldom any revenue. They seldom acknowledged themselves subject to the dominion of the mother city. They were generally her allies in war, but very seldom her subjects in peace.

The main advantages that any empire gains from the provinces under its control are, first, the military support they provide for its defense, and second, the revenue they generate to support its civil government. Roman colonies occasionally provided both military and financial support. Greek colonies sometimes offered military assistance but rarely contributed revenue. They rarely considered themselves subjects of the mother city. Instead, they were usually allies during wars but seldom subjects during times of peace.

The European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military force for the defence of the mother country. The military force has never yet been sufficient for their own defence; and in the different wars in which the mother countries have been engaged, the defence of their colonies has generally occasioned a very considerable distraction of the military force of those countries. In this respect, therefore, all the European colonies have, without exception, been a cause rather of weakness than of strength to their respective mother countries.

The European colonies in America have never provided any military force to defend the mother country. The military force has never been enough for their own defense, and during the various wars that the mother countries have fought, defending their colonies has usually led to a significant distraction of their military resources. In this way, all the European colonies, without exception, have been more of a liability than an asset to their respective mother countries.

The colonies of Spain and Portugal only have contributed any revenue towards the defence of the mother country, or the support of her civil government. The taxes which have been levied upon those of other European nations, upon those of England in particular, have seldom been equal to the expense laid out upon them in time of peace, and never sufficient to defray that which they occasioned in time of war. Such colonies, therefore, have been a source of expense, and not of revenue, to their respective mother countries.

The Spanish and Portuguese colonies have really only provided some funds for the defense of the mother country or for supporting its civil government. The taxes imposed on people from other European countries, especially England, have rarely matched the costs incurred during peacetime and have never been enough to cover the expenses during wartime. Therefore, these colonies have been a financial burden rather than a source of income for their mother countries.

The advantages of such colonies to their respective mother countries, consist altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of America; and the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the sole source of all those peculiar advantages.

The benefits of these colonies to their mother countries are entirely due to the unique advantages believed to come from provinces as distinctive as the European colonies in America; and it is recognized that the exclusive trade is the only source of all those specific advantages.

In consequence of this exclusive trade, all that part of the surplus produce of the English colonies, for example, which consists in what are called enumerated commodities, can be sent to no other country but England. Other countries must afterwards buy it of her. It must be cheaper, therefore, in England than it can be in any other country, and must contribute more to increase the enjoyments of England than those of any other country. It must likewise contribute more to encourage her industry. For all those parts of her own surplus produce which England exchanges for those enumerated commodities, she must get a better price than any other countries can get for the like parts of theirs, when they exchange them for the same commodities. The manufactures of England, for example, will purchase a greater quantity of the sugar and tobacco of her own colonies than the like manufactures of other countries can purchase of that sugar and tobacco. So far, therefore, as the manufactures of England and those of other countries are both to be exchanged for the sugar and tobacco of the English colonies, this superiority of price gives an encouragement to the former beyond what the latter can, in these circumstances, enjoy. The exclusive trade of the colonies, therefore, as it diminishes, or at least keeps down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and the industry of the countries which do not possess it, so it gives an evident advantage to the countries which do possess it over those other countries.

Because of this exclusive trade, all of the surplus products from the English colonies, specifically those known as enumerated commodities, can only be sent to England. Other countries must buy these goods from England afterward. Therefore, it should be cheaper in England than in any other country, and it should provide more enjoyment to England than to any other place. It also boosts England’s industry more than that of other countries. For all the surplus products that England trades for these enumerated commodities, she gets a better price than any other countries can for similar goods when they trade for the same commodities. For instance, English manufacturers will buy more sugar and tobacco from their own colonies than similar manufacturers in other countries can purchase. Consequently, when comparing English manufacturers to those from other countries in the exchange for sugar and tobacco from the English colonies, this price advantage gives the former a boost that the latter cannot enjoy under these conditions. Thus, the exclusive trade of the colonies not only decreases, or at least keeps down below what they could otherwise rise to, the enjoyment and industry of countries that do not have it, but it also clearly advantages the countries that do have it over those that don’t.

This advantage, however, will, perhaps, be found to be rather what may be called a relative than an absolute advantage, and to give a superiority to the country which enjoys it, rather by depressing the industry and produce of other countries, than by raising those of that particular country above what they would naturally rise to in the case of a free trade.

This advantage, however, may be seen as more of a relative advantage than an absolute one. It tends to provide an edge to the country that has it by depressing the industry and output of other countries rather than truly enhancing the industry and output of that specific country beyond what they would normally achieve in a free trade scenario.

The tobacco of Maryland and Virginia, for example, by means of the monopoly which England enjoys of it, certainly comes cheaper to England than it can do to France, to whom England commonly sells a considerable part[Pg 245] of it. But had France and all other European countries been at all times allowed a free trade to Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco of those colonies might by this time have come cheaper than it actually does, not only to all those other countries, but likewise to England. The produce of tobacco, in consequence of a market so much more extensive than any which it has hitherto enjoyed, might, and probably would, by this time have been so much increased as to reduce the profits of a tobacco plantation to their natural level with those of a corn plantation, which it is supposed they are still somewhat above. The price of tobacco might, and probably would, by this time have fallen somewhat lower than it is at present. An equal quantity of the commodities, either of England or of those other countries, might have purchased in Maryland and Virginia a greater quantity of tobacco than it can do at present, and consequently have been sold there for so much a better price. So far as that weed, therefore, can, by its cheapness and abundance, increase the enjoyments, or augment the industry, either of England or of any other country, it would probably, in the case of a free trade, have produced both these effects in somewhat a greater degree than it can do at present. England, indeed, would not, in this case, have had any advantage over other countries. She might have bought the tobacco of her colonies somewhat cheaper, and consequently have sold some of her own commodities somewhat dearer, than she actually does; but she could neither have bought the one cheaper, nor sold the other dearer, than any other country might have done. She might, perhaps, have gained an absolute, but she would certainly have lost a relative advantage.

The tobacco from Maryland and Virginia, for instance, thanks to the monopoly that England holds over it, definitely arrives in England at a lower cost than it does in France, which typically buys a significant portion of it from England. However, if France and other European countries had always been allowed to trade freely with Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco from those colonies might by now have been cheaper than it currently is, not only for those other countries but also for England. The production of tobacco, due to a market much wider than it has ever had, could and probably would have increased sufficiently by now to bring the profits from tobacco plantations in line with those of corn plantations, which are presumed to still be somewhat higher. The price of tobacco might, and likely would, have dropped a bit lower than it is right now. An equal amount of goods, from either England or those other countries, could have bought a larger amount of tobacco in Maryland and Virginia than they can currently, and therefore would have sold there for a better price. So, to the extent that tobacco can enhance enjoyment or boost industry, whether in England or elsewhere, it would likely have had a greater impact if there had been free trade. In this scenario, England wouldn't have had any edge over other countries. It might have purchased the tobacco from its colonies for a bit less and consequently sold some of its own goods for a bit more than it does now; however, it couldn't have bought the tobacco cheaper or sold its goods for more than any other country could have. While it might have gained an absolute advantage, it would definitely have lost a relative one.

In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony trade, in order to execute the invidious and malignant project of excluding, as much as possible, other nations from any share in it, England, there are very probable reasons for believing, has not only sacrificed a part of the absolute advantage which she, as well as every other nation, might have derived from that trade, but has subjected herself both to an absolute and to a relative disadvantage in almost every other branch of trade.

To gain this relative advantage in the colonial trade and to carry out the harmful plan of keeping other nations from participating as much as possible, England has likely sacrificed part of the absolute benefits that she, like any other nation, could have gained from that trade. Instead, she has put herself at both an absolute and relative disadvantage in nearly every other area of trade.

When, by the act of navigation, England assumed to herself the monopoly of the colony trade, the foreign capitals which had before been employed in it, were necessarily withdrawn from it. The English capital, which had before carried on but a part of it, was now to carry on the whole. The capital which had before supplied the colonies with but a part of the goods which they wanted from Europe, was now all that was employed to supply them with the whole. But it could not supply them with the whole; and the goods with which it did supply them were necessarily sold very dear. The capital which had before bought but a part of the surplus produce of the colonies, was now all that was employed to buy the whole. But it could not buy the whole at anything near the old price; and therefore, whatever it did buy, it necessarily bought very cheap. But in an employment of capital, in which the merchant sold very dear, and bought very cheap, the profit must have been very great, and much above the ordinary level of profit in other branches of trade. This superiority of profit in the colony trade could not fail to draw from other branches of trade a part of the capital which had before been employed in them. But this revulsion of capital, as it must have gradually increased the competition of capitals in the colony trade, so it must have gradually diminished that competition in all those other branches of trade; as it must have gradually lowered the profits of the one, so it must have gradually raised those of the other, till the profits of all came to a new level, different from, and somewhat higher, than that at which they had been before.

When England took control of the colony trade through navigation, foreign investments that had previously been involved in it were pulled out. The English capital, which had only handled part of the trade before, was now responsible for the entirety. The capital that once supplied the colonies with only some of their desired goods from Europe was now all that could provide them with everything they needed. However, it couldn't meet the entire demand, and the goods it did provide were sold at much higher prices. The capital that used to buy only a portion of the colonies’ surplus produce was now the only capital buying all of it. But it couldn't purchase everything at prices similar to before, so whatever it did acquire was bought at very low prices. In a situation where merchants sold at high prices and bought at low prices, the profits must have been significant, exceeding the usual profit margins in other areas of trade. This increase in profit from colonial trade inevitably attracted some capital away from other trade sectors. However, as this capital shifted, it would gradually enhance competition within the colonial trade while diminishing competition in other trade sectors. As competition decreased and profits fell in the other sectors, profits in colonial trade would rise, leading to a new equilibrium where overall profits were somewhat higher than before.

This double effect of drawing capital from all other trades, and of raising the rate of profit somewhat higher than it otherwise would have been in all trades, was not only produced by this monopoly upon its first establishment, but has continued to be produced by it ever since.

This dual impact of pulling capital from all other industries and increasing the profit rate slightly above what it would have been in all sectors was created by this monopoly when it first began and has continued to happen ever since.

First, This monopoly has been continually drawing capital from all other trades, to be employed in that of the colonies.

First, This monopoly has been constantly taking money from all other industries to invest in the colonies.

Though the wealth of Great Britain has increased very much since the establishment of the act of navigation, it certainly has not increased in the same proportion as that of the colonies. But the foreign trade of every country naturally increases in proportion to its wealth, its surplus produce in proportion to its whole produce; and Great Britain having engrossed to herself almost the whole of what may be called the foreign trade of the colonies, and her capital not having increased in the same proportion as the extent of that trade, she could not carry it on without continually withdrawing from other branches of trade some part of the capital which had before been employed in them, as well as withholding from them a great deal more which would otherwise have gone to them. Since the establishment of the act of navigation, accordingly, the colony trade has been continually increasing, while many other branches of foreign trade, particularly of that to other parts of Europe, have been continually decaying. Our manufactures for foreign sale, instead of being suited, as before the act of navigation, to the neighbouring market of Europe, or to the more distant one of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, have, the greater part of them, been accommodated to the still more distant one of[Pg 246] the colonies; to the market in which they have the monopoly, rather than to that in which they have many competitors. The causes of decay in other branches of foreign trade, which, by Sir Matthew Decker and other writers, have been sought for in the excess and improper made of taxation, in the high price of labour, in the increase of luxury, &c. may all be found in the overgrowth of the colony trade. The mercantile capital of Great Britain, though very great, yet not being infinite, and though greatly increased since the act of navigation, yet not being increased in the same proportion as the colony trade, that trade could not possibly be carried on without withdrawing some part of that capital from other branches of trade, nor consequently without some decay of those other branches.

Although the wealth of Great Britain has significantly increased since the Navigation Act was established, it hasn't grown at the same rate as that of the colonies. Naturally, foreign trade in any country tends to rise in line with its wealth, and its surplus production increases compared to its overall production. Great Britain has secured nearly all of the foreign trade from the colonies, but her capital hasn't grown in proportion to the extent of that trade, which means she couldn’t sustain it without continually pulling funds from other sectors that had previously relied on that capital, and also holding back a substantial amount that would have otherwise benefited those sectors. Since the Navigation Act was put in place, the trade with the colonies has been steadily growing, while many other areas of foreign trade, especially trade with other parts of Europe, have been consistently declining. Our products meant for export, which used to be aimed at the nearby European markets or the more distant Mediterranean markets, are now primarily tailored for the even more distant colonies, where we have a monopoly rather than facing stiff competition. The reasons for decline in other sectors of foreign trade, as suggested by Sir Matthew Decker and other writers—including excessive and poorly structured taxes, high labor costs, and rising luxury—can all be traced back to the rapid growth of colony trade. Although the mercantile capital of Great Britain is substantial, it isn’t limitless, and despite increasing significantly since the Navigation Act, it hasn't kept pace with the growth of the colony trade. Therefore, that trade couldn't possibly be sustained without diverting some of that capital from other sectors, leading to a decline in those areas.

England, it must be observed, was a great trading country, her mercantile capital was very great, and likely to become still greater and greater every day, not only before the act of navigation had established the monopoly of the corn trade, but before that trade was very considerable. In the Dutch war, during the government of Cromwell, her navy was superior to that of Holland; and in that which broke out in the beginning of the reign of Charles II., it was at least equal, perhaps superior to the united navies of France and Holland. Its superiority, perhaps, would scarce appear greater in the present times, at least if the Dutch navy were to bear the same proportion to the Dutch commerce now which it did then. But this great naval power could not, in either of those wars, be owing to the act of navigation. During the first of them, the plan of that act had been but just formed; and though, before the breaking out of the second, it had been fully enacted by legal authority, yet no part of it could have had time to produce any considerable effect, and least of all that part which established the exclusive trade to the colonies. Both the colonies and their trade were inconsiderable then, in comparison of what they are now. The island of Jamaica was an unwholesome desert, little inhabited, and less cultivated. New York and New Jersey were in the possession of the Dutch, the half of St. Christopher's in that of the French. The island of Antigua, the two Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia, were not planted. Virginia, Maryland, and New England were planted; and though they were very thriving colonies, yet there was not perhaps at that time, either in Europe or America, a single person who foresaw, or even suspected, the rapid progress which they have since made in wealth, population, and improvement. The island of Barbadoes, in short, was the only British colony of any consequence, of which the condition at that time bore any resemblance to what it is at present. The trade of the colonies, of which England, even for some time after the act of navigation, enjoyed but a part (for the act of navigation was not very strictly executed till several years after it was enacted), could not at that time be the cause of the great trade of England, nor of the great naval power which was supported by that trade. The trade which at that time supported that great naval power was the trade of Europe, and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. But the share which Great Britain at present enjoys of that trade could not support any such great naval power. Had the growing trade of the colonies been left free to all nations, whatever share of it might have fallen to Great Britain, and a very considerable share would probably have fallen to her, must have been all an addition to this great trade of which she was before in possession. In consequence of the monopoly, the increase of the colony trade has not so much occasioned an addition to the trade which Great Britain had before, as a total change in its direction.

England was a major trading country, and her mercantile capital was substantial, likely to keep growing each day. This was true not only before the Navigation Acts established a monopoly on the corn trade but even when that trade was still pretty modest. During the Dutch War under Cromwell, England's navy surpassed that of Holland; in the subsequent war at the start of Charles II's reign, it was at least on par, if not superior, to the combined navies of France and Holland. Its superiority might not seem as impressive today, especially if the Dutch navy were to maintain the same proportion to Dutch commerce now as it did back then. However, this significant naval power wasn’t a result of the Navigation Acts in either war. During the first conflict, the plan for that act had just been formed; and while it was fully enacted before the second war, none of its provisions, especially those related to exclusive trade with the colonies, had enough time to have a substantial impact. The colonies and their trade were minor compared to what they are today. Jamaica was a harsh, uninhabited desert with little cultivation. New York and New Jersey were under Dutch control, and half of St. Christopher's belonged to the French. The islands of Antigua, the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia were not yet settled. Virginia, Maryland, and New England were established, and though they were thriving colonies, it’s unlikely that anyone at that time, in either Europe or America, anticipated the rapid growth they would later experience in wealth, population, and development. Barbados was the only significant British colony that resembled its current state. The trade of these colonies, which England only partially benefited from even after the Navigation Act—since it wasn’t strictly enforced for several years—could not have been the cause of England's extensive trade or the naval power it afforded. At that time, the trade that supported this great naval power was primarily European trade and that of the Mediterranean countries. Yet, the share that Great Britain has of that trade today couldn't sustain such a large naval power. If the burgeoning colony trade had been open to all nations, Great Britain would likely have received a significant portion of it, but that would have added to the existing trade she already possessed. Due to the monopoly, the growth of the colony trade has primarily shifted the direction of trade Great Britain was already engaged in rather than adding to it.

Secondly, This monopoly has necessarily contributed to keep up the rate of profit, in all the different branches of British trade, higher than it naturally would have been, had all nations been allowed a free trade to the British colonies.

Secondly, this monopoly has inevitably helped maintain higher profit rates across all branches of British trade than they would have been if all nations had the freedom to trade with the British colonies.

The monopoly of the colony trade, as it necessarily drew towards that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would have gone to it of its own accord, so, by the expulsion of all foreign capitals, it necessarily reduced the whole quantity of capital employed in that trade below what it naturally would have been in the case of a free trade. But, by lessening the competition of capitals in that branch of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of profit in that branch. By lessening, too, the competition of British capitals in all other branches of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of British profit in all those other branches. Whatever may have been, at any particular period since the establishment of the act of navigation, the state or extent of the mercantile capital of Great Britain, the monopoly of the colony trade must, during the continuance of that state, have raised the ordinary rate of British profit higher than it otherwise would have been, both in that and in all the other branches of British trade. If, since the establishment of the act of navigation, the ordinary rate of British profit has fallen considerably, as it certainly has, it must have fallen still lower, had not the monopoly established by that act contributed to keep it up.

The monopoly on colony trade, by drawing more of Great Britain's capital into that trade than would have happened on its own, also forced out all foreign capital. This caused the total amount of capital used in that trade to drop below what it would have been with free trade. However, by reducing competition among capitals in that area, it increased the profit rate there. Similarly, by diminishing the competition among British capitals in all other sectors, it raised the profit rate across those sectors as well. Regardless of the state or size of Great Britain's mercantile capital at any time since the navigation act was put in place, the monopoly on colony trade must have elevated the typical British profit rate higher than it would have been otherwise, both in that area and in all other sectors of British trade. If the ordinary British profit rate has indeed significantly declined since the navigation act was established, it's likely that it would have fallen even more if that monopoly hadn't helped maintain it.

But whatever raises, in any country, the ordinary rate of profit higher than it otherwise would be, necessarily subjects that country[Pg 247] both to an absolute, and to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of which she has not the monopoly.

But anything that increases the normal profit rate in any country beyond what it would be otherwise places that country[Pg 247] at both an absolute and a relative disadvantage in every trade sector where it doesn't hold a monopoly.

It subjects her to an absolute disadvantage; because, in such branches of trade, her merchants cannot get this greater profit without selling dearer than they otherwise would do, both the goods of foreign countries which they import into their own, and the goods of their own country which they export to foreign countries. Their own country must both buy dearer and sell dearer; must both buy less, and sell less; must both enjoy less and produce less, than she otherwise would do.

It puts her at a complete disadvantage because, in these areas of trade, her merchants can’t make this higher profit without selling at higher prices than they normally would, for both the imported goods from other countries and the exported goods from their own country. Their own country has to buy at higher prices and sell at higher prices; it must buy less and sell less; it must enjoy and produce less than it otherwise would.

It subjects her to a relative disadvantage; because, in such branches of trade, it sets other countries, which are not subject to the same absolute disadvantage, either more above her or less below her, than they otherwise would be. It enables them both to enjoy more and to produce more, in proportion to what she enjoys and produces. It renders their superiority greater, or their inferiority less, than it otherwise would be. By raising the price of her produce above what it otherwise would be, it enables the merchants of other countries to undersell her in foreign markets, and thereby to justle her out of almost all those branches of trade, of which she has not the monopoly.

It puts her at a relative disadvantage because, in those areas of trade, it positions other countries, which don’t face the same absolute disadvantage, either higher above her or lower below her than they otherwise would be. It allows them to enjoy and produce more compared to what she enjoys and produces. It makes their advantage greater or their disadvantage smaller than it would otherwise be. By increasing the price of her goods beyond what it would normally be, it allows merchants from other countries to sell cheaper than her in foreign markets, pushing her out of almost all those areas of trade where she doesn’t have a monopoly.

Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour, as the cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets; but they are silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of the extravagant gain of other people; but they say nothing of their own. The high profits of British stock, however, may contribute towards raising the price of British manufactures, in many cases, as much, and in some perhaps more, than the high wages of British labour.

Our merchants often complain about the high wages of British workers, saying it's why their products are being sold for less in foreign markets; yet, they don’t mention the high profits they make. They grumble about the excessive earnings of others but keep quiet about their own. The high profits in British industries might actually contribute to driving up the prices of British goods just as much, and in some cases even more, than the high wages of British workers.

It is in this manner that the capital of Great Britain, one may justly say, has partly been drawn and partly been driven from the greater part of the different branches of trade of which she has not the monopoly; from the trade of Europe, in particular, and from that of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea.

In this way, the capital of Great Britain, one could rightly say, has been partly attracted and partly pushed from most of the various branches of trade in which she doesn’t have a monopoly; particularly from trade in Europe and from the countries around the Mediterranean Sea.

It has partly been drawn from those branches of trade, by the attraction of superior profit in the colony trade, in consequence of the continual increase of that trade, and of the continual insufficiency of the capital which had carried it on one year to carry it on the next.

It has partly come from those areas of business, due to the lure of higher profits in the colonial trade, because that trade keeps growing and the capital that supported it one year isn't enough to sustain it the next.

It has partly been driven from them, by the advantage which the high rate of profit established in Great Britain gives to other countries, in all the different branches of trade of which Great Britain has not the monopoly.

It has partly been pushed out by the advantage that the high profit rates in Great Britain give to other countries in all the different areas of trade where Great Britain doesn't have a monopoly.

As the monopoly of the colony trade has drawn from those other branches a part of the British capital, which would otherwise have been employed in them, so it has forced into them many foreign capitals which would never have gone to them, had they not been expelled from the colony trade. In those other branches of trade, it has diminished the competition of British capitals, and thereby raised the rate of British profit higher than it otherwise would have been. On the contrary, it has increased the competition of foreign capitals, and thereby sunk the rate of foreign profit lower than it otherwise would have been. Both in the one way and in the other, it must evidently have subjected Great Britain to a relative disadvantage in all those other branches of trade.

As the colony trade monopoly has taken away some British capital that could have been used in other sectors, it has also pushed foreign capital into those sectors that would never have invested there if they hadn’t been pushed out of the colony trade. In these other sectors, it has reduced competition from British capital, which has raised British profits higher than they would have been otherwise. On the other hand, it has increased competition from foreign capital, which has lowered foreign profits more than they would have been otherwise. In both cases, it clearly puts Great Britain at a relative disadvantage in all those other sectors of trade.

The colony trade, however, it may perhaps be said, is more advantageous to Great Britain than any other; and the monopoly, by forcing into that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would otherwise have gone to it, has turned that capital into an employment, more advantageous to the country than any other which it could have found.

The colonial trade, however, might be said to benefit Great Britain more than any other; and the monopoly, by channeling a larger share of Great Britain's capital into that trade than would have otherwise occurred, has directed that capital into a use that is more beneficial to the country than any other option it could have pursued.

The most advantageous employment of any capital to the country to which it belongs, is that which maintains there the greatest quantity of productive labour, and increases the most the annual produce of the land and labour of that country. But the quantity of productive labour which any capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption can maintain, is exactly in proportion, it has been shown in the second book, to the frequency of its returns. A capital of a thousand pounds, for example, employed in a foreign trade of consumption, of which the returns are made regularly once in the year, can keep in constant employment, in the country to which it belongs, a quantity of productive labour, equal to what a thousand pounds can maintain there for a year. If the returns are made twice or thrice in the year, it can keep in constant employment a quantity of productive labour, equal to what two or three thousand pounds can maintain there for a year. A foreign trade of consumption carried on with a neighbouring, is, upon that account, in general, more advantageous than one carried on with a distant country; and, for the same reason, a direct foreign trade of consumption, as it has likewise been shown in the second book, is in general more advantageous than a round-about one.

The best use of any money in a country is to keep the most productive jobs there and increase the annual output from its land and labor. However, the amount of productive labor that any capital put into foreign consumption trade can support depends on how often its returns come in. For instance, if you invest a thousand pounds in a foreign consumption trade with returns coming back once a year, that money can support the same amount of productive labor in its home country for a year. If the returns happen twice or three times a year, it can support a level of productive labor equivalent to what two or three thousand pounds could maintain for a year. Generally, trade with a neighboring country is more beneficial than trade with a distant one for this reason; and, as discussed in the second book, direct foreign consumption trade is usually better than indirect trade.

But the monopoly of the colony trade, so far as it has operated upon the employment of the capital of Great Britain, has, in all cases, forced some part of it from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant country, and in many cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption to a round-about one.

But the monopoly of the colony trade, as it has affected the use of Great Britain's capital, has, in every instance, pushed some of it away from a foreign trade of consumption with a neighboring country to one with a more distant one, and in many cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption to an indirect one.

First, The monopoly of the colony trade has, in all cases, forced some part of the cap[Pg 248]ital of Great Britain from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant country.

First, the colony trade monopoly has, in every case, pushed some of Great Britain's capital away from a nearby foreign trade of consumption and toward trade with a more distant country.

It has, in all cases, forced some part of that capital from the trade with Europe, and with the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, to that with the more distant regions of America and the West Indies; from which the returns are necessarily less frequent, not only on account of the greater distance, but on account of the peculiar circumstances of those countries. New colonies, it has already been observed, are always understocked. Their capital in always much less than what they could employ with great profit and advantage in the improvement and cultivation of their land. They have a constant demand, therefore, for more capital than they have of their own; and, in order to supply the deficiency of their own, they endeavour to borrow as much as they can of the mother country, to whom they are, therefore, always in debt. The most common way in which the colonies contract this debt, is not by borrowing upon bond of the rich people of the mother country, though they sometimes do this too, but by running as much in arrear to their correspondents, who supply them with goods from Europe, as those correspondents will allow them. Their annual returns frequently do not amount to more than a third, and sometimes not to so great a proportion of what they owe. The whole capital, therefore, which their correspondents advance to them, is seldom returned to Britain in less than three, and sometimes not in less than four or five years. But a British capital of a thousand pounds, for example, which is returned to Great Britain only once in five years, can keep in constant employment only one-fifth part of the British industry which it could maintain, if the whole was returned once in the year; and, instead of the quantity of industry which a thousand pounds could maintain for a year, can keep in constant employment the quantity only which two hundred pounds can maintain for a year. The planter, no doubt, by the high price which he pays for the goods from Europe, by the interest upon the bills which he grants at distant dates, and by the commission upon the renewal of those which he grants at near dates, makes up, and probably more than makes up, all the loss which his correspondent can sustain by this delay. But, though he make up the loss of his correspondent, he cannot make up that of Great Britain. In a trade of which the returns are very distant, the profit of the merchant may be as great or greater than in one in which they are very frequent and near; but the advantage of the country in which he resides, the quantity of productive labour constantly maintained there, the annual produce of the land and labour, must always be much less. That the returns of the trade to America, and still more those of that to the West Indies, are, in general, not only more distant, but more irregular and more uncertain, too, than those of the trade to any part of Europe, or even of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, will readily be allowed, I imagine, by every body who has any experience of these different branches of trade.

It has, in every case, redirected some of that capital from trade with Europe and the countries around the Mediterranean Sea to trade with the more distant regions of America and the West Indies. The returns are inevitably less frequent, not only because of the greater distance but also due to the specific conditions in those countries. As has already been noted, new colonies are always understocked. Their capital is always much less than what they could effectively use for the improvement and cultivation of their land. They constantly need more capital than they possess, and to fill this gap, they try to borrow as much as possible from the mother country, to which they are always indebted. The most common way for the colonies to accrue this debt isn't by borrowing through bonds from the wealthy people of the mother country, although they do this sometimes; rather, it's by falling behind on payments to their suppliers in Europe as much as those suppliers will permit. Their annual returns often amount to only about a third, and sometimes even less, of what they owe. Consequently, the entire capital advanced to them by their suppliers is rarely returned to Britain in less than three years, and sometimes not for four or five years. For instance, if a British capital of a thousand pounds is sent back to Great Britain only once every five years, it can only support one-fifth of the British industry that it could if the full amount were returned each year. Instead of supporting the level of industry that a thousand pounds could for a year, it can only sustain what two hundred pounds would maintain for that duration. The planter, certainly, compensates for the high prices he pays for goods from Europe, the interest on delayed bills, and the commissions on renewing those bills that are due soon, often covering, and likely exceeding, all the losses his supplier may incur from this delay. However, while he can compensate for his supplier's loss, he cannot compensate for that of Great Britain. In a trade with infrequent returns, the merchant's profits can be as high or even higher than in trades with frequent ones; however, the benefit to the country where he resides—the amount of productive labor consistently maintained, the annual output from land and labor—will always be significantly lower. It's generally accepted, I believe, by anyone with experience in these different trade sectors, that the returns from trade with America, and even more so with the West Indies, are not just more distant but also more irregular and uncertain than those from trade with any part of Europe or even the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea.

Secondly, The monopoly of the colony trade, has, in many cases, forced some part of the capital of Great Britain from a direct foreign trade of consumption, into a round-about one.

Secondly, the monopoly of colonial trade has, in many cases, redirected some of Great Britain's capital from direct foreign consumer trade into an indirect one.

Among the enumerated commodities which can be sent to no other market but Great Britain, there are several of which the quantity exceeds very much the consumption of Great Britain, and of which, a part, therefore, must be exported to other countries. But this cannot be done without forcing some part of the capital of Great Britain into a round-about foreign trade of consumption. Maryland, and Virginia, for example, send annually to Great Britain upwards of ninety-six thousand hogsheads of tobacco, and the consumption of Great Britain is said not to exceed fourteen thousand. Upwards of eighty-two thousand hogsheads, therefore, must be exported to other countries, to France, to Holland, and, to the countries which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. But that part of the capital of Great Britain which brings those eighty-two thousand hogsheads to Great Britain, which re-exports them from thence to those other countries, and which brings back from those countries to Great Britain either goods or money in return, is employed in a round-about foreign trade of consumption; and is necessarily forced into this employment, in order to dispose of this great surplus. If we would compute in how many years the whole of this capital is likely to come back to Great Britain, we must add to the distance of the American returns that of the returns from those other countries. If, in the direct foreign trade of consumption which we carry on with America, the whole capital employed frequently does not come back in less than three or four years, the whole capital employed in this round-about one is not likely to come back in less than four or five. If the one can keep in constant employment but a third or a fourth part of the domestic industry which could be maintained by a capital returned once in the year, the other can keep in constant employment but a fourth or a fifth part of that industry. At some of the out-ports a credit is commonly given to those foreign correspondents to whom they export their tobacco. At the port of London, indeed, it is commonly sold for ready money: the rule is Weigh and pay. At the port of London, therefore, the final returns of the[Pg 249] whole round-about trade are more distant than the returns from America, by the time only which the goods may lie unsold in the warehouse; where, however, they may sometimes lie long enough. But, had not the colonies been confined to the market of Great Britain for the sale of their tobacco, very little more of it would probably have come to us than what was necessary for the home consumption. The goods which Great Britain purchases at present for her own consumption with the great surplus of tobacco which she exports to other countries, she would, in this case, probably have purchased with the immediate produce of her own industry, or with some part of her own manufactures. That produce, those manufactures, instead of being almost entirely suited to one great market, as at present, would probably have been fitted to a great number of smaller markets. Instead of one great round-about foreign trade of consumption, Great Britain would probably have carried on a great number of small direct foreign trades of the same kind. On account of the frequency of the returns, a part, and probably but a small part, perhaps not above a third or a fourth of the capital which at present carries on this great round-about trade, might have been sufficient to carry on all those small direct ones; might have kept in constant employment an equal quantity of British industry; and have equally supported the annual produce of the land and labour of Great Britain. All the purposes of this trade being, in this manner, answered by a much smaller capital, there would have been a large spare capital to apply to other purposes; to improve the lands, to increase the manufactures, and to extend the commerce of Great Britain; to come into competition at least with the other British capitals employed in all those different ways, to reduce the rate of profit in them all, and thereby to give to Great Britain, in all of them, a superiority over other countries, still greater than what she at present enjoys.

Among the listed goods that can only be sent to Great Britain, there are several that far exceed what Great Britain actually consumes, meaning some of it must be exported to other countries. However, this requires diverting some of Great Britain's capital into a roundabout foreign trade. For instance, Maryland and Virginia ship over ninety-six thousand hogsheads of tobacco to Great Britain each year, while the consumption there is said to be no more than fourteen thousand. Thus, over eighty-two thousand hogsheads must be exported to other countries like France, Holland, and those around the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. The capital of Great Britain that brings those eighty-two thousand hogsheads in, re-exports them, and then returns with goods or money from those countries is tied up in this indirect foreign trade. This diversion is necessary to handle the significant surplus. If we were to calculate how many years it would take for the entire capital to return to Great Britain, we would need to account for both the distance of the American returns and the returns from those other nations. In the direct foreign trade with America, the total capital often doesn’t come back in less than three or four years; in this roundabout trade, it’s likely to take at least four or five years. While one trade can consistently sustain about a third or a quarter of the domestic industry that would thrive with capital returning annually, the other can only keep about a fourth or a fifth of that industry going. At some ports, exporters usually offer credit to foreign correspondents receiving their tobacco. In London, however, it is mostly sold for cash: the rule is "Weigh and pay." Thus, the final returns from the whole roundabout trade are more distant than those from America, simply by the time the goods may sit unsold in the warehouse, where they can sometimes linger for quite a while. If the colonies hadn’t been restricted to selling their tobacco solely in Great Britain, it’s likely that only what was necessary for local consumption would have reached us. The goods that Great Britain currently buys for its own use with the large surplus of tobacco it exports would likely have been sourced instead from its own industry’s immediate outputs or its own manufactured goods. This production and these goods, rather than being geared almost entirely to one large market as they are now, would probably have been suited for many smaller markets. Instead of having one large roundabout foreign trade, Great Britain would likely have engaged in numerous small direct trades of that kind. Due to the frequency of returns, a smaller portion—probably just a third or a fourth—of the capital currently used for this significant roundabout trade may have sufficed for all those smaller direct trades; this would have maintained an equal amount of British industry and adequately supported the annual output of land and labor in Great Britain. With all the objectives of this trade met by a much smaller capital, there would be substantial spare capital available for other purposes: improving lands, increasing manufacturing, and expanding commerce. This could enable Great Britain to compete with other British capitals engaged in those various activities, lowering the profit rates in all of them and providing a greater edge over other countries than it enjoys at present.

The monopoly of the colony trade, too, has forced some part of the capital of Great Britain from all foreign trade of consumption to a carrying trade; and, consequently from supporting more or less the industry of Great Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting partly that of the colonies, and partly that of some other countries.

The monopoly on colonial trade has also pushed some of Great Britain's capital away from foreign consumer trade towards shipping trade. As a result, this capital no longer supports the industries in Great Britain as much, but instead is used mainly to support the industries of the colonies and partially those of other countries.

The goods, for example, which are annually purchased with the great surplus of eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco annually re-exported from Great Britain, are not all consumed in Great Britain. Part of them, linen from Germany and Holland, for example, is returned to the colonies for their particular consumption. But that part of the capital of Great Britain which buys the tobacco with which this linen is afterwards bought, is necessarily withdrawn from supporting the industry of Great Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting, partly that of the colonies, and partly that of the particular countries who pay for this tobacco with the produce of their own industry.

The goods, for instance, that are bought each year with the excess of eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco re-exported from Great Britain aren't all used up in Great Britain. Some of them, like linen from Germany and Holland, are sent back to the colonies for their own use. However, the portion of Great Britain's capital that purchases the tobacco—which is later used to buy this linen—has to be drawn away from supporting British industry. Instead, it's entirely used to support both the colonies and the specific countries that pay for this tobacco with the products of their own industries.

The monopoly of the colony trade, besides, by forcing towards it a much greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would naturally have gone to it, seems to have broken altogether that natural balance which would otherwise have taken place among all the different branches of British industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of being accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been principally suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running in a great number of small channels, has been taught to run principally in one great channel. But the whole system of her industry and commerce has thereby been rendered less secure; the whole state of her body politic less healthful than it otherwise would have been. In her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many dangerous disorders, scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body politic. The expectation of a rupture with the colonies, accordingly, has struck the people of Great Britain with more terror than they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or a French invasion. It was this terror, whether well or ill grounded, which rendered the repeal of the stamp act, among the merchants at least, a popular measure. In the total exclusion from the colony market, was it to last only for a few years, the greater part of our merchants used to fancy that they foresaw an entire stop to their trade; the greater part of our master manufacturers, the entire ruin of their business; and the greater part of our workmen, an end of their employment. A rupture with any of our neighbours upon the continent, though likely, too, to occasion some stop or interruption in the employments of some of all these different orders of people, is foreseen, however, without any such general emotion. The blood, of which the circulation is stopt in some of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges itself into the greater, without occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopt in any of the greater vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and unavoidable consequences. If but one of those overgrown manufactures, which, by means either of bounties or of the[Pg 250] monopoly of the home and colony markets, have been artificially raised up to any unnatural height, finds some small stop or interruption in its employment, it frequently occasions a mutiny and disorder alarming to government, and embarrassing even to the deliberations of the legislature. How great, therefore, would be the disorder and confusion, it was thought, which must necessarily be occasioned by a sudden and entire stop in the employment of so great a proportion of our principal manufacturers?

The monopoly of the colonial trade, in addition to pushing a much larger share of Britain's capital into it than would have naturally occurred, seems to have completely disrupted the natural balance that would have otherwise existed among all the different sectors of British industry. Instead of being spread out across many small markets, Britain's industry has become mainly focused on one large market. Her commerce, instead of flowing through many small channels, has been trained to flow primarily through one major channel. However, this whole system of industry and commerce has become less secure; the overall state of the political system is less healthy than it could have been. In her current situation, Great Britain is like one of those unhealthy bodies where some vital organs are overgrown, making it prone to many dangerous ailments that aren't as likely to strike those with properly proportioned parts. A small blockage in that enlarged artery, which has been artificially inflated beyond its natural size and through which an unnatural percentage of the country's industry and commerce circulates, is likely to lead to serious issues for the entire political system. The fear of a break with the colonies has filled the people of Great Britain with more dread than they ever felt for a Spanish Armada or a French invasion. It was this fear, whether justified or not, that made the repeal of the Stamp Act, at least among merchants, a popular decision. The total exclusion from the colonial market, even if it lasted only a few years, led most of our merchants to think they were facing a complete halt to their trade; most of our main manufacturers feared the total ruin of their businesses; and most of our workers worried about losing their jobs. A conflict with any of our neighbors on the continent, while likely to cause some disruptions in the jobs of various groups, is generally anticipated without the same level of panic. Blood, when circulation is stopped in some small vessels, can easily flow back into the larger ones without causing any serious problems; but when circulation is halted in any of the larger vessels, convulsions, stroke, or death are immediate and unavoidable outcomes. If just one of those oversized industries—artificially elevated to an unnatural level through subsidies or the monopoly of domestic and colonial markets—experiences even a minor disruption in its operations, it often leads to unrest and disorder that alarms the government and complicates legislative discussions. How significant, then, would be the disorder and chaos expected from a sudden and total halt in the operations of such a large portion of our key manufacturers?

Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to Great Britain the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is rendered in a great measure free, seems to be the only expedient which can, in all future times, deliver her from this danger; which can enable her, or even force her, to withdraw some part of her capital from this overgrown employment, and to turn it, though with less profit, towards other employments; and which, by gradually diminishing one branch of her industry, and gradually increasing all the rest, can, by degrees, restore all the different branches of it to that natural, healthful, and proper proportion, which perfect liberty necessarily establishes, and which perfect liberty can alone preserve. To open the colony trade all at once to all nations, might not only occasion some transitory inconveniency, but a great permanent loss, to the greater part of those whose industry or capital is at present engaged in it. The sudden loss of the employment, even of the ships which import the eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco, which are over and above the consumption of Great Britain, might alone be felt very sensibly. Such are the unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile system. They not only introduce very dangerous disorders into the state of the body politic, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning, for a time at least, still greater disorders. In what manner, therefore, the colony trade ought gradually to be opened; what are the restraints which ought first, and what are those which ought last, to be taken away; or in what manner the natural system of perfect liberty and justice ought gradually to be restored, we must leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine.

Some moderate and gradual easing of the laws that give Great Britain exclusive trade with the colonies seems to be the only solution that can, in the long run, protect her from this risk. It can allow her, or even compel her, to pull some of her capital from this excessive engagement and redirect it, albeit with lower returns, to other ventures. By gradually reducing one sector of her industry while increasing all the others, this approach can gradually restore all the various sectors to their natural, healthy, and appropriate balance, which true freedom naturally establishes and can only preserve. Opening the colony trade to all nations at once might not only create temporary issues but could also lead to significant long-term losses for many whose work or capital is currently involved in it. The abrupt loss of jobs, even for the ships that bring in the eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco beyond what Great Britain consumes, would be deeply felt. Such are the unfortunate consequences of all the rules of the mercantile system. They introduce not only dangerous imbalances into the political landscape but also issues that are often hard to fix without temporarily causing even greater disruptions. How exactly the colony trade should be opened up gradually; which restrictions should be removed first, and which should be taken away last; or how the natural system of true liberty and justice should be restored step by step is something we must leave to the insight of future leaders and lawmakers to decide.

Five different events, unforeseen and unthought of, have very fortunately concurred to hinder Great Britain from feeling, so sensibly as it was generally expected she would, the total exclusion which has now taken place for more than a year (from the first of December 1774) from a very important branch of the colony trade, that of the twelve associated provinces of North America. First, those colonies, in preparing themselves for their non-importation agreement, drained Great Britain completely of all the commodities which were fit for their market; secondly, the extraordinary demand of the Spanish flota has, this year, drained Germany and the north of many commodities, linen in particular, which used to come into competition, even in the British market, with the manufactures of Great Britain; thirdly, the peace between Russia and Turkey has occasioned an extraordinary demand from the Turkey market, which, during the distress of the country, and while a Russian fleet was cruising in the Archipelago, had been very poorly supplied; fourthly, the demand of the north of Europe for the manufactures of Great Britain has been increasing from year to year, for some time past; and, fifthly, the late partition, and consequential pacification of Poland, by opening the market of that great country, have, this year, added an extraordinary demand from thence to the increasing demand of the north. These events are all, except the fourth, in their nature transitory and accidental; and the exclusion from so important a branch of the colony trade, if unfortunately it should continue much longer, may still occasion some degree of distress. This distress, however, as it will come on gradually, will be felt much less severely than if it had come on all at once; and, in the mean time, the industry and capital of the country may find a new employment and direction, so as to prevent this distress from ever rising to any considerable height.

Five unexpected events have fortunately come together to prevent Great Britain from feeling, as strongly as was generally expected, the complete exclusion that has now lasted for over a year (since December 1, 1774) from a key part of colonial trade, specifically with the twelve associated provinces of North America. First, those colonies, in getting ready for their non-importation agreement, completely drained Great Britain of all the goods suitable for their market. Second, the high demand from the Spanish fleet has, this year, depleted Germany and the north of many goods, especially linen, which used to compete, even in the British market, with British manufactured products. Third, the peace between Russia and Turkey has created an unusual demand in the Turkish market, which had been very poorly supplied during the country's distress, particularly while a Russian fleet was active in the Archipelago. Fourth, the demand from northern Europe for British manufactured goods has been increasing year after year for some time now. And fifth, the recent partition and subsequent peace in Poland have opened up that large country's market, contributing to an extraordinary demand from there in addition to the rising demand from the north. All these events, except the fourth, are temporary and accidental in nature; and if the exclusion from such an important part of colonial trade were to continue for much longer, it could still lead to some level of distress. However, since this distress will build gradually, it will be felt much less severely than if it had happened suddenly; and in the meantime, the country's workers and resources may find new opportunities and directions, preventing this distress from ever becoming significant.

The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, so far as it has turned towards that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would otherwise have gone to it, has in all cases turned it, from a foreign trade of consumption with a neighbouring, into one with a more distant country; in many cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption into a round-about one; and, in some cases, from all foreign trade of consumption into a carrying trade. It has, in all cases, therefore, turned it from a direction in which it would have maintained a greater quantity of productive labour, into one in which it can maintain a much smaller quantity. By suiting, besides, to one particular market only, so great a part of the industry and commerce of Great Britain, it has rendered the whole state of that industry and commerce more precarious and less secure, than if their produce had been accommodated to a greater variety of markets.

The colony's trade monopoly has, to the extent that it has directed a larger share of Great Britain's capital towards that trade than would have normally gone there, shifted it from a foreign trade of consumption with a nearby country to one with a more distant nation. In many instances, it has converted a direct foreign trade of consumption into an indirect one, and in some cases, it has completely moved away from foreign consumption trade to a shipping trade. Consequently, it has redirected trade from an avenue that could have supported a larger amount of productive labor to one that can support a much smaller amount. Additionally, by concentrating such a significant part of Great Britain's industry and commerce on just one specific market, it has made the overall state of that industry and commerce more unstable and less secure than if their output had been distributed across a wider range of markets.

We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and those of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful. But the former are so beneficial, that the colony trade, though subject to a monopoly, and, notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still, upon the whole, beneficial, and greatly beneficial, though a good deal less so than it otherwise would be.

We need to clearly differentiate between the impact of the colony trade and the impact of the monopoly on that trade. The former is always beneficial, while the latter is always harmful. However, the benefits of the colony trade are so significant that even with a monopoly in place, and despite the negative effects of that monopoly, it’s still overall beneficial and very beneficial, although not as much as it could be without the monopoly.

The effect of the colony trade, in its natu[Pg 251]ral and free state, is to open a great though distant market, for such parts of the produce of British industry as may exceed the demand of the markets nearer home, of those of Europe, and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. In its natural and free state, the colony trade, without drawing from those markets any part of the produce which had ever been sent to them, encourages Great Britain to increase the surplus continually, by continually presenting new equivalents to be exchanged for it. In its natural and free state, the colony trade tends to increase the quantity of productive labour in Great Britain, but without altering in any respect the direction of that which had been employed there before. In the natural and free state of the colony trade, the competition of all other nations would hinder the rate of profit from rising above the common level, either in the new market, or in the new employment. The new market, without drawing any thing from the old one, would create, if one may say so, a new produce for its own supply; and that new produce would constitute a new capital for carrying on the new employment, which, in the same manner, would draw nothing from the old one.

The impact of colony trade, in its natural and free form, is to create a significant, albeit distant, market for parts of British products that exceed the demand of closer markets, including those in Europe and the countries around the Mediterranean Sea. In this natural and free state, colony trade encourages Great Britain to continually increase its surplus by consistently offering new goods to exchange. Colony trade, in its natural and free state, aims to boost the amount of productive labor in Great Britain without changing the focus of labor already being utilized. With colony trade operating naturally and freely, the competition from other nations would prevent profit rates from exceeding the average, whether in the new market or new ventures. The new market would generate a new supply without depleting resources from the old market, effectively creating new products for its own needs; these new products would form a new capital for supporting the new ventures, which, likewise, would not take away from the old market.

The monopoly of the colony trade, on the contrary, by excluding the competition of other nations, and thereby raising the rate of profit, both in the new market and in the new employment, draws produce from the old market, and capital from the old employment. To augment our share of the colony trade beyond what it otherwise would be, is the avowed purpose of the monopoly. If our share of that trade were to be no greater with, than it would have been without the monopoly, there could have been no reason for establishing the monopoly. But whatever forces into a branch of trade, of which the returns are slower and more distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater proportion of the capital of any country, than what of its own accord would go to that branch, necessarily renders the whole quantity of productive labour annually maintained there, the whole annual produce of the land and labour of that country, less than they otherwise would be. It keeps down the revenue of the inhabitants of that country below what it would naturally rise to, and thereby diminishes their power of accumulation. It not only hinders, at all times, their capital from maintaining so great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain, but it hinders it from increasing so fast as it would otherwise increase, and, consequently, from maintaining a still greater quantity of productive labour.

The colony trade monopoly, on the other hand, excludes competition from other countries, which raises profit margins both in the new market and the new jobs. This pulls resources away from the old market and capital from previous industries. The main goal of the monopoly is to increase our share of the colony trade beyond what it would have been otherwise. If our share of that trade were to be no greater with the monopoly than it would have been without it, there would be no reason to have the monopoly at all. However, when a greater portion of a country’s capital is forced into a trade that offers slower and more distant returns compared to most other trades, it results in a lower total of productive labor and less overall annual output of land and labor in that country than would naturally occur. This keeps the residents' income below its potential, reducing their ability to save and invest. It not only limits their capital from maintaining as large a quantity of productive labor as it could, but it also slows its growth, meaning they can’t sustain even more productive labor in the future.

The natural good effects of the colony trade, however, more than counterbalance to Great Britain the bad effects of the monopoly; so that, monopoly and altogether, that trade, even as it is carried on at present, is not only advantageous, but greatly advantageous. The new market and the new employment which are opened by the colony trade, are of much greater extent than that portion of the old market and of the old employment which is lost by the monopoly. The new produce and the new capital which has been created, if one may say so, by the colony trade, maintain in Great Britain a greater quantity of productive labour than what can have been thrown out of employment by the revulsion of capital from other trades of which the returns are more frequent. If the colony trade, however, even as it is carried on at present, is advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by means of the monopoly, but in spite of the monopoly.

The positive effects of the colony trade more than outweigh the negative effects of the monopoly for Great Britain. Overall, this trade, even as it is currently conducted, is not just beneficial but highly beneficial. The new market and job opportunities created by the colony trade are much larger than the old market and jobs lost due to the monopoly. The new products and capital generated, so to speak, by the colony trade support a greater amount of productive labor in Great Britain than what has been lost because of capital shifting away from other trades with more frequent returns. Even though the colony trade is currently beneficial to Great Britain, it is not because of the monopoly, but rather in spite of it.

It is rather for the manufactured than for the rude produce of Europe, that the colony trade opens a new market. Agriculture is the proper business of all new colonies; a business which the cheapness of land renders more advantageous than any other. They abound, therefore, in the rude produce of land; and instead of importing it from other countries, they have generally a large surplus to export. In new colonies, agriculture either draws hands from all other employments, or keeps them from going to any other employment. There are few hands to spare for the necessary, and none for the ornamental manufactures. The greater part of the manufactures of both kinds they find it cheaper to purchase of other countries than to make for themselves. It is chiefly by encouraging the manufactures of Europe, that the colony trade indirectly encourages its agriculture. The manufacturers of Europe, to whom that trade gives employment, constitute a new market for the produce of the land, and the most advantageous of all markets; the home market for the corn and cattle, for the bread and butcher's meat of Europe, is thus greatly extended by means of the trade to America.

The colony trade opens up a new market primarily for manufactured goods rather than raw products from Europe. Agriculture is the main focus for all new colonies, a sector that the low cost of land makes more profitable than any other. They have plenty of raw land products, and instead of importing them from other countries, they usually have a sizable surplus to export. In new colonies, agriculture either pulls workers away from all other jobs or prevents them from taking on any other work. There are few workers available for necessary goods, and none for luxury items. Most of the products in both categories are cheaper for them to buy from other countries than to produce themselves. The colony trade mainly boosts European manufacturing, which in turn supports agriculture. The European manufacturers who benefit from that trade create a new market for the land's produce, which is the best kind of market; the domestic market for grain and livestock, for bread and meat in Europe, is significantly expanded through trade with America.

But that the monopoly of the trade of populous and thriving colonies is not alone sufficient to establish, or even to maintain, manufactures in any country, the examples of Spain and Portugal sufficiently demonstrate. Spain and Portugal were manufacturing countries before they had any considerable colonies. Since they had the richest and most fertile in the world, they have both ceased to be so.

But the monopoly of trade in large and prosperous colonies is not enough to create or even sustain industries in any country, as the examples of Spain and Portugal clearly show. Spain and Portugal were manufacturing countries before they had any significant colonies. Since acquiring the richest and most fertile colonies in the world, they have both stopped being so.

In Spain and Portugal, the bad effects of the monopoly, aggravated by other causes, have, perhaps, nearly overbalanced the natural good effects of the colony trade. These causes seem to be other monopolies of different kinds: the degradation of the value of gold and silver below what it is in most other countries; the exclusion from foreign markets by improper taxes upon exportation, and the narrowing of the home market, by still more[Pg 252] improper taxes upon the transportation of goods from one part of the country to another; but above all, that irregular and partial administration of justice which often protects the rich and powerful debtor from the pursuit of his injured creditor, and which makes the industrious part of the nation afraid to prepare goods for the consumption of those haughty and great men, to whom they dare not refuse to sell upon credit, and from whom they are altogether uncertain of repayment.

In Spain and Portugal, the negative effects of the monopoly, made worse by other factors, have probably outweighed the natural benefits of colony trade. These factors seem to include other kinds of monopolies: the drop in the value of gold and silver below what it is in most other countries; the exclusion from foreign markets due to unfair export taxes, and the restriction of the domestic market through even more unfair taxes on transporting goods within the country; but most importantly, the inconsistent and biased administration of justice that often protects wealthy and powerful debtors from their wronged creditors, and discourages hardworking people from producing goods for those arrogant and powerful individuals, to whom they feel they must sell on credit, and from whom they have no guarantee of repayment.

In England, on the contrary, the natural good effects of the colony trade, assisted by other causes, have in a great measure conquered the bad effects of the monopoly. These causes seem to be, the general liberty of trade, which, notwithstanding some restraints, is at least equal, perhaps superior, to what it is in any other country; the liberty of exporting, duty free, almost all sorts of goods which are the produce of domestic industry, to almost any foreign country; and what, perhaps, is of still greater importance, the unbounded liberty of transporting them from one part of our own country to any other, without being obliged to give any account to any public office, without being liable to question or examination of any kind; but, above all, that equal and impartial administration of justice, which renders the rights of the meanest British subject respectable to the greatest, and which, by securing to every man the fruits of his own industry, gives the greatest and most effectual encouragement to every sort of industry.

In England, on the other hand, the positive benefits of colonial trade, supported by various other factors, have largely outweighed the negative impacts of the monopoly. These factors seem to include the overall freedom of trade, which, despite some restrictions, is at least equivalent, if not better, than in any other country; the ability to export nearly all types of goods produced by local industries, tax-free, to almost any foreign country; and perhaps more importantly, the unrestricted freedom to transport these goods from one part of our country to another without having to report to any government office or facing any scrutiny or inspection. Most importantly, the equal and fair administration of justice makes the rights of even the lowest British citizen respected by the highest, and by ensuring that everyone receives the benefits of their own work, it provides the strongest motivation for all forms of industry.

If the manufactures of Great Britain, however, have been advanced, as they certainly have, by the colony trade, it has not been by means of the monopoly of that trade, but in spite of the monopoly. The effect of the monopoly has been, not to augment the quantity, but to alter the quality and shape of a part of the manufactures of Great Britain, and to accommodate to a market, from which the returns are slow and distant, what would otherwise have been accommodated to one from which the returns are frequent and near. Its effect has consequently been, to turn a part of the capital of Great Britain from an employment in which it would have maintained a greater quantity of manufacturing industry, to one in which it maintains a much smaller, and thereby to diminish, instead of increasing, the whole quantity of manufacturing industry maintained in Great Britain.

If the manufacturers of Great Britain have indeed benefited from colonial trade, as they certainly have, it hasn't been due to the monopoly on that trade but rather despite it. The monopoly's effect has not been to increase the quantity produced but to change the quality and type of some British manufactured goods. It has tailored these goods for a market with slow and distant returns, instead of one with frequent and nearby returns. As a result, it has diverted a portion of British capital from roles that would have sustained a larger manufacturing industry to those that support a much smaller one, ultimately reducing, rather than increasing, the overall amount of manufacturing industry in Great Britain.

The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, like all the other mean and malignant expedients of the mercantile system, depresses the industry of all other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies, without in the least increasing, but on the contrary diminishing, that of the country in whose favour it is established.

The monopoly on colonial trade, therefore, like all the other petty and harmful tactics of the mercantile system, lowers the productivity of all other countries, especially the colonies, without actually boosting, and instead reducing, that of the country it benefits.

The monopoly hinders the capital of that country, whatever may, at any particular time, be the extent of that capital, from maintaining so great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain, and from affording so great a revenue to the industrious inhabitants as it would otherwise afford. But as capital can be increased only by savings from revenue, the monopoly, by hindering it from affording so great a revenue as it would otherwise afford, necessarily hinders it from increasing so fast as it would otherwise increase, and consequently from maintaining a still greater quantity of productive labour, and affording a still greater revenue to the industrious inhabitants of that country. One great original source of revenue, therefore, the wages of labour, the monopoly must necessarily have rendered, at all times, less abundant than it otherwise would have been.

The monopoly prevents the capital of that country, no matter how much capital it has at any given time, from supporting as much productive labor as it could otherwise. It also stops it from providing as much income to hardworking residents as it would normally provide. Since capital can only grow through savings from income, the monopoly, by limiting the income that could be generated, inevitably slows down its growth and, as a result, restricts the ability to support even more productive labor and provide even greater income to the industrious people of that country. Thus, one major original source of income—wages from labor—has always been less plentiful because of the monopoly than it would have been otherwise.

By raising the rate of mercantile profit, the monopoly discourages the improvement of land. The profit of improvement depends upon the difference between what the land actually produces, and what, by the application of a certain capital, it can be made to produce. If this difference affords a greater profit than what can be drawn from an equal capital in any mercantile employment, the improvement of land will draw capital from all mercantile employments. If the profit in less, mercantile employments will draw capital from the improvement of land. Whatever, therefore, raises the rate of mercantile profit, either lessens the superiority, or increases the inferiority of the profit of improvement: and, in the one case, hinders capital from going to improvement, and in the other draws capital from it; but by discouraging improvement, the monopoly necessarily retards the natural increase of another great original source of revenue, the rent of land. By raising the rate of profit, too, the monopoly necessarily keeps up the market rate of interest higher than it otherwise would be. But the price of land, in proportion to the rent which it affords, the number of years purchase which is commonly paid for it, necessarily falls as the rate of interest rises, and rises as the rate of interest falls. The monopoly, therefore, hurts the interest of the landlord two different ways, by retarding the natural increase, first, of his rent, and, secondly, of the price which he would get for his land, in proportion to the rent which it affords.

By increasing the rate of profit in trade, the monopoly discourages land improvements. The profit from improvements depends on the difference between what the land currently produces and what it could produce with a certain capital investment. If this difference provides a greater profit than what could be made from an equivalent investment in trade, then money will flow into improving the land. If the profit is lower, money will be pulled away from land improvements towards trading ventures. So, anything that raises the trade profit either reduces the advantage or increases the disadvantage of improving land profits; in one case, it prevents investment in improvements, and in the other, it pulls investment away from them. By discouraging improvements, the monopoly inevitably slows down the natural growth of another significant source of income, which is land rent. Additionally, by raising the profit rate, the monopoly keeps the market interest rate higher than it would be otherwise. However, the price of land in relation to the rent it generates, or the number of years' worth of rent people are willing to pay for it, will typically decrease as the interest rate rises and increase as it falls. Thus, the monopoly harms the landlord's interests in two ways: by slowing the natural increase of both his rent and the price he could get for his land compared to the rent it produces.

The monopoly, indeed, raises the rate of mercantile profit, and thereby augments somewhat the gain of our merchants. But as it obstructs the natural increase of capital, it tends rather to diminish than to increase the sum total of the revenue which the inhabitants of the country derive from the profits of stock; a small profit upon a great capital generally affording a greater revenue than a great profit upon a small one. The monopoly raises the rate of profit, but it hinders the[Pg 253] sum of profit from rising so high as it otherwise would do.

The monopoly does increase the rate of commercial profit, which gives our merchants a bit more gain. However, since it blocks the natural growth of capital, it actually tends to reduce rather than increase the overall revenue that the people in the country get from stock profits; a small profit on a large capital usually leads to more revenue than a big profit on a small one. While the monopoly raises the profit rate, it prevents the total profit from reaching the higher levels it otherwise could.

All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of land, and the profits of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant than they otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one little order of men in one country, it hurts the interest of all other orders of men in that country, and of all the men in all other countries.

All the original sources of revenue—the wages of labor, the rent of land, and the profits from investments—are made much less plentiful by the monopoly than they would be otherwise. To support the minor interests of a small group of people in one country, it harms the interests of all other groups in that country, as well as everyone in all other countries.

It is solely by raising the ordinary rate of profit, that the monopoly either has proved, or could prove, advantageous to any one particular order of men. But besides all the bad effects to the country in general, which have already been mentioned as necessarily resulting from a higher rate of profit, there is one more fatal, perhaps, than all these put together, but which, if we may judge from experience, is inseparably connected with it. The high rate of profit seems everywhere to destroy that parsimony which, in other circumstances, is natural to the character of the merchant. When profits are high, that sober virtue seems to be superfluous, and expensive luxury to suit better the affluence of his situation. But the owners of the great mercantile capitals are necessarily the leaders and conductors of the whole industry of every nation; and their example has a much greater influence upon the manners of the whole industrious part of it than that of any other order of men. If his employer is attentive and parsimonious, the workman is very likely to be so too; but if the master in dissolute and disorderly, the servant, who shapes his work according to the pattern which his master prescribes to him, will shape his life, too, according to the example which he sets him. Accumulation is thus prevented in the hands of all those who are naturally the most disposed to accumulate; and the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour, receive no augmentation from the revenue of those who ought naturally to augment them the most. The capital of the country, instead of increasing, gradually dwindles away, and the quantity of productive labour maintained in it grows every day less and less. Have the exorbitant profits of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon augmented the capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they alleviated the poverty, have they promoted the industry, of those two beggarly countries? Such has been the tone of mercantile expense in those two trading cities, that those exorbitant profits, far from augmenting the general capital of the country, seem scarce to have been sufficient to keep up the capitals upon which they were made. Foreign capitals are every day intruding themselves, if I may say so, more and more into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. It is to expel those foreign capitals from a trade which their own grows every day more and more insufficient for carrying on, that the Spaniards and Portuguese endeavour every day to straiten more and more the galling bands of their absurd monopoly. Compare the mercantile manners of Cadiz and Lisbon with those of Amsterdam, and you will be sensible how differently the conduct and character of merchants are affected by the high and by the low profits of stock. The merchants of London, indeed, have not yet generally become such magnificent lords as those of Cadiz and Lisbon; but neither are they in general such attentive and parsimonious burghers as those of Amsterdam. They are supposed, however, many of them, to be a good deal richer than the greater part of the former, and not quite so rich as many of the latter: but the rate of their profit is commonly much lower than that of the former, and a good deal higher than that of the latter. Light come, light go, says the proverb; and the ordinary tone of expense seems everywhere to be regulated, not so much according to the real ability of spending, as to the supposed facility of getting money to spend.

It’s only by raising the ordinary profit rate that the monopoly has shown or could show any benefit to a specific group of people. However, aside from all the negative effects on the country as a whole, which have already been mentioned as inevitable outcomes of a higher profit rate, there’s one more disastrous consequence, perhaps worse than all the others combined, that seems to be inevitably tied to it. The high profit rate appears to undermine the frugality that is usually part of a merchant’s character. When profits are high, that sensible trait seems unnecessary, and lavish luxury seems to better match the wealth of the situation. But the owners of large commercial capital are inevitably the leaders and managers of an entire nation’s industry; their behavior greatly influences the work ethic of all industrious people more than any other group. If the employer is careful and frugal, the worker is likely to follow suit. But if the boss is reckless and disorganized, the employee, who shapes his work by the standards his boss sets, will also shape his life to mirror that example. This hinders accumulation among those who are naturally inclined to save; the funds meant for supporting productive labor do not grow from the earnings of those who should ideally be increasing them the most. Instead of growing, the country’s capital gradually shrinks, and the amount of productive labor supported in it decreases day by day. Have the excessive profits of the merchants in Cadiz and Lisbon increased the capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they reduced poverty or promoted industry in those struggling countries? The spending habits in those two trading cities have been such that those enormous profits seem hardly enough to maintain the capitals from which they were earned, let alone to expand them. Foreign capital is increasingly encroaching, if I may put it that way, into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. To drive out these foreign investments from a trade that their own is becoming increasingly inadequate to sustain, Spaniards and Portuguese are constantly trying to tighten the burdensome restrictions of their silly monopoly. Compare the mercantile attitudes of Cadiz and Lisbon with those of Amsterdam, and you’ll see how differently the behavior and character of merchants are influenced by high versus low profit rates. The merchants in London haven’t yet reached the same level of opulence as those in Cadiz and Lisbon; however, they also aren’t generally as careful and frugal as those in Amsterdam. Many of them are thought to be considerably richer than most in the former group and not quite as wealthy as many in the latter. Yet, their profit rate is usually much lower than that of the former and significantly higher than that of the latter. The saying goes, "easy come, easy go," and the usual spending habits seem to be determined not so much by actual spending capacity, but by the perceived ease of making money to spend.

It is thus that the single advantage which the monopoly procures to a single order of men, is in many different ways hurtful to the general interest of the country.

The one benefit that the monopoly provides to a specific group of people often harms the overall interests of the country in various ways.

To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and treasure of their fellow-citizens, to found and maintain such an empire. Say to a shopkeeper, Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my clothes at your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I can have them for at other shops; and you will not find him very forward to embrace your proposal. But should any other person buy you such an estate, the shopkeeper will be much obliged to your benefactor if he would enjoin you to buy all your clothes at his shop. England purchased for some of her subjects, who found themselves uneasy at home, a great estate in a distant country. The price, indeed, was very small, and instead of thirty years purchase, the ordinary price of land in the present times, it amounted to little more than the expense of the different equipments which made the first discovery, reconoitered the coast, and took a fictitious possession of the country. The land was good, and of great extent; and the cultivators having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some time at liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became, in the course of[Pg 254] little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660), so numerous and thriving a people, that the shopkeepers and other traders of England wished to secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without pretending, therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the original purchase money, or of the subsequent expense of improvement, they petitioned the parliament, that the cultivators of America might for the future be confined to their shop; first, for buying all the goods which they wanted from Europe; and, secondly, for selling all such parts of their own produce as these traders might find it convenient to buy. For they did not find it convenient to buy every part of it. Some parts of it imported into England, might have interfered with some of the trades which they themselves carried on at home. Those particular parts of it, therefore, they were willing that the colonists should sell where they could; the farther off the better; and upon that account proposed that their market should be confined to the countries south of Cape Finisterre. A clause in the famous act of navigation established this truly shopkeeper proposal into a law.

To create a massive empire solely to generate a population of customers might seem like an idea suitable only for a nation of shopkeepers. However, it’s actually a project that doesn’t fit a nation of shopkeepers at all, but is very suitable for a nation whose government is influenced by them. Only such politicians can truly believe they will gain something by using the blood and money of their fellow citizens to build and maintain such an empire. Tell a shopkeeper, "Buy me a nice piece of land, and I promise to always buy my clothes at your store, even if I have to pay a bit more than at other places," and you won’t find him eager to accept your offer. But if someone else were to buy that land for you, the shopkeeper would be grateful to your benefactor for insisting you buy all your clothes from his store. England secured a large piece of land in a faraway country for some of her citizens who were feeling discontent at home. The price was very low; instead of the usual thirty years’ worth of land payments, it barely covered the costs of the initial exploration, surveying the coast, and making a symbolic claim to the territory. The land was good and extensive. The farmers, having plenty of quality land to cultivate and being allowed for a while to sell their goods wherever they wanted, became, in just about thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660), such a large and prosperous group that the shopkeepers and other merchants from England wanted to ensure that they dominated their business. Without pretending that they had contributed to either the original purchase price or the later costs of improvement, they petitioned Parliament to ensure that American farmers would only buy their goods from them and would only sell their produce to these traders as they deemed convenient. But they didn’t find it convenient to buy everything. Some of the goods brought into England might have competed with the businesses they ran at home. For those specific goods, they were happy for the colonists to sell them wherever they could find a market, the farther away the better; thus, they proposed that their market be limited to countries south of Cape Finisterre. A provision in the famous Navigation Act turned this truly shopkeeper request into law.

The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or more properly, perhaps, the sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is supposed, consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never yet afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the civil government, or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is the principal badge of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which has hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Whatever expense Great Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency, has really been laid out in order to support this monopoly. The expense of the ordinary peace establishment of the colonies amounted, before the commencement of the present disturbances to the pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the expense of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary provisions, with which it was necessary to supply them; and to the expense of a very considerable naval force, which was constantly kept up, in order to guard from the smuggling vessels of other nations, the immense coast of North America, and that of our West Indian islands. The whole expense of this peace establishment was a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at the same time, the smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has cost the mother country. If we would know the amount of the whole, we must add to the annual expense of this peace establishment, the interest of the sums which, in consequence of their considering her colonies as provinces subject to her dominion, Great Britain has, upon different occasions, laid out upon their defence. We must add to it, in particular, the whole expense of the late war, and a great part of that of the war which preceded it. The late war was altogether a colony quarrel; and the whole expense of it, in whatever part of the world it might have been laid out, whether in Germany or the East Indies, ought justly to be stated to the account of the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions sterling, including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the two shillings in the pound additional land tax, and the sums which were every year borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war which began in 1739 was principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent the search of the colony ships, which carried on a contraband trade with the Spanish Main. This whole expense is, in reality, a bounty which has been given in order to support a monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was to encourage the manufactures, and to increase the commerce of Great Britain. But its real effect has been to raise the rate of mercantile profit, and to enable our merchants to turn into a branch of trade, of which the returns are more slow and distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater proportion of their capital than they otherwise would have done; two events which, if a bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps have been very well worth while to give such a bounty.

Maintaining this monopoly has been the main, or more accurately, the only goal of Great Britain's control over its colonies. The supposed main advantage for these provinces lies in the exclusive trade, which has never provided any revenue or military support for the civil government or the defense of the mother country. This monopoly is the main indicator of their dependency, and it is the only benefit that has come from that dependency so far. Any money Great Britain has spent to maintain this dependency has really been to support this monopoly. Before the current unrest began, the cost of the regular peace setup in the colonies equated to the pay of twenty foot regiments, along with the expenses for artillery, supplies, and special provisions that were necessary. Additionally, there was a significant naval presence constantly maintained to guard the vast coastline of North America and our Caribbean islands from other nations’ smuggling vessels. The entire cost of this peace setup was covered by Great Britain's revenue, and it was just a small part of what controlling the colonies has actually cost the mother country. To understand the total, we must add the annual cost of this peace setup to the interest on the funds that Great Britain has spent at various times defending the colonies, based on their view of the colonies as provinces under their control. Specifically, we need to include the total cost of the recent war and a significant portion of the previous war's expenses. The recent war was purely a colony matter, and all its costs, wherever they occurred—in Germany or the East Indies—should justly be charged to the colonies. It cost over ninety million pounds, including not only the new debt incurred but also the additional land tax and yearly funds borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war that started in 1739 was mainly a conflict over the colonies, primarily aimed at preventing inspections of colonial ships engaged in illegal trade with the Spanish Main. This entire expenditure is essentially a subsidy meant to support a monopoly. The claimed goal was to promote British manufacturing and increase trade, but in reality, it has driven up profit margins and allowed our merchants to invest a larger share of their capital into a trade that offers slower and more distant returns compared to most other trades; outcomes that, if a subsidy could have changed, might have made it worthwhile to provide such a subsidy.

Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies.

Under the current management system, Great Britain only experiences loss from the control she has over her colonies.

To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own laws, and to make peace and war, as they might think proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be, adopted by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to the expense which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of every nation; and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it, who would thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction, which the possession of the most turbulent, and, to the great body of the people, the most unprofitable province, seldom fails to afford. The most visionary enthusiasts would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure, with[Pg 255] any serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted. If it was adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By thus parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother country, which, perhaps our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished, would quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to respect, for whole centuries together, that treaty of commerce which they had concluded with us at parting, but to favour us in war as in trade, and instead of turbulent and factious subjects, to become our most faithful, affectionate, and generous allies; and the same sort of parental affection on the one side, and filial respect on the other, might revive between Great Britain and her colonies, which used to subsist between those of ancient Greece and the mother city from which they descended.

To suggest that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all control over her colonies and allow them to choose their own leaders, make their own laws, and decide matters of peace and war as they see fit would be to propose something that has never been, and likely never will be, accepted by any nation in the world. No nation has ever willingly relinquished control over a territory, no matter how difficult it might be to govern or how little income it generates compared to the expenses it incurs. Such sacrifices, while they might align with long-term interests, are always a blow to the pride of any nation, and more importantly, they go against the personal interests of those in power, who would lose access to many positions of trust and profit, as well as opportunities for wealth and status that even the most troubled and seemingly unprofitable province can often provide. Even the most idealistic dreamers would struggle to propose such a measure with any real hope of it being accepted. If it were accepted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately relieved of the entire annual cost of maintaining peace in the colonies, but could also negotiate a trade agreement that would effectively guarantee her a more advantageous open trade, even if it might not be as beneficial to merchants as the current monopoly. By parting on good terms, the natural connection between the colonies and the mother country, which recent conflicts may have nearly extinguished, would likely be rekindled. This could lead them to honor, for many centuries, the trade agreement made upon separation, and to support us in both trade and war, turning from rebellious subjects into our most loyal, loving, and generous allies. The kind of parental love on one side and respect on the other that once existed between the ancient city-states of Greece and their mother city could thrive again between Great Britain and her colonies.

In order to render any province advantageous to the empire to which it belongs, it ought to afford, in time of peace, a revenue to the public, sufficient not only for defraying the whole expense of its own peace establishment, but for contributing its proportion to the support of the general government of the empire. Every province necessarily contributes, more or less, to increase the expense of that general government. If any particular province, therefore, does not contribute its share towards defraying this expense, an unequal burden must be thrown upon some other part of the empire. The extraordinary revenue, too, which every province affords to the public in time of war, ought, from parity of reason, to bear the same proportion to the extraordinary revenue of the whole empire, which its ordinary revenue does in time of peace. That neither the ordinary nor extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her colonies, bears this proportion to the whole revenue of the British empire, will readily be allowed. The monopoly, it has been supposed, indeed, by increasing the private revenue of the people of Great Britain, and thereby enabling them to pay greater taxes, compensates the deficiency of the public revenue of the colonies. But this monopoly, I have endeavoured to show, though a very grievous tax upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue of a particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes, instead of increasing, that of the great body of the people, and consequently diminishes, instead of increasing, the ability of the great body of the people to pay taxes. The men, too, whose revenue the monopoly increases, constitute a particular order, which it is both absolutely impossible to tax beyond the proportion of other orders, and extremely impolitic even to attempt to tax beyond that proportion, as I shall endeavour to show in the following book. No particular resource, therefore, can be drawn from this particular order.

To make any province beneficial to the empire it belongs to, it should provide a revenue during peacetime that not only covers all its own peace-related expenses but also contributes its fair share to the overall support of the empire's government. Every province inevitably adds to the expenses of that central government, even if to varying degrees. If a specific province fails to contribute its part toward covering these expenses, it unfairly shifts a larger burden onto another part of the empire. Moreover, the extra revenue each province brings in during wartime should, logically, be proportional to the extra revenue of the entire empire, just as its regular revenue is in peacetime. It is widely accepted that neither the regular nor the extra revenue that Great Britain gets from its colonies matches this proportion in relation to the total revenue of the British empire. The monopoly is believed to elevate private income for the people of Great Britain, which enables them to pay higher taxes and compensates for the revenue shortfall from the colonies. However, I have shown that while this monopoly imposes a heavy tax on the colonies and may boost the revenue for a specific group in Great Britain, it actually reduces, rather than increases, the income of the majority of the population, thereby diminishing their capacity to pay taxes. The individuals whose income is enhanced by the monopoly belong to a specific group that cannot be taxed beyond the proportion of other groups, and it's not advisable to even try and tax them beyond that. Therefore, no significant benefit can be gained from this particular group.

The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies, or by the parliament of Great Britain.

The colonies can be taxed either by their own assemblies or by the British Parliament.

That the colony assemblies can never be so managed as to levy upon their constituents a public revenue, sufficient, not only to maintain at all times their own civil and military establishment, but to pay their proper proportion of the expense of the general government of the British empire, seems not very probable. It was a long time before even the parliament of England, though placed immediately under the eye of the sovereign, could be brought under such a system of management, or could be rendered sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting the civil and military establishments even of their own country. It was only by distributing among the particular members of parliament a great part either of the offices, or of the disposal of the offices arising from this civil and military establishment, that such a system of management could be established, even with regard to the parliament of England. But the distance of the colony assemblies from the eye of the sovereign, their number, their dispersed situation, and their various constitutions, would render it very difficult to manage them in the same manner, even though the sovereign had the same means of doing it; and those means are wanting. It would be absolutely impossible to distribute among all the leading members of all the colony assemblies such a share, either of the offices, or of the disposal of the offices, arising from the general government of the British empire, as to dispose them to give up their popularity at home, and to tax their constituents for the support of that general government, of which almost the whole emoluments were to be divided among people who were strangers to them. The unavoidable ignorance of administration, besides, concerning the relative importance of the different members of those different assemblies, the offences which must frequently be given, the blunders which must constantly be committed, in attempting to manage them in this manner, seems to render such a system of management altogether impracticable with regard to them.

It seems unlikely that the colonial assemblies can ever be managed in a way that allows them to impose a public revenue on their constituents that is enough not only to maintain their own civil and military needs but also to cover their fair share of the expenses for the general government of the British Empire. Even the English Parliament, which is directly overseen by the sovereign, took a long time to be managed in such a way, or to be generous enough in their funding to support the civil and military needs of their own country. This was only achieved by distributing many of the offices or the control over those offices among members of Parliament, allowing for a system of management to be established, even for England's Parliament. However, the colonial assemblies are far from the eye of the sovereign, they are numerous, scattered, and have different structures, making it very challenging to manage them in the same way, even if the sovereign had the means to do so, which they lack. It would be utterly impossible to distribute among the leading members of all the colonial assemblies a share of either the offices or the control over these offices from the general government of the British Empire that would persuade them to give up their popularity at home and tax their constituents to support a general government whose benefits would mostly go to people they don't know. Additionally, the inevitable lack of familiarity with administration regarding the relative importance of the various members of these different assemblies, the frequent offenses that would occur, and the constant mistakes that would be made in trying to manage them this way make such a system of management seem completely impractical for them.

The colony assemblies, besides, cannot be supposed the proper judges of what is necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire. The care of that defence and support is not entrusted to them. It is not their business, and they have no regular means of information concerning it. The assembly of[Pg 256] a province, like the vestry of a parish, may judge very properly concerning the affairs of its own particular district, but can have no proper means of judging concerning those of the whole empire. It cannot even judge properly concerning the proportion which its own province bears to the whole empire, or concerning the relative degree of its wealth and importance, compared with the other provinces; because those other provinces are not under the inspection and superintendency of the assembly of a particular province. What is necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire, and in what proportion each part ought to contribute, can be judged of only by that assembly which inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire.

The colony assemblies shouldn't be seen as the right judges of what's necessary for the defense and support of the entire empire. That responsibility isn't given to them. It's not their area of expertise, and they lack consistent access to the information they would need. An assembly of [Pg 256] a province, similar to a parish vestry, may make informed decisions about its own local matters, but it cannot properly assess issues concerning the entire empire. It can't accurately determine how its own province compares to the rest of the empire, or how its wealth and significance stack up against other provinces, because those other provinces aren't under the oversight of a specific provincial assembly. Only the assembly that oversees and manages the affairs of the entire empire can properly determine what is needed for its defense and support, and how much each part should contribute.

It has been proposed, accordingly, that the colonies should be taxed by requisition, the parliament of Great Britain determining the sum which each colony ought to pay, and the provincial assembly assessing and levying it in the way that suited best the circumstances of the province. What concerned the whole empire would in this way be determined by the assembly which inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire; and the provincial affairs of each colony might still be regulated by its own assembly. Though the colonies should, in this case, have no representatives in the British parliament, yet, if we may judge by experience, there is no probability that the parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable. The parliament of England has not, upon any occasion, shewn the smallest disposition to overburden those parts of the empire which are not represented in parliament. The islands of Guernsey and Jersey, without any means of resisting the authority of parliament, are more lightly taxed than any part of Great Britain. Parliament, in attempting to exercise its supposed right, whether well or ill grounded, of taxing the colonies, has never hitherto demanded of them any thing which even approached to a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow-subjects at home. If the contribution of the colonies, besides, was to rise or fall in proportion to the rise or fall of the land-tax, parliament could not tax them without taxing, at the same time, its own constituents, and the colonies might, in this case, be considered as virtually represented in parliament.

It has been suggested that the colonies should be taxed through requisition, with the Parliament of Great Britain deciding how much each colony should pay, and the provincial assembly collecting that amount in the manner that best fits the province's situation. This way, issues affecting the entire empire would be handled by the assembly responsible for overseeing the affairs of the empire as a whole, while each colony's local matters could still be managed by its own assembly. Although the colonies wouldn't have representatives in the British Parliament, based on past experiences, it seems unlikely that the parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable. The Parliament of England has never shown any tendency to unfairly burden parts of the empire that lack representation in Parliament. The islands of Guernsey and Jersey, which cannot resist Parliament's authority, are taxed less than any part of Great Britain. In its attempts to exercise its claimed right to tax the colonies, Parliament has never asked them for contributions that would even come close to what their fellow subjects at home pay. Additionally, if the colonies' contributions were to increase or decrease alongside the land tax, then Parliament couldn't tax them without also taxing its own constituents, meaning the colonies could be seen as virtually represented in Parliament.

Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different provinces are not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one mass; but in which the sovereign regulates the sum which each province ought to pay, and in some provinces assesses and levies it as he thinks proper; while in others he leaves it to be assessed and levied as the respective states of each province shall determine. In some provinces of France, the king not only imposes what taxes he thinks proper, but assesses and levies them in the way he thinks proper. From others he demands a certain sum, but leaves it to the states of each province to assess and levy that sum as they think proper. According to the scheme of taxing by requisition, the parliament of Great Britain would stand nearly in the same situation towards the colony assemblies, as the king of France does towards the states of those provinces which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their own, the provinces of France which are supposed to be the best governed.

There are many examples of empires where not all the different provinces are taxed uniformly, if I may say it that way; instead, the ruler decides how much each province should pay. In some areas, he assesses and collects taxes as he sees fit, while in others, he allows the local governments to determine how they will assess and collect taxes. In some provinces of France, the king not only decides what taxes to impose but also assesses and collects them as he sees fit. From other provinces, he requests a specific amount, but leaves it up to the local governments to assess and collect that amount as they see fit. Under the system of taxing by requisition, the Parliament of Great Britain would be in a similar position to the colonial assemblies, much like the king of France is to the local governments of those provinces that still enjoy the privilege of having their own assemblies, which are thought to be the best governed in France.

But though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just reason to fear that their share of the public burdens should ever exceed the proper proportion to that of their fellow-citizens at home, Great Britain might have just reason to fear that it never would amount to that proper proportion. The parliament of Great Britain has not, for some time past, had the same established authority in the colonies, which the French king has in those provinces of France which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their own. The colony assemblies, if they were not very favourably disposed (and unless more skilfully managed than they ever have been hitherto, they are not very likely to be so), might still find many pretences for evading or rejecting the most reasonable requisitions of parliament. A French war breaks out, we shall suppose; ten millions must immediately be raised, in order to defend the seat of the empire. This sum must be borrowed upon the credit of some parliamentary fund mortgaged for paying the interest. Part of this fund parliament proposes to raise by a tax to be levied in Great Britain, and part of it by a requisition to all the different colony assemblies of America and the West Indies. Would people readily advance their money upon the credit of a fund which partly depended upon the good humour of all these assemblies, far distant from the seat of the war, and sometimes, perhaps, thinking themselves not much concerned in the event of it? Upon such a fund, no more money would probably be advanced than what the tax to be levied in Great Britain might be supposed to answer for. The whole burden of the debt contracted on account of the war would in this manner fall, as it always has done hitherto, upon Great Britain; upon a part of the empire, and not upon the whole empire. Great Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only state which, as it has extended its empire, has only increased its expense, without once augmenting its resources. Other states have generally disburdened themselves, upon their subject and subordinate provinces, of the most considerable part of the expense of defending the empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole expense. In order to put Great Britain[Pg 257] upon a footing of equality with her own colonies, which the law has hitherto supposed to be subject and subordinate, it seems necessary, upon the scheme of taxing them by parliamentary requisition, that parliament should have some means of rendering its requisitions immediately effectual, in case the colony assemblies should attempt to evade or reject them; and what those means are, it is not very easy to conceive, and it has not yet been explained.

But even though, under this plan, the colonies shouldn’t reasonably fear that their share of public burdens would ever be more than a fair proportion compared to their fellow citizens back home, Great Britain might justifiably worry that it wouldn’t reach that fair proportion. The British Parliament hasn’t had the same established authority in the colonies for a while now, unlike the French king in those provinces of France that still have their own assemblies. The colonial assemblies, if they aren’t very cooperative (and unless they’re managed better than they have been so far, they’re probably not going to be), could easily find many excuses to avoid or reject even the most reasonable demands from Parliament. Let’s say a war with France breaks out; ten million must be raised right away to defend the heart of the empire. This amount needs to be borrowed against a parliamentary fund that’s already mortgaged to pay interest. Part of this fund Parliament plans to raise through a tax in Great Britain, and part through requests to all the various colonial assemblies in America and the West Indies. Would people be willing to lend their money based on a fund that partly relies on the goodwill of these assemblies that are far away from the war and may sometimes think they aren’t very affected by it? It’s likely that no more money would be advanced than what the tax levied in Great Britain could guarantee. The entire burden of the debt from the war would, as it has in the past, fall solely on Great Britain, affecting a portion of the empire rather than the whole thing. Great Britain is perhaps the only state in history that, as it has expanded its empire, has only increased its expenses without ever increasing its resources. Other states have generally shifted much of the cost of defending the empire onto their subject and subordinate territories. Meanwhile, Great Britain has allowed her subject and subordinate territories to offload nearly all of this cost onto her. To put Great Britain on equal footing with its own colonies, which are legally considered subject and subordinate, it seems necessary that, in the proposed scheme of taxing them through parliamentary requisition, Parliament should have some means to ensure its requests are met immediately, in case the colonial assemblies try to avoid or reject them; however, it’s not easy to figure out what those means would be, and it hasn’t been clarified yet.

Should the parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever fully established in the right of taxing the colonies, even independent of the consent of their own assemblies, the importance of those assemblies would, from that moment, be at an end, and with it, that of all the leading men of British America. Men desire to have some share in the management of public affairs, chiefly on account of the importance which it gives them. Upon the power which the greater part of the leading men, the natural aristocracy of every country, have of preserving or defending their respective importance, depends the stability and duration of every system of free government. In the attacks which those leading men are continually making upon the importance of one another, and in the defence of their own, consists the whole play of domestic faction and ambition. The leading men of America, like those of all other countries, desire to preserve their own importance. They feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies, which they are fond of calling parliaments, and of considering as equal in authority to the parliament of Great Britain, should be so far degraded as to become the humble ministers and executive officers of that parliament, the greater part of their own importance would be at an end. They have rejected, therefore, the proposal of being taxed by parliamentary requisition, and, like other ambitious and high-spirited men, have rather chosen to draw the sword in defence of their own importance.

If the British Parliament were to fully establish its right to tax the colonies without the consent of their own assemblies, the significance of those assemblies would cease immediately, along with that of all the leading figures in British America. People want a say in public affairs mainly because of the status it gives them. The ability of most leading figures, the natural aristocracy of any nation, to maintain or defend their status is crucial for the stability and longevity of any free government. The ongoing struggles among these leaders to undermine each other's significance while defending their own make up the essence of domestic rivalry and ambition. Like leaders in other countries, American leaders want to maintain their importance. They fear, or believe, that if their assemblies, which they often refer to as parliaments and see as equals to the British Parliament, became subordinate as mere agents of that Parliament, their own significance would largely disappear. Therefore, they have rejected the idea of being taxed by parliamentary demand and, much like other ambitious and proud individuals, have chosen to take up arms to defend their own importance.

Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who had borne the principal burden of defending the state and extending the empire, demanded to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens. Upon being refused, the social war broke out. During the course of that war, Rome granted those privileges to the greater part of them, one by one, and in proportion as they detached themselves from the general confederacy. The parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing the colonies; and they refuse to be taxed by a parliament in which they are not represented. If to each colony which should detach itself from the general confederacy, Great Britain should allow such a number of representatives as suited the proportion of what it contributed to the public revenue of the empire, in consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with its fellow-subjects at home; the number of its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its contribution might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition, would be presented to the leading men of each colony. Instead of piddling for the little prizes which are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colony faction, they might then hope, from the presumption which men naturally have in their own ability and good fortune, to draw some of the great prizes which sometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery of British politics. Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and there seems to be none more obvious than this, of preserving the importance and of gratifying the ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to consider, that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so, is, every drop of it, the blood either of those who are, or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow-citizens. They are very weak who flatter themselves that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies will be easily conquered by force alone. The persons who now govern the resolutions of what they call their continental congress, feel in themselves at this moment a degree of importance which, perhaps, the greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel. From shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attorneys, they are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world. Five hundred different people, perhaps, who, in different ways, act immediately under the continental congress, and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act under those five hundred, all feel, in the same manner, a proportionable rise in their own importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in America fills, at present, in his own fancy, a station superior, not only to what he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected to fill; and unless some new object of ambition is presented either to him or to his leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a man, he will die in defence of that station.

Towards the decline of the Roman Republic, Rome's allies, who had largely carried the burden of defending the state and expanding the empire, demanded to be granted all the rights of Roman citizens. When they were turned down, the social war erupted. Throughout that conflict, Rome gradually granted those rights to most of them, one by one, as they separated from the larger confederacy. The British parliament insists on taxing the colonies, while the colonies refuse to be taxed by a parliament in which they have no representation. If Great Britain allowed each colony that distanced itself from the general confederacy a number of representatives based on its contribution to the empire's public revenue, and allowed it the same trade freedoms as its fellow subjects at home, the number of representatives could increase as the contribution grew. This would present a new way to gain importance, a fresh and more enticing ambition for the leaders of each colony. Instead of scrambling for the minor rewards found in the petty conflicts within the colonies, they might aim for the significant rewards offered by the larger political landscape of British governance. Unless we adopt this or some other approach, and no other seems as clear-cut, to maintain the significance and satisfy the ambitions of our American leaders, it’s unlikely they will willingly submit to us; and we should remember that every drop of blood shed in forcing this is the blood of those we wish to consider as fellow citizens. It’s misguided to believe that our colonies can be readily conquered through sheer force. The individuals currently steering what they term their continental congress feel a sense of importance that perhaps even the highest officials in Europe barely experience. From shopkeepers, tradesmen, and lawyers, they have transformed into statesmen and lawmakers, tasked with designing a new government for a vast empire that they believe, and indeed seems likely, will become one of the greatest and most formidable in history. Hundreds of individuals who operate under the continental congress, alongside possibly hundreds of thousands acting under them, similarly feel a proportional rise in their own significance. Almost every member of America’s governing class currently perceives themselves in a position superior not only to any they have held before but also to any they ever expected to hold; and unless a new ambition is presented to him or his leaders, if he possesses the usual human spirit, he will fight to defend that position.

It is a remark of the President Heynaut, that we now read with pleasure the account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which, when they happened, were not, perhaps, considered as very important pieces of news. But every man then, says he, fancied himself of some importance; and the innumerable memoirs which have come down to us from those times, were the greater part of them written by people who took pleasure in recording and[Pg 258] magnifying events, in which they flattered themselves they had been considerable actors. How obstinately the city of Paris, upon that occasion, defended itself, what a dreadful famine it supported, rather than submit to the best, and afterwards the most beloved of all the French kings, is well known. The greater part of the citizens, or those who governed the greater part of them, fought in defence of their own importance, which, they foresaw, was to be at an end whenever the ancient government should be re-established. Our colonies, unless they can be induced to consent to a union, are very likely to defend themselves, against the best of all mother countries, as obstinately as the city of Paris did against one of the best of kings.

It's a comment from President Heynaut that we now enjoy reading about many small events from the Ligue that, at the time they happened, probably weren't seen as significant news. But back then, everyone believed they were important, he says. Most of the countless memoirs that have survived from those times were written by people who delighted in recording and exaggerating events where they thought they played major roles. It's well known how stubbornly the city of Paris defended itself during that time, enduring a terrible famine rather than submit to the best, and later the most beloved of all French kings. Most of the citizens, or those who led them, fought to protect their own significance, which they predicted would vanish the moment the old government was restored. Our colonies, unless they can be convinced to agree to a union, are likely to defend themselves against the best of all mother countries as stubbornly as Paris did against one of the best kings.

The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times. When the people of one state were admitted to the right of citizenship in another, they had no other means of exercising that right, but by coming in a body to vote and deliberate with the people of that other state. The admission of the greater part of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman citizens, completely ruined the Roman republic. It was no longer possible to distinguish between who was, and who was not, a Roman citizen. No tribe could know its own members. A rabble of any kind could be introduced into the assemblies of the people, could drive out the real citizens, and decide upon the affairs of the republic, as if they themselves had been such. But though America were to send fifty or sixty new representatives to parliament, the door-keeper of the house of commons could not find any great difficulty in distinguishing between who was and who was not a member. Though the Roman constitution, therefore, was necessarily ruined by the union of Rome with the allied states of Italy, there is not the least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable. The principal, perhaps, arise, not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people, both on this and on the other side of the Atlantic.

The concept of representation was unfamiliar in ancient times. When the citizens of one state were granted citizenship rights in another, they could only exercise those rights by gathering in groups to vote and discuss issues with the people of that other state. The inclusion of most of the inhabitants of Italy as Roman citizens ultimately led to the downfall of the Roman Republic. It became impossible to tell who was a Roman citizen and who wasn't. No tribe could recognize its own members. A chaotic crowd could enter the assemblies of the people, push out the true citizens, and make decisions about the republic as if they were legitimate members. However, even if America were to send fifty or sixty new representatives to Parliament, the doorkeeper of the House of Commons would have no trouble distinguishing between who was and who wasn't a member. Therefore, even though the Roman constitution was undeniably damaged by the unification of Rome with the allied states of Italy, it is highly unlikely that the British constitution would suffer from the union of Great Britain and its colonies. In fact, that constitution would be enhanced by it and seems incomplete without it. The assembly that discusses and makes decisions about the affairs of every part of the empire should certainly have representatives from all those parts to be well-informed. I don’t claim that this union could be achieved easily or that challenges, including significant ones, won’t arise in the process. However, I haven’t encountered any obstacles that seem impossible to overcome. The main issues may stem not from the situation itself but from the biases and beliefs of the people on both sides of the Atlantic.

We on this side of the water are afraid lest the multitude of American representatives should overturn the balance of the constitution, and increase too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or the force of the democracy on the other. But if the number of American representatives were to be in proportion to the produce of American taxation, the number of people to be managed would increase exactly in proportion to the means of managing them, and the means of managing to the number of people to be managed. The monarchical and democratical parts of the constitution would, after the union, stand exactly in the same degree of relative force with regard to one another as they had done before.

We're worried over here that too many American representatives could upset the balance of the constitution, giving either too much power to the crown or too much to the democracy. However, if the number of American representatives were based on American tax contributions, then the number of people we have to manage would increase in line with our ability to manage them, and our capacity to manage would match the number of people we need to oversee. After the union, the monarchical and democratic parts of the constitution would hold the same relative strength against each other as they did before.

The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest their distance from the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions; but their representatives in parliament, of which the number ought from the first to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all oppression. The distance could not much weaken the dependency of the representative upon the constituent, and the former would still feel that he owed his seat in parliament, and all the consequence which he derived from it, to the good-will of the latter. It would be the interest of the former, therefore, to cultivate that good-will, by complaining, with all the authority of a member of the legislature, of every outrage which any civil or military officer might be guilty of in those remote parts of the empire. The distance of America from the seat of government, besides, the natives of that country might flatter themselves, with some appearance of reason too, would not be of very long continuance. Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that country in wealth, population, and improvement, that in the course of little more than a century, perhaps, the produce of the American might exceed that of the British taxation. The seat of the empire would then naturally remove itself to that part of the empire which contributed most to the general defence and support of the whole.

The people across the water are worried that their distance from the government might make them vulnerable to various oppressions; however, their parliament representatives, who should be numerous from the start, would easily be able to protect them from all forms of oppression. The distance wouldn't significantly weaken the representative's connection to their constituents, and the representative would still recognize that they owe their seat in parliament—and the benefits that come with it—to the goodwill of the constituents. Therefore, it would be in the representative's best interest to nurture that goodwill by speaking out, with the authority of a legislature member, about any wrongdoings by civil or military officials in those far-off parts of the empire. Additionally, the people of America might reasonably hope that this distance wouldn’t last long. Given the impressive growth in wealth, population, and development that this country has experienced, it's possible that within just over a century, America's output could surpass that of British taxation. At that point, it would be natural for the center of the empire to shift to the part that contributes most to the overall defense and support of the entire realm.

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been great; but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events, no human wisdom can foresee. By uniting in some measure the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another's wants, to increase one another's enjoyments, and to encourage one another's industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes[Pg 259] which they have occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from any thing in the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker; and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force, than that mutual communication of knowledge, and of all sorts of improvements, which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it.

The discovery of America and the route to the East Indies around the Cape of Good Hope are the two biggest and most significant events in human history. Their impacts have already been substantial, but in the two to three centuries since these discoveries, it's impossible to have fully realized their consequences. No one can predict what benefits or misfortunes may come from these major events in the future. By connecting far-off parts of the world, allowing them to support each other's needs, enhance each other's pleasures, and boost each other's efforts, their overall effect seems to be positive. However, for the native peoples of both the East and West Indies, the commercial advantages that have come from these events have been overshadowed by the terrible tragedies they have caused. These tragedies seem to have stemmed more from chance than from the nature of the events themselves. At the time of these discoveries, European forces were so dominant that they could commit various injustices in those distant lands without facing consequences. In the future, perhaps the locals will become stronger or the Europeans weaker, leading all people around the world to achieve a balance of power and courage that could inspire mutual respect for each other's rights. Nothing seems more likely to create this balance of power than the mutual exchange of knowledge and advancements that broad trade between nations naturally, or even necessarily, facilitates.

In the mean time, one of the principal effects of those discoveries has been, to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendour and glory which it could never otherwise have attained to. It is the object of that system to enrich a great nation, rather by trade and manufactures than by the improvement and cultivation of land, rather by the industry of the towns than by that of the country. But in consequence of those discoveries, the commercial towns of Europe, instead of being the manufacturers and carriers for but a very small part of the world (that part of Europe which is washed by the Atlantic ocean, and the countries which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas), have now become the manufacturers for the numerous and thriving cultivators of America, and the carriers, and in some respects the manufacturers too, for almost all the different nations of Asia, Africa, and America. Two new worlds have been opened to their industry, each of them much greater and more extensive than the old one, and the market of one of them growing still greater and greater every day.

In the meantime, one of the main effects of those discoveries has been to elevate the mercantile system to a level of splendor and success that it could never have reached otherwise. The goal of that system is to enrich a great nation more through trade and manufacturing than through improving and cultivating land, more through the efforts of cities than through rural labor. However, because of those discoveries, the commercial towns of Europe, instead of merely serving as manufacturers and transporters for a small part of the world (specifically, the Atlantic coast of Europe and the countries around the Baltic and Mediterranean seas), have now become the manufacturers for the many productive cultivators in America, as well as the carriers—and in some ways the manufacturers—as well for almost all the various nations in Asia, Africa, and America. Two new worlds have opened up to their industry, each much larger and more expansive than the old one, with one of these markets continuing to grow larger every day.

The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade directly to the East Indies, enjoy indeed the whole show and splendour of this great commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all the invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them, frequently enjoy a greater share of the real benefit of it. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, for example, give more real encouragement to the industry of other countries than to that of Spain and Portugal. In the single article of linen alone, the consumption of those colonies amounts, it is said (but I do not pretend to warrant the quantity), to more than three millions sterling a-year. But this great consumption is almost entirely supplied by France, Flanders, Holland, and Germany. Spain and Portugal furnish but a small part of it. The capital which supplies the colonies with this great quantity of linen, is annually distributed among, and furnishes a revenue to, the inhabitants of those other countries. The profits of it only are spent in Spain and Portugal, where they help to support the sumptuous profusion of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon.

The countries that own the colonies in America and trade directly to the East Indies truly enjoy the entire spectacle and wealth of this massive trade. However, other countries, despite the unfair restrictions designed to keep them out, often reap more of the actual benefits. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, for example, actually provide more real support to the economies of other nations than to those of Spain and Portugal themselves. Just in terms of linen consumption, it's reported (though I can't guarantee the exact number) to exceed three million pounds a year from those colonies. But this significant demand is almost entirely met by France, Flanders, Holland, and Germany, with Spain and Portugal contributing only a small portion. The capital that supplies these colonies with such a large volume of linen gets distributed among, and generates revenue for, the people in those other countries. The profits from this trade are mostly spent in Spain and Portugal, where they help maintain the lavish lifestyles of merchants in Cadiz and Lisbon.

Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to itself the exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more hurtful to the countries in favour of which they are established, than to those against which they are established. The unjust oppression of the industry of other countries falls back, if I may say so, upon the heads of the oppressors, and crushes their industry more than it does that of those other countries. By those regulations, for example, the merchant of Hamburg must send the linen which he destines for the American market to London, and he must bring back from thence the tobacco which he destines for the German market; because he can neither send the one directly to America, nor bring the other directly from thence. By this restraint he is probably obliged to sell the one somewhat cheaper, and to buy the other somewhat dearer, than he otherwise might have done; and his profits are probably somewhat abridged by means of it. In this trade, however, between Hamburg and London, he certainly receives the returns of his capital much more quickly than he could possibly have done in the direct trade to America, even though we should suppose, what is by no means the case, that the payments of America were as punctual as those of London. In the trade, therefore, to which those regulations confine the merchant of Hamburg, his capital can keep in constant employment a much greater quantity of German industry than he possibly could have done in the trade from which he is excluded. Though the one employment, therefore, may to him perhaps be less profitable than the other, it cannot be less advantageous to his country. It is quite otherwise with the employment into which the monopoly naturally attracts, if I may say so, the capital of the London merchant. That employment may, perhaps, be more profitable to him than the greater part of other employments; but on account of the slowness of the returns, it cannot be more advantageous to his country.

Even the regulations that countries use to try to keep exclusive trade of their own colonies often do more harm to the countries they’re meant to benefit than to those they target. The unfair oppression of other countries' industries usually boomerangs back on the oppressors, damaging their own industry more than the affected countries. For instance, a merchant in Hamburg must send the linen he plans to sell in America to London first, and then he has to bring back the tobacco he intends for the German market from there, since he can't send it directly to America or bring it back directly. Because of this restriction, he likely has to sell the linen for less and buy the tobacco for more than he would otherwise, resulting in lower profits. However, in this trade between Hamburg and London, he definitely receives his capital returns much faster than he would have in a direct trade to America, even if, for the sake of argument, we assumed that American payments were as prompt as those from London. Therefore, the trade that these regulations force the Hamburg merchant into allows his capital to support much more German industry than he could in the trade he’s excluded from. So, while one path may seem less profitable to him, it can still be more beneficial for his country. It's a different story for the opportunities that this monopoly draws in the capital of the London merchant. That path might be more profitable for him than many others, but due to the slow returns, it can't be as beneficial for his country.

After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own colonies, no country has yet been able to engross to itself any thing but the expense of supporting in time of peace, and of defending in time of war, the oppressive authority which it assumes over them. The inconveniencies[Pg 260] resulting from the possession of its colonies, every country has engrossed to itself completely. The advantages resulting from their trade, it has been obliged to share with many other countries.

After all the unfair attempts by every country in Europe to monopolize the benefits of its own colonies, no country has been able to gain anything other than the costs of maintaining them in peacetime and defending them in wartime. The drawbacks of owning colonies have fully fallen to each country. The benefits from their trade, however, have had to be shared with many other nations.

At first sight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of America naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest value. To the undiscerning eye of giddy ambition it naturally presents itself, amidst the confused scramble of politics and war, as a very dazzling object to fight for. The dazzling splendour of the object, however, the immense greatness of the commerce, is the very quality which renders the monopoly of it hurtful, or which makes one employment, in its own nature necessarily less advantageous to the country than the greater part of other employments, absorb a much greater proportion of the capital of the country than what would otherwise have gone to it.

At first glance, it’s clear that having a monopoly over America’s vast trade seems incredibly valuable. To those blinded by ambition, it stands out as a tempting prize worth fighting for amidst the chaos of politics and war. However, the very brilliance of this opportunity—the immense scale of the commerce—is what makes the monopoly harmful. It causes one line of work, which should be inherently less beneficial for the nation, to consume a much larger share of the country’s capital than it would have otherwise received.

The mercantile stock of every country, it has been shown in the second book, naturally seeks, if one may say so, the employment most advantageous to that country. If it is employed in the carrying trade, the country to which it belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of all the countries whose trade that stock carries on. But the owner of that stock necessarily wishes to dispose of as great a part of those goods as he can at home. He thereby saves himself the trouble, risk, and expense of exportation; and he will upon that account be glad to sell them at home, not only for a much smaller price, but with somewhat a smaller profit, than he might expect to make by sending them abroad. He naturally, therefore, endeavours as much as he can to turn his carrying trade into a foreign trade of consumption. If his stock, again, is employed in a foreign trade of consumption, he will, for the same reason, be glad to dispose of, at home, as great a part as he can of the home goods which he collects in order to export to some foreign market, and he will thus endeavour, as much as he can, to turn his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. The mercantile stock of every country naturally courts in this manner the near, and shuns the distant employment; naturally courts the employment in which the returns are frequent, and shuns that in which they are distant and slow; naturally courts the employment in which it can maintain the greatest quantity of productive labour in the country to which it belongs, or in which its owner resides, and shuns that in which it can maintain there the smallest quantity. It naturally courts the employment which in ordinary cases is most advantageous, and shuns that which in ordinary cases is least advantageous to that country.

The trade resources of every country, as discussed in the second book, naturally seek out the most beneficial use for that country. If these resources are used in the shipping trade, the country they belong to becomes the central hub for goods from all the countries whose trade it facilitates. However, the owner of those resources wants to sell as much of those goods as possible domestically. This way, they avoid the trouble, risk, and cost of exporting, so they are happy to sell them at home, even at a lower price and with somewhat lower profit than they could expect by sending them abroad. Therefore, they will try to shift their shipping trade into a foreign consumption trade as much as possible. If their resources are used in foreign consumption trade, they'll similarly want to sell as much as they can of the local goods they gather for export to a foreign market, thus trying to shift their foreign consumption trade into a local one. The trade resources of each country naturally prefer closer, more frequent returns and avoid distant, slower returns; they prefer opportunities that can sustain the highest amount of productive labor in the country they belong to or where their owner resides and avoid those that sustain the least. They tend to seek out the opportunities that are typically the most advantageous and steer clear of those that are usually the least advantageous for that country.

But if, in any one of these distant employments, which in ordinary cases are less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen to rise somewhat higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural preference which is given to nearer employments, this superiority of profit will draw stock from those nearer employments, till the profits of all return to their proper level. This superiority of profit, however, is a proof that, in the actual circumstances of the society, those distant employments are somewhat understocked in proportion to other employments, and that the stock of the society is not distributed in the properest manner among all the different employments carried on in it. It is a proof that something is either bought cheaper or sold dearer than it ought to be, and that some particular class of citizens is more or less oppressed, either by paying more, or by getting less than what is suitable to that equality which ought to take place, and which naturally does take place, among all the different classes of them. Though the same capital never will maintain the same quantity of productive labour in a distant as in a near employment, yet a distant employment may be as necessary for the welfare of the society as a near one; the goods which the distant employment deals in being necessary, perhaps, for carrying on many of the nearer employments. But if the profits of those who deal in such goods are above their proper level, those goods will be sold dearer than they ought to be, or somewhat above their natural price, and all those engaged in the nearer employments will be more or less oppressed by this high price. Their interest, therefore, in this case, requires, that some stock should be withdrawn from those nearer employments, and turned towards that distant one, in order to reduce its profits to their proper level, and the price of the goods which it deals in to their natural price. In this extraordinary case, the public interest requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those employments which, in ordinary cases, are more advantageous, and turned towards one which, in ordinary cases, is less advantageous to the public; and, in this extraordinary case, the natural interests and inclinations of men coincide as exactly with the public interests as in all other ordinary cases, and lead them to withdraw stock from the near, and to turn it towards the distant employments.

But if, in any of these distant jobs that usually aren't as beneficial to the country, the profit happens to be a bit higher than what’s enough to balance the natural preference for jobs that are closer, that higher profit will attract investment away from those nearby jobs until the profits for all of them return to their normal levels. However, this higher profit indicates that, given the current situation in society, those distant jobs are somewhat underfunded compared to other jobs, and the resources in society aren’t allocated in the best way among all the different activities. It shows that something is either being bought for less or sold for more than it should be, and that a specific group of citizens is being treated unfairly, either by paying more or receiving less than what would be fair, which ideally should be the case for all of them. Although the same amount of capital will never support the same level of productive work in a distant job as it would in a nearby one, a distant job can still be crucial for the wellbeing of society just as much as a nearby one, because the goods from that distant job may be necessary for supporting many of the nearby jobs. But if the profits of those dealing in those goods are above their normal levels, those goods will be sold for more than they should be, or somewhat above their natural price, and everyone involved in the nearby jobs will be affected by this high price. Therefore, their interest, in this case, calls for some investment to be taken from those nearby jobs and redirected to that distant one to bring its profits down to their proper level and the price of the goods back to their natural price. In this unusual case, the public interest requires that some resources be moved away from jobs that are usually more advantageous and redirected to one that is typically less beneficial to the public; and in this rare instance, the natural interests and tendencies of people align perfectly with public interest just like they do in all other typical situations, prompting them to withdraw investment from the nearer jobs and redirect it toward the distant ones.

It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments which in ordinary cases, are most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the fall of profit in them, and the rise of it in all others, immediately dispose them to alter this faulty distribution. Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society among all the[Pg 261] different employments carried on in it, as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society.

Individuals' private interests and passions naturally lead them to invest their resources in jobs that are usually most beneficial for society. However, if they focus too much on these jobs, the profits from them will decline, while the profits from other jobs will increase, prompting them to adjust this uneven allocation. Thus, without any legal intervention, people's personal interests and passions naturally guide them to distribute the resources of every society among all the[Pg 261] various jobs as closely as possible in a way that aligns with the overall interest of society.

All the different regulations of the mercantile system necessarily derange more or less this natural and most advantageous distribution of stock. But those which concern the trade to America and the East Indies derange it, perhaps, more than any other; because the trade to those two great continents absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other branches of trade. The regulations, however, by which this derangement is effected in those two different branches of trade, are not altogether the same. Monopoly is the great engine of both; but it is a different sort of monopoly. Monopoly of one kind or another, indeed, seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile system.

All the various rules of the mercantile system disrupt this natural and most beneficial allocation of resources to some extent. However, the regulations related to trade with America and the East Indies disrupt it more than any other, as trade with these two vast regions absorbs more resources than any other two sectors. The regulations causing this disruption in those two areas of trade are not entirely identical. Monopoly plays a major role in both, but it's a different type of monopoly. In fact, various forms of monopoly seem to be the main driving force behind the mercantile system.

In the trade to America, every nation endeavours to engross as much as possible the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly excluding all other nations from any direct trade to them. During the greater part of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese endeavoured to manage the trade to the East Indies in the same manner, by claiming the sole right of sailing in the Indian seas, on account of the merit of having first found out the road to them. The Dutch still continue to exclude all other European nations from any direct trade to their spice islands. Monopolies of this kind are evidently established against all other European nations, who are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in, somewhat dearer than if they could import them themselves directly from the countries which produced them.

In the trade with America, every nation tries to dominate the entire market of its own colonies by effectively keeping all other nations from engaging in direct trade with them. For most of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese tried to control trade to the East Indies in a similar way, claiming exclusive rights to sail in the Indian seas because they were the first to discover the route there. The Dutch still work to prevent all other European nations from participating in direct trade with their spice islands. These kinds of monopolies are clearly set up against all other European nations, which not only means they are shut out from a trade that could benefit them but also forces them to buy goods from that trade at higher prices than if they could import them directly from the producing countries.

But since the fall of the power of Portugal, no European nation has claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian seas, of which the principal ports are now open to the ships of all European nations. Except in Portugal, however, and within these few years in France, the trade to the East Indies has, in every European country, been subjected to an exclusive company. Monopolies of this kind are properly established against the very nation which erects them. The greater part of that nation are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in somewhat dearer than if it was open and free to all their countrymen. Since the establishment of the English East India company, for example, the other inhabitants of England, over and above being excluded from the trade, must have paid, in the price of the East India goods which they have consumed, not only for all the extraordinary profits which the company may have made upon those goods in consequence of their monopoly, but for all the extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse inseparable from the management of the affairs of so great a company must necessarily have occasioned. The absurdity of this second kind of monopoly, therefore, is much more manifest than that of the first.

But since Portugal lost its power, no European nation has claimed the exclusive right to sail the Indian seas, and now the main ports are open to ships from all European nations. However, except for Portugal and recently France, trade to the East Indies has been controlled by exclusive companies in every European country. These kinds of monopolies are really set up against the very nation that establishes them. Most people in that nation are not only shut out from a trade that could benefit them but are also forced to buy the goods from that trade at higher prices than if it were open and free to all their fellow citizens. For example, since the English East India Company was established, other people in England, aside from being excluded from the trade, must pay, in the price of East India goods they consume, not only for the huge profits the company makes because of its monopoly but also for the significant waste caused by the fraud and mismanagement that comes with running such a large company. Therefore, the absurdity of this second type of monopoly is much clearer than that of the first.

Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the natural distribution of the stock of the society; but they do not always derange it in the same way.

Both of these types of monopolies disrupt the natural distribution of resources in society to some extent, but they don’t always disrupt it in the same manner.

Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the particular trade in which they are established a greater proportion of the stock of the society than what would go to that trade of its own accord.

Monopolies of the first kind always draw a larger share of society's resources into the specific trade where they exist than would normally go to that trade on its own.

Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock towards the particular trade in which they are established, and sometimes repel it from that trade, according to different circumstances. In poor countries, they naturally attract towards the trade more stock than would otherwise go to it. In rich countries, they naturally repel from it a good deal of stock which would otherwise go to it.

Monopolies of the second kind can sometimes draw investment into the specific industry they dominate, while at other times, they can push it away, depending on various factors. In poorer countries, they tend to bring in more investment to that industry than would typically occur. In wealthier countries, they often discourage a significant amount of investment that would otherwise flow into that industry.

Such poor countries as Sweden and Denmark, for example, would probably have never sent a single ship to the East Indies, had not the trade been subjected to an exclusive company. The establishment of such a company necessarily encourages adventurers. Their monopoly secures them against all competitors in the home market, and they have the same chance for foreign markets with the traders of other nations. Their monopoly shows them the certainty of a great profit upon a considerable quantity of goods, and the chance of a considerable profit upon a great quantity. Without such extraordinary encouragement, the poor traders of such poor countries would probably never have thought of hazarding their small capitals in so very distant and uncertain an adventure as the trade to the East Indies must naturally have appeared to them.

Countries like Sweden and Denmark, for example, probably would never have sent a single ship to the East Indies if it weren’t for the trade being controlled by an exclusive company. The existence of such a company naturally encourages adventurers. Their monopoly protects them from competition in the domestic market, and they have the same opportunities in foreign markets as traders from other nations. Their monopoly guarantees them a substantial profit on a significant quantity of goods and the potential for a large profit on a great quantity. Without this extraordinary incentive, the struggling traders from these less wealthy countries would likely never have considered risking their small investments in such a distant and uncertain venture as the trade to the East Indies must have seemed to them.

Such a rich country as Holland, on the contrary, would probably, in the case of a free trade, send many more ships to the East Indies than it actually does. The limited stock of the Dutch East India company probably repels from that trade many great mercantile capitals which would otherwise go to it. The mercantile capital of Holland is so great, that it is, as it were, continually overflowing, sometimes into the public funds of foreign countries, sometimes into loans to private traders and adventurers of foreign countries, sometimes into the most round-about foreign trades consumption, and sometimes into the carrying trade. All near employments being completely filled up, all the capital which can be placed in them with any tolerable profit being already placed in them, the capital of Holland necessarily flows towards the most[Pg 262] distant employments. The trade to the East Indies, if it were altogether free, would probably absorb the greater part of this redundant capital. The East Indies offer a market both for the manufactures of Europe, and for the gold and silver, as well as for the several other productions of America, greater and more extensive than both Europe and America put together.

A wealthy country like Holland would likely send many more ships to the East Indies if trade were completely free. The limited resources of the Dutch East India Company probably discourage many large trading capitals that would otherwise participate in that trade. The trading capital in Holland is so substantial that it’s constantly overflowing—sometimes into the public funds of other countries, sometimes into loans for foreign traders and adventurers, sometimes into roundabout foreign trades, and sometimes into shipping. Since all local business opportunities are fully occupied and all the capital that can be profitably invested in them is already used, Holland’s capital naturally flows toward the most distant enterprises. If trade to the East Indies were completely free, it would likely absorb most of this excess capital. The East Indies provide a market that is both larger and more varied than the combined markets of Europe and America, for European manufactured goods, gold and silver, and various other products from America.

Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily hurtful to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling from a particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to it, or by attracting towards a particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it. If, without any exclusive company, the trade of Holland to the East Indies would be greater than it actually is, that country must suffer a considerable loss, by part of its capital being excluded from the employment most convenient for that port. And, in the same manner, if, without an exclusive company, the trade of Sweden and Denmark to the East Indies would be less than it actually is, or, what perhaps is more probable, would not exist at all, those two countries must likewise suffer a considerable loss, by part of their capital being drawn into an employment which must be more or less unsuitable to their present circumstances. Better for them, perhaps, in the present circumstances, to buy East India goods of other nations, even though they should pay somewhat dearer, than to turn so great a part of their small capital to so very distant a trade, in which the returns are so very slow, in which that capital can maintain so small a quantity of productive labour at home, where productive labour is so much wanted, where so little is done, and where so much is to do.

Every disruption in the natural flow of resources is harmful to the society in which it occurs; whether it drives away resources that would have otherwise gone to a specific industry or pulls in resources that wouldn’t normally come. If, without a monopoly, the trade from Holland to the East Indies could be greater than it currently is, that country loses out significantly because part of its capital is restricted from being used in the most beneficial way for that port. Similarly, if, without a monopoly, the trade from Sweden and Denmark to the East Indies could be less than it currently is, or perhaps wouldn’t exist at all, those two countries also face major losses, as part of their capital is being allocated to ventures that aren’t ideal for their current situation. It might be better for them, given the current circumstances, to purchase East India goods from other nations, even if it costs a bit more, than to invest so much of their limited capital into a very distant trade with slow returns, where that capital can support very little productive work at home, where productive work is in high demand, where very little is accomplished, and where so much needs to be done.

Though without an exclusive company, therefore, a particular country should not be able to carry on any direct trade to the East Indies, it will not from thence follow, that such a company ought to be established there, but only that such a country ought not, in these circumstances, to trade directly to the East Indies. That such companies are not in general necessary for carrying on the East India trade, is sufficiently demonstrated by the experience of the Portuguese, who enjoyed almost the whole of it for more than a century together, without any exclusive company.

Although there's no exclusive trading company, that doesn’t mean a specific country should be allowed to trade directly with the East Indies. It just means that country shouldn’t engage in direct trade under these conditions. The fact that these companies aren't generally needed for the East India trade is clearly shown by the experience of the Portuguese, who held almost all of that trade for over a century without any exclusive company.

No private merchant, it has been said, could well have capital sufficient to maintain factors and agents in the different ports of the East Indies, in order to provide goods for the ships which he might occasionally send thither; and yet, unless he was able to do this, the difficulty of finding a cargo might frequently make his ships lose the season for returning; and the expense of so long a delay would not only eat up the whole profit of the adventure, but frequently occasion a very considerable loss. This argument, however, if it proved any thing at all, would prove that no one great branch of trade could be carried on without an exclusive company, which is contrary to the experience of all nations. There is no great branch of trade, in which the capital of any one private merchant is sufficient for carrying on all the subordinate branches which must be carried on, in order to carry on the principal one. But when a nation is ripe for any great branch of trade, some merchants naturally turn their capitals towards some principal, and some towards the subordinate branches of it; and though all the different branches of it are in this manner carried on, yet it very seldom happens that they are all carried on by the capital of one private merchant. If a nation, therefore, is ripe for the East India trade, a certain portion of its capital will naturally divide itself among all the different branches of that trade. Some of its merchants will find it for their interest to reside in the East Indies, and to employ their capitals there in providing goods for the ships which are to be sent out by other merchants who reside in Europe. The settlements which different European nations have obtained in the East Indies, if they were taken from the exclusive companies to which they at present belong, and put under the immediate protection of the sovereign, would render this residence both safe and easy, at least to the merchants of the particular nations to whom those settlements belong. If, at any particular time, that part of the capital of any country which of its own accord tended and inclined, if I may say so, towards the East India trade, was not sufficient for carrying on all those different branches of it, it would be a proof that, at that particular time, that country was not ripe for that trade, and that it would do better to buy for some time, even at a higher price, from other European nations, the East India goods it had occasion for, than to import them itself directly from the East Indies. What it might lose by the high price of those goods, could seldom be equal to the loss which it would sustain by the distraction of a large portion of its capital from other employments more necessary, or more useful, or more suitable to its circumstances and situation, than a direct trade to the East Indies.

No private merchant, it has been said, could possibly have enough capital to maintain representatives and agents in various ports of the East Indies to supply goods for the ships he might occasionally send there. Yet, if he couldn't do this, the challenge of finding a cargo could often cause his ships to miss the returning season, and the cost of such delays would not only wipe out the entire profit of the venture but could also result in a significant loss. This argument, however, if it proves anything, would show that no major branch of trade could be conducted without an exclusive company, which goes against the experience of all nations. There’s no significant branch of trade where the capital of any single private merchant is enough to manage all the necessary subordinate branches to support the main one. However, when a nation is ready for a major branch of trade, some merchants will naturally focus their capital on key aspects, while others engage in the supporting branches. Even though all these different branches can be developed this way, it rarely happens that all are funded by the capital of one private merchant. Therefore, if a nation is prepared for the East India trade, a portion of its capital will naturally be spread across all the different areas of that trade. Some merchants will find it beneficial to stay in the East Indies and use their capital there to source goods for ships sent out by other merchants based in Europe. The establishments that various European nations have in the East Indies, if they were taken from the exclusive companies that currently control them and placed under direct protection of the government, would make this presence both safe and easier, at least for the merchants of the specific nations that own those establishments. If, at any given time, the part of a country’s capital that was inclined toward the East India trade was not enough to support all those various branches, it would indicate that the country was not ready for that trade and that it would be better to buy, even at a higher price, from other European nations the East India goods it needed rather than importing them directly from the East Indies. What it might lose by paying higher prices for those goods would rarely equal the loss caused by diverting a large part of its capital from other activities that are more necessary, useful, or better suited to its circumstances than a direct trade with the East Indies.

Though the Europeans possess many considerable settlements both upon the coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established, in either of those countries, such numerous and thriving colonies as those in the islands and continent of America. Africa, however, as well as several of the countries comprehended under the general name of the East Indies, is inhabited by barbarous nations. But those nations were by no means so weak and defenceless as the miserable and[Pg 263] helpless Americans; and in proportion to the natural fertility of the countries which they inhabited, they were, besides, much more populous. The most barbarous nations, either of Africa or of the East Indies, were shepherds; even the Hottentots were so. But the natives of every part of America, except Mexico and Peru, were only hunters; and the difference is very great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters, whom the same extent of equally fertile territory can maintain. In Africa and the East Indies, therefore, it was more difficult to displace the natives, and to extend the European plantations over the greater part of the lands of the original inhabitants. The genius of exclusive companies, besides, is unfavourable, it has already been observed, to the growth of new colonies, and has probably been the principal cause of the little progress which they have made in the East Indies. The Portuguese carried on the trade both to Africa and the East Indies, without any exclusive companies; and their settlements at Congo, Angola, and Benguela, on the coast of Africa, and at Goa in the East Indies, though much depressed by superstition and every sort of bad government, yet bear some resemblance to the colonies of America, and are partly inhabited by Portuguese who have been established there for several generations. The Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good Hope and at Batavia, are at present the most considerable colonies which the Europeans have established, either in Africa or in the East Indies; and both those settlements are peculiarly fortunate in their situation. The Cape of Good Hope was inhabited by a race of people almost as barbarous, and quite as incapable of defending themselves, as the natives of America. It is, besides, the half-way house, if one may say so, between Europe and the East Indies, at which almost every European ship makes some stay, both in going and returning. The supplying of those ships with every sort of fresh provisions, with fruit, and sometimes with wine, affords alone a very extensive market for the surplus produce of the colonies. What the Cape of Good Hope is between Europe and every part of the East Indies, Batavia is between the principal countries of the East Indies. It lies upon the most frequented road from Indostan to China and Japan, and is nearly about mid-way upon that road. Almost all the ships too, that sail between Europe and China, touch at Batavia; and it is, over and above all this, the centre and principal mart of what is called the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it which is carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the native Indians; and vessels navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan, of Tonquin, Malacca, Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes, are frequently to be seen in its port. Such advantageous situations have enabled those two colonies to surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an exclusive company may have occasionally opposed to their growth. They have enabled Batavia to surmount the additional disadvantage of perhaps the most unwholesome climate in the world.

Even though Europeans have established several significant settlements along the coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they haven't created as many successful colonies there as they have in the islands and mainland of America. However, Africa and many countries in the East Indies are home to fierce nations. But those nations were not nearly as weak and defenseless as the unfortunate and helpless Americans; relative to the natural fertility of the lands they occupied, they were much more populous. The most primitive nations in Africa or the East Indies were pastoralists; even the Hottentots fell into this category. In contrast, the natives of nearly all of America, except for Mexico and Peru, were solely hunters; and there is a significant difference between the number of pastoralists and hunters that the same sized, equally fertile territory can support. Therefore, in Africa and the East Indies, it was harder to displace the natives and expand European plantations over the majority of the original inhabitants' lands. The nature of exclusive companies, as previously noted, is not conducive to the development of new colonies, and likely accounts for the limited progress in the East Indies. The Portuguese engaged in trade with both Africa and the East Indies without any exclusive companies, and their settlements at Congo, Angola, and Benguela on the African coast, as well as at Goa in the East Indies, though severely impacted by superstition and poor governance, bear some resemblance to the colonies in America and are partially populated by Portuguese who have lived there for generations. The Dutch settlements at Cape of Good Hope and Batavia are currently the largest colonies established by Europeans in either Africa or the East Indies; both of these locations are particularly well-situated. The Cape of Good Hope was home to a people who were nearly as barbaric and just as incapable of defending themselves as the native Americans. Moreover, it serves as a halfway point between Europe and the East Indies, where almost every European ship stops while going to and returning from these regions. Providing those ships with fresh produce, fruit, and sometimes wine creates a large market for the surplus goods from the colonies. Just as the Cape of Good Hope serves as a link between Europe and every part of the East Indies, Batavia acts similarly among the main countries of the East Indies. It is located along the busiest route from India to China and Japan, roughly in the middle of that path. Almost all ships traveling between Europe and China stop at Batavia, and on top of that, it is the central hub and primary market for what is known as the country trade in the East Indies; this includes trade conducted by Europeans as well as trade by local Indians, with vessels operated by inhabitants from China, Japan, Tonquin, Malacca, Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes frequently seen in its port. Such advantageous locations have allowed these two colonies to overcome all the challenges that the restrictive nature of an exclusive company may have posed to their growth. They have also enabled Batavia to rise above the added challenge of potentially being in one of the unhealthiest climates in the world.

The English and Dutch companies, though they have established no considerable colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both made considerable conquests in the East Indies. But in the manner in which they both govern their new subjects, the natural genius of an exclusive company has shewn itself most distinctly. In the spice islands, the Dutch are said to burn all the spiceries which a fertile season produces, beyond what they expect to dispose of in Europe with such a profit as they think sufficient. In the islands where they have no settlements, they give a premium to those who collect the young blossoms and green leaves of the clove and nutmeg trees, which naturally grow there, but which this savage policy has now, it is said, almost completely extirpated. Even in the islands where they have settlements, they have very much reduced, it is said, the number of those trees. If the produce even of their own islands was much greater than what suited their market, the natives, they suspect, might find means to convey some part of it to other nations; and the best way, they imagine, to secure their own monopoly, is to take care that no more shall grow than what they themselves carry to market. By different arts of oppression, they have reduced the population of several of the Moluccas nearly to the number which is sufficient to supply with fresh provisions, and other necessaries of life, their own insignificant garrisons, and such of their ships as occasionally come there for a cargo of spices. Under the government even of the Portuguese, however, those islands are said to have been tolerably well inhabited. The English company have not yet had time to establish in Bengal so perfectly destructive a system. The plan of their government, however, has had exactly the same tendency. It has not been uncommon, I am well assured, for the chief, that is, the first clerk of a factory, to order a peasant to plough up a rich field of poppies, and sow it with rice, or some other grain. The pretence was, to prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the real reason, to give the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a large quantity of opium which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon other occasions, the order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or other grain has been ploughed up, in order to make room for a plantation of poppies, when the chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be made by opium. The servants of the company have, upon several occasions, at[Pg 264]tempted to establish in their own favour the monopoly of some of the most important branches, not only of the foreign, but of the inland trade of the country. Had they been allowed to go on, it is impossible that they should not, at some time or another, have attempted to restrain the production of the particular articles of which they had thus usurped the monopoly, not only to the quantity which they themselves could purchase, but to that which they could expect to sell with such a profit as they might think sufficient. In the course of a century or two, the policy of the English company would, in this manner, have probably proved as completely destructive as that of the Dutch.

The English and Dutch companies, although they haven't set up any significant colonies aside from the two mentioned, have both made substantial conquests in the East Indies. However, their governance of the local populations reveals the exclusive nature of these companies quite clearly. In the spice islands, the Dutch reportedly burn all the spices produced during a good season, beyond what they believe they can sell in Europe for a sufficient profit. In areas where they don't have settlements, they incentivize locals to collect young blossoms and green leaves from clove and nutmeg trees, which naturally grow there, but this harsh approach has nearly wiped them out. Even in the islands where they have settlements, they've significantly reduced the number of those trees. They fear that if their own islands produced more than they could sell, the locals might find ways to trade it with other nations. They think the best way to maintain their monopoly is to ensure that only as much grows as they can sell. Through various oppressive tactics, they've lowered the population in several of the Moluccas to just enough to supply their small garrisons and the few ships that come by for spice cargo. Under Portuguese rule, however, those islands were said to be reasonably well-populated. The English company hasn't yet had the time to implement such a destructive system in Bengal, but their governance has had a similar impact. It's not uncommon, as I've been assured, for the chief—specifically the head clerk of a factory—to order a peasant to plow a rich poppy field and plant rice or some other grain instead. The excuse was to avoid food shortages; however, the real reason was to create an opportunity for the chief to sell a large stock of opium at a better price. At other times, the order has been reversed, plowing up a rich field of rice to make way for poppies when the chief predicted that significant profits could be made from opium. The company’s employees have repeatedly attempted to establish a monopoly over some of the most crucial aspects of both foreign and domestic trade in the region. If they had been allowed to continue, it’s hard to believe they wouldn't have also tried to limit the production of specific items they monopolized, not just to what they could buy, but to what they thought they could sell at a satisfactory profit. Over a century or two, the English company's policies would likely have proven just as destructive as those of the Dutch.

Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real interest of those companies, considered as the sovereigns of the countries which they have conquered, than this destructive plan. In almost all countries, the revenue of the sovereign is drawn from that of the people. The greater the revenue of the people, therefore, the greater the annual produce of their land and labour, the more they can afford to the sovereign. It is his interest, therefore, to increase as much as possible that annual produce. But if this is the interest of every sovereign, it is peculiarly so of one whose revenue, like that of the sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a land-rent. That rent must necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and value of the produce; and both the one and the other must depend upon the extent of the market. The quantity will always be suited, with more or less exactness, to the consumption of those who can afford to pay for it; and the price which they will pay will always be in proportion to the eagerness of their competition. It is the interest of such a sovereign, therefore, to open the most extensive market for the produce of his country, to allow the most perfect freedom of commerce, in order to increase as much as possible the number and competition of buyers; and upon this account to abolish, not only all monopolies, but all restraints upon the transportation of the home produce from one part of the country to another, upon its exportation to foreign countries, or upon the importation of goods of any kind for which it can be exchanged. He is in this manner most likely to increase both the quantity and value of that produce, and consequently of his own share of it, or of his own revenue.

Nothing, however, can be more directly opposed to the true interests of those companies, viewed as the rulers of the countries they've conquered, than this harmful plan. In almost all nations, the ruler's revenue comes from that of the people. Therefore, the higher the people's revenue, the greater the annual output of their land and labor, and the more they can contribute to the ruler. It's in the ruler's best interest to increase that annual output as much as possible. But if this is true for every ruler, it is especially relevant for one whose revenue, like that of the ruler of Bengal, primarily comes from land rent. That rent must inevitably be based on the quantity and value of the produce, which both depend on the size of the market. The quantity will always be adjusted, more or less precisely, to the needs of those who can afford to buy it; and the price they will pay will always correspond to the intensity of their competition. It's in the interest of such a ruler, therefore, to create the largest possible market for his country's produce and to allow complete freedom of trade, in order to maximize the number and competition of buyers. For this reason, he should eliminate not only all monopolies but also any restrictions on moving domestic produce from one part of the country to another, on exporting to foreign countries, or on importing goods of any kind that can be exchanged. By doing so, he is most likely to increase both the quantity and value of that produce, and consequently his own share of it, or his own revenue.

But a company of merchants, are, it seems, incapable of considering themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such. Trade, or buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principal business, and by a strange absurdity, regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of the merchant; as something which ought to be made subservient to it, or by means of which they may be enabled to buy cheaper in India, and thereby to sell with a better profit in Europe. They endeavour, for this purpose, to keep out as much as possible all competitors from the market of the countries which are subject to their government, and consequently to reduce, at least, some part of the surplus produce of those countries to what is barely sufficient for supplying their own demand, or to what they can expect to sell in Europe, with such a profit as they may think reasonable. Their mercantile habits draw them in this manner, almost necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon all ordinary occasions, the little and transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and permanent revenue of the sovereign; and would gradually lead them to treat the countries subject to their government nearly as the Dutch treat the Moluccas. It is the interest of the East India company, considered as sovereigns, that the European goods which are carried to their Indian dominions should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the Indian goods which are brought from thence should bring there as good a price, or should be sold there as dear as possible. But the reverse of this is their interest as merchants. As sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same with that of the country which they govern. As merchants, their interest is directly opposite to that interest.

But it seems that a group of merchants is incapable of seeing themselves as rulers, even after they’ve become one. They still view trade, or buying to resell, as their main business and, oddly enough, see the role of a ruler as just an addition to that of a merchant; something that should serve their trading interests or help them buy cheaper in India so they can sell for a better profit in Europe. To achieve this, they try to keep competitors out of the markets in the countries they govern, resulting in reducing at least some of the surplus from those countries to what’s barely enough to meet their own demand or what they can sell in Europe at a reasonable profit. Their trading habits lead them to prefer the small, short-term gains of a monopolist over the larger, long-term revenue of a ruler, gradually causing them to treat the countries they govern similarly to how the Dutch treat the Moluccas. As rulers, the East India Company has an interest in ensuring that European goods sent to their Indian territories are sold as cheaply as possible, while the Indian goods brought back should sell for the best price possible. However, as merchants, their interests are the complete opposite. As rulers, their interests align with those of the country they govern; as merchants, their interests conflict.

But if the genius of such a government, even as to what concerns its direction in Europe, is in this manner essentially, and perhaps incurably faulty, that of its administration in India is still more so. That administration is necessarily composed of a council of merchants, a profession no doubt extremely respectable, but which in no country in the world carries along with it that sort of authority which naturally overawes the people, and without force commands their willing obedience. Such a council can command obedience only by the military force with which they are accompanied; and their government is, therefore, necessarily military and despotical. Their proper business, however, is that of merchants. It is to sell, upon their master's account, the European goods consigned to them, and to buy, in return, Indian goods for the European market. It is to sell the one as dear, and to buy the other as cheap as possible, and consequently to exclude, as much as possible, all rivals from the particular market where they keep their shop. The genius of the administration, therefore, so far as concerns the trade of the company, is the same as that of the direction. It tends to make government subservient to the interest of monopoly, and consequently to stunt the natural growth of some parts, at least, of the surplus produce of the country, to what is barely sufficient for answering the demand of the company.[Pg 265]

But if the genius of such a government, even regarding its direction in Europe, is fundamentally and perhaps irreparably flawed, the administration in India is even more so. That administration is inevitably made up of a council of merchants, a profession which is undoubtedly very respectable, but which in no country in the world has the kind of authority that naturally dominates the people and commands their willing obedience without force. Such a council can only command obedience through the military force that accompanies them; thus, their government is necessarily military and authoritarian. However, their main business is that of merchants. They are supposed to sell, on behalf of their employer, the European goods sent to them, and to buy Indian goods for the European market in return. They aim to sell the former at the highest price and buy the latter at the lowest possible cost, thus excluding any competitors from the market where they operate. The essence of the administration, in terms of the company’s trade, mirrors that of its direction. It seeks to make government serve the interests of monopoly, which consequently hampers the natural growth of at least some parts of the country's surplus produce to just enough to meet the demand of the company.[Pg 265]

All the members of the administration, besides, trade more or less upon their own account; and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing so. Nothing can be more completely foolish than to expect that the clerks of a great counting-house, at ten thousand miles distance, and consequently almost quite out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their master, give up at once doing any sort of business upon their own account; abandon for ever all hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in their hands; and content themselves with the moderate salaries which those masters allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can seldom be augmented, being commonly as large as the real profits of the company trade can afford. In such circumstances, to prohibit the servants of the company from trading upon their own account, can have scarce any other effect than to enable its superior servants, under pretence of executing their master's order, to oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure. The servants naturally endeavour to establish the same monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of the company. If they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will establish this monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles in which they choose to deal; and this, perhaps, is the best and least oppressive way of establishing it. But if, by an order from Europe, they are prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to establish a monopoly of the same kind secretly and indirectly, in a way that is much more destructive to the country. They will employ the whole authority of government, and pervert the administration of justice, in order to harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of commerce, which by means of agents, either concealed, or at least not publicly avowed, they may choose to carry on. But the private trade of the servants will naturally extend to a much greater variety of articles than the public trade of the company. The public trade of the company extends no further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a part only of the foreign trade of the country. But the private trade of the servants may extend to all the different branches both of its inland and foreign trade. The monopoly of the company can tend only to stunt the natural growth of that part of the surplus produce which, in the case of a free trade, would be exported to Europe. That of the servants tends to stunt the natural growth of every part of the produce in which they choose to deal; of what is destined for home consumption, as well as of what is destined for exportation; and consequently to degrade the cultivation of the whole country, and to reduce the number of its inhabitants. It tends to reduce the quantity of every sort of produce, even that of the necessaries of life, whenever the servants of the country choose to deal in them, to what those servants can both afford to buy and expect to sell with such a profit as pleases them.

All the members of the administration also engage in their own personal trade to some extent, and it’s pointless to try and stop them. It’s completely foolish to think that clerks in a large trading company, thousands of miles away and mostly out of sight, would instantly stop their own businesses just because their boss asked them to. They won’t give up their chances of making a fortune, which they have the means to pursue, and simply settle for the modest salaries their bosses pay them. Those salaries, while modest, are usually as high as the actual profits from the company’s trade can allow. In this situation, trying to prevent the company’s employees from trading on their own will likely only empower the higher-ups, who, under the guise of following orders, will take advantage of the lower-ranking staff who fall out of favor with them. Employees will naturally try to create the same monopoly for their private trade as the company has for its public trade. If they are allowed to pursue their interests, they will openly establish this monopoly by outright banning others from trading in the goods they want to sell, which could be the least oppressive way to do it. However, if they are ordered from Europe to stop, they will find ways to create a similar monopoly in secret, which is far more harmful to the country. They will use the full power of the government and corrupt the justice system to intimidate and ruin anyone who competes with them in any area of commerce, using agents that may be hidden or at least not openly acknowledged. The private trade of the employees will likely cover a much wider array of goods than the company’s public trade. The company’s public trade is limited to trade with Europe and only includes part of the foreign trade of the country. In contrast, the employees’ private trade can include all different aspects of both local and foreign trade. The company’s monopoly only serves to stunt the natural growth of the surplus products that could be exported to Europe under free trade. The employees’ monopolies tend to stifle the growth of every type of product they choose to sell, whether intended for local consumption or for export. This ultimately hampers the agricultural development of the entire country and reduces its population. It seeks to decrease the availability of every type of product, even essential goods, whenever the country’s employees choose to engage with them, limiting them to what those employees can afford to buy and expect to sell at a profit that satisfies them.

From the nature of their situation, too, the servants must be more disposed to support with rigourous severity their own interest, against that of the country which they govern, than their masters can be to support theirs. The country belongs to their masters, who cannot avoid having some regard for the interest of what belongs to them; but it does not belong to the servants. The real interest of their masters, if they were capable of understanding it, is the same with that of the country;[42] and it is from ignorance chiefly, and the meanness of mercantile prejudice, that they ever oppress it. But the real interest of the servants is by no means the same with that of the country, and the most perfect information would not necessarily put an end to their oppressions. The regulations, accordingly, which have been sent out from Europe, though they have been frequently weak, have upon most occasions been well meaning. More intelligence, and perhaps less good meaning, has sometimes appeared in those established by the servants in India. It is a very singular government in which every member of the administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has left it, and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake.

Given their situation, the servants are likely to prioritize their own interests with strict severity against the interests of the country they govern, more than their masters can uphold theirs. The country belongs to their masters, who cannot help but consider the interests of their own property; but it does not belong to the servants. The true interests of their masters, if they were capable of understanding them, align with those of the country, and it's mainly due to ignorance and petty mercantile biases that they oppress it. However, the true interests of the servants do not align with those of the country, and even the best information wouldn’t necessarily stop their oppression. The regulations sent from Europe, while often inadequate, have usually been well-intended. At times, those established by the servants in India have shown greater intelligence, but perhaps less good intent. It’s quite unusual for a government where every member of the administration wants to leave the country as soon as possible, wishing to end their governance, and to whose interests it would be completely indifferent if, the day after leaving and taking all their wealth with them, the entire country were to be destroyed by an earthquake.

I mean not, however, by any thing which I have here said, to throw any odious imputation upon the general character of the servants of the East India company, and much less upon that of any particular persons. It is the system of government, the situation in which they are placed, that I mean to censure, not the character of those who have acted in it. They acted as their situation naturally directed, and they who have clamoured the loudest against them would probably not have acted better themselves. In war and negotiation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta, have upon several occasions, conducted themselves with a resolution and decisive wisdom, which would have done honour to the senate of Rome in the best days of that republic. The members of those councils, however, had been bred to professions very different from war and politics. But their situation alone, without education, experience,[Pg 266] or even example, seems to have formed in them all at once the great qualities which it required, and to have inspired them both with abilities and virtues which they themselves could not well know that they possessed. If upon some occasions, therefore, it has animated them to actions of magnanimity which could not well have been expected from them, we should not wonder if, upon others, it has prompted them to exploits of somewhat a different nature.

I don’t mean, however, to place any unfair blame on the general character of the servants of the East India Company, and even less on any specific individuals. It’s the system of government and the circumstances they are in that I intend to criticize, not the individuals who operated within it. They acted as their situation naturally dictated, and those who have complained the loudest against them probably wouldn't have done any better themselves. In both war and negotiation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta have, on several occasions, demonstrated a determination and clear-headed wisdom that would have earned respect in the Senate of Rome during its finest days. However, the members of those councils had been trained in professions quite different from warfare and politics. Yet, their circumstances, without formal education, experience, or even role models, seem to have instantly cultivated in them the crucial qualities needed for their tasks, inspiring them with abilities and virtues they might not even have realized they had. If at times this has driven them to acts of courage that were unexpected, we shouldn’t be surprised if, at other times, it has led them to actions of a different kind.

Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect; always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under their government.

Such exclusive companies are, therefore, a hassle in every way; they are always somewhat inconvenient to the countries where they operate and harmful to those unfortunate enough to be under their control.


CHAP. VIII.

CONCLUSION OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM.

Though the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of importation, are the two great engines by which the mercantile system proposes to enrich every country, yet, with regard to some particular commodities, it seems to follow an opposite plan: to discourage exportation, and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however, it pretends, is always the same, to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade. It discourages the exportation of the materials of manufacture, and of the instruments of trade, in order to give our own workmen an advantage, and to enable them to undersell those of other nations in all foreign markets; and by restraining, in this manner, the exportation of a few commodities, of no great price, it proposes to occasion a much greater and more valuable exportation of others. It encourages the importation of the materials of manufacture, in order that our own people may be enabled to work them up more cheaply, and thereby prevent a greater and more valuable importation of the manufactured commodities. I do not observe, at least in our statute book, any encouragement given to the importation of the instruments of trade. When manufactures have advanced to a certain pitch of greatness, the fabrication of the instruments of trade becomes itself the object of a great number of very important manufactures. To give any particular encouragement to the importation of such instruments, would interfere too much with the interest of those manufactures. Such importation, therefore, instead of being encouraged, has frequently been prohibited. Thus the importation of wool cards, except from Ireland, or when brought in as wreck or prize goods, was prohibited by the 3d of Edward IV.; which prohibition was renewed by the 39th of Elizabeth, and has been continued and rendered perpetual by subsequent laws.

While promoting exports and discouraging imports are the main strategies that the mercantile system uses to enrich any country, there are specific commodities where it seems to take the opposite approach: discouraging exports and encouraging imports. The ultimate goal, it claims, is always the same—to enrich the country through a favorable balance of trade. It discourages the export of manufacturing materials and trade instruments to give our workers an advantage, allowing them to sell for less than their competitors in international markets. By limiting the export of a few low-value commodities, it aims to promote a much larger and more valuable export of others. It encourages importing manufacturing materials so our people can process them more affordably and thus prevent a larger and more valuable import of finished goods. I don’t see, at least in our laws, any encouragement for importing trade instruments. When manufacturing reaches a certain level of development, creating trade instruments becomes a significant industry itself. Any specific encouragement for importing such tools would clash too much with the interests of those manufacturers. Therefore, this type of import has often been banned. For example, importing wool cards is prohibited unless they come from Ireland or are brought in as wreckage or prize goods, as established by the 3rd of Edward IV.; this ban was reaffirmed by the 39th of Elizabeth and has been continued and made permanent by later laws.

The importation of the materials of manufacture has sometimes been encouraged by an exemption from the duties to which other goods are subject, and sometimes by bounties.

The import of manufacturing materials has occasionally been promoted by exemptions from the duties that apply to other goods and sometimes by financial incentives.

The importation of sheep's wool from several different countries, of cotton wool from all countries, of undressed flax, of the greater part of dyeing drugs, of the greater part of undressed hides from Ireland, or the British colonies, of seal skins from the British Greenland fishery, of pig and bar iron from the British colonies, as well as of several other materials of manufacture, has been encouraged by an exemption from all duties, if properly entered at the custom-house. The private interest of our merchants and manufacturers may, perhaps, have extorted from the legislature these exemptions, as well as the greater part of our other commercial regulations. They are, however, perfectly just and reasonable; and if, consistently with the necessities of the state, they could be extended to all the other materials of manufacture, the public would certainly be a gainer.

The import of sheep's wool from various countries, cotton wool from all nations, raw flax, most dyeing agents, most raw hides from Ireland or British colonies, seal skins from the British Greenland fishery, pig iron, and bar iron from the British colonies, along with several other manufacturing materials, has been encouraged by a waiver of all duties, as long as they're properly reported at the customs office. The private interests of our merchants and manufacturers may have influenced the legislature to grant these exemptions, as well as many of our other trade regulations. However, they are completely fair and reasonable; and if, in line with the needs of the state, they could be expanded to include all other manufacturing materials, the public would definitely benefit.

The avidity of our great manufacturers, however, has in some cases extended these exemptions a good deal beyond what can justly be considered as the rude materials of their work. By the 24th Geo. II. chap. 46, a small duty of only 1d. the pound was imposed upon the importation of foreign brown linen yarn, instead of much higher duties, to which it had been subjected before, viz. of 6d. the pound upon sail yarn, of 1s. the pound upon all French and Dutch yarn, and of L.2 : 13 : 4 upon the hundred weight of all spruce or Muscovia yarn. But our manufacturers were not long satisfied with this reduction: by the 29th of the same king, chap. 15, the same law which gave a bounty upon the exportation of British and Irish linen, of which the price did not exceed 18d. the yard, even this small duty upon the importation of brown linen yarn was taken away. In the different operations, however, which are necessary for the preparation of linen yarn, a good deal more industry is employed, than in the subsequent operation of preparing linen cloth from linen yarn. To say nothing of the industry of the flax-growers and flax-dressers, three or four spinners at least are necessary in order to keep one weaver in constant employment; and more than four-fifths of the whole quantity of labour necessary for the preparation of linen cloth, is employed in that of linen yarn; but our spinners are poor people; women commonly scattered about in all different parts of the country, without support or protection. It is not by the sale of their work, but by that of the complete work[Pg 267] of the weavers, that our great master manufactures make their profits. As it is their interest to sell the complete manufacture as dear, so it is to buy the materials as cheap as possible. By extorting from the legislature bounties upon the exportation of their own linen, high duties upon the importation of all foreign linen, and a total prohibition of the home consumption of some sorts of French linen, they endeavour to sell their own goods as dear as possible. By encouraging the importation of foreign linen yarn, and thereby bringing it into competition with that which is made by our own people, they endeavour to buy the work of the poor spinners as cheap as possible. They are as intent to keep down the wages of their own weavers, as the earnings of the poor spinners; and it is by no means for the benefit of the workmen that they endeavour either to raise the price of the complete work, or to lower that of the rude materials. It is the industry which is carried on for the benefit of the rich and the powerful, that is principally encouraged by our mercantile system. That which is carried on for the benefit of the poor and the indigent is too often either neglected or oppressed.

The greed of our major manufacturers has, in some cases, pushed these exemptions far beyond what can reasonably be seen as the raw materials of their products. By the 24th George II, chapter 46, a small duty of only 1 penny per pound was placed on the importation of foreign brown linen yarn, instead of the much higher duties it faced before, namely, 6 pence per pound on sail yarn, 1 shilling per pound on all French and Dutch yarn, and £2 : 13 : 4 per hundredweight on all spruce or Muscovia yarn. But our manufacturers were not happy for long with this reduction: by the 29th of the same king, chapter 15, the same law that provided a bounty for exporting British and Irish linen, priced not over 18 pence per yard, eliminated even this small duty on importing brown linen yarn. In the different processes necessary to prepare linen yarn, a lot more effort is involved than in the later step of turning that yarn into linen cloth. Not to mention the work of flax-growers and flax-dressers, at least three or four spinners are needed to keep one weaver consistently busy; over four-fifths of the total labor needed to prepare linen cloth goes into making linen yarn. However, our spinners are poor individuals—often women scattered across the country—without support or protection. They don't profit from selling their work; instead, it’s the complete output of the weavers that makes money for our major manufacturers. Since it's in their interest to sell the finished products at a high price, they also aim to buy materials as cheaply as possible. By persuading the government to provide bounties for exporting their own linen, imposing high duties on importing all foreign linen, and completely banning the home consumption of some types of French linen, they try to sell their own goods at the highest price possible. By promoting the importation of foreign linen yarn and putting it in competition with domestic yarn, they also aim to buy the work of poor spinners at the lowest price. They are just as focused on suppressing the wages of their own weavers as they are on lowering the earnings of the poor spinners; and it’s not at all for the benefit of these workers that they seek either to raise the price of the finished products or to lower that of the raw materials. The industries benefiting the wealthy and powerful are the ones encouraged by our mercantile system, while those aimed at helping the poor and needy are often ignored or oppressed.

Both the bounty upon the exportation of linen, and the exemption from the duty upon the importation of foreign yarn, which were granted only for fifteen years, but continued by two different prolongations, expire with the end of the session of parliament which shall immediately follow the 24th of June 1786.

Both the reward for exporting linen and the exemption from taxes on imported foreign yarn, which were originally granted for fifteen years but extended twice, will end with the conclusion of the parliamentary session immediately following June 24, 1786.

The encouragement given to the importation of the materials of manufacture by bounties, has been principally confined to such as were imported from our American plantations.

The support for importing manufacturing materials through financial incentives has mainly been limited to those brought in from our American plantations.

The first bounties of this kind were those granted about the beginning of the present century, upon the importation of naval stores from America. Under this denomination were comprehended timber fit for masts, yards, and bowsprits; hemp, tar, pitch, and turpentine. The bounty, however, of L.1 the ton upon masting-timber, and that of L.6 the ton upon hemp, were extended to such as should be imported into England from Scotland. Both these bounties continued, without any variation, at the same rate, till they were severally allowed to expire; that upon hemp on the 1st of January 1741, and that upon masting-timber at the end of the session of parliament immediately following the 24th June 1781.

The first bounties of this kind were granted around the beginning of the current century for importing naval supplies from America. This category included timber suitable for masts, yards, and bowsprits; hemp, tar, pitch, and turpentine. The bounty of £1 per ton for masting timber and £6 per ton for hemp was also extended to imports from Scotland into England. Both of these bounties remained at the same rate without any changes until they were allowed to expire; the bounty on hemp expired on January 1, 1741, and the one on masting timber ended at the close of the parliamentary session right after June 24, 1781.

The bounties upon the importation of tar, pitch, and turpentine, underwent, during their continuance, several alterations. Originally, that upon tar was L.4 the ton; that upon pitch the same; and that upon turpentine L.3 the ton. The bounty of L.4 the ton upon tar was afterwards confined to such as had been prepared in a particular manner; this upon other good, clean, and merchantable tar was reduced to L.2, 4s. the ton. The bounty upon pitch was likewise reduced to L.1, and that upon turpentine to L.1 : 10s. the ton.

The rewards for importing tar, pitch, and turpentine changed several times during their period in effect. Initially, the reward for tar was £4 per ton; pitch was the same; and turpentine was £3 per ton. The £4 per ton reward for tar was later restricted to those that had been processed in a specific way; the reward for other good, clean, and marketable tar was lowered to £2.4s. per ton. Similarly, the reward for pitch was reduced to £1, and for turpentine, it was cut to £1.10s. per ton.

The second bounty upon the importation of any of the materials of manufacture, according to the order of time, was that granted by the 21st Geo. II. chap. 30, upon the importation of indigo from the British plantations. When the plantation indigo was worth three-fourths of the price of the best French indigo, it was, by this act, entitled to a bounty of 6d. the pound. This bounty, which, like most others was granted only for a limited time, was continued by several prolongations, but was reduced to 4d. the pound. It was allowed to expire with the end of the session of parliament which followed the 25th March 1781.

The second bounty on importing any manufacturing materials, in chronological order, was granted by the 21st Geo. II. chap. 30, for importing indigo from British plantations. When plantation indigo was valued at three-fourths of the price of the best French indigo, this act allowed it a bounty of 6d. per pound. This bounty, like many others, was granted for only a limited time and was extended several times, but ultimately reduced to 4d. per pound. It expired at the end of the parliamentary session following March 25, 1781.

The third bounty of this kind was that granted (much about the time that we were beginning sometimes to court, and sometimes to quarrel with our American colonies), by the 4th Geo. III. chap. 26, upon the importation of hemp, or undressed flax, from the British plantations. This bounty was granted for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1764 to the 24th June 1785. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of L.8 the ton; for the second at L.6; and for the third at L.4. It was not extended to Scotland, of which the climate (although hemp is sometimes times raised there in small quantities, and of an inferior quality) is not very fit for that produce. Such a bounty upon the importation of Scotch flax in England would have been too great a discouragement to the native produce of the southern part of the united kingdom.

The third bounty of this kind was granted (around the time we were starting to both court and quarrel with our American colonies) by 4th Geo. III. chap. 26, regarding the importation of hemp or undressed flax from the British plantations. This bounty lasted for twenty-one years, from June 24, 1764, to June 24, 1785. For the first seven years, it was set at £8 per ton; for the next seven at £6; and for the last seven at £4. It was not extended to Scotland, where the climate (even though hemp is sometimes grown there in small amounts and of inferior quality) is not very suitable for that crop. Offering such a bounty on the importation of Scotch flax into England would have been too discouraging for the local production in the southern part of the united kingdom.

The fourth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 5th Geo. III. chap. 45, upon the importation of wood from America. It was granted for nine years from the 1st January 1766 to the 1st January 1775. During the first three years, it was to be for every hundred-and-twenty good deals, at the rate of L.1, and for every load containing fifty cubic feet of other square timber, at the rate of 12s. For the second three years, it was for deals, to be at the rate of 15s., and for other squared timber at the rate of 8s.; and for the third three years, it was for deals, to be at the rate of 10s.; and for every other squared timber at the rate of 5s.

The fourth bounty of this type was granted by the 5th Geo. III. chap. 45, regarding the importation of wood from America. It was granted for nine years, from January 1, 1766, to January 1, 1775. During the first three years, the bounty was £1 for every 120 good deals and 12s for every load containing 50 cubic feet of other square timber. In the second three years, the bounty was set at 15s for deals and 8s for other squared timber. For the final three years, it was 10s for deals and 5s for every other squared timber.

The fifth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 9th Geo. III. chap. 38, upon the importation of raw silk from the British plantations. It was granted for twenty-one years, from the 1st January 1770, to the 1st January 1791. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of L.25 for every hundred pounds value; for the second, at L.20; and for the third, at L.15. The management of the silk-worm, and the preparation of silk, requires so much hand-labour, and labour is so very dear in America, that even[Pg 268] this great bounty, I have been informed, was not likely to produce any considerable effect.

The fifth bounty of this type was granted by the 9th Geo. III. chap. 38, on the importation of raw silk from the British colonies. It was established for twenty-one years, from January 1, 1770, to January 1, 1791. For the first seven years, it was set at £25 for every hundred pounds in value; for the second, it would be £20; and for the third, it would be £15. Managing silkworms and preparing silk involves a lot of manual labor, and since labor is quite expensive in America, even with this significant bounty, I've been told it was unlikely to have any substantial impact.

The sixth bounty of this kind was that granted by 11th Geo. III. chap. 50, for the importation of pipe, hogshead, and barrel-staves and heading from the British plantations. It was granted for nine years, from 1st January 1772 to the 1st January 1781. For the first three years, it was, for a certain quantity of each, to be at the rate of L.6; for the second three years at L.4; and for the third three years at L.2.

The sixth bounty of this type was granted by 11th Geo. III. chap. 50, for importing pipe, hogshead, and barrel staves and heads from the British plantations. It was approved for nine years, from January 1, 1772, to January 1, 1781. For the first three years, it was set at £6 for a specific quantity of each; for the next three years, it was £4; and for the last three years, it was £2.

The seventh and last bounty of this kind was that granted by the 19th Geo. III. chap. 37, upon the importation of hemp from Ireland. It was granted in the same manner as that for the importation of hemp and undressed flax from America, for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1779 to the 24th June 1800. The term is divided likewise into three periods, of seven years each; and in each of those periods, the rate of the Irish bounty is the same with that of the American. It does not, however, like the American bounty, extend to the importation of undressed flax. It would have been too great a discouragement to the cultivation of that plant in Great Britain. When this last bounty was granted, the British and Irish legislatures were not in much better humour with one another, than the British and American had been before. But this boon to Ireland, it is to be hoped, has been granted under more fortunate auspices than all those to America.

The seventh and final bounty of this type was provided by the 19th Geo. III. chap. 37, for the importation of hemp from Ireland. It was granted in the same way as the bounty for the importation of hemp and raw flax from America, lasting for twenty-one years, from June 24, 1779, to June 24, 1800. This period is also divided into three seven-year segments, and during each of those segments, the rate of the Irish bounty matches that of the American. However, unlike the American bounty, it does not cover the importation of raw flax. Allowing that would have been too discouraging for the cultivation of that plant in Great Britain. When this final bounty was granted, the British and Irish legislatures were not much more amicable with each other than the British and Americans had been before. But hopefully, this gift to Ireland has been given under better circumstances than those granted to America.

The same commodities, upon which we thus gave bounties, when imported from America, were subjected to considerable duties when imported from any other country. The interest of our American colonies was regarded as the same with that of the mother country. Their wealth was considered as our wealth. Whatever money was sent out to them, it was said, came all back to us by the balance of trade, and we could never become a farthing the poorer by any expense which we could lay out upon them. They were our own in every respect, and it was an expense laid out upon the improvement of our own property, and for the profitable employment of our own people. It is unnecessary, I apprehend, at present to any any thing further, in order to expose the folly of a system which fatal experience has now sufficiently exposed. Had our American colonies really been a part of Great Britain, those bounties might have been considered as bounties upon production, and would still have been liable to all the objections to which such bounties are liable, but to no other.

The same goods that we funded with subsidies when imported from America faced high tariffs when imported from any other country. The interests of our American colonies were seen as the same as those of the mother country. Their wealth was viewed as our wealth. It was claimed that any money sent to them always returned to us through the balance of trade, and we could never lose a penny from any expense we incurred on them. They were ours in every way, and the money spent on them was an investment in our own property and in the productive use of our own people. I believe it’s unnecessary to say anything more to highlight the foolishness of a system that has now been proven detrimental by experience. If our American colonies had truly been part of Great Britain, those subsidies might have been seen as incentives for production, and would still be subject to all the criticisms that such incentives face, but no others.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture is sometimes discouraged by absolute prohibitions, and sometimes by high duties.

The export of manufactured goods is sometimes stopped by outright bans and other times by high tariffs.

Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful than any other class of workmen, in persuading the legislature that the prosperity of the nation depended upon the success and extension of their particular business. They have not only obtained a monopoly against the consumers, by an absolute prohibition of importing woollen cloths from any foreign country; but they have likewise obtained another monopoly against the sheep farmers and growers of wool, by a similar prohibition of the exportation of live sheep and wool. The severity of many of the laws which have been enacted for the security of the revenue is very justly complained of, as imposing heavy penalties upon actions which, antecedent to the statutes that declared them to be crimes, had always been understood to be innocent. But the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison to some of those which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers has extorted from the legislature, for the support of their own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in blood.

Our wool manufacturers have been more successful than any other group of workers in convincing lawmakers that the nation’s prosperity relies on the success and growth of their industry. They have not only secured a monopoly against consumers by completely banning the import of woolen fabrics from other countries; they have also established another monopoly against sheep farmers and wool producers by prohibiting the exportation of live sheep and wool. Many of the laws enacted to protect revenue are rightly criticized for imposing severe penalties on actions that, before the statutes deemed them crimes, were generally considered innocent. However, I would argue that the harshest of our revenue laws are mild compared to some that the outcry from our merchants and manufacturers has forced lawmakers to create to uphold their own unreasonable and oppressive monopolies. Like Draco’s laws, these legislations can be described as being written in blood.

By the 8th of Elizabeth, chap. 3, the exporter of sheep, lambs, or rams, was for the first offence, to forfeit all his goods for ever, to suffer a year's imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off on a market town, upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and for the second offence, to be adjudged a felon, and to suffer death accordingly. To prevent the breed of our sheep from being propagated in foreign countries, seems to have been the object of this law. By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap. 18, the exportation of wool was made felony, and the exporter subjected to the same penalties and forfeitures as a felon.

By the 8th of Elizabeth, chap. 3, anyone who exported sheep, lambs, or rams faced severe penalties for their first offense: they would lose all their goods forever, serve a year in prison, and then have their left hand chopped off in a market town on market day, where it would be publicly displayed. For a second offense, they would be deemed a felon and face the death penalty. This law aimed to prevent the breeding of our sheep in foreign countries. By the 13th and 14th of Charles II, chap. 18, exporting wool was also made a felony, imposing the same penalties and forfeitures on exporters as those faced by felons.

For the honour of the national humanity, it is to be hoped that neither of these statutes was ever executed. The first of them, however, so far as I know, has never been directly repealed, and serjeant Hawkins seems to consider it as still in force. It may, however, perhaps be considered as virtually repealed by the 12th of Charles II. chap. 32, sect. 3, which, without expressly taking away the penalties imposed by former statutes, imposes a new penalty, viz. that of 20s. for every sheep exported, or attempted to be exported, together with the forfeiture of the sheep, and of the owner's share of the sheep. The second of them was expressly repealed by the 7th and 8th of William III. chap. 28, sect. 4, by which it is declared that 'Whereas the statute of the 13th and 14th of king Charles II. made against the exportation of wool, among other things in the said act mentioned, doth enact the same to be deemed felony, by the severity of which penalty the prosecution of offenders hath not been so effectually put in execution; be it therefore enacted, by the[Pg 269] authority aforesaid, that so much of the said act, which relates to the making the said offence felony, be repealed and made void.'

For the honor of our national identity, we can only hope that neither of these laws was ever enforced. As far as I know, though, the first one has never been officially repealed, and Sergeant Hawkins appears to believe it is still valid. However, it might be viewed as effectively repealed by the 12th of Charles II. chap. 32, sect. 3, which, while not explicitly removing the penalties from previous laws, introduces a new penalty of 20 shillings for every sheep exported or attempted to be exported, along with the forfeiture of the sheep and the owner's share of them. The second law was explicitly repealed by the 7th and 8th of William III. chap. 28, sect. 4, which states that "Whereas the statute of the 13th and 14th of King Charles II. against the exportation of wool, among other things mentioned in the act, declared the same to be considered felony, and because the harshness of this penalty has not effectively led to the prosecution of offenders; be it therefore enacted, by the [Pg 269] authority aforesaid, that so much of the said act relating to making this offense felony be repealed and made void."

The penalties, however, which are either imposed by this milder statute, or which, though imposed by former statutes, are not repealed by this one, are still sufficiently severe. Besides the forfeiture of the goods, the exporter incurs the penalty of 3s. for every pound weight of wool, either exported or attempted to be exported, that is, about four or five times the value. Any merchant, or other person convicted of this offence, is disabled from requiring any debt or account belonging to him from any factor or other person. Let his fortune be what it will, whether he is or is not able to pay those heavy penalties, the law means to ruin him completely. But, as the morals of the great body of people are not yet so corrupt as those of the contrivers of this statute, I have not heard that any advantage has ever been taken of this clause. If the person convicted of this offence is not able to pay the penalties within three months after judgment, he is to be transported for seven years; and if he returns before the expiration of that time, he is liable to the pains of felony, without benefit of clergy. The owner of the ship, knowing this offence, forfeits all his interest in the ship and furniture. The master and mariners knowing this offence, forfeit all their goods and chattels, and suffer three months imprisonment. By a subsequent statute, the master suffers six months imprisonment.

The penalties, however, that are either set by this more lenient law, or which, although set by previous laws, are not canceled by this one, are still quite harsh. In addition to losing their goods, the exporter faces a fine of 3s. for every pound of wool exported or attempted to be exported, which is about four or five times its value. Any merchant or individual found guilty of this crime cannot claim any debt or account owed to them by any agent or other person. Regardless of their financial status or ability to pay these heavy fines, the law is designed to completely ruin them. However, since the morals of the majority of people aren't as corrupt as those who crafted this law, I haven't heard of anyone taking advantage of this clause. If the person convicted of this crime cannot pay the penalties within three months after the judgment, they will be transported for seven years; if they return before this period is over, they will face felony charges, without the opportunity for clergy benefit. The ship owner, aware of this offense, loses all interest in the ship and its equipment. The master and crew, knowing about this offense, lose all their belongings and face three months in prison. According to a later law, the master serves six months in prison.

In order to prevent exportation, the whole inland commerce of wool is laid under very burdensome and oppressive restrictions. It cannot be packed in any box, barrel, cask, case, chest, or any other package, but only in packs of leather or pack-cloth, on which must be marked on the outside the words wool or yarn, in large letters, not less than three inches long, on pain of forfeiting the same and the package, and 3s. for every pound weight, to be paid by the owner or packer. It cannot be loaden on any horse or cart, or carried by land within five miles of the coast, but between sun-rising, and sun-setting, on pain of forfeiting the same, the horses and carriages. The hundred next adjoining to the sea coast, out of, or through which the wool is carried or exported, forfeits L.20, if the wool is under the value of L.10; and if of greater value, then treble that value, together with treble costs, to be sued for within the year. The execution to be against any two of the inhabitants, whom the sessions must reimburse, by an assessment on the other inhabitants, as in the cases of robbery. And if any person compounds with the hundred for less than this penalty, he is to be imprisoned for five years, and any other person may prosecute. These regulations take place through the whole kingdom.

To prevent exports, all inland wool trade is subject to very heavy and oppressive restrictions. It can only be packed in leather or pack-cloth bundles, which must be clearly marked on the outside with the words wool or yarn in large letters, at least three inches tall. If this isn't followed, both the wool and the package will be confiscated, and the owner or packer will owe a fine of 3 shillings for each pound. Wool cannot be loaded onto any horse or cart or transported by land within five miles of the coast, except between sunrise and sunset, or else the wool and the horses or vehicles will be forfeited. The hundred nearest to the coast from which the wool is transported or exported will lose £20 if the wool is valued under £10; and if it's worth more, they will lose three times that amount along with triple the costs, which must be claimed within a year. Enforcement will be against any two local residents, who must be compensated by an assessment on the others, similar to cases of theft. If anyone makes a deal with the hundred for less than this penalty, they will be imprisoned for five years, and anyone else can bring charges. These rules are enforced throughout the entire kingdom.

But in the particular counties of Kent and Sussex, the restrictions are still more troublesome. Every owner of wool within ten miles of the sea coast must give an account in writing, three days after shearing, to the next officer of the customs, of the number of his fleeces, and of the places where they are lodged. And before he removes any part of them, he must give the like notice of the number and weight of the fleeces, and of the name and abode of the person to whom they are sold, and of the place to which it is intended they should be carried. No person within fifteen miles of the sea, in the said counties, can buy any wool, before he enters into bond to the king, that no part of the wool which he shall so buy shall be sold by him to any other person within fifteen miles of the sea. If any wool is found carrying towards the sea side in the said counties, unless it has been entered and security given as aforesaid, it is forfeited, and the offender also forfeits 3s. for every pound weight. If any person lay any wool, not entered as aforesaid, within fifteen miles of the sea, it must be seized and forfeited; and if, after such seizure, any person shall claim the same, he must give security to the exchequer, that if he is cast upon trial he shall pay treble costs, besides all other penalties.

But in the specific counties of Kent and Sussex, the restrictions are even more problematic. Every owner of wool within ten miles of the coast must submit a written account within three days after shearing to the next customs officer, detailing the number of fleeces and where they're stored. Before removing any portion of them, they must provide similar notice regarding the number and weight of the fleeces, along with the name and address of the person they're sold to, and the destination where they're intended to go. No one within fifteen miles of the sea in these counties can purchase any wool before securing a bond to the king, stating that none of the wool they buy will be resold to anyone else within fifteen miles of the sea. If any wool is found being transported toward the coast in these counties without being properly registered and secured as mentioned, it will be forfeited, and the offender will also lose 3s. for every pound of weight. If anyone stores wool that hasn't been registered as required within fifteen miles of the sea, it will be confiscated and forfeited; and if, after such confiscation, someone claims it, they must provide security to the exchequer, agreeing to pay triple costs if they're found guilty in trial, in addition to all other penalties.

When such restrictions are imposed upon the inland trade, the coasting trade, we may believe, cannot be left very free. Every owner of wool, who carrieth, or causeth to be carried, any wool to any part or place on the sea coast, in order to be from thence transported by sea to any other place or port on the coast, must first cause an entry thereof to be made at the port from whence it is intended to be conveyed, containing the weight, marks, and number, of the packages, before he brings the same within five miles of that part, on pain of forfeiting the same, and also the horses, carts, and other carriages; and also of suffering and forfeiting, as by the other laws in force against the exportation of wool. This law, however (1st of William III. chap. 32), is so very indulgent as to declare, that 'this shall not hinder any person from carrying his wool home from the place of shearing, though it be within five miles of the sea, provided that in ten days after shearing, and before he remove the wool, he do under his hand certify to the next officer of the customs the true number of fleeces, and where it is housed; and do not remove the same, without certifying to such officer, under his hand, his intention so to do, three days before.' Bond must be given that the wool to be carried coast-ways is to be landed at the particular port for which it is entered outwards; and if any part of it is landed without the presence of an officer, not only the forfeiture of the wool is incurred, as in other goods, but the usual additional penalty[Pg 270] of 3s. for every pound weight is likewise incurred.

When these restrictions are placed on inland trade, we can assume that coastal trade won't be unrestricted either. Every owner of wool who transports or arranges for the transportation of wool to any area along the coastline, intending for it to be shipped by sea to another port, must first have it entered at the port from which it's being sent. This entry must include the weight, markings, and number of packages before bringing it within five miles of that area, or they risk losing the wool and also their horses, carts, and other vehicles. They could also face penalties in accordance with other laws regarding wool exportation. However, this law (1st of William III. chap. 32) is quite lenient, as it states that this will not prevent anyone from taking their wool home from where it was sheared, even if it's within five miles of the sea, as long as they provide, within ten days after shearing and before moving the wool, a written notice to the nearest customs officer detailing the exact number of fleeces and their storage location. They must also notify this officer in writing about their intent to transport the wool three days before doing so. A bond must be secured to ensure that the wool transported along the coast is unloaded at the specific port it was registered for. If any part of it is unloaded without the presence of an officer, not only is the wool forfeited like other goods, but an additional penalty of 3s. for every pound is also applied.

Our woollen manufacturers, in order to justify their demand of such extraordinary restrictions and regulations, confidently asserted, that English wool was of a peculiar quality, superior to that of any other country; that the wool of other countries could not, without some mixture of it, be wrought up into any tolerable manufacture; that fine cloth could not be made without it; that England, therefore, if the exportation of it could be totally prevented, could monopolize to herself almost the whole woollen trade of the world; and thus, having no rivals, could sell at what price she pleased, and in a short time acquire the most incredible degree of wealth by the most advantageous balance of trade. This doctrine, like most other doctrines which are confidently asserted by any considerable number of people, was, and still continues to be, most implicitly believed by a much greater number: by almost all those who are either unacquainted with the woollen trade, or who have not made particular inquiries. It is, however, so perfectly false, that English wool is in any respect necessary for the making of fine cloth, that it is altogether unfit for it. Fine cloth is made altogether of Spanish wool. English wool, cannot be even so mixed with Spanish wool, as to enter into the composition without spoiling and degrading, in some degree, the fabric of the cloth.

Our wool manufacturers, to justify their demand for such extreme restrictions and regulations, confidently claimed that English wool was of a unique quality, better than any other country’s. They argued that without some blend of English wool, wool from other countries couldn’t be made into any decent fabric; that fine cloth couldn’t be produced without it; and that, therefore, if the export of English wool could be completely stopped, England could dominate almost the entire wool trade in the world. Without competitors, England could set any price it wanted and quickly amass incredible wealth through a favorable balance of trade. This idea, like many confidently stated by a large group of people, was, and still is, widely accepted by many more: most of those who know little about the wool trade or haven’t looked into it closely. However, the claim that English wool is in any way necessary for making fine cloth is completely false; it is actually unsuitable for it. Fine cloth is made entirely from Spanish wool. Mixing English wool with Spanish wool degrades the quality of the cloth.

It has been shown in the foregoing part of this work, that the effect of these regulations has been to depress the price of English wool, not only below what it naturally would be in the present times, but very much below what it actually was in the time of Edward III. The price of Scotch wool, when, in consequence of the Union, it became subject to the same regulations, is said to have fallen about one half. It is observed by the very accurate and intelligent author of the Memoirs of Wool, the Reverend Mr. John Smith, that the price of the best English wool in England, is generally below what wool of a very inferior quality commonly sells for in the market of Amsterdam. To depress the price of this commodity below what may be called its natural and proper price, was the avowed purpose of those regulations; and there seems to be no doubt of their having produced the effect that was expected from them.

It has been shown in the previous sections of this work that these regulations have driven down the price of English wool, not just below what it would naturally be today, but significantly lower than what it was during the time of Edward III. The price of Scottish wool, when it became subject to the same regulations as a result of the Union, reportedly dropped by about half. The very precise and knowledgeable author of the Memoirs of Wool, the Reverend Mr. John Smith, notes that the price of the best English wool is usually lower than what lower-quality wool typically sells for in the Amsterdam market. The aim of these regulations was to reduce the price of this commodity below what could be considered its natural and appropriate price, and it seems clear that they achieved the intended effect.

This reduction of price, it may perhaps be thought, by discouraging the growing of wool, must have reduced very much the annual produce of that commodity, though not below what it formerly was, yet below what, in the present state of things, it would probably have been, had it, in consequence of an open and free market, been allowed to rise to the natural and proper price. I am, however, disposed to believe, that the quantity of the annual produce cannot have been much, though it may, perhaps, have been a little affected by these regulations. The growing of wool is not the chief purpose for which the sheep farmer employs his industry and stock. He expects his profit, not so much from the price of the fleece, as from that of the carcase; and the average or ordinary price of the latter must even, in many cases, make up to him whatever deficiency there may be in the average or ordinary price of the former. It has been observed, in the foregoing part of this work, that 'whatever regulations tend to sink the price, either of wool or of raw hides, below what it naturally would be, must, in an improved and cultivated country, have some tendency to raise the price of butcher's meat. The price, both of the great and small cattle which are fed on improved and cultivated land, must be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and the profit which the farmer, has reason to expect from improved and cultivated land. If it is not, they will soon cease to feed them. Whatever part of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the hide, must be paid by the carcase. The less there is paid for the one, the more must be paid for the other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the different parts of the beast, is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid to them. In an improved and cultivated country, therefore, their interest as landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by such regulations, though their interest as consumers may, by the rise in the price of provisions.' According to this reasoning, therefore, this degradation in the price of wool is not likely, in an improved and cultivated country, to occasion any diminution in the annual produce of that commodity; except so far as, by raising the price of mutton, it may somewhat diminish the demand for, and consequently the production of, that particular species of butcher's meat. Its effect, however, even in this way, it is probable, is not very considerable.

This price drop might be seen as discouraging wool production, likely reducing the annual output of that commodity. While it hasn't fallen below previous levels, it’s probably below what it could have been if the market had been open and free, allowing prices to rise to their natural and appropriate levels. However, I tend to believe that the annual output hasn’t been significantly impacted, although it may have been slightly affected by these regulations. Wool production isn’t the primary reason sheep farmers invest their efforts and resources. They expect to make a profit more from the price of the carcass than from the wool. The average price for the latter often compensates for any shortfall in the average price of the wool. It’s been noted earlier in this work that ‘any regulations that push down the prices of wool or raw hides below their natural levels will likely raise the price of meat in a developed and farmed country. The price of livestock raised on improved land must be enough to cover the expected rent for the landlord and the farmer's profit. If it’s not, farmers will stop raising them. Thus, whatever part of this price isn’t covered by the wool and hides must come from the carcass. The less paid for one, the more must be paid for the other. How this price is distributed among the different parts of the animal doesn’t matter to landlords and farmers as long as they receive the full amount. Therefore, in a developed and farmed country, their interests as landlords and farmers won’t be greatly affected by such regulations, although their interests as consumers may be impacted by rising food prices.’ Based on this reasoning, the drop in wool prices is unlikely to lead to any significant reduction in the annual output of that commodity, except in how it might increase mutton prices, which could slightly lower the demand for and therefore production of that specific type of meat. However, even in this regard, its impact is likely minimal.

But though its effect upon the quantity of the annual produce may not have been very considerable, its effect upon the quality, it may perhaps be thought, must necessarily have been very great. The degradation in the quality of English wool, if not below what it was in former times, yet below what it naturally would have been in the present state of improvement and cultivation, must have been, it may perhaps be supposed, very nearly in proportion to the degradation of price. As the quality depends upon the breed, upon the pasture, and upon the management and cleanliness of the sheep, during the whole progress of the growth of the fleece, the attention to these circumstances, it may naturally enough be imagined, can never be greater than in proportion to the recompence which the price of the fleece is likely to make for the labour and expense which that atten[Pg 271]tion requires. It happens, however, that the goodness of the fleece depends, in great measure, upon the health, growth, and bulk of the animal: the same attention which is necessary for the improvement of the carcase is, in some respect, sufficient for that of the fleece. Notwithstanding the degradation of price, English wool is said to have been improved considerably during the course even of the present century. The improvement, might, perhaps, have been greater if the price had been better; but the lowness of price, though it may have obstructed, yet certainly it has not altogether prevented that improvement.

But even though its impact on the amount of annual produce may not have been very significant, its impact on quality, it might be argued, must have been substantial. The decline in the quality of English wool, if not lower than it was in earlier times, is still below what it could have been given today's advancements and cultivation. It's reasonable to think that this drop in quality closely aligns with the drop in price. Since quality is influenced by the breed, the pasture, and the care and cleanliness of the sheep throughout the entire fleece growth process, it can be expected that attention to these factors is directly proportional to the profit the fleece price can yield in relation to the labor and costs involved. However, the quality of the fleece significantly relies on the animal's health, growth, and size: the same attention needed for improving the carcass is, in some ways, adequate for enhancing the fleece. Despite the drop in price, English wool is reported to have improved significantly in this century. The improvement might have been even greater if prices had been higher, but while low prices may have hindered progress, they certainly haven't completely stopped it.

The violence of these regulations, therefore, seems to have affected neither the quantity nor the quality of the annual produce of wool, so much as it might have been expected to do (though I think it probable that it may have affected the latter a good deal more than the former); and the interest of the growers of wool, though it must have been hurt in some degree, seems upon the whole, to have been much less hurt than could well have been imagined.

The harshness of these regulations doesn't seem to have impacted the amount or quality of the yearly wool production as much as one might have expected (though I think it’s likely that the quality was affected more than the quantity); and while the wool producers have likely suffered some negative effects, overall, it seems their interests have been hurt less than one would have thought.

These considerations, however, will not justify the absolute prohibition of the exportation of wool; but they will fully justify the imposition of a considerable tax upon that exportation.

These factors, however, will not justify completely banning the export of wool; but they will fully support imposing a significant tax on that export.

To hurt, in any degree, the interest of any one order of citizens, for no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjects. But the prohibition certainly hurts, in some degree, the interest of the growers of wool, for no other purpose but to promote that of the manufacturers.

To harm, even slightly, the interests of one group of citizens just to benefit another group is clearly against the justice and equality that the ruler owes to all the different groups of his subjects. However, the ban definitely impacts the interests of wool growers, solely to benefit manufacturers.

Every different order of citizens is bound to contribute to the support of the sovereign or commonwealth. A tax of five, or even of ten shillings, upon the exportation of every tod of wool, would produce a very considerable revenue to the sovereign. It would hurt the interest of the growers somewhat less than the prohibition, because it would not probably lower the price of wool quite so much. It would afford a sufficient advantage to the manufacturer, because, though he might not buy his wool altogether so cheap as under the prohibition, he would still buy it at least five or ten shillings cheaper than any foreign manufacturer could buy it, besides saving the freight and insurance which the other would be obliged to pay. It is scarce possible to devise a tax which could produce any considerable revenue to the sovereign, and at the same time occasion so little inconveniency to any body.

Every group of citizens is required to support the government or the commonwealth. A tax of five or even ten shillings on the export of every tod of wool would generate a significant amount of revenue for the government. It would negatively impact the growers a bit less than a complete ban would, since it likely wouldn’t reduce the price of wool quite as much. It would give manufacturers a decent advantage, because, although they might not buy their wool as cheaply as they would under a ban, they would still pay at least five or ten shillings less than any foreign manufacturer, plus they would save on shipping and insurance costs that foreign sellers would have to cover. It’s nearly impossible to create a tax that could generate substantial revenue for the government while causing minimal inconvenience to anyone.

The prohibition, notwithstanding all the penalties which guard it, does not prevent the exportation of wool. It is exported, it is well known, in great quantities. The great difference between the price in the home and that in the foreign market, presents such a temptation to smuggling, that all the rigour of the law cannot prevent it. This illegal exportation is advantageous to nobody but the smuggler. A legal exportation, subject to a tax, by affording a revenue to the sovereign, and thereby saving the imposition of some other, perhaps more burdensome and inconvenient taxes, might prove advantageous to all the different subjects of the state.

The ban, despite all the penalties in place, doesn't stop wool from being exported. It's widely known that it gets exported in large amounts. The big difference between domestic and foreign prices creates such a temptation for smuggling that no amount of strict law enforcement can stop it. This illegal export only benefits the smuggler. On the other hand, legal exports, which are taxed, could provide revenue for the government, helping to avoid the imposition of potentially more burdensome and inconvenient taxes, and could benefit all the citizens of the state.

The exportation of fuller's earth, or fuller's clay, supposed to be necessary for preparing and cleansing the woollen manufactures, has been subjected to nearly the same penalties as the exportation of wool. Even tobacco-pipe clay, though acknowledged to be different from fuller's clay, yet, on account of their resemblance, and because fuller's clay might sometimes be exported as tobacco-pipe clay, has been laid under the same prohibitions and penalties.

The export of fuller's earth, or fuller's clay, which is thought to be essential for preparing and cleaning woolen products, has faced penalties similar to those for exporting wool. Even tobacco-pipe clay, though recognized as different from fuller's clay, is also banned from export due to their similarities, as fuller's clay could sometimes be shipped as tobacco-pipe clay.

By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap. 7, the exportation, not only of raw hides, but of tanned leather, except in the shape of boots, shoes, or slippers, was prohibited; and the law gave a monopoly to our boot-makers and shoe-makers, not only against our graziers, but against our tanners. By subsequent statutes, our tanners have got themselves exempted from this monopoly, upon paying a small tax of only one shilling on the hundred weight of tanned leather, weighing one hundred and twelve pounds. They have obtained likewise the drawback of two-thirds of the excise duties imposed upon their commodity, even when exported without further manufacture. All manufactures of leather may be exported duty free; and the exporter is besides entitled to the drawback of the whole duties of excise. Our graziers still continue subject to the old monopoly. Graziers, separated from one another, and dispersed through all the different corners of the country, cannot, without great difficulty, combine together for the purpose either of imposing monopolies upon their fellow-citizens, or of exempting themselves from such as may have been imposed upon them by other people. Manufacturers of all kinds, collected together in numerous bodies in all great cities, easily can. Even the horns of cattle are prohibited to be exported; and the two insignificant trades of the horner and comb-maker enjoy, in this respect, a monopoly against the graziers.

By the 13th and 14th years of Charles II, chapter 7, the export of not just raw hides but also tanned leather, except as boots, shoes, or slippers, was banned. This law created a monopoly for our boot-makers and shoe-makers, limiting competition from our graziers and tanners. Later laws allowed our tanners to be exempt from this monopoly by paying a small tax of just one shilling on every hundred weight of tanned leather, which weighs one hundred twelve pounds. They also received a refund of two-thirds of the excise duties on their products, even when exported without any further processing. All leather goods can be exported without duty, and the exporter can also receive a refund for all excise duties paid. Our graziers, however, remain under the old monopoly. They are scattered across various regions of the country, making it challenging to unite against monopolies imposed by others or to create monopolies themselves. On the other hand, manufacturers, who gather in large groups in major cities, can do so easily. Even exporting cattle horns is banned, giving the small trades of horners and comb-makers a monopoly over graziers in this regard.

Restraints, either by prohibitions, or by taxes, upon the exportation of goods which are partially, but not completely manufactured,
are not peculiar to the manufacture of
leather. As long as any thing remains to be done, in order to fit any commodity for immediate use and consumption, our manufacturers think that they themselves ought to[Pg 272] the doing of it. Woollen yarn and worsted are prohibited to be exported, under the same penalties as wool. Even white cloths are subject to a duty upon exportation; and our dyers have so far obtained a monopoly against our clothiers. Our clothiers would probably have been able to defend themselves against it; but it happens that the greater part of our principal clothiers are themselves likewise dyers. Watch-cases, clock-cases, and dial-plates for clocks and watches, have been prohibited to be exported. Our clock-makers and watch-makers are, it seems, unwilling that the price of this sort of workmanship should be raised upon them by the competition of foreigners.

Restraints, whether through bans or taxes, on the export of goods that are partially, but not fully manufactured,
are not exclusive to the leather industry.
As long as there’s anything left to do to make a product ready for immediate use and consumption, our manufacturers believe they should do it themselves.[Pg 272] Wool yarn and worsted are banned from export under the same penalties as raw wool. Even white cloths have an export duty; our dyers have managed to secure a monopoly over our cloth makers. Our cloth makers might have been able to fight against this, but most of the leading cloth makers are also dyers themselves. Exporting watch cases, clock cases, and clock and watch dial plates has been banned. Our clock and watch makers seem unwilling to let foreign competition drive up the price of this type of work.

By some old statutes of Edward III. Henry VIII. and Edward VI. the exportation of all metals was prohibited. Lead and tin were alone excepted, probably on account of the great abundance of those metals; in the exportation of which a considerable part of the trade of the kingdom in those days consisted. For the encouragement of the mining trade, the 5th of William and Mary, chap. 17, exempted from this prohibition iron, copper, and mundic metal made from British ore. The exportation of all sorts of copper bars, foreign as well as British, was afterwards permitted by the 9th and 10th of William III. chap 26. The exportation of unmanufactured brass, of what is called gun-metal, bell-metal, and shroff-metal, still continues to be prohibited. Brass manufactures of all sorts may be exported duty free.

According to some old laws from Edward III, Henry VIII, and Edward VI, exporting all metals was banned. Lead and tin were the only exceptions, probably because there was so much of those metals; a significant part of the kingdom's trade at that time relied on exporting them. To support the mining industry, the 5th of William and Mary, chap. 17, lifted this ban for iron, copper, and mundic metal made from British ore. Later, the 9th and 10th of William III, chap. 26, allowed the export of all kinds of copper bars, both foreign and British. However, exporting unprocessed brass, gun-metal, bell-metal, and shroff-metal is still prohibited. All types of brass products can be exported without paying a duty.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture, where it is not altogether prohibited, is, in many cases, subjected to considerable duties.

The export of manufactured goods, where it isn't completely banned, is often subject to significant taxes.

By the 8th Geo. I. chap. 15, the exportation of all goods, the produce or manufacture of Great Britain, upon which any duties had been imposed by former statutes, was rendered duty free. The following goods, however, were excepted: alum, lead, lead-ore, tin, tanned leather, copperas, coals, wool, cards, white woolen cloths, lapis calaminaris, skins of all sorts, glue, coney hair or wool, hares wool, hair of all sorts, horses, and litharge of lead. If you expect horses, all these are either materials of manufacture, or incomplete manufactures (which may be considered as materials for still further manufacture), or instruments of trade. This statute leaves them subject to all the old duties which had ever been imposed upon them, the old subsidy, and one per cent. outwards.

By the 8th Geo. I. chap. 15, the export of all goods produced or made in Great Britain, which had previously been subject to any duties, was made duty-free. However, the following goods were exceptions: alum, lead, lead ore, tin, tanned leather, copperas, coal, wool, cards, white woolen cloths, lapis calaminaris, all types of skins, glue, coney hair or wool, hare's wool, all types of hair, horses, and litharge of lead. If you're referring to horses, all these are either raw materials or unfinished products (which can be seen as materials for further manufacturing), or tools used in trade. This statute keeps them subject to all the old duties that had ever been imposed on them, the old subsidy, and one percent on exports.

By the same statute, a great number of foreign drugs for dyers use are exempted from all duties upon importation. Each of them, however, is afterwards subjected to a certain duty, not indeed a very heavy one, upon exportation. Our dyers, it seems, while they thought it for their interest to encourage the importation of those drugs, by an exemption from all duties, thought it likewise for their own interest to throw some small discouragement upon their exportation. The avidity, however, which suggested this notable piece of mercantile ingenuity, most probably disappointed itself of its object. It necessarily taught the importers to be more careful than they might otherwise have been, that their importation should not exceed what was necessary for the supply of the home market. The home market was at all times likely to be more scantily supplied; the commodities were at all times likely to be somewhat dearer there than they would have been, had the exportation been rendered as free as the importation.

By the same law, many foreign dyes used by dyers are exempt from import duties. However, each of them is later subject to a small export duty, which isn’t too heavy. It seems that our dyers thought it was in their best interest to encourage the import of these dyes by exempting them from all duties, but they also believed it was beneficial to impose a small discouragement on their export. The eagerness behind this clever trade strategy likely backfired. It made importers more cautious than they might have been, ensuring that their imports didn’t exceed what was needed for the local market. The local market was always likely to be less supplied, and prices there were likely to be somewhat higher than they would have been if export had been as free as import.

By the above-mentioned statute, gum senega, or gum arabic, being among the enumerated dyeing drugs, might be imported duty free. They were subjected, indeed, to a small poundage duty, amounting only to threepence in the hundred weight, upon their re-exportation. France enjoyed, at that time, an exclusive trade to the country most productive of those drugs, that which lies in the neighbourhood of the Senegal; and the British market could not easily be supplied by the immediate importation of them from the place of growth. By the 25th Geo. II. therefore, gum senega was allowed to be imported (contrary to the general dispositions of the act of navigation) from any part of Europe. As the law, however, did not mean to encourage this species of trade, so contrary to the general principles of the mercantile policy of England, it imposed a duty of ten shillings the hundred weight upon such importation, and no part of this duty was to be afterwards drawn back upon its exportation. The successful war which began in 1755 gave Great Britain the same exclusive trade to those countries which France had enjoyed before. Our manufactures, as soon as the peace was made, endeavoured to avail themselves of this advantage, and to establish a monopoly in their own favour both against the growers and against the importers of this commodity. By the 5th Geo. III. therefore, chap. 37, the exportation of gum senega, from his majesty's dominions in Africa, was confined to Great Britain, and was subjected to all the same restrictions, regulations, forfeitures, and penalties, as that of the enumerated commodities of the British colonies in America and the West Indies. Its importation, indeed, was subjected to a small duty of sixpence the hundred weight, but its re-exportation was subjected to the enormous duty of one pound ten shillings the hundred weight. It was the intention of our manufacturers, that the whole produce of those countries should be imported into Great Britain; and in order that they themselves might be enabled to buy it at their own price, that no part of it should be exported again, but at such an expense as would[Pg 273] sufficiently discourage that exportation. Their avidity, however, upon this, as well as upon many other occasions, disappointed itself of its object. This enormous duty presented such a temptation to smuggling, that great quantities of this commodity were clandestinely exported, probably to all the manufacturing countries of Europe, but particularly to Holland, not only from Great Britain, but from Africa. Upon this account, by the 14th Geo. III. chap. 10, this duty upon exportation was reduced to five shillings the hundred weight.

According to the aforementioned law, gum senega, or gum arabic, which is listed among the approved dyeing drugs, could be imported without paying duties. However, there was a minor fee of threepence per hundredweight when it was re-exported. At that time, France held a monopoly on the trade of these drugs from the region near Senegal, making it difficult for the British market to source them directly from their place of origin. Therefore, under the 25th Geo. II, gum senega was permitted to be imported (contrary to the general rules of the Navigation Act) from anywhere in Europe. However, this law did not aim to promote such trade, which against England's usual mercantile policies, so it imposed a duty of ten shillings per hundredweight on these imports, with no possibility of recovering this duty upon export. The successful war that started in 1755 allowed Great Britain to gain the same exclusive trade in those regions that France previously had. As soon as peace was established, British manufacturers sought to capitalize on this advantage and create a monopoly favoring themselves against both the producers and importers of this product. Consequently, under the 5th Geo. III, chap. 37, the export of gum senega from his majesty's territories in Africa was restricted to Great Britain and faced the same constraints, rules, penalties, and forfeitures as those of listed goods from British colonies in America and the West Indies. Its importation was subject to a small duty of sixpence per hundredweight, but its re-exportation faced a hefty duty of one pound ten shillings per hundredweight. The goal of our manufacturers was to ensure that all the produce from these countries was brought into Great Britain, and to enable them to purchase it at their own price, ensuring it could not be exported again without incurring costs that would significantly deter such exportation. However, in their greed, they frequently undermined their own objectives. This exorbitant duty created a strong incentive for smuggling, resulting in large quantities of this product being secretly exported, likely to various manufacturing countries in Europe, especially Holland, from both Great Britain and Africa. As a result, under the 14th Geo. III, chap. 10, the export duty was reduced to five shillings per hundredweight.

In the book of rates, according to which the old subsidy was levied, beaver skins were estimated at six shillings and eight pence a-piece; and the different subsidies and imposts which, before the year 1722, had been laid upon their importation, amounted to one-fifth part of the rate, or to sixteen pence upon each skin; all of which, except half the old subsidy, amounting only to twopence, was drawn back upon exportation. This duty, upon the importation of so important a material of manufacture, had been thought too high; and, in the year 1722, the rate was reduced to two shillings and sixpence, which reduced the duty upon importation to sixpence, and of this only one-half was to be drawn back upon exportation. The same successful war put the country most productive of beaver under the dominion of Great Britain; and beaver skins being among the enumerated commodities, the exportation from America was consequently confined to the market of Great Britain. Our manufacturers soon bethought themselves of the advantage which they might make of this circumstance; and in the year 1764, the duty upon the importation of beaver skin was reduced to one penny, but the duty upon exportation was raised to sevenpence each skin, without any drawback of the duty upon importation. By the same law, a duty of eighteen pence the pound was imposed upon the exportation of beaver wool or woumbs, without making any alteration in the duty upon the importation of that commodity, which, when imported by British, and in British shipping, amounted at that time to between fourpence and fivepence the piece.

In the book of rates, based on which the old tax was collected, beaver skins were valued at six shillings and eight pence each; and the various taxes and duties that had been imposed on their importation before 1722 added up to one-fifth of the rate, or sixteen pence for each skin. All of this, except for half of the old subsidy, which was only two pence, was refunded upon export. This tax on importing such an essential manufacturing material was deemed too high; so in 1722, the rate was lowered to two shillings and sixpence, which brought the import tax down to sixpence, with only half of that refundable upon export. The same successful war placed the country most known for producing beaver under British control; since beaver skins were among the listed goods, exports from America were thus restricted to the British market. Our manufacturers quickly realized the advantage of this situation; and in 1764, the import tax on beaver skins was reduced to one penny, while the export tax was raised to seven pence per skin, with no refund on the import duty. By the same legislation, a tax of eighteen pence per pound was imposed on exporting beaver wool or wombs, without changing the import duty on that commodity, which, when imported by British ships, was then between four pence and five pence each.

Coals may be considered both as a material of manufacture, and as an instrument of trade. Heavy duties, accordingly, have been imposed upon their exportation, amounting at present (1783) to more than five shillings the ton, or more than fifteen shillings the chaldron, Newcastle measure; which is, in most cases, more than the original value of the commodity at the coal-pit, or even at the shipping port for exportation.

Coals can be viewed both as a manufacturing material and as a trade commodity. As a result, hefty export duties have been placed on them, currently (1783) exceeding five shillings per ton or more than fifteen shillings per chaldron, measured by Newcastle standards. This often exceeds the original value of the coal at the coal pit or even at the shipping port for export.

The exportation, however, of the instruments of trade, properly so called, is commonly restrained, not by high duties, but by absolute prohibitions. Thus, by the 7th and 8th of William III. chap. 20, sect. 8, the exportation of frames or engines for knitting gloves or stockings, is prohibited, under the penalty, not only of the forfeiture of such frames or engines, so exported, or attempted to be exported, but of forty pounds, one half to the king, the other to the person who shall inform or sue for the same. In the same manner, by the 14th Geo. III. chap. 71, the exportation to foreign parts, of any utensils made use of in the cotton, linen, woollen, and silk manufacturers, is prohibited under the penalty, not only of the forfeiture of such utensils, but of two hundred pounds, to be paid by the person who shall offend in this manner; and likewise of two hundred pounds, to be paid by the master of the ship, who shall knowingly suffer such utensils to be loaded on board his ship.

The export of trade tools, specifically speaking, is usually restricted not by high taxes but by outright bans. For example, according to the 7th and 8th of William III, chapter 20, section 8, exporting frames or machines for knitting gloves or stockings is prohibited. Violators face not only losing the frames or machines being exported or attempted to be exported but also a fine of forty pounds, half going to the king and the other half to the person who reports or sues for it. Similarly, under the 14th George III, chapter 71, exporting any tools used in cotton, linen, wool, and silk manufacturing to foreign countries is banned, with penalties including forfeiting the tools and a fine of two hundred pounds for the offender, as well as another two hundred pounds for the ship's captain if they knowingly allow such tools to be loaded on their ship.

When such heavy penalties were imposed upon the exportation of the dead instruments of trade, it could not well be expected that the living instrument, the artificer, should be allowed to go free. Accordingly, by the 5th Geo. I. chap. 27, the person who shall be convicted of enticing any artificer, of or in any of the manufactures of Great Britain, to go into any foreign parts, in order to practise or teach his trade, is liable, for the first offence, to be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred pounds, and to three months imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid; and for the second offence, to be fined in any sum, at the discretion of the court, and to imprisonment for twelve months, and until the fine shall be paid. By the 23d Geo. II. chap. 13, this penalty is increased, for the first offence, to five hundred pounds for every artificer so enticed, and to twelve months imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid; and for the second offence, to one thousand pounds, and to two years imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid.

When such heavy penalties were placed on the export of inanimate tools of trade, it wasn't reasonable to expect that the skilled workers, the craftsmen, would be allowed to leave freely. Consequently, by the 5th Geo. I. chap. 27, anyone convicted of enticing a craftsman from any of Great Britain's industries to go abroad to practice or teach their trade faces penalties. For a first offense, the fine can be up to one hundred pounds and includes three months of imprisonment, lasting until the fine is paid. For a second offense, the fined amount is at the court's discretion, along with a year of imprisonment, also until the fine is paid. Under the 23d Geo. II. chap. 13, these penalties are increased, with the first offense resulting in a five hundred pound fine for each craftsman enticed, along with twelve months of imprisonment until the fine is paid; for the second offense, the fine rises to one thousand pounds and two years of imprisonment, again until the fine is paid.

By the former of these two statutes, upon proof that any person has been enticing any artificer, or that any artificer has promised or contracted to go into foreign parts, for the purposes aforesaid, such artificer may be obliged to give security, at the discretion of the court, that he shall not go beyond the seas, and may be committed to prison until he give such security.

By the first of these two laws, if it's proven that someone has been trying to persuade a craftsman, or that a craftsman has agreed to go abroad for the purposes mentioned, that craftsman may be required to provide security, as decided by the court, that he will not leave the country, and may be sent to jail until he provides that security.

If any artificer has gone beyond the seas, and is exercising or teaching his trade in any foreign country, upon warning being given to him by any of his majesty's ministers or consuls abroad, or by one of his majesty's secretaries of state, for the time being, if he does not, within six months after such warning, return into this realm, and from henceforth abide and inhabit continually within the same, he is from thenceforth declared incapable of taking any legacy devised to him within this kingdom, or of being executor or administrator to any person, or of taking any lands within this kingdom, by descent, devise, or purchase.[Pg 274] He likewise forfeits to the king all his lands, goods, and chattels; is declared an alien in every respect; and is put out of the king's protection.

If any craftsman has gone abroad and is working or teaching his trade in another country, after being warned by any of the king's ministers or consuls overseas, or by one of the king's secretaries of state at that time, if he does not return to this country within six months of that warning and continue to live here permanently from then on, he will be considered ineligible to receive any inheritance left to him in this kingdom, to act as executor or administrator for anyone, or to acquire any land in this kingdom, whether by inheritance, will, or purchase.[Pg 274] He will also lose all his lands, property, and possessions to the king; will be declared an alien in every way; and will be removed from the king's protection.

It is unnecessary, I imagine, to observe how contrary such regulations are to the boasted liberty of the subject, of which we affect to be so very jealous; but which, in this case, is so plainly sacrificed to the futile interests of our merchants and manufacturers.

I don’t think I need to point out how these regulations go against the supposed freedom of individuals that we claim to protect; yet, in this instance, it’s clearly being compromised for the trivial interests of our merchants and manufacturers.

The laudable motive of all these regulations, is to extend our own manufactures, not by their own improvement, but by the depression of those of all our neighbours, and by putting an end, as much as possible, to the troublesome competition of such odious and disagreeable rivals. Our master manufacturers think it reasonable that they themselves should have the monopoly of the ingenuity of all their countrymen. Though by restraining, in some trades, the number of apprentices which can be employed at one time, and by imposing the necessity of a long apprenticeship in all trades, they endeavour, all of them, to confine the knowledge of their respective employments to as small a number as possible; they are unwilling, however, that any part of this small number should go abroad to instruct foreigners.

The admirable goal of all these regulations is to boost our own manufacturing, not by improving our products, but by undermining those of our neighbors and minimizing the annoying competition from such unpleasant rivals. Our leading manufacturers believe it's fair that they alone should hold the monopoly on the skills of all their fellow countrymen. Although by limiting, in some industries, the number of apprentices that can be employed at one time, and by requiring a long apprenticeship in all trades, they aim to keep the knowledge of their respective fields confined to as few people as possible, they are, however, reluctant to let any of this small group go abroad to teach others.

Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.

Consumption is the only goal and purpose of all production; and the interests of the producer should be considered only to the extent that it helps promote the interests of the consumer.

The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce.

The principle is so clearly obvious that it would be ridiculous to try to prove it. However, in the commercial system, the interests of the consumer are almost always put aside for the benefit of the producer; it seems to prioritize production over consumption as the ultimate goal of all industry and trade.

In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign commodities which can come into competition with those of our own growth or manufacture, the interest of the home consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of the producer. It is altogether for the benefit of the latter, that the former is obliged to pay that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost always occasions.

In the restrictions on importing foreign goods that can compete with our own products, the needs of local consumers are clearly compromised for the sake of producers. The latter benefit entirely from this situation, as the former are forced to pay the higher prices that this monopoly usually causes.

It is altogether for the benefit of the producer, that bounties are granted upon the exportation of some of his productions. The home consumer is obliged to pay, first, the tax which is necessary for paying the bounty; and, secondly, the still greater tax which necessarily arises from the enhancement of the price of the commodity in the home market.

It’s completely beneficial for the producer that incentives are given for exporting some of their products. The local consumer ends up paying, first, the tax needed to fund the incentive; and second, the even larger tax that results from the increased price of the product in the local market.

By the famous treaty of commerce with Portugal, the consumer is prevented by high duties from purchasing of a neighbouring country, a commodity which our own climate does not produce; but is obliged to purchase it of a distant country, though it is acknowledged, that the commodity of the distant country is of a worse quality than that of the near one. The home consumer is obliged to submit to this inconvenience, in order that the producer may import into the distant country some of his productions, upon more advantageous terms than he otherwise would have been allowed to do. The consumer, too, is obliged to pay whatever enhancement in the price of those very productions this forced exportation may occasion in the home market.

Due to the well-known trade agreement with Portugal, consumers are stuck with high tariffs that prevent them from buying goods from a neighboring country that our own climate doesn't provide. Instead, they have to buy these goods from a distant country, even though it's recognized that the quality from the distant country is inferior to what could be obtained closer to home. Consumers have to deal with this hassle so that producers can sell some of their goods to the distant country under better terms than they otherwise would have had. Additionally, consumers end up paying any price increases that this forced exportation causes in the local market.

But in the system of laws which has been established for the management of our American and West Indies colonies, the interest of the home consumer has been sacrificed to that of the producer, which a more extravagant profusion than in all our other commercial regulations. A great empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of customers, who should be obliged to buy, from the shops of our different producers, all the goods with which these could supply them. For the sake of that little enhancement of price which this monopoly might afford our producers, the home consumers have been burdened with the whole expense of maintaining and defending that empire. For this purpose, and for this purpose only, in the last two wars, more than two hundred millions have been spent, and a new debt of more than a hundred and seventy millions has been contracted, over and above all that had been expended for the same purpose in former wars. The interest of this debt alone is not only greater than the whole extraordinary profit which, it never could be pretended, was made by the monopoly of the colony trade, but than the whole value of that trade, or than the whole value of the goods which, at an average, have been annually exported to the colonies.

But in the system of laws created to manage our American and West Indies colonies, the needs of the home consumer have been sacrificed for the benefit of the producer, resulting in a more excessive distribution than in all our other trading rules. A vast empire has been built solely to create a nation of customers who are forced to buy all the goods from our different producers’ shops. Just for that slight price increase that this monopoly might provide our producers, home consumers have been burdened with the entire cost of maintaining and defending that empire. For this purpose, and only for this purpose, over the last two wars, more than two hundred million has been spent, and a new debt of over a hundred seventy million has been incurred, on top of what was already spent for the same reasons in earlier wars. The interest on this debt alone is not only greater than all the exceptional profit that could ever be claimed from the monopoly of the colony trade but also exceeds the total value of that trade or the total value of the goods that, on average, have been exported to the colonies each year.

It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class, our merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In the mercantile regulations, which have been taken notice of in this chapter, the interest of our manufacturers has been most peculiarly attended to; and the interest, not so much of the consumers, as that of some other sets of producers, has been sacrificed to it.[Pg 275]

It's not too hard to figure out who created this entire commercial system; it's definitely not the consumers, whose interests have been completely ignored, but the producers, whose interests have been carefully prioritized. Among these producers, our merchants and manufacturers stand out as the main architects. In the trade regulations discussed in this chapter, the needs of our manufacturers have been given special attention, often at the expense of not just consumers but also other groups of producers.[Pg 275]


CHAP. IX.

OF THE AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS, OR OF THOSE SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WHICH REPRESENT THE PRODUCE OF LAND, AS EITHER THE SOLE OR THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF THE REVENUE AND WEALTH OF EVERY COUNTRY.

The agricultural systems of political economy will not require so long an explanation as that which I have thought it necessary to bestow upon the mercantile or commercial system.

The agricultural systems of political economy won’t need as lengthy an explanation as the one I felt was necessary for the mercantile or commercial system.

That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country, has, so far as I know, never been adopted by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a few men of great learning and ingenuity in France. It would not, surely, be worth while to examine at great length the errors of a system which never has done, and probably never will do, any harm in any part of the world. I shall endeavour to explain, however, as distinctly as I can, the great outlines of this very ingenious system.

The system that views the output of land as the only source of a country's revenue and wealth has, to my knowledge, never been adopted by any nation. Right now, it only exists in the theories of a few highly educated and creative individuals in France. It wouldn’t make sense to delve deeply into the mistakes of a system that has never caused, and likely never will cause, any harm anywhere in the world. However, I will try to clearly explain the main features of this very clever system.

Mr. Colbert, the famous minister of Lewis XIV. was a man of probity, of great industry, and knowledge of detail; of great experience and acuteness in the examination of public accounts; and of abilities, in short, every way fitted for introducing method and good order into the collection and expenditure of the public revenue. That minister had unfortunately embraced all the prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a system of restraint and regulation, and such as could scarce fail to be agreeable to a laborious and plodding man of business, who had been accustomed to regulate the different departments of public offices, and to establish the necessary checks and controuls for confining each to its proper sphere. The industry and commerce of a great country, he endeavoured to regulate upon the same model as the departments of a public office; and instead of allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice, he bestowed upon certain branches of industry extraordinary privileges, while he laid others under as extraordinary restraints. He was not only disposed, like other European ministers, to encourage more the industry of the towns than that of the country; but, in order to support the industry of the towns, he was willing even to depress and keep down that of the country. In order to render provisions cheap to the inhabitants of the towns, and thereby to encourage manufactures and foreign commerce, he prohibited altogether the exportation of corn, and thus excluded the inhabitants of the country from every foreign market, for by far the most important part of the produce of their industry. This prohibition, joined to the restraints imposed by the ancient provincial laws of France upon the transportation of corn from one province to another, and to the arbitrary and degrading taxes which are levied upon the cultivators in almost all the provinces, discouraged and kept down the agriculture of that country very much below the state to which it would naturally have risen in so very fertile a soil, and so very happy a climate. This state of discouragement and depression was felt more or less in every different part of the country, and many different inquiries were set on foot concerning the causes of it. One of those causes appeared to be the preference given, by the institutions of Mr. Colbert, to the industry of the towns above that of the country.

Mr. Colbert, the well-known minister of Louis XIV, was a man of integrity, hard work, and attention to detail. He had extensive experience and sharp insight in reviewing public accounts, making him well-equipped to bring order and efficiency to the collection and spending of public funds. Unfortunately, this minister adopted all the biases of the mercantile system, which is fundamentally a system of restrictions and regulations. This approach likely appealed to a diligent and methodical businessman like him, who was used to managing various departments within public offices and establishing necessary checks to keep everything in its designated area. He tried to apply the same model he used for public offices to the industry and commerce of a large nation. Instead of letting individuals pursue their interests freely under principles of equality, liberty, and justice, he granted specific industries special privileges while placing others under significant constraints. Unlike other European ministers, he favored urban industry over rural; to support urban growth, he was even willing to suppress rural industry. He aimed to make food cheaper for city residents, thus promoting manufacturing and international trade, by entirely banning the export of grain, blocking rural residents from access to foreign markets for a major portion of their produce. This ban, along with the historical provincial laws in France that restricted grain transport between provinces and the heavy and humiliating taxes imposed on farmers across many regions, significantly hindered agriculture in the country, keeping it far below its potential for such fertile land and a favorable climate. This state of discouragement and hardship was evident throughout the nation, prompting various investigations into its causes. One identified cause was Mr. Colbert's preference for urban industry over rural production.

If the rod be bent too much one way, says the proverb, in order to make it straight, you must bend it as much the other. The French philosophers, who have proposed the system which represents agriculture as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country, seem to have adopted this proverbial maxim; and, as in the plan of Mr. Colbert, the industry of the towns was certainly overvalued in comparison with that of the country, so in their system it seems to be as certainly under-valued.

If a rod is bent too much one way, the saying goes, to straighten it out, you have to bend it just as much the other way. The French philosophers who suggested that agriculture is the only source of revenue and wealth for any country seem to have embraced this saying. Just like in Mr. Colbert's plan, where the industry of the towns was definitely overvalued compared to that of the countryside, in their system, agriculture seems to be just as definitely undervalued.

The different orders of people, who have ever been supposed to contribute in any respect towards the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, they divide into three classes. The first is the class of the proprietors of land. The second is the class of the cultivators, of farmers and country labourers, whom they honour with the peculiar appellation of the productive class. The third is the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, whom they endeavour to degrade by the humiliating appellation of the barren or unproductive class.

The different groups of people who are thought to contribute in any way to the yearly output of the country's land and labor are divided into three classes. The first class is made up of landowners. The second class includes farmers and rural laborers, who are respected as the productive class. The third class consists of craftspeople, manufacturers, and merchants, whom they try to diminish by calling them the barren or unproductive class.

The class of proprietors contributes to the annual produce, by the expense which they may occasionally lay out upon the improvement of the land, upon the buildings, drains, inclosures, and other ameliorations, which they may either make or maintain upon it, and by means of which the cultivators are enabled, with the same capital, to raise a greater produce, and consequently to pay a greater rent. This advanced rent may be considered as the interest or profit due to the proprietor, upon the expense or capital which he thus employs in the improvement of his land. Such expenses are in this system called ground expenses (depenses foncieres).

The class of property owners contributes to the annual output by the money they occasionally spend on improving the land, buildings, drainage, enclosures, and other enhancements they either create or maintain. This allows farmers to produce more with the same amount of capital, which in turn enables them to pay a higher rent. This increased rent can be seen as the interest or profit owed to the property owner for the money or resources they invest in improving their land. In this system, such expenses are referred to as ground expenses (depenses foncieres).

The cultivators or farmers contribute to the annual produce, by what are in this system called the original and annual expenses (depenses primitives, et depenses annuelles), which they lay out upon the cultivation of the land. The original expenses consist in the instruments of husbandry, in the stock of cattle, in[Pg 276] the seed, and in the maintenance of the farmer's family, servants, and cattle, during at least a great part of the first year of his occupancy, or till he can receive some return from the land. The annual expenses consist in the seed, in the wear and tear of instruments of husbandry, and in the annual maintenance of the farmer's servants and cattle, and of his family too, so far as any part of them can be considered as servants employed in cultivation. That part of the produce of the land which remains to him after paying the rent, ought to be sufficient, first, to replace to him, within a reasonable time, at least during the term of his occupancy, the whole of his original expenses, together with the ordinary profits of stock; and, secondly, to replace to him annually the whole of his annual expenses, together likewise with the ordinary profits of stock. Those two sorts of expenses are two capitals which the farmer employs in cultivation; and unless they are regularly restored to him, together with a reasonable profit, he cannot carry on his employment upon a level with other employments; but, from a regard to his own interest, must desert it as soon as possible, and see some other. That part of the produce of the land which is thus necessary for enabling the farmer to continue his business, ought to be considered as a fund sacred to cultivation, which, if the landlord violates, he necessarily reduces the produce of his own land, and, in a few years, not only disables the farmer from paying this racked rent, but from paying the reasonable rent which he might otherwise have got for his land. The rent which properly belongs to the landlord, is no more than the neat produce which remains after paying, in the completest manner, all the necessary expenses which must be previously laid out, in order to raise the gross or the whole produce. It is because the labour of the cultivators, over and above paying completely all those necessary expenses, affords a neat produce of this kind, that this class of people are in this system peculiarly distinguished by the honourable appellation of the productive class. Their original and annual expenses are for the same reason called, in this system, productive expenses, because, over and above replacing their own value, they occasion the annual reproduction of this neat produce.

Farmers contribute to the yearly output through what this system refers to as original and annual expenses (depenses primitives, et depenses annuelles), which they spend on cultivating the land. The original expenses include the tools for farming, the livestock, the seed, and the support of the farmer's family, workers, and animals during at least a significant part of the first year of their occupation, or until they start to see a return from the land. The annual expenses involve the seed, the wear and tear of farming tools, and the yearly upkeep of the farmer's workers and livestock, as well as his family, to the extent that part of them can be regarded as helpers in farming. The portion of the land's produce that remains to the farmer after paying rent should be enough, first, to reimburse him in a reasonable timeframe, at least during his time there, for all his original expenses as well as the usual profits from his investments; and, second, to cover all his annual expenses each year, along with the usual profits from his investments. These two types of expenses represent two capitals that the farmer invests in farming; if they are not consistently returned to him, along with a reasonable profit, he cannot continue his work on par with other jobs; for his own benefit, he will have to leave and seek other opportunities. The part of the land's output that is essential for allowing the farmer to maintain his business should be seen as a fund dedicated to farming. If the landlord undermines this fund, he ultimately diminishes the yield from his own land and, in a few years, not only makes it impossible for the farmer to pay his inflated rent, but also the fair rent he could have received otherwise. The rent rightfully owed to the landlord is merely the net output left after covering all necessary expenses that must be paid in full to generate the gross or total produce. It’s because the labor of farmers, beyond fully covering all those necessary expenses, provides this net output that this group is uniquely recognized in this system as the productive class. Their original and annual expenses are referred to in this system as productive expenses because, in addition to recouping their own value, they lead to the yearly generation of this net output.

The ground expenses, as they are called, or what the landlord lays out upon the improvement of his land, are, in this system, too, honoured with the appellation of productive expenses. Till the whole of those expenses, together with the ordinary profits of stock, have been completely repaid to him by the advanced rent which he gets from his land, that advanced rent ought to be regarded as sacred and inviolable, both by the church and by the king; ought to be subject neither to tithe nor to taxation. If it is otherwise, by discouraging the improvement of land, the church discourages the future increase of her own tithes, and the king the future increase of his own taxes. As in a well ordered state of things, therefore, those ground expenses, over and above reproducing in the completest manner their own value, occasion likewise, after a certain time, a reproduction of neat produce, they are in this system considered as productive expenses.

The ground expenses, as they're called, or the money the landlord spends on improving the land, are also referred to in this system as productive expenses. Until all those expenses, along with the regular profits from investments, have been fully repaid to him through the advanced rent he receives from his land, that advanced rent should be seen as protected and untouchable, both by the church and by the king; it shouldn't be subject to tithes or taxes. If this isn't the case, by discouraging land improvement, the church hinders the future growth of its own tithes, and the king hampers the future increase of his own taxes. Therefore, in a well-ordered system, those ground expenses, besides completely recovering their own value, also eventually lead to an increase in net produce, so they're considered productive expenses in this context.

The ground expenses of the landlord, however, together with the original and the annual expenses of the farmer, are the only three sorts of expenses which in this system are considered as productive. All other expenses, and all other orders of people, even those who, in the common apprehensions of men, are regarded as the most productive, are, in this account of things, represented as altogether barren and unproductive.

The landlord's basic expenses, along with the initial and yearly costs of the farmer, are the only three types of expenses seen as productive in this system. All other expenses and all other groups of people, even those typically viewed as the most productive, are considered completely unproductive in this context.

Artificers and manufacturers, in particular, whose industry, in the common apprehensions of men, increases so much the value of the rude produce of land, are in this system represented as a class of people altogether barren and unproductive. Their labour, it is said, replaces only the stock which employs them, together with its ordinary profits. That stock consists in the materials, tools, and wages, advanced to them by their employer; and is the fund destined for their employment and maintenance. Its profits are the fund destined for the maintenance of their employer. Their employer, as he advances to them the stock of materials, tools, and wages, necessary for their employment, so he advances to himself what is necessary for his own maintenance; and this maintenance he generally proportions to the profit which he expects to make by the price of their work. Unless its price repays to him the maintenance which he advances to himself, as well as the materials, tools, and wages, which he advances to his workmen, it evidently does not repay to him the whole expense which he lays out upon it. The profits of manufacturing stock, therefore, are not, like the rent of land, a neat produce which remains after completely repaying the whole expense which must be laid out in order to obtain them. The stock of the farmer yields him a profit, as well as that of the master manufacturer; and it yields a rent likewise to another person, which that of the master manufacturer does not. The expense, therefore, laid out in employing and maintaining artificers and manufacturers, does no more than continue, if one may say so, the existence of its own value, and does not produce any new value. It is, therefore, altogether a barren and unproductive expense. The expense, on the contrary, laid out in employing farmers and country labourers, over and above continuing the existence of its own value, produces a new value[Pg 277] the rent of the landlord. It is, therefore, a productive expense.

Artisans and manufacturers, in particular, whose work is often seen as increasing the value of raw land products, are viewed in this framework as a group that is completely unproductive. It is claimed that their labor merely replaces the capital that employs them, along with its usual profits. This capital consists of the materials, tools, and wages provided to them by their employer, and it serves as the fund for their work and living expenses. The profits from this capital are meant to support their employer. As the employer provides them with the necessary materials, tools, and wages for their work, they also advance what they need for their own living. Typically, this living expense is in line with the profit they anticipate from the price of the work performed. If the price does not cover their living expenses, along with the materials, tools, and wages they pay their workers, it clearly does not reimburse them for the total costs incurred. Therefore, the profits from manufacturing capital are not like land rent, which is a surplus that remains after fully covering all expenses needed to generate it. The farmer’s capital provides profit, just as the master manufacturer’s does; however, the latter does not generate rent for someone else. Thus, the money spent on employing and maintaining artisans and manufacturers does little more than sustain its own value and does not create any new value. As a result, it is completely unproductive expenditure. In contrast, the money spent on employing farmers and agricultural workers not only maintains its own value but also generates new value, which becomes the landlord's rent. Therefore, it is regarded as productive expenditure.

Mercantile stock is equally barren and unproductive with manufacturing stock. It only continues the existence of its own value, without producing any new value. Its profits are only the repayment of the maintenance which its employer advances to himself during the time that he employs it, or till he receives the returns of it. They are only the repayment of a part of the expense which must be laid out in employing it.

Mercantile stock is just as empty and unproductive as manufacturing stock. It merely maintains its own value without creating any new value. Its profits are just a return on the investment that the employer makes in it while it's in use, or until they get the results from it. They are only a refund of a portion of the costs involved in utilizing it.

The labour of artificers and manufacturers never adds any thing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land. It adds, indeed, greatly to the value of some particular parts of it. But the consumption which, in the mean time, it occasions of other parts, is precisely equal to the value which it adds to those parts; so that the value of the whole amount is not, at any one moment of time, in the least augmented by it. The person who works the lace of a pair of fine ruffles for example, will sometimes raise the value of, perhaps, a pennyworth of flax to L.30 sterling. But though, at first sight, he appears thereby to multiply the value of a part of the rude produce about seven thousand and two hundred times, he in reality adds nothing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce. The working of that lace costs him, perhaps, two years labour. The L.30 which he gets for it when it is finished, is no more than the repayment of the subsistence which he advances to himself during the two years that he is employed about it. The value which, by every day's, month's, or year's labour, he adds to the flax, does no more than replace the value of his own consumption during that day, month, or year. At no moment of time, therefore, does he add any thing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land: the portion of that produce which he is continually consuming, being always equal to the value which he is continually producing. The extreme poverty of the greater part of the persons employed in this expensive, though trifling manufacture, may satisfy us that the price of their work does not, in ordinary cases, exceed the value of their subsistence. It is otherwise with the work of farmers and country labourers. The rent of the landlord is a value which, in ordinary cases, it is continually producing over and above replacing, in the most complete manner, the whole consumption, the whole expense laid out upon the employment and maintenance both of the workmen and of their employer.

The work of artisans and manufacturers doesn’t really increase the value of the total annual output of raw materials from the land. It definitely increases the value of certain specific parts of it. However, the consumption it causes of other parts is exactly equal to the value it adds to those parts, meaning that at any given moment, the total value isn’t increased at all by this work. For instance, the person who makes lace for a pair of fine cuffs may sometimes increase the value of perhaps a penny's worth of flax to £30. But while it seems like he’s multiplying the value of a part of the raw produce by around seven thousand two hundred times, he is actually not adding anything to the overall annual value of the raw produce. Making that lace might take him two years of labor. The £30 he receives for it when it’s done is simply a repayment for the living expenses he covers for himself during those two years of work. The value he adds to the flax through each day, month, or year of labor just replaces what he consumes during that time. Therefore, at no point does he add anything to the total annual value of the raw produce from the land; the amount of produce he consumes matches the value he continues to produce. The extreme poverty of most people employed in this costly, yet trivial, industry shows us that the price of their work typically doesn't exceed the value of what they need to live on. This is different for the work of farmers and rural laborers. The landlord's rent is a value that, in normal circumstances, is continually produced beyond just covering the complete costs of consumption and all expenses related to both the workers and their employer.

Artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, can augment the revenue and wealth of their society by parsimony only; or, as it is expressed in this system, by privation, that is, by depriving themselves of a part of the funds destined for their own subsistence. They annually reproduce nothing but those funds. Unless, therefore, they annually save some part of them, unless they annually deprive themselves of the enjoyment of some part of them, the revenue and wealth of their society can never be, in the smallest degree, augmented by means of their industry. Farmers and country labourers, on the contrary, may enjoy completely the whole funds destined for their own subsistence, and yet augment, at the same time, the revenue and wealth of their society. Over and above what is destined for their own subsistence, their industry annually affords a neat produce, of which the augmentation necessarily augments the revenue and wealth of their society. Nations, therefore, which like France or England, consist in a great measure, of proprietors and cultivators, can be enriched by industry and enjoyment. Nations, on the contrary which, like Holland and Hamburgh, are composed chiefly of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, can grow rich only through parsimony and privation. As the interest of nations so differently circumstanced is very different, so is likewise the common character of the people. In those of the former kind, liberality, frankness, and good fellowship, naturally make a part of their common character; in the latter, narrowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition, averse to all social pleasure and enjoyment.

Artisans, manufacturers, and traders can increase their society's income and wealth only through frugality; or, as it's described in this system, through deprivation, meaning that they need to forgo a portion of the funds meant for their own living. Every year, they only reproduce those funds. Therefore, unless they save some of it annually, unless they give up some of their enjoyment each year, the income and wealth of their society can never grow, even a little, through their work. On the other hand, farmers and rural laborers can fully enjoy all the funds allocated for their own living while still increasing the income and wealth of their society. Besides what is needed for their own subsistence, their work each year produces a surplus, which naturally contributes to the society's wealth and income. Thus, nations like France or England, which largely consist of landowners and farmers, can become wealthier through both productivity and enjoyment. In contrast, nations like Holland and Hamburg, which are primarily made up of traders, artisans, and manufacturers, can only grow rich through frugality and deprivation. Just as the interests of these differently situated nations vary significantly, so does the general character of their people. In the former nations, generosity, openness, and good-naturedness are part of their common character; in the latter, traits like stinginess, pettiness, and a selfish attitude, which avoid all social pleasures and enjoyment, prevail.

The unproductive class, that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, is maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the two other classes, of that of proprietors, and of that of cultivators. They furnish it both with the materials of its work, and with the fund of its subsistence, with the corn and cattle which it consumes while it is employed about that work. The proprietors and cultivators finally pay both the wages of all the workmen of the unproductive class, and the profits of all their employers. Those workmen and their employers are properly the servants of the proprietors and cultivators. They are only servants who work without doors, as menial servants work within. Both the one and the other, however, are equally maintained at the expense of the same masters. The labour of both is equally unproductive. It adds nothing to the value of the sum total of the rude produce of the land. Instead of increasing the value of that sum total, it is a charge and expense which must be paid out of it.

The unproductive class, made up of merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers, is supported and employed entirely at the expense of the other two classes: the property owners and the farmers. They provide both the materials needed for their work and the food and livestock they consume while working. In the end, the property owners and farmers pay the wages of all the workers in the unproductive class, as well as the profits of all their employers. Those workers and their employers are essentially servants of the property owners and farmers. They are just servants who work outside, like domestic servants work inside. However, both types of servants are equally supported by the same masters. The labor of both is equally unproductive. It doesn't add any value to the total raw output of the land. Instead of increasing that total value, it becomes a cost and an expense that must be covered from it.

The unproductive class, however, is not only useful, but greatly useful, to the other two classes. By means of the industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, the proprietors and cultivators can purchase both the foreign goods and the manufactured produce of their own country, which they have occasion for, with the produce of a much[Pg 278] smaller quantity of their own labour, than what they would be obliged to employ, if they were to attempt, in an awkward and unskilful manner, either to import the one, or to make the other, for their own use. By means of the unproductive class, the cultivators are delivered from many cares, which would otherwise distract their attention from the cultivation of land. The superiority of produce, which in consequence of this undivided attention, they are enabled to raise, is fully sufficient to pay the whole expense which the maintenance and employment of the unproductive class costs either the proprietors or themselves. The industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, though in its own nature altogether unproductive, yet contributes in this manner indirectly to increase the produce of the land. It increases the productive powers of productive labour, by leaving it at liberty to confine itself to its proper employment, the cultivation of land; and the plough goes frequently the easier and the better, by means of the labour of the man whose business is most remote from the plough.

The unproductive class is not just useful, but extremely helpful, to the other two classes. Thanks to the work of merchants, artisans, and manufacturers, landowners and farmers can buy both foreign goods and the manufactured products from their own country that they need, using much less of their own labor than they would if they tried to awkwardly import or produce everything themselves. The unproductive class frees farmers from many worries that would otherwise take their focus away from farming. The increased output resulting from this uninterrupted attention is more than enough to cover all the costs of maintaining and utilizing the unproductive class for both the landowners and the farmers. Even though the work of merchants, artisans, and manufacturers is inherently unproductive, it indirectly boosts land productivity. It enhances the effectiveness of productive labor by allowing it to focus solely on its main task—cultivating the land. The plow often operates more smoothly and efficiently because of the labor contributed by those whose work is far removed from farming.

It can never be the interest of the proprietors and cultivators, to restrain or to discourage, in any respect, the industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers. The greater the liberty which this unproductive class enjoys, the greater will be the competition in all the different trades which compose it, and the cheaper will the other two classes be supplied, both with foreign goods and with the manufactured produce of their own country.

It’s never in the best interest of the owners and farmers to limit or discourage, in any way, the work of merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers. The more freedom this unproductive group has, the more competition there will be in all the different trades within it, which will result in lower prices for the other two classes, both for foreign goods and for the products made in their own country.

It can never be the interest of the unproductive class to oppress the other two classes. It is the surplus produce of the land, or what remains after deducting the maintenance, first of the cultivators, and afterwards of the proprietors, that maintains and employs the unproductive class. The greater this surplus, the greater must likewise be the maintenance and employment of that class. The establishment of perfect justice, of perfect liberty, and of perfect equality, is the very simple secret which most effectually secures the highest degree of prosperity to all the three classes.

It can never benefit the unproductive class to oppress the other two classes. It’s the extra yield from the land, or what’s left after covering the needs of the farmers and then the property owners, that supports and employs the unproductive class. The bigger this surplus, the more support and employment there must be for that class. Establishing complete justice, absolute freedom, and true equality is the straightforward key that effectively ensures the highest level of prosperity for all three classes.

The merchants, artificers, and manufacturers of those mercantile states, which, like Holland and Hamburgh, consist chiefly of this unproductive class, are in the same manner maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the proprietors and cultivators of land. The only difference is, that those proprietors and cultivators are, the greater part of them, placed at a most inconvenient distance from the merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, whom they supply with the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence; are the inhabitants of other countries, and the subjects of other governments.

The merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers of those trading states, like Holland and Hamburg, primarily consist of this unproductive class, and are supported and employed entirely at the expense of the landowners and farmers. The only difference is that most of these landowners and farmers are located a significant distance away from the merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers, whom they provide with the materials for their work and the means for their livelihood; they are from other countries and under different governments.

Such mercantile states, however, are not only useful, but greatly useful, to the inhabitants of these other countries. They fill up, in some measure, a very important void; and supply the place of the merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, whom the inhabitants of those countries ought to find at home, but whom, from some defect in their policy, they do not find at home.

Such trading states are not only helpful but extremely beneficial to the people of these other countries. They partially fill a significant gap and take the place of the merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers that the people in those countries should have locally, but due to some shortcomings in their policies, they do not have.

It can never be the interest of those landed nations, if I may call them so, to discourage or distress the industry of such mercantile states, by imposing high duties upon their trade, or upon the commodities which they furnish. Such duties, by rendering those commodities dearer, could serve only to sink the real value of the surplus produce of their own land, with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which those commodities are purchased. Such duties could only serve to discourage the increase of that surplus produce, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land. The most effectual expedient, on the contrary, for raising the value of that surplus produce, for encouraging its increase, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land, would be to allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all such mercantile nations.

It can never be in the best interest of those land-rich countries, if I can call them that, to dissuade or harm the economy of trading nations by imposing high tariffs on their commerce or on the goods they provide. Such tariffs, by making those goods more expensive, would only diminish the actual value of the excess produce from their own land, which is used to buy those goods. These tariffs would only discourage the growth of that excess produce, and therefore, the enhancement and cultivation of their own land. The most effective way to increase the value of that excess produce, promote its growth, and consequently improve and cultivate their own land, would be to allow total freedom in trade with all those trading nations.

This perfect freedom of trade would even be the most effectual expedient for supplying them, in due time, with all the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, whom they wanted at home; and for filling up, in the properest and most advantageous manner, that very important void which they felt there.

This complete freedom of trade would be the best way to provide them, in time, with all the craftsmen, producers, and sellers they needed at home; and to effectively and beneficially fill that significant gap they experienced there.

The continual increase of the surplus produce of their land would, in due time, create a greater capital than what would be employed with the ordinary rate of profit in the improvement and cultivation of land; and the surplus part of it would naturally turn itself to the employment of artificers and manufacturers, at home. But these artificers and manufacturers, finding at home both the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence, might immediately, even with much less art and skill be able to work as cheap as the little artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, who had both to bring from a greater distance. Even though, from want of art and skill, they might not for some time be able to work as cheap, yet, finding a market at home, they might be able to sell their work there as cheap as that of the artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, which could not be brought to that market but from so great a distance; and as their art and skill improved, they would soon be able to sell it cheaper. The artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, therefore, would immediately be rivalled in the market of those landed nations, and soon after undersold and justled out of it[Pg 279] altogether. The cheapness of the manufactures of those landed nations, in consequence of the gradual improvements of art and skill, would, in due time, extend their sale beyond the home market, and carry them to many foreign markets, from which they would, in the same manner, gradually justle out many of the manufacturers of such mercantile nations.

The ongoing increase in the surplus production of their land would eventually create a larger capital than what would typically be used with the ordinary profit rate to improve and cultivate land. The surplus would naturally go towards hiring artisans and manufacturers at home. However, these artisans and manufacturers, having both the materials for their work and the means to support themselves at home, could immediately work as cheaply as the small artisans and manufacturers from commercial states, who had to source their materials from much farther away. Even if they initially lacked the art and skill to be as cheap, finding a local market would allow them to sell their products at prices comparable to those of the artisans and manufacturers from far-off commercial states, which faced higher transportation costs. As their skills improved, they would soon be able to sell their products even cheaper. Therefore, the artisans and manufacturers from these commercial states would soon face competition in the markets of those agricultural nations and eventually would be undersold and pushed out altogether. The affordability of the goods from these agricultural nations, due to the gradual enhancement of art and skill, would eventually allow them to expand their sales beyond the local market and reach many foreign markets, thereby gradually pushing out many manufacturers from those commercial nations.

This continual increase, both of the rude and manufactured produce of those landed nations, would, in due time, create a greater capital than could, with the ordinary rate of profit, be employed either in agriculture or in manufactures. The surplus of this capital would naturally turn itself to foreign trade, and be employed in exporting, to foreign countries, such parts of the rude and manufactured produce of its own country, as exceeded the demand of the home market. In the exportation of the produce of their own country, the merchants of a landed nation would have an advantage of the same kind over those of mercantile nations, which its artificers and manufacturers had over the artificers and manufacturers of such nations; the advantage of finding at home that cargo, and those stores and provisions, which the others were obliged to seek for at a distance. With inferior art and skill in navigation, therefore, they would be able to sell that cargo as cheap in foreign markets as the merchants of such mercantile nations; and with equal art and skill they would be able to sell it cheaper. They would soon, therefore, rival those mercantile nations in this branch of foreign trade, and, in due time, would justle them out of it altogether.

This ongoing increase, both in raw materials and manufactured goods from those agricultural nations, would eventually create a larger capital than could be used in agriculture or manufacturing with the usual profit margins. The excess capital would naturally shift towards foreign trade, being used to export to other countries those parts of its raw and manufactured goods that exceeded the needs of the local market. When exporting their own goods, the merchants of an agricultural nation would have a similar advantage over those from trading nations as its craftsmen and manufacturers did over the craftsmen and manufacturers of those nations; they would have the advantage of sourcing that cargo, along with supplies and provisions, domestically, while others had to search for them far away. Thus, even with lesser skill in navigation, they could sell their goods at the same price in foreign markets as the merchants from those trading nations; and with equal skill, they could sell them for less. Consequently, they would quickly compete with those trading nations in this area of foreign trade and, eventually, push them out entirely.

According to this liberal and generous system, therefore, the most advantageous method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own, is to grant the most perfect freedom of trade to the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of all other nations. It thereby raises the value of the surplus produce of its own land, of which the continual increase gradually establishes a fund, which, in due time, necessarily raises up all the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, whom it has occasion for.

According to this open and generous system, the best way for a nation with land to develop its own skilled workers, manufacturers, and merchants is to allow complete freedom of trade for the skilled workers, manufacturers, and merchants of all other countries. This approach increases the value of the extra produce from its own land, and the ongoing growth of this surplus eventually creates a fund that will, in time, naturally support all the skilled workers, manufacturers, and merchants it needs.

When a landed nation on the contrary, oppresses, either by high duties or by prohibitions, the trade of foreign nations, it necessarily hurts its own interest in two different ways. First, by raising the price of all foreign goods, and of all sorts of manufactures, it necessarily sinks the real value of the surplus produce of its own land, with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which, it purchases those foreign goods and manufactures. Secondly, by giving a sort of monopoly of the home market to its own merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, it raises the rate of mercantile and manufacturing profit, in proportion to that of agricultural profit; and, consequently, either draws from agriculture a part of the capital which had before been employed in it, or hinders from going to it a part of what would otherwise have gone to it. This policy, therefore, discourages agriculture in two different ways; first, by sinking the real value of its produce, and thereby lowering the rate of its profits; and, secondly, by raising the rate of profit in all other employments. Agriculture is rendered less advantageous, and trade and manufactures more advantageous, than they otherwise would be; and every man is tempted by his own interest to turn, as much as he can, both his capital and his industry from the former to the latter employments.

When a country oppresses foreign trade through high tariffs or bans, it ultimately harms its own interests in two ways. First, by increasing the price of all foreign goods and various manufactured items, it reduces the real value of the surplus produced by its own land, which it uses to buy those foreign goods and products. Second, by giving a sort of monopoly to its own merchants, artisans, and manufacturers, it drives up the profit margins in trade and manufacturing compared to agriculture. This either pulls capital away from agriculture or prevents potential investment from going to it. Therefore, this policy discourages agriculture in two ways: first, by lowering the real value of its produce and thus reducing profit rates; and second, by raising profit rates in other industries. Agriculture becomes less profitable, while trade and manufacturing become more lucrative than they would otherwise be, leading individuals to be motivated by self-interest to shift their capital and labor from agriculture to these other sectors.

Though, by this oppressive policy, a landed nation should be able to raise up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own, somewhat sooner than it could do by the freedom of trade; a matter, however, which is not a little doubtful; yet it would raise them up, if one may say so, prematurely, and before it was perfectly ripe for them. By raising up too hastily one species of industry, it would depress another more valuable species of industry. By raising up too hastily a species of industry which only replaces the stock which employs it, together with the ordinary profit, it would depress a species of industry which, over and above replacing that stock, with its profit, affords likewise a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. It would depress productive labour, by encouraging too hastily that labour which is altogether barren and unproductive.

Although this oppressive policy could allow a land-rich nation to develop its own skilled workers, manufacturers, and merchants faster than through free trade—a matter that is somewhat uncertain—it would create these industries prematurely, before the time was truly right for them. By rushing to establish one type of industry, it would negatively impact another, more valuable type. If it quickly promotes an industry that merely replaces the resources it consumes along with the usual profits, it would harm an industry that not only replaces those resources and profits but also generates additional output, providing a real income for the landlord. This would undermine productive labor by hastily encouraging labor that is entirely unproductive and fruitless.

In what manner, according to this system, the sum total of the annual produce of the land is distributed among the three classes above mentioned, and in what manner the labour of the unproductive class does no more than replace the value of its own consumption, without increasing in any respect the value of that sum total, is represented by Mr Quesnai, the very ingenious and profound author of this system, in some arithmetical formularies. The first of these formularies, which, by way of eminence, he peculiarly distinguishes by the name of the Economical Table, represents the manner in which he supposes this distribution takes place, in a state of the most perfect liberty, and, therefore, of the highest prosperity; in a state where the annual produce is such as to afford the greatest possible neat produce, and where each class enjoys its proper share of the whole annual produce. Some subsequent formularies represent the manner in which he supposes this distribution is made in different states of restraint and regulation; in which, either the class of proprietors, or the barren and unproductive class, is more favoured than the class of cultivators; and in which either the one or the other encroaches, more or less, upon the[Pg 280] share which ought properly to belong to this productive class. Every such encroachment, every violation of that natural distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, must, according to this system, necessarily degrade, more or less, from one year to another, the value and sum total of the annual produce, and must necessarily occasion a gradual declension in the real wealth and revenue of the society; a declension, of which the progress must be quicker or slower, according to the degree of this encroachment, according as that natural distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, is more or less violated. Those subsequent formularies represent the different degrees of declension which, according to this system, correspond to the different degrees in which this natural distribution of things is violated.

In this system, the overall annual yield of the land is divided among the three classes mentioned earlier, and the way the labor of the unproductive class merely covers its own consumption without adding to the total value is illustrated by Mr. Quesnai, a clever and insightful originator of this system, through some mathematical formulas. The first of these formulas, which he notably calls the Economical Table, shows how he believes this distribution occurs in a state of complete freedom, and thus, of highest prosperity; a situation in which the annual yield provides the maximum possible net produce, and where each class receives its fair share of the total annual yield. Some later formulas depict how he thinks this distribution happens under various conditions of restriction and regulation, where either the landowners or the unproductive class benefit more than the cultivators, leading one or the other to encroach upon the share that rightfully belongs to the productive class. Each encroachment, each breach of that natural distribution that perfect liberty would ensure, must, according to this system, inevitably lower the value and total of the annual yield from year to year and result in a gradual decline in the actual wealth and income of society; a decline that will speed up or slow down based on the extent of this encroachment, depending on how much the natural distribution, achievable through perfect liberty, is violated. Those later formulas illustrate the various levels of decline that, according to this system, correspond to how much this natural distribution is disrupted.

Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the human body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet and exercise, of which every, the smallest violation, necessarily occasioned some degree of disease or disorder proportionate to the degree of the violation. Experience, however, would seem to shew, that the human body frequently preserves, to all appearance at least, the most perfect state of health under a vast variety of different regimens; even under some which are generally believed to be very far from being perfectly wholesome. But the healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself some unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or of correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen. Mr Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered, that in the political body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to better his own condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy, in some degree both partial and oppressive. Such a political economy, though it no doubt retards more or less, is not always capable of stopping altogether, the natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, and still less of making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered. In the political body, however, the wisdom of nature has fortunately made ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; in the same manner as it has done in the natural body, for remedying those of his sloth and intemperance.

Some speculative doctors seem to have thought that the health of the human body could only be maintained by a very specific regimen of diet and exercise, where even the smallest violation would lead to a corresponding degree of illness or disorder. However, experience shows that the human body often maintains, at least on the surface, a perfect state of health under a wide variety of different regimens, including some that are widely believed to be far from wholesome. It seems that the healthy state of the human body contains some unknown principle of preservation, capable of preventing or correcting many of the negative effects of a faulty regimen. Mr. Quesnai, who was himself a physician and quite the speculative one, appears to have had a similar idea about the political body, thinking that it could only thrive and prosper under a precise regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have taken into account that in the political body, every person’s natural effort to improve their own situation is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correcting many of the adverse effects of a political economy that is somewhat partial and oppressive. Such a political economy, while it may slow down progress, often cannot completely stop a nation's natural advancement toward wealth and prosperity, nor can it make it regress. If a nation could not prosper without perfect liberty and perfect justice, then there would be no nation in the world that ever prospered. Fortunately, in the political body, nature's wisdom has made ample provisions to remedy many of the harmful effects of human folly and injustice, just as it has in the natural body to address issues of laziness and excess.

The capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its representing the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, as altogether barren and unproductive. The following observations may serve to shew the impropriety of this representation:—

The main mistake of this system, however, seems to be in portraying the group of craftsmen, manufacturers, and merchants as entirely unproductive and worthless. The following observations may help illustrate the inaccuracy of this portrayal:—

First, this class, it is acknowledged, reproduces annually the value of its own annual consumption, and continues, at least, the existence of the stock or capital which maintains and employs it. But, upon this account alone, the denomination of barren or unproductive should seem to be very improperly applied to it. We should not call a marriage barren or unproductive, though it produced only a son and a daughter, to replace the father and mother, and though it did not increase the number of the human species, but only continued it as it was before. Farmers and country labourers, indeed, over and above the stock which maintains and employs them, reproduce annually a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. As a marriage which affords three children is certainly more productive than one which affords only two, so the labour of farmers and country labourers is certainly more productive than that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers. The superior produce of the one class, however, does not, render the other barren or unproductive.

First, this class, it is acknowledged, reproduces every year the value of its own annual consumption, and at least maintains the existence of the stock or capital that sustains and employs it. Because of this alone, it seems very inappropriate to label it as barren or unproductive. We wouldn’t call a marriage barren or unproductive, even if it only produced a son and a daughter to replace the father and mother, and didn’t increase the population, but merely maintained it as it was before. Farmers and rural laborers, in addition to the stock that supports and employs them, generate a clear profit each year, providing rent for the landlord. Just as a marriage that has three children is certainly more productive than one that has only two, the work of farmers and rural laborers is certainly more productive than that of merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers. However, the greater output of one class doesn’t make the other barren or unproductive.

Secondly, it seems, on this account, altogether improper to consider artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, in the same light as menial servants. The labour of menial servants does not continue the existence of the fund which maintains and employs them. Their maintenance and employment is altogether at the expense of their masters, and the work which they perform is not of a nature to repay that expense. That work consists in services which perish generally in the very instant of their performance, and does not fix or realize itself in any vendible commodity, which can replace the value of their wages and maintenance. The labour, on the contrary, of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, naturally does fix and realize itself in some such vendible commodity. It is upon this account that, in the chapter in which I treat of productive and unproductive labour, I have classed artificers, manufacturers, and merchants among the productive labourers, and menial servants among the barren or unproductive.

Secondly, it seems completely inappropriate to consider artisans, manufacturers, and merchants in the same category as domestic servants. The work of domestic servants doesn't contribute to the fund that supports and employs them. Their support and employment are entirely at the expense of their employers, and the work they do doesn't generate a return on that expense. Their work consists of services that usually vanish the moment they are performed and doesn't produce any sellable goods that could replace the value of their wages and upkeep. In contrast, the work of artisans, manufacturers, and merchants typically results in some sellable product. That's why, in the chapter where I discuss productive and unproductive labor, I've categorized artisans, manufacturers, and merchants as productive laborers, while domestic servants are classified as unproductive.

Thirdly, it seems, upon every supposition, improper to say, that the labour of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, does not increase the real revenue of the society. Though we should suppose, for example, as it seems to be supposed in this system, that the value of the daily, monthly, and yearly consumption[Pg 281] of this class was exactly equal to that of its daily, monthly, and yearly production; yet it would not from thence follow, that its labour added nothing to the real revenue, to the real value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. An artificer, for example, who, in the first six months after harvest, executes ten pounds worth of work, though he should, in the same time, consume ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, yet really adds the value of ten pounds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. While he has been consuming a half-yearly revenue of ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, he has produced an equal value of work, capable of purchasing, either to himself, or to some other person, an equal half-yearly revenue. The value, therefore, of what has been consumed and produced during these six months, is equal, not to ten, but to twenty pounds. It is possible, indeed, that no more than ten pounds worth of this value may ever have existed at any one moment of time. But if the ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries which were consumed by the artificer, had been consumed by a soldier, or by a menial servant, the value of that part of the annual produce which existed at the end of the six months, would have been ten pounds less than it actually is in consequence of the labour of the artificer. Though the value of what the artificer produces, therefore, should not, at any one moment of time, be supposed greater than the value he consumes, yet, at every moment of time, the actually existing value of goods in the market is, in consequence of what he produces, greater than it otherwise would be.

Thirdly, it seems, under any assumption, it's incorrect to say that the work of craftsmen, manufacturers, and merchants doesn’t contribute to the real income of society. Even if we assume, for example, as this system seems to suggest, that the value of this class's daily, monthly, and yearly consumption[Pg 281] is exactly equal to the value of its daily, monthly, and yearly production, it wouldn’t follow that their work adds nothing to the real revenue or the actual value of the annual output from the land and labor of society. For instance, a craftsman who, in the first six months after harvest, produces ten pounds' worth of work, even if he consumes ten pounds' worth of grain and other essentials in that time, still truly contributes ten pounds to the annual output from the land and labor of society. While he consumes a half-year's worth of ten pounds in grain and other essentials, he has created an equal value of work, which can purchase, either for himself or someone else, an equal half-year's worth of revenue. Therefore, the value of what has been consumed and produced during these six months is equal not to ten, but to twenty pounds. It's true that no more than ten pounds' worth of this value might have existed at any single moment. However, if the ten pounds' worth of grain and other essentials consumed by the craftsman had been consumed by a soldier or a domestic servant, the value of that part of the annual total at the end of the six months would be ten pounds less than what it actually is due to the craftsman's labor. So, while the value of what the craftsman produces might not be seen as greater than the value he consumes at any one moment, the actual value of goods in the market is, at every moment, greater as a result of what he produces than it would be otherwise.

When the patrons of this system assert, that the consumption of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, is equal to the value of what they produce, they probably mean no more than that their revenue, or the fund destined for their consumption, is equal to it. But if they had expressed themselves more accurately, and only asserted, that the revenue of this class was equal to the value of what they produced, it might readily have occurred to the reader, that what would naturally be saved out of this revenue, must necessarily increase more or less the real wealth of the society. In order, therefore, to make out something like an argument, it was necessary that they should express themselves as they have done; and this argument, even supposing things actually were as it seems to presume them to be, turns out to be a very inconclusive one.

When the supporters of this system claim that the spending of workers, manufacturers, and merchants equals the value of what they produce, they likely mean that their income, or the funds they have for spending, is equal to that value. However, if they had stated more precisely that the income of this group is equal to the value of what they produce, it may have occurred to the reader that whatever is saved from this income would naturally increase the overall wealth of society. Therefore, to create a more convincing argument, they needed to phrase it as they did; even if we assume things are as they suggest, their argument remains quite weak.

Fourthly, farmers and country labourers can no more augment, without parsimony, the real revenue, the annual produce of the land and labour of their society, than artificers, manufacturers, and merchants. The annual produce of the land and labour of any society can be augmented only in two ways; either, first, by some improvement in the productive powers of the useful labour actually maintained within it; or, secondly, by some increase in the quantity of that labour.

Fourth, farmers and rural workers can no longer increase, without being frugal, the actual income, the yearly output of the land and labor of their community, just like artisans, manufacturers, and merchants. The yearly output of the land and labor of any community can only be increased in two ways: first, by improving the productivity of the useful labor currently available; or second, by increasing the amount of that labor.

The improvement in the productive powers of useful labour depends, first, upon the improvement in the ability of the workman; and, secondly, upon that of the machinery with which he works. But the labour of artificers and manufacturers, as it is capable of being more subdivided, and the labour of each workman reduced to a greater simplicity of operation, than that of farmers and country labourers; so it is likewise capable of both these sorts of improvement in a much higher degree.[43] In this respect, therefore, the class of cultivators can have no sort of advantage over that of artificers and manufacturers.

The enhancement in the productivity of useful labor relies, first, on the worker's improved skills; and, second, on the advancement of the machinery they use. However, the labor of artisans and manufacturers can be broken down into smaller tasks, allowing each worker’s job to be simplified more than that of farmers and agricultural laborers. This means that their work can also benefit from both types of improvements to a much greater extent. In this regard, the farming class has no advantage over artisans and manufacturers.[43]

The increase in the quantity of useful labour actually employed within any society must depend altogether upon the increase of the capital which employs it; and the increase of that capital, again, must be exactly equal to the amount of the savings from the revenue, either of the particular persons who manage and direct the employment of that capital, or of some other persons, who lend it to them. If merchants, artificers, and manufacturers are, as this system seems to suppose, naturally more inclined to parsimony and saving than proprietors and cultivators, they are, so far, more likely to augment the quantity of useful labour employed within their society, and consequently to increase its real revenue, the annual produce of its land and labour.

The growth in the amount of productive work happening in any society relies entirely on the growth of the capital that funds it. This increase in capital must match the savings generated from the income of either the individuals who manage and oversee this capital or from others who lend it to them. If merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers are, as this system suggests, naturally more inclined to be frugal and save than landowners and farmers, then they are more likely to increase the amount of productive work in their society, thereby boosting its actual revenue, which is the annual output of its land and labor.

Fifthly and lastly, though the revenue of the inhabitants of every country was supposed to consist altogether, as this system seems to suppose, in the quantity of subsistence which their industry could procure to them; yet, even upon this supposition, the revenue of a trading and manufacturing country must, other things being equal, always be much greater than that of one without trade or manufactures. By means of trade and manufactures, a greater quantity of subsistence can be annually imported into a particular country, than what its own lands, in the actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of a town, though they frequently possess no lands of their own, yet draw to themselves, by their industry, such a quantity of the rude produce of the lands of other people, as supplies them, not only with the materials of their work, but with the fund of their subsistence. What a town always is with regard to the country in its neighbourhood, one independent state or country may frequently be with regard to other independent states or countries. It is thus that Holland draws a great part of its subsistence from other countries; live cattle from Hol[Pg 282]stein and Jutland, and corn from almost all the different countries of Europe. A small quantity of manufactured produce, purchases a great quantity of rude produce. A trading and manufacturing country, therefore, naturally purchases, with a small part of its manufactured produce, a great part of the rude produce of other countries; while, on the contrary, a country without trade and manufactures is generally obliged to purchase, at the expense of a great part of its rude produce, a very small part of the manufactured produce of other countries. The one exports what can subsist and accommodate but a very few, and imports the subsistence and accommodation of a great number. The other exports the accommodation and subsistence of a great number, and imports that of a very few only. The inhabitants of the one must always enjoy a much greater quantity of subsistence than what their own lands, in the actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of the other most always enjoy a much smaller quantity.

Fifthly and lastly, while the income of the people in every country was thought to be entirely based on the amount of food and resources their hard work could provide, even with that assumption, the income of a trading and manufacturing country will, all else being equal, always be significantly higher than that of a country without trade or manufacturing. Because of trade and manufacturing, a trading nation can import a larger amount of food and resources each year than its own land, given its current level of farming, could supply. People in a town, even if they don’t own any land, can rely on their hard work to acquire a sufficient amount of raw materials from the lands of others, enabling them to get both the materials for their work and the means to support themselves. Just as a town interacts with the surrounding countryside, an independent state can often interact similarly with other independent states. This is how Holland gets much of its food from other countries, importing livestock from Hol[Pg 282]stein and Jutland, and grain from various European nations. A small amount of manufactured goods can buy a large amount of raw materials. Therefore, a trading and manufacturing country typically acquires a significant portion of the raw materials it needs by exporting a small share of its manufactured goods, whereas a country without trade or manufacturing often has to give up a large amount of its raw resources to obtain just a small amount of manufactured products from other nations. One exports resources that can sustain only a few, while importing the goods needed for many. The other exports enough to support many, while only bringing in what a few require. The people in one country will always enjoy a far greater amount of resources than what their own land could provide, while those in the other will usually have much less.

This system, however, with all its imperfections, is perhaps the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of political economy; and is upon that account, well worth the consideration of every man who wishes to examine with attention the principles of that very important science. Though in representing the labour which is employed upon land as the only productive labour, the notions which it inculcates are, perhaps, too narrow and confined; yet in representing the wealth of nations as consisting, not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the consumable goods annually reproduced by the labour of the society, and in representing perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering this annual reproduction the greatest possible, its doctrine seems to be in every respect as just as it is generous and liberal. Its followers are very numerous; and as men are fond of paradoxes, and of appearing to understand what surpasses the comprehensions of ordinary people, the paradox which it maintains, concerning the unproductive nature of manufacturing labour, has not, perhaps, contributed a little to increase the number of its admirers. They have for some years past made a pretty considerable sect, distinguished in the French republic of letters by the name of the Economists. Their works have certainly been of some service to their country; not only by bringing into general discussion, many subjects which had never been well examined before, but by influencing, in some measure, the public administration in favour of agriculture. It has been in consequence of their representations, accordingly, that the agriculture of France has been delivered from several of the oppressions which it before laboured under. The term, during which such a lease can be granted, as will be valid against every future purchaser or proprietor of the land, has been prolonged from nine to twenty-seven years. The ancient provincial restraints upon the transportation of corn from one province of the kingdom to another, have been entirely taken away; and the liberty of exporting it to all foreign countries, has been established as the common law of the kingdom in all ordinary cases. This sect, in their works, which are very numerous, and which treat not only of what is properly called Political Economy, or of the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, but of every other branch of the system of civil government, all follow implicitly, and without any sensible variation, the doctrine of Mr. Quesnai. There is, upon this account, little variety in the greater part of their works. The most distinct and best connected account of this doctrine is to be found in a little book written by Mr. Mercier de la Riviere, some time intendant of Martinico, entitled, The natural and essential Order of Political Societies. The admiration of this whole sect for their master, who was himself a man of the greatest modesty and simplicity, is not inferior to that of any of the ancient philosophers for the founders of their respective systems. 'There have been since the world began,' says a very diligent and respectable author, the Marquis de Mirabeau, 'three great inventions which have principally given stability to political societies, independent of many other inventions which have enriched and adorned them. The first is the invention of writing, which alone gives human nature the power of transmitting, without alteration, its laws, its contracts, its annals, and its discoveries. The second is the invention of money, which binds together all the relations between civilized societies. The third is the economical table, the result of the other two, which completes them both by perfecting their object; the great discovery of our age, but of which our posterity will reap the benefit.'

This system, despite its flaws, is probably the closest we've come to the truth about political economy that's been published so far; for that reason, it deserves the attention of anyone who wants to thoughtfully explore the principles of this crucial field. While it presents labor on land as the only productive kind of labor, its perspective might be too limited and narrow. However, by defining the wealth of nations as not just the unspendable riches of money, but rather the consumable goods produced each year by society's labor, and by asserting that true freedom is the best way to maximize this annual production, its teachings are impressively just, generous, and open-minded. Its followers are quite numerous, and since people enjoy paradoxes and like to seem knowledgeable about complex ideas, the argument it puts forward about manufacturing labor being unproductive has likely attracted even more admirers. Over the years, they've formed a significant group known in the French literary world as the Economists. Their work has certainly benefited their country, not only by bringing many previously overlooked subjects into public discussion but also by somewhat influencing government policy in favor of agriculture. Because of their advocacy, French agriculture has been freed from several previous burdens. The duration for leases that are enforceable against future buyers or landowners has been extended from nine to twenty-seven years. The old regional restrictions on moving grain from one province to another have been completely removed, and the freedom to export grain to foreign countries has been established as normal law in most cases. This group, in their many writings, which cover not only what we call Political Economy or the nature and causes of a nation’s wealth but also various aspects of civil government, all consistently adhere to Mr. Quesnai's teachings without significant variation. As a result, there is little diversity in much of their work. The clearest and most comprehensive explanation of these ideas can be found in a small book by Mr. Mercier de la Riviere, who was once the intendant of Martinique, titled The Natural and Essential Order of Political Societies. The admiration this entire group has for their leader, who was a man of great humility and simplicity, is comparable to that of ancient philosophers towards the founders of their respective systems. "Since the dawn of time," says a diligent and respected author, the Marquis de Mirabeau, "there have been three major inventions that have primarily provided stability to political societies, aside from many others that have enriched and embellished them. The first is the invention of writing, which alone allows humans to transmit their laws, contracts, records, and discoveries without alteration. The second is the invention of money, which connects all relationships among civilized societies. The third is the economic table, a result of the first two, which completes them by perfecting their purpose; a great discovery of our time, but one that future generations will truly benefit from."

As the political economy of the nations of modern Europe has been more favourable to manufactures and foreign trade, the industry of the towns, than to agriculture, the industry of the country; so that of other nations has followed a different plan, and has been more favourable to agriculture than to manufactures and foreign trade.

As the political economy of modern European nations has favored manufacturing and international trade, benefiting urban industries more than agriculture in rural areas, other nations have taken a different approach and have supported agriculture more than manufacturing and international trade.

The policy of China favours agriculture more than all other employments. In China, the condition of a labourer is said to be as much superior to that of an artificer, as in most parts of Europe that of an artificer is to that of a labourer. In China, the great ambition of every man is to get possession of a little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and leases are there said to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently secured to the lessees. The Chinese have[Pg 283] little respect for foreign trade. Your beggarly commerce! was the language in which the mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr. De Lange, the Russian envoy, concerning it[44]. Except with Japan, the Chinese carry on, themselves, and in their own bottoms, little or no foreign trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade, therefore, is, in China, every way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it would naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in their own ships, or in those of foreign nations.

The policy in China prioritizes agriculture over all other jobs. In China, the status of a laborer is considered much better than that of a craftsman, just as in most of Europe, a craftsman's status is better than that of a laborer. The main goal for every man in China is to own a small piece of land, either through ownership or lease; leases are said to be offered on very reasonable terms and are well-secured for the lessees. The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. "Your pathetic commerce!" was how the mandarins of Beijing talked to Mr. De Lange, the Russian envoy, about it. Aside from Japan, the Chinese engage in very little foreign trade, mostly using their own ships; they only allow a few foreign ships to enter one or two of their ports. As a result, foreign trade in China is significantly more limited than it would be if there were more freedom for it, whether in their own ships or those of foreign nations.

Manufactures, as in a small bulk they frequently contain a great value, and can upon that account be transported at less expense from one country to another than most parts of rude produce, are, in almost all countries, the principal support of foreign trade. In countries, besides, less extensive, and less favourably circumstanced for inferior commerce than China, they generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign market, they could not well flourish, either in countries so moderately extensive as to afford but a narrow home market, or in countries where the communication between one province and another was so difficult, as to render it impossible for the goods of any particular place to enjoy the whole of that home market which the country could afford. The perfection of manufacturing industry, it must be remembered, depends altogether upon the division of labour; and the degree to which the division of labour can be introduced into any manufacture, is necessarily regulated, it has already been shewn, by the extent of the market. But the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, the variety of climate, and consequently of productions in its different provinces, and the easy communication by means of water-carriage between the greater part of them, render the home market of that country of so great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable subdivisions of labour. The home market of China is, perhaps, in extent, not much inferior to the market of all the different countries of Europe put together. A more extensive foreign trade, however, which to this great home market added the foreign market of all the rest of the world, especially if any considerable part of this trade was carried on in Chinese ships, could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn the art of using and constructing, themselves, all the different machines made use of in other countries, as well as the other improvements of art and industry which are practised in all the different parts of the world. Upon their present plan, they have little opportunity of improving themselves by the example of any other nation, except that of the Japanese.

Manufacturing, since it often holds a lot of value in a small volume, can usually be transported between countries at a lower cost compared to most raw products. This makes it a key driver of foreign trade in almost every nation. In countries that are less extensive and not as well-suited for low-level commerce as China, they often rely on foreign trade to thrive. Without a large foreign market, they struggle to succeed, particularly in nations that have a limited home market or where it's challenging to transport goods between provinces, preventing any specific location from fully accessing the country’s whole home market. The success of manufacturing industries heavily relies on the division of labor, and the extent to which this division can be applied is determined by the market size. However, China’s vast empire, its large population, diverse climates, and easy waterways for transportation create a home market that is large enough to sustain extensive manufacturing and allow significant divisions of labor. The home market in China is probably almost as large as the combined markets of all the different European countries. A larger foreign trade, which would add the global market to this already substantial home market, particularly if a significant portion of this trade were conducted using Chinese ships, would definitely boost China's manufacturing and improve its industrial productivity. Through expanded navigation, the Chinese would naturally pick up the skills to use and create various machines employed in other nations, as well as other advancements in art and industry from around the world. Under their current system, they have limited chances to learn from other nations, except for Japan.

The policy of ancient Egypt, too, and that of the Gentoo government of Indostan, seem to have favoured agriculture more than all other employments.

The policy of ancient Egypt, as well as that of the Gentoo government of Indostan, seems to have favored agriculture more than all other occupations.

Both in ancient Egypt and Indostan, the whole body of the people was divided into different casts or tribes each of which was confined, from father to son, to a particular employment, or class of employments. The son of a priest was necessarily a priest; the son of a soldier, a soldier; the son of a labourer, a labourer; the son of a weaver, a weaver; the son of a tailor, a tailor, &c. In both countries, the cast of the priests holds the highest rank, and that of the soldiers the next; and in both countries the cast of the farmers and labourers was superior to the casts of merchants and manufacturers.

Both in ancient Egypt and India, the entire population was divided into different castes or tribes, each of which was bound, from father to son, to a specific job or type of work. The son of a priest had to become a priest; the son of a soldier became a soldier; the son of a laborer was a laborer; the son of a weaver was a weaver; the son of a tailor was a tailor, and so on. In both societies, the priest caste held the highest status, followed by the soldier caste; additionally, in both places, the farming and laborer castes were ranked above merchants and manufacturers.

The government of both countries was particularly attentive to the interest of agriculture. The works constructed by the ancient sovereigns of Egypt, for the proper distribution of the waters of the Nile, were famous in antiquity, and the ruined remains of some of them are still the admiration of travellers. Those of the same kind which were constructed by the ancient sovereigns of Indostan, for the proper distribution of the waters of the Ganges, as well as of many other rivers, though they have been less celebrated, seem to have been equally great. Both countries accordingly, though subject occasionally to dearths, have been famous for their great fertility. Though both were extremely populous, yet, in years of moderate plenty, they were both able to export great quantities of grain to their neighbours.

The governments of both countries paid special attention to agriculture. The structures created by the ancient rulers of Egypt for the effective distribution of the Nile’s waters were well-known in ancient times, and the ruins of some of these are still admired by travelers today. Similarly, the projects built by the ancient rulers of India for the distribution of the Ganges’ waters, along with those of many other rivers, though less famous, appear to have been equally impressive. As a result, both countries, despite occasionally experiencing shortages, have been renowned for their incredible fertility. Even though both populations were very large, during years of moderate abundance, they were both able to export significant amounts of grain to their neighboring countries.

The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious aversion to the sea; and as the Gentoo religion does not permit its followers to light a fire, nor consequently to dress any victuals, upon the water, it, in effect, prohibits them from all distant sea voyages. Both the Egyptians and Indians must have depended almost altogether upon the navigation of other nations for the exportation of their surplus produce; and this dependency, as it must have confined the market, so it must have discouraged the increase of this surplus produce. It must have discouraged, too, the increase of the manufactured produce, more than that of the rude produce. Manufactures require a much more extensive market than the most important parts of the rude produce of the land. A single shoemaker will make more than 300 pairs of shoes in the year;[Pg 284] and his own family will not, perhaps, wear out six pairs. Unless, therefore, he has the custom of, at least, 50 such families as his own, he cannot dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. The most numerous class of artificers will seldom, in a large country, make more than one in 50, or one in a 100, of the whole number of families contained in it. But in such large countries, as France and England, the number of people employed in agriculture has, by some authors, been computed at a half, by others at a third, and by no author that I know of, at less than a fifth of the whole inhabitants of the country. But as the produce of the agriculture of both France and England is, the far greater part of it, consumed at home, each person employed in it must, according to these computations, require little more than the custom of one, two, or, at most, of four such families as his own, in order in dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. Agriculture, therefore, can support itself under the discouragement of a confined market much better than manufactures. In both ancient Egypt and Indostan, indeed, the confinement of the foreign market was in some measure compensated by the conveniency of many inland navigations, which opened, in the most advantageous manner, the whole extent of the home market to every part of the produce of every different district of those countries. The great extent of Indostan, too, rendered the home market of that country very great, and sufficient to support a great variety of manufactures. But the small extent of ancient Egypt, which was never equal to England, must at all times, have rendered the home market of that country too narrow for supporting any great variety of manufactures. Bengal accordingly, the province of Indostan which commonly exports the greatest quantity of rice, has always been more remarkable for the exportation of a great variety of manufactures, than for that of its grain. Ancient Egypt, on the contrary, though it exported some manufactures, fine linen in particular, as well as some other goods, was always most distinguished for its great exportation of grain. It was long the granary of the Roman empire.

The ancient Egyptians were superstitious about the sea, and since the Gentoo religion doesn't allow its followers to light a fire or cook food on water, this effectively prevents them from taking long sea trips. Both the Egyptians and Indians likely relied heavily on other nations for shipping their excess produce. This reliance must have limited their market and discouraged the growth of that surplus produce. It would have also discouraged the expansion of manufactured goods more than that of raw produce. Manufacturing needs a much larger market than the main types of raw goods from the land. A single shoemaker can produce over 300 pairs of shoes in a year, yet his own family might only wear out six pairs. Unless he attracts the business of at least 50 families like his own, he can't sell all the shoes he makes. In large countries, the most common types of craftsmen rarely make up more than one in 50 or one in 100 families in total. In larger countries like France and England, some authors estimate that half of the population is employed in agriculture, while others say a third, but no one I know suggests it's less than a fifth. Since most agricultural produce in France and England is consumed at home, each person in agriculture only needs the business of one, two, or at most four families like theirs to sell all they produce. Therefore, agriculture can sustain itself despite a restricted market much better than manufacturing can. In both ancient Egypt and India, the limited foreign market was somewhat balanced out by the convenience of many inland waterways, which connected different regions to the home market effectively. Additionally, the vast size of India created a substantial home market capable of supporting diverse manufacturing. However, the smaller size of ancient Egypt, which was never as large as England, always made its home market too limited to support a wide range of manufacturing. Consequently, Bengal, the Indian province that typically exports the most rice, has historically been better known for a variety of manufactured goods than for its grain. In contrast, ancient Egypt, while it did export some manufactured items, particularly fine linen, was primarily recognized for its significant grain exports. It was for a long time the granary of the Roman Empire.

The sovereigns of China, of ancient Egypt, and of the different kingdoms into which Indostan has, at different times, been divided, have always derived the whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue, from some sort of land tax or land rent. This land tax, or land rent, like the tithe in Europe, consisted in a certain proportion, a fifth it is said, of the produce of the land, which was either delivered in kind, or paid in money, according to a certain valuation, and which, therefore, varied from year to year, according to all the variations of the produce. It was natural, therefore, that the sovereigns of those countries should be particularly attentive to the interests of agriculture, upon the prosperity or declension of which immediately depended the yearly increase or diminution of their own revenue.

The rulers of China, ancient Egypt, and the various kingdoms of India, which have been divided throughout history, have always gotten most, if not all, of their revenue from some form of land tax or land rent. This land tax, similar to the tithe in Europe, was typically a certain percentage—often said to be a fifth—of the land's produce. This produce could be paid in kind or as money based on a specific valuation, which meant it changed from year to year depending on the yield. It makes sense that the rulers of these nations would be especially focused on the interests of agriculture, since the success or decline of farming directly affected the annual increase or decrease of their own revenue.

The policy of the ancient republics of Greece, and that of Rome, though it honoured agriculture more than manufactures or foreign trade, yet seems rather to have discouraged the latter employments, than to have given any direct or intentional encouragement to the former. In several of the ancient states of Greece, foreign trade was prohibited altogether; and in several others the employments of artificers and manufacturers were considered as hurtful to the strength and agility of the human body, as rendering it incapable of those habits which their military and gymnastic exercises endeavoured to form in it, and as thereby disqualifying it, more or less, for undergoing the fatigues and encountering the dangers of war. Such occupations were considered as fit only for slaves, and the free citizens of the states were prohibited from exercising them. Even in those states where no such prohibition took place, as in Rome and Athens, the great body of the people were in effect excluded from all the trades which are now commonly exercised by the lower sort of the inhabitants of towns. Such trades were, at Athens and Rome, all occupied by the slaves of the rich, who exercised them for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, power, and protection, made it almost impossible for a poor freeman to find a market for his work, when it came into competition with that of the slaves of the rich. Slaves, however, are very seldom inventive; and all the most important improvements, either in machinery, or in the arrangement and distribution of work, which facilitate and abridge labour have been the discoveries of freemen. Should a slave propose any improvement of this kind, his master would be very apt to consider the proposal as the suggestion of laziness, and of a desire to save his own labour at the master's expense. The poor slave, instead of reward would probably meet with much abuse, perhaps with some punishment. In the manufactures carried on by slaves, therefore, more labour must generally have been employed to exercise the same quantity of work, than in those carried on by freemen. The work of the former must, upon that account, generally have been dearer than that of the latter. The Hungarian mines, it is remarked by Mr. Montesquieu, though not richer, have always been wrought with less expense, and therefore with more profit, than the Turkish mines in their neighbourhood. The Turkish mines are wrought by slaves; and the arms of those slaves are the only machines which the Turks have ever thought of employing. The Hungarian mines are wrought by freemen, who[Pg 285] employ a great deal of machinery, by which they facilitate and abridge their own labour. From the very little that is known about the price of manufactures in the times of the Greeks and Romans, it would appear that those of the finer sort were excessively dear. Silk sold for its weight in gold. It was not, indeed, in those times an European manufacture; and as it was all brought from the East Indies, the distance of the carriage may in some measure account for the greatness of the price. The price, however, which a lady, it is said, would sometimes pay for a piece of very fine linen, seems to have been equally extravagant; and as linen was always either an European, or at farthest, an Egyptian manufacture, this high price can be accounted for only by the great expense of the labour which must have been employed about it, and the expense of this labour again could arise from nothing but the awkwardness of the machinery which is made use of. The price of fine woollens, too, though not quite so extravagant, seems, however, to have been much above that of the present times. Some cloths, we are told by Pliny[45], dyed in a particular manner, cost a hundred denarii, or L.3 6s. 8d. the pound weight. Others, dyed in another manner, cost a thousand denarii the pound weight, or L.33 6s. 8d. The Roman pound, it must be remembered, contained only twelve of our avoirdupois ounces. This high price, indeed, seems to have been principally owing to the dye. But had not the cloths themselves been much dearer than any which are made in the present times, so very expensive a dye would not probably have been bestowed upon them. The disproportion would have been too great between the value of the accessory and that of the principal. The price mentioned by the same author[46], of some triclinaria, a sort of woollen pillows or cushions made use of to lean upon as they reclined upon their couches at table, passes all credibility; some of them being said to have cost more than L.30,000, others more than L.300,000. This high price, too, is not said to have arisen from the dye. In the dress of the people of fashion of both sexes, there seems to have been much less variety, it is observed by Dr. Arbuthnot, in ancient than in modern times; and the very little variety which we find in that of the ancient statues, confirms his observation. He infers from this, that their dress must, upon the whole, have been cheaper than ours; but the conclusion does not seem to follow. When the expense of fashionable dress is very great, the variety must be very small. But when, by the improvements in the productive powers of manufacturing art and industry, the expense of any one dress comes to be very moderate, the variety will naturally be very great. The rich, not being able to distinguish themselves by the expense of any one dress, will naturally endeavour to do so by the multitude and variety of their dresses.

The policies of the ancient republics of Greece and Rome valued agriculture more than manufacturing or foreign trade, but they tended to discourage the latter rather than actively support the former. In several ancient Greek states, foreign trade was completely banned; in others, trades like those of artisans and manufacturers were seen as detrimental to physical strength and agility, making individuals less capable of the physical training that military and athletic activities aimed to develop. Such jobs were deemed suitable only for slaves, and free citizens were prohibited from practicing them. Even in places like Rome and Athens, where there were no such prohibitions, the majority of the population was effectively excluded from the trades commonly held by the lower classes in towns. In Athens and Rome, these trades were mostly done by the slaves of wealthy citizens, who worked for their masters' benefit. The wealth, power, and protection of these wealthy individuals made it nearly impossible for a poor free person to compete for work alongside slaves. However, slaves rarely came up with new ideas, and all significant improvements in machinery or the organization of work, which made labor easier and more efficient, were the result of free individuals' discoveries. If a slave suggested an improvement, their master would likely view it as a sign of laziness and just wanting to avoid work at their expense. Instead of being rewarded, the slave would probably face abuse or even punishment. Consequently, more labor was usually required from slaves to accomplish the same amount of work that free individuals could handle. This meant that the work done by slaves was generally more expensive than that done by free individuals. Mr. Montesquieu noted that while Hungarian mines aren't richer, they have always been operated more efficiently and profitably than nearby Turkish mines. The Turkish mines are worked by slaves, who are the only tools the Turks have thought to use. In contrast, Hungarian mines are operated by free workers employing a lot of machinery to make their labor easier and faster. Based on what little is known about the prices of goods in ancient Greece and Rome, it seems that finer products were extremely pricey. Silk was sold at its weight in gold. At that time, silk wasn’t produced in Europe and was imported from the East Indies, so the long transportation likely justified the high price. However, it's said that a lady might sometimes pay an exorbitant amount for a piece of very fine linen, which was always produced in Europe, or at most, Egypt. This high price can only be explained by the significant cost of labor involved, which likely stemmed from the inefficiencies of the machinery used. Prices for fine woolen fabrics, while not as outrageous, also appeared to be much higher than today's prices. Pliny reports that some cloths dyed in a particular way cost a hundred denarii, or £3 6s. 8d. per pound. Others, dyed differently, could cost a thousand denarii per pound, or £33 6s. 8d. It's worth noting that the Roman pound contained only twelve of our avoirdupois ounces. This high price was mainly due to the dye. However, if the cloth itself hadn’t been significantly more expensive than modern versions, such an expensive dye probably wouldn’t have been used. The cost disparity would have been too great between the additional expense and the primary product. The same author notes that some triclinaria, a type of woolen pillow or cushion used for reclining on couches at the table, had prices that defy belief—some reportedly costing more than £30,000, others exceeding £300,000. Interestingly, this steep price is not attributed to the dye. Dr. Arbuthnot observed that ancient clothing for both genders had much less variety compared to today; the minimal variety noted in ancient statues supports his observation. He deduces that overall, their clothing must have been cheaper than ours; however, this conclusion does not seem accurate. When fashionable clothing is extremely expensive, the variety is typically limited. But as improvements in manufacturing and industry lower the costs of clothing, the variety naturally increases. The wealthy, unable to stand out through the expense of any single outfit, will likely try to distinguish themselves by the number and diversity of their clothing.

The greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation, it has already been observed, is that which is carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of the country. The inhabitants of the town draw from the country the rude produce, which constitutes both the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence; and they pay for this rude produce, by sending back to the country a certain portion of it manufactured and prepared for immediate use. The trade which is carried on between these two different sets of people, consists ultimately in a certain quantity of rude produce exchanged for a certain quantity of manufactured produce. The dearer the latter, therefore, the cheaper the former; and whatever tends in any country to raise the price of manufactured produce, tends to lower that of the rude produce of the land, and thereby to discourage agriculture. The smaller the quantity of manufactured produce, which any given quantity of rude produce, or, what comes to the same thing, which the price of any given quantity of rude produce, is capable of purchasing, the smaller the exchangeable value of that given quantity of rude produce; the smaller the encouragement which either the landlord has to increase its quantity by improving, or the farmer by cultivating the land. Whatever, besides, tends to diminish in any country the number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home market, the most important of all markets, for the rude produce of the land, and thereby still further to discourage agriculture.

The biggest and most important part of every nation's trade is the exchange between city dwellers and rural inhabitants. City residents obtain raw goods from the countryside, which serve as both the materials for their work and the basis for their livelihood. They pay for these raw goods by sending back a portion of them as processed and ready-to-use products. The trade between these two groups ultimately involves a certain amount of raw goods being exchanged for a specific amount of manufactured goods. Thus, the more expensive the manufactured goods are, the cheaper the raw goods become; anything that increases the price of manufactured goods in a country tends to decrease the price of the raw goods produced there, which discourages farming. If a specific quantity of raw goods can buy less manufactured produce or has a lower price, then the exchange value of those raw goods decreases. This provides less incentive for landlords to increase the amount produced by improving their lands and for farmers to cultivate more land. Additionally, anything that reduces the number of artisans and manufacturers in a country diminishes the domestic market, which is the most important market for the raw goods produced, further discouraging agriculture.

Those systems, therefore, which preferring agriculture to all other employments, in order to promote it, impose restraints upon manufactures and foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose, and indirectly discourage that very species of industry which they mean to promote. They are so far, perhaps, more inconsistent than even the mercantile system. That system, by encouraging manufactures and foreign trade more than agriculture, turns a certain portion of the capital of the society, from supporting a more advantageous, to support a less advantageous species of industry. But still it really, and in the end, encourages that species of industry which it means to promote. Those agricultural systems, on the contrary, really, and in the end, discourage their own favourite species of industry.

Those systems that prioritize agriculture over all other jobs, in their effort to support it, place restrictions on manufacturing and foreign trade, actually go against their own goals and unintentionally undermine the very type of industry they aim to promote. They might be even more inconsistent than the mercantile system. That system, by promoting manufacturing and foreign trade more than agriculture, shifts a portion of society's capital from a more beneficial type of industry to a less beneficial one. However, it still genuinely encourages the type of industry it intends to support. In contrast, those agricultural systems truly discourage the very type of industry they claim to favor.

It is thus that every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it,[Pg 286] or, by extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, is, in reality subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of its land and labour.

Every system that tries, either through special incentives to attract more capital to a specific type of industry than it would normally receive,[Pg 286] or through strict restrictions to take away capital from a particular industry that would otherwise use it, actually undermines the very goal it aims to achieve. It slows down the society's progress towards true wealth and greatness, and it reduces, rather than enhances, the real value of the annual output from its land and labor.

All systems, either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which, no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works, and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual, or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.

All systems, whether based on preference or restraint, being completely removed, the clear and straightforward system of natural liberty establishes itself naturally. Every individual, as long as they don't break the laws of justice, is entirely free to pursue their own interests in their own way, and to compete their industry and capital with those of anyone else or any group of people. The government is entirely freed from a responsibility, which is fraught with countless misconceptions, and for the proper execution of which, no amount of human wisdom or knowledge could ever be adequate; that is, the duty of overseeing the work of private individuals and steering it toward the activities that best serve society’s interests. According to the system of natural liberty, the government has only three important responsibilities to manage; these duties are significant but clear and understandable to the average person: first, the duty of protecting society from violence and invasion by other independent societies; second, the duty of safeguarding, as much as possible, every member of society from the injustice or oppression of others, or the responsibility of establishing a fair legal system; and third, the responsibility of building and maintaining certain public works and institutions, which it would never be in the interest of any individual or small group to create and support, since the benefits could never compensate for the costs to any individual or small group, although they often can greatly exceed the costs for a large society.

The proper performance of those several duties of the sovereign necessarily supposes a certain expense; and this expense again necessarily requires a certain revenue to support it. In the following book, therefore, I shall endeavour to explain, first, what are the necessary expenses of the sovereign or commonwealth; and which of those expenses ought to be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society; and which of them, by that of some particular part only, or of some particular members of the society; secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole society may be made to contribute towards defraying the expenses incumbent on the whole society; and what are the principal advantages and inconveniences of each of those methods; and thirdly, what are the reasons and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of this revenue, or to contract debts; and what have been the effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. The following book, therefore, will naturally be divided into three chapters.

The proper performance of the various duties of the sovereign requires certain expenses, and those expenses, in turn, need a certain revenue to cover them. In the following book, I will try to explain, first, what the necessary expenses of the sovereign or commonwealth are; which of those expenses should be covered by the general contributions of the entire society, and which should be covered by specific parts or members of society; second, what the different ways are that the whole society can contribute to covering the expenses that affect everyone; and what the main advantages and disadvantages of each method are; and third, what the reasons and causes are that have led almost all modern governments to rely on part of this revenue or to take on debts; and what the effects of those debts have been on the true wealth and annual output of the land and labor of the society. The following book will therefore be divided into three chapters.


INDEX.

The two following accounts are subjoined, in order to illustrate and confirm what is said in the fifth chapter of the fourth book, concerning the Tonnage Bounty to the White-herring Fishery. The reader, I believe, may depend upon the accuracy of both accounts.

The two accounts that follow are included to illustrate and confirm what’s mentioned in the fifth chapter of the fourth book about the Tonnage Bounty for the White-herring Fishery. I believe the reader can trust the accuracy of both accounts.

An Account of Busses fitted out in Scotland for eleven Years, with the Number of empty Barrels carried out, and the Number of Barrels of Herrings caught; also the Bounty, at a Medium, on each Barrel of Sea-sticks, and on each Barrel when fully packed.

Years.Number of
Busses.
Empty Barrels
carried out.
Barrels of
Herrings caught.
Bounty paid
on the Busses.
L. s. d.
1771   29   5,948   2,832 2,885   0 0
1772 168 41,316 22,237 11,055   7 6
1773 190 42,333 42,055 12,510   8 6
1774 240 59,303 56,365 26,952   2 6
1775 275 69,144 52,879 19,315 15 0
1776 294 76,329 51,863 21,290   7 6
1777 240 62,679 45,313 17,592   2 6
1778 220 56,390 40,958 16,316   2 6
1779 206 55,194 29,367 15,287   0 0
1780 181 48,315 19,885 13,445 12 6
1781 135 33,992 16,593 9,613 15 6
Total, 2,186 550,943 378,347L.165,463 14 0

 

Sea-sticks,378,347
1-3d deducted,126,11523
————
Barrels fully packed,     252,23113

 

Bounty, at a medium, for each barrel of sea-sticks,L.0   8 2¼
But a barrel of sea-sticks being only reckoned two thirds of a barrel fully packed, one third is to be deducted, which brings the bounty toL.0 12 3¾
And if the herrings are exported, there is besides, a premium ofL.0   2 8
—————
So that the bounty paid by government in money, for each barrel, isL.0 14 11¾
But if to this, the duty of the salt usually taken credit for as expended in curing each barrel, which, at a medium, is, of foreign, one bushel and one-fourth of a bushel, at 10s. a-bushel, be added. viz.   0 12 6
—————
the bounty on each barrel would amount toL.1   7 5¾
—————[Pg 288]
If the herrings are cured with British salt, it will stand thus, viz.
Bounty, as beforeL.0 14 11¾
But if to this bounty, the duty on two bushels of Scotch salt, at 1s. 6d. per bushel, supposed to be the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each barrel, is added, viz.   0   3 0
—————
the bounty on each barrel will amount toL.0 17 11¾
—————
And when buss herrings are entered for home consumption in Scotland, and pay the shilling a-barrel of duty, the bounty stands thus, to wit, as beforeL.0 12 3
From which the 1s. a-barrel is to be deducted   0   1 0
—————
L.0 11 3¾
But to that there is to be added again, the duty of the foreign salt used in curing a barrel of herrings, viz.   0 12 6
—————
So that the premium allowed for each barrel of herrings entered for home consumption isL.1   3 9¾
—————
If the herrings are cured with British salt, it will stand as follows, viz.
Bounty on each barrel brought in by the busses, as aboveL.0 12 3¾
From which deduct the 1s. a-barrel, paid at the time they are entered for home consumption   0   1 0
—————
L.0 11 3¾
But if to the bounty, the duty on two bushels of Scotch salt, at 1s. 6d. per bushel, supposed to be the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each barrel, is added, viz.   0   3 0
—————
the premium for each barrel entered for home consumption will beL.0 14 3¾

Though the loss of duties upon herrings exported cannot, perhaps, properly be considered as bounty, that upon herrings entered for home consumption certainly may.

Though the removal of duties on exported herrings might not be exactly seen as a bounty, the duty on herrings brought in for home use definitely can be.

An Account of the Quantity of Foreign Salt imported into Scotland, and of Scotch Salt delivered Duty-free from the Works there, for the Fishery, from the 5th of April 1771 to the 5th of April 1782, with the Medium of both for one Year.

PERIOD.Foreign Salt imported.Scotch Salt delivered
from the Works.
Bushels Bushels
From the 5th of April 1771 to the 5th April 1782. 936,974 168,226
Medium for one year 85,179511 15,293311

It is to be observed, that the bushel of foreign salt weighs 48lb. that of British salt, 56lb. only.

It should be noted that a bushel of foreign salt weighs 48 pounds, while a bushel of British salt weighs only 56 pounds.


BOOK V.

OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH.


CHAP. I.

OF THE EXPENSES OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH.

PART I.

Of the Expense of Defence.

The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force. But the expense both of preparing this military force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is very different in the different states of society, in the different periods of improvement.

The primary responsibility of the ruler, which is to safeguard society from the violence and invasions of other independent societies, can only be fulfilled through military force. However, the costs associated with training this military force during peacetime and deploying it during wartime vary significantly across different societal states and at different stages of progress.

Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior, as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to defend his society, or to revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other societies, he maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner as when he lives at home. His society (for in this state of things there is properly neither sovereign nor commonwealth) is at no sort of expense, either to prepare him for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.

In societies of hunters, which represent the most basic and roughest form of social organization, like those among the native tribes of North America, every man is both a warrior and a hunter. When he goes to war, whether to protect his community or to seek revenge for acts committed against it by other groups, he supports himself through his own work, just as he would when at home. His community (because in this kind of society there is really no sovereign or government) doesn’t spend anything to equip him for battle or to take care of him while he’s out there.

Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as we find it among the Tartar and Arabs, every man is, in the same manner a warrior. Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either in tents, or in a sort of covered wagons, which are easily transported from place to place. The whole tribe, or nation, changes its situation according to the different seasons of the year, as well as according to other accidents. When its herds and flocks have consumed the forage of one part of the country, it removes to another, and from that to a third. In the dry season, it comes down to the banks of the rivers; in the wet season, it retires to the upper country. When such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not trust their herds and flocks to the feeble defence of their old men, their women and children; and their old men, their women and children, will not be left behind without defence, and without subsistence. The whole nation, besides, being accustomed to a wandering life, even in time of peace, easily takes the field in time of war. Whether it marches as an army, or moves about as a company of herdsmen, the way of life is nearly the same, though the object proposed by it be very different. They all go to war together, therefore, and every one does as well as he can. Among the Tartars, even the women have been frequently known to engage in battle. If they conquer, whatever belongs to the hostile tribe is the recompence of the victory; but if they are vanquished, all is lost; and not only their herds and flocks, but their women and children, become the booty of the conqueror. Even the greater part of those who survive the action are obliged to submit to him for the sake of immediate subsistence. The rest are commonly dissipated and dispersed in the desert.

Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced society, like those of the Tartars and Arabs, every man is also a warrior. These nations typically don’t have a permanent home but live in tents or covered wagons that can easily be moved from place to place. The entire tribe or nation moves based on the seasons or other circumstances. When their herds and flocks have eaten all the grass in one area, they move to another and then to another. In dry seasons, they go down to the riverbanks; in wet seasons, they retreat to higher land. When a nation goes to war, the warriors won’t leave their herds and flocks vulnerable to the protection of the elderly, women, and children; and the elderly, women, and children won’t be left behind without security or food. Since the entire nation is used to a nomadic lifestyle, even in peacetime, they’re able to mobilize quickly for war. Whether they march like an army or move around like a group of herdsmen, their way of life is very similar, even if their goals are different. They all go to war together, and everyone does their best. Among the Tartars, it's common for women to participate in battle. If they win, they take everything from the opposing tribe as their reward; but if they lose, they lose everything, including their herds, flocks, and their women and children, who become the spoils of the victors. Most of those who survive must submit to the conqueror for basic survival. The rest usually scatter and are lost in the desert.

The ordinary life, the ordinary exercise of a Tartar or Arab, prepare him sufficiently for war. Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the javelin, drawing the bow, &c. are the common pastimes of those who live in the open air, and are all of them the images of war. When a Tartar or Arab actually goes to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks, which he carries with him, in the same manner as in peace. His chief or sovereign (for those nations have all[Pg 290] chiefs or sovereigns) is at no sort of expense in preparing him for the field; and when he is in it, the chance of plunder is the only pay which he either expects or requires.

The everyday life and activities of a Tartar or Arab are enough to prepare him for war. Running, wrestling, playing with sticks, throwing javelins, shooting bows, etc., are the usual pastimes for those who live outdoors, and all of these activities symbolize warfare. When a Tartar or Arab goes to war, he is supported by his own herds and flocks, which he takes along, just like in peacetime. His leader or ruler (since those nations always have leaders or rulers) doesn’t have to spend anything to get him ready for battle; and while he’s in battle, the chance to gain spoils is the only payment he expects or needs.

An army of hunters can seldom exceed two or three hundred men. The precarious subsistence which the chace affords, could seldom allow a greater number to keep together for any considerable time. An army of shepherds, on the contrary, may sometimes amount to two or three hundred thousand. As long as nothing stops their progress, as long as they can go on from one district, of which they have consumed the forage, to another, which is yet entire; there seems to be scarce any limit to the number who can march on together. A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the civilized nations in their neighbourhood; a nation of shepherds may. Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America; nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invasion has frequently been in Asia. The judgement of Thucydides, that both Europe and Asia could not resist the Scythians united, has been verified by the experience of all ages. The inhabitants of the extensive, but defenceles plains of Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the dominion of the chief of some conquering horde or clan; and the havock and devastation of Asia have always signalized their union. The inhabitants of the inhospitable deserts of Arabia, the other great nation of shepherds, have never been united but once, under Mahomet and his immediate successors. Their union, which was more the effect of religious enthusiasm than of conquest, was signalized in the same manner. If the hunting nations of America should ever become shepherds, their neighbourhood would be much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at present.

An army of hunters usually can't have more than two or three hundred men. The unstable living that hunting provides doesn't typically let a larger group stay together for long. On the other hand, an army of shepherds can sometimes number in the hundreds of thousands. As long as they can keep moving from one area—where they've eaten up all the resources—to another, which still has plenty, there seems to be almost no limit to how many can march together. A nation of hunters isn't really a threat to the civilized nations nearby, while a nation of shepherds can be. There's nothing more insignificant than an Indian war in North America; conversely, a Tartar invasion has often been terrifying in Asia. Thucydides was right when he said that both Europe and Asia couldn't resist the united Scythians; history has shown this to be true across the ages. The people of the large but defenseless plains of Scythia or Tartary have often come together under the leadership of some conquering chief or clan, and their unity has resulted in widespread destruction in Asia. The fierce deserts of Arabia, another major group of shepherds, have only come together once—under Mohammed and his immediate successors. Their unity was driven more by religious fervor than by conquest, and it too resulted in significant consequences. If the hunting nations in America ever turned to shepherding, they would pose a much greater threat to the European colonies than they do now.

In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of husbandmen who have little foreign commerce, and no other manufactures but those coarse and household ones, which almost every private family prepares for its own use, every man, in the same manner, either is a warrior, or easily becomes such. Those who live by agriculture generally pass the whole day in the open air, exposed to all the inclemencies of the seasons. The hardiness of their ordinary life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to some of which their necessary occupations bear a great analogy. The necessary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches, and to fortify a camp, as well as to inclose a field. The ordinary pastimes of such husbandmen are the same as those of shepherds, and are in the same manner the images of war. But as husbandmen have less leisure than shepherds, they are not so frequently employed in those pastimes. They are soldiers, but soldiers not quite so much masters of their exercise. Such as they are, however, it seldom costs the sovereign or commonwealth any expense to prepare them for the field.

In a more advanced society, among those nations of farmers who have little foreign trade and only produce basic household goods for their own use, every man either is a warrior or can easily become one. Those who work in agriculture typically spend their whole day outdoors, facing all kinds of weather. The toughness of their everyday life readies them for the challenges of war, as some of their daily tasks are quite similar to military duties. For instance, a ditch digger is prepared to work in trenches, fortify a camp, and enclose a field. The usual pastimes of these farmers resemble those of shepherds and often reflect the themes of war. However, since farmers have less free time than shepherds, they're not as often engaged in those activities. They may be soldiers, but they aren’t quite as skilled in their training. Nonetheless, it rarely costs the ruler or the state much to get them ready for battle.

Agriculture, even in its rudest and lowest state, supposes a settlement, some sort of fixed habitation, which cannot be abandoned without great loss. When a nation of mere husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole people cannot take the field together. The old men, the women and children, at least, must remain at home, to take care of the habitation. All the men of the military age, however, may take the field, and in small nations of this kind, have frequently done so. In every nation, the men of the military age are supposed to amount to about a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people. If the campaign, too, should begin after seed-time, and end before harvest, both the husbandman and his principal labourers can be spared from the farm without much loss. He trusts that the work which must be done in the mean time, can be well enough executed by the old men, the women, and the children. He is not unwilling, therefore, to serve without pay during a short campaign; and it frequently costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field as to prepare him for it. The citizens of all the different states of ancient Greece seem to have served in this manner till after the second Persian war; and the people of Peloponnesus till after the Peloponnesian war. The Peloponnesians, Thucydides observes, generally left the field in the summer, and returned home to reap the harvest. The Roman people, under their kings, and during the first ages of the republic, served in the same manner. It was not till the siege of Veii, that they who staid at home began to contribute something towards maintaining those who went to war. In the European monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, both before, and for some time after, the establishment of what is properly called the feudal law, the great lords, with all their immediate dependents, used to serve the crown at their own expense. In the field, in the same manner as at home, they maintained themselves by their own revenue, and not by any stipend or pay which they received from the king upon that particular occasion.

Agriculture, even in its simplest form, requires a settlement, a kind of permanent home that can't be abandoned without significant loss. So, when a nation made up of farmers goes to war, the entire population can't fight together. At least the elderly, women, and children must stay behind to take care of the home. However, all the men of military age can go to battle, and this has often happened in smaller nations like this. In every nation, men of military age typically make up about a quarter or a fifth of the total population. If a campaign starts after planting and ends before harvest, both the farmer and his key workers can leave the farm with minimal loss. He believes that the necessary work can be managed by the elderly, women, and children during that time. Therefore, he is often willing to fight without pay for a short campaign; it often costs the ruler or state as little to keep him in the field as it would to prepare him for it. Citizens in the various states of ancient Greece seem to have served this way until after the second Persian War, and the people of Peloponnesus until after the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides notes that the Peloponnesians commonly left the battlefield in the summer to return home to harvest. The Roman populace, under their kings and during the early years of the republic, served similarly. It wasn’t until the siege of Veii that those who stayed home started contributing something to support those who went to war. In the European monarchies that arose from the remnants of the Roman Empire, both before and for some time after the establishment of what we now call the feudal system, the great lords, along with their immediate followers, would serve the crown at their own expense. On the battlefield, just like at home, they supported themselves with their own revenue rather than receiving any salary or pay from the king for that specific occasion.

In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to render it altogether impossible that they who take the field should maintain themselves at their own expense. Those two causes are, the progress of manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.

In a more advanced society, two key factors make it completely unfeasible for those who go to battle to support themselves financially. These factors are the advancement of manufacturing and the enhancement of military tactics.

Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it begins after seed-time, and ends before harvest, the interruption of his business will not always occasion any[Pg 291] considerable diminution of his revenue. Without the intervention of his labour, Nature does herself the greater part of the work which remains to be done. But the moment that an artificer, a smith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his workhouse, the sole source of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature does nothing for him; he does all for himself. When he takes the field, therefore, in defence of the public, as he has no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be maintained by the public. But in a country, of which a great part of the inhabitants are artificers and manufacturers, a great part the people who go to war must be drawn from those classes, and must, therefore, be maintained by the public as long as they are employed in its service.

Even if a farmer is engaged in a military campaign, as long as it starts after planting season and finishes before harvest, the disruption of his work won't always lead to a significant loss of income. Without his labor, nature handles most of the remaining tasks on its own. However, when a tradesman like a blacksmith, carpenter, or weaver stops working, his income completely disappears. Nature doesn’t help him; he relies entirely on his own efforts. So, when he leaves to defend the community, he has no way to support himself and must be supported by the public. In a country where many people are tradesmen and manufacturers, a significant portion of those who go to war will come from those groups, and they will need to be supported by the public while they serve.

When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very intricate and complicated science; when the event of war ceases to be determined, as in the first ages of society, by a single irregular skirmish or battle; but when the contest is generally spun out through several different campaigns, each of which lasts during the greater part of the year; it becomes universally necessary that the public should maintain those who serve the public in war, at least while they are employed in that service. Whatever, in time of peace, might be the ordinary occupation of those who go to war, so very tedious and expensive a service would otherwise be by far too heavy a burden upon them. After the second Persian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens seem to have been generally composed of mercenary troops, consisting, indeed, partly of citizens, but partly, too, of foreigners; and all of them equally hired and paid at the expense of the state. From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received pay for their service during the time which they remained in the field. Under the feudal governments, the military service, both of the great lords, and of their immediate dependents, was, after a certain period, universally exchanged for a payment in money, which was employed to maintain those who served in their stead.

When the art of war has evolved into a complex and intricate science; when the outcome of war is no longer decided, as it was in the early days of society, by a single chaotic skirmish or battle; but instead, when the struggle often stretches out over several campaigns, each lasting most of the year; it becomes essential for the public to support those who serve in the military, at least while they're on duty. Whatever the usual occupations of those who go to war may be in peacetime, such a demanding and costly service would otherwise be an overwhelming burden. After the second Persian war, the armies of Athens were mainly made up of mercenary soldiers, which included some citizens but also a number of foreigners; all of them equally hired and compensated by the state. Since the siege of Veii, the Roman armies were paid for their service for the time they spent in the field. Under feudal systems, both the military service of the powerful lords and their direct followers was eventually replaced by monetary payment, which was used to support those who took their place.

The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number of the people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized than in a rude state of society. In a civilized society, as the soldiers are maintained altogether by the labour of those who are not soldiers, the number of the former can never exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above maintaining, in a manner suitable to their respective stations, both themselves and the other officers of government and law, whom they are obliged to maintain. In the little agrarian states of ancient Greece, a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people considered themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it is said, take the field. Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed, that not more than the one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which pays the expense of their service.

The number of people who can go to war, in relation to the total population, is significantly smaller in a civilized society than in a primitive one. In a civilized society, since soldiers are entirely supported by the labor of non-soldiers, the number of soldiers can never exceed what the non-soldiers can sustain while also providing for themselves and the other government and law officials they need to support. In the small farming states of ancient Greece, about a quarter or a fifth of the population viewed themselves as soldiers and would sometimes, it’s said, take up arms. In modern civilized nations of Europe, it’s generally estimated that no more than one percent of the population can serve as soldiers without causing economic harm to the country that funds their service.

The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have become considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the field had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth. In all the different republics of ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises, was a necessary part of education imposed by the state upon every free citizen. In every city there seems to have been a public field, in which, under the protection of the public magistrate, the young people were taught their different exercises by different masters. In this very simple institution consisted the whole expense which any Grecian state seems ever to have been at, in preparing its citizens for war. In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose with those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under the feudal governments, the many public ordinances, that the citizens of every district should practise archery, as well as several other military exercises, were intended for promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so well. Either from want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution of those ordinances, or from some other cause, they appear to have been universally neglected; and in the progress of all those governments, military exercises seem to have gone gradually into disuse among the great body of the people.

The cost of getting the army ready for action doesn't seem to have become significant in any nation until long after the responsibility of maintaining it in the field fell entirely on the ruler or the state. In all the different republics of ancient Greece, learning military skills was a necessary part of education mandated by the state for every free citizen. Every city seemed to have a public field where, under the supervision of public officials, young people were taught various skills by different instructors. This very straightforward system was all the expense any Greek state ever incurred in preparing its citizens for war. In ancient Rome, the exercises at the Campus Martius served the same purpose as those at the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under feudal governments, various public laws requiring citizens in every district to practice archery and other military exercises were intended to achieve the same goal, but they don’t seem to have been as effective. Either due to a lack of interest from the officials tasked with enforcing those laws or some other reason, these practices appear to have been widely ignored, and over time, military exercises seem to have gradually fallen out of use among the general population.

In the republic of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of their existence, and under the feudal governments, for a considerable time after their first establishment, the trade of a soldier was not a separate, distinct trade, which constituted the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens; every subject of the state, whatever might be the ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his livelihood, considered himself, upon all ordinary occasions, as fit likewise to exercise the trade of a soldier, and, upon many extraordinary occasions, as bound to exercise it.

In ancient Greece and Rome, throughout their entire existence, and under feudal governments for quite a while after they were first established, being a soldier wasn't seen as a separate, distinct profession that was the main job of a specific group of citizens. Every citizen, regardless of the everyday job or occupation they used to earn a living, viewed themselves as capable of being a soldier whenever needed, and in many exceptional circumstances, felt it was their duty to serve as one.

The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so, in the progress of improvement, it necessarily becomes one of most complicated among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as some other arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens; and the division[Pg 292] of labour is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art. Into other arts, the division of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their private interest better by confining themselves to a particular trade, than by exercising a great number. But it is the wisdom of the state only, which can render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others. A private citizen, who, in time of profound peace, and without any particular encouragement from the public, should spend the greater part of his time in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very much in them, and amuse himself very well; but he certainly would not promote his own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only, which can render it for his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar occupation; and states have not always had this wisdom, even when their circumstances had become such, that the preservation of their existence required that they should have it.

The art of war is undoubtedly the noblest of all arts, and as it evolves, it naturally becomes one of the most complex. The state of mechanical and other related arts, which are connected to it, determines how advanced it can be at any given time. To reach this level of advancement, war must become the main or sole focus of a specific group of citizens; the division of labor is just as essential for its improvement as it is for any other art. In other fields, individuals usually introduce division of labor to better serve their personal interests by specializing in a particular trade instead of juggling many. However, only the wisdom of the state can establish the profession of a soldier as a distinct trade, separate from all others. A private citizen, during a time of peace and without any public incentive, who spends most of their time on military training may indeed improve their skills and find enjoyment in it, but they would not be acting in their best interest. It takes the wisdom of the state to make it beneficial for them to dedicate most of their time to this unique profession; and states have not always displayed this wisdom, even when their situation demanded it for survival.

A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbandman, in the rude state of husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The first may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial exercises; the second may employ some part of it; but the last cannot employ a single hour in them without some loss, and his attention to his own interest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. Those improvements in husbandry, too, which the progress of arts and manufacturers necessarily introduces, leave the husbandman as little leisure as the artificer. Military exercises come to be as much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as by those of the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. That wealth, at the same time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and manufactures, and which, in reality, is no more than the accumulated produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their neighbours. An industrious, and, upon that account, a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked; and unless the states takes some new measure for the public defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.

A shepherd has plenty of free time; a farmer, in the basic form of farming, has some; a craftsman or manufacturer has none at all. The first can spend a lot of his time on military training without losing anything; the second can spend some time on it; but the last can’t afford to spend even an hour on it without suffering a loss, and his focus on his own interests naturally causes him to ignore it entirely. The improvements in farming that come with advancements in arts and manufacturing leave the farmer with just as little free time as the craftsman. Military training becomes neglected by people in the countryside just as much as by those in the city, and the general population becomes completely unmilitary. At the same time, the wealth that typically comes from advancements in agriculture and manufacturing—which is really just the accumulated output of those advancements—invites invasion from neighboring regions. A hardworking and therefore wealthy nation is, of all nations, the most likely to be attacked; and unless the state adopts some new measures for public defense, the inherent habits of the people make them entirely unable to defend themselves.

In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the state can make any tolerable provision for the public defence.

In these circumstances, it looks like there are only two ways the government can ensure some decent support for public safety.

If may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people, enforce the practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on.

If it’s possible, first, by using a very strict police force, and despite the overall interests, talents, and preferences of the people, to impose the practice of military drills, and require either all citizens of military age or a specific number of them to participate in some way in the occupation of a soldier alongside whatever other job or profession they may have.

Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

Or, secondly, by keeping and involving a certain number of citizens in regular military drills, it can make the profession of a soldier a specific trade, separate and distinct from all others.

If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military force is said to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist in a standing army. The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance or pay which the state affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence from some other occupation. In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier; in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two different species of military force.

If a state uses the first of those two options, its military force is referred to as a militia; if it uses the second, it's called a standing army. The primary role of soldiers in a standing army is to participate in military drills, and the pay provided by the state is their main source of income. In contrast, soldiers in a militia only occasionally engage in military drills and primarily support themselves through other jobs. In a militia, the roles of worker, craftsman, or tradesperson take precedence over that of a soldier; in a standing army, the soldier's role is the dominant one. This distinction highlights the key difference between these two types of military forces.

Militias have been of several different kinds. In some countries, the citizens destined for defending the state seem to have been exercised only, without being, if I may say so, regimented; that is, without being divided into separate and distinct bodies of troops, each of which performed its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers. In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, each citizen, as long as he remained at home, seems to have practiced his exercises, either separately and independently, or with such of his equals as he liked best; and not to have been attached to any particular body of troops, till he was actually called upon to take the field. In other countries, the militia has not only been exercised, but regimented. In England, in Switzerland, and, I believe, in every other country of modern Europe, where any imperfect military force of this kind has been established, every militiaman is, even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which performs its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers.

Militias come in various forms. In some countries, citizens who are meant to defend the state seem to have trained individually, without being organized into distinct groups; in other words, they weren't divided into separate units, each led by its own permanent officers. In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, every citizen, as long as he stayed home, seems to have practiced his drills either alone or with friends he preferred, and wasn't assigned to any specific troops until he was actually needed on the battlefield. In other countries, the militia has not only trained but also been organized. In England, Switzerland, and, I think, every other modern European country where any sort of imperfect military force like this is established, every militiaman is linked to a specific unit, which conducts its training under its own permanent officers, even during peacetime.

Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the use of their arms. Strength and agility of body were of the highest consequence, and commonly determined the fate of battles. But this skill and dexterity in the use of their arms could be acquired only, in the same manner as fencing is at present, by practising, not in great bodies, but each man separately, in a particular school, under a particular master, or with his own particular equals and companions. Since the invention of [Pg 293]fire-arms, strength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms, though they are far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less consequence. The nature of the weapon, though it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts him more nearly so than he ever was before. All the dexterity and skill, it is supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough acquired by practising in great bodies.

Before the invention of firearms, an army was superior when its soldiers had the greatest individual skill and dexterity in using their weapons. Strength and agility were highly important and often determined the outcome of battles. However, this skill and dexterity could only be developed, similar to how fencing is taught today, through practice—not in large groups, but individually, in a specific school, under a particular master, or with peers and companions. Since the invention of [Pg 293] firearms, while strength, agility, and even extraordinary dexterity in using weapons still matter, they are less crucial than they once were. The nature of the weapon, although it doesn’t level the playing field between the clumsy and the skilled, does bring them closer together than before. It’s assumed that all the dexterity and skill needed to use it can be sufficiently gained through practice in larger groups.

Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which, in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles, than the dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their arms. But the noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and the invisible death to which every man feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be well said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a modern battle. In an ancient battle, there was no noise but what arose from the human voice; there was no smoke, there was no invisible cause of wounds or death. Every man, till some mortal weapon actually did approach him, saw clearly that no such weapon was near him. In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence in their own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have been a good deal less difficult to preserve some degree of regularity and order, not only in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an ancient battle, and till one of the two armies was fairly defeated. But the habits of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired only by troops which are exercised in great bodies.

Regularity, order, and quick obedience to commands are traits that, in modern armies, matter more for deciding the outcome of battles than the soldiers' skill and proficiency with their weapons. However, the noise of gunfire, the smoke, and the unseen danger that every soldier feels exposed to as soon as they come within cannon range—and often long before the battle truly starts—make it really hard to maintain a significant level of regularity, order, and quick obedience, even at the start of a modern battle. In ancient battles, the only noise came from human voices; there was no smoke and no invisible cause for injury or death. Each soldier, until an actual lethal weapon was near, could clearly see that no such weapon was close to them. Given these conditions and among troops who had confidence in their own skills and ability to use their weapons, it was likely much easier to maintain some level of regularity and order, not just at the start but throughout the entire course of an ancient battle, until one of the armies was decisively defeated. However, the habits of regularity, order, and quick obedience to commands can only be developed in troops trained in large groups.

A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or exercised, must always be much inferior to a well disciplined and well exercised standing army.

A militia, no matter how well trained or organized, will always be much less effective than a well-trained and well-prepared standing army.

The soldiers who are exercised only once a-week, or once a-month, can never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are exercised every day, or every other day; and though this circumstance may not be of so much consequence in modern, as it was in ancient times, yet the acknowledged superiority of the Prussian troops, owing, it is said, very much to their superior expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that it is, even at this day, of very considerable consequence.

The soldiers who train only once a week or once a month can never be as skilled in using their weapons as those who train every day or every other day; and while this may not matter as much today as it did in the past, the recognized superiority of the Prussian troops—due in large part to their advanced training—shows that it is still very important today.

The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a-week, or once a-month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, without being, in any respect, accountable to him, can never be under the same awe in his presence, can never have the same disposition to ready obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what is called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise, or in the management and use of its arms. But, in modern war, the habit of ready and instant obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable superiority in the management of arms.

The soldiers, who only have to follow their officer's orders once a week or once a month, are free to handle their own affairs however they like at all other times, without being accountable to him in any way. They can't possibly feel the same level of respect when he's around, nor will they be as inclined to obey right away, unlike those whose everyday lives are completely directed by him, and who even wake up and go to bed, or at least head to their quarters, based on his instructions. In terms of discipline, or the habit of quick obedience, a militia will always be less effective than a standing army, even if it sometimes matches them in what is known as manual exercise or in handling and using weapons. However, in modern warfare, the ability to respond quickly and obediently is far more important than having a notable advantage in weapon management.

Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the same chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace, are by far the best. In respect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they approach nearest to standing armies. The Highland militia, when it served under its own chieftains, had some advantage of the same kind. As the Highlanders, however, were not wandering, but stationary shepherds, as they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable times, accustomed to follow their chieftain from place to place; so, in time of war, they were less willing to follow him to any considerable distance, or to continue for any long time in the field. When they had acquired any booty, they were eager to return home, and his authority was seldom sufficient to detain them. In point of obedience, they were always much inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As the Highlanders, too, from their stationary life, spend less of their time in the open air, they were always less accustomed to military exercises, and were less expert in the use of their arms than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

Militias like the Tartar or Arab militia, which go to war under the same leaders they usually obey in peacetime, are by far the best. They show respect for their officers and are quick to obey, making them similar to standing armies. The Highland militia, when it served under its own leaders, had some similar advantages. However, since the Highlanders were not nomads but settled shepherds, with fixed homes and not used to following their leader from place to place during peaceful times, they were less inclined to follow him far during wartime, or to remain in the field for extended periods. Once they gained any loot, they were eager to head home, and their leader's authority was rarely strong enough to keep them. In terms of obedience, they were always much weaker than what is reported about the Tartars and Arabs. Additionally, because of their settled lifestyle, the Highlanders spent less time outdoors, making them less familiar with military training and less skilled with their weapons than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has served for several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a standing army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms, and, being constantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to the same prompt obedience which takes place in standing armies. What they were before they took the field, is of little importance. They necessarily become in every respect a standing army, after they have passed a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America drag out through another campaign, the American militia may become, in every respect, a match for that standing army, of which the valour appeared, in the last war at least, not inferior to that of the hardiest veterans of France and Spain.

Any type of militia, it should be noted, that has served in multiple successive campaigns in the field effectively turns into a standing army. The soldiers are continuously trained in the use of their weapons, and since they are constantly under the command of their officers, they get used to the same quick obedience that happens in standing armies. What they were before they took to the field doesn't matter much. They inevitably become, in every sense, a standing army after having gone through a few campaigns. If the war in America continues for another campaign, the American militia could very well become, in every way, a rival to that standing army, which showed in the last war at least, bravery not inferior to that of the toughest veterans from France and Spain.

This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages, it will be found, bears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well regulated standing army has over a militia.[Pg 294]

Once this distinction is clear, the history of all time will show that a properly organized standing army is far superior to a militia.[Pg 294]

One of the first standing armies, of which we have any distinct account in any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a standing army. When he was at peace, which he was very seldom, and never for any long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle, indeed, the gallant and well exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece; and afterwards, with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised militia of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek republics, and of the Persian empire was the effect of the irresistible superiority which a standing army has over every other sort of militia. It is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct and circumstantial account.

One of the first standing armies we have a clear record of in well-documented history is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and several Greek cities near Macedon gradually transformed his troops, which initially were probably just a militia, into a well-disciplined standing army. Even when he was at peace—which was rare and never lasted long—he made sure not to disband that army. After a long and intense struggle, it defeated the brave and well-trained militias of the leading city-states of ancient Greece, and then, with very little effort, it overcame the weak and poorly trained militia of the vast Persian Empire. The fall of the Greek republics and the Persian Empire was the result of the undeniable superiority that a standing army has over any other type of militia. This marks the first significant revolution in human affairs that history has recorded in any clear and detailed manner.

The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second. All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may very well be accounted for from the same cause.

The fall of Carthage and the rise of Rome is the second. All the ups and downs in the fortunes of those two famous republics can be explained by the same reason.

From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command; Amilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal: first in chastising their own rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of Africa; and lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of standing army. The Romans, in the meantime, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not, during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence; and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Annibal encountered at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannæ, were militia opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those battles.

From the end of the first Carthaginian war to the beginning of the second, the Carthaginian armies were constantly active, led by three great generals who took turns in command: Amilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal. They first dealt with their own rebellious slaves, then focused on conquering the revolted nations of Africa, and finally went on to conquer the vast kingdom of Spain. The army that Annibal led from Spain into Italy must have been gradually trained into a well-disciplined standing army during these different campaigns. Meanwhile, the Romans, although not completely at peace, hadn't been involved in any major wars during this time, which is said to have led to a significant relaxation in their military discipline. The Roman forces Annibal faced at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannæ were made up of militia facing a standing army. This factor likely played a bigger role than any other in determining the outcomes of those battles.

The standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain had the like superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it; and, in a few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal, expelled them almost entirely from that country.

The standing army that Hannibal left behind in Spain had a clear advantage over the militia that the Romans sent to fight against it. Within a few years, under the leadership of his brother, the younger Hasdrubal, they pushed the Romans almost completely out of that country.

Annibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually in the field, became, in the progress of the war, a well disciplined and well exercised standing army; and the superiority of Annibal grew every day less and less. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead the whole, or almost the whole, of the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the assistance of his brother in Italy. In this march, he is said to have been misled by his guides; and in a country which he did not know, was surprised and attacked, by another standing army, in every respect equal or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

Annibal was poorly provided for from his homeland. The Roman militia, constantly in the field, became a well-trained and well-prepared standing army as the war progressed; thus, Annibal's advantage diminished day by day. Asdrubal decided it was necessary to lead most, if not all, of the standing army he commanded in Spain to help his brother in Italy. During this march, he was reportedly misled by his guides; unfamiliar with the territory, he was ambushed and attacked by another standing army that was, in every way, equal to or stronger than his own, and he was completely defeated.

When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia, and, in the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well disciplined and well exercised standing army. That standing army was afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppose it. In order to defend Carthage, it became necessary to recal the standing army of Annibal. The disheartened and frequently defeated African militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the greater part of the troops of Annibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the two rival republics.

When Asdrubal left Spain, the great Scipio faced nothing but a militia that was weaker than his own. He defeated and took control of that militia, and throughout the war, his own militia evolved into a well-trained and well-disciplined standing army. This standing army was later sent to Africa, where it encountered nothing but a militia to challenge it. To defend Carthage, it became necessary to recall Annibal’s standing army. The demoralized and often defeated African militia joined forces with it, and at the Battle of Zama, they made up the majority of Annibal's troops. The outcome of that day decided the fate of the two rival republics.

From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The standing army of Macedon made some resistance to their arms. In the height of their grandeur, it cost them two great wars, and three great battles, to subdue that little kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have been still more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient word, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the standing armies of Rome. The militias of some barbarous nations defended themselves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias, too, were always respectable, and upon several occasions, gained very considerable advantages over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much superior; and if the Romans did not pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or Germany, it was probably because they judged that it was not worth while to add those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too large. The ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a[Pg 295] nation of wandering shepherds, who went to war under the same chiefs whom they were accustomed to follow in peace. Their militia was exactly of the same kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom, too, they were probably descended.

From the end of the second Carthaginian war until the fall of the Roman Republic, the armies of Rome operated like standing armies in every sense. The standing army of Macedon put up some resistance against them. At the height of their power, it took Rome two major wars and three significant battles to conquer that small kingdom, which would likely have been even harder to take if not for the cowardice of its final king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, including Greece, Syria, and Egypt, offered weak resistance against the standing armies of Rome. In contrast, the militias of some barbaric nations defended themselves much more effectively. The Scythian or Tartar militia that Mithridates recruited from the regions north of the Black and Caspian Seas were the most formidable opponents the Romans faced after the second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias were also consistently formidable and, on several occasions, achieved significant victories over the Roman armies. Generally, however, when the Roman armies were well commanded, they seemed to have a strong advantage. If the Romans did not pursue the total conquest of either Parthia or Germany, it was likely because they decided it wasn’t worth expanding an already vast empire to include those two barbaric lands. The ancient Parthians seem to have been a nation of Scythian or Tartar descent and to have retained many customs of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of nomadic shepherds who went to war under the same leaders they followed in peace. Their militia was very similar to that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom they were probably descended.

Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them, their heavy armour was laid aside as unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious exercises were neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the Roman emperors, besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own generals. In order to render them less formidable, according to some authors, Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine, first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and dispersed them in small bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence they were scarce ever removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion. Small bodies of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns, and seldom removed from those quarters, became themselves tradesmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the military character; and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the attack of the German and Scythian militias, which soon afterwards invaded the western empire. It was only by hiring the militia of some of those nations to oppose to that of others, that the emperors were for some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, of which ancient history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account. It was brought about by the irresistible superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by militias have generally been, not over standing armies, but over other militias, in exercise and discipline inferior to themselves. Such were the victories which the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian empire; and such, too, were those which, in later times, the Swiss militia gained over that of the Austrians and Burgundians.

Many different factors led to a relaxation of discipline in the Roman armies. Their extreme strictness was probably one of these factors. During their heyday, when no enemy seemed able to challenge them, they set aside their heavy armor as unnecessarily burdensome and neglected their rigorous training as overly tiresome. Under the Roman emperors, particularly the standing armies stationed along the German and Pannonian frontiers became a threat to those in power, often supporting their own generals against the rulers. To make these forces less intimidating, some historians say Diocletian, while others argue it was Constantine who first moved them away from the front lines, where they had previously camped in large groups of two or three legions, and instead scattered them in smaller units throughout various provincial towns. They were rarely relocated unless there was a need to fend off an invasion. Small groups of soldiers stationed in trading and manufacturing towns, who were seldom moved, took on roles as tradespeople, craftsmen, and manufacturers. The civilian culture started to overshadow the military spirit, leading the standing armies of Rome to gradually become a corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia, unable to resist the attacks from the German and Scythian forces that soon invaded the western empire. The emperors could only defend themselves for a while by hiring militias from some of those nations to fight against others. The fall of the western empire marks the third major shift in human history that ancient records have captured in any significant detail. This collapse occurred due to the undeniable superiority of the militia from a barbaric culture over that of a civilized one, just as the militia of a society of shepherds had the advantage over a community of farmers and artisans. The victories achieved by militias have usually been against other militias that were less trained and disciplined than they were. Such were the victories of the Greek militia over the Persian empire, and similarly, those of the Swiss militia over the Austrians and Burgundians in later times.

The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who established themselves upon the ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be of the same kind in their new settlements, as it had been in their original country. It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of war, took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well exercised, and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced, however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the people had less time to spare for military exercises. Both the discipline and the exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and standing armies were gradually introduced to supply the place of it. When the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once been adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its neighbors should follow the example. They soon found that their safety depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia was altogether incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.

The military power of the German and Scythian nations, who settled on the remnants of the western empire, remained pretty much the same in their new homes as it had been in their original lands. It was made up of farmers and shepherds who, during wartime, took up arms under the same leaders they respected in times of peace. Because of this, they were relatively well-trained and disciplined. However, as arts and industries progressed, the authority of the leaders started to weaken, and the general population had less time for military training. Consequently, the discipline and training of the feudal militia slowly declined, and standing armies gradually became more common to replace them. Once one civilized nation adopted the idea of a standing army, it became crucial for all its neighbors to do the same. They quickly realized that their safety depended on following suit and that their own militias were entirely unprepared to defend against such an army.

The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops, and, the very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to face the hardiest and most experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe. The Russian empire, however, had enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and could at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy. When the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace for about eight-and-twenty years. The valour of her soldiers, however, far from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more distinguished than in the attempt upon Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate war. In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may sometimes forget their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.

The soldiers of a standing army, even if they've never faced an enemy, often show as much courage as seasoned troops and seem ready to take on the toughest and most experienced veterans the moment they step onto the battlefield. In 1756, when the Russian army entered Poland, the bravery of the Russian soldiers appeared to match that of the Prussians, who were then considered the toughest and most experienced veterans in Europe. However, the Russian empire had enjoyed nearly twenty years of peace before this, so at that time, it likely had very few soldiers who had ever seen combat. When the Spanish war started in 1739, England had experienced a long peace of about twenty-eight years. Yet, the bravery of its soldiers was far from diminished by that long peace, and it was never more evident than in the assault on Carthagena, the first unfortunate mission of that unfortunate war. In a lengthy period of peace, generals might sometimes forget their skills, but when a well-regulated standing army is maintained, soldiers seem to never forget their bravery.

When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation. A well regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the civilization of any[Pg 296] country can be perpetuated, or even preserved, for any considerable time.

When a civilized nation relies on a militia for its defense, it is always vulnerable to being defeated by any nearby barbaric nation. The repeated conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia by the Tartars clearly show the natural advantage that the militia of a barbaric nation has over that of a civilized one. A well-organized standing army is superior to any militia. Such an army can be best maintained by a wealthy and civilized nation, and only it can effectively protect that nation from the invasion of a poor and barbaric neighbor. Therefore, it is only through a standing army that the civilization of any[Pg 296] country can be sustained or even safeguarded for a significant time.

As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a civilized country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country can be suddenly and tolerably civilised. A standing army establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree of regular government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever examines with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves into the establishment of a well regulated standing army. It is the instrument which executes and maintains all his other regulations. That degree of order and internal peace, which that empire has ever since enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.

A well-regulated standing army is essential for defending a civilized country, and it’s also the key to suddenly and effectively civilizing a barbarous country. A standing army enforces the law of the sovereign with undeniable power across even the most distant parts of the empire and helps to maintain some level of government in regions that wouldn’t be able to sustain any otherwise. Anyone who closely examines the changes that Peter the Great made in the Russian empire will see that they mostly come down to creating a well-organized standing army. This army is the tool that carries out and upholds all of his other reforms. The order and internal peace that the empire has enjoyed since then can be attributed entirely to the influence of that army.

Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army, as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the general, and that of the principal officers, are not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of the state. The standing army of Cæsar destroyed the Roman republic. The standing army of Cromwell turned the long parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may, in some cases, be favourable to liberty. The security which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen. Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the must licentious remonstrances, can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated standing army. It is in such countries only, that the public safety does not require that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power, for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious liberty.

People with republican ideals have always been wary of a standing army, seeing it as a threat to freedom. This is definitely true when the interests of the general and the main officers aren't directly tied to upholding the constitution. Caesar's standing army led to the downfall of the Roman Republic. Cromwell's standing army kicked the Long Parliament out. However, when the sovereign is also the general, and the leading nobles and gentry are the army's main officers, the military is in the hands of those most invested in maintaining civil authority since they have a significant share of that authority themselves. In this scenario, a standing army can never threaten liberty. In fact, it might even support it in some situations. The security it provides to the sovereign makes it unnecessary to have that annoying vigilance seen in some modern republics, which seems to monitor every little action and is always ready to disrupt the peace of every citizen. When the magistrate's security is at risk from every wave of popular discontent, where even a minor disturbance can swiftly lead to a major upheaval, the entire government must focus on quelling and punishing any dissent. On the other hand, a sovereign who feels backed not only by the natural aristocracy but also by a well-regulated standing army can disregard even the rudest, baseless, and most outrageous complaints. He can easily forgive or ignore them, and his strong sense of superiority naturally leads him to do so. That level of freedom that edges toward disorder can only be tolerated in nations where the sovereign is safeguarded by a well-regulated standing army. It is only in such nations that public safety does not require the sovereign to have discretionary power to suppress even the irritating excesses of this reckless liberty.

The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization. The military force of the society, which originally cost the sovereign no expense, either in time of peace, or in time of war, must, in the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, and afterwards even in time of peace.

The primary responsibility of the ruler, then, which is to protect the society from the violence and unfairness of other independent societies, becomes increasingly costly as society becomes more civilized. The military power of the society, which originally didn’t cost the ruler anything during peacetime or wartime, must, as society progresses, first be funded by him during wartime, and eventually even during peacetime.

The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of fire-arms, has enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and disciplining any particular number of soldiers in time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive. A musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta. The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably, and occasions a very considerable expense. The javelins and arrows which were thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily be picked up again, and were, besides, of very little value. The cannon and the mortar are not only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the balista or catapulta; and require a greater expense, not only to prepare them for the field, but to carry them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery, too, over that of the ancients, is very grant; it has become much more difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town, so as to resist, even for a few weeks, the attack of that superior artillery. In modern times, many different causes contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the the art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of gunpowder, seems to have given occasion.

The major change brought about by the invention of firearms has further increased both the cost of training and maintaining a specific number of soldiers in peacetime and the cost of using them during wartime. Both their weapons and their ammunition have become more expensive. A musket costs more than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar is pricier than a ballista or a catapult. The gunpowder used during a modern military review is lost forever, leading to significant expenses. The javelins and arrows used in ancient practices could easily be collected again and were worth very little. Additionally, cannons and mortars are not only much more expensive but also heavier than the ballista or catapult, requiring more money to prepare them for battle and transport them. As the superiority of modern artillery over ancient methods is substantial, it has become much harder—and correspondingly more expensive—to fortify a town to withstand, even for a few weeks, an attack from that advanced artillery. Nowadays, various factors contribute to making the defense of society more costly. The unavoidable effects of ongoing advancements have been amplified by a significant shift in the art of war, which seems to have been triggered by the accidental invention of gunpowder.

In modern war, the great expense of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expense; and consequently, to an opulent and civilized, over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times, the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times, the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and[Pg 297] civilized. The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable, both to the permanency and to the extension of civilisation.

In modern warfare, the high cost of firearms clearly gives an advantage to the country that can best handle that expense; thus, wealthy and civilized nations have an edge over poorer and less developed ones. In ancient times, wealthy and civilized societies struggled to protect themselves from poorer, more savage nations. Nowadays, it's the poorer and less developed nations that find it hard to defend against the wealthy and civilized. The invention of firearms, which initially seems harmful, actually supports both the stability and growth of civilization.[Pg 297]

PART II.

Of the Expense of Justice.

The second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice, requires two very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society.

The second responsibility of the ruler, which is to protect each member of society from the injustice or oppression by others, or the duty to ensure a fair system of justice, demands two very different levels of funding at various stages of society.

Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour; so there is seldom any established magistrate, or any regular administration of justice. Men who have no property, can injure one another only in their persons or reputations. But when one man kills, wounds, beats, or defames another, though he to whom the injury is done suffers, he who does it receives no benefit. It is otherwise with the injuries to property. The benefit of the person who does the injury is often equal to the loss of him who suffers it. Envy, malice, or resentment, are the only passions which can prompt one man to injure another in his person or reputation. But the greater part of men are not very frequently under the influence of those passions; and the very worst men are so only occasionally. As their gratification, too, how agreeable soever it may be to certain characters, is not attended with any real or permanent advantage, it is, in the greater part of men, commonly restrained by prudential considerations. Men may live together in society with some tolerable degree of security, though there is no civil magistrate to protect them from the injustice of those passions. But avarice and ambition in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of present ease and enjoyment, are the passions which prompt to invade property; passions much more steady in their operation, and much more universal in their influence. Wherever there is a great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate, that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate, continually held up to chastise it. The requisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil government is not so necessary.

In societies of hunters, where there's hardly any property, or at least not more than what you'd earn in two or three days of work, there usually isn't a formal magistrate or a regular justice system. People who have no property can only harm each other physically or damage their reputations. However, when someone kills, injures, assaults, or defames another, the victim suffers, but the attacker gains nothing. This is different when it comes to property damage. The person who inflicts harm often benefits just as much as the person who suffers from it. Only feelings like envy, malice, or resentment drive someone to hurt another person or their reputation. Most people are not frequently influenced by these emotions, and even the worst individuals are affected only sometimes. Since the satisfaction gained from such actions, no matter how enjoyable it is to some, doesn’t bring real or lasting benefits, most people are usually held back by practical considerations. People can live together in society with a fair degree of security, even without a civil magistrate to guard them from the wrongs produced by those emotions. But greed and ambition among the wealthy, and the disdain for work combined with the desire for immediate comfort and enjoyment among the poor, are the feelings that lead to property invasions—emotions that are more constant and widely felt. Wherever there is significant wealth, there is also great inequality. For every very rich person, there need to be at least five hundred poor individuals, and the wealth of a few assumes the poverty of many. The wealth of the rich stirs up resentment among the poor, who are often driven by need and envy to seize what others possess. It is only under the protection of a civil magistrate that the owner of valuable property, earned through years of hard work or generations, can even sleep securely at night. They are constantly surrounded by unknown foes who, although they have never been provoked, can never be appeased, and from whose injustices they can only be protected by the strong hand of the civil magistrate, always ready to punish it. Therefore, having valuable and extensive property makes the establishment of civil government essential. Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days’ labor, civil government is not as necessary.

Civil government supposes a certain subordination. But as the necessity of civil government gradually grows up with the acquisition of valuable property, so the principal causes, which naturally introduce subordination, gradually grow up with the growth of that valuable property.

Civil government requires a certain level of subordination. However, as the need for civil government increases alongside the accumulation of valuable property, the main reasons that naturally bring about this subordination also emerge with the growth of that valuable property.

The causes or circumstances which naturally introduce subordination, or which naturally and antecedent to any civil institution, give some men some superiority over the greater part of their brethren, seem to be four in number.

The reasons or situations that naturally create subordination, or that exist prior to any civil institution, giving certain individuals an advantage over most of their peers, appear to be four in total.

The first of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of personal qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body; of wisdom and virtue of prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind. The qualifications of the body, unless supported by those of the mind, can give little authority in any period of society. He is a very strong man, who, by mere strength of body, can force two weak ones to obey him. The qualifications of the mind can alone give very great authority. They are however, invisible qualities; always disputable, and generally disputed. No society, whether barbarous or civilized, has ever found it convenient to settle the rules of precedency of rank and subordination, according to those invisible qualities; but according to something that is more plain and palpable.

The first of those causes or circumstances is the advantage of personal qualities, like physical strength, beauty, and agility, as well as wisdom and virtues like prudence, justice, courage, and self-control. Physical traits, unless backed by mental attributes, don’t carry much weight in any society. A very strong man might be able to make two weaker individuals follow him just by his physical power. However, qualities of the mind can provide significant authority. Yet, these are hidden traits; always debatable, and often debated. No society, whether primitive or advanced, has ever found it practical to establish the rules of ranking and hierarchy based on these hidden qualities but instead relies on factors that are more obvious and tangible.

The second of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of age. An old man, provided his age is not so far advanced as to give suspicion of dotage, is everywhere more respected than a young man of equal rank, fortune, and abilities. Among nations of hunters, such as the native tribes of North America, age is the sole foundation of rank and precedency. Among them, father is the appellation of a superior; brother, of an equal; and son, of an inferior. In the most opulent and civilized nations, age regulates rank among those who are in every other respect equal; and among whom, therefore, there is nothing else to regulate it. Among brothers and among sisters, the eldest always takes place; and in the succession of the paternal estate, every thing which cannot be divided, but must go entire to one person, such as a title of honour, is in most cases given to the eldest. Age is a plain and palpable quality, which admits of no dispute.[Pg 298]

The second reason or circumstance is the advantage of age. An older man, as long as he isn’t so old that it raises concerns about his mental acuity, is generally more respected than a younger man with the same status, wealth, and skills. Among hunting societies, like the Indigenous tribes of North America, age is the main basis for rank and social standing. In these communities, "father" refers to someone of higher status, "brother" indicates an equal, and "son" signifies someone of lower status. In the wealthiest and most developed nations, age governs rank among those who are otherwise equal, where there's nothing else to determine it. Among siblings, the oldest always takes precedence; and when it comes to inheritance of family wealth, anything that can't be divided but must go to one person, like a title of honor, is usually passed on to the eldest. Age is a clear and obvious factor that leaves no room for debate.[Pg 298]

The third of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of fortune. The authority of riches, however, though great in every age of society, is, perhaps, greatest in the rudest ages of society, which admits of any considerable inequality of fortune. A Tartar chief, the increase of whose flocks and herds is sufficient to maintain a thousand men, cannot well employ that increase in any other way than in maintaining a thousand men. The rude state of his society does not afford him any manufactured produce; any trinkets or baubles of any kind, for which he can exchange that part of his rude produce which is over and above his own consumption. The thousand men whom he thus maintains, depending entirely upon him for their subsistence, must both obey his orders in war, and submit to his jurisdiction in peace. He is necessarily both their general and their judge, and his chieftainship is the necessary effect of the superiority of his fortune. In an opulent and civilized society, a man may possess a much greater fortune, and yet not be able to command a dozen of people. Though the produce of his estate may be sufficient to maintain, and may, perhaps, actually maintain, more than a thousand people, yet, as those people pay for every thing which they get from him, as he gives scarce any thing to any body but in exchange for an equivalent, there is scarce any body who considers himself as entirely dependent upon him, and his authority extends only over a few menial servants. The authority of fortune, however, is very great, even in an opulent and civilized society. That it is much greater than that either of age or of personal qualities, has been the constant complaint of every period of society which admitted of any considerable inequality of fortune. The first period of society, that of hunters, admits of no such inequality. Universal poverty establishes their universal equality; and the superiority, either of age or of personal qualities, are the feeble, but the sole foundations of authority and subordination. There is, therefore, little or no authority or subordination in this period of society. The second period of society, that of shepherds, admits of very great inequalities of fortune, and there is no period in which the superiority of fortune gives so great authority to those who possess it. There is no period, accordingly, in which authority and subordination are more perfectly established. The authority of an Arabian scherif is very great; that of a Tartar khan altogether despotical.

The third cause of these circumstances is the advantage of wealth. The power that comes with riches, while significant in every era, is perhaps greatest in the earliest stages of society, where there is a notable disparity in wealth. A Tartar chief, whose growing flocks and herds can support a thousand men, has little choice but to use that surplus to maintain those men. The primitive nature of his society offers him no manufactured goods or trinkets to trade for what exceeds his own needs. The thousand men he supports are entirely reliant on him for their survival, meaning they must follow his commands in battle and adhere to his rule in peace. He is both their leader in war and their judge in peace, and his leadership naturally arises from his wealth. In a wealthy and developed society, a person might have far more wealth yet lack the ability to command even a small group. Although the resources from his estate might support, and maybe even cover, the needs of more than a thousand people, since those people pay for everything they receive from him and he rarely gives anything without expecting something in return, few see themselves as entirely dependent on him, and his influence extends mainly to a handful of servants. However, the influence of wealth is still significant, even in a wealthy and civilized society. Many have continuously lamented that this influence is far stronger than that of age or personal qualities, in any society with noticeable wealth inequalities. The earliest stage of society, that of hunters, has no such disparities. Their shared poverty creates universal equality, and the superiority of age or personal traits is only a weak basis for authority and hierarchy. Consequently, there is little to no authority or hierarchy in this stage. The second stage, that of shepherds, does allow for significant wealth inequalities, and it is during this stage that wealth provides the greatest authority to those who have it. There is no period where authority and hierarchy are more clearly defined. The power of an Arabian sherif is substantial; that of a Tartar khan is outright despotic.

The fourth of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of birth. Superiority of birth supposes an ancient superiority of fortune in the family of the person who claims it. All families are equally ancient; and the ancestors of the prince, though they may be better known, cannot well be more numerous than those of the beggar. Antiquity of family means everywhere the antiquity either of wealth, or of that greatness which is commonly either founded upon wealth, or accompanied with it. Upstart greatness is everywhere less respected than ancient greatness. The hatred of usurpers, the love of the family of an ancient monarch, are in a great measure founded open the contempt which men naturally have for the former, and upon their veneration for the latter. As a military officer submits, without reluctance, to the authority of a superior by whom he has always been commanded, but cannot bear that his inferior should be set over his head; so men easily submit to a family to whom they and their ancestors have always submitted; but are fired with indignation when another family, in whom they had never acknowledged any such superiority, assumes a dominion over them.

The fourth reason or circumstance is the advantage of birth. The advantage of birth assumes an old family wealth for the person who claims it. All families have an equal history; the ancestors of a prince, although they might be better known, can't be more numerous than those of a beggar. Old family lineage signifies either old wealth or that kind of greatness usually built on wealth or accompanied by it. New wealth is generally less respected than old wealth. The disdain for usurpers and the affection for the lineage of an old king are largely based on the natural contempt people have for the former and the respect they have for the latter. Just as a military officer willingly submits to the authority of a superior with whom he has always served but cannot tolerate having an inferior placed over him, people easily accept a family to whom they and their ancestors have always submitted, but they become outraged when another family, to whom they have never recognized any superiority, tries to rule over them.

The distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can have no place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in fortune, must likewise be very nearly equal in birth. The son of a wise and brave man may, indeed, even among them, be somewhat more respected than a man of equal merit, who has the misfortune to be the son of a fool or a coward. The difference, however, will not be very great; and there never was, I believe, a great family in the world, whose illustration was entirely derived from the inheritance of wisdom and virtue.

The distinction of birth, which comes after wealth inequality, doesn’t matter in hunter societies, where everyone is pretty much equal in wealth and, therefore, also close to equal in status. The son of a wise and brave man might, indeed, be respected a bit more than someone of similar merit who happens to be the son of a fool or a coward. However, the difference isn’t significant; and I believe there has never been a great family in the world whose reputation was solely based on inherited wisdom and virtue.

The distinction of birth not only may, but always does, take place among nations of shepherds. Such nations are always strangers to every sort of luxury, and great wealth can scarce ever be dissipated among them by improvident profusion. There are no nations, accordingly, who abound more in families revered and honoured on account of their descent from a long race of great and illustrious ancestors; because there are no nations among whom wealth is likely to continue longer in the same families.

The difference in social status based on birth not only can, but always does, exist among shepherding nations. These nations are typically unfamiliar with luxury, and great wealth rarely gets squandered through reckless spending. As a result, there are no nations that have more families respected and honored for their lineage from a long line of great and distinguished ancestors, because there are no nations where wealth is likely to stay with the same families for longer.

Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally set one man above another. They are the two great sources of personal distinction, and are, therefore, the principal causes which naturally establish authority and subordination among men. Among nations of shepherds, both those causes operate with their full force. The great shepherd or herdsman, respected on account of his great wealth, and of the great number of those who depend upon him for subsistence, and revered on account of the nobleness of his birth, and of the immemorial antiquity of his illustrious family, has a natural authority over all the inferior shepherds or herdsmen of his horde or clan. He can command the united force of a greater number of people than any of them. His military power is greater than that of any of them. In time of[Pg 299] war, they are all of them naturally disposed to muster themselves under his banner, rather than under that of any other person; and his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to him some sort of executive power. By commanding, too, the united force of a greater number of people than any of them, he is best able to compel any one of them, who may have injured another, to compensate the wrong. He is the person, therefore, to whom all those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally look up for protection. It is to him that they naturally complain of the injuries which they imagine have been done to them; and his interposition, in such cases, is more easily submitted to, even by the person complained of, than that of any other person would be. His birth and fortune thus naturally procure him some sort of judicial authority.

Birth and wealth are clearly the two main factors that place one person above another. They are the primary sources of personal distinction and, as a result, the main reasons that naturally establish authority and hierarchy among people. In societies of shepherds, both factors have a strong influence. The leading shepherd or herdsman, respected for his considerable wealth and the many people who depend on him for their livelihood, and admired for the nobility of his lineage and the ancient prestige of his family, holds a natural authority over the lesser shepherds or herdsmen in his group or clan. He can muster a larger force than any of them. His military strength surpasses that of any individual among them. During times of war, they are all inclined to gather under his leadership rather than that of anyone else, and his birth and wealth grant him some form of executive power. By commanding a larger group of people than any of them, he is also the one best able to enforce compensation for any harm done by one individual to another. Therefore, he is the person that those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally turn to for protection. They complain to him about the wrongs they believe have been done to them, and his involvement in these matters is more readily accepted, even by the accused, than that of anyone else. His birth and wealth thus naturally grant him a degree of judicial authority.

It is in the age of shepherds, in the second period of society, that the inequality of fortune first begins to take place, and introduces among men a degree of authority and subordination, which could not possibly exist before. It thereby introduces some degree of that civil government which is indispensably necessary for its own preservation; and it seems to do this naturally, and even independent of the consideration of that necessity. The consideration of that necessity comes, no doubt, afterwards, to contribute very much to maintain and secure that authority and subordination. The rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things, which can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages. Men of inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior wealth in the possession of their property, in order that men of superior wealth may combine to defend them in the possession of theirs. All the inferior shepherds and herdsmen feel, that the security of their own herds and flocks depends upon the security of those of the great shepherd or herdsman; that the maintenance of their lesser authority depends upon that of his greater authority; and that upon their subordination to him depends his power of keeping their inferiors in subordination to them. They constitute a sort of little nobility, who feel themselves interested to defend the property, and to support the authority, of their own little sovereign, in order that he may be able to defend their property, and to support their authority. Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is, in reality, instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.

In the era of shepherds, during the second stage of society, the inequality of wealth starts to emerge, creating a level of authority and hierarchy among people that couldn’t exist before. This creates a form of civil government that is essential for its own survival; it seems to develop naturally, even outside of considering that necessity. Of course, the awareness of that necessity later plays a significant role in maintaining and securing that authority and hierarchy. The wealthy, in particular, have a vested interest in preserving the existing order, as it ensures their grip on their own resources. People with less wealth band together to protect those with greater wealth in holding onto their possessions, so that those wealthier individuals will protect them in return. All the lesser shepherds and herdsmen understand that the safety of their own herds and flocks relies on the safety of the larger shepherd or herdsman; their lower authority hinges on his higher authority; and their subordination to him enables his ability to keep others subordinate to them. They form a sort of minor nobility, motivated to defend the property and uphold the authority of their own small ruler so that he can defend their assets and support their power. Civil government, insofar as it is created to safeguard property, is essentially created to protect the rich from the poor, or those who own some property from those who own none at all.

The judicial authority of such a sovereign, however, far from being a cause of expense, was, for a long time, a source of revenue to him. The persons who applied to him for justice were always willing to pay for it, and a present never failed to accompany a petition. After the authority of the sovereign, too, was thoroughly established, the person found guilty, over and above the satisfaction which he was obliged to make to the party, was likewise forced to pay an amercement to the sovereign. He had given trouble, he had disturbed, he had broke the peace of his lord the king, and for those offences an amercement was thought due. In the Tartar governments of Asia, in the governments of Europe which were founded by the German and Scythian nations who overturned the Roman empire, the administration of justice was a considerable source of revenue, both to the sovereign, and to all the lesser chiefs or lords who exercised under him any particular jurisdiction, either over some particular tribe or clan, or over some particular territory or district. Originally, both the sovereign and the inferior chiefs used in exercise this jurisdiction in their own persons. Afterwards, they universally found it convenient to delegate it to some substitute, bailiff, or judge. This substitute, however, was still obliged to account to his principal or constituent for the profits of the jurisdiction. Whoever reads the instructions[47] which were given to the judges of the circuit in the time of Henry II. will see clearly that those judges were a sort of itinerant factors, sent round the country for the purpose of levying certain branches of the king's revenue. In those days, the administration of justice not only afforded a certain revenue to the sovereign, but, to procure this revenue, seems to have been one of the principal advantages which he proposed to obtain by the administration of justice.

The judicial power of such a ruler, however, instead of being a cost, was, for a long time, a source of income for him. The people who came to him for justice were always ready to pay for it, and a gift always came with a request. After the ruler’s power was firmly established, the person found guilty, on top of compensating the victim, was also forced to pay a fine to the ruler. He had caused trouble, disrupted, and disturbed the peace of his lord, the king, and for those wrongdoings, a fine was deemed required. In the Tartar governments of Asia and in the European governments established by the German and Scythian nations that toppled the Roman Empire, the justice system was a significant source of revenue for both the ruler and all the minor chiefs or lords who had specific jurisdictions, whether over a tribe or clan or a particular area. Initially, both the ruler and the lower chiefs exercised this authority themselves. Later, they found it easier to delegate it to a substitute, bailiff, or judge. This substitute, however, still had to report back to his superior about the profits from the jurisdiction. Anyone who reads the instructions[47] given to the circuit judges during the time of Henry II will see clearly that those judges were a kind of traveling agents, sent around to collect certain parts of the king's income. Back then, the administration of justice not only provided a certain income for the ruler, but to obtain this income seemed to be one of the main benefits he aimed to gain through the justice system.

This scheme of making the administration of justice subservient to the purposes of revenue, could scarce fail to be productive of several very gross abuses. The person who applied for justice with a large present in his hand, was likely to get something more than justice; while he who applied for it with a small one was likely to get something less. Justice, too, might frequently be delayed, in order that this present might be repeated. The amercement, besides, of the person complained of, might frequently suggest a very strong reason for finding him in the wrong, even when he had not really been so. That such abuses were far from being uncommon, the ancient history of every country in Europe bears witness.

This way of making the justice system serve revenue goals was bound to lead to numerous blatant abuses. Someone seeking justice with a significant bribe was likely to receive more than just justice, while someone with a smaller bribe was likely to receive less. Justice could also often be delayed so that the bribe could be offered again. Additionally, the penalty imposed on the accused often created a strong incentive to find him guilty, even if he was innocent. The historical records of every country in Europe show that such abuses were quite common.

When the sovereign or chief exercises his judicial authority in his own person, how much soever he might abuse it, it must have been scarce possible to get any redress; because there could seldom be any body powerful enough to call him to account. When he exercised it by a bailiff, indeed, redress might sometimes be had. If it was for his own be[Pg 300]nefit only, that the bailiff had been guilty of an act of injustice, the sovereign himself might not always be unwilling to punish him, or to oblige him to repair the wrong. But if it was for the benefit of his sovereign; if it was in order to make court to the person who appointed him, and who might prefer him, that he had committed any act of oppression; redress would, upon most occasions be as impossible as if the sovereign had committed it himself. In all barbarous governments, accordingly, in all those ancient governments of Europe in particular, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the administration of justice appears for a long time to have been extremely corrupt; far from being quite equal and impartial, even under the best monarchs, and altogether profligate under the worst.

When the ruler or leader exercises their judicial authority personally, no matter how much they might abuse it, it would have been nearly impossible to find any way to get justice. This is because there were rarely people powerful enough to hold them accountable. When they exercised that authority through a bailiff, however, it was sometimes possible to seek redress. If the bailiff acted unjustly for his own benefit, the ruler might not always be opposed to punishing him or making him correct the harm done. But if the injustice was done for the ruler's benefit; if the bailiff was trying to win favor with the person who appointed him, who could promote him, then getting justice would often be as impossible as if the ruler had committed the act themselves. In all primitive governments, particularly in those ancient European governments that arose from the collapse of the Roman Empire, the administration of justice seems to have been extremely corrupt for a long time; it was far from being equal and impartial, even under the best kings, and completely shameless under the worst.

Among nations of shepherds, where the sovereign or chief is only the greatest shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the same manner as any of his vassals or subjects, by the increase of his own herds or flocks. Among those nations of husbandmen, who are but just come out of the shepherd state, and who are not much advanced beyond that state, such as the Greek tribes appear to have been about the time of the Trojan war, and our German and Scythian ancestors, when they first settled upon the ruins of the western empire; the sovereign or chief is, in the same manner, only the greatest landlord of the country, and is maintained in the same manner as any other landlord, by a revenue derived from his own private estate, or from what, in modern Europe, was called the demesne of the crown. His subjects, upon ordinary occasions, contribute nothing to his support, except when, in order to protect them from the oppression of some of their fellow-subjects, they stand in need of his authority. The presents which they make him upon such occasions constitute the whole ordinary revenue, the whole of the emoluments which, except, perhaps, upon some very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his dominion over them. When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles, for his friendship, the sovereignty of seven Greek cities, the sole advantage which he mentions as likely to be derived from it was, that the people would honour him with presents. As long as such presents, as long as the emoluments of justice, or what may be called the fees of court, constituted, in this manner, the whole ordinary revenue which the sovereign derived from his sovereignty, it could not well be expected, it could not even decently be proposed, that he should give them up altogether. It might, and it frequently was proposed, that he should regulate and ascertain then. But after they had been so regulated and ascertained, how to hinder a person who was all-powerful from extending them beyond those regulations, was still very difficult, not to say impossible. During the continuance of this state of things, therefore, the corruption of justice, naturally resulting from the arbitrary and uncertain nature of those presents, scarce admitted of any effectual remedy.

Among societies of shepherds, where the ruler or chief is just the leading shepherd or herdsman of the group or clan, he is supported in the same way as any of his vassals or subjects, through the growth of his own herds or flocks. In societies of farmers, who have just transitioned from being shepherds and are not much beyond that phase—like the Greek tribes during the Trojan War and our German and Scythian ancestors when they first settled on the ruins of the western empire—the ruler or chief is similarly the largest landowner in the area and is sustained just like any other landowner, through income from his own estate or from what in modern Europe was called the crown's demesne. His subjects typically contribute nothing to his support, except when they need his authority to protect them from the oppression of other subjects. The gifts they offer him in such instances make up his entire usual revenue, essentially everything he earns from his rule over them, except perhaps in very rare emergencies. When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers Achilles the rule of seven Greek cities as a gesture of friendship, the only benefit he highlights is that people would honor him with gifts. As long as these gifts, along with the earnings from justice or what might be seen as court fees, were the entire usual revenue the ruler received from his authority, it was unreasonable to expect—or even suggest—that he should give them up entirely. It might have been suggested that he should regulate and define them, but once that was done, it was still very challenging, if not impossible, to prevent a person with absolute power from exceeding those regulations. Therefore, during this period, the corruption of justice, stemming from the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of those gifts, hardly allowed for any effective remedy.

But when, from different causes, chiefly from the continually increasing expense of defending the nation against the invasion of other nations, the private estate of the sovereign had become altogether insufficient for defraying the expense of the sovereignty; and when it had become necessary that the people should, for their own security, contribute towards this expense by taxes of different kinds; it seems to have been very commonly stipulated, that no present for the administration of justice should, under any pretence, be accepted either by the sovereign, or by his bailiffs and substitutes, the judges. Those presents, it seems to have been supposed, could more easily be abolished altogether, than effectually regulated and ascertained. Fixed salaries were appointed to the judges, which were supposed to compensate to them the loss of whatever might have been their share of the ancient emoluments of justice; as the taxes more than compensated to the sovereign the loss of his. Justice was then said to be administered gratis.

But when, due to various reasons, mainly the rising costs of defending the nation from other countries, the private wealth of the sovereign became completely insufficient to cover the expenses of governance; and when it became necessary for the people to contribute to these costs through different taxes for their own security; it seems there was a common agreement that no gifts for the administration of justice should, under any circumstance, be accepted by the sovereign, or by his officials and substitutes, the judges. It was believed that these gifts could be abolished more easily than they could be effectively regulated and defined. Fixed salaries were established for the judges, which were meant to compensate them for the loss of whatever they might have received from the traditional fees of justice; just as the taxes compensated the sovereign for his losses. Justice was then said to be administered for free.

Justice, however, never was in reality administered gratis in any country. Lawyers and attorneys, at least, must always be paid by the parties; and if they were not, they would perform their duty still worse than they actually perform it. The fees annually paid to lawyers and attorneys, amount, in every court, to a much greater sum than the salaries of the judges. The circumstance of those salaries being paid by the crown, can nowhere much diminish the necessary expense of a law-suit. But it was not so much to diminish the expense, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges were prohibited from receiving any present or fee from the parties.

Justice, however, has never really been offered for free in any country. Lawyers and attorneys must always be paid by the clients; if they weren't, they'd do their jobs even worse than they already do. The fees paid to lawyers and attorneys each year add up to a much larger total than the salaries of the judges in every court. The fact that those salaries are paid by the crown doesn't significantly reduce the overall cost of a lawsuit. However, it wasn't so much about lowering costs as it was about preventing corruption in the legal system that judges were banned from accepting any gifts or fees from the parties involved.

The office of judge is in itself so very honourable, that men are willing to accept of it, though accompanied with very small emoluments. The inferior office of justice of peace, though attended with a good deal of trouble, and in most cases with no emoluments at all, is an object of ambition to the greater part of our country gentlemen. The salaries of all the different judges, high and low, together with the whole expense of the administration and execution of justice, even where it is not managed with very good economy, makes, in any civilized country, but a very inconsiderable part of the whole expense of government.

The role of a judge is highly respected, so people are eager to take it on, even if the pay is quite low. The lesser role of a justice of the peace, which involves a lot of work and usually offers no payment at all, is still sought after by many of our country gentlemen. The salaries of all judges, both high and low, along with the total costs of administering and enforcing justice—even when not managed very efficiently—make up just a small part of the overall expenses of government in any civilized country.

The whole expense of justice, too, might easily be defrayed by the fees of court; and, without exposing the administration of justice to any real hazard of corruption, the public[Pg 301] revenue might thus be entirely discharged from a certain, though perhaps but a small incumbrance. It is difficult to regulate the fees of court effectually, where a person so powerful as the sovereign is to share in them, and to derive any considerable part of his revenue from them. It is very easy, where the judge is the principal person who can reap any benefit from them. The law can very easily oblige the judge to respect the regulation, though it might not always be able to make the sovereign respect it. Where the fees of court are precisely regulated and ascertained; where they are paid all at once, at a certain period of every process, into the hands of a cashier or receiver, to be by him distributed in certain known proportions among the different judges after the process is decided, and not till it is decided; there seems to be no more danger of corruption than where such fees are prohibited altogether. Those fees, without occasioning any considerable increase in the expense of a law-suit, might be rendered fully sufficient for defraying the whole expense of justice. But not being paid to the judges till the process was determined, they might be some incitement to the diligence of the court in examining and deciding it. In courts which consisted of a considerable number of judges, by proportioning the share of each judge to the number of hours and days which he had employed in examining the process, either in the court, or in a committee, by order of the court, those fees might give some encouragement to the diligence of each particular judge. Public services are never better performed, than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them. In the different parliaments of France, the fees of court (called epices and vacations) constitute the far greater part of the emoluments of the judges. After all deductions are made, the neat salary paid by the crown to a counsellor or judge in the parliament of Thoulouse, in rank and dignity the second parliament of the kingdom, amounts only to 150 livres, about L.6. 11s. sterling a-year. About seven years ago, that sum was in the same place the ordinary yearly wages of a common footman. The distribution of these epices, too, is according to the diligence of the judges. A diligent judge gains a comfortable, though moderate revenue, by his office; an idle one gets little more than his salary. Those parliaments are, perhaps, in many respects, not very convenient courts of justice, but they have never been accused; they seem never even to have been suspected of corruption.

The entire cost of justice could easily be covered by court fees, and without putting the administration of justice at risk of corruption, the public revenue could be freed from a certain, although perhaps minor, burden. It's tough to regulate court fees effectively when a powerful figure like the sovereign takes a share and gains a significant part of their revenue from them. It's much simpler in cases where the judge is the main beneficiary. The law can easily compel judges to follow regulations, even if it sometimes struggles to do the same for the sovereign. When court fees are precisely set and known, and are paid all at once at a specific point in the process to a cashier or receiver—who then distributes them in known shares among the judges only after the case is settled—there appears to be no greater risk of corruption than if those fees were banned entirely. Those fees could sufficiently cover the entire cost of justice without significantly raising the expense of a lawsuit. However, since they’re not given to the judges until after the process is resolved, they might encourage the court to be diligent in examining and deciding the case. In courts with a large number of judges, sharing the fees based on the hours and days each judge spent reviewing the case—whether in court or in a committee directed by the court—could incentivize the diligence of each judge. Public services are best performed when their rewards depend solely on their completion and are proportionate to the effort involved. In the various parliaments of France, court fees (known as epices and vacations) make up most of the judges’ earnings. After all deductions, the net salary paid by the crown to a counselor or judge in the parliament of Toulouse—the second most important parliament in the kingdom—is only 150 livres, about £6. 11s. a year. About seven years ago, that amount was the typical annual salary of a common footman in the same city. The allocation of these epices is also based on the judges’ productivity. A hard-working judge earns a decent, though modest, income from their position; a lazy one makes little more than their salary. While those parliaments may not be the most convenient courts of justice in many ways, they have never faced accusations of corruption, nor have they seemed to be suspected of it.

The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognizance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. The court of king's bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognizance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king, because the defendant would not pay him. In consequence of such fictions, it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties, before what court they would choose to have their cause tried, and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally, in a great measure, formed by this emulation, which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit, for every sort of injustice. Originally, the courts of law gave damages only for breach of contract. The court of chancery, as a court of conscience, first took upon it to enforce the specific performance of agreements. When the breach of contract consisted in the non-payment of money, the damage sustained could be compensated in no other way than by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a specific performance of the agreement. In such cases, therefore, the remedy of the courts of law was sufficient. It was not so in others. When the tenant sued his lord for having unjustly outed him of his lease, the damages which he recovered were by no means equivalent to the possession of the land. Such causes, therefore, for some time, went all to the court of chancery, to the no small loss of the courts of law. It was to draw back such causes to themselves, that the courts of law are said to have invented the artificial and fictitious writ of ejectment, the most effectual remedy for an unjust outer or dispossession of land.

The court fees seem to have originally been the main source of funding for various courts of justice in England. Each court tried to attract as much business as possible, which made them willing to handle many cases that weren't originally meant for their jurisdiction. The king's bench court, established for criminal cases only, also took on civil cases, with the plaintiff claiming that the defendant had committed some trespass or wrongdoing by not providing justice. The exchequer court, set up to collect the king’s revenue and enforce debts owed to the king, also handled other contract debts, with the plaintiff arguing they couldn’t pay the king because the defendant wouldn’t pay them. Because of these legal fictions, it often depended on the parties involved which court they wanted to have their case heard, and each court worked to attract more cases by being faster and fairer. The current exceptional structure of the courts in England was likely shaped significantly by this rivalry between judges, each striving to provide the quickest and most effective legal remedy for all kinds of injustices. Initially, law courts awarded damages only for breaches of contract. The chancery court, acting as a court of conscience, was the first to enforce specific performance of agreements. When a breach of contract involved failure to pay money, the only remedy was ordering payment, which was like enforcing the specific performance of the agreement. In those situations, the law courts' remedy was sufficient, but it was not so for others. For instance, when a tenant sued their lord for being wrongfully evicted from their lease, the damages recovered were not equivalent to regaining possession of the land. As a result, such cases often went to the chancery court, causing significant losses for the law courts. To bring those cases back, the law courts are said to have created the artificial and fictitious writ of ejectment, which became the most effective remedy for wrongful eviction or dispossession of land.

A stamp-duty upon the law proceedings by each particular court, to be levied by that court, and applied towards the maintenance of the judges, and other officers belonging to it, might in the same manner, afford a revenue sufficient for defraying the expense of the administration of justice, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society. The judges, indeed, might in this case, be under the temptation of multiplying unnecessarily the proceedings upon[Pg 302] every cause, in order to increase, as much as possible, the produce of such a stamp-duty. It has been the custom in modern Europe to regulate, upon most occasions, the payment of the attorneys and clerks of court according to the number of pages which they had occasion to write; the court, however, requiring that each page should contain so many lines, and each line so many words. In order to increase their payment, the attorneys and clerks have contrived to multiply words beyond all necessity, to the corruption of the law language of, I believe, every court of justice in Europe. A like temptation might, perhaps, occasion a like corruption in the form of law proceedings.

A stamp duty on legal proceedings by each specific court could be implemented by that court and used to support the judges and other staff members. This might generate enough revenue to cover the costs of administering justice without impacting the overall finances of society. However, judges might be tempted to unnecessarily extend proceedings for every case to maximize the revenue from the stamp duty. In modern Europe, it's common to determine the payment for attorneys and court clerks based on the number of pages they write, with the requirement that each page contains a specific number of lines and each line a certain number of words. To increase their earnings, attorneys and clerks have found ways to add unnecessary words, degrading the legal language of almost every court in Europe. A similar temptation could potentially lead to corruption in the processes of legal proceedings as well.

But whether the administration of justice be so contrived as to defray its own expense, or whether the judges be maintained by fixed salaries paid to them from some other fund, it does not seem necessary that the person or persons entrusted with the executive power should be charged with the management of that fund, or with the payment of those salaries. That fund might arise from the rent of landed estates, the management of each estate being entrusted to the particular court which was to be maintained by it. That fund might arise even from the interest of a sum of money, the lending out of which might, in the same manner, be entrusted to the court which was to be maintained by it. A part, though indeed but a small part of the salary of the judges of the court of session in Scotland, arises from the interest of a sum of money. The necessary instability of such a fund seems, however, to render it an improper one for the maintenance of an institution which ought to last for ever.

But whether the justice system is set up to cover its own costs, or whether the judges receive fixed salaries from a different source, it doesn’t seem necessary for the people in charge of the executive power to handle that funding or pay those salaries. That funding could come from the rental income of land estates, with each estate managed by the specific court that it supports. That funding could also come from the interest on a sum of money, with the lending process similarly managed by the court that it supports. A small portion of the judges' salaries in the Scottish Court of Session comes from the interest on a sum of money. However, the inherent instability of such a fund seems to make it an unsuitable source for the support of an institution that should endure forever.

The separation of the judicial from the executive power, seems originally to have arisen from the increasing business of the society, in consequence of its increasing improvement. The administration of justice became so laborious and so complicated a duty, as to require the undivided attention of the person to whom it was entrusted. The person entrusted with the executive power, not having leisure to attend to the decision of private causes himself, a deputy was appointed to decide them in his stead. In the progress of the Roman greatness, the consul was too much occupied with the political affairs of the state, to attend to the administration of justice. A prætor, therefore, was appointed to administer it in his stead. In the progress of the European monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the sovereigns and the great lords came universally to consider the administration of justice as an office both too laborious and too ignoble for them to execute in their own persons. They universally, therefore, discharged themselves of it, by appointing a deputy, bailiff, or judge.

The separation of the judicial and executive powers seems to have originally come from the growing demands of society due to its ongoing development. The administration of justice became such a complex and demanding responsibility that it required the full attention of the person in charge. Since those in executive roles didn't have the time to handle private disputes themselves, they appointed a deputy to make those decisions on their behalf. As Roman power expanded, consuls became too busy with political matters to oversee justice, so a prætor was assigned to manage it instead. When European monarchies emerged from the remnants of the Roman Empire, kings and nobles generally viewed the administration of justice as a role that was too taxing and beneath their dignity to perform themselves. Consequently, they relieved themselves of this responsibility by appointing a deputy, bailiff, or judge.

When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power. The regular payment of his salary should not depend upon the good will, or even upon the good economy of that power.

When the judicial system is linked to the executive branch, it’s hard for justice not to be compromised by what we commonly call politics. The people responsible for the state's major interests might, without any corrupt intentions, sometimes believe they need to prioritize those interests over an individual's rights. However, the unbiased enforcement of justice is crucial for the freedom of every person and their sense of security. To ensure every individual feels completely secure in their rights, it’s essential that the judiciary is not only separate from the executive but also as independent as possible from that power. A judge shouldn’t be at risk of losing their position based on the whims of that power. Their salary should be regularly paid and not dependent on the goodwill or even the economic decisions of that power.

PART III.

Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions.

The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth, is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual, or small number of individuals; and which it, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual, or small number of individuals, should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society.

The third and final responsibility of the government or community is to establish and maintain public institutions and works that, while extremely beneficial to society as a whole, are not profitable enough to justify the costs for any one person or small group. Therefore, it’s unrealistic to expect that any individual or small group would build or sustain them. Fulfilling this responsibility also demands varying levels of investment depending on the different stages of society.

After the public institutions and public works necessary for the defence of the society, and for the administration of justice, both of which have already been mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people. The institutions for instruction are of two kinds: those for the education of the youth, and those for the instruction of people of all ages. The consideration of the manner in which the expense of those different sorts of public works and institutions may be most properly defrayed will divide this third part of the present chapter into three different articles.

After the public institutions and public works needed for the defense of society and for administering justice, which have already been mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind mainly aim to facilitate trade and promote education for the people. The educational institutions fall into two categories: those for teaching young people and those for instructing individuals of all ages. The discussion on how to best cover the costs of these different types of public works and institutions will split this third part of the chapter into three distinct sections.

ART. I.Of the public Works and Institutions for facilitating the Commerce of the Society.

And, first, of those which are necessary for facilitating Commerce in general.

That the erections and maintenance of the public works which facilitate the commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, &c. must require very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society, is evident without any proof. The expense of making and maintaining the public roads of any country must evidently increase with the annual produce of the land and labour of that country, or with the quantity and weight of the goods which it becomes necessary to fetch and carry upon those roads. The strength of a bridge must be suited to the number and weight of the carriages which are likely to pass over it. The depth and the supply of water for a navigable canal must be proportional to the number and tonnage of the lighters which are likely to carry goods upon it; the extent of a harbour, to the number of the shipping which are likely to take shelter in it.

It's clear without needing proof that building and maintaining public works that support a country's commerce, like good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbors, etc., will require different amounts of money at different times in society. The cost of creating and maintaining public roads in any country will naturally rise with the annual output of its land and labor or with the amount and weight of the goods that need to be transported on those roads. The strength of a bridge must match the number and weight of the vehicles that are expected to cross it. The depth and water supply for a navigable canal must be proportional to the number and tonnage of the boats that will carry goods on it; the size of a harbor must correspond to the number of ships that will look for shelter there.

It does not seem necessary that the expense of those public works should be defrayed from that public revenue, as it is commonly called, of which the collection and application are in most countries, assigned to the executive power. The greater part of such public works may easily be so managed, as to afford a particular revenue, sufficient for defraying their own expense, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society.

It doesn’t seem necessary for the cost of those public works to be covered by the public revenue, as it’s commonly referred to, which is typically collected and managed by the executive branch in most countries. Most of these public works can be organized in a way that generates their own income, enough to cover their expenses, without putting any strain on the overall funds of the society.

A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may, in most cases, be both made and maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which make use of them; a harbour, by a moderate port-duty upon the tonnage of the shipping which load or unload in it. The coinage, another institution for facilitating commerce, in many countries, not only defrays its own expense, but affords a small revenue or a seignorage to the sovereign. The post-office, another institution for the same purpose, over and above defraying its own expense, affords, in almost all countries, a very considerable revenue to the sovereign.

A highway, a bridge, or a navigable canal, for instance, can usually be built and maintained by a small toll on the vehicles that use them; a harbor can be funded by a reasonable port charge based on the tonnage of the ships that load or unload there. The coinage system, which also helps facilitate commerce, not only covers its own costs in many countries but also provides a small revenue or fee to the ruling authority. The post office, serving a similar purpose, not only pays for its own expenses but also generates a significant revenue for the government in almost every country.

When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or their tonnage, they pay for the maintenance of these public works exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works. This tax or toll, too, though it is advanced by the carrier, is finally paid by the consumer, to whom it must always be charged in the price of the goods. As the expense of carriage, however, is very much reduced by means of such public works, the goods, notwithstanding the toll, come cheaper to the consumer than they could otherwise have done, their price not being so much raised by the toll, as it is lowered by the cheapness of the carriage. The person who finally pays this tax, therefore, gains by the application more than he loses by the payment of it. His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain. It is, in reality, no more than a part of that gain which he is obliged to give up, in order to get the rest. It seems impossible to imagine a more equitable method of raising a tax.

When carriages travel over a highway or bridge, and boats sail on a navigable canal, they pay tolls based on their weight or tonnage. This means they contribute to the maintenance of these public works in direct relation to the damage they cause. It’s hard to think of a fairer way to fund such projects. Although the carrier initially covers this toll, the cost ultimately falls on the consumer, as it gets added to the price of the goods. However, because public works significantly lower the cost of transportation, the goods still end up cheaper for the consumer than they would be otherwise. The toll doesn’t raise prices as much as the lower transportation costs bring them down. Therefore, the person who ends up paying this tax actually benefits more from the improvements than they lose by paying. Their payment is perfectly aligned with their benefit. It’s really just a portion of the gain that they give up to enjoy the rest. It’s hard to envision a fairer way to collect a tax.

When the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon coaches, post-chaises, &c. is made somewhat higher in proportion to their weight, than upon carriages of necessary use, such as carts, waggons, &c. the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute, in a very easy manner, to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country.

When the fees for luxury carriages, like fancy coaches and post chaises, are set a bit higher based on their weight compared to necessary vehicles like carts and wagons, the laziness and vanity of wealthy people help support the poor. This happens easily since it makes it cheaper to transport heavy goods across the country.

When high-roads, bridges, canals, &c. are in this manner made and supported by the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they can be made only where that commerce requires them, and, consequently, where it is proper to make them, Their expense, too, their grandeur and magnificence, must be suited to what that commerce can afford to pay. They must be made, consequently, as it is proper to make them. A magnificent high-road cannot be made through a desert country, where there is little or no commerce, or merely because it happens to lead to the country villa of the intendant of the province, or to that of some great lord, to whom the intendant finds it convenient to make his court. A great bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where nobody passes, or merely to embellish the view from the windows of a neighbouring palace; things which sometimes happen in countries, where works of this kind are carried on by any other revenue than that which they themselves are capable of affording.

When highways, bridges, canals, etc. are built and maintained through the trade that relies on them, they can only be constructed where that trade needs them, and therefore, where it makes sense to build them. Their cost, as well as their scale and splendor, must align with what that trade can afford. They must be constructed appropriately. A grand highway cannot be built through a barren area with little to no trade, or just because it leads to the country home of the province's official, or that of some noble lord, to whom the official finds it advantageous to gain favor. A large bridge cannot be built over a river in a spot where no one travels, or merely to beautify the view from the windows of a nearby palace; these are situations that sometimes occur in countries where such projects are financed by sources other than what they can support on their own.

In several different parts of Europe, the toll or lock-duty upon a canal is the property of private persons, whose private interest obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is not kept in tolerable order, the navigation necessarily ceases altogether, and, along with it, the whole profit which they can make by the tolls. If those tolls were put under the the management of commissioners, who had themselves no interest in them, they might be less attentive to the maintenance of the works which produced them. The canal of Languedoc cost the king of France and the province upwards of thirteen millions of livres, which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of sil[Pg 304]ver, the value of French money in the end of the last century) amounted to upwards of nine hundred thousand pounds sterling. When that great work was finished, the most likely method, it was found, of keeping it in constant repair, was to make a present of the tolls to Riquet, the engineer who planned and conducted the work. Those tolls constitute, at present, a very large estate to the different branches of the family of that gentleman, who have, therefore, a great interest to keep the work in constant repair. But had those tolls been put under the management of commissioners, who had no such interest, they might perhaps, have been dissipated in ornamental and unnecessary expenses, while the most essential parts of the works were allowed to go to ruin.

In various parts of Europe, the toll or lock fee on a canal is owned by private individuals, whose personal interests drive them to maintain the canal. If it’s not kept in decent shape, navigation completely stops, and along with it, all the profit they could earn from the tolls. If those tolls were managed by commissioners without any personal stake, they might not pay as much attention to maintaining the infrastructure that generates them. The Languedoc canal cost the king of France and the province over thirteen million livres, which (at twenty-eight livres per mark of silver, the value of French currency at the end of the last century) totaled over nine hundred thousand pounds sterling. Once this major project was completed, it became clear that the best way to ensure constant repairs was to grant the tolls to Riquet, the engineer who designed and oversaw the project. These tolls now make up a considerable estate for Riquet's descendants, giving them a strong incentive to keep the canal well maintained. However, had those tolls been managed by commissioners without any such interest, they might have been squandered on decorative and unnecessary expenses while the critical parts of the infrastructure fell into disrepair.

The tolls for the maintenance of a high-road cannot, with any safety, be made the property of private persons. A high-road, though entirely neglected, does not become altogether impassable, though a canal does. The proprietors of the tolls upon a high-road, therefore, might neglect altogether the repair of the road, and yet continue to levy very nearly the same tolls. It is proper, therefore, that the tolls for the maintenance of such a work should be put under the management of commissioners or trustees.

The fees for maintaining a highway shouldn't belong to private individuals. A highway, even if completely ignored, doesn't become completely unusable, while a canal does. The owners of the tolls on a highway might fully neglect the road's upkeep and still charge nearly the same tolls. Therefore, it makes sense for the fees for maintaining such a system to be managed by commissioners or trustees.

In Great Britain, the abuses which the very trustees have committed in the management of those tolls, have, in many cases, been very justly complained of. At many turnpikes, it has been said, the money levied is more than double of what is necessary for executing, in the completest manner, the work, which is often executed in a very slovenly manner, and sometimes not executed at all. The system of repairing the high-roads by tolls of this kind, it must be observed, is not of very long standing. We should not wonder, therefore, if it has not yet been brought that degree of perfection of which it seems capable. If mean and improper persons are frequently appointed trustees; and if proper courts of inspection and account have not yet been established for controlling their conduct, and for reducing the tolls to what is barely sufficient for executing the work to be done by them; the recency of the institution both accounts and apologizes for those defects, of which, by the wisdom of parliament, the greater part may, in due time, be gradually remedied.

In Great Britain, the issues caused by the trustees in managing those tolls have often been rightly criticized. At many toll booths, it's been said that the charges are more than double what's needed to properly carry out the work, which is often done poorly or not done at all. It's important to note that the system of maintaining the highways through these kinds of tolls is relatively new. So, we shouldn't be surprised if it hasn't reached the level of efficiency it seems capable of. If unqualified and unsuitable people are frequently chosen as trustees, and if appropriate oversight and accounting systems aren't yet in place to monitor their actions and to lower the tolls to what is just enough to get the work done, then the newness of this system explains and justifies many of the shortcomings, most of which can be fixed over time with the right legislative action.

The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain, is supposed to exceed so much what is necessary for repairing the roads, that the savings which, with proper economy, might be made from it, have been considered, even by some ministers, as a very great resource, which might, at some time or another, be applied to the exigencies of the state. Government, it has been said, by taking the management of the turnpikes into its own hands, and by employing the soldiers, who would work for a very small addition to their pay, could keep the roads in good order, at a much less expense than it can be done by trustees, who have no other workmen to employ, but such as derive their whole subsistence from their wages. A great revenue, half a million, perhaps[48], it has been pretended, might in this manner be gained, without laying any new burden upon the people; and the turnpike roads might be made to contribute to the general expense of the state, in the same manner as the post-office does at present.

The money collected at the various tolls in Great Britain is thought to exceed what’s necessary for repairing the roads by such a margin that even some government officials believe the savings from proper management could serve as a significant resource for state needs. It has been suggested that if the government took over the management of the tolls and used soldiers, who would work for just a small increase in their pay, they could keep the roads in good shape at a much lower cost than trustees, who only employ workers relying solely on their wages. It's been claimed that a substantial revenue, maybe half a million, could be generated in this way without adding any new burdens on the public; the toll roads could help cover general state expenses just like the post office does today.

That a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner, I have no doubt, though probably not near so much as the projectors of this plan have supposed. The plan itself, however, seems liable to several very important objections.

I have no doubt that a significant amount of revenue could be generated this way, though it’s likely not as much as the people behind this plan expect. However, the plan itself appears to have several major issues.

First, If the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should ever be considered as one of the resources for supplying the exigencies of the state, they would certainly be augmented as those exigencies were supposed to require. According to the policy of Great Britain, therefore, they would probably be augmented very fast. The facility with which a great revenue could be drawn from them, would probably encourage administration to recur very frequently to this resource. Though it may, perhaps, be more than doubtful, whether half a million could by any economy be saved out of the present tolls, it can scarcely be doubted, but that a million might be saved out of them, if they were doubled; and perhaps two millions, if they were tripled[49]. This great revenue, too, might be levied without the appointment of a single new officer to collect and receive it. But the turnpike tolls, being continually augmented in this manner, instead of facilitating the inland commerce of the country, as at present, would soon become a very great incumbrance upon it. The expense of transporting all heavy goods from one part of the country to another, would soon be so much increased, the market for all such goods, consequently, would soon be so much narrowed, that their production would be in a great measure discouraged, and the most important branches of the domestic industry of the country annihilated altogether.

First, if the tolls charged at the turnpikes were ever seen as a way to cover the state's needs, they would definitely be increased as those needs were thought to require. Following the practices of Great Britain, they would likely be raised very quickly. The ease with which a significant revenue could be generated from them would probably motivate the government to rely on this source quite often. Although it's questionable whether half a million could be saved from the current tolls through any savings, there's little doubt that a million could be saved if the tolls were doubled; and perhaps even two million if they were tripled[49]. This considerable revenue could also be collected without hiring a single new officer to manage it. However, if the turnpike tolls keep increasing in this way, instead of making it easier for the country's inland commerce, they would soon become a significant burden. The cost of transporting heavy goods from one area to another would rise so much that the market for those goods would shrink, discouraging their production and potentially wiping out major sectors of the nation's domestic industry.

Secondly, A tax upon carriages, in proportion to their weight, though a very equal tax when applied to the sole purpose of repairing the roads, is a very unequal one when[Pg 305] applied to any other purpose, or to supply the common exigencies of the state. When it is applied to the sole purpose above mentioned, each carriage is supposed to pay exactly for the wear and tear which that carriage occasions of the roads. But when it is applied to any other purpose, each carriage is supposed to pay for more than that wear and tear, and contributes to the supply of some other exigency of the state. But as the turnpike toll raises the price of goods in proportion to their weight and not to their value, it is chiefly paid by the consumers of coarse and bulky, not by those of precious and light commodities. Whatever exigency of the state, therefore, this tax might be intended to supply, that exigency would be chiefly supplied at the expense of the poor, not of the rich; at the expense of those who are least able to supply it, not of those who are most able.

Secondly, a tax on carriages based on their weight, while very fair when used solely for road repair, is quite unfair when used for any other purpose or to meet general state needs. When it's applied only for road maintenance, each carriage is thought to pay exactly for the wear and tear it causes on the roads. However, when it's used for other purposes, each carriage is assumed to pay for more than just that wear and tear, contributing to other state needs. Since the turnpike toll increases the cost of goods based on their weight instead of their value, it mainly falls on the consumers of heavy and bulky items rather than those buying valuable and lightweight goods. Therefore, whatever state need this tax aims to address, it would mainly be funded by the poor, not the rich; by those who can least afford it, not by those who can most easily pay.

Thirdly, If government should at any time neglect the reparation of the high-roads, it would be still more difficult, than it is at present, to compel the proper application of any part of the turnpike tolls. A large revenue might thus be levied upon the people, without any part of it being applied to the only purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner ought ever to be applied. If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of turnpike roads render it sometimes difficult, at present, to oblige them to repair their wrong; their wealth and greatness would render it ten times more so in the case which is here supposed.

Thirdly, if the government ever neglects to fix the highways, it will be even harder than it is now to ensure that any part of the tolls collected is used properly. A large amount of money could be taken from the people without any of it being spent on the one purpose that such revenue should be used for. If the lack of resources among the trustees of the toll roads makes it sometimes difficult to hold them accountable for repairs now, their increased wealth and power would make it ten times harder in the scenario being considered.

In France, the funds destined for the reparation of the high-roads are under the immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds consist, partly in a certain number of days labour, which the country people are in most parts of Europe obliged to give to the reparation of the highways; and partly in such a portion of the general revenue of the state as the king chooses to spare from his other expenses.

In France, the money allocated for road repairs is directly managed by the executive branch. This funding comes from two main sources: a set number of days of labor that rural residents in many parts of Europe are required to contribute to repairing the highways, and a portion of the state's general revenue that the king decides to set aside from his other expenses.

By the ancient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of Europe, the labour of the country people was under the direction of a local or provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependency upon the king's council. But, by the present practice, both the labour of the country people, and whatever other fund the king may choose to assign for the reparation of the high-roads in any particular province or generality, are entirely under the management of the intendant; an officer who is appointed and removed by the king's council who receives his orders from it, and is in constant correspondence with it. In the progress of despotism, the authority of the executive power gradually absorbs that of every other power in the state, and assumes to itself the management of every branch of revenue which is destined for any public purpose. In France, however, the great post-roads, the roads which make the communication between the principal towns of the kingdom, are in general kept in good order; and, in some provinces, are even a good deal superior to the greater part of the turnpike roads of England. But what we call the cross roads, that is, the far greater part of the roads in the country, are entirely neglected, and are in many places absolutely impassable for any heavy carriage. In some places it is even dangerous to travel on horseback, and mules are the only conveyance which can safely be trusted. The proud minister of an ostentatious court, may frequently take pleasure in executing a work of splendour and magnificence, such as a great highway, which is frequently seen by the principal nobility, whose applauses not only flatter his vanity, but even contribute to support his interest at court. But to execute a great number of little works, in which nothing that can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the smallest degree of admiration in any traveller, and which, in short, have nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a business which appears, in every respect, too mean and paltry to merit the attention of so great a magistrate. Under such an administration, therefore, such works are almost always entirely neglected.

According to the old laws of France and most other parts of Europe, local or provincial officials managed the work of rural people without direct control from the king's council. However, now the labor of rural workers and any funds the king allocates for road maintenance in a specific province are completely overseen by the intendant, an official appointed and dismissed by the king's council, taking orders from it and maintaining constant communication. As despotism rises, the authority of the executive gradually overtakes every other power in the state, controlling every source of revenue meant for public use. In France, the main highways that connect the major towns are generally well-maintained, and in some areas, they are even better than many of England's main roads. But what we refer to as cross roads—the majority of country roads—are completely neglected and, in many places, are utterly impassable for heavy vehicles. In some regions, traveling on horseback can be dangerous, and mules are the only reliable means of transportation. The proud minister of a flashy court might enjoy overseeing the construction of impressive works, such as a grand highway, especially since prominent nobles frequently see these projects and their praise flatters his ego while helping secure his position at court. However, managing numerous small projects that don't attract any attention or admiration from travelers, and which are only valuable for their utility, seems too insignificant and trivial to garner the attention of such an important official. As a result, under this leadership, these kinds of projects are nearly always ignored.

In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive power charges itself both with the reparation of the high-roads, and with the maintenance of the navigable canals. In the instructions which are given to the governor of each province, those objects, it is said, are constantly recommended to him, and the judgment which the court forms of his conduct is very much regulated by the attention which he appears to have paid to this part of his instructions. This branch of public police, accordingly, is said to be very much attended to in all those countries, but particularly in China, where the high-roads, and still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing of the same kind which is known in Europe. The accounts of those works, however, which have been transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by weak and wondering travellers; frequently by stupid and lying missionaries. If they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts of them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would not, perhaps, appear to be so wonderful. The account which Bernier gives of some works of this kind in Indostan, falls very short of what had been reported of them by other travellers, more disposed to the marvellous than he was. It may too, perhaps, be in those countries, as it is in France, where the great roads, the great communications, which are likely to be the[Pg 306] subjects of conversation at the court and in the capital, are attended to, and all the rest neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan, and in several other governments of Asia, the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from a land tax or land rent, which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce of the land. The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least expensive communication between all the different parts of the country; which can be done only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals. But the revenue of the sovereign does not, in any part of Europe, arise chiefly from a land tax or land rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps, the greater part of it may ultimately depend upon the produce of the land: but that dependency is neither so immediate nor so evident. In Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel himself so directly called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value of the produce of the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide the most extensive market for that produce. Though it should be true, therefore, what I apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia this department of the public police is very properly managed by the executive power, there is not the least probability that, during the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of Europe.

In China and several other Asian governments, the executive power handles both the repair of major roads and the upkeep of navigable canals. The instructions given to the governor of each province consistently emphasize these tasks, and the court's assessment of his performance largely depends on how much attention he pays to this part of his instructions. This aspect of public administration is reportedly given considerable attention in those countries, especially in China, where the major roads and even more so the navigable canals are said to surpass anything similar in Europe. However, the accounts of these works that have reached Europe are often compiled by weak and amazed travelers or frequently by ignorant and dishonest missionaries. If more discerning observers had examined them and more reliable witnesses had reported on them, they might not seem so remarkable. The description Bernier provides of some of these works in India is much less impressive than what other, more sensationalist travelers have reported. It may also be that, similar to France, great roads and major connections that are likely to be discussed at the court and in the capital receive attention while everything else is neglected. Moreover, in China, India, and several other Asian governments, the ruler’s revenue mainly comes from a land tax or land rent that fluctuates with the annual yield of the land. Thus, the ruler’s significant interest—his revenue—is directly linked to land cultivation, the volume of its produce, and its value. To maximize that produce in both quantity and value, it’s essential to secure as broad a market as possible, which requires establishing the most open, easiest, and least costly transportation routes across the country. This can only be achieved through excellent roads and navigable canals. In contrast, the ruler’s revenue in Europe doesn’t primarily come from a land tax or land rent. While in the major kingdoms of Europe the bulk of revenue might ultimately depend on agricultural produce, that dependency is neither as immediate nor as apparent. Therefore, rulers in Europe do not feel as directly compelled to promote the increase in both quantity and value of agricultural produce or to maintain good roads and canals to provide the broadest market for that produce. Even if it were true—though I think it’s quite doubtful—that in some parts of Asia this aspect of public administration is effectively managed by the executive power, there’s little chance that it could be adequately managed by that power in any part of Europe under the current circumstances.

Even those public works, which are of such a nature that they cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place or district, are always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue, under the management of a local and provincial administration, than by the general revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have the management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expense of the treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an expense? The expense, besides, instead of being raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or district in London, would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state, and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no sort of benefit from the lighting and paving of the streets of London.

Even public works that don't generate any revenue to support themselves and mainly benefit specific areas are usually better funded by local or regional sources managed by local authorities than by the national state's general funds, which are controlled by central government. If the streets of London were to be lit and paved using the national treasury, would they be as well maintained as they are now or at such a low cost? Additionally, rather than being funded by a local tax on residents of each specific street, neighborhood, or district in London, the costs would come from the national revenue. This means the funding would rely on taxes from all citizens of the country, many of whom receive no benefit from the lighting and paving of London's streets.

The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial administration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous soever they may appear, are in reality, however, almost always very trifling in comparison of those which commonly take place in the administration and expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, besides, much more easily corrected. Under the local or provincial administration of the justices of the peace in Great Britain, the six days labour which the country people are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, is not always, perhaps, very judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever exacted with any circumstance of cruelty or oppression. In France, under the administration of the intendants, the application is not always more judicious, and the exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive. Such corvees, as they are called, make one of the principal instruments of tyranny by which these officers chastise any parish or communeaute, which has had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure.

The abuses that sometimes slip into local and provincial administration of revenue, no matter how huge they may seem, are actually almost always quite minor compared to those that usually occur in the management and spending of revenue in a large empire. Additionally, they are much easier to fix. Under the local or provincial administration of justices of the peace in Great Britain, the six days of labor that country people must contribute to repairing highways might not always be used wisely, but it is hardly ever demanded in a cruel or oppressive manner. In France, under the administration of the intendants, the application is not always more sensible, and the demands are often the most cruel and oppressive. These corvees, as they are called, are one of the main tools of tyranny that these officers use to punish any parish or community that has unfortunately fallen out of favor with them.

Of the public Works and Institutions which are necessary for facilitating particular Branches of Commerce.

The object of the public works and institutions above mentioned, is to facilitate commerce in general. But in order to facilitate some particular branches of it, particular institutions are necessary, which again require a particular and extraordinary expense.

The purpose of the public works and institutions mentioned above is to make commerce easier overall. However, to support specific areas of commerce, we need specific institutions, which in turn demand special and substantial funding.

Some particular branches of commerce which are carried on with barbarous and uncivilized nations, require extraordinary protection. An ordinary store or counting-house could give little security to the goods of the merchants who trade to the western coast of Africa. To defend them from the barbarous natives, it is necessary that the place where they are deposited should be in same measure fortified. The disorders in the government of Indostan have been supposed to render a like precaution necessary, even among that mild and gentle people; and it was under pretence of securing their persons and property from violence, that both the English and French East India companies were allowed to erect the first forts which they possessed in that country. Among other nations, whose vigorous government will suffer no strangers to possess any fortified place within their territory, it may be necessary to maintain some ambassador, minister, or consul, who may both decide, according to their own customs, the differences arising among his own countrymen; and, in their disputes with the natives, may[Pg 307] by means of his public character, interfere with more authority and afford them a more powerful protection than they could expect from any private man. The interests of commerce have frequently made it necessary to maintain ministers in foreign countries, where the purposes either of war or alliance would not have required any. The commerce of the Turkey company first occasioned the establishment of an ordinary ambassador at Constantinople. The first English embassies to Russia arose altogether from commercial interests. The constant interference with those interests, necessarily occasioned between the subjects of the different states of Europe, has probably introduced the custom of keeping, in all neighbouring countries, ambassadors or ministers constantly resident, even in the time of peace. This custom, unknown to ancient times, seems not to be older than the end of the fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century; that is, than the time when commerce first began to extend itself to the greater part of the nations of Europe, and when they first began to attend to its interests.

Some specific sectors of trade with primitive and uncivilized nations require special protection. A regular store or office offers little security for the goods of merchants trading on the western coast of Africa. To safeguard them from hostile locals, it’s essential that the storage places are fortified to some degree. The instability in the governance of India has also led to a similar need for precautions, even among that generally peaceful people. It was under the guise of protecting their lives and property from violence that both the English and French East India companies were permitted to build their initial forts in that region. In other countries, where strong governments do not allow foreigners to hold fortified locations within their territory, it may be necessary to maintain an ambassador, minister, or consul who can resolve disputes among his fellow countrymen according to local customs, and in conflicts with the locals, can use his official position to intervene more effectively and provide them with stronger protection than any private individual could offer. The needs of commerce have often made it essential to have ministers in foreign lands, even in situations where war or alliances would not have necessitated it. The trade of the Turkey company was the first reason to establish a regular ambassador in Constantinople. The initial English embassies to Russia were entirely driven by trade interests. The ongoing interactions affecting those interests have likely led to the practice of having ambassadors or ministers stationed in neighboring countries, even during peacetime. This practice, which was not known in ancient times, seems to date back only to the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century; that is, to the period when trade began to expand among most European nations and they started to prioritize its interests.

It seems not unreasonable, that the extraordinary expense which the protection of any particular branch of commerce may occasion, should be defrayed by a moderate tax upon that particular branch; by a moderate fine, for example, to be paid by the traders when they first enter into it; or, what is more equal, by a particular duty of so much per cent. upon the goods which they either import into, or export out of, the particular countries with which it is carried on. The protection of trade, in general, from pirates and freebooters, is said to have given occasion to the first institution of the duties of customs. But, if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade, in order to defray the expense of protecting trade in general, it should seem equally reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a particular branch of trade, in order to defray the extraordinary expense of protecting that branch.

It makes sense that the significant costs of protecting a specific part of commerce should be covered by a reasonable tax on that part; for instance, a reasonable fee could be charged to traders when they first enter it, or, more fairly, a specific duty based on a percentage of the goods they either import into or export out of the countries involved. The protection of trade from pirates and robbers is said to have led to the creation of customs duties. However, if it was deemed fair to impose a general tax on trade to cover the costs of protecting trade overall, it should also be considered fair to impose a specific tax on a particular branch of trade to cover the extra costs of protecting that branch.

The protection of trade, in general, has always been considered as essential to the defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that account, a necessary part of the duty of the executive power. The collection and application of the general duties of customs, therefore, have always been left to that power. But the protection of any particular branch of trade is a part of the general protection of trade; a part, therefore, of the duty of that power; and if nations always acted consistently, the particular duties levied for the purposes of such particular protection, should always have been left equally to its disposal. But in this respect, as well as in many others, nations have not always acted consistently; and in the greater part of the commercial states of Europe, particular companies of merchants have had the address to persuade the legislature to entrust to them the performance of this part of the duty of the sovereign, together with all the powers which are necessarily connected with it.

The protection of trade has always been seen as crucial for the defense of the community, and for that reason, it's a key responsibility of the executive power. The collection and use of general customs duties have traditionally been managed by that power. However, the protection of specific areas of trade is part of the overall protection of trade; thus, it's also a duty of that power. If countries were always consistent in their actions, the specific duties imposed for such protection would likewise always be left to its discretion. Unfortunately, in this regard, as in many others, countries have not always been consistent. In many European commercial states, specific merchant companies have managed to persuade the legislature to assign them this part of the sovereign's duty, along with all the associated powers.

These companies, though they may, perhaps, have been useful for the first introduction of some branches of commerce, by making, at their own expense, an experiment which the state might not think it prudent to make, have in the long-run proved, universally, either burdensome or useless, and have either mismanaged or confined the trade.

These companies, while they might have been helpful in introducing some types of commerce by conducting experiments at their own cost—experiments that the government might not have deemed wise—have ultimately turned out to be either burdensome or useless and have either mismanaged or limited the trade.

When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock, but are obliged to admit any person, properly qualified, upon paying a certain fine, and agreeing to submit to the regulations of the company, each member trading upon his own stock, and at his own risk, they are called regulated companies. When they trade upon a joint stock, each member sharing in the common profit or loss, in proportion to his share in this stock, they are called joint-stock companies. Such companies, whether regulated or joint-stock, sometimes have, and sometimes have not, exclusive privileges.

When companies don't operate on a joint stock system but must accept anyone who meets the qualifications by paying a certain fee and agreeing to follow the company's rules, with each member trading using their own funds and at their own risk, they're known as regulated companies. When they do operate on a joint stock system, with each member sharing in the profits or losses based on their share in that stock, they are called joint-stock companies. These companies, whether regulated or joint-stock, may or may not have exclusive privileges.

Regulated companies resemble, in every respect, the corporation of trades, so common in the cities and towns of all the different countries of Europe; and are a sort of enlarged monopolies of the same kind. As no inhabitant of a town can exercise an incorporated trade, without first obtaining his freedom in the incorporation, so, in most cases, no subject of the state can lawfully carry on any branch of foreign trade, for which a regulated company is established, without first becoming a member of that company. The monopoly is more or less strict, according as the terms of admission are more or less difficult, and according as the directors of the company have more or less authority, or have it more or less in their power to manage in such a manner as to confine the greater part of the trade to themselves and their particular friends. In the most ancient regulated companies, the privileges of apprenticeship were the same as in other corporations, and entitled the person who had served his time to a member of the company, to become himself a member, either without paying any fine, or upon paying a much smaller one than what was exacted of other people. The usual corporation spirit, wherever the law does not restrain it, prevails in all regulated companies. When they have been allowed to act according to their natural genius, they have always, in order to confine the competition to as small a number of persons as possible, endeavoured to subject the trade to many burdensome regulations. When the law has restrained them from doing this, they have become altogether useless and insignificant.

Regulated companies are similar to the trade corporations that are common in cities and towns across different countries in Europe; they essentially function as larger monopolies of the same type. Just as no resident of a town can engage in an incorporated trade without first obtaining their freedom within that incorporation, in most cases, no citizen of the state can legally participate in any branch of foreign trade established for a regulated company without first becoming a member of that company. The monopoly can be stricter or looser based on how difficult the admission process is and how much authority the company directors have to manage things in a way that keeps most of the trade for themselves and their close friends. In the oldest regulated companies, the benefits of apprenticeship were similar to those in other corporations, allowing someone who completed their apprenticeship with a company member to become a member themselves without paying a fine or by paying a much smaller one than others had to. The typical corporate mindset, wherever the law doesn't limit it, is evident in all regulated companies. When allowed to operate how they naturally do, they've consistently tried to restrict competition to a minimal number of people by imposing numerous burdensome regulations on the trade. When the law has prevented them from doing this, they have become completely ineffective and insignificant.

The regulated companies for foreign commerce which at present subsist in Great Bri[Pg 308]tain, are the ancient merchant-adventurers company, now commonly called the Hamburgh company, the Russia company, the Eastland company, the Turkey company, and the African company.

The regulated companies involved in foreign trade that currently exist in Great Britain are the ancient merchant-adventurers company, now commonly known as the Hamburg company, the Russia company, the Eastland company, the Turkey company, and the African company.

The terms of admission into the Hamburgh company are now said to be quite easy; and the directors either have it not in their power to subject the trade to any troublesome restraint or regulations, or, at least, have not of late exercised that power. It has not always been so. About the middle of the last century, the fine for admission was fifty, and at one time one hundred pounds, and the conduct of the company was said to be extremely oppressive. In 1643, in 1645, and in 1661, the clothiers and free traders of the west of England complained of them to parliament, as of monopolists, who confined the trade, and oppressed the manufactures of the country. Though those complaints produced no act of parliament, they had probably intimidated the company so far, as to oblige them to reform their conduct. Since that time, at least, there have been no complaints against them. By the 10th and 11th of William III. c. 6, the fine for admission into the Russia company was reduced to five pounds; and by the 25th of Charles II. c. 7, that for admission into the Eastland company to forty shillings; while, at the same time, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, all the countries on the north side of the Baltic, were exempted from their exclusive charter. The conduct of those companies had probably given occasion to those two acts of parliament. Before that time, Sir Josiah Child had represented both these and the Hamburgh company as extremely oppressive, and imputed to their bad management the low state of the trade, which we at that time carried on to the countries comprehended within their respective charters. But though such companies may not, in the present times, be very oppressive, they are certainly altogether useless. To be merely useless, indeed, is perhaps, the highest eulogy which can ever justly be bestowed upon a regulated company; and all the three companies above mentioned seem, in their present state, to deserve this eulogy.

The requirements to join the Hamburgh company are now said to be pretty easy, and the directors either can't impose any annoying restrictions or rules on the trade, or at least haven't done so lately. It wasn't always like that. Around the middle of the last century, the fee for joining was fifty, and at one point, one hundred pounds, and the company's behavior was described as very oppressive. In 1643, 1645, and 1661, clothiers and free traders from the west of England complained about them to parliament, accusing them of being monopolists who restricted trade and burdened the country's manufacturers. Although these complaints didn’t lead to any new laws, they likely scared the company enough to change their ways. Since then, there haven't been any complaints against them. By the 10th and 11th years of William III., chapter 6, the fee to join the Russia company was lowered to five pounds; and by the 25th year of Charles II., chapter 7, the fee for joining the Eastland company was cut to forty shillings; meanwhile, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, along with all the countries north of the Baltic, were exempted from their exclusive charter. The actions of those companies likely prompted those two laws. Before that time, Sir Josiah Child had portrayed both these and the Hamburgh company as very oppressive, blaming their poor management for the decline of trade to the countries covered by their respective charters. But while these companies may not be very oppressive today, they are definitely completely useless. Being just useless is probably the highest praise that can be justly given to a regulated company, and all three companies mentioned above seem to fit this description in their current state.

The fine for admission into the Turkey company was formerly twenty-five pounds for all persons under twenty-six years of age, and fifty pounds for all persons above that age. Nobody but mere merchants could be admitted; a restriction which excluded all shop-keepers and retailers. By a bye-law, no British manufactures could be exported to Turkey but in the general ships of the company; and as those ships sailed always from the port of London, this restriction confined the trade to that expensive port, and the traders in those who lived in London and in its neighbourhood. By another bye-law, no person living within twenty miles of London, and not free of the city could be admitted a member; another restriction which, joined to the foregoing, necessarily excluded all but the freemen of London. As the time for the loading and sailing of those general ships depended altogether upon the directors, they could easily fill them with their own goods, and those of their particular friends, to the exclusion of others, who, they might pretend, had made their proposals too late. In this state of things, therefore, this company was, in every respect, a strict and oppressive monopoly. Those abuses gave occasion to the act of the 26th of George II. c. 18, reducing the fine for admission to twenty pounds for all persons, without any distinction of ages, or any restriction, either to mere merchants, or to the freemen of London; and granting to all such persons the liberty of exporting, from all the ports of Great Britain, to any port in Turkey, all British goods, of which the exportation was not prohibited, upon paying both the general duties of customs, and the particular duties assessed for defraying the necessary expenses of the company; and submitting, at the same time, to the lawful authority of the British ambassador and consuls resident in Turkey, and to the bye-laws of the company duly enacted. To prevent any oppression by those bye-laws, it was by the same act ordained, that if any seven members of the company conceived themselves aggrieved by any bye-law which should be enacted after the passing of this act, they might appeal to the board of trade and plantations (to the authority of which a committee of the privy council has now succeeded), provided such appeal was brought within twelve months after the bye-law was enacted; and that, if any seven members conceived themselves aggrieved by any bye-law which had been enacted before the passing of this act, they might bring a like appeal, provided it was within twelve months after the day on which this act was to take place. The experience of one year, however, may not always be sufficient to discover to all the members of a great company the pernicious tendency of a particular bye-law; and if several of them should afterwards discover it, neither the board of trade, nor the committee of council, can afford them any redress. The object, besides, of the greater part of the bye-laws of all regulated companies, as well as of all other corporations, is not so much to oppress those who are already members, as to discourage others from becoming so; which may be done, not only by a high fine, but by many other contrivances. The constant view of such companies is always to raise the rate of their own profit as high as they can; to keep the market, both for the goods which they export, and for those which they import, as much understocked as they can; which can be done only by restraining the competition, or by discouraging new[Pg 309] adventurers from entering into the trade. A fine, even of twenty pounds, besides, though it may not, perhaps, be sufficient to discourage any man from entering into the Turkey trade, with an intention to continue in it, may be enough to discourage a speculative merchant from hazarding a single adventure in it. In all trades, the regular established traders, even though not incorporated, naturally combine to raise profits, which are noway so likely to be kept, at all times, down to their proper level, as by the occasional competition of speculative adventurers. The Turkey trade, though in some measure laid open by this act of parliament, is still considered by many people as very far from being altogether free. The Turkey company contribute to maintain an ambassador and two or three consuls, who, like other public ministers, ought to be maintained altogether by the state, and the trade laid open to all his majesty's subjects. The different taxes levied by the company, for this and other corporation purposes, might afford a revenue much more than sufficient to enable a state to maintain such ministers.

The fee for joining the Turkey company used to be twenty-five pounds for anyone under twenty-six years old and fifty pounds for those older. Only merchants were allowed to join, which excluded all shopkeepers and retailers. According to a bylaw, no British products could be exported to Turkey except on the company's ships, which always sailed from London. This rule limited trade to the expensive London port and favored traders living in London and nearby. Another bylaw stated that anyone living within twenty miles of London who wasn't a freeman of the city couldn't become a member, further excluding all but London's freemen. Since the timing for loading and sailing those ships was entirely up to the directors, they could easily fill them with their own goods and those of their friends, claiming that others’ proposals came in too late. Thus, the company operated as a strict and oppressive monopoly. These issues led to the act of the 26th of George II, c. 18, which lowered the admission fee to twenty pounds for everyone, without age distinctions or restrictions to just merchants or London freemen. It granted all individuals the right to export any British goods not prohibited from any British port to any port in Turkey, as long as they paid the general customs duties and the specific fees to cover the company’s expenses, while also complying with the authority of the British ambassador and consuls in Turkey, as well as the company's bylaws. To prevent abuse from these bylaws, the same act stated that if any seven members felt wronged by a bylaw enacted after this act, they could appeal to the board of trade and plantations (now succeeded by a committee of the Privy Council), as long as the appeal was made within twelve months of the bylaw’s enactment. If any seven members felt wronged by a pre-existing bylaw, they could also appeal within twelve months of this act’s start date. However, one year may not always be enough for all members of a large company to realize the harmful impact of a specific bylaw, and if some do discover it later, neither the board of trade nor the council committee can help them. Moreover, many bylaws in regulated companies and other corporations are designed not just to oppress current members but to dissuade others from joining. This can be accomplished through high fees and other methods. Companies typically aim to maximize their profit margins by keeping the market for both their exports and imports understocked, which can only be achieved by limiting competition or dissuading new entrants. Although a twenty-pound fee might not discourage someone from entering the Turkey trade with the intention to stay, it could be enough to deter speculative merchants from taking a single risk. In any trade, established traders, even if not incorporated, naturally ally to increase profits, which are less likely to remain at the right level with the occasional competition from speculative adventurers. Despite this parliamentary act partially opening up the Turkey trade, many still see it as far from completely free. The Turkey company pays for an ambassador and a few consuls, who, like other public officials, should be fully funded by the state, allowing the trade to be accessible to all of the king's subjects. The various taxes imposed by the company for its and other corporate purposes could provide more than enough revenue to enable a state to support such officials.

Regulated companies, it was observed by Sir Josiah Child, though they had frequently supported public ministers, had never maintained any forts or garrisons in the countries to which they traded; whereas joint-stock companies frequently had. And, in reality, the former seem to be much more unfit for this sort of service than the latter. First, the directors of a regulated company have no particular interest in the prosperity of the general trade of the company, for the sake of which such forts and garrisons are maintained. The decay of that general trade may even frequently contribute to the advantage of their own private trade; as, by diminishing the number of their competitors, it may enable them both to buy cheaper, and to sell dearer. The directors of a joint-stock company, on the contrary, having only their share in the profits which are made upon the common stock committed to their management, have no private trade of their own, of which the interest can be separated from that of the general trade of the company. Their private interest is connected with the prosperity of the general trade of the company, and with the maintenance of the forts and garrisons which are necessary for its defence. They are more likely, therefore, to have that continual and careful attention which that maintenance necessarily requires. Secondly, The directors of a joint-stock company have always the management of a large capital, the joint stock of the company, a part of which they may frequently employ, with propriety, in building, repairing, and maintaining such necessary forts and garrisons. But the directors of a regulated company, having the management of no common capital, have no other fund to employ in this way, but the casual revenue arising from the admission fines, and from the corporation duties imposed upon the trade of the company. Though they had the same interest, therefore, to attend to the maintenance of such forts and garrisons, they can seldom have the same ability to render that attention effectual. The maintenance of a public minister, requiring scarce any attention, and but a moderate and limited expense, is a business much more suitable both to the temper and abilities of a regulated company.

Regulated companies, as noted by Sir Josiah Child, often supported public ministers but never established any forts or military bases in the countries they traded with; in contrast, joint-stock companies frequently did so. In fact, regulated companies seem much less suited for this kind of service than joint-stock companies. First, the directors of a regulated company don’t have a specific interest in the success of the overall trade of the company, for which such forts and garrisons are maintained. The decline of that overall trade might actually benefit their private trade, as having fewer competitors can allow them to buy at lower prices and sell at higher prices. On the other hand, the directors of a joint-stock company, having only their share in the profits made from the common stock they're responsible for, don’t have a private trade that can be separated from the general trade of the company. Their personal interests are tied to the success of the general trade of the company and the upkeep of the necessary forts and garrisons for its protection. They are therefore more likely to provide the ongoing and careful attention that maintenance requires. Secondly, the directors of a joint-stock company always manage a large capital—the company's joint stock—which they can often use appropriately for building, repairing, and maintaining those essential forts and garrisons. But the directors of a regulated company manage no common capital and have no other funds to use in this way than the occasional revenue from admission fees and the corporate duties imposed on the company’s trade. Even if they had the same interest in maintaining those forts and garrisons, they seldom have the same capacity to make that attention effective. The upkeep of a public minister, requiring minimal attention and only moderate expense, is much better suited to the nature and capabilities of a regulated company.

Long after the time of Sir Josiah Child, however, in 1750, a regulated company was established, the present company of merchants trading to Africa; which was expressly charged at first with the maintenance of all the British forts and garrisons that lie between Cape Blanc and the Cape of Good Hope, and afterwards with that of those only which lie between Cape Rouge and the Cape of Good Hope. The act which establishes this company (the 23d of George II. c. 31), seems to have had two distinct objects in view; first, to restrain effectually the oppressive and monopolizing spirit which is natural to the directors of a regulated company; and, secondly, to force them, as much as possible, to give an attention, which is not natural to them, towards the maintenance of forts and garrisons.

Long after the time of Sir Josiah Child, in 1750, a regulated company was formed, now known as the company of merchants trading to Africa. This company was initially tasked with maintaining all the British forts and garrisons between Cape Blanc and the Cape of Good Hope, and later it was limited to just those between Cape Rouge and the Cape of Good Hope. The act that established this company (the 23rd of George II. c. 31) appears to have had two main goals: first, to effectively limit the oppressive and monopolizing tendencies typical of the directors of a regulated company, and second, to compel them to focus their attention—something they typically don’t do—on maintaining forts and garrisons.

For the first of these purposes, the fine for admission is limited to forty shillings. The company is prohibited from trading in their corporate capacity, or upon a joint stock; from borrowing money upon common seal, or from laying any restraints upon the trade, which may be carried on freely from all places, and by all persons being British subjects, and paying the fine. The government is in a committee of nine persons, who meet at London, but who are chosen annually by the freemen of the company at London, Bristol, and Liverpool; three from each place. No committee-man can be continued in office for more than three years together. Any committee-man might be removed by the board of trade and plantations, now by a committee of council, after being heard in his own defence. The committee are forbid to export negroes from Africa, or to import any African goods into Great Britain. But as they are charged with the maintenance of forts and garrisons, they may, for that purpose export from Great Britain to Africa goods and stores of different kinds. Out of the moneys which they shall receive from the company, they are allowed a sum, not exceeding eight hundred pounds, for the salaries of their clerks and agents at London, Bristol, and Liverpool, the house-rent of their offices at London, and all other expenses of management, commission, and agency, in England. What remains of this sum, after defraying these different expenses, they may divide among themselves, as compensation for their trouble, in what manner they think pro[Pg 310]per. By this constitution, it might have been expected, that the spirit of monopoly would have been effectually restrained, and the first of these purposes sufficiently answered. It would seem, however, that it had not. Though by the 4th of George III. c. 20, the fort of Senegal, with all its dependencies, had been invested in the company of merchants trading to Africa, yet, in the year following (by the 5th of George III. c. 44), not only Senegal and its dependencies, but the whole coast, from the port of Sallee, in South Barbary, to Cape Rouge, was exempted from the jurisdiction of that company, was vested in the crown, and the trade to it declared free to all his majesty's subjects. The company had been suspected of restraining the trade and of establishing some sort of improper monopoly. It is not, however, very easy to conceive how, under the regulations of the 23d George II. they could do so. In the printed debates of the house of commons, not always the most authentic records of truth, I observe, however, that they have been accused of this. The members of the committee of nine being all merchants, and the governors and factors in their different forts and settlements being all dependent upon them, it is not unlikely that the latter might have given peculiar attention to the consignments and commissions of the former, which would establish a real monopoly.

For the first purpose, the admission fee is capped at forty shillings. The company cannot trade as a corporation, or as a joint stock; they cannot borrow money using the common seal, or impose any restrictions on trade, which must be allowed to operate freely from all locations and by all British citizens who pay the fee. The government consists of a committee of nine people who meet in London, and they are chosen each year by the freemen of the company in London, Bristol, and Liverpool, with three from each city. No committee member can serve more than three consecutive years. Any committee member can be removed by the board of trade and plantations, now by a council committee, after being heard in their defense. The committee is prohibited from exporting blacks from Africa or importing any African goods into Great Britain. However, since they are responsible for maintaining forts and garrisons, they can export goods and supplies from Great Britain to Africa for that purpose. From the money they receive from the company, they are allowed a maximum of eight hundred pounds for the salaries of their clerks and agents in London, Bristol, and Liverpool, the office rent in London, and other management, commission, and agency costs in England. Whatever is left after covering these expenses can be shared among themselves as compensation for their efforts, in whatever way they see fit. With this constitution, one might expect that the spirit of monopoly would be effectively restrained, fulfilling the first purpose adequately. However, it appears that this was not the case. Although by the 4th of George III, chapter 20, the fort of Senegal and all its dependencies were assigned to the company of merchants trading to Africa, in the following year (by the 5th of George III, chapter 44), not only was Senegal and its dependencies exempted from the company's control, but the entire coast from the port of Sallee in South Barbary to Cape Rouge was placed under crown jurisdiction, making trade there open to all of His Majesty's subjects. The company was suspected of limiting trade and creating some form of unfair monopoly. Nevertheless, it is not easy to understand how, under the regulations of the 23rd George II, they could have done so. In the printed records of the House of Commons, which are not always the most reliable accounts of the truth, there are mentions of these accusations. Since all members of the nine-person committee are merchants, and the governors and factors in their various forts and settlements depend on them, it is likely that the latter might have focused closely on the shipments and commissions of the former, which would create a genuine monopoly.

For the second of these purposes, the maintenance of the forts and garrisons, an annual sum has been allotted to them by parliament, generally about L.13,000. For the proper application of this sum, the committee is obliged to account annually to the cursitor baron of exchequer; which account is afterwards to be laid before parliament. But parliament, which gives so little attention to the application of millions, is not likely to give much to that of L.13,000 a-year; and the cursitor baron of exchequer, from his profession and education, is not likely to be profoundly skilled in the proper expense of forts and garrisons. The captains of his majesty's navy, indeed, or any other commissioned officers, appointed by the board of admiralty, may inquire into the condition of the forts and garrisons, and report their observations to that board. But that board seems to have no direct jurisdiction over the committee, nor any authority to correct those whose conduct it may thus inquire into; and the captains of his majesty's navy, besides, are not supposed to be always deeply learned in the science of fortification. Removal from an office, which can be enjoyed only for the term of three years, and of which the lawful emoluments, even during that term, are so very small, seems to be the utmost punishment to which any committee-man is liable, for any fault, except direct malversation, or embezzlement, either of the public money, or of that of the company; and the fear of the punishment can never be a motive of sufficient weight to force a continual and careful attention to a business to which he has no other interest to attend. The committee are accused of having sent out bricks and stones from England for the reparation of Cape Coast Castle, on the coast of Guinea; a business for which parliament had several times granted an extraordinary sum of money. These bricks and stones, too, which had thus been sent upon so long a voyage, were said to have been of so bad a quality, that it was necessary to rebuild, from the foundation, the walls which had been repaired with them. The forts and garrisons which lie north of Cape Rouge, are not only maintained at the expense of the state, but are under the immediate government of the executive power; and why those which lie south of that cape, and which, too, are, in part at least, maintained at the expense of the state, should be under a different government, it seems not very easy even to imagine a good reason. The protection of the Mediterranean trade was the original purpose or pretence of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca; and the maintenance and government of those garrisons have always been, very properly, committed, not to the Turkey company, but to the executive power. In the extent of its dominion consists, in a great measure, the pride and dignity of that power; and it is not very likely to fail in attention to what is necessary for the defence of that dominion. The garrisons at Gibraltar and Minorca, accordingly, have never been neglected. Though Minorca has been twice taken, and is now probably lost for ever, that disaster has never been imputed to any neglect in the executive power. I would not, however, be understood to insinuate, that either of those expensive garrisons was ever, even in the smallest degree, necessary for the purpose for which they were originally dismembered from the Spanish monarchy. That dismemberment, perhaps, never served any other real purpose than to alienate from England her natural ally the king of Spain, and to unite the two principal branches of the house of Bourbon in a much stricter and more permanent alliance than the ties of blood could ever have united them.

For the second purpose, the maintenance of the forts and garrisons, parliament has allocated an annual budget, usually around £13,000. The committee is required to report on the use of this fund each year to the cursitor baron of the exchequer, and that report must then be presented to parliament. However, since parliament pays little attention to how millions are spent, it's unlikely they would closely monitor the use of £13,000 a year. Additionally, the cursitor baron of the exchequer, due to his profession and training, probably isn't well-versed in the proper expenses for forts and garrisons. The captains of the royal navy or any commissioned officers appointed by the Board of Admiralty can assess the condition of the forts and garrisons and report their findings. However, that board seems to lack direct oversight over the committee and authority to correct any issues that arise. Moreover, navy captains are not expected to be experts in fortification science. The highest penalty for a member of the committee, aside from direct mismanagement or embezzlement of public funds or company money, appears to be removal from an office that can only be held for three years and has minimal lawful earnings during that period. The threat of this punishment is unlikely to motivate someone to consistently pay close attention to a responsibility they have little personal interest in. The committee has been criticized for sending bricks and stones from England for repairs at Cape Coast Castle on the coast of Guinea, a job for which parliament had previously allocated additional funds multiple times. These materials, which had traveled such a long distance, were reportedly of such poor quality that it was necessary to rebuild the walls that had been repaired with them from the ground up. The forts and garrisons north of Cape Rouge are not only funded by the state but also directly governed by the executive power. It’s hard to understand why those south of the cape, which are at least partially funded by the state, would be under a different government. Protecting Mediterranean trade was the original reason given for the garrisons at Gibraltar and Minorca, and their maintenance and governance have appropriately been entrusted to the executive, not the Turkey company. The power's pride and dignity largely depend on the extent of its control, and it’s unlikely to overlook what’s necessary for protecting that control. Consequently, the garrisons at Gibraltar and Minorca have not been neglected. Though Minorca has been captured twice and is likely lost for good, that loss has never been blamed on any neglect by the executive. However, I don’t mean to suggest that either of these costly garrisons was ever, even slightly, necessary for their original purpose after being taken from the Spanish monarchy. That separation may have served no real purpose other than to sever England’s natural alliance with the Spanish king and to forge a tighter and more enduring bond between the two main branches of the House of Bourbon than mere familial ties could ever achieve.

Joint-stock companies, established either by royal charter, or by act of parliament, are different in several respects, not only from regulated companies, but from private copartneries.

Joint-stock companies, created either by royal charter or by an act of parliament, differ in several ways, not just from regulated companies but also from private partnerships.

First, In a private copartnery, no partner without the consent of the company, can transfer his share to another person, or introduce a new member into the company. Each member, however, may, upon proper warning, withdraw from the copartnery, and demand payment from them of his share of the common stock. In a joint-stock company, on the contrary, no member can demand pay[Pg 311]ment of his share from the company; but each member can, without their consent, transfer his share to another person, and thereby introduce a new member. The value of a share in a joint stock is always the price which it will bring in the market; and this may be either greater or less in any proportion, than the sum which its owner stands credited for in the stock of the company.

First, in a private partnership, no partner can transfer their share to another person or add a new member to the partnership without the company’s consent. However, each member can withdraw from the partnership with proper notice and request payment for their share of the collective assets. In a joint-stock company, on the other hand, no member can demand payment for their share from the company; instead, each member can transfer their share to another person without needing approval, effectively adding a new member. The value of a share in a joint stock is always determined by what it can sell for in the market, which can be higher or lower than the amount the owner is credited with in the company's stock.

Secondly, In a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the debts contracted by the company, to the whole extent of his fortune. In a joint-stock company, on the contrary, each partner is bound only to the extent of his share.

Secondly, in a private partnership, each partner is responsible for the company's debts to the full extent of their assets. In a joint-stock company, on the other hand, each partner is only responsible for the amount of their share.

The trade of a joint-stock company is always managed by a court of directors. This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors. But the greater part of these proprietors seldom pretend to understand any thing of the business of the company; and when the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them. This total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages many people to become adventurers in joint-stock companies, who would, upon no account, hazard their fortunes in any private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, commonly draw to themselves much greater stocks, than any private copartnery can boast of. The trading stock of the South Sea company at one time amounted to upwards of thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand pounds. The divided capital of the Bank of England amounts, at present, to ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds. The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. It is upon this account, that joint-stock companies for foreign trade have seldom been able to maintain the competition against private adventurers. They have, accordingly, very seldom succeeded without an exclusive privilege; and frequently have not succeeded with one. Without an exclusive privilege, they have commonly mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive privilege, they have both mismanaged and confined it.

The business of a joint-stock company is always run by a board of directors. This board is often subject to the oversight of a general assembly of shareholders. However, most of these shareholders rarely pretend to understand the company's operations, and when there’s no infighting among them, they don't concern themselves with it, but happily accept whatever semi-annual or annual dividends the directors decide to distribute. This complete freedom from hassle and risk, beyond a set limit, encourages many people to invest in joint-stock companies who would never take the chance of risking their wealth in any private partnership. Consequently, these companies usually attract much larger investments than any private partnership can claim. At one point, the trading stock of the South Sea Company exceeded thirty-three million eight hundred thousand pounds. Currently, the Bank of England's capital amounts to ten million seven hundred eighty thousand pounds. However, since the directors of these companies are managing other people's money rather than their own, it's unrealistic to expect them to oversee it with the same passionate care that partners in a private partnership often do. Like the caretakers of a wealthy individual, they tend to dismiss small details as beneath their dignity and easily excuse themselves from focusing on them. Thus, negligence and wastefulness are likely to be prevalent in the management of such a company’s affairs. For this reason, joint-stock companies for international trade have rarely been able to compete with private investors. As a result, they’ve seldom succeeded without exclusive rights and often haven’t succeeded even with them. Without an exclusive privilege, they have generally mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive privilege, they have both mismanaged and restricted it.

The Royal African company, the predecessors of the present African company, had an exclusive privilege by charter; but as that charter had not been confirmed by act of parliament, the trade, in consequence of the declaration of rights, was, soon after the Revolution, laid open to all his majesty's subjects. The Hudson's Bay company are, as to their legal rights, in the same situation as the Royal African company. Their exclusive charter has not been confirmed by act of parliament. The South Sea company, as long as they continued to be a trading company, had an exclusive privilege confirmed by act of parliament; as have likewise the present united company of merchants trading to the East Indies.

The Royal African Company, the predecessor of the current African Company, had an exclusive charter privilege; however, since that charter wasn't confirmed by an act of parliament, the trade was opened up to all of His Majesty's subjects shortly after the Revolution, due to the Declaration of Rights. The Hudson's Bay Company is in the same legal position as the Royal African Company. Their exclusive charter also hasn't been confirmed by an act of parliament. The South Sea Company, as long as it operated as a trading company, had an exclusive privilege confirmed by an act of parliament, as does the current united company of merchants trading to the East Indies.

The Royal African company soon found that they could not maintain the competition against private adventurers, whom, notwithstanding the declaration of rights, they continued for some time to call interlopers, and to persecute as such. In 1698, however, the private adventurers were subjected to a duty of ten per cent. upon almost all the different branches of their trade, to be employed by the company in the maintenance of their forts and garrisons. But, notwithstanding this heavy tax, the company were still unable to maintain the competition. Their stock and credit gradually declined. In 1712, their debts had become so great, that a particular act of parliament was thought necessary, both for their security and for that of their creditors. It was enacted, that the resolution of two-thirds of these creditors in number and value should bind the rest, both with regard to the time which should be allowed to the company for the payment of their debts, and with regard to any other agreement which it might be thought proper to make with them concerning those debts. In 1730, their affairs were in so great disorder, that they were altogether incapable of maintaining their forts and garrisons, the sole purpose and pretext of their institution. From that year till their final dissolution, the parliament judged it necessary to allow the annual sum of ten thousand pounds for that purpose. In 1732, after having been for many years losers by the trade of carrying negroes to the West Indies, they at last resolved to give it up altogether; to sell to the private traders to America the negroes which they purchased upon the coast; and to employ their servants in a trade to the inland parts of Africa for gold dust, elephants teeth, dyeing drugs, &c. But their success in this more confined trade was not greater than in their former extensive one. Their affairs continued to go gradually to decline, till at last, being in every respect a bankrupt company, they were dissolved by act of parliament, and their forts and garrisons vested in the present regulated company of merchants trading to Africa. Before the erection of the Royal African company, there had been[Pg 312] three other joint-stock companies successively established, one after another, for the African trade. They were all equally unsuccessful. They all, however, had exclusive charters, which, though not confirmed by act of parliament, were in those days supposed to convey a real exclusive privilege.

The Royal African Company quickly realized they couldn’t keep up with private traders, who they still called interlopers despite the declaration of rights, and treated as such for a while longer. In 1698, however, private traders were hit with a 10% duty on nearly all aspects of their business, which was to be used by the company to maintain their forts and garrisons. Despite this heavy tax, the company still struggled to compete. Their stock and credit slowly fell. By 1712, their debts had ballooned to such an extent that a special act of Parliament was deemed necessary for the safety of both the company and its creditors. It was mandated that a two-thirds majority of these creditors in both number and value would bind the rest when it came to the repayment terms for the company’s debts and any related agreements. By 1730, their situation was so disorganized that they could not sustain their forts and garrisons, which was the main reason for their establishment. From that year until they dissolved, Parliament decided to provide an annual sum of £10,000 for that aim. In 1732, after years of losses from the trade of transporting slaves to the West Indies, they finally chose to abandon it entirely; they sold the slaves they bought on the coast to private American traders and focused their workers on trading for gold dust, elephant tusks, dyeing materials, etc., in the interior of Africa. However, their success in this narrower trade wasn't any better than their previous wider endeavors. Their situation continued to worsen until, essentially bankrupt, they were dissolved by an act of Parliament, and their forts and garrisons were handed over to the current regulated merchant company trading to Africa. Before the Royal African Company was created, there had been[Pg 312] three other joint-stock companies established one after the other for the African trade. All of them were equally unsuccessful. However, they all held exclusive charters, which, although not officially confirmed by acts of Parliament, were believed to provide real exclusive rights back then.

The Hudson's Bay company, before their misfortunes in the late war, had been much more fortunate than the Royal African company. Their necessary expense is much smaller. The whole number of people whom they maintain in their different settlements and habitations, which they have honoured with the name of forts, is said not to exceed a hundred and twenty persons. This number, however, is sufficient to prepare beforehand the cargo of furs and other goods necessary for loading their ships, which, on account of the ice, can seldom remain above six or eight weeks in those seas. This advantage of having a cargo ready prepared, could not, for several years, be acquired by private adventurers; and without it there seems to be no possibility of trading to Hudson's Bay. The moderate capital of the company, which, it is said, does not exceed one hundred and ten thousand pounds, may, besides, be sufficient to enable them to engross the whole, or almost the whole trade and surplus produce, of the miserable though extensive country comprehended within their charter. No private adventurers, accordingly, have ever attempted to trade to that country in competition with them. This company, therefore, have always enjoyed an exclusive trade, in fact, though they may have no right to it in law. Over and above all this, the moderate capital of this company is said to be divided among a very small number of proprietors. But a joint-stock company, consisting of a small number of proprietors, with a moderate capital, approaches very nearly to the nature of a private copartnery, and may be capable of nearly the same degree of vigilance and attention. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if, in consequence of these different advantages, the Hudson's Bay company had, before the late war, been able to carry on their trade with a considerable degree of success. It does not seem probable, however, that their profits ever approached to what the late Mr Dobbs imagined them. A much more sober and judicious writer, Mr Anderson, author of the Historical and Chronological Deduction of Commerce, very justly observes, that upon examining the accounts which Mr Dobbs himself has given for several years together, of their exports and imports, and upon making proper allowances for their extraordinary risk and expense, it does not appear that their profits deserve to be envied, or that they can much, if at all, exceed the ordinary profits of trade.

The Hudson's Bay Company, before their setbacks in the recent war, was doing much better than the Royal African Company. Their necessary expenses are much lower. The total number of people they support in their various settlements and places, which they have called forts, is said to be no more than one hundred and twenty. This number, however, is enough to prepare in advance the cargo of furs and other goods needed to load their ships, which, due to the ice, can rarely stay in those waters for more than six or eight weeks. Having a pre-prepared cargo was something private traders couldn’t manage for several years; without it, trading to Hudson's Bay seems impossible. The company's moderate capital, which is said to be no more than one hundred and ten thousand pounds, could also be enough for them to control most, if not all, of the trade and excess produce from the poor but vast area covered by their charter. As a result, no private traders have really tried to compete with them in trading to that region. Therefore, this company has always had an exclusive trade in practice, even if they don't have the legal right to it. Additionally, the company's capital is reportedly shared among a very small number of owners. However, a joint-stock company with a small number of owners and a moderate capital is very similar to a private partnership and can be just as vigilant and attentive. It’s not surprising, then, that, due to these various advantages, the Hudson's Bay Company was able to conduct their trade quite successfully before the recent war. It seems unlikely, however, that their profits ever reached the levels that the late Mr. Dobbs suggested. A much more sensible and thoughtful writer, Mr. Anderson, who authored the Historical and Chronological Deduction of Commerce, rightly points out that, when examining the accounts Mr. Dobbs has provided over several years regarding their exports and imports, and making proper allowances for their considerable risks and expenses, it doesn’t appear that their profits are particularly enviable or that they can exceed the normal profits of trade by much, if at all.

The South Sea company never had any forts or garrisons to maintain, and therefore were entirely exempted from one great expense, to which other joint-stock companies for foreign trade are subject; but they had an immense capital divided among an immense number of proprietors. It was naturally to be expected, therefore, that folly, negligence, and profusion, should prevail in the whole management of their affairs. The knavery and extravagance of their stock-jobbing projects are sufficiently known, and the explication of them would be foreign to the present subject. Their mercantile projects were not much better conducted. The first trade which they engaged in, was that of supplying the Spanish West Indies with negroes, of which (in consequence of what was called the Assiento Contract granted them by the treaty of Utrecht) they had the exclusive privilege. But as it was not expected that much profit could be made by this trade, both the Portuguese and French companies, who had enjoyed it upon the same terms before them, having been ruined by it, they were allowed, as compensation, to send annually a ship of a certain burden, to trade directly to the Spanish West Indies. Of the ten voyages which this annual ship was allowed to make, they are said to have gained considerably by one, that of the Royal Caroline, in 1731; and to have been losers, more or less, by almost all the rest. Their ill success was imputed, by their factors and agents, to the extortion and oppression of the Spanish government; but was, perhaps, principally owing to the profusion and depredations of those very factors and agents; some of whom are said to have acquired great fortunes, even in one year. In 1734, the company petitioned the king, that they might be allowed to dispose of the trade and tonnage of their annual ship, on account of the little profit which they made by it, and to accept of such equivalent as they could obtain from the king of Spain.

The South Sea Company never had any forts or garrisons to manage, so they were completely exempt from a major expense that other foreign trade joint-stock companies faced. However, they had an enormous capital split among a vast number of shareholders. It was only to be expected that foolishness, carelessness, and wastefulness would dominate the management of their affairs. The deceit and extravagance of their stock market activities are well known, and explaining them isn’t relevant here. Their trading ventures weren’t much better run. The first trade they got involved in was supplying the Spanish West Indies with enslaved people, for which they had exclusive rights due to the Assiento Contract granted to them by the Treaty of Utrecht. Since it was not anticipated that much profit could be made from this trade—the Portuguese and French companies that had it previously were both ruined by it—they were allowed, as compensation, to send an annual ship of a certain size to trade directly with the Spanish West Indies. Of the ten voyages this annual ship was permitted to make, they reportedly made a decent profit from one, that of the Royal Caroline, in 1731; most of the others were losses to varying degrees. Their poor results were blamed by their agents on the Spanish government's greed and oppression, but were likely mainly due to the wastefulness and wrongdoing of those same agents, some of whom reportedly amassed great fortunes in just one year. In 1734, the company asked the king if they could sell the trade and tonnage of their annual ship since they were making little profit from it, and to accept whatever compensation they could get from the king of Spain.

In 1724, this company had undertaken the whale fishery. Of this, indeed, they had no monopoly; but as long as they carried it on, no other British subjects appear to have engaged in it. Of the eight voyages which their ships made to Greenland, they were gainers by one, and losers by all the rest. After their eighth and last voyage, when they had sold their ships, stores, and utensils, they found that their whole loss upon this branch, capital and interest included, amounted to upwards of two hundred and thirty-seven thousand pounds.

In 1724, this company started whaling. They didn’t have a monopoly on it, but while they were involved, no other British subjects seemed to participate. Out of the eight voyages their ships made to Greenland, they made a profit on only one and lost money on the others. After their eighth and final voyage, when they sold their ships, supplies, and equipment, they discovered that their total loss in this area, including capital and interest, came to over two hundred thirty-seven thousand pounds.

In 1722, this company petitioned the parliament to be allowed to divide their immense capital of more than thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand pounds, the whole of which been lent to government, into two equal parts; the one half, or upwards of sixteen millions nine hundred thousand pounds, to be put upon the same footing with other government annuities, and not to be subject to the debts contracted, or losses incurred, by the[Pg 313] directors of the company, in the prosecution of their mercantile projects; the other half to remain as before, a trading stock, and to be subject to those debts and losses. The petition was too reasonable not to be granted. In 1733, they again petitioned the parliament, that three-fourths of their trading stock might be turned into annuity stock, and only one-fourth remain as trading stock, or exposed to the hazards arising from the bad management of their directors. Both their annuity and trading stocks had, by this time, been reduced more than two millions each, by several different payments from government; so that this fourth amounted only to L.3,662,784 : 8 : 6. In 1748, all the demands of the company upon the king of Spain, in consequence of the assiento contract, were, by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, given up for what was supposed an equivalent. An end was put to their trade with the Spanish West Indies; the remainder of their trading stock was turned into an annuity stock; and the company ceased, in every respect, to be a trading company.

In 1722, this company requested parliament's permission to divide their enormous capital of over thirty-three million eight hundred thousand pounds, all of which had been lent to the government, into two equal parts. One half, amounting to over sixteen million nine hundred thousand pounds, would be treated like other government annuities and wouldn't be impacted by any debts or losses incurred by the directors of the company in pursuing their business projects. The other half would remain as before, a trading stock, and would still be subject to those debts and losses. The petition was too reasonable not to be approved. In 1733, they again asked parliament to convert three-fourths of their trading stock into annuity stock, leaving only one-fourth as trading stock, or exposed to the risks from poor management by their directors. By this time, both their annuity and trading stocks had been reduced by more than two million each due to various payments from the government, meaning this fourth only amounted to £3,662,784: 8: 6. In 1748, all the company's claims against the King of Spain due to the asiento contract were, by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, surrendered for what was believed to be an equivalent. Their trade with the Spanish West Indies ended, the remaining trading stock was converted into annuity stock, and the company completely stopped being a trading company.

It ought to be observed, that in the trade which the South Sea company carried on by means of their annual ship, the only trade by which it ever was expected that they could make any considerable profit, they were not without competitors, either in the foreign or in the home market. At Carthagena, Porto Bello, and La Vera Cruz, they had to encounter the competition of the Spanish merchants, who brought from Cadiz to those markets European goods, of the same kind with the outward cargo of their ship; and in England they had to encounter that of the English merchants, who imported from Cadiz goods of the Spanish West Indies, of the same kind with the inward cargo. The goods, both of the Spanish and English merchants, indeed, were, perhaps, subject to higher duties. But the loss occasioned by the negligence, profusion, and malversation of the servants of the company, had probably been a tax much heavier than all those duties. That a joint-stock company should be able to carry on successfully any branch of foreign trade, when private adventurers can come into any sort of open and fair competition with them, seems contrary to all experience.

It should be noted that in the trade the South Sea Company conducted through their annual ship, which was the only trade expected to generate significant profits, they faced competition both from foreign and domestic markets. In Carthagena, Porto Bello, and La Vera Cruz, they competed with Spanish merchants who brought European goods from Cadiz that were similar to the products on their ship. In England, they faced competition from English merchants who imported goods from the Spanish West Indies that matched their inward cargo. While the goods from both Spanish and English merchants may have been subject to higher duties, the losses caused by the negligence, extravagance, and misconduct of the company’s employees were likely a much heavier burden than those duties. It seems against all experience that a joint-stock company could successfully conduct any branch of foreign trade when private investors can easily compete with them in an open and fair market.

The old English East India company was established in 1600, by a charter from Queen Elizabeth. In the first twelve voyages which they fitted out for India, they appear to have traded as a regulated company, with separate stocks, though only in the general ships of the company. In 1612, they united into a joint stock. Their charter was exclusive, and, though not confirmed by act of parliament, was in those days supposed to convey a real exclusive privilege. For many years, therefore, they were not much disturbed by interlopers. Their capital, which never exceeded seven hundred and fourty-four thousand pounds, and of which fifty pounds was a share, was not so exorbitant, nor their dealings so extensive, as to afford either a pretext for gross negligence and profusion, or a cover to gross malversation. Notwithstanding some extraordinary losses, occasioned partly by the malice of the Dutch East India company, and partly by other accidents, they carried on for many years a successful trade. But in process of time, when the principles of liberty were better understood, it became every day more and more doubtful, how far a royal charter, not confirmed by act of parliament, could convey an exclusive privilege. Upon this question the decisions of the courts of justice were not uniform, but varied with the authority of government, and the humours of the times. Interlopers multiplied upon them; and towards the end of the reign of Charles II., through the whole of that of James II., and during a part of that of William III., reduced them to great distress. In 1698, a proposal was made to parliament, of advancing two millions to government, at eight per cent. provided the subscribers were erected into a new East India company, with exclusive privileges. The old East India company offered seven hundred thousand pounds, nearly the amount of their capital, at four per cent. upon the same conditions. But such was at that time the state of public credit, that it was more convenient for government to borrow two millions at eight per cent. than seven hundred thousand pounds at four. The proposal of the new subscribers was accepted, and a new East India company established in consequence. The old East India company, however, had a right to continue their trade till 1701. They had, at the same time, in the name of their treasurer, subscribed very artfully three hundred and fifteen thousand pounds into the stock of the new. By a negligence in the expression of the act of parliament, which vested the East India trade in the subscribers to this loan of two millions, it did not appear evident that they were all obliged to unite into a joint stock. A few private traders, whose subscriptions amounted only to seven thousand two hundred pounds, insisted upon the privilege of trading separately upon their own stocks, and at their own risks. The old East India company had a right to a separate trade upon their own stock till 1701; and they had likewise, both before and after that period, a right, like that of other private traders, to a separate trade upon the three hundred and fifteen thousand pounds, which they had subscribed into the stock of the new company. The competition of the two companies with the private traders, and with one another, is said to have well nigh ruined both. Upon a subsequent occasion, in 1730, when a proposal was made to parliament for putting the trade under the management of a regulated company, and thereby[Pg 314] laying it in some measure open, the East India company, in opposition to this proposal, represented, in very strong terms, what had been, at this time, the miserable effects, as they thought them, of this competition. In India, they said, it raised the price of goods so high, that they were not worth the buying; and in England, by overstocking the market, it sunk their price so low, that no profit could be made by them. That by a more plentiful supply, to the great advantage and conveniency of the public, it must have reduced very much the price of India goods in the English market, cannot well be doubted; but that it should have raised very much their price in the Indian market, seems not very probable, as all the extraordinary demand which that competition could occasion must have been but as a drop of water in the immense ocean of Indian commerce. The increase of demand, besides, though in the beginning it may sometimes raise the price of goods, never fails to lower it in the long-run. It encourages production, and thereby increases the competition of the producers, who, in order to undersell one another, have recourse to new divisions of labour and new improvements of art, which might never otherwise have been thought of. The miserable effects of which the company complained, were the cheapness of consumption, and the encouragement given to production; precisely the two effects which it is the great business of political economy to promote. The competition, however, of which they gave this doleful account, had not been allowed to be of long continuance. In 1702, the two companies were, in some measure, united by an indenture tripartite, to which the queen was the third party; and in 1708, they were by act of parliament, perfectly consolidated into one company, by their present name of the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies. Into this act it was thought worth while to insert a clause, allowing the separate traders to continue their trade till Michaelmas 1711; but at the same time empowering the directors, upon three years notice, to redeem their little capital of seven thousand two hundred pounds, and thereby to convert the whole stock of the company into a joint stock. By the same act, the capital of the company, in consequence of a new loan to government, was augmented from two millions to three millions two hundred thousand pounds. In 1743, the company advanced another million to government. But this million being raised, not by a call upon the proprietors, but by selling annuities and contracting bond-debts, it did not augment the stock upon which the proprietors could claim a dividend. It augmented, however, their trading stock, it being equally liable with the other three millions two hundred thousand pounds, to the losses sustained, and debts contracted by the company in prosecution of their mercantile projects. From 1708, or at least from 1711, this company, being delivered from all competitors, and fully established in the monopoly of the English commerce to the East Indies, carried on a successful trade, and from their profits, made annually a moderate dividend to their proprietors. During the French war, which began in 1741, the ambition of Mr. Dupleix, the French governor of Pondicherry, involved them in the wars of the Carnatic, and in the politics of the Indian princes. After many signal successes, and equally signal losses, they at last lost Madras, at that time their principal settlement in India. It was restored to them by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; and, about this time the spirit of war and conquest seems to have taken possession of their servants in India, and never since to have left them. During the French war, which began in 1755, their arms partook of the general good fortune of those of Great Britain. They defended Madras, took Pondicherry, recovered Calcutta, and acquired the revenues of a rich and extensive territory, amounting, it was then said, to upwards of three millions a-year. They remained for several years in quiet possession of this revenue; but in 1767, administration laid claim to their territorial acquisitions, and the revenue arising from them, as of right belonging to the crown; and the company, in compensation for this claim, agreed to pay to government four hundred thousand pounds a-year. They had, before this, gradually augmented their dividend from about six to ten per cent.; that is, upon their capital of three millions two hundred thousand pounds, they had increased it by a hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds, or had raised it from one hundred and ninety-two thousand to three hundred and twenty thousand pounds a-year. They were attempting about this time to raise it still further, to twelve and a-half per cent., which would have made their annual payments to their proprietors equal to what they had agreed to pay annually to government, or to four hundred thousand pounds a-year. But during the two years in which their agreement with government was to take place, they were restrained from any further increase of dividend by two successive acts of parliament, of which the object was to enable them to make a speedier progress in the payment of their debts, which were at this time estimated at upwards of six or seven millions sterling. In 1769, they renewed their agreement with government for five years more, and stipulated, that during the course of that period, they should be allowed gradually to increase their dividend to twelve and a-half per cent; never increasing it, however, more than one per cent. in one year. This increase of dividend, therefore, when it had risen to its utmost height, could augment their annual[Pg 315] payments, to their proprietors and government together, but by six hundred and eight thousand pounds, beyond what they had been before their late territorial acquisitions. What the gross revenue of those territorial acquisitions was supposed to amount to, has already been mentioned; and by an account brought by the Cruttenden East Indiaman in 1769, the neat revenue, clear of all deductions and military charges, was stated at two millions forty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-seven pounds. They were said, at the same time, to possess another revenue, arising partly from lands, but chiefly from the customs established at their different settlements, amounting to four hundred and thirty-nine thousand pounds. The profits of their trade, too, according to the evidence of their chairman before the house of commons, amounted, at this time, to at least four hundred thousand pounds a-year; according to that of their accountant, to at least five hundred thousand; according to the lowest account, at least equal to the highest dividend that was to be paid to their proprietors. So great a revenue might certainly have afforded augmentation of six hundred and eight thousand pounds in their annual payments; and, at the same time, have left a large sinking fund, sufficient for the speedy reduction of their debt. In 1773, however, their debts, instead of being reduced, were augmented by an arrear to the treasury in the payment of the four hundred thousand pounds; by another to the custom-house for duties unpaid; by a large debt to the bank, for money borrowed; and by a fourth, for bills drawn upon them from India, and wantonly accepted, to the amount of upwards of twelve hundred thousand pounds. The distress which these accumulated claims brought upon them, obliged them not only to reduce all at once their dividend to six per cent. but to throw themselves upon the mercy of government, and to supplicate, first, a release from the further payment of the stipulated four hundred thousand pounds a-year; and, secondly, a loan of fourteen hundred thousand, to save them from immediate bankruptcy. The great increase of their fortune had, it seems, only served to furnish their servants with a pretext for greater profusion, and a cover for greater malversation, than in proportion even to that increase of fortune. The conduct of their servants in India, and the general state of their affairs both in India and in Europe, became the subject of a parliamentary inquiry: in consequence of which, several very important alterations were made in the constitution of their government, both at home and abroad. In India, their principal settlements of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, which had before been altogether independent of one another, were subjected to a governor-general, assisted by a council of four assessors, parliament assuming to itself the first nomination of this governor and council, who were to reside at Calcutta; that city having now become, what Madras was before, the most important of the English settlements in India. The court of the Mayor of Calcutta, originally instituted for the trial of mercantile causes, which arose in the city and neighbourhood, had gradually extended its jurisdiction with the extension of the empire. It was now reduced and confined to the original purpose of its institution. Instead of it, a new supreme court of judicature was established, consisting of a chief justice and three judges, to be appointed by the crown. In Europe, the qualification necessary to entitle a proprietor to vote at their general courts was raised, from five hundred pounds, the original price of a share in the stock of the company, to a thousand pounds. In order to vote upon this qualification, too, it was declared necessary, that he should have possessed it, if acquired by his own purchase, and not by inheritance, for at least one year, instead of six months, the term requisite before. The court of twenty-four directors had before been chosen annually; but it was now enacted, that each director should, for the future, be chosen for four years; six of them, however, to go out of office by rotation every year, and not be capable of being re-chosen at the election of the six new directors for the ensuing year. In consequence of these alterations, the courts, both of the proprietors and directors, it was expected, would be likely to act with more dignity and steadiness than they had usually done before. But it seems impossible, by any alterations, to render those courts, in any respect, fit to govern, or even to share in the government of a great empire; because the greater part of their members must always have too little interest in the prosperity of that empire, to give any serious attention to what may promote it. Frequently a man of great, sometimes even a man of small fortune, is willing to purchase a thousand pounds share in India stock, merely for the influence which he expects to acquire by a vote in the court of proprietors. It gives him a share, though not in the plunder, yet in the appointment of the plunderers of India; the court of directors, though they make that appointment, being necessarily more or less under the influence of the proprietors, who not only elect those directors, but sometimes over-rule the appointments of their servants in India. Provided he can enjoy this influence for a few years, and thereby provide for a certain number of his friends, he frequently cares little about the dividend, or even about the value of the stock upon which his vote in founded. About the prosperity of the great empire, in the government of which that vote gives him a share, he seldom cares at all. No other sovereigns ever were, or, from the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly indifferent about the happiness[Pg 316] or misery of their subjects, the improvement or waste of their dominions, the glory or disgrace of their administration, as, from irresistible moral causes, the greater part of the proprietors of such a mercantile company are, and necessarily must be. This indifference, too, was more likely to be increased than diminished by some of the new regulations which were made in consequence of the parliamentary inquiry. By a resolution of the house of commons, for example, it was declared, that when the L.1,400,000 lent to the company by government, should be paid, and their bond-debts be reduced to L.1,500,000, they might then, and not till then, divide eight per cent. upon their capital; and that whatever remained of their revenues and neat profits at home should be divided into four parts; three of them to be paid into the exchequer for the use of the public, and the fourth to be reserved as a fund, either for the further reduction of their bond-debts, or for the discharge of other contingent exigencies which the company might labour under. But if the company were bad stewards and bad sovereigns, when the whole of their neat revenue and profits belonged to themselves, and were at their own disposal, they were surely not likely to be better when three-fourths of them were to belong to other people, and the other fourth, though to be laid out for the benefit of the company, yet to be so under the inspection and with the approbation of other people.

The old English East India Company was established in 1600 with a charter from Queen Elizabeth. During their first twelve voyages set for India, they seemed to operate as a regulated company, with separate stocks, although only on the company's general ships. In 1612, they merged into a joint stock. Their charter was exclusive, and while it wasn't confirmed by an act of parliament, it was believed at the time to grant a genuine exclusive privilege. For many years, they faced little disruption from competitors. Their capital, which never exceeded seven hundred forty-four thousand pounds, with each share valued at fifty pounds, wasn't excessive, nor were their operations extensive enough to provide justification for gross negligence or malfeasance. Despite some major losses caused partly by the hostility of the Dutch East India Company and other incidents, they managed a successful trade for many years. However, as understanding of liberty evolved, it became increasingly questionable how far a royal charter, not backed by an act of parliament, could grant an exclusive privilege. Court decisions on this matter were inconsistent and varied with the government's authority and the prevailing sentiments of the time. Competitors began to multiply, and toward the end of Charles II's reign, throughout James II's reign, and during part of William III's, they faced significant distress. In 1698, a proposal was made to parliament to advance two million to the government at eight percent, conditioned on the subscribers being formed into a new East India Company with exclusive rights. The old East India Company offered seven hundred thousand pounds, nearly their entire capital, at four percent under the same conditions. However, due to the state of public credit at the time, it was more advantageous for the government to borrow two million at eight percent than seven hundred thousand at four. The proposal from the new subscribers was accepted, and a new East India Company was formed. The old East India Company retained the right to continue their trade until 1701. They had also cleverly subscribed three hundred fifteen thousand pounds to the stock of the new company under the name of their treasurer. Due to a vague phrasing in the act of parliament, which vested the East India trade in the subscribers of the two million loan, it was not clear that they were all required to merge into a joint stock. A few private traders, whose subscriptions totaled only seven thousand two hundred pounds, insisted on the right to trade separately with their own funds. The old East India Company maintained the right to conduct a separate trade with their own stock until 1701; they also had a right to trade separately with the three hundred fifteen thousand pounds they subscribed to the new company's stock, both before and after that time. The competition between the two companies and the private traders is said to have nearly ruined both. In 1730, when parliament considered putting the trade under the management of a regulated company, making it somewhat open, the East India Company strongly opposed this proposal, arguing that this competition had led to dire consequences. In India, they claimed it inflated prices so much that goods weren't worth purchasing; in England, overstocking the market lowered prices so far that no profit could be made from them. It's indisputable that a more abundant supply would significantly reduce the price of Indian goods in the English market, but it's doubtful it would have greatly increased their price in the Indian market, as any extraordinary demand generated by that competition would have been a mere drop in the vast sea of Indian commerce. Moreover, while an increase in demand may initially boost prices, it ultimately leads to lower prices over time. Increased demand encourages production and promotes competition among producers, who, in a bid to undercut each other, may adopt new methods of labor division and improvements in techniques that may not have been considered otherwise. The disastrous effects the company lamented were, in fact, the benefits of lower consumption costs and encouragement for production—the very two outcomes that political economy aims to foster. The competition they depicted so gloomily was not allowed to last long. In 1702, the two companies were partially united by a tripartite indenture, with the queen being the third party; and in 1708, an act of parliament fully consolidated them into one entity, known as the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies. This act included a clause allowing private traders to continue their trade until Michaelmas 1711 while empowering the directors, with three years' notice, to buy back their small capital of seven thousand two hundred pounds and therefore convert the entire company's assets into a joint stock. Additionally, the company’s capital was increased from two million to three million two hundred thousand pounds due to a new loan to the government. In 1743, the company lent another million to the government. However, since this million was raised by selling annuities and borrowing, rather than calling on shareholders, it didn't increase the stock from which dividends could be claimed. Nonetheless, it did increase their trading stock, which, along with the other three million two hundred thousand pounds, was liable for losses and debts incurred by the company in pursuing their commercial objectives. Following 1708, or at least by 1711, this company, free from all competitors and firmly established as the monopoly of English trade to the East Indies, conducted a thriving business and consistently provided a moderate annual dividend to its shareholders. During the French war that began in 1741, the ambitions of Mr. Dupleix, the French governor of Pondicherry, drew them into the conflicts in the Carnatic and the politics of Indian princes. After many notable victories and significant defeats, they ultimately lost Madras, their main settlement in India at that time. It was returned to them by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; around this time, the spirit of war and conquest seems to have captivated their servants in India and never left. During the French war that began in 1755, they enjoyed the good fortune of British arms. They successfully defended Madras, captured Pondicherry, reclaimed Calcutta, and acquired the revenues from an extensive and wealthy territory, then estimated to yield over three million annually. They held quiet possession of this revenue for several years, but in 1767, the government claimed their territorial gains and the revenues from them as rights belonging to the crown; in compensation, the company agreed to pay the government four hundred thousand pounds a year. Prior to this, they gradually raised their dividend from about six to ten percent; that is, on their capital of three million two hundred thousand pounds, they increased this by one hundred twenty-eight thousand pounds, boosting it from one hundred ninety-two thousand to three hundred twenty thousand pounds annually. They were also aiming to increase it further to twelve and a half percent, which would have aligned their annual payments to shareholders with the four hundred thousand pounds annual payment to the government. However, during the two years in which their arrangement with the government was in effect, two consecutive acts of parliament restricted any further increase in dividends to allow them to make quicker progress in paying off their debts, which were estimated at over six or seven million sterling at the time. In 1769, they renewed their agreement with the government for another five years, stipulating that during this period, they would be allowed to gradually raise their dividend to twelve and a half percent, though they couldn't increase it more than one percent in a single year. Thus, when it reached its peak, this increase in dividend could boost their total annual payments to shareholders and the government by only six hundred eight thousand pounds beyond what they had before their recent territorial acquisitions. The rough revenue from these acquisitions had already been mentioned; according to an account brought back by the Cruttenden East Indiaman in 1769, the net revenue, after all deductions and military expenses, was reported to be two million forty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-seven pounds. They were also believed to have another revenue stream from lands and primarily from customs established at different settlements amounting to four hundred thirty-nine thousand pounds. Their trade profits, as indicated by their chairman in a House of Commons session, were claimed to be at least four hundred thousand pounds annually; according to their accountant, at least five hundred thousand; according to the lowest estimates, at least equal to the highest dividend due to their shareholders. Such a significant revenue could certainly have supported an increase of six hundred eight thousand pounds in their annual payments, while also providing a substantial sinking fund sufficient to rapidly reduce their debt. However, in 1773, rather than decreasing, their debts grew due to arrears owed to the treasury for the four hundred thousand pounds, unpaid duties owed to customs, a large loan from the bank, and additional debts from bills drawn from India, amounting to over twelve hundred thousand pounds. The pressure from these accumulated claims forced them to reduce their dividend to six percent while pleading with the government first for relief from the continued payment of the agreed four hundred thousand pounds per year and secondly for a loan of fourteen hundred thousand to prevent immediate bankruptcy. It seemed that their substantial fortune merely provided their servants with a pretext for greater wastefulness and a cover for more corruption than was ever proportional to that increased fortune. The behavior of their servants in India and the general state of their affairs both there and in Europe became the subject of a parliamentary inquiry, which led to several significant changes in their governance structure, both domestically and abroad. In India, their main settlements of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, which had previously operated independently, were placed under a governor-general, supported by a council of four advisers, with parliament claiming the first appointment of this governor and council, who were to be based in Calcutta; that city having now become, like Madras before it, the most crucial of the English settlements in India. The court of the Mayor of Calcutta, originally established to hear commercial disputes in the city and surrounding area, had slowly extended its jurisdiction as the empire expanded. It was now restricted back to its original purpose. In its place, a new supreme court of justice was set up, comprising a chief justice and three judges appointed by the crown. In Europe, the requirement for a shareholder to be eligible to vote at general courts was raised from five hundred pounds—the original price of a stock share—to one thousand pounds. To qualify for this vote, it was also mandated that the shareholder must have held that amount, if obtained through personal purchase and not inheritance, for at least a year, instead of the previous six months. Directors who had previously been elected annually were now mandated to serve four-year terms; however, six of them would rotate out of office each year and could not be re-elected during the election for the six new directors of the following year. It was anticipated that these changes would allow both the shareholders and directors to operate with more dignity and stability than they had in the past. Yet, it appears impossible to make those governing bodies fit to rule or even participate in governing a large empire, as a majority of their members would always have too little stake in the empire's prosperity to devote serious attention to its advancement. Often, individuals with considerable, and sometimes even modest wealth, are willing to buy a one thousand-pound share in India stocks, merely for the influence they expect to gain through a vote in the court of proprietors. This grants them a share, albeit not in the spoils, at least in the selection of those who profit at India's expense; since the court of directors, while appointed by the proprietors, is often influenced by them and may sometimes override their own appointments for their servants in India. Provided they can enjoy this influence for a few years and help secure positions for some of their friends, they usually care little about dividends or even the stock's value upon which their vote is based. Regarding the prosperity of the vast empire in whose governance their vote grants them a role, they show scant concern. Never before have sovereigns, whether great or small, been so wholly indifferent to their subjects' well-being, the stewardship of their territories, or the honor and reputation of their administration, as many of the shareholders in such a commercial enterprise necessarily are by moral compulsion. Moreover, this indifference was likely heightened, rather than diminished, by some of the new regulations that followed the parliamentary inquiry. For instance, the House of Commons declared that once the L.1,400,000 loaned by the government to the company was paid off, and their bond debts reduced to L.1,500,000, only then could they divide eight percent of their capital; and whatever remained of their revenues and net profits should be divided into four parts: three to go to the exchequer for public use, and the fourth set aside as a fund either to further reduce their bond debts or cover other unforeseen costs the company might face. However, if the company was poor at managing finances and governance when all their net revenue and profits belonged solely to them, they were unlikely to perform better when three-fourths belonged to others, and the remaining fourth, while meant to benefit the company, was subject to oversight and approval by outside parties.

It might be more agreeable to the company, that their own servants and dependants should have either the pleasure of wasting, or the profit of embezzling, whatever surplus might remain, after paying the proposed dividend of eight per cent. than that it should come into the hands of a set of people with whom those resolutions could scarce fail to set them in some measure at variance. The interest of those servants and dependants might so far predominate in the court of proprietors, as sometimes to dispose it to support the authors of depredations which had been committed in direct violation of its own authority. With the majority of proprietors, the support even of the authority of their own court might sometimes be a matter of less consequence than the support of those who had set that authority at defiance.

It might be more acceptable to the company that their own employees and dependents should either enjoy the pleasure of wasting or benefit from embezzling any surplus left after paying the proposed eight percent dividend, rather than allowing it to end up in the hands of people who would likely create conflict with those resolutions. The interests of these employees and dependents might be so significant in the shareholders' meeting that they could sometimes lean towards supporting those who committed thefts that directly violated the company's authority. For most shareholders, backing their own court's authority might occasionally be less important than backing those who openly disregarded that authority.

The regulations of 1773, accordingly, did not put an end to the disorder of the company's government in India. Notwithstanding that, during a momentary fit of good conduct, they had at one time collected into the treasury of Calcutta more than L.3,000,000 sterling; notwithstanding that they had afterwards extended either their dominion or their depredations over a vast accession of some of the richest and most fertile countries in India, all was wasted and destroyed. They found themselves altogether unprepared to stop or resist the incursion of Hyder Ali; and in consequence of those disorders, the company is now (1784) in greater distress than ever; and, in order to prevent immediate bankruptcy, is once more reduced to supplicate the assistance of government. Different plans have been proposed by the different parties in parliament for the better management of its affairs; and all those plans seem to agree in supposing, what was indeed always abundantly evident, that it is altogether unfit to govern its territorial possessions. Even the company itself seems to be convinced of its own incapacity so far, and seems, upon that account willing to give them up to government.

The regulations of 1773, therefore, did not put an end to the chaos of the company's administration in India. Despite having temporarily acted responsibly and collecting over £3,000,000 in the treasury of Calcutta at one point, and despite later expanding their control or exploitation over some of the richest and most fertile regions in India, everything was squandered and ruined. They found themselves completely unprepared to stop or fend off Hyder Ali's invasion; as a result of this turmoil, the company is now (1784) in greater trouble than ever and, to avoid immediate bankruptcy, has once again been compelled to seek help from the government. Various plans have been suggested by different groups in parliament for better managing its operations, and all these plans seem to share the belief, which has always been quite clear, that it is utterly unfit to govern its territories. Even the company itself seems to recognize its own inability to do so and appears willing, for that reason, to surrender control to the government.

With the right of possessing forts and garrisons in distant and barbarous countries, is necessarily connected the right of making peace and war in those countries. The joint-stock companies, which have had the one right, have constantly exercised the other, and have frequently had it expressly conferred upon them. How unjustly, how capriciously, how cruelly, they have commonly exercised it, is too well known from recent experience.

With the right to own forts and military bases in far-off and savage lands comes the right to declare peace and war in those regions. Joint-stock companies that have held this right have consistently exercised the other, often having it explicitly granted to them. How unfairly, randomly, and harshly they have usually wielded this power is well known from recent experience.

When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint-stock company, and to grant them, in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated, upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. But upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine; the forts and garrisons, if it was found necessary to establish any, to be taken into the hands of government, their value to be paid to the company, and the trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the state. By a perpetual monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for many of them to carry on. It is for the most worthless of all purposes, too, that they are taxed in this manner. It is merely to enable the company to support the negligence, profusion, and malversation of their own servants, whose disorderly conduct seldom allows the dividend of the company to exceed the ordinary rate of profit in trades which are altogether free, and very frequently makes it[Pg 317] fall even a good deal short of that rate. Without a monopoly, however, a joint-stock company, it would appear from experience, cannot long carry on any branch of foreign trade. To buy in one market, in order to sell with profit in another, when there are many competitors in both; to watch over, not only the occasional variations in the demand, but the much greater and more frequent variations in the competition, or in the supply which that demand is likely to get from other people; and to suit with dexterity and judgment both the quantity and quality of each assortment of goods to all these circumstances, is a species of warfare, of which the operations are continually changing, and which can scarce ever be conducted successfully, without such an unremitting exertion of vigilance and attention as cannot long be expected from the directors of a joint-stock company. The East India company, upon the redemption of their funds, and the expiration of their exclusive privilege, have a right, by act of parliament, to continue a corporation with a joint stock, and to trade in their corporate capacity to the East Indies, in common with the rest of their fellow subjects. But in this situation, the superior vigilance and attention of a private adventurer would, in all probability, soon make them weary of the trade.

When a group of merchants takes on the risk and cost of starting a new trade with a distant and uncivilized nation, it might be reasonable to form them into a joint-stock company and give them, in case they succeed, a monopoly on the trade for a set number of years. This is the easiest and most natural way for the state to reward them for taking on a risky and expensive venture that the public will benefit from later. A temporary monopoly like this can be justified on the same grounds as granting a monopoly for a new invention to its creator, or a new book to its author. However, once the term expires, the monopoly should definitely end; any forts or garrisons, if necessary to establish, should be handed over to the government, their value compensated to the company, and the trade opened up to all citizens of the state. A permanent monopoly absurdly taxes other citizens of the state in two ways: first, by making goods expensive, which they could buy much cheaper in a free market; and second, by completely excluding them from a business that could be both convenient and profitable for many. This taxation serves the most pointless purpose, merely enabling the company to cover the negligence, wastefulness, and misconduct of their employees, whose disorganized work rarely allows the company’s dividends to exceed the usual profit rate of entirely free trades, and often results in profits falling well below that rate. Without a monopoly, it seems from experience that a joint-stock company cannot sustain any branch of foreign trade for long. Buying in one market to sell profitably in another, especially with many competitors in both, requires constant attention not just to occasional changes in demand but also to the much greater and frequent shifts in competition or supply that other sellers provide. Successfully managing the quantity and quality of goods in response to these circumstances is a kind of ongoing battle that requires relentless vigilance and focus, which the directors of a joint-stock company cannot maintain for long. The East India Company, upon redeeming their funds and losing their exclusive rights, has the legal right to remain a corporation with joint stock and trade in their corporate capacity to the East Indies, just like their fellow citizens. However, in this scenario, the greater vigilance and attention of a private trader would likely soon make them tired of the trade.

An eminent French author, of great knowledge in matters of political economy, the Abbé Morellet, gives a list of fifty-five joint-stock companies for foreign trade, which have been established in different parts of Europe since the year 1600, and which, according to him, have all failed from mismanagement, notwithstanding they had exclusive privileges. He has been misinformed with regard to the history of two or three of them, which were not joint-stock companies and have not failed. But, in compensation, there have been several joint-stock companies which have failed, and which he has omitted.

A prominent French author, well-versed in political economy, Abbé Morellet, lists fifty-five joint-stock companies for foreign trade that were set up in various parts of Europe since 1600. According to him, all of these have failed due to mismanagement, even though they had exclusive privileges. He has been misinformed about the history of a couple of them, which weren't actually joint-stock companies and haven't failed. However, there have been several joint-stock companies that did fail, and those he has overlooked.

The only trades which it seems possible for a joint-stock company to carry on successfully, without an exclusive privilege, are those, of which all the operations are capable of bring reduced to what is called a routine, or to such a uniformity of method as admits of little or no variation. Of this kind is, first, the banking trade; secondly, the trade of insurance from fire and from sea risk, and capture in time of war; thirdly, the trade of making and maintaining a navigable cut or canal; and, fourthly, the similar trade of bringing water for the supply of a great city.

The only businesses that a joint-stock company can successfully operate without special privileges are those that can be streamlined into a routine or have a consistent method that allows for minimal changes. Examples of this include first, the banking industry; second, the insurance business covering fire and maritime risks, along with war-related captures; third, the operation of constructing and maintaining a navigable canal; and fourth, the similar business of supplying water to a large city.

Though the principles of the banking trade may appear somewhat abstruse, the practice is capable of being reduced to strict rules. To depart upon any occasion from those rules, in consequence of some flattering speculation of extraordinary gain, is almost always extremely dangerous and frequently fatal to the banking company which attempts it. But the constitution of joint-stock companies renders them in general, more tenacious of established rules than any private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, seem extremely well fitted for this trade. The principal banking companies in Europe, accordingly, are joint-stock companies, many of which manage their trade very successfully without any exclusive privilege. The bank of England has no other exclusive privilege, except that no other banking company in England shall consist of more than six persons. The two banks of Edinburgh are joint-stock companies, without any exclusive privilege.

Although the principles of banking might seem a bit complicated, the practice can be broken down into clear rules. Straying from those rules, due to a tempting promise of huge profits, is usually very risky and can often lead to disaster for the banking company that tries it. However, the structure of joint-stock companies generally makes them more committed to established rules than any private partnership. Thus, these companies appear to be particularly well-suited for this industry. The leading banking companies in Europe are mostly joint-stock companies, many of which operate very successfully without any special privileges. The Bank of England holds no other exclusive privilege aside from the fact that no other banking company in England can have more than six members. The two banks in Edinburgh are also joint-stock companies and do not have any exclusive privileges.

The value of the risk, either from fire, or from loss by sea, or by capture, though it cannot, perhaps, be calculated very exactly, admits, however, of such a gross estimation, as renders it, in some degree, reducible to strict rule and method. The trade of insurance, therefore, may be carried on successfully by a joint-stock company, without any exclusive privilege. Neither the London Assurance, nor the Royal Exchange Assurance companies, have any such privilege.

The value of the risks, whether from fire, loss at sea, or capture, may not be calculated with complete accuracy, but it can be estimated in a way that makes it somewhat manageable and systematic. Because of this, insurance can be successfully managed by a joint-stock company without any special privileges. Neither the London Assurance nor the Royal Exchange Assurance companies have such privileges.

When a navigable cut or canal has been once made, the management of it becomes quite simple and easy, and it is reducible to strict rule and method. Even the making of it is so, as it may be contracted for with undertakers, at so much a mile, and so much a lock. The same thing may be said of a canal, an aqueduct, or a great pipe for bringing water to supply a great city. Such undertakings, therefore, may be, and accordingly frequently are, very successfully managed by joint-stock companies, without any exclusive privilege.

Once a navigable cut or canal is created, managing it becomes straightforward and can be organized into clear rules and methods. Even the construction process is similar, as it can be contracted out with builders for a set price per mile and per lock. The same applies to a canal, an aqueduct, or a large pipe that brings water to supply a major city. Thus, these projects can, and often are, effectively managed by joint-stock companies without needing any exclusive rights.

To establish a joint-stock company, however, for any undertaking, merely because such a company might be capable of managing it successfully; or, to exempt a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which take place with regard to all their neighbours, merely because they might be capable of thriving, if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be reasonable. To render such an establishment perfectly reasonable, with the circumstance of being reducible to strict rule and method, two other circumstances ought to concur. First, it ought to appear with the clearest evidence, that the undertaking is of greater and more general utility than the greater part of common trades; and, secondly, that it requires a greater capital than can easily be collected into a private copartnery. If a moderate capital were sufficient, the great utility of the undertaking would not be a sufficient reason for establishing a joint-stock company; because, in this case, the demand for what it was to produce, would readily and easily be supplied by private adventurers. In the four[Pg 318] trades above mentioned, both those circumstances concur.

To set up a joint-stock company for any project just because it might handle it well, or to free a specific group of traders from some of the general laws that apply to all their neighbors, simply because they might succeed with that exemption, wouldn't make much sense. To make such an establishment completely reasonable and organized, two other conditions need to be met. First, it should clearly demonstrate that the project offers more significant and broader benefits than most regular trades; and second, it must need a larger capital than can easily be gathered in a private partnership. If only a moderate capital was needed, the great benefits of the project wouldn't be a good enough reason to establish a joint-stock company because, in that case, private investors could easily meet the demand for what it was meant to produce. In the four[Pg 318] trades mentioned earlier, both of those conditions apply.

The great and general utility of the banking trade, when prudently managed, has been fully explained in the second book of this Inquiry. But a public bank, which is to support public credit, and, upon particular emergencies, to advance to government the whole produce of a tax, to the amount, perhaps, of several millions, a year or two before it comes in, requires a greater capital than can easily be collected into any private copartnery.

The overall usefulness of the banking industry, when managed wisely, has been thoroughly discussed in the second book of this Inquiry. However, a public bank, intended to support public credit and, in certain emergencies, provide the government with the full amount of a tax—potentially several million dollars, a year or two in advance—needs a larger capital than can be easily gathered by any private partnership.

The trade of insurance gives great security to the fortunes of private people, and, by dividing among a great many that loss which would ruin an individual, makes it fall light and easy upon the whole society. In order to give this security, however, it is necessary that the insurers should have a very large capital. Before the establishment of the two joint-stock companies for insurance in London, a list, it is said, was laid before the attorney-general, of one hundred and fifty private insurers, who had failed in the course of a few years.

The insurance industry provides significant protection for individuals' wealth, and by spreading the burden of a loss that could destroy someone financially, it makes it lighter and more manageable for society as a whole. However, to offer this protection, insurers need to maintain a substantial amount of capital. Before the two joint-stock insurance companies were established in London, it's reported that a list was presented to the attorney general, showing one hundred and fifty private insurers who had gone bankrupt over a few years.

That navigable cuts and canals, and the works which are sometimes necessary for supplying a great city with water, are of great and general utility, while, at the same time, they frequently require a greater expense than suits the fortunes of private people, is sufficiently obvious.

It’s clear that navigable cuts and canals, along with the construction needed to supply a major city with water, are very useful overall. However, they often come with costs that exceed what private individuals can afford.

Except the four trades above mentioned, I have not been able to recollect any other, in which all the three circumstances requisite for rendering reasonable the establishment of a joint-stock company concur. The English copper company of London, the lead-smelting company, the glass-grinding company, have not even the pretext of any great or singular utility in the object which they pursue; nor does the pursuit of that object seem to require any expense unsuitable to the fortunes of many private men. Whether the trade which those companies carry on, is reducible to such strict rule and method as to render it fit for the management of a joint-stock company, or whether they have any reason to boast of their extraordinary profits, I do not pretend to know. The mine-adventurers company has been long ago bankrupt. A share in the stock of the British Linen company of Edinburgh sells, at present, very much below par, though less so than it did some years ago. The joint-stock companies, which are established for the public-spirited purpose of promoting some particular manufacture, over and above managing their own affairs ill, to the diminution of the general stock of the society, can, in other respects, scarce ever fail to do more harm than good. Notwithstanding the most upright intentions, the unavoidable partiality of their directors to particular branches of the manufacture, of which the undertakers mislead and impose upon them, is a real discouragement to the rest, and necessarily breaks, more or less, that natural proportion which would otherwise establish itself between judicious industry and profit, and which, to the general industry of the country, is of all encouragements the greatest and the most effectual.

Aside from the four trades mentioned earlier, I can’t think of any others where all three conditions necessary for the reasonable formation of a joint-stock company come together. The English copper company in London, the lead-smelting company, and the glass-grinding company don’t even have the excuse of providing significant or unique benefits for what they do; nor does their work seem to require expenses that are beyond what many private individuals can afford. I don’t know if the trades those companies operate follow such strict rules and methods that they are suitable for joint-stock management, or if they have any reason to claim extraordinary profits. The mine-adventurers company went bankrupt long ago. A share in the stock of the British Linen Company in Edinburgh currently sells for much less than its value, although it’s improved from a few years back. Joint-stock companies set up to promote a specific manufacturing purpose, in addition to mismanaging their own affairs and diminishing the general stock of society, often do more harm than good. Despite their best intentions, the unavoidable bias of their directors towards certain manufacturing branches, which the operators mislead and exploit, discourages others and disrupts the natural balance that would otherwise develop between wise industry and profit. This balance is, in fact, the greatest and most effective encouragement for the overall productivity of the country.

ART. II.Of the Expense of the Institution for the Education of Youth.

The institutions for the education of the youth may, in the same manner, furnish a revenue sufficient for defraying their own expense. The fee or honorary, which the scholar pays to the master, naturally constitutes a revenue of this kind.

The educational institutions for young people can similarly generate enough income to cover their own costs. The tuition or fee that students pay to their teachers naturally serves as a source of this income.

Even where the reward of the master does not arise altogether from this natural revenue, it still is not necessary that it should be derived from that general revenue of the society, of which the collection and application are, in most countries, assigned to the executive power. Through the greater part of Europe, accordingly, the endowment of schools and colleges makes either no charge upon that general revenue, or but a very small one. It everywhere arises chiefly from some local or provincial revenue, from the rent of some landed estate, or from the interest of some sum of money, allotted and put under the management of trustees for this particular purpose, sometimes by the sovereign himself, and sometimes by some private donor.

Even when a master’s reward doesn’t come solely from natural income, it doesn’t have to come from the general revenue of society, which is usually managed by the government in most countries. In many parts of Europe, the funding for schools and colleges either doesn’t impact that general revenue or only has a minimal effect. Instead, it mainly comes from local or regional funds, from the rental income of land, or from the interest on a specific sum of money set aside and managed by trustees for this purpose, sometimes by the ruler themselves, and other times by private donors.

Have those public endowments contributed in general, to promote the end of their institution? Have they contributed to encourage the diligence, and to improve the abilities, of the teachers? Have they directed the course of education towards objects more useful, both to the individual and to the public, than those to which it would naturally have gone of its own accord? It should not seem very difficult to give at least a probable answer to each of those questions.

Have those public funds generally helped promote the goals of their institution? Have they encouraged teachers to be more diligent and to enhance their skills? Have they steered education towards objectives that are more beneficial for both individuals and society than what would have naturally occurred on its own? It shouldn’t be too hard to provide at least a reasonable answer to each of those questions.

In every profession, the exertion of the greater part of those who exercise it, is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of making that exertion. This necessity is greatest with those to whom the emoluments of their profession are the only source from which they expect their fortune, or even their ordinary revenue and subsistence. In order to acquire this fortune, or even to get this subsistence, they must, in the course of a year, execute a certain quantity of work of a known value; and, where the competition is free, the rivalship of competitors, who are all endeavouring to justle one another out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his work with a certain degree of exactness. The greatness of the ob[Pg 319]jects which are to be acquired by success in some particular professions may, no doubt, sometimes animate the exertion of a few men of extraordinary spirit and ambition. Great objects, however, are evidently not necessary, in order to occasion the greatest exertions. Rivalship and emulation render excellency, even in mean professions, an object of ambition, and frequently occasion the very greatest exertions. Great objects, on the contrary, alone and unsupported by the necessity of application, have seldom been sufficient to occasion any considerable exertion. In England, success in the profession of the law leads to some very great objects of ambition; and yet how few men, born to easy fortunes, have ever in this country been eminent in that profession?

In every job, how hard people work is always related to how much they need to put in that effort. This need is highest for those who rely on their job for their income, or even just to get by. To make a living or build wealth, they have to complete a specific amount of work that has a set value each year. In a competitive environment, everyone is trying to outdo each other for positions, which pushes everyone to do their work with a certain level of precision. The high rewards that can come from success in certain jobs can definitely motivate a few highly ambitious individuals. However, achieving great rewards isn't necessary to drive the highest levels of effort. Competition and the desire to excel make even less prestigious jobs something to strive for, often leading to the biggest efforts. On the other hand, big goals alone, without the push to apply oneself, rarely result in significant effort. In England, becoming successful in law offers some major ambitions, yet how many people born into wealth have really made a name for themselves in that field?

The endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished, more or less, the necessity of application in the teachers. Their subsistence, so far as it arises from their salaries, is evidently derived from a fund, altogether independent of their success and reputation in their particular professions.

The funding for schools and colleges has reduced, which has lessened the need for teachers to be dedicated. Their livelihood, at least in terms of their salaries, clearly comes from a source that is completely separate from their success and reputation in their respective fields.

In some universities, the salary makes but a part, and frequently but a small part, of the emoluments of the teacher, of which the greater part arises from the honoraries or fees of his pupils. The necessity of application, though always more or less diminished, is not, in this case, entirely taken away. Reputation in his profession is still of some importance to him, and he still has some dependency upon the affection, gratitude, and favourable report of those who have attended upon his instructions; and these favourable sentiments he is likely to gain in no way so well as by deserving them, that is, by the abilities and diligence with which he discharges every part of his duty.

In some universities, the salary is only part of a teacher's total earnings, often just a small part, with most of their income coming from the fees or honorariums paid by students. While the need for effort is still somewhat lessened, it’s not completely eliminated. Having a good reputation in their field still matters, and teachers rely on the affection, gratitude, and positive feedback from their students. They are most likely to earn this positive sentiment by truly deserving it, which means showing skill and dedication in fulfilling all their responsibilities.

In other universities, the teacher is prohibited from receiving any honorary or fee from his pupils, and his salary constitutes the whole of the revenue which he derives from his office. His interest is, in this case, set as directly in opposition to his duty as it is possible to set it. It is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he does or does not perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his interest, at least as interest is vulgarly understood, either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some authority which will not suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless and slovenly a manner as that authority will permit. If he is naturally active and a lover of labour, it is his interest to employ that activity in any way from which he can derive some advantage, rather than in the performance of his duty, from which he can derive none.

In other universities, teachers are not allowed to accept any honorary payments or fees from their students, and their salary is the only income they get from their job. In this situation, their personal interest is directly opposed to their responsibilities. Everyone wants to live as easily as possible; if a teacher’s pay is the same whether they do a difficult job or not, it’s definitely in their interest—at least in the common sense of the term—to either ignore those duties completely or, if they can’t do that because of some authority, to carry them out as carelessly as that authority will allow. If they are naturally active and enjoy working, they’ll find it more beneficial to channel that energy into something that gives them a reward rather than fulfilling a duty that doesn’t offer any.

If the authority to which he is subject resides in the body corporate, the college, or university, of which he himself is a member, and in which the greater part of the other members are, like himself, persons who either are, or ought to be teachers, they are likely to make a common cause, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man to consent that his neighbour may neglect his duty, provided he himself is allowed to neglect his own. In the university of Oxford, the greater part of the public professors have, for these many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching.

If the authority he answers to is part of the corporate body, the college, or university that he's a member of, and where most of the other members are, like him, people who are or should be teachers, they’re likely to band together, be very forgiving of each other, and each person will agree that their neighbor can ignore their responsibilities as long as they can ignore their own too. At the University of Oxford, most of the public professors have, for many years now, completely stopped even pretending to teach.

If the authority to which he is subject resides, not so much in the body corporate, of which he is a member, as in some other extraneous persons, in the bishop of the diocese, for example, in the governor of the province, or, perhaps, in some minister of state, it is not, indeed, in this case, very likely that he will be suffered to neglect his duty altogether. All that such superiors, however, can force him to do, is to attend upon his pupils a certain number of hours, that is, to give a certain number of lectures in the week, or in the year. What those lectures shall be, must still depend upon the diligence of the teacher; and that diligence is likely to be proportioned to the motives which he has for exerting it. An extraneous jurisdiction of this kind, besides, is liable to be exercised both ignorantly and capriciously. In its nature, it is arbitrary and discretionary; and the persons who exercise it, neither attending upon the lectures of the teacher themselves, nor perhaps understanding the sciences which it is his business to teach, are seldom capable of exercising it with judgment. From the insolence of office, too, they are frequently indifferent how they exercise it, and are very apt to censure or deprive him of his office wantonly and without any just cause. The person subject to such jurisdiction is necessarily degraded by it, and, instead of being one of the most respectable, is rendered one of the meanest and most contemptible persons in the society. It is by powerful protection only, that he can effectually guard himself against the bad usage to which he is at all times exposed; and this protection he is most likely to gain, not by ability or diligence in his profession, but by obsequiousness to the will of his superiors, and by being ready, at all times, to sacrifice to that will the rights, the interest, and the honour of the body corporate, of which he is a member. Whoever has attended for any considerable time to the administration of a French university, must have had occasion to remark the effects which naturally result from an arbitrary and extraneous jurisdiction of this kind.

If someone’s authority comes not from the organization they belong to, but rather from outside figures—like the bishop of the diocese, the governor of the province, or maybe some state official—it’s unlikely they will be completely allowed to ignore their responsibilities. All these higher-ups can really compel him to do is spend a certain number of hours with his students, that is, to deliver a specific number of lectures each week or year. What those lectures cover still depends on the teacher’s own efforts, and those efforts are likely influenced by the reasons he has to put in that work. Such external authority can often be applied in ignorant or arbitrary ways. It’s inherently random and discretionary; the people wielding it typically don’t attend the teacher’s lectures themselves and may not even grasp the subjects he’s supposed to teach, which makes them ill-suited to judge his work. Moreover, due to their positions, they often don’t care how they wield their power, and they are prone to criticize or unjustly remove him from his role without any legitimate reason. Being subject to such authority inevitably diminishes his status, making him one of the least respected and most despised individuals in society. He can only effectively protect himself from the mistreatment to which he is constantly subjected through strong backing; and he’s more likely to obtain this protection not through skill or hard work, but by being obedient to his superiors and willing to sacrifice the rights, interests, and dignity of the organization he represents. Anyone who has spent any significant time observing the management of a French university would have noticed the consequences that naturally arise from this kind of arbitrary and external authority.

Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or university, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers, tends more or less to diminish the necessity of that merit or reputation.[Pg 320]

Whatever motivates a certain number of students to attend any college or university, regardless of the quality or reputation of the teachers, tends to lessen the importance of that quality or reputation.[Pg 320]

The privileges of graduates in arts, in law, physic, and divinity, when they can be obtained only by residing a certain number of years in certain universities, necessarily force a certain number of students to such universities, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers. The privileges of graduates are a sort of statutes of apprenticeship, which have contributed to the improvement of education, just as the other statutes of apprenticeship have to that of arts and manufactures.

The benefits of graduates in fields like arts, law, medicine, and theology, which can only be earned by spending a specific number of years at certain universities, inevitably attract a certain number of students to those institutions, regardless of the quality or reputation of the instructors. The benefits of graduates serve as a kind of apprenticeship requirement that has helped enhance education, much like the other apprenticeship laws have improved crafts and industries.

The charitable foundations of scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, &c. necessarily attach a certain number of students to certain colleges, independent altogether of the merit of those particular colleges. Were the students upon such charitable foundations left free to choose what college they liked best, such liberty might perhaps contribute to excite some emulation among different colleges. A regulation, on the contrary, which prohibited even the independent members of every particular college from leaving it, and going to any other, without leave first asked and obtained of that which they meant to abandon, would tend very much to extinguish that emulation.

The charitable foundations for scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc., inevitably tie a certain number of students to specific colleges, regardless of those colleges' actual merit. If students on these charitable foundations were allowed to freely choose which college they preferred, that freedom might spark some competition among various colleges. However, a rule that prevented even independent members of each college from leaving to go to another one, without first asking for and receiving permission from the college they intended to leave, would significantly dampen that competition.

If in each college, the tutor or teacher, who was to instruct each student in all arts and sciences, should not be voluntarily chosen by the student, but appointed by the head of the college; and if, in case of neglect, inability, or bad usage, the student should not be allowed to change him for another, without leave first asked and obtained; such a regulation would not only tend very much to extinguish all emulation among the different tutors of the same college, but to diminish very much, in all of them, the necessity of diligence and of attention to their respective pupils. Such teachers, though very well paid by their students, might be as much disposed to neglect them, as those who are not paid by them at all or who have no other recompense but their salary.

If, in each college, the tutor or teacher who is supposed to instruct each student in all arts and sciences is not chosen by the student voluntarily but appointed by the head of the college; and if, in cases of neglect, inability, or poor treatment, the student is not allowed to replace them with someone else without first asking for and obtaining permission; such a rule would not only greatly reduce competition among the different tutors within the same college but would also significantly lessen the need for diligence and attention to their students. Such teachers, even though they are well-paid by their students, might still be just as likely to neglect them as those who are not paid by them at all or who only receive a salary as compensation.

If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, it must be an unpleasant thing to him to be conscious, while he is lecturing to his students, that he is either speaking or reading nonsense, or what is very little better than nonsense. It must, too, be unpleasant to him to observe, that the greater part of his students desert his lectures; or perhaps, attend upon them with plain enough marks of neglect, contempt, and derision. If he is obliged, therefore, to give a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without any other interest, might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones. Several different expedients, however, may be fallen upon, which will effectually blunt the edge of all those incitements to diligence. The teacher, instead of explaining to his pupils himself the science in which he proposes to instruct them, may read some book upon it; and if this book is written in a foreign and dead language, by interpreting it to them into their own, or, what would give him still less trouble, by making them interpret it to him, and by now and then making an occasional remark upon it, he may flatter himself that he is giving a lecture. The slightest degree of knowledge and application will enable him to do this, without exposing himself to contempt or derision, by saying any thing that is really foolish, absurd, or ridiculous. The discipline of the college, at the same time, may enable him to force all his pupils to the most regular attendance upon his sham lecture, and to maintain the most decent and respectful behaviour during the whole time of the performance.

If the teacher is someone with common sense, it must be frustrating for him to realize, while lecturing his students, that he is either talking nonsense or something barely better than nonsense. It must also be disheartening for him to notice that most of his students skip his lectures or attend them with clear signs of neglect, disdain, and mockery. If he has to deliver a certain number of lectures, just these feelings alone, without any other motivation, might encourage him to put in some effort to make them at least somewhat decent. However, there are several different methods he could use that would effectively dull his drive to be diligent. Instead of explaining the subject he intends to teach himself, the teacher could read from a book about it; and if this book is written in a foreign and outdated language, he might interpret it for his students in their own language or, even easier, have them interpret it for him, occasionally making a comment, and thus convince himself that he's giving a lecture. Even a little bit of knowledge and effort would allow him to do this without embarrassing himself by saying anything truly foolish, absurd, or ridiculous. At the same time, the college's discipline could force all his students to attend his superficial lecture regularly and maintain respectable behavior throughout the entire session.

The discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for the benefit of the students, but for the interest, or, more properly speaking, for the ease of the masters. Its object is, in all cases, to maintain the authority of the master, and, whether he neglects or performs his duty, to oblige the students in all cases to behave to him as if he performed it with the greatest diligence and ability. It seems to presume perfect wisdom and virtue in the one order, and the greatest weakness and folly in the other. Where the masters, however, really perform their duty, there are no examples, I believe, that the greater part of the students ever neglect theirs. No discipline is ever requisite to force attendance upon lectures which are really worth the attending, as is well known wherever any such lectures are given. Force and restraint may, no doubt, be in some degree requisite, in order to oblige children, or very young boys, to attend to those parts of education, which it is thought necessary for them to acquire during that early period of life; but after twelve or thirteen years of age, provided the master does his duty, force or restraint can scarce ever be necessary to carry on any part of education. Such is the generosity of the greater part of young men, that so far from being disposed to neglect or despise the instructions of their master, provided he shews some serious intention of being of use to them, they are generally inclined to pardon a great deal of incorrectness in the performance of his duty, and sometimes even to conceal from the public a good deal of gross negligence.

The discipline in colleges and universities is generally created not for the benefit of the students, but for the convenience of the instructors. Its purpose is always to maintain the authority of the instructor, and whether they fulfill their duties or not, students are expected to behave towards them as if they are performing with the utmost diligence and skill. It seems to assume complete wisdom and virtue on one side, and the greatest weakness and foolishness on the other. However, where instructors actually do their job, I believe there are no cases where most students neglect theirs. No discipline is needed to force attendance at lectures that are genuinely worth attending, as is well known wherever such lectures are offered. Force and restraint may be somewhat necessary to ensure children or very young boys focus on parts of their education considered essential during early childhood; but after the age of twelve or thirteen, as long as the instructor does their job, force or restraint is rarely needed to continue any aspect of education. Most young men are so generous that far from neglecting or disrespecting their instructor’s guidance—when they see a genuine intention to be helpful—they are generally inclined to overlook a lot of mistakes in how the instructor fulfills their role, and sometimes even to cover up significant negligence from the public.

Those parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there are no public institutions, are generally the best taught. When a young man goes to a fencing or a dancing school, he does not, indeed, always learn to fence or to dance very well; but he seldom fails of learning to fence or to dance. The good effects of the riding school are not commonly so evident. The expense of a riding school is so great, that in most places it is a public institution. The three[Pg 321] most essential parts of literary education, to read, write, and account, it still continues to be more common to acquire in private than in public schools; and it very seldom happens, that anybody fails of acquiring them to the degree in which it is necessary to acquire them.

It's noticeable that the areas of education not covered by public institutions are usually the best taught. When a young man attends a fencing or dance school, he may not always learn to fence or dance exceptionally well, but he almost always learns at least the basics. The benefits of riding schools aren't as obvious. The cost of riding schools is so high that in many places they become public institutions. The three most crucial aspects of literacy—reading, writing, and arithmetic—are still more often learned in private settings than in public schools, and it's rare for anyone to fail to master them at the necessary level.

In England, the public schools are much less corrupted than the universities. In the schools, the youth are taught, or at least may be taught, Greek and Latin; that is, every thing which the masters pretend to teach, or which it is expected they should teach. In the universities, the youth neither are taught, nor always can find any proper means of being taught the sciences, which it is the business of those incorporated bodies to teach. The reward of the schoolmaster, in most cases, depends principally, in some cases almost entirely, upon the fees or honoraries of his scholars. Schools have no exclusive privileges. In order to obtain the honours of graduation, it is not necessary that a person should bring a certificate of his having studied a certain number of years at a public school. If, upon examination, he appears to understand what is taught there, no questions are asked about the place where he learnt it.

In England, public schools are much less corrupt than universities. In these schools, students are taught, or at least can be taught, Greek and Latin; that is, everything that the teachers claim to teach, or what is expected of them. In universities, students are neither taught, nor can they always find proper ways to learn the subjects that these institutions are supposed to provide. The pay for schoolteachers, in most cases, mainly depends, in some cases almost entirely, on the fees or payments from their students. Schools have no exclusive privileges. To earn a degree, a person does not need to provide a certificate proving they studied a certain number of years at a public school. If they demonstrate understanding of the material in an exam, no one asks where they learned it.

The parts of education which are commonly taught in universities, it may perhaps be said, are not very well taught. But had it not been for those institutions, they would not have been commonly taught at all; and both the individual and the public would have suffered a good deal from the want of those important parts of education.

The aspects of education that are usually taught in universities aren't necessarily taught very well. However, if it weren't for these institutions, they wouldn't be taught at all, and both individuals and society would have significantly suffered from the lack of these important educational components.

The present universities of Europe were originally, the greater part of them, ecclesiastical corporations, instituted for the education of churchmen. They were founded by the authority of the pope; and were so entirely under his immediate protection, that their members, whether masters or students, had all of them what was then called the benefit of clergy, that is, were exempted from the civil jurisdiction of the countries in which their respective universities were situated, and were amenable only to the ecclesiastical tribunals. What was taught in the greater part of those universities was suitable to the end of their institution, either theology, or something that was merely preparatory to theology.

The universities we see in Europe today were mostly established as religious organizations aimed at training clergy. They were set up under the authority of the pope and were fully protected by him, which meant that all their members, both professors and students, enjoyed what was known as the benefit of clergy. This meant they were exempt from the civil laws of the countries where their universities were located and could only be judged by church courts. The curriculum in most of these universities was focused on their original purpose, primarily theology or subjects leading up to theology.

When Christianity was first established by law, a corrupted Latin had become the common language of all the western parts of Europe. The service of the church, accordingly, and the translation of the Bible which were read in churches, were both in that corrupted Latin; that is, in the common language of the country. After the irruption of the barbarous nations who overturned the Roman empire, Latin gradually ceased to be the language of any part of Europe. But the reverence of the people naturally preserves the established forms and ceremonies of religion long after the circumstances which first introduced and rendered them reasonable, are no more. Though Latin, therefore, was no longer understood anywhere by the great body of the people, the whole service of the church still continued to be performed in that language. Two different languages were thus established in Europe, in the same manner as in ancient Egypt: a language of the priests, and a language of the people; a sacred and a profane, a learned and an unlearned language. But it was necessary that the priests should understand something of that sacred and learned language in which they were to officiate; and the study of the Latin language therefore made, from the beginning, an essential part of university education.

When Christianity was first established by law, a corrupted form of Latin had become the common language across Western Europe. As a result, church services and Bible translations read in churches were both in that corrupted Latin, which was the everyday language of the people. After the invasions by barbarian tribes that toppled the Roman Empire, Latin gradually stopped being spoken anywhere in Europe. However, the respect people had for their religious practices kept the established forms and ceremonies of religion alive long after the reasons for their existence had disappeared. Even though the general population no longer understood Latin, church services continued to be conducted in that language. This created two different languages in Europe, similar to ancient Egypt: one for the priests and another for the people; a sacred language and a common one, a learned language and an unlearned one. Nonetheless, it was essential for the priests to have some understanding of the sacred and learned language they were to use in their duties, so studying Latin became a crucial part of university education from the start.

It was not so with that either of the Greek or of the Hebrew language. The infallible decrees of the church had pronounced the Latin translation of the Bible, commonly called the Latin Vulgate, to have been equally dictated by divine inspiration, and therefore of equal authority with the Greek and Hebrew originals. The knowledge of those two languages, therefore, not being indispensably requisite to a churchman, the study of them did not for a long time make a necessary part of the common course of university education. There are some Spanish universities, I am assured, in which the study of the Greek language has never yet made any part of that course. The first reformers found the Greek text of the New Testament, and even the Hebrew text of the Old, more favourable to their opinions than the vulgate translation, which, as might naturally be supposed, had been gradually accommodated to support the doctrines of the Catholic Church. They set themselves, therefore, to expose the many errors of that translation, which the Roman catholic clergy were thus put under the necessity of defending or explaining. But this could not well be done without some knowledge of the original languages, of which the study was therefore gradually introduced into the greater part of universities; both of those which embraced, and of those which rejected, the doctrines of the reformation. The Greek language was connected with every part of that classical learning, which, though at first principally cultivated by catholics and Italians, happened to come into fashion much about the same time that the doctrines of the reformation were set on foot. In the greater part of universities, therefore, that language was taught previous to the study of philosophy, and as soon as the student had made some progress in the Latin. The Hebrew language having no connection with classical learning, and, except the Holy Scriptures, being the language of not a single book in any esteem[Pg 322] the study of it did not commonly commence till after that of philosophy, and when the student had entered upon the study of theology.

It wasn't the same with the Greek or Hebrew languages. The church's authoritative decisions had declared the Latin translation of the Bible, known as the Latin Vulgate, to have been equally inspired by God, making it just as important as the Greek and Hebrew originals. Because knowledge of those two languages wasn't absolutely necessary for a churchman, studying them didn't become a required part of the standard university curriculum for a long time. I'm told there are some Spanish universities where Greek hasn't been part of the curriculum at all. The first reformers found the Greek text of the New Testament and even the Hebrew text of the Old Testament more supportive of their views than the Vulgate translation, which, as you might expect, had been gradually adjusted to back the doctrines of the Catholic Church. They aimed to expose the many errors in that translation, forcing Roman Catholic clergy to defend or explain it. However, this couldn't be done well without some knowledge of the original languages, prompting universities—both those that accepted and those that rejected the Reformation's doctrines—to gradually introduce their study. The Greek language was associated with classical learning, which, while initially mostly pursued by Catholics and Italians, became popular around the time the Reformation started. In most universities, therefore, Greek was taught before philosophy, and as soon as students had progressed in Latin. Hebrew, having no connection to classical studies and being the language of no other respected books aside from the Holy Scriptures, was typically studied only after philosophy, once students began their theological studies.[Pg 322]

Originally, the first rudiments, both of the Greek and Latin languages, were taught in universities; and in some universities they still continue to be so. In others, it is expected that the student should have previously acquired, at least, the rudiments of one or both of those languages, of which the study continues to make everywhere a very considerable part of university education.

Originally, the basic elements of both Greek and Latin were taught in universities, and in some universities, they still are. In others, students are expected to have already learned at least the basics of one or both of those languages, as studying them remains a significant part of university education everywhere.

The ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three great branches; physics, or natural philosophy; ethics, or moral philosophy; and logic. This general division seems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things.

The ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three main branches: physics, or natural philosophy; ethics, or moral philosophy; and logic. This overall division seems to align well with the nature of things.

The great phenomenon of nature, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, eclipses, comets; thunder and lightning, and other extraordinary meteors; the generation, the life, growth, and dissolution of plants and animals; are objects which, as they necessarily excite the wonder, so they naturally call forth the curiosity of mankind to inquire into their causes. Superstition first attempted to satisfy this curiosity, by referring all those wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards endeavoured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such as mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As those great phenomena are the first objects of human curiosity, so the science which pretends to explain them must naturally have been the first branch of philosophy that was cultivated. The first philosophers, accordingly, of whom history has preserved any account, appears to have been natural philosophers.

The amazing aspects of nature—the movements of celestial bodies, eclipses, comets; thunder and lightning, along with other extraordinary weather events; the birth, life, growth, and decay of plants and animals—are things that, while they naturally inspire awe, also spark human curiosity to understand their causes. Superstition initially tried to answer this curiosity by attributing these wonders to the direct influence of the gods. Later, philosophy sought to explain them using more familiar reasons or things that people were more familiar with than the influence of the gods. Since these significant phenomena are the first things that capture human curiosity, the science that aims to explain them must have been the first area of philosophy that people explored. The earliest philosophers that history remembers seem to have been natural philosophers.

In every age and country of the world, men must have attended to the characters, designs, and actions of one another; and many reputable rules and maxims for the conduct of human life must have been laid down and approved of by common consent. As soon as writing came into fashion, wise men, or those who fancied themselves such, would naturally endeavour to increase the number of those established and respected maxims, and to express their own sense of what was either proper or improper conduct, sometimes in the more artificial form of apologues, like what are called the fables of Æsop; and sometimes in the more simple one of apophthegms or wise sayings, like the proverbs of Solomon, the verses of Theognis and Phocyllides, and some part of the works of Hesiod. They might continue in this manner, for a long time, merely to multiply the number of those maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempting to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical order, much less to connect them together by one or more general principles, from which they were all deducible, like effects from their natural causes. The beauty of a systematical arrangement of different observations, connected by a few common principles, was first seen in the rude essays of those ancient times towards a system of natural philosophy. Something of the same kind was afterwards attempted in morals. The maxims of common life were arranged in some methodical order, and connected together by a few common principles, in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect the phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles, is what is properly called Moral Philosophy.

In every time and place in the world, people have needed to pay attention to each other's character, intentions, and actions; and many widely accepted rules and guidelines for living must have been established and agreed upon collectively. Once writing became common, wise individuals—or those who thought of themselves as wise—naturally sought to expand the list of recognized and respected maxims, expressing their views on what was appropriate or inappropriate behavior, sometimes in a more elaborate way through fables, like Aesop's fables, and sometimes in simpler forms such as proverbs, like those from Solomon, the verses of Theognis and Phocyllides, and parts of Hesiod's works. They could go on like this for a long time, simply adding to the pool of guidelines for good judgment and morality, without trying to organize them systematically or, even more so, connect them through one or more overarching principles, as one might derive effects from their natural causes. The beauty of systematically organizing various observations linked by a few shared principles first appeared in the primitive writings of those ancient attempts at natural philosophy. A similar effort was later made in moral philosophy. The principles for everyday living were organized in a more structured way and interlinked by a few common ideas, just as they had previously tried to categorize and connect the phenomena of nature. The field that aims to investigate and clarify these connecting principles is what we now call Moral Philosophy.

Different authors gave different systems, both of natural and moral philosophy. But the arguments by which they supported those different systems, far from being always demonstrations, were frequently at best but very slender probabilities, and sometimes mere sophisms, which had no other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language. Speculative systems, have, in all ages of the world, been adopted for reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of common sense, in a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters of philosophy and speculation; and in these it has frequently had the greatest. The patrons of each system of natural and moral philosophy, naturally endeavoured to expose the weakness of the arguments adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In examining those arguments, they were necessarily led to consider the difference between a probable and a demonstrative argument, between a fallacious and a conclusive one; and logic, or the science of the general principles of good and bad reasoning, necessarily arose out of the observations which a scrutiny of this kind gave occasion to; though, in its origin, posterior both to physics and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater part of the ancient schools of philosophy, previously to either of those sciences. The student, it seems to have been thought, ought to understand well the difference between good and bad reasoning, before he was led to reason upon subjects of so great importance.

Different authors proposed various systems of both natural and moral philosophy. However, the arguments supporting these different systems were often not real proofs; at best, they were weak probabilities, and at worst, mere fallacies based on the imprecision and vagueness of everyday language. Speculative systems have been accepted throughout history for reasons too trivial to sway the judgment of anyone with common sense, especially regarding even the slightest financial interest. Crude sophistry has rarely affected people's beliefs except in philosophy and speculation, where it has often had the most significant impact. Advocates of each natural and moral philosophy system typically sought to highlight the weaknesses of the arguments put forth to support opposing systems. In examining these arguments, they had to consider the distinction between probable and demonstrative arguments, as well as between fallacious and conclusive ones; thus, logic, the study of the general principles of good and bad reasoning, emerged from this kind of scrutiny. Although it originated after physics and ethics, logic was commonly taught—though not in all, but in most ancient schools of philosophy—before either of those sciences. It seems to have been believed that students should clearly understand the difference between good and bad reasoning before being encouraged to reason about such important subjects.

This ancient division of philosophy into three parts was, in the greater part of the universities of Europe, changed for another into five.

This old division of philosophy into three parts was, in most of the universities in Europe, changed to a division into five.

In the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to[Pg 323] consist, were parts of the great system of the universe, and parts, too, productive of the most important effects. Whatever human reason could either conclude or conjecture concerning them, made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great system of the universe. But in the universities of Europe, where philosophy was taught only as subservient to theology, it was natural to dwell longer upon these two chapters than upon any other of the science. They were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many inferior chapters; till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can be known, came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy as the doctrine of bodies, of which so much can be known. The doctrines concerning those two subjects were considered as making two distinct sciences. What are called metaphysics, or pneumatics, were set in opposition to physics, and were cultivated not only as the more sublime, but, for the purposes of a particular profession, as the more useful science of the two. The proper subject of experiment and observation, a subject in which a careful attention is capable of making so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely neglected. The subject in which, after a very few simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can consequently produce nothing but subtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated.

In ancient philosophy, everything taught about the nature of the human mind or the Deity was part of the physics system. These beings, regardless of their supposed essence, were integral to the universe's grand system and played crucial roles. Whatever human reason could conclude or speculate about them formed, in a sense, two critical chapters of the science that aimed to explain the origin and changes of the universe. However, in European universities, where philosophy was taught mainly to support theology, it made sense to focus more on these two chapters than any other area of science. They gradually expanded and divided into many sub-chapters, until the doctrine of spirits, about which so little can be known, took up as much space in philosophy as the doctrine of bodies, which is much better understood. The doctrines on these two topics were seen as two separate sciences. What we call metaphysics or pneumatics was opposed to physics and was pursued not only as the more elevated study but also, for specific professional purposes, as the more practical of the two. The proper subject for experiments and observations—a field where careful attention can lead to many useful discoveries—was largely ignored. Meanwhile, the subject where, after a few simple and obvious truths, the most diligent examination reveals nothing but confusion and uncertainty, and thus can only generate subtleties and sophistries, was heavily explored.

When these two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another, the comparison between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was called ontology, or the science which treated of the qualities and attributes which were common to both the subjects of the other two sciences. But if subtleties and sophisms composed the greater part of the metaphysics or pneumatics of the schools, they composed the whole of this cobweb science of ontology, which was likewise sometimes called metaphysics.

When these two fields of study were set against each other, comparing them naturally led to the emergence of a third field, known as ontology, which focused on the qualities and attributes shared by the subjects of the other two fields. However, if the complexities and tricky arguments made up most of the metaphysics or pneumatics taught in the schools, they made up the entirety of this convoluted science of ontology, which was also sometimes referred to as metaphysics.

Wherein consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, considered not only as an individual, but as the member of a family, of a state, and of the great society of mankind, was the object which the ancient moral philosophy proposed to investigate. In that philosophy, the duties of human life were treated of as subservient to the happiness and perfection of human life. But when moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come. In the ancient philosophy, the perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life. In the modern philosophy, it was frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always, inconsistent with any degree of happiness in this life; and heaven was to be earned only by penance and mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a monk, not by the liberal, generous, and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry, and an ascetic morality, made up, in most cases, the greater part of the moral philosophy of the schools. By far the most important of all the different branches of philosophy became in this manner by far the most corrupted.

The happiness and fulfillment of a person, seen not just as an individual but also as part of a family, a community, and society as a whole, was the focus of ancient moral philosophy. In that philosophy, the responsibilities of human life were viewed as essential to achieving happiness and fulfillment. However, when moral and natural philosophy started to be taught mainly in relation to theology, the responsibilities of human life were seen primarily as serving the happiness of an afterlife. In ancient philosophy, the perfection of virtue was believed to bring the greatest happiness in this life to those who embodied it. In contrast, modern philosophy often portrayed virtue as generally, or almost always, conflicting with any kind of happiness in this life; obtaining heaven was to be earned through penance and self-denial, through the strict and humble life of a monk, rather than through the generous and spirited actions of a person. In many cases, the moral philosophy taught in schools was primarily made up of casuistry and ascetic morality. This way, one of the most crucial branches of philosophy became one of the most corrupted.

Such, therefore, was the common course of philosophical education in the greater part of the universities in Europe. Logic was taught first; ontology came in the second place; pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human soul and of the Deity, in the third; in the fourth followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which was considered as immediately connected with the doctrines of pneumatology, with the immortality of the human soul, and with the rewards and punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: a short and superficial system of physics usually concluded the course.

This was the typical path for philosophical education in most universities across Europe. Logic was taught first; ontology came next; then pneumatalogy, which includes teachings about the nature of the human soul and the Deity, was third. Following that was a simplified system of moral philosophy, seen as closely linked to the ideas of pneumatalogy, the immortality of the human soul, and the rewards and punishments expected from the justice of the Deity in an afterlife. A brief and basic overview of physics usually wrapped up the course.

The alterations which the universities of Europe thus introduced into the ancient course of philosophy were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics, and to render it a more proper introduction to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry and ascetic morality which those alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render it more for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely either to improve the understanding or to mend the heart.

The changes that the universities of Europe made to the traditional study of philosophy were intended to educate clergy and better prepare them for studying theology. However, the added complexity, tricks of reasoning, case-based ethics, and strict morality brought about by these changes definitely didn't make it more suitable for educating gentlemen or worldly men, nor did it likely enhance understanding or improve character.

This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater part of the universities of Europe, with more or less diligence, according as the constitution of each particular university happens to render diligence more or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the richest and best endowed universities, the tutors content themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted course; and even these they commonly teach very negligently and superficially.

This philosophy course is still being taught in most universities across Europe, with varying levels of dedication, depending on what each university's setup requires from its instructors. In some of the wealthiest and best-funded universities, the teachers are satisfied with only covering a few random bits and pieces of this flawed course, and even those are usually taught quite carelessly and superficially.

The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in several different branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in universities, though some, no doubt, have. The greater part of universities have not even been very forward to adopt those improvements after they were made; and several of those learned societies have chosen to remain, for a long time, the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection, after they had been hunted out of every other[Pg 324] corner of the world. In general, the richest and best endowed universities have been slowest in adopting those improvements, and the most averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education. Those improvements were more easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.

The improvements made in various branches of philosophy in recent times haven't mostly occurred in universities, though some certainly have. Many universities haven't been very quick to adopt those improvements even after they were introduced; in fact, several of these learned societies have chosen to remain, for a long time, as safe havens for outdated systems and old biases, after they had been driven out of every other corner of the world. Generally, the wealthiest and best-funded universities have been the slowest to embrace these improvements and the most resistant to allowing any significant changes in the established education system. Those improvements were more easily adopted in some of the less wealthy universities, where the teachers, reliant on their reputations for most of their income, had to pay more attention to the prevailing opinions of the world.[Pg 324]

But though the public schools and universities of Europe were originally intended only for the education of a particular profession, that of churchmen; and though they were not always very diligent in instructing their pupils, even in the sciences which were supposed necessary for that profession; yet they gradually drew to themselves the education of almost all other people, particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of fortune. No better method, it seems, could be fallen upon, of spending, with any advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which men begin to apply in good earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is to employ them during the remainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught in schools and universities, however, does not seem to be the most proper preparation for that business.

But even though the public schools and universities of Europe were initially meant solely for training churchmen, and they weren't always very thorough in teaching their students, even in the subjects deemed necessary for that profession, they gradually began to encompass the education of almost everyone else, especially gentlemen and wealthy individuals. It seems there was no better way to effectively use the long period between childhood and the time when people start seriously engaging in the real work of the world, the work that will occupy them for the rest of their lives. However, much of what is taught in schools and universities doesn't seem to be the best preparation for that work.

In England, it becomes every day more and more the custom to send young people to travel in foreign countries immediately upon their leaving school, and without sending them to any university. Our young people, it is said, generally return home much improved by their travels. A young man, who goes abroad at seventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one-and-twenty, returns three or four years older than he was when he went abroad; and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four years. In the course of his travels, he generally acquires some knowledge of one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is seldom sufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In other respects, he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more dissipated, and more incapable of any serious application, either to study or to business, than he could well have become in so short a time had he lived at home. By travelling so very young, by spending in the must frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his life, at a distance from the inspection and controul of his parents and relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of his education might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being riveted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or effaced. Nothing but the discredit into which the universities are allowing themselves to fall, could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of travelling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father delivers himself, at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a son unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes.

In England, it's becoming more common to send young people to travel abroad right after finishing school, without them going to university first. It's said that our young people usually come back much better after their travels. A young man who goes abroad at seventeen or eighteen and comes back at twenty-one returns three or four years older than when he left; and at that age, it's pretty hard not to improve quite a bit in three or four years. During his travels, he generally picks up some knowledge of one or two foreign languages; however, this knowledge is rarely enough for him to speak or write them correctly. In other ways, he typically comes back more arrogant, less principled, more indulgent, and less able to focus seriously on either studying or working than he would have become if he had stayed at home during that time. By traveling at such a young age and wasting the most valuable years of his life on pointless distractions, away from the oversight of his parents and relatives, any good habits that his early education might have helped him form are almost always weakened or erased. Only the decline of the universities could have made such an absurd practice as traveling at such an early stage of life seem acceptable. By sending his son abroad, a father at least temporarily frees himself from the unpleasant sight of his son being idle, neglected, and spiraling downwards right in front of him.

Such have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for education.

Such have been the effects of some of the modern educational institutions.

Different plans and different institutions for education seem to have taken place in other ages and nations.

Different systems and institutions for education appear to have existed in various times and countries.

In the republics of ancient Greece, every free citizen was instructed, under the direction of the public magistrate, in gymnastic exercises and in music. By gymnastic exercises, it was intended to harden his body, to sharpen his courage, and to prepare him for the fatigues and dangers of war; and as the Greek militia was, by all accounts, one of the best that ever was in the world, this part of their public education must have answered completely the purpose for which it was intended. By the other part, music, it was proposed, at least by the philosophers and historians, who have given us an account of those institutions, to humanize the mind, to soften the temper, and to dispose it for performing all the social and moral duties of public and private life.

In the city-states of ancient Greece, every free citizen was trained, under the guidance of public officials, in physical fitness and music. The purpose of physical fitness was to strengthen the body, boost courage, and prepare citizens for the challenges and dangers of war; considering that the Greek army was widely regarded as one of the strongest in history, this aspect of their public education must have effectively achieved its goal. Regarding music, it was believed—at least by the philosophers and historians who documented these practices—that it aimed to refine the mind, ease the temperament, and ready individuals to fulfill their social and moral responsibilities in both public and private life.

In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose as those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece, and they seem to have answered it equally well. But among the Romans there was nothing which corresponded to the musical education of the Greeks. The morals of the Romans, however, both in private and public life, seem to have been, not only equal, but, upon the whole, a good deal superior to those of the Greeks. That they were superior in private life, we have the express testimony of Polybius, and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, two authors well acquainted with both nations; and the whole tenor of the Greek and Roman history bears witness to the superiority of the public morals of the Romans. The good temper and moderation of contending factions seem to be the most essential circumstances in the public morals of a free people. But the factions of the Greeks were almost always violent and sanguinary; whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been shed in any Roman faction; and from the time of the Gracchi, the Roman republic may be considered as in reality dissolved. Notwithstanding, therefore, the very respectable authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, and notwithstanding the very ingenious reasons by which Mr. Montesquieu endeavours to support that authority, it seems probable that the musical education of the Greeks had no great effect in mending their morals, since, without any such education, those of the Romans were, upon the whole, superior. The respect of those ancient sages[Pg 325] for the institutions of their ancestors had probably disposed them to find much political wisdom in what was, perhaps, merely an ancient custom, continued, without interruption, from the earliest period of those societies, to the times in which they had arrived at a considerable degree of refinement. Music and dancing are the great amusements of almost all barbarous nations, and the great accomplishments which are supposed to fit any man for entertaining his society. It is so at this day among the negroes on the coast of Africa. It was so among the ancient Celtes, among the ancient Scandinavians, and, as we may learn from Homer, among the ancient Greeks, in the times preceding the Trojan war. When the Greek tribes had formed themselves into little republics, it was natural that the study of those accomplishments should for a long time make a part of the public and common education of the people.

In ancient Rome, the activities in the Campus Martius served the same purpose as those in the Gymnasium of ancient Greece, and they seemed to work just as well. However, the Romans didn't have anything that matched the musical education of the Greeks. That said, the morals of the Romans, both in their personal and public lives, appeared to be not only equal but overall significantly superior to those of the Greeks. We have clear evidence of their superiority in private life from authors like Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who were well familiar with both cultures; and the overall history of both the Greeks and Romans supports the idea that Roman public morals were superior. The good nature and moderation of competing factions seem to be the key aspects of a free society's public morals. In contrast, Greek factions were often violent and bloody; until the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been spilled in any Roman faction, and after the Gracchi, the Roman republic can be seen as effectively falling apart. Therefore, despite the respected views of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, and despite the clever arguments made by Mr. Montesquieu to back that authority, it seems likely that Greek musical education didn't substantially improve their morals since, without such education, Roman morals were generally superior. The respect that those ancient thinkers had for their forebears' institutions likely led them to see a lot of political wisdom in what might have simply been an ancient tradition, maintained continuously since the earliest days of those societies until they reached a notable level of sophistication. Music and dancing are the primary forms of entertainment for most primitive societies and are seen as essential skills for entertaining others. This is still true today among the tribes along the coast of Africa. It was also the case among the ancient Celts, the ancient Scandinavians, and, as we learn from Homer, among the Greeks before the Trojan war. As Greek tribes formed into small republics, it was only natural that learning these skills became a significant part of the public and common education of the people.

The masters who instructed the young people, either in music or in military exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the state, either in Rome or even at Athens, the Greek republic of whose laws and customs we are the best informed. The state required that every free citizen should fit himself for defending it in war, and should upon that account, learn his military exercises. But it left him to learn them of such masters as he could find; and it seems to have advanced nothing for this purpose, but a public field or place of exercise, in which he should practise and perform them.

The teachers who trained young people, whether in music or military skills, don't seem to have been paid or even appointed by the state, either in Rome or at Athens, the Greek republic we know the most about in terms of laws and customs. The state required that every free citizen prepare himself for defending it in war, which is why they needed to learn military training. However, it left it up to the individual to find teachers, and it seems to have only provided a public field or area for them to practice and take part in these activities.

In the early ages, both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of education seem to have consisted in learning to read, write, and account, according to the arithmetic of the times. These accomplishments the richer citizens seem frequently to have acquired at home, by the assistance of some domestic pedagogue, who was, generally, either a slave or a freedman; and the poorer citizens in the schools of such masters as made a trade of teaching for hire. Such parts of education, however, were abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does not appear that the state ever assumed any inspection or direction of them. By a law of Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining those parents who had neglected to instruct them in some profitable trade or business.

In ancient times, during the Greek and Roman republics, education mainly involved learning to read, write, and do basic math according to the standards of the era. Wealthier citizens often learned these skills at home with the help of a private tutor, who was usually a slave or a freedman. On the other hand, poorer citizens went to schools run by teachers who made a living from education. However, the responsibility for education generally fell to the parents or guardians of each child. It doesn’t seem like the state took any responsibility for overseeing or guiding this education. In fact, a law from Solon stated that children were not obliged to support parents who failed to teach them a useful trade or skill.

In the progress of refinement, when philosophy and rhetoric came into fashion, the better sort of people used to send their children to the schools of philosophers and rhetoricians, in order to be instructed in these fashionable sciences. But those schools were not supported by the public. They were, for a long time, barely tolerated by it. The demand for philosophy and rhetoric was, for a long time, so small, that the first professed teachers of either could not find constant employment in any one city, but were obliged to travel about from place to place. In this manner lived Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and many others. As the demand increased, the schools, both of philosophy and rhetoric, became stationary, first in Athens, and afterwards in several other cities. The state, however, seems never to have encouraged them further, than by assigning to some of them a particular place to teach in, which was sometimes done, too, by private donors. The state seems to have assigned the Academy to Plato, the Lyceum to Aristotle, and the Portico to Zeno of Citta, the founder of the Stoics. But Epicurus bequeathed his gardens to his own school. Till about the time of Marcus Antoninus, however, no teacher appears to have had any salary from the public, or to have had any other emoluments, but what arose from the honoraries or fees of his scholars. The bounty which that philosophical emperor, as we learn from Lucian, bestowed upon one of the teachers of philosophy, probably lasted no longer than his own life. There was nothing equivalent to the privileges of graduation; and to have attended any of those schools was not necessary, in order to be permitted to practise any particular trade or profession. If the opinion of their own utility could not draw scholars to them, the law neither forced anybody to go to them, nor rewarded anybody for having gone to them. The teachers had no jurisdiction over their pupils, nor any other authority besides that natural authority which superior virtue and abilities never fail to procure from young people towards those who are entrusted with any part of their education.

In the era of refinement, when philosophy and rhetoric became popular, educated families often sent their children to study with philosophers and rhetoricians to learn these trendy subjects. However, these schools weren't publicly funded and were mostly tolerated for a long time. The interest in philosophy and rhetoric was so low initially that the early professional teachers couldn’t find steady work in one city and had to move around. This was the case for Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and many others. As demand grew, the schools for philosophy and rhetoric became more stable, first in Athens and later in several other cities. The government, however, only supported them by designating certain places for teaching, sometimes with the help of private donations. The Academy was assigned to Plato, the Lyceum to Aristotle, and the Portico to Zeno of Citta, who founded the Stoics. Epicurus left his gardens to his school. Until the time of Marcus Antoninus, it seems no teacher received a salary from the government, relying instead on fees from students. The generosity of that philosophical emperor, as noted by Lucian, likely lasted only during his lifetime. There were no equivalent privileges for graduation, and attending these schools wasn't necessary to pursue any trade or profession. If the schools couldn't attract students through their perceived value, the law didn't compel anyone to attend or reward them for doing so. Teachers had no control over their students and relied solely on the natural authority that comes from genuine virtue and skill, which young people typically respect in their educators.

At Rome, the study of the civil law made a part of the education, not of the greater part of the citizens, but of some particular families. The young people, however, who wished to acquire knowledge in the law, had no public school to go to, and had no other method of studying it, than by frequenting the company of such of their relations and friends as were supposed to understand it. It is, perhaps, worth while to remark, that though the laws of the twelve tables were many of them copied from those of some ancient Greek republics, yet law never seems to have grown up to be a science in any republic of ancient Greece. In Rome it became a science very early, and gave a considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who had the reputation of understanding it. In the republics of ancient Greece, particularly in Athens, the ordinary courts of justice consisted of numerous, and therefore disorderly, bodies of people, who frequently decided almost at random, or as clamour, faction, and party-spirit, happened to determine. The ignominy of an unjust decision, when it was to be divided among five hundred, a thousand, or fifteen hundred people (for[Pg 326] some of their courts were so very numerous), could not fall very heavy upon any individual. At Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of justice consisted either of a single judge, or of a small number of judges, whose characters, especially as they deliberated always in public, could not fail to be very much affected by any rash or unjust decision. In doubtful cases such courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally endeavour to shelter themselves under the example or precedent of the judges who had sat before them, either in the same or in some other court. This attention to practice and precedent, necessarily formed the Roman law into that regular and orderly system in which it has been delivered down to us; and the like attention has had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where such attention has taken place. The superiority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of their courts of justice, than to any of the circumstances to which those authors ascribe it. The Romans are said to have been particularly distinguished for their superior respect to an oath. But the people who were accustomed to make oath only before some diligent and well informed court of justice, would naturally be much more attentive to what they swore, than they who were accustomed to do the same thing before mobbish and disorderly assemblies.

In Rome, studying civil law was part of the education of specific families rather than the majority of citizens. Young people who wanted to learn about the law didn’t have public schools to attend, so they had to rely on spending time with relatives and friends believed to understand it. It’s interesting to note that although many laws of the Twelve Tables were adapted from ancient Greek republics, law never evolved into a formal science in any Greek republic. In contrast, it became a science in Rome early on, providing significant knowledge to citizens known for their understanding of it. In ancient Greek republics, particularly Athens, regular courts were made up of large, unruly groups of people who often decided cases arbitrarily, influenced by noise, factions, and party spirit. When a wrongful decision was shared among five hundred, a thousand, or even fifteen hundred people (as some courts were extremely large), the shame didn’t weigh heavily on any single individual. In Rome, however, the main courts had either a single judge or a small group of judges, whose reputations were greatly impacted by any hasty or unfair verdict, especially since they deliberated in public. In uncertain cases, these courts, eager to avoid blame, would look to previous examples or precedents from judges who had served before them, whether in the same or other courts. This focus on practice and precedent helped shape Roman law into the structured and organized system we have today, and similar attention has produced similar results in other countries where such practices were observed. The Romans’ higher moral standards compared to the Greeks, noted by Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, were likely more due to the better structure of their courts than to the factors those authors suggested. Romans were known for their strong respect for oaths. People who took oaths only before a diligent and informed court would naturally be more careful about what they swore than those used to swearing before chaotic and disorderly crowds.

The abilities, both civil and military, of the Greeks and Romans, will readily be allowed to have been at least equal to those of any modern nation. Our prejudice is perhaps rather to overrate them. But except in what related to military exercises, the state seems to have been at no pains to form those great abilities; for I cannot be induced to believe that the musical education of the Greeks could be of much consequence in forming them. Masters, however, had been found, it seems, for instructing the better sort of people among those nations, in every art and science in which the circumstances of their society rendered it necessary or convenient for them to be instructed. The demand for such instruction produced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. In the attention which the ancient philosophers excited, in the empire which they acquired over the opinions and principles of their auditors, in the faculty which they possessed of giving a certain tone and character to the conduct and conversation of those auditors, they appear to have been much superior to any modern teachers. In modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or less corrupted by the circumstances which render them more or less independent of their success and reputation in their particular professions. Their salaries, too, put the private teacher, who would pretend to come into competition with them, in the same state with a merchant who attempts to trade without a bounty, in competition with those who trade with a considerable one. If he sells his goods at nearly the same price, he cannot have the same profit; and poverty and beggary at least, if not bankruptcy and ruin, will infallibly be his lot. If he attempts to sell them much dearer, he is likely to have so few customers, that his circumstances will not be much mended. The privileges of graduation, besides, are in many countries necessary, or at least extremely convenient, to most men of learned professions, that is, to the far greater part of those who have occasion for a learned education. But those privileges can be obtained only by attending the lectures of the public teachers. The most careful attendance upon the ablest instructions of any private teacher cannot always give any title to demand them. It is from these different causes that the private teacher of any of the sciences, which are commonly taught in universities, is, in modern times, generally considered as in the very lowest order of men of letters. A man of real abilities can scarce find out a more humiliating or a more unprofitable employment to turn them to. The endowments of schools and colleges have in this manner not only corrupted the diligence of public teachers, but have rendered it almost impossible to have any good private ones.

The skills, both civil and military, of the Greeks and Romans were likely at least equal to those of any modern nation. We might even overestimate them a bit. However, aside from military training, the state didn’t seem to focus much on developing these great abilities. I can't believe that the musical education of the Greeks played a significant role in shaping them. Nonetheless, it seems that there were teachers available to instruct the upper classes of those societies in every art and science that their circumstances made necessary or useful. The need for such education naturally created the talent to provide it, and the competition that arises from unrestricted rivalry seems to have pushed that talent to a very high level of excellence. In the attention that ancient philosophers commanded, in the influence they had over the opinions and beliefs of their listeners, and in their ability to shape the behavior and discussions of those listeners, they appear to have been far superior to any modern educators. Nowadays, the dedication of public teachers is often undermined by the factors that make them less dependent on their performance and reputation in their fields. Their salaries also put private teachers, who might want to compete with them, in a position similar to a merchant trying to sell goods without any subsidies, competing against those who do have significant support. If he sells his products at about the same price, he won’t make the same profit, and he could end up in poverty or worse. If he tries to charge significantly more, he might get so few customers that it won't improve his situation much. Additionally, in many countries, degrees are necessary or at least very helpful for most people in learned professions, meaning the majority of those needing a higher education. But those degrees can only be earned by attending classes taught by public teachers. No matter how diligently someone studies under a private teacher, it doesn’t always give them a right to claim those qualifications. Because of these various factors, a private teacher in any of the subjects typically taught at universities is generally regarded as being at the very bottom of the academic hierarchy today. A person with genuine talent can hardly find a more degrading or less rewarding job to apply their skills. The funding of schools and colleges has not only spoiled the commitment of public teachers but has also made it nearly impossible to have good private ones.

Were there no public institutions for education, no system, no science, would be taught, for which there was not some demand, or which the circumstances of the times did not render it either necessary or convenient, or at least fashionable to learn. A private teacher could never find his account in teaching either an exploded and antiquated system of a science acknowledged to be useful, or a science universally believed to be a mere useless and pedantic heap of sophistry and nonsense. Such systems, such sciences, can subsist nowhere but in those incorporated societies for education, whose prosperity and revenue are in a great measure independent of their industry. Were there no public institutions for education, a gentleman, after going through, with application and abilities, the most complete course of education which the circumstances of the times were supposed to afford, could not come into the world completely ignorant of every thing which is the common subject of conversation among gentlemen and men of the world.

If there were no public educational institutions, no system or science would be taught unless there was some demand for it, or unless the times made it necessary, convenient, or at least trendy to learn. A private tutor couldn’t benefit from teaching either an outdated system or a science that everyone views as useless and full of nonsense. Such systems and sciences only survive in formal educational societies, whose success and funds rely largely on factors outside their own efforts. Without public educational institutions, a gentleman who diligently went through what was believed to be the most thorough education available at the time wouldn't graduate completely ignorant of the topics that are commonly discussed among other gentlemen and people in society.

There are no public institutions for the education of women, and there is accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical, in the[Pg 327] common course of their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it necessary or useful for them to learn, and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their education tends evidently to some useful purpose; either to improve the natural attractions of their person, or to form their mind to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to economy; to render them both likely to become the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they have become such. In every part of her life, a woman feels some conveniency or advantage from every part of her education. It seldom happens that a man, in any part of his life, derives any conveniency or advantage from some of the most laborious and troublesome parts of his education.

There are no public institutions for the education of women, so there’s nothing pointless, ridiculous, or unrealistic in the[Pg 327] common aspects of their education. They are taught what's deemed necessary or useful by their parents or guardians, and nothing beyond that. Every aspect of their education clearly serves a practical purpose; either enhancing their physical attractiveness or developing their character to be reserved, modest, chaste, and economical. This prepares them to become responsible heads of a household and to act appropriately once they have that role. Throughout her life, a woman benefits from every part of her education. It rarely occurs that a man, at any point in his life, gains any benefit from some of the most demanding and challenging parts of his education.

Ought the public, therefore, to give no attention, it may be asked, to the education of the people? Or, if it ought to give any, what are the different parts of education which it ought to attend to in the different orders of the people? and in what manner ought it to attend to them?

Ought the public, therefore, to pay no attention to the education of the people? Or, if it should pay some attention, what aspects of education should it focus on for different groups of people? And how should it go about doing this?

In some cases, the state of society necessarily places the greater part of individuals in such situations as naturally form in them, without any attention of government, almost all the abilities and virtues which that state requires, or perhaps can admit of. In other cases, the state of the society does not place the greater part of individuals in such situations; and some attention of government is necessary, in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people.

In some cases, the condition of society puts most people in situations that naturally develop the skills and virtues needed or allowed by that condition, without any government intervention. In other cases, society doesn’t place most individuals in those situations, and some government attention is needed to prevent the widespread corruption and decline of the general population.

In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects, too, are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention, in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard, with abhorrence, the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a soldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employment, than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized society, this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.

As labor becomes more specialized, most people who work are stuck doing just a few simple tasks, often only one or two. This repetition shapes how they think. Someone who spends their whole life performing a few basic tasks, especially when the results are always similar, doesn’t need to challenge their mind or find new solutions to problems that don’t come up. Because of this, they gradually lose the ability to think critically and often become as dull and uninformed as possible. Their mental sluggishness makes it hard for them to engage in meaningful conversation or to feel deep, generous emotions, which also prevents them from making well-rounded judgments on many everyday responsibilities. When it comes to the broader issues affecting their country, they can’t think critically either, and unless they receive special training, they are just as unable to defend their country in wartime. The sameness of their stagnant lives dulls their bravery and makes them look down on the unpredictable and daring life of a soldier. It even weakens their physical abilities, meaning they can’t muster their strength effectively for anything outside their usual job. Their skill in their specific trade seems to come at the cost of their mental, social, and martial strengths. But in any advanced and developed society, this is inevitably the condition into which the working class—the majority of people—will descend unless the government intervenes to stop it.

It is otherwise in the barbarous societies, as they are commonly called, of hunters, of shepherds, and even of husbandmen in that rude state of husbandry which precedes the improvement of manufactures, and the extension of foreign commerce. In such societies, the varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity, and to invent expedients for removing difficulties which are continually occurring. Invention is kept alive, and the mind is not suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity, which, in a civilized society, seems to benumb the understanding of almost all the inferior ranks of people. In those barbarous societies, as they are called, every man, it has already been observed, is a warrior. Every man, too, is in some measure a statesman, and can form a tolerable judgment concerning the interest of the society, and the conduct of those who govern it. How far their chiefs are good judges in peace, or good leaders in war, is obvious to the observation of almost every single man among them. In such a society, indeed, no man can well acquire that improved and refined understanding which a few men sometimes possess in a more civilized state. Though in a rude society there is a good deal of variety in the occupations of every individual, there is not a great deal in those of the whole society. Every man does, or is capable of doing, almost every thing which any other man does, or is capable of doing. Every man has a considerable degree of knowledge, ingenuity, and invention; but scarce any man has a great degree. The degree, however, which is commonly possessed, is generally sufficient for conducting the whole simple business of the society. In a civilized state, on the contrary, though there is little variety in the occupations of the greater part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety in those of the whole society. These varied occupations present an almost infinite variety of objects to the contemplation of those few, who, being attached to no particular occupation themselves, have leisure[Pg 328] and inclination to examine the occupations of other people. The contemplation of so great a variety of objects necessarily exercises their minds in endless comparisons end combinations, and renders their understandings, in an extraordinary degree, both acute and comprehensive. Unless those few, however, happen to be placed in some very particular situations, their great abilities, though honourable to themselves, may contribute very little to the good government or happiness of their society. Notwithstanding the great abilities of those few, all the nobler parts of the human character may be, in a great measure, obliterated end extinguished in the great body of the people.

It’s different in what are often referred to as primitive societies of hunters, herders, and even farmers in the early stages of agriculture, which precede the development of manufacturing and the expansion of international trade. In these societies, the varied tasks of each person push everyone to use their skills and come up with solutions for the challenges that constantly arise. Innovation remains active, and people’s minds don’t slip into the dull apathy that seems to numb the understanding of most lower-class individuals in a civilized society. In those so-called primitive societies, every individual is, as noted, a warrior. Everyone is also somewhat of a statesman, capable of making reasonable judgments about the interests of their community and the actions of its leaders. It is clear to nearly everyone there how competent their leaders are in times of peace or war. In such a society, no one can genuinely develop the refined understanding that a few individuals might have in a more advanced society. While there is a fair amount of diversity in the roles of each individual in a primitive society, there isn’t much variety across the entire community. Each person does, or is able to do, nearly everything that any other individual does or can do. Everyone possesses a significant level of knowledge, creativity, and innovation; however, very few have an exceptionally high level. Nevertheless, the level of skill commonly held is generally enough to manage the straightforward functions of society. In contrast, in a civilized society, while there may be little variation in the tasks of most individuals, there exists an almost endless variety in the roles across the community. These diverse roles offer countless objects for contemplation to those few who, not tied to any specific occupation, have the time and interest to explore the work of others. Reflecting on such a vast range of subjects inevitably sharpens their minds through endless comparisons and combinations, making their understanding unusually sharp and broad. However, unless these individuals find themselves in very specific situations, their considerable talents, while admirable, may contribute little to the better governance or happiness of their society. Despite the exceptional abilities of these individuals, the nobler aspects of human character can largely be diminished and extinguished within the general populace.

The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and commercial society, the attention of the public, more than that of people of some rank and fortune. People of some rank and fortune are generally eighteen or nineteen years of age, before they enter upon that particular business, profession, or trade, by which they propose to distinguish themselves in the world. They have, before that, full time to acquire, or at least to fit themselves for afterwards acquiring, every accomplishment which can recommend them to the public esteem, or render them worthy of it. Their parents or guardians are generally sufficiently anxious that they should be so accomplished, and are, in most cases, willing enough to lay out the expense which is necessary for that purpose. If they are not always properly educated, it is seldom from the want of expense laid out upon their education, but from the improper application of that expense. It is seldom from the want of masters, but from the negligence and incapacity of the masters who are to be had, and from the difficulty, or rather from the impossibility, which there is, in the present state of things, of finding any better. The employments, too, in which people of some rank or fortune spend the greater part of their lives, are not, like those of the common people, simple and uniform. They are almost all of them extremely complicated, and such as exercise the head more than the hands. The understandings of those who are engaged in such employments, can seldom grow torpid for want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank and fortune, besides, are seldom such as harass them from morning to night. They generally have a good deal of leisure, during which they may perfect themselves in every branch, either of useful or ornamental knowledge, of which they may have laid the foundation, or for which they may have acquired some taste in the earlier part of life.

The education of everyday people needs, perhaps, in a civilized and commercial society, more public attention than that of those with wealth and status. Wealthy individuals usually reach eighteen or nineteen before they dive into the specific business, profession, or trade they plan to excel in. Before that, they have plenty of time to learn, or at least to prepare to learn, any skills that could earn them public respect or make them deserving of it. Their parents or guardians usually care enough to ensure they are well-educated and are, in most cases, ready to invest the money needed for that education. If they aren't always properly educated, it's rarely due to a lack of funds spent on their education, but rather how that money is used. It's not usually because there aren't enough teachers but because of the negligence and incompetence of the available teachers, and the challenge, or even impossibility, of finding better options in the current situation. The jobs that wealthy individuals hold for most of their lives are not, like those of common people, straightforward and consistent. Almost all of them are very complex and require more brainpower than manual work. The minds of people engaged in such jobs rarely become dull from lack of use. Additionally, the occupations of wealthy individuals often don't wear them out from dawn till dusk. They typically have a good amount of free time during which they can enhance their knowledge in both practical and aesthetic areas they may have started exploring earlier in life.

It is otherwise with the common people. They have little time to spare for education. Their parents can scarce afford to maintain them, even in infancy. As soon as they are able to work, they must apply to some trade, by which they can earn their subsistence. That trade, too, is generally so simple and uniform, as to give little exercise to the understanding; while, at the same time, their labour is both so constant and so severe, that it leaves them little leisure and less inclination to apply to, or even to think of any thing else.

It's different for regular people. They have hardly any time for education. Their parents can barely afford to support them, even when they're babies. As soon as they're able to work, they have to get into some trade to earn a living. That trade is usually so basic and predictable that it doesn't challenge their minds much; meanwhile, their work is so demanding and relentless that they have little free time and even less desire to focus on or think about anything else.

But though the common people cannot, in any civilized society, be so well instructed as people of some rank and fortune; the most essential parts of education, however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at so early a period of life, that the greater part, even of those who are to be bred to the lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be employed in those occupations. For a very small expense, the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education.

But even though regular people can’t receive as much education as those of higher status and wealth in any civilized society, the most important parts of education—reading, writing, and math—can be learned at a young age. This means that most people, even those headed for the simplest jobs, have time to learn these skills before they start working. With a relatively small investment, the public can make it easier, encourage, and even require almost everyone to learn these essential parts of education.

The public can facilitate this acquisition, by establishing in every parish or district a little school, where children may be taught for a reward so moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it; the master being partly, but not wholly, paid by the public; because, if he was wholly, or even principally, paid by it, he would soon learn to neglect his business. In Scotland, the establishment of such parish schools has taught almost the whole common people to read, and a very great proportion of them to write and account. In England, the establishment of charity schools has had an effect of the same kind, though not so universally, because the establishment is not so universal. If, in those little schools, the books by which the children are taught to read, were a little more instructive than they commonly are; and if, instead of a little smattering in Latin, which the children of the common people are sometimes taught there, and which can scarce ever be of any use to them, they were instructed in the elementary parts of geometry and mechanics; the literary education of this rank of people would, perhaps, be as complete as can be. There is scarce a common trade, which does not afford some opportunities of applying to it the principles of geometry and mechanics, and which would not, therefore, gradually exercise and improve the common people in those principles, the necessary introduction to the most sublime, as well as to the most useful sciences.

The public can help make this happen by setting up a small school in every neighborhood or district, where children can be taught for such a low fee that even a regular worker can afford it; the teacher would receive partial payment from the public, but not entirely, because if he were fully or mostly paid by the public, he would quickly start to neglect his job. In Scotland, creating these local schools has enabled almost everyone to learn how to read, and a significant number have also learned to write and do basic math. In England, charity schools have had a similar effect, though not as widespread, since their establishment is not as universal. If these small schools had books that were a bit more educational than the usual ones, and instead of just a little bit of Latin—which is rarely useful for common children—they taught the basics of geometry and mechanics, the education of this group of people could be as complete as possible. There's hardly a common trade that doesn't provide opportunities to apply the principles of geometry and mechanics, which would gradually help improve the general public's understanding of these principles, forming a necessary foundation for both the most advanced and the most practical sciences.

The public can encourage the acquisition of those most essential parts of education, by giving small premiums, and little badges of distinction, to the children of the common people who excel in them.

The community can promote the learning of the most important aspects of education by offering small rewards and little badges of recognition to kids from working-class backgrounds who excel in them.

The public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people the necessity of acquiring the most essential parts of education, by obliging every man to undergo an exami[Pg 329]nation or probation in them, before he can obtain the freedom in any corporation, or be allowed to set up any trade, either in a village or town corporate.

The public can require almost everyone to get the essential parts of an education by making it mandatory for each person to pass a test or qualification in these subjects before they can gain membership in any organization or be permitted to start a business, whether in a village or a city.

It was in this manner, by facilitating the acquisition of their military and gymnastic exercises, by encouraging it, and even by imposing upon the whole body of the people the necessity of learning those exercises, that the Greek and Roman republics maintained the martial spirit of their respective citizens. They facilitated the acquisition of those exercises, by appointing a certain place for learning and practising them, and by granting to certain masters the privilege of teaching in that place. Those masters do not appear to have had either salaries or exclusive privileges of any kind. Their reward consisted altogether in what they got from their scholars; and a citizen, who had learnt his exercises in the public gymnasia, had no sort of legal advantage over one who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had learned them equally well. Those republics encouraged the acquisition of those exercises, by bestowing little premiums and badges of distinction upon those who excelled in them. To have gained a prize in the Olympic, Isthmian, or Nemæan games, gave illustration, not only to the person who gained it, but to his whole family and kindred. The obligation which every citizen was under, to serve a certain number of years, if called upon, in the armies of the republic, sufficient imposed the necessity of learning those exercises, without which he could not be fit for that service.

In this way, by making it easier to learn their military and athletic skills, by promoting them, and even by requiring the entire population to learn these skills, the Greek and Roman republics sustained the fighting spirit of their citizens. They made it easier to learn these skills by designating specific places for training and by allowing certain instructors the right to teach there. These instructors didn’t seem to receive salaries or special privileges. Their compensation came entirely from what they earned from their students; a citizen who learned his skills at the public gymnasiums had no legal advantage over someone who learned them privately, as long as the latter was equally skilled. Those republics motivated the pursuit of these skills by awarding small prizes and badges of honor to those who excelled. Winning a prize at the Olympic, Isthmian, or Nemean games not only brought glory to the individual but also to their entire family and relatives. The requirement for every citizen to serve a certain number of years in the republic's armies, if needed, clearly made learning these skills necessary for being fit for service.

That in the progress of improvement, the practice of military exercises, unless government takes proper pains to support it, goes gradually to decay, and, together with it, the martial spirit of the great body of the people, the example of modern Europe sufficiently demonstrates. But the security of every society must always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great body of the people. In the present times, indeed, that martial spirit alone, and unsupported by a well-disciplined standing army, would not, perhaps, be sufficient for the defence and security of any society. But where every citizen had the spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army would surely be requisite. That spirit, besides, would necessarily diminish very much the dangers to liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are commonly apprehended from a standing army. As it would very much facilitate the operations of that army against a foreign invader; so it would obstruct them as much, if unfortunately they should ever be directed against the constitution of the state.

In the process of improvement, the practice of military drills will fade away unless the government puts in the effort to support it, which the example of modern Europe clearly shows. The safety of every society will always rely, to some extent, on the martial spirit of the majority of its people. In today's world, that martial spirit alone, without a well-trained standing army, might not be enough to protect and secure any society. However, if every citizen had the mindset of a soldier, a smaller standing army would definitely be needed. Moreover, that spirit would greatly reduce the risks to freedom, whether they are real or imagined, that people often fear from a standing army. It would ease the army's actions against a foreign threat; conversely, it would hinder those actions if, unfortunately, they were ever directed against the constitution of the state.

The ancient institutions of Greece and Rome seem to have been much more effectual for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the people, than the establishment of what are called the militias of modern times. They were much more simple. When they were once established, they executed themselves, and it required little or no attention from government to maintain them in the most perfect vigour. Whereas to maintain, even in tolerable execution, the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government, without which they are constantly falling into total neglect and disuse. The influence, besides, of the ancient institutions, was much more universal. By means of them, the whole body of the people was completely instructed in the use of arms; whereas it is but a very small part of them who can ever be so instructed by the regulations of any modern militia, except, perhaps, that of Switzerland. But a coward, a man incapable either of defending or of revenging himself, evidently wants one of the most essential parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of its most essential members, or has lost the use of them. He is evidently the more wretched and miserable of the two; because happiness and misery, which reside altogether in the mind, must necessarily depend more upon the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet, to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy, or any other loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself among them; though, perhaps, no other public good might result from such attention, besides the prevention of so great a public evil.

The old systems of Greece and Rome were clearly more effective at keeping the fighting spirit alive in the general population than the militias we have today. They were much simpler. Once set up, they maintained themselves, requiring little to no involvement from the government to stay in peak condition. In contrast, keeping the complicated rules of any modern militia even somewhat functional demands constant and painful attention from the government; otherwise, they quickly fall into neglect and disuse. Additionally, the influence of the ancient systems was much more widespread. Through them, the entire population learned to use weapons; nowadays, only a very small portion of people can get that training from modern militia regulations—unless we consider Switzerland. A coward, someone incapable of defending or avenging themselves, clearly lacks one of the most vital aspects of being human. They are as mentally crippled and deformed as someone physically disabled, who has lost key parts of their body or can’t use them. The person who is cowardly is likely more miserable than someone who is physically deformed because happiness and misery stem entirely from the mind. This state of mind relies more on its health than on the health of the body. Even if the fighting spirit of people were useless for defending society, preventing the mental damage, deformity, and misery that cowardice brings from spreading through the population is still a critical duty for the government. This is similar to the need to prevent the spread of leprosy or other disgusting and intolerable diseases, even if those diseases are not lethal or dangerous and no other public benefit might arise from the effort besides avoiding a significant public harm.

The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of all the inferior ranks of people. A man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man, is, if possible, more contemptible than even a coward, and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature. Though the state was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations frequently occasion the most dreadful[Pg 330] disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each individually, more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are, therefore, more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition; and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance, that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.

The same can be said about the blatant ignorance and foolishness that often seem to dull the understanding of lower social classes in a civilized society. A person who doesn't properly use their intellectual abilities is, if anything, more deserving of disdain than a coward and appears to be mutilated and deformed in a more fundamental aspect of human nature. Even if the state didn't gain anything from educating the lower classes, it would still be important to ensure they aren't completely uninformed. However, the state does benefit significantly from their education. The more educated they are, the less susceptible they are to misguided beliefs and superstitions, which often lead to horrific turmoil in ignorant societies. Furthermore, an educated and informed populace tends to be more decent and organized than an ignorant and foolish one. They feel more self-respect and have a better chance of earning the respect of their rightful leaders, making them more likely to respect those leaders in return. They are also more inclined to scrutinize and more capable of seeing through the self-serving complaints of factions and rebellions, which makes them less likely to be misled into unnecessary opposition to government actions. In democratic countries, where the government's stability greatly relies on how favorably the public views its actions, it's incredibly important that they aren't quick to judge it without careful consideration.

ART. III.Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Instruction of People of all Ages.

The institutions for the instruction of people of all ages, are chiefly those for religious instruction. This is a species of instruction, which the object is not so much to render the people good citizens in this world, as to prepare them for another and a better world in the life to come. The teachers of the doctrine which contains this instruction, in the same manner as other teachers, may either depend altogether for their subsistence upon the voluntary contributions of their hearers; or they may derive it from some other fund, to which the law of their country may entitle them; such as a landed estate, a tythe or land tax, an established salary or stipend. Their exertion, their zeal and industry, are likely to be much greater in the former situation than in the latter. In this respect, the teachers of a new religion have always had a considerable advantage in attacking these ancient and established systems, of which the clergy, reposing themselves upon their benefices, had neglected to keep up the fervour of faith and devotion in the great body of the people; and having given themselves up to indolence, were become altogether incapable of making any vigorous exertion in defence even of their own establishment. The clergy of an established and well endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance, who possess all the virtues of gentlemen, or which can recommend them to the esteem of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original causes of the success and establishment of their religion. Such a clergy, when attacked by a set of popular and bold, though perhaps stupid and ignorant enthusiasts, feel themselves as perfectly defenceless as the indolent, effeminate, and full fed nations of the southern parts of Asia, when they were invaded by the active, hardy, and hungry Tartars of the north. Such a clergy, upon such an emergency, have commonly no other resource than to call upon the civil magistrate to persecute, destroy, or drive out their adversaries, as disturbers of the public peace. It was thus that the Roman catholic clergy called upon the civil magistrate to persecute the protestants, and the church of England to persecute the dissenters; and that in general every religious sect, when it has once enjoyed, for a century or two, the security of a legal establishment, has found itself incapable of making any vigorous defence against any new sect which chose to attack its doctrine or discipline. Upon such occasions, the advantage, in point of learning and good writing, may sometimes be on the side of the established church. But the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining proselytes, are constantly on the side of its adversaries. In England, those arts have been long neglected by the well endowed clergy of the established church, and are at present chiefly cultivated by the dissenters and by the methodists. The independent provisions, however, which in many places have been made for dissenting teachers, by means of voluntary subscriptions, of trust rights, and other evasions of the law, seem very much to have abated the zeal and activity of those teachers. They have many of them become very learned, ingenious, and respectable men; but they have in general ceased to be very popular preachers. The methodists, without half the learning of the dissenters, are much more in vogue.

The institutions for teaching people of all ages are mainly focused on religious education. This type of instruction aims not just to make people good citizens in this life, but to prepare them for another, better life to come. The teachers of this doctrine, like other educators, can either rely entirely on voluntary donations from their audience or get support from some other source that the law allows, like land ownership, a tithe, a land tax, or a set salary. Their commitment, enthusiasm, and effort are likely to be much higher when they depend on donations than when they have a steady income. In this way, teachers of new religions often have a significant advantage when challenging long-established systems, as the clergy of these systems, comfortable in their positions, have often failed to maintain the passion for faith and devotion among the general public. Given to idleness, they have become incapable of mounting any strong defense of their own beliefs. Clergy from a well-established and well-funded religion often become educated and cultured individuals who exhibit the qualities of gentlemen or those that earn them respect; however, they tend to gradually lose both the positive and negative traits that gave them authority and influence with the lower classes, which may have been crucial for their religion's original success and establishment. When such a clergy faces challenges from energetic and bold, though possibly misguided and uneducated, enthusiasts, they can feel as defenseless as the complacent and well-fed societies of southern Asia when the vigorous and hungry Tartars from the north invaded. During such crises, this clergy often has no choice but to ask the civil authorities to persecute, eliminate, or expel their opponents as disruptors of public order. This is how the Roman Catholic clergy called on civil authorities to persecute Protestants, and how the Church of England sought to suppress dissenters; generally, any religious group that has enjoyed the security of legal establishment for a century or two has found itself unable to effectively defend against any new group challenging its beliefs or practices. In such instances, while the established church may sometimes hold an edge in terms of knowledge and eloquence, the skills of popularity and the ability to attract new followers consistently belong to its challengers. In England, these skills have long been overlooked by the well-supported clergy of the established church and are now primarily nurtured by dissenters and Methodists. However, the independent support systems that many places have set up for dissenting teachers, through voluntary donations, trust rights, and other legal loopholes, seem to have significantly reduced the enthusiasm and activity of those teachers. Many of them have become very knowledgeable, clever, and respected figures; yet, they generally no longer attract much of a following as preachers. In contrast, the Methodists, lacking the same level of education as the dissenters, are far more popular.

In the church of Rome the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy are kept more alive by the powerful motive of self-interest, than perhaps in any established protestant church. The parochial clergy derive many of them, a very considerable part of their subsistence from the voluntary oblations of the people; a source of revenue, which confession gives them many opportunities of improving. The mendicant orders derive their whole subsistence from such oblations. It is with them as with the hussars and light infantry of some armies; no plunder, no pay. The parochial clergy are like those teachers whose reward depends partly upon their salary, and partly upon the fees or honoraries which they get from their pupils; and these must always depend, more or less, upon their industry and reputation. The mendicant orders are like those teachers whose subsistence depends altogether upon their industry. They are obliged, therefore, to use every art which can animate the devotion of the common people. The establishment of the two great mendicant orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, it is[Pg 331] observed by Machiavel, revived, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the languishing faith and devotion of the catholic church. In Roman catholic countries, the spirit of devotion is supported altogether by the monks, and by the poorer parochial clergy. The great dignitaries of the church, with all the accomplishments of gentlemen and men of the world, and sometimes with those of men of learning, are careful to maintain the necessary discipline over their inferiors, but seldom give themselves any trouble about the instruction of the people.

In the church of Rome, the hard work and enthusiasm of the lower clergy are kept more alive by the strong motivation of self-interest than in perhaps any established Protestant church. Many of the parochial clergy rely significantly on the voluntary donations of the people for their income, a revenue source that confession often provides many opportunities to enhance. The mendicant orders depend entirely on such donations. They are like the hussars and light infantry in some armies; no plunder means no pay. The parochial clergy resemble teachers whose income comes partly from their salary and partly from the fees or honorariums they receive from their students; these depend, to some extent, on their effort and reputation. The mendicant orders are like teachers whose entire support relies solely on their effort. Therefore, they must employ every strategy to inspire devotion among the common people. The establishment of the two major mendicant orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, as noted by Machiavelli, revived the waning faith and devotion of the Catholic Church in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In Roman Catholic countries, the spirit of devotion is entirely upheld by the monks and the poorer parochial clergy. The high-ranking church officials, with all the attributes of gentlemen and worldly men, and sometimes those of learned individuals, work hard to maintain the necessary discipline over their subordinates, but they rarely concern themselves with educating the people.

"Most of the arts and professions in a state," says by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age, "are of such a nature, that, while they promote the interests of the society, they are also useful or agreeable to some individuals; and, in that case, the constant rule of the magistrate, except, perhaps, on the first introduction of any art, is, to leave the profession to itself, and trust its encouragement to the individuals who reap the benefit of it. The artisans, finding their profits to rise by the favour of their customers, increase, as much as possible, their skill and industry; and as matters are not disturbed by any injudicious tampering, the commodity is always sure to be at all times nearly proportioned to the demand."

"Most of the arts and professions in a society," says the most notable philosopher and historian of our time, "are such that, while they serve the interests of the community, they are also beneficial or enjoyable for certain individuals. In that case, the usual guideline for the authorities, except possibly when a new art is first introduced, is to let the profession operate independently and trust its growth to those who benefit from it. The artisans, seeing their profits increase thanks to their customers' support, work hard to improve their skills and productivity; and since things aren't disrupted by any misguided interference, the supply is always closely aligned with the demand."

"But there are also some callings which, though useful and even necessary in a state, bring no advantage or pleasure to any individual; and the supreme power is obliged to alter its conduct with regard to the retainers of those professions. It must give them public encouragement in order to their subsistence; and it must provide against that negligence to which they will naturally be subject, either by annexing particular honours to profession, by establishing a long subordination of ranks, and a strict dependence, or by some other expedient. The persons employed in the finances, fleets, and magistracy, are instances of this order of men.

"But there are also some jobs that, while useful and even necessary for a society, offer no benefit or enjoyment to any individual; and the highest authority has to change its approach toward those who hold these positions. It must provide them with public support to ensure their livelihood; and it must guard against the negligence they are likely to fall into, either by attaching specific honors to their roles, by creating a long hierarchy of ranks and strict dependencies, or by some other means. Those working in finance, the navy, and as magistrates are examples of this type of workers."

"It may naturally be thought, at first sight, that the ecclesiastics belong to the first class, and that their encouragement, as well as that of lawyers and physicians, may safely be entrusted to the liberality of individuals, who are attached to their doctrines, and who find benefit or consolation from their spiritual ministry and assistance. Their industry and vigilance will, no doubt, be whetted by such an additional motive; and their skill in the profession, as well as their address in governing the minds of the people, must receive daily increase, from their increasing practice, study, and attention.

At first glance, it might seem that the clergy belong to the highest tier, and that their support, along with that of lawyers and doctors, can confidently rely on the generosity of individuals who are dedicated to their teachings and who gain comfort or help from their spiritual guidance. Their hard work and dedication will certainly be sharpened by this extra incentive; and their expertise in their field, along with their ability to influence people's thoughts, will surely grow daily from their increasing experience, learning, and focus.

"But if we consider the matter more closely, we shall find that this interested diligence of the clergy is what every wise legislator will study to prevent; because, in every religion except the true, it is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency to pervert the truth, by infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion. Each ghostly practitioner, in order to render himself more precious and sacred in the eyes of his retainers, will inspire them with the most violent abhorrence of all other sects, and continually endeavour, by some novelty, to excite the languid devotion of his audience. No regard will be paid to truth, morals, or decency, in the doctrines inculcated. Every tenet will be adopted that best suits the disorderly affections of the human frame. Customers will be drawn in each conventicle by new industry and address, in practising on the passions and credulity of the populace. And, in the end, the civil magistrate will find that he has dearly paid for his intended frugality, in saving a fixed establishment for the priests; and that, in reality, the most decent and advantageous composition, which he can make with the spiritual guides, is to bribe their indolence, by assigning stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to prevent their flock from straying in quest of new pastors. And in this manner ecclesiastical establishments, though commonly they arose at first from religious views, prove in the end advantageous to the political interests of society."

"But if we take a closer look at the situation, we’ll see that the active involvement of the clergy is exactly what any wise lawmaker will aim to avoid; because, in every religion except the true one, it’s extremely harmful, and it tends to distort the truth by mixing it with a heavy dose of superstition, foolishness, and deception. Each spiritual leader, in order to make himself seem more valuable and revered to his followers, will instill in them a deep hatred for all other sects and will constantly try to stir up their lackluster devotion with something new. No attention will be given to truth, morals, or decency in the teachings presented. Every belief will be chosen based on how well it caters to the chaotic emotions of people. New tactics will be used in every gathering to manipulate the passions and gullibility of the public. Ultimately, the government official will realize that he has paid dearly for his attempt to save money by avoiding a stable system for the priests; in reality, the best deal he can strike with the spiritual leaders is to pay them a salary, thus making it unnecessary for them to be actively involved except to keep their congregation from wandering off in search of new leaders. In this way, while ecclesiastical systems often originally emerged for religious reasons, they ultimately end up benefiting the political interests of society."

But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent provision of the clergy, it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon them from any view to those effects. Times of violent religious controversy have generally been times of equally violent political faction. Upon such occasions, each political party has either found it, or imagined it, for his interest, to league itself with some one or other of the contending religious sects. But this could be done only by adopting, or, at least, by favouring the tenets of that particular sect. The sect which had the good fortune to be leagued with the conquering party necessarily shared in the victory of its ally, by whose favour and protection it was soon enabled, in some degree, to silence and subdue all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally leagued themselves with the enemies of the conquering party, and were, therefore the enemies of that party. The clergy of this particular sect having thus become complete masters of the field, and their influence and authority with the great body of the people being in its highest vigour, they were powerful enough to overawe the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and to oblige the civil magistrate to respect their opinions and inclinations. Their first demand was generally that he should silence and subdue all their adversaries; and their second, that he should bestow an independent provision on themselves. As they had generally contributed a good[Pg 332] deal to the victory, it seemed not unreasonable that they should have some share in the spoil. They were weary, besides, of humouring the people, and of depending upon their caprice for a subsistence. In making this demand, therefore, they consulted their own ease and comfort, without troubling themselves about the effect which it might have, in future times, upon the influence and authority of their order. The civil magistrate, who could comply with their demand only by giving them something which he would have chosen much rather to take, or to keep to himself, was seldom very forward to grant it. Necessity, however, always forced him to submit at last, though frequently not till after many delays, evasions, and affected excuses.

But whatever the good or bad effects of providing for the clergy independently, it was probably rarely given to them with those effects in mind. Times of intense religious debate have often coincided with equally intense political conflicts. During these times, each political party has either found it, or imagined it, in their best interest to ally with one of the opposing religious groups. However, this could only happen by adopting, or at least favoring, the beliefs of that particular group. The group that managed to align with the winning side naturally shared in its victory, gaining the support and protection needed to quiet and defeat its opponents. Those opponents typically united with the enemies of the winning party and were, therefore, against that party. The clergy of this particular group, now in complete control and highly influential with the general public, were powerful enough to intimidate the leaders of their own party and to compel the civil authorities to respect their views. Their first demand was usually for the authorities to silence all their adversaries; their second was for an independent salary for themselves. Since they had generally contributed significantly to the victory, it seemed reasonable that they should get a share of the rewards. They were also tired of catering to the whims of the people and depending on their unpredictable support for a living. By making this demand, they prioritized their own comfort without considering how it might impact the future power and authority of their order. The civil authorities, who could meet their demands only by giving them something they would have preferred to keep for themselves, were rarely eager to comply. However, necessity eventually forced them to give in, though often not without many delays, evasions, and false excuses.

But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another, when it had gained the victory, it would probably have dealt equally and impartially with all the different sects, and have allowed every man to choose his own priest, and his own religion, as he thought proper. There would, and, in this case, no doubt, have been, a great multitude of religious sects. Almost every different congregation might probably have had a little sect by itself, or have entertained some peculiar tenets of its own. Each teacher, would, no doubt, have felt himself under the necessity of making the utmost exertion, and of using every art, both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples. But as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity, the success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great. The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where there is either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects; the teachers of each acting by concert, and under a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal must be altogether innocent, where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or, perhaps, into as many thousand small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to disturb the public tranquillity. The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation which are so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, whose tenets, being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who, therefore, see nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect; and the concessions which they would mutually find in both convenient and agreeable to make one to another, might in time, probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have, in all ages of the world, wished to see established; but such as positive law has, perhaps, never yet established, and probably never will establish in any country; because, with regard to religion, positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less influenced by popular superstition and enthusiasm. This plan of ecclesiastical government, or, more properly, of no ecclesiastical government, was what the sect called Independents (a sect, no doubt, of very wild enthusiasts), proposed to establish in England towards the end of the civil war. If it had been established, though of a very unphilosophical origin, it would probably, by this time, have been productive of the most philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every sort of religious principle. It has been established in Pennsylvania, where, though the quakers happen to be the most numerous, the law, in reality, favours no one sect more than another; and it is there said to have been productive of this philosophical good temper and moderation.

But if politics had never relied on religion, and if the victorious group had never favored one sect over another after winning, it would likely have treated all the different sects equally and allowed everyone to choose their own priest and religion as they saw fit. There would have, and in this scenario, certainly would have been, a vast number of religious sects. Almost every unique congregation probably would have formed its own little sect or held some special beliefs. Each teacher would undoubtedly feel the pressure to put in the maximum effort and utilize every tactic to retain and grow their followers. However, since every other teacher would feel the same pressure, none would achieve significant success. The passionate and engaged zeal of religious leaders can be concerning and problematic only when there’s either a single tolerated sect in society or when a large society is split into two or three major sects; the leaders from each working together and under a structured hierarchy. But that zeal would be completely harmless in a society divided into two or three hundred, or potentially even thousands, of small sects, where no single one could disrupt public peace. The leaders of each sect, realizing they are surrounded by more opponents than supporters, would have to adopt the tolerance and moderation often missing among leaders of those large sects, whose beliefs are upheld by civil authority and respected by almost everyone in vast kingdoms and empires, thus finding nothing but followers, disciples, and admirers around them. The leaders of each small sect, feeling nearly isolated, would need to show respect to those from almost every other sect; and the compromises they would find mutually beneficial could eventually lead the majority of them to adopt a purer and more rational form of religion, devoid of any absurdity, deception, or fanaticism—something wise individuals have sought to see established throughout history, though positive law might never have accomplished this in any country; because, in terms of religion, positive law has always been, and likely always will be, influenced to some extent by popular superstition and fervor. This framework of ecclesiastical governance, or, more accurately, the absence of it, was what the group known as the Independents (who were surely quite radical enthusiasts) aimed to implement in England toward the end of the civil war. If it had been put into effect, regardless of its rather unphilosophical roots, it would likely have fostered a spirit of philosophical good nature and moderation concerning all forms of religious belief by now. It has indeed been implemented in Pennsylvania, where, despite the Quakers being the most numerous, the law actually does not favor any one sect over the others; and it is said to have led to this philosophical good nature and moderation.

But though this equality of treatment should not be productive of this good temper and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the religious sects of a particular country; yet, provided those sects were sufficiently numerous, and each of them consequently too small to disturb the public tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each for its particular tenets could not well be productive of any very hurtful effects, but, on the contrary, of several good ones; and if the government was perfectly decided, both to let them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one another, there is little danger that they would not of their own accord, subdivide themselves fast enough, so as soon to become sufficiently numerous.

But even if this equal treatment doesn't create good attitudes and moderation in everyone, or even in most religious groups in a country, as long as those groups are numerous enough and each one is small enough not to disrupt public peace, their excessive passion for their own beliefs likely won't cause any serious harm. Instead, it could lead to several positive outcomes. If the government is fully committed to leaving them alone and requiring them to do the same with each other, there's little risk that they won't quickly break themselves down into smaller groups, becoming sufficiently numerous in the process.

In every civilized society, in every society where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established, there have been always two different schemes or systems of morality current at the same time; of which the one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people; the latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called the people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour, seems to constitute the principal dis[Pg 333]tinction between those two opposite schemes or systems. In the liberal or loose system, luxury, wanton, and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two sexes, &c. provided they are not accompanied with gross indecency, and do not lead to falsehood and injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are easily either excused or pardoned altogether. In the austere system, on the contrary, those excesses are regarded with the utmost abhorrence and detestation. The vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people, and a single week's thoughtlessness and dissipation is often sufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him, through despair, upon committing the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort of the common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and detestation of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so immediately fatal to people of their condition. The disorder and extravagance of several years, on the contrary, will not always ruin a man of fashion; and people of that rank are very apt to consider the power of indulging in some degree of excess, as one of the advantages of their fortune; and the liberty of doing so without censure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station, therefore, they regard such excesses with but a small degree of disapprobation, and censure them either very slightly or not at all.

In every civilized society, in every society where the distinction of social classes has been firmly established, there have always been two different moral systems coexisting: one can be called strict or austere, and the other liberal, or, if you prefer, loose. The strict system is generally admired and respected by the common people, while the liberal system is usually more valued and embraced by those known as the fashionable crowd. The extent to which we should condemn the vices of lightheartedness—vices that tend to arise from great prosperity and excesses of joy and humor—seems to be the main way we distinguish between these two opposing moral systems. In the liberal or loose system, behaviors such as luxury, indulgent and even reckless enjoyment, the pursuit of pleasure to some extent of excess, and breaches of chastity (at least for one gender), etc., are generally viewed with a lot of leniency, easily excused or even completely forgiven as long as they don’t involve blatant indecency or lead to lies and injustice. In contrast, the austere system looks upon those excesses with the utmost disgust and revulsion. Lighthearted vices are always harmful to the common people, and just one week of carelessness and excess can often ruin a poor worker forever, pushing him into despair and prompting him to commit terrible crimes. Therefore, the more sensible and virtuous members of the common people hold these excesses in the highest disdain, as their experience has shown them how immediately destructive they can be to those in their circumstances. On the other hand, years of disorder and extravagance may not necessarily ruin someone from high society; those in that social class often view the ability to indulge in some degree of excess as one of the perks of their wealth, and the freedom to do so without judgement as one of the privileges of their status. Consequently, they tend to view such excesses in their own class with minimal disapproval, critiquing them either lightly or not at all.

Almost all religious sects have begun among the common people, from whom they have generally drawn their earliest, as well as their most numerous proselytes. The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those sects almost constantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been some. It was the system by which they could best recommend themselves to that order of people, to whom they first proposed their plan of reformation upon what had been before established. Many of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain credit by refining upon this austere system, and by carrying it to some degree of folly and extravagance; and this excessive rigour has frequently recommended them, more than any thing else, to the respect and veneration of the common people.

Almost all religious groups have started among everyday people, from whom they generally gathered their earliest and most numerous followers. This strict moral system has been consistently adopted by these groups, with very few exceptions; there have been some. It was the system that allowed them to best appeal to the type of people to whom they initially presented their plan for reform based on what already existed. Many of them, perhaps most, have even tried to gain credibility by refining this strict system and taking it to levels of folly and extravagance; and this extreme rigor has often earned them the respect and admiration of ordinary people.

A man of rank and fortune is, by his station, the distinguished member of a great society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the respect which this society bears to him. He dares not do any thing which would disgrace or discredit him in it; and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that species of morals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country village, his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city, he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody; and he is, therefore, very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice. He never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excites so much the attention of any respectable society, as by his becoming the member of a small religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration which he never had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe his conduct; and, if he gives occasion to any scandal, if he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost always require of one another, to punish him by what is always a very severe punishment, even where no evil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication from the sect. In little religious sects, accordingly, the morals of the common people have been almost always remarkably regular and orderly; generally much more so than in the established church. The morals of those little sects, indeed, have frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial.

A wealthy and influential man is, due to his position, a key member of an important society. He has to be mindful of his behavior, which forces him to pay attention to all aspects of his actions. His power and respect come largely from how this society views him. He cannot afford to do anything that would tarnish his reputation within it; thus, he is required to adhere to the strict morals—whether open-minded or strict—that the general consensus of this society imposes on individuals of his status. On the other hand, a man of lower status is far less likely to be a notable member of any significant society. While he lives in a rural area, his actions might be noticed, and he may feel obliged to regulate his own behavior. In this context, and only in this context, he might have what’s known as a reputation to uphold. However, as soon as he moves to a big city, he becomes lost in anonymity. No one pays attention to his behavior, making it likely that he will neglect it himself and indulge in all sorts of low behavior and vice. He never truly escapes this obscurity, nor does his conduct attract attention from any respectable society, until he joins a small religious group. From that moment, he gains a level of respect he never had before. His fellow members are invested in maintaining the group's reputation and will keep an eye on his behavior. If he behaves inappropriately or strays too far from the strict morals they typically expect from each other, they will impose a harsh penalty on him, such as expulsion or excommunication, which is always significant, even if no negative consequences arise from it. In these smaller religious groups, the morals of ordinary people tend to be remarkably consistent and orderly, often more so than those found in established churches. However, the moral standards in these small sects can sometimes be uncomfortably strict and unsociable.

There are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint operation the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unsocial or disagreeably rigorous in the morals of all the little sects into which the country was divided.

There are two very simple and effective solutions, though, whose combined efforts could help the state, without resorting to violence, address anything that was unwelcoming or overly harsh in the values of the various small groups into which the country was divided.

The first of those remedies is the study of science and philosophy, which the state might render almost universal among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune; not by giving salaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle, but by instituting some sort of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every person before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession, or before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office, of trust or profit. If the state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trouble about providing them with proper teachers. They would soon find better teachers for themselves, than any whom the state could provide for them. Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much exposed to it.[Pg 334]

The first of those solutions is the study of science and philosophy, which the government could make almost universal among all people of average or above-average status and wealth; not by paying teachers to make them lazy and unproductive, but by implementing some form of probation, even in the more advanced and challenging sciences, that everyone must complete before they can take on any respectable profession or be considered for any esteemed position of responsibility or profit. If the government required this group of people to learn, it wouldn't need to worry about finding them good teachers. They would quickly discover better teachers for themselves than those the government could offer. Science is the major antidote to the harmful effects of fanaticism and superstition; and where all the higher social classes are protected from it, the lower classes can’t be too exposed to it.[Pg 334]

The second of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diversions. The state, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire liberty to all those who, from their own interest, would attempt, without scandal or indecency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, music, dancing; by all sorts of dramatic representations and exhibitions; would easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and enthusiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread and hatred to all the fanatical promoters of those popular frenzies. The gaiety and good humour which those diversions inspire, were altogether inconsistent with that temper of mind which was fittest for their purpose, or which they could best work upon. Dramatic representations, besides, frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and sometimes even to public execration, were, upon that account, more than all other diversions, the objects of their peculiar abhorrence.

The second remedy is the frequency and joy of public entertainment. The state, by encouraging and allowing anyone who, motivated by their own interests, wants to entertain the public through art, poetry, music, dancing, and various types of performances and shows, could easily alleviate much of the sadness and gloom that often nurtures popular superstition and enthusiasm. Public entertainment has always been feared and hated by the fanatics who promote these popular frenzies. The joy and good spirits that these activities inspire are completely at odds with the mindset that is most suitable for their agenda or that they can manipulate effectively. Additionally, dramatic performances, which often expose their tricks to public mockery and sometimes even anger, were particularly hated by them, more than any other form of entertainment.

In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than those of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should have any particular or immediate dependency upon the sovereign or executive power; or that he should have any thing to do either in appointing or in dismissing them from their offices. In such a situation, he would have no occasion to give himself any concern about them, further than to keep the peace among them, in the same manner as among the rest of his subjects, that is, to hinder them from persecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. But it is quite otherwise in countries where there is an established or governing religion. The sovereign can in this case never be secure, unless he has the means of influencing in a considerable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion.

In a country where the law treats teachers of all religions equally, there would be no need for any of them to have a direct dependency on the sovereign or the executive power, nor would the sovereign need to be involved in hiring or firing them. In that scenario, the sovereign wouldn’t need to worry about them, other than to maintain peace among them, just like with the rest of the citizens, meaning preventing them from persecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. However, this is not the case in countries with an established or governing religion. In that situation, the sovereign can never be secure unless they have a significant influence over the majority of the teachers of that religion.

The clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation. They can act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan, and with one spirit as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they are frequently, too, under such direction. Their interest as an incorporated body is never the same with that of the sovereign, and is sometimes directly opposite to it. Their great interest is to maintain their authority with the people, and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the supposed necessity of adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid eternal misery. Should the sovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride, or doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from humanity, attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy, who have no sort of dependency upon him, is immediately provoked to proscribe him as a profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion, in order to oblige the people to transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince. Should he oppose any of their pretensions or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel against the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been charged, too, with the additional crime of heresy, notwithstanding their solemn protestations of their faith, and humble submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests conquer all other fears. When the authorized teachers of religion propagate through the great body of the people, doctrines subversive of the authority of the sovereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that he can maintain his authority. Even a standing army cannot in this case give him any lasting security; because if the soldiers are not foreigners, which can seldom be the case, but drawn from the great body of the people, which must almost always be the case, they are likely to be soon corrupted by those very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually occasioning at Constantinople, as long as the eastern empire subsisted; the convulsions which, during the course of several centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning in every part of Europe, sufficiently demonstrate how precarious and insecure must always be the situation of the sovereign, who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of the established and governing religion of his country.

The clergy of every established church forms a large organization. They can work together and pursue their interests in a unified way, almost as if they were guided by one person; and they often are. Their interests as a group rarely align with those of the sovereign and can sometimes be in direct opposition to them. Their primary goal is to maintain their authority with the public, which depends on the perceived certainty and significance of the doctrines they promote, and on the belief that adopting every part of these teachings with complete faith is necessary to avoid eternal suffering. If the sovereign foolishly appears to mock or doubt even the smallest aspect of their teachings, or, out of compassion, tries to protect those who do, the clergy—who have no real dependence on him—will be quick to denounce him as a heretic and will use all the threats of religion to persuade the people to shift their allegiance to a more orthodox and compliant ruler. If he challenges any of their claims or oversteps, the risk is equally significant. Rulers who have had the audacity to rebel against the church have, in addition to being charged with rebellion, often faced accusations of heresy, despite their solemn declarations of faith and genuine submission to all the beliefs that the church dictated. The authority of religion outweighs all other authorities. The fears it instills overshadow all other concerns. When the official teachers of religion spread ideas that undermine the authority of the sovereign throughout the populace, he can only maintain his power through violence or a standing army. Even a standing army won’t offer lasting security in this situation, because if the soldiers are not from foreign lands—a rare occurrence—they are likely to come from the general population, which means they could be influenced by those same doctrines. The unrest caused by the Greek clergy in Constantinople during the existence of the eastern empire, as well as the turmoil triggered by the Roman clergy across Europe over several centuries, clearly illustrate how unstable and insecure a sovereign's position becomes when he lacks effective means to influence the clergy of his country's established and governing religion.

Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the people. With regard to such matters, therefore, his authority can seldom be sufficient to counterbalance the united authority of the clergy of the established church. The public tranquillity, however, and his own security, may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may think proper to propagate concerning such matters. As he can seldom directly oppose their decision, therefore, with proper weight and authority, it is necessary that he should be able to influence it; and he can influence it only by the fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater part of the individuals of the order. Those fears and ex[Pg 335]pectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other punishment, and in the expectation of further preferment.

Articles of faith and all other spiritual matters clearly don't fall under the authority of a temporal ruler. While a sovereign may be quite capable of protecting people, they are rarely seen as qualified to guide or instruct them. In these matters, their authority is usually not strong enough to outweigh the combined authority of the established church's clergy. However, public peace and the ruler's own security often rely on the teachings that the clergy choose to promote regarding these issues. Since they can't directly challenge the clergy's beliefs with enough weight and authority, it's essential for the ruler to find ways to influence them. This influence can only be achieved through the fears and hopes they create in the majority of clergy members. Those fears and hopes might include the fear of losing their position or facing other punishments, along with the anticipation of further advancement.

In all Christian churches, the benefices of the clergy are a sort of freeholds, which they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life or good behaviour. If they held them by a more precarious tenure, and were liable to be turned out upon every slight disobligation either of the sovereign or of his ministers, it would perhaps be impossible for them to maintain their authority with the people, who would then consider them as mercenary dependents upon the court, in the sincerity of whose instructions they could no longer have any confidence. But should the sovereign attempt irregularly, and by violence, to deprive any number of clergymen of their freeholds, on account, perhaps, of their having propagated, with more than ordinary zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine, he would only render, by such persecution, both them and their doctrine ten times more popular, and therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous, than they had been before. Fear is in almost all cases a wretched instrument of government, and ought in particular never to be employed against any order of men who have the smallest pretensions to independency. To attempt to terrify them, serves only to irritate their bad humour, and to confirm them in an opposition, which more gentle usage, perhaps, might easily induce them either to soften, or to lay aside altogether. The violence which the French government usually employed in order to oblige all their parliaments, or sovereign courts of justice, to enregister any unpopular edict, very seldom succeeded. The means commonly employed, however, the imprisonment of all the refractory members, one would think, were forcible enough. The princes of the house of Stuart sometimes employed the like means in order to influence some of the members of the parliament of England, and they generally found them equally intractable. The parliament of England is now managed in another manner; and a very small experiment, which the duke of Choiseul made, about twelve years ago, upon the parliament of Paris, demonstrated sufficiently that all the parliaments of France might have been managed still more easily in the same manner. That experiment was not pursued. For though management and persuasion are always the easiest and safest instruments of government as force and violence are the worst and the most dangerous; yet such, it seems, is the natural insolence of man, that he almost always disdains to use the good instrument, except when he cannot or dare not use the bad one. The French government could and durst use force, and therefore disdained to use management and persuasion. But there is no order of men, it appears I believe, from the experience of all ages, upon whom it is so dangerous or rather so perfectly ruinous, to employ force and violence, as upon the respected clergy of an established church. The rights, the privileges, the personal liberty of every individual ecclesiastic, who is upon good terms with his own order, are, even in the most despotic governments, more respected than those of any other person of nearly equal rank and fortune. It is so in every gradation of despotism, from that of the gentle and mild government of Paris, to that of the violent and furious government of Constantinople. But though this order of men can scarce ever be forced, they may be managed as easily as any other; and the security of the sovereign, as well as the public tranquillity, seems to depend very much upon the means which he has of managing them; and those means seem to consist altogether in the preferment which he has to bestow upon them.

In all Christian churches, the church leaders have a sort of freehold that they enjoy not just at will but for life or as long as they uphold good behavior. If they had a less secure claim and could be dismissed for any minor offense by the ruler or their officials, it would likely be impossible for them to maintain their authority with the people. The people would then see them as mercenary dependents of the court, making it hard to trust their guidance. However, if the ruler tried to violently remove a group of clergymen from their positions because they were fervently promoting divisive or rebellious teachings, such persecution would only make both the clergymen and their beliefs even more popular and, therefore, much more troublesome and dangerous than before. Fear is usually a poor tool for governance, especially against any group that has even a small claim to independence. Trying to intimidate them merely provokes their resentment and reinforces their opposition, which gentler treatment might have softened or even set aside entirely. The French government often used force to compel their parliaments or courts of justice to register unpopular decrees, but this strategy seldom worked. They typically imprisoned all the rebellious members, which one would think would be effective. The princes of the house of Stuart employed similar tactics to sway some members of the English parliament, yet they generally found them equally resistant. The English parliament now operates differently, and a small experiment conducted by the Duke of Choiseul about twelve years ago on the Paris parliament clearly showed that all the parliaments in France could have been influenced with even greater ease. That experiment was not continued. While management and persuasion are always the easiest and safest tools for governance, force and violence are the worst and most dangerous. Yet, it seems that human nature leads people to prefer the effective means only when they can't or won't use the harmful ones. The French government could use force, so they dismissed the possibility of management and persuasion. However, history shows that employing force and violence against the clergy of an established church is usually very perilous, if not completely disastrous. In even the most despotic regimes, the rights and privileges, as well as the personal freedoms of every individual clergyman in good standing with their order, are respected more than those of any other person of similar rank and status. This holds true across all levels of despotism, from the mild governance of Paris to the brutal rule of Constantinople. Although this group can rarely be coerced, they can be managed just as easily as any other, and the security of the ruler, as well as public peace, largely depends on how well they are managed; this management rests significantly on the opportunities for advancement the ruler has to offer them.

In the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the episcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and while they did retain it, they almost always acted under the influence of the clergy, who, in such spiritual matters, appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found it easier to elect their own bishops themselves. The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of abbacies. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended within the diocese were collated by the bishop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church preferments were in this manner in the disposal of the church. The sovereign, though he might have some indirect influence in those elections, and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his consent to elect, and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or sufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not so much to his sovereign as to his own order, from which only he could expect preferment.

In the early setup of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was chosen by a vote from both the clergy and the people of the main city. However, the people didn’t keep their voting rights for long; even when they did, they mostly followed the clergy's lead, who seemed to be their natural guides in spiritual matters. The clergy soon got tired of managing the people and found it easier to choose their own bishops. Similarly, the abbot was usually elected by the monks in most monasteries. The bishop appointed all the lower church positions within the diocese, giving them to those he deemed fit. This meant that all church appointments were under the control of the church. Although the monarch might have some indirect influence over those elections and it was sometimes customary to seek his approval for both the election process and the elected candidates, he had no direct or significant way to control the clergy. Each clergyman’s ambition naturally led him to court not so much the sovereign, but rather his own order, from which he could only hope to gain promotion.

Through the greater part of Europe, the pope gradually drew to himself, first the collation of almost all bishoprics and abbacies, or of what were called consistorial benefices, and afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehended within each diocese, little more being left to the bishop than what was barely necessary to give him a decent authority with his own clergy. By this arrangement the condition of the sovereign was still worse than it bad been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a sort of spiritual army, dispersed in different quarters, indeed, but of[Pg 336] which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be considered as a particular detachment of that army, of which the operations could easily be supported and seconded by all the other detachments quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependent upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all the other detachments.

Across much of Europe, the pope gradually took control of most bishoprics and abbeys, or what were known as consistorial benefices, and later, through various schemes and pretenses, he gained control of most lower-level benefices within each diocese. This left bishops with barely enough authority to maintain respect among their own clergy. As a result, the situation for sovereigns became even worse than before. The clergy across different European countries were organized into a sort of spiritual army. While they were spread out in various regions, all their actions could now be directed by one leader and coordinated under a single plan. The clergy in each country could be seen as a specific unit of that army, with operations easily supported by other units stationed in neighboring countries. Each unit was not only independent of the local sovereign who maintained it but also reliant on a foreign leader who could, at any moment, turn their forces against the local ruler, backed by all the other units.

Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the ancient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the common people which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were established, of the same kind with those of the great barons, and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace, without the support or assistance either of the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the king's courts, as those of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and, therefore, liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy possessed in the tithes a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues arising from both those species of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures, for the produce of which they could exchange the surplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the ancient clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They not only maintained almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were often as numerous as those of the greatest lay-lords; and the retainers of all the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay-lords. There was always much more union among the clergy than among the lay-lords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been less numerous than those of the great lay-lords, and their tenants were probably much less numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more formidable. The hospitality and charity of the clergy, too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increased very much the weight of their spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest respect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or related to so popular an order, its possessions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of the common people; and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest act of sacrilegious wickedness and profaneness. In this state of things, if the sovereign frequently found it difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the great nobility, we cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the united force of the clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances, the wonder is, not that he was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he ever was able to resist.

Those arms were the most impressive that one could imagine. In ancient Europe, before the development of arts and industries, the wealth of the clergy gave them influence over the common people similar to that of the powerful barons over their vassals, tenants, and retainers. Within the large estates that misguided generosity from both princes and private individuals had granted to the church, jurisdictions were created that matched those of the barons for the same reasons. On these estates, the clergy, or their agents, could maintain order without needing help from the king or anyone else, while neither the king nor anyone else could enforce peace there without the support of the clergy. Thus, the clergy's jurisdictions in their own baronies or manors were just as independent and exclusive of the authority of the king's courts as those of the powerful lords. The clergy's tenants were, much like those of the barons, mostly tenants at will, completely reliant on their immediate lords, and could be summoned to fight in any conflict the clergy deemed necessary. Besides the rents from these estates, the clergy also collected tithes that constituted a significant portion of the rents from all other estates in every kingdom in Europe. Most of the revenues from both types of rents were paid in goods like grain, wine, cattle, and poultry. The amount far exceeded what the clergy could consume, and there were no industries to exchange the surplus. The clergy could only benefit from this excess by using it, just like the barons did, for lavish hospitality and extensive charity. Consequently, the hospitality and charity of the ancient clergy were considered considerable. They not only supported almost all the poor in each kingdom but many knights and gentlemen often had no other way to survive than by traveling from monastery to monastery under the guise of devotion, but really to enjoy the clergy's hospitality. The followers of certain bishops were often as numerous as those of the most significant lay lords, and collectively, the clergy's retainers might have outnumbered those of all the lay lords combined. There was consistently much more unity among the clergy than among the lay lords. The clergy functioned under a structured discipline and were subordinate to papal authority, while the lay lords had no such order and were typically jealous of one another and of the king. Thus, even if the clergy's tenants and followers were fewer in total than those of the powerful lay lords, their unity made them more formidable. Moreover, the hospitality and charity of the clergy not only provided them with substantial temporal power but also significantly enhanced the weight of their spiritual influence. These virtues earned them immense respect and reverence from lower social classes, many of whom were consistently, and almost all occasionally, supported by them. Anything related to such a popular institution—its possessions, privileges, and doctrines—was seen as sacred by the common people, and any violation, whether real or perceived, was regarded as a serious act of sacrilege and profanation. Given this context, if the sovereign often struggled to counter the alliance of a few noble families, it's no surprise he found it even more challenging to stand against the unified force of the clergy in his own lands, backed by the clergy from neighboring territories. Under these circumstances, the remarkable fact is not that he sometimes had to concede, but that he was ever able to resist.

The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us, who live in the present times, appear the most absurd), their total exemption from the secular jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of clergy, were the natural, or rather the necessary, consequences of this state of things. How dangerous must it have been for the sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his order were disposed to protect him, and to represent either the proof as insufficient for convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion? The sovereign could, in such circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts, who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as much as[Pg 337] possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even from giving occasion to such gross scandal as might disgust the minds of the people.

The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which seem incredibly absurd to us today), like their complete exemption from secular authority, or what was referred to in England as the benefit of clergy, were the natural, or rather necessary, outcomes of that situation. How dangerous it must have been for the ruler to try punishing a clergyman for any crime if his order was willing to defend him, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict such a holy person, or that the punishment was too harsh for someone whose position was sanctified by religion. In such cases, the ruler could do no better than to let him be tried by the ecclesiastical courts, which, for the sake of their own reputation, were motivated to minimize, as much as possible, any member of their order from committing serious crimes, or even from causing such outrageous scandal that it might alienate the public.

In the state in which things were, through the greater part of Europe, during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that period, the constitution of the church of Rome may be considered as the must formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind, which can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them. In that constitution, the grossest delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner by the private interests of so great a number of people, as put them out of all danger from any assault of human reason; because, though human reason might, perhaps, have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of superstition, it could never have dissolved the ties of private interest. Had this constitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, it must have endured for ever. But that immense and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was, by the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed; and is now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins altogether.

During the time things were as they were throughout much of Europe in the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that, the structure of the Roman church could be seen as the most formidable combination ever formed against civil government's authority and security, as well as against the freedom, reason, and happiness of humanity, which can only thrive when civil government is able to protect them. In that structure, the worst deceptions of superstition were supported so robustly by the personal interests of many that they were shielded from any challenge by human reason; because, even though human reason might have been able to reveal some of superstitions' lies to common people, it could never break the bonds of personal interest. Had this structure faced no other enemies but the weak efforts of human reason, it would have lasted forever. But that vast and well-constructed system, which all the wisdom and virtue of humanity could never have shaken or overturned, was naturally weakened over time and eventually partially destroyed; and now, in a few more centuries, it is likely to crumble into ruins completely.

The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the grant barons, destroyed, in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending their whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal, or less profuse. Their retainers became consequently less numerous, and, by degrees, dwindled away altogether. The clergy, too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their landed estates, in order to spend it, in the same manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by granting leases to their tenants, who thereby became, in a great measure, independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and dissolved. They were even broken and dissolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to the great barons; because the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which they had once had over the great body of the people was very much decayed. The power of the church was, by that time, very nearly reduced, through the greater part of Europe, to what arose from their spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened, when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order as they had done before; as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity, luxury, and expense of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor.

The gradual improvements in the arts, manufacturing, and commerce, which destroyed the power of the great barons, similarly weakened the entire temporal power of the clergy throughout much of Europe. In the products of arts, manufacturing, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something they could trade their basic goods for, which allowed them to spend their entire income on themselves without sharing significantly with others. Their acts of charity became less widespread, and their hospitality became less generous or lavish. As a result, their retainers became fewer and eventually faded away completely. The clergy also, like the great barons, wanted to get a better return from their land in order to spend it on their own vanity and foolishness. However, this increase in rent could only be achieved by granting leases to their tenants, which made those tenants largely independent. The financial ties that connected the lower ranks of society to the clergy were gradually weakened and dissolved. These ties fell apart sooner than those that linked the same social classes to the great barons because the church's benefices were mostly much smaller than the estates of the great barons. Thus, each holder of a benefice could quickly spend all of its income on themselves. For most of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons remained strong across much of Europe. But the temporal power of the clergy—once firmly in control over the general populace—had significantly declined. By that time, the church's influence was largely reduced to what stemmed from its spiritual authority; even that authority weakened as it lost the support of the clergy's charity and hospitality. The lower classes no longer viewed that order as they once did—as comforters in their distress and alleviators of their poverty. Instead, they were irritated and repulsed by the vanity, luxury, and extravagance of the wealthier clergy, who seemed to squander what had traditionally been seen as the heritage of the poor.

In this situation of things, the sovereigns in the different states of Europe endeavoured to recover the influence which they had once had in the disposal of the great benefices of the church; by procuring to the deans and chapters of each diocese the restoration of their ancient right of electing the bishop; and to the monks of each abbacy that of electing the abbot. The reestablishing this ancient order was the object of several statutes enacted in England during the course of the fourteenth century, particularly of what is called the statute of provisors; and of the pragmatic sanction, established in France in the fifteenth century. In order to render the election valid, it was necessary that the sovereign should both consent to it before hand, and afterwards approve of the person elected; and though the election was still supposed to be free, he had, however all the indirect means which his situation necessarily afforded him, of influencing the clergy in his own dominions. Other regulations, of a similar tendency, were established in other parts of Europe. But the power of the pope, in the collation of the great benefices of the church, seems, before the reformation, to have been nowhere so effectually and so universally restrained as in France and England. The concordat afterwards, in the sixteenth century, gave to the kings of France the absolute right of presenting to all the great, or what are called the consistorial, benefices of the Gallican church.

In this situation, the rulers of different European states tried to regain the influence they once had over the appointment of major church positions by restoring the rights of deans and chapters in each diocese to elect their bishops, and allowing the monks in each abbey to elect their abbots. Reestablishing this ancient order was the purpose of several laws passed in England during the fourteenth century, particularly what’s known as the statute of provisors, and the pragmatic sanction created in France in the fifteenth century. For the election to be valid, the sovereign needed to approve it beforehand and then confirm the chosen person afterward; although the election was still considered free, the sovereign had all the indirect methods at his disposal to influence the clergy within his realm. Similar regulations were put in place in other parts of Europe. However, the pope's power in assigning major church positions seems to have been most effectively and uniformly limited in France and England before the Reformation. The concordat later, in the sixteenth century, granted the kings of France the absolute right to present candidates for all the major, or what are called the consistorial, benefices of the Gallican church.

Since the establishment of the pragmatic sanction and of the concordat, the clergy of France have, in general shewn less respect to the decrees of the papal court, than the[Pg 338] clergy of any other catholic country. In all the disputes which their sovereign has had with the pope, they have almost constantly taken part with the former. This independency of the clergy of France upon the court of Rome seems to be principally founded upon the pragmatic sanction and the concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy, the clergy of France appear to have been as much devoted to the pope as those of any other country. When Robert, the second prince of the Capetian race, was most unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own servants, it is said, threw the victuals which came from his table to the dogs, and refused to taste any thing themselves which had been polluted by the contact of a person in his situation. They were taught to do so, it may very safely be presumed, by the clergy of his own dominions.

Since the establishment of the pragmatic sanction and the concordat, the clergy of France have generally shown less respect for the decrees of the papal court than the clergy in any other Catholic country. In all the disputes between their sovereign and the pope, they have almost always sided with the former. This independence of the French clergy from the court of Rome seems to be mainly based on the pragmatic sanction and the concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy, the clergy of France appeared to be just as devoted to the pope as those in any other country. When Robert, the second prince of the Capetian line, was unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, it is said that his own servants threw the food from his table to the dogs and refused to eat anything that had been tainted by the presence of someone in his situation. They were likely taught to do this by the clergy of his own lands.

The claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim in defence of which the court of Rome had frequently shaken, and sometimes overturned, the thrones of some of the greatest sovereigns in Christendom, was in this manner either restrained or modified, or given up altogether, in many different parts of Europe, even before the time of the reformation. As the clergy had now less influence over the people, so the state had more influence over the clergy. The clergy, therefore, had both less power, and less inclination, to disturb the state.

The claim to control the major benefits of the church, a claim that the court of Rome had often challenged and sometimes toppled the thrones of some of the most powerful rulers in Christendom to defend, was either limited, changed, or completely abandoned in many parts of Europe even before the Reformation. As the clergy now had less influence over the people, the state gained more power over the clergy. Consequently, the clergy had less power and less desire to disrupt the state.

The authority of the church of Rome was in this state of declension, when the disputes which gave birth to the reformation began in Germany, and soon spread themselves through every part of Europe. The new doctrines were everywhere received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all that enthusiastic zeal which commonly animates the spirit of party, when it attacks established authority. The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps, in other respects, not more learned than many of the divines who defended the established church, seem in general to have been better acquainted with ecclesiastical history, and with the origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the authority of the church was established; and they had thereby the advantage in almost every dispute. The austerity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who contrasted the strict regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy. They possessed, too, in a much higher degree than their adversaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes; arts which the lofty and dignified sons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great measure useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to some, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the established clergy to a still greater number: but the zealous, passionate, and fanatical, though frequently coarse and rustic eloquence, with which they were almost everywhere inculcated, recommended them to by far the greatest number.

The authority of the Roman Church was in decline when the disputes that sparked the Reformation began in Germany and quickly spread across Europe. The new doctrines were widely embraced with great public enthusiasm. They were shared with all the passionate zeal that usually drives a group when it challenges established authority. The teachers of these doctrines, while perhaps not more educated than many of the theologians defending the established church, generally had a better understanding of church history and the origins and development of the beliefs that underpinned the church's authority, giving them an edge in almost every debate. Their strict lifestyles earned them respect among the common people, who compared their disciplined behavior to the chaotic lives of most of their own clergy. They also had a much stronger grasp of the tactics of popularity and converting followers—skills that the proud and dignified members of the church had long overlooked, considering them largely unnecessary. The reasoning behind the new doctrines appealed to some, their novelty attracted many, and the dislike and scorn for the established clergy resonated with an even larger crowd. But the passionate, fervent, and sometimes rough-mannered eloquence with which these ideas were presented won over the strongest support among the masses.

The success of the new doctrines was almost everywhere so great, that the princes, who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome, were, by means of them, easily enabled, in their own dominions, to overturn the church, which having lost the respect and veneration of the inferior ranks of people, could make scarce any resistance. The court of Rome had disobliged some of the smaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably considered as too insignificant to be worth the managing. They universally, therefore, established the reformation in their own dominions. The tyranny of Christiern II., and of Troll archbishop of Upsal, enabled Gustavus Vasa to expel them both from Sweden. The pope favoured the tyrant and the archbishop, and Gustavus Vasa found no difficulty in establishing the reformation in Sweden. Christiern II. was afterwards deposed from the throne of Denmark, where his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The pope, however, was still disposed to favour him; and Frederic of Holstein, who had mounted the throne in his stead, revenged himself, by following the example of Gustavus Vasa. The magistrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel with the pope, established with great ease the reformation in their respective cantons, where just before some of the clergy had, by an imposture somewhat grosser than ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and contemptible.

The success of the new beliefs was so widespread that the princes, who were at that time on bad terms with the court of Rome, were easily able to dismantle the church within their own territories. The church had lost the respect and reverence of the lower classes, making it unable to resist. The court of Rome had upset some of the smaller princes in northern Germany, whom it likely viewed as too insignificant to be worth its attention. As a result, they all established the Reformation in their own regions. The tyranny of Christiern II. and the Archbishop Troll of Upsal allowed Gustavus Vasa to drive them both out of Sweden. The pope supported the tyrant and the archbishop, but Gustavus Vasa had no trouble establishing the Reformation in Sweden. Christiern II. was later deposed from the throne of Denmark, where his actions had made him just as hated as in Sweden. However, the pope still showed favor towards him, and Frederic of Holstein, who took the throne in his place, sought revenge by following Gustavus Vasa's lead. The leaders of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular issues with the pope, easily implemented the Reformation in their cantons, where just before, some clergy had made the entire order both disliked and contemptible through a particularly crude deception.

In this critical situation of its affairs the papal court was at sufficient pains to cultivate the friendship of the powerful sovereigns of France and Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their assistance, it was enabled, though not without great difficulty, and much bloodshed, either to suppress altogether, or obstruct very much, the progress of the reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined, too, to be complaisant to the king of England. But from the circumstances of the times, it could not be so without giving offense to a still greater sovereign, Charles V., king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII., accordingly, though he did not embrace himself the greater part of the doctrines of the reformation was yet enabled, by their general prevalence, to suppress all the monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the church of Rome in his dominions. That he should go so far, though he went no further, gave some satisfaction to the patrons of the reformation, who, having got possession of the government in the reign of his son and successor, com[Pg 339]pleted, without any difficulty, the work which Henry VIII. had begun.

In this critical situation, the papal court worked hard to build relationships with the powerful rulers of France and Spain, with the latter being the emperor of Germany at the time. With their help, it managed, though not without significant challenges and a lot of bloodshed, to either fully suppress or greatly hinder the progress of the Reformation in their territories. It also tried to be accommodating to the king of England. However, given the circumstances of the time, it couldn't do this without upsetting an even greater ruler, Charles V, king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII, although he didn't fully adopt most of the Reformation's doctrines, was still able to use their widespread influence to close down all the monasteries and eliminate the authority of the Church of Rome in his realm. His actions, while not going as far as some might have liked, satisfied the supporters of the Reformation, who, once they gained control during the reign of his son and successor, easily completed the work that Henry VIII had started.

In some countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and not very firmly established, the reformation was strong enough to overturn, not only the church, but the state likewise, for attempting to support the church.

In some countries, like Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and not very stable, the reformation was strong enough to take down not just the church, but the state as well, for trying to support the church.

Among the followers of the reformation, dispersed in all the different countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal, which, like that of the court of Rome, or an œcumenical council, could settle all disputes among them, and, with irresistible authority, prescribe to all of them the precise limits of orthodoxy. When the followers of the reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the dispute could never be decided; and many such disputes arose among them. Those concerning the government of the church, and the right of conferring ecclesiastical benefices, were perhaps the most interesting to the peace and welfare of civil society. They gave birth, accordingly, to the two principal parties or sects among the followers of the reformation, the Lutheran and Calvinistic sects, the only sects among them, of which the doctrine and discipline have ever yet been established by law in any part of Europe.

Among the followers of the Reformation, spread across various countries in Europe, there was no central authority like the court of Rome or an ecumenical council that could resolve all disputes and confidently define the exact boundaries of orthodoxy. Therefore, when Reformation supporters in one country disagreed with their counterparts in another, there was no common judge to turn to, so the disputes could never be settled; many such disputes did arise among them. Those related to church governance and the right to assign church positions were probably the most impactful on the peace and well-being of society. Consequently, these issues led to the emergence of the two main groups within the Reformation: the Lutheran and Calvinistic sects, which are the only groups whose doctrines and practices have been legally established in any part of Europe.

The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of England, preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established subordination among the clergy, gave the sovereign the disposal of all the bishoprics, and other consistorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the bishop of the right of collating to the smaller benefices within his diocese, they, even to those benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of presentation, both in the sovereign and in all other lay patrons. This system of church government was, from the beginning, favourable to peace and good order, and to submission to the civil sovereign. It has never, accordingly, been the occasion of any tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been established. The church of England, in particular, has always valued herself, with great reason, upon the unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under such a government, the clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themselves to the sovereign, to the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by whose influence they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to those patrons, sometimes, no doubt, by the vilest flattery and assentation; but frequently, too, by cultivating all those arts which best deserve, and which are therefore most likely to gain them, the esteem of people of rank and fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of useful and ornamental learning, by the decent liberality of their manners, by the social good humour of their conversation, and by their avowed contempt of those absurd and hypocritical austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practise, in order to draw upon themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practise them, the abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect altogether the means of maintaining their influence and authority with the lower. They are listened to, esteemed, and respected by their superiors; but before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, effectually, and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate doctrines, against the most ignorant enthusiast who chooses to attack them.

The followers of Luther, along with what is known as the Church of England, maintained a level of episcopal governance, established hierarchy among the clergy, and allowed the sovereign to control all bishoprics and other church positions within his realm, effectively making him the real head of the church. While this setup didn’t take away the bishop's right to appoint people to smaller church positions within his diocese, it did allow the sovereign and other lay patrons to also have the right to present candidates for those positions. This system of church governance has historically supported peace, order, and obedience to the civil authority. Consequently, it has never led to any significant unrest or civil disorder in countries where it has been established. The Church of England, in particular, has always prided itself on the unquestionable loyalty of its principles. In such a government structure, clergy naturally try to gain favor with the sovereign, the court, and the nobility and gentry, from whom they primarily expect to receive promotions. They often curry favor with these patrons, sometimes through excessive flattery, but frequently by honing the skills and knowledge that are most likely to earn them the respect of influential and wealthy individuals. They showcase their expertise in various areas of practical and aesthetic learning, exhibit gracious manners, maintain a pleasant demeanor in conversation, and openly reject the absurd and hypocritical strictness advocated by fanatics, who seek to gain admiration from the masses while those of higher status openly denounce such practices. However, this clergy, while seeking favor from the upper classes, often neglect the means to maintain their influence and authority over the lower classes. They are listened to, esteemed, and respected by their superiors, but they often struggle to convincingly defend their own sober and moderate teachings against the most ignorant zealot who chooses to challenge them.

The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly those of Calvin, on the contrary, bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church became vacant, the right of electing their own pastor; and established, at the same time, the most perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of this institution, as long as it remained in vigour, seems to have been productive of nothing but disorder and confusion, and to have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The latter part seems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable.

The followers of Zwingli, or more accurately those of Calvin, on the other hand, granted the people of each parish the right to choose their own pastor whenever the church was vacant. They also established complete equality among the clergy. The first part of this system, as long as it was active, seemed to lead to nothing but disorder and confusion, and it appeared to corrupt the morals of both the clergy and the people. The second part, however, seemed to have only positive effects.

As long as the people of each parish preserved the right of electing their own pastors, they acted almost always under the influence of the clergy, and generally of the most factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order to preserve their influence in those popular elections, became, or affected to become, many of them, fanatics themselves, encouraged fanaticism among the people, and gave the preference almost always to the most fanatical candidate. So small a matter as the appointment of a parish priest, occasioned almost always a violent contest, not only in one parish, but in all the neighbouring parishes who seldom failed to take part in the quarrel. When the parish happened to be situated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into two parties; and when that city happened, either to constitute itself a little republic, or to be the head and capital of a little republic, as in the case with many of the considerable cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry dispute of this kind, over and above exasperating the animosity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind it, both a new schism in the church, and a new faction in the state. In those small republics, therefore, the magistrate very[Pg 340] soon found it necessary, for the sake of preserving the public peace, to assume to himself the right of presenting to all vacant benefices. In Scotland, the most extensive country in which this presbyterian form of church government has ever been established, the rights of patronage were in effect abolished by the act which established presbytery in the beginning of the reign of William III. That act, at least, put in the power of certain classes of people in each parish to purchase, for a very small price, the right of electing their own pastor. The constitution which this act established, was allowed to subsist for about two-and-twenty years, but was abolished by the 10th of queen Anne, ch. 12, on account of the confusions and disorders which this more popular mode of election had almost everywhere occasioned. In so extensive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote parish was not so likely to give disturbance to government as in a smaller state. The 10th of queen Anne restored the rights of patronage. But though, in Scotland, the law gives the benefice, without any exception to the person presented by the patron; yet the church requires sometimes (for she has not in this respect been very uniform in her decisions) a certain concurrence of the people, before she will confer upon the presentee what is called the cure of souls, or the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the parish. She sometimes, at least, from an affected concern for the peace of the parish, delays the settlement till this concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of some of the neighbouring clergy, sometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate, in order to enable them upon such occasions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the causes which principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical spirit, either in the clergy or in the people of Scotland.

As long as the people in each parish had the right to choose their own pastors, they were usually influenced by the clergy, particularly by the most extreme and fanatical members of the group. To maintain their influence in these elections, many clergy members either became fanatics themselves or pretended to be, encouraging fanaticism among the people and often favoring the most radical candidates. Even the simple act of appointing a parish priest led to intense conflicts, not just in one parish but also in neighboring ones, who would often get involved in the disputes. In larger cities, this division split the residents into two opposing groups. When a city operated like a small republic, as many significant cities in Switzerland and Holland did, trivial disagreements like these stirred up animosities among various factions and threatened to create new schisms in the church and factions in the government. Consequently, in these small republics, officials soon found it essential to claim the right to appoint individuals to all vacant positions to maintain public peace. In Scotland, the largest country where this Presbyterian form of church governance was established, the rights of patronage were effectively abolished by the act that created presbytery at the beginning of William III's reign. This act empowered specific groups within each parish to buy the right to elect their pastor for a minimal cost. The constitution established by this act lasted about twenty-two years but was abolished by the 10th of Queen Anne, chapter 12, due to the chaos and disorder that this more popular voting method often caused. However, in a large country like Scotland, a riot in a distant parish was less likely to trouble the government than in a smaller state. The 10th of Queen Anne reinstated the rights of patronage. Although the law in Scotland grants the benefice without exception to the person chosen by the patron, the church sometimes requires a certain level of community agreement before conferring upon that person what is known as the cure of souls or the ecclesiastical authority in the parish. Sometimes, out of a seemingly genuine concern for parish peace, the church delays the settlement until this agreement can be achieved. The private interference of neighboring clergy, often aiming to secure or, more frequently, obstruct this agreement, and the strategies they employ to influence these situations may be the main factors that sustain whatever remnants of the old fanatical spirit remain among both the clergy and the people of Scotland.

The equality which the presbyterian form of church government establishes among the clergy, consists, first, in the equality of authority or ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and, secondly, in the equality of benefice. In all presbyterian churches, the equality of authority is perfect; that of benefice is not so. The difference, however, between one benefice and another, is seldom so considerable, as commonly to tempt the possessor even of the small one to pay court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and assentation, in order to get a better. In all the presbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage are thoroughly established, it is by nobler and better arts, that the established clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour of their superiors; by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their life, and by the faithful and diligent discharge of their duty. Their patrons even frequently complain of the independency of their spirit, which they are apt to construe into ingratitude for past favours, but which, at worst, perhaps, is seldom any more than that indifference which naturally arises from the consciousness that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is scarce, perhaps, to be found anywhere in Europe, a more learned, decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the greater part of the presbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

The equality established by the Presbyterian system of church governance among the clergy is based, first, on the equality of authority or ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and, secondly, on the equality of benefice. In all Presbyterian churches, the equality of authority is complete; the equality of benefice is not. However, the difference between one benefice and another is rarely so significant that it would tempt someone holding a smaller benefice to resort to flattery and agreement to win over their patron in hopes of a better position. In all Presbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage are firmly established, the clergy generally seek to gain the favor of their superiors through nobler means; by showcasing their knowledge, maintaining a respectable and upright life, and diligently fulfilling their responsibilities. Patrons often find themselves complaining about the independence of spirit displayed by their clergy, viewing it as ingratitude for past support, when, in reality, it is more likely a sense of indifference stemming from the understanding that no further favors will be granted. There is hardly a more learned, respectable, independent, and admirable group of individuals in Europe than the majority of the Presbyterian clergy from Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

Where the church benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very great; and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may be, no doubt, carried too far, has, however, some very agreeable effects. Nothing but exemplary morals can give dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of levity and vanity necessarily render him ridiculous, and are, besides, almost as ruinous to him as they are to the common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged to follow that system of morals which the common people respect the most. He gains their esteem and affection, by that plan of life which his own interest and situation would lead him to follow. The common people look upon him with that kindness with which we naturally regard one who approaches somewhat to our own condition, but who, we think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindness naturally provokes his kindness. He becomes careful to instruct them, and attentive to assist and relieve them. He does not even despise the prejudices of people who are disposed to be so favourable to him, and never treats them with those contemptuous and arrogant airs, which we so often meet with in the proud dignitaries of opulent and well endowed churches. The presbyterian clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people, than perhaps the clergy of any other established church. It is, accordingly, in presbyterian countries only, that we ever find the common people converted, without persecution completely, and almost to a man, to the established church.

Where church benefits are nearly equal, none of them can be very significant; and this average state of benefits, while it can certainly be taken too far, does have some very positive effects. Only exemplary morals can give respect to a person of small means. The vices of carelessness and arrogance inevitably make him look foolish and are nearly as damaging to him as they are to the general public. Therefore, in his behavior, he is compelled to follow the moral code that the common people respect the most. He earns their esteem and affection by living a life that aligns with his own interests and circumstances. The common people regard him with the kindness we naturally show to someone who shares a similar situation but, in our view, should be in a higher position. Their kindness naturally inspires his kindness. He becomes committed to educating them and attentive to helping and supporting them. He doesn't even look down on the beliefs of those who are inclined to be supportive of him and never treats them with the disdainful and arrogant attitudes that we often encounter in the proud leaders of wealthy and well-endowed churches. As a result, Presbyterian clergy have more influence over the minds of the general public than perhaps clergy from any other established church. Indeed, it is only in Presbyterian countries that we find the common people converted, without complete persecution, and almost universally, to the established church.

In countries where church benefices are, the greater part of them, very moderate, a chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a church benefice. The universities have, in this case, the picking and chusing of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country, constitute by far the most numerous class of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very considerable, the church naturally draws from the universities the greater part of their eminent men of letters; who generally find some patron, who does himself honour by procuring them church preferment. In the former situation, we are likely to find the[Pg 341] universities filled with the most eminent men of letters that are to be found in the country. In the latter, we are likely to find few eminent men among them, and those few among the youngest members of the society, who are likely, too, to be drained away from it, before they can have acquired experience and knowledge enough to be of much use to it. It is observed by Mr. de Voltaire, that father Porée, a jesuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters, was the only professor they had ever had in France, whose works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced so many eminent men of letters, it must appear somewhat singular, that scarce one of them should have been a professor in a university. The famous Cassendi was, in the beginning of his life, a professor in the university of Aix. Upon the first dawning of his genius, it was represented to him, that by going into the church he could easily find a much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better situation for pursuing his studies; and he immediately followed the advice. The observation of Mr. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman Catholic countries. We very rarely find in any of them an eminent man of letters, who is a professor in a university, except, perhaps, in the professions of law and physic; professions from which the church is not so likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England is by far the richest and best endowed church in Christendom. In England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the universities of all their best and ablest members; and an old college tutor who is known and distinguished in Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the protestant cantons of Switzerland, in the protestant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the most eminent men of letters whom those countries have produced, have, not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been professors in universities. In those countries, the universities are continually draining the church of all its most eminent men of letters.

In countries where there are church benefices, most of them are quite modest, and a university position is usually a better opportunity than a church benefice. In this case, universities have the advantage of selecting their faculty from all the clergy in the country, who are typically by far the largest group of literate individuals. Conversely, where church benefices are quite substantial, the church tends to attract many of the prominent scholars from the universities; they often find a supporter who takes pride in helping them secure church positions. In the former scenario, we are likely to see the universities filled with the most distinguished scholars in the country. In the latter, there will likely be fewer notable scholars, and those who are present will often be among the younger members, who are prone to leave before they gain enough experience and knowledge to significantly contribute. Mr. de Voltaire noted that Father Porée, a Jesuit who was not very notable in the literary world, was the only professor they had ever had in France whose works were worth reading. In a country that has produced so many remarkable scholars, it seems unusual that hardly any of them have been university professors. The famous Cassendi was a professor at the university of Aix early in his career. When his talent first began to show, it was suggested to him that joining the church would provide a much easier and more comfortable living, as well as a better environment for furthering his studies; he promptly followed that advice. I believe Mr. de Voltaire’s observation applies not just to France but to all other Roman Catholic countries as well. We rarely find in any of them an outstanding scholar who is a university professor, except perhaps in the fields of law and medicine, where the church is less likely to recruit them. After the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England is by far the richest and best-endowed church in Christendom. Consequently, in England, the church consistently draws the best and brightest from the universities; an esteemed college instructor recognized across Europe as a prominent scholar is as hard to find there as in any Roman Catholic nation. In contrast, in Geneva, the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, the Protestant regions of Germany, Holland, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark, the most eminent scholars produced by those countries have, for the most part—not all, but the majority—been university professors. In those places, universities are continually attracting the church's most distinguished scholars.

It may, perhaps, be worth while to remark, that, if we except the poets, a few orators, and a few historians, the far greater part of the other eminent men of letters, both of Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public or private teachers; generally either of philosophy or of rhetoric. This remark will be found to hold true, from the days of Lysias and Isocrates, of Plato and Aristotle, down to those of Plutarch and Epictetus, Suetonius, and Quintilian. To impose upon any man the necessity of teaching, year after year, in any particular branch of science seems in reality to be the most effectual method for rendering him completely master of it himself. By being obliged to go every year over the same ground, if he is good for any thing, he necessarily becomes, in a few years, well acquainted with every part of it: and if, upon any particular point, he should form too hasty an opinion one year, when he comes, in the course of his lectures to reconsider the same subject the year thereafter, he is very likely to correct it. As to be a teacher of science is certainly the natural employment of a mere man of letters; so is it likewise, perhaps, the education which is most likely to render him a man of solid learning and knowledge. The mediocrity of church benefices naturally tends to draw the greater part of men of letters in the country where it takes place, to the employment in which they can be the most useful to the public, and at the same time to give them the best education, perhaps, they are capable of receiving. It tends to render their learning both as solid as possible, and as useful as possible.

It might be worth noting that, aside from poets, a few speakers, and a handful of historians, most of the other notable literary figures from both Greece and Rome appear to have been either public or private educators, usually in philosophy or rhetoric. This observation holds true from the times of Lysias and Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle, all the way to Plutarch, Epictetus, Suetonius, and Quintilian. Requiring someone to teach consistently, year after year, in a specific area of knowledge seems to be the most effective way to ensure they become truly skilled in it themselves. By having to revisit the same material each year, if they have any talent, they inevitably become very familiar with every aspect of it. If they form a quick opinion on a certain topic one year, when they revisit it in their lectures the following year, they are likely to adjust their viewpoint. Being a teacher in academia is clearly the natural role of a dedicated scholar, and it may also be the type of education most likely to make them a person of substantial knowledge and understanding. The average pay of church positions tends to lead most scholars in such areas to pursue roles where they can be most beneficial to the public, while also receiving the best education they can achieve. This encourages their learning to be both as thorough and as practical as possible.

The revenue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may arise from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed, of the general revenue of the state, which is thus diverted to a purpose very different from the defence of the state. The tithe, for example, is a real land-tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute so largely towards the defence of the state as they otherwise might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the sole fund; and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the exigencies of the state must be ultimately supplied. The more of this fund that is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the state. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that all other things being supposed equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either the sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and, in all cases, the less able must the state be to defend itself. In several protestant countries, particularly in all the protestant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which anciently belonged to the Roman catholic church, the tithes and church lands, has been found a fund sufficient, not only to afford competent salaries to the established clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other expenses of the state. The magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have accumulated, out of the savings from this fund, a very large sum, supposed to amount to several millions; part of which is deposited in a public treasure, and part is placed at interest in what are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; chiefly in those of France[Pg 342] and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expense which the church, either of Berne, or of any other protestant canton, costs the state, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, including their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manses or dwelling-houses, estimated according to a reasonable valuation, amounted only to L.68,514, 1s. 5112d. This very moderate revenue affords a decent subsistence to nine hundred and forty-four ministers. The whole expense of the church, including what is occasionally laid out for the building and reparation of churches, and of the manses of ministers, cannot well be supposed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a-year. The most opulent church in Christendom does not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the spirit of order, regularity, and austere morals, in the great body of the people, than this very poorly endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious, which an established church can be supposed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the protestant churches of Switzerland, which, in general, are not better endowed than the church of Scotland, produce those effects in a still higher degree. In the greater part of the protestant cantons, there is not a single person to be found, who does not profess himself to be of the established church. If he professes himself to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton. But so severe, or, rather, indeed, so oppressive a law, could never have been executed in such free countries, had not the diligence of the clergy beforehand converted to the established church the whole body of the people, with the exception of, perhaps, a few individuals only. In some parts of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a protestant and Roman catholic country, the conversion has not been so complete, both religions are not only tolerated, but established by law.

The income of every established church, except for what comes from specific lands or manors, is essentially a part of the state's overall revenue, which is then used for purposes that are quite different from the protection of the state. For instance, the tithe acts like a real land tax, limiting how much landowners can contribute to the state's defense. Some argue that land rent is the only source of income, while others believe it is the main source from which the demands of the state must ultimately be met in large monarchies. The more of this income that goes to the church, the less can be allocated to the state. It’s a clear principle that if everything else is equal, the wealthier the church, the poorer either the sovereign or the people must be, which makes it harder for the state to defend itself. In several Protestant countries, especially in the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue that once belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, including tithes and church lands, has proven to be sufficient not only to pay decent salaries to the established clergy but also to cover most of the state's expenses with little or no extra charge. The magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have amassed a substantial amount from this fund, reportedly several million; part of it is held in a public treasury, and part is invested in what are referred to as the public funds of various indebted European nations, mainly France and Great Britain. I’m not sure of the total cost that the church, either in Berne or any other Protestant canton, imposes on the state. A detailed account shows that in 1755, the total revenue of the clergy of the Church of Scotland, including their glebe or church lands and the rent of their manses or homes, was estimated at only £68,514, 1s. 5112d. This reasonably modest income supports a decent living for nine hundred and forty-four ministers. The entire cost of the church, including what is occasionally spent on building or repairing churches and ministers' homes, is unlikely to exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a year. The wealthiest church in Christendom does not maintain the uniformity of faith, the fervor of devotion, the spirit of order, regularity, and strict morals among the general population better than this understaffed Church of Scotland does. All the positive effects, both civil and religious, that an established church is thought to create, are accomplished by it just as effectively as by any other. Most of the Protestant churches in Switzerland, which generally aren't better endowed than the Church of Scotland, produce these effects to an even greater extent. In most Protestant cantons, there isn't a single person who does not identify as part of the established church. If someone claims to follow a different faith, the law requires them to leave the canton. However, such a harsh, or rather oppressive law, could never have been enforced in free countries like these without the clergy’s prior efforts to convert the entire population to the established church, with perhaps only a few exceptions. In some parts of Switzerland, where a Protestant and a Roman Catholic country happen to be united, both religions are not just tolerated but legally established.

The proper performance of every service seems to require, that its pay or recompence should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of the service. If any service is very much underpaid, it is very apt to suffer by the meanness and incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed in it. If it is very much overpaid, it is apt to suffer, perhaps still more, by their negligence and idleness. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be his profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation. But in a clergyman, this train of life not only consumes the time which ought to be employed in the duties of his function, but in the eyes of the common people, destroys almost entirely that sanctity of character, which can alone enable him to perform these duties with proper weight and authority.

The proper execution of any service seems to require that its pay or compensation should be as closely aligned as possible with the nature of the service. If any service is significantly underpaid, it tends to suffer due to the low quality and lack of ability of most of those who work in it. If it is overly paid, it can suffer even more from their carelessness and laziness. A person with a substantial income, regardless of their profession, believes they should live like other people with similar incomes, spending a large portion of their time in celebration, vanity, and indulgence. However, for a clergyman, this lifestyle not only takes away the time that should be dedicated to his responsibilities but also, in the eyes of ordinary people, nearly obliterates the sanctity of character that is essential for him to carry out these responsibilities with the proper respect and authority.

PART IV.

Of the Expense of supporting the Dignity of the Sovereign.

Over and above the expenses necessary for enabling the sovereign to perform his several duties, a certain expense is requisite for the support of his dignity. This expense varies, both with the different periods of improvement, and with the different forms of government.

Besides the costs needed for the sovereign to fulfill his various responsibilities, a certain amount of money is required to uphold his dignity. This cost varies depending on different times of progress and the various forms of government.

In an opulent and improved society, where all the different orders of people are growing every day more expensive in their houses, in their furniture, in their tables, in their dress, and in their equipage; it cannot well be expected that the sovereign should alone hold out against the fashion. He naturally, therefore, or rather necessarily, becomes more expensive in all those different articles too. His dignity even seems to require that he should become so.

In a wealthy and developed society, where all social classes are increasingly spending more on their homes, furniture, dining, clothing, and transportation, it’s unrealistic to expect the ruler to resist these trends. Naturally, or rather inevitably, the ruler also becomes more extravagant in all these areas. His position even seems to demand that he does.

As, in point of dignity, a monarch is more raised above his subjects than the chief magistrate of any republic is ever supposed to be above his fellow-citizens; so a greater expense is necessary for supporting that higher dignity. We naturally expect more splendour in the court of a king, than in the mansion-house of a doge or burgo-master.

As far as dignity goes, a monarch is elevated above their subjects more than the chief magistrate of any republic is ever thought to be above their fellow citizens; therefore, more expense is needed to maintain that higher dignity. We naturally anticipate more grandeur in a king's court than in the residence of a doge or mayor.

CONCLUSION.

The expense of defending the society, and that of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole society. It is reasonable, therefore, that they should be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society; all the different members contributing, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities.

The cost of protecting the community and maintaining the honor of the leader should be covered for the benefit of everyone in the community. It makes sense, then, that these expenses should be met by contributions from the entire community, with each member contributing as much as they can based on their abilities.

The expense of the administration of justice, too, may no doubt be considered as laid out for the benefit of the whole society. There is no impropriety, therefore, in its being defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society. The persons, however, who give occasion to this expense, are those who, by their injustice in one way or another, make it necessary to seek redress or protection from the courts of justice. The persons, again, most immediately benefited by this expense, are those whom the courts of justice either restore to their rights, or maintain in their[Pg 343] rights. The expense of the administration of justice, therefore, may very properly be defrayed by the particular contribution of one or other, or both, of those two different sets of persons, according as different occasions may require, that is, by the fees of court. It cannot be necessary to have recourse to the general contribution of the whole society, except for the conviction of those criminals who have not themselves any estate or fund sufficient for paying those fees.

The cost of running the justice system can definitely be seen as something that benefits all of society. There's nothing inappropriate about it being covered by the collective contributions of everyone. However, the people who cause these expenses are the ones whose unfair actions make it necessary to seek help or protection from the courts. The individuals who benefit most directly from these expenses are those the courts either help regain their rights or keep in their rights. Therefore, the cost of administering justice can reasonably be funded by the specific contributions of one or both of these groups, depending on the circumstances, that is, through court fees. It's only necessary to rely on the general contributions of society for the prosecution of those criminals who don’t have any property or funds to pay those fees.

Those local or provincial expenses, of which the benefit is local or provincial (what is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular town or district), ought to be defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and ought to be no burden upon the general revenue of the society. It is unjust that the whole society should contribute towards an expense, of which the benefit is confined to a part of the society.

Those local or regional expenses that provide benefits only to that specific area (like spending on the police in a certain town or district) should be covered by local or regional revenue and should not place a burden on the general revenue of society. It's unfair for the entire society to contribute to an expense that only benefits a portion of it.

The expense of maintaining good roads and communications is, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without any injustice, be defrayed by the general contributions of the whole society. This expense, however, is most immediately and directly beneficial to those who travel or carry goods from one place to another, and to those who consume such goods. The turnpike tolls in England, and the duties called peages in other countries, lay it altogether upon those two different sets of people, and thereby discharge the general revenue of the society from a very considerable burden.

The cost of maintaining good roads and communication is definitely beneficial to everyone in society, and can, therefore, fairly be covered by the overall contributions from the whole community. However, this cost is most directly beneficial to those who travel or transport goods and to those who purchase those goods. Turnpike tolls in England and similar fees called peages in other countries place the financial burden on these two specific groups, which relieves the general revenue of society from a significant expense.

The expense of the institutions for education and religious instruction, is likewise, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without injustice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society. This expense, however, might, perhaps, with equal propriety, and even with some advantage, be defrayed altogether by those who receive the immediate benefit of such education and instruction, or by the voluntary contribution of those who think they have occasion for either the one or the other.

The cost of educational and religious institutions is certainly beneficial to society as a whole and can justly be covered by contributions from everyone. However, this expense might also be fairly and possibly even more effectively covered entirely by those who directly benefit from the education and instruction, or through voluntary contributions from those who feel they need either one or the other.

When the institutions, or public works, which are beneficial to the whole society, either cannot be maintained altogether, or are not maintained altogether, by the contribution of such particular members of the society as are most immediately benefited by them; the deficiency must, in most cases, be made up by the general contribution of the whole society. The general revenue of the society, over and above defraying the expense of defending the society, and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, must make up for the deficiency of many particular branches of revenue. The sources of this general or public revenue, I shall endeavour to explain in the following chapter.

When public institutions or services that benefit society as a whole can't be fully supported by the contributions of those who benefit from them the most, the shortfall usually has to be covered by contributions from everyone in society. The overall revenue of society, in addition to covering the costs of defense and the prestige of the top leader, has to compensate for the shortfall in several specific revenue streams. I will explain the sources of this public revenue in the following chapter.


CHAP. II.

OF THE SOURCES OF THE GENERAL OR PUBLIC REVENUE OF THE SOCIETY.

The revenue which must defray, not only the expense of defending the society and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, but all the other necessary expenses of government, for which the constitution of the state has not provided any particular revenue may be drawn, either, first, from some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which is independent of the revenue of the people; or, secondly, from the revenue of the people.

The income that needs to cover not just the costs of protecting society and upholding the position of the chief leader, but all other essential government expenses for which the state constitution hasn't allocated specific funds, can come from either, first, a fund that uniquely belongs to the government or the community, which is separate from the people's revenue; or, second, from the revenue of the people.

PART I.

Of the Funds, or Sources, of Revenue, which may peculiarly belong to the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

The funds, or sources, of revenue, which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or commonwealth, must consist, either in stock, or in land.

The funds, or sources of revenue, that may specifically belong to the government or community must come from either assets or land.

The sovereign, like any other owner of stock, may derive a revenue from it, either by employing it himself, or by lending it. His revenue is, in the one case, profit, in the other interest.

The ruler, like any other stockholder, can earn income from it, either by using it himself or by lending it out. In the first case, his income is profit; in the second case, it's interest.

The revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief consists in profit. It arises principally from the milk and increase of his own herds and flocks, of which he himself superintends the management, and is the principal shepherd or herdsman of his own horde or tribe. It is, however, in this earliest and rudest state of civil government only, that profit has ever made the principal part of the public revenue of a monarchical state.

The income of a Tartar or Arabian chief comes from profit. It mainly comes from the milk and growth of his own herds and flocks, which he manages personally and serves as the main shepherd or herdsman of his own group or tribe. However, this is only true in the earliest and most basic form of civil government, where profit has always been the main source of public revenue in a monarchy.

Small republics have sometimes derived a considerable revenue from the profit of mercantile projects. The republic of Hamburgh is said to do so from the profits of a public wine-cellar and apothecary's shop.[50] That state cannot be very great, of which the sovereign has leisure to carry on the trade of a wine-merchant or an apothecary. The profit of a public bank has been a source of revenue to more con[Pg 344]siderable states. It has been so, not only to Hamburgh, but to Venice and Amsterdam. A revenue of this kind has even by some people been thought not below the attention of so great an empire as that of Great Britain. Reckoning the ordinary dividend of the bank of England at five and a-half per cent., and its capital at ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds, the net annual profit, after paying the expense of management, must amount, it is said, to five hundred and ninety-two thousand nine hundred pounds. Government, it is pretended, could borrow this capital at three per cent. interest, and, by taking the management of the bank into its own hands, might make a clear profit of two hundred and sixty-nine thousand five hundred pounds a-year. The orderly, vigilant, and parsimonious administration of such aristocracies as those of Venice and Amsterdam, is extremely proper, it appears from experience, for the management of a mercantile project of this kind. But whether such a government as that of England, which, whatever may be its virtues, has never been famous for good economy; which, in time of peace, has generally conducted itself with the slothful and negligent profusion that is, perhaps, natural to monarchies; and, in time of war, has constantly acted with all the thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt to fall into, could be safely trusted with the management of such a project, must at least be good deal more doubtful.

Small republics have sometimes made a significant income from trading ventures. It's said that the republic of Hamburg does this through the income from a public wine cellar and pharmacy.[50] A state can't be very powerful if its leader has time to run a wine shop or pharmacy. The earnings from a public bank have been a source of revenue for larger states as well. This has been true not only for Hamburg but for Venice and Amsterdam too. Some people even think this kind of income is worth the attention of a great empire like Great Britain. Assuming the ordinary dividend of the Bank of England is five and a half percent and its capital is ten million seven hundred eighty thousand pounds, the net annual profit, after management costs, is said to be five hundred ninety-two thousand nine hundred pounds. It's claimed that the government could borrow this capital at three percent interest and, by taking over the bank's management, could earn a clear profit of two hundred sixty-nine thousand five hundred pounds a year. The careful, watchful, and frugal management found in the aristocracies of Venice and Amsterdam seems very effective for running a commercial project like this. However, whether a government like England's, which, despite its strengths, has never been known for good financial management—often showing lazy and careless spending in peacetime and reckless extravagance in wartime—could be trusted to manage such a project remains very much in question.

The post-office is properly a mercantile project. The government advances the expense of establishing the different offices, and of buying or hiring the necessary horses or carriages, and is repaid, with a large profit, by the duties upon what is carried. It is, perhaps, the only mercantile project which has been successfully managed by, I believe, every sort of government. The capital to be advanced is not very considerable. There is no mystery in the business. The returns are not only certain, but immediate.

The post office is basically a business venture. The government covers the costs of setting up various offices and purchasing or renting the necessary horses and carriages, and it makes a significant profit through the fees on what’s delivered. Maybe it’s the only business initiative that’s been successfully managed by pretty much every type of government. The amount of capital needed is not very high. There’s nothing complicated about the operation. The returns are not only guaranteed but also quick.

Princes, however, have frequently engaged in many other mercantile projects, and have been willing, like private persons, to mend their fortunes, by becoming adventurers in the common branches of trade. They have scarce ever succeeded. The profusion with which the affairs of princes are always managed, renders it almost impossible that they should. The agents of a prince regard the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are careless at what price they buy, are careless at what price they sell, are careless at what expense they transport his goods from one place to another. Those agents frequently live with the profusion of princes; and sometimes, too, in spite of that profusion, and by a proper method of making up their accounts, acquire the fortunes of princes. It was thus, as we are told by Machiavel, that the agents of Lorenzo of Medicis, not a prince of mean abilities, carried on his trade. The republic of Florence was several times obliged to pay the debt into which their extravagance had involved him. He found it convenient, accordingly to give up the business of merchant, the business to which his family had originally owed their fortune, and, in the latter part of his life, to employ both what remained of that fortune, and the revenue of the state, of which he had the disposal, in projects and expenses more suitable to his station.

Princes have often taken part in various business ventures and have been eager, just like regular people, to improve their fortunes by exploring common trade opportunities. They have rarely found success. The way princes manage their affairs usually makes success nearly impossible. A prince’s agents see their master's wealth as limitless; they don’t care what they pay to buy goods, what prices they sell for, or how much it costs to transport his goods from one place to another. These agents often enjoy the lavish lifestyle of princes, and sometimes, despite that extravagance, they manage to accumulate significant wealth themselves through careful account management. According to Machiavelli, this is how the agents of Lorenzo de' Medici, a prince of notable capability, conducted his business. The republic of Florence had to step in multiple times to cover the debts resulting from their lavish spending. Consequently, Lorenzo found it necessary to abandon the merchant business, which had originally contributed to his family's wealth, and in the later years of his life, he chose to invest both what remained of his fortune and the state revenue he controlled into projects more fitting for his position.

No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign. If the trading spirit of the English East India company renders them very bad sovereigns, the spirit of sovereignty seems to have rendered them equally bad traders. While they were traders only, they managed their trade successfully, and were able to pay from their profits a moderate dividend to the proprietors of their stock. Since they became sovereigns, with a revenue which, it is said, was originally more than three millions sterling, they have been obliged to beg the ordinary assistance of government, in order to avoid immediate bankruptcy. In their former situation, their servants in India considered themselves as the clerks of merchants; in their present situation, those servants consider themselves as the ministers of sovereigns.

No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of traders and rulers. While the trading spirit of the English East India Company makes them poor rulers, the mindset of ruling seems to have made them equally poor traders. When they were just traders, they managed their business well and were able to pay a reasonable dividend to their shareholders from their profits. Since they became rulers, with revenue reportedly over three million pounds, they've had to rely on the usual support from the government to avoid going bankrupt. In their previous role, their employees in India saw themselves as the clerks of merchants; now, in their current role, those employees view themselves as the advisors of rulers.

A state may sometimes derive some part of its public revenue from the interest of money, as well as from the profits of stock. If it has amassed a treasure, it may lend a part of that treasure, either to foreign states, or to its own subjects.

A state may sometimes get part of its public revenue from interest on money, as well as from profits on investments. If it has accumulated a reserve of wealth, it may lend some of that wealth, either to foreign countries or to its own citizens.

The canton of Berne derives a considerable revenue by lending a part of its treasure to foreign states, that is, by placing it in the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, chiefly in those of France and England. The security of this revenue must depend, first, upon the security of the funds in which it is placed, or upon the good faith of the government which has the management of them; and, secondly, upon the certainty or probability of the continuance of peace with the debtor nation. In the case of a war, the very first act of hostility on the part of the debtor nation might be the forfeiture of the funds of its creditor. This policy of lending money to foreign states is, so far as I know peculiar to the canton of Berne.

The canton of Berne makes a significant income by lending part of its wealth to foreign countries, specifically by investing in the public funds of various indebted nations in Europe, mainly France and England. The safety of this income relies, first, on the reliability of the funds it’s invested in or the trustworthiness of the government managing them; and second, on the likelihood or certainty of maintaining peace with the debtor nation. If a war breaks out, the first act of aggression from the debtor country could lead to the loss of the funds belonging to its creditor. To my knowledge, this strategy of lending money to foreign nations is unique to the canton of Berne.

The city of Hamburgh[51] has established a sort of public pawn-shop, which lends money to the subjects of the state, upon pledges, at six per cent. interest. This pawn-shop, or lombard, as it is called, affords a revenue, it is pretended, to the state, of a hundred and[Pg 345] fifty thousand crowns, which, at four and sixpence the crown, amounts to L.33,750 sterling.

The city of Hamburg[51] has set up a kind of public pawn shop that lends money to the citizens of the state, using pledges, at six percent interest. This pawn shop, or lombard, as it’s called, supposedly generates a revenue for the state of one hundred and[Pg 345]fifty thousand crowns, which, at four and sixpence per crown, totals L.33,750 sterling.

The government of Pennsylvania, without amassing any treasure, invented a method of lending, not money, indeed, but what is equivalent to money, to its subjects. By advancing to private people, at interest, and upon land security to double the value, paper bills of credit, to be redeemed fifteen years after their date; and, in the mean time, made transferable from hand to hand, like banknotes, and declared by act of assembly to be a legal tender in all payments from one inhabitant of the province to another, it raised a moderate revenue, which went a considerable way towards defraying an annual expense of about L.4500, the whole ordinary expense of that frugal and orderly government. The success of an expedient of this kind must have depended upon three different circumstances: first, upon the demand for some other instrument of commerce, besides gold and silver money, or upon the demand for such a quantity of consumable stock as could not be had without sending abroad the greater part of their gold and silver money, in order to purchase it; secondly, upon the good credit of the government which made use of this expedient; and, thirdly, upon the moderation with which it was used, the whole value of the paper bills of credit never exceeding that of the gold and silver money which would have been necessary for carrying on their circulation, had there been no paper bills of credit. The same expedient was, upon different occasions, adopted by several other American colonies; but, from want of this moderation, it produced, in the greater part of them, much more disorder than conveniency.

The government of Pennsylvania, without gathering any wealth, came up with a way to lend not actual money, but something equivalent to it, to its citizens. By issuing paper bills of credit to private individuals at interest, secured by land worth double, which would be redeemable fifteen years later, and allowing these bills to be transferred easily like banknotes, they declared through an act of assembly that these bills would be legal tender for all payments between residents of the province. This created a moderate revenue that covered a significant portion of an annual expense of about £4,500, the total regular cost of that frugal and orderly government. The success of this approach relied on three key factors: first, the need for a means of trade other than gold and silver, or the necessity for consumable goods that required exporting most of their gold and silver to buy; second, the good credit of the government using this method; and third, the careful manner in which it was implemented, ensuring the total value of the paper bills of credit never exceeded that of the gold and silver money needed for circulation if no paper bills existed. Other American colonies also used this method on various occasions; however, in many cases, due to the lack of moderation, it led to more chaos than benefit.

The unstable and perishable nature of stock and credit, however, renders them unfit to be trusted to as the principal funds of that sure, steady, and permanent revenue, which can alone give security and dignity to government. The government of no great nation, that was advanced beyond the shepherd state, seems ever to have derived the greater part of its public revenue from such sources.

The unstable and fragile nature of stock and credit makes them unreliable as the main sources of a secure, steady, and lasting revenue, which is essential for providing security and respect to the government. No major nation that has progressed beyond a basic agricultural society seems to have relied significantly on such sources for its public revenue.

Land is a fund of more stable and permanent nature; and the rent of public lands, accordingly, has been the principal source of the public revenue of many a great nation that was much advanced beyond the shepherd state. From the produce or rent of the public lands, the ancient republics of Greece and Italy derived for a long time the greater part of that revenue which defrayed the necessary expenses of the commonwealth. The rent of the crown lands constituted for a long time the greater part of the revenue of the ancient sovereigns of Europe.

Land is a more stable and permanent resource, and the rent from public lands has been the main source of public revenue for many advanced nations beyond just agriculture. The ancient republics of Greece and Italy relied heavily on the income from public lands to cover most of their necessary expenses. For a long time, the rent from crown lands made up the majority of revenue for the ancient rulers of Europe.

War, and the preparation for war, are the two circumstances which, in modern times, occasion the greater part of the necessary expense of all great states. But in the ancient republics of Greece and Italy, every citizen was a soldier, and both served, and prepared himself for service, at his own expense. Neither of those two circumstances, therefore, could occasion any very considerable expense to the state. The rent of a very moderate landed estate might be fully sufficient for defraying all the other necessary expenses of government.

War and preparing for war are the two main factors that, in modern times, create most of the necessary expenses for all major states. But in the ancient republics of Greece and Italy, every citizen was a soldier who served and prepared for service at their own expense. Therefore, neither of those two factors could lead to significant costs for the state. The income from a fairly modest piece of land could cover all the other essential government expenses.

In the ancient monarchies of Europe, the manners and customs of the times sufficiently prepared the great body of the people for war; and when they took the field, they were, by the condition of their feudal tenures, to be maintained either at their own expense, or at that of their immediate lords, without bringing any new charge upon the sovereign. The other expenses of government were, the greater part of them, very moderate. The administration of justice, it has been shewn, instead of being a cause of expense was a source of revenue. The labour of the country people, for three days before, and for three days after, harvest, was thought a fund sufficient for making and maintaining all the bridges, highways, and other public works, which the commerce of the country was supposed to require. In those days the principal expense of the sovereign seems to have consisted in the maintenance of his own family and household. The officers of his household, accordingly, were then the great officers of state. The lord treasurer received his rents. The lord steward and lord chamberlain looked after the expense of his family. The care of his stables was committed to the lord constable and the lord marshal. His houses were all built in the form of castles, and seem to have been the principal fortresses which he possessed. The keepers of those houses or castles might be considered as a sort of military governors. They seem to have been the only military officers whom it was necessary to maintain in time of peace. In these circumstances, the rent of a great landed estate might, upon ordinary occasions, very well defray all the necessary expenses of government.

In the ancient kingdoms of Europe, the customs and traditions of the time prepared most people for war. When they went to battle, their feudal agreements meant they were to be supported either at their own cost or by their immediate lords, without placing any new financial burden on the king. Most government costs were quite low. As shown, administering justice was not a cost but rather a source of income. The work of local farmers for three days before and three days after the harvest was considered enough to build and maintain all the bridges, roads, and other public works needed for the country’s trade. Back then, the king's main expense was his family and household. Therefore, the household officials were often the top state officials. The lord treasurer collected the rents, while the lord steward and lord chamberlain managed the household expenses. The lord constable and lord marshal took care of the stables. His residences were built like castles and served as his main fortresses. The keepers of these houses or castles acted like military governors. They seemed to be the only military officers needed to be kept in peacetime. Given these conditions, the rent from a large estate could generally cover all necessary government expenses.

In the present state of the greater part of the civilized monarchies of Europe, the rent of all the lands in the country, managed as they probably would be, if they all belonged to one proprietor, would scarce, perhaps, amount to the ordinary revenue which they levy upon the people even in peaceable times. The ordinary revenue of Great Britain, for example, including not only what is necessary for defraying the current expense of the year, but for paying the interest of the public debts, and for sinking a part of the capital of those debts, amounts to upwards of ten millions a-year. But the land tax, at four shillings in the pound, falls short of two millions a-year. This land tax, as it is called,[Pg 346] however, is supposed to be one-fifth, not only of the rent of all the land, but of that of all the houses, and of the interest of all the capital stock of Great Britain, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public, or employed as farming stock in the cultivation of land. A very considerable part of the produce of this tax arises from the rent of houses and the interest of capital stock. The land tax of the city of London, for example, at four shillings in the pound, amounts to L.123,399 : 6 : 7; that of the city of Westminster to L.63,092 : 1 : 5; that of the palaces of Whitehall and St. James's to L.30,754 : 6 : 3. A certain proportion of the land tax is, in the same manner, assessed upon all the other cities and towns corporate in the kingdom; and arises almost altogether, either from the rent of houses, or from what is supposed to be the interest of trading and capital stock. According to the estimation, therefore, by which Great Britain is rated to the land tax, the whole mass of revenue arising from the rent of all the lands, from that of all the houses, and from the interest of all the capital stock, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public, or employed in the cultivation of land, does not exceed ten millions sterling a-year, the ordinary revenue which government levies upon the people even in peaceable times. The estimation by which Great Britain is rated to the land tax is, no doubt, taking the whole kingdom at an average, very much below the real value; though in several particular counties and districts it is said to be nearly equal to that value. The rent of the lands alone, exclusive of that of houses and of the interest of stock, has by many people been estimated at twenty millions; an estimation made in a great measure at random, and which, I apprehend, is as likely to be above as below the truth. But if the lands of Great Britain, in the present state of their cultivation, do not afford a rent of more than twenty millions a-year, they could not well afford the half, most probably not the fourth part of that rent, if they all belonged to a single proprietor, and were put under the negligent, expensive, and oppressive management of his factors and agents. The crown lands of Great Britain do not at present afford the fourth part of the rent which could probably be drawn from them if they were the property of private persons. If the crown lands were more extensive, it is probable, they would be still worse managed.

In the current situation of most civilized monarchies in Europe, the total rent from all the lands in the country, if they were managed as if they all belonged to a single owner, would likely barely cover the usual taxes collected from the people, even during peaceful times. For instance, the regular revenue of Great Britain—which includes not just the funds needed for daily expenses but also for paying the interest on public debts and reducing some of the principal on those debts—exceeds ten million pounds a year. However, the land tax, which is set at four shillings per pound, brings in less than two million pounds a year. This land tax is thought to represent one-fifth of not just the rent from all the land, but also from all the houses and the interest from all capital stock in Great Britain, excluding only the part that is either loaned to the government or used as farming stock for growing crops. A significant portion of the revenue from this tax comes from the rent of houses and the interest on capital stock. For example, the land tax for the city of London amounts to £123,399 : 6 : 7 at four shillings per pound; for the city of Westminster, it is £63,092 : 1 : 5; and for the palaces of Whitehall and St. James's, it is £30,754 : 6 : 3. A certain portion of the land tax is similarly assessed on other cities and towns across the kingdom, deriving almost entirely from the rent of houses or what is believed to be the interest on trading and capital stock. Based on how Great Britain is assessed for the land tax, the total revenue from the rent of all lands, the rent of all houses, and the interest from all capital stock—except for the part used for lending to the public or for farming—does not exceed ten million pounds a year, which is the usual revenue collected from the people, even in peaceful times. The assessment by which Great Britain is rated for the land tax is, without a doubt, significantly below the actual value when considering the entire kingdom as a whole, although in certain counties and regions, it is said to be close to that value. The rent from the lands alone, excluding houses and the interest on stock, has been estimated by many at twenty million, a figure largely guessed at random and likely to be as often too high as too low. However, if the lands of Great Britain, given their current state of cultivation, do not provide a rent of more than twenty million pounds a year, it would be difficult for them to yield even half of that, and most likely not even a quarter, if they were owned by a single proprietor and managed poorly and expensively by his representatives. Currently, the crown lands in Great Britain do not generate even a quarter of the rent that could probably be extracted from them if they were privately owned. If the crown lands were more extensive, it’s likely they would be even worse managed.

The revenue which the great body of the people derives from land is, in proportion, not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. The whole annual produce of the land of every country, if we except what is reserved for seed, is either annually consumed by the great body of the people, or exchanged for something else that is consumed by them. Whatever keeps down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to, keeps down the revenue of the great body of the people, still more than it does that of the proprietors of land. The rent of land, that portion of the produce which belongs to the proprietors, is scarce anywhere in Great Britain supposed to be more than a third part of the whole produce. If the land which, in one state of cultivation, affords a revenue of ten millions sterling a-year, would in another afford a rent of twenty millions; the rent being, in both cases, supposed a third part of the produce, the revenue of the proprietors would be less than it otherwise might be, by ten millions a-year only; but the revenue of the great body of the people would be less than it otherwise might be, by thirty millions a-year, deducting only what would be necessary for seed. The population of the country would be less by the number of people which thirty millions a-year, deducting always the seed, could maintain, according to the particular mode of living, and expense which might take place in the different ranks of men, among whom the remainder was distributed.

The income that most people get from land isn’t based on the rent but on the produce of the land. The total annual produce of the land in every country, excluding what’s saved for seed, is either consumed by the majority of people each year or exchanged for something they consume. Anything that limits the produce of the land below its potential also reduces the income of most people even more than it does for the landowners. The rent of land, which is the part of the produce that goes to the landowners, is hardly believed to be more than a third of the total produce anywhere in Great Britain. If land that generates ten million pounds a year in one method of farming could generate twenty million under another method, assuming rent is a third of the produce in both cases, the income of the landowners would only be ten million pounds less than it could otherwise be. However, the income of most people would be thirty million pounds less than it could otherwise be, after accounting for what’s needed for seed. The country’s population would be lower by the number of people that thirty million pounds a year, minus what’s necessary for seeds, could sustain, depending on the particular lifestyle and expenses of the various social classes among whom the rest is distributed.

Though there is not at present in Europe, any civilized state of any kind which derives the greater part of its public revenue from the rent of lands which are the property of the state; yet, in all the great monarchies of Europe, there are still many large tracts of land which belong to the crown. They are generally forest, and sometimes forests where, after travelling several miles, you will scarce find a single tree; a mere waste and loss of country, in respect both of produce and population. In every great monarchy of Europe, the sale of the crown lands would produce a very large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to the crown. In countries where lands, improved and cultivated very highly, and yielding, at the time of sale, as great a rent as can easily be got from them, commonly sell at thirty years purchase; the unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown lands, might well be expected to sell at forty, fifty, or sixty years purchase. The crown might immediately enjoy the revenue which this great price would redeem from mortgage. In the course of a few years, it would probably enjoy another revenue. When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated. The increase of their produce would increase the population of the country, by augmenting the revenue and consumption of the people. But the revenue which the crown derives[Pg 347] from the duties of custom and excise, would necessarily increase with the revenue and consumption of the people.

Though there isn’t currently any civilized state in Europe that primarily gets its public revenue from land rents owned by the state, there are still many large areas of land that belong to the crown in all the major monarchies of Europe. These lands are usually forests, and sometimes they are forests where, after traveling several miles, you can hardly find a single tree—essentially a wasted area that offers little in terms of production or population. In every major European monarchy, selling off crown lands could generate a significant amount of money, which, if used to pay off public debts, would create a much larger revenue than what those lands have ever provided to the crown. In countries where highly improved and cultivated lands, yielding the maximum rent possible, typically sell for thirty years' worth of income, the unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown lands could be expected to sell for forty, fifty, or even sixty years' worth of income. The crown could immediately benefit from the revenue that this large sum would release from mortgage. In a few years, it would likely start to see additional revenue. Once the crown lands became private property, they would, over time, be well improved and cultivated. The boost in their production would lead to an increase in the country’s population by raising both revenue and consumption among the people. Moreover, the revenue that the crown gets from customs and excise duties would naturally rise alongside the increased revenue and consumption of the people.

The revenue which, in any civilized monarchy, the crown derives from the crown lands, though it appears to cost nothing to individuals, in reality costs more to the society than perhaps any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys. It would, in all cases, be for the interest of the society, to replace this revenue to the crown by some other equal revenue, and to divide the lands among the people, which could not well be done better, perhaps, than by exposing them to public sale.

The revenue that a crown gets from its crown lands in any civilized monarchy may seem like it doesn’t cost individuals anything, but it actually costs society more than almost any other equal revenue the crown receives. It would always benefit society to substitute this revenue for something else of equal value and to distribute the lands among the people, perhaps best accomplished by selling them at public auction.

Lands, for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence, parks, gardens, public walks, &c. possessions which are everywhere considered as causes of expense, not as sources of revenue, seem to be the only lands which, in a great and civilized monarchy, ought to belong to the crown.

Lands meant for enjoyment and beauty, like parks, gardens, public walks, etc., are seen everywhere as expenses rather than income sources. These types of lands should be the only ones that belong to the crown in a large and civilized monarchy.

Public stock and public lands, therefore, the two sources of revenue which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or commonwealth, being both improper and insufficient funds for defraying the necessary expense of any great and civilized state; it remains that this expense must, the greater part of it, be defrayed by taxes of one kind or another; the people contributing a part of their own private revenue, in order to make up a public revenue to the sovereign or commonwealth.

Public stock and public lands are two sources of revenue that exclusively belong to the government or community. However, they are both inadequate and inappropriate for covering the necessary expenses of any large and developed state. As a result, most of these expenses must be covered by various types of taxes, with the people contributing a portion of their own private income to create a public revenue for the government or community.

PART II.

Of Taxes.

The private revenue of individuals, it has been shown in the first book of this Inquiry, arises, ultimately from the three different sources; rent, profit, and wages. Every tax must finally be paid from some one or other of those three different sources of revenue, or from all of them indifferently. I shall endeavour to give the best account I can, first, of those taxes which, it is intended should fall upon rent; secondly, of those which, it is intended should fall upon profit; thirdly, of those which, it is intended should fall upon wages; and fourthly, of those which, it is intended should fall indifferently upon all those three different sources of private revenue. The particular consideration of each of these four different sources of taxes will divide the second part of the present chapter into four articles, three of which will require several other subdivisions. Many of these taxes, it will appear from the following review, are not finally paid from the fund, or source of revenue, upon which it is intended they should fall.

The private income of individuals, as discussed in the first book of this Inquiry, ultimately comes from three different sources: rent, profit, and wages. Every tax must eventually be paid from one of those three sources of income, or from all of them equally. I will try to provide the best explanation I can, first, of those taxes that are meant to target rent; second, of those that are meant to target profit; third, of those that are meant to target wages; and fourth, of those intended to affect all three sources of private income equally. The detailed examination of each of these four categories of taxes will divide the second part of this chapter into four sections, three of which will need additional subdivisions. Many of these taxes, as will become clear in the following analysis, are not ultimately paid from the source of income to which they are intended to apply.

Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes, it is necessary to premise the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general.

Before I discuss specific taxes, it's important to lay out the following four principles regarding taxes in general.

1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim, consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every tax, it must be observed once for all, which falls finally upon one only of the three sorts of revenue above mentioned, is necessarily unequal, in so far as it does not affect the other two. In the following examination of different taxes, I shall seldom take much farther notice of this sort of inequality; but shall, in most cases, confine my observations to that inequality which is occasioned by a particular tax falling unequally upon that particular sort of private revenue which is affected by it.

1. People in every state should contribute to the government's support as closely as possible, based on their abilities; meaning, based on the income they receive under the state's protection. The cost of government for individuals in a large nation is similar to the management costs for joint owners of a large estate, who all have to contribute according to their respective shares in the estate. The observation or disregard of this principle defines what we call the fairness or unfairness of taxation. It should be noted that any tax that ultimately impacts only one of the three types of income mentioned is inherently unfair, as it does not consider the other two. In the upcoming discussion of different taxes, I'll usually not focus much on this type of unfairness; instead, I'll mostly concentrate on the imbalance caused by a specific tax impacting inequitably that particular type of private income it affects.

2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay, ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-getherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence, and favours the corruption, of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty.

2. The tax each person has to pay should be clear and not random. The timing of payment, how to pay, and the amount due should all be obvious to the taxpayer and everyone else. When this is not the case, each person subject to the tax is placed more or less at the mercy of the tax collector, who can either increase the tax on any disliked taxpayer or demand some sort of payment or favor out of fear of such increases. The unpredictability of taxes breeds arrogance and supports the corruption of a group of people who are naturally unpopular, even when they aren’t being arrogant or corrupt. The certainty of how much each person should pay is so crucial in taxation that a significant amount of inequality, it seems, according to experiences from all nations, is not nearly as harmful as a small amount of uncertainty.

3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay; or when he is most likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconveniency from such taxes.[Pg 348]

3. Every tax should be collected at a time or in a way that makes it easiest for the contributor to pay. A tax on the rent of land or houses, due at the same time that rents are usually paid, is collected when it’s most convenient for the contributor to pay or when they’re most likely to have the means to do so. Taxes on luxury goods are ultimately paid by the consumer, usually in a way that’s very convenient for them. They pay gradually, as they buy the goods they want. Since they have the choice to buy or not buy as they wish, it’s their own responsibility if they face significant inconvenience from such taxes.[Pg 348]

4. Every tax ought to be so contrived, as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of business which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes. While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some of the funds which might enable them more easily to do so. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur, who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling. But the penalties of smuggling must arise in proportion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the punishment, too, in proportion to the very circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime.[52] Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expense, it is certainly equivalent to the expense at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in some one or other of these four different ways, that taxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign.

4. Every tax should be designed to take as little money as possible from the people, beyond what it contributes to the government’s treasury. A tax can take more from people than it contributes in four main ways. First, enforcing the tax might require a lot of officials, whose salaries can consume the majority of the tax revenue, and their additional benefits may create another burden on the people. Second, it can hinder people's ability to work and discourage them from pursuing certain jobs that could provide livelihoods and jobs for many. While it forces people to pay, it may also reduce or even eliminate some of the resources they need to do so more easily. Third, the fines and other penalties imposed on those who unsuccessfully try to avoid the tax can often ruin them and eliminate the benefits the community could have gained from their investment. An unreasonable tax creates a strong temptation for smuggling. However, the penalties for smuggling must be proportional to the temptation. The law, against all common principles of justice, first creates the temptation and then punishes those who give in to it; it often increases the punishment in proportion to the very thing that should ease it—the temptation to commit the crime.[52] Fourth, by subjecting people to frequent visits and annoying inspections by tax collectors, it can cause them a lot of unnecessary trouble, frustration, and oppression; and while frustration is not technically an expense, it is certainly equivalent to what one would be willing to pay to avoid it. It is through one or more of these four ways that taxes often end up being much heavier for the people than they are beneficial for the government.

The evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims have recommended them, more or less, to the attention of all nations. All nations have endeavoured, to the best of their judgment, to render their taxes as equal as they could contrive; as certain, as convenient to the contributor, both the time and the mode of payment, and in proportion to the revenue which they brought to the prince, as little burdensome to the people. The following short review of some of the principal taxes which have taken place in different ages and countries, will show, that the endeavours of all nations have not in this respect been equally successful.

The clear fairness and usefulness of the above principles have drawn the attention of all nations to some degree. Every nation has tried, to the best of its ability, to make their taxes as fair as possible; to ensure they are certain and convenient for the taxpayer, both in terms of timing and method of payment, and to balance the revenue they provide to the government with minimal burden on the people. The brief overview that follows of some key taxes from various times and places will demonstrate that different nations have not all been equally successful in this regard.

ART. I.Taxes upon Rent—Taxes upon the Rent of Land.

A tax upon the rent of land may either be imposed according to a certain canon, every district being valued at a certain rent, which valuation is not afterwards to be altered; or it may be imposed in such a manner, as to vary with every variation in the real rent of the land, and to rise or fall with the improvement or declaration of its cultivation.

A tax on land rent can be set based on a specific standard, with each area assessed at a fixed rent that won’t change later; or it can be structured to fluctuate along with any changes in the actual rent of the land, increasing or decreasing with the growth or enhancement of its cultivation.

A land tax which, like that of Great Britain, is assessed upon each district according to a certain invariable canon, though it should be equal at the time of its first establishment, necessarily becomes unequal in process of time, according to the unequal degrees of improvement or neglect in the cultivation of the different parts of the country. In England, the valuation, according to which the different counties and parishes were assessed to the land tax by the 4th of William and Mary, was very unequal even at its first establishment. This tax, therefore, so far offends against the first of the four maxims above mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other three. It is perfectly certain. The time of payment for the tax, being the same as that for the rent, is as convenient as it can be to the contributor. Though the landlord is, in all cases, the real contributor, the tax is commonly advanced by the tenant, to whom the landlord is obliged to allow it in the payment of the rent. This tax is levied by a much smaller number of officers than any other which affords nearly the same revenue. As the tax upon each district does not rise with the rise of the rent, the sovereign does not share in the profits of the landlord's improvements. Those improvements sometimes contribute, indeed, to the discharge of the other landlords of the district. But the aggravation of the tax, which this may sometimes occasion upon a particular estate, is always so very small, that it never can discourage those improvements, nor keep down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to. As it has no tendency to diminish the quantity, it can have none to raise the price of that produce. It does not obstruct the industry of the people; it subjects the landlord to no other inconveniency besides the unavoidable one of paying the tax.

A land tax, similar to that of Great Britain, is assessed on each district based on a fixed standard. While it should be equal at its initial establishment, it inevitably becomes unequal over time due to varying levels of development or neglect in different areas of the country. In England, the valuation used to assess the land tax in different counties and parishes, established by the 4th of William and Mary, was quite unequal even at the beginning. Therefore, this tax violates the first of the four principles mentioned earlier, but aligns perfectly with the other three. It is certainly reliable. The timing of tax payments coincides with rent due dates, making it as convenient as possible for the payer. Although the landlord ultimately bears the tax cost, it is usually paid upfront by the tenant, who then receives a deduction from the landlord in their rent payment. This tax is administered by far fewer officials compared to any other tax that generates a similar amount of revenue. Since the tax for each district doesn’t increase with rising rents, the government does not benefit from the landlord's improvements. These improvements can help reduce the tax burden for other landlords in the district. However, the additional tax burden this might create for an individual estate is usually so minor that it doesn’t deter those improvements or keep the land's output from reaching its potential. Since it doesn’t reduce the quantity produced, it won’t increase the price of that output. It does not hinder people's industriousness and only imposes the unavoidable inconvenience of tax payment on the landlord.

The advantage, however, which the landlord has derived from the invariable constancy of the valuation, by which all the lands of Great Britain are rated to the land-tax, has been principally owing to some circumstances altogether extraneous to the nature of the tax.[Pg 349]

The benefit that the landlord has gained from the consistent value used to assess all the lands in Great Britain for land tax is mainly due to factors completely unrelated to the nature of the tax.[Pg 349]

It has been owing in part, to the great prosperity of almost every part of the country, the rents of almost all the estates of Great Britain having, since the time when this valuation was first established, been continually rising, and scarce any of them having fallen. The landlords, therefore, have almost all gained the difference between the tax which they would have paid, according to the present rent of their estates, and that which they actually pay according to the ancient valuation. Had the state of the country been different, had rents been gradually falling in consequence of the declension of cultivation, the landlords would almost all have lost this difference. In the state of things which has happened to take place since the revolution, the constancy of the valuation has been advantageous to the landlord and hurtful to the sovereign. In a different state of things it might have been advantageous to the sovereign and hurtful to the landlord.

It has partly been due to the strong prosperity in almost every area of the country, with rents for nearly all estates in Great Britain having continuously increased since the valuation was first established, and hardly any of them having decreased. As a result, landlords have mostly gained the difference between the tax they would have paid based on their estates' current rents and what they actually pay according to the old valuation. If the country's situation had been different, with rents gradually falling due to a decline in cultivation, landlords would have mostly lost this difference. With the circumstances that have occurred since the revolution, the stability of the valuation has benefited the landlord and been detrimental to the sovereign. In a different situation, it could have been beneficial for the sovereign and harmful to the landlord.

As the tax is made payable in money, so the valuation of the land is expressed in money. Since the establishment of this valuation, the value of silver has been pretty uniform, and there has been no alteration in the standard of the coin, either as to weight or fineness. Had silver risen considerably in its value, as it seems to have done in the course of the two centuries which preceded the discovery of the mines of America, the constancy of the valuation might have proved very oppressive to the landlord. Had silver fallen considerably in its value, as it certainly did for about a century at least after the discovery of those mines, the same constancy of valuation would have reduced very much this branch of the revenue of the sovereign. Had any considerable alteration been made in the standard of the money, either by sinking the same quantity of silver to a lower denomination, or by raising it to a higher; had an ounce of silver, for example, instead of being coined into five shillings and two pence, been coined either into pieces which bore so low a denomination as two shillings and seven pence, or into pieces which bore so high a one as ten shillings and four pence, it would, in the one case, have hurt the revenue of the proprietor, in the other that of the sovereign.

Since the tax is paid in cash, the land's value is also expressed in cash. Since this valuation was established, the value of silver has been quite stable, and there haven't been any changes in the coin's standard regarding weight or purity. If silver had significantly increased in value, like it appeared to have done during the two centuries before the discovery of the American mines, the steady valuation could have been very burdensome for landowners. If silver had significantly decreased in value, as it definitely did for at least a century after those mines were discovered, the same consistent valuation would have greatly reduced this part of the government's revenue. If any significant change had been made to the money's standard, either by lowering the same amount of silver to a lower denomination or by raising it to a higher one; for instance, if an ounce of silver, instead of being minted into five shillings and two pence, had been minted into coins with a low denomination like two shillings and seven pence, or into coins with a high denomination like ten shillings and four pence, it would have affected the landowner's revenue in one case and the government's revenue in the other.

In circumstances, therefore, somewhat different from those which have actually taken place, this constancy of valuation might have been a very great inconveniency, either to the contributors or to the commonwealth. In the course of ages, such circumstances, however, must at some time or other happen. But though empires, like all the other works of men, have all hitherto proved mortal, yet every empire aims at immortality. Every constitution, therefore, which it is meant should be as permanent as the empire itself, ought to be convenient, not in certain circumstances only, but in all circumstances; or ought to be suited, not to those circumstances which are transitory, occasional, or accidental, but to those which are necessary, and therefore always the same.

In situations that are somewhat different from what has actually happened, this consistency in valuation could have been a significant problem for either the contributors or the society as a whole. Over time, such situations are bound to occur. However, while empires, like all human creations, have proven to be temporary, each empire strives for lasting power. Therefore, any constitution that is intended to be as enduring as the empire itself should be convenient not just in specific situations but in all situations; it should be designed for circumstances that are necessary and therefore always constant, rather than for those that are temporary, occasional, or random.

A tax upon the rent of land, which varies with every variation of the rent, or which rises and falls according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation, is recommended by that sect of men of letters in France, who call themselves the economists, as the most equitable of all taxes. All taxes, they pretend, fall ultimately upon the rent of land, and ought, therefore, to be imposed equally upon the fund which must finally pay them. That all taxes ought to fall as equally as possible upon the fund which must finally pay them, is certainly true. But without entering into the disagreeable discussion of the metaphysical arguments by which they support their very ingenious theory, it will sufficiently appear, from the following review, what are the taxes which fall finally upon the rent of the land, and what are those which fall finally upon some other fund.

A tax on land rent, which changes with every fluctuation in rent, or which increases and decreases based on how well the land is cultivated or neglected, is suggested by a group of thinkers in France who call themselves economists, as the fairest of all taxes. They argue that all taxes ultimately impact land rent and should, therefore, be applied equally to the funds that will ultimately bear them. It is certainly true that all taxes should fall as evenly as possible on the funds that will ultimately pay them. However, without diving into the unpleasant debate over the philosophical arguments that support their clever theory, it will become clear from the following review what taxes ultimately impact land rent and which ones affect other funds.

In the Venetian territory, all the arable lands which are given in lease to farmers are taxed at a tenth of the rent.[53] The leases are recorded in a public register, which is kept by the officers of revenue in each province or district. When the proprietor cultivates his own lands, they are valued according to an equitable estimation, and he is allowed a deduction of one-fifth of the tax; so that for such land he pays only eight instead of ten per cent. of the supposed rent.

In the Venetian region, all the farmland leased to farmers is taxed at ten percent of the rent.[53] Leases are recorded in a public register maintained by the revenue officers in each province or district. When the owner cultivates their own land, it's assessed based on a fair evaluation, and they can deduct one-fifth of the tax; so for that land, they only pay eight percent instead of ten percent of the estimated rent.

A land-tax of this kind is certainly more equal than the land-tax of England. It might not, perhaps, be altogether so certain, and the assessment of the tax might frequently occasion a good deal more trouble to the landlord. It might, too, be a good deal more expensive in the levying.

A land tax like this is definitely fairer than the land tax in England. It might not always be as certain, and calculating the tax could often create a lot more hassle for the landowner. It could also end up being much more costly to collect.

Such a system of administration, however, might, perhaps, be contrived, as would in a great measure both prevent this uncertainty, and moderate this expense.

Such a system of administration, however, might be designed to significantly reduce this uncertainty and lower this expense.

The landlord and tenant, for example, might jointly be obliged to record their lease in a public register. Proper penalties might be enacted against concealing or misrepresenting any of the conditions; and if part of those penalties were to be paid to either of the two parties who informed against and convicted the other of such concealment or misrepresentation, it would effectually deter them from combining together in order to defraud the public revenue. All the conditions of the lease might be sufficiently known from such a record.

The landlord and tenant, for instance, might both be required to register their lease in a public record. Appropriate penalties could be put in place for hiding or misrepresenting any of the terms; and if part of those penalties were paid to either party who reported and successfully prosecuted the other for such concealment or misrepresentation, it would effectively discourage them from colluding to defraud the public revenue. All the terms of the lease could be clearly understood from such a record.

Some landlords, instead of raising the rent, take a fine for the renewal of the lease. This practice is, in most cases, the expedient of a spendthrift, who, for a sum of ready money[Pg 350] sells a future revenue of much greater value. It is, in most cases, therefore, hurtful to the landlord; it is frequently hurtful to the tenant; and it is always hurtful to the community. It frequently takes from the tenant so great a part of his capital, and thereby diminishes so much his ability to cultivate the land, that he finds it more difficult to pay a small rent than it would otherwise have been to pay a great one. Whatever diminishes his ability to cultivate, necessarily keeps down, below what it would otherwise have been, the most important part of the revenue of the community. By rendering the tax upon such fines a good deal heavier than upon the ordinary rent, this hurtful practice might be discouraged, to the no small advantage of all the different parties concerned, of the landlord, of the tenant, of the sovereign, and of the whole community.

Some landlords, instead of increasing the rent, charge a fee for renewing the lease. This practice is usually a tactic of someone who, for a lump sum of cash[Pg 350], sacrifices future income that is worth much more. It often ends up being detrimental to the landlord; it can frequently harm the tenant; and it always negatively impacts the community. It often takes such a large portion of the tenant's capital that it reduces their ability to effectively manage the land, making it harder for them to pay a smaller rent than it would be to pay a larger one. Anything that reduces their ability to manage the land will naturally lower the most significant part of the community's revenue. By making the tax on such fees much heavier than on regular rent, this harmful practice could be discouraged, greatly benefiting all parties involved: the landlord, the tenant, the government, and the entire community.

Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of cultivation, and a certain succession of crops, during the whole continuance of the lease. This condition, which is generally the effect of the landlord's conceit of his own superior knowledge (a conceit in most cases very ill-founded), ought always to be considered as an additional rent, as a rent in service, instead of a rent in money. In order to discourage the practice, which is generally a foolish one, this species of rent might be valued rather high, and consequently taxed somewhat higher than common money-rents.

Some leases require the tenant to follow a specific method of farming and a set sequence of crops for the entire duration of the lease. This condition, usually arising from the landlord's misplaced belief in their own superior expertise (a belief that is often unfounded), should always be viewed as an extra payment, like a rent for services, rather than just a monetary rent. To discourage this practice, which is typically unwise, this type of rent could be valued relatively high and, as a result, taxed a bit more than regular cash rents.

Some landlords, instead of a rent in money, require a rent in kind, in corn, cattle, poultry, wine, oil, &c.; others, again, require a rent in service. Such rents are always more hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord. They either take more, or keep more out of the pocket of the former, than they put into that of the latter. In every country where they take place, the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much according to the degree in which they take place. By valuing, in the same manner, such rents rather high, and consequently taxing them somewhat higher than common money-rents, a practice which is hurtful to the whole community, might, perhaps, be sufficiently discouraged.

Some landlords, instead of asking for rent in cash, require it in goods like grain, livestock, poultry, wine, oil, etc.; others, in service. These types of rents are usually more damaging to tenants than beneficial to landlords. They often take more from the tenant's pocket than they give to the landlord's. In every country where this practice exists, tenants tend to be poor and struggling, largely depending on how widespread the practice is. By assessing such rents at a higher value and therefore taxing them a bit more than regular cash rents, a practice that harms the entire community, might be effectively discouraged.

When the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own lands, the rent might be valued according to an equitable arbitration of the farmers and landlords in the neighbourhood, and a moderate abatement of the tax might be granted to him, in the same manner as in the Venetian territory, provided the rent of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain sum. It is of importance that the landlord should be encouraged to cultivate a part of his own land. His capital is generally greater than that of the tenant, and, with less skill, he can frequently raise a greater produce. The landlord can afford to try experiments, and in generally disposed to do so. His unsuccessful experiments occasion only a moderate loss to himself. His successful ones contribute to the improvement and better cultivation of the whole country. It might be of importance, however, that the abatement of the tax should encourage him to cultivate to a certain extent only. If the landlords should, the greater part of them, be tempted to farm the whole of their own lands, the country (instead of sober and industrious tenants, who are bound by their own interest to cultivate as well as their capital and skill will allow them) would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs, whose abusive management would soon degrade the cultivation, and reduce the annual produce of the land, to the diminution, not only of the revenue of their masters, but of the most important part of that of the whole society.

When the landlord decided to farm some of his own land, the rent could be assessed based on a fair agreement between local farmers and landlords. He might receive a reasonable tax reduction, similar to what happens in the Venetian area, as long as the rent for the land he was farming didn’t go over a certain amount. It’s important to encourage landlords to cultivate part of their own land. They usually have more capital than tenants and can often produce more even with less skill. Landlords can afford to experiment, and they are typically inclined to do so. If their experiments fail, they only face a small loss. Successful experiments can lead to improvements and better farming practices across the region. However, it’s vital that the tax reduction encourages them to cultivate only to a certain extent. If most landlords were tempted to farm all their land, the country would be filled with lazy and irresponsible bailiffs instead of diligent and hardworking tenants who have a personal stake in how well they farm. This could lead to poor management that would degrade farming practices and lower the land’s annual output, ultimately hurting not just their income but also the overall well-being of society.

Such a system of administration might, perhaps, free a tax of this kind from any degree of uncertainty, which could occasion either oppression or inconveniency to the contributor; and might, at the same time, serve to introduce into the common management of land such a plan of policy as might contribute a good deal to the general improvement and good cultivation of the country.

Such an administration system could potentially eliminate any uncertainty regarding this type of tax, which could lead to either oppression or difficulties for the taxpayer. At the same time, it might introduce a management approach for land that could significantly enhance the overall development and cultivation of the country.

The expense of levying a land-tax, which varied with every variation of the rent, would, no doubt, be somewhat greater than that of levying one which was always rated according to a fixed valuation. Some additional expense would necessarily be incurred, both by the different register-offices which it would be proper to establish in the different districts of the country, and by the different valuations which might occasionally be made of the lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself. The expense of all this, however, might be very moderate, and much below what is incurred in the levying of many other taxes, which afford a very inconsiderable revenue in comparison of what might easily be drawn from a tax of this kind.

The cost of collecting a land tax, which would change with every fluctuation in rental prices, would likely be somewhat higher than that of collecting a tax based on a fixed value. Some extra costs would inevitably arise from the various registries that would need to be set up in different regions of the country, as well as from the occasional revaluation of the land that the owner decided to occupy. However, the overall expense might be quite reasonable and much lower than what is involved in collecting many other taxes, which generate a significantly smaller revenue compared to what could easily be obtained from this type of tax.

The discouragement which a variable land-tax of this kind might give to the improvement of land, seems to be the most important objection which can be made to it. The landlord would certainly be less disposed to improve, when the sovereign, who contributed nothing to the expense, was to share in the profit of the improvement. Even this objection might, perhaps, be obviated, by allowing the landlord, before he began his improvement, to ascertain, in conjunction with the officers of revenue, the actual value of his lands, according to the equitable arbitration of a certain number of landlords and farmers in the neighbourhood, equally chosen by both parties: and by rating him, according to this valuation, for such a number of years as might be fully sufficient for his complete indemnification. To draw the attention of the sovereign towards the improvement of the land,[Pg 351] from a regard to the increase of his own revenue, is one of the principal advantages proposed by this species of land-tax. The term, therefore, allowed, for the indemnification of the landlord, ought not to be a great deal longer than what was necessary for that purpose, lest the remoteness of the interest should discourage too much this attention. It had better, however, be somewhat too long, than in any respect too short. No incitement to the attention of the sovereign can ever counterbalance the smallest discouragement to that of the landlord. The attention of the sovereign can be, at best, but a very general and vague consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular and minute consideration of what is likely to be the most advantageous application of every inch of ground upon his estate. The principal attention of the sovereign ought to be, to encourage, by every means in his power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer, by allowing both to pursue their own interest in their own way, and according to their own judgment; by giving to both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full recompence of their own industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market for every part of their produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest communications, both by land and by water, through every part of his own dominions, as well as the most unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other princes.

The discouragement that a variable land tax like this might cause to land improvement seems to be the main objection against it. The landlord would likely be less inclined to make improvements if the government, which contributed nothing to the cost, would benefit from the profits of those improvements. This issue could potentially be resolved by allowing the landlord, before starting any improvement, to work with revenue officers to determine the actual value of his land. This would be based on a fair assessment by a selected group of landlords and farmers from the area, chosen by both parties. The landlord could then be taxed based on this valuation for a period long enough to fully cover his costs. One of the key benefits of this type of land tax is that it focuses the government's attention on land improvements in order to increase its own revenue. Therefore, the period allowed for the landlord's compensation should not be much longer than necessary, as too long a wait could discourage the government's interest. However, it's better for the period to be slightly longer than too short. No incentive for the government's interest can outweigh even a small disincentive for the landlord's involvement. The government's focus is generally broad and vague regarding what might improve the cultivation of most of its territory, while the landlord's focus is specific and detailed, considering the most beneficial use of every inch of land on their estate. The government should primarily aim to encourage the interests of both landlords and farmers by allowing them to pursue their own goals in their own ways, based on their own judgments. It should provide both with strong assurances that they will reap the full rewards of their hard work and create the most extensive market for their products by establishing the easiest and safest transportation routes, both on land and water, throughout its territories and ensuring free export to the lands of other rulers.

If, by such a system of administration, a tax of this kind could be so managed as to give, not only no discouragement, but, on the contrary, some encouragement to the improvement of land, it does not appear likely to occasion any other inconveniency to the landlord, except always the unavoidable one of being obliged to pay the tax.

If a tax like this could be managed in such a way that it not only doesn't discourage but actually encourages land improvement, it seems unlikely to cause any other issues for the landlord, apart from the unavoidable one of having to pay the tax.

In all the variations of the state of the society, in the improvement and in the declension of agriculture; in all the variations in the value of silver, and in all those in the standard of the coin, a tax of this kind would, of its own accord, and without any attention of government, readily suit itself to the actual situation of things, and would be equally just and equitable in all those different changes. It would, therefore, be much more proper to be established as a perpetual and unalterable regulation, or as what is called a fundamental law of the commonwealth, than any tax which was always to be levied according to a certain valuation.

In all the different conditions of society, whether in the progress or decline of agriculture, and in all the fluctuations of silver's value and changes in coin standards, a tax like this would automatically adapt to the real situation without needing any government intervention. It would be fair and just during all these changes. Therefore, it would be much more appropriate to establish it as a permanent and unchangeable rule, or what’s known as a fundamental law of the community, rather than any tax that is always based on a fixed valuation.

Some states, instead of the simple and obvious expedient of a register of leases, have had recourse to the laborious and expensive one of an actual survey and valuation of all the lands in the country. They have suspected, probably, that the lessor and lessee, in order to defraud the public revenue, might combine to conceal the real terms of the lease. Doomsday-book seems to have been the result of a very accurate survey of this kind.

Some states, rather than using the straightforward and obvious option of a lease register, have opted for the complicated and costly approach of conducting an actual survey and valuation of all the land in the country. They likely suspected that landlords and tenants might work together to hide the true terms of the lease in order to cheat the public revenue. The Domesday Book appears to have come from a very precise survey of this type.

In the ancient dominions of the king of Prussia, the land-tax is assessed according to an actual survey and valuation, which is reviewed and altered from time to time.[54] According to that valuation, the lay proprietors pay from twenty to twenty-five per cent. of their revenue; ecclesiastics from forty to forty-five per cent. The survey and valuation of Silesia was made by order of the present king, it is said, with great accuracy. According to that valuation, the lands belonging to the bishop of Breslaw are taxed at twenty-five per cent. of their rent. The other revenues of the ecclesiastics of both religions at fifty per cent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order, and of that of Malta, at forty per cent. Lands held by a noble tenure, at thirty-eight and one-third per cent. Lands held by a base tenure, at thirty-five and one-third per cent.

In the ancient territories of the king of Prussia, the land tax is calculated based on an actual survey and valuation, which is reviewed and updated periodically.[54] According to that valuation, lay property owners pay between twenty to twenty-five percent of their revenue; clergy pay between forty to forty-five percent. The survey and valuation for Silesia was conducted by the current king’s orders and is said to be very accurate. Based on that valuation, the lands owned by the bishop of Breslaw are taxed at twenty-five percent of their rent. The other income of clergy from both faiths is taxed at fifty percent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order and of Malta are taxed at forty percent. Lands held under noble tenure are taxed at thirty-eight and one-third percent, while those held under lower tenure are taxed at thirty-five and one-third percent.

The survey and valuation of Bohemia is said to have been the work of more than a hundred years. It was not perfected till after the peace of 1748, by the orders of the present empress queen.[55] The survey of the duchy of Milan, which was begun in the time of Charles VI., was not perfected till after 1760. It is esteemed one of the most accurate that has ever been made. The survey of Savoy and Piedmont was executed under the orders of the late king of Sardinia.[56]

The survey and valuation of Bohemia reportedly took over a hundred years to complete. It wasn't finished until after the peace treaty of 1748, by the orders of the current empress queen.[55] The survey of the duchy of Milan, which started during the reign of Charles VI., wasn't completed until after 1760. It's considered one of the most precise surveys ever conducted. The survey of Savoy and Piedmont was carried out under the orders of the former king of Sardinia.[56]

In the dominions of the king of Prussia, the revenue of the church is taxed much higher than that of lay proprietors. The revenue of the church is, the greater part of it, a burden upon the rent of land. It seldom happens that any part of it is applied towards the improvement of land; or is so employed as to contribute, in any respect, towards increasing the revenue of the great body of the people. His Prussian majesty had probably, upon that account, thought it reasonable that it should contribute a good deal more towards relieving the exigencies of the state. In some countries, the lands of the church are exempted from all taxes. In others, they are taxed more lightly than other lands. In the duchy of Milan, the lands which the church possessed before 1575, are rated to the tax at a third only of their value.

In the kingdom of Prussia, church revenue is taxed much higher than that of private landowners. Most of the church's revenue adds to the burden of land rent. It rarely happens that any of this revenue is used to improve the land or to help increase the overall income of the people. The king of Prussia likely thought it fair that the church should contribute significantly more to help meet the state's needs. In some countries, church lands are completely tax-exempt. In others, they are taxed less than other lands. In the duchy of Milan, church lands owned before 1575 are taxed at only one-third of their value.

In Silesia, lands held by a noble tenure are taxed three per cent. higher than those held by a base tenure. The honours and privileges of different kinds annexed to the former, his Prussian majesty had probably imagined, would sufficiently compensate to the proprietor a small aggravation of the tax;[Pg 352] while, at the same time, the humiliating inferiority of the latter would be in some measure alleviated, by being taxed somewhat more lightly. In other countries, the system of taxation, instead of alleviating, aggravates this inequality. In the dominions of the king of Sardinia, and in those provinces of France which are subject to what is called the real or predial taille, the tax falls altogether upon the lands held by a base tenure. Those held by a noble one are exempted.

In Silesia, lands owned by nobles are taxed three percent higher than those owned by commoners. The honors and privileges associated with noble ownership, the Prussian king likely thought, would make up for the slight increase in tax; meanwhile, the burden on commoners would be somewhat eased by their lower tax rate. In other countries, however, the tax system instead worsens this inequality. In the territories ruled by the king of Sardinia and in certain provinces of France that are subject to the real or predial taille, the tax is completely imposed on lands owned by commoners, while noble lands are exempted.[Pg 352]

A land tax assessed according to a general survey and valuation, how equal soever it may be at first, must, in the course of a very moderate period of time, become unequal. To prevent its becoming so would require the continual and painful attention of government to all the variations in the state and produce of every different farm in the country. The governments of Prussia, of Bohemia, of Sardinia, and of the duchy of Milan, actually exert an attention of this kind; an attention so unsuitable to the nature of government, that it is not likely to be of long continuance, and which, if it is continued, will probably, in the long-run, occasion much more trouble and vexation then it can possibly bring relief to the contributors.

A property tax based on a general survey and valuation, no matter how fair it seems at first, will inevitably become unequal over time. Preventing this inequality would require constant and painstaking attention from the government to track all the changes in the condition and output of every different farm in the country. The governments of Prussia, Bohemia, Sardinia, and the Duchy of Milan actually pay this kind of attention; however, this focus is so ill-suited to the nature of government that it’s unlikely to last long, and if it does continue, it will probably cause much more trouble and frustration than it could ever provide relief to the taxpayers.

In 1666, the generality of Montauban was assessed to the real or predial taille, according, it is said, to a very exact survey and valuation.[57] By 1727, this assessment had become altogether unequal. In order to remedy this inconveniency, government has found no better expedient, than to impose upon the whole generality an additional tax of a hundred and twenty thousand livres. This additional tax is rated upon all the different districts subject to the taille according to the old assessment. But it is levied only upon those which, in the actual state of things, are by that assessment under-taxed; and it is applied to the relief of those which, by the same assessment, are over-taxed. Two districts, for example, one of which ought, in the actual state of things, to be taxed at nine hundred, the other at eleven hundred livres, are, by the old assessment, both taxed at a thousand livres. Both these districts are, by the additional tax, rated at eleven hundred livres each. But this additional tax is levied only upon the district under-charged, and it is applied altogether to the relief of that overcharged, which consequently pays only nine hundred livres. The government neither gains nor loses by the additional tax, which is applied altogether to remedy the inequalities arising from the old assessment. The application is pretty much regulated according to the discretion of the intendant of the generality, and must, therefore, be in a great measure arbitrary.

In 1666, the Montauban region was evaluated for the real or property tax based on what’s said to be a very precise survey and assessment.[57] By 1727, this assessment had become completely unfair. To address this issue, the government decided to impose an extra tax of one hundred and twenty thousand livres on the entire region. This extra tax is assigned to all the various districts subject to the property tax based on the old assessment. However, it is only collected from those districts that are currently under-taxed according to that assessment, and it is used to support those that are over-taxed under the same assessment. For instance, one district might need to be taxed nine hundred livres while another one should be taxed eleven hundred livres, but both are taxed at one thousand livres according to the old assessment. With the new additional tax, both districts are charged eleven hundred livres each. However, the additional tax is only taken from the under-taxed district, and it's completely used to help the over-taxed district, which ultimately pays only nine hundred livres. The government neither benefits nor loses from this extra tax, as it is entirely used to correct the inconsistencies from the old assessment. The application of this can be largely determined at the discretion of the intendant of the region, making it quite arbitrary.

Taxes which are proportioned, not to the Rent, but to the Produce of Land.

Taxes upon the produce of land are, in reality, taxes upon the rent; and though they may be originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by the landlord. When a certain portion of the produce is to be paid away for a tax, the farmer computes as well as he can, what the value of this portion is, one year with another, likely to amount to, and he makes a proportionable abatement in the rent which he agrees to pay to the landlord. There is no farmer who does not compute before hand what the church tythe, which is a land tax of this kind, is, one year with another, likely to amount to.

Taxes on the produce of land are essentially taxes on the rent; and while they may be initially paid by the farmer, they are ultimately the responsibility of the landlord. When a portion of the produce goes towards taxes, the farmer calculates the expected value of that portion over the years and adjusts the rent he agrees to pay to the landlord accordingly. Every farmer considers in advance how much the church tithe, which functions like a land tax, is expected to be each year.

The tythe, and every other land tax of this kind, under the appearance of perfect equality, are very unequal taxes; a certain portion of the produce being in different situations, equivalent to a very different portion of the rent. In some very rich lands, the produce is so great, that the one half of it is fully sufficient to replace to the farmer his capital employed in cultivation, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in the neighbourhood. The other half, or, what comes to the same thing, the value of the other half, he could afford to pay as rent to the landlord, if there was no tythe. But if a tenth of the produce is taken from him in the way of tythe, he must require an abatement of the fifth part of his rent, otherwise he cannot get back his capital with the ordinary profit. In this case, the rent of the landlord, instead of amounting to a half, or five-tenths of the whole produce, will amount only to four-tenths of it. In poorer lands, on the contrary, the produce is sometimes so small, and the expense of cultivation so great, that it requires four-fifths of the whole produce, to replace to the farmer his capital with the ordinary profit. In this case, though there was no tythe, the rent of the landlord could amount to no more than one-fifth or two-tenths of the whole produce. But if the farmer pays one-tenth of the produce in the way of tythe, he must require an equal abatement of the rent of the landlord, which will thus be reduced to one-tenth only of the whole produce. Upon the rent of rich lands the tythe may sometimes be a tax of no more than one-fifth part, or four shillings in the pound; whereas upon that of poorer lands, it may sometimes be a tax of one half, or of ten shillings in the pound.

The tithe and other similar land taxes, while seeming perfectly equal, are actually very unequal taxes; a certain part of the crop in different situations is equivalent to a very different part of the rent. In some very fertile lands, the yield is so high that half of it is enough to cover the farmer's investment in cultivation, along with the typical profits of farming stock in the area. The other half, or the value of that half, could be paid as rent to the landlord if there were no tithe. However, if a tenth of the produce is taken from him as a tithe, he must ask for a reduction of one-fifth of his rent; otherwise, he can't recover his investment with the usual profit. In this case, the landlord's rent, instead of being half or five-tenths of the total produce, will only be four-tenths of it. In less fertile lands, on the other hand, the yield is sometimes so low and the cost of farming so high that it takes four-fifths of the total produce to cover the farmer's investment and regular profit. In this situation, even without a tithe, the landlord's rent could only be one-fifth or two-tenths of the total produce. But if the farmer pays one-tenth of the produce as a tithe, he must request a corresponding reduction in the landlord's rent, which will then be cut down to one-tenth of the total produce. For the rent of rich lands, the tithe can sometimes be a tax of no more than one-fifth, or four shillings in the pound; while for poorer lands, it can sometimes be a tax of one-half, or ten shillings in the pound.

The tythe, as it is frequently a very unequal tax upon the rent, so it is always a great discouragement, both to the improvements of the landlord, and to the cultivation of the farmer. The one cannot venture to make the most important, which are generally the most[Pg 353] expensive improvements; nor the other to raise the most valuable, which are generally, too, the most expensive crops; when the church, which lays out no part of the expense, is to share so very largely in the profit. The cultivation of madder was, for a long time, confined by the tythe to the United Provinces, which, being presbyterian countries, and upon that account exempted from this destructive tax, enjoyed a sort of monopoly of that useful dyeing drug against the rest of Europe. The late attempts to introduce the culture of this plant into England, have been made only in consequence of the statute, which enacted that five shillings an acre should be received in lieu of all manner of tythe upon madder.

The tithe, often an unequal tax on rent, is a significant discouragement for both landlords' improvements and farmers' cultivation. Landlords hesitate to make crucial and costly improvements, while farmers are reluctant to grow more valuable and generally expensive crops when the church, which doesn’t contribute to the costs, takes a large share of the profits. For a long time, the cultivation of madder was limited to the United Provinces, which, being Presbyterian areas, were exempt from this harmful tax, thus enjoying a sort of monopoly on this useful dye against the rest of Europe. Recent efforts to grow this plant in England have only happened due to the law that established a payment of five shillings per acre in place of all tithes on madder.

As through the greater part of Europe, the church, so in many different countries of Asia, the state, is principally supported by a land tax, proportioned not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. In China, the principal revenue of the sovereign consists in a tenth part of the produce of all the lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is estimated so very moderately, that, in many provinces, it is said not to exceed a thirtieth part of the ordinary produce. The land tax or land rent which used to be paid to the Mahometan government of Bengal, before that country fell into the hands of the English East India company, is said to have amounted to about a fifth part of the produce. The land tax of ancient Egypt is said likewise to have amounted to a fifth part.

Just like in much of Europe, where the church is mainly funded by a land tax, many Asian countries rely on a state-supported land tax that's based on the crop yield rather than the rental value. In China, the main source of income for the emperor comes from taking a tenth of the total produce from all the land in the empire. However, this tenth is estimated quite modestly, so in many regions, it reportedly doesn’t exceed a thirtieth of the usual yield. Before Bengal was taken over by the English East India Company, the land tax or rent paid to the Muslim government was about a fifth of the total produce. Similarly, ancient Egypt's land tax is also said to have been around a fifth of the produce.

In Asia, this sort of land tax is said to interest the sovereign in the improvement and cultivation of land. The sovereigns of China, those of Bengal while under the Mahometan government, and those of ancient Egypt, are said, accordingly, to have been extremely attentive to the making and maintaining of good roads and navigable canals, in order to increase, as much as possible, both the quantity and value of every part of the produce of the land, by procuring to every part of it the most extensive market which their own dominions could afford. The tythe of the church is divided into such small portions that no one of its proprietors can have any interest of this kind. The parson of a parish could never find his account in making a road or canal to a distant part of the country, in order to extend the market for the produce of his own particular parish. Such taxes, when destined for the maintenance of the state, have some advantages, which may serve in some measure to balance their inconveniency. When destined for the maintenance of the church, they are attended with nothing but inconveniency.

In Asia, this type of land tax is believed to encourage the ruler to improve and cultivate the land. The emperors of China, the rulers of Bengal during the Muslim rule, and the leaders of ancient Egypt were reportedly very focused on building and maintaining good roads and navigable canals to maximize both the quantity and value of all the land's produce by giving every area access to the largest market possible within their own territories. The church tithes are divided into such small amounts that none of the owners can have any real interest in it. The parish priest would never benefit from building a road or canal to a faraway part of the country to expand the market for the produce from his specific parish. Such taxes, when used for funding the state, have some benefits that can somewhat offset their disadvantages. However, when used for the church, they come with nothing but drawbacks.

Taxes upon the produce of land may be levied, either in kind, or, according to a certain valuation in money.

Taxes on the output of land can be collected in goods or based on a specific monetary value.

The person of a parish, or a gentleman of small fortune who lives upon his estate, may sometimes, perhaps find some advantage in receiving, the one his tythe, and the other his rent, in kind. The quantity to be collected, and the district within which it is to be collected, are so small, that they both can oversee, with their own eyes, the collection and disposal of every part of what is due to them. A gentleman of great fortune, who lived in the capital, would be in danger of suffering much by the neglect, and more by the fraud, of his factors and agents, if the rents of an estate in a distant province were to be paid to him in this manner. The loss of the sovereign, from the abuse and depredation of his tax-gatherers, would necessarily be much greater. The servants of the most careless private person are, perhaps, more under the eye of their master than those of the most careful prince; and a public revenue, which was paid in kind, would suffer so much from the mismanagement of the collectors, that a very small part of what was levied upon the people would ever arrive at the treasury of the prince. Some part of the public revenue of China, however, is said to be paid in this manner. The mandarins and other tax-gatherers will, no doubt, find their advantage in continuing the practice of a payment, which is so much more liable to abuse than any payment in money.

A local parish official or a gentleman with a modest income living on his estate might sometimes benefit from receiving, the first his tithes and the other his rent, in kind. The amounts to be collected, and the area they cover, are so small that they can both personally oversee the collection and distribution of everything owed to them. A wealthy gentleman living in the city would risk significant losses due to neglect and especially fraud from his factors and agents if rent from a distant property were paid to him this way. The sovereign would incur even greater losses from the misuse and theft by his tax collectors. The servants of a careless private individual are likely more closely monitored by their master than those of a diligent prince; thus, a public revenue paid in kind would suffer tremendously from the mismanagement of the collectors, leading to only a small portion ever reaching the treasury. However, it is said that some of China’s public revenue is collected this way. The mandarins and other tax collectors likely find their own advantage in maintaining a payment system that is far more susceptible to abuse than any monetary payment.

A tax upon the produce of land, which is levied in money, may be levied, either according to a valuation, which varies with all the variations of the market price; or according to a fixed valuation, a bushel of wheat, for example, being always valued at one and the same money price, whatever may be the state of the market. The produce of a tax levied in the former way will vary only according to the variations in the real produce of the land, according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation. The produce of a tax levied in the latter way will vary, not only according to the variations in the produce of the land, but according both to those in the value of the precious metals, and those in the quantity of those metals, which is at different times contained in coin of the same denomination. The produce of the former will always bear the same proportion to the value of the real produce of the land. The produce of the latter may, at different times, bear very different proportions to that value.

A tax on the output of land, which is charged in money, can be applied either based on a valuation that changes with market prices or based on a fixed valuation. For instance, a bushel of wheat could always be priced the same, regardless of market conditions. The revenue from a tax applied in the first way will only change with real fluctuations in the land's output, depending on how well it is cultivated or neglected. In contrast, the revenue from a tax assessed in the second way will change not only with the output of the land but also with the variations in the value of precious metals and the amounts of those metals found in coins of the same denomination at different times. Revenue from the first approach will consistently maintain the same ratio to the actual value of the land's output, while revenue from the second approach may vary greatly in proportion to that value at different times.

When, instead either of a certain portion of the produce of land, or of the price of a certain portion, a certain sum of money is to be paid in full compensation for all tax or tythe; the tax becomes, in this case, exactly of the same nature with the land tax of England. It neither rises nor falls with the rent of the land. It neither encourages nor discourages improvement. The tythe in the greater part of those parishes which pay what is called a modus, in lieu of all other tythe[Pg 354], is a tax of this kind. During the Mahometan government of Bengal, instead of the payment in kind of the fifth part of the produce, a modus, and, it is said, a very moderate one, was established in the greater part of the districts or zemindaries of the country. Some of the servants of the East India company, under pretence of restoring the public revenue to its proper value, have, in some provinces, exchanged this modus for a payment in kind. Under their management, this change is likely both to discourage cultivation, and to give new opportunities for abuse in the collection of the public revenue, which has fallen very much below what it was said to have been when it first fell under the management of the company. The servants of the company may, perhaps, have profited by the change, but at the expense, it is probable, both of their masters and of the country.

When, instead of a specific portion of the land's produce or the price for that portion, a fixed amount of money is paid as full compensation for all taxes or tithes, the tax becomes exactly like the land tax in England. It neither increases nor decreases with the land's rent. It doesn't promote or hinder improvements. The tithe in most of the parishes that pay what's called a modus, instead of other tithes[Pg 354], is a tax of this kind. During the Muslim rule in Bengal, rather than paying a fifth of the produce, a modus was set up, which was reportedly quite reasonable, in most districts or zemindaries of the region. Some employees of the East India Company, under the guise of restoring the public revenue to its appropriate value, have, in some regions, replaced this modus with payments in kind. Under their management, this change is likely to discourage farming and create new opportunities for corruption in collecting public revenue, which has decreased significantly from what it reportedly was when it first came under the company's control. The company's employees might have benefited from this change, but it's likely at the expense of both their employers and the country.

Taxes upon the Rent of Houses.

The rent of a house may be distinguished into two parts, of which the one may very properly be called the building-rent; the other is commonly called the ground-rent.

The rent of a house can be divided into two parts: one can appropriately be called the building rent, while the other is commonly referred to as the ground rent.

The building-rent is the interest or profit of the capital expended in building the house. In order to put the trade of a builder upon a level with other trades, it is necessary that this rent should be sufficient, first, to pay him the same interest which he would have got for his capital, if he had lent it upon good security; and, secondly, to keep the house in constant repair, or, what comes to the same thing, to replace, within a certain term of years, the capital which had been employed in building it. The building-rent, or the ordinary profit of building, is, therefore, everywhere regulated by the ordinary interest of money. Where the market rate of interest is four per cent. the rent of a house, which, over and above paying the ground-rent, affords six or six and a-half per cent. upon the whole expense of building, may, perhaps, afford a sufficient profit to the builder. Where the market rate of interest is five per cent. it may perhaps require seven or seven and a-half per cent. If, in proportion to the interest of money, the trade of the builders affords at any time much greater profit than this, it will soon draw so much capital from other trades as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it affords at any time much less than this, other trades will soon draw so much capital from it as will again raise that profit.

The rent for a building is the return or profit from the money spent on constructing the house. To ensure that the work of a builder is fairly comparable to other professions, this rent needs to be enough, first, to provide him with the same interest he would have earned if he had lent his money securely, and second, to keep the house well-maintained, or essentially, to recover the investment made in its construction within a certain number of years. Therefore, the building rent, or the usual profit from building, is generally determined by the standard interest rate. If the market interest rate is four percent, the rent for a house, in addition to covering the ground rent, should provide six to six and a-half percent on the total construction costs, which may be a sufficient profit for the builder. If the market interest rate is five percent, it might require seven to seven and a-half percent. If at any time the builder's trade yields significantly more profit than this relative to the interest on money, it will soon attract enough investment from other trades to bring the profit back down to the appropriate level. Conversely, if it generates significantly less profit than this, other trades will quickly withdraw enough capital from it to raise that profit again.

Whatever part of the whole rent of a house is over and above what is sufficient for affording this reasonable profit, naturally goes to the ground-rent; and, where the owner of the ground and the owner of the building are two different persons, is, in most cases, completely paid to the former. This surplus rent is the price which the inhabitant of the house pays for some real or supposed advantage of the situation. In country houses, at a distance from any great town, where there is plenty of ground to chuse upon, the ground-rent is scarce any thing, or no more than what the ground which the house stands upon would pay, if employed in agriculture. In country villas, in the neighbourhood of some great town, it is sometimes a good deal higher; and the peculiar conveniency or beauty of situation is there frequently very well paid for. Ground-rents are generally highest in the capital, and in those particular parts of it where there happens to be the greatest demand for houses, whatever be the reason of that demand, whether for trade and business, for pleasure and society, or for mere vanity and fashion.

Any part of a house's rent that exceeds what's needed to provide a reasonable profit typically goes to the ground rent. When the landowner and the building owner are different people, this extra rent usually goes entirely to the landowner. This surplus rent is what the person living in the house pays for certain real or perceived benefits of the location. In rural houses far from large towns, where there's ample land to choose from, the ground rent is minimal or only about what the land would generate if used for farming. In country villas near a major town, it can be significantly higher, and the unique advantages or beauty of the location are often well compensated. Ground rents are typically highest in the capital and in those specific areas where there's the greatest demand for housing, regardless of whether that demand comes from trade, leisure, socializing, or simply status and trends.

A tax upon house-rent, payable by the tenant, and proportioned to the whole rent of each house, could not, for any considerable time at least, affect the building-rent. If the builder did not get his reasonable profit, he would be obliged to quit the trade; which, by raising the demand for building, would, in a short time, bring back his profit to its proper level with that of other trades. Neither would such a tax fall altogether upon the ground-rent; but it would divide itself in such a manner, as to fall partly upon the inhabitant of the house, and partly upon the owner of the ground.

A tax on house rent, paid by the tenant and based on the total rent of each house, couldn't significantly impact the building rent for any extended period. If the builder wasn't making a reasonable profit, they'd have to leave the trade, which would increase the demand for building and soon restore their profits to a normal level, comparable to other trades. Moreover, this tax wouldn't be fully borne by the ground rent; rather, it would be shared in such a way that part of it would be absorbed by the tenant and part by the landowner.

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular person judges that he can afford for house-rent an expense of sixty pounds a-year; and let us suppose, too, that a tax of four shillings in the pound, or of one-fifth, payable by the inhabitant, is laid upon house-rent. A house of sixty pounds rent will, in that case, cost him seventy-two pounds a-year, which is twelve pounds more than he thinks he can afford. He will, therefore, content himself with a worse house, or a house of fifty pounds rent, which, with the additional ten pounds that he must pay for the tax, will make up the sum of sixty pounds a-year, the expense which he judges he can afford, and, in order to pay the tax, he will give up a part of the additional conveniency which he might have had from a house of ten pounds a-year more rent. He will give up, I say, a part of this additional conveniency; for he will seldom be obliged to give up the whole, but will, in consequence of the tax, get a better house for fifty pounds a-year, than he could have got if there had been no tax. For as a tax of this kind, by taking away this particular competitor, must diminish the competition for houses of sixty pounds rent, so it must likewise diminish it for those of fifty pounds rent, and in the same manner for those of all other rents, except the lowest[Pg 355] rent, for which it would for some time increase the competition. But the rents of every class of houses for which the competition was diminished, would necessarily be more or less reduced. As no part of this reduction, however, could for any considerable time at least, affect the building-rent, the whole of it must, in the long-run, necessarily fall upon the ground-rent. The final payment of this tax, therefore, would fall partly upon the inhabitant of the house, who, in order to pay his share, would be obliged to give up part of his conveniency; and partly upon the owner of the ground, who, in order to pay his share, would be obliged to give up a part of his revenue. In what proportion this final payment would be divided between them, it is not, perhaps, very easy to ascertain. The division would probably be very different in different circumstances, and a tax of this kind might, according to those different circumstances, affect very unequally, both the inhabitant of the house and the owner of the ground.

Let’s say, for example, that a particular person figures they can afford to spend sixty pounds a year on rent. Also, let’s assume there's a tax of four shillings per pound, or one-fifth, paid by the tenant on house rent. In this case, a house with a rent of sixty pounds will actually cost him seventy-two pounds a year, which is twelve pounds more than he believes he can afford. Therefore, he will have to settle for a lesser house, or a house with a rent of fifty pounds, which, with the extra ten pounds he has to pay for the tax, will bring his total to sixty pounds a year—the amount he thinks he can manage. To pay the tax, he will have to sacrifice some of the conveniences he could have enjoyed in a house with ten pounds more rent. I say he will give up some of this extra convenience; he will rarely have to forgo it entirely, and as a result of the tax, he can actually get a better house for fifty pounds a year than he would have been able to without the tax. Since a tax like this reduces competition for sixty-pound rental houses by eliminating a specific contender, it will also reduce competition for fifty-pound rentals, and similarly for all other rental prices, except the lowest rent, for which competition may temporarily increase. However, the rents of all classes of houses that face decreased competition would inevitably be reduced to some extent. Yet, this reduction wouldn't significantly impact the building rent for any considerable time; thus, it will ultimately fall on the ground rent. Therefore, the final cost of this tax will partially affect the person living in the house, who will have to give up some of their conveniences to cover their share, and partly impact the landowner, who will need to give up a portion of their income to pay their share. It may be difficult to determine how this final payment will be split between them. The division will likely vary significantly depending on different circumstances, and a tax like this could affect the tenant and the landowner very unevenly based on those circumstances.[Pg 355]

The inequality with which a tax of this kind might fall upon the owners of different ground-rents, would arise altogether from the accidental inequality of this division. But the inequality with which it might fall upon the inhabitants of different houses, would arise, not only from this, but from another cause. The proportion of the expense of house-rent to the whole expense of living, is different in the different degrees of fortune. It is, perhaps, highest in the highest degree, and it diminishes gradually through the inferior degrees, so as in general to be lowest in the lowest degree. The necessaries of life occasion the great expense of the poor. They find it difficult to get food, and the greater part of their little revenue is spent in getting it. The luxuries and vanities of life occasion the principal expense of the rich; and a magnificent house embellishes and sets off to the best advantage all the other luxuries and vanities which they possess. A tax upon house-rents, therefore, would in general fall heaviest upon the rich; and in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very unreasonable. It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion.

The unfair burden of a tax like this on different ground-rent owners would come from the random inequality of this division. However, the uneven impact on residents of various houses would stem not only from this but also from another factor. The share of rent in the overall cost of living varies across different income levels. It is likely highest among the wealthiest and gradually decreases as you move down the income spectrum, usually reaching its lowest point among the poorest. The essentials of life are a significant expense for low-income individuals. They struggle to afford food, and most of their limited income goes toward it. In contrast, the rich mainly face costs from their luxuries and indulgences; an extravagant house highlights and enhances all the other luxuries they own. Therefore, a tax on house rents would generally impact the wealthy the most, and this kind of inequality may not seem unreasonable. It’s not unreasonable to expect the rich to contribute to public expenses not just in proportion to their income but even a bit more than that.

The rent of houses, though it in some respects resembles the rent of land, is in one respect essentially different from it. The rent of land is paid for the use of a productive subject. The land which pays it produces it. The rent of houses is paid for the use of an unproductive subject. Neither the house, nor the ground which it stands upon, produce any thing. The person who pays the rent, therefore, must draw it from some other source of revenue, distinct from and independent of this subject. A tax upon the rent of houses, so far as it falls upon the inhabitants, must be drawn from the same source as the rent itself, and must be paid from their revenue, whether derived from the wages of labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land. So far as it falls upon the inhabitants, it is one of those taxes which fall, not upon one only, but indifferently upon all the three different sources of revenue; and is, in every respect, of the same nature as a tax upon any any other sort of consumable commodities. In general, there is not perhaps, any one article of expense or consumption by which the liberality or narrowness of a man's whole expense can be better judged of than by his house-rent. A proportional tax upon this particular article of expense might, perhaps, produce a more considerable revenue than any which has hitherto been drawn from it in any part of Europe. If the tax, indeed, was very high, the greater part of people would endeavour to evade it as much as they could, by contenting themselves with smaller houses, and by turning the greater part of their expense into some other channel.

The rent for houses, while somewhat similar to land rent, is fundamentally different in one key way. Land rent is paid for the use of a productive asset, as the land itself generates income. In contrast, house rent is paid for the use of an unproductive asset. Neither the house nor the land it’s on produces anything. Therefore, the rent payer needs to obtain the funds from a different source of income that is distinct from this asset. A tax on house rent, in as much as it affects residents, must be sourced from the same income as the rent itself and is paid from their earnings, whether that comes from wages, business profits, or land rent. To the extent that it impacts residents, it's a tax that affects not just one income source but equally targets all three. It is, in every way, similar to a tax on any other consumable goods. Generally, there might not be a better indicator of a person's overall spending habits than their house rent. A proportional tax on this specific expense might generate more revenue than any other taxes collected from it in Europe so far. If the tax were indeed very high, most people would likely try to avoid it by choosing smaller houses and redirecting a large part of their spending elsewhere.

The rent of houses might easily be ascertained with sufficient accuracy, by a policy of the same kind with that which would be necessary for ascertaining the ordinary rent of land. Houses not inhabited ought to pay no tax. A tax upon them would fall altogether upon the proprietor, who would thus be taxed for a subject which afforded him neither conveniency nor revenue. Houses inhabited by the proprietor ought to be rated, not according to the expense which they might have cost in building, but according to the rent which an equitable arbitration might judge them likely to bring if leased to a tenant. If rated according to the expense which they might have cost in building, a tax of three or four shillings in the pound, joined with other taxes, would ruin almost all the rich and great families of this, and, I believe, of every other civilized country. Whoever will examine with attention the different town and country houses of some of the richest and greatest families in this country, will find that, at the rate of only six and a-half, or seven per cent. upon the original expense of building, their house-rent is nearly equal to the whole neat rent of their estates. It is the accumulated expense of several successive generations, laid out upon objects of great beauty and magnificence, indeed, but, in proportion to what they cost, of very small exchangeable value.[58]

The rent for houses can easily be determined accurately, using a method similar to the one needed to figure out the standard rent for land. Uninhabited houses shouldn't be taxed. A tax on them would only burden the owner, who would end up paying for something that provides no convenience or income. Houses owned by the proprietor should be taxed not based on their construction cost but on the rent they would potentially bring in if rented out. If taxes were based on construction expenses, a tax rate of three or four shillings per pound, along with other taxes, would devastate nearly all wealthy families in this country and likely in every other civilized nation. Anyone who carefully examines the various town and country homes of some of the wealthiest families here will see that, at a rate of just six and a half or seven percent of the original building cost, their house rent nearly matches the entire net rent from their estates. It's the accumulated spending of many generations, invested in beautiful and magnificent properties, which, relative to their cost, have very little market value. [58]

Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rent of houses; it would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground.[Pg 356] More or less can be got for it, according as the competitors happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify their fancy for a particular spot of ground at a greater or smaller expense. In every country, the greatest number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there accordingly that the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of those competitors would in no respect be increased by a tax upon ground-rents, they would not probably be disposed to pay more for the use of the ground. Whether the tax was to be advanced by the inhabitant or by the owner of the ground, would be of little importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the less he would incline to pay for the ground; so that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent. The ground-rents of uninhabited houses ought to pay no tax.

Ground rents are actually a better target for taxation than the rent of houses. A tax on ground rents wouldn't increase house rents; it would be fully shouldered by the ground-rent owner, who operates as a monopolist and demands the highest rent possible for the use of his land.[Pg 356] The amount he can charge varies depending on how wealthy his competitors are and their willingness to spend more or less on a specific piece of land. In every country, the most affluent competitors are typically in the capital, which is why the highest ground rents are found there. Since a tax on ground rents wouldn’t increase the wealth of these competitors, they likely wouldn’t be willing to pay more for land use. Whether the tax burden fell on the tenant or the ground-owner is less significant. The more the tenant has to pay in taxes, the less they would want to pay for the land itself, meaning the final tax payment would ultimately fall on the ground-rent owner. Ground rents for uninhabited houses should not be taxed at all.

Both ground-rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are a species of revenue which the owner, in many cases, enjoys without any care or attention of his own. Though a part of this revenue should be taken from him in order to defray the expenses of the state, no discouragement will thereby be given to any sort of industry. The annual produce of the land and labour of the society, the real wealth and revenue of the great body of the people, might be the same after such a tax as before. Ground-rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are therefore, perhaps, the species of revenue which can best bear to have a peculiar tax imposed upon them.

Both ground rents and regular land rent are types of income that the owner often receives without needing to do much, if anything, themselves. While a portion of this income should be taken to cover state expenses, it won’t discourage any type of industry. The total output from land and labor in society—the real wealth and income of the majority—could remain unchanged after such a tax. Therefore, ground rents and regular land rent might be the types of income that can best handle having a specific tax placed on them.

Ground-rents seem, in this respect, a more proper subject of peculiar taxation, than even the ordinary rent of land. The ordinary rent of land is, in many cases, owing partly, at least, to the attention and good management of the landlord. A very heavy tax might discourage, too much, this attention and good management. Ground-rents, so far as they exceed the ordinary rent of land, are altogether owing to the good government of the sovereign, which, by protecting the industry either of the whole people or of the inhabitants of some particular place, enables them to pay so much more than its real value for the ground which they build their houses upon; or to make to its owner so much more than compensation for the loss which he might sustain by this use of it. Nothing can be more reasonable, than that a fund, which owes its existence to the good government of the state, should be taxed peculiarly, or should contribute something more than the greater part of other funds, towards the support of that government.

Ground rents seem, in this respect, to be a more appropriate subject for special taxation than even the regular rent of land. The regular rent of land is, in many cases, at least partly due to the attention and good management of the landlord. A very heavy tax could discourage this attention and good management too much. Ground rents, as far as they exceed the regular rent of land, are entirely due to the good governance of the state, which, by protecting the industry's interests, either for the entire population or for the residents of a specific area, allows them to pay much more than the actual value for the land beneath their homes; or to provide the landowner with significantly more than just compensation for the loss he might suffer from this use of it. Nothing could be more reasonable than that a resource, which owes its existence to the good governance of the state, should be uniquely taxed or should contribute more than most other resources toward supporting that government.

Though, in many different countries of Europe, taxes have been imposed upon the rent of houses, I do not know of any in which ground-rents have been considered as a separate subject of taxation. The contrivers of taxes have, probably, found some difficulty in ascertaining what part of the rent ought to be considered as ground-rent, and what part ought to be considered as building-rent. It should not, however, seem very difficult to distinguish those two parts of the rent from one another.

Though in many different countries in Europe, taxes have been imposed on house rents, I'm not aware of any where ground rents have been treated as a separate subject for taxation. The creators of taxes have probably found it challenging to determine what portion of the rent should be classified as ground rent and what portion should be classified as building rent. However, it shouldn’t seem too difficult to distinguish between these two parts of the rent.

In Great Britain the rent of houses is supposed to be taxed in the same proportion as the rent of land, by what is called the annual land tax. The valuation, according to which each different parish and district is assessed to this tax, is always the same. It was originally extremely unequal, and it still continues to be so. Through the greater part of the kingdom this tax falls still more lightly upon the rent of houses than upon that of land. In some few districts only, which were originally rated high, and in which the rents of houses have fallen considerably, the land tax of three or four shillings in the pound is said to amount to an equal proportion of the real rent of houses. Untenanted houses, though by law subject to the tax, are, in most districts, exempted from it by the favour of assessors; and this exemption sometimes occasions some little variation in the rate of particular houses, though that of the district is always the same. Improvements of rent, by new buildings, repairs, &c. go to the discharge of the district, which occasions still further variations in the rate of particular houses.

In Great Britain, the rent of houses is supposed to be taxed at the same rate as the rent of land, through something called the annual land tax. The valuation used to assess each parish and district for this tax is always the same. Initially, it was highly uneven, and it still remains so. In most parts of the country, this tax burdens the rent of houses even less than that of land. In only a few districts, which were originally assessed high and where house rents have dropped significantly, the land tax of three or four shillings per pound is said to be equivalent to the real rent of houses. Unrented houses, although legally required to pay the tax, are often exempt from it in most areas due to the discretion of assessors; this exemption sometimes leads to slight variations in the rates of specific houses, though the overall rate for the district remains constant. Increases in rent due to new buildings, repairs, etc., contribute to the district's revenue, leading to further variations in the rates of particular houses.

In the province of Holland,[59] every house is taxed at two and a-half per cent. of its value, without any regard, either to the rent which it actually pays, or to the circumstance of its being tenanted or untenanted. There seems to be a hardship in obliging the proprietor to pay a tax for an untenanted house, from which he can derive no revenue, especially so very heavy a tax. In Holland, where the market rate of interest does not exceed three per cent., two and a-half per cent. upon the whole value of the house must, in most cases, amount to more than a third of the building-rent, perhaps of the whole rent. The valuation, indeed, according to which the houses are rated, though very unequal, in said to be always below the real value. When a house is rebuilt, improved, or enlarged, there is a new valuation, and the tax is rated accordingly.

In the province of Holland,[59] every house is taxed at two and a half percent of its value, regardless of the rent it actually pays or whether it’s occupied or not. It seems unfair to make the owner pay a tax for a vacant house, from which they gain no income, especially such a significant tax. In Holland, where the market interest rate is no more than three percent, two and a half percent on the total value of the house often exceeds a third of the rental income, possibly even the entire rent. The assessments used to determine the house taxes, although quite unequal, are said to always be lower than the actual value. When a house is rebuilt, upgraded, or expanded, a new assessment is done, and the tax is adjusted accordingly.

The contrivers of the several taxes which in England have, at different times, been imposed upon houses, seem to have imagined that there was some great difficulty in ascertaining, with tolerable exactness, what was the real rent of every house. They have regulated their taxes, therefore, according to some more obvious circumstance, such as they had probably imagined would, in most cases, bear some proportion to the rent.

The people who designed the various taxes imposed on houses in England at different times seem to have thought that it was quite challenging to determine, with reasonable accuracy, the actual rent of each house. As a result, they based their taxes on more obvious factors, assuming these would generally relate to the rent in most situations.

The first tax of this kind was hearth-money;[Pg 357] or a tax of two shillings upon every hearth. In order to ascertain how many hearths were in the house, it was necessary that the tax-gatherer should enter every room in it. This odious visit rendered the tax odious. Soon after the Revolution, therefore, it was abolished as a badge of slavery.

The first tax of this kind was hearth money;[Pg 357] a tax of two shillings on every hearth. To figure out how many hearths were in a house, the tax collector had to enter every room. This unpleasant visit made the tax unpopular. Shortly after the Revolution, it was abolished as a symbol of oppression.

The next tax of this kind was a tax of two shillings upon every dwelling-house inhabited. A house with ten windows to pay four shillings more. A house with twenty windows and upwards to pay eight shillings. This tax was afterwards so far altered, that houses with twenty windows, and with less than thirty, were ordered to pay ten shillings, and those with thirty windows and upwards to pay twenty shillings. The number of windows can, in most cases, be counted from the outside, and, in all cases, without entering every room in the house. The visit of the tax-gatherer, therefore, was less offensive in this tax than in the hearth-money.

The next tax of this type was two shillings on every occupied dwelling. A house with ten windows had to pay an additional four shillings. A house with twenty windows or more had to pay eight shillings. This tax was later modified so that houses with twenty windows, but less than thirty, were required to pay ten shillings, while those with thirty windows or more had to pay twenty shillings. The number of windows can usually be counted from the outside and, in all situations, without needing to enter every room in the house. As a result, the tax collector's visit was less intrusive for this tax compared to the hearth-tax.

This tax was afterwards repealed, and in the room of it was established the window-tax, which has undergone two several alterations and augmentations. The window tax, as it stands at present (January 1775), over and above the duty of three shillings upon every house in England, and of one shilling upon every house in Scotland, lays a duty upon every window, which in England augments gradually from twopence, the lowest rate upon houses with not more than seven windows, to two shillings, the highest rate upon houses with twenty-five windows and upwards.

This tax was later repealed and replaced by the window tax, which has gone through two changes and increases. The window tax, as it exists now (January 1775), adds a charge of three shillings on every house in England and one shilling on every house in Scotland, along with a fee for each window. In England, this fee starts at two pence for houses with no more than seven windows and increases to two shillings for houses with twenty-five windows or more.

The principal objection to all such taxes is their inequality; an inequality of the worst kind, as they must frequently fall much heavier upon the poor than upon the rich. A house of ten pounds rent in a country town, may sometimes have more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the inhabitant of the former in likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet, so far as his contribution is regulated by the window tax, he must contribute more to the support of the state. Such taxes are, therefore, directly contrary to the first of the four maxims above mentioned. They do not seem to offend much against any of the other three.

The main issue with these kinds of taxes is their inequality; they are unfairly burdensome, often hitting the poor much harder than the rich. A house with a rent of ten pounds in a small town might have more windows than a house that costs five hundred pounds in London. Even though the person living in the cheaper house is likely much poorer than the one in the expensive house, the window tax means he has to pay more to support the government. Therefore, these taxes directly go against the first of the four principles mentioned earlier. They don’t seem to violate the other three principles significantly.

The natural tendency of the window tax, and of all other taxes upon houses, is to lower rents. The more a man pays for the tax, the less, it is evident, he can afford to pay for the rent. Since the imposition of the window tax, however, the rents of houses have, upon the whole, risen more or less, in almost every town and village of Great Britain, with which I am acquainted. Such has been, almost everywhere, the increase of the demand for houses, that it has raised the rents more than the window tax could sink them; one of the many proofs of the great prosperity of the country, and of the increasing revenue of its inhabitants. Had it not been for the tax, rents would probably have risen still higher.

The natural tendency of the window tax, and all other house taxes, is to lower rents. The more someone pays in taxes, the less they can afford to pay in rent. However, since the window tax was introduced, rents for houses have generally gone up in almost every town and village in Great Britain that I know of. The demand for houses has increased so much that it has pushed rents up more than the window tax could bring them down, which is one of many signs of the country's prosperity and the growing income of its people. If it weren't for the tax, rents would likely have risen even higher.

ART. II.Taxes upon Profit, or upon the Revenue arising from Stock.

The revenue or profit arising from stock naturally divides itself into two parts; that which pays the interest, and which belongs to the owner of the stock; and that surplus part which is over and above what is necessary for paying the interest.

The money or profit from stocks naturally splits into two parts: the portion that covers the interest, which belongs to the stock owner, and the extra part that goes beyond what’s needed to pay the interest.

This latter part of profit is evidently a subject not taxable directly. It is the compensation, and, in most cases, it is no more than a very moderate compensation for the risk and trouble of employing the stock. The employer must have this compensation, otherwise he cannot, consistently with his own interest, continue the employment. If he was taxed directly, therefore, in proportion to the whole profit, he would be obliged either to raise the rate of his profit, or to charge the tax upon the interest of money; that is, to pay less interest. If he raised the rate of his profit in proportion to the tax, the whole tax, though it might be advanced by him, would be finally paid by one or other of two different sets of people, according to the different ways in which he might employ the stock of which he had the management. If he employed it as a farming stock, in the cultivation of land, he could raise the rate of his profit only by retaining a greater portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of a greater portion, of the produce of the land; and as this could be done only by a reduction of rent, the final payment of the tax would fall upon the landlord. If he employed it as a mercantile or manufacturing stock, he could raise the rate of his profit only by raising the price of his goods; in which case, the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the consumers of those goods. If he did not raise the rate of his profit, he would be obliged to charge the whole tax upon that part of it which was allotted for the interest of money. He could afford less interest for whatever stock he borrowed, and the whole weight of the tax would, in this case, fall ultimately upon the interest of money. So far as he could not relieve himself from the tax in the one way, he would be obliged to relieve himself in the other.

This latter part of profit is clearly not something that can be taxed directly. It serves as compensation, and in most cases, it’s just a modest compensation for the risk and effort of using the capital. The employer needs this compensation; otherwise, he can’t continue to keep the employment in his own best interest. If he were taxed directly based on the total profit, he’d have to either raise his profit margin or pass the tax onto the interest on money, meaning he'd pay less interest. If he raised his profit margin to cover the tax, that tax, even if initially paid by him, would ultimately be borne by different groups of people depending on how he managed his capital. If he used it for farming, to grow crops, he could only raise his profit margin by keeping a larger share, or the price of a larger share, of the crop’s yield; and this could only happen through lowering the rent, meaning the final burden of the tax would fall on the landlord. If he used it as business or manufacturing capital, he could only increase his profit margin by increasing the price of his products; in this case, the total burden of the tax would end up on the consumers of those products. If he didn’t raise his profit margin, he’d have to put the entire tax burden on the portion meant for interest payments. He wouldn’t be able to offer as much interest for any borrowed capital, and in that case, the full impact of the tax would ultimately rest on the interest payments. If he couldn’t shift the tax burden in one way, he’d have to shift it in the other.

The interest of money seems, at first sight, a subject equally capable of being taxed directly as the rent of land. Like the rent of land, it is a neat produce, which remains, after completely compensating the whole risk and trouble of employing the stock. As a tax upon the rent of land cannot raise rents, because the neat produce which remains, after replacing the stock of the farmer, together with his reasonable profit, cannot be greater[Pg 358] after the tax than before it, so, for the same reason, a tax upon the interest of money could not raise the rate of interest; the quantity of stock or money in the country, like the quantity of land, being supposed to remain the same after the tax as before it. The ordinary rate of profit, it has been shewn, in the first book, is everywhere regulated by the quantity of stock to be employed, in proportion to the quantity of the employment, or of the business which must be done by it. But the quantity of the employment, or of the business to be done by stock, could neither be increased nor diminished by any tax upon the interest of money. If the quantity of the stock to be employed, therefore, was neither increased nor diminished by it, the ordinary rate of profit would necessarily remain the same. But the portion of this profit, necessary for compensating the risk and trouble of the employer, would likewise remain the same; that risk and trouble being in no respect altered. The residue, therefore, that portion which belongs to the owner of the stock, and which pays the interest of money, would necessarily remain the same too. At first sight, therefore, the interest of money seems to be a subject as fit to be taxed directly as the rent of land.

The interest on money seems, at first glance, like a topic that could be directly taxed just like land rent. Similar to land rent, it represents a net income that remains after fully compensating for all the risks and efforts involved in using the capital. Just as a tax on land rent can't increase rents—because the net income left after covering the farmer's capital and reasonable profit can't be more after the tax than it was before—similarly, a tax on money interest wouldn't increase the interest rate either. The total amount of money or capital in the country, like the amount of land, is assumed to stay the same after the tax as it was before. The regular profit rate, as demonstrated in the first book, is influenced by the amount of capital available for use in relation to the amount of work or business that needs to be done with it. However, the amount of work or business that can be done with capital can't be changed by any tax on money interest. Thus, if the amount of capital available for use isn't increased or decreased by the tax, the normal profit rate will remain unchanged as well. The portion of that profit needed to cover the risk and effort of the business owner would also stay the same, as those factors haven't changed. Therefore, the remainder that belongs to the capital owner, which pays the interest on the money, would also remain the same. At first glance, then, money interest appears to be just as suitable for direct taxation as land rent.

There are, however, two different circumstances, which render the interest of money a much less proper subject of direct taxation than the rent of land.

There are, however, two different situations that make the interest on money a much less suitable subject for direct taxation than the rent of land.

First, the quantity and value of the land which any man possesses, can never be a secret, and can always be ascertained with great exactness. But the whole amount of the capital stock which he possesses is almost always a secret, and can scarce ever be ascertained with tolerable exactness. It is liable, besides, to almost continual variations. A year seldom passes away, frequently not a month, sometimes scarce a single day, in which it does not rise or fall more or less. An inquisition into every man's private circumstances, and an inquisition which, in order to accommodate the tax to them, watched over all the fluctuations of his fortune, would be a source of such continual and endless vexation as no person could support.

First, the amount and value of the land that anyone owns can never be a secret and can always be determined with great accuracy. However, the total amount of capital he has is almost always a secret and can rarely be accurately figured out. It is also subject to almost constant changes. A year rarely goes by, often not even a month, and sometimes hardly a single day, without it fluctuating up or down. Investigating everyone's personal situations, and doing so in order to adjust the tax based on them while monitoring all the ups and downs of their finances, would create such constant and endless frustration that no one could tolerate it.

Secondly, land is a subject which cannot be removed; whereas stock easily may. The proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular country in which his estate lies. The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a burdensome tax; and would remove his stock to some other country, where he could either carry on his business, or enjoy his fortune more at his ease. By removing his stock, he would put an end to all the industry which it had maintained in the country which he left. Stock cultivates land; stock employs labour. A tax which tended to drive away stock from any particular country, would so far tend to dry up every source of revenue, both to the sovereign and to the society. Not only the profits of stock, but the rent of land, and the wages of labour, would necessarily be more or less diminished by its removal.

Secondly, land is something that can't be moved, while stock can be easily relocated. The owner of land is automatically a citizen of the country where their property is located. In contrast, the owner of stock is more like a global citizen and isn’t tied to any specific nation. They would likely leave a country if faced with annoying scrutiny or heavy taxes, moving their assets to a place where they could more easily run their business or enjoy their wealth. By taking their stock elsewhere, they would end all the jobs and economic activity that it supported in the country they left. Stock develops land and employs workers. A tax that drives stock away from a particular country would ultimately reduce sources of revenue for both the government and the society. Not just stock profits, but also land rents and labor wages would decrease as a result of its departure.

The nations, accordingly, who have attempted to tax the revenue arising from stock, instead of any severe inquisition of this kind, have been obliged to content themselves with some very loose, and, therefore, more or less arbitrary estimation. The extreme inequality and uncertainty of a tax assessed in this manner, can be compensated only by its extreme moderation; in consequence of which, every man finds himself rated so very much below his real revenue, that he gives himself little disturbance though his neighbour should be rated somewhat lower.

The countries that have tried to tax income from investments, rather than conduct any serious investigation, have had to settle for very rough and, therefore, somewhat random estimates. The significant inequality and uncertainty of a tax assessed this way can only be balanced out by being extremely low; as a result, everyone feels they are taxed much less than their actual income, so they don’t worry much if their neighbor is taxed a little less.

By what is called the land tax in England, it was intended that the stock should be taxed in the same proportion as land. When the tax upon land was at four shillings in the pound, or at one-fifth of the supposed rent, it was intended that stock should be taxed at one-fifth of the supposed interest. When the present annual land tax was first imposed, the legal rate of interest was six per cent. Every hundred pounds stock, accordingly, was supposed to be taxed at twenty-four shillings, the fifth part of six pounds. Since the legal rate of interest has been reduced to five per cent. every hundred pounds stock is supposed to be taxed at twenty shillings only. The sum to be raised, by what is called the land tax, was divided between the country and the principal towns. The greater part of it was laid upon the country; and of what was laid upon the towns, the greater part was assessed upon the houses. What remained to be assessed upon the stock or trade of the towns (for the stock upon the land was not meant to be taxed) was very much below the real value of that stock or trade. Whatever inequalities, therefore, there might be in the original assessment, gave little disturbance. Every parish and district still continues to be rated for its land, its houses, and its stock, according to the original assessment; and the almost universal prosperity of the country, which, in most places, has raised very much the value of all these, has rendered those inequalities of still less importance now. The rate, too, upon each district, continuing always the same, the uncertainty of this tax, so far as it might be assessed upon the stock of any individual, has been very much diminished, as well as rendered of much less consequence. If the greater part of the lands of England are not rated to the land tax at half their actual value, the greater part of the stock of England is, perhaps, scarce rated at[Pg 359] the fiftieth part of its actual value. In some towns, the whole land tax is assessed upon houses; as in Westminster, where stock and trade are free. It is otherwise in London.

In England, what's known as the land tax was meant to tax stock in the same way it taxed land. When the land tax was set at four shillings per pound, or one-fifth of the estimated rent, it was intended for stock to be taxed at one-fifth of the estimated interest. When the current annual land tax was first introduced, the legal interest rate was six percent. Thus, every hundred pounds of stock was assumed to be taxed at twenty-four shillings, which is one-fifth of six pounds. Since the legal interest rate has dropped to five percent, every hundred pounds of stock is now supposed to be taxed at only twenty shillings. The amount needed from the land tax was divided between the countryside and the main towns. Most of it was placed on rural areas, and of what was placed on towns, the majority was assessed on the houses. The remaining amount assessed on the stock or trade of the towns (since the stock on land was not meant to be taxed) was significantly lower than the actual value of that stock or trade. So, any inequalities in the initial assessment caused little disruption. Every parish and district continues to be taxed on its land, houses, and stock based on the original assessment, and the overall prosperity of the country, which has greatly increased the value of all these, has made those inequalities even less significant now. The tax rate for each district remains constant, which has reduced the uncertainty about how this tax might affect any individual’s stock and has made it much less important. If most of the land in England isn't rated for the land tax at half its actual value, then much of the stock in England is likely assessed at barely one-fiftieth of its actual value. In some towns, the entire land tax is assessed solely on houses, like in Westminster, where stock and trade are exempt. It's different in London.

In all countries, a severe inquisition into the circumstances of private persons has been carefully avoided.

In every country, a thorough investigation into the situations of private individuals has been deliberately avoided.

At Hamburg,[60] every inhabitant is obliged to pay to the state one fourth per cent. of all that he possesses; and as the wealth of the people of Hamburg consists principally in stock, this tax may be considered as a tax upon stock. Every man assesses himself, and, in the presence of the magistrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain sum of money, which he declares upon oath, to be one fourth per cent. of all that he possesses, but without declaring what it amounts to, or being liable to any examination upon that subject. This tax is generally supposed to be paid with great fidelity. In a small republic, where the people have entire confidence in their magistrates, are convinced of the necessity of the tax for the support of the state, and believe that it will be faithfully applied to that purpose, such conscientious and voluntary payment may sometimes be expected. It is not peculiar to the people of Hamburg.

In Hamburg,[60] every resident is required to pay the state a tax of one-fourth percent of all their possessions. Since the wealth of the people in Hamburg mainly comes from stocks, this tax can be seen as a tax on stock. Each person evaluates their own wealth and, in front of the magistrate, contributes an annual sum of money to the public purse, which they declare under oath to be one-fourth percent of their total possessions, without having to disclose the actual amount or undergo any examination about it. This tax is generally thought to be paid quite honestly. In a small republic where the citizens have full trust in their magistrates, are convinced of the necessity of the tax for the state's support, and believe it will be used responsibly, such honest and voluntary payments can sometimes be expected. This isn't unique to the people of Hamburg.

The canton of Underwald, in Switzerland, is frequently ravaged by storms and inundations, and it is thereby exposed to extraordinary expenses. Upon such occasions the people assemble, and every one is said to declare with the greatest frankness what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly. At Zurich, the law orders, that in cases of necessity, every one should be taxed in proportion to his revenue; the amount of which he is obliged to declare upon oath. They have no suspicion, it is said, that any of their fellow-citizens will deceive them. At Basil, the principal revenue of the state arises from a small custom upon goods exported. All the citizens make oath, that they will pay every three months all the taxes imposed by law. All merchants, and even all inn-keepers, are trusted with keeping themselves the account of the goods which they sell, either within or without the territory. At the end of every three months, they send this account to the treasurer, with the amount of the tax computed at the bottom of it. It is not suspected that the revenue suffers by this confidence.[61]

The canton of Underwald in Switzerland often faces storms and floods, which leads to significant expenses. During these times, people gather, and everyone is said to openly declare their worth so they can be taxed accordingly. In Zurich, the law states that in times of need, everyone should be taxed based on their income, which they must declare under oath. They believe none of their fellow citizens will cheat them. In Basel, the main source of state revenue comes from a small tax on exported goods. All citizens swear that they will pay all legally imposed taxes every three months. Merchants and even innkeepers are trusted to keep track of the goods they sell, both inside and outside the territory. At the end of every three months, they send this account to the treasurer, along with the calculated tax amount at the bottom. It's not believed that this trust negatively impacts the revenue.

To oblige every citizen to declare publicly upon oath, the amount of his fortune, must not, it seems, in those Swiss cantons, be reckoned a hardship. At Hamburg it would be reckoned the greatest. Merchants engaged in the hazardous projects of trade, all tremble at the thoughts of being obliged, at all times, to expose the real state of their circumstances. The ruin of their credit, and the miscarriage of their projects, they foresee, would too often be the consequence. A sober and parsimonious people, who are strangers to all such projects, do not feel that they have occasion for any such concealment.

Forcing every citizen to publicly declare their wealth under oath doesn't seem to be a burden in those Swiss cantons. In Hamburg, though, it would be seen as a huge hardship. Merchants involved in the risky business of trade dread the idea of always having to reveal the true state of their finances. They predict that it would often lead to the downfall of their credit and the failure of their plans. A prudent and frugal population, unfamiliar with such ventures, doesn't feel the need for any kind of secrecy.

In Holland, soon after the exaltation of the late prince of Orange to the stadtholdership, a tax of two per cent. or the fiftieth penny, as it was called, was imposed upon the whole substance of every citizen. Every citizen assessed himself, and paid his tax, in the same manner as at Hamburg, and it was in general supposed to have been paid with great fidelity. The people had at that time the greatest affection for their new government, which they had just established by a general insurrection. The tax was to be paid but once, in order to relieve the state in a particular exigency. It was, indeed, too heavy to be permanent. In a country where the market rate of interest seldom exceeds three per cent., a tax of two per cent. amounts to thirteen shillings and four pence in the pound, upon the highest neat revenue which is commonly drawn from stock. It is a tax which very few people could pay, without encroaching more or less upon their capitals. In a particular exigency, the people may, from great public zeal, make a great effort, and give up even a part of their capital, in order to relieve the state. But it is impossible that they should continue to do so for any considerable time; and if they did, the tax would soon ruin them so completely, as to render them altogether incapable of supporting the state.

In Holland, shortly after the late prince of Orange became the stadtholder, a tax of two percent, or the fiftieth penny as it was known, was imposed on the entire wealth of every citizen. Each citizen assessed themselves and paid their tax in the same way as in Hamburg, and it was generally believed that this was done with great responsibility. At that time, the people had strong affection for their new government, which they had just established through a widespread uprising. The tax was meant to be paid only once to help the state in a specific emergency. It was definitely too burdensome to be permanent. In a country where the market interest rate rarely exceeds three percent, a two percent tax results in thirteen shillings and four pence in the pound on the highest net revenue typically generated from investments. This is a tax that very few could pay without dipping into their capital. In certain emergencies, the public might, driven by strong civic spirit, make an effort and even sacrifice part of their capital to support the state. However, it is unsustainable for them to do so over a significant period; if they did, the tax would quickly deplete their resources, leaving them unable to support the state at all.

The tax upon stock, imposed by the land tax bill in England, though it is proportioned to the capital, is not intended to diminish or take away any part of that capital. It is meant only to be a tax upon the interest of money, proportioned to that upon the rent of land; so that when the latter is at four shillings in the pound, the former may be at four shillings in the pound too. The tax at Hamburg, and the still more moderate taxes of Underwald and Zurich, are meant, in the same manner, to be taxes, not upon the capital, but upon the interest or neat revenue of stock. That of Holland was meant to be a tax upon the capital.

The tax on stock, imposed by the land tax bill in England, while calculated based on the capital, is not meant to reduce or take away any part of that capital. It is simply intended as a tax on the interest of money, aligned with that on the rent of land; so when the latter is four shillings per pound, the former is also set at four shillings per pound. The tax in Hamburg, and the even lower taxes in Underwald and Zurich, are similarly designed to be taxes on the interest or net revenue of stock, not the capital itself. The tax in Holland was intended to be a tax on the capital.

Taxes upon the Profit of particular Employments.

In some countries, extraordinary taxes are imposed upon the profits of stock; sometimes when employed in particular branches of trade, and sometimes when employed in agriculture.

In some countries, special taxes are placed on stock profits; sometimes when used in certain trades, and sometimes when used in agriculture.

Of the former kind, are in England, the[Pg 360] tax upon hawkers and pedlars, that upon hackney-coaches and chairs, and that which the keepers of ale-houses pay for a licence to retail ale and spiritous liquors. During the late war, another tax of the same kind was proposed upon shops. The war having been undertaken, it was said, in defence of the trade of the country, the merchants, who were to profit by it, ought to contribute towards the support of it.

Of the former kind, there are in England, the[Pg 360] tax on hawkers and peddlers, the one on taxis and carriages, and the license fee that alehouse owners pay to sell ale and spirits. During the recent war, another tax of the same kind was suggested for shops. The war was said to be fought in defense of the country’s trade, so the merchants who would benefit from it should help cover the costs.

A tax, however, upon the profits of stock employed in any particular branch of trade, can never fall finally upon the dealers (who must in all ordinary cases have their reasonable profit, and, where the competition is free, can seldom have more than that profit), but always upon the consumers, who must be obliged to pay in the price of the goods the tax which the dealer advances; and generally with some overcharge.

A tax on the profits from stock used in a specific branch of trade can never ultimately be absorbed by the dealers (who, in typical situations, need to make a reasonable profit and, when competition is fair, can rarely earn more than that profit). Instead, it always gets passed on to the consumers, who have to cover the tax included in the price of the goods plus usually a little extra charge.

A tax of this kind, when it is proportioned to the trade of the dealer, is finally paid by the consumer, and occasions no oppression to the dealer. When it is not so proportioned, but is the same upon all dealers, though in this case, too, it is finally paid by the consumer, yet it favours the great, and occasions some oppression to the small dealer. The tax of five shillings a-week upon every hackney coach, and that of ten shillings a-year upon every hackney chair, so far as it is advanced by the different keepers of such coaches and chairs, is exactly enough proportioned to the extent of their respective dealings. It neither favours the great, nor oppresses the smaller dealer. The tax of twenty shillings a-year for a licence to sell ale; of forty shillings for a licence to sell spiritous liquors; and of forty shillings more for a licence to sell wine, being the same upon all retailers, must necessarily give some advantage to the great, and occasion some oppression to the small dealers. The former must find it more easy to get back the tax in the price of their goods than the latter. The moderation of the tax, however, renders this inequality of less importance; and it may to many people appear not improper to give some discouragement to the multiplication of little ale-houses. The tax upon shops, it was intended, should be the same upon all shops. It could not well have been otherwise. It would have been impossible to proportion, with tolerable exactness, the tax upon a shop to the extent of the trade carried on in it, without such an inquisition as would have been altogether insupportable in a free country. If the tax had been considerable, it would have oppressed the small, and forced almost the whole retail trade into the hands of the great dealers. The competition of the former being taken away, the latter would have enjoyed a monopoly of the trade; and, like all other monopolists, would soon have combined to raise their profits much beyond what was necessary for the payment of the tax. The final payment, instead of falling upon the shop-keeper, would have fallen upon the consumer, with a considerable overcharge to the profit of the shop-keeper. For these reasons, the project of a tax upon shops was laid aside, and in the room of it was substituted the subsidy, 1759.

A tax like this, when based on the dealer's trade, is ultimately paid by the consumer and doesn't burden the dealer. However, if it's the same for all dealers, even though the consumer still pays it in the end, it favors the larger businesses and puts some pressure on the smaller ones. The five-shilling weekly tax on each hackney coach and the ten-shilling annual tax on every hackney chair are perfectly aligned with the scale of their respective businesses. This setup neither helps the large dealers nor harms the smaller ones. The annual twenty-shilling license fee to sell ale, the forty-shilling fee to sell spirits, and another forty-shilling fee to sell wine, being the same for all retailers, inevitably gives an advantage to larger dealers and creates challenges for smaller ones. The larger dealers can more easily recover the tax cost in their prices than the smaller ones. However, the mildness of the tax makes this inequality less significant, and some might think it's reasonable to limit the number of small alehouses. The tax on shops was meant to be uniform across all shops, as it couldn't have been otherwise. It would have been impossible to accurately assess a shop's tax based on its trade volume without a level of scrutiny completely unacceptable in a free society. If the tax had been large, it would have hurt smaller shops and forced most retail trade into the hands of the larger ones. Eliminating competition from smaller dealers would have allowed the larger ones to monopolize the market and, like all monopolists, they would soon collude to drive their profits far above what was necessary to cover the tax. Consequently, the burden would not have landed on the shopkeeper but on the consumer, with a significant markup benefiting the shopkeeper. For these reasons, the proposal for a shop tax was abandoned and replaced by the subsidy in 1759.

What in France is called the personal taille, is perhaps, the most important tax upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture, that is levied in any part of Europe.

What is called the personal taille in France is probably the most significant tax on the profits from agricultural stock that is imposed anywhere in Europe.

In the disorderly state of Europe, during the prevalence of the feudal government, the sovereign was obliged to content himself with taxing those who were too weak to refuse to pay taxes. The great lords, though willing to assist him upon particular emergencies, refused to subject themselves to any constant tax, and he was not strong enough to force them. The occupiers of land all over Europe were, the greater part of them, originally bond-men. Through the greater part of Europe, they were gradually emancipated. Some of them acquired the property of landed estates, which they held by some base or ignoble tenure, sometimes under the king, and sometimes under some other great lord, like the ancient copy-holders of England. Others, without acquiring the property, obtained leases for terms of years, of the lands which they occupied under their lord, and thus became less dependent upon him. The great lords seem to have beheld the degree of prosperity and independency, which this inferior order of men had thus come to enjoy, with a malignant and contemptuous indignation, and willingly consented that the sovereign should tax them. In some countries, this tax was confined to the lands which were held in property by an ignoble tenure; and, in this case, the taille was said to be real. The land tax established by the late king of Sardinia, and the taille in the provinces of Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine, and Brittany; in the generality of Montauban, and in the elections of Agen and Condom, as well as in some other districts of France; are taxes upon lands held in property by an ignoble tenure. In other countries, the tax was laid upon the supposed profits of all those who held, in farm or lease, lands belonging to other people, whatever might be the tenure by which the proprietor held them; and in this case, the taille was said to be personal. In the greater part of those provinces of France, which are called the countries of elections, the taille is of this kind. The real taille, as it is imposed only upon a part of the lands of the country, is necessarily an unequal, but it is not always an arbitrary tax, though it is so upon some occasions. The personal taille, as it is intended to be propor[Pg 361]tioned to the profits of a certain class of people, which can only be guessed at, is necessarily both arbitrary and unequal.

In the chaotic state of Europe, during the time of feudal rule, the king had to settle for taxing those who were too powerless to refuse. The powerful lords, while willing to help him in certain emergencies, wouldn't agree to any regular tax, and he didn't have the strength to compel them. Most landowners across Europe began as serfs. Over time, they were gradually freed. Some of them obtained ownership of land, but it was often under lowly terms, sometimes directly from the king and sometimes from another lord, like the historical copyholders in England. Others, without owning the land, got leases for a number of years for the lands they farmed, thus becoming less reliant on their lords. The powerful lords appeared to look upon the prosperity and independence that this lower class had come to enjoy with jealousy and disdain, and they readily agreed for the king to tax them. In some places, the tax was limited to lands held under lowly terms; in this case, it was referred to as a real taille. The land tax set by the recent king of Sardinia, and the taille in Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine, and Brittany, along with Montauban and in the elections of Agen and Condom, as well as other areas in France, are taxes on lands held by lowly tenure. In other places, the tax was imposed on the supposed profits of all who farmed or leased land owned by others, regardless of the terms held by the owner; in this scenario, it was referred to as a personal taille. In most of the provinces of France known as the election countries, the taille falls into this category. The real taille, imposed only on part of the country's lands, is necessarily unequal, though not always arbitrary, even if it can be in certain situations. The personal taille, intended to be proportionate to the profits of a certain group of people, which can only be estimated, is both arbitrary and unequal by nature.

In France, the personal taille at present (1775) annually imposed upon the twenty generalities, called the countries of elections, amounts to 40,107,239 livres, 16 sous.[62] The proportion in which this sum is assessed upon those different provinces, varies from year to year, according to the reports which are made to the king's council concerning the goodness or badness of the crops, as well as other circumstances, which may either increase or diminish their respective abilities to pay. Each generality is divided into a certain number of elections; and the proportion in which the sum imposed upon the whole generality is divided among those different elections, varies likewise from year to year, according to the reports made to the council concerning their respective abilities. It seems impossible, that the council, with the best intentions, can ever proportion, with tolerable exactness, either of these two assessments to the real abilities of the province or district upon which they are respectively laid. Ignorance and misinformation must always, more or less, mislead the most upright council. The proportion which each parish ought to support of what is assessed upon the whole election, and that which each individual ought to support of what is assessed upon his particular parish, are both in the same manner varied from year to year, according as circumstances are supposed to require. These circumstances are judged of, in the one case, by the officers of the election, in the other, by those of the parish; and both the one and the other are, more or less, under the direction and influence of the intendant. Not only ignorance and misinformation, but friendship, party animosity, and private resentment, are said frequently to mislead such assessors. No man subject to such a tax, it is evident, can ever be certain, before he is assessed, of what he is to pay. He cannot even be certain after he is assessed. If any person has been taxed who ought to have been exempted, or if any person has been taxed beyond his proportion, though both must pay in the mean time, yet if they complain, and make good their complaints, the whole parish is reimposed next year, in order to reimburse them. If any of the contributors become bankrupt or insolvent, the collector is obliged to advance his tax; and the whole parish is reimposed next year, in order to reimburse the collector. If the collector himself should become bankrupt, the parish which elects him must answer for his conduct to the receiver-general of the election. But, as it might be troublesome for the receiver to prosecute the whole parish, he takes at his choice five or six of the richest contributors, and obliges them to make good what had been lost by the insolvency of the collector. The parish is afterwards reimposed, in order to reimburse those five or six. Such reimpositions are always over and above the taille of the particular year in which they are laid on.

In France, as of 1775, the personal taille imposed on the twenty generalities, also known as the election areas, amounts to 40,107,239 livres and 16 sous.[62] The way this total is distributed among different provinces changes each year based on reports submitted to the king's council about the quality of crops and other factors that might affect their ability to pay. Each generality is further divided into several elections, and the way the total is divided among these elections also changes yearly, depending on reports regarding their abilities. It seems unrealistic for the council, even with the best intentions, to accurately align either of these assessments with the actual financial capabilities of the province or district they apply to. Misunderstandings and false information can easily mislead even the most honest council. The amount each parish should contribute based on the total assessed on the entire election, as well as what each individual should pay based on their specific parish, also varies from year to year according to assumed needs. These needs are evaluated by the election officers in one case and parish officials in another, both of whom are influenced to some extent by the intendant. It's not just ignorance and misinformation that affect this process; personal relationships, political rivalries, and individual grievances often mislead assessors as well. Clearly, no one subjected to this tax can ever be certain, even before they are assessed, about what they will owe. They might not even know for sure after being assessed. If someone is taxed who should have been exempted, or if someone is taxed more than their share, both must pay in the meantime, but if they file a complaint and prove their case, the entire parish is re-assessed the following year to reimburse them. If any contributors go bankrupt or become unable to pay, the collector must cover their tax, and the parish is re-assessed the next year to reimburse the collector. If the collector goes bankrupt, the parish that elected them is responsible for their actions to the receiver-general of the election. However, since it could be impractical for the receiver to pursue the entire parish, they often choose five or six of the wealthiest contributors and require them to make up for what was lost due to the collector's insolvency. The parish is then re-assessed to reimburse those five or six individuals. These re-assessments are always in addition to the taille for the specific year in which they occur.

When a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock in a particular branch of trade, the traders are all careful to bring no more goods to market than what they can sell at a price sufficient to reimburse them from advancing the tax. Some of them withdraw a part of their stocks from the trade, and the market is more sparingly supplied than before. The price of the goods rises, and the final payment of the tax falls upon the consumer. But when a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture, it is not the interest of the farmers to withdraw any part of their stock from that employment. Each farmer occupies a certain quantity of land, for which he pays rent. For the proper cultivation of this land, a certain quantity of stock is necessary; and by withdrawing any part of this necessary quantity, the farmer is not likely to be more able to pay either the rent or the tax. In order to pay the tax, it can never be his interest to diminish the quantity of his produce, nor consequently to supply the market more sparingly than before. The tax, therefore, will never enable him to raise the price of his produce, so as to reimburse himself, by throwing the final payment upon the consumer. The farmer, however, must have his reasonable profit as well as every other dealer, otherwise he must give up the trade. After the imposition of a tax of this kind, he can get this reasonable profit only by paying less rent to the landlord. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he can afford to pay in the way of rent. A tax of this kind, imposed during the currency of a lease, may, no doubt, distress or ruin the farmer. Upon the renewal of the lease, it must always fall upon the landlord.

When a tax is placed on the profits from a specific type of trade, traders are careful not to bring more goods to market than they can sell at a price that covers the tax they have to pay. Some may withdraw part of their stock from the trade, which makes the market less supplied than before. As a result, the price of goods goes up, and the final burden of the tax falls on the consumer. However, when a tax is imposed on the profits from agricultural stock, farmers do not have an interest in pulling any of their stock from production. Each farmer manages a specific amount of land for which they pay rent. To properly cultivate this land, a certain amount of stock is necessary; if they withdraw any of this essential stock, it won't help them pay either the rent or the tax. In order to cover the tax, it’s never in a farmer's interest to reduce their output or supply the market less than before. Therefore, the tax won't allow them to raise prices to the point where they recoup their costs by passing it on to consumers. However, farmers need to make a reasonable profit like anyone else, or else they’ll have to leave the business. After this kind of tax is imposed, the only way for a farmer to secure that reasonable profit is by paying less rent to the landlord. The more they have to pay in taxes, the less they can afford to pay in rent. A tax like this, applied during a lease, can certainly distress or ruin a farmer. When it’s time to renew the lease, though, the burden typically shifts back to the landlord.

In the countries where the personal taille takes place, the farmer is commonly assessed in proportion to the stock which he appears to employ in cultivation. He is, upon this account, frequently afraid to have a good team of horses or oxen, but endeavours to cultivate with the meanest and most wretched instruments of husbandry that he can. Such is his distrust in the justice of his assessors, that he counterfeits poverty, and wishes to appear scarce able to pay any thing, for fear of being obliged to pay too much. By this miserable policy, he does not, perhaps, always consult his own interest in the most effectual manner; and he probably loses more by the diminution of his produce, than he saves by that of his tax. Though, in consequence of this wretched cultivation, the market is, no doubt, somewhat worse supplied; yet, the small rise of price which this may occasion, as it is not likely even to indemnify the farmer for the di[Pg 362]minution of his produce, it is still less likely to enable him to pay more rent to the landlord. The public, the farmer, the landlord, all suffer more or less by this degraded cultivation. That the personal taille tends, in many different ways, to discourage cultivation, and consequently to dry up the principal source of the wealth of every great country, I have already had occasion to observe in the third book of this Inquiry.

In countries where the personal taille is in effect, farmers are usually taxed based on the livestock they appear to use for farming. Because of this, they are often reluctant to own a good team of horses or oxen, opting instead to use the most basic and inadequate farming tools available. Their lack of trust in their assessors leads them to fake poverty, trying to seem barely able to pay anything out of fear of paying too much. This unfortunate strategy may not always serve their best interests; they likely lose more due to reduced yields than they save in taxes. Although this poor farming leads to a slightly lower market supply, any small increase in prices it might cause is unlikely to compensate farmers for their reduced output, making it even less probable that they can afford to pay higher rent to their landlords. The public, the farmers, and the landlords all face the consequences of this subpar farming. I've already pointed out in the third book of this Inquiry how the personal taille discourages farming in various ways, ultimately undermining the primary source of wealth for any major nation.

What are called poll-taxes in the southern provinces of North America, and the West India islands, annual taxes of so much a-head upon every negro, are properly taxes upon the profits of a certain species of stock employed in agriculture. As the planters, are the greater part of them, both farmers and landlords, the final payment of the tax falls upon them in their quality of landlords, without any retribution.

What are known as poll taxes in the southern states of North America and the West Indian islands are annual taxes charged per person on every Black individual. These taxes are essentially levies on the profits from a specific type of agricultural labor. Since most planters are both farmers and landlords, the burden of this tax ultimately falls on them as landlords, without any compensation.

Taxes of so much a head upon the bondmen employed in cultivation, seem anciently to have been common all over Europe. There subsists at present a tax of this kind in the empire of Russia. It is probably upon this account that poll-taxes of all kinds have often been represented as badges of slavery. Every tax, however, is to the person who pays it, a badge, not of slavery, but of liberty. It denotes that he is subject to government, indeed; but that, as he has some property, he cannot himself be the property of a master. A poll-tax upon slaves is altogether different from a poll-tax upon freemen. The latter is paid by the persons upon whom it is imposed; the former, by a different set of persons. The latter is either altogether arbitrary, or altogether unequal, and, in most cases, is both the one and the other; the former, though in some respects unequal, different slaves being of different values, is in no respect arbitrary. Every master, who knows the number of his own slaves, knows exactly what he has to pay. Those different taxes, however, being called by the same name, have been considered as of the same nature.

Taxes charged per person on the laborers working in agriculture have long been common across Europe. Today, this kind of tax still exists in Russia. This is likely why poll taxes have often been seen as symbols of slavery. However, every tax is, for the person paying it, a symbol not of slavery, but of freedom. It signifies that while he is subject to government, he possesses some property and, therefore, cannot be the property of a master. A poll tax on slaves is completely different from one on free people. The latter is paid by those it’s imposed on; the former is paid by a different group. The latter is either entirely arbitrary or completely unequal, and in many cases, it's both. The former, although somewhat unequal due to the different values of slaves, is not arbitrary. Every master who knows the number of his slaves knows exactly what he owes. However, since both types of taxes are labeled with the same name, they are often seen as the same in nature.

The taxes which in Holland are imposed upon men and maid servants, are taxes, not upon stock, but upon expense; and so far resemble the taxes upon consumable commodities. The tax of a guinea a-head for every man-servant, which has lately been imposed in Great Britain, is of the same kind. It falls heaviest upon the middling rank. A man of two hundred a-year may keep a single man-servant. A man of ten thousand a-year will not keep fifty. It does not affect the poor.

The taxes in Holland that are charged on male and female servants are based on expenses rather than assets, and they are similar to taxes on consumable goods. The recent tax of a guinea per head for each male servant imposed in Great Britain is of the same nature. It puts the most burden on the middle class. A person earning two hundred a year can afford to hire one male servant, while someone making ten thousand a year won't hire fifty. It doesn't impact the poor.

Taxes upon the profits of stock, in particular employments, can never affect the interest of money. Nobody will lend his money for less interest to those who exercise the taxed, than to those who exercise the untaxed employments. Taxes upon the revenue arising from stock in all employments, where the government attempts to levy them with any degree of exactness, will, in many cases, fall upon the interest of money. The vingtieme, or twentieth penny, in France, is a tax of the same kind with what is called the land tax in England, and is assessed, in the same manner, upon the revenue arising upon land, houses, and stock. So far as it affects stock, it is assessed, though not with great rigour, yet with much more exactness than that part of the land tax in England which is imposed upon the same fund. It, in many cases, falls altogether upon the interest of money. Money is frequently sunk in France, upon what are called contracts for the constitution of a rent; that is, perpetual annuities, redeemable at any time by the debtor, upon payment of the sum originally advanced, but of which this redemption is not exigible by the creditor except in particular cases. The vingtieme seems not to have raised the rate of those annuities, though it is exactly levied upon them all.

Taxes on profits from investments, especially in jobs, can never impact interest rates. No one will lend their money for less interest to those engaged in taxed jobs compared to those in untaxed jobs. Taxes on revenue from investments in all jobs, where the government tries to collect them accurately, will often affect interest rates. The vingtieme, or twentieth penny, in France is a tax similar to the land tax in England, assessed in the same way on revenue from land, houses, and investments. As it relates to investments, it is assessed, though not very strictly, with much more precision than that portion of the land tax in England applied to the same source. In many cases, it completely affects interest rates. Money is often invested in France in what are referred to as contracts for the creation of a rent; that is, perpetual annuities that can be redeemed at any time by the borrower upon repayment of the original amount, but the borrower is not obligated to redeem except in specific situations. The vingtieme does not seem to have increased the rate of those annuities, even though it is precisely collected from them all.

APPENDIX TO ARTICLES I. AND II.Taxes upon the Capital Value of Lands, Houses, and Stock.

While property remains in the possession of the same person, whatever permanent taxes may have been imposed upon it, they have never been intended to diminish or take away any part of its capital value, but only some part of the revenue arising from it. But when property changes hands, when it is transmitted either from the dead to the living, or from the living to the living, such taxes have frequently been imposed upon it as necessarily take away some part of its capital value.

While a person still owns property, any permanent taxes that have been put on it are not meant to reduce or eliminate its overall value; they only affect some of the income it generates. However, when property is sold or transferred, whether from someone who has passed away to someone alive, or between living people, those taxes are often imposed in a way that can reduce its overall value.

The transference of all sorts of property from the dead to the living, and that of immoveable property of land and houses from the living to the living, are transactions which are in their nature either public and notorious, or such as cannot be long concealed. Such transactions, therefore, may be taxed directly. The transference of stock or moveable property, from the living to the living, by the lending of money, is frequently a secret transaction, and may always be made so. It cannot easily, therefore, be taxed directly. It has been taxed indirectly in two different ways; first, by requiring that the deed, containing the obligation to repay, should be written upon paper or parchment which had paid a certain stamp duty, otherwise not to be valid; secondly, by requiring, under the like penalty of invalidity, that it should be recorded either in a public or secret register, and by imposing certain duties upon such registration. Stamp duties, and duties of registration, have frequently been imposed likewise upon the deeds transferring[Pg 363] property of all kinds from the dead to the living, and upon those transferring immoveable property from the living to the living; transactions which might easily have been taxed directly.

The transfer of all kinds of property from the deceased to the living, as well as the transfer of real estate like land and houses between the living, are transactions that are either public and well-known or difficult to keep hidden for long. Because of this, these transactions can be taxed directly. The transfer of stocks or movable property, through the lending of money, is often a private deal and can always be made so. As a result, it’s not easy to tax it directly. Instead, it has often been taxed indirectly in two ways: first, by requiring that the document outlining the obligation to repay be written on paper or parchment that has paid a specific stamp duty, or else it's not valid; and second, by requiring that it be recorded in either a public or private register, with certain fees imposed for that registration. Stamp duties and registration fees have also often been placed on deeds transferring all types of property from the deceased to the living, as well as on those moving real estate between the living; transactions that could easily have been taxed directly.

The vicesima hereditatum, or the twentieth penny of inheritances, imposed by Augustus upon the ancient Romans, was a tax upon the transference of property from the dead to the living. Dion Cassius,[63] the author who writes concerning it the least indistinctly, says, that it was imposed upon all successions, legacies and donations, in case of death, except upon those to the nearest relations, and to the poor.

The vicesima hereditatum, or the twentieth penny of inheritances, which Augustus introduced for the ancient Romans, was a tax on the transfer of property from the deceased to the living. Dion Cassius,[63] the author who discusses it the most clearly, mentions that it was applied to all inheritances, legacies, and gifts upon death, except for those given to close relatives and to the poor.

Of the same kind is the Dutch tax upon successions.[64] Collateral successions are taxed according to the degree of relation, from five to thirty per cent. upon the whole value of the succession. Testamentary donations, or legacies to collaterals, are subject to the like duties. Those from husband to wife, or from wife to husband, to the fiftieth penny. The luctuosa hereditas, the mournful succession of ascendants to descendants, to the twentieth penny only. Direct successions, or those of descendants to ascendants, pay no tax. The death of a father, to such of his children as live in the same house with him, is seldom attended with any increase, and frequently with a considerable diminution of revenue; by the loss of his industry, of his office, or of some life-rent estate, of which he may have been in possession. That tax would be cruel and oppressive, which aggravated their loss, by taking from them any part of his succession. It may, however, sometimes be otherwise with those children, who, in the language of the Roman law, are said to be emancipated; in that of the Scotch law, to be foris-familiated; that is, who have received their portion, have got families of their own, and are supported by funds separate and independent of those of their father. Whatever part of his succession might come to such children, would be a real addition to their fortune, and might, therefore, perhaps, without more inconveniency than what attends all duties of this kind, be liable to some tax.

The Dutch tax on inheritances works similarly.[64] Inheritances from collateral relatives are taxed based on how closely related they are, ranging from five to thirty percent of the total value of the inheritance. Bequests or legacies to collateral relatives are subject to the same taxes. Transfers between spouses are taxed at a rate of fifty cents on the dollar. The inheritance from ancestors to descendants is taxed at only twenty cents on the dollar. Direct inheritances, where descendants inherit from ancestors, are not taxed. When a father passes away, his children who live with him often don’t see an increase in income and may even experience a significant drop in revenue due to the loss of his work, position, or some life estate he held. A tax that adds to their burden by taking away part of his inheritance would be harsh and unfair. However, the situation might be different for those children who are considered emancipated in Roman law or foris-familiated in Scottish law; that is, those who have received their share, established their families, and are financially independent of their father. Any part of his inheritance that might come to these children would genuinely increase their wealth and could potentially be subject to some tax, without causing more inconvenience than any similar taxes would typically entail.

The casualties of the feudal law were taxes upon the transference of land, both from the dead to the living, and from the living to the living. In ancient times, they constituted, in every part of Europe, one of the principal branches of the revenue of the crown.

The costs of the feudal system were taxes on the transfer of land, both from the deceased to the living and from one living person to another. In ancient times, these taxes were, in every part of Europe, one of the main sources of revenue for the crown.

The heir of every immediate vassal of the crown paid a certain duty, generally a year's rent, upon receiving the investiture of the estate. If the heir was a minor, the whole rents of the estate, during the continuance of the minority, devolved to the superior, without any other charge besides the maintenance of the minor, and the payment of the widow's dower, when there happened to be a dowage upon the land. When the minor came to be of age, another tax, called relief, was still due to the superior, which generally amounted likewise to a year's rent. A long minority, which, in the present times, so frequently disburdens a great estate of all its incumbrances, and restores the family to their ancient splendour, could in those times have no such effect. The waste, and not the disincumbrance of the estate, was the common effect of a long minority.

The heir of every immediate vassal of the crown had to pay a specific duty, usually equal to a year's rent, when they inherited the estate. If the heir was underage, all the rents from the estate went to the superior during the minority, with the only obligations being to support the minor and pay the widow's dower if there was one attached to the land. When the minor reached adulthood, another fee, called relief, was still owed to the superior, which typically also amounted to a year's rent. In contrast to today, where a long minority often frees a large estate from its burdens and helps restore the family's former glory, back then, a lengthy minority usually led to waste rather than relief for the estate.

By a feudal law, the vassal could not alienate without the consent of his superior, who generally extorted a fine or composition on granting it. This fine, which was at first arbitrary, came, in many countries, to be regulated at a certain portion of the price of the land. In some countries, where the greater part of the other feudal customs have gone into disuse, this tax upon the alienation of land still continues to make a very considerable branch of the revenue of the sovereign. In the canton of Berne it is so high as a sixth part of the price of all noble fiefs, and a tenth part of that of all ignoble ones.[65] In the canton of Lucern, the tax upon the sale of land is not universal, and takes place only in certain districts. But if any person sells his land in order to remove out of the territory, he pays ten per cent. upon the whole price of the sale.[66] Taxes of the same kind, upon the sale either of all lands, or of lands held by certain tenures, take place in many other countries, and make a more or less considerable branch of the revenue of the sovereign.

By feudal law, the vassal couldn't sell land without permission from their superior, who usually demanded a fee or compensation in exchange. This fee, which started off as arbitrary, eventually became regulated in many places as a specific percentage of the land's selling price. In some regions where most other feudal practices have faded away, this tax on land sales still significantly contributes to the government’s revenue. In the canton of Berne, it's as high as one-sixth of the value of all noble estates, and one-tenth for non-noble ones.[65] In the canton of Lucern, the tax on land sales isn’t uniform and only applies in certain areas. However, if someone sells their land to leave the territory, they pay ten percent of the total sale price.[66] Similar taxes on the sale of land, whether for all properties or those held under specific agreements, exist in many other countries and represent a more or less significant portion of the government's revenue.

Such transactions may be taxed indirectly, by means either of stamp duties, or of duties upon registration; and those duties either may, or may not, be proportioned to the value of the subject which is transferred.

Such transactions might be taxed indirectly, either through stamp duties or registration fees; and those fees may or may not be based on the value of the property being transferred.

In Great Britain, the stamp duties are higher or lower, not so much according to the value of the property transferred (an eighteen-penny or half-crown stamp being sufficient upon a bond for the largest sum of money), as according to the nature of the deed. The highest do not exceed six pounds upon every sheet of paper, or skin of parchment; and these high duties fall chiefly upon grants from the crown, and upon certain law proceedings, without any regard to the value of the subject. There are, in Great Britain, no duties on the registration of deeds or writings, except the fees of the officers who keep the register; and these are seldom more than a reasonable recompense for their labour. The crown derives no revenue from them.[Pg 364]

In Great Britain, stamp duties vary more based on the type of document than the value of the property being transferred (a stamp of eighteen pence or half a crown is enough for a bond for the largest amount of money). The highest fees don’t go beyond six pounds for each sheet of paper or piece of parchment, and these high charges mainly apply to grants from the crown and certain legal proceedings, regardless of the value involved. In Great Britain, there are no fees for registering deeds or documents, aside from what the officers who maintain the register charge; these fees are usually just a fair payment for their work. The crown doesn’t earn any revenue from these fees.[Pg 364]

In Holland[67] there are both stamp duties and duties upon registration; which in some cases are, and in some are not, proportioned to the value of the property transferred. All testaments must be written upon stamped paper, of which the price is proportioned to the property disposed of; so that there are stamps which cost from three pence or three stivers a-sheet, to three hundred florins, equal to about twenty-seven pounds ten shillings of our money. If the stamp is of an inferior price to what the testator ought to have made use of, his succession is confiscated. This is over and above all their other taxes on succession. Except bills of exchange, and some other mercantile bills, all other deeds, bonds, and contracts, are subject to a stamp duty. This duty, however, does not rise in proportion to the value of the subject. All sales of land and of houses, and all mortgages upon either, must be registered, and, upon registration, pay a duty to the state of two and a-half per cent. upon the amount of the price or of the mortgage. This duty is extended to the sale of all ships and vessels of more than two tons burden, whether decked or undecked. These, it seems, are considered as a sort of houses upon the water. The sale of moveables, when it is ordered by a court of justice, is subject to the like duty of two and a-half per cent.

In Holland[67], there are both stamp duties and registration fees, which in some cases are proportional to the value of the property transferred and in other cases are not. All wills must be written on stamped paper, with the price based on the value of the property being distributed; therefore, there are stamp prices ranging from three pence or three stivers per sheet to three hundred florins, roughly equal to twenty-seven pounds ten shillings in our currency. If the stamp is of a lower value than what the testator should have used, their inheritance is confiscated. This is in addition to all their other inheritance taxes. Except for bills of exchange and a few other commercial bills, all other deeds, bonds, and contracts are subject to a stamp duty. However, this duty does not increase in proportion to the value of the item. All sales of land and houses, as well as all mortgages on either, must be registered and pay a state duty of two and a half percent on the price or the mortgage amount upon registration. This duty also applies to the sale of all ships and vessels over two tons, whether decked or undecked. These are seen as a kind of house on water. The sale of movable property, when ordered by a court, is also subject to the same two and a half percent duty.

In France, there are both stamp duties and duties upon registration. The former are considered as a branch of the aids of excise, and, in the provinces where those duties take place, are levied by the excise officers. The latter are considered as a branch of the domain of the crown, and are levied by a different set of officers.

In France, there are stamp duties and registration fees. The stamp duties are seen as part of the excise taxes, and in the regions where these duties apply, they are collected by excise officers. The registration fees are viewed as a part of the crown's domain and are collected by a different group of officers.

Those modes of taxation by stamp duties and by duties upon registration, are of very modern invention. In the course of little more than a century, however, stamp duties have, in Europe, become almost universal, and duties upon registration extremely common. There is no art which one government sooner learns of another, than that of draining money from the pockets of the people.

Those ways of taxing through stamp duties and registration fees are quite new. In just a little over a century, though, stamp duties have become nearly universal in Europe, and registration fees are very common. There is no skill that one government picks up from another faster than the art of extracting money from the public.

Taxes upon the transference of property from the dead to the living, fall finally, as well as immediately, upon the persons to whom the property is transferred. Taxes upon the sale of land fall altogether upon the seller. The seller is almost always under the necessity of selling, and must, therefore, take such a price as he can get. The buyer is scarce ever under the necessity of buying, and will, therefore, only give such a price as he likes. He considers what the land will cost him, in tax and price together. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he will be disposed to give in the way of price. Such taxes, therefore, fall almost always upon a necessitous person, and must, therefore, be frequently very cruel and oppressive. Taxes upon the sale of new-built houses, where the building is sold without the ground, fall generally upon the buyer, because the builder must generally have his profit; otherwise he must give up the trade. If he advances the tax, therefore, the buyer must generally repay it to him. Taxes upon the sale of old houses, for the same reason as those upon the sale of land, fall generally upon the seller; whom, in most cases, either conveniency or necessity obliges to sell. The number of new-built houses that are annually brought to market, is more or less regulated by the demand. Unless the demand is such as to afford the builder his profit, after paying all expenses, he will build no more houses. The number of old houses which happen at any time to come to market, is regulated by accidents, of which the greater part have no relation to the demand. Two or three great bankruptcies in a mercantile town, will bring many houses to sale, which must be sold for what can be got for them. Taxes upon the sale of ground-rents fall altogether upon the seller, for the same reason as those upon the sale of lands. Stamp duties, and duties upon the registration of bonds and contracts for borrowed money, fall altogether upon the borrower, and, in fact, are always paid by him. Duties of the same kind upon law proceedings fall upon the suitors. They reduce to both the capital value of the subject in dispute. The more it costs to acquire any property, the less must be the neat value of it when acquired.

Taxes on transferring property from deceased individuals to the living ultimately fall on the people receiving the property. Taxes on selling land are fully borne by the seller. Sellers often have no choice but to sell and must settle for whatever price they can get. Buyers are rarely forced to purchase and will only pay what they want to. They consider the total cost of the land, including taxes and price. The more they need to pay in taxes, the less they're willing to pay in price. Thus, these taxes usually burden someone in need, which can be quite harsh and oppressive. Taxes on the sale of newly built houses, when the building is sold without the land, generally fall on the buyer since the builder needs to make a profit; otherwise, they would have to quit the business. If the builder pays the tax upfront, the buyer typically has to reimburse them. Taxes on selling old houses, for the same reasons as those on land, generally fall on the seller, who is usually compelled by convenience or necessity to sell. The number of new houses available each year is influenced by demand. If builders can't earn a profit after expenses, they won't build any more houses. The number of old houses on the market at any given time is often determined by circumstances that are mostly unrelated to demand. A few major bankruptcies in a commercial area can lead to many houses being sold, which must go for whatever price can be obtained. Taxes on the sale of ground rents fall entirely on the seller for the same reasons as those on land sales. Stamp duties and fees for registering loans and contracts are paid by the borrower. Similarly, fees associated with legal proceedings fall on the plaintiffs. These costs diminish the overall value of the contested property. The higher the cost to acquire any property, the lower its net value will be once acquired.

All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as they diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour. They are all more or less unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the expense of the capital of the people, which maintains none but productive.

All taxes on the transfer of any property, as they reduce the overall value of that property, tend to decrease the resources allocated for supporting productive labor. They are generally inefficient taxes that boost the government's revenue, which rarely supports anything other than unproductive workers, at the cost of the people's capital, which only supports productive ones.

Such taxes, even when they are proportioned to the value of the property transferred, are still unequal; the frequency of transference not being always equal in property of equal value. When they are not proportioned to this value, which is the case with the greater part of the stamp duties and duties of registration, they are still more so. They are in no respect arbitrary, but are, or may be, in all cases, perfectly clear and certain. Though they sometimes fall upon the person who is not very able to pay, the time of payment is, in most cases, sufficiently convenient for him. When the payment becomes due, he must, in most cases, have the money to pay. They are levied at very little expense, and in general subject the contribu[Pg 365]tors to no other inconveniency, besides always the unavoidable one of paying the tax.

Such taxes, even when they are based on the value of the property being transferred, are still unequal; the frequency of transfers isn’t always the same for properties of equal value. When they aren’t based on this value, as is the case with most stamp duties and registration fees, they become even less fair. They aren’t arbitrary at all; they can be clear and certain in every case. While they sometimes fall on those who can’t easily afford to pay, the timing of the payment is usually manageable. By the time payment is due, they generally have the money to cover it. They are collected with minimal cost and typically do not impose any other burdens on the contributors, aside from the unavoidable requirement of paying the tax.

In France, the stamp duties are not much complained of. Those of registration, which they call the Controle, are. They give occasion, it is pretended, to much extortion in the officers of the farmers-general who collect the tax, which is in a great measure arbitrary and uncertain. In the greater part of the libels which have been written against the present system of finances in France, the abuses of the controle make a principal article. Uncertainty, however, does not seem to be necessarily inherent in the nature of such taxes. If the popular complaints are well founded, the abuse must arise, not so much from the nature of the tax as from the want of precision and distinctness in the words of the edicts or laws which impose it.

In France, people don't complain much about stamp duties. However, they do about the registration fees, which they call the Controle. It's said that these fees lead to a lot of extortion by the collectors, who are farmers-general, and the tax is largely arbitrary and unpredictable. Many critiques of the current financial system in France highlight the abuses related to the controle. However, uncertainty doesn't seem to be an inherent issue with such taxes. If the public complaints are valid, the problem likely stems not from the tax itself but from the vague and unclear language in the edicts or laws that enforce it.

The registration of mortgages, and in general of all rights upon immoveable property, as it gives great security both to creditors and purchasers, is extremely advantageous to the public. That of the greater part of deeds of other kinds, is frequently inconvenient and even dangerous to individuals, without any advantage to the public. All registers which, it is acknowledged, ought to be kept secret, ought certainly never to exist. The credit of individuals ought certainly never to depend upon so very slender a security, as the probity and religion of the inferior officers of revenue. But where the fees of registration have been made a source of revenue to the sovereign, register-offices have commonly been multiplied without end, both for the deeds which ought to be registered, and for those which ought not. In France there are several different sorts of secret registers. This abuse, though not perhaps a necessary, it must be acknowledged, is a very natural effect of such taxes.

The registration of mortgages, and basically all rights related to real estate, provides significant security for both creditors and buyers, making it very beneficial for the public. However, the registration of most other types of deeds can often be inconvenient and even harmful to individuals, without any public benefit. All registers that should, by nature, be kept confidential should definitely not exist. Individuals’ credit should never rely on such a flimsy guarantee as the honesty and integrity of lower-level revenue officers. However, where registration fees have been turned into a source of revenue for the sovereign, register offices have often been created endlessly, for both deeds that should be registered and those that shouldn’t. In France, there are several different types of secret registers. This issue, while perhaps not necessary, is certainly a natural result of such taxes.

Such stamp duties as those in England upon cards and dice, upon newspapers and periodical pamphlets, &c. are properly taxes upon consumption; the final payment falls upon the persons who use or consume such commodities. Such stamp duties as those upon licences to retail ale, wine, and spiritous liquors, though intended, perhaps, to fall upon the profits of the retailers, are likewise finally paid by the consumers of those liquors. Such taxes, though called by the same name, and levied by the same officers, and in the same manner with the stamp duties above mentioned upon the transference of property, are, however, of a quite different nature, and fall upon quite different funds.

Stamp duties like those in England on cards and dice, newspapers, and periodical pamphlets are essentially consumption taxes; the final cost is borne by the people who use or consume these items. Similarly, stamp duties on licenses to sell ale, wine, and spirits, although they might be meant to target the profits of the retailers, ultimately get paid by the consumers of those drinks. Although these taxes share the same name, are collected by the same officials, and enforced in the same way as the stamp duties on property transfers, they are fundamentally different in nature and impact different sources of revenue.

ART. III.Taxes upon the Wages of Labour.

The wages of the inferior classes of workmen, I have endeavoured to show in the first book are everywhere necessarily regulated by two different circumstances; the demand for labour, and the ordinary or average price of provisions. The demand for labour, according as it happens to be either increasing, stationary or declining; or to require an increasing, stationary, or declining population; regulates the subsistence of the labourer, and determines in what degree it shall be either liberal, moderate, or scanty. The ordinary average price of provisions determines the quantity of money which must be paid to the workman, in order to enable him, one year with another, to purchase this liberal, moderate, or scanty subsistence. While the demand for the labour and the price of provisions, therefore, remain the same, a direct tax upon the wages of labour can have no other effect, than to raise them somewhat higher than the tax. Let us suppose, for example, that, in particular place, the demand for labour and the price of provisions were such as to render ten shillings a-week the ordinary wages of labour; and that a tax of one-fifth, or four shillings in the pound, was imposed upon wages. If the demand for labour and the price of provisions remained the same, it would still be necessary that the labourer should, in that place, earn such a subsistence as could be bought only for ten shillings a-week; or that, after paying the tax, he should have ten shillings a-week free wages. But, in order to leave him such free wages, after paying such a tax, the price of labour must, in that place, soon rise, not to twelve shillings a-week only, but to twelve and sixpence; that is, in order to enable him to pay a tax of one-fifth, his wages must necessarily soon rise, not one-fifth part only, but one-fourth. Whatever was the proportion of the tax, the wages of labour must, in all cases rise, not only in that proportion, but in a higher proportion. If the tax for example, was one-tenth, the wages of labour must necessarily soon rise, not one-tenth part only, but one-eighth.

The wages of lower-class workers, as I tried to explain in the first book, are always influenced by two main factors: the demand for labor and the average price of basic goods. The demand for labor, whether it's increasing, stable, or decreasing, or whether it needs a growing, stable, or shrinking population, affects the worker's ability to make a living and decides how generous, fair, or minimal that living will be. The typical price of basic goods sets the amount of money that must be paid to the worker so they can afford, year after year, a sufficient, reasonable, or limited standard of living. Therefore, as long as the demand for labor and the prices of goods stay the same, a direct tax on workers' wages can only lead to wages being increased somewhat beyond the tax amount. For instance, let's say that in a specific location, the demand for labor and the price of basic goods make the usual weekly wage ten shillings. If a tax of one-fifth or four shillings per pound is placed on the wages, and assuming the demand for labor and prices remain unchanged, the worker would still need to earn enough to secure the same living standard that costs ten shillings per week – meaning, after taxes, he should have ten shillings in take-home pay. Nevertheless, to achieve this take-home amount after the tax is deducted, wages must quickly rise to not just twelve shillings but to twelve shillings and sixpence. This means that, in order for him to cover a one-fifth tax, his wages would have to increase not just by a fifth, but by a quarter. Whatever the tax rate is, wages will always need to rise, not just by that rate, but by an even larger percentage. For example, if the tax was one-tenth, wages would have to increase, not merely by one-tenth, but by one-eighth.

A direct tax upon the wages of labour, therefore, though the labourer might, perhaps, pay it out of his hand, could not properly be said to be even advanced by him; at least if the demand for labour and the average price of provisions remained the same after the tax as before it. In all such cases, not only the tax, but something more than the tax, would in reality be advanced by the person who immediately employed him. The final payment would, in different cases, fall upon different persons. The rise which such a tax might occasion in the wages of manufacturing labour would be advanced by the master manufacturer, who would both be entitled and obliged to charge it, with a profit, upon the price of his goods. The final payment of this rise of wages, therefore, together with the additional profit of the master manufacturer, would fall upon the consumer. The rise which[Pg 366] such a tax might occasion in the wages of country labour would be advanced by the farmer, who, in order to maintain the name number of labourers as before, would he obliged to employ a greater capital. In order to get back this greater capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, it would be necessary that he should retain a larger portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of a larger portion, of the produce of the land, and, consequently, that he should pay less rent to the landlord. The final payment of this rise of wages, therefore, would, in this case, fall upon the landlord, together with the additional profit of the farmer who had advanced it. In all cases, a direct tax upon the wages of labour must, in the long-run, occasion both a greater reduction in the rent of land, and a greater rise in the price of manufactured goods than would have followed from the proper assessment of a sum equal to the produce of the tax, partly upon the rent of land, and partly upon consumable commodities.

A direct tax on wages, while the worker might pay it directly, shouldn't really be considered as something he advances on his own; at least not if the labor demand and average cost of goods stay the same after the tax as they were before. In these situations, not only the tax itself, but also an additional amount, would actually be covered by the person who directly hired him. The final payment would, in different scenarios, be absorbed by different people. For example, any increase in wages for factory workers due to such a tax would be absorbed by the factory owner, who would be entitled and required to add that cost, plus a profit, to the price of his products. Consequently, the increased wage cost, along with the added profit for the factory owner, would ultimately be paid by the consumer. On the other hand, any increase in wages for agricultural workers due to such a tax would be taken on by the farmer, who would need to invest more capital to keep the same number of workers as before. To recover this larger investment, along with the normal profit margin, the farmer would have to hold onto a bigger share, or effectively, the price of a larger share, of the agricultural output, which means he would pay less rent to the landowner. So, in this case, the end cost of the wage increase would fall on the landowner, along with the farmer's extra profit. In all cases, a direct tax on labor wages will, in the long run, lead to a bigger drop in land rent and a larger increase in the price of manufactured goods than if the tax had been properly distributed—partly on land rent and partly on consumable goods.

If direct taxes upon the wages of labour have not always occasioned a proportionable rise in those wages, it is because they have generally occasioned a considerable fall in the demand of labour. The declension of industry, the decrease of employment for the poor, the diminution of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, have generally been the effects of such taxes. In consequence of them, however, the price of labor must always be higher than it otherwise would have been in the actual state of the demand; and this enhancement of price, together with the profit of those who advance it, must always be finally paid by the landlords and consumers.

If direct taxes on wages haven't always led to a proportional increase in those wages, it’s because they usually cause a significant drop in the demand for labor. The decline in industry, the reduction of jobs for the poor, and the decrease in the annual output of the land and labor in the country have typically been the results of such taxes. As a result, the cost of labor must always be higher than it would be otherwise given the current state of demand; and this increase in price, along with the profits of those who pay it, ultimately has to be covered by landlords and consumers.

A tax upon the wages of country labour does not raise the price of the rude produce of land in proportion to the tax; for the same reason that a tax upon the farmer's profit does not raise that price in that proportion.

A tax on the wages of rural labor doesn’t increase the price of basic agricultural products in line with the tax; for the same reason that a tax on the farmer's profit doesn’t raise that price proportionally.

Absurd and destructive as such taxes are, however, they take place in many countries. In France, that part of the taille which is charged upon the industry of workmen and day-labourers in country villages, is properly a tax of this kind. Their wages are computed according to the common rate of the district in which they reside; and, that they may be as little liable as possible to any overcharge, their yearly gains are estimated at no more than two hundred working days in the year.[68] The tax of each individual is varied from year to year, according to different circumstances, of which the collector or the commissary, whom the intendant appoints to assist him, are the judges. In Bohemia, in consequence of the alteration in the system of finances which was begun in 1748, a very heavy tax is imposed upon the industry of artificers. They are divided into four classes. The highest class pay a hundred florins a-year, which, at two-and-twenty pence half penny a-florin, amounts to L.9 : 7 : 6. The second class are taxed at seventy; the third at fifty; and the fourth, comprehending artificers in villages, and the lowest class of those in towns, at twenty-five florins.[69]

Absurd and destructive as such taxes are, they exist in many countries. In France, the part of the taille imposed on the work of laborers and day workers in rural areas is a typical example of this kind of tax. Their wages are calculated based on the average rate for the area where they live, and to minimize any risk of being overcharged, their annual earnings are estimated at no more than two hundred working days a year. The tax for each individual varies from year to year, depending on different circumstances, which the collector or the commissioner appointed by the intendant judges. In Bohemia, due to the financial system changes that started in 1748, a heavy tax is placed on the work of craftsmen. They are grouped into four classes. The top class pays a hundred florins per year, which, at two shillings and sixpence a florin, totals £9: 7: 6. The second class is taxed at seventy; the third at fifty; and the fourth, which includes craftsmen in villages and the lowest tier of those in towns, at twenty-five florins.

The recompence of ingenious artists, and of men of liberal professions, I have endeavoured to show in the first book, necessarily keeps a certain proportion to the emoluments of inferior trades. A tax upon this recompence, therefore, could have no other effect than to raise it somewhat higher than in proportion to the tax. If it did not rise in this manner, the ingenious arts and the liberal professions, being no longer upon a level with other trades, would be so much deserted, that they would soon return to that level.

The rewards for creative artists and professionals, which I discussed in the first book, naturally need to match the earnings of lower-skilled jobs. So, a tax on these rewards would only result in them increasing slightly more than the tax itself. If they didn't increase like this, the creative arts and professional fields would fall out of favor compared to other jobs and would quickly revert to that lower level.

The emoluments of offices are not, like those of trades and professions, regulated by the free competition of the market, and do not, therefore, always bear a just proportion to what the nature of the employment requires. They are, perhaps, in most countries, higher than it requires; the persons who have the administration of government being generally disposed to regard both themselves and their immediate dependents, rather more than enough. The emoluments offices, therefore, can, in most cases, very well bear to be taxed. The persons, besides, who enjoy public offices, especially the more lucrative, are, in all countries, the objects of general envy; and a tax upon their emoluments, even though it should be somewhat higher than upon any other sort of revenue, is always a very popular tax. In England, for example, when, by the land-tax, every other sort of revenue was supposed to be assessed at four shillings in the pound, it was very popular to lay a real tax of five shillings and sixpence in the pound upon the salaries of offices which exceeded a hundred pounds a-year; the pensions of the younger branches of the royal family, the pay of the officers of the army and navy, and a few others less obnoxious to envy, excepted. There are in England no other direct taxes upon the wages of labour.

The pay for government jobs isn't determined by free market competition like it is for trades and professions, so it doesn't always match what the role actually requires. In fact, in most countries, the pay is often higher than necessary because those in charge of government tend to focus more on benefiting themselves and their close associates. Therefore, government salaries can usually handle being taxed quite well. Plus, those who hold public positions, especially the better-paying ones, are often envied by others. A tax on their earnings, even if it's a bit higher than taxes on other types of income, is typically well-received. For instance, in England, when the land tax assessed other income at four shillings per pound, there was strong support for imposing a real tax of five shillings and sixpence per pound on salaries exceeding one hundred pounds a year, with some exceptions like pensions for younger royal family members and salaries for army and navy officers, which were less envied. In England, there are no other direct taxes on wages.

ART. IV.Taxes which it is intended should fall indifferently upon every different Species of Revenue.

The taxes which it is intended should fall indifferently upon every different species of revenue, are capitation taxes, and taxes upon consumable commodities. These must be paid indifferently, from whatever revenue the con[Pg 367]tributors may possess; from the rent of their land, from the profits of their stock, or from the wages of their labour.

The taxes that are meant to apply equally to all types of income are head taxes and taxes on goods. These must be paid regardless of the income sources the taxpayers have, whether from the rent of their land, from the profits of their investments, or from their wages.

Capitation Taxes.

Capitation taxes, if it is attempted to proportion them to the fortune or revenue of each contributor, become altogether arbitrary. The state of a man's fortune varies from day to day; and, without an inquisition, more intolerable than any tax, and renewed at least once every year, can only be guessed at. His assessment, therefore, must, in most cases, depend upon the good or bad humour of his assessors, and must, therefore, be altogether arbitrary and uncertain.

Capitation taxes, if they're tried to be adjusted based on the wealth or income of each person, end up being completely arbitrary. A person's financial situation changes daily, and without an investigation that's more burdensome than any tax and repeated at least once a year, it can only be estimated. So, in most cases, his assessment will rely on the whims of his assessors, making it entirely arbitrary and uncertain.

Capitation taxes, if they are proportioned, not to the supposed fortune, but to the rank of each contributor, become altogether unequal; the degrees of fortune being frequently unequal in the same degree of rank.

Capitation taxes, if they're based not on the supposed wealth but on the status of each person, become completely unequal; the levels of wealth can often vary significantly even among those with the same status.

Such taxes, therefore, if it is attempted to render them equal, become altogether arbitrary and uncertain; and if it is attempted to render them certain and not arbitrary, become altogether unequal. Let the tax be light or heavy, uncertainty is always a great grievance. In a light tax, a considerable degree of inequality may be supported; in a heavy one, it is altogether intolerable.

Such taxes, if we try to make them equal, end up being completely random and unpredictable; and if we try to make them certain and not random, they become completely unequal. Whether the tax is light or heavy, uncertainty is always a significant issue. With a light tax, some level of inequality can be tolerated; with a heavy one, it is totally unacceptable.

In the different poll-taxes which took place in England during the reign of William III. the contributors were, the greater part of them, assessed according to the degree of their rank; as dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, barons, esquires, gentlemen, the eldest and youngest sons of peers, &c. All shop-keepers and tradesmen worth more than three hundred pounds, that is, the better sort of them, were subject to the same assessment, how great soever might be the difference in their fortunes. Their rank was more considered than their fortune. Several of those who, in the first poll-tax, were rated according to their supposed fortune, were afterwards rated according to their rank. Serjeants, attorneys, and proctors at law, who, in the first poll-tax, were assessed at three shillings in the pound of their supposed income, were afterwards assessed as gentlemen. In the assessment of a tax which was not very heavy, a considerable degree of inequality had been found less insupportable than any degree of uncertainty.

In the various poll taxes that occurred in England during the reign of William III, most contributors were assessed based on their rank, such as dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, barons, esquires, gentlemen, and the eldest and youngest sons of peers, among others. All shopkeepers and tradespeople worth over three hundred pounds—essentially the better-off among them—were subjected to the same assessment, regardless of how significantly their fortunes varied. Their rank was prioritized over their wealth. Many individuals who were initially assessed based on their assumed wealth in the first poll tax were later rated according to their rank. Lawyers, including serjeants, attorneys, and proctors, who were originally assessed at three shillings per pound of their presumed income, were later classified as gentlemen. In an assessment for a tax that wasn't particularly burdensome, it was found that a considerable level of inequality was less intolerable than any level of uncertainty.

In the capitation which has been levied in France, without any interruption, since the beginning of the present century, the highest orders of people are rated according to their rank, by an invariable tariff; the lower orders of people, according to what is supposed to be their fortune, by an assessment which varies from year to year. The officers of the king's court, the judges, and other officers in the superior courts of justice, the officers of the troops, &c. are assessed in the first manner. The inferior ranks of people in the provinces are assessed in the second. In France, the great easily submit to a considerable degree of inequality in a tax which, so far as it affects them, is not a very heavy one; but could not brook the arbitrary assessment of an intendant.

In France, the capitation tax has been consistently applied since the beginning of this century. The upper class is taxed based on their rank, following a fixed rate, while the lower class is taxed based on their presumed wealth, with rates changing each year. Officials from the king's court, judges, and other high-ranking judicial officers, as well as military leaders, are assessed using the fixed rate. People from the lower ranks in the provinces are taxed based on their changing assessments. In France, the wealthy generally accept a significant level of inequality in a tax that is not particularly burdensome for them; however, they cannot tolerate the arbitrary assessments imposed by an intendant.

The inferior ranks of people must, in that country, suffer patiently the usage which their superiors think proper to give them.

The lower classes of people in that country have to endure the treatment their superiors deem appropriate.

In England, the different poll-taxes never produced the sum which had been expected from them, or which it was supposed they might have produced, had they been exactly levied. In France, the capitation always produces the sum expected from it. The mild government of England, when it assessed the different ranks of people to the poll-tax, contented itself with what that assessment happened to produce, and required no compensation for the loss which the state might sustain, either by those who could not pay, or by those who would not pay (for there were many such), and who, by the indulgent execution of the law, were not forced to pay. The more severe government of France assesses upon each generality a certain sum, which the intendant must find as he can. If any province complains of being assessed too high, it may, in the assessment of next year, obtain an abatement proportioned to the overcharge of the year before; but it must pay in the mean time. The intendant, in order to be sure of finding the sum assessed upon his generality, was empowered to assess it in a larger sum, that the failure or inability of some of the contributors might be compensated by the overcharge of the rest; and till 1765, the fixation of this surplus assessment was left altogether to his discretion. In that year, indeed, the council assumed this power to itself. In the capitation of the provinces, it is observed by the perfectly well informed author of the Memoirs upon the Impositions in France, the proportion which falls upon the nobility, and upon those whose privileges exempt them from the taille, is the least considerable. The largest falls upon those subject to the taille, who are assessed to the capitation at so much a-pound of what they pay to that other tax.

In England, the various poll taxes never brought in the amount that was expected from them, or what it was thought they could have raised if they had been collected correctly. In France, the capitation always brings in the expected amount. The lenient government of England, when it assessed the different social classes for the poll tax, was satisfied with the revenue it generated and didn’t demand any compensation for the losses incurred by the state, either from those who couldn't pay or those who simply wouldn’t pay (and there were many of those). Because of the lenient enforcement of the law, they were not forced to comply. In contrast, the stricter government of France sets a specific amount to be collected from each region, which the intendant must raise as best as he can. If a province feels it has been taxed too heavily, it can request a reduction during the next year’s assessment based on the overcharge from the previous year, but it still has to pay in the meantime. The intendant, to ensure that he can meet the required amount for his region, was allowed to assess a higher amount, so that any shortfall or inability to pay from some contributors could be balanced out by charging the others more. Until 1765, the determination of this extra assessment was entirely at his discretion. That year, the council took over that authority. In the capitation system among the provinces, it is noted by the well-informed author of the Memoirs on Impositions in France that the proportion paid by the nobility and those with privileges exempting them from the taille is relatively small. The largest burden falls on those liable for the taille, who are assessed for capitation based on how much they pay in that other tax.

Capitation taxes, so far as they are levied upon the lower ranks of people, are direct taxes upon the wages of labour, and are attended with all the inconveniencies of such taxes.

Capitation taxes, when applied to the lower classes, are direct taxes on workers' wages and come with all the drawbacks of such taxes.

Capitation taxes are levied at little expense; and, where they are rigorously exacted, afford a very sure revenue to the state. It is upon this account that, in countries where the ease, comfort, and security of the inferior ranks of people are little attended to, capitation taxes are very common. It is in general, however, but a small part of the public reve[Pg 368]nue, which, in a great empire, has ever been drawn from such taxes; and the greatest sum which they have ever afforded, might always have been found in some other way much more convenient to the people.

Capitation taxes are collected with minimal cost, and when strictly enforced, provide a reliable source of income for the government. This is why, in countries where the well-being, comfort, and safety of lower-income groups are often overlooked, capitation taxes are quite common. However, in general, these taxes make up only a small portion of the total public revenue, which, in a large empire, has mostly come from other, more convenient sources for the people.

Taxes upon Consumable Commodities.

The impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to their revenue, by any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon consumable commodities. The state not knowing how to tax, directly and proportionably, the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which, it is supposed, will, in most cases, be nearly in proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed, by taxing the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out.

The difficulty of taxing people based on their income through a straightforward head tax seems to have led to the creation of taxes on goods and services. Since the government isn’t sure how to directly and fairly tax the income of its citizens, it tries to do so indirectly by taxing their spending, which is believed to be roughly aligned with their income in most scenarios. Their spending gets taxed by placing taxes on the goods and services they purchase.

Consumable commodities are either necessaries or luxuries.

Consumable goods are either essentials or luxuries.

By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensibly necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person, of either sex, would be ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who may, without any discredit, walk about barefooted. In France, they are necessaries neither to men nor to women; the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden shoes, and sometimes barefooted. Under necessaries, therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other things I call luxuries, without meaning, by this appellation, to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man of any rank may, without any reproach, abstain totally from tasting such liquors. Nature does not render them necessary for the support of life; and custom nowhere renders it indecent to live without them.

By “necessities,” I mean not just the things that are absolutely essential for living, but also anything that society deems improper for respectable people, even those of lower status, to be without. A linen shirt, for instance, isn’t strictly necessary for life. The Greeks and Romans lived quite comfortably, I suppose, without it. But nowadays, in most of Europe, a respectable day laborer would feel embarrassed to be seen in public without a linen shirt; lacking one would be seen as indicating a level of poverty that suggests serious personal failings. Similarly, in England, custom has made leather shoes essential for life. The poorest respectable person, regardless of gender, would feel ashamed to go out in public without them. In Scotland, customs make shoes necessary for the lowest class of men; however, women in the same class can walk around barefoot without any loss of honor. In France, neither men nor women see shoes as necessities; even those of the lowest status can appear in public without shame, sometimes wearing wooden shoes or going barefoot. Therefore, when I talk about necessities, I include not only what nature requires but also what the established standards of decency dictate as necessary for the lowest class of people. Everything else I refer to as luxuries, and I don’t mean to criticize the moderate use of them. Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in wine-producing countries, are luxuries. A person of any social class can abstain completely from drinking these beverages without any shame. Nature doesn’t make them essential for survival, and customs don’t deem it improper to live without them.

As the wages of labour are everywhere regulated, partly by the demand for it, and partly by the average price of the necessary articles of subsistence; whatever raises this average price must necessarily raise those wages; so that the labourer may still be able to purchase that quantity of those necessary articles which the state of the demand for labour, whether increasing, stationary, or declining, requires that he should have.[70] A tax upon those articles necessarily raises their price somewhat higher than the amount of the tax, because the dealer, who advances the tax, must generally get it back, with a profit. Such a tax must, therefore, occasion a rise in the wages of labour, proportionable to this rise of price.

As wages for labor are influenced by both demand and the average price of essential goods, any increase in this average price will inevitably lead to higher wages. This ensures that workers can still afford the necessary items they need, regardless of whether the demand for labor is growing, stable, or declining. [70] A tax on these goods will raise their price by more than the tax amount because sellers, who pay the tax upfront, usually pass that cost on, plus a profit. Therefore, such a tax will result in a rise in labor wages that corresponds to this increase in price.

It is thus that a tax upon the necessaries of life operates exactly in the same manner as a direct tax upon the wages of labour. The labourer, though he may pay it out of his hand, cannot, for any considerable time at least, be properly said even to advance it. It must always, in the long-run, be advanced to him by his immediate employer, in the advanced state of wages. His employer, if he is a manufacturer, will charge upon the price of his goods the rise of wages, together with a profit, so that the final payment of the tax, together with this overcharge, will fall upon the consumer. If his employer is a farmer, the final payment, together with a like overcharge, will fall upon the rent of the landlord.

A tax on the essentials of life works just like a direct tax on workers' wages. Although the worker might pay it directly, they can’t realistically be said to advance it for long. Ultimately, the worker’s employer has to front that cost by paying higher wages. If the employer is a manufacturer, they will increase the price of their goods to cover the wage increase plus a profit, meaning that the consumer will end up paying the tax along with that markup. If the employer is a farmer, the cost, along with a similar markup, will be transferred to the landlord's rent.

It is otherwise with taxes upon what I call luxuries, even upon those of the poor. The rise in the price of the taxed commodities, will not necessarily occasion any rise in the wages of labour. A tax upon tobacco, for example, though a luxury of the poor, as well as of the rich, will not raise wages. Though it is taxed in England at three times, and in France at fifteen times its original price, those high duties seem to have no effect upon the wages of labour. The same thing may be said of the taxes upon tea and sugar, which, in England and Holland, have become luxuries of the lowest ranks of people; and of those upon chocolate, which, in Spain, is said to have become so.

It’s different when it comes to taxes on what I consider luxuries, even those that the poor might enjoy. The increase in the price of taxed goods doesn’t necessarily lead to higher wages for workers. A tax on tobacco, for instance, which is a luxury for both the poor and the rich, won't increase wages. Even though it's taxed in England at three times and in France at fifteen times its original price, those high duties don’t seem to affect labor wages. The same can be said for taxes on tea and sugar, which have become luxuries for the lower classes in England and Holland; and on chocolate, which is reportedly considered a luxury in Spain.

The different taxes which, in Great Britain, have, in the course of the present century, been imposed upon spiritous liquors, are not supposed to have had any effect upon the wages of labour. The rise in the price of porter, occasioned by an additional tax of three shillings upon the barrel of strong beer, has not raised the wages of common labour in London. These were about eighteen pence or twenty pence a-day before the tax, and they are not more now.

The various taxes that have been imposed on alcoholic beverages in Great Britain during this century are not believed to have affected labor wages. The increase in the price of porter due to an extra tax of three shillings on a barrel of strong beer hasn’t led to an increase in the wages of common laborers in London. These wages were around eighteen or twenty pence a day before the tax, and they remain the same now.

The high price of such commodities does[Pg 369] not necessarily diminish the ability of the inferior ranks of people to bring up families. Upon the sober and industrious poor, taxes upon such commodities act as sumptuary laws, and dispose them either to moderate, or to refrain altogether from the use of superfluities which they can no longer easily afford. Their ability to bring up families, in consequence of this forced frugality, instead of being diminished, is frequently, perhaps, increased by the tax. It is the sober and industrious poor who generally bring up the most numerous families, and who principally supply the demand for useful labour. All the poor, indeed, are not sober and industrious; and the dissolute and disorderly might continue to indulge themselves in the use of such commodities, after this rise of price, in the same manner as before, without regarding the distress which this indulgence might bring upon their families. Such disorderly persons, however, seldom rear up numerous families, their children generally perishing from neglect, mismanagement, and the scantiness or unwholesomeness of their food. If, by the strength of their constitution, they survive the hardships to which the bad conduct of their parents exposes them, yet the example of that bad conduct commonly corrupts their morals; so that, instead of being useful to society by their industry, they become public nuisances by their vices and disorders. Though the advanced price of the luxuries of the poor, therefore, might increase somewhat the distress of such disorderly families, and thereby diminish somewhat their ability to bring up children, it would not probably diminish much the useful population of the country.

The high cost of such goods does[Pg 369] not necessarily reduce the ability of lower-income families to raise children. For the responsible and hardworking poor, taxes on these goods act like regulations, prompting them to either cut back or eliminate their spending on non-essentials they can no longer easily afford. As a result of this enforced frugality, their ability to raise families may actually improve rather than decline. It’s usually the responsible and hardworking poor who have larger families and contribute the most to the demand for essential labor. Not all poor people are responsible and hardworking, however; those who are careless and disorganized might continue to indulge in these goods despite the price increase, without considering the hardship it brings to their families. However, such disorganized individuals rarely raise large families; their children often suffer due to neglect, mismanagement, and a lack of nutritious food. Even if their children survive the challenges posed by their parents' poor choices, the negative example set by those parents tends to corrupt their morals, leading them to become burdens to society rather than contributors through their work. So, while the increased prices of the poor's luxuries may worsen conditions for some of these disorganized families and slightly reduce their ability to raise children, it likely won’t greatly affect the overall productive population of the country.

Any rise in the average price of necessaries, unless it be compensated by a proportionable rise in the wages of labour, must necessarily diminish, more or less, the ability of the poor to bring up numerous families, and, consequently, to supply the demand for useful labour; whatever may be the state of that demand, whether increasing, stationary, or declining; or such as requires an increasing, stationary, or declining population.

Any increase in the average price of essentials, unless matched by a comparable increase in wages, will inevitably reduce the ability of poor families to support large households. As a result, this will affect the supply of available labor, no matter the condition of that demand—whether it's growing, stable, or declining—or if it needs a rising, stable, or declining population.

Taxes upon luxuries have no tendency to raise the price of any other commodities, except that of the commodities taxed. Taxes upon necessaries, by raising the wages of labour, necessarily tend to raise the price of all manufactures, and consequently to diminish the extent of their sale and consumption. Taxes upon luxuries are finally paid by the consumers of the commodities taxed, without any retribution. They fall indifferently upon every species of revenue, the wages of labour, the profits of stock, and the rent of land. Taxes upon necessaries, so far as they affect the labouring poor, are finally paid, partly by landlords, in the diminished rent of their lands, and partly by rich consumers, whether landlords or others, in the advanced price of manufactured goods; and always with a considerable overcharge. The advanced price of such manufactures as are real necessaries of life, and are destined for the consumption of the poor, of coarse woollens, for example, must be compensated to the poor by a farther advancement of their wages. The middling and superior ranks of people, if they understood their own interest, ought always to oppose all taxes upon the necessaries of life, as well as all taxes upon the wages of labour. The final payment of both the one and the other falls altogether upon themselves, and always with a considerable overcharge. They fall heaviest upon the landlords, who always pay in a double capacity; in that of landlords, by the reduction, of their rent; and in that of rich consumers, by the increase of their expense. The observation of Sir Matthew Decker, that certain taxes are, in the price of certain goods, sometimes repeated and accumulated four or five times, is perfectly just with regard to taxes upon the necessaries of life. In the price of leather, for example, you must pay not only for the tax upon the leather of your own shoes, but for a part of that upon those of the shoemaker and the tanner. You must pay, too, for the tax upon the salt, upon the soap, and upon the candles which those workmen consume while employed in your service; and for the tax upon the leather, which the salt-maker, the soap-maker, and the candle-maker consume, while employed in their service.

Taxes on luxury items don't raise the prices of other goods, except for the taxed items themselves. However, taxes on necessities, by increasing labor wages, tend to raise the prices of all manufactured goods, which can lead to a decrease in their sales and consumption. Consumers ultimately bear the cost of taxes on luxuries without any compensation. These taxes affect all types of income, including wages, profits, and rent. On the other hand, taxes on necessities, particularly affecting low-income workers, are partly absorbed by landlords through lower rents and partly by wealthy consumers—landlords or not—through higher prices on manufactured goods, often at a significant markup. The increased price of essential goods, like coarse woolens aimed at the poor, must be offset by higher wages for those workers. The middle and upper classes should consistently oppose taxes on life's necessities and labor wages because the total cost ultimately falls on them, typically at a significant markup. Landlords feel the double burden, as they pay through reduced rents and increased expenses as affluent consumers. Sir Matthew Decker's observation about certain taxes being included multiple times in the price of certain goods is completely accurate when it comes to necessities. For instance, when buying leather, you pay not just for the tax on your shoes but also for a portion of the taxes included in the shoes made by the shoemaker and the tanner. Additionally, you're covering the taxes on the salt, soap, and candles those workers use while working for you, along with the taxes on the leather consumed by the salt-maker, soap-maker, and candle-maker while serving them.

In Great Britain, the principal taxes upon the necessaries of life, are those upon the four commodities just now mentioned, salt, leather, soap, and candles.

In Great Britain, the main taxes on basic necessities are those on the four commodities just mentioned: salt, leather, soap, and candles.

Salt is a very ancient and a very universal subject of taxation. It was taxed among the Romans, and it is so at present in, I believe, every part of Europe. The quantity annually consumed by any individual is so small, and may be purchased so gradually, that nobody, it seems to have been thought, could feel very sensibly even a pretty heavy tax upon it. It is in England taxed at three shillings and fourpence a bushel; about three times the original price of the commodity. In some other countries, the tax is still higher. Leather is a real necessary of life. The use of linen renders soap such. In countries where the winter nights are long, candles are a necessary instrument of trade. Leather and soap are in Great Britain taxed at three halfpence a-pound; candles at a penny; taxes which, upon the original price of leather, may amount to about eight or ten per cent.; upon that of soap, to about twenty or five-and-twenty per cent.; and upon that of candles to about fourteen or fifteen per cent.; taxes which, though lighter than that upon salt, are still very heavy. As all those four commodities are real necessaries of life, such heavy taxes upon them must increase some[Pg 370] what the expense of the sober and industrious poor, and must consequently raise more or less the wages of their labour.

Salt has been a long-standing and common subject of taxation. The Romans taxed it, and it’s still taxed today in what I believe is every part of Europe. The amount that any individual consumes each year is so small and can be bought gradually that it seems no one really feels a significant burden from even a relatively large tax on it. In England, it's taxed at three shillings and fourpence per bushel, which is about three times the original price of the product. In some other countries, the tax is even higher. Leather is an essential part of life. Linen makes soap essential as well. In countries with long winter nights, candles are a necessary tool for business. Leather and soap are taxed in Great Britain at three halfpence per pound; candles at a penny. This translates to about eight to ten percent tax on leather’s original price, around twenty to twenty-five percent on soap, and about fourteen to fifteen percent on candles—taxes that, while lighter than salt's, are still quite significant. Since all four of these products are genuine necessities, such heavy taxes on them must increase the expenses for the diligent and modest poor, which in turn will likely drive up their labor costs.

In a country where the winters are so cold as in Great Britain, fuel is, during that season, in the strictest sense of the word, a necessary of life, not only for the purpose of dressing victuals, but for the comfortable subsistence of many different sorts of workmen who work within doors; and coals are the cheapest of all fuel. The price of fuel has so important an influence upon that of labour, that all over Great Britain, manufactures have confined themselves principally to the coal countries; other parts of the country, on account of the high price of this necessary article, not being able to work so cheap. In some manufactures, besides, coal is a necessary instrument of trade; as in those of glass, iron, and all other metals. If a bounty could in any case be reasonable, it might perhaps be so upon the transportation of coals from those parts of the country in which they abound, to those in which they are wanted. But the legislature, instead of a bounty, has imposed a tax of three shillings and threepence a-ton upon coals carried coastways; which, upon most sorts of coal, is more than sixty per cent. of the original price at the coal pit. Coals carried, either by land or by inland navigation, pay no duty. Where they are naturally cheap, they are consumed duty free; where they are naturally dear, they are loaded with a heavy duty.

In a country like Great Britain where the winters are extremely cold, fuel is absolutely essential for survival, not just for cooking but also for the comfort of many indoor workers. Coal is the cheapest source of fuel. The cost of fuel has a significant impact on labor prices, so across Great Britain, industries mainly focus on coal-rich areas; other regions can't compete because of the high cost of this essential resource. In some industries, coal is also a critical component for production, like in glassmaking, iron, and other metals. If there were ever a good reason for a subsidy, it might be for transporting coal from areas where it is abundant to areas where it is needed. However, instead of a subsidy, the government has placed a tax of three shillings and threepence per ton on coal transported by sea, which amounts to more than sixty percent of the original price at the coal mine for most types of coal. Coal transported by land or inland waterways pays no tax. Where coal is naturally cheap, it's consumed without any duties; where it's expensive, it's burdened with heavy taxes.

Such taxes, though they raise the price of subsistence, and consequently the wages of labour, yet they afford a considerable revenue to government, which it might not be easy to find in any other way. There may, therefore, be good reasons for continuing them. The bounty upon the exportation of corn, so far as it tends, in the actual state of tillage, to raise the price of that necessary article, produces all the like bad effects; and instead of affording any revenue, frequently occasions a very great expense to government. The high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which, in years of moderate plenty, amount to a prohibition; and the absolute prohibition of the importation, either of live cattle, or of salt provisions, which takes place in the ordinary state of the law, and which, on account of the scarcity, is at present suspended for a limited time with regard to Ireland and the British plantations, have all had the bad effects of taxes upon the necessaries of life, and produce no revenue to government. Nothing seems necessary for the repeal of such regulations, but to convince the public of the futility of that system in consequence of which they have been established.

Such taxes, while they increase the cost of living and consequently the wages of workers, also provide significant revenue to the government that might be hard to find otherwise. Therefore, there could be valid reasons to keep them. The subsidy on exporting corn, as it currently stands with farming practices, raises the price of this essential item and results in similar negative effects; rather than generating revenue, it often leads to substantial expenses for the government. The high tariffs on importing foreign corn, which essentially act as a ban during years of moderate abundance, and the complete ban on importing live cattle or preserved foods, which usually occurs under normal laws and is currently suspended for a limited time for Ireland and the British colonies due to scarcity, all have the detrimental effects of taxes on essential goods and do not generate any revenue for the government. Nothing seems necessary for repealing such regulations except to convince the public of the ineffectiveness of the system that brought them about.

Taxes upon the necessaries of life are much higher in many other countries than in Great Britain. Duties upon flour and meal when ground at the mill, and upon bread when baked at the oven, take place in many countries. In Holland the money-price of the bread consumed in towns is supposed to be doubled by means of such taxes. In lieu of a part of them, the people who live in the country, pay every year so much a-head, according to the sort of bread they are supposed to consume. Those who consume wheaten bread pay three guilders fifteen stivers; about six shillings and ninepence halfpenny. These, and some other taxes of the same kind, by raising the price of labour, are said to have ruined the greater part of the manufactures of Holland[71]. Similar taxes, though not quite so heavy, take place in the Milanese, in the states of Genoa, in the duchy of Modena, in the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and the Ecclesiastical state. A French author[72] of some note, has proposed to reform the finances of his country, by substituting in the room of the greater part of other taxes, this most ruinous of all taxes. There is nothing so absurd, says Cicero, which has not sometimes been asserted by some philosophers.

Taxes on essential goods are much higher in many other countries than in Great Britain. Duties on flour and meal when processed at the mill, and on bread when baked, exist in many places. In Holland, the price of bread consumed in cities is thought to be doubled because of these taxes. Instead of paying part of these taxes, people in rural areas pay a set amount each year, based on the type of bread they are expected to consume. Those who eat wheaten bread pay three guilders and fifteen stivers, which is about six shillings and ninepence halfpenny. These and other similar taxes are said to have devastated much of Holland's manufacturing by increasing labor costs[71]. Similar taxes, although not quite as heavy, are found in the Milanese, in the states of Genoa, in the duchy of Modena, in the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and in the Ecclesiastical state. A notable French author[72] has suggested reforming his country's finances by replacing most other taxes with this highly destructive tax. There is nothing so absurd, says Cicero, which has not sometimes been asserted by some philosophers.

Taxes upon butcher's meat are still more common than those upon bread. It may indeed be doubted, whether butcher's meat is any where a necessary of life. Grain and other vegetables, with the help of milk, cheese, and butter, or oil, where butter is not to be had, it is known from experience, can, without any butcher's meat, afford the most plentiful, the most wholesome, the most nourishing, and the most invigorating diet. Decency nowhere requires that any man should eat butcher's meat, as it in most places requires that he should wear a linen shirt or a pair of leather shoes.

Taxes on meat are more common than those on bread. It can even be questioned whether meat is truly a necessity for life. Grain and other vegetables, along with milk, cheese, and butter, or oil if butter isn’t available, can provide a plentiful, healthy, nourishing, and energizing diet without any meat. It’s not considered improper anywhere for a person to avoid eating meat, unlike the expectation in most places for them to wear a linen shirt or leather shoes.

Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two different ways. The consumer may either pay an annual sum on account of his using or consuming goods of a certain kind; or the goods may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer. The consumable goods which last a considerable time before they are consumed altogether, are most properly taxed in the one way; those of which the consumption is either immediate or more speedy, in the other. The coach-tax and plate-tax are examples of the former method of imposing; the greater part of the other duties of excise and customs, of the latter.

Consumable products, whether essentials or luxuries, can be taxed in two different ways. The consumer can either pay an annual fee for using or consuming certain types of goods, or the goods can be taxed while they are still with the dealer, before reaching the consumer. Goods that last a long time before they are fully consumed are usually taxed in the first way; those that are consumed immediately or more quickly fall under the second method. The coach tax and plate tax are examples of the first method, while most other excise and customs duties are examples of the second.

A coach may, with good management, last ten or twelve years. It might be taxed, once for all, before it comes out of the hands of the coach-maker. But it is certainly more convenient for the buyer to pay four pounds a-year for the privilege of keeping a coach, than to pay all at once forty or forty-eight pounds additional price to the coach-maker;[Pg 371] or a sum equivalent to what the tax is likely to cost him during the time he uses the same coach. A service of plate in the same manner, may last more than a century. It is certainly easier for the consumer to pay five shillings a-year for every hundred ounces of plate, near one per cent. of the value, than to redeem this long annuity at five-and-twenty of thirty years purchase, which would enhance the price at least five-and-twenty or thirty per cent. The different taxes which affect houses, are certainly more conveniently paid by moderate annual payments, than by a heavy tax of equal value upon the first building or sale of the house.

A coach can last ten or twelve years with proper care. It could be taxed in advance before it leaves the workshop of the coach-maker. However, it’s definitely more convenient for the buyer to pay four pounds a year for the right to own a coach rather than coughing up a one-time fee of forty or forty-eight pounds extra to the coach-maker;[Pg 371] or a sum that matches what the tax will likely cost during the time they use the coach. Similarly, a set of silverware can last over a hundred years. It's much easier for the consumer to pay five shillings a year for every hundred ounces of silver, about one percent of the value, than to redeem this long-term payment with twenty-five or thirty years' worth of purchase, which would raise the price by at least twenty-five or thirty percent. Taxes on houses are definitely more easily handled with regular annual payments than with a hefty tax equal to the total value at the initial construction or sale of the house.

It was the well-known proposal of Sir Matthew Decker, that all commodities, even those of which the consumption is either immediate or speedy, should be taxed in this manner; the dealer advancing nothing, but the consumer paying a certain annual sum for the licence to consume certain goods. The object of his scheme was to promote all the different branches of foreign trade, particularly the carrying trade, by taking away all duties upon importation and exportation, and thereby enabling the merchant to employ his whole capital and credit in the purchase of goods and the freight of ships, no part of either being diverted towards the advancing of taxes. The project, however, of taxing, in this manner, goods of immediate or speedy consumption, seems liable to the four following very important objections. First, the tax would be more unequal, or not so well proportioned to the expense and consumption of the different contributors, as in the way in which it is commonly imposed. The taxes upon ale, wine, and spiritous liquors, which are advanced by the dealers, are finally paid by the different consumers, exactly in proportion to their respective consumption. But if the tax were to be paid by purchasing a licence to drink those liquors, the sober would, in proportion to his consumption, be taxed much more heavily than the drunken consumer. A family which exercised great hospitality, would be taxed much more lightly than one who entertained fewer guests. Secondly, this mode of taxation, by paying for an annual, half-yearly, or quarterly licence to consume certain goods, would diminish very much one of the principal conveniences of taxes upon goods of speedy consumption; the piece-meal payment. In the price of threepence halfpenny, which is at present paid for a pot of porter, the different taxes upon malt, hops, and beer, together with the extraordinary profit which the brewer charges for having advanced them, may perhaps amount to about three halfpence. If a workman can conveniently spare those three halfpence, he buys a pot of porter. If he cannot, he contents himself with a pint; and, as a penny saved is a penny got, he thus gains a farthing by his temperance. He pays the tax piece-meal, as he can afford to pay it, and when he can afford to pay it, and every act of payment is perfectly voluntary, and what he can avoid if he chuses to do so. Thirdly, such taxes would operate less as sumptuary laws. When the licence was once purchased, whether the purchaser drunk much or drunk little, his tax would he the same. Fourthly, if a workman were to pay all at once, by yearly, half-yearly, or quarterly payments, a tax equal to what he at present pays, with little or no inconveniency, upon all the different pots and pints of porter which he drinks in any such period of time, the sum might frequently distress him very much. This mode of taxation, therefore, it seems evident, could never, without the most grievous oppression, produce a revenue nearly equal to what is derived from the present mode without any oppression. In several countries, however, commodities of an immediate or very speedy consumption are taxed in this manner. In Holland, people pay so much a-head for a licence to drink tea. I have already mentioned a tax upon bread, which, so far as it is consumed in farm houses and country villages, is there levied in the same manner.

It was the well-known suggestion of Sir Matthew Decker that all goods, even those consumed quickly, should be taxed this way: the dealer wouldn't pay anything upfront, but the consumer would pay a certain annual fee for the right to buy specific products. The goal of his plan was to encourage all branches of foreign trade, especially transportation, by eliminating all import and export duties. This would allow merchants to use all their capital and credit for buying goods and shipping rather than diverting any of it to pay taxes. However, the idea of taxing goods consumed quickly comes with four significant objections. First, the tax would be less equitable, or not well-aligned with the spending and consumption of different consumers, compared to the usual method. Taxes on ale, wine, and spirits are paid by dealers but ultimately fall on consumers based on how much they purchase. If the tax were instead paid via a license to drink those drinks, a sober person would end up paying more relative to their consumption than someone who drinks heavily. A family that hosts many guests would be taxed much less than one that entertains fewer people. Second, this type of tax based on an annual, semi-annual, or quarterly license to consume certain goods would significantly reduce one of the main advantages of taxes on goods consumed quickly: the ability to pay in smaller amounts. Currently, the cost of three and a half pennies for a pint of porter includes various taxes on malt, hops, and beer, which may collectively add up to about three halfpennies. If a worker can afford those three halfpennies, they buy a pint. If not, they settle for a smaller serving, effectively saving money through moderation. They pay the tax in smaller amounts based on their ability, timing each payment voluntarily and avoiding it if they choose. Third, such taxes wouldn’t serve as social controls as much. Once the license is bought, whether the buyer drinks a lot or a little, their tax remains the same. Fourth, if a worker had to make a lump sum payment, whether yearly, semi-annually, or quarterly, that equaled what they currently pay without much trouble for every pint they drink in that time, the total could often be a significant burden. This type of tax clearly would not generate revenue close to what is collected under the current system without causing severe hardship. In several countries, however, goods that are consumed quickly are taxed this way. In Holland, for example, people pay a fee for a license to drink tea. I have already noted a tax on bread that is also collected this way in farmhouses and rural villages.

The duties of excise are imposed chiefly upon goods of home produce, destined for home consumption. They are imposed only upon a few sorts of goods of the most general use. There can never be any doubt, either concerning the goods which are subject to those duties, or concerning the particular duty which each species of goods is subject to. They fall almost altogether upon what I call luxuries, excepting always the four duties above mentioned, upon salt, soap, leather, candles, and perhaps that upon green glass.

The excise duties are mainly placed on domestically produced goods intended for local use. They apply only to a limited range of commonly used items. There is no confusion about which goods are subject to these duties or the specific duty rate for each type. They primarily target luxuries, with the exception of the four duties mentioned earlier, which apply to salt, soap, leather, candles, and possibly green glass.

The duties of customs are much more ancient than those of excise. They seem to have been called customs, as denoting customary payments, which had been in use for time immemorial. They appear to have been originally considered as taxes upon the profits of merchants. During the barbarous times of feudal anarchy, merchants, like all the other inhabitants of burghs, were considered as little better than emancipated bondmen, whose persons were despised, and whose gains were envied. The great nobility, who had consented that the king should tallage the profits of their own tenants, were not unwilling that he should tallage likewise those of an order of men whom it was much less their interest to protect. In those ignorant times, it was not understood, that the profits of merchants are a subject not taxable directly; or that the final payment of all such taxes must fall, with a considerable overcharge, upon the consumers.

The duties of customs are much older than those of excise. They seem to have been called customs because they were customary payments that had been around for a long time. They originally appeared to be considered as taxes on the profits of merchants. During the chaotic times of feudal anarchy, merchants, like everyone else in towns, were seen as little better than freed serfs, whose status was looked down upon and whose earnings were envied. The powerful nobles, who agreed that the king could tax the profits of their own tenants, were not hesitant to let him tax those of a group of people they were less inclined to protect. In those unenlightened times, it wasn’t realized that the profits of merchants should not be directly taxed or that the ultimate burden of all such taxes would largely fall on consumers, with a significant markup.

The gains of alien merchants were looked upon more unfavourably than those of English merchants. It was natural, therefore, that those of the former should be taxed more[Pg 372] heavily than those of the latter. This distinction between the duties upon aliens and those upon English merchants, which was begun from ignorance, has been continued from the spirit of monopoly, or in order to give our own merchants an advantage, both in the home and in the foreign market.

The profits of foreign merchants were viewed more negatively than those of English merchants. So, it made sense that the former would be taxed more heavily than the latter. This difference in taxes on foreigners compared to English merchants started out of ignorance and has continued out of a desire for monopoly or to give our own merchants an edge, both domestically and internationally.[Pg 372]

With this distinction, the ancient duties of customs were imposed equally upon all sorts of goods, necessaries as well as luxuries, goods exported as well as goods imported. Why should the dealers in one sort of goods, it seems to have been thought, be more favoured than those in another? or why should the merchant exporter be more favoured than the merchant importer?

With this distinction, the old customs duties were applied to all types of goods, both essential items and luxury products, whether they were being exported or imported. Why should sellers of one type of goods be preferred over those of another? Or why should the exporting merchant have more advantages than the importing merchant?

The ancient customs were divided into three branches. The first, and, perhaps, the most ancient of all those duties, was that upon wool and leather. It seems to have been chiefly or altogether an exportation duty. When the woollen manufacture came to be established in England, lest the king should lose any part of his customs upon wool by the exportation of woollen cloths, a like duty was imposed upon them. The other two branches were, first, a duty upon wine, which being imposed at so much a-ton, was called a tonnage; and, secondly, a duty upon all other goods, which being imposed at so much a-pound of their supposed value, was called a poundage. In the forty-seventh year of Edward III., a duty of sixpence in the pound was imposed upon all goods exported and imported, except wools, wool-felts, leather, and wines which were subject to particular duties. In the fourteenth of Richard II., this duty was raised to one shilling in the pound; but, three years afterwards, it was again reduced to sixpence. It was raised to eightpence in the second year of Henry IV.; and, in the fourth of the same prince, to one shilling. From this time to the ninth year of William III., this duty continued at one shilling in the pound. The duties of tonnage and poundage were generally granted to the king by one and the same act of parliament, and were called the subsidy of tonnage and poundage. The subsidy of poundage having continued for so long a time at one shilling in the pound, or at five per cent., a subsidy came, in the language of the customs, to denote a general duty of this kind of five per cent. This subsidy, which is now called the old subsidy, still continues to be levied, according to the book of rates established by the twelfth of Charles II. The method of ascertaining, by a book of rates, the value of goods subject to this duty, is said to be older than the time of James I. The new subsidy, imposed by the ninth and tenth of William III., was an additional five per cent. upon the greater part of goods. The one-third and the two-third subsidy made up between them another five per cent. of which they were proportionable parts. The subsidy of 1747 made a fourth five per cent. upon the greater part of goods; and that of 1759, a fifth upon some particular sorts of goods. Besides those five subsidies, a great variety of other duties have occasionally been imposed upon particular sorts of goods in order sometimes to relieve the exigencies of the state, and sometimes to regulate the trade of the country, according to the principles of the mercantile system.

The old customs were divided into three categories. The first, and perhaps the oldest of these duties, was on wool and leather. It seems to have mostly been an export duty. Once the woolen industry was established in England, to ensure the king wouldn’t lose any revenue from wool due to the export of woolen cloth, a similar duty was placed on those products. The other two branches were, first, a duty on wine, which was charged at a rate per ton and called a tonnage; and secondly, a duty on all other goods, which was based on their assumed value per pound and called a poundage. In the forty-seventh year of Edward III., a duty of sixpence per pound was introduced on all goods exported and imported, except for wools, wool-felts, leather, and wines, which had their specific duties. In the fourteenth year of Richard II., this duty was raised to one shilling per pound; however, three years later, it was reduced back to sixpence. It was increased to eightpence in the second year of Henry IV, and again raised to one shilling in the fourth year of the same king. From that point until the ninth year of William III, this duty remained at one shilling per pound. The duties of tonnage and poundage were typically granted to the king through a single act of parliament and were referred to as the subsidy of tonnage and poundage. The poundage subsidy, having remained so long at one shilling per pound, or five percent, came to symbolize a general duty of that kind of five percent. This subsidy, now known as the old subsidy, is still collected according to the rates established by the twelfth of Charles II. The practice of determining the value of goods subject to this duty using a rates book is said to predate James I. The new subsidy, introduced by the ninth and tenth of William III, was an extra five percent on most goods. The one-third and two-third subsidies combined to form another five percent, being proportional parts of that. The subsidy in 1747 added a fourth five percent on most goods; and that of 1759 contributed a fifth on certain kinds of goods. In addition to these five subsidies, a variety of other duties have been charged on specific types of goods, sometimes to address the government's financial needs, and other times to regulate the country's trade in line with mercantile principles.

That system has come gradually more and more into fashion. The old subsidy was imposed indifferently upon exportation, as well as importation. The four subsequent subsidies, as well as the other duties which have since been occasionally imposed upon particular sorts of goods, have, with a few exceptions, been laid altogether upon importation. The greater part of the ancient duties which had been imposed upon the exportation of the goods of home produce and manufacture, have either been lightened or taken away altogether. In most cases, they have been taken away. Bounties have even been given upon the exportation of some of them. Drawbacks, too, sometimes of the whole, and, in most cases, or a part of the duties which are paid upon the importation of foreign goods, have been granted upon their exportation. Only half the duties imposed by the old subsidy upon importation, are drawn back upon exportation; but the whole of those imposed by the latter subsidies and other imports are, upon the greater parts of the goods, drawn back in the same manner. This growing favour of exportation, and discouragement of importation, have suffered only a few exceptions, which chiefly concern the materials of some manufactures. These our merchants and manufacturers are willing should come as cheap as possible to themselves, and as dear as possible to their rivals and competitors in other countries. Foreign materials are, upon this account, sometimes allowed to be imported duty-free; Spanish wool, for example, flax, and raw linen yarn. The exportation of the materials of home produce, and of those which are the particular produce of our colonies, has sometimes been prohibited, and sometimes subjected to higher duties. The exportation of English wool has been prohibited. That of beaver skins, of beaver wool, and of gum-senega, has been subjected to higher duties; Great Britain, by the conquests of Canada and Senegal, having got almost the monopoly of those commodities.

That system has gradually become more popular. The old subsidy was applied equally to both exports and imports. The four later subsidies, along with other duties that have occasionally been imposed on specific types of goods, have mostly been placed entirely on imports, with a few exceptions. Most of the old duties on the export of domestically produced and manufactured goods have either been reduced or completely removed. In most cases, they have been removed. Incentives have even been given for the export of some of these goods. Refunds, often for the full amount, and in most cases at least a portion of the duties paid on imported foreign goods, have been granted when those goods are exported. Only half of the duties from the old subsidy on imports are refunded upon export; however, the full amount of those imposed by the later subsidies and other imports is refunded for the majority of the goods in the same way. This increasing support for exports and discouragement of imports has only a few exceptions, mainly related to materials for certain industries. Our merchants and manufacturers prefer these materials to be as inexpensive as possible for themselves and as expensive as possible for their competitors in other countries. For this reason, some foreign materials, like Spanish wool, flax, and raw linen yarn, are sometimes allowed to be imported without tariffs. The export of locally produced materials and those that are specific to our colonies has sometimes been banned or subjected to higher duties. The export of English wool has been banned. Exporting beaver skins, beaver wool, and gum senega has encountered higher duties; Great Britain, having gained almost a monopoly on those commodities through its conquests in Canada and Senegal.

That the mercantile system has not been very favourable to the revenue of the great body of the people, to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, I have endeavoured to show in the fourth book of this Inquiry. It seems not to have been more[Pg 373] favourable to the revenue of the sovereign; so far, at least, as that revenue depends upon the duties of customs.

That the mercantile system hasn't been very beneficial to the revenue of the general population or the yearly output of the country's land and labor, I’ve tried to demonstrate in the fourth book of this Inquiry. It also doesn't seem to have been much better for the revenue of the government, at least in terms of how that revenue relies on customs duties.

In consequence of that system, the importation of several sorts of goods has been prohibited altogether. This prohibition has, in some cases, entirely prevented, and in others has very much diminished, the importation of those commodities, by reducing the importers to the necessity of smuggling. It has entirely prevented the importation of foreign wollens; and it has very much diminished that of foreign silks and velvets. In both cases, it has entirely annihilated the revenue of customs which might have been levied upon such importation.

As a result of that system, the import of several types of goods has been completely banned. This ban has, in some instances, totally stopped and in other cases significantly reduced the import of those products, forcing importers to resort to smuggling. It has completely halted the import of foreign woolens and greatly reduced the import of foreign silks and velvets. In both scenarios, it has completely wiped out the customs revenue that could have been collected from such imports.

The high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many different sorts of foreign goods in order to discourage their consumption in Great Britain, have, in many cases, served only to encourage smuggling, and, in all cases, have reduced the revenues of the customs below what more moderate duties would have afforded. The saying of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of the customs, two and two, instead of making four, make sometimes only one, holds perfectly true with regard to such heavy duties, which never could have been imposed, had not the mercantile system taught us, in many cases, to employ taxation as an instrument, not of revenue, but of monopoly.

The high taxes placed on the import of various foreign goods to discourage their consumption in Great Britain have often only led to more smuggling. In every case, these taxes have lowered customs revenue compared to what more reasonable taxes would have generated. Dr. Swift's saying that in customs math, two and two can sometimes equal only one is spot on when it comes to such heavy taxes, which wouldn't have been possible if the business system hadn’t shown us to use taxes as a tool for monopoly rather than revenue.

The bounties which are sometimes given upon the exportation of home produce and manufactures, and the drawbacks which are paid upon the re-exportation of the greater part of foreign goods, have given occasion to many frauds, and to a species of smuggling, more destructive of the public revenue than any other. In order to obtain the bounty or drawback, the goods, it is well known, are sometimes shipped, and sent to sea, but soon afterwards clandestinely re-landed in some other part of the country. The defalcation of the revenue of customs occasioned by bounties and drawbacks, of which a great part are obtained fraudulently, is very great. The gross produce of the customs, in the year which ended on the 5th of January 1755, amounted to L.5,068,000. The bounties which were paid out of this revenue, though in that year there was no bounty upon corn, amounted to L.167,800. The drawbacks which were paid upon debentures and certificates, to L.2,156,800. Bounties and drawbacks together amounted to L.2,324,600. In consequence of these deductions, the revenue of the customs amounted only to L.2,743,400; from which deducting L.287,900 for the expense of management, in salaries and other incidents, the neat revenue of the customs for that year comes out to be L.2,455,500. The expense of management, amounts, in this manner, to between five and six per cent. upon the gross revenue of the customs; and to something more than ten per cent. upon what remains of that revenue, after deducting what is paid away in bounties and drawbacks.

The incentives sometimes offered for exporting local products and goods, along with the refunds provided for the re-export of most foreign items, have led to many frauds and a type of smuggling that harms public revenue more than anything else. To get the incentive or refund, it's well known that goods are sometimes shipped and sent to sea, but shortly after, they are secretly brought back to another part of the country. The loss in customs revenue caused by incentives and refunds, a large portion of which is obtained fraudulently, is significant. The total customs revenue for the year ending January 5, 1755, was £5,068,000. The incentives paid from this revenue, even though there was no bounty on grain that year, totaled £167,800. The refunds paid for debentures and certificates reached £2,156,800. Combined, the incentives and refunds amounted to £2,324,600. As a result of these deductions, customs revenue only totaled £2,743,400; when we subtract £287,900 for management expenses, including salaries and other costs, the net customs revenue for that year is £2,455,500. Management expenses account for about five to six percent of the gross customs revenue, and over ten percent of what remains after accounting for incentives and refunds.

Heavy duties being imposed upon almost all goods imported, our merchant importers smuggle as much, and make entry of as little as they can. Our merchant exporters, on the contrary, make entry of more than they export; sometimes out of vanity, and to pass for great dealers in goods which pay no duty and sometimes to gain a bounty or a drawback. Our exports, in consequence of these different frauds, appear upon the custom-house books greatly to overbalance our imports, to the unspeakable comfort of those politicians, who measure the national prosperity by what they call the balance of trade.

With heavy taxes on almost all imported goods, our merchants are smuggling in as much as they can and declaring as little as possible. In contrast, our exporting merchants declare more than they actually export; sometimes this is due to vanity, trying to look like big dealers in goods that aren’t taxed, and other times to qualify for a bounty or a rebate. As a result of these various schemes, our exports seem to greatly exceed our imports on the customs records, which provides immense satisfaction to those politicians who judge national prosperity by what they refer to as the balance of trade.

All goods imported, unless particularly exempted, and such exemptions are not very numerous, are liable to some duties of customs. If any goods are imported, not mentioned in the book of rates, they are taxed at 4s. 9920d. for every twenty shillings value, according to the oath of the importer, that is, nearly at five subsidies, or five poundage duties. The book of rates is extremely comprehensive, and enumerates a great variety of articles, many of them little used, and, therefore, not well known. It is, upon this account, frequently uncertain under what article a particular sort of goods ought to be classed, and, consequently what duty they ought to pay. Mistakes with regard to this sometimes ruin the custom-house officer, and frequently occasion much trouble, expense, and vexation to the importer. In point of perspicuity, precision, and distinctness, therefore, the duties of customs are much more inferior to those of excise.

All imported goods, unless specifically exempted—which are not very many—are subject to some customs duties. If any goods are imported that aren’t listed in the rate book, they’re taxed at 4s. 9920d. for every twenty shillings in value, based on the importer’s declaration, which is nearly equivalent to five subsidies or five poundage duties. The rate book is very detailed and lists a wide variety of items, many of which are rarely used and not well known. Because of this, it’s often unclear under which category a certain type of goods should fall, and thus what duty applies. Errors in this regard can sometimes be detrimental to the customs officer and often create significant trouble, expense, and frustration for the importer. In terms of clarity, accuracy, and specificity, therefore, customs duties are much less satisfactory than excise duties.

In order that the greater part of the members of any society should contribute to the public revenue, in proportion to their respective expense, it does not seem necessary that every single article of that expense should be taxed. The revenue which is levied by the duties of excise is supposed to fall as equally upon the contributors as that which is levied by the duties of customs; and the duties of excise are imposed upon a few articles only of the most general use and consumption. It has been the opinion of many people, that, by proper management, the duties of customs might likewise, without any loss to the public revenue, and with great advantage to foreign trade, be confined to a few articles only.

To ensure that most members of any society contribute to public revenue based on their spending, it doesn’t seem necessary to tax every single item they purchase. The revenue collected through excise duties is believed to impact contributors as fairly as customs duties do; excise duties are only imposed on a few commonly used products. Many people believe that, with the right management, customs duties could also be limited to a few items without harming public revenue and could actually benefit foreign trade.

The foreign articles, of the most general use and consumption in Great Britain, seem at present to consist chiefly in foreign wines and brandies; in some of the productions of America and the West Indies, sugar, rum, tobacco, cocoa-nuts, &c. and in some of those of the East Indies, tea, coffee, china-ware, spiceries of all kinds, several sorts of piece-goods, &c. These different articles afford,[Pg 374] perhaps, at present, the greater part of the revenue which is drawn from the duties of customs. The taxes which at present subsist upon foreign manufactures, if you except those upon the few contained in the foregoing enumeration, have, the greater part of them, been imposed for the purpose, not of revenue, but of monopoly, or to give our own merchants an advantage in the home market. By removing all prohibitions, and by subjecting all foreign manufactures to such moderate taxes, as it was found from experience, afforded upon each article the greatest revenue to the public, our own workmen might still have a considerable advantage in the home market; and many articles, some of which at present afford no revenue to government, and others a very inconsiderable one, might afford a very great one.

The foreign products that are most commonly used and consumed in Great Britain right now mainly include foreign wines and brandies, some products from America and the West Indies like sugar, rum, tobacco, cocoa-nuts, etc., and from the East Indies, items like tea, coffee, china, various spices, several types of textiles, etc. These different products probably make up most of the revenue that comes from customs duties. The taxes currently imposed on foreign goods, aside from those on the few mentioned above, have mostly been established not for revenue but to create a monopoly or to give our local merchants an edge in the domestic market. By lifting all restrictions and subjecting all foreign goods to moderate taxes based on what experience has shown to generate the most revenue for the public, our workers could still enjoy a significant advantage in the domestic market. Additionally, many products, some of which currently generate no revenue for the government and others only a small amount, could potentially bring in a much larger sum.

High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes.

High taxes, by reducing the consumption of taxed goods and sometimes promoting smuggling, often generate less revenue for the government than could be collected with more moderate taxes.

When the diminution of revenue is the effect of the diminution of consumption, there can be but one remedy, and that is the lowering of the tax.

When a decrease in revenue results from a decrease in consumption, there is only one solution: reducing the tax.

When the diminution of revenue is the effect of the encouragement given to smuggling, it may, perhaps, be remedied in two ways; either by diminishing the temptation to smuggle, or by increasing the difficulty of smuggling. The temptation to smuggle can be be diminished only by the lowering of the tax; and the difficulty of smuggling can be increased only by establishing that system of administration which is most proper for preventing it.

When a decrease in revenue is caused by the encouragement of smuggling, it can possibly be fixed in two ways: either by reducing the temptation to smuggle, or by making it harder to smuggle. The temptation to smuggle can be reduced only by lowering the tax, and the difficulty of smuggling can be increased only by implementing the best system of administration to prevent it.

The excise laws, it appears, I believe, from experience, obstruct and embarrass the operations of the smuggler much more effectually than those of the customs. By introducing into the customs a system of administration as similar to that of the excise as the nature of the different duties will admit, the difficulty of smuggling might be very much increased. This alteration, it has been supposed by many people, might very easily be brought about.

The excise laws, from what I’ve seen, interfere with and complicate the activities of smugglers far more effectively than customs do. By making the customs administration similar to that of the excise, within the limits of the different duties, it could be made much harder to smuggle. Many people believe that this change could be implemented quite easily.

The importer of commodities liable to any duties of customs, it has been said, might, at his option, he allowed either to carry them to his own private warehouse; or to lodge them in a warehouse, provided either at his own expense or at that of the public, but under the key of the custom-house officer, and never to be opened but in his presence. If the merchant carried them to his own private warehouse, the duties to be immediately paid, and never afterwards to be drawn back; and that warehouse to be at all times subject to the visit and examination of the custom-house officer, in order to ascertain how far the quantity contained in it corresponded with that for which the duty had been paid. If he carried them to the public warehouse, no duty to be paid till they were taken out for home consumption. If taken out for exportation, to be duty-free; proper security being always given that they should be so exported. The dealers in those particular commodities, either by wholesale or retail, to be at all times subject to the visit and examination of the custom-house officer; and to be obliged to justify, by proper certificates, the payment of the duty upon the whole quantity contained in their shops or warehouses. What are called the excise duties upon rum imported, are at present levied in this manner; and the same system of administration might, perhaps, be extended to all duties upon goods imported; provided always that those duties were, like the duties of excise, confined to a few sorts of goods of the most general use and consumption. If they were extended to almost all sorts of goods, as at present, public warehouses of sufficient extent could not easily be provided; and goods of a very delicate nature, or of which the preservation required much care and attention, could not safely be trusted by the merchant in any warehouse but his own.

The importer of goods that are subject to customs duties can choose to either take them to his own private warehouse or store them in a public warehouse, either at his own cost or funded by the government, but under the control of the customs officer, who must always be present when the warehouse is opened. If the merchant decides to use his own warehouse, he must pay the duties upfront, and these will not be refunded later; this warehouse will also be open to inspections by the customs officer to verify that the quantity stored matches what the duties were paid for. If the goods are stored in the public warehouse, the duty is not paid until they are taken out for local consumption. Additionally, if they are taken out for export, they are exempt from duties as long as proper security is provided to ensure they will be exported. Dealers in these specific goods, whether selling wholesale or retail, are always subject to inspections by the customs officer and must provide valid certificates proving that the duty has been paid on all stock in their shops or warehouses. The current excise duties on imported rum are collected in this way, and this same management approach could potentially be applied to all import duties, as long as those duties, like excise duties, are limited to a few commonly used goods. However, if these duties were applied to nearly all types of goods as they are now, it would be difficult to maintain public warehouses large enough, and merchants would not be able to securely store delicate goods or items that require careful handling in any warehouse other than their own.

If, by such a system of administration, smuggling to any considerable extent could be prevented, even under pretty high duties; if every duty was occasionally either heightened or lowered according as it was likely, either the one way or the other, to afford the greatest revenue to the state; taxation being always employed as an instrument of revenue, and never of monopoly; it seems not improbable that a revenue, at least equal to the present neat revenue of the customs, might be drawn from duties upon the importation of only a few sorts of goods of the most general use and consumption; and that the duties of customs might thus be brought to the same degree of simplicity, certainty, and precision, as those of excise. What the revenue at present loses by drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods, which are afterwards re-landed and consumed at home, would, under this system, be saved altogether. If to this saving, which would alone be very considerable, were added the abolition of all bounties upon the exportation of home produce; in all cases in which those bounties were not in reality drawbacks of some duties of excise which had before been advanced; it cannot well be doubted, but that the neat revenue of customs might, after an alteration of this kind, be fully equal to what it had ever been before.

If, through such an administration system, we could significantly reduce smuggling, even with relatively high duties; and if every duty was occasionally raised or lowered based on its potential to generate the most revenue for the state; with taxation always used as a means of generating revenue rather than creating monopolies; it seems likely that we could raise a revenue at least equal to the current net revenue from customs, solely from duties on a limited number of widely used and consumed goods. This would bring customs duties to the same level of simplicity, certainty, and accuracy as excise duties. Currently, the revenue lost from refunds on re-exported foreign goods that are later consumed domestically would be fully saved under this system. If we added this saving, which would be substantial, to the removal of all bounties on the export of domestic products, in cases where those bounties weren’t actually refunds of some previously paid excise duties, we could confidently say that the net customs revenue could be completely restored to what it was before this change.

If, by such a change of system, the public revenue suffered no loss, the trade and manufactures of the country would certainly gain a very considerable advantage. The trade in the commodities not taxed, by far the greatest[Pg 375] number would be perfectly free, and might be carried on to and from all parts of the world with every possible advantage. Among those commodities would be comprehended all the necessaries of life, and all the materials of manufacture. So far as the free importation of the necessaries of life reduced their average money price in the home market, it would reduce the money price of labour, but without reducing in any respect its real recompense. The value of money is in proportion to the quantity of the necessaries of life which it will purchase. That of the necessaries of life is altogether independent of the quantity of money which can be had for them. The reduction in the money price of labour would necessarily be attended with a proportionable one in that of all home manufactures, which would thereby gain some advantage in all foreign markets. The price of some manufactures would be reduced, in a still greater proportion, by the free importation of the raw materials. If raw silk could be imported from China and Indostan, duty-free, the silk manufacturers in England could greatly undersell those of both France and Italy. There would be no occasion to prohibit the importation of foreign silks and velvets. The cheapness of their goods would secure to our own workmen, not only the possession of a home, but a very great command of the foreign market. Even the trade in the commodities taxed, would be carried on with much more advantage than at present. If those commodities were delivered out of the public warehouse for foreign exportation, being in this case exempted from all taxes, the trade in them would be perfectly free. The carrying trade, in all sorts of goods, would, under this system, enjoy every possible advantage. If these commodities were delivered out for home consumption, the importer not being obliged to advance the tax till he had an opportunity of selling his goods, either to some dealer, or to some consumer, he could always afford to sell them cheaper than if he had been obliged to advance it at the moment of importation. Under the same taxes, the foreign trade of consumption, even in the taxed commodities, might in this manner be carried on with much more advantage than it is at present.

If, with this change in the system, the public revenue didn't suffer any losses, the country's trade and manufacturing would definitely see a significant boost. The trade in untaxed goods, which make up the vast majority[Pg 375], would be completely free, and could thrive with all possible benefits from trade with every part of the world. This includes all the essentials for life and the raw materials for manufacturing. As the free import of essential goods lowered their average price in the local market, it would also reduce the money price of labor, but not its actual value. The value of money is determined by how many essential goods it can buy. The value of those essential goods is completely independent of the amount of money exchanged for them. The decrease in the money price of labor would naturally lead to a similar decline in the price of all local manufacturing, giving them an edge in foreign markets. Some manufacturing prices would drop even more significantly due to the unrestricted import of raw materials. If raw silk could be brought in from China and India without duties, silk manufacturers in England could easily undercut those in France and Italy. There wouldn’t be a need to ban the import of foreign silks and velvets. The affordability of those goods would not only benefit our own workers, providing them with job security at home but also give them considerable access to foreign markets. Even trade in taxed goods would operate more advantageously than it does now. If those goods were released from the public warehouse for export, exempt from all taxes, that trade would be completely free. The transport of all kinds of goods would, under this system, enjoy all possible advantages. If these goods were designated for local consumption, the importer wouldn't have to pay the tax until they had the chance to sell their goods, either to a dealer or a consumer; thus, they could always sell them for less than if they had to pay the tax at the time of import. With the same taxes, the foreign trade of consumption, even for taxed goods, could be conducted much more advantageously than it is currently.

It was the object of the famous excise scheme of Sir Robert Walpole, to establish, with regard to wine and tobacco, a system not very unlike that which is here proposed. But though the bill which was then brought into Parliament, comprehended those two commodities only, it was generally supposed to be meant as an introduction to a more extensive scheme of the same kind. Faction, combined with the interest of smuggling merchants, raised so violent, though so unjust a clamour, against that bill, that the minister thought proper to drop it; and, from a dread of exciting a clamour of the same kind, none of his successors have dared to resume the project.

The famous tax plan of Sir Robert Walpole aimed to create a system for wine and tobacco that was similar to the one proposed here. Although the bill presented to Parliament only included those two products, many believed it was intended as a step toward a broader plan of the same nature. Political factions, along with the interests of smuggling merchants, raised such an uproar—though it was completely unfair—against that bill that the minister decided to abandon it. Since then, fearing a similar backlash, none of his successors have been willing to take up the proposal again.

The duties upon foreign luxuries, imported for home consumption, though they sometimes fall upon the poor, fall principally upon people of middling or more than middling fortune. Such are, for example, the duties upon foreign wines, upon coffee, chocolate, tea, sugar, &c.

The taxes on imported luxury goods, even though they sometimes impact the poor, primarily affect people of moderate or higher income. These include taxes on foreign wines, coffee, chocolate, tea, sugar, and so on.

The duties upon the cheaper luxuries of home produce, destined for home consumption, fall pretty equally upon people of all ranks, in proportion to their respective expense. The poor pay the duties upon malt, hops, beer, and ale, upon their own consumption; the rich, upon both their own consumption and that of their servants.

The taxes on affordable luxuries made at home, meant for local use, are mostly shared by people of all classes, based on how much they spend. The poor pay taxes on malt, hops, beer, and ale for what they consume; the rich pay taxes on what they consume as well as what their servants consume.

The whole consumption of the inferior ranks of people, or of those below the middling rank, it must be observed, is, in every country, much greater, not only in quantity, but in value, than that of the middling, and of those above the middling rank. The whole expense of the inferior is much greater than that of the superior ranks. In the first place, almost the whole capital of every country is annually distributed among the inferior ranks of people, as the wages of productive labour. Secondly, a great part of the revenue, arising from both the rent of land and the profits of stock, is annually distributed among the same rank, in the wages and maintenance of menial servants, and other unproductive labourers. Thirdly, some part of the profits of stock belongs to the same rank, as a revenue arising from the employment of their small capitals. The amount of the profits annually made by small shopkeepers, tradesmen, and retailers of all kinds, is everywhere very considerable, and makes a very considerable portion of the annual produce. Fourthly and lastly, some part even of the rent of land belongs to the same rank; a considerable part to those who are somewhat below the middling rank, and a small part even to the lowest rank; common labourers sometimes possessing in property an acre or two of land. Though the expense of those inferior ranks of people, therefore, taking them individually, is very small, yet the whole mass of it, taking them collectively, amounts always to by much the largest portion of the whole expense of the society; what remains of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, for the consumption of the superior ranks, being always much less, not only in quantity, but in value. The taxes upon expense, therefore, which fall chiefly upon that of the superior ranks of people, upon the smaller portion of the annual produce, are likely to be much less productive than either those which fall indifferently upon the expense of all ranks, or even those which fall chiefly upon that of the inferior ranks, than[Pg 376] either those which fall indifferently upon the whole annual produce, or those which fall chiefly upon the larger portion of it. The excise upon the materials and manufacture of home-made fermented and spiritous liquors, is, accordingly, of all the different taxes upon expense, by far the most productive; and this branch of the excise falls very much, perhaps principally, upon the expense of the common people. In the year which ended on the 5th of July 1775, the gross produce of this branch of the excise amounted to L.3,341,837 : 9 : 9.

The overall spending of the lower classes or those below the middle class, it should be noted, is, in every country, much higher, not just in quantity but in value, than that of the middle class and those above it. The total expenses of the lower classes are significantly greater than those of the upper classes. First, nearly all the capital in every country is distributed each year among the lower classes as wages for productive work. Second, a large part of the income from both land rent and profit from capital is distributed annually among the same class, through wages and support for domestic workers and other non-productive laborers. Third, a portion of the profits from capital belongs to this class, as income generated from their small investments. The profits earned each year by small shopkeepers, tradespeople, and all kinds of retailers are quite substantial everywhere and make up a significant portion of the annual output. Finally, a part of the land rent also goes to this class; a significant share goes to those just below the middle class, and a small amount even to the lowest class, with common laborers sometimes owning an acre or two of land. Although the spending of these lower classes, when considered individually, is quite small, collectively, it amounts to the largest portion of the total expenditures in society; what is left of the annual output from the land and labor of the country for the consumption of the upper classes is always much less, both in quantity and value. Therefore, the taxes on expenses, which mainly affect the spending of the upper classes, on a smaller portion of the annual output, are likely to be much less productive than those taxes that apply equally to all classes or even those that mainly impact the lower classes, or those that apply to the entire annual output, especially those that focus on the larger portion of it. The excise tax on the production and sale of homemade fermented and alcoholic beverages is, consequently, by far the most productive of all the different taxes on expenses; this tax mainly affects the spending of ordinary people. For the year ending on July 5, 1775, the total revenue from this excise amounted to £3,341,837 : 9 : 9.

It must always be remembered, however, that it is the luxuries, and not the necessary expense of the inferior ranks of people, that ought ever to be taxed. The final payment of any tax upon their necessary expense, would fall altogether upon the superior ranks of people; upon the smaller portion of the annual produce, and not upon the greater. Such a tax must, in all cases, either raise the wages of labour, or lessen the demand for it. It could not raise the wages of labour, without throwing the final payment of the tax upon the superior ranks of people. It could not lessen the demand for labour, without lessening the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, the fund upon which all taxes must be finally paid. Whatever might be the state to which a tax of this kind reduced the demand for labour, it must always raise wages higher than they otherwise would be in that state; and the final payment of this enhancement of wages must, in all cases, fall upon the superior ranks of people.

It should always be remembered that it's the luxuries, not the essential costs of lower-income people, that should be taxed. The final burden of any tax on their necessary expenses would ultimately fall on the higher-income groups; on the smaller share of the total production, not the larger one. Such a tax would either increase wages or reduce the demand for labor. It couldn't increase wages without putting the final tax burden on the higher-income groups. It also couldn't reduce the demand for labor without decreasing the overall production of the land and labor in the country, which is the source for all taxes to be paid. No matter what impact such a tax has on the demand for labor, it would always result in wages being higher than they would otherwise be in that situation; and the final cost of this wage increase would, in all cases, be borne by the higher-income groups.

Fermented liquors brewed, and spiritous liquors distilled, not for sale, but for private use, are not in Great Britain liable to any duties of excise. This exemption, of which the object is to save private families from the odious visit and examination of the tax-gatherer, occasions the burden of those duties to fall frequently much lighter upon the rich than upon the poor. It is not, indeed, very common to distil for private use, though it is done sometimes. But in the country, many middling, and almost all rich and great families, brew their own beer. Their strong beer, therefore, costs them eight shillings a-barrel less than it costs the common brewer, who must have his profit upon the tax, as well as upon all the other expense which he advances. Such families, therefore, must drink their beer at least nine or ten shillings a-barrel cheaper than any liquor of the same quality can be drank by the common people, to whom it is everywhere more convenient to buy their beer, by little and little, from the brewery or the alehouse. Malt, in the same manner, that is made for the use of a private family, is not liable to the visit or examination of the tax-gatherer; but, in this case the family must compound at seven shillings and sixpence a-head for the tax. Seven shillings and sixpence are equal to the excise upon ten bushels of malt; a quantity fully equal to what all the different members of any sober family, men, women, and children, are, at an average, likely to consume. But in rich and great families, where country hospitality is much practised, the malt liquors consumed by the members of the family make but a small part of the consumption of the house. Either on account of this composition, however, or for other reasons, it is not near so common to malt as to brew for private use. It is difficult to imagine any equitable reason, why those who either brew or distil for private use should not be subject to a composition of the same kind.

Fermented drinks made and distilled spirits created for personal use, not for sale, are exempt from excise duties in Great Britain. This exemption aims to protect private families from the undesirable visits and inspections of tax collectors, often resulting in the burden of these duties falling more heavily on the poor than on the wealthy. While it’s not very common for people to distill for personal use, it does happen occasionally. However, in rural areas, many middle-class and nearly all wealthy families brew their own beer. Because of this, their strong beer costs about eight shillings less per barrel than it does from a commercial brewer, who needs to make a profit on the tax as well as on all the other costs. Consequently, wealthy families can drink their beer for at least nine or ten shillings less per barrel than what the general public pays for drinks of the same quality, as it's usually more convenient for them to buy smaller quantities from a brewery or alehouse. Similarly, malt made for a private household isn’t subject to tax inspections, but in this case, the family must pay a fee of seven shillings and sixpence per head for tax purposes. Seven shillings and sixpence corresponds to the excise tax on ten bushels of malt, which is roughly how much all members of a sober family—men, women, and children—are likely to consume on average. Yet in wealthy families, especially those that practice country hospitality, the malt beverages consumed by family members make up a small portion of the overall consumption of the household. For either this fee or other reasons, it’s not nearly as common to malt as it is to brew for personal use. It's hard to see a fair reason why those who brew or distill for personal use shouldn’t be subject to a similar fee.

A greater revenue than what is at present drawn from all the heavy taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, might be raised, it has frequently been said, by a much lighter tax upon malt; the opportunities of defrauding the revenue being much greater in a brewery than in a malt-house; and those who brew for private use being exempted from all duties or composition for duties, which is not the case with those who malt for private use.

A higher revenue than what is currently collected from the heavy taxes on malt, beer, and ale could often be achieved with a much lighter tax on malt. This is because there are more opportunities to evade the taxes in a brewery than in a malt house, and people who brew for personal use are not subject to any duties or arrangements for duties, unlike those who malt for personal use.

In the porter brewery of London, a quarter of malt is commonly brewed into more than two barrels and a-half, sometimes into three barrels of porter. The different taxes upon malt amount to six shillings a-quarter; those upon strong ale and beer to eight shillings a-barrel. In the porter brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, amount to between twenty-six and thirty shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. In the country brewery for common country sale, a quarter of malt is seldom brewed into less than two barrels of strong, and one barrel of small beer; frequently into two barrels and a-half of strong beer. The different taxes upon small beer amount to one shilling and fourpence a-barrel. In the country brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, seldom amount to less than twenty-three shillings and fourpence, frequently to twenty-six shillings, upon the produce of a quarter of malt. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, therefore, the whole amount of the duties upon malt, beer, and ale, cannot be estimated at less than twenty-four or twenty-five shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. But by taking off all the different duties upon beer and ale, and by trebling the malt tax, or by raising it from six to eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt, a greater revenue, it is said, might be raised by this single tax, than what is at present drawn from all those heavier taxes.[Pg 377]

In the London porter brewery, a quarter of malt typically produces over two and a half barrels, sometimes even three barrels of porter. The various taxes on malt total six shillings per quarter; those on strong ale and beer amount to eight shillings per barrel. Thus, in the porter brewery, the total taxes on malt, beer, and ale come to between twenty-six and thirty shillings based on the yield of a quarter of malt. In a country brewery for local sales, a quarter of malt usually produces no less than two barrels of strong beer and one barrel of small beer; often, it results in two and a half barrels of strong beer. The taxes on small beer are one shilling and fourpence per barrel. Therefore, in the country brewery, the total taxes on malt, beer, and ale usually amount to at least twenty-three shillings and fourpence, frequently reaching twenty-six shillings based on the yield of a quarter of malt. Taking the entire country into account, the overall duties on malt, beer, and ale are estimated to be no less than twenty-four or twenty-five shillings on the yield of a quarter of malt. However, by eliminating all the varying duties on beer and ale and tripling the malt tax, or increasing it from six to eighteen shillings per quarter of malt, it is suggested that a greater revenue could be generated from this single tax than what is currently collected from all those heavier taxes.[Pg 377]

L.s.d.
In 1772, the old malt tax produced722,0231111
      The additional356,7767
In 1773, the old tax produced561,6273
      The additional278,65015
In 1774, the old tax produced624,61417
      The additional310,7452
In 1775, the old tax produced657,3570
      The additional323,78512
——————————
4)3,835,58012
——————————
Average of these four years958,89530316
——————————
In 1772, the country excise produced1,243,12053
      The London brewery408,2607
In 1773, the country excise1,245,80833
      The London brewery405,4061710½
In 1774, the country excise1,246,37314
      The London brewery320,60118
In 1775, the country excise1,214,5836
      The London brewery463,6707
——————————
4)6,547,83219
——————————
Average of these four years1,636,9584
To which adding the average malt-tax, or958,89530316
——————————
The whole amount of those different taxes comes out to be2,595,853791116
——————————
But, by trebling the malt tax, or by raising it from six to eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt, that single tax would produce2,876,68590916
A sum which exceeds the foregoing by280,832121416

Under the old malt tax, indeed, is comprehended a tax of four shillings upon the hogshead of cyder, and another of ten shillings upon the barrel of mum. In 1774, the tax upon cyder produced only L.3083 : 6 : 8. It probably fell somewhat short of its usual amount; all the different taxes upon cyder, having, that year, produced less than ordinary. The tax upon mum, though much heavier, is still less productive, on account of the smaller consumption of that liquor. But to balance whatever may be the ordinary amount of those two taxes, there is comprehended under what is called the country excise, first, the old excise of six shillings and eightpence upon the hogshead of cyder; secondly, a like tax of six shillings and eightpence upon the hogshead of verjuice; thirdly, another of eight shillings and ninepence upon the hogshead of vinegar; and, lastly, a fourth tax of elevenpence upon the gallon of mead or metheglin. The produce of those different taxes will probably much more than counterbalance that of the duties imposed, by what is called the annual malt tax, upon cyder and mum.

Under the old malt tax, there is a tax of four shillings on a hogshead of cider and another tax of ten shillings on a barrel of mum. In 1774, the tax on cider brought in only £3,083: 6: 8. It likely fell a bit short of its usual amount, as all the different taxes on cider that year produced less than normal. The tax on mum, though heavier, generates even less revenue due to its lower consumption. However, to offset what might be the regular amount from these two taxes, there is included in what’s called the country excise, first, an old excise of six shillings and eight pence on the hogshead of cider; second, a similar tax of six shillings and eight pence on the hogshead of verjuice; third, another of eight shillings and nine pence on the hogshead of vinegar; and lastly, a fourth tax of eleven pence on the gallon of mead or metheglin. The revenue from these various taxes will likely far exceed that from the duties imposed under what is known as the annual malt tax on cider and mum.

Malt is consumed, not only in the brewery of beer and ale, but in the manufacture of low wines and spirits. If the malt tax were to be raised to eighteen shillings upon the quarter, it might be necessary to make some abatement in the different excises which are imposed upon those particular sorts of low wines and spirits, of which malt makes any part of the materials. In what are called malt spirits, it makes commonly but a third part of the materials; the other two-thirds being either raw barley, or one-third barley and one-third wheat. In the distillery of malt spirits, both the opportunity and the temptation to smuggle are much greater than either in a brewery or in a malt-house; the opportunity, on account of the smaller bulk and greater value of the commodity, and the temptation, on account of the superior height of the duties, which amounted to 3s. 1023d.[73] upon the gallon of spirits. By increasing the duties upon malt, and reducing those upon the distillery, both the opportunities and the temptation to smuggle would be diminished, which might occasion a still further augmentation of revenue.

Malt is used not only in breweries for beer and ale but also in making low wines and spirits. If the malt tax were increased to eighteen shillings per quarter, it might be necessary to lower some of the excise taxes imposed on specific low wines and spirits that use malt as part of their ingredients. In what are called malt spirits, malt typically makes up only a third of the ingredients, while the other two-thirds consist of either raw barley or equal parts barley and wheat. When distilling malt spirits, there are greater opportunities and temptations to smuggle compared to a brewery or malt house; the opportunity arises from the smaller size and higher value of the product, and the temptation comes from the much higher duties, which reached 3s. 1023d.[73] per gallon of spirits. By raising the duties on malt and lowering those on distilling, both the opportunities and temptations to smuggle would decrease, potentially leading to even greater revenue.

It has for some time past been the policy of Great Britain to discourage the consumption of spirituous liquors, on account of their supposed tendency to ruin the health and to corrupt the morals of the common people. According to this policy, the abatement of the taxes upon the distillery ought not to be so great as to reduce, in any respect, the price of those liquors. Spirituous liquors might remain as dear as ever; while, at the same time, the wholesome and invigorating liquors of beer and ale might be considerably reduced in their price. The people might thus be in part relieved from one of the burdens of which they at present complain the most; while, at the same time, the revenue might be considerably augmented.

For some time now, Great Britain has aimed to discourage the consumption of alcoholic beverages because of their believed tendency to harm people's health and corrupt their morals. Following this approach, the reduction of taxes on distilleries shouldn't be so significant that it lowers the price of these spirits. Alcoholic drinks could stay just as expensive as before, while the prices of healthier and more refreshing drinks like beer and ale could be significantly lowered. This way, people could be partially relieved from one of their biggest complaints, while the government could also increase its revenue.

The objections of Dr. Davenant to this alteration in the present system of excise duties, seem to be without foundation. Those objections are, that the tax, instead of dividing itself, as at present, pretty equally upon the profit of the maltster, upon that of the brewer, [Pg 378]and upon that of the retailer, would so far as it affected profit, fall altogether upon that of the maltster; that the maltster could not so easily get back the amount of the tax in the advanced price of his malt, as the brewer and retailer in the advanced price of their liquor; and that so heavy a tax upon malt might reduce the rent and profit of barley land.

Dr. Davenant's objections to changing the current system of excise duties seem unfounded. His concerns are that the tax, instead of being distributed fairly among the profits of the maltster, the brewer, [Pg 378] and the retailer, would primarily hit the maltster's profits; that the maltster wouldn't be able to pass on the tax cost to his customers as easily as the brewer and retailer could with their higher liquor prices; and that such a high tax on malt might lower both the rent and profit from barley land.

No tax can ever reduce, for any considerable time, the rate of profit in any particular trade, which must always keep its level with other trades in the neighbourhood. The present duties upon malt, beer, and ale, do not affect the profits of the dealers in those commodities, who all get back the tax with an additional profit, in the enhanced price of their goods. A tax, indeed, may render the goods upon which it is imposed so dear, as to diminish the consumption of them. But the consumption of malt is in malt liquors; and a tax of eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt could not well render those liquors dearer than the different taxes, amounting to twenty-four or twenty-five shillings, do at present. Those liquors, on the contrary, would probably become cheaper, and the consumption of them would be more likely to increase than to diminish.

No tax can ever significantly lower the profit rate in any specific trade for an extended period, as it must always align with other nearby trades. The current taxes on malt, beer, and ale do not impact the profits of dealers in those products, who all recover the tax with an added profit from the increased prices of their goods. A tax may make the goods it targets so expensive that it reduces their consumption. However, malt is consumed in the form of malt beverages, and a tax of eighteen shillings per quarter of malt is unlikely to make those beverages more expensive than the various taxes, totaling twenty-four or twenty-five shillings, do now. In fact, those beverages might actually become cheaper, and their consumption is more likely to rise than fall.

It is not very easy to understand why it should be more difficult for the maltster to get back eighteen shillings in the advanced price of his malt, than it is at present for the brewer to get back twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes thirty shillings, in that of his liquor. The maltster, indeed, instead of a tax of six shillings, would be obliged to advance one of eighteen shillings upon every quarter of malt. But the brewer is at present obliged to advance a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes thirty shillings, upon every quarter of malt which he brews. It could not be more inconvenient for the maltster to advance a lighter tax, than it is at present for the brewer to advance a heavier one. The maltster does not always keep in his granaries a stock of malt, which it will require a longer time to dispose of than the stock of beer and ale which the brewer frequently keeps in his cellars. The former, therefore, may frequently get the returns of his money as soon as the latter. But whatever inconveniency might arise to the maltster from being obliged to advance a heavier tax, it could easily be remedied, by granting him a few months longer credit than is at present commonly given to the brewer.

It’s not easy to understand why it should be harder for the maltster to recover eighteen shillings in the increased price of his malt than it currently is for the brewer to recover twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes even thirty shillings, for his liquor. The maltster would indeed have to pay eighteen shillings for every quarter of malt, instead of just a six-shilling tax. Meanwhile, the brewer has to pay a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes thirty shillings, on every quarter of malt he brews. It couldn’t be more difficult for the maltster to pay a lighter tax than it is for the brewer to handle a heavier one. The maltster doesn’t always have a stock of malt that takes longer to sell than the beer and ale the brewer often keeps in his cellars. Therefore, the maltster can often get his money back just as quickly as the brewer. However, any inconvenience the maltster faces from having to pay a heavier tax could easily be solved by giving him a few extra months of credit compared to what the brewer usually gets.

Nothing could reduce the rent and profit of barley land, which did not reduce the demand for barley. But a change of system, which reduced the duties upon a quarter of malt brewed into beer and ale, from twenty-four and twenty-five shillings to eighteen shillings, would be more likely to increase than diminish that demand. The rent and profit of barley land, besides, must always be nearly equal to those of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. If they were less, some part of the barley land would soon be turned to some other purpose; and if they were greater, more land would soon be turned to the raising of barley. When the ordinary price of any particular produce of land is at what may be called a monopoly price, a tax upon it necessarily reduces the rent and profit of the land which grows it. A tax upon the produce of those precious vineyards, of which the wine falls so much short of the effectual demand, that its price is always above the natural proportion to that of the produce of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land, would necessarily reduce the rent and profit of those vineyards. The price of the wines being already the highest that could be got for the quantity commonly sent to market, it could not be raised higher without diminishing that quantity; and the quantity could not be diminished without still greater loss, because the lands could not be turned to any other equally valuable produce. The whole weight of the tax, therefore, would fall upon the rent and profit; properly upon the rent of the vineyard. When it has been proposed to lay any new tax upon sugar, our sugar planters have frequently complained that the whole weight of such taxes fell not upon the consumer, but upon the producer; they never having been able to raise the price of their sugar after the tax higher than it was before. The price had, it seems, before the tax, been a monopoly price; and the arguments adduced to show that sugar was an improper subject of taxation, demonstrated perhaps that it was a proper one; the gains of monopolists, whenever they can be come at, being certainly of all subjects the most proper. But the ordinary price of barley has never been a monopoly price; and the rent and profit of barley land have never been above their natural proportion to those of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. The different taxes which have been imposed upon malt, beer, and ale, have never lowered the price of barley; have never reduced the rent and profit of barley land. The price of malt to the brewer has constantly risen in proportion to the taxes imposed upon it; and those taxes, together with the different duties upon beer and ale, have constantly either raised the price, or, what comes to the same thing, reduced the quality of those commodities to the consumer. The final payment of those taxes has fallen constantly upon the consumer, and not upon the producer.

Nothing could lower the rent and profit from barley land, which didn’t decrease the demand for barley. However, a change in the system that reduced the duties on a quarter of malt brewed into beer and ale, from twenty-four and twenty-five shillings to eighteen shillings, would likely increase that demand instead of decreasing it. The rent and profit from barley land must always be close to those of other equally fertile and well-cultivated land. If they were lower, some of the barley land would quickly be used for something else; and if they were higher, more land would soon be converted to barley production. When the regular price of a particular crop is at what you might call a monopoly price, a tax on it will reduce the rent and profit of the land that produces it. A tax on the produce of those valuable vineyards, where the wine falls short of effective demand, causing its price to be consistently higher than what is normal compared to other equally fertile and well-cultivated land, would also reduce the rent and profit of those vineyards. Since wine prices are already at the highest possible point for the usual quantity sent to market, they couldn’t be raised further without reducing that quantity. This reduction would lead to even greater losses because the land couldn’t be switched to any other equally valuable crop. Therefore, the entire burden of the tax would fall on the rent and profit, specifically on the rent of the vineyard. When there have been proposals to impose new taxes on sugar, our sugar planters have often complained that the full burden of such taxes fell not on the consumer but on the producer; they had never managed to raise the sugar price after the tax higher than it was before. It seems the price was, prior to the tax, a monopoly price; and the arguments made against taxing sugar perhaps indicated that it was suitable for taxation, as the profits of monopolists, whenever reachable, certainly make for one of the best subjects for tax. However, the ordinary price of barley has never been a monopoly price, and the rent and profit from barley land have never been higher than their natural proportion to those of other equally fertile and well-cultivated land. The various taxes imposed on malt, beer, and ale have never lowered the price of barley or reduced the rent and profit from barley land. The price of malt to the brewer has continually increased in relation to the taxes imposed on it; and those taxes, along with the different duties on beer and ale, have either raised prices or, in other words, lowered the quality of those goods for the consumer. The ultimate burden of these taxes has consistently fallen on the consumer, not the producer.

The only people likely to suffer by the change of system here proposed, are those who brew for their own private use. But the exemption, which this superior rank of people at present enjoy, from very heavy taxes which[Pg 379] are paid by the poor labourer and artificer, is surely most unjust and unequal, and ought to be taken away, even though this change was never to take place. It has probably been the interest of this superior order of people, however, which has hitherto prevented a change of system that could not well fail both to increase the revenue and to relieve the people.

The only people likely to be affected by the proposed change in the system are those who brew for their personal use. However, the exemption that this higher class currently enjoys from the very heavy taxes that the poor laborer and craftsman pay is clearly unfair and unequal. It should be removed, even if this change doesn’t happen. It seems to have been in the interest of this higher class that a system change has so far been avoided, a change that could easily boost revenue and help the people.

Besides such duties as those of customs and excise above mentioned, there are several others which affect the price of goods more unequally and more indirectly. Of this kind are the duties, which, in French, are called peages, which in old Saxon times were called the duties of passage, and which seem to have been originally established for the same purpose as our turnpike tolls, or the tolls upon our canals and navigable rivers, for the maintenance of the road or of the navigation. Those duties, when applied to such purposes, are most properly imposed according to the bulk or weight of the goods. As they were originally local and provincial duties, applicable to local and provincial purposes, the administration of them was, in most cases, entrusted to the particular town, parish, or lordship, in which they were levied; such communities being, in some way or other, supposed to be accountable for the application. The sovereign, who is altogether unaccountable, has in many countries assumed to himself the administration of those duties; and though he has in most cases enhanced very much the duty, he has in many entirely neglected the application. If the turnpike tolls of Great Britain should ever become one of the resources of government, we may learn, by the example of many other nations, what would probably be the consequence. Such tolls, no doubt, are finally paid by the consumer; but the consumer is not taxed in proportion to his expense, when he pays, not according to the value, but according to the bulk or weight of what he consumes. When such duties are imposed, not according to the bulk or weight, but according to the supposed value of the goods, they become properly a sort of inland customs or excise, which obstruct very much the most important of all branches of commerce, the interior commerce of the country.

In addition to duties like customs and excise mentioned earlier, there are several other duties that affect the price of goods more unevenly and indirectly. These include duties known in French as peages, which were called passage duties in old Saxon times. They seem to have been established for similar reasons as our turnpike tolls or the tolls on our canals and navigable rivers, primarily for the maintenance of roads or navigation. When applied to these purposes, such duties are most appropriately charged based on the bulk or weight of the goods. Initially, they were local and provincial duties intended for local purposes, and their management was usually entrusted to the specific town, parish, or lordship where they were collected, with these communities expected to be accountable for their use. The sovereign, who is not accountable to anyone, has taken control of these duties in many countries; while he has often increased the duty significantly, he has frequently overlooked how the funds are used. If the turnpike tolls of Great Britain were to become a source of government revenue, we could see, based on the experiences of other nations, what might happen. Those tolls are ultimately paid by consumers; however, the consumers are not taxed fairly in relation to their expenses when they are charged based on bulk or weight rather than value. When such duties are imposed not based on bulk or weight but on the perceived value of the goods, they effectively become a type of inland customs or excise, which significantly hinders one of the most crucial aspects of commerce: the internal trade of the country.

In some small states, duties similar to those passage duties are imposed upon goods carried across the territory, either by land or by water, from one foreign country to another. These are in some countries called transit-duties. Some of the little Italian states which are situated upon the Po, and the rivers which run into it, derive some revenue from duties of this kind, which are paid altogether by foreigners, and which, perhaps, are the only duties that one state can impose upon the subjects of another, without obstructing, in any respect, the industry or commerce of its own. The most important transit-duty in the world, is that levied by the king of Denmark upon all merchant ships which pass through the Sound.

In some small states, fees similar to transit duties are charged on goods moved across the territory, whether by land or water, from one foreign country to another. In some countries, these are known as transit duties. Some of the small Italian states located along the Po River and its tributaries earn some revenue from these kinds of duties, which are paid entirely by foreigners and may be the only fees one state can impose on the citizens of another without hindering its own industry or trade. The most significant transit duty in the world is the one imposed by the king of Denmark on all merchant ships passing through the Sound.

Such taxes upon luxuries, as the greater part of the duties of customs and excise, though they all fall indifferently upon every different species of revenue, and are paid finally, or without any retribution, by whoever consumes the commodities upon which they are imposed, yet they do not always fall equally or proportionally upon the revenue of every individual. As every man's humour regulates the degree of his consumption, every man contributes rather according to his humour, than in proportion to his revenue: the profuse contribute more, the parsimonious less, than their proper proportion. During the minority of a man of great fortune, he contributes commonly very little, by his consumption, towards the support of that state from whose protection he derives a great revenue. Those who live in another country, contribute nothing by their consumption towards the support of the government of that country, in which is situated the source of their revenue. If in this latter country there should be no land tax, nor any considerable duty upon the transference either of moveable or immoveable property, as is the case in Ireland, such absentees may derive a great revenue from the protection of a government, to the support of which they do not contribute a single shilling. This inequality is likely to be greatest in a country of which the government is, in some respects, subordinate and dependant upon that of some other. The people who possess the most extensive property in the dependant, will, in this case, generally chuse to live in the governing country. Ireland is precisely in this situation; and we cannot therefore wonder, that the proposal of a tax upon absentees should be so very popular in that country. It might, perhaps, be a little difficult to ascertain either what sort, or what degree of absence, would subject a man to be taxed as an absentee, or at what precise time the tax should either begin or end. If you except, however, this very peculiar situation, any inequality in the contribution of individuals which can arise from such taxes, is much more than compensated by the very circumstance which occasions that inequality; the circumstance that every man's contribution is altogether voluntary; it being altogether in his power, either to consume, or not to consume, the commodity taxed. Where such taxes, therefore, are properly assessed, and upon proper commodities, they are paid with less grumbling than any other. When they are advanced by the merchant or manufacturer, the consumer, who finally pays them, soon comes to confound them with the price of the commodities, and almost forgets that he pays any tax.[Pg 380]

Taxes on luxury items, like most customs and excise duties, impact different sources of revenue without distinction. Ultimately, they’re paid by whoever consumes the goods they’re applied to, but they don't affect everyone’s finances equally or fairly. Since every person's preferences determine how much they consume, contributions depend more on personal taste than income: those who spend freely end up paying more, while those who are thrifty pay less than what would be expected based on their income. During the time a wealthy person is still a minor, they often contribute very little through their spending towards the government that provides them with considerable benefits. People living abroad don’t contribute anything through their consumption to the government of the country where their wealth originates. If that country doesn’t have a land tax or significant fees on transferring property, like Ireland, those living elsewhere may benefit from government protection without contributing a single cent. This inequality tends to be greatest in countries where the government is, in some ways, subordinate to another. Typically, the individuals with the most extensive property in the dependent country will choose to live in the governing country. This is precisely the case in Ireland, so it’s no surprise that the idea of taxing absentees is quite popular there. It might be somewhat challenging to determine what type or how long someone must be absent to be taxed as an absentee or when precisely this tax should start or end. However, aside from this specific situation, any differences in individual contributions resulting from such taxes are more than balanced out by the very nature of the taxes: everyone’s contribution is entirely voluntary; people can choose whether or not to buy the taxed goods. When taxes are fairly applied to appropriate items, they are paid with less complaint than any other kind. When merchants or manufacturers advance these taxes, the consumers who ultimately pay for them soon mix them into the prices of the goods, nearly forgetting that they are paying any tax at all.[Pg 380]

Such taxes are, or may be, perfectly certain; or may be assessed, so as to leave no doubt concerning either what ought to be paid, or when it ought to be paid; concerning either the quantity or the time of payment. Whatever uncertainty there may sometimes be, either in the duties of customs in Great Britain, or in other duties of the same kind in other countries, it cannot arise from the nature of those duties, but from the inaccurate or unskilful manner in which the law that imposes them is expressed.

Such taxes can be completely clear; they can be set up in a way that leaves no doubt about how much needs to be paid or when it needs to be paid, covering both the amount and the timing. Any uncertainty that might sometimes exist, whether in customs duties in Great Britain or similar duties in other countries, doesn’t come from the nature of these duties themselves, but from the unclear or poorly crafted way the law that imposes them is written.

Taxes upon luxuries generally are, and always may be, paid piece-meal, or in proportion as the contributors have occasion to purchase the goods upon which they are imposed. In the time and mode of payment, they are, or may be, of all taxes the most convenient. Upon the whole, such taxes, therefore, are perhaps as agreeable to the three first of the four general maxims concerning taxation, as any other. They offend in every respect against the fourth.

Taxes on luxury items are usually paid gradually, as people buy the goods that have these taxes applied. In terms of when and how they are paid, these taxes are among the most convenient. Overall, such taxes may align well with the first three of the four general principles regarding taxation, more so than others. However, they violate the fourth principle in every way.

Such taxes, in proportion to what they bring into the public treasury of the state, always take out, or keep out, of the pockets of the people, more than almost any other taxes. They seem to do this in all the four different ways in which it is possible to do it.

Such taxes, in relation to what they contribute to the state's public treasury, consistently remove or prevent more from the people's pockets than nearly any other taxes. They appear to achieve this through all four different methods that are possible.

First, the levying of such taxes, even when imposed in the most judicious manner, requires a great number of custom-house and excise officers, whose salaries and perquisites are a real tax upon the people, which brings nothing into the treasury of the state. This expense, however, it must be acknowledged, is more moderate in Great Britain than in most other countries. In the year which ended on the 5th of July, 1775, the gross produce of the different duties, under the management of the commissioners of excise in England, amounted to L.5,507,308 : 18 : 8¼, which was levied at an expense of little more than five and a-half per cent. From this gross produce, however, there must be deducted what was paid away in bounties and drawbacks upon the exportation of exciseable goods, which will reduce the neat produce below five millions.[74] The levying of the salt duty, and excise duty, but under a different management, is much more expensive. The neat revenue of the customs does not amount to two millions and a-half, which is levied at an expense of more than ten per cent., in the salaries of officers and other incidents. But the perquisites of custom-house officers are everywhere much greater than their salaries; at some ports more than double or triple those salaries. If the salaries of officers, and other incidents, therefore, amount to more than ten per cent. upon the neat revenue of the customs, the whole expense of levying that revenue may amount, in salaries and perquisites together, to more than twenty or thirty per cent. The officers of excise receive few or no perquisites; and the administration of that branch of the revenue being of more recent establishment, is in general less corrupted than that of the customs, into which length of time has introduced and authorized many abuses. By charging upon malt the whole revenue which is at present levied by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, a saving, it is supposed, of more than L.50,000, might be made in the annual expense of the excise. By confining the duties of customs to a few sorts of goods, and by levying those duties according to the excise laws, a much greater saving might probably be made in the annual expense of the customs.

First, collecting these taxes, no matter how carefully done, requires a lot of customs and excise officers, whose salaries and benefits are a real burden on the public, contributing nothing to the state's treasury. However, it must be noted that these costs are generally lower in Great Britain compared to many other places. In the year ending July 5, 1775, the total revenue from various duties managed by the excise commissioners in England was £5,507,308 : 18 : 8¼, which was collected at a cost of just over five and a-half percent. From this total revenue, though, we need to subtract what was paid out in bounties and rebates for exported exciseable goods, which brings the net revenue down to less than five million.[74] Collecting the salt tax and excise tax, though under different management, is much more costly. The net revenue from customs does not reach two and a-half million, collected at a cost of over ten percent in officer salaries and related expenses. But the benefits for customs officers are generally much higher than their salaries; at some ports, they can be more than double or triple their pay. So if officer salaries and other expenses exceed ten percent of the net customs revenue, the total cost to collect that revenue can amount to over twenty or thirty percent when combining salaries and benefits. Excise officers receive few or no extra benefits, and since this part of revenue collection is more recent, it tends to be less corrupt than customs, which has been allowed to become corrupt over time with many abuses. By applying the entire revenue currently collected from various malt and malt liquor duties solely to malt, it’s estimated that over £50,000 could be saved annually in excise costs. By limiting customs duties to a few types of goods and collecting those duties according to excise laws, it’s likely that even greater savings could be achieved in annual customs expenses.

Secondly, such taxes necessarily occasion some obstruction or discouragement to certain branches of industry. As they always raise the price of the commodity taxed, they so far discourage its consumption, and consequently its production. If it is a commodity of home growth or manufacture, less labour comes to be employed in raising and producing it. If it is a foreign commodity of which the tax increases in this manner the price, the commodities of the same kind which are made at home may thereby, indeed, gain some advantage in the home market, and a greater quantity of domestic industry may thereby be turned toward preparing them. But though this rise of price in a foreign commodity, may encourage domestic industry in one particular branch, it necessarily discourages that industry in almost every other. The dearer the Birmingham manufacturer buys his foreign wine, the cheaper he necessarily sells that part of his hardware with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which, he buys it. That part of his hardware, therefore, becomes of less value to him, and he has less encouragement to work at it. The dearer the consumers in one country pay for the surplus produce of another, the cheaper they necessarily sell that part of their own surplus produce with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which, they buy it. That part of their own surplus produce becomes of less value to them, and they have less encouragement to increase its quantity. All taxes upon consumable commodities, therefore, tend to reduce the quantity of productive labour below what it otherwise would be, either in preparing the commodities taxed, if they are home commodities, or in preparing these with which they are purchased, if they are foreign commodities. Such taxes, too, always alter, more or less, the natural direction of national industry, and turn it into a chan[Pg 381]nel always different from, and generally less advantageous, than that in which is would have run of its own accord.

Secondly, such taxes inevitably create some obstacles or discouragement for certain industries. Since they always raise the price of the taxed goods, they deter consumption and, consequently, production. If it's a product grown or made domestically, less labor is used to produce it. If it's an imported good and the tax raises its price, it might give a slight advantage to similar products made at home, potentially shifting more domestic effort toward their production. However, while this price increase for foreign products may boost domestic industry in one area, it inevitably discourages that industry across almost all others. The more expensive the Birmingham manufacturer pays for foreign wine, the less he can sell that portion of his hardware that he uses to buy it, or essentially, with the money he uses to buy it. As a result, that segment of his hardware loses value, and he has less incentive to work on it. The more consumers in one country pay for the excess goods of another, the less they can sell that part of their own surplus goods with which, or essentially, with the money they use to purchase it. That part of their surplus products loses value too, and they have less motivation to increase its quantity. Therefore, all taxes on consumable goods tend to decrease the amount of productive labor below what it would be otherwise, either in producing the taxed goods if they are domestic, or in producing the goods they buy if they are foreign. These taxes also tend to change the natural direction of national industry, redirecting it into a path that is always different from, and generally less beneficial than, where it would have gone on its own.

Thirdly, the hope of evading such taxes by smuggling, gives frequent occasion to forfeitures and other penalties, which entirely ruin the smuggler; a person who, though no doubt highly blameable for violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen, had not the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so. In those corrupted governments, where there is at least a general suspicion of much unnecessary expense, and great misapplication of the public revenue, the laws which guard it are little respected. Not many people are scrupulous about smuggling, when, without perjury, they can find an easy and safe opportunity of doing so. To pretend to have any scruple about buying smuggled goods, though a manifest encouragement to the violation of the revenue laws, and to the perjury which almost always attends it, would, in most countries, be regarded as one of those pedantic pieces of hypocrisy which, instead of gaining credit with anybody, serve only to expose the person who affects to practise them to the suspicion of being a greater knave than most of his neighbours. By this indulgence of the public, the smuggler is often encouraged to continue a trade, which he is thus taught to consider as in some measure innocent; and when the severity of the revenue laws is ready to fall upon him, he is frequently disposed to defend with violence, what he has been accustomed to regard as his just property. From being at first, perhaps, rather imprudent than criminal, he at last too often becomes one of the hardiest and most determined violators of the laws of society. By the ruin of the smuggler, his capital, which had before been employed in maintaining productive labour, is absorbed either in the revenue of the state, or in that of the revenue officer; and is employed in maintaining unproductive, to the diminution of the general capital of the society, and of the useful industry which it might otherwise have maintained.

Thirdly, the hope of avoiding such taxes through smuggling often leads to confiscations and other penalties that completely destroy the smuggler. This person, while definitely at fault for breaking the laws of their country, may not be doing anything against natural justice, and would have been a great citizen if the laws hadn't made something a crime that nature intended to be acceptable. In corrupt governments where there's widespread suspicion of unnecessary spending and misuse of public funds, the laws protecting those finances aren’t taken seriously. Many people don’t hesitate to smuggle when they can do so without lying, especially if it’s easy and safe. Pretending to have an issue with buying smuggled goods, which clearly supports violating tax laws and the perjury that usually goes along with it, would in most places be seen as a pretentious kind of hypocrisy that only makes the person seem more dishonest than their neighbors. Because of the public's leniency, smugglers often feel encouraged to continue what they see as a somewhat innocent trade, and when the harsh revenue laws come after them, they frequently feel justified in defending what they believe is rightfully theirs. Starting off perhaps more foolish than criminal, they often become some of the most determined lawbreakers in society. When smugglers are ruined, their capital, which could have been used for productive work, ends up either in state revenue or in the hands of revenue officers, contributing instead to unproductive endeavors, which decreases the general capital of society and the useful industries it could have supported.

Fourthly, such taxes, by subjecting at least the dealers in the taxed commodities, to the frequent visits and odious examination of the tax-gatherers, expose them sometimes, no doubt, to some degree of oppression, and always to much trouble and vexation; and though vexation, as has already been said, is not strictly speaking expense, it is certainly equivalent to the expense at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. The laws of excise, though more effectual for the purpose for which they were instituted, are, in this respect, more vexatious than those of the customs. When a merchant has imparted goods subject to certain duties of customs; when he has paid those duties, and lodged the goods in his warehouse; he is not, in most cases, liable to any further trouble or vexation from the custom-house officer. It is otherwise with goods subject to duties of excise. The dealers have no respite from the continual visits and examination of the excise officers. The duties of excise are, upon this account, more unpopular than those of the customs; and so are the officers who levy them. Those officers, it is pretended, though in general, perhaps, they do their duty fully as well as those of the customs; yet, as that duty obliges them to be frequently very troublesome to some of their neighbours, commonly contract a certain hardness of character, which the others frequently have not. This observation, however, may very probably be the mere suggestion of fraudulent dealers, whose smuggling is either prevented or detected by their diligence.

Fourthly, these taxes, by putting at least the sellers of the taxed goods under the constant scrutiny and annoying inspections of tax collectors, often subject them to some level of unfair treatment and always to a lot of hassle and frustration. Although frustration, as mentioned before, isn't exactly a financial cost, it definitely equates to the expense that everyone would pay to be free from it. The excise laws, while more effective for their intended purpose, are, in this regard, more irritating than customs laws. Once a merchant has paid the customs duties on goods and stored them in his warehouse, he usually doesn’t face any more hassle or annoyance from customs officers. However, it’s different for goods subject to excise duties. The sellers are constantly pestered by excise officers coming by for inspections. Because of this, excise duties are more disliked than customs duties, and the officers who collect them are too. It’s said that although these officers generally perform their jobs as well as customs officers do, their role often forces them to be quite bothersome to some of their neighbors, which tends to give them a harsher demeanor that customs officers usually don’t have. However, this observation might just be the complaint of dishonest sellers, whose smuggling activities are either thwarted or uncovered by the hard work of those officers.

The inconveniencies, however, which are, perhaps, in some degree inseparable from taxes upon consumable commodities, fall as light upon the people of Great Britain as upon those of any other country of which the government is nearly as expensive. Our state is not perfect, and might be mended; but it is as good, or better, than that of most of our neighbours.

The inconveniences, however, which are, perhaps, somewhat unavoidable with taxes on consumable goods, affect the people of Great Britain just as lightly as those in any other country with a similarly expensive government. Our situation isn't perfect and could be improved; but it's as good, or better, than that of most of our neighbors.

In consequence of the notion, that duties upon consumable goods were taxes upon the profits of merchants, those duties have, in some countries, been repeated upon every successive sale of the goods. If the profits of the merchant-importer or merchant-manufacturer were taxed, equality seemed to require that those of all the middle buyers, who intervened between either of them and the consumer, should likewise be taxed. The famous alcavala of Spain seems to have been established upon this principle. It was at first a tax of ten per cent, afterwards of fourteen per cent. and it is at present only six per cent. upon the sale of every sort of property, whether moveable or immoveable; and it is repeated every time the property is sold.[75] The levying of this tax requires a multitude of revenue officers, sufficient to guard the transportation of goods, not only from one province to another, but from one shop to another. It subjects, not only the dealers in some sorts of goods, but those in all sorts, every farmer, every manufacturer, every merchant and shopkeeper, to the continual visit and examination of the tax-gatherers. Through the greater part of the country in which a tax of this kind is established, nothing can be produced for distant sale. The produce of every part of the country must be proportioned to the consumption of the neighbourhood. It is to the alcavala, accordingly, that Ustaritz imputes the ruin [Pg 382]of the manufactures of Spain. He might have imputed to it, likewise, the declension of agriculture, it being imposed not only upon manufactures, but upon the rude produce of the land.

Due to the idea that taxes on consumable goods were actually taxes on merchants' profits, some countries have applied these duties on every successive sale of the goods. If the profits of the merchant-importer or merchant-manufacturer were taxed, it seemed fair to also tax the profits of all the middle buyers who stood between them and the consumer. The well-known alcavala in Spain was based on this principle. Initially, it was a tax of ten percent, later increased to fourteen percent, and is now only six percent on the sale of all types of property, whether movable or immovable; and it is charged every time the property is sold.[75] Collecting this tax requires a large number of revenue officers to monitor the transportation of goods, not just from one province to another, but also from one store to another. It affects not only dealers in certain goods but all types of sellers, including every farmer, manufacturer, merchant, and shopkeeper, subjecting them to constant visits and inspections from tax collectors. In most areas where this type of tax exists, nothing can be produced for long-distance sale. The output of each area must match the consumption of the local market. Thus, Ustaritz attributed the collapse of Spanish manufacturing to the alcavala. He could also have connected it to the decline of agriculture since it is imposed not only on manufactured goods but also on raw agricultural products.

In the kingdom of Naples, there is a similar tax of three per cent. upon the value of all contracts, and consequently upon that of all contracts of sale. It is both lighter than the Spanish tax, and the greater part of towns and parishes are allowed to pay a composition in lieu of it. They levy this composition in what manner they please, generally in a way that gives no interruption to the interior commerce of the place. The Neapolitan tax, therefore, is not near so ruinous as the Spanish one.

In the kingdom of Naples, there is a similar tax of three percent on the value of all contracts, and therefore on all sales contracts. It is lighter than the Spanish tax, and most towns and parishes can pay a fee instead of it. They can set this fee however they want, usually in a way that doesn’t disrupt local commerce. As a result, the Neapolitan tax is not nearly as burdensome as the Spanish one.

The uniform system of taxation, which, with a few exceptions of no great consequence, takes place in all the different parts of the united kingdom of Great Britain, leaves the interior commerce of the country, the inland and coasting trade, almost entirely free. The inland trade is almost perfectly free; and the greater part of goods may be carried from one end of the kingdom to the other, without requiring any permit or let-pass, without being subject to question, visit or examination, from the revenue officers. There are a few exceptions, but they are such as can give no interruption to any important branch of inland commerce of the country. Goods carried coastwise, indeed, require certificates or coast-cockets. If you except coals, however, the rest are almost all duty-free. This freedom of interior commerce, the effect of the uniformity of the system of taxation, is perhaps one of the principal causes of the prosperity of Great Britain; every great country being necessarily the best and most extensive market for the greater part of the productions of its own industry. If the same freedom in consequence of the same uniformity, could be extended to Ireland and the plantations, both the grandeur of the state, and the prosperity of every part of the empire, would probably be still greater than at present.

The uniform tax system, which, with a few unimportant exceptions, is in place across all parts of Great Britain, keeps the country's internal trade, including inland and coastal commerce, largely unrestricted. The inland trade is nearly completely free, and most goods can be moved from one side of the kingdom to the other without needing any permits or passes, and without being subjected to checks, inspections, or examinations by revenue officers. There are a few exceptions, but they do not significantly disrupt any major aspect of the country's inland trade. Goods transported by sea do require certificates or coast-cockets, but aside from coal, most are duty-free. This freedom in internal commerce, resulting from the uniform tax system, is likely one of the main reasons for Britain's prosperity; every major nation tends to be the best and largest market for most of its own products. If the same freedoms, due to this uniformity, could be extended to Ireland and the colonies, both the state's greatness and the prosperity of every part of the empire would probably be even greater than it is now.

In France, the different revenue laws which take place in the different provinces, require a multitude of revenue officers to surround, not only the frontiers of the kingdom, but those of almost each particular province, in order either to prevent the importation of certain goods, or to subject it to the payment of certain duties, to the no small interruption of the interior commerce of the country. Some provinces are allowed to compound for the gabelle, or salt tax; others are exempted from it altogether. Some provinces are exempted from the exclusive sale of tobacco, which the farmers-general enjoy through the greater part of the kingdom. The aides, which correspond to the excise in England, are very different in different provinces. Some provinces are exempted from them, and pay a composition or equivalent. In those in which they take place, and are in farm, there are many local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or district. The traites, which correspond to our customs, divide the kingdom into three great parts; first, the provinces subject to the tariff of 1664, which are called the provinces of the five great farms, and under which are comprehended Picardy, Normandy, and the greater part of the interior provinces of the kingdom; secondly, the provinces subject to the tariff of 1667, which are called the provinces reckoned foreign, and under which are comprehended the greater part of the frontier provinces; and, thirdly, those provinces which are said to be treated as foreign, or which, because they are allowed a free commerce with foreign countries, are, in their commerce with the other provinces of France, subjected to the same duties as other foreign countries. These are Alsace, the three bishoprics of Mentz, Toul, and Verdun, and the three cities of Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marseilles. Both in the provinces of the five great farms (called so on account of an ancient division of the duties of customs into five great branches, each of which was originally the subject of a particular farm, though they are now all united into one), and in those which are said to be reckoned foreign, there are many local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or district. There are some such even in the provinces which are said to be treated as foreign, particularly in the city of Marseilles. It is unnecessary to observe how much both the restraints upon the interior commerce of the country, and the number of the revenue officers, must be multiplied, in order to guard the frontiers of those different provinces and districts which are subject to such different systems of taxation.

In France, the various tax laws that apply in different provinces require a large number of revenue officers to monitor not only the borders of the kingdom but also almost every specific province. This is done to either prevent the importation of certain goods or to impose certain duties, which significantly disrupts internal trade in the country. Some provinces can pay a fixed amount for the salt tax (gabelle); others are completely exempt from it. Certain provinces are also exempt from the exclusive sale of tobacco, a privilege held by the farmers-general in most of the kingdom. The aides, which are similar to excise taxes in England, vary widely between provinces. Some provinces are exempt and instead pay a flat fee or equivalent. In those provinces where aides are applied, and are under farm, there are many local taxes that only apply to a specific town or area. The traites, which correspond to customs duties, divide the kingdom into three main parts: first, the provinces under the 1664 tariff, known as the provinces of the five great farms, which include Picardy, Normandy, and most of the interior provinces; second, the provinces under the 1667 tariff, referred to as foreign provinces, which include most of the border provinces; and third, the provinces treated as foreign, which enjoy free trade with foreign countries and face the same duties as foreign nations in their trade with other provinces of France. These include Alsace, the three bishoprics of Mentz, Toul, and Verdun, and the three cities of Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marseilles. In both the provinces of the five great farms (named for an old division of customs duties into five main branches, each originally managed separately but now all unified) and in those classified as foreign, there are many local duties that are confined to a specific town or region. Some exist even in the provinces considered foreign, particularly in the city of Marseilles. It’s clear how much both the restrictions on internal trade and the number of revenue officers must increase to manage the borders of these various provinces and districts, which each have their own systems of taxation.

Over and above the general restraints arising from this complicated system of revenue laws, the commerce of wine (after corn, perhaps, the most important production of France) is, in the greater part of the provinces, subject to particular restraints arising from the favour which has been shown to the vineyards of particular provinces and districts above those of others. The provinces most famous for their wines, it will be found, I believe, are those in which the trade in that article is subject to the fewest restraints of this kind. The extensive market which such provinces enjoy, encourages good management both in the cultivation of their vineyards, and in the subsequent preparation of their wines.

Besides the general restrictions from this complex set of revenue laws, the wine trade (which is possibly the most significant product in France after grains) faces specific limitations in most provinces due to preferential treatment given to vineyards in certain areas over others. I believe that the provinces well-known for their wines are those where the trade of this product is subject to the least amount of such restrictions. The broad market that these provinces have promotes better management in both the cultivation of their vineyards and the processing of their wines.

Such various and complicated revenue laws are not peculiar to France. The little duchy of Milan is divided into six provinces, in each of which there is a different system of taxation, with regard to several different sorts of consumable goods. The still smaller territories of the duke of Parma are divided into three or four, each of which has, in the same manner, a system of its own. Under such [Pg 383]absurd management, nothing but the great fertility of the soil, and happiness of the climate, could preserve such countries from soon relapsing into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism.

Such various and complicated tax laws are not unique to France. The small duchy of Milan is divided into six provinces, and each has its own system of taxation for different types of consumable goods. The even smaller territories of the Duke of Parma are split into three or four regions, each with its own system as well. With such absurd management, only the rich fertility of the land and the pleasantness of the climate can keep these countries from quickly falling back into severe poverty and backwardness.

Taxes upon consumable commodities may either be levied by an administration, of which the officers are appointed by government, and immediately accountable to government, of which the revenue must, in this case, vary from year to year, according to the occasional variations in the produce of the tax; or they may be let in farm for a rent certain, the farmer being allowed to appoint his own officers, who, though obliged to levy the tax in the manner directed by the law, are under his immediate inspection, and are immediately accountable to him. The best and most frugal way of levying a tax can never be by farm. Over and above what is necessary for paying the stipulated rent, the salaries of the officers, and the whole expense of administration, the farmer must always draw from the produce of the tax a certain profit, proportioned at least to the advance which he makes, to the risk which he runs, to the trouble which he is at, and to the knowledge and skill which it requires to manage so very complicated a concern. Government, by establishing an administration under their own immediate inspection, of the same kind with that which the farmer establishes, might at least save this profit, which is almost always exorbitant. To farm any considerable branch of the public revenue requires either a great capital, or a great credit; circumstances which would alone restrain the competition for such an undertaking to a very small number of people. Of the few who have this capital or credit, a still smaller number have the necessary knowledge or experience; another circumstance which restrains the competition still further. The very few who are in condition to become competitors, find it more for their interest to combine together; to become copartners, instead of competitors; and, when the farm is set up to auction, to offer no rent but what is much below the rent value. In countries where the public revenues are in farm, the farmers are generally the most opulent people. Their wealth would alone excite the public indignation; and the vanity which almost always accompanies such upstart fortunes, the foolish ostentation with which they commonly display that wealth, excite that indignation still more.

Taxes on consumer goods can either be imposed by a government-appointed administration that is directly accountable to the government, meaning the revenue can change each year based on tax yields, or they can be leased out for a fixed rent, allowing the contractor to hire their own officers. These officers, while required to collect the tax according to legal guidelines, operate under the contractor's supervision and are accountable to them. The most efficient and cost-effective way to collect a tax is never through leasing. Beyond what's needed to cover the agreed rent, the salaries of the officers, and the overall administration costs, the contractor will always take a profit from the tax yield, which should at least reflect their initial investment, the risks they take, the effort involved, and the expertise needed to oversee such a complex process. By setting up their own administration, similar to what the contractor would do, the government could potentially save on this often excessive profit. Leasing a significant part of public revenue necessitates either substantial capital or strong credit, which limits the competition for such contracts to a select few individuals. Among those with the required capital or credit, even fewer possess the necessary knowledge or experience, further narrowing the competitive field. The few who can compete tend to prefer collaborating as partners rather than competing against each other; so when leases are auctioned, they bid much lower than the potential rent value. In places where public revenues are leased out, the contractors often become the wealthiest individuals. Their wealth alone can stir public outrage, and the arrogance and showiness that typically accompany such newfound fortunes only intensifies that anger.

The farmers of the public revenue never find the laws too severe, which punish any attempt to evade the payment of a tax. They have no bowels for the contributors, who are not their subjects, and whose universal bankruptcy, if it should happen the day after the farm is expired, would not much affect their interest. In the greatest exigencies of the state, when the anxiety of the sovereign for the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily the greatest, they seldom fail to complain, that without laws more rigorous than those which actually took place, it will be impossible for them to pay even the usual rent. In those moments of public distress, their commands cannot be disputed. The revenue laws, therefore, become gradually more and more severe. The most sanguinary are always to be found in countries where the greater part of the public revenue is in farm; the mildest, in countries where it is levied under the immediate inspection of the sovereign. Even a bad sovereign feels more compassion for his people than can ever be expected from the farmers of his revenue. He knows that the permanent grandeur of his family depends upon the prosperity of his people, and he will never knowingly ruin that prosperity for the sake of any momentary interest of his own. It is otherwise with the farmers of his revenue, whose grandeur may frequently be the effect of the ruin, and not of the prosperity, of his people.

The tax collectors never think the laws are too harsh when they punish any attempt to avoid paying taxes. They don’t care about the taxpayers who aren’t their subjects, and the widespread failure of these taxpayers, if it were to happen right after their contract ends, wouldn’t significantly impact their interests. In times of serious need for the state, when the ruler is particularly anxious about collecting revenue, they often complain that without stricter laws than those currently in place, it will be impossible for them to pay even the usual rent. In those times of public crisis, their demands can’t be challenged. As a result, the tax laws gradually become tougher. The most severe laws are typically found in countries where a large portion of the public revenue is farmed out; the milder ones are in places where the revenue is collected under the direct supervision of the ruler. Even a bad ruler shows more compassion for his people than can ever be expected from the tax collectors. He understands that the lasting greatness of his family relies on the success of his subjects, and he won’t intentionally destroy that success for any short-term benefit of his own. The same cannot be said for the tax collectors, whose own success can often come at the expense, rather than the prosperity, of the people.

A tax is sometimes not only farmed for a certain rent, but the farmer has, besides, the monopoly of the commodity taxed. In France, the duties upon tobacco and salt are levied in this manner. In such cases, the farmer, instead of one, levies two exorbitant profits upon the people; the profit of the farmer, and the still more exorbitant one of the monopolist. Tobacco being a luxury, every man is allowed to buy or not to buy as he chuses; but salt being a necessary, every man is obligated to buy of the farmer a certain quantity of it; because, if he did not buy this quantity of the farmer, he would, it is presumed, buy it of some smuggler. The taxes upon both commodities are exorbitant. The temptation to smuggle, consequently, is to many people irresistible; while, at the same time, the rigour of the law, and the vigilance of the farmer's officers, render the yielding to the temptation almost certainly ruinous. The smuggling of salt and tobacco sends every year several hundred people to the galleys, besides a very considerable number whom it sends to the gibbet. Those taxes, levied in this manner, yield a very considerable revenue to government. In 1767, the farm of tobacco was let for twenty-two millions five hundred and forty-one thousand two hundred and seventy-eight livres a-year; that of salt for thirty-six millions four hundred and ninety-two thousand four hundred and four livres. The farm, in both cases, was to commence in 1768, and to last for six years. These who consider the blood of the people as nothing, in comparison with the revenue of the prince, may, perhaps, approve of this method of levying taxes. Similar taxes and monopolies of salt and tobacco have been established in many other countries, particularly in the Austrian and Prussian domi[Pg 384]nions, and in the greater part of the states of Italy.

A tax is sometimes not just based on a fixed rent, but the person collecting it also has the exclusive rights to the taxed commodity. In France, the taxes on tobacco and salt are collected this way. In these situations, the collector makes two huge profits from the people—one from the tax collector and an even larger one from having a monopoly. Tobacco is a luxury, so everyone can choose whether or not to buy it; however, salt is a necessity, and everyone has to buy a certain amount from the collector. If they didn't buy this amount from the collector, it’s assumed they would buy it from a smuggler. The taxes on both of these goods are excessive. This situation makes smuggling very tempting for many people, but at the same time, the strict laws and close monitoring by the collector's agents make giving in to that temptation almost certainly disastrous. The smuggling of salt and tobacco leads to several hundred people being sent to prison each year, and many others facing execution. These taxes, collected in this way, generate a significant income for the government. In 1767, the deal for tobacco was valued at twenty-two million five hundred forty-one thousand two hundred seventy-eight livres a year, and for salt, it was thirty-six million four hundred ninety-two thousand four hundred four livres. Both deals were set to start in 1768 and last for six years. Those who see the suffering of people as insignificant compared to the profits of the government may support this way of taxing. Similar taxes and monopolies on salt and tobacco have been established in many other countries, especially in the Austrian and Prussian territories, as well as in most of the states in Italy.

In France, the greater part of the actual revenue of the crown is derived from eight different sources; the taille, the capitation, the two vingtiemes, the gabelles, the aides, the traites, the domaine, and the farm of tobacco. The five last are, in the greater part of the provinces, under farm. The three first are everywhere levied by an administration, under the immediate inspection and direction of government; and it is universally acknowledged, that in proportion to what they take out of the pockets of the people, they bring more into the treasury of the prince than the other five, of which the administration is much more wasteful and expensive.

In France, most of the crown's actual revenue comes from eight different sources: the taille, the capitation, the two vingtiemes, the gabelles, the aides, the traites, the domaine, and the tobacco farm. The last five are mostly managed by private contractors in most provinces. The first three are collected everywhere by an administration, under the direct oversight and direction of the government; and it is widely accepted that the amount they take from the people's pockets brings in more to the prince's treasury than the other five, which are managed in a much more wasteful and costly manner.

The finances of France seem, in their present state, to admit of three very obvious reformations. First, by abolishing the taille and the capitation, and by increasing the number of the vingtiemes, so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of those other taxes, the revenue of the crown might be preserved; the expense of collection might be much diminished; the vexation of the inferior ranks of people, which the taille and capitation occasion, might be entirely prevented; and the superior ranks might not be more burdened than the greater part of them are at present. The vingtieme, I have already observed, is a tax very nearly of the same kind with what is called the land tax of England. The burden of the taille, it is acknowledged, falls finally upon the proprietors of land; and as the greater part of the capitation is assessed upon those who are subject to the taille, at so much a-pound of that other tax, the final payment of the greater part of it must likewise fall upon the same order of people. Though the number of the vingtiemes, therefore, was increased, so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of both those taxes, the superior ranks of people might not be more burdened than they are at present; many individuals, no doubt, would, on account of the great inequalities with which the taille is commonly assessed upon the estates and tenants of different individuals. The interest and opposition of such favoured subjects, are the obstacles most likely to prevent this, or any other reformation of the same kind. Secondly, by rendering the gabelle, the aides, the traites, the taxes upon tobacco, all the different customs and excises, uniform in all the different parts of the kingdom, those taxes might be levied at much less expense, and the interior commerce of the kingdom might be rendered as free as that of England. Thirdly, and lastly, by subjecting all those taxes to an administration under the immediate inspection and direction of government, the exorbitant profits of the farmers-general might be added to the revenue of the state. The opposition arising from the private interest of individuals, is likely to be as effectual for preventing the two last as the first-mentioned scheme of reformation.

The finances of France currently show three clear areas for reform. First, by eliminating the taille and capitation taxes and increasing the number of vingtiemes to generate extra revenue equivalent to those taxes, the crown's income could be maintained; the cost of collecting taxes could be significantly reduced; the burden on lower-income individuals caused by the taille and capitation could be completely avoided; and the higher classes wouldn’t be taxed more than they are now. The vingtieme is very similar to what England calls the land tax. It's recognized that the burden of the taille ultimately falls on landowners, and since much of the capitation is levied on those who also pay the taille, most of that tax will end up affecting the same group of people. Even if the number of vingtiemes were increased to match the revenue of both taxes, the higher classes wouldn’t face any greater burden than they currently do; certainly, some individuals would, due to the significant disparities in how the taille is assessed on various estates and tenants. The interests and opposition from those privileged individuals are the main obstacles to this and other similar reforms. Second, by making the gabelle, aides, traites, taxes on tobacco, and all other customs and excises uniform across the kingdom, these taxes could be collected at much lower costs, and internal trade could be as free as it is in England. Lastly, by placing all these taxes under strict government oversight and management, the excessive profits of the tax farmers could be redirected to the state’s revenue. However, the private interests of individuals are likely to be just as effective in blocking the last two proposals as they would be in obstructing the first reform plan.

The French system of taxation seems, in every respect, inferior to the British. In Great Britain, ten millions sterling are annually levied upon less than eight millions of people, without its being possible to say that any particular order is oppressed. From the Collections of the Abbé Expilly, and the observations of the author of the Essay upon the Legislation and Commerce of Corn, it appears probable that France, including the provinces of Lorraine and Bar, contains about twenty-three or twenty-four millions of people; three times the number, perhaps, contained in Great Britain. The soil and climate of France are better than those of Great Britain. The country has been much longer in a state of improvement and cultivation, and is, upon that account, better stocked with all those things which it requires a long time to raise up and accumulate; such as great towns, and convenient and well-built houses, both in town and country. With these advantages, it might be expected, that in France a revenue of thirty millions might be levied for the support of the state, with as little inconvenience as a revenue of ten millions is in Great Britain. In 1765 and 1766, the whole revenue paid into the treasury of France, according to the best, though, I acknowledge, very imperfect accounts which I could get of it, usually run between 308 and 325 millions of livres; that is, it did not amount to fifteen millions sterling; not the half of what might have been expected, had the people contributed in the same proportion to their numbers as the people of Great Britain. The people of France, however, it is generally acknowledged, are much more oppressed by taxes than the people of Great Britain. France, however, is certainly the great empire in Europe, which, after that of Great Britain, enjoys the mildest and most indulgent government.

The French tax system seems, in every way, worse than the British one. In Great Britain, ten million pounds are collected each year from less than eight million people, and it's hard to say that any specific group is unfairly burdened. According to the Collections of Abbé Expilly and the observations from the author of the Essay on the Legislation and Commerce of Corn, it seems likely that France, including the provinces of Lorraine and Bar, has about twenty-three or twenty-four million people—possibly three times the population of Great Britain. The land and climate of France are better than those in Great Britain. France has been developing and cultivating its land for much longer, which means it has a greater abundance of things that take time to build up, like large cities and well-constructed houses, both in urban areas and the countryside. Given these advantages, one might expect that France could generate a revenue of thirty million with as little difficulty as Great Britain does with ten million. In 1765 and 1766, the total revenue collected by the French treasury, according to the best, though admittedly very incomplete records I could find, was typically between 308 and 325 million livres; that is, it amounted to less than fifteen million pounds—not even half of what could have been expected if the population contributed in the same way as those in Great Britain. However, it is generally recognized that the people of France are much more heavily taxed than those in Great Britain. Nonetheless, France is certainly the major empire in Europe that, after Great Britain, enjoys the most gentle and lenient government.

In Holland, the heavy taxes upon the necessaries of life have ruined, it is said, their principal manufacturers, and are likely to discourage, gradually, even their fisheries and their trade in ship-building. The taxes upon the necessaries of life are inconsiderable in Great Britain, and no manufacture has hitherto been ruined by them. The British taxes which bear hardest on manufactures, are some duties upon the importation of raw materials, particularly upon that of raw silk. The revenue of the States-General and of the different cities, however, is said to amount to more than five millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling; and as the inhabitants of the United Provinces cannot well be supposed to amount to more than a third part of those of Great Britain, they must, in proportion to their number, be much more heavily taxed.[Pg 385]

In Holland, the high taxes on essential goods have reportedly devastated their key manufacturers and are likely to gradually discourage even their fishing industry and shipbuilding trade. In Great Britain, taxes on essential goods are minimal, and no manufacturing sector has been harmed by them so far. The British taxes that most affect manufacturing are import duties on raw materials, especially raw silk. However, the revenue from the States-General and various cities is said to exceed five million two hundred fifty thousand pounds sterling; since the population of the United Provinces is not likely to be more than a third of that of Great Britain, they must be significantly more heavily taxed relative to their population.[Pg 385]

After all the proper subjects of taxation have been exhausted, if the exigencies of the state still continue to require new taxes, they must be imposed upon improper ones. The taxes upon the necessaries of life, therefore, may be no impeachment of the wisdom of that republic, which, in order to acquire and to maintain its independency, has, in spite of its great frugality, been involved in such expensive wars as have obliged it to contract great debts. The singular countries of Holland and Zealand, besides, require a considerable expense even to preserve their existence, or to prevent their being swallowed up by the sea, which must have contributed to increase considerably the load of taxes in those two provinces. The republican form of government seems to be the principal support of the present grandeur of Holland. The owners of great capitals, the great mercantile families, have generally either some direct share, or some indirect influence, in the administration of that government. For the sake of the respect and authority which they derive from this situation, they are willing to live in a country where their capital, if they employ it themselves, will bring them less profit, and if they lend it to another, less interest; and where the very moderate revenue which they can draw from it will purchase less of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than in any other part of Europe. The residence of such wealthy people necessarily keeps alive, in spite of all disadvantages, a certain degree of industry in the country. Any public calamity which should destroy the republican form of government, which should throw the whole administration into the hands of nobles and of soldiers, which should annihilate altogether the importance of those wealthy merchants, would soon render it disagreeable to them to live in a country where they were no longer likely to be much respected. They would remove both their residence and their capital to some other country, and the industry and commerce of Holland would soon follow the capitals which supported them.

Once all the proper subjects of taxation have been tapped out, if the state's needs still call for more taxes, they have to be imposed on less appropriate ones. So, taxes on life’s necessities may not reflect poorly on the wisdom of a republic that, in its effort to gain and maintain independence, has, despite being quite frugal, found itself entangled in costly wars that have forced it to take on significant debts. The unique regions of Holland and Zealand also require a substantial amount of money just to survive or to protect themselves from being taken over by the sea, which likely contributes significantly to the tax burden in those provinces. The republican form of government appears to be the main pillar of Holland's current greatness. Wealthy capital owners and major trading families generally have some direct involvement or indirect influence in running that government. For the respect and authority they gain from this position, they are willing to live in a country where their investments yield lower returns when they manage them personally, and even less when they lend it to others; and where the modest income they can derive from it buys fewer of life’s essentials and comforts than in other parts of Europe. The presence of such affluent individuals inevitably sustains, despite various challenges, a certain level of industry in the country. Any disaster that would destroy the republican government, placing all power in the hands of nobles and soldiers, and completely undermining the significance of those wealthy merchants, would quickly make it unpleasant for them to stay in a country where they were no longer respected. They would move both their homes and their wealth to another nation, and the industry and trade of Holland would swiftly follow the capital that supported them.


CHAP. III.

OF PUBLIC DEBTS.

In that rude state of society which precedes the extension of commerce and the improvement of manufactures; when those expensive luxuries, which commerce and manufactures can alone introduce, are altogether unknown; the person who possesses a large revenue, I have endeavoured to show in the third book of this Inquiry, can spend or enjoy that revenue in no other way than by maintaining nearly as many people as it can maintain. A large revenue may at all times be said to consist in the command of a large quantity of the necessaries of life. In that rude state of things, it is commonly paid in a large quantity of those necessaries, in the materials of plain food and coarse clothing, in corn and cattle, in wool and raw hides. When neither commerce nor manufactures furnish any thing for which the owner can exchange the greater part of those materials which are over and above his own consumption, he can do nothing with the surplus, but feed and clothe nearly as many people as it will feed and clothe. A hospitality in which there is no luxury, and a liberality in which there is no ostentation, occasion, in this situation of things, the principal expenses of the rich and the great. But these I have likewise endeavoured to show, in the same book, are expenses by which people are not very apt to ruin themselves. There is not, perhaps, any selfish pleasure so frivolous, of which the pursuit has not sometimes ruined even sensible men. A passion for cock-fighting has ruined many. But the instances, I believe, are not very numerous, of people who have been ruined by a hospitality or liberality of this kind; though the hospitality of luxury, and the liberality of ostentation have ruined many. Among our feudal ancestors, the long time during which estates used to continue in the same family, sufficiently demonstrates the general disposition of people to live within their income. Though the rustic hospitality, constantly exercised by the great landholders, may not, to us in the present times, seem consistent with that order which we are apt to consider as inseparably connected with good economy; yet we must certainly allow them to have been at least so far frugal, as not commonly to have spent their whole income. A part of their wool and raw hides, they had generally an opportunity of selling for money. Some part of this money, perhaps, they spent in purchasing the few objects of vanity and luxury, with which the circumstances of the times could furnish them; but some part of it they seem commonly to have hoarded. They could not well, indeed, do any thing else but hoard whatever money they saved. To trade, was disgraceful to a gentleman; and to lend money at interest, which at that time was considered as usury, and prohibited by law, would have been still more so. In those times of violence and disorder, besides, it was convenient to have a hoard of money at hand, that in case they should be driven from their own home, they might have something of known value to carry with them to some place of safety. The same violence which made it convenient to hoard, made it equally convenient to conceal the hoard. The frequency of treasure-trove, or of treasure found, of which no owner was known, sufficiently [Pg 386]demonstrates the frequency, in those times, both of hoarding and of concealing the hoard. Treasure-trove was then considered as an important branch of the revenue of the sovereign. All the treasure-trove of the kingdom would scarce, perhaps, in the present times, make an important branch of the revenue of a private gentleman of a good estate.

In that rough stage of society before commerce expanded and manufacturing improved, when those pricey luxuries that trade and industry can only provide were completely unknown, I have attempted to show in the third book of this Inquiry that someone with a large income can only spend or enjoy it by supporting nearly as many people as it can sustain. A large income can always be said to consist of controlling a significant amount of life's necessities. In that undeveloped state of affairs, it's typically paid in a large quantity of those essentials, like simple food and basic clothing, grains and livestock, wool and raw hides. When neither commerce nor manufacturing offers anything that the owner can trade for most of those resources that exceed their own needs, they can only use the surplus to feed and clothe nearly as many people as it can feed and clothe. A hospitality without luxury and a generosity without showy display often account for the main expenses of the wealthy and powerful in this context. However, I have also shown in the same book that these expenses typically don't lead people to financial ruin. There may not be a selfish pleasure so trivial that its pursuit hasn’t sometimes led sensible individuals to disaster. A passion for cockfighting has brought down many. But I believe there aren’t many cases of people who have been ruined by this kind of hospitality or generosity, although the hospitality of luxury and the generosity of ostentation have ruined plenty. Among our feudal ancestors, the long duration during which estates remained in the same family clearly shows people's general tendency to live within their means. Although the rural hospitality regularly practiced by major landowners might not seem consistent with the order we typically associate with good financial management today, we must acknowledge that they were at least frugal enough not to spend their entire income. They often had the opportunity to sell some of their wool and raw hides for money. They might have used some of this money to buy a few objects of vanity and luxury that the times allowed, but it seems they generally saved a portion of it. In fact, they really had little choice but to save whatever money they could. Trading was considered undignified for a gentleman, and lending money at interest, which was regarded as usury and banned by law back then, would have been even worse. During those times of violence and chaos, it was useful to have a stash of money on hand so that if they were forced from their homes, they’d have something valuable to carry to a safe place. The same violence that made it useful to save also made it necessary to hide that savings. The frequency of treasure finds, where no owner was known, clearly demonstrates the common practice of both hoarding and concealing wealth during those times. Treasure finds were viewed as a significant source of income for the sovereign. All the treasure found in the kingdom likely wouldn’t even amount to a substantial source of income for a well-off gentleman today.

The same disposition, to save and to hoard, prevailed in the sovereign, as well as in the subjects. Among nations, to whom commerce and manufactures are little known, the sovereign, it has already been observed in the fourth book, is in a situation which naturally disposes him to the parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that situation, the expense, even of a sovereign, cannot be directed by that vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court. The ignorance of the times affords but few of the trinkets in which that finery consists. Standing armies are not then necessary; so that the expense, even of a sovereign, like that of any other great lord, can be employed in scarce any thing but bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always does. All the ancient sovereigns of Europe, accordingly, it has already been observed, had treasures. Every Tartar chief, in the present times, is said to have one.

The same tendency to save and hoard existed in the monarch as well as in the people. In nations where commerce and manufacturing are not well understood, the monarch, as noted in the fourth book, is naturally inclined towards the frugality needed for accumulation. In that context, even a monarch’s spending cannot be influenced by the vanity that enjoys the flashy decorations of a royal court. The ignorance of the era offers few of the trinkets that make up such finery. During these times, standing armies are not necessary, so even a monarch’s expenses, like those of any other large landowner, can mainly go towards generosity to his tenants and hospitality to his followers. However, generosity and hospitality rarely lead to extravagance, while vanity usually does. As has been observed, all the ancient rulers of Europe accumulated wealth. It is said that every Tartar chief today has a treasure as well.

In a commercial country, abounding with every sort of expensive luxury, the sovereign, in the same manner as almost all the great proprietors in his dominions, naturally spends a great part of his revenue in purchasing those luxuries. His own and the neighbouring countries supply him abundantly with all the costly trinkets which compose the splendid, but insignificant, pageantry of a court. For the sake of an inferior pageantry of the same kind, his nobles dismiss their retainers, make their tenants independent, and become gradually themselves as insignificant as the greater part of the wealthy burghers in his dominions. The same frivolous passions, which influence their conduct, influence his. How can it be supposed that he should be the only rich man in his dominions who is insensible to pleasures of this kind? If he does not, what he is very likely to do, spend upon those pleasures so great a part of his revenue as to debilitate very much the defensive power of the state, it cannot well be expected that he should not spend upon them all that part of it which is over and above what is necessary for supporting that defensive power. His ordinary expense becomes equal to his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it does not frequently exceed it. The amassing of treasure can no longer be expected; and when extraordinary exigencies require extraordinary expenses, he must necessarily call upon his subjects for an extraordinary aid. The present and the late king of Prussia are the only great princes of Europe, who, since the death of Henry IV. of France, in 1610, are supposed to have amassed any considerable treasure. The parsimony which leads to accumulation has become almost as rare in republican as in monarchical governments. The Italian republics, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt. The canton of Berne is the single republic in Europe which has amassed any considerable treasure. The other Swiss republics have not. The taste for some sort of pageantry, for splendid buildings, at least, and other public ornaments, frequently prevails as much in the apparently sober senate-house of a little republic, as in the dissipated court of the greatest king.

In a wealthy country full of all kinds of expensive luxuries, the ruler, like almost all the wealthy landowners in his realm, naturally spends a large portion of his income on these luxuries. He is well supplied by his own country and the neighboring ones with all the pricey trinkets that make up the impressive but ultimately trivial spectacle of a court. To achieve a lesser version of this spectacle, his nobles let go of their servants, make their tenants independent, and gradually become as inconsequential as most of the affluent merchants in his land. The same shallow desires that drive their behavior also affect him. How can we assume that he would be the only rich person in his domain immune to such pleasures? If he doesn’t spend a significant portion of his income on these pleasures, which he likely will, diminishing the state's defensive capabilities, we can't reasonably expect him to refrain from spending all the extra money he has beyond what is necessary to maintain that defense. His usual expenses match his regular income, and it would be a relief if they don’t often exceed it. Saving money has become nearly impossible, and when unusual circumstances demand extraordinary spending, he must ask his subjects for additional support. The current and former kings of Prussia are the only great rulers in Europe who, since the death of Henry IV of France in 1610, are believed to have built up any significant wealth. The stinginess that leads to saving has become almost as rare in republics as in monarchies. The Italian republics and the United Provinces of the Netherlands are all in debt. The canton of Berne is the only republic in Europe that has accumulated any considerable treasure; the other Swiss republics have not. A desire for some form of pageantry, for grand buildings at least, and other public decorations often exists just as much in the seemingly austere meeting halls of small republics as in the lavish court of even the most extravagant king.

The want of parsimony, in time of peace, imposes the necessity of contracting debt in time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the treasury, but what is necessary for carrying on the ordinary expense of the peace establishment. In war, an establishment of three or four times that expense becomes necessary for the defence of the state; and consequently, a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue. Supposing that the sovereign should have, what he scarce ever has, the immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expense; yet still the produce of the taxes, from which this increase of revenue must be drawn, will not begin to come into the treasury, till perhaps ten or twelve months after they are imposed. But the moment in which war begins, or rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army must be augmented, the fleet must be fitted out, the garrisoned towns must be put into a posture of defence; that army, that fleet, those garrisoned towns, must be furnished with arms, ammunition, and provisions. An immediate and great expense must be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes. In this exigency, government can have no other resource but in borrowing.

The lack of frugality in peacetime forces the government to take on debt during wartime. When war breaks out, the treasury has only enough money for the regular costs of maintaining peace. In wartime, expenses can increase three or four times to defend the state, leading to the need for revenue that is three or four times higher than what was needed during peace. Even if the ruler somehow manages to increase revenue in line with these rising costs—which is rare—the new taxes won’t begin generating income for about ten or twelve months after they're implemented. However, as soon as war seems imminent, the army must be increased, the navy must be prepared, and fortified towns must be made defensible. The army, navy, and these towns need to be equipped with weapons, ammunition, and supplies. An immediate and substantial expense must be covered at that moment of acute danger, which cannot await the slow arrival of new tax revenue. In this situation, the government has no choice but to borrow.

The same commercial state of society which, by the operation of moral causes, brings government in this manner into the necessity of borrowing, produces in the subjects both an ability and an inclination to lend. If it commonly brings along with it the necessity of borrowing, it likewise brings with it the facility of doing so.

The same commercial society that, through moral reasons, leads the government to need to borrow, also creates both the ability and desire for citizens to lend. If it usually brings the need to borrow, it also makes it easier to do so.

A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, necessarily abounds with a set of people through whose hands, not only their own capitals, but the capitals of all those who either lend them money, or trust them with goods, pass as frequently, or more frequently, than the revenue of a private man, who, without trade or business, lives upon his in[Pg 387]come, passes through his hands. The revenue of such a man can regularly pass through his hands only once in a year. But the whole amount of the capital and credit of a merchant, who deals in a trade of which the returns are very quick, may sometimes pass through his hands two, three, or four times in a year. A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, therefore, necessarily abounds with a set of people, who have it at all times in their power to advance, if they chuse to do so, a very large sum of money to government. Hence the ability in the subjects of a commercial state to lend.

A country full of merchants and manufacturers naturally has a group of people through whom not only their own capital, but also the capital of anyone who lends them money or trusts them with goods, flows just as often, if not more often, than the income of a private individual who, without trade or business, lives solely on his income. Such an individual's income typically passes through their hands only once a year. However, the total capital and credit of a merchant engaged in a trade with quick returns can sometimes move through their hands two, three, or four times in a year. Therefore, a country rich in merchants and manufacturers has a group of people who can always choose to lend a significant amount of money to the government if they want to. This is why individuals in a commercial state are capable of lending.

Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice; in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property; in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law; and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state, in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government. The same confidence which disposes great merchants and manufacturers upon ordinary occasions, to trust their property to the protection of a particular government, disposes them, upon extraordinary occasions, to trust that government with the use of their property. By lending money to government, they do not even for a moment diminish their ability to carry on their trade and manufactures; on the contrary, they commonly augment it. The necessities of the state render government, upon most occasions willing to borrow upon terms extremely advantageous to the lender. The security which it grants to the original creditor, is made transferable to any other creditor; and from the universal confidence in the justice of the state, generally sells in the market for more than was originally paid for it. The merchant or monied man makes money by lending money to government, and instead of diminishing, increases his trading capital. He generally considers it as a favour, therefore, when the administration admits him to a share in the first subscription for a new loan. Hence the inclination or willingness in the subjects of a commercial state to lend.

Commerce and manufacturing rarely thrive in any society that lacks a consistent justice system; where people don’t feel secure in their ownership; where contracts aren’t backed by law; and where the government isn’t consistently enforcing debt payments from those who can pay. In short, commerce and manufacturing struggle to succeed in any society without a certain level of trust in the fairness of the government. The same trust that encourages major merchants and manufacturers to rely on a particular government for protection in normal circumstances also leads them, in unusual situations, to entrust that government with their assets. When they lend money to the government, they don’t reduce their ability to conduct business; in fact, they often enhance it. The government’s needs frequently make it willing to borrow on terms that are very beneficial for the lender. The security provided to the original lender can be transferred to other creditors, and due to widespread confidence in the fairness of the government, it usually sells for more in the market than what was initially invested. Merchants and investors profit by lending to the government, ultimately increasing their trading capital instead of diminishing it. Therefore, they often see it as a privilege when the government allows them to participate in the initial offering of a new loan. This is why individuals in a commercial society are inclined to lend money.

The government of such a state is very apt to repose itself upon this ability and willingness of its subjects to lend it their money on extraordinary occasions. It foresees the facility of borrowing, and therefore dispenses itself from the duty of saving.

The government of such a state is likely to rely on the readiness of its citizens to lend it money during exceptional times. It anticipates the ease of borrowing and, as a result, feels no obligation to save.

In a rude state of society, there are no great mercantile or manufacturing capitals. The individuals, who hoard whatever money they can save, and who conceal their hoard, do so from a distrust of the justice of government; from a fear, that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to be found, they would quickly be plundered. In such a state of things, few people would be able, and nobody would be willing to lend their money to government on extraordinary exigencies. The sovereign feels that he must provide for such exigencies by saving, because he foresees the absolute impossibility of borrowing. This foresight increases still further his natural disposition to save.

In a harsh society, there are no major trading or manufacturing hubs. People who save whatever money they can and keep it hidden do so because they don't trust the government's fairness; they fear that if it’s known they have savings and where those savings are, they’ll quickly be robbed. In such situations, few people would be able, and no one would be willing, to lend their money to the government during emergencies. The ruler realizes he must prepare for these emergencies by saving, as he sees it’s completely impossible to borrow. This awareness only drives him to save even more.

The progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the long-run probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe, has been pretty uniform. Nations, like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what may be called personal credit, without assigning or mortgaging any particular fund for the payment of the debt; and when this resource has failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon assignments or mortgages of particular funds.

The growth of the massive debts that are currently burdening and will likely eventually destroy all the major nations of Europe has been fairly consistent. Countries, similar to individuals, usually start borrowing based on what can be termed personal credit, without designating or mortgaging any specific resources for repaying the debt; and when this option runs out, they then resort to borrowing against specific assets or funds.

What is called the unfunded debt of Great Britain, is contracted in the former of those two ways. It consists partly in a debt which bears, or is supposed to bear, no interest, and which resembles the debts that a private man contracts upon account; and partly in a debt which bears interest, and which resembles what a private man contracts upon his bill or promissory-note. The debts which are due, either for extraordinary services, or for services either not provided for, or not paid at the time when they are performed; part of the extraordinaries of the army, navy, and ordnance, the arrears of subsidies to foreign princes, those of seamen's wages, &c. usually constitute a debt of the first kind. Navy and exchequer bills, which are issued sometimes in payment of a part of such debts, and sometimes for other purposes, constitutes a debt of the second kind; exchequer bills bearing interest from the day on which they are issued, and navy bills six months after they are issued. The bank of England, either by voluntarily discounting those bills at their current value, or by agreeing with government for certain considerations to circulate exchequer bills, that is, to receive them at par, paying the interest which happens to be due upon them, keeps up the value, and facilitates their circulation, and thereby frequently enables government to contract a very large debt of this kind. In France, where there is no bank, the state bills (billets d'etat[76]) have sometimes sold at sixty and seventy per cent. discount. During the great recoinage in king William's time, when the bank of England thought proper to put a stop to its usual transactions, exchequer bills and tallies are said to have sold from twenty-five to sixty per cent. discount; owing partly, no doubt, to the supposed instability of the new govern[Pg 388]ment established by the Revolution, but partly, too, to the want of the support of the bank of England.

What’s known as the unfunded debt of Great Britain is created in one of two ways. It includes some debt that supposedly doesn't earn interest, similar to debts that a private individual incurs on account; and some debt that does earn interest, resembling the obligations a private person takes on through a bill or promissory note. The debts owed for extraordinary services or for services not budgeted for or paid when performed; parts of the extra expenses for the army, navy, and ordnance, overdue payments to foreign princes, and unpaid seamen's wages, typically fall into the first category. Navy and exchequer bills, issued sometimes to pay a portion of these debts and sometimes for other reasons, represent the second type of debt; exchequer bills earn interest from the day they are issued, while navy bills do so six months after issuance. The Bank of England either voluntarily discounts these bills at their current value or agrees with the government to circulate exchequer bills for certain considerations, which means they accept them at face value and pay the applicable interest, thereby sustaining their value and easing their circulation. This often allows the government to take on a significant amount of this type of debt. In France, where there’s no central bank, state bills (billets d'etat[76]) have sometimes been sold at discounts of sixty to seventy percent. During the major recoinage in King William’s time, when the Bank of England decided to halt its usual operations, exchequer bills and tallies reportedly sold at discounts of twenty-five to sixty percent, caused partly by the perceived instability of the new government formed by the Revolution, and partly due to the lack of support from the Bank of England.

When this resource is exhausted, and it becomes necessary, in order to raise money, to assign or mortgage some particular branch of the public revenue for the payment of the debt, government has, upon different occasions, done this in two different ways. Sometimes it has made this assignment or mortgage for a short period of time only, a year, or a few years, for example; and sometimes for perpetuity. In the one case, the fund was supposed sufficient to pay, within the limited time, both principal and interest of the money borrowed. In the other, it was supposed sufficient to pay the interest only, or a perpetual annuity equivalent to the interest, government being at liberty to redeem, at any time, this annuity, upon paying back the principal sum borrowed. When money was raised in the one way, it was said to be raised by anticipation; when in the other, by perpetual funding, or, more shortly, by funding.

When this resource runs out, and it becomes necessary to raise money by assigning or mortgaging a specific part of the public revenue to pay off the debt, the government has done this in two different ways on various occasions. Sometimes, it assigns or mortgages for a short period, like a year or a few years; other times, it's for eternity. In the first case, the fund is expected to be enough to cover both the principal and interest within that limited time. In the second case, it’s expected to cover just the interest or a perpetual annuity equal to the interest, allowing the government to redeem this annuity at any time by repaying the principal amount borrowed. When money is raised in one way, it’s called raising by anticipation; when it's raised in the other, it’s called perpetual funding, or simply funding.

In Great Britain, the annual land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated every year, by virtue of a borrowing clause constantly inserted into the acts which impose them. The bank of England generally advances at an interest, which, since the Revolution, has varied from eight to three per cent., the sums of which those taxes are granted, and receives payment as their produce gradually comes in. If there is a deficiency, which there always is, it is provided for in the supplies of the ensuing year. The only considerable branch of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged, is thus regularly spent before it comes in. Like an improvident spendthrift, whose pressing occasions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenue, the state is in the constant practice of borrowing of its own factors and agents, and of paying interest for the use of its own money.

In Great Britain, the annual land and malt taxes are consistently expected each year, thanks to a borrowing clause that is always included in the laws that impose them. The Bank of England usually lends money at an interest rate that has ranged from eight to three percent since the Revolution, based on the amounts that these taxes generate, and receives repayment as the tax revenue comes in gradually. If there’s a shortfall, which is always the case, it’s covered by the revenues of the following year. The only significant part of the public revenue that remains unburdened is routinely spent even before it arrives. Like a careless spender who can’t wait for their regular income, the state constantly borrows from its own suppliers and agents, paying interest for the use of its own funds.

In the reign of king William, and during a great part of that of queen Anne, before we had become so familiar as we are now with the practice of perpetual funding, the greater part of the new taxes were imposed but for a short period of time (for four, five, six, or seven years only), and a great part of the grants of every year consisted in loans upon anticipations of the produce of those taxes. The produce being frequently insufficient for paying, within the limited term, the principal and interest of the money borrowed, deficiencies arose; to make good which, it became necessary to prolong the term.

During the reign of King William and much of Queen Anne’s, before we became as used to perpetual funding as we are today, most new taxes were temporary, lasting only four, five, six, or seven years. A significant part of the annual grants was made up of loans based on expected tax revenues. Since the revenues were often not enough to cover the principal and interest on the loans within that limited time, there were shortfalls; to address these, it was necessary to extend the repayment period.

In 1697, by the 8th of William III., c. 20, the deficiencies of several taxes were charged upon what was then called the first general mortgage or fund, consisting of a prolongation to the first of August 1706, of several different taxes, which would have expired within a shorter term, and of which the produce was accumulated into one general fund. The deficiencies charged upon this prolonged term amounted to L.5,160,459 : 14 : 9½.

In 1697, under the 8th of William III., c. 20, the shortfalls of several taxes were applied to what was then referred to as the first general mortgage or fund. This consisted of an extension to August 1, 1706, for several different taxes that would have expired sooner, and their revenue was combined into one general fund. The shortfalls assigned to this extended term totaled £5,160,459 : 14 : 9½.

In 1701, those duties, with some others, were still further prolonged, for the like purposes, till the first of August 1710, and were called the second general mortgage or fund. The deficiencies charged upon it amounted to L.2,055,999 : 7 : 11½.

In 1701, those duties, along with a few others, were extended even further for similar purposes until August 1, 1710, and were known as the second general mortgage or fund. The shortcomings associated with it totaled £2,055,999 : 7 : 11½.

In 1707, those duties were still further prolonged, as a fund for new loans, to the first of August 1712, and were called the third general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was L.983,254 : 11 : 9¼.

In 1707, those responsibilities were extended even more, to serve as a fund for new loans, until August 1, 1712, and were referred to as the third general mortgage or fund. The amount borrowed against it was £983,254 : 11 : 9¼.

In 1708, those duties were all (except the old subsidy of tonnage and poundage, of which one moiety only was made a part of this fund, and a duty upon the importation of Scotch linen, which had been taken off by the articles of union) still further continued, as a fund for new loans, to the first of August 1714, and were called the fourth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was L.925,176 : 9 : 2¼.

In 1708, all those duties (except for the old subsidy on tonnage and poundage, of which only half was included in this fund, and a tax on the import of Scotch linen, which was removed by the articles of union) were extended even further, up until August 1, 1714, and were referred to as the fourth general mortgage or fund. The total amount borrowed against it was £925,176 : 9 : 2¼.

In 1709, those duties were all (except the old subsidy of tonnage and poundage, which was now left out of this fund altogether) still further continued, for the same purpose, to the first of August 1716, and were called the fifth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was L.922,029 : 6s.

In 1709, those duties were all (except for the old subsidy of tonnage and poundage, which was now completely excluded from this fund) further extended for the same purpose until August 1, 1716, and were referred to as the fifth general mortgage or fund. The amount borrowed against it was £922,029: 6s.

In 1710, those duties were again prolonged to the first of August 1720, and were called the sixth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was L.1,296,552 : 9 : 11¾.

In 1710, those duties were extended again to August 1, 1720, and were referred to as the sixth general mortgage or fund. The amount borrowed against it was £1,296,552 : 9 : 11¾.

In 1711, the same duties (which at this time were thus subject to four different anticipations), together with several others, were continued for ever, and made a fund for paying the interest of the capital of the South-sea company, which had that year advanced to government, for paying debts, and making good deficiencies, the sum of L.9,177,967 : 15 : 4, the greatest loan which at that time had ever been made.

In 1711, the same duties (which at this time were subject to four different expectations), along with several others, were established permanently as a fund to pay the interest on the capital of the South Sea Company. That year, they had lent the government £9,177,967.15.4, the largest loan ever made at that time, for paying off debts and covering shortfalls.

Before this period, the principal, so far as I have been able to observe, the only taxes, which, in order to pay the interest of a debt, had been imposed for perpetuity, were these for paying the interest of the money which had been advanced to government by the bank and East-India company, and of what it was expected would be advanced, but which was never advanced, by a projected land bank. The bank fund at this time amounted to L.3,375,027 : 17 : 10½, for which was paid an annuity or interest of L.206,501 : 13 : 5. The East-India fund amounted to L.3,200,000, for which was paid an annuity or interest of L.160,000; the bank fund being at six per cent., the East-India fund at five per cent. interest.

Before this period, the principal taxes that, as far as I can tell, were imposed indefinitely to cover the interest on a debt were those for paying the interest on the money loaned to the government by the bank and the East India Company, as well as what was anticipated would be loaned by a proposed land bank, which never actually provided any funds. At this time, the bank fund totaled £3,375,027.17.10½, for which an annuity or interest payment of £206,501.13.5 was made. The East India fund amounted to £3,200,000, with an annuity or interest payment of £160,000; the bank fund yielding six percent interest, and the East India fund yielding five percent interest.

In 1715, by the first of George I., c. 12, the different taxes which had been mortgaged for paying the bank annuity, together with[Pg 389] several others, which, by this act, were likewise rendered perpetual, were accumulated into one common fund, called the aggregate fund, which was charged not only with the payment of the bank annuity, but with several other annuities and burdens of different kinds. This fund was afterwards augmented by the third of George I., c. 8., and by the fifth of George I., c. 3, and the different duties which were then added to it were likewise rendered perpetual.

In 1715, under the first of George I, c. 12, the various taxes that had been set aside for paying the bank annuity, along with several others that were also made permanent by this act, were combined into a single common fund known as the aggregate fund. This fund was responsible not only for paying the bank annuity but also for several other annuities and different types of obligations. This fund was later expanded by the third of George I, c. 8, and by the fifth of George I, c. 3, and the various duties that were added to it were also made permanent.

In 1717, by the third of George I., c. 7, several other taxes were rendered perpetual, and accumulated into another common fund, called the general fund, for the payment of certain annuities, amounting in the whole to L.724,849 : 6 : 10½.

In 1717, during the third year of George I, c. 7, a number of other taxes were made permanent and combined into a common fund known as the general fund, which was used to pay certain annuities totaling L.724,849 : 6 : 10½.

In consequence of those different acts, the greater part of the taxes, which before had been anticipated only for a short term of years were rendered perpetual, as a fund for paying, not the capital, but the interest only, of the money which had been borrowed upon them by different successive anticipations.

As a result of those various actions, most of the taxes that were previously expected to last only for a short period became permanent. They were established as a fund to pay not the principal, but just the interest on the money borrowed against them through different successive anticipations.

Had money never been raised but by anticipation, the course of a few years would have liberated the public revenue, without any other attention of government besides that of not overloading the fund, by charging it with more debt than it could pay within the limited term, and not of anticipating a second time before the expiration of the first anticipation. But the greater part of European governments have been incapable of those attentions. They have frequently overloaded the fund, even upon the first anticipation; and when this happened not to be the case, they have generally taken care to overload it, by anticipating a second and a third time, before the expiration of the first anticipation. The fund becoming in this manner altogether insufficient for paying both principal and interest of the money borrowed upon it, it became necessary to charge it with the interest only, or a perpetual annuity equal to the interest; and such improvident anticipations necessarily gave birth to the more ruinous practice of perpetual funding. But though this practice necessarily puts off the liberation of the public revenue from a fixed period, to one so indefinite that it is not very likely ever to arrive; yet, as a greater sum can, in all cases, be raised by this new practice than by the old one of anticipation, the former, when men have once become familiar with it, has, in the great exigencies of the state, been universally preferred to the latter. To relieve the present exigency, is always the object which principally interests those immediately concerned in the administration of public affairs. The future liberation of the public revenue they leave to the care of posterity.

If money had only ever been raised through borrowing, a few years would have freed up public revenue without the government needing to do much besides avoiding overloading the fund by taking on more debt than it could repay in the set time and not borrowing again before the first loan was paid off. However, most European governments have failed to pay attention to these details. They have often overloaded the fund, even with the first loan; and when that wasn't the case, they usually took steps to overload it by borrowing again before the first loan matured. As a result, the fund became inadequate for covering both the principal and the interest on the money borrowed, leading to a situation where only interest or a perpetual annuity equivalent to the interest could be charged. These irresponsible borrowings inevitably led to the even more damaging practice of perpetual funding. While this practice delays the freeing up of public revenue from a fixed timeline to an indefinite one that is unlikely to ever be reached, it allows for a larger sum to be raised than the previous practice of borrowing. Once people become accustomed to it, perpetual funding has been favored in times of state emergencies. The immediate needs are always the priority for those in charge of public affairs, and they leave the future freedom of public revenue to the next generation.

During the reign of queen Anne, the market rate of interest had fallen from six to five per cent.; and, in the twelfth year of her reign, five per cent. was declared to be the highest rate which could lawfully be taken for money borrowed upon private security. Soon after the greater part of the temporary taxes of Great Britain had been rendered perpetual, and distributed into the aggregate, South-sea, and general funds, the creditors of the public, like those of private persons, were induced to accept of five per cent. for the interest of their money, which occasioned a saving of one per cent. upon the capital of the greater part of the debts which had been thus funded for perpetuity, or of one-sixth of the greater part of the annuities which were paid out of the three great funds above mentioned. This saving left a considerable surplus in the produce of the different taxes which had been accumulated into those funds, over and above what was necessary for paying the annuities which were now charged upon them, and laid the foundation of what has since been called the sinking fund. In 1717, it amounted to L.323,434 : 7 : 7½. In 1727, the interest of the greater part of the public debts was still further reduced to four per cent.; and, in 1753 and 1757, to three and a-half, and three per cent., which reductions still further augmented the sinking fund.

During Queen Anne's reign, the market interest rate dropped from six to five percent. In the twelfth year of her reign, five percent was established as the highest rate that could legally be charged for money borrowed against private security. Soon after, most of the temporary taxes of Great Britain became permanent and were allocated into the aggregate, South Sea, and general funds. Public creditors, like private lenders, were encouraged to accept five percent interest on their loans, resulting in a one percent saving on the capital of many debts that had been funded for perpetuity, or about one-sixth of the majority of the annuities paid from the three main funds mentioned. This savings created a significant surplus in the income generated from the various taxes collected for those funds, beyond what was needed to pay the annuities now attached to them, laying the groundwork for what is now known as the sinking fund. By 1717, it totaled £323,434: 7: 7½. In 1727, the interest on most public debts was further reduced to four percent; and in 1753 and 1757, to three and a half and three percent, respectively, which further increased the sinking fund.

A sinking fund, though instituted for the payment of old, facilitates very much the contracting of new debts. It is a subsidiary fund, always at hand, to be mortgaged in aid of any other doubtful fund, upon which money is proposed to be raised in any exigency of the state. Whether the sinking fund of Great Britain has been more frequently applied to the one or to other of those two purposes, will sufficiently appear by and by.

A sinking fund, while established for paying off existing debts, greatly helps in taking on new ones. It acts as a backup fund, readily available to be used as collateral for any other uncertain fund when money needs to be raised in any urgent situation for the state. It will become clear later whether the sinking fund of Great Britain has been more often used for paying off old debts or for taking on new ones.

Besides these two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by a perpetual funding, there are two other methods, which hold a sort of middle place between them; these are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms of years, and that of borrowing upon annuities for lives.

Aside from these two ways of borrowing, through anticipations and perpetual funding, there are two other methods that act as a middle ground between the two; these are borrowing against annuities for a set number of years, and borrowing against annuities for the duration of a person's life.

During the reigns of king William and queen Anne, large sums were frequently borrowed upon annuities for terms of years, which were sometimes longer and sometimes shorter. In 1693, an act was passed for borrowing one million upon an annuity of fourteen per cent., or L.140,000 a-year, for sixteen years. In 1691, an act was passed for borrowing a million upon annuities for lives, upon terms which, in the present times, would appear very advantageous; but the subscription was not filled up. In the following year, the deficiency was made good, by borrowing upon annuities for lives, at fourteen per cent. or a little more than seven years purchase. In 1695, the persons who had purchased those annuities were allowed to exchange them for others of ninety-six years, upon paying into the exchequer sixty-three pounds in the hundred; that is, the difference[Pg 390] between fourteen per cent. for life, and fourteen per cent. for ninety-six years, was sold for sixty-three pounds, or for four and a-half years purchase. Such was the supposed instability of government, that even these terms procured few purchasers. In the reign of queen Anne, money was, upon different occasions, borrowed both upon annuities for lives, and upon annuities for terms of thirty-two, of eighty-nine, of ninety-eight, and of ninety-nine years. In 1719, the proprietors of the annuities for thirty-two years were induced to accept, in lieu of them, South-sea stock to the amount of eleven and a-half years purchase of the annuities, together with an additional quantity of stock, equal to the arrears which happened then to be due upon them. In 1720, the greater part of the other annuities for terms of years, both long and short, were subscribed into the same fund. The long annuities, at that time, amounted to L.666,821 : 8 : 3½ a-year. On the 5th of January 1775, the remainder of them, or what was not subscribed at that time, amounted only to L.136,453 : 12 : 8.

During the reigns of King William and Queen Anne, large amounts were often borrowed against annuities for varying terms, sometimes longer and sometimes shorter. In 1693, an act was passed to borrow one million on an annuity of fourteen percent, or £140,000 a year, for sixteen years. In 1691, an act was passed to borrow a million on annuities for lives, under terms that would seem very favorable today; however, the subscription didn’t get fully completed. The next year, the shortfall was addressed by borrowing against life annuities at fourteen percent, or just over seven years' purchase. In 1695, those who had purchased these annuities were allowed to exchange them for others lasting ninety-six years by paying sixty-three pounds in the hundred into the exchequer; essentially, the difference between fourteen percent for life and fourteen percent for ninety-six years was sold for sixty-three pounds, or four and a half years' purchase. So unstable was the government perceived to be that even these terms attracted few buyers. During Queen Anne's reign, money was borrowed on different occasions against life annuities and annuities for terms of thirty-two, eighty-nine, ninety-eight, and ninety-nine years. In 1719, the owners of the thirty-two-year annuities were persuaded to accept South Sea stock in exchange for them, amounting to eleven and a half years' purchase of the annuities, along with additional stock equal to any arrears owed at the time. In 1720, most of the other annuities for various terms, both long and short, were subscribed into the same fund. At that time, the long annuities totaled £666,821 : 8 : 3½ a year. On January 5, 1775, the remainder of these that had not been subscribed by then amounted to only £136,453 : 12 : 8.

During the two wars which began in 1739 and in 1755, little money was borrowed, either upon annuities for terms of years, or upon those for lives. An annuity for ninety-eight or ninety-nine years, however, is worth nearly as much as a perpetuity, and should therefore, one might think, be a fund for borrowing nearly as much. But those who, in order to make family settlements, and to provide for remote futurity, buy into the public stocks, would not care to purchase into one of which the value was continually diminishing; and such people make a very considerable proportion, both of the proprietors and purchasers of stock. An annuity for a long term of years, therefore, though its intrinsic value may be very nearly the same with that of a perpetual annuity, will not find nearly the same number of purchasers. The subscribers to a new loan, who mean generally to sell their subscription as soon as possible, prefer greatly a perpetual annuity, redeemable by parliament, to an irredeemable annuity, for a long term of years, of only equal amount. The value of the former may be supposed always the same, or very nearly the same; and it makes, therefore, a more convenient transferable stock than the latter.

During the two wars that started in 1739 and 1755, not much money was borrowed, either through annuities for set terms or those based on lifetimes. An annuity for ninety-eight or ninety-nine years is almost as valuable as a perpetual annuity, so one might think it could be used to borrow a similar amount. However, people who invest in public stocks to make family arrangements and plan for the distant future would be reluctant to buy into something whose value keeps dropping; and these individuals make up a significant portion of both stock owners and buyers. Therefore, even though a long-term annuity has nearly the same intrinsic value as a perpetual annuity, it doesn’t attract nearly as many buyers. Those subscribing to a new loan, who generally want to sell their subscription as quickly as possible, greatly prefer a perpetual annuity that can be redeemed by parliament over an irredeemable annuity for a long term that is of equal value. The value of the former is expected to remain constant, or very nearly constant, making it a more convenient and transferable stock than the latter.

During the two last-mentioned wars, annuities, either for terms of years or for lives, were seldom granted, but as premiums to the subscribers of a new loan, over and above the redeemable annuity or interest, upon the credit of which the loan was supposed to be made. They were granted, not as the proper fund upon which the money was borrowed, but as an additional encouragement to the lender.

During the last two wars mentioned, annuities, whether for a set number of years or for life, were rarely given, except as bonuses to the people who subscribed to a new loan, in addition to the redeemable annuity or interest that the loan was based on. They were offered not as the main source from which the money was borrowed, but as an extra incentive for the lender.

Annuities for lives have occasionally been granted in two different ways; either upon separate lives, or upon lots of lives, which, in French, are called tontines, from the name of their inventor. When annuities are granted upon separate lives, the death of every individual annuitant disburdens the public revenue, so far as it was affected by his annuity. When annuities are granted upon tontines, the liberation of the public revenue does not commence till the death of all the annuitants comprehended in one lot, which may, sometimes consist of twenty or thirty persons, of whom the survivors succeed to the annuities of all those who die before them; the last survivor succeeding to the annuities of the whole lot. Upon the same revenue, more money can always be raised by tontines than by annuities for separate lives. An annuity, with a right of survivorship, is really worth more than an equal annuity for a separate life; and, from the confidence which every man naturally has in his own good fortune, the principle upon which is founded the success of all lotteries, such an annuity generally sells for something more than it is worth. In countries where it is usual for government to raise money by granting annuities, tontines are, upon this account, generally preferred to annuities for separate lives. The expedient which will raise most money, is almost always preferred to that which is likely to bring about, in the speediest manner, the liberation of the public revenue.

Annuities for lives are sometimes issued in two different ways: either based on separate lives or based on lots of lives, which in French are called tontines, named after their creator. When annuities are issued based on separate lives, the death of each individual annuitant reduces the public revenue associated with their annuity. In contrast, when annuities are issued through tontines, the public revenue isn't freed up until all the annuitants in a single group, which can consist of twenty or thirty people, have passed away. The survivors then inherit the annuities of those who die before them, with the last survivor claiming the annuities of everyone in the group. Tontines can generally raise more money using the same revenue than annuities based on separate lives. An annuity with a right of survivorship is worth more than an equivalent annuity for a separate life; and because people tend to have faith in their own luck—similar to the principle behind the success of lotteries—such annuities usually sell for more than their true value. In countries where it's common for the government to raise funds by offering annuities, tontines are often preferred over annuities for separate lives for this reason. The method that raises the most money is typically favored over the one that would most quickly free up public revenue.

In France, a much greater proportion of the public debts consists in annuities for lives than in England. According to a memoir presented by the parliament of Bourdeaux to the king, in 1764, the whole public debt of France is estimated at twenty-four hundred millions of livres; of which the capital, for which annuities for lives had been granted, is supposed to amount to three hundred millions, the eighth part of the whole public debt. The annuities themselves are computed to amount to thirty millions a-year, the fourth part of one hundred and twenty millions, the supposed interest of that whole debt. These estimations, I know very well, are not exact; but having been presented by so very respectable a body as approximations to the truth, they may, I apprehend, be considered as such. It is not the different degrees of anxiety in the two governments of France and England for the liberation of the public revenue, which occasions this difference in their respective modes of borrowing; it arises altogether from the different views and interests of the lenders.

In France, a much larger share of public debt consists of life annuities compared to England. A report submitted by the Bordeaux parliament to the king in 1764 estimates the total public debt of France at 2.4 billion livres; of which the capital linked to life annuities is estimated at 300 million, making it an eighth of the total public debt. The annuities themselves are calculated to be about 30 million a year, which is a quarter of 120 million, the estimated interest on that entire debt. I know these estimates aren't precise; however, since they were presented by such a reputable body as rough approximations of the truth, they can be regarded as reputable. The difference in borrowing methods between the French and English governments is not due to varying levels of concern for public revenue but entirely stems from the differing perspectives and interests of the lenders.

In England, the seat of government being in the greatest mercantile city in the world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to government. By advancing it, they do not mean to diminish, but, on the contrary, to increase their mercantile capitals; and unless they expected to sell, with some profit, their share in the subscription for a new loan, they never would sub[Pg 391]scribe. But if, by advancing their money, they were to purchase, instead of perpetual annuities, annuities for lives only, whether their own or those of other people, they would not always be so likely to sell them with a profit. Annuities upon their own lives they would always sell with loss; because no man will give for an annuity upon the life of another, whose age and state of health are nearly the same with his own, the same price which he would give for one upon his own. An annuity upon the life of a third person, indeed, is, no doubt, of equal value to the buyer and the seller; but its real value begins to diminish from the moment it is granted, and continues to do so, more and more, as long as it subsists. It can never, therefore, make so convenient a transferable stock as a perpetual annuity, of which the real value may be supposed always the same, or very nearly the same.

In England, where the government is based in the largest trading city in the world, merchants are typically the ones who lend money to the government. When they lend it, they don’t intend to reduce their capital but rather to increase it. Unless they expect to sell their share in a new loan subscription for a profit, they wouldn’t participate at all. However, if, by lending their money, they were to get annuities for lives only, instead of permanent ones—whether for their own lives or others’—they might not always manage to sell them for a profit. Selling annuities based on their own lives would likely result in a loss because no one wants to pay the same amount for an annuity on someone else's life who is similar in age and health as they are. An annuity based on a third person’s life is indeed valued equally by both the buyer and the seller, but its real value starts to decline as soon as it is issued and continues to decrease over time. Therefore, it can never be as convenient a transferable asset as a permanent annuity, whose real value is generally seen as stable or very close to constant.

In France, the seat of government not being in a great mercantile city, merchants do not make so great a proportion of the people who advance money to government. The people concerned in the finances, the farmers-general, the receivers of the taxes which are not in farm, the court-bankers, &c. make the greater part of those who advance their money in all public exigencies. Such people are commonly men of mean birth, but of great wealth, and frequently of great pride. They are too proud to marry their equals, and women of quality disdain to marry them. They frequently resolve, therefore, to live bachelors; and having neither any families of their own, nor much regard for those of their relations, whom they are not always very fond of acknowledging, they desire only to live in splendour during their own time, and are not unwilling that their fortune should end with themselves. The number of rich people, besides, who are either averse to marry, or whose condition of life renders it either improper or inconvenient for them to do so, is much greater in France than in England. To such people, who have little or no care for posterity, nothing can be more convenient than to exchange their capital for a revenue, which is to last just as long, and no longer, than they wish it to do.

In France, since the government isn't based in a major trading city, merchants make up a smaller portion of those who lend money to the government. The majority of people involved in finances—like the farmers-general, tax collectors who aren’t farmers, court bankers, etc.—are the ones who provide funding during public emergencies. These individuals typically come from humble beginnings but have amassed significant wealth and often carry a sense of pride. They're too proud to marry within their social class, and women of higher status usually refuse to marry them. As a result, many choose to remain single; without families of their own and with little attachment to their relatives—who they aren’t always keen to acknowledge—they aim to live lavishly during their lives, unconcerned if their wealth disappears with them. Additionally, there are many wealthy individuals in France who either prefer not to marry or find their social status makes it impractical, which is more common in France than in England. For those who care little about leaving a legacy, it makes perfect sense to convert their capital into income that lasts exactly as long as they desire.

The ordinary expense of the greater part of modern governments, in time of peace, being equal, or nearly equal, to their ordinary revenue, when war comes, they are both unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in proportion to the increase of their expense. They are unwilling, for fear of offending the people, who, by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are unable, from not well knowing what taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The facility of borrowing delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear and inability would otherwise occasion. By means of borrowing, they are enabled, with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year, money sufficient for carrying on the war; and by the practice of perpetual funding, they are enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually the largest possible sum of money. In great empires, the people who live in the capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene of action, feel, many of them, scarce any inconveniency from the war, but enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the exploits of their own fleets and armies. To them this amusement compensates the small difference between the taxes which they pay on account of the war, and those which they had been accustomed to pay in time of peace. They are commonly dissatisfied with the return of peace, which puts an end to their amusement, and to a thousand visionary hopes of conquest and national glory, from a longer continuance of the war.

The usual expenses of most modern governments during peacetime are about equal to their regular revenue. However, when war breaks out, they find themselves both reluctant and unable to increase their revenue to match the rising costs. They are hesitant because they fear upsetting the public, who would quickly grow frustrated with the war due to a sudden and significant increase in taxes. They are also unable because they don't know which taxes would generate the needed revenue. The option to borrow money helps them avoid the complications that this fear and inability could cause. By borrowing, they can sustain the war with only a slight increase in taxes, enabling them to raise enough funds each year. Through the practice of perpetual funding, they can collect the largest amount of money possible with the smallest increase in taxes. In large empires, many people living in the capital and remote provinces hardly feel the impact of the war. Instead, they enjoy the amusement of reading about the achievements of their fleets and armies in the newspapers. This enjoyment outweighs the minor difference between the taxes they pay because of the war and those they paid during peacetime. They often become dissatisfied when peace returns, as it ends their entertainment and dampens their fantasies of conquest and national pride, which they believe could continue with a prolonged war.

The return of peace, indeed, seldom relieves them from the greater part of the taxes imposed during the war. These are mortgaged for the interest of the debt contracted, in order to carry it on. If, over and above paying the interest of this debt, and defraying the ordinary expense of government, the old revenue, together with the new taxes, produce some surplus revenue, it may, perhaps, be converted into a sinking fund for paying off the debt. But, in the first place, this sinking fund, even supposing it should be applied to no other purpose, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the course of any period during which it can reasonably be expected that peace should continue, the whole debt contracted during the war; and, in the second place, this fund is almost always applied to other purposes.

The return of peace rarely frees people from the major taxes imposed during the war. These are pledged for the interest on the debt incurred to sustain it. If, in addition to paying the interest on this debt and covering the usual government expenses, the old revenue along with the new taxes generates some extra funds, it might possibly be used as a sinking fund to pay off the debt. However, first, this sinking fund, even if it is only used for this purpose, is usually not enough to cover the entire debt from the war over any reasonable period of expected peace. Second, this fund is almost always used for other purposes.

The new taxes were imposed for the sole purpose of paying the interest of the money borrowed upon them. If they produce more, it is generally something which was neither intended nor expected, and is, therefore, seldom very considerable. Sinking funds have generally arisen, not so much from any surplus of the taxes which was over and above what was necessary for paying the interest or annuity originally charged upon them, as from a subsequent reduction of that interest; that of Holland in 1655, and that of the ecclesiastical state in 1685, were both formed in this manner. Hence the usual insufficiency of such funds.

The new taxes were introduced solely to pay the interest on the borrowed money. Any extra revenue it generates is usually unexpected and not intended, so it's rarely significant. Sinking funds typically come not from any tax surplus beyond what’s needed for the original interest or annuity, but from later reductions in that interest; for example, those of Holland in 1655 and the ecclesiastical state in 1685 were created this way. This is why such funds are often insufficient.

During the most profound peace, various events occur, which require an extraordinary expense; and government finds it always more convenient to defray this expense by misapplying the sinking fund, than by imposing a new tax. Every new tax is immediately felt more or less by the people. It occasions always some murmur, and meets with some[Pg 392] opposition. The more taxes may have been multiplied, the higher they may have been raised upon every different subject of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of every new tax, the more difficult it becomes, too, either to find out new subjects of taxation, or to raise much higher the taxes already imposed upon the old. A momentary suspension of the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the people, and occasions neither murmur nor complaint. To borrow of the sinking fund is always an obvious and easy expedient for getting out of the present difficulty. The more the public debts may have been accumulated, the more necessary it may have become to study to reduce them; the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be to missapply any part of the sinking fund; the less likely is the public debt to be reduced to any considerable degree, the more likely, the more certainly, is the sinking fund to be misapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary expenses which occur in time of peace. When a nation is already overburdened with taxes, nothing but the necessities of a new war, nothing but either the animosity of national vengeance, or the anxiety for national security, can induce the people to submit, with tolerable patience, to a new tax. Hence the usual misapplication of the sinking fund.

During times of significant peace, various situations arise that require unexpected spending, and the government often finds it easier to cover these costs by misusing the sinking fund rather than imposing a new tax. Every new tax is immediately felt by the public, causing some level of dissatisfaction and facing some opposition. The more taxes are added and the higher they are raised on different taxable items, the more the public complains about any new tax. This makes it increasingly challenging to identify new sources of taxation or to significantly increase the rates on existing ones. A temporary pause in debt payments doesn’t create immediate discomfort for the public and doesn’t provoke any complaints. Borrowing from the sinking fund is always a straightforward and convenient way to escape current troubles. As public debts accumulate, it becomes even more crucial to focus on reducing them; however, the greater the danger and potential fallout from misusing any part of the sinking fund, the less likely it is that the public debt will be significantly decreased. More often, the sinking fund is misused to cover all the unexpected expenses that arise during peacetime. When a nation is already weighed down by taxes, only urgent needs for a new war, national revenge, or concerns for national security can convince the people to accept a new tax with any level of patience. This is the common reason for the misuse of the sinking fund.

In Great Britain, from the time that we had first recourse to the ruinous expedient of perpetual funding, the reduction of the public debt, in time of peace, has never borne any proportion to its accumulation in time of war. It was in the war which began in 1668, and was concluded by the treaty of Ryswick, in 1697, that the foundation of the present enormous debt of Great Britain was first laid.

In Great Britain, ever since we started using the costly method of perpetual funding, reducing the public debt during peacetime has never matched the amount that accumulated during wartime. The war that began in 1668 and ended with the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 was when the foundation of today's massive debt of Great Britain was first established.

On the 31st of December 1697, the public debts of Great Britain, funded and unfunded, amounted to L.21,515,742 : 13 : 8½. A great part of those debts had been contracted upon short anticipations, and some part upon annuities for lives; so that, before the 31st of December 1701, in less than four years, there had partly been paid off, and partly reverted to the public, the sum of L.5,121,041 : 12 : 0¾; a greater reduction of the public debt than has ever since been brought about in so short a period of time. The remaining debt, therefore, amounted only to L.16,394,701 : 1 : 7¼.

On December 31, 1697, the public debts of Great Britain, both funded and unfunded, totaled £21,515,742.13.8½. A significant portion of those debts had been incurred on short-term loans, and some were based on life annuities; so, by December 31, 1701, in less than four years, a total of £5,121,041.12.0¾ had been either paid off or reverted to the public, marking a greater reduction of the public debt than has ever been achieved in such a short time since. Consequently, the remaining debt amounted to just £16,394,701.1.7¼.

In the war which began in 1702, and which was concluded by the treaty of Utrecht, the public debts were still more accumulated. On the 31st of December 1714, they amounted to L.53,681,076 : 5 : 6112. The subscription into the South-sea fund, of the short and long annuities, increased the capital of the public debt; so that, on the 31st of December 1722, it amounted to L.55,282,978 : 1 : 356. The reduction of the debt began in 1723, and went on so slowly, that, on the 31st of December 1739, during seventeen years of profound peace, the whole sum paid off was no more than L.8,328,354 : 17 : 11312, the capital of the public debt, at that time, amounting to L.46,954,623 : 3 : 4712.

In the war that started in 1702 and ended with the Treaty of Utrecht, public debts grew even more. By December 31, 1714, they reached £53,681,076.5.6112. The investment in the South Sea fund, along with short and long annuities, increased the public debt capital, so that by December 31, 1722, it totaled £55,282,978.1.356. The reduction of the debt began in 1723, but it progressed so slowly that by December 31, 1739, after seventeen years of peace, the total amount paid off was just £8,328,354.17.11312, with the public debt at that time amounting to £46,954,623.3.4712.

The Spanish war, which began in 1739, and the French war which soon followed it, occasioned a further increase of the debt, which, on the 31st of December 1748, after the war had been concluded by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, amounted to L.78,293,313 : 1 : 10¾. The most profound peace of 17 years continuance, had taken no more than L.8,328,354 : 17 : 11¼ from it. A war, of less than nine years continuance, added L.31,338,689 : 18 : 616 to it.[77]

The Spanish war, which started in 1739, and the French war that quickly followed led to a significant increase in debt. By December 31, 1748, after the war ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the debt had reached £78,293,313: 1: 10¾. The long period of peace that lasted 17 years had only reduced it by £8,328,354: 17: 11¼. However, a war lasting less than nine years added £31,338,689: 18: 616 to the total.[77]

During the administration of Mr. Pelham, the interest of the public debt was reduced, or at least measures were taken for reducing it, from four to three per cent.; the sinking fund was increased, and some part of the public debt was paid off. In 1755, before the breaking out of the late war, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to L.72,289,673. On the 5th of January 1763, at the conclusion of the peace, the funded debt amounted to L.122,603,336 : 8 : 2¼. The unfunded debt has been stated at L.13,927,589 : 2 : 2. But the expense occasioned by the war did not end with the conclusion of the peace; so that, though on the 5th of January 1764, the funded debt was increased (partly by a new loan, and partly by funding a part of the unfunded debt) to L.129,586,789 : 10 : 1¾, there still remained (according to the very well informed author of Considerations on the Trade and Finances of Great Britain) an unfunded debt, which was brought to account in that and the following year, of L.9,975,017, 12s. 21544d. In 1764, therefore, the public debt of Great Britain, funded and unfunded together, amounted, according to this author, to L.139,561,807 : 2 : 4. The annuities for lives, too, which had been granted as premiums to the subscribers to the new loans in 1757, estimated at fourteen-years purchase, were valued at L.472,500; and the annuities for long terms of years, granted as premiums likewise, in 1761 and 1762, estimated at twenty-seven years and a-half purchase, were valued at L.6,826,875. During a peace of about seven years continuance, the prudent and truly patriotic administration of Mr. Pelham was not able to pay off an old debt of six millions. During a war of nearly the same continuance, a new debt of more than seventy-five millions was contracted.

During Mr. Pelham's administration, the interest on the public debt was lowered, or at least steps were taken to lower it, from four to three percent; the sinking fund was increased, and part of the public debt was paid off. In 1755, before the outbreak of the recent war, the funded debt of Great Britain was £72,289,673. On January 5, 1763, at the end of the peace, the funded debt was £122,603,336 : 8 : 2¼. The unfunded debt was recorded at £13,927,589 : 2 : 2. However, the costs from the war didn’t end with the peace treaty; so that, although on January 5, 1764, the funded debt increased (partly from a new loan and partly by funding some of the unfunded debt) to £129,586,789 : 10 : 1¾, there still remained (according to the very knowledgeable author of Considerations on the Trade and Finances of Great Britain) an unfunded debt, which was accounted for that year and the following year, of £9,975,017, 12s. 21544d. Therefore, in 1764, the total public debt of Great Britain, funded and unfunded combined, amounted, according to this author, to £139,561,807 : 2 : 4. The life annuities granted as premiums to subscribers of the new loans in 1757, estimated at fourteen years' purchase, were valued at £472,500; and the long-term annuities, granted as premiums as well, in 1761 and 1762, estimated at twenty-seven and a half years' purchase, were valued at £6,826,875. During a period of about seven years of peace, the prudent and truly patriotic administration of Mr. Pelham was unable to pay off an old debt of six million. During a war of nearly the same length, a new debt of more than seventy-five million was incurred.

On the 5th of January 1775, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to L.124,996,086, 1s. 6¼d. The unfunded, exclusive of a large civil-list debt, to L.4,150,236 : 3 : 1178. Both together, to L.129,146,322 : 5 : 6. According[Pg 393] to this account, the whole debt paid off, during eleven years of profound peace, amounted only to L.10,415,476 : 16 : 978. Even this small reduction of debt, however, has not been all made from the savings out of the ordinary revenue of the state. Several extraneous sums, altogether independent of that ordinary revenue, have contributed towards it. Amongst these we may reckon an additional shilling in the pound land tax, for three years; the two millions received from the East-India company, as indemnification for their territorial acquisitions; and the one hundred and ten thousand pounds received from the bank for the renewal of their charter. To these must be added several other sums, which, as they arose out of the late war, ought perhaps to be considered as deductions from the expenses of it. The principal are,

On January 5, 1775, Great Britain's funded debt totaled £124,996,086, 1s. 6¼d. The unfunded debt, excluding a large civil-list debt, was £4,150,236 : 3 : 1178. Together, both debts amounted to £129,146,322 : 5 : 6. According[Pg 393] to this account, the total debt paid off during eleven years of complete peace was only £10,415,476 : 16 : 978. However, this minor reduction in debt wasn’t solely achieved through savings from the state's regular revenue. Several other amounts, entirely independent of that regular revenue, have contributed to it. These include an extra shilling in the pound land tax for three years, the two million received from the East India Company as compensation for their territorial acquisitions, and the one hundred and ten thousand pounds received from the bank for renewing their charter. Additionally, several other sums arose from the recent war and should perhaps be considered as deductions from its expenses. The main ones are,

The produce of French prizesL.690,449189
Composition for French prisoners670,00000
What has been received from the sale of the ceded islands95,50000
 ——————————
Total,L.1,455,949189

If we add to this sum the balance of the earl of Chatham's and Mr. Calcraft's accounts, and other army savings of the same kind, together with what has been received from the bank, the East-India company, and the additional shilling in the pound land tax, the whole must be a good deal more than five millions. The debt, therefore, which, since the peace, has been paid out of the savings from the ordinary revenue of the state, has not, one year with another, amounted to half a million a-year. The sinking fund has, no doubt, been considerably augmented since the peace, by the debt which had been paid off, by the reduction of the redeemable four per cents to three per cents, and by the annuities for lives which have fallen in; and, if peace were to continue, a million, perhaps, might now be annually spared out of it towards the discharge of the debt. Another million, accordingly, was paid in the course of last year; but at the same time, a large civil-list debt was left unpaid, and we are now involved in a new war, which, in its progress, may prove as expensive as any of our former wars.[78] The new debt which will probably be contracted before the end of the next campaign, may, perhaps, be nearly equal to all the old debt which has been paid off from the savings out of the ordinary revenue of the state. It would be altogether chimerical, therefore, to expect that the public debt should ever be completely discharged, by any savings which are likely to be made from that ordinary revenue as it stands at present.

If we add the balance of the Earl of Chatham's and Mr. Calcraft's accounts along with other similar army savings, and include what we've received from the bank, the East India Company, and the extra shilling in the pound land tax, the total must be well over five million. Since the peace, the debt paid from the regular revenue of the state has not averaged half a million a year. The sinking fund has certainly grown since the peace due to the debt that has been cleared, the reduction of the redeemable four percent to three percent, and the annuities for lives that have expired. If peace continues, maybe a million could now be set aside each year to help pay down the debt. Last year, another million was paid off, but at the same time, a significant civil-list debt remained unpaid, and we're now caught up in a new war that may become as costly as any of our previous ones.[78] The new debt that will likely be incurred before the next campaign ends may be nearly equal to all the old debt that has been paid off from the ordinary revenue savings. Thus, it would be entirely unrealistic to expect that the public debt could ever be fully cleared by any savings likely to be made from that ordinary revenue as it currently stands.

The public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, particularly those of England, have, by one author, been represented as the accumulation of a great capital, superadded to the other capital of the country, by means of which its trade is extended, its manufactures are multiplied, and its lands cultivated and improved, much beyond what they could have been by means of that other capital only. He does not consider that the capital which the first creditors of the public advanced to government, was, from the moment in which he advanced it, a certain portion of the annual produce, turned away from serving in the function of a capital, to serve in that of a revenue; from maintaining productive labourers, to maintain unproductive ones, and to be spent and wasted, generally in the course of the year, without even the hope of any future reproduction. In return for the capital which they advanced, they obtained, indeed, an annuity of the public funds, in most cases, of more than equal value. This annuity, no doubt, replaced to them their capital, and enabled them to carry on their trade and business to the same, or, perhaps, to a greater extent than before; that is, they were enabled, either to borrow of other people a new capital, upon the credit of this annuity or, by selling it, to get from other people a new capital of their own, equal, or superior, to that which they had advanced to government. This new capital, however, which they in this manner either bought or borrowed of other people, must have existed in the country before, and must have been employed, as all capitals are, in maintaining productive labour. When it came into the hands of those who had advanced their money to government, though it was, in some respects, a new capital to them, it was not so to the country, but was only a capital withdrawn from certain employments, in order to be turned towards others. Though it replaced to them what they had advanced to government, it did not replace it to the country. Had they not advanced this capital to government, there would have been in the country two capitals, two portions of the annual produce, instead of one, employed in maintaining productive labour.

The public funds of the various indebted nations in Europe, especially those of England, have been described by one author as the buildup of significant capital that adds to the country’s existing capital. This accumulation allows for the expansion of trade, an increase in manufacturing, and improved and cultivated land, far beyond what could have been achieved with just the existing capital. He overlooks the fact that the capital initially provided to the government by the first creditors was, from the moment it was given, essentially a part of the annual yield that was redirected from serving as capital to serving as revenue. This meant shifting resources from supporting productive workers to supporting non-productive ones, leading to spending and waste throughout the year without any expectation of future returns. In exchange for the capital they contributed, they received an annuity from the public funds, which in most cases was of equal or greater value. This annuity replaced their capital and allowed them to continue their trade and business at the same level or potentially even more than before. In other words, they could either borrow new capital from others based on the credit of this annuity or sell the annuity to obtain new capital of their own, equal to or greater than what they had initially given to the government. However, this new capital that they either purchased or borrowed must have already existed in the country and had been utilized, as all capital is, to support productive labor. When this capital reached the hands of those who had invested in the government, while it was new capital for them, it wasn't new for the country; it was just capital that had been removed from certain uses to be put toward others. Although it returned to them what they had given to the government, it didn't return it to the country. If they had not invested this capital in the government, there would have been two capitals, two portions of the annual yield in the country employed in supporting productive labor instead of just one.

When, for defraying the expense of government, a revenue is raised within the year, from the produce of free or unmortgaged taxes, a certain portion of the revenue of private people is only turned away from maintaining one species of unproductive labour, towards maintaining another. Some part of[Pg 394] what they pay in those taxes, might, no doubt, have been accumulated into capital, and consequently employed in maintaining productive labour; but the greater part would probably have been spent, and consequently employed in maintaining unproductive labour. The public expense, however, when defrayed in this manner, no doubt hinders, more or less, the further accumulation of new capital; but it does not necessarily occasion the destruction of any actually-existing capital.

When revenue is raised within the year to cover government expenses from the income of free or unencumbered taxes, a certain portion of people's income is simply redirected from supporting one type of unproductive work to another. Some of what they pay in those taxes could have been saved and used for productive work; however, most of it would likely have been spent, which would also go toward unproductive work. The public expense, when covered this way, does hinder the accumulation of new capital to some extent, but it doesn’t necessarily lead to the loss of any existing capital.

When the public expense is defrayed by funding, it is defrayed by the annual destruction of some capital which had before existed in the country; by the perversion of some portion of the annual produce which had before been destined for the maintenance of productive labour, towards that of unproductive labour. As in this case, however, the taxes are lighter than they would have been, had a revenue sufficient for defraying the same expense been raised within the year; the private revenue of individuals is necessarily less burdened, and consequently their ability to save and accumulate some part of that revenue into capital, is a good deal less impaired. If the method of funding destroys more old capital, it, at the same time, hinders less the accumulation or acquisition of new capital, than that of defraying the public expense by a revenue raised within the year. Under the system of funding, the frugality and industry of private people can more easily repair the breaches which the waste and extravagance of government may occasionally make in the general capital of the society.

When public expenses are covered by funding, they're actually paid for by the annual depletion of some existing capital in the country, and by misallocating part of the annual output that was originally meant for productive work toward unproductive work. However, in this case, the taxes are lower than they would have been if a sufficient revenue had been raised within the year to cover the same expenses. This means that individuals' personal finances are not as heavily burdened, allowing them to save and accumulate some of their revenue into capital more effectively. If the funding method destroys more old capital, it simultaneously has less impact on the creation or acquisition of new capital compared to funding public expenses through revenue raised in the same year. Under the funding system, the thrift and hard work of individuals can more easily mend the gaps that government waste and extravagance might occasionally create in the overall capital of society.

It is only during the continuance of war, however, that the system of funding has this advantage over the other system. Were the expense of war to be defrayed always by a revenue raised within the year, the taxes from which that extraordinary revenue was drawn would last no longer than the war. The ability of private people to accumulate, though less during the war, would have been greater during the peace, than under the system of funding. War would not necessarily have occasioned the destruction of any old capitals, and peace would have occasioned the accumulation of many more new. Wars would, in general, be more speedily concluded, and less wantonly undertaken. The people feeling, during continuance of war, the complete burden of it, would soon grow weary of it; and government, in order to humour them, would not be under the necessity of carrying it on longer than it was necessary to do so. The foresight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or solid interest to fight for. The seasons during which the ability of private people to accumulate was somewhat impaired, would occur more rarely, and be of shorter continuance. Those, on the contrary, during which that ability was in the highest vigour, would be of much longer duration than they can well be under the system of funding.

It’s only during the duration of war that the funding system has this advantage over other systems. If war expenses were always covered by revenue generated within the year, the taxes from that extraordinary revenue would last only as long as the war. Although people's ability to save is lower during war, it would be higher during peacetime than under the funding system. War wouldn't necessarily destroy existing capitals, and peace would lead to the accumulation of many more new ones. Wars would generally be resolved more quickly and entered into less randomly. People, feeling the full burden of war, would soon become tired of it; and the government, to appease them, wouldn’t have to continue it longer than necessary. The awareness of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would stop people from carelessly calling for it when there’s no real or solid interest at stake. The times when people's ability to save is somewhat limited would happen less often and last for a shorter time. In contrast, the times when that ability is at its peak would last much longer than they typically would under the funding system.

When funding, besides, has made a certain progress, the multiplication of taxes which it brings along with it, sometimes impairs as much the ability of private people to accumulate, even in time of peace, as the other system would in time of war. The peace revenue of Great Britain amounts at present to more than ten millions a year. If free and unmortgaged, it might be sufficient, with proper management, and without contracting a shilling of new debt, to carry on the most vigorous war. The private revenue of the inhabitants of Great Britain is at present as much incumbered in time of peace, their ability to accumulate is as much impaired, as it would have been in the time of the most expensive war, had the pernicious system of funding never been adopted.

When funding has made some progress, the increase in taxes that comes with it can sometimes reduce people's ability to save, even in peacetime, as much as another system would during wartime. Right now, Britain's peace revenue is over ten million a year. If it were free and clear, it could be enough, with good management and without taking on any new debt, to support a strong war effort. The private incomes of people in Britain currently face the same burdens in peacetime, and their ability to save is just as affected, as it would have been during the most costly war, had the harmful system of funding never been implemented.

In the payment of the interest of the public debt, it has been said, it is the right hand which pays the left. The money does not go out of the country. It is only a part of the revenue of one set of the inhabitants which is transferred to another; and the nation is not a farthing the poorer. This apology is founded altogether in the sophistry of the mercantile system; and, after the long examinatior, which I have already bestowed upon that system, it may, perhaps, be unnecessary to say any thing further about it. It supposes, besides, that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as several other foreign nations, having a very considerable share in our public funds. But though the whole debt were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not, upon that account, be less pernicious.

In paying the interest on the public debt, it's often said that one part pays another. The money doesn’t leave the country; it's simply a transfer of revenue from one group of people to another, and the country doesn't lose a penny. This argument is based entirely on the flawed reasoning of the mercantile system, and since I've already examined that system in detail, it might be unnecessary to discuss it further. It also assumes that the entire public debt is owed to the citizens of the country, which isn’t true; the Dutch and several other foreign nations own a significant portion of our public funds. But even if the entire debt were owed to the citizens, it wouldn’t make it any less harmful.

Land and capital stock are the two original sources of all revenue, both private and public. Capital stock pays the wages of productive labour, whether employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce. The management of those two original sources of revenue belongs to two different sets of people; the proprietors of land, and the owners or employers of capital stock.

Land and capital are the two original sources of all revenue, both private and public. Capital provides the wages for productive labor, whether it's in agriculture, manufacturing, or commerce. The management of these two original sources of revenue belongs to two different groups of people: landowners and the owners or employers of capital.

The proprietor of land is interested, for the sake of his own revenue, to keep his estate in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his tenants houses, by making and maintaining the necessary drains and inclosures, and all those other expensive improvements which it properly belongs to the landlord to make and maintain. But, by different land taxes, the revenue of the landlord may be so much diminished, and, by different duties upon the necessaries and conveniencies of life, that diminished revenue maybe rendered of so little real value, that he may find himself altogether unable to make or maintain those expensive improvements. When the[Pg 395] landlord, however, ceases to do his part, it is altogether impossible that the tenant should continue to do his. As the distress of the landlord increases, the agriculture of the country must necessarily decline.

The landowner is motivated, for their own profit, to keep their property in as good shape as possible by building and fixing up their tenants' homes, creating and maintaining necessary drainage systems and enclosures, and all those other costly improvements that are normally the landlord's responsibility. However, various land taxes might significantly reduce the landlord's income, and additional duties on essential goods and services could make that reduced income so minimal that they struggle to afford those costly improvements. When the landowner stops fulfilling their obligations, it becomes impossible for the tenant to keep up with theirs. As the landowner's difficulties mount, the country's agriculture is bound to decline.

When, by different taxes upon the necessaries and conveniencies of life, the owners and employers of capital stock find, that whatever revenue they derive from it, will not, in a particular country, purchase the same quantity of those necessaries and conveniencies which an equal revenue would in almost any other, they will be disposed to remove to some other. And when, in order to raise those taxes, all or the greater part of merchants and manufacturers, that is, all or the greater part of the employers of great capitals, come to be continually exposed to the mortifying and vexatious visits of the tax-gatherers, this disposition to remove will soon be changed into an actual removing. The industry of the country will necessarily fall with the removal of the capital which supported it, and the ruin of trade and manufactures will follow the declension of agriculture.

When owners and employers of capital stock realize that the revenue they earn won’t buy the same amount of basic goods and services in a particular country as it would in nearly any other, they will likely consider relocating. Additionally, when the majority of merchants and manufacturers, meaning most employers of significant capital, are constantly facing the frustrating visits from tax collectors in order to pay those taxes, this intention to leave will quickly turn into an actual move. The country's productivity will inevitably decline with the exit of the capital that supported it, leading to the collapse of trade and manufacturing following the decline of agriculture.

To transfer from the owners of those two great sources of revenue, land, and capital stock, from the persons immediately interested in the good condition of every particular portion of land, and in the good management of every particular portion of capital stock, to another set of persons (the creditors of the public, who have no such particular interest), the greater part of the revenue arising from either, must, in the long-run, occasion both the neglect of land, and the waste or removal of capital stock. A creditor of the public has, no doubt, a general interest in the prosperity of the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country; and consequently in the good condition of its land, and in the good management of its capital stock. Should there be any general failure or declension in any of these things, the produce of the different taxes might no longer be sufficient to pay him the annuity or interest which is due to him. But a creditor of the public, considered merely as such, has no interest in the good condition of any particular portion of land, or in the good management of any particular portion of capital stock. As a creditor of the public, he has no knowledge of any such particular portion. He has no inspection of it. He can have no care about it. Its ruin may in some cases be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him.

To transfer from the owners of those two major sources of income—land and capital stock—to another group of people (the public creditors, who don’t have a specific interest), most of the revenue generated from either will, over time, lead to the neglect of land and the waste or removal of capital stock. A public creditor certainly has a general interest in the well-being of the agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce of the country, and thus in the condition of its land and the management of its capital stock. If there were to be a significant decline in any of these areas, the revenue from various taxes might not be enough to pay him the annuity or interest owed. However, as a public creditor, he has no vested interest in the condition of any specific piece of land or in the management of any specific portion of capital stock. As a public creditor, he isn’t aware of any particular piece. He has no oversight of it. He does not concern himself with it. Its deterioration might go unnoticed by him and cannot directly impact him.

The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state which has adopted it. The Italian republics seem to have begun it. Genoa and Venice, the only two remaining which can pretend to an independent existence, have both been enfeebled by it. Spain seems to have learned the practice from the Italian republics, and (its taxes being probably less judicious than theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural strength, been still more enfeebled. The debts of Spain are of very old standing. It was deeply in debt before the end of the sixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed a shilling. France, notwithstanding all its natural resources, languishes under an oppressive load of the same kind. The republic of the United Provinces is as much enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it likely that, in Great Britain alone, a practice, which has brought either weakness or dissolution into every other country, should prove altogether innocent?

The practice of borrowing money has gradually weakened every state that has adopted it. The Italian republics seem to have started it. Genoa and Venice, the only two remaining that can claim to be independent, have both been weakened by it. Spain appears to have learned this practice from the Italian republics, and with its taxes likely being less effective than theirs, it has become even weaker relative to its natural strength. Spain's debts date back a long time. It was already deeply in debt by the end of the sixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed anything. France, despite all its natural resources, suffers under a heavy burden of debt as well. The republic of the United Provinces is just as weakened by its debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it reasonable to think that, in Great Britain alone, a practice that has caused weakness or collapse in every other country would be harmless?

The system of taxation established in those different countries, it may be said, is inferior to that of England. I believe it is so. But it ought to be remembered, that when the wisest government has exhausted all the proper subjects of taxation, it must, in cases of urgent necessity, have recourse to improper ones. The wise republic of Holland has, upon some occasions, been obliged to have recourse to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of those of Spain. Another war, begun before any considerable liberation of the public revenue had been brought about, and growing in its progress as expensive as the last war, may, from irresistible necessity, render the British system of taxation as oppressive as that of Holland, or even as that of Spain. To the honour of our present system of taxation, indeed, it has hitherto given so little embarrassment to industry, that, during the course even of the most expensive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals seem to have been able, by saving and accumulation, to repair all the breaches which the waste and extravagance of government had made in the general capital of the society. At the conclusion of the late war, the most expensive that Great Britain ever waged, her agriculture was as flourishing, her manufacturers as numerous and as fully employed, and her commerce as extensive, as they had ever been before. The capital, therefore, which supported all those different branches of industry, must have been equal to what it had ever been before. Since the peace, agriculture has been still further improved; the rents of houses have risen in every town and village of the country, a proof of the increasing wealth and revenue of the people; and the annual amount of the greater part of the old taxes, of the principal branches of the excise and customs, in particular, has been continually increasing, an equally clear proof of an increasing consumption, and consequently of an increasing produce, which could alone support that consumption. Great Britain seems to support with ease, a burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of supporting. Let us not, however, upon this account, rashly conclude that she is capable of supporting any burden; not even[Pg 396] be too confident that she could support, without great distress, a burden a little greater than what has already been laid upon her.

The tax system set up in those different countries is, I would say, not as good as England's. I believe that's true. However, it's important to remember that when even the smartest government has run out of appropriate ways to collect taxes, it may have to resort to less suitable methods in cases of urgent need. The wise government of Holland has sometimes had to rely on taxes that are as inconvenient as many in Spain. If another war starts before there's been a significant recovery of public revenue, and if it becomes as costly as the last one, it could inevitably make the British tax system as burdensome as Holland's or even Spain's. To the credit of our current tax system, it has been so minimally disruptive to industry that even during the most expensive wars, people's frugality and good management have allowed them to save and rebuild what the government has wasted. At the end of the most expensive war ever fought by Great Britain, agriculture was thriving, manufacturers were numerous and fully employed, and trade was as vast as ever before. Therefore, the capital supporting all these different industries must have been as strong as it ever was. Since the peace, agriculture has improved even more; rents for homes have gone up in every town and village, showing the rising wealth and income of the people. Additionally, the annual total from most of the old taxes, particularly the main branches of excise and customs, has been steadily increasing, which clearly indicates that consumption is rising, and therefore, production is also increasing to support that consumption. Great Britain now appears to manage a burden that no one would have thought possible half a century ago. However, we shouldn't hastily conclude that she can bear any weight; we shouldn't be overly confident that she could handle a burden a bit larger than what she already carries without significant strain.

When national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree, there is scarce, I believe, a single instance of their having been fairly and completely paid. The liberation of the public revenue, if it has ever been brought about at all, has always been brought about by a bankruptcy; sometimes by an avowed one, though frequently by a pretended payment.

When national debts reach a certain point, I don't think there's a single case where they've been fully and fairly paid off. The release of public funds, if it has ever happened, has always come about through bankruptcy; sometimes openly declared, but often through a façade of payment.

The raising of the denomination of the coin has been the most usual expedient by which a real public bankruptcy has been disguised under the appearance of a pretended payment. If a sixpence, for example, should, either by act of parliament or royal proclamation, be raised to the denomination of a shilling, and twenty sixpences to that of a pound sterling; the person who, under the old denomination, had borrowed twenty shillings, or near four ounces of silver, would, under the new, pay with twenty sixpences, or with something less than two ounces. A national debt of about a hundred and twenty-eight millions, near the capital of the funded and unfunded debt of Great Britain, might, in this manner, be paid with about sixty-four millions of our present money. It would, indeed, be a pretended payment only, and the creditors of the public would really be defrauded of ten shillings in the pound of what was due to them. The calamity, too, would extend much further than to the creditors of the public, and those of every private person would suffer a proportionable loss; and this without any advantage, but in most cases with a great additional loss, to the creditors of the public. If the creditors of the public, indeed, were generally much in debt to other people, they might in some measure compensate their loss by paying their creditors in the same coin in which the public had paid them. But in most countries, the creditors of the public are, the greater part of them, wealthy people, who stand more in the relation of creditors than in that of debtors, towards the rest of their fellow-citizens. A pretended payment of this kind, therefore, instead of alleviating, aggravates, in most cases, the loss of the creditors of the public; and, without any advantage to the public, extends the calamity to a great number of other innocent people. It occasions a general and most pernicious subversion of the fortunes of private people; enriching, in most cases, the idle and profuse debtor, at the expense of the industrious and frugal creditor; and transporting a great part of the national capital from the hands which were likely to increase and improve it, to those who are likely to dissipate and destroy it. When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy, is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor. The honour of a state is surely very poorly provided for, when, in order to cover the disgrace of a real bankruptcy, it has recourse to a juggling trick of this kind, so easily seen through, and at the same time so extremely pernicious.

Increasing the value of a coin is the most common tactic used to disguise a true public bankruptcy under the guise of a fake payment. For instance, if a sixpence were raised to the value of a shilling by an act of parliament or royal proclamation, and twenty sixpences to the value of a pound sterling, someone who had borrowed twenty shillings, or almost four ounces of silver, would now only be paying back with twenty sixpences, or something less than two ounces. A national debt of around one hundred twenty-eight million, close to the total funded and unfunded debt of Great Britain, could be settled this way with about sixty-four million of our current money. This would essentially be a fake payment, and the public creditors would effectively be cheated out of ten shillings for every pound owed to them. The impact would also reach further than just the public creditors; private creditors would suffer proportional losses as well, often without any benefit, and in many cases, incurring more significant losses. If the public creditors were largely indebted to others, they might offset their loss by paying their creditors with the same devalued currency the public used to pay them. However, in most countries, most public creditors are wealthy individuals who are primarily creditors of other citizens rather than debtors. Thus, a fake payment like this typically worsens the loss for public creditors and, without benefiting the public, spreads hardship to many innocent people. It leads to a widespread and damaging disruption of private fortunes; often benefiting the reckless debtor at the expense of the hardworking and prudent creditor, removing a significant portion of national capital from those who would likely invest it wisely to those likely to squander it. When a state needs to declare bankruptcy, just as an individual does, a fair, transparent, and open bankruptcy is always the least dishonorable option for the debtor and the least harmful for the creditor. A state's honor is poorly safeguarded when, to conceal the shame of real bankruptcy, it resorts to a trick like this that is so easy to see through and extremely harmful.

Almost all states, however, ancient as well as modern, when reduced to this necessity, have, upon some occasions, played this very juggling trick. The Romans, at the end of the first Punic war, reduced the As, the coin or denomination by which they computed the value of all their other coins, from containing twelve ounces of copper, to contain only two ounces; that is, they raised two ounces of copper to a denomination which had always before expressed the value of twelve ounces. The republic was, in this manner, enabled to pay the great debts which it had contracted with the sixth part of what it really owed. So sudden and so great a bankruptcy, we should in the present times be apt to imagine, must have occasioned a very violent popular clamour. It does not appear to have occasioned any. The law which enacted it was, like all other laws relating to the coin, introduced and carried through the assembly of the people by a tribune, and was probably a very popular law. In Rome, as in all other ancient republics, the poor people were constantly in debt to the rich and the great, who, in order to secure their votes at the annual elections, used to lend them money at exorbitant interest, which, being never paid, soon accumulated into a sum too great for the debtor to pay, or for any body else to pay for him. The debtor, for fear of a very severe execution, was obliged, without any further gratuity, to vote for the candidate whom the creditor recommended. In spite of all the laws against bribery and corruption, the bounty of the candidates, together with the occasional distributions of coin which were ordered by the senate, were the principal funds from which, during the latter times of the Roman republic, the poorer citizens derived their subsistence. To deliver themselves from this subjection to their creditors, the poorer citizens were continually calling out, either for an entire abolition of debts, or for what they called new tables; that is, for a law which should entitle them to a complete acquittance, upon paying only a certain proportion of their accumulated debts. The law which reduced the coin of all denominations to a sixth part of its former value, as it enabled them to pay their debts with a sixth part of what they really owed, was equivalent to the most advantageous new tables. In order to satisfy the people, the rich and the great were, upon several different occasions, obliged to consent to laws, both for abolishing debts, and for introducing new tables; and they probably were induced to consent to this law, partly for the same[Pg 397] reason, and partly that, by liberating the public revenue, they might restore vigour to that government, of which they themselves had the principal direction. An operation of this kind would at once reduce a debt of L.128,000,000 to L.21,333,333 : 6 : 8. In the course of the second Punic war, the As was still further reduced, first, from two ounces of copper to one ounce, and afterwards from one ounce to half an ounce; that is, to the twenty-fourth part of its original value. By combining the three Roman operations into one, a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight millions of our present money, might in this manner be reduced all at once to a debt of L.5,333,333 : 6 : 8. Even the enormous debt of Great Britain might in this manner soon be paid.

Almost all states, both ancient and modern, when faced with this necessity, have occasionally resorted to this kind of trick. The Romans, after the first Punic War, decreased the As, the coin used to determine the value of all their other coins, from twelve ounces of copper to just two ounces. This meant they treated two ounces of copper as if it held the value of twelve ounces. This maneuver allowed the republic to settle its massive debts with only a fraction of what it actually owed. In today’s world, we would likely think that such a sudden and drastic bankruptcy would lead to significant public outcry. But there doesn’t seem to have been any. The law that enacted this change, like all laws concerning currency, was introduced and passed through the people’s assembly by a tribune, and it was probably very popular. In Rome, as in all other ancient republics, the poor were often in debt to the wealthy, who lent them money at high interest rates to secure their votes during elections. This accumulating debt quickly became too much for the debtor or anyone else to pay off. The debtor, fearing harsh repercussions, had no choice but to vote for the candidate suggested by the creditor. Despite numerous laws against bribery and corruption, the generosity of candidates, along with occasional coin distributions mandated by the senate, were the main sources of livelihood for poorer citizens during the latter years of the Roman republic. To free themselves from their creditors’ control, poorer citizens frequently demanded either a complete cancellation of debts or what they called "new tables," which meant a law that would let them fully discharge their debts by paying only a fraction of what they owed. The law that reduced the value of all coins to one-sixth of their previous worth effectively allowed them to settle their debts with just one-sixth of the actual amount owed, similar to the most beneficial new tables. To appease the people, the wealthy and influential were, on several occasions, forced to agree to laws that both abolished debts and implemented new tables; they likely agreed to this law partly for this reason and partly to boost public revenue, which would restore strength to a government they controlled. Such a measure would reduce a debt of £128,000,000 to £21,333,333 : 6 : 8. During the second Punic War, the As was further lowered, first to one ounce of copper and then to half an ounce, equating to just one twenty-fourth of its original value. By combining these three Roman measures, a debt of one hundred and twenty-eight million in today’s currency could be reduced all at once to a debt of £5,333,333 : 6 : 8. Even Britain's significant debt could be cleared in a similar way.

By means of such expedients, the coin of, I believe, all nations, has been gradually reduced more and more below its original value, and the same nominal sum has been gradually brought to contain a smaller and a smaller quantity of silver.

Using these methods, the currency of, I believe, all countries has been steadily decreased below its original value, and the same stated amount has been gradually reduced to hold less and less silver.

Nations have sometimes, for the same purpose, adulterated the standard of their coin; that is, have mixed a greater quantity of alloy in it. If in the pound weight of our silver coin, for example, instead of eighteen penny-weight, according to the present standard, there were mixed eight ounces of alloy; a pound sterling, or twenty shillings of such coin, would be worth little more than six shillings and eightpence of our present money. The quantity of silver contained in six shillings and eightpence of our present money, would thus be raised very nearly to the denomination of a pound sterling. The adulteration of the standard has exactly the same effect with what the French call an augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin.

Nations have sometimes, for the same reason, tampered with the standard of their currency; that is, they have mixed in a higher amount of alloy. For instance, if in a pound of our silver coin, instead of eighteen penny-weight, there were mixed eight ounces of alloy, a pound sterling, or twenty shillings of that coin, would be worth just a bit more than six shillings and eight pence of our current money. The amount of silver in six shillings and eight pence of our current money would therefore be nearly equivalent to the value of a pound sterling. Tampering with the standard has the same effect as what the French call an augmentation, or a direct increase of the coin's value.

An augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin, always is, and from its nature must be, an open and avowed operation. By means of it, pieces of a smaller weight and bulk are called by the same name, which had before been given to pieces of a greater weight and bulk. The adulteration of the standard, on the contrary, has generally been a concealed operation. By means of it, pieces are issued from the mint, of the same denomination, and, as nearly as could be contrived, of the same weight, bulk, and appearance, with pieces which had been current before of much greater value. When king John of France,[79] in order to pay his debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were sworn to secrecy. Both operations are unjust. But a simple augmentation is an injustice of open violence; whereas an adulteration is an injustice of treacherous fraud. This latter operation, therefore, as soon as it has been discovered, and it could never be concealed very long, has always excited much greater indignation than the former. The coin, after any considerable augmentation, has very seldom been brought back to its former weight; but after the greatest adulterations, it has almost always been brought back to its former fineness. It has scarce ever happened, that the fury and indignation of the people could otherwise be appeased.

An increase, or a direct raising of the value of the coin, is always a public and acknowledged action. Through this, items of smaller weight and size are referred to by the same name that was previously given to items of greater weight and size. In contrast, the tampering with the standard has usually been a hidden action. Through this method, coins of the same denomination are produced by the mint, and as closely as possible mimic the weight, size, and appearance of coins that were once in circulation and had much greater value. When King John of France,[79] to settle his debts, tampered with his coins, all the officials at his mint were sworn to secrecy. Both actions are unfair. However, a straightforward increase is an act of blatant violence, whereas tampering is an act of deceitful fraud. This latter action, therefore, once discovered (and it could never be hidden for long), has always stirred much greater anger than the former. After any significant increase, it is rare for the coin to return to its original weight; but after the most severe tampering, it almost always returns to its original purity. It has hardly ever happened that the outrage and anger of the people could be calmed in any other way.

In the end of the reign of Henry VIII., and in the beginning of that of Edward VI., the English coin was not only raised in its denomination, but adulterated in its standard. The like frauds were practised in Scotland during the minority of James VI. They have occasionally been practised in most other countries.

At the end of Henry VIII's reign and the start of Edward VI's, English coins were not only increased in value but also diluted in quality. Similar frauds occurred in Scotland during James VI's childhood. These practices have occasionally been seen in many other countries.

That the public revenue of Great Britain can never be completely liberated, or even that any considerable progress can ever be made towards that liberation, while the surplus of that revenue, or what is over and above defraying the annual expense of the peace establishment, is so very small, it seems altogether in vain to expect. That liberation, it is evident, can never be brought about, without either some very considerable augmentation of the public revenue, or some equally considerable reduction of the public expense.

That the public revenue of Great Britain can never be fully freed, or even that any significant progress can be made toward that freedom, while the surplus of that revenue, or what remains after covering the annual cost of maintaining peace, is so minimal, seems pointless to expect. It is clear that this freedom can never be achieved without either a significant increase in public revenue or an equally significant reduction in public spending.

A more equal land tax, a more equal tax upon the rent of houses, and such alterations in the present system of customs and excise as those which have been mentioned in the foregoing chapter, might, perhaps, without increasing the burden of the greater part of the people, but only distributing the weight of it more equally upon the whole, produce a considerable augmentation of revenue. The most sanguine projector, however, could scarce flatter himself, that any augmentation of this kind would be such as could give any reasonable hopes, either of liberating the public revenue altogether, or even of making such progress towards that liberation in time of peace, as either to prevent or to compensate the further accumulation of the public debt in the next war.

A fairer land tax, a more balanced tax on housing rents, and adjustments to the current customs and excise system, like those mentioned in the previous chapter, could potentially increase revenue without placing an extra burden on most people, merely redistributing the weight more evenly. However, even the most optimistic planner couldn’t realistically expect that any increase like this would offer a genuine chance to completely free the public revenue or make meaningful progress toward that goal during peacetime, enough to either prevent or offset the further growth of public debt in the next war.

By extending the British system of taxation to all the different provinces of the empire, inhabited by people either of British or European extraction, a much greater augmentation of revenue might be expected. This, however, could scarce, perhaps, be done, consistently with the principles of the British constitution, without admitting into the British parliament, or, if you will, into the states-general of the British empire, a fair and equal representation of all those different provinces; that of each province bearing the same proportion to the produce of its taxes, as the representation of Great Britain might bear to the produce of the taxes levied upon Great Britain. The private interest of many power[Pg 398]ful individuals, the confirmed prejudices of great bodies of people, seem, indeed, at present, to oppose to so great a change, such obstacles as it may be very difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to surmount. Without, however, pretending to determine whether such a union be practicable or impracticable, it may not, perhaps, be improper, in a speculative work of this kind, to consider how far the British system of taxation might be applicable to all the different provinces of the empire; what revenue might be expected from it, if so applied; and in what manner a general union of this kind might be likely to affect the happiness and prosperity of the different provinces comprehended within it. Such a speculation, can, at worst, be regarded but as a new Utopia, less amusing, certainly, but no more useless and chimerical than the old one.

By extending the British tax system to all the various provinces of the empire, which are populated by people of British or European descent, we could expect a significant increase in revenue. However, this would be difficult to achieve consistently with the principles of the British constitution without allowing a fair and equal representation of all those provinces in the British parliament, or, if you prefer, in the states-general of the British empire; with each province's representation reflecting the amount of taxes it produces, similar to how Great Britain's representation would relate to the taxes collected from Great Britain. The personal interests of many powerful individuals and the deep-seated beliefs of large groups of people currently present challenges that may be very hard, if not impossible, to overcome. Without claiming to know whether such a union is feasible, it might be worth exploring how applicable the British tax system could be across the different provinces of the empire; what kind of revenue could be anticipated if implemented; and how a general union of this nature might impact the well-being and prosperity of the provinces involved. Such speculation can, at worst, be viewed as a new Utopia—perhaps less entertaining but no more impractical or fanciful than the old one.

The land tax, the stamp duties, and the different duties of customs and excise, constitute the four principal branches of the British taxes.

The land tax, the stamp duties, and the various customs and excise duties make up the four main types of taxes in Britain.

Ireland is certainly as able, and our American and West India plantations more able, to pay a land tax, than Great Britain. Where the landlord is subject neither to tythe nor poor's rate, he must certainly be more able to pay such a tax, than where he is subject to both those other burdens. The tythe, where there is no modus, and where it is levied in kind, diminishes more what would otherwise be the rent of the landlord, than a land tax which really amounted to five shillings in the pound. Such a tythe will be found, in most cases, to amount to more than a fourth part of the real rent of the land, or of what remains after replacing completely the capital of the farmer, together with his reasonable profit. If all moduses and all impropriations were taken away, the complete church tythe of Great Britain and Ireland could not well be estimated at less than six or seven millions. If there was no tythe either in Great Britain or Ireland, the landlords could afford to pay six or seven millions additional land tax, without being more burdened than a very great part of them are at present. America pays no tythe, and could, therefore, very well afford to pay a land tax. The lands in America and the West Indies, indeed, are, in general, not tenanted nor leased out to farmers. They could not, therefore, be assessed according to any rent roll. But neither were the lands of Great Britain, in the 4th of William and Mary, assessed according to any rent roll, but according to a very loose and inaccurate estimation. The lands in America might be assessed either in the same manner, or in according to an equitable valuation, in consequence of an accurate survey, like that which was lately made in the Milanese, and in the dominions of Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia.

Ireland is definitely just as capable, and our American and West India plantations are even more capable, of paying a land tax compared to Great Britain. Where the landlord isn’t subject to tithes or poor rates, they are certainly in a better position to pay such a tax than where they face both those other burdens. The tithe, where there is no set fee and is collected in kind, reduces what would otherwise be the landlord’s rent more than a land tax that actually amounts to five shillings per pound. In most cases, such a tithe will be found to exceed one-fourth of the actual rent of the land or what remains after fully covering the farmer’s capital along with a reasonable profit. If all set fees and all impropriations were removed, the total church tithe for Great Britain and Ireland could not be estimated at less than six or seven million. If there were no tithes in either Great Britain or Ireland, landlords could easily pay an additional six or seven million in land tax without being more burdened than many of them are right now. America pays no tithe and could, therefore, easily afford to pay a land tax. The lands in America and the West Indies, in general, are not tenanted or leased to farmers. They couldn't, therefore, be assessed based on any rent roll. However, the lands in Great Britain, in the 4th of William and Mary, were also not assessed according to a rent roll, but based on a very loose and inaccurate estimation. The lands in America could be assessed similarly, or according to a fair valuation resulting from an accurate survey, like the one recently done in the Milanese and in the territories of Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia.

Stamp duties, it is evident, might be levied without any variation, in all countries where the forms of law process, and the deeds by which property, both real and personal, is transferred, are the same, or nearly the same.

Stamp duties can clearly be imposed uniformly in all countries where the legal processes and the documents for transferring both real and personal property are the same or very similar.

The extension of the custom-house laws of Great Britain to Ireland and the plantations, provided it was accompanied, as in justice it ought to be, with an extension of the freedom of trade, would be in the highest degree advantageous to both. All the invidious restraints which at present oppress the trade of Ireland, the distinction between the enumerated and non-enumerated commodities of America, would be entirely at an end. The countries north of Cape Finisterre would be as open to every part of the produce of America, as those south of that cape are to some parts of that produce at present. The trade between all the different parts of the British empire would, in consequence of this uniformity in the customs-house laws, be as free as the coasting trade of Great Britain is at present. The British empire would thus afford, within itself, an immense internal market for every part of the produce of all its different provinces. So great an extension of market would soon compensate, both to Ireland and the plantations, all that they could suffer from the increase of the duties of customs.

The expansion of Great Britain's customs laws to Ireland and the colonies, if it were justly accompanied by an extension of trade freedoms, would be extremely beneficial for both. All the unfair restrictions currently burdening Irish trade, including the distinction between the listed and non-listed goods from America, would be completely eliminated. The regions north of Cape Finisterre would be just as accessible to all American products as those to the south are to some of those products now. As a result of this uniformity in customs laws, trade among all different parts of the British Empire would be as free as Britain's coastal trade is today. Therefore, the British Empire would provide a vast internal market for every type of product from its various provinces. Such a significant market expansion would quickly compensate both Ireland and the colonies for any losses they might experience from increased customs duties.

The excise is the only part of the British system of taxation, which would require to be varied in any respect, according as it was applied to the different provinces of the empire. It might be applied to Ireland without any variation; the produce and consumption of that kingdom being exactly of the same nature with those of Great Britain. In its application to America and the West Indies, of which the produce and consumption are so very different from those of Great Britain, some modification might be necessary, in the same manner as in its application to the cyder and beer counties of England.

The excise is the only part of the British tax system that would need to change depending on how it’s applied to the different regions of the empire. It could be applied to Ireland without any changes since the produce and consumption there are exactly the same as in Great Britain. However, when applied to America and the West Indies, where the produce and consumption differ significantly from those of Great Britain, some adjustments might be necessary, similar to how it’s applied to the cider and beer counties of England.

A fermented liquor, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is made of molasses, bears very little resemblance to our beer, makes a considerable part of the common drink of the people in America. This liquor, as it can be kept only for a few days, cannot, like our beer, be prepared and stored up for sale in great breweries, but every private family must brew it for their own use, in the same manner as they cook their victuals. But to subject every private family to the odious visits and examination of the tax-gatherers, in the same manner as we subject the keepers of alehouses and the brewers for public sale, would be altogether inconsistent with liberty. If, for the sake of equality, it was thought necessary to lay a tax upon this liquor, it might be taxed by taxing the material of which it is made, either at the place of manufacture, or, if the circumstances of the trade rendered such an excise improper, by laying a duty upon its importation into the[Pg 399] colony in which it was to be consumed. Besides the duty of one penny a-gallon imposed by the British parliament upon the importation of molasses into America, there is a provincial tax of this kind upon their importation into Massachusetts Bay, in ships belonging to any other colony, of eightpence the hogshead; and another upon their importation from the northern colonies into South Carolina, of fivepence the gallon. Or, if neither of these methods was found convenient, each family might compound for its consumption of this liquor, either according to the number of persons of which it consisted, in the same manner as private families compound for the malt tax in England; or according to the different ages and sexes of those persons, in the same manner as several different taxes are levied in Holland; or, nearly as Sir Matthew Decker proposes, that all taxes upon consumable commodities should be levied in England. This mode of taxation, it has already been observed, when applied to objects of a speedy consumption, is not a very convenient one. It might be adopted, however, in cases where no better could be done.

A fermented drink, called beer, made from molasses, doesn’t look much like our beer, but it’s a big part of what people in America usually drink. This drink can only be kept for a few days, so unlike our beer, it can't be brewed and stored for sale in big breweries; instead, every household has to make it for their own use, just like they cook their meals. However, making every household endure annoying visits and inspections from tax collectors, like we do with tavern owners and brewers selling to the public, goes against the idea of freedom. If a tax on this drink was seen as necessary for fairness, it could be levied by taxing the ingredients used to make it, either at the manufacturing site or, if trade conditions made that impractical, by taxing its importation into the [Pg 399] colony where it would be consumed. Besides the penny-per-gallon tax imposed by the British Parliament on molasses imported into America, there’s an additional provincial tax on imports into Massachusetts Bay from other colonies of eightpence per hogshead, and another tax on imports from the northern colonies into South Carolina of fivepence per gallon. Alternatively, if neither of these options worked well, each household could pay a flat fee for its share of this drink based on how many people were in the family, similar to how families pay the malt tax in England; or based on the ages and genders of family members, like how different taxes are assessed in Holland; or, as Sir Matthew Decker suggests, like how all taxes on consumable goods could be levied in England. This type of taxation, as mentioned before, isn’t very convenient when applied to quickly consumed items, but it could be used if there were no better options available.

Sugar, rum, and tobacco, are commodities which are nowhere necessaries of life, which are become objects of almost universal consumption, and which are, therefore, extremely proper subjects of taxation. If a union with the colonies were to take place, those commodities might be taxed, either before they go out of the hands of the manufacturer or grower; or, if this mode of taxation did not suit the circumstances of those persons, they might be deposited in public warehouses, both at the place of manufacture, and at all the different ports of the empire, to which they might afterwards be transported, to remain there, under the joint custody of the owner and the revenue officer, till such time as they should be delivered out, either to the consumer, to the merchant-retailer for home consumption, or to the merchant-exporter; the tax not to be advanced till such delivery. When delivered out for exportation, to go duty-free, upon proper security being given, that they should really be exported out of the empire. These are, perhaps, the principal commodities, with regard to which the union with the colonies might require some considerable change in the present system of British taxation.

Sugar, rum, and tobacco are not essential to life, but they are widely consumed and therefore good candidates for taxation. If a merger with the colonies happens, these products could be taxed either at the point of production or, if that’s not practical for the producers, they could be stored in public warehouses at manufacturing sites and various ports throughout the empire. They would stay there under the joint supervision of the owner and a revenue officer until they are either sold to consumers, provided to retailers for local consumption, or shipped out by exporters; taxes would only be paid upon delivery. When sent out for export, they could go tax-free if proper guarantees are provided to ensure they really leave the empire. These are likely the main products that would necessitate significant changes in the current British taxation system in light of the union with the colonies.

What might be the amount of the revenue which this system of taxation, extended to all the different provinces of the empire, might produce, it must, no doubt, be altogether impossible to ascertain with tolerable exactness. By means of this system, there is annually levied in Great Britain, upon less than eight millions of people, more than ten millions of revenue. Ireland contains more than two millions of people, and, according to the accounts laid before the congress, the twelve associated provinces of America contain more than three. Those accounts, however, may have been exaggerated, in order, perhaps, either to encourage their own people, or to intimidate those of this country; and we shall suppose, therefore, that our North American and West Indian colonies, taken together, contain no more than three millions; or that the whole British empire, in Europe and America, contains no more than thirteen millions of inhabitants. If, upon less than eight millions of inhabitants, this system of taxation raises a revenue of more than ten millions sterling; it ought, upon thirteen millions of inhabitants, to raise a revenue of more than sixteen millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. From this revenue, supposing that this system could produce it, must be deducted the revenue usually raised in Ireland and the plantations, for defraying the expense of the respective civil governments. The expense of the civil and military establishment of Ireland, together with the interest of the public debt, amounts, at a medium of the two years which ended March 1775, to something less than seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds a-year. By a very exact account of the revenue of the principal colonies of America and the West Indies, it amounted, before the commencement of the present disturbances, to a hundred and forty-one thousand eight hundred pounds. In this account, however, the revenue of Maryland, of North Carolina, and of all our late acquisitions, both upon the continent, and in the islands, is omitted; which may, perhaps, make a difference of thirty or forty thousand pounds. For the sake of even numbers, therefore, let us suppose that the revenue necessary for supporting the civil government of Ireland and the plantations may amount to a million. There would remain, consequently, a revenue of fifteen millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, to be applied towards defraying the general expense of the empire, and towards paying the public debt. But if, from the present revenue of Great Britain, a million could, in peaceable times, be spared towards the payment of that debt, six millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds could very well be spared from this improved revenue. This great sinking fund, too, might be augmented every year by the interest of the debt which had been discharged the year before; and might, in this manner, increase so very rapidly, as to be sufficient in a few years to discharge the whole debt, and thus to restore completely the at-present debilitated and languishing vigour of the empire. In the mean time, the people might be relieved from some of the most burdensome taxes; from those which are imposed either upon the necessaries of life, or upon the materials of manufacture. The labouring poor would thus be enabled to live[Pg 400] better, to work cheaper, and to send their goods cheaper to market. The cheapness of their goods would increase the demand for them, and consequently for the labour of those who produced them. This increase in the demand for labour would both increase the numbers, and improve the circumstances of the labouring poor. Their consumption would increase, and, together with it, the revenue arising from all those articles of their consumption upon which the taxes might be allowed to remain.

What might be the revenue generated by this taxation system, if applied across all the provinces of the empire, is difficult to determine with any real accuracy. In Great Britain, this system raises more than ten million pounds from less than eight million people every year. Ireland has over two million people, and according to the reports provided to Congress, the twelve associated provinces of America have more than three million. However, these reports may have been exaggerated to either motivate their own people or intimidate those in this country. Therefore, let’s assume that our North American and West Indian colonies together have no more than three million people, bringing the total population of the entire British Empire in Europe and America to around thirteen million. If this taxation system can generate over ten million pounds from less than eight million people, it should be able to raise more than sixteen million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds from thirteen million inhabitants. Out of this revenue, we must subtract what is normally raised in Ireland and the colonies to cover the costs of their civil governments. The cost of Ireland's civil and military establishment, along with public debt interest, was less than seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds per year, based on averages from the two years ending in March 1775. Before the current disruptions began, the total revenue from the main American and West Indian colonies reached a hundred and forty-one thousand eight hundred pounds. However, this figure does not account for Maryland, North Carolina, and all our recent acquisitions on the continent and in the islands, which could add thirty or forty thousand pounds. For simplicity, let's estimate that the revenue needed to support the civil government of Ireland and the colonies is about a million pounds. Thus, there would be a remaining revenue of fifteen million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds available for covering the empire's general expenses and public debt. If, under peaceful conditions, Great Britain could allocate a million pounds from its current revenue towards paying off the debt, it would be feasible to allocate six million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds from this improved revenue. Additionally, this significant sinking fund could grow every year through the interest from the previous year's paid debt, allowing it to potentially increase rapidly enough to eliminate the entire debt in a few years, fully restoring the weakened vitality of the empire. In the meantime, the people could be relieved from some of the heaviest taxes, particularly those on essential goods or manufacturing materials. This would allow the working class to live better, work for less, and sell their goods at lower prices. The lower prices would boost demand, not only for their products but also for the labor required to produce them. This increase in labor demand would enhance both the number of jobs available and the working conditions of the laboring poor. Their consumption would rise, which in turn would increase the revenue from the taxed items that would remain.

The revenue arising from this system of taxation, however, might not immediately increase in proportion to the number of people who were subjected to it. Great indulgence would for some time be due to those provinces of the empire which were thus subjected to burdens to which they had not before been accustomed; and even when the same taxes came to be levied everywhere as exactly as possible, they would not everywhere produce a revenue proportioned to the numbers of the people. In a poor country, the consumption of the principal commodities subject to the duties of customs and excise, is very small; and in a thinly inhabited country, the opportunities of smuggling are very great. The consumption of malt liquors among the inferior ranks of people in Scotland is very small; and the excise upon malt, beer, and ale, produces less there than in England, in proportion to the numbers of the people and the rate of the duties, which upon malt is different, on account of a supposed difference of quality. In these particular branches of the excise, there is not, I apprehend, much more smuggling in the one country than in the other. The duties upon the distillery, and the greater part of the duties of customs, in proportion to the numbers of people in the respective countries, produce less in Scotland than in England, not only on account of the smaller consumption of the taxed commodities, but of the much greater facility of smuggling. In Ireland, the inferior ranks of people are still poorer than in Scotland, and many parts of the country are almost as thinly inhabited. In Ireland, therefore, the consumption of the taxed commodities might, in proportion to the number of the people, be still less than in Scotland, and the facility of smuggling nearly the same. In America and the West Indies, the white people, even of the lowest rank, are in much better circumstances than those of the same rank in England; and their consumption of all the luxuries in which they usually indulge themselves, is probably much greater. The blacks, indeed, who make the greater part of the inhabitants, both of the southern colonies upon the continent and of the West India islands, as they are in a state of slavery, are, no doubt, in a worse condition than the poorest people either in Scotland or Ireland. We must not, however, upon that account, imagine that they are worse fed, or that their consumption of articles which might be subjected to moderate duties, is less than that even of the lower ranks of people in England. In order that they may work well, it is the interest of their master that they should be fed well, and kept in good heart, in the same manner as it is his interest that his working cattle should be so. The blacks, accordingly, have almost everywhere their allowance of rum, and of molasses or spruce-beer, in the same manner as the white servants; and this allowance would not probably be withdrawn, though those articles should be subjected to moderate duties. The consumption of the taxed commodities, therefore, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, would probably be as great in America and the West Indies as in any part of the British empire. The opportunities of smuggling, indeed, would be much greater; America, in proportion to the extent of the country, being much more thinly inhabited than either Scotland or Ireland. If the revenue, however, which is at present raised by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, were to be levied by a single duty upon malt, the opportunity of smuggling in the most important branch of the excise would be almost entirely taken away; and if the duties of customs, instead of being imposed upon almost all the different articles of importation, were confined to a few of the most general use and consumption, and if the levying of those duties were subjected to the excise laws, the opportunity of smuggling, though not so entirely taken away, would be very much diminished. In consequence of those two apparently very simple and easy alterations, the duties of customs and excise might probably produce a revenue as great, in proportion to the consumption of the most thinly inhabited province, as they do at present, in proportion to that of the most populous.

The revenue from this tax system, however, might not immediately rise in line with the number of people paying it. For a while, certain provinces of the empire that were newly subjected to these burdens would need some leniency, as they weren’t used to them before. Even when the same taxes are applied uniformly, they wouldn’t yield a revenue proportional to the population everywhere. In a poor country, the consumption of key goods subject to customs and excise duties is quite low; and in sparsely populated areas, opportunities for smuggling are significantly higher. The consumption of malt beverages among the lower-income groups in Scotland is very low; and the excise on malt, beer, and ale generates less revenue there than in England, relative to both the population and the tax rates, which differ due to an assumed quality difference. In these specific areas of excise, I believe there isn’t much more smuggling in one country than in the other. The duties on distilling and most customs duties produce less in Scotland compared to England, not only because of lower consumption of taxed goods but also due to much easier smuggling opportunities. In Ireland, the lower-income groups are even poorer than in Scotland, and many regions are similarly sparsely populated. Therefore, in Ireland, the consumption of taxed goods might be even lower relative to the population than in Scotland, and smuggling opportunities would likely be about the same. In America and the West Indies, even the lowest-ranked white people are in much better situations than their counterparts in England; their consumption of luxuries is probably much higher. The majority of the inhabitants, who are black and enslaved, are undoubtedly worse off than the poorest in Scotland or Ireland. However, we shouldn’t assume that they eat worse or consume less of goods that could be moderately taxed compared to the lower-income groups in England. For them to work effectively, it is in their masters' interest to ensure they are well-fed and treated well, much like their working animals. Consequently, black people almost everywhere receive rations of rum and molasses or spruce beer, similar to white servants; and this allowance likely wouldn’t be removed even if those goods were subject to moderate taxes. Therefore, the consumption of taxed goods per person would likely be as high in America and the West Indies as in any part of the British Empire. Indeed, opportunities for smuggling would be significantly greater; America, given its size, is much less densely populated than Scotland or Ireland. If the revenue currently collected from the various duties on malt and malt liquors were instead charged as a single duty on malt, the chances of smuggling in this major area of excise would nearly disappear. Moreover, if customs duties were limited to a few commonly used goods rather than nearly all imported items and those duties were subject to excise regulations, the smuggling opportunities, while not completely eliminated, would be greatly reduced. As a result of these two seemingly simple changes, customs and excise duties could potentially generate a revenue as substantial, relative to the consumption in the most sparsely populated province, as they do now in relation to that of the most populous.

The Americans, it has been said, indeed, have no gold or silver money, the interior commerce of the country being carried on by a paper currency; and the gold and silver, which occasionally come among them, being all sent to Great Britain, in return for the commodities which they receive from us. But without gold and silver, it is added, there is no possibility of paying taxes. We already get all the gold and silver which they have. How is it possible to draw from them what they have not?

The Americans, it has been said, really don’t have any gold or silver money; the country’s trade relies on paper currency. Any gold and silver that occasionally comes their way is sent to Great Britain in exchange for the goods they get from us. But, they say, without gold and silver, there's no way to pay taxes. We already take all the gold and silver they have. How can we get from them what they don’t have?

The present scarcity of gold and silver money in America, is not the effect of the poverty of that country, or of the inability of the people there to purchase those metals. In a country where the wages of labour are so much higher, and the price of provisions so much lower than in England, the greater part of the people must surely have wherewithal to purchase a greater quantity, if it were either[Pg 401] necessary or convenient for them to do so. The scarcity of those metals, therefore, must be the effect of choice, and not of necessity.

The current shortage of gold and silver money in America isn't due to the country's poverty or the people's inability to buy those metals. In a country where wages are much higher and the cost of food is much lower than in England, most people definitely have enough to buy more if they found it either necessary or convenient. Therefore, the shortage of these metals must be a matter of choice, not necessity.

It is for transacting either domestic or foreign business, that gold or silver money is either necessary or convenient.

It’s for doing either domestic or international business that gold or silver money is either essential or useful.

The domestic business of every country, it has been shewn in the second book of this Inquiry, may, at least in peaceable times, be transacted by means of a paper currency, with nearly the same degree of conveniency as by gold and silver money. It is convenient for the Americans, who could always employ with profit, in the improvement of their lands, a greater stock than they can easily get, to save as much as possible the expense of so costly an instrument of commerce as gold and silver; and rather to employ that part of their surplus produce which would be necessary for purchasing those metals, in purchasing the instruments of trade, the materials of clothing, several parts of household furniture, and the iron work necessary for building and extending their settlements and plantations; in purchasing not dead stock, but active and productive stock. The colony governments find it for their interest to supply the people with such a quantity of paper money as is fully sufficient, and generally more than sufficient, for transacting their domestic business. Some of those governments, that of Pennsylvania, particularly, derive a revenue from lending this paper money to their subjects, at an interest of so much per cent. Others, like that of Massachusetts Bay, advance, upon extraordinary emergencies, a paper money of this kind for defraying the public expense; and afterwards, when it suits the conveniency of the colony, redeem it at the depreciated value to which it gradually falls. In 1747,[80] that colony paid in this manner the greater part of its public debts, with the tenth part of the money for which its bills had been granted. It suits the conveniency of the planters, to save the expense of employing gold and silver money in their domestic transactions; and it suits the conveniency of the colony governments, to supply them with a medium, which, though attended with some very considerable disadvantages, enables them to save that expense. The redundancy of paper money necessarily banishes gold and silver from the domestic transactions of the colonies, for the same reason that it has banished those metals from the greater part of the domestic transactions in Scotland; and in both countries, it is not the poverty, but the enterprizing and projecting spirit of the people, their desire of employing all the stock which they can get, as active and productive stock, which has occasioned this redundancy of paper money.

The domestic business of every country, as shown in the second book of this Inquiry, can, at least during peaceful times, be conducted using paper currency with nearly the same convenience as using gold and silver money. It’s practical for Americans, who can always profitably invest more in improving their land than they can easily obtain, to minimize the costs of using such an expensive medium of exchange like gold and silver. Instead, they prefer to allocate their surplus produce, which would otherwise go toward buying those metals, to purchase trade tools, clothing materials, various household items, and the ironwork needed for building and expanding their farms and settlements—essentially investing in active and productive resources rather than just passive ones. The colonial governments find it beneficial to provide their people with enough paper money, often more than needed, to carry out their domestic business. Some of these governments, particularly Pennsylvania, earn revenue by lending this paper money to their citizens at a certain interest rate. Others, like Massachusetts Bay, issue this kind of paper money during emergencies to cover public expenses and later redeem it at a lower value as it gradually depreciates. In 1747,[80] that colony managed to pay off most of its public debts in this manner, using only a tenth of the currency for which its notes had been issued. It benefits planters to avoid the cost of employing gold and silver in their transactions, while it also serves the interests of colonial governments to provide them with a medium that, despite its significant disadvantages, allows them to save money. The excess of paper money inevitably drives gold and silver out of domestic transactions in the colonies, for the same reason that it has done so in much of Scotland; and in both regions, it’s not the lack of wealth but the entrepreneurial spirit of the people, their eagerness to use all the resources they can gather as active and productive stock, that has led to this excess of paper currency.

In the exterior commerce which the different colonies carry on with Great Britain, gold and silver are more or less employed, exactly in proportion as they are more or less necessary. Where those metals are not necessary, they seldom appear. Where they are necessary, they are generally found.

In the trade that the various colonies engage in with Great Britain, gold and silver are used more or less depending on how essential they are. When those metals aren't needed, they rarely show up. When they are needed, they are usually present.

In the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies, the British goods are generally advanced to the colonists at a pretty long credit, and are afterwards paid for in tobacco, rated at a certain price. It is more convenient for the colonists to pay in tobacco than in gold and silver. It would be more convenient for any merchant to pay for the goods which his correspondents had sold to him, in some other sort of goods which he might happen to deal in, than in money. Such a merchant would have no occasion to keep any part of his stock by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. He could have, at all times, a larger quantity of goods in his shop or warehouse, and he could deal to a greater extent. But it seldom happens to be convenient for all the correspondents of a merchant to receive payment for the goods which they sell to him, in goods of some other kind which he happens to deal in. The British merchants who trade to Virginia and Maryland, happen to be a particular set of correspondents, to whom it is more convenient to receive payment for the goods which they sell to those colonies in tobacco, than in gold and silver. They expect to make a profit by the sale of the tobacco; they could make none by that of the gold and silver. Gold and silver, therefore, very seldom appear in the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies. Maryland and Virginia have as little occasion for those metals in their foreign, as in their domestic commerce. They are said, accordingly, to have less gold and silver money than any other colonies in America. They are reckoned, however, as thriving, and consequently as rich, as any of their neighbours.

In the trade between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies, British goods are typically provided to the colonists on credit for a significant amount of time and are later paid for with tobacco, set at a specific price. It's easier for the colonists to pay with tobacco rather than with gold and silver. It would also be more convenient for any merchant to pay for the goods they’ve purchased from their suppliers with other goods they deal in instead of cash. This way, the merchant wouldn't need to keep part of their stock idle, holding cash for unexpected expenses. They could always have a larger selection of goods in their store or warehouse and could operate on a bigger scale. However, it isn't always practical for all the suppliers of a merchant to get paid for the goods they sell in other types of goods the merchant sells. The British merchants trading with Virginia and Maryland are a specific group of suppliers who find it more convenient to be paid for their goods in tobacco rather than in gold and silver. They expect to profit from selling the tobacco but wouldn’t gain any profit from selling gold and silver. Therefore, gold and silver rarely show up in the trade between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies. Maryland and Virginia have little need for these metals in both their international and local trade. As a result, they are said to have less gold and silver currency than any other colonies in America. Nevertheless, they are considered to be as prosperous, and thus as wealthy, as their neighbors.

In the northern colonies, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, the four governments of New England, &c. the value of their own produce which they export to Great Britain is not equal to that of the manufactures which they import for their own use, and for that of some of the other colonies, to which they are the carriers. A balance, therefore, must be paid to the mother-country in gold and silver, and this balance they generally find.

In the northern colonies—Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and the four New England governments—the value of the goods they export to Great Britain isn't equal to the value of the manufactured goods they import for their own use, as well as for some of the other colonies that they supply. As a result, they often have to pay a balance to the mother country in gold and silver, and they usually manage to find this balance.

In the sugar colonies, the value of the produce annually exported to Great Britain is much greater than that of all the goods imported from thence. If the sugar and rum annually sent to the mother-country were paid for in those colonies, Great Britain would be obliged to send out, every year, a very large balance in money; and the trade to the West Indies would, by a certain species of politicians, be considered as extremely disadvanta[Pg 402]geous. But it so happens, that many of the principal proprietors of the sugar plantations reside in Great Britain. Their rents are remitted to them in sugar and rum, the produce of their estates. The sugar and rum which the West India merchants purchase in those colonies upon their own account, are not equal in value to the goods which they annually sell there. A balance, therefore, must necessarily he paid to them in gold and silver, and this balance, too, is generally found.

In the sugar colonies, the value of the products exported annually to Great Britain is much higher than the value of all the goods imported from there. If the sugar and rum sent to the mother country each year were paid for in those colonies, Great Britain would have to send a significant amount of money each year; and some politicians would consider the trade with the West Indies extremely disadvantageous. However, many of the main owners of the sugar plantations live in Great Britain. Their rents are sent to them in sugar and rum, which come from their estates. The sugar and rum that West India merchants buy in those colonies for themselves are not worth as much as the goods they sell there each year. Therefore, a balance must be paid to them in gold and silver, and this balance is usually found.

The difficulty and irregularity of payment from the different colonies to Great Britain, have not been at all in proportion to the greatness or smallness of the balances which were respectively due from them. Payments have, in general, been more regular from the northern than from the tobacco colonies, though the former have generally paid a pretty large balance in money, while the latter have either paid no balance, or a much smaller one. The difficulty of getting payment from our different sugar colonies has been greater or less in proportion, not so much to the extent of the balances respectively due from them, as to the quantity of uncultivated land which they contained; that is, to the greater or smaller temptation which the planters have been under of over-trading, or of undertaking the settlement and plantation of greater quantities of waste land than suited the extent of their capitals. The returns from the great island of Jamaica, where there is still much uncultivated land, have, upon this account, been, in general, more irregular and uncertain than those from the smaller islands of Barbadoes, Antigua, and St. Christopher's, which have, for these many years, been completely cultivated, and have, upon that account, afforded less field for the speculations of the planter. The new acquisitions of Grenada, Tobago, St. Vincent's, and Dominica, have opened a new field for speculations of this kind; and the returns from those islands have of late been as irregular and uncertain as those from the great island of Jamaica.

The challenges and inconsistency of payments from the various colonies to Great Britain haven't really matched up to the size of the balances they owed. Generally, payments have been more consistent from the northern colonies compared to the tobacco colonies, even though the northern ones usually paid a significant amount in cash, while the tobacco colonies either paid nothing or a much smaller amount. The difficulty in receiving payments from our sugar colonies has varied more based on the amount of uncultivated land they had rather than the total balances they owed. This relates to how much temptation the planters faced to overextend themselves by trying to cultivate more land than their capital could support. The returns from Jamaica, a large island with much uncultivated land, have been more inconsistent and unpredictable for this reason compared to the smaller islands of Barbados, Antigua, and St. Christopher’s, which have been fully cultivated for many years and offered less opportunity for planter speculation. The new acquisitions of Grenada, Tobago, St. Vincent, and Dominica have created new opportunities for this kind of speculation, and the returns from those islands have recently been just as inconsistent and unpredictable as those from Jamaica.

It is not, therefore, the poverty of the colonies which occasions, in the greater part of them, the present scarcity of gold and silver money. Their great demand for active and productive stock makes it convenient for them to have as little dead stock as possible, and disposes them, upon that account, to content themselves with a cheaper, though less commodious instrument of commerce, than gold and silver. They are thereby enabled to convert the value of that gold and silver into the instruments of trade, into the materials of clothing, into household furniture, and into the iron work necessary for building and extending their settlements and plantations. In those branches of business which cannot be transacted without gold and silver money, it appears, that they can always find the necessary quantity of those metals; and if they frequently do not find it, their failure is generally the effect, not of their necessary poverty, but of their unnecessary and excessive enterprise. It is not because they are poor that their payments are irregular and uncertain, but because they are too eager to become excessively rich. Though all that part of the produce of the colony taxes, which was over and above what was necessary for defraying the expense of their own civil and military establishments, were to be remitted to Great Britain in gold and silver, the colonies have abundantly wherewithal to purchase the requisite quantity of those metals. They would in this case be obliged, indeed, to exchange a part of their surplus produce, with which they now purchase active and productive stock, for dead stock. In transacting their domestic business, they would be obliged to employ a costly, instead of a cheap instrument of commerce; and the expense of purchasing this costly instrument might damp somewhat the vivacity and ardour of their excessive enterprise in the improvement of land. It might not, however, be necessary to remit any part of the American revenue in gold and silver. It might be remitted in bills drawn upon, and accepted by, particular merchants or companies in Great Britain, to whom a part of the surplus produce of America had been consigned, who would pay into the treasury the American revenue in money, after having themselves received the value of it in goods; and the whole business might frequently be transacted without exporting a single ounce of gold or silver from America.

It isn’t the poverty of the colonies that causes the current scarcity of gold and silver currency in most of them. Their high demand for active and productive assets leads them to minimize their dead stock and makes them okay with using a cheaper, though less convenient, form of trade instead of gold and silver. This allows them to turn the value of that gold and silver into trade tools, clothing materials, household furniture, and the ironwork needed for building and expanding their settlements and farms. In areas where transactions require gold and silver, they can usually find enough of those metals. If they often can’t find them, it’s typically because of their unnecessary and excessive risk-taking, not because they’re truly poor. Their irregular and uncertain payments aren’t due to poverty but rather their eagerness to become overly wealthy. Even if all the surplus from colonial taxes, beyond what’s needed for their civil and military expenses, were sent to Great Britain in gold and silver, the colonies would have plenty of resources to buy the amount of those metals they need. However, they would have to trade part of their excess produce, which they currently use to purchase active and productive assets, for dead stock. In managing their domestic affairs, they would have to use a more expensive form of currency instead of a cheaper one; this cost might slightly lessen their enthusiasm for improving land. However, it may not be necessary to send any part of the American revenue in gold and silver. It could be sent in bills drawn on and accepted by specific merchants or companies in Great Britain who received part of the surplus produce from America. Those merchants would then pay the American revenue into the treasury after receiving its value in goods, and this whole process could often happen without exporting any gold or silver from America.

It is not contrary to justice, that both Ireland and America should contribute towards the discharge of the public debt of Great Britain. That debt has been contracted in support of the government established by the Revolution; a government to which the protestants of Ireland owe, not only the whole authority which they at present enjoy in their own country, but every security which they possess for their liberty, their property, and their religion; a government to which several of the colonies of America owe their present charters, and consequently their present constitution; and to which all the colonies of America owe the liberty, security, and property, which they have ever since enjoyed. That public debt has been contracted in the defence, not of Great Britain alone, but of all the different provinces of the empire. The immense debt contracted in the late war in particular, and a great part of that contracted in the war before, were both properly contracted in defence of America.

It's not unjust for both Ireland and America to help pay off the public debt of Great Britain. This debt was incurred to support the government established by the Revolution; a government that the Protestants of Ireland owe not only their current authority in their own country but also every safeguard for their liberty, property, and religion. Several colonies in America owe their current charters and thus their present constitution to this government, and all the colonies in America owe their liberty, security, and property to it as well. This public debt was incurred not just for Great Britain, but for all the various provinces of the empire. The massive debt from the recent war, in particular, along with a significant part of that incurred from the previous war, was incurred largely to defend America.

By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, besides the freedom of trade, other advantages much more important, and which would much more than compensate any increase of taxes that might accompany that union. By the union with England, the[Pg 403] middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland gained a complete deliverance from the power of an aristocracy, which had always before oppressed them. By a union with Great Britain, the greater part of people of all ranks in Ireland would gain an equally complete deliverance from a much more oppressive aristocracy; an aristocracy not founded, like that of Scotland, in the natural and respectable distinctions of birth and fortune, but in the most odious of all distinctions, those of religious and political prejudices; distinctions which, more than any other, animate both the insolence of the oppressors, and the hatred and indignation of the oppressed, and which commonly render the inhabitants of the same country more hostile to one another than those of different countries ever are. Without a union with Great Britain, the inhabitants of Ireland are not likely, for many ages, to consider themselves as one people.

By joining with Great Britain, Ireland would not only gain the freedom to trade but also other benefits that are far more significant and would more than offset any potential tax increases that might come with that union. The union with England allowed the average and lower classes in Scotland to break free from the oppressive power of an aristocracy that had long held them down. Similarly, by uniting with Great Britain, most people in Ireland, regardless of their status, would achieve an equally thorough liberation from a much harsher aristocracy; one that isn’t rooted, like that of Scotland, in natural and worthy distinctions of birth and wealth, but rather in the most unpleasant distinctions of religious and political biases. These distinctions often fuel both the arrogance of the oppressors and the anger and resentment of the oppressed, making people from the same country more antagonistic toward each other than those from different countries usually are. Without a union with Great Britain, the people of Ireland are unlikely to see themselves as one nation for many years to come.

No oppressive aristocracy has ever prevailed in the colonies. Even they, however, would, in point of happiness and tranquillity, gain considerably by a union with Great Britain. It would, at least, deliver them from those rancourous and virulent factions which are inseparable from small democracies, and which have so frequently divided the affections of their people, and disturbed the tranquillity of their governments, in their form so nearly democratical. In the case of a total separation from Great Britain, which, unless prevented by a union of this kind, seems very likely to take place, those factions would be ten times more virulent than ever. Before the commencement of the present disturbances, the coercive power of the mother-country had always been able to restrain those factions from breaking out into any thing worse than gross brutality and insult. If that coercive power were entirely taken away, they would probably soon break out into open violence and bloodshed. In all great countries which are united under one uniform government, the spirit of party commonly prevails less in the remote provinces than in the centre of the empire. The distance of those provinces from the capital, from the principal seat of the great scramble of faction and ambition, makes them enter less into the views of any of the contending parties, and renders them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. The spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than in England. In the case of a union, it would probably prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland; and the colonies would probably soon enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity, at present unknown in any part of the British empire. Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed, would be subjected to heavier taxes than any which they at present pay. In consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful application of the public revenue towards the discharge of the national debt, the greater part of those taxes might not be of long continuance, and the public revenue of Great Britain might soon be reduced to what was necessary for maintaining a moderate peace-establishment.

No oppressive aristocracy has ever dominated the colonies. Still, they would greatly benefit in terms of happiness and peace by uniting with Great Britain. It would at least protect them from those bitter and hostile factions that often arise in small democracies, which have repeatedly divided the loyalty of their citizens and disrupted the stability of their mostly democratic governments. If a complete separation from Great Britain occurs, which seems likely without such a union, those factions would become even more aggressive than ever. Before the current unrest began, the authority of the mother country had always managed to keep these factions from escalating beyond brutal behavior and insults. If that authority were completely removed, they would likely soon erupt into open violence and bloodshed. In large countries under a single government, the influence of party spirit tends to be weaker in outlying regions than in the center of power. The distance of those regions from the capital, the main hub of political conflict and ambition, makes them less involved in the goals of any of the rival factions and allows them to be more impartial observers of everyone’s actions. The party spirit is less strong in Scotland than in England. If a union happens, it would likely be even weaker in Ireland than in Scotland; and the colonies would probably soon experience a level of agreement and unity currently unseen in any part of the British Empire. Both Ireland and the colonies would indeed face higher taxes than they do now. However, due to diligent and responsible use of public funds to pay off national debt, most of those taxes might not last long, and Britain’s public revenue could soon be reduced to what is necessary for maintaining a moderate peacetime military presence.

The territorial acquisitions of the East-India Company, the undoubted right of the Crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain, might be rendered another source of revenue, more abundant, perhaps, than all those already mentioned. Those countries are represented as more fertile, more extensive, and, in proportion to their extent, much richer and more populous than Great Britain. In order to draw a great revenue from them, it would not probably be necessary to introduce any new system of taxation into countries which are already sufficiently, and more than sufficiently, taxed. It might, perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to aggravate the burden of those unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to draw a revenue from them, not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing the embezzlement and misapplication of the greater part of those which they already pay.

The land acquisitions of the East India Company, which rightfully belong to the Crown, meaning the state and people of Great Britain, could provide another source of revenue, potentially even greater than all the ones previously mentioned. These territories are said to be more fertile, larger in size, and, relative to their size, much wealthier and more populated than Great Britain. To generate significant revenue from them, it likely wouldn’t be necessary to implement any new tax system in places that are already heavily taxed. It might be better to ease rather than worsen the burden on these struggling nations and to find ways to increase revenue not by adding new taxes but by stopping the theft and misuse of most of the taxes they currently pay.

If it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any considerable augmentation of revenue from any of the resources above mentioned, the only resource which can remain to her, is a diminution of her expense. In the mode of collecting and in that of expending the public revenue, though in both there may be still room for improvement, Great Britain seems to be at least as economical as any of her neighbours. The military establishment which she maintains for her own defence in time of peace, is more moderate than that of any European state, which can pretend to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of those articles, therefore, seem to admit of any considerable reduction of expense. The expense of the peace-establishment of the colonies was, before the commencement of the present disturbances, very considerable, and is an expense which may, and, if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought certainly to be saved altogether. This constant expense in time of peace, though very great, is insignificant in comparison with what the defence of the colonies has cost us in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken altogether on account of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it has already been observed, upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish war of 1739 was principally undertaken on their account; in which, and in the French war that was the consequence of it, Great Britain, spent upwards of forty millions; a great part of which ought justly to be charged to the colonies. In those two wars, the colonies cost Great Britain much more than double the sum which the national debt amounted to before the commencement of the first of them. Had it not been for those wars, that debt[Pg 404] might, and probably would by this time, have been completely paid; and had it not been for the colonies, the former of those wars might not, and the latter certainly would not, have been undertaken. It was because the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British Empire, that this expense was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire, cannot be considered as provinces. They may, perhaps, be considered as appendages, as a sort of splendid and shewy equipage of the empire. But if the empire can no longer support the expense of keeping up this equipage, it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it cannot raise its revenue in proportion to its expense, it ought at least to accommodate its expense to its revenue. If the colonies, notwithstanding their refusal to submit to British taxes, are still to be considered as provinces of the British empire, their defence, in some future war, may cost Great Britain as great an expense as it ever has done in any former war. The rulers of Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost, immense expense, without being likely to bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it has been shewn, are to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of profit. It is surely now time that our rulers should either realize this golden dream, in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as the people; or that they should awake from it themselves, and endeavour to awaken the people. If the project cannot be completed, it ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil or military establishments in time of peace; and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.

If it's found that Great Britain can't significantly increase revenue from the resources mentioned above, the only option left is to cut expenses. Although there’s still room for improvement in how the public revenue is collected and spent, Great Britain seems to be at least as economical as her neighbors. The military establishment she maintains for her defense during peacetime is more modest than any European state that can compete with her in wealth or power. Therefore, none of these areas seem to allow for significant expense reduction. The cost of the colonial peace establishment was quite considerable before the current disruptions, and this is an expense that should certainly be eliminated if no revenue can be generated from them. This ongoing expense during peacetime, while significant, is trivial compared to the defense costs of the colonies in wartime. The last war, fought entirely for the colonies' sake, cost Great Britain over ninety million, as previously noted. The Spanish war of 1739 was mainly for their benefit, leading to the French war that followed, costing Great Britain over forty million, a large portion of which should justly be attributed to the colonies. In these two wars, the colonies cost Great Britain more than double the national debt before the first war began. Without these wars, that debt might have been fully paid off by now, and without the colonies, the former war might not have happened, and the latter definitely wouldn’t have. It was because the colonies were thought to be part of the British Empire that this expense was incurred. However, regions that contribute neither revenue nor military support to the empire can't be treated as provinces. They might be viewed as accessories or a sort of extravagant decoration of the empire. But if the empire can’t sustain the cost of maintaining this decoration, it should definitely discard it; and if it can’t generate revenue that matches its expenses, it must at least adjust its expenses to its revenue. If the colonies, despite refusing to accept British taxes, are still viewed as provinces of the British Empire, their defense in future wars may cost Great Britain as much as it has in past conflicts. For over a century, the leaders of Great Britain have captivated the public with the idea that they have a vast empire on the west side of the Atlantic. Yet, this empire has only existed in imagination so far. It’s not an empire but merely the concept of one; not a gold mine, but the idea of a gold mine—an idea that has cost, continues to cost, and if pursued in the same manner, is likely to incur tremendous costs without yielding any profit. The outcomes of the monopoly on colonial trade have proven to result in loss rather than gain for the majority. It’s time for our leaders to either bring this golden dream to fruition, which they might have been indulging in along with the public, or awaken from it themselves and strive to wake others. If the project can't be realized, it should be abandoned. If any of the provinces of the British Empire can't be made to contribute to the empire's support, it's certainly time for Great Britain to relieve herself of the costs of defending those provinces during war and supporting any part of their civil or military operations during peace and to adjust her future plans to the reality of her situation.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] It is mentioned, that when about three years old, he was stolen from the door of his uncle, Mr. Douglas, in Strathenry, where his mother had been on a visit, by some tinkers, or gypsies. He was rescued in Leslie wood by his uncle, who was thus the happy instrument, Mr. Stewart observes, of preserving to the world, a genius, which was destined, not only to extend the boundaries of science, but to enlighten and reform the commercial policy of Europe.

[1] It's reported that when he was about three years old, he was taken from the doorstep of his uncle, Mr. Douglas, in Strathenry, where his mother was visiting, by some tinkers or gypsies. He was rescued in Leslie woods by his uncle, who was, as Mr. Stewart notes, the fortunate means of preserving a talent that was meant not only to push the limits of science but also to enlighten and reform Europe's commercial policies.

[2] Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. iv. p. 17

[2] Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. iv. p. 17

[3] Edinburgh Review, vol. i. p. 432.

[3] Edinburgh Review, vol. i. p. 432.

[4] It may not be uninteresting to mention what has been said of the manner in which the writings of Mr. Smith were composed.—'Mr. Smith observed to me, not long before his death,' says Mr. Stewart, 'that after all his practice in writing, he composed as slowly, and with as great difficulty as at first.' He added, at the same time, that Mr. Hume had acquired so great a facility in this respect, that the last volume of his History was printed from the original copy, with a few marginal corrections. Mr. Smith, when be was employed in composition, generally walked up and down his apartment, dictating to a secretary. All Mr. Hume's works, it has been said, were written with his own hand.

[4] It might be worth mentioning what has been said about how Mr. Smith's writings were created. "Mr. Smith told me, shortly before his death," says Mr. Stewart, "that despite all his experience in writing, he still composed as slowly and with as much difficulty as he did at the beginning." He added that Mr. Hume had become so skilled in this area that the last volume of his History was printed directly from the original manuscript, with just a few notes in the margins. Mr. Smith typically walked back and forth in his room while dictating to a secretary when he was writing. It is said that all of Mr. Hume's works were written by him personally.

[5] This observation, as may easily be perceived, cannot apply in certain indirect imposts, such as those for the support of the roads; which, as they cannot be confounded with the price of any consumable commodity, combine all the inconveniencies of indirect, with those of direct imposts.

[5] This point, as can be easily seen, doesn't apply to certain indirect taxes, like those for road maintenance; since they can’t be mixed up with the price of any consumer goods, they combine all the drawbacks of indirect taxes with those of direct taxes.

[6] Plin. Hist. Nat. lib. 33, cap. 3.

[6] Plin. Hist. Nat. Book 33, Chapter 3.

[7] Pliny, lib. xxxiii. cap. 3.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Pliny, book 33, ch. 3.

[8] This was written in 1773, before the commencement of the late disturbances.

[8] This was written in 1773, before the start of the recent unrest.

[9] See his scheme for the maintenance of the poor, in Burn's History of the Poor Laws.

[9] Check out his plan for supporting the poor in Burn's History of the Poor Laws.

[10] See Denisart, Article Taux des Interests, tom. iii, p. 18.

[10] See Denisart, Article Interest Rates, vol. iii, p. 18.

[11] See Idyllium xxi.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Idyllium 21.

[12] See Madox Firma Burgi p. 26 &c.

[12] See Madox Firma Burgi p. 26 &c.

[13] See the Statute of Labourers, 25, Ed. III.

[13] See the Statute of Labourers, 25, Ed. III.

[14] Voyages d'un Philosophe.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Adventures of a Philosopher.

[15] Douglas's Summary, vol. ii, p. 372, 373.

[15] Douglas's Summary, vol. ii, p. 372, 373.

[16] See his Preface to Anderson's Diplomata Scotiæ.

[16] Check out his Preface to Anderson's Diplomata Scotiæ.

[17] Lowndes's Essay on the Silver Coin, 68.

[17] Lowndes's Essay on Silver Coins, 68.

[18] See Tracts on the Corn Trade, Tract 3.

[18] See Tracts on the Corn Trade, Tract 3.

[19] Solorzano, vol. ii.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Solorzano, vol. 2.

[20] Postscript to the Universal Merchant, p. 15 and 16. This postscript was not printed till 1756, three years after the publication of the book, which has never had a second edition. The postscript is, therefore, to be found in few copies; it corrects several error in the book.

[20] Postscript to the Universal Merchant, p. 15 and 16. This postscript wasn’t printed until 1756, three years after the book was published, which has never had a second edition. Therefore, the postscript is found in only a few copies; it corrects several errors in the book.

[21] See Ruddiman's Preface to Anderson's Diplomata, &c. Scotiæ.

[21] See Ruddiman's Preface to Anderson's Diplomata, & c. Scotland.

[22] Lib. x, c. 29.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Book 10, chapter 29.

[23] Lib. ix, c. 17.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Book 9, Chapter 17.

[24] Kalm's Travels, vol. i, p. 343, 344.

[24] Kalm's Travels, vol. 1, pp. 343, 344.

[25] See Smith's Memoirs of Wool, vol. i. c. 5, 6, 7. also vol. ii.

[25] See Smith's Memoirs of Wool, vol. i. c. 5, 6, 7. also vol. ii.

[26] Wanting in the account. The year 1646 supplied by Bishop Fleetwood.

[26] Missing from the record. The year 1646 provided by Bishop Fleetwood.

[27] See Ruddiman's Preface to Anderson's Diplomata, &c. Scotiæ.

[27] See Ruddiman's Preface to Anderson's Diplomata, &c. Scotland.

[28] The method described in the text was by no means either the must common or the most expensive one in which those adventurers sometimes raised money by circulation. It frequently happened, that A in Edinburgh would enable B in London to pay the first bill of exchange, by drawing, a few days before it became due, a second bill at three months date upon the same B in London. This bill, being payable to his own order, A sold in Edinburgh at par; and with its contents purchased bills upon London, payable at sight to the order of B, to whom he sent them by the post. Towards the end of the late war, the exchange between Edinburgh and London was frequently three per cent. against Edinburgh, and those bills at sight must frequently have cost A that premium. This transaction, therefore, being repeated at least four times in the year, and being loaded with a commission of at least one half per cent, upon each repetition, must at that period have cost A, at least, fourteen per cent. in the year. At other times A would enable B to discharge the first bill of exchange, by drawing, a few days before it became due, a second bill at two months date, not upon B, but upon some third person, C, for example, in London. This other bill was made payable to the order of B, who, upon its being accepted by C, discounted it with some banker in London; and A enabled C to discharge it, by drawing, a few days before it became due, a third bill likewise at two months date, sometimes upon his first correspondent B and sometimes upon some fourth or fifth person, D or E, for example. This third bill was made payable to the order of C, who, as soon as it was accepted, discounted it in the same manner with some banker in London. Such operations being repeated at least six times in the year, and being loaded with a commission of at least one half per cent. upon each repetition, together with legal interest of five per cent. this method of raising money, in the same manner as described in the text, must have cost A something more than eight per cent. By saving, however, the exchange between Edinburgh and London, it was less expensive than that mentioned in the foregoing part of this note; but then it required an established credit with more houses than one in London, an advantage which many of these adventurers could not always find it easy to procure.

[28] The method outlined in the text was neither the most common nor the most expensive way for those adventurers to raise money through circulation. Often, A in Edinburgh would enable B in London to pay the first bill of exchange by drawing a second bill at a three-month date a few days before the first was due. This second bill, payable to A's order, was sold in Edinburgh at face value, and with the proceeds, A purchased bills on London that were payable on sight to B, whom he sent them to by mail. Toward the end of the recent war, the exchange rate between Edinburgh and London often favored London by three percent, meaning those sight bills likely cost A that premium. Thus, this transaction, repeated at least four times a year and charged at a commission of at least half a percent per transaction, would have cost A at least fourteen percent in total for the year. Sometimes, A would enable B to settle the first bill by drawing a second bill at a two-month date not on B, but on a third person, like C in London. This other bill was made payable to B's order, who discounted it with a banker in London after C accepted it; A then enabled C to pay it off by drawing a third bill, also at a two-month date, sometimes on B and sometimes on another person, like D or E. This third bill was made payable to C, who, upon acceptance, would also discount it with a banker in London. With these operations happening at least six times a year, and each transaction incurring a commission of at least half a percent along with a legal interest charge of five percent, this method of raising money, as described, would have cost A just over eight percent. However, by saving on the exchange rate between Edinburgh and London, it was cheaper than the method mentioned earlier in this note, but it required established credit with multiple houses in London, which many of these adventurers found difficult to obtain.

[29] James Postlethwaite's History of the Public Revenue, p. 301

[29] James Postlethwaite's History of the Public Revenue, p. 301

[30] Some French authors of great learning and ingenuity have used those words in a different sense. In the last chapter of the fourth book, I shall endeavour to shew that their sense is an improper one.

[30] Some knowledgeable and clever French writers have used those words in a different way. In the last chapter of the fourth book, I will try to show that their meaning is incorrect.

[31] See Brady's Historical Treatise of Cities and Boroughs, p. 3. &c.

[31] See Brady's Historical Treatise of Cities and Boroughs, p. 3. &c.

[32] See Madox, Firma Burgi, p. 18; also History of the Exchequer, chap. 10, sect. v, p. 223, first edition.

[32] See Madox, Firma Burgi, p. 18; also History of the Exchequer, chap. 10, sect. v, p. 223, first edition.

[33] See Madox, Firma Burgi. See also Pfeffel in the Remarkable events under Frederick II. and his Successors of the House of Suabia.

[33] See Madox, Firma Burgi. Also check out Pfeffel in the Remarkable events under Frederick II. and his Successors of the House of Suabia.

[34] See Madox

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Check out Madox

[35] See Pfeffel

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Pfeffel

[36] See Sandi Istoria civile de Vinezia, part 2, vol. i, page 247 and 256.

[36] See Sandi Istoria civile de Vinezia, part 2, vol. i, page 247 and 256.

[37] The following are the prices at which the bank of Amsterdam at present (September 1775) receives bullion and coin of different kinds:

[37] Here are the current prices at which the Bank of Amsterdam is accepting bullion and various types of coins as of September 1775:

SILVER.
Mexico dollars} Guilders. B—22 per mark.
French crowns
English silver coin
Mexico dollars, new coin     21 10
Ducatoons3   0
Rix-dollars2   8

Bar silver, containing 11-12ths fine silver, 21 per mark, and in this proportion down to 1-4th fine, on which 5 guilders are given.

Bar silver, which has 11-12ths pure silver, is valued at 21 per mark, and is graded down to 1-4th pure, for which 5 guilders are given.

Fine bars, 28 per mark.

Fine bars, 28 per ounce.

GOLD.
Portugal coinI'm sorry, but there doesn't seem to be any text provided. Please provide a specific phrase or piece of text you'd like me to modernize. B—310 per mark.
Guineas
Louis d'ors, new
Ditto old300
New ducats     4 19 8 per ducat.

Bar or ingot gold is received in proportion to its fineness, compared with the above foreign gold coin. Upon fine bars the bank gives 340 per mark. In general, however, something more is given upon coin of a known fineness, than upon gold and silver bars, of which the fineness cannot be ascertained but by a process of melting and assaying.

Bar or ingot gold is accepted based on its purity, compared to foreign gold coins mentioned above. For fine bars, the bank pays 340 per mark. In general, though, a bit more is paid for coins of known purity than for gold and silver bars, whose purity can only be determined through melting and testing.

[38] This paragraph was written in the year 1775.

[38] This paragraph was written in 1775.

[39] See the accounts at the end of this Book.

[39] Check out the accounts at the end of this Book.

[40] Before the 13th of the present king, the following were the duties payable upon the importation of the different sorts of grain:

[40] Before the 13th of the current king, the following were the fees due on the importation of various types of grain:

Grain.Duties.Duties.Duties.
Beans to 28s. per qr.19s. 10d. after till 40s.     16s. 8d.then 12d.
Barley to 28s.19s. 10d. after till 32s.16s.12d.
Malt is prohibited by the annual malt-tax bill.
Oats to 16s.5s. 10d. after9½d.
Pease to 40s.16s. 0d. after9¾d.
Rye to 36s.19s. 10d. till 40s.16s. 8d.   then 12d.
Wheat to 44s.21s. 9d. till 53s. 4d.17s.then   8s.
    till L.4, and after that about 1s. 4d.
Buck-wheat to 32s. per qr. to pay 16s.

These different duties were imposed, partly by the 22d of Charles II. in place of the old subsidy, partly by the new subsidy, by the one-third and two-thirds subsidy, and by the subsidy 1747.

These different duties were imposed, partly by the 22nd of Charles II. instead of the old subsidy, partly by the new subsidy, by the one-third and two-thirds subsidy, and by the subsidy of 1747.

[41] See Dictionnaire des Monnoies, tom. ii. article Seigneurage, p. 489, par M. Abbot de Baringhen, Conseiller-Commissaire en la Cour des Monnoies à Paris.

[41] See Dictionnaire des Monnoies, vol. ii, article Seigneurage, p. 489, by M. Abbot de Baringhen, Advisor-Commissioner in the Court of Coins in Paris.

[42] The interest of every proprietor of India stock, however, is by no means the same with that of the country in the government of which his vote gives him some influence.—See book v, chap. i, part ii.

[42] The interests of every owner of India stock are not necessarily aligned with the interests of the country where his vote gives him some influence.—See book v, chap. i, part ii.

[43] See book I chap. I

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Book 1, Ch. 1

[44] See the Journal of Mr. De Lange, in Bell's Travels, vol. ii. p. 258, 276, 293.

[44] Check out the Journal of Mr. De Lange in Bell's Travels, vol. ii. p. 258, 276, 293.

[45] Plin. 1. ix. c. 30.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Pliny 1. 9. c. 30.

[46] Plin. 1. viii. c. 48.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Pliny 1.8.48.

[47] They are to be found in Tyrol's History of England.

[47] You can find them in Tyrol's History of England.

[48] Since publishing the first two editions of this book, I have got good reasons to believe that all the turnpike tolls levied in Great Britain do not produce a neat revenue that amounts to half a million; a sum which, under the management of government, would not be sufficient to keep in repair five of the principal roads in the kingdom.

[48] Since publishing the first two editions of this book, I have strong reasons to believe that all the tolls collected on the turnpikes in Great Britain do not generate a tidy revenue that totals half a million; an amount that, under government management, would not be enough to maintain five of the main roads in the country.

[49] I have now good reason to believe that all those conjectural sums are by much too large.

[49] I now have good reason to believe that all those estimated amounts are actually much too high.

[50] See Memoires concernant les Droits et Impositions en Europe, tome i. page 73. This work was compiled by the order of the court, for the use of a commission employed for some years past in considering the proper means for reforming the finances of France. The account of the French taxes, which takes up three volumes in quarto, may be regarded as perfectly authentic. That of those of other European nations was compiled from such information as the French ministers at the different courts could procure. It is much shorter, and probably not quite so exact as that of the French taxes.

[50] See Memoires concerning the Rights and Taxes in Europe, volume i. page 73. This work was put together by order of the court for a commission that has been working for several years on finding ways to reform France's finances. The account of French taxes, which fills three quarto volumes, can be considered completely reliable. The account of taxes from other European countries was put together based on the information that French ministers could gather from various courts. It is much shorter and likely not quite as accurate as the account of French taxes.

[51] See Memoires concernant les Droits et Impositions en Europe tome i. p. 73.

[51] See Memoirs on Rights and Taxes in Europe, Volume I, p. 73.

[52] See Sketches of the History of Man page 474, and Seq.

[52] See Sketches of the History of Man page 474, and Seq.

[53] Memoires concernant les Droits, p. 240, 241.

[53] Memoirs on Rights, pp. 240, 241.

[54] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 114, 115, 116, &c.

[54] Memoirs on Rights, etc. vol. i. pp. 114, 115, 116, etc.

[55] Id. tom. i. p. 83, 84.

[55] Id. vol. 1, pp. 83, 84.

[56] Id. p. 280, &c.; also p. 287, &c. to 316.

[56] Id. p. 280, &c.; also p. 287, &c. to 316.

[57] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. ii. p. 139, &c.

[57] Memoirs on Rights, etc. vol. ii, p. 139, etc.

[58] Since the first publication of this book, a tax nearly upon the above-mentioned principles has been imposed.

[58] Since the first publication of this book, a tax based on the principles mentioned above has been implemented.

[59] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. p. 223.

[59] Memoirs concerning the Rights, etc. p. 223.

[60] Memoires concernant les Droits, tom. i, p. 74.

[60] Memoirs on Rights, vol. 1, p. 74.

[61] Memoires concernant les Droits, tom. i, p. 163, 167, 171.

[61] Memoirs on Rights, vol. i, pp. 163, 167, 171.

[62] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. ii. p. 17.

[62] Memoirs on the Rights, etc. vol. ii. p. 17.

[63] Lib. 55. See also Burman, de Vectigalibus Pop. Rom. cap. xi. and Bouchaud de l'impot du vingtieme sur les successions.

[63] Lib. 55. Also check Burman, on the Taxes of the Roman People, chapter xi, and Bouchaud on the twentieth tax on inheritances.

[64] See Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 225.

[64] See Memoirs on Rights, etc. vol. i. p. 225.

[65] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 154.

[65] Memoirs on Rights, etc., vol. i, p. 154.

[66] Id. p. 157.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Same source, p. 157.

[67] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 223, 224, 225.

[67] Memoirs regarding Rights, etc. vol. i. pp. 223, 224, 225.

[68] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. ii. p. 108.

[68] Memoirs on Rights, etc. vol. ii. p. 108.

[69] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. iii. p. 87.

[69] Memoirs on Rights, etc. vol. iii. p. 87.

[70] See book i. chap. 8.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Book 1, Chapter 8.

[71] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c., p. 210, 211.

[71] Memoirs about the Rights, &c., p. 210, 211.

[72] Le Reformateur

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Reformer

[73] Though the duties directly imposed upon proof spirits amount only to 2s. 6d. per gallon, these, added to the duties upon the low wines, from which they are distilled, amount to 3s. 1023d. Both low wines and proof spirits are, to prevent frauds, now rated according to what they gauge in the wash.

[73] Even though the taxes directly applied to proof spirits are just 2s. 6d. per gallon, when you include the taxes on the low wines they come from, the total comes to 3s. 1023d. To prevent cheating, both low wines and proof spirits are now assessed based on their volume in the wash.

[74] The neat production of that year, after deducting all expenses and allowances, amounted to L.4,975,652 : 19 : 6.

[74] The total output for that year, after subtracting all costs and allowances, was £4,975,652.19.6.

[75] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. 1, p. 45

[75] Memoirs on Rights, etc. vol. 1, p. 45

[76] See Examen des Reflections Politiques sut les Finances.

[76] See Examination of Political Reflections on Finances.

[77] See James Postlethwaite's History of the Public Revenue.

[77] Check out James Postlethwaite's History of the Public Revenue.

[78] It has proved more expensive than any one of our former wars, and has involved us in an additional debt of more than one hundred millions. During a profound peace of eleven years, little more than ten millions of debt was paid; during a war of seven years, more than one hundred millions was contracted.

[78] It has turned out to be more costly than any of our previous wars and has put us into an extra debt of over one hundred million. In a deep peace lasting eleven years, we paid off just over ten million in debt; during a seven-year war, we took on more than one hundred million.

[79] See Du Cange Glossary, voce Moneta; the Benedictine Edition.

[79] See Du Cange Glossary, entry Moneta; the Benedictine Edition.

[80] See Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts Bay vol. ii, page 436, et seq.

[80] Check out Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts Bay vol. ii, page 436, and following.


INDEX.


A

Absentee tax, the propriety of, considered with reference to Ireland, 379.

Accounts of money, in modern Europe, all kept, and the value of goods computed, in silver, 16.

Actors, public, paid for the contempt attending their profession, 44.

Africa, cause assigned for the barbarous state of the interior parts of that continent, 9.

African company, establishment and constitution of, 309.
Receive an annual allowance from parliament for forts and garrisons, 310.
The company not under sufficient controul, ib.
History of the Royal African company, 311.
Decline of, ib. Rise of the present company, ib.

Age, the foundation of rank and precedency in rude as well as civilized societies, 297.

Aggregate fund, in the British finances, explained, 388.

Agio of the bank of Amsterdam explained, 194.
Of the bank of Hamburgh, 195.
The agio at Amsterdam, how kept at a medium rate, 197.

Agriculture, the labour of, does not admit of such subdivisions as manufactures, 3.
This impossibility of separation prevents agriculture from improving equally with manufactures, ib.
Natural state of, in a new colony, 38.
Requires more knowledge and experience than most mechanical professions, and yet is carried on without any restrictions, 53.
The terms of rent, how adjusted between landlord and tenant, 60.
Is extended by good roads and navigable canals, 62.
Under what circumstances pasture land is more valuable than arable, 63.
Gardening not a very gainful employment, 64.
Vines the most profitable article of culture, 65.
Estimates of profit from projects very fallacious, ib.
Cattle and tillage mutually improve each other, 93.
Remarks on that of Scotland, ib.
On that of North America, 94.
Poultry, a profitable article in husbandry, ib.
Hogs, 95.
Dairy, 96.
Evidences of land being completely improved, ib.
The extension of cultivation, as it raises the price of animal food, reduces that of vegetables, 103.
By whom and how practised under feudal government, 137.
Its operations not so much intended to increase, as to direct the fertility of nature, 149.
Has been the cause of the prosperity of the British colonies in America, 150.
The profits of, exaggerated by projectors, 154.
On equal terms, is naturally preferred to trade, 156.
Artificers necessary to the carrying it on, ib.
Was not attended to by the northern destroyers of the Roman empire, 157.
The ancient policy of Europe unfavourable to, 162.
Was promoted by the commerce and manufactures of towns, 170.
The wealth arising from, more solid and durable than that which proceeds from commerce, 172.
Is not encouraged by the bounty on the exportation of corn, 207.
Why the proper business of new companies, 251.
The present agricultural system of political economy adopted in France, described, 275.
Is discouraged by restrictions and prohibitions in trade, 279.
Is favoured beyond manufactures in China, 282.
And in Indostan, 283.
Does not require so extensive a market as manufactures, 284.
To check manufactures in order to promote agriculture, false policy, 285.
Landlords ought to be encouraged to cultivate part of their own land, 350.

Alcavala, the tax in Spain so called, explained and considered, 381.
The ruin of the Spanish manufactures attributed to this tax, ib.

Alehouses, the number of, not the efficient cause of drunkenness, 148, 200.

Allodial rights, mistaken for feudal rights, 168.
The introduction of the feudal law tended to moderate the authority of the allodial lords, ib.

Ambassadors, the first motive of their appointment, 307.

America, why labour is dearer in North America than in England, 29.
Great increase of population there, ib.
Common rate of interest there, 38.
Is a new market for the produce of its own silver mines, 85.
[Pg 406]The first accounts of the two empires of Peru and Mexico greatly exaggerated, ib.
Improving state of the Spanish colonies there, 86.
Account of the paper currency of the British colonies, 134.
Cause of the rapid prosperity of the British colonies there, 150.
Why manufactures for distant sale have never been established there, 156.
Its speedy improvement owing to assistance from foreign capitals, 157.
The purchase and improvement of uncultivated land the most profitable employment of capitals, 171.
Commercial alterations produced by the discovery of, 181.
But two civilized nations found on the whole continent, ib.
The wealth of the North American colonies increased, though the balance of trade continued against them, 203.
Madeira wine, how introduced there, 204.
Historical review of the European settlements in, 229.
Of Spain, 232, 233.
Of Holland, 234.
Of France, ib.
Of Britain, ib.
Ecclesiastical government in the several European colonies, 235.
Fish a principal article of trade from North America to Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean, 237.
Naval stores to Britain, 238.
Little credit due to the policy of Europe from the success of the colonies, 242.
The discovery and colonization of, how far advantageous to Europe, 243.
And to America, ib.
The colonies in, governed by a spirit of monopoly, 261.
The interest of the consumer in Britain sacrificed to that of the producer, by the system of colonization, 274.
Plan for extending the British system of taxation, over all the provinces of, 397, 398.
The question, how the Americans could pay taxes without specie, considered, 402.
Ought in justice to contribute to discharge the public debt in Britain, 402.
Expediency of their union with Britain, 403.
The British empire there a mere project, 404.

Amsterdam, agio of the bank of, explained, 194.
Occasion of its establishment, 195.
Advantages attending payments there, ib.
Rate demanded for keeping money there, ib.
Prices at which bullion and coin are received, 196, note.
This bank the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, 197.
Demands upon, how made and answered, ib.
The agio, how kept at a medium rate, ib.
The treasure of, whether all preserved in its repositories, 198.
The amount of its treasure only to be conjectured, ib.
Fees paid to the bank for transacting business, ib.

Annuities, for terms of years, and for lives, in the British finances, historical account of, 389.

Apothecaries, the profit on their drugs, unjustly stigmatized as exorbitant, 46.

Apprenticeship, the nature and intention of this bond of servitude, explained, 42.
The limitations imposed on various trades as to the number of apprentices, 50.
The statute of apprenticeship in England, ib.
Apprenticeships in France and Scotland, 51.
General remarks on the tendency and operation of long apprenticeships, ib.
The statute of, ought to be repealed, 191.

Arabs, their manner of supporting war, 289.

Army, three different ways by which a nation may maintain one in a distant country, 178.
Standing, distinction between and a militia, 292.
Historical review of, 294.
The Macedonian army, ib.
Carthaginian army, ib.
Roman army, ib.
Is alone able to perpetuate the civilization of a country, 296.
Is the speediest engine for civilizing a barbarous country, ib.
Under what circumstances dangerous to, and under what favourable to liberty, ib.

Artificers prohibited by law from going to foreign countries, 273.
Residing abroad, and not returning on notice, exposed to outlawry, ib.
See Manufactures.

Asdrubal, his army greatly improved by discipline, 294.
How defeated, ib.

Assembly, houses of, in the British colonies, the constitutional freedom of, shewn, 240.

Assiento Contract, 312.

Assize of bread and ale, remarks on that statute, 75, 77.

Augustus, emperor, emancipates the slaves of Vedius Pollio for his cruelty, 241.


B

Balance of annual produce and consumption explained, 203.
May be in favour of a nation, when the balance of trade is against it, ib.

Balance of trade, no certain criterion to determine on which side it turns between two countries, 192.
The current doctrine of, on which most regulations of trade are founded, absurd, 199.
If even, by the exchange of their native commodities, both sides may be gainers, ib.
How the balance would stand if native commodities on one side were paid with foreign commodities on the other, ib.
How the balance stands when commodities are purchased with gold and silver, ib., 200.
The ruin of countries often predicted from the doctrine of an unfavourable balance of trade, 202.

Banks, great increase of trade in Scotland since the establishment of them in the principal towns, 120.
Their usual course of business, 121.
Consequences of their issuing too much paper, 122.
Necessary caution for some time observed by them with regard to giving credit to their customers, 124.
Limits of the advances they may imprudently make to traders, 125.
How injured by the practice of drawing and redrawing bills, 126, 127.
History of the Ayr bank, 128.
History of the bank of England, 130.
The nature and public advantage of banks considered, 131.
Bankers might carry on their business with less paper, 132.
Effects of the optional clauses in the Scotch notes, 133.
Origin of their establishment, 194.
Bank money explained, 195.
Bank of England, the conduct of, in regard to the coinage, 226.
[Pg 407]Joint stock companies, why well adapted to the trade of banking, 317, 318.
A doubtful question, whether the government of Great Britain is equal to the management of the bank to profit, 344.

Bankers, the credit of their notes how established, 118.
The nature of the banking business explained, ib., 121.
The multiplication and competition of bankers, under proper regulations of service to public credit, 135.

Baretti, Mr. his account of the quantity of Portugal gold sent weekly to England, 225.

Barons, feudal, their power contracted by the grant of municipal privileges, 163.
Their extensive authority, 168.
How they lost their authority over their vassals, 169.
And the power to disturb their country, 170.

Barter, the exchange of one commodity for another, the propensity to, of extensive operation, and peculiar to man, 6.
Is not sufficient to carry on the mutual intercourse of mankind, 10. See Commerce.

Batavia, causes of the prosperity of the Dutch settlement there, 263.

Beaver skins, review of the policy used in the trade for, 273.

Beef, cheaper now in London than in the reign of James I., 63.
Compared with the prices of wheat at the corresponding times, 64.

Benefices, ecclesiastical, the tenure of, why rendered secure, 335.
The power of collating to, how taken from the pope, in England and France, 338.
General equality of, among the presbyterians, 340.
Good effects of this equality, ib.

Bengal, to what circumstances its early improvement in agriculture and manufactures was owing, 9.
Present miserable state of the country, 30.
Remarks on the high rates of interest there, 39.
Oppressive conduct of the English there, to suit their trade in opium, 263.
Why more remarkable for the exportation of manufactures than of grain, 284.

Berne, brief history of the republic of, 164.
Establishment of the reformation there, 338.
Application of the revenue of the catholic clergy, 341.
Derives a revenue from the interest of its treasure, 344.

Bills of Exchange, punctuality in the payment of, how secured, 126.
The pernicious practice of drawing and redrawing explained, ib.
The arts made use of to disguise this mutual traffic in bills, 127.

Birth, superiority of, how it confers respect and authority, 298.

Bishops, the ancient mode of electing them, and how altered, 335, 337.

Body, natural and political, analogy between, 280.

Bohemia, account of the tax there on the industry of artificers, 366.

Bounty, on the exportation of corn, the tendency of this measure examined, 81.

Bounties, why given in commerce, 183.
On exportation, the policy of granting them considered, 205.
On the exportation of corn, 206.
This bounty imposes two taxes on the people, 207.
Evil tendency of this bounty, 209.
The bounty only beneficial to the exporter and importer, ib.
Motives of the country gentlemen in granting the bounty, 210.
A trade which requires a bounty, necessarily a losing trade, ib.
Tonnage bounties to the fisheries considered, 211.
Account of the white-herring fishery, 212.
Remarks on other bounties, 213.
A review of the principles on which they are generally granted, 267.
Those granted on American produce founded on mistaken policy, 268.
How they affect the consumer, 274.

Bourdeaux, why a town of great trade, 138.

Brazil grew to be a powerful colony under neglect, 233.
The Dutch invaders expelled by the Portuguese colonists, ib.
Computed number of inhabitants there, ib.
The trade of the principal provinces oppressed by the Portuguese, 236.

Bread, its relative value with butcher's meat compared, 62, 63.

Brewery, reasons for transferring the taxes on to the malt, 376.

Bridges, how to be erected and maintained, 303.

Britain, Great, evidences that labour is sufficiently paid for there, 30.
The price of provisions nearly the same in most places, 31.
Great variations in the price of labour, ib.
Vegetables imported from Flanders in the last century, 32.
Historical account of the alterations interest of money has undergone, 37.
Double interest deemed a reasonable mercantile profit, 40.
In what respects the carrying trade is advantageous to, 152, 153.
Appears to enjoy more of the carrying trade of Europe than it really has, 153.
It is the only country of Europe in which the obligation of purveyance is abolished, 161.
Its funds for the support of foreign wars inquired into, 178, 179.
Why never likely to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle, 186.
Nor salt provisions, ib.
Could be little affected by the importation of foreign corn, 187.
The policy of the commercial restraints on the trade with France examined, 192.
The trade with France might be more advantageous to each country than that with any other, 202.
Why one of the richest countries in Europe, while Spain and Portugal are among the poorest, 221.
Review of her American colonies, 234.
The trade of her colonies, how regulated, 236.
Distinction between enumerated and non-enumerated commodities explained, 237.
Restrains manufactures in America, 238, 239.
Indulgences granted to the colonists, 239.
Constitutional freedom of her colony government, 240.
The sugar colonies of, worse governed than those of France, 241.
Disadvantages resulting from retaining the exclusive trade of tobacco with Maryland and Virginia, 244, 245.
[Pg 408]The navigation act has increased the colony trade, at the expense of many other branches of foreign trade, 245.
The advantage of the colony trade estimated, 247.
A gradual relaxation of the exclusive trade recommended, 250.
Events which have concurred to prevent the ill effects of the loss of the colony trade, ib.
The natural good effects of the colony trade more than counterbalance the bad effects of the monopoly, 251.
To maintain a monopoly, the principal end of the dominion assumed over the colonies, 254.
Has derived nothing but loss from this dominion, ib.
Is perhaps the only state which has only increased its expenses by extending its empire, 256.
The constitution of, would have been completed by admitting of American representation, 258.
Review of the administration of the East India Company, 264, 265.
The interest of the consumer sacrificed to that of the producer in raising an empire in America, 274.
The annual revenue of, compared with its annual rents and interest of capital stock, 345, 346.
The land-tax of, considered, 348.
Tithes, 352.
Window-tax, 357.
Stamp-duties, 363, 365.
Poll-taxes in the reign of William III., 367.
The uniformity of taxation in, favourable to internal trade, 382.
The system of taxation in, compared with that in France, 384.
Account of the unfunded debt of, 387.
Funded debt, 388.
Aggregate and general funds, ib.
Sinking fund, 389.
Annuities for terms of years and for lives, ib.
Perpetual annuities the best transferable stock, 391.
The reduction of the public debts during peace bears no proportion to their accumulation during war, 392.
The trade with the tobacco colonies, how carried on, without the intervention of specie, 401.
The trade with the sugar colonies explained, ib.
Ireland and America ought in justice to contribute towards the discharge of her public debts, 402.
How the territorial acquisitions of the East India Company might be rendered a source of revenue, 403.
If no such assistance can be obtained, her only resource pointed out, ib.

Bullion, the money of the great mercantile republic, 179. See Gold and Silver.

Burghs, free, the origin of, 163.
To what circumstances they owed their corporate jurisdictions, ib.
Why admitted to send representatives to parliament, 164.
Are allowed to protect refugees from the country, 165.

Burn, Dr. his observation on the laws relating to the settlements of the poor, 58, 59.

Butcher's meat, nowhere a necessary of life, 370.


C

Calvinists, origin of that sect, 339.
Their principles of church government, ib.

Cameron, Mr. of Lochiel, exercised, within thirty years since, a criminal jurisdiction over his own tenants, 168.

Canada, the French colony there, long under the government of an exclusive company, 234.
But improved speedily after the dissolution of the company, ib.

Canals, navigable, the advantages of, 62.
How to be made and maintained, 303.
That of Languedoc, the support of, how secured, ib.
May be successfully managed by joint stock companies, 317.

Cantillon, Mr. remarks on his account of the earnings of the labouring poor, 28.

Cape of Good Hope, causes of the prosperity of the Dutch settlement there, 263.

Capital, in trade, explained, and how employed, 112.
Distinguished into circulating and, fixed capitals, ib.
Characteristic of fixed capitals, 113.
The several kinds of fixed capitals specified, ib.
Characteristic of circulating capitals, and the several kinds of, 114.
Fixed capitals supported by those which are circulating, ib.
Circulating capitals how supported, ib.
Intention of a fixed capital, 116.
The expense of maintaining the fixed and circulating capitals illustrated, ib.
Money, as an article of circulating capital, considered, ib.
Money no measure of capital, 118.
What quantity of industry any capital can employ, 120.
Capitals, how far they may be extended by paper credit, 125.
Must always be replaced with profit by the annual produce of land and labour, 136.
The proportion between capital and revenue regulates the proportion between industry and idleness, 138.
How it is increased or diminished, ib.
National evidences of the increase of, 141.
In what instances private expenses contribute to enlarge the national capital, 142.
The increase of, reduces profits by competition, 145.
The different ways of employing a capital, 147.
How replaced to the different classes of traders, 148.
That employed in agriculture puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour than any equal capital employed in manufacturers, 149.
That of a manufacturer should reside within the country, 150.
The operation of capitals employed in agriculture, manufactures, and foreign trade compared, ib.
The prosperity of a country depends on the due proportion of its capital applied to these three grand objects, 151.
Different returns of capitals employed in foreign trade, 152.
Is rather employed in agriculture than in trade and manufactures, on equal terms, 155, 156.
Is rather employed in manufactures than in foreign trade, 156.
The natural progress of the employment of, 157.
Acquired by trade, is very precarious, until realized by the cultivation and improvement of land, 172.
The employment of, in the different species of trade, how determined, 183.

Capitation taxes, the nature of, considered, 367.
In England, ib.
In France, ib.

Carriage, land and water, compared, 8.
Water carriage contributes to improve arts and industry in all countries where it can be used, 9, 62, 87.
Land, how facilitated and reduced in price by public works, 303.
[Pg 409]
Carrying trade, the nature and operation of, examined, 152.
Is the symptom, but not the cause of national wealth, and hence points out the two richest countries in Europe, 153.
Trades may appear to be carrying trades which are not so, ib.
The disadvantages of, to individuals, 183.
The Dutch, how excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, 187, 188.
Drawbacks of duties originally granted for the encouragement of, 205.

Carthaginian army, its superiority over the Roman army accounted for, 294.

Cattle and Corn, their value compared, in the different stages of agriculture, 62.
The price of, reduced by artificial grasses, 63.
To what height the price of cattle may rise in an improving country, 92, 93.
The raising a stock of, necessary for the supply of manure to farms, 93.
Cattle must bear a good price to be well fed, ib.
The price of, rises in Scotland in consequence of the union with England ib.
Great multiplication of European cattle in America, 94.
Are killed in some countries merely for the sake of the hides and tallow, 97.
The market for these articles more extensive than for the carcase, ib.
This market sometimes brought nearer home by the establishment of manufactures, ib.
How the extension of cultivation raises the price of animal food, 103.
Is perhaps the only commodity more expensive to transport by sea than by land, 186.
Great Britain never likely to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle, ib.

Certificates, parish, the laws relating to, with observations on them, 58.

Child, Sir Josiah, his observation on trading companies, 309.

Children, riches unfavourable to the production, and extreme poverty to the raising, of them, 33.
The mortality still greater among those maintained by charity, ib.

China, to what the early improvement in arts and industry there was owing, 9.
Concurrent testimonies of the misery of the lower ranks of the Chinese, 30.
Is not, however, a declining country, ib.
High rate of interest of money there, 40.
Great state assumed by the grandees, 86.
The price of labour there lower than in the greater mpart of Europe, 87.
Silver the most profitable article to send thither, ib.
The proportional value of gold to silver, how rated there, 89.
The value of gold and silver much higher there than in any part of Europe, 101.
Agriculture favoured there beyond manufactures, 282.
Foreign trade not favoured there, 283.
Extension of the home market, ib.
Great attention paid to the roads there, 305, 306.
In what the principal revenue of the sovereign consists, 353.
The revenue of, partly raised in kind, ib.

Church, the richer the church the poorer the state, 341.
Amount of the revenue of church of Scotland, 342.
The revenue of the church heavier taxed in Prussia than lay proprietors, 351.
The nature and effect of tithes considered, 352.

Circulation, the dangerous practice of raising money by, explained, 127.
In traffic, the two different branches of, considered, 132.

Cities, circumstances which contributed to their opulence, 165.
Those of Italy the first that rose to consequence, ib.
The commerce and manufactures of, have occasioned the improvement and cultivation of the country, 170.

Clergy, a supply of, provided for, by public and private foundations for their education, 55.
Curates worse paid than many mechanics, ib.
Of an established religion, why unsuccessful against the teachers of a new religion, 330.
Why they persecute their adversaries, ib.
The zeal of the inferior clergy of the church of Rome, how kept alive, ib.
Utility of ecclesiastical establishments, 331.
How connected with the civil magistrate, ib., 332.
Unsafe for the civil magistrate to differ with them, 334.
Must be managed without violence, ib., 335.
Of the church of Rome, one great army cantoned over Europe, ib., 336.
Their power similar to that of the temporal barons during the feudal monkish ages, ib.
How the power of the Romish clergy declined, 337.
Evils attending allowing parishes to elect their own ministers, 339.

Clothing, more plentiful than food in uncultivated countries, 68.
The materials for, the first articles rude nations have to offer, ib.

Coal must generally be cheaper than wood to gain the preference for fuel, 70.
The price of, how reduced, ib.
The exportation of, subjected to a duty higher than the prime cost of, at the pit, 273.
The cheapest of all fuel, 370.
The tax on absurdly regulated, ib.

Coal mines, their different degrees of fertility, 70.
When fertile, are sometimes unprofitable by situation, ib.
The proportion of rent generally paid for, ib., 71.
The machinery necessary to, expensive, 112.

Coal trade from Newcastle to London employs more shipping than all the other carrying trade of England, 153.

Cochin China, remarks on the principal article of cultivation there, 66.

Coin, stamped, the origin and peculiar advantages of, in commerce, 11.
The different species of, in different ages and countries, ib.
Causes of the alterations in the value of, ib., 12, 13, 14.
How the standard coin of different nations came to be of different metals, 16.
A reform in the English coinage suggested, 19.
Silver, consequences attending the debasement of, 82.
Coinage of France and Britain examined, 193.
Why coin is privately melted down, 225.
The mint chiefly employed to keep up the quantity thus diminished, ib.
A duty to pay the coinage would preserve money from being melted or counterfeited, ib.
Standard of the gold coin in France, ib.
How a seignorage on coin would operate, 226.
[Pg 410]A tax upon coinage is advanced by every body, and finally paid by nobody, ib.
A revenue lost by government defraying the expense of coinage, 227.
Amount of the annual coinage before the late reformation of the gold coin, ib.
The law for the encouragement of, founded on prejudice, ib.
Consequences of raising the denomination as an expedient to facilitate the payment of public debts, 395.
Adulteration of, 397.

Colbert, M., the policy of his commercial regulations disputed, 189, 275.
His character, 275.

Colleges, cause of the depreciation of their money rents inquired into, 14.
The endowments of, from whence they generally arise, 318.
Whether they have in general answered the purposes of their institution, ib.
These endowments have diminished the necessity of application in the teachers, 319.
The privileges of graduates by residence, and charitable foundation of scholarships, injurious to collegiate education, 320.
Discipline of, ib.

Colliers and Coal-heavers, their high earnings accounted for, 43.

Colonies, new, the natural progress of, 38.
Modern, the commercial advantages derived from them, 183.
Ancient, on what principles founded, 227, 228.
Ancient Grecian colonies not retained under subjection to the parent states, ib.
Distinction between the Roman and Greek colonies, 228.
Circumstances that led to the establishment of European colonies in the East Indies and America, ib.
The East Indies discovered by Vasco de Gama, 229.
The West, Indies discovered by Columbus, ib.
Gold the object of the first Spanish enterprises there, 230.
And of all those of all other European nations, 231.
Causes of the prosperity of new colonies, ib.
Rapid progress of the ancient Greek colonies, 232.
The Roman colonies slow in improvement, ib.
The remoteness of America and the West Indies greatly in favour of the European colonies there, ib.
Review of the British American colonies, 234.
Expense of the civil establishments in British America, 235.
Ecclesiastical government, ib.
General view of the restraints laid upon the trade of the European colonies, 236.
The trade of the British colonies, how regulated, ib.
The different kinds of non-enumerated commodities specified, 237.
Enumerated commodities, 238.
Restraints upon their manufactures, ib.
Indulgences granted them by Britain, 239.
Were free in every other respect except as to their foreign trade, 240.
Little credit due to the policy of Europe from the success of the colonies, 242.
Throve by the disorder and injustice of the European governments, ib.
Have contributed to augment the industry of all the countries of Europe, 243.
Exclusive privileges of trade a dead weight upon all these exertions both in Europe and America, ib.
Have in general been a source of expense instead of revenue to their mother countries, 244.
Have only benefited their mother countries by the exclusive trade carried on with them, ib.
Consequences of the navigation act, 245.
The advantage of the colony trade to Britain estimated, 247.
A gradual relaxation of the exclusive commerce recommended, 250.
Events which have prevented Britain from sensibly feeling the loss of the colony trade, ib.
The effects of the colony trade, and the monopoly of that trade, distinguished, ib.
To maintain a monopoly, the principal end of the dominion Great Britain assumes over the colonies, 254.
Amount of the ordinary peace establishment of, ib.
The two late wars Britain sustained, colony wars, to support a monopoly, ib.
Two modes by which they might be taxed, 255.
Their assemblies not likely to tax them, ib.
Taxes by parliamentary requisition as little likely to be raised, 256.
Representatives of, might he seated into the British parliament with good effect, 257.
Answer to objections against American representation, 258.
The interest of the consumer in Britain sacrificed to that of the producer in raising an empire in America, 274.

Columbus, the motive that led to his discovery of Americas, 229.
Why he gave the name of Indies to the islands he discovered, ib.
His triumphal exhibition of their productions, 230.

Columella, his instructions for fencing a kitchen garden, 64.
Advises the planting of vineyards, 65.

Commerce, the different common standards or mediums made use of to facilitate the exchange of commodities in the early stages of, 10.
Origin of money, ib.
Definition of the term value, 12.
Treaties of, though advantageous to the merchants and manufacturers of the favoured countries, necessarily, disadvantageous to those of the favouring country, 222.
Translation of the commercial treaty between England and Portugal, concluded in 1703, by Mr. Methuen, 223.
Restraints laid upon the European colonies in America, 236.
The present splendour of the mercantile system owing to the discovery and colonization of America, 259.
Review of the plan by which it proposes to enrich a country, 266.
The interest of the consumer constantly sacrificed to that of the producer, 274.
See Agriculture, Banks, Capital, Manufactures, Merchant, Money, Stock, Trade, &c.

Commodities, the barter of, insufficient for the mutual supply of the wants of mankind, 10.
Metals found to be the best medium to facilitate the exchange of, ib.
Labour an invariable standard for the value of, 14.
Real and nominal prices of, distinguished, ib.
Component parts of the prices of, explained and illustrated, 21.
Natural and market prices of, distinguished and how regulated, 23.
[Pg 411]The ordinary proportion between the value of two commodities, not necessarily the same as between the quantities of them commonly in the market, 89.
The price of rude produce, how affected by the advance of wealth and improvement, 91, 92.
Foreign are primarily purchased with the produce of domestic industry, 151.
When advantageously exported in a rude state, even by a foreign capital, 156.
The quantity of, in every country, naturally regulated by the demand, 176.
Wealth in goods, and in money, compared, 177.
Exportation of, to a proper market, always attended with more profit than that of gold and silver, 179.
The natural advantages of countries in particular productions sometimes not possible to struggle against, 185.

Company, mercantile, incapable of consulting their true interests when they become sovereigns, 264.
An exclusive company a public nuisance, 265.
Trading, how first formed, 307.
Regulated and joint-stock companies distinguished, ib.
Regulated companies in Great Britain specified, ib., 308.
Are useless, 308.
Constant view of such companies, ib.
Forts and garrisons, why never maintained by regulated companies, 309.
The nature of joint-stock companies explained, 310, 311, 316.
A monopoly necessary to enable a joint-stock company to carry on a foreign trade, 317.
What kind of joint-stock companies need no exclusive privileges, ib.
Joint-stock companies, why well adapted to the trade of banking, ib.
The trade of insurance may be carried on successfully by a joint-stock company, ib.
Also, inland navigations, and the supply of water to a great city, ib.
Ill success of joint-stock companies in other undertakings, 318.

Competition, the effect of, in the purchase of commodities, 23.
Among the venders, ib., 37.

Concordat in France, its object, 337.

Congress, American, its strength owing to the important characters it confers on the members of it, 257.

Conversion price, in the payment of rents in Scotland, explained, 76, 77.

Copper, the standard measure of value among the ancient Romans, 16.
Is no legal tender in England, ib.

Cori, the largest quadruped on the island of St. Domingo, described, 229.

Corn, the raising of, in different countries, not subject to the same degree of rivalship, as manufactures, 3, 4.
Is the best standard for reserved rents, 14.
The price of, how regulated, 15.
The price of, the best standard for comparing the different values of particular commodities at different times and places, 16.
The three component parts in the price of, 21.
Is dearer in Scotland than in England, 31.
Its value compared with that of butcher's meat, in the different periods of agriculture, 62.
Compared with silver, 75.
Circumstances in a historical view of the prices of corn that have misled writers in treating of the value of silver at different periods, 76.
Is always a more accurate measure of value than any other commodity, 79.
Why dearer in great towns than in the country, 80.
Why dearer in some rich commercial countries, as Holland and Genoa, ib.
Rose in its nominal price on the discovery of the American mines, 81.
And in consequence of the civil war under king Charles I., ib.
And in consequence of the bounty on the exportation of, 82.
Tendency of the bounty examined, 83.
Chronological table of the prices of, 108.
The least profitable article of growth in the British West Indian colonies, 159.
The restraints formerly laid upon the trade of, unfavourable to the cultivation of land, 162.
The free importation of, could little affect the farmers of Great Britain, 187.
The policy of the bounty on the exportation of, examined, 206.
The reduction in the price of, not produced by the bounty, ib.
Tillage not encouraged by the bounty, ib.
The money price of, regulates that of all other home-made commodities, 207.
Illustration, 208.
Ill effects of the bounty, ib.
Motives of the country gentlemen in granting the bounty, 209.
The natural value of not to be altered by altering the money price, 210.
The four several branches of the corn trade specified, 213.
The inland dealer, for his own interest, will not raise the price of, higher than the scarcity of the season requires, ib.
Corn a commodity the least liable to be monopolised, 214.
The inland dealers too numerous and dispersed to form a general combination, ib.
Dearths, never artificial, but when government interferes improperly to prevent them, ib.
The freedom of the corn trade the best security against a famine, 215.
Old English statute to prohibit the corn trade, ib.
Consequences of farmers being forced to become corn dealers, ib.
The use of corn dealers to the farmers, 216.
The prohibitory statute against the corn trade softened, 217.
But still under the influence of popular prejudices, ib., 218.
The average quantity imported and exported compared with the consumption and annual produce, ib.
Tendency of a free importation of, 219.
The home-market the most important one for corn, ib.
Impropriety of the statute 22 Car. II. for regulating the importation of wheat, confessed by the suspension of its execution by temporary statutes, ib.
Duties payable on the importation of grain before 13 Geo. III. ib. note, ib.
The home-market indirectly supplied by the exportation of corn, ib.
How a liberal system of free exportation and importation and among all nations would operate, 220.
The laws concerning corn, similar to those relating to religion, 221.
The home-market supplied by the carrying trade, ib.
The system of laws connected with the establishment of the bounty, undeserving of praise, ib.
Remarks on the statute 13 Geo. III. ib.

[Pg 412]Corporations, tendency of the exclusive privileges of, on trade, 26.
By what authority erected, 50, 52.
The advantages they derive from the surrounding country, ib.
Check the operations of competition, 54.
Their internal regulations combinations against the public, ib.
Are injurious even to the members of them, ib.
The laws of, obstruct the free circulation of labour from one employment to another, 57.
Origin of, 163.
Are exempted by their privileges from the power of the feudal barons, 164.
The European East India companies disadvantageous to the eastern commerce, 181, 182.
The exclusive privileges of corporations ought to be destroyed, 191.

Cottagers, in Scotland, their situation described, 49.
Are cheap manufacturers of stockings, ib.
The diminution of, in England, considered, 95.

Coward, character of, 329.

Credit. See Paper Money.

Crusades, to the Holy land, favourable to the revival of commerce, 165.

Currency of states, remarks on, 194.

Customs, the motives and tendency of drawbacks from the duties of, 203.
The revenue of the customs increased by drawbacks, 205.
Occasion of first imposing the duties of, 307.
Origin of those duties, 371.
Three ancient branches of, 372.
Drawbacks of, ib.
Are regulated according to the mercantile system, ib., 373.
Frauds practised to obtain drawbacks and bounties, ib.
The duties of, in many instances uncertain, ib.
Improvement of, suggested, 374.
Computation of the expense of collecting them, 380.


D

Dairy, the business of, generally carried on as a save-all, 96.
Circumstances which impede or promote the attention to it, ib.
English and Scotch dairies, ib.

Danube, the navigation of that river, why of little use to the interior parts of the country from whence it flows, 9.

Davenant, Dr. his objections to the transferring the duties on beer to the malt considered, 377.

Dearths, never caused by combinations among the dealers in corn, but by some general calamity, 214.
The free exercise of the corn trade the best palliative against the inconveniencies of a dearth, 217.
Corn dealers the best friends to the people at such seasons, 218.

Debts, public, the origin of, traced, 386.
Are accelerated by the expenses attending war, ib.
Account of the unfunded debt of Great Britain, 387.
The funded debt, 388.
Aggregate and general funds, 389.
Sinking fund, ib.
Annuities for terms of years and for lives, ib.
The reduction of, during peace, bears no proportion to its accumulation during war, 391.
The plea of the interest being no burden to the nation considered, 394.
Are seldom fairly paid when accumulated to a certain degree, 396.
Might easily be discharged, by extending the British system of taxation over all the provinces of the empire, 397.
Ireland and America ought to contribute to discharge the public debts of Britain, 402.

Decker, Sir Matthew, his observations on the accumulation of taxes, 369.
His proposal for transferring all taxes to the consumer, by annual payments, considered, 371.

Demand, though the increase of, may at first raise the price of goods, it never fails to reduce it afterwards, 314.

Denmark, account of the settlements of, in the West Indies, 234.

Diamonds, the mines of, not always worth working for, 73.

Discipline, the great importance of, in war, 293.
Instances of, ib.

Diversions, public, their political use, 334.

Domingo, St. mistaken by Columbus for a part of the East Indies, 229.
Its principal productions, ib.
The natives soon stripped of all their gold, 230.
Historical view of the French colony there, 234.

Doomsday-book, the intention of that compilation, 351.

Dorians, ancient, where the colonies of, settled, 227.

Dramatic exhibitions, the political use of, 334.

Drawbacks, in commerce, explained, 182.
The motives to, and tendency of, explained, 203.
On wines, currants, and wrought silks, ib.
On tobacco and sugar, 204.
On wines, particularly considered, ib.
Were originally granted to encourage the carrying trade, 205.
The revenue of the customs increased by them, ib.
Drawbacks allowed in favour of the colonies, 213.

Drugs, regulations of their importation and exportation, 272.

Drunkenness, the motive to this vice inquired into, 200.

Dutch, their settlements in America slow in in improvement, because under the government of an exclusive company, 234.
Their East India trade checked by monopoly, 261.
Measures taken by, to secure the monopoly of the spice trade. See Holland.


E

East Indies, representation of the miserable state of the provinces of, under the English government there, 30.
Historical view of the European trade with those countries, 86.
Rice countries more populous and rich than corn countries, ib.
The real price of labour lower in China and Indostan than in the greater part of Europe, 87.
Gold and silver the most profitable commodities to carry thither, ib.
The proportional value of gold to silver, how rated there, 89.
Great extension of foreign commerce by the discovery of a passage to, round the Cape of Good Hope, 181.
Historical review of the intercourse with, ib., 182.
Effect of the annual exportation of silver to, from Europe, ib.
The trade with, chiefly carried on by exclusive companies, 261.
Tendency of their monopolies, ib.
[Pg 413]
East India company, a monopoly against the very nation in which it is erected, 261.
The operation of such a company in a poor and in a rich country compared, ib.
That country whose capital is not large enough to extend to such a distant trade ought not to engage in it, 262.
The mercantile habits of trading companies render them incapable of consulting their true interests when they become sovereigns, 264.
The genius of the administration of the English company, ib.
Subordinate practices of their agents and clerks, 265.
The bad conduct of agents in India owing to their situation, ib.
Such an exclusive company a nuisance in every respect, 266.
Brief review of their history, 313.
Their privileges invaded, ib.
A rival company formed, ib.
The two companies united, 314.
Are infected by the spirit of war and conquest, ib.
Agreements between the company and government, ib.
Interference of government in their territorial administration, 315.
And in the direction at home, ib.
Why unfit to govern a great empire, ib.
Their sovereign and commercial characters incompatible, 344.
How the territorial acquisitions of, might be rendered a source of revenue, 403.

Economists, sect of, in France, their political tenets, 275.

Edinburgh, its present share of trade owing to the removal of the court and parliament, 138.

Education, the principal cause of the various talents observable in different men, 7.
Those parts of, for which there are no public institutions, generally the best taught, 320.
In universities, a view of, 323.
Of travelling for, 324.
Course of, in the republics of ancient Greece, ib.
In ancient Rome, ib.
The ancient teachers superior to those in modern times, 326.
Public institutions injurious to good education, ib.
Inquiry how far the public ought to attend to the education of the people, 327.
The different opportunities of education in the different ranks of the people, 328.
The advantages of proper attention in the state to the education of the people, 329.

Egypt, the first country in which agriculture and manufactures appear to have been cultivated, 9.
Agriculture was greatly favoured there, 283.
Was long the granary of the Roman empire, 284.

Ejectment, action of, in England, when invented, and its operation, 160.

Employments, the advantages and disadvantages of the different kinds of, in the same neighbourhood, continually tend to equality, 41.
The differences or inequalities among, specified, ib.
The constancy or precariousness of, influences the rate of wages, 43.

England, the dates of its several species of coinage, silver, gold, and copper, 16.
Why labour is cheaper there than in North America, 29.
The rate of population in both countries compared, ib.
The produce and labour of, have gradually increased from the earliest accounts in history, while writers are representing the country as rapidly declining, 141.
Enumeration of obstructions and calamities which the prosperity of the country has surmounted, ib.
Circumstances that favour commerce and manufactures, 171.
Laws in favour of agriculture, ib.
Why formerly unable to carry on foreign wars of long duration, 180.
Why the commerce with France has been subjected to so many discouragements, 202.
Foundation of the enmity between these countries, ib.
Translation of the commercial treaty concluded in 1703 with Portugal, 223.
Inquiry into the value of the trade with Portugal, ib., 224.
Might procure gold without the Portugal trade, ib.
Consequences of securing the colony trade by the navigation act, 245.

Engrossing. See Forstalling.

Entails, the law of, prevents the division of land by alienation, 157.
Intention of, 158.

Europe, general review of the several nations of, as to their improvement since the discovery of America, 85.
The two richest countries in, enjoy the greatest shares of the carrying trade, 153.
Inquiry into the advantages derived by, from the discovery and colonization of America, 243.
The particular advantages derived by each colonizing country, 244.
And by others which have no colonies, 259.

Exchange, the operation of, in the commercial intercourse of different countries, 174.
The course of, an uncertain criterion of the balance of trade between two countries, 192, 193.
Is generally in favour of those countries which pay in bank money, against those which pay in common currency, 198.

Excise, the principal objects of, 371.
The duties of, more clear and distinct than the customs, 373.
Affects only a few articles of the most general consumption, ib.
The scheme of Sir Robert Walpole defended, 375.
The excise upon home-made fermented and spiritous liquors the most productive, 376.
Expense of levying excise duties computed, 380.
The laws of, more vexatious than those of the customs, 381.

Exercise, military, alteration in, produced by the invention of fire-arms, 292.

Expenses, private, how they influence the national capital, 33.
Advantage of bestowing them on durable commodities, ib.

Export trade, the principles of, explained, 153.
When rude produce may be advantageously exported, even by a foreign capital, 156, 157.
Why encouraged by European nations, 182, 183.
By what means promoted, ib.
The motives to, and tendency of, drawbacks of duties, 203.
The grants of bounties on, considered, 205.
Exportation of the materials of manufactures, review of the restraints and prohibitions of, 268.
[Pg 414]

F

Faith, articles of, how regulated by the civil magistrate, 354.

Families seldom remain on large estates many generations in commercial countries, 170.

Famine. See Dearth.

Farmers of land, the several articles that compose their gain distinguished, 22.
Require more knowledge and experience than the generality of manufacturers, 53.
In what their capitals consist, 112.
The great quantity of productive labour put into motion by their capitals, 149.
Artificers necessary to them, 156.
Their situation better in England than in any other part of Europe, 160.
Labour under great disadvantages everywhere, 161.
Origin of long leases of farms, 170.
Are a class of men least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly, 187.
Were forced by old statutes to become the only dealers in corn, 215.
Could not sell corn cheaper than any other corn merchant, 216.
Could seldom sell it so cheap, ib.
The culture of land obstructed by this division of their capitals, 217.
The use of corn-dealers to the farmers, ib.
How they contribute to the annual production of the land, according to the French agricultural system of political economy, 275.

Farmers of the public revenue, their character, 383, 391.

Feudal government, miserable state of the occupiers of land under, 137.
Trade and interest of money under, ib.
Chiefs, their power, 157.
Slaves, their situation, 159.
Tenures of land, ib.
Taxation, 161.
Original poverty and servile state of the tradesmen in towns, 162.
Immunities seldom granted but for valuable considerations, 163.
Origin of free burghs, ib.
The power of the barons reduced by municipal privileges, ib.
The cause and effect of ancient hospitality, 167.
Extensive power of the ancient barons, 168.
Was not established in England until the Norman conquest, ib.
Was silently subverted by manufactures and commerce, 169.

Feudal wars, how supported, 290.
Military exercises not well attended to, under, 291.
Standing armies gradually introduced to supply the place of the feudal militia, 295.
Account of the casualties or taxes under, 363.
Revenues under, how enjoyed by the great landholders, 385.

Fairs, public, in Scotland, the nature of the institution, explained, 76, 77.

Fines for the renewal of leases, the motive for exacting them, and their tendency, 349.

Fire-arms, alteration in the art of war effected by the invention of, 292, 295.
The invention of, favourable to the extension of civilisation, 296.

Fish, the component parts of the price of, explained, 21.
The multiplication of, at market, by human industry, both limited and uncertain, 99.
How an increase of demand raises the price of fish, 100.

Fisheries, observations on the tonnage bounties granted to, 211.
To the herring fishery ib.
The boat fishery ruined by this bounty, 212.

Flanders, the ancient commercial prosperity of, perpetuated by the solid improvements of agriculture, 172.

Flax, the component parts of the price of, explained, 21.

Fleetwood, Bishop, remarks on his Chronicon Pretiosum, 77, 78.

Flour, the component parts of the price of, explained, 21.

Food, will always purchase as much labor as it can maintain on the spot, 61.
Bread and butcher's meat compared, 62, 63.
Is the original source of every other production, 69.
The abundance of, constitutes the principal part of the riches of the world, and gives the principal value to many other kinds of riches, 73.

Forestalling and engrossing, the popular fear of, like the suspicions of witchcraft, 218.

Forts, when necessary for the protection of commerce, 306.

France, fluctuations in the legal rate of interest for money there during the course of the present century, 37, 38.
Remarks on the trade and riches of, ib.
The nature of apprenticeships there, 51.
The propriety of restraining the planting of vineyards examined, 65.
Variations in the price of grain there, 73.
The money price of labour has sunk gradually with the money price of corn, 84.
Foundation of the Mississippi scheme, 130.
Little trade or industry to be found in the parliament towns of, 138.
Description of the class of farmers called metayers, 159.
Laws relating to the tenure of land, 161.
Services formerly exacted besides rent, ib.
The taille, what, and in operation in checking the cultivation of land, ib.
Origin of the magistrates and councils of cities, 164.
No direct legal encouragement given to agriculture, 171.
Ill policy of M. Colbert's commercial regulations, 189.
French goods heavily taxed in Great Britain, 192.
The commercial intercourse between France and England, now chiefly carried on by smugglers, ib.
The policy of the commercial restraints between France and Britain considered, ib.
State of the coinage there, 194.
Why the commerce with England has been subjected to discouragement, 202.
Foundation of the enmity between these countries, ib.
Remarks concerning the seignorage on coin, 225.
Standard of the gold coin there, ib.
The trade of the French colonies, how regulated, 237.
The government of the colonies conducted with moderation, 241.
The sugar colonies of, better governed than those of Britain, ib.
The kingdom of, how taxed, 256.
The members of the league fought more in defence of their own importance than for any other cause, 258.
[Pg 415]The present agricultural system of political economy adopted by philosophers there described, 275.
Under what direction the funds for the repair of the roads are placed, 305.
General state of the roads, ib.
The universities badly governed, 319.
Remarks on the management of the parliaments of, 335.
Measures taken in, to reduce the power of the clergy, 337.
Account of the mode of rectifying the inequalities of the predial taille in the generality of Montauban, 352.
The personal taille explained, 360.
The inequalities in, how remedied, 361.
How the personal taille discourages cultivation, ib.
The vingtieme, 362.
Stamp duties and the controle, 364, 365.
The capitation tax, how rated, 367.
Restraints upon the interior trade of the country by the local variety of the revenue laws, 382.
The duties on tobacco and salt, how levied, 383.
The different sources of revenue in, 384.
How the finances of, might be reformed, ib.
The French system of taxation compared with that in Britain, ib.
The nature of tontines explained, 390.
Estimate of the whole national debt of, ib.

Frugality, generally a predominating principle in human nature, 140.

Fuller's earth, the exportation of why prohibited, 271.

Funds, British, brief historical view of, 387.
Operation of, politically considered, 393.
The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state that has adopted it, 395.

Fur trade, the first principles of, 68.


G

Gama, Vasco de, the first European who discovered a naval track to the East Indies, 229.

Gardening, the gains from, distinguished into the component parts, 22.
Not a profitable employment, 64.

Gems, See Stones.

General fund in the British finances explained, 389.

Genoa, why corn is dear in the territory of, 80.

Glasgow, the trade of, doubled in fifteen years, by erecting banks there, 120.
Why a city of greater trade than Edinburgh, 138.

Gold, not the standard value in England, 16.
Its value measured by silver, 17.
Reformation of the gold coin, ib.
Mint price of gold in England, ib.
The working the mines of, in Peru, very unprofitable, 71.
Qualities for which this metal is valued, 72.
The proportionate value of, to silver, how rated before and after the discovery of the American mines, 89.
Is cheaper in the Spanish market than silver, 90.
Great quantities of, remitted annually from Portugal to England, 223.
Why little of it remains in England, ib.
Is always to be had for its value, 224.

Gold and Silver, the prices of, how affected by the increase of the quantity of the metals, 79.
Are commodities that naturally seek the best market, 80.
Are metals of the least value among the poorest nations, ib.
The increase in the quantity of, by means of wealth and improvement, has no tendency to diminish their value, 81.
The annual consumption of those metals very considerable, 87.
Annual importation of, into Spain and Portugal, 88.
Are not likely to multiply beyond the demand, ib.
The durability of, the cause of the steadiness of their price, ib.
On what circumstances the quantity of, in every particular country, depends, 100.
The low value of these metals in a country no evidence of its wealth, nor their high value of its poverty, 101.
If not employed at home, will be sent abroad notwithstanding all prohibitions, 139.
The reason why European nations have studied to accumulate these metals, 174.
Commercial arguments in favour of their exportation, ib.
These and all other commodities are mutually the prices of each other, 175.
The quantity of, in every country, regulated by the effectual demand, 176.
Why the prices of these metals do not fluctuate so much as those of other commodities, ib.
To preserve a due quantity of, in a country, no proper object of attention for the government, 176.
The accumulated gold and silver in a country distinguished into three parts, 178.
A great quantity of bullion alternately exported and imported for the purposes of foreign trade, 179.
Annual amount of these metals imported into Spain and Portugal, 180.
The importation of, not the principal benefit derived from foreign trade, 181.
The value of, how affected by the discovery of the American mines, ib.
And by the passage round the Cape of Good Hope to the East Indies, ib.
Effect of the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies, 182.
The commercial means pursued to increase the quantity of these metals in a country, ib., 192.
Bullion, how received and paid at the bank of Amsterdam, 195.
At what prices, 196, note.
A trading country without mines not likely to be exhausted by an annual exportation of these metals, 200.
The value of, in Spain and Portugal, depreciated by restraining the exportation of them, 208.
Are not imported for the purposes of plate or coin, but for foreign trade, 224.
The search after mines of, the most ruinous of all projects, 230.
Are valuable because scarce and difficult to be procured, 231.

Gorgias, evidence of the wealth he acquired by teaching, 56.

Government, civil, indispensibly necessary for the security of private property, 297.
Subordination in society, by what means introduced, ib.
Inequality of fortune introduces civil government for its preservation, 299.
The administration of justice a source of revenue in early times, ib.
Why government ought not to have the management of turnpikes, 304.
Nor of other public works, 306.
Want of parsimony during peace imposes a necessity of contracting debts, to carry on a war, 386.
[Pg 416]Must support a regular administration of justice to cause manufactures and commerce to flourish, 387.
Origin of a national debt, ib.
Progression of public debts, ib.
War, why generally agreeable to the people, 391.

Governors, political, the greatest spendthrifts in society, 142.

Grasses, artificial, tend to reduce the price of butcher's meat, 63.

Graziers, subject to monopolies obtained by manufactures to their prejudice, 271.

Greece, foreign trade promoted in several of the ancient states of, 284.
Military exercises a part of general education, 291.
Soldiers not a distinct profession in, ib.
Course of education in the republics of, 324.
The morals of the Greeks inferior to those of the Romans, ib.
Schools of the philosophers and rhetoricians, 325.
Law no science among the Greeks, ib.
Courts, of justice, ib.
The martial spirit of the people, how supported, 329.

Greek colonies, how distinguished from Roman colonies, 227, 228.
Rapid progress of these colonies, 232.

Greek language, how introduced as a part of university education, 322.
Philosophy, the three great branches of, ib.

Ground rents, great variations of, according to situation, 354.
Are a more proper subject of taxation, than houses, 355.

Gum senega, review of the regulations imposed on the trade for, 272.

Gunpowder, great revolution effected in the art of war by the invention of, 292, 296.
This invention favourable to the extension of civilization, 296.

Gustavus Vasa, how enabled to establish the Reformation in Sweden, 338.


H

Hanseatic league, causes that rendered it formidable, 164.
Why no vestige remains of the wealth of the Hans towns, 172.

Hamburgh, agio of the bank of, explained, 195.
Sources of the revenue of that city, 343, 344.
The inhabitants of, how taxed to the state, 359.

Hamburgh company, some account of, 308.

Hearth money, why abolished in England, 356, 357.

Henry VIII. of England, prepares the way for the Reformation, by shutting out the authority of the pope, 338.

Herring buss bounty, remarks on, 211.
Fraudulent claims of the bounty, ib.
The boat fishery the most natural and profitable, 212.
Account of the British white herring fishery, ib.
Account of the busses fitted out in Scotland, the amount of their cargoes, and the bounties on them, 287, Append.

Hides, the produce of rude countries commonly carried to a distant market, 97.
Price of, in England three centuries ago, 98.
Salted hides inferior to fresh ones, 98, 99.
The price of, how affected by circumstances in cultivated and in uncultivated countries, ib.

Highlands of Scotland, interesting remarks on the population of, 33.
Military character of the Highlanders, 293.

Hobbes, Mr. remarks on his definition of wealth, 13.

Hogs, circumstances which render their flesh cheap or dear, 95.

Holland, observations on the riches, and trade of the republic of, 38.
Not to follow some business unfashionable there, 40.
Cause of the dearness of corn there, 80.
Enjoys the greatest share in the carrying trade of Europe, 153.
How the Dutch were excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, 188.
Is a country that prospers under the heaviest taxation, 189.
Account of the bank of Amsterdam, 194, 195.
This republic derives even its subsistence from foreign trade, 202, 203.
Tax paid on houses there, 356.
Account of the tax upon successions, 363.
Stamp duties, 364.
High amount of the taxes in, 370, 384.
Its prosperity depends on the republican form of government, 385.

Honoraries, from pupils to teachers in colleges tendency of, to quicken their diligence, 319.

Hose, in the time of Edward IV., how made, 104.

Hospitality, ancient, the cause and effect of, 169, 385.

House, different acceptations of the term in England, and some other countries, 49.
Houses considered as part of the national stock, 113.
Houses produce no revenue, ib.
The rent of, distinguished into two parts, 354.
Operation of a tax upon house rent, payable by the tenant, ib.
House rent, the best test of the tenant's circumstances, 355.
Proper regulation of a tax  on, ib.
How taxed in Holland, 356.
Hearth money, ib.
Window tax, 357.

Hudson's Bay company, the nature of their establishment and trade, 312.
Their profits not so high as has been reported, ib.

Hunters, war, how supported by a nation of, 289.
Cannot be very numerous, 290.
No established administration of justice needful among them, 297.
Age the sole foundation of rank and precedency among, ib.
No considerable inequality of fortune or subordination to be found among them, 298.
No hereditary honours in such a society, ib.

Husbandmen, war, how supported by a nation of, 290.

Husbandry. See Agriculture.


I, J

Jamaica, the returns of trade from that island, why irregular, 402.

Idleness unfashionable in Holland, 40.

Jewels. See Stones.

Importation, why restraints have been imposed on, with the two kinds of, 182.
How restrained to secure a monopoly of the home market to domestic industry, 183.
The true policy of these restraints doubtful, ib.
[Pg 417]The free importation of foreign manufactures more dangerous than that of raw materials, 186.
How far it may be proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods, 189.
How far it may be proper to restore the free importation of goods, after it has been interrupted, ib.
Of the materials of manufacture, review of the legal encouragements given to, 266.

Independents, the principles of that sect, explained, 332.

Indies. See East and West.

Indostan, the several classes of people there kept distinct, 283.
The natives of, how prevented from undertaking long sea voyages, ib.

Industry, the different kinds of, seldom dealt impartially with by any nation, 1, 2.
The species of, frequently local, 8.
Naturally suited to the demand, 24.
Is increased by the liberal reward of labour, 34.
How affected by seasons of plenty and scarcity, ib., 35.
Is more advantageously exerted in towns than in the country, 53.
The average produce of, always suited to the average consumption, 79.
Is promoted by the circulation of paper money, 119.
Three requisites to putting industry in motion, 120.
How the general character of nations is estimated by, 137.
And idleness, the proportion between, how regulated, ib.
Is employed for subsistence before it extends to conveniencies and luxury, 155.
Whether the general industry of a society is promoted by commercial restraints on importation, 183.
Private interest naturally points to that employment most advantageous to the society, ib.
But without intending or knowing it, 184.
Legal regulations of private industry dangerous assumptions of power, 185.
Domestic industry ought not to be employed on what can be purchased cheaper from abroad, ib.
Of the society, can augment only in proportion as its capital augments, ib.
When it may be necessary to impose some burden upon foreign industry to favour that at home, 187.
The free exercise of industry ought to be allowed to all, 191.
The natural effort of every individual to better his condition, will, if unrestrained, result in the prosperity of the society, 221.

Insurance, from fire and sea risks, the nature and profits of examined, 45.
The trade of insurance may be successfully carried on by a joint-stock company, 317, 318.

Interest, landed, monied, and trading, distinguished, 144.

Interest for the use of money, the foundation of that allowance explained, 22.
Historical view of the alterations of, in England, and other countries, 37.
Remarks on the high rates of, in Bengal, 39.
And in China, 40.
May be raised by defective laws, independent on the influence of wealth or poverty, ib.
The lowest ordinary rate of, must somewhat more than compensate occasional losses, ib.
The common relative proportion between interest and mercantile profits inquired into, ib.
Was not lowered, in consequence of the discovery of the American mines, 145.
How the legal rate of, ought to be fixed, 146.
Consequences of its being fixed too high or too low, ib., 147.
The market rate of, regulates the price of land, ib.
Whether a proper object of taxation, 357.

Ireland, why never likely to furnish cattle to the prejudice of Great Britain, 186.
The proposed absentee tax there considered, 379.
Ought in justice to contribute towards the discharge of the public debt of Great Britain, 402.
Expediency of an union with Great Britain, ib.

Isocrates, the handsome income he made by teaching, 56.

Italy, the only great country in Europe which has been cultivated and improved in every part by means of its foreign commerce, 172.
Was originally colonized by the Dorians, 227.

Jurisdictions, territorial, did not originate in the feudal law, 168.

Justice, the administration of, a duty of the sovereign, 297.
In early times a source of revenue to him, 299.
The making justice subservient to the revenue a source of great abuses, ib.
Is never administered gratis, 300.
The whole administration of, but an inconsiderable part of the expense of government, ib.
How the whole expense of justice might be defrayed from the fees of court, ib.
The interference of the jurisdictions of the several English courts of law accounted for, 301.
Law language, how corrupted, 302.
The judicial and executive power, why divided, ib.
By whom the expense of administration of, ought to be borne, 342.


K

Kalm, the Swedish traveller, his account of the husbandry of the British colonies in North America, 94.

Kelp, a rent demanded for the rocks on which it grows, 61.

King, Mr. his account of the average price of wheat, 83.

King, under feudal institutions, no more than the greatest baron in the nation, 168.
Was unable to restrain the violence of his barons, 169.
Treasure-trove an important branch of revenue to, 385, 386.
His situation, how favourable for the accumulating treasure, ib.
In a commercial country, naturally spends his revenue in luxuries, ib.
Is hence driven to call upon his subjects for extraordinary aids, ib.

Kings and their ministers the greatest spendthrifts in a country, 149.


L

Labour, the fund which originally supplies every nation with its annual consumption, 1.
How the proportion between labour and consumption in regulated, ib.
The different kinds of industry seldom dealt impartially with by any nation, 2.
The division of labour considered, ib., 3.
This division increases the quantity of work, 4.
Instances in illustration, 5.
[Pg 418]From what principle the division of labour originates, 6.
The divisibility of governed by the market, 8.
Labour the real measure of the exchangeable value of commodities, 12.
Different kinds of, not easily estimated by immediate comparison, 13.
Is compared by the intermediate standard of money, ib.
In an invariable standard for the value of commodities, 14.
Has a real and a nominal price, ib.
The quantity of labour employed on different objects, the only rule for exchanging them in the rude stages of society, 20.
Difference between the wages of labour and profits on stock in manufactures, ib.
The whole labour of a country never exerted, 22.
Is in every instance suited to the demand, 24.
The effect of extraordinary calls for, 25.
The deductions made from the produce of labour employed upon land, 27.
Why dearer in North America than in England, 29.
Is cheap in countries that are stationary, ib.
The demand for, would continually decrease, in a declining country, 30.
The province of Bengal cited as an instance, ib.
Is not badly paid for in Great Britain, ib., 31.
An increasing demand for, favourable to population, 33.
That of freemen cheaper to the employers than that of slaves, ib.
The money price of, how regulated, 36.
Is liberally rewarded in new colonies, 38.
Common labour and skilful labour distinguished, 42.
The free circulation of, from one employment to another, obstructed by corporation laws, 57.
The unequal prices of, in different places, probably owing to the law of settlements, 59.
Can always procure subsistence on the spot, where it is purchased, 61.
The money price of, in different countries, how governed, 80.
Is set into motion by stock employed for profit, 106.
The division of, depends on the accumulation of stock, 111.
Machines to facilitate labour advantageous to society, 116.
Productive and unproductive distinguished, 135.
Various orders of men specified whose labour in unproductive, 136.
Unproductive labourers all maintained by revenue, ib.
The price of, how raised by the increase of the national capital, 145.
Its price, though nominally raised, may continue the same, 146.
Is liberally rewarded in new colonies, 231.
Of artificers and manufacturers, never adds any value to the whole amount of the rude produce of the land, according to the French agricultural system of political economy, 277.
This doctrine shewn to be erroneous, 281.
The productive powers of labour, how to be improved, ib.

Labourers, useful and productive, everywhere proportioned to the capital stock on which they are employed, 1, 2.
Share the produce of their labour, in most cases, with the owners of the stock on which they are employed, 20.
Their wages a continued subject of contest between them and their masters, 28.
Are seldom successful in their outrageous combinations, ib.
The sufficiency of their earnings a point not easily determined, ib.
Their wages sometimes raised by increase of work, ib.
Their demands limited by the funds destined for payment, 29.
Are continually wanted in North America, ib.
Miserable condition of those in China, ib., 30.
Are not ill paid in Great Britain, ib., 31.
If able to maintain their families in dear years, they must be at their ease in plentiful seasons, ib.
A proof furnished  in the complaints of their luxury, 33.
Why worse paid than artificers, 42.
Their interests, strictly connected with the interests of the society, 106.
Labour the only source of their revenue, 112.
Effects of a life of labour on the understandings of the poor, 327.

Land, the demand of rent for, how founded, 21.
The rent paid enters into the greater part of all commodities, ib.
Generally produces more food than will maintain the labour necessary to bring it to market, 61.
Good roads and navigable canals equalize difference of situation, 62.
That employed in raising food for men and cattle regulates the rent of all other cultivated land, 64, 67.
Can clothe and lodge more than it can feed while uncultivated, and the contrary when improved, 68.
The culture of land producing food creates a demand for the produce of other lands, 73.
Produces by agriculture a much greater quantity of vegetable than of animal food, 79.
The full improvement of, requires a stock of cattle to supply manure, 93.
Cause and effect of the diminution of cottagers, 95.
Signs of the land being completely improved, 96.
The whole annual produce, or the price of it, naturally divides itself into rent, wages, and profit of stock, 106.
The usual price of, depends on the common rate of interest for money, 147.
The profits of cultivation exaggerated by projectors, 154.
The cultivation of, naturally preferred to trade and manufactures, on equal terms, 155.
Artificers necessary to the cultivation of, 156.
Was all appropriated, though not cultivated, by the northern destroyers of the Roman empire, 157.
Origin of the law of primogeniture under the feudal government, ib.
Entails, 158.
Obstacles to the improvement of land under feudal proprietors, ib.
Feudal tenures, 159, 160.
Feudal taxation, 161.
The improvement of land checked in France, by the taille, ib.
Occupiers of, labour under great disadvantages, ib.
Origin of long leases of, 169.
Small proprietors the best improvers of, 170.
Small purchasers of, cannot hope to raise fortunes by cultivation, ib., 171.
Tenures of, in the British American colonies, 235.
Is the most permanent source of revenue, 345.
The rent of a whole country not equal to the ordinary levy upon the people, ib.
The revenue from, proportioned not to the rent, but to the produce, 346.
Reasons for selling the crown lands, ib.
The land tax of Great Britain considered, 348.
An improved land-tax suggested, 349.
[Pg 419]A land-tax, however equally rated by a general survey, will soon become unequal, 352.
Tithes a very unequal tax, ib.
Tithes discourage improvement, ib.

Landholders, why frequently inattentive to their own particular interests, 106.
How they contribute to the annual production of the land, according to the French agricultural system of political economy, 275.
Should be encouraged to cultivate a part of their own land, 350.

Latin language, how it became an essential part of university education, 321.

Law, the language of, how corrupted, 302.
Did not improve into a science in ancient Greece, 325.
Remarks on the courts of justice in Greece and Rome, ib., 326.

Law, Mr. account of his banking scheme for the improvement of Scotland, 130.

Lawyers, why amply rewarded for their labour, 44.
Great amount of their fees, 300.

Leases, the various usual conditions of, 349, 350.

Leather, restrictions on the exportation of unmanufactured, 271.

Lectures in universities frequently improper for instruction, 320.

Levity, the vices of, ruinous to the common people, and therefore severely censured by them, 332, 333.

Liberty, three duties only necessary for a sovereign to attend to for supporting a system of, 286.

Lima, computed number of inhabitants in that city, 233.

Linen manufacture, narrow policy of the master manufacturers in, 266.

Literature, the rewards of, reduced by competition, 56.
Was more profitable in ancient Greece, ib.
The cheapness of literary education an advantage to the public, 57.

Loans of money, the nature of, analysed, 144.
The extensive operation of, ib.

Locke, Mr. remarks on his opinion of the difference between the market and mint prices of silver bullion, 18.
His account of the cause of lowering the rates of interest for money, examined, 145.
His distinction between money and moveable goods, 173.

Lodgings, cheaper in London than in any other capital city in Europe, 49.

Logic, the origin and employment of, 322.

Lotteries, the true nature of, and the causes of their success, explained, 45.

Luck, instances of the universal reliance mankind have on it, 45.

Lutherans, origin and principles of that sect, 339.

Luxuries, distinguished from necessaries, 368.
Operation of taxes on, ib.
The good and bad properties of taxes on, 380.


M

Macedon, Philip of, the superiority that discipline gave his army over that of his enemies, 294.

Machines for facilitating mechanical operations, how invented and improved, 4, 5.
Are advantageous to every society, 116.

Madder, the cultivation of, long confined to Holland by English tithes, 353.

Madeira wines, how introduced into North America and Britain, 204.

Malt, reasons for transferring the duties on brewing to, 378.
Distillery, how to prevent smuggling, 377.

Manufactures, the great advantages resulting from a division of labour in, 3.
Instances in illustration, 5.
Why profits increase in the higher stages of, 21.
Of what parts the gain consists, 22.
The private advantages of secrets in, 25.
Peculiar advantages of soil and situation, ib.
Monopolies, ib.
Corporation privileges, 26.
The deductions made from labour employed on manufactures, 27.
Inquiry how far they are affected by seasons of plenty and scarcity, 35.
Are not no materially affected by circumstances in the country where they are carried on, as in the places where they are consumed, ib.
New manufactures generally  give higher wages than old ones, 48.
Are more profitably carried on in towns than in the open country, 53.
By what means the prices of, are reduced while the society continues improving, 103.
Instances in hardware, ib.
Instances in the woollen manufacture, 104.
What fixed capitals are required to carry on particular manufactures, 112.
Manufactures for distant sale, why not established in North America, 156.
Why preferred to foreign trade for the employment of a capital, ib.
Motives to the establishment of manufactures for distant sale, 165.
How shifted from one country to another, ib., 166.
Natural circumstances which contribute to the establishment of them, ib.
Their effect on the government and manners of a country, 167.
The independence of artisans explained, 169.
May flourish amidst the ruin of a country, and begin to decay on the return of its prosperity, 180.
Inquiry how far manufactures might be affected by a freedom of trade, 190.
British restraints on manufactures in North America, 238, 239.
The exportation of instruments in, prohibited, 273.
By the principal support of foreign trade, 283.
Require a more extensive market than rude produce of the land, ib.
Were exercised by slaves in ancient Greece, 284.
High prices of, in Greece and at Rome, 285.
False policy to check manufactures in order to promote agriculture, ib.
In Great Britain, why principally fixed in the coal countries, 370.

Manufacturers, those thrown out of one business can transfer their industry to colateral employments, 190.
A spirit of combination among them to support monopolies, 191.
Manufacturers prohibited by old statutes from keeping a shop, or selling their own goods by retail, 215, 216.
The use of wholesale dealers to manufacturers, 217.
An unproductive class of the people, according to the French agricultural system of political economy, 276.
[Pg 420]The error of this doctrine shewn, 280.
How manufacturers augment the revenue of a country, 281.

Manure, the supply of, in most places depends on the stock of cattle raised, 93.

Maritime countries, why the first that are civilized and improved, 9.

Martial spirit, how supported in the ancient republics of Greece and Rome, 329.
The want of it now supplied by standing armies, ib.
The establishment of a militia little able to support it, ib.

Mediterranean sea, peculiarly favourable for the first attempts in navigation, 9.

Meggens, Mr. his account of the annual importation of gold and silver into Spain and Portugal, 88.
His relative proportion of each, 89.

Mercantile system explained, 372.

Mercenary troops, origin and reason of, 291.
The numbers of, how limited, ib.

Merchants, their judgments more to be depended on respecting the interest of their particular branches of trade, than with regard to the public interest, 106, 107.
Their capitals altogether circulating, 112.
Their dealings extended by the aid of bankers notes, 121, 124.
Customs of, first established to supply the want of laws, and afterwards admitted as laws, 126.
The manner of negociating bills of exchange, explained, ib.
The pernicious tendency of drawing and redrawing, ib., 127.
In what method their capitals are employed, 147.
Their capitals, dispersed and unfixed, 149.
The principles of foreign trade examined, 153.
Are the best of improvers when they turn country gentlemen, 167.
Their preference among the different species of trade, how determined, 183.
Are actuated by a narrow spirit of monopoly, 201.
The several branches of the corn trade specified and considered, 215.
The government of a company of, the worst a country can be under, 234.
Of London, not good economists, 253.
An unproductive class of men, according to the present agricultural system of political economy in France, 277.
The quick return of mercantile capitals enables merchants to advance money to government, 386, 387.
Their capitals increased by lending money to the state, 387.

Mercier, de la Riviere, M. character of his natural and essential order of political societies, 282.

Metals, why the best medium of commerce, 10.
Origin of stamped coins, 11.
Why different metals became the standard of value among different nations, 16.
The durability of, the cause of the steadiness of their price, 88.
On what the quantity of precious metals in every particular country depends, 100.
Restraints upon the exportation of, 272.

Metaphysics, the science of, explained, 323.

Metayers, description of the class of farmers so called in France, 159.

Methodists, the teachers among, why popular preachers, 330.

Methuen, Mr. translation of the commercial treaty concluded by him between England and Portugal, 223.

Mexico, was a less civilized country than Peru, when first visited by the Spaniards, 85.
Present populousness of the capital city, 233.
Low state of arts at the first discovery of that empire, ib.

Militia, why allowed to be formed in cities, and its formidable nature, 164.
The origin and nature of, explained, 292.
How distinguished from a regular standing army, ib.
Must always be inferior to a standing army, 293.
A few campaigns of service may make a militia equal to a standing army, ib.
Instances, 294.

Milk, a most perishable commodity, how manufactured for store, 96.

Mills, wind and water, their late introduction into England, 105.

Mines, distinguished by their fertility or barrenness, 70.
Comparison between those of coal and those of metals, 71.
The competition between, extends to all parts of the world, ib.
The working of, a lottery, 72.
Diamond mines not always worth working, 73.
Tax paid to the king of Spain from the Peruvian mines, 85.
The discovery of mines not dependent on human skill or industry, 100.
In Hungary, why worked at less expense than the neighbouring ones in Turkey, 284.

Mining, projects of, uncertain and ruinous, and unfit for legal encouragement, 230.

Mirabeau, Marquis de, his character of the economical table, 282.

Mississippi scheme in France, the real foundation of, 130.

Modus for tithe, a relief to the farmer, 353.

Money, the origin of, traced, 10.
Is the representative of labour, 13.
The value of, greatly depreciated by the discovery of the American mines, 14.
How different metals became the standard money of different nations, 16.
The only part of the circulating capital of a society, of which the maintenance can diminish their neat revenue, 116.
Makes no part of the revenue of a society, 117.
The term money, in common acceptation, of ambiguous meaning, ib.
The circulating money, in society, no measure of its revenue, 118.
Paper money, ib.
Effect of paper on the circulation of cash, ib., 119.
Inquiry into the proportion the circulating money of any country bears to the annual produce circulated by it, 120.
Paper can never exceed the value of the cash, of which it supplies the place, in any country, 122.
The pernicious practice of raising money by circulation, explained, 126.
The true cause of its exportation, 139.
Loans of, the principles of, analysed, 144.
Monied interest distinguished from the landed and trading interest, ib.
Inquiry into the real causes of the reduction of interest, 145.
Money and wealth synonymous terms in popular language, 173.
And moveable goods compared, ib.
[Pg 421]The accumulation of, studied by the European nations, 174.
The mercantile arguments for liberty to export gold and silver, ib.
The validity of these arguments examined, 175.
Money and goods mutually the price of each other, ib.
Over-trading causes complaints of the scarcity of money, 176.
Why more easy to buy goods with money, than to buy money with goods, 177.
Inquiry into the circulating quantity of, in Great Britain, 178.
Effect of the discovery of the American mines on the value of, 181.
Money and wealth different things, 182.
Bank money explained, 195.
See Coins, Gold, and Silver.

Monopolies in trade or manufactures, the tendency of, 25.
Are enemies to good management, 62.
Tendency of making a monopoly, of colony trade, 251.
Countries which have colonies obliged to share their advantages with many other countries, 260.
The chief engine in the mercantile system, 261.
How monopolies derange the natural distribution of the stock of the society, ib.
Are supported by unjust and cruel laws, 268.
Of a temporary nature, how far justifiable, 316.
Perpetual monopolies injurious to the people at large, ib.

Montauban, the inequalities in the predial taille in that generality, how rectified, 352.

Montesquieu, reasons given by him for the high rates of interest among all Mahometan nations, 40.
Examination of his idea of the cause of lowering the rate of interest of money, 145.

Morality, two different systems of, in every civilized society, 332.
The principal points of distinction between them, 333.
The ties of obligation in each system, ib.
Why the morals of the common people are more regular in sectaries than under the established church, ib.
The excesses of, how to be corrected, ib.

Morellet, M. his account of joint-stock companies, defective, 317.

Mun, Mr. his illustration of the operation of money exported for commercial purposes, 174.

Music, why a part of the ancient Grecian education, 324.
And dancing, great amusement among barbarous nations, ib.


N

Nations, sometimes driven to inhuman customs, by poverty, 1.
The number of useful and productive labourers in, always proportioned to the capital stock on which they are employed, 1, 2.
The several sorts of industry seldom dealt impartially by, 2.
Maritime nations, why the first improved, 8.
How ruined by a neglect of public economy, 140.
Evidences of the increase of a national capital, 141.
How the expenses of individuals may increase the national capital, 142.

Navigation, inland, a great means of improving a country in arts and industry, 9.
The advantages of, 62.
May be successfully managed by joint-stock companies, 317.

Navigation act of England, the principal dispositions of, 187.
Motives that dictated, this law, 188.
Its political and commercial tendency, ib.
Its consequences, so far as it affected the colony trade with England, 245.
Diminished the foreign trade with Europe, 246.
Has kept up high profits in the British trade, ib.
Subjects Britain to a disadvantage in every branch of trade of which she has not the monopoly, ib., 247.

Necessaries distinguished from luxuries, 368.
Operation of taxes on, ib.
Principal necessaries taxed, 369.

Negro slaves, why not much employed in raising corn in the English colonies, 159.
Why more numerous on sugar than on tobacco plantations, ib.

Nile, river, the cause of the early improvement of agriculture and manufactures in Egypt, 9.


O

Oats, bread made of, not so suitable to the human constitution as that made of wheat, 68.

Ontology, the science of, explained, 323.

Oxford, the professorships there, sinecures, 319.


P

Paper money, the credit of, how established, 118.
Its operation explained, ib.
Its effect on the circulation of cash, ib., 119.
Promotes industry, ib.
Operation of the several banking companies established in Scotland, 120.
Can never exceed the value of the gold and silver, of which it supplies the place in any country, 122.
Consequences of too much paper being issued, ib.
The practice of drawing and redrawing explained, with its pernicious effects, 126.
The advantages and disadvantages of paper credit, stated, 131.
Ill effects of notes issued for small sums, 132.
Suppressing small notes renders money more plentiful, ib.
The currency of, does not affect the prices of goods, 133.
Account of the paper currency in North America, 134.
Expedient of the government of Pennsylvania to raise money, 345.
Why convenient for the domestic purposes of the North Americans, 400.

Paris enjoys a little more trade than is necessary for the consumption of its inhabitants, 138.

Parish ministers, evils attending vesting the election of, in the people, 339.

Parsimony is the immediate cause of the increase of capitals, 138.
Promotes industry, ib.
Frugal men public benefactors, 140.
Is the only means by which artificers and manufacturers can add to the revenue and wealth of society, according to the French agricultural system of political economy, 277.
[Pg 422]
Pasture land, under what circumstances more profitable than arable land, 62, 63.
Why it ought to be inclosed, 63.

Patronage, the right of, why established in Scotland, 340.

Pay, military, origin and reason of, 291.

Pennsylvania, account of the paper currency there, 134.
Good consequences of the government there having no religious establishment, 332.
Derive a revenue from their paper currency, 401.

People, how divided into productive and unproductive classes according to the present French system of agricultural political economy, 275.
The unproductive class greatly useful to the others, 277.
The great body of, how rendered unwarlike, 292.
The different opportunities of education in the different ranks of, 328.
The inferior ranks of, the greatest consumers, 375.
The luxurious expenses of these ranks ought only to be taxed, 376.

Persecution for religious opinions, the true cause of, 330.

Peru, the discovery of the silver mines in, occasioned those in Europe to be in a great measure abandoned, 71.
These mines yield but small profit to the proprietors, ib.
Tax paid to the king of Spain from these mines, 85.
The early accounts of the splendour and state of arts, in this country greatly exaggerated, 85, 86.
Present state of, under the Spanish government, 86.
The working of the mines there becomes gradually more expensive, 90.
Low state of arts there when first discovered, 233.
Is probably more populous now than at any former period, ib.

Philosophy, natural, the origin and objects of, 322.
Moral, the nature of, explained, ib.
Logic, the origin and employment of, ib.

Physicians, why amply rewarded for their labour, 43, 44.

Physics, the ancient system of, explained, 322.

Pin-making, the extraordinary advantage of a division of labour in this art, 3.

Plate of private families, the melting it down to supply state exigencies, an insignificant resource, 178.
New plate is chiefly made from old, 225.

Ploughmen, their knowledge more extensive than the generality of mechanics, 53.

Pneumatics, the science of, explained, 323.

Poivre, M. his account of the agriculture of Chochin-China, 66.

Poland, a country still kept in poverty by the feudal system of its government, 101.

Political economy, the two distinct objects and two different systems of, 173.
The present agricultural system of, adopted by French philosophers, described, 275.
Classes of the people who contribute to the annual produce of the land, ib.
How proprietors contribute, ib.
How cultivators contribute, ib.
Artificers and manufacturers unproductive, 276.
The unproductive classes maintained by the others, 277.
Bad tendency of restrictions and prohibitions in trade, 279.
How this system is delineated by M. Quesnai. The bad effects of an injudicious political economy, how corrected, 280.
The capital error in this system pointed out, ib.

Poll-taxes, origin of, under the feudal government, 162, 163.
Why esteemed badges of slavery, 362.
The nature of, considered, 367.

Poor, history of the laws made for the provision of, in England, 57.

Pope of Rome, the great power formerly assumed by, 335.
His power how reduced, 337.
Rapid progress of the Reformation, 338.

Population, riches and extreme poverty equally unfavourable to, 33.
Is limited by the means of subsistence, ib., 69.

Porter, the proportion of malt used in the brewing of, 376.

Portugal, the cultivation of the country not advanced by its commerce, 171, 172.
The value of gold and silver there depreciated by prohibiting their exportation, 208.
Translation of the commercial treaty concluded in 1703 with England, 223.
A large share of the Portugal gold sent annually to England, ib.
Motives that led to the discovery of a passage to the East round the Cape of Good Hope, 229.
Lost its manufactures by acquiring rich and fertile colonies, 251.

Post-office, a mercantile project, well calculated for being managed by a government, 344.

Potatoes, remarks on, as an article of food, 67.
Culture and great produce of, ib.
The difficulty of preserving them the great obstacle to cultivating them for general diet, 68.

Poverty, sometimes urges nations to inhuman customs, 1.
Is no check to the production of children, 33.
But very unfavourable to raising them, ib.

Poultry, the cause of their cheapness, 95.
Is a more important article of rural economy in France than in England, ib.

Pragmatic sanction in France, the object of, 337.
Is followed by the concordat, ib.

Preferments, ecclesiastical, the means by which a national clergy ought to be managed by the civil magistrate, 335.
Alterations in the mode of electing to them, ib., 337.

Presbyterian church government, the nature of, described, 340.
Character of the clergy of, ib., 341.

Prices, real and nominal, of commodities, distinguished, 14.
Money price of goods explained, 19.
Rent for land enters into the price of the greater part of all commodities, 21.
The component parts of the price of goods explained, ib.
Natural and market prices distinguished, and how governed, 23, 36.
Though raised at first by an increase of demand, always reduced by it in the result, 314.

Primogeniture, origin and motive of the law of succession by, under the feudal government, 157.
In contrary to the real interest of families, 158.
[Pg 423]
Princes, why not well calculated to manage mercantile projects for the sake of a revenue, 344.

Prodigality, the natural tendency of, both to the individual and to the public, 138.
Prodigal men enemies to their country, 140.

Produce of land and labour the source of all revenue, 136.
The value of, how to be increased, 141.

Professors in Universities, circumstances which determine their merit, 340, 341.

Profit, the various articles of gain that pass under the common idea of, 22.
An average rate of, in all countries, 23.
Averages of, extremely difficult to ascertain, 37.
Interest of money the best standard of, ib.
The diminution of, a natural consequence of prosperity, 38.
Clear and gross profit distinguished, 40.
The nature of the highest ordinary rate of, defined, ib.
Double interest deemed in Great Britain a reasonable mercantile profit, ib.
In thriving countries low profit may compensate the high wages of labour, 41.
The operation of high profits and high wages compared, ib.
Compensates inconvenience and disgrace, 42.
Of stock, how affected, 46.
Large profits must be made from small capitals, 47.
Why goods are cheaper in the metropolis than in country villages, ib.
Great fortunes more frequently made by trade in large towns than in small ones, ib.
Is naturally low in rich, and high in poor countries, 106.
How that of the different classes of traders is raised, 148.
Private, the sole motive of employing capitals in any branch of business, 154.
When raised by monopolies, encourage luxury, 253.

Projects, unsuccessful in arts, injurious to a country, 140.

Property, passions which prompt mankind to the invasion of, 297.
Civil government necessary for the production of, ib.
Wealth a source of authority, 298.

Provisions, how far the variations in the price of, affect labour and industry, 30, 34, 36.
Whether cheaper in the metropolis or in country villages, 47.
The prices of, better regulated by competition than by law, 60.
A rise in the prices of, must be uniform, to shew that it proceeds from a depreciation of the value of silver, 102.

Provisers, object of the statute of, in England, 337.

Prussia, mode of assessing the land-tax there, 351.

Public works and institutions, how to be maintained, 302.
Equity of tolls for passage over roads, bridges and canals, 303.
Why government ought not to have the management of turnpikes, 304.
Nor of other public works, 306.

Purveyance, a service still exacted in most parts of Europe, 161.


Q

Quakers of Pennsylvania, inference from their resolution to emancipate all their negro slaves, 159.

Quesnai, M. view of his agricultural system of political economy, 279.
His doctrine generally subscribed to, 282.

Quito, populousness of that city, 233.


R

Reformation, rapid progress of the doctrines of, in Germany, 338.
In Sweden and Switzerland, ib.
In England and Scotland, ib., 339.
Origin of the Lutheran and the Calvinistic sects, ib.

Regulated companies. See Companies.

Religion, the object of instruction in, 330.
Advantage the teachers of a new religion enjoy over those of one that is established, ib.
Origin of persecutions for heretical opinions, ib.
How the zeal of the inferior clergy of the church of Rome is kept alive, ib.
Utility of ecclesiastical establishments, 331.
How united with the civil power, ib., 332.

Rent, reserved, ought not to consist of money, 14.
But of corn, ib.
Of land, constitutes a third part of the price of most kinds of goods, 21.
An average rate of, in all countries, and how regulated, 23.
Makes the first deduction from the produce of labour employed upon land, 27.
The terms of, how adjusted between landlord and tenant, 60, 61.
Is sometimes demanded for what is altogether incapable of human improvement, 61.
Is paid for, and produced, by land in almost all situations, ib.
The general proportion paid for coal mines, 71.
And metal mines, ib.
Mines of precious stones frequently yield no rent, 73.
How paid in ancient times, 76.
Is raised, either directly or indirectly, by every improvement in the circumstances of society, 105.
Gross and neat rent distinguished, 115.
How raised and paid under feudal governments, 137.
Present average proportion of, compared with the produce of the land, ib.
Of houses distinguished into two parts, 354.
Difference between rent of house and rent of land, 355.
Rent of a house the best estimate of a tenants circumstances, ib.

Retainers, under the feudal system of government described, 167.
How the connection between them and their lords was broken, 169.

Revenue, the original source of, pointed out, 22.
Of a country, of what it consists, 115.
The neat revenue of a society diminished by supporting a circulating stock of money, 116.
Money no part of revenue, 117.
Is not to be computed in money, but in what money will purchase, ib.
How produced, and how appropriated, in the first instance, 136.
Produce of land, ib.
Produce of manufactures, ib. Must always replace capital, ib.
The proportion between revenue and capital regulates the proportion between idleness and industry, 138.
Both the savings and the spendings of, annually, consumed, ib.
Of every society, equal to the exchangeable value of the whole produce of its industry, 184.
[Pg 424]Of the customs, increase by drawbacks, 205.
Why government ought not to take the management of turnpikes, to derive a revenue from them, 304.
Public works of a local nature always better maintained by provincial revenues than by the general revenue of the state, 306.
The abuses in provincial revenues trifling, when compared with those in the revenue of a great empire, ib.
The greater the revenue of the church, the smaller must be that of the state, 341.
The revenue of the state ought to be raised proportionably from the whole society, 342.
Local expenses ought to be defrayed by a local revenue, 343.
Inquiry into the sources of public revenue, ib.
Of the republic of Hamburgh, ib., 344.
Whether the government of Britain could undertake the management of the bank, to derive a revenue from it, ib.
The post office, a mercantile project, well calculated for being managed by government, ib.
Princes not well qualified to improve their fortunes by trade, ib.
The English East India Company good traders before they became sovereigns, but each character now spoils the other, ib.
Expedient of the government of Pennsylvania to raise money, 345.
Rent of land the most permanent fund, ib.
Feudal revenues, ib.
Of Great Britain, ib.
Revenue from land proportioned not to the rent but to the produce, 346.
Reasons for selling the crown lands, ib., 347.
An improved land-tax suggested, 349.
The nature and effect of tithes explained, 352.
Why a revenue cannot be raised in kind, 353.
When raised in money, how affected by different modes of valuation, ib.
A proportionable tax on houses the best source of revenue, 355.
Remedies for the diminution of, according to their causes, 374.
Bad effects of farming out public revenues, 381.
The different sources of revenue in France, 384.
How expended in the rude state of society, 385.

Rice, a very productive article of cultivation, 67.
Requires a soil unfit for raising any other kind of food, ib.
Rice countries more populous than corn countries, 86.

Riches, the chief enjoyment of, consists in the parade of, 72, 73.

Risk, instances of the inattention mankind pay to it, 45.

Roads, good, the public advantages of, 62.
How to be made and maintained, 303.
The maintenance of, why improper to be trusted to private interest, 304.
General state of, in France, 305.
In China, ib.

Romans, why copper became the standard of value among them, 16.
The extravagant prices paid by them for certain luxuries for the table accounted for, 92.
The value of silver higher among them than at the present time, ib.
The republic of, founded on a division of land among the citizens, 228.
The Agrarian law only executed upon one or two occasions, ib.
How the citizens who had no land subsisted, ib.
Distinction between the Roman and Greek colonies, ib.
The improvement of the former slower than that of the latter, 232.
Origin of the social war, 257.
The republic ruined by extending the privilege of Roman citizens to the greater part of the inhabitants of Italy, 258.
When contributions were first raised to maintain those who went to the wars, 290.
Soldiers not a distinct profession there, 291.
Improvement of the Roman armies by discipline, 294.
How that discipline was lost, 295.
The fall of the western empire, how effected, ib.
Remarks on the education of the ancient Romans, 324.
Their morals superior to those of the Greeks, ib.
State of law, and forms of justice, 325.
The martial spirit of the people, how supported, 329.
Great reductions of the coin practised by, at particular exigencies, 396.

Rome, modern, how the zeal of the inferior clergy of, is kept alive, 330.
The clergy of, one great spiritual army dispersed in different quarters over Europe, 335.
Their power during the feudal monkish ages similar to that of the temporal barons, 336.
Their power, how reduced, 337.

Rouen, why a town of great trade, 138.

Ruddiman, Mr. remarks on his account of the ancient price of wheat in Scotland, 77.

Russia, was civilized under Peter the Great by a standing army, 296.


S

Sailors, why no sensible inconvenience felt by the great numbers disbanded at the close of a war, 190.

Salt, account of foreign salt imported into Scotland, and of Scotch salt delivered duty free for the fishery, 288, Append.
Is an object of heavy taxation everywhere, 369.
The collection of the duty on, expensive, 380.

Sardinia, the land-tax how assessed there, 352.

Saxon lords, their authority and jurisdiction as great before the Conquest as those of the Normans were afterwards, 168.

Schools, parochial, observations on, 328.

Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition, 333.

Scipio, his Spanish militia rendered superior to the Carthaginian militia by discipline and service, 294.

Scotland, compared with England as to the prices of labour and provisions, 31.
Remarks on the population of the Highlands, 33.
The market rate of interest higher than the legal rate, 37.
The situation of cottagers there described, 49.
Apprenticeships and corporations, 51.
The common people of, why neither so strong nor so handsome as the same class in England, 68.
Cause of the frequent emigrations from, 80.
Progress of agriculture there before the union with England, 93.
Present obstructions to better husbandry, ib., 94.
The price of wool reduced by the Union, 99.
[Pg 425]Operation of the several banking companies established there, 120.
Amount of the circulating money there before the Union, ib.
Amount of the present circulating cash, 121.
Course of dealings in the Scotch banks ib.
Difficulties occasioned by these banks issuing too much paper, 123.
Necessary caution for some time observed by the banks in giving credit to their customers, with the good effects of it, 124.
The scheme of drawing and redrawing adopted by traders, 126.
Its pernicious tendency explained, ib., 127.
History of the Ayr bank, 128.
Mr. Law's scheme to improve the country, 130.
The prices of goods in, not altered by paper currency, 133.
Effect of the optional clauses in their notes, ib.
Cause of the speedy establishment of the Reformation there, 339.
The disorders attending popular elections of the clergy there, occasioned the right of patronage to be established, ib.
Amount of the whole revenue of the clergy, 342.

Sea service and military service by land, compared, 45.

Sects in religion, the more numerous, the better for society, 332.
Why they generally profess the austere system of morality, 333.

Self-love the governing principle in the intercourse of human society, 6.

Servants, menial, distinguished from hired workmen, 135.
The various orders of men who rank in the former class in reference to their labour, 136.
Their labour unproductive, 280.

Settlements of the poor, brief review of the English laws relating to, 57.
The removals of the poor a violation of natural liberty, 59.
The law of, ought to be repealed, 191.

Sheep, frequently killed in Spain for the sake of the fleece and the tallow, 97.
Severe laws against the exportation of them and their wool, 268.

Shepherds, war, how supported by a nation of, 289.
Inequality of fortune among, the source of great authority, 298.
Birth and family highly honoured in nations of shepherds, ib.
Inequality of fortune first began to take place in the age of shepherds, 299.
And introduced civil government, ib.

Shetland, how rents are estimated and paid there, 61.

Silk manufacture, how transferred from Lucca to Venice, 166.

Silver, the first standard coinage of the northern subverters of the Roman empires, 16.
Its proportional value to gold regulated by law, 17.
Is the measure of the value of gold, ib.
Mint price of silver in England, ib.
Inquiry into the difference between the mint and market price of bullion, ib., 18.
How to preserve the silver coin from being melted down for profit, 18.
The mines of, in Europe, why generally abandoned, 71.
Evidences of the small profit they yield to the proprietors in Peru, ib.
Qualities for which this metal is valued, 72.
The most abundant mines of, would add little to the wealth of the world, 73.
But the increase in the quantity of, would depreciate its own value, 74.
Circumstances that might counteract this effect, ib.
Historical view of the variations in the value of, during the four last centuries, ib., 75.
Remarks on its rise in value compared with corn, 76.
Circumstances that might have misled writers in reviewing the value of silver, ib.
Corn the best standard for judging of the real value of silver, 79.
The price of, how affected by the increase of quantity, ib.
The value of, sunk by the discovery of the American mines, 81.
When the reduction of its value from this cause appears to have been completed, ib.
Tax paid from the Peruvian mines to the king of Spain, 85.
The value of silver kept up by an extension of the market, ib.
Is the most profitable commodity that can be sent to China, 86.
The value of, how proportioned to that of gold before and after the discovery of the American mines, 89.
The quantity commonly in the market in proportion to that of gold probably greater than their relative values indicate, ib.
The value of, probably rising, and why, 90, 91.
The opinion of a depreciation of its value not well founded, 100.
The real value of, degraded by the bounty on the exportation of corn, 207.

Sinking fund in the British finances explained, 389.
Is inadequate to the discharge of former debts, and almost wholly applied to other purposes, 391.
Motives to the misapplication of it, ib., 392.

Slaves, the labour of, dearer to the masters than that of freemen, 53.
Under feudal lords, circumstances of their situation, 159.
Countries where this order of men still remains, ib.
Why the service of slave is preferred to that of freemen, ib.
Their labour why unprofitable, ib.
Causes of the abolishing of slavery throughout the greater part of Europe, 160.
Receive more protection from the magistrate in an arbitrary government than in one that is free, 241.
Why employed in manufactures by the ancient Grecians, 284.
Why no improvements are to be expected from them, ib.

Smuggling, a tempting, but generally a ruinous employment, 46.
Encouraged by high duties, 373.
Remedies against, 374.
The crime of, morally considered, 381.

Society, human, the first principles of, 6.

Soldiers, remarks on their motives for engaging in the military line, 45.
Comparison between the land and sea service, ib.
Why no sensible inconvenience felt by the disbanding of great numbers after a war is over, 190.
Reason of their first serving for pay, 291.
How they became a distinct class of the people, 292.
How distinguished from the militia, ib.
Alteration in their exercise produced by the invention of fire-arms, ib.

South Sea company, amazing capital once enjoyed by, 311.
Mercantile and stock-jobbing projects of, 312.
Assiento contract, ib.
Whale fishery, ib.
The capital of, turned into annuity stock, ib., 388.

Sovereign and trader, inconsistent characters, 344.
[Pg 426]
Sovereign, three duties only necessary for him to attend to for supporting a system of natural liberty, 286.
How he is to protect the society from external violence, 289, 296.
And the members of it from the injustice and oppression of each other, 297.
And to maintain public works and institutions, 302.

Spain, One of the poorest countries in Europe, notwithstanding its rich mines, 101.
Its commerce has produced no considerable manufactures for distant sale, and the greater part of the country remains uncultivated, 171, 172.
Spanish mode of estimating their American discoveries, 173.
The value of gold, and silver there depreciated by laying a tax on the exportation of them, 208.
Agriculture and manufactures there discouraged by the redundancy of gold and silver, ib., 209.
Natural consequences that would result from taking away this tax, ib.
The real and pretended motives of the court of Castile for taking possession of the countries discovered by Columbus, 230.
The tax on gold and silver, how reduced, ib.
Gold the object of all the enterprises to the new world, ib.
The colonies of, less populous than those of any other European nation, 232, 233.
Asserted an exclusive claim to all America, until the miscarriage of their invincible armada, ib.
Policy of the trade with the colonies, 236.
The American establishments of, effected by private adventurers, who received little beyond permission from the government, 242.
Lost its manufactures by acquiring rich and fertile colonies, 251.
The alcavala tax there explained, 381.
The ruin of the Spanish manufactures attributed to it, ib.

Speculation, a distinct employment in improved society, 5.
Speculative merchants described, 47.

Stage, public performers on, paid for the contempt attending their profession, 44.
The political use of dramatic representations, 334.

Stamp duties in England and Holland, remarks on, 363, 364, 365.

Steel-bow tenants in Scotland, what, 160.

Stock, the profits raised on, in manufactures, explained, 20.
In trade, an increase of, raises wages, and diminishes profit, 36.
Must be larger in a great town than in a country village, 37.
Natural consequences of a deficiency of stock in new colonies, 38.
The profits on, little affected by the easiness or difficulty of learning a trade, 43.
But by the risk or disagreeableness of the business, 46.
Stock employed for profit sets into motion the greater part of useful labour, 106.
No accumulation of, necessary in the rude state of society, 111.
The accumulation of, necessary to the division of labour, ib.
Stock distinguished into two parts, 112.
The general stock of a country or society explained, 113.
Houses, ib.
Improved land, ib.
Personal abilities, ib.
Money and provisions, 114.
Raw materials and manufactured goods, ib.
Stock of individuals, how employed, 115.
Is frequently buried or concealed in arbitrary countries, ib.
The profits on, decrease in proportion as the quantity increases, 137.
On what principles stock is lent and borrowed at interest, 144.
That of every society divided among different employments, in the proportion most agreeable to the public interest, by the private views of individuals, 260.
The natural distribution of, deranged by monopolizing systems, 261.
Every derangement of, injurious to the society, 262.
Mercantile, is barren and unproductive, according to the French agricultural system of political economy, 277.
How far the revenue from, is an object of taxation, 357.
A tax on, intended under the land-tax, 358.

Stockings, why cheaply manufactured in Scotland, 49.
When first introduced into England, 104.

Stone quarries, their value depends on situation, 69, 74.

Stones, precious, of no use but for ornament, and how the price of, is regulated, 73.
The most abundant mines, would add little to the wealth of the world, ib.

Subordination, how introduced into society, 297.
Personal qualifications, ib.
Age and fortune, ib.
Birth, 298.
Birth and fortune two great sources of personal distinction, ib.

Subsidy, old, in the English customs, the drawbacks upon, 203.
Origin and import of the term, 372.

Sugar, a very profitable article of cultivation, 66, 159.
Drawbacks on the importation of, from England, 204.
Might be cultivated by the drill-plough, instead of all hand-labour by slaves, 241.
A proper subject for taxation, as an article sold at monopoly price, 378.

Sumptuary laws, superfluous restraints on the common people, 142.

Surinam, present state of the Dutch colony there, 234.

Switzerland, establishment of the Reformation in Berne and Zurich, 338.
The clergy there zealous and industrious, 342.
Taxes how paid there, 359, 363.


T

Taille, in France, the nature of that tax, and its operation, explained, 161.

Talents, natural, not so various in different men as is supposed, 7.

Tartars, their manner of conducting war, 289.
Their invasions dreadful, ib.

Tavernier, his account of the diamond mines of Golconda and Visiapour, 73.

Taxes, the origin of, under the feudal government, 162.
The sources from whence they must arise, 347.
Unequal taxes, ib.
Ought to be clear and certain, ib.
Ought to be levied at the times most convenient for payment, ib.
Ought to take as little as possible out of the pockets of the people more than is brought into the public treasury, 348.
[Pg 427]How they may be made more burdensome to the people than beneficial to the sovereign, ib.
The land-tax of Great Britain, ib.
Land-tax of Venice, 349.
Improvements suggested for a land-tax, ib.
Mode of assessing the land-tax in Prussia, 351.
Tithes a very unequal tax, and a discouragement to improvement, 352.
Operation of tax on house rent, payable by the tenant, 354.
A proportionable tax on houses the best source of revenue, 355.
How far the revenue from stock is a proper object of taxation, 357.
Whether interest of money is proper for taxation, ib.
How taxes are paid at Hamburgh, 339.
In Switzerland, ib.
Taxes upon particular employments, ib.
Poll-taxes, 362.
Taxes badges of liberty, ib.
Taxes upon the transfer of property, 362.
Stamp duties, 363.
On whom the several kinds of taxes principally fall, 364.
Taxes upon the wages of labour, 365.
Capitation taxes, 367.
Taxes upon consumable commodities, 368.
Upon necessaries, ib.
Upon luxuries, ib.
Principal necessaries taxed, 369.
Absurdities in taxation, 370.
Different parts of Europe very highly taxed, ib.
Two different methods of taxing consumable commodities, ib.
Sir Matthew Decker's scheme of taxation considered, 371.
Excise and customs, ib.
Taxation sometimes not an instrument of revenue, but of monopoly, 373.
Improvements of the customs suggested, 374.
Taxes paid in the price of a commodity little adverted to, 379, 380.
On luxuries, the good and bad properties of, ib.
Bad effects of farming them out, 383.
How the finances of France might be reformed, 384.
French and English taxations compared, ib.
New taxes always generate discontent, 391, 392.
How far the British system of taxation might be applicable to all the different provinces of the empire, 397.
Such a plan might speedily discharge the national debt, 399.

Tea, great importation and consumption of that drug in Britain, 86.

Teachers in Universities, tendency of endowments to diminish their application, 319.
The jurisdictions to which they are subject little calculated to quicken their diligence, ib.
Are frequently obliged to gain protection by servility, ib.
Defects in their establishments, ib., 320.
Teachers among the ancient Greeks and Romans superior to those of modern times, 326.
Circumstances which draw good ones to, or drain them from, the universities, 340.
Their employment naturally renders them eminent in letters, 341.

Tenures, feudal, general observations on, 137.
Described, 157.

Theology, monkish, the complexion of, 323.

Thoulouse, salary paid to counsellor or judge in the parliament of, 301.

Tin, average rent of the mines of in Cornwall, 71.
Yield a greater profit to the proprietors than the silver mines of Peru, ib., 72.
Regulations under which tin mines are worked, ib.

Tobacco, the culture of, why restrained in Europe, 66.
Not so profitable an article of cultivation in the West Indies as sugar, ib.
The amount and course of the British trade with, explained, 153.
The whole duty upon, drawn back on exportation, 204.
Consequences of the exclusive trade Britain enjoys with Maryland and Virginia in this article, 244.

Tolls, for passage over roads, bridges, and navigable canals, the equity of, shewn, 303.
Upon carriages of luxury, ought to be higher than upon carriages of utility, ib.
The management of turnpikes often an object of just complaint, 304.
Why government ought not to have the management of turnpikes, ib., 379.

Tonnage and poundage, origin of those duties, 372.

Tontine in the French finances, what, with the derivation of the name, 390.

Towns, the places where industry is most profitably exerted, 53.
The spirit of combination prevalent among manufacturers, ib., 54.
According to what circumstances the general character of the inhabitants as to industry is formed, 137.
The reciprocal nature of the trade between them and the country explained, 155.
Subsist on the surplus produce of the country, ib.
How first formed, 156.
Are continual fairs, ib.
The original poverty and servile state of the inhabitants of, 162.
Their early exemptions and privileges, how obtained, ib.
The inhabitants of, obtained liberty much earlier than the occupiers of land in the country, 163.
Origin of free burghs, ib.
Origin of corporations, ib.
Why allowed to form militia, 164.
How the increase and riches of commercial towns contributed to the improvement of the countries to which they belonged, 167.

Trade, double interest deemed a reasonable mercantile profit in, 40.
Four general classes of, equally necessary to, and dependent on, each other, 147.
Wholesale, three different sorts of, 151.
The different returns of home and foreign trade, ib.
The nature and operation of the carrying trade examined, 152.
The principles of foreign trade examined, 153.
The trade between town and country explained, 155.
Original poverty and servile state of the inhabitants of towns under feudal government, 162.
Exemptions and privileges granted to them, ib.
Extension of commerce by rude nations selling their own raw produce for the manufactures of more civilised countries, 165.
Its salutary effects on the government and manners of a country, 167.
Subverted the feudal authority, 168.
The independence of tradesmen and artizans explained, 169.
The capitals acquired by, very precarious, until some part has been realised by the cultivation and improvement of land, 172.
Over-trading, the cause of complaints of the scarcity of money, 176.
The importation of gold and silver not the principal benefit derived from foreign trade, 181.
[Pg 428]Effect produced in trade and manufactures by the discovery of America, ib.
And by the discovery of a passage to the East Indies round the Cape of Good Hope, ib.
Error of commercial writers in estimating national wealth by gold and silver, 182.
Inquiry into the cause and effect of restraints upon trade, ib.
Individuals, by pursuing their own interest, unknowingly promote that of the public, 184.
Legal regulations, of trade unsafe, ib.
Retaliatory regulations between nations, 189.
Measures for laying trade open ought to be carried into execution slowly, 191.
Policy of the restraints on trade between France and Britain considered, 192.
No certain criterion to determine on which side the balance of trade between two countries turns, ib.
Most of the regulations of, founded on a mistaken doctrine of the balance of trade, 199.
Is generally founded on narrow principles of policy, 201.
Drawbacks of duties, 203.
The dealer who employs his whole stock on one single branch of business has an advantage of the same kind with the workman who employs his whole labour on a single operation, 216.
Consequences of drawing it from a number of small channels into one great channel, 249.
Colony trade, and the monopoly of that trade distinguished, 250.
The interest of the consumer constantly sacrificed to that of the producer, 274.
Advantages attending a perfect freedom of, to landed nations, according to the present agricultural system of political economy in France, 278.
Origin of foreign trade, 279.
Consequences of high duties and prohibitions in landed nations, ib.
How trade augments the revenue of a country, 281.
Nature of the trading intercourse between the inhabitants of towns and those of the country, 285.

Trades, cause and effect of the separation of, 3.
Origin of, 7.

Transit duties explained, 379.

Travelling for education, summary view of the effects of, 324.

Treasures, why formerly accumulated by princes, 180.

Treasure-trove, the term explained, 115.
Why an important branch of revenue under the ancient feudal governments, 385.

Turkey company, short historical view of, 308.

Turnpikes. See Tolls.

Tithes, why an unequal tax, 352.
The levying of, a great discouragement to improvements, ib.
The fixing a modus for, a relief to the farmer, 353.


V

Value, the term defined, 12.

Vedius Pollio, his cruelty to his slaves checked by the Roman emperor Augustus, which could not have been done under the republican form of government, 241.

Venice, origin of the silk manufacture in that city, 166.
Traded in East India goods before the sea track round the Cape of Good Hope was discovered, 228, 229.
Nature of the land-tax in that republic, 349.

Venison, the price of, in Britain, does not compensate the expense of a deer park, 94.

Vicesima hereditatum among the ancient Romans, the nature of, explained, 363.

Villages, how first formed, 156.

Villenage, probable cause of the wearing out of that tenure in Europe, 160, 161.

Vineyard, the most profitable part of agriculture, both among the ancients and moderns, 65.
Great advantages derived from peculiarities of soil in, ib.

Universities, the emoluments of the teachers in, how far calculated to promote their diligence, 319.
The professors at Oxford have mostly given up teaching, ib.
Those in France subject to incompetent jurisdictions, ib.
The privileges of graduates improperly obtained, 320.
Abuse of lectureships, ib.
The discipline of, seldom calculated for the benefit of the students, ib.
Are in England more corrupted than the public schools, 321.
Original foundation of, ib.
How Latin became an essential article in academical education, ib.
How the study of the Greek language was introduced, ib., 322.
The three great branches of the Greek philosophy, ib.
Are now divided into five branches, ib.
The monkish course of education in, 323.
Have not been very ready to adopt improvements, ib.
Are not well calculated to prepare men for the world, 324.
How filled with good professors or drained of them, 340.
Where the worst and best professors are generally to be met with, ib., 341.
—See Colleges and Teachers.


W

Wages of labour, how settled between masters and workmen, 27.
The workmen generally obliged to comply with the terms of their employers, ib.
The opposition of workmen outrageous, and seldom successful, 28.
Circumstances which operate to raise wages, ib.
The extent of wages limited by the funds from which they arise, ib.
Why higher in North America than in England, ib.
Are low in countries that are stationary, ib.
Not oppressively low in Great Britain, 30.
A distinction made here between the wages in summer and in winter, 31.
If sufficient in dear years, they must be ample in seasons of plenty, ib.
Different rates of, in different places, ib.
Liberal wages encourage industry and propagation, 33.
An advance of, necessarily raises the price of many commodities, 36.
An average of, not easily ascertained, 37.
The operation of high wages and high profits compared, 41.
Causes of the variations of, in different employments, ib.
Are generally higher in new, than in old trades, 48, 57.
Legal regulations of, destroy industry and ingenuity, 59, 60.
Natural effect of a direct tax upon, 365.

Walpole, Sir Robert, his excise scheme defended, 375.
[Pg 429]
Wants of mankind, how supplied through the operation of labour, 9, 10.
How extended, in proportion to their supply, 69.
The far greater part of them supplied from the produce of other men's labour, 111.

Wars, foreign, the funds for the maintenance of, in the present century, have little dependence on the quantity of gold and silver in a nation, 178, 179.
How supported by a nation of hunters, 289.
By a nation of shepherds, ib.
By a nation of husbandmen, 290.
Men of military age, what proportion they bear to the whole society, ib.
Feudal wars, how supported, ib.
Causes which, in the advanced state of society, rendered it impossible for those who took the field, to maintain themselves, ib.
How the art of war became a distinct profession, 291.
Distinction between the militia and regular forces, 292.
Alteration in the art of war produced by the invention of fire-arms, ib., 296.
Importance of discipline, 293.
Macedonian army, 294.
Carthaginian army, ib.
Roman army, ib.
Feudal armies, 295.
A well regulated standing army, the only defence of a civilized country, and the only means for speedily civilizing a barbarous country, 296.
The want of parsimony during peace, imposes on states the necessity of contracting debts to carry on war, 386, 391.
Why war is agreeable to those who live secure from the immediate calamities of it, 391.
Advantages of raising the supplies for, within the year, 394.

Watch movements, great reduction in the prices of, owing to mechanical improvements, 103.

Wealth and money, synonymous terms, in popular language, 173, 182.
Spanish and Tartarian estimate of, compared, 173.
The great authority conferred by the possession of, 298.

Weavers, the profits of, why necessarily greater than those of spinners, 21.

West Indies, discovered by Columbus, 229.
How they obtained this name, ib.
The original native productions of, ib.
The thirst of gold the object of all the Spanish enterprises there, 230.
And of those of every other European nation, 231.
The remoteness of, greatly in favour of the European colonies there, 232.
The sugar colonies of France better governed than those of Britain, 241.

Wheat. See Corn.

Window-tax in Britain, how rated, 357.
Tends to reduce house rent, ib.

Windsor market, chronological table of the prices of corn at, 109.

Wine, the cheapness of, would be a cause of sobriety, 200.
The carrying trade in, encouraged by English statutes, 204.

Wood, the price of, rises in proportion as a country is cultivated, 70.
The growth of young trees prevented by cattle, ib.
When the planting of trees becomes a profitable employment, ib.

Wool, the produce of rude countries, commonly carried to a distant market, 97.
The price of, in England, has fallen considerably since the time of Edward III., ib.
Causes of this diminution in price, 98.
The price of, considerably reduced in Scotland, by the Union with England, 99.
Severity of the laws against the exportation of, 268.
Restraints upon the inland commerce of, 269.
Restraints upon the coasting trade of, ib.
Pleas on which these restraints are founded, ib.
The price of wool depressed by these regulations, 270.
The exportation of, ought to be allowed, subject to a duty, 271.

Woollen cloth, the present prices of, compared with those at the close of the fifteenth century, 104.
Three mechanical improvements introduced in the manufacture of, ib., 105.


A

Absentee tax and its appropriateness in relation to Ireland, 379.

Accounts of money in modern Europe are all maintained, and the worth of goods calculated, in silver, 16.

Public actors are compensated for the disdain associated with their profession, 44.

Africa, the reason given for the savage condition of its interior regions, 9.

African company, establishment and structure of, 309.
Receive an annual budget from parliament for forts and garrisons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The company isn't well enough controlled, ib.
History of the Royal African Company, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Decline of, ib. Rise of the current company, ib.

Age is the basis for rank and precedence in both primitive and civilized societies, 297.

Aggregate fund in British finances explained, 388.

Agio of the bank of Amsterdam explained, 194.
Of the Hamburg bank, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The exchange rate in Amsterdam remains at a moderate level, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Agriculture, its labor does not permit the same subdivisions as manufacturing, 3.
This inability to separate prevents agriculture from advancing at the same pace as manufacturing, ib.
The typical situation of farming in a new colony, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Requires more knowledge and experience than most mechanical jobs, yet is carried out without limitations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
How rental terms are set between the landlord and tenant, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Expanded by improved roads and navigable canals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Under what conditions is pasture land valued more than arable land, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__?
Gardening isn't a very lucrative job, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Vines are the most profitable crop, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Profit estimates from projects can often be inaccurate, ib.
Cattle and farming benefit each other, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Comments on agriculture in Scotland, ib.
On farming in North America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Poultry provides a lucrative business opportunity in farming, ib.
Pigs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Dairy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Proof that the land has been fully developed, ib.
The growth of farming increases meat prices and decreases vegetable prices, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
By whom and how it was practiced under feudal rule, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Its operations focus more on guiding rather than boosting nature's fertility, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
It has been essential to the success of British colonies in America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The profits from it are blown out of proportion by con artists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
It is naturally better to trade when conditions are equal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Craftsmen needed to continue it, ib.
Was overlooked by the northern destroyers of the Roman Empire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Europe's ancient policies held it back, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Was supported by the trade and production of towns, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The wealth it creates is more stable and enduring than what's generated from trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Is not backed by the bounty on corn exports, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Reasons why it is the right business for new companies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The current agricultural political economy system in France is described __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Is discouraged by trade restrictions and bans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Is preferred over manufacturing in China, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
And in India, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Does not need as large a market as manufacturing does, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Limiting manufacturing to boost agriculture is a misguided policy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Landowners should be motivated to grow crops on some of their own land, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Alcavala, the tax in Spain explained and evaluated, 381.
The decrease in Spanish manufacturing is attributed to this tax, ib.

Alehouses are not the main cause of drunkenness, 148, 200.

Allodial rights are confused with feudal rights, 168.
The introduction of feudal law sought to restrict the authority of allodial lords, ib.

Ambassadors are appointed primarily due to their initial purpose, 307.

America, reasons for why labor costs more in North America than in England, 29.
There is a substantial rise in the population there, ib.
Common interest rate there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
There’s a new market for the products from its silver mines, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
[Pg 406]The early reports about the two empires of Peru and Mexico were highly exaggerated, ib.
Improvement in the conditions of Spanish colonies there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Overview of the paper money used in the British colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Reasons for the quick growth of British colonies there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Why long-lasting manufacturing has never been established there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Rapid advancements thanks to foreign investment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Investing in and improving uncultivated land is the most profitable use of capital, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Commercial changes brought about by the discovery of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
There are only two civilized nations located on the entire continent, ib.
Even with the ongoing negative trade balance, the wealth of North American colonies increased, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Madeira wine was brought there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
A historical overview of European settlements in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Of Spain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
About Holland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Of France, ib.
Of Britain, ib.
Church governance in the different European colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Fish are a key trade item from North America to Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Naval supplies to the UK, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
European policy deserves little credit for the success of the colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The discovery and colonization of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ were very beneficial for Europe.
And to America, ib.
The colonies were run with a monopoly mindset, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The interests of consumers in Britain are being sacrificed for the sake of producers through the colonization system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Plan to extend the British taxation system across all provinces of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
The issue of how Americans can pay taxes without using cash is being discussed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They should fairly help repay Britain's public debt, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The importance of their connection with Britain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The British Empire is just an idea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Amsterdam, agio of the bank of, explained, 194.
Reason for its establishment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Benefits associated with payments there, ib.
Fees applied for keeping money there, ib.
Prices at which bullion and coins are accepted, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, note.
This bank is the primary source for bullion in Europe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Demands on it, how they are created and fulfilled, ib.
How the agio is maintained at a moderate rate, ib.
Whether all treasure is kept safe in its storage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The amount of its treasure can only be estimated, ib.
Fees charged by the bank for doing business, ib.

Annuities for fixed terms and for lives in British finances, a historical account of, 389.

Apothecaries, the profits on their drugs wrongly labeled as excessive, 46.

Apprenticeship, the nature and intention of this servitude described, 42.
The limits on different trades concerning the number of apprentices, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The apprenticeship law in England, ib.
Apprenticeships in France and Scotland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
General observations on the effects of long apprenticeships, ib.
The apprenticeship laws should be revoked, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Arabs, their method of sustaining war, 289.

Army, three ways a nation can maintain one in a distant territory, 178.
The difference between a standing army and a militia is __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Historical overview of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The Macedonian army, ib.
The Carthaginian army, ib.
The Roman army, ib.
The only way to support a country's civilization is __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Is the fastest way to civilize a savage land, ib.
Under what conditions it can pose a threat to freedom, ib.

Artificers prohibited from traveling abroad by law, 273.
Living abroad without returning when notified can result in being considered an outlaw, ib.
See Manufacturers.

Asdrubal improved his army significantly through discipline, 294.
How he was defeated, ib.

Assembly, houses of in the British colonies demonstrate constitutional freedom, 240.

Assiento Contract, 312.

Assize of bread and ale, comments on that statute, 75, 77.

Augustus, the emperor, freed the slaves of Vedius Pollio due to his cruelty, 241.


B

Balance of annual production and consumption explained, 203.
A nation may still be favored even if the trade balance is negative, ib.

Balance of trade is not a reliable measure to determine which side benefits between two countries, 192.
Current trade theory, which most trade regulations rely on, is ridiculous, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
If balanced, both sides can gain by trading their own goods, ib.
How the balance would look if local goods on one side were exchanged for foreign goods on the other, ib.
How the balance is affected when commodities are purchased with gold and silver, ib., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The downfall of nations is often predicted based on the idea of a negative trade balance, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Banks, major growth in trade in Scotland since they were established in major towns, 120.
Their usual business practices, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Consequences of overprinting money, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They have been exercising necessary caution for some time when it comes to extending credit to customers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Limits on the advances they might unintentionally provide to traders, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
How they have been affected by the practice of revising and rewriting bills, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
History of the Ayr bank, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
History of the Bank of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The role and advantages of banks for the public are examined, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Bankers could work with less paperwork, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Effects of optional clauses in Scotch notes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The origin of their establishment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Bank money explained, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Bank of England, its decisions about currency, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
[Pg 407]Joint stock companies are well-suited for the banking sector, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
A debated issue is whether the government of Great Britain can successfully run the bank for profit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bankers, how the credibility of their notes is established, 118.
The nature of banking explained, ib., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The competition and collaboration among bankers, which benefits public credit when regulated correctly, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Baretti, Mr. his account of the amount of Portugal gold sent weekly to England, 225.

Barons, feudal, their power limited by the granting of municipal privileges, 163.
Their broad authority, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
How they lost control over their vassals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
And their ability to disrupt their country, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Barter, the exchange of one commodity for another, the inclination to engage in it, widespread, and unique to humans, 6.
Is insufficient for enabling mutual exchanges among individuals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See Commerce.

Batavia, reasons for the prosperity of the Dutch settlement there, 263.

Beaver skins, review of the trade policy regarding, 273.

Beef is cheaper now in London than it was during the reign of James I., 63.
Compared to the prices of wheat back then, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Benefices, ecclesiastical, how their tenure became secure, 335.
The authority to appoint them was removed from the pope in England and France, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
General equality among Presbyterians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Positive results from this equality, ib.

Bengal, factors contributing to its early improvements in agriculture and manufacturing, 9.
The country's current miserable situation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
There are concerns about the high interest rates there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The harsh actions of the English there were aimed at supporting their opium trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Why is it better known for manufacturing exports than for grain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__?

Berne, brief history of the republic of, 164.
Reformation established there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The revenue generated by the Catholic clergy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
It earns money from the interest on its treasury, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bills of Exchange, punctuality in payments is secured, 126.
The harmful practice of drawing and redrawing explained, ib.
Methods used to hide this mutual trading in bills, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Birth, superiority due to it confers respect and authority, 298.

Bishops, the ancient method of their election, and how it changed, 335, 337.

Body, both natural and political, analogies between the two, 280.

Bohemia, account of taxation on the labor of artificers there, 366.

Bounty on corn exports analyzed, 81.

Bounties, reasons for giving them in commerce, 183.
When exporting, the policy behind them is analyzed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
On corn export, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
This bounty imposes two taxes on the public, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Negative effects of this bounty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The bounty only helps the exporter and importer, ib.
Incentives for country gentlemen in providing the grant, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
A trade that needs a bounty is basically a losing trade, ib.
Tonnage rewards for fisheries discussed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Overview of the white herring fishery, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Observations on other rewards, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
A look at the principles that usually lead to their approval, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Bounties on American crops result from misguided policies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Impact on the consumer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bourdeaux, reasons it is a major trading town, 138.

Brazil became a thriving colony despite neglect, 233.
The Dutch invaders were driven out by the Portuguese colonists, ib.
Estimated number of residents there, ib.
The main provinces' trade was stifled by the Portuguese, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bread, its comparative value with butcher's meat examined, 62, 63.

Brewery, reasons for moving taxes onto malt, 376.

Bridges, how to construct and maintain, 303.

Britain, Great, evidence that labor is adequately compensated there, 30.
Prices for supplies are pretty consistent in most places, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Significant changes in labor costs, ib.
Vegetables brought in from Flanders last century, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
A historical overview of changes to interest rates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Double interest is considered a reasonable trading profit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
How carrying trade is beneficial, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
Seems to have a bigger share of Europe’s carrying trade than it really does, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
It is the only European country where purveyance obligations have been eliminated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Analyzing its resources for supporting foreign wars, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
The free import of Irish cattle is unlikely to have a major effect on it, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
No salt provisions, ib.
Might be slightly impacted by foreign corn imports, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The analysis of the trade restrictions placed on commerce with France, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Trade with France might bring more benefits to both countries than trading with any other nation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Reasons it is one of the wealthiest countries in Europe, while Spain and Portugal are among the poorest, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Review of its US colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
How the trade of its colonies is handled, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The difference between enumerated and non-enumerated goods is explained, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Limits production in the U.S., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
Exemptions allowed for colonists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They have freedoms in every area except for foreign trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
European policies receive little credit for the successes of the colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They thrived despite the chaos and unfairness of European governments, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Exclusive trade privileges hinder these efforts in both Europe and America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They have mostly spent money instead of making revenue for their parent countries, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The advantages for their home countries come only from the exclusive trade with them, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Effects of the Navigation Act, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The benefits of colonial trade to Britain are estimated at __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
It is suggested that the exclusive trade be gradually relaxed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Events that have reduced the effects of losing the colony trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The natural advantages of the colony trade are greater than the drawbacks of monopolies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The main goal of controlling the colonies is to maintain a monopoly, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
It has resulted in nothing but losses from that control, ib.
Is probably the only state that has raised its spending due to the expansion of its empire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The constitution would have been completed by including American representation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Review of how the East India Company was managed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
The needs of consumers are overlooked for the sake of producers building an empire in America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Columbus, the motivation for his discovery of the Americas, 10.
He named the islands he discovered the Indies, ib.
His celebration highlighting their resources, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Columella, his advice on fencing a kitchen garden, 222.
Suggests planting vineyards, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Commerce, the various common standards or mediums used to ease the exchange of goods in its early stages, 236.
Origin of money, ib.
Definition of the term value, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Trade treaties can help merchants from favored countries, but they might put merchants from the favoring country at a disadvantage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Translation of the trade agreement between England and Portugal, finalized in 1703, by Mr. Methuen, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Restrictions imposed on European colonies in America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The current glory of the commercial system is attributed to the discovery and colonization of America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Review of the plan designed to improve the country, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The consumer's interests are often put aside for the producer's, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
See Agriculture, Banks, Capital, Manufactures, Merchant, Money, Stock, Trade, etc.

Commodities, the exchange of, inadequate for meeting mankind's needs, 89.
Metals are recognized as the most effective medium for facilitating exchanges of, ib.
Labor acts as a steady measure for the worth of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Real and nominal prices are distinguished, ib.
The elements of prices are explained and illustrated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Natural and market prices, how they differ and are regulated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
[Pg 411]The usual relationship between the value of two goods isn’t always the same as the amounts usually available in the market, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The price of raw produce is influenced by increases in wealth and improvements, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
Foreign goods are mainly obtained using domestic production, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
When exported positively in their raw form, even by foreign investment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The amount of something in any country is naturally controlled by demand, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Wealth in merchandise versus wealth in cash, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Exporting to the right market usually brings in higher profits than exporting gold and silver, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The natural advantages that countries have in certain productions can sometimes be unbeatable, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Company, mercantile, unable to prioritize their true interests when they assume sovereignty, 308.
An exclusive company is a public nuisance, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Trading: how it originated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Regulated and joint-stock companies are distinguished, ib.
Regulated companies in Great Britain include __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
They're not effective, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Constant scrutiny of these companies, ib.
Why regulated companies never keep forts and garrisons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The characteristics of joint-stock companies are revealed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.
A monopoly is crucial for a joint-stock company to engage in foreign trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Types of joint-stock companies that don’t need exclusive privileges, ib.
Joint-stock companies are well-suited for banking, ib.
The insurance industry can be successfully run by a joint-stock company, ib.
Also, inland navigation and providing water to a big city, ib.
Unsatisfactory results from joint-stock companies in other ventures, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Competition, the effect of, on commodity purchases, 77.
Among vendors, id., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Concordat in France, its purpose, 229.

Congress, American, its strength lies in the significant roles it provides its members, 3.

Conversion price, in rent payments in Scotland explained, 4, 14.

Copper, the standard measure of value among the ancient Romans, 15.
Is not considered legal tender in England, ib.

Cori, the largest four-legged animal on the island of St. Domingo, described, 16.

Corn, producing it varies across countries and is not subject to the same level of competition as manufacturing, 21, 31.
Best as a guideline for rent reserves, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
How the price of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ is regulated.
The price of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ is the best way to compare the specific values of commodities at different times and places.
The three key elements of the price of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Is more expensive in Scotland than in England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Its value compared to butcher's meat at different agricultural stages, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Compared to silver, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The historical context of corn prices might have confused writers when they talked about the value of silver at various times, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Is always a more accurate measure of value than any other commodity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Why it’s more expensive in big cities than in rural areas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Why it costs more in wealthy trading nations like Holland and Genoa, ib.
Rose in price after discovering American mines, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
And because of the civil war during the reign of King Charles I, ib.
Due to the rewards for corn exports, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Examining the bounty’s trend, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Chronological table of the prices of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The least profitable crop in the British West Indies is __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Previous trade restrictions were harmful to land cultivation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The unrestricted importation of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ could have minimal impact on British farmers.
The bounty export policy reviewed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Price reductions were not due to the bounty, ib.
Tillage is not promoted by the reward, ib.
The price of money determines the price of all other goods produced domestically, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Understood! Please provide the text you would like to have modernized.
Negative effects of the bounty, ib.
Reasons for country gentlemen granting the bounty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The intrinsic value shouldn't change just because the price in money is altered, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The four main branches of the corn trade specified, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The inland dealer will not raise the price beyond what the scarcity of the season requires, ib.
Corn is probably the least monopolizable commodity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Inland dealers are usually too numerous and spread out to create a general coalition, ib.
Shortages are never fake unless the government improperly intervenes to stop them, ib.
The unrestricted corn trade is the best protection against hunger, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
An old English law that bans the corn trade, ib.
Effects of farmers being forced to become corn dealers, ib.
The significance of corn dealers to farmers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The ban on corn trading was relaxed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
However, it is still affected by common biases, ib., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The average quantity imported and exported in relation to consumption and yearly production, ib.
The impact of unrestricted imports on __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The local market is the most important for corn, ib.

[Pg 412]Corporations, the effect of their exclusive privileges on trade, 54.
By what authority were they established, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
The advantages they receive from their nearby areas, ib.
Stifle competition's activities, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Their internal rules encourage conspiracies against the public, ib.
They are harmful even to their own members, ib.
The laws of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ restrict the free movement of labor from one job to another.
Origin of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They are free from the control of feudal lords because of their privileges, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The European East India companies disrupt eastern trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
The exclusive trade privileges of corporations should be eliminated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cottagers in Scotland, their situation detailed, 165.
They are low-cost producers of stockings, ib.
The decline of, as considered in England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Coward, character of, 203.

Credit. See Paper Money.

Crusades to the Holy Land benefited the resurgence of commerce, 205.

Currency of states, observations on, 307.

Customs, motivations and effects of drawbacks on, 371.
Revenue from customs is boosted by refunds, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The origin of the duties on __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Three ancient branches of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Drawbacks of, ib.
They are governed by the mercantile system, ib., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Frauds carried out to obtain refunds and rewards, ib.
The responsibilities of, unclear in many instances, ib.
Improvements on, proposed, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Calculating the cost of gathering them, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.


D

Dairy, the business of is typically run as a means of saving, 377.
Factors that either discourage or encourage attention to it, ib.
English and Scottish dairies, ib.

Danube, the navigation on that river is of little use for the inner regions of the country it flows through, 214.

Davenant, Dr. his objections to shifting the duties on beer to malt considered, 217.

Dearths are never caused by combinations among corn dealers but by widespread calamity, 218.
The free operation of the corn trade is the best solution for the problems caused by a shortage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Corn dealers are the best allies for the people during times like these, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Debts, public, the origins of, traced, 388.
Driven by the expenses related to war, ib.
Overview of Great Britain's unpayable debt, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The funded debt, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Aggregate and general funds, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Sinking fund, ib.
Annuities for specific terms and lives, ib.
During peacetime, the decrease of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ has no connection to their buildup during wartime.
The argument that interest doesn't weigh down the nation is taken into account, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They are usually not fully paid off once they reach a certain amount, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
This could be easily resolved by expanding British taxation to all the provinces in the empire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Ireland and America should also help eliminate Britain's public debts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Decker, Sir Matthew, his observations on tax accumulation, 314.
His suggestion to pass all taxes onto consumers through annual payments was considered, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Demand, even though an increase in may initially raise prices, it usually leads to a decrease afterwards, 73.

Denmark, description of its settlements in the West Indies, 293.

Diamonds, the profitability of mining them can be inconsistent, 334.

Discipline, its crucial importance in warfare, 229.
Examples of, ib.

Diversions, public, their political significance, 230.

Domingo, St. mistaken for a region of the East Indies by Columbus, 234.
Its main products, ib.
The natives were quickly robbed of their gold, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
A historical overview of the French colony there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Doomsday-book, the purpose of this compilation, 334.

Dorians, ancient, where they settled their colonies, 182.

Dramatic exhibitions, their political significance, 203.

Drawbacks, in commerce, explained, 204.
The reasons behind and effects of, investigated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
On wines, currants, and silks, ib.
On tobacco and sugar, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
On wines, specifically analyzed, ib.
Originally given to support the shipping trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Customs revenue increased because of them, ib.
Drawbacks permitted for the colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Drugs, importing and exporting regulations, 234.

Drunkenness, the motives behind this vice examined, 261.

Dutch, their settlements in America progressed slowly due to governance by an exclusive company, 30.
Their East India trade was limited by a monopoly, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Actions taken to protect the monopoly on the spice trade. See Holland.


E

East Indies, depiction of the dire conditions of the provinces under English rule, 87.
A historical view of European trade with those regions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Rice-producing regions are more populated and wealthier than corn-producing areas, ib.
Labor costs in China and India are lower than in most of Europe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Gold and silver are the most sought-after items to take to those locations, ib.
The ratio of gold to silver there is __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The major increase in foreign trade came from finding a route to these locations around the Cape of Good Hope, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
A historical overview of interactions with __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Effects of the annual export of silver to and from Europe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Trade is mainly handled by exclusive companies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The consequences of their monopolies, ib.
[Pg 413]
East India company, a monopoly against the very nation that founded it, 265.
The impact of such a company in a poor country compared to a wealthy one, ib.
A country whose capital isn't enough for long-distance trade shouldn't participate in it, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The business practices of trading companies make it difficult for them to prioritize national interests when they gain power, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The nature of English company management, ib.
The actions of their agents and clerks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The poor management of agents in India due to their circumstances, ib.
Such a monopoly is a hassle in every way, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Brief history of their operations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Their privileges were infringed upon, ib.
A competing company was established, ib.
The two companies merged, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
They are shaped by a mindset of war and conquest, ib.
Agreements between the company and the government, ib.
And in managing governance at home, ib.
The reasons they are not suitable for managing a large empire, ib.

Economists, the faction in France, their political views, 275.

Edinburgh, its current share of trade analysis due to the relocation of the court and parliament, 138.

Education, the primary cause of the varying talents observable in different people, 7.
Areas without public institutions often receive better education, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
In universities, a perspective on, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Traveling for education, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Course of, in the republics of ancient Greece, ib.
In ancient Rome, ib.
The superiority of ancient teachers compared to modern ones, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Public institutions can negatively impact quality education, ib.
Questions about how much attention the public should dedicate to education, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The different educational opportunities available among various social classes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The advantages of the state prioritizing education, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Egypt, the first country where agriculture and manufacturing appear to have been cultivated, 9.
Farming there was highly favored, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Long served as the grain storage of the Roman Empire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ejectment, the action in England, when it was created, and its effects, 160.

Employments, the pros and cons of different types in the same area, tend to balance out, 41.
The differences or inequalities among, specified, ib.
The consistency or instability of influences wage rates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

England, the dates of its various types of coinage: silver, gold, and copper, 16.
Reasons why labor is cheaper there than in North America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Comparison of population growth rates in both countries, ib.
The output and labor have slowly increased based on historical accounts, while writers argue that the country is declining quickly, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
List of obstacles and disasters this country's prosperity has overcome, ib.
Factors that help business and manufacturing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Laws supporting farming, ib.
Reasons for the past inability to engage in long-term foreign wars, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Reasons for the many challenges in trading with France, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The roots of hostility between these two nations, ib.
Translation of the 1703 trade agreement with Portugal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Investigation into the value of trade with Portugal, ib., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Could obtain gold without relying on the Portuguese trade, ib.
Implications of securing colony trade through the Navigation Act, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Engrossing. See Forstalling.

Entails, the legal framework governing them prevents land division through alienation, 157.
Purpose of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Europe, general overview of various nations regarding progress following the discovery of America, 85.
The two richest countries gain the most from the carrying trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Exploring the benefits gained from the discovery and colonization of America, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The specific benefits gained by each colonizing nation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
And by those without colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Exchange, the practice of, in the commercial interactions between countries, 174.
The process of an unclear trade balance between two countries, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
Typically gives preference to nations that use bank money instead of regular currency, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Excise, primary targets for, 371.
Duties are clearer and more defined than customs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Only a few commonly consumed items are impacted, ib.
Sir Robert Walpole's excise plan defended, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
The tax on homemade fermented and strong alcoholic drinks is the most effective, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Costs of collecting excise duties have been calculated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Excise laws are often more demanding than customs laws, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Exercise, military, changes due to firearms invention, 292.

Expenses, personal, how they impact national capital, 33.
Benefits of investing in durable goods, ib.

Export trade, principles of, explained, 153.
When fresh produce can be exported successfully, even with foreign investment, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
Reasons for encouraging, by European nations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.
By what means it is promoted, ib.

THE END.


STEREOTYPED.

Edinburgh:—Duncan Stevenson,
Printer to the University.

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:

1. Footnotes have been renumbered moved to the end of this HTML version.

1. Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of this HTML version.

2. Obvious errors in punctuation have been silently corrected.

2. Obvious punctuation errors have been quietly fixed.

3. Missing letters/words in improperly scanned images have been silently added.

3. Missing letters or words in poorly scanned images have been quietly added.

4. The following misprints have been corrected:

4. The following typos have been corrected:

Pg xiv, "ralate" changed to "relate" (relate to the imitative)
Pg xviii, "uxuries" changed to "luxuries" (their luxuries,)
Pg xx, "induustry" changed to "industry" (resources of industry?)
Pg xxiii, "exhibting" changed to "exhibiting" (exhibiting to him)
Pg xxx, "beeen" changed to "been" (never been better shown;)
Pg 17, "cold" changed to "gold" (of the gold coin. In the market,)
Pg 30, "poplousness" changed to "populousness" (and populousness,)
Pg 35, "taillies" changed to "tallies" (tallies in the election)
Pg 101, "barrennes" changed to "barrenness" (only of the barrenness)
Pg 112, "requirs" changed to "requires" (master tailor requires)
Pg 118, "the the" changed to "the" (different operations of the)
Pg 147, "univesally" changed to "universally" (are universally)
Pg 153, "natrually" changed to "naturally" (violence, naturally)
Pg 176, "god" changed to "good" (though with a good deal)
Pg 210, "wich" changed to "which" (value of silver which varies)
Pg 237, "interferred" changed to "interfered" (interfered too much)
Pg 246, "fallan" changed to "fallen" (British profit has fallen)
Pg 259, "restrain" changed to "restraint" (By this restraint)
Pg 281, "manufacterers" changed to "manufacturers" (over that of artificers and manufacturers.)
Pg 288, "85,159511" changed to "85,179511"
Pg 290, "seige" changed to "siege" (till the siege of Veii,)
Pg 342, "re-respective" changed to "respective" (to their respective abilities.)
Pg 353, "pruduce" changed to "produce" (fifth part of the produce.)
Pg 364, "more" changed to "money" (have the money to pay.)
Pg 406, "dicovery" changed to "discovery" (The discovery and colonization of,)
Pg 415, "evidince" changed to "evidence" (evidence of its wealth,)
Pg 415, "of of" changed to "of" (restraining the exportation of)
Pg 415, "for for" changed to "for" (but for foreign trade,)

Pg xiv, "ralate" changed to "relate" (relate to the imitative)
Pg xviii, "uxuries" changed to "luxuries" (their luxuries,)
Pg xx, "induustry" changed to "industry" (resources of industry?)
Pg xxiii, "exhibting" changed to "exhibiting" (exhibiting to him)
Pg xxx, "beeen" changed to "been" (never been better shown;)
Pg 17, "cold" changed to "gold" (of the gold coin. In the market,)
Pg 30, "poplousness" changed to "populousness" (and populousness,)
Pg 35, "taillies" changed to "tallies" (tallies in the election)
Pg 101, "barrennes" changed to "barrenness" (only of the barrenness)
Pg 112, "requirs" changed to "requires" (master tailor requires)
Pg 118, "the the" changed to "the" (different operations of the)
Pg 147, "univesally" changed to "universally" (are universally)
Pg 153, "natrually" changed to "naturally" (violence, naturally)
Pg 176, "god" changed to "good" (though with a good deal)
Pg 210, "wich" changed to "which" (value of silver which varies)
Pg 237, "interferred" changed to "interfered" (interfered too much)
Pg 246, "fallan" changed to "fallen" (British profit has fallen)
Pg 259, "restrain" changed to "restraint" (By this restraint)
Pg 281, "manufacterers" changed to "manufacturers" (over that of artificers and manufacturers.)
Pg 288, "85,159511" changed to "85,179511"
Pg 290, "seige" changed to "siege" (till the siege of Veii,)
Pg 342, "re-respective" changed to "respective" (to their respective abilities.)
Pg 353, "pruduce" changed to "produce" (fifth part of the produce.)
Pg 364, "more" changed to "money" (have the money to pay.)
Pg 406, "dicovery" changed to "discovery" (The discovery and colonization of,)
Pg 415, "evidince" changed to "evidence" (evidence of its wealth,)
Pg 415, "of of" changed to "of" (restraining the exportation of)
Pg 415, "for for" changed to "for" (but for foreign trade,)

5. Other than the corrections listed above, printer's inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained.

5. Aside from the corrections mentioned above, the printer's inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been kept.




        
        
    
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